Table of Contents

Country Reports

LM Report 2006

Palestine

Key developments since May 2005: There were reports of Palestinian use of antivehicle mines in June and July 2006 during Israeli military action in Gaza. A UN mine action assessment in September 2005 criticized the Palestinian Authority for its lack of an effective response to the threat from landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices, which increased when Israeli settlers and military withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005. There were 46 people killed and 317 people injured in 187 incidents in 2005, an increase from 2004. In early 2006, efforts were made to revitalize the National Mine Action Committee. Palestinian police explosive ordnance disposal teams conducted 1,162 explosive ordnance disposal tasks in 2005, compared to 939 in 2004.

Mine Ban Policy

The Palestinian Authority (PA) lacks the international legal status to join international instruments such as the Mine Ban Treaty. It has not made any public statements with regard to the treaty or its policy toward the banning of antipersonnel mines since April 2000.^[1] The landmine issue has yet to be discussed within the framework of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and apparently it is not a priority for either government. The Palestinian Authority has not participated in any Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings since May 1999.

Use

In recent years, armed Palestinian groups have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on many occasions. There have been a small number of reports of use of antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines. Some groups have reportedly used the high explosives from mines to make other kinds of explosive devices.^[2]

The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits not only antipersonnel mines, but also explosive booby-traps and IEDs that are victim-activated. Media and others are not always clear whether the devices used are victim-activated or command-detonated and often use terms interchangeably, citing the use of bombs, landmines, booby-traps and IEDs in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) without making distinctions.

In this reporting period, since May 2005, Landmine Monitor is aware of one allegation of possible use of an antipersonnel mine by Palestinian groups, and no allegations of use by Israeli forces in the OPT.

On 9 June 2006, seven Palestinians, including five children, were killed by an explosion as they picnicked on Beit Lahia beach in Gaza.^[3] While media reports initially indicated the deaths were caused by an Israeli artillery attack, Israeli officials said a military investigation into the incident had concluded the blast could have been caused by a mine buried in the sand by Hamas to stop Israeli forces from landing on the beach.^[4] Some officials said the explosive was likely a bounding antipersonnel mine. Field investigators from Human Rights Watch concluded that the evidence strongly suggests that the blast was caused by an Israeli shell, based on shrapnel from a 155mm artillery shell at the scene, the size of the crater, the nature of the injuries, and eyewitness testimony from the time of the blast.^[5] This is believed to be the first time that Israel has accused Hamas of mining Gaza’s beaches. There have been no previous reports of Hamas, or other Palestinian groups, using bounding antipersonnel mines.

In May 2006, according to a military spokesperson, the Israeli navy seized a Palestinian fishing boat near the Gaza Strip filled with several hundred kilograms of TNT explosives, as well as parts that could be used to make landmines.^[6]

In June and July 2006, there were reports of Palestinian use of mines during Israeli military action in Gaza. Most media reports appeared to be referring to homemade antivehicle mines (IEDs) that were command-detonated.^[7] A detailed Washington Post account said that Hamas gunmen “removed a half-dozen mines the size of snare drums from duffel bags and placed them along the street, pushing piles of trash over them. Another fighter unspooled detonator wire, running it into the orchards after attaching it to the mines. He then poured sand over the wire to hide it.”^[8]

Landmine and ERW Problem

The OPT are contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).^[9] Mines are largely a legacy of World War II, the British mandate, and the Six Day War in 1967. There are 15 known minefields in the OPT, all of which are located in the West Bank on the border with Jordan and the Jordan Valley. For the most part, these minefields are not properly fenced or marked. While they represent a threat to civilian populations, they pose far less danger than ERW.^[10] The National Security Forces do not have maps or records of minefields and rely on information from the Israelis.^[11]

It is believed that landmines have been laid by Israeli forces on the border between Egypt and Gaza, and in various areas across the Gaza Strip.^[12] There have also been documented reports that Israeli troops have laid mines at the blockades that separate the Palestinian governorates, and have planted antipersonnel mines in some Palestinian-inhabited buildings, claiming that armed Palestinians shoot from these locations.^[13]

ERW are a result of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Both abandoned explosive ordnance and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are found throughout the OPT. Explosive ordnance includes Israeli munitions, such as unexploded missiles, grenades and small arms ammunition, as well as booby-traps.^[14] A further hazard arises from Palestinian improvised explosive devices, including homemade mortars, rockets, mines and roadside bombs. The placement of these devices varies, but appears to be mostly in the vicinity of Israeli settlements.^[15] In addition, Israeli military training fields are at times improperly fenced or not fenced at all, and the Israel Defense Forces do not collect all the UXO left behind.^[16]

