Key developments since May 2005: Russian officials confirmed to
Landmine Monitor in June 2006 that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel
mines in Chechnya. CCW Amended Protocol II entered into force for Russia on 2
September 2005. Clearance teams undertook over 300 tasks in 2005 to deal with
explosive remnants from World War II, destroying 40,000 explosive items,
including 10,500 mines. Landmine Monitor identified 305 new casualties in at
least 82 incidents in 2005.
Mine Ban Policy
The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has often
cited the military utility of antipersonnel mines, the lack of viable
alternatives, and the financial difficulties in destroying its large stockpile
of antipersonnel mines within four years as reasons for not joining. In January
2005, Russia told the Conference on Disarmament that a “mine-free world
remains our goal. We support in principle the idea of joining the [Mine Ban
Treaty]. But it can be done only when we find ourselves capable to fulfill our
obligations.... Progress towards a mine-free world should be realistic, phased
and based on maintaining the necessary level of
stability.”[1]
Russia has abstained since 1996 on each annual UN General Assembly resolution
supporting a global ban on antipersonnel landmines, including UNGA Resolution
60/80 on 8 December 2005. Russia did not attend as an observer the Sixth
Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Zagreb, Croatia in
November-December 2005. After regularly attending meetings of the
treaty’s intersessional Standing Committees in Geneva from 2000-2004, it
was absent in June 2005 and May 2006.
Russia is party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and
ratified Amended Protocol II on 2 March 2005. Amended Protocol II entered into
force for it on 2 September 2005. Russia attended the Seventh Annual Conference
of States Parties to the protocol in November 2005 and, as required by Article
13, submitted an annual report for 2005. Russia exercised the option to defer
for nine years compliance with Amended Protocol II’s requirements for
self-destruction and self-deactivation of remotely delivered antipersonnel mines
and for detectability of low metal content antipersonnel mines. Russia
submitted a series of declarations with its ratification instrument that will
guide its national implementation of Amended Protocol
II.[2]
Production and Transfer
Russia has produced at least 10 types of antipersonnel mines since 1992,
including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4 and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines
(POMZ-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100 and MON-200). Russia has stated that
it stopped production of blast mines in
1997.[3]Russia has been conducting
research on modifications to existing landmines, new landmines and alternatives
to landmines since at least
1997.[4]
Russia has had a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not
detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices since 1 December 1994.
The moratorium formally expired on 1 December 2002, but Russian officials have
stated on occasion that it is still being
observed.[5]Russia is not known to
have made any state-approved transfers of any type of antipersonnel mine since
1994.
Stockpiling and Destruction
In November 2004, Russia for the first time released official information on
the number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles, when the Minister of
Defense cited a figure of 26.5 million. The Minister stated that in 2000,
Russia retained 46 million antipersonnel mines, but had since destroyed or
disposed of about 19.5 million of them.[6]
The Minister further said that approximately 23.5 million of the remaining
26.5 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines were subject to destruction or
disposal between 2005 and 2015. He noted that Russia spends some 150-180
million rubles (US$5-6 million) per year on the disposal of outdated
antipersonnel mines and mines falling under the restrictions of Amended Protocol
II.[7]
Russian officials have acknowledged that Russian military units in other
members of the Commonwealth of Independent States maintain antipersonnel mine
stockpiles, such as 18,200 in Tajikistan and an unknown number in Georgia
(Abkhazia).[8]In May 2006, Russia
stated to Landmine Monitor that there are no stockpiles of landmines with
Russian forces in the disputed Transnistria region of
Moldova.[9]According to
information received by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) Mission in May 2005 from the Headquarters of the Operational Group of
Russian Forces in Transnistria, a stockpile of 25,423 antipersonnel mines held
by Russian forces there were destroyed. The types and quantities of
antipersonnel mines reported destroyed were: PMN (8,742); PMN-2 (13,771); POMZ-2
(200); OZM-72 (514); MON-50 (1,768); MON-90 (68); MON-100 (360). The dates and
means of destruction are not known and the process was not verified or financed
by the OSCE.[10]
Use
Russia has used mines on a regular basis since 1999, primarily in Chechnya,
but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the border with Georgia.
Russia has generally argued that its mine usage has been necessary to stop flows
of weapons, drugs and terrorists, and it maintains that it has been in full
compliance with CCW Amended Protocol
II.[11]
In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian
forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced
mines and existing defensive minefields, noting, “Antipersonnel mines are
used to protect facilities of high importance.” They insisted that all
use of antipersonnel mines “complies with Amended Protocol II,” that
“all necessary documentation for minefields is retained,” and that
all minefields “are fenced and the civilian population informed.”
They indicated mines are used by forces of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of
Interior, and Border Guards. They said Russian forces “do not use
antivehicle mines” in Chechnya because the rebels “have no
vehicles.”[12]
While Russia has regularly acknowledged using antipersonnel mines in Chechnya
in the past, in August 2005 Russian military officials claimed that Russian
Ministry of Defense forces had not used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in 2004
or 2005. They said they could not comment on whether other Russian forces
(Interior Ministry, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Border