A mission by the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 2005 found mine/ERW contamination in Palestine is mainly a UXO/IED “recycling problem.” Thus, recovered munitions tend to be recycled and turned into IEDs. This seems to be particularly the case in the Gaza Strip as a result of its greater isolation than the West Bank.^[17] But the UN has also claimed that since 2000, when the second Intifada began, the scope of the mine and ERW problem has increased beyond minefields and military training zones to include the areas of confrontation, where belligerents leave many explosive devices.^[18] A Palestinian police officer claimed that, owing to air and ground attacks in many areas, ERW contamination now extends to virtually all of the OPT.^[19]

In addition, since settlers in Gaza and the large military contingents guarding them were withdrawn in 2005, the Palestinians were said to have been confronted with new challenges because the former settlements were surrounded by unexploded devices. Residents and aid agencies working and living in these areas report that they found “countless” numbers of UXO following the Israeli withdrawal―on rooftops, buried under rubble, and in streets and alleys.^[20] However, the UNDP assessment mission in September 2005 concluded that ERW were not blocking essential land for the population in the OPT and that the overall contamination could be considered low.^[21]

With no systematic ongoing data collection system, comprehensive figures regarding the number of mine and UXO casualties are not available. However, according to one source, all of the 116 children injured by UXO and mines since the start of the Intifada were sustained as a result of devices found near military training areas or in areas targeted by the Israeli army during confrontation with Palestinians.^[22] The OPT’s police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams recorded 187 casualties in 2005, of which 59 percent were caused by Palestinian IEDs and 41 percent by Israeli UXO. No incidents caused by mines were recorded.^[23] The number of incidents has reportedly increased over the last years (see Landmine/ERW Casualties section in this report). According to the police EOD teams, casualties occur when militant organizations handle explosives, from shelling by the Israel Defense Forces, and from explosives left behind following the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip.^[24]

Mine Action Program

Mine action is coordinated in Gaza and the West Bank through the National Mine Action Committee (NMAC), which was established in 2002 by a decision of the Palestinian Authority under the Ministry of Planning. Until April 2006, the NMAC was chaired and coordinated by the National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children (now called the Child Rights Planning Unit) of the Ministry of Planning.^[25]

Since April 2006, the Ministry of Interior has taken the lead and chairs the NMAC while the Child Rights Planning Unit of the Ministry of Planning is part of the coordinating body.^[26] By June, it was decided that the NMAC would include the ministries of culture, education, environment, health, interior, justice, planning, social affairs, and youth and sports; other members, such as NGOs, were under discussion.^[27]

The NMAC’s initial mandate was to work on preventing and reducing the risks from landmines, ERW and IEDs among the Palestinian population, especially children. This included developing an awareness-raising program, building a national capacity to deal with the threat, ensuring that there were national mine action legislation and policies, that services were available to casualties, and that information on the nature and extent of the threat was collected and spread to the population.

However, the NMAC has not had the authority to allocate resources for these activities. In practice, its activities have been restricted mainly to coordinating awareness-raising and mine risk education activities. The UNDP noted that while the NMAC had been instrumental in addressing the ERW threat to children in the OPT through mine risk education and victim assistance, the broader scope of the mine and ERW problem had not been addressed. The NMAC appeared to have a vague mandate, lacked consistency, and had to respond to unclear direction from Palestinian authorities. The NMAC members also faced challenges in trying to master everything from policy, legislation and politics to strategic and technical management of mine action. It appeared to UNDP that mine action in general lacked recognition by the Palestinian authorities at the highest level.^[28]

The UNDP mission report concluded that although the Palestinian authorities have sufficient structures and capacity to address their mine/IED/ERW problem, “there is an urgent need to expand the mine action programming and strengthen the institutional framework through technical assistance so as to ensure the establishment of a mine action policy, clear strategy, and formal structures at all levels.”^[29]

The Ministry of Interior, which was on the board of the NMAC, decided to take the lead in revitalizing it. All four branches of the Ministry of Interior are also represented within the revived NMAC (police, civil defense, the National Security Force and the Preventive Security Force, which is engaged in actions against terrorist and opposition groups). The Deputy Minister of Interior wrote to seven other ministries inviting them to nominate members to the NMAC. An introductory meeting took place on 25 May 2006; a subcommittee was formed to coordinate the activities of the NMAC, comprised of two members of the Ministry of Interior and one member of the Ministry of Planning. A first workshop was held on 4 June, which reviewed a proposal prepared by the subcommittee for the formal establishment of the Palestinian NMAC, including its role and responsibilities and a draft operating budget. The proposal would be presented to the Palestinian Cabinet for approval. It was planned that organizations such as Defense for Children International Palestine Section, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) would be asked to participate in a second workshop.^[30] It is envisaged that the NMAC will establish a mine action center, depending on the funds made available for the NMAC.^[31]

In 2005, the NMAC requested UNICEF support to investigate the possibility of creating a formally recognized ERW/mine action coordination body, and to develop a national mine action plan and strategy to improve efficiency and coordination between Gaza and the West Bank. A member of the UNICEF Landmines and Small Arms Team based in New York undertook a field visit to Israel and the OPT in August 2005.^[32] A further consultancy in support of the development of a national strategy was planned for October 2005 but had not taken place as of April 2006.^[33]

Following the UNICEF mission, the Ministry of Interior requested UNDP to conduct a mission in order to assist the Palestinian authorities in assessing the impact of landmines and ERW on people in the OPT, the clearance and mine risk education capabilities, and the existing institutional framework. It was also asked to look specifically at the mine and ERW situation in Gaza following the Israeli withdrawal from the settlements.^[34] UNDP conducted the mine action assessment mission in September 2005. It made the following recommendations to the Ministry of Interior:

• A mine action authority with the power to influence OPT policy-making should be formalized by law or decree, and should be allocated resources to function;
• An information management system for mine action should be set up;
• A strategy that covers demining, mine risk education and victim assistance should be developed, to avoid gaps and overlaps and ensure an effective use of resources; and,
• An operational coordination capacity should be built that could be structured within existing authorities such as the police or civil defense.^[35]

The report also recommended that UNDP assist the Palestinian authorities by providing a mine action specialist and a national program officer. UNDP made specific recommendations to strengthen EOD capacity, including conducting a thorough needs assessment and formulating a clear EOD strategy; this should be done before any additional equipment and training is provided.^[36]

According to its Head of Governance in the OPT, UNDP did not subsequently become more involved in mine action in Palestine for several reasons, including lack of funding, lack of support and advice from its headquarters, internal management changes and the political turmoil in Palestine.^[37]

Strategic Planning and Progress

As of June 2006, there was no mine action strategy for the OPT. The NMAC, previously chaired by the National Plan of Action for Palestinian Children, determined priorities for mine risk education with the support of UNICEF.^[38]

According to the Child Rights Planning Unit, the NMAC’s former chair, activities undertaken by the NMAC in 2005 through April 2006 included supporting the UNDP assessment mission, as well as working with the Ministry of Education and police to ensure that schools were not ERW-contaminated and that children received mine risk education. Police continued to provide support to dispose of ERW on an emergency basis and to provide risk education training to teachers. At the field level, NMAC said it focused on awareness-raising activities, while working at the political level to institutionalize itself as a national mine action authority.^[39]

The UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects for 2006 identified as key objectives: supporting the PA in the development of a comprehensive mine action program; building mine action capacity within Palestinian ministries and the NMAC to better coordinate programs; strengthening links with police EOD teams, European Union Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUCOPPS), ministries and NGOs; training personnel in demining; developing local capacity to reduce risk caused by mines and ERW in the high-risk areas of Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilya, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron in the West Bank and most of Gaza; supporting mine risk education and monitoring the impact of mines and ERW on children; strengthening the national mine/ERW casualty information reporting system; and ensuring adequate psychological and physical rehabilitation and support for all mine and ERW casualties.^[40]

In 2006, UNICEF planned to concentrate on awareness-raising among children and their communities, while UNDP provided technical assistance to develop a comprehensive plan of action and establish institutions such as a national mine action authority.^[41] As of June 2006, UNDP and UNICEF had made little progress due to lack of funding and the political turmoil since January 2006 when Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections. The UN, United States, European Union and Russia took the decision to minimize direct dealings with the Hamas-led government, which slowed the momentum towards implementing the project proposed through the UN Portfolio.^[42]

Demining

The Palestinian police EOD teams are reported to be the only body mandated to dispose of ERW in the OPT.^[43] The Israel Defense Forces also clear mines and UXO on an emergency basis in Israel and in some parts of the OPT.^[44] There is no mine clearance capability within Palestine, as the Israeli government has not allowed this to be established.^[45]

The UNDP assessment reported that the police EOD capacity is large enough to deal with the ERW problem, but that its coordination is weak. Formal standing operating procedures and training were lacking, and “more importantly”, the police EOD teams lacked protective equipment, basic EOD equipment and vehicles. The UNDP mission also found that the Preventive Security Forces in Gaza had a 15-person unit fully equipped for EOD/IED tasks, but its role and mandate within the OPT and how it coordinated with the police, were unclear. Palestinian EOD entities seemed to lack a formal mandate and clear divisions of responsibility.^[46]

Police EOD teams comprised 120 staff: 80 were operational and divided into eight units, three deployed in Gaza and five in the West Bank. Several of the staff have attended international EOD courses. The units possessed eight vehicles and some basic and more advanced EOD equipment. Four of the vehicles and some equipment were donated by the US government in 1997 and were said to be in poor condition. The British government donated the other four vehicles and some basic and more advanced EOD equipment in 2005.^[47]

A EUCOPPS project to support police EOD teams started in May 2005 and finished in March 2006. Support was provided to four EOD teams in Gaza, Khan Younis, Bethlehem and Nablus, mainly in the form of training, EOD equipment and storage. Four vehicles with EOD equipment were provided. A monitoring committee was established in June 2005 and met six times during the project period. The project’s final report concluded that it had achieved its objectives to increase the civil police EOD capacity, to increase public confidence in the police, and to raise public awareness of the risks of UXO and other devices.^[48]

A EUCOPPS monitoring mission in 2006 showed that all equipment was in place and in good condition, with sensitive materials such as fuzes and cartridges properly stored. The mission noted that refresher and advanced/specialized training courses were needed.^[49]

The police EOD teams in the West Bank suffer from the Israeli restrictions on movement between the different areas, not all of which are under the control of the Palestinian Authority. According to UNDP, this means that greater resources are needed. Israeli restrictions on the importing of equipment has also limited the police EOD teams’ capabilities, and led to a situation where large amounts of retrieved munitions are stored at demolition sites for long periods of time. In some cases, the ordnance is said to “disappear” from these storage sites. Restrictions also limit methods of disposal and sometimes leads them to use methods that may be dangerous for both the operator and civilians.^[50]

Instances of cooperation between the Palestinian police and Israeli forces in the disposal of bombs and IEDs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip have also been reported.^[51]

Mine and ERW Clearance

Police EOD teams conducted 1,162 tasks in 2005, an increase from 2004 (939) and 2003 (916). These tasks included area inspections, post-incident inspections, car searches, securing tasks and disposal operations. The number of ERW and IEDs destroyed has not been reported.^[52]

There were no reports of casualties among police EOD teams during 2005.^[53]

The municipality of Jerusalem contracted the Israeli Maavarim Civil Engineering Ltd. to conduct clearance of mine-affected land in Tzur Baher, a small Palestinian village on the eastern outskirts of Jerusalem. The overall project aimed at releasing mine-affected land to build new school infrastructure. The project took place after five years of legal dispute between the municipality and the Israel Defense Forces over who was responsible for clearing the minefield.^[54] Israel’s Ministry of Justice decided in 2005 that the municipality should contract and pay for demining by a civilian mine clearance company, and that the Israel Defense Forces would ensure the quality of the clearance. As a result, Maavarim returned 50,000 square meters of mine-affected land to the community in November 2005, by manual and mechanical clearance methods. No antivehicle mines were found; the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed was not communicated to Landmine Monitor. Quality assurance was conducted using mine detecting dogs and the Israel Defense Forces gave the final certification. Reportedly, it adopted International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) for this project on the recommendation of Maavarim.^[55]

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education (MRE) in the OPT has been conducted through NMAC partner organizations. As in previous years, children were the main target group in 2005, with smaller-scale MRE also provided to the adult population.

The UNDP mission in September 2005 included an assessment of existing MRE-capabilities, concluding that, “Given the situation in OPT, NMAC and its partners have made remarkable achievements in the area of MRE directed at children. ...However, the scope of the problem caused by ERW is broader and there is a great need to address the whole problem.” The report pointed to the need for a coordination mechanism and MRE standards. UNDP observed that the organizations involved in MRE did not have a clear view of each other’s activities.^[56]

UNDP recommended that “all people living and working in the OPT should receive ‘Landmine & UXO safety training’ to raise their awareness and knowledge in preparation for a safe behaviour if they get in contact with ERW. This training should consist of a basic training course with a refresher course every 6 months to keep the information fresh in their minds. The training can be provided by any of the MRE organisations available in OPT or UN Security organization.”^[57]

Handling ERW has been identified by several sources, such as the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRSC) and ICRC, as a common factor in incidents. There is a lucrative “black market” for ERW items, which involves recovery, dismantling and selling of UXO, components, or a complete recycling system; UNDP commented that, “...there is a possibility that the trade and handling of ERW items is imitated by the younger population as a learned behaviour. Already a larger number of young people in some areas in the OPT make and play with firecrackers as well as track UXOs, in comparison with children in other similar ERW contaminated environments.” It recommended that, to address this problem, targeted MRE campaigns for high-risk groups should be conducted.^[58]

The NMAC, with support from UNICEF, developed a child-focused MRE strategy and material, using three complementing approaches: MRE by and with children, through parents and the community, and by preparing institutions to better protect children from the conflict.^[59]

The Palestine Red Crescent Society, supported by ICRC, continued the MRE program in West Bank and Gaza described in last year’s report.^[60] It received US$20,000 from UNICEF in 2005, for a three-month MRE campaign in the run-up to the disengagement process in Gaza.^[61] In 2006, it received UNICEF support for eight months from May to December 2006. MRE was conducted by 300 volunteers involved in schools, summer camps, youth clubs and safe play areas reaching 59,720 people in 2005; MRE songs and games, TV and radio spots and printed materials for schoolchildren were produced.^[62] Of the 15 safe play areas established in Gaza by UNICEF during 2005, 13 were still functional; 15 alternative play areas in Gaza were also used to conduct MRE activities.^[63]

Canada reported contributing C$59,350 ($48,989) to UNICEF for MRE in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2005.^[64]

The EUCOPPS project in support of police EOD teams from May 2005 to March 2006 included building public awareness of the risks associated with UXO and IEDs. UNICEF carried out an information campaign aimed at children involving television and radio interviews, documentaries, announcements and educational materials.

Landmine/ERW Casualties

In 2005, there were at least 46 people killed and 317 people injured in 187 mine/ERW/IED incidents, according to the EOD police and EUCOPPS. This is an increase compared to 2004, when 187 casualties were recorded in 105 incidents (19 people killed, 168 injured).^[65] The number of incidents and casualties per type of device were not reported in 2005, but the increase in incidents has been attributed to more cases of handling UXO, increased Israeli Defense Forces shelling, and ERW left behind in the Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip.^[66] In 2004, most of the incidents (59 percent) were caused by IEDs, 41 percent by Israeli UXO; no mine incidents were recorded.^[67]

The Defense for Children International, Palestine Section (DCI/PS) recorded at least 28 new mine/ERW casualties in 2005; these included six children killed and 20 injured, one adult injured and one killed. At least seven of the recorded casualties in 2005 were in the Gaza Strip, five were in Bethlehem governorate, three in Hebron governorate, two in Jericho, two in Jenin, two in Ramallah and one in Nablus; the location of four was unknown.^[68] In one incident in March in the southern border town of Rafah, four children were seriously injured when UXO exploded in a confined residential area.^[69] In August, a man and his two children were injured by a landmine near their house in Yatta, Hebron governorate.^[70] Reportedly, incidents due to scrap metal collection have increased, especially among children, and the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 was followed by an increase in the number of mine/ERW incidents.^[71]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2006, with at least 21 new mine/ERW casualties recorded by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society between January and May (six killed, 15 injured).^[72] DCI/PS recorded one child killed and one injured in the West Bank until the end of May. ^[73] Landmine Monitor identified two boys killed by a mine in Gaza on 6 March.^[74]

The lack of comprehensive and reliable casualty data in Palestine inhibits an accurate picture of the situation. There is no nationwide casualty data mechanism, hospitals do not record the cause of incidents, and people do not seem to know where to report ERW incidents. The EOD police collect casualty data through its EOD interventions; reportedly, DCI/PS collects information on child casualties. The Palestinian Red Crescent Society and UNICEF occasionally collect information on casualties; they are investigating how to collect more precise and relevant information. In 2005, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society designed a casualty database, which started recording casualties in January 2006.^[75] Improved data collection, including better coordination between the Ministry of Health and the police, was seen by the NMAC as one of the key challenges for 2006.^[76]

The UNDP stated that some of the recorded incidents are “most likely directly linked to the ongoing conflict”, but others might go unreported because they involve illegal activities.^[77] It seems that many ERW casualties were a result of contact with devices found near military training areas or in areas targeted by the Israeli army during confrontation with Palestinians.^[78]

According to DCI/PS, more than 2,500 people were killed or injured by mines and UXO between 1967 and 1998. Between May 2000 and the end of 2005, Landmine Monitor reported at least 165 mine/UXO casualties (37 people killed and 128 injured), including at least 114 children.^[79] UNICEF reported 26 children killed and 120 injured by UXO between September 2000 and the end of May 2005.^[80] Four children were killed and at least 24 injured by mines/ERW in Jenin alone after the April 2002 confrontation with Israel in the city and surrounding refugee camps.^[81]

Survivor Assistance, Disability Policy and Practice

One of the main recommendations of the UNDP assessment mission in September 2005 was that the NMAC should develop a mine action strategy “covering as a minimum MRE, VA and ERW disposal” as well providing the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to strengthen information management.^[82] Previously, the NMAC has lacked the financial and other capacity to play a “national” coordinating role in survivor assistance and data collection. The revised NMAC planned to hold a meeting on 25 June focusing on these topics, to which key players such as the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, ICRC, UN agencies and local NGOs were invited.

Palestine had a project in the UNMAS Portfolio of Mine Action Projects for 2006 which addressed the provision of rehabilitation services for mine and UXO survivors and MRE. The proposed activities were to be implemented by the Secretariat for the National Plan of Action for Children, in coordination with various ministries, the National Guidance Commission and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society.^[83] International reaction to the election of Hamas in January 2006 and internal problems in the PA have been an impediment to obtaining donor funding, and delayed the implementation of such initiatives.

Palestinian residents of the OPT are not eligible for medical insurance coverage under the Israeli National Insurance Services. The most prominent health service providers have been the Ministry of Health, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), NGOs and United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in the Palestinian refugee camps both in and outside OPT territory. The Ministry of Health is responsible for assisting mine/ERW casualties, but hospitals in the OPT sometimes lack the capacity to deal with complex cases, which are then transferred to neighboring Arab countries. The Ministry of Health has provided 60 percent of services and in some cases has been the only service provider. After the Hamas election, humanitarian aid to the OPT was frozen or reduced and Israel stopped the value-added tax transfers, which make up 50 percent of the Palestinian Authority budget, impacting on the provision of healthcare in general. In June 2006, UNICEF and the World Health Organization (WHO) stated that medical staff had not been paid since March and hospitals were running out of supplies, medication and fuel. WHO suggested the creation of an interim funding mechanism to prevent “disruption of basic services and bridge the current gaps in the delivery of health services and public health functions” in the OPT.^[84]

The Palestinian standard of life decreased in 2005-2006 and many people cannot afford medical care. The quality of medical care (especially emergency care) dropped, and insecurity and movement restrictions further limited access to healthcare services.^[85] Roadblocks, internal closures preventing travel between parts of OPT, the separation barrier, and concern that militants might misuse ambulances, have all hampered emergency transport. The Israel Defense Forces delayed the movement of, and occasionally fired upon, medical personnel and ambulances.^[86]

The PA depends to a large extent on NGOs to provide assistance to people with physical disabilities, but many NGOs lack funding.^[87]

UNRWA has provided an extensive range of services, including a health and education program and special hardship programs for vulnerable groups. UNRWA has increasingly been involved in emergency operations, including emergency medical care, but suffered from financial constraints, and both staff and beneficiaries suffered from reduced accessibility due to internal closures. UNRWA operated a hospital in Qalqilya and five emergency medical teams to improve access to health services for refugees in remote or closed areas. UNRWA operated a comprehensive socially-oriented, rights-based program for people with disabilities through 39 community-based rehabilitation centers. Between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2005, UNRWA noticed that physical disabilities were increasing among the Palestinian refugees, but especially children. A new community-based rehabilitation center was opened in Nablus, a prosthetics center was opened in Jenin and a physiotherapy center was opened in Deir al-Balah (Gaza). Two prosthetic/orthotic technicians received six months of training in Jordan; the PA sponsored two of the physiotherapists in Gaza and three were employed by the UNRWA emergency job creation program. During this time period, 30,348 disabled people and their families benefited from the program (some 20 percent increase over the previous year); 24,728 people benefited from direct rehabilitation services and 5,016 people were referred to specialized services. The centers fitted 1,503 prosthetic devices, 107 houses were modified, 974 children with disabilities were mainstreamed into normal education and 5,622 children with disabilities participated in summer and winter camps. The UNRWA disability program organized a regional workshop on its disability policy; recommendations included the establishment of a monitoring mechanism and enhancement of vocational training and employment programs.^[88]

The Palestinian Red Crescent Society provided a network of 122 ambulances, six hospitals, 38 emergency care stations, 30 health clinics (26 in the West Bank, four in Gaza) and 27 rehabilitation centers and units, providing affordable services in the OPT. The rehabilitation centers also provided psychosocial support. In 2005, the PRCS provided 35,359 rehabilitation sessions: 3,084 people received physiotherapy, 724 occupational therapy, 1,824 psychological counseling, 4,980 people were reached with community-based rehabilitation, 145 people received vocational training and 191 “injured” people received rehabilitation support. Special education, sports and summer camps were also organized for children with disabilities and 132 rehabilitation staff participated in six technical training workshops.^[89] The PRCS also assisted Palestinian refugees in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt.^[90] However, reduced funding of the PA and humanitarian aid in OPT in 2006 directly affected the Palestinian Red Crescent Society as the PA has covered 50 percent of the salary costs. ICRC funds 60 percent of the PRCS emergency medical services.^[91]

In 2005, ICRC continued to support the Palestinian Ministry of Health with emergency medical supplies and transportation for emergency cases from the West Bank to Jordan and facilitated the movement of PRCS ambulances and medical teams to ensure minimum delays. In December 2005, the ICRC in cooperation with the Ministry of Health held two emergency room trauma courses for 50 medical staff in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip “to increase their capacities to respond to mass-casualty situations.”^[92] ICRC in Lebanon supported the Sidon Orphan Welfare Society, which provided services to Palestinians in refugee camps. ICRC covered the costs of treatment for 25 people who received prostheses and 21 who received orthoses in 2005.^[93]

The 1999 Law Number 4, People with Disability Rights Law, applies to all people with disabilities, including mine/UXO survivors. The law has been implemented gradually over the years.^[94] The General Union for Disabled Palestinians, the lead agency for disability issues, advocates for full implementation of the law. The Ministry of Social Affairs has responsibility for issues relating to people with disabilities, in consultation with other relevant ministries. There was discrimination against Palestinians with disabilities in education, employment, transportation and accessibility.

It was estimated that 10 percent of the approximately 29,000 Palestinians injured since 2000 would have permanent disabilities.^[95]

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[1] In April 2000, an official stated that the PA supported and desired to join the Mine Ban Treaty. Letter from the Office of the Palestinian Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Gaza, 27 April 2000.
[2] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 969; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1224; Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 848-849.
[3] Chris McGreal, “Death on the beach: seven Palestinians killed as Israeli shells hit family picnic,” The Guardian, 10 June 2006, www.guardian.co.uk.
[4] Laurie Copans, “Israel blames Hamas mine for beach blast,” Associated Press, 13 June 2006; Chris McGreal, “Israelis blame Hamas for beach deaths,” The Guardian, 13 June 2006.
[5] Human Rights Watch Press Release, “Israel: Investigate Gaza Beach Killings,” 13 June 2006; Scott Wilson, “Israeli Airstrike Kills 11 Palestinians, Nine Civilians Among Dead; Israel Denies Role in Last Week’s Fatal Beach Explosion,” Washington Post (Gaza City), 14 June 2006; Chris McGreal, “Israelis blame Hamas for beach deaths,” The Guardian, 13 June 2006.
[6] “Israel seizes explosives-filled boat near Gaza,” Agence France-Presse (Jerusalem), 14 May 2006.
[7] See, for example, Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Israeli army poised to step up Gaza offensive,” Reuters (Gaza), 29 June 2006, stating “Home-made landmines were planted along roads to combat Israeli armoured vehicles;” “Gaza militants shelve civil war to fight Israel,” Reuters (Jabalya Refugee Camp), 30 June 2006, stating that at night, Hamas and Fatah fighters “have been planting homemade mines for Israeli vehicles.”
[8] Scott Wilson, “Preparing for Battle and its Victims in a Palestinian City,” Washington Post (Beit Lahiya), 7 July 2006.
[9] Under Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition
[10] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, pp. 442-443.
[11] Laila El-Haddad, “Landmines: Palestine’s hidden danger,” Al Jazeera, 10 January 2004.
[12] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1225.
[13] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, pp. 442-443.
[14] Email from Kaj Stendorf, Police Advisor, European Union Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUCOPPS), 30 August 2005; UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, pp. 442-443.
[15] Email from Kaj Stendorf, EUCOPPS, 30 August 2005.
[16] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, pp. 442-443.
[17] Email from Kent Paulusson, Mine Action Specialist, UNDP, 13 April 2006.
[18] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, pp. 442-443; UN, “Country Profile: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” 4 May 2006, www.mineaction.org, accessed on 2 June 2006.
[19] Interview with Ali Mograbi, Palestinian Police, Ramallah, 27 March 2003.
[20] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, pp. 442-443.
[21] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 2.
[22] Defense for Children International, Palestine Section, data quoted in: UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 443.
[23] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 2.
[24] EUCOPPS, “Regular Monitoring Report, Project Code 03A1/05/2005, EOD – Assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police,” undated but 2006.
[25] For ministries and organizations, which formed the NMAC prior to April 2006, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 970.
[26] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, pp. 3, 7; telephone interview with Pauline O’Dea, Child Protection Project Officer, UNICEF, OPT, 19 August 2005.
[27] Emails from Rima Merriman, Coordinator General, Child Rights Unit, Ministry of Planning, OPT, 1 and 12 June 2006. According to UNICEF, a decision has been taken to include NGOs. Email from Asmahan W. Nasser, Assistant Project Officer, Child Protection, UNICEF OPT, 12 July 2006.
[28] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 7.
[29] Ibid; email from Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 13 April 2006.
[30] Emails from Rima Merriman, Ministry of Planning, 27 May, 1 and 12 June 2006.
[31] Emails from Rima Merriman, Ministry of Planning, 27 May and 1 June 2006.
[32] Telephone interview with Pauline O’Dea, UNICEF, OPT, 19 August 2005.
[33] Information provided by Julien Temple, Project Officer, Landmines and Small Arms, Office of Emergency Programmes, UNICEF, 5 April 2006.
[34] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 2.
[35] Ibid, p. 8; UNDP, “Landmine and UXO assessment,” presentation document, September 2005.
[36] Ibid, pp. 11-12.
[37] Email from Mounir Kleibo, Head of Governance, UNDP, OPT, Jerusalem, 1 June 2006.
[38] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 970.
[39] Email from Cairo Arafat, Director, Child Rights Unit, Ministry of Planning, former Chair of NMAC, 3 June 2006; UN, “Country Profile: OPT,” www.minesaction.org.
[40] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, pp. 443-444.
[41] UN, “Country Profile: OPT,” www.minesaction.org.
[42] Emails from Mounir Kleibo, UNDP, OPT, Jerusalem, 18 April and 1 June 2006.
[43] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 3.
[44] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 971; see report on Israel in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
[45] UNICEF, “Final Report/Mission Report OPT,” August 2002, p. 9; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 971.
[46] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 9.
[47] Ibid.
[48] EUCOPPS, “Final Report, EOD – Assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police,” undated but 2006.
[49] Ibid.
[50] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 10.
[51] EUCOPPS, “Regular Monitoring Report, Project Code 03A1/05/2005, EOD – Assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police,” undated but 2006.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Maavarim, “Mine Field as a school ground: The Tzur Baher Minefield clearance project,” (undated); emails from Ben Zion Telefus, Marketing Manager, Maavarim Civil Engineering Ltd., 5 and 6 June 2006; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1014; Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 616; see report on Israel in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
[55] Maavarim, “Mine Field as a school ground: The Tzur Baher Minefield clearance project,” (undated); emails from Ben Zion Telefus, Maavarim Civil Engineering Ltd., 5 and 6 June 2006.
[56] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, pp. 3, 8.
[57] Ibid, pp. 6-7.
[58] Ibid, p. 6.
[59] UNMAS, “Occupied Palestinian Territories,” country sheet, updated 4 May 2006, www.mineaction.org, accessed 23 June 2006.
[60] Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 972-973.
[61] Email from Asmahan W. Nasser, UNICEF, OPT, 27 June 2006.
[62] Email from Srdjan Jovanovic, Mine Action Delegate, ICRC, Amman, 3 July 2006.
[63] Email from Asmahan W. Nasser, UNICEF, OPT, 27 June 2006.
[64] Mine Action Investments database; email from Carly Volkes, DFAIT, 7 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = C$1.2115. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2006.
[65] Email from Axel Haas, Lead Field Police Advisor, EUCOPPS, 21 June 2006.
[66] Ibid.
[67] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 6; UNICEF, “Unexploded ordnance in Gaza a real threat to kids,” 11 August 2005.
[68] Email from Ayed Abu Eqtaish, DCI/PS, Jerusalem, 27 May 2006; “Palestinian radio on three injured in landmine blast, Israeli closures, arrests,” BBC (Ramallah), 17 August 2005.
[69] UNICEF, “Humanitarian Action Occupied Palestinian Territory Donor Update,” 12 April 2005, p. 2.
[70] “Palestinian radio on three injured in landmine blast, Israeli closures, arrests,” BBC (Ramallah), 17 August 2005.
[71] Email from Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 13 April 2006.
[72] Email from Srdjan Jovanovic, ICRC, Amman, 3 July 2006.
[73] Email from Ayed Abu Eqtaish, DCI/PS, Jerusalem, 27 May 2006.
[74] “Two Palestinian boys killed in Israeli mine blast in Gaza,” Kuwait News Agency (Gaza), 6 March 2006.
[75] Email from Srdjan Jovanovic, ICRC, Amman, 3 July 2006.
[76] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 443.
[77] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 6.
[78] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, pp. 442-443.
[79] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1226; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 973.
[80] UNICEF, “Unexploded ordnance in Gaza a real threat to kids,” 11 August 2005.
[81] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 442.
[82] UNDP, “Mine Action assessment report: Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT),” September 2005, p. 4.
[83] UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, p. 447.
[84] “UN Agency Paints Grim Health Scenario of Possible Cut-off of Funds to Palestinians,” UN, New York, 7 April 2006; WHO, “Averting a humanitarian health crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory,” 13 June 2006. 
[85] WHO, “West Bank and Gaza Strip Health Sector Needs Assessment,” 15 February 2006, p. 1.
[86] US Department of State, “Country Report on Human Right Practices – 2005: Israel and the occupied territories,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006.
[87] Ibid.
[88] “Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 2004-30 June 2005,” submitted on 26 September 2005, General Assembly, Official Records, Sixtieth Session Supplement No. 13 (A/60/13), pp. 30-31; see also www.un.org/unrwa.
[89] PRCS, “Rehabilitation and Abilities Development Program Annual Report 2005,” www.palestinercs.org, accessed 18 June 2006.
[90] PRCS, “Operations Update,” 15 May 2006.
[91] PRCS, “Emergency Appeal,” April 2006, p. 2.
[92] ICRC, “Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, June 2006, p. 314.
[93] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme - Annual Report 2005,” Geneva, July 2006, p. 44.
[94] Email from Ayed Abu Eqtaish, DCI/PS, Jerusalem, 20 August 2005; see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 851.
[95] US Department of State, “Country Report on Human Right Practices – 2005: Israel and the occupied territories,” Washington DC, 8 March 2006.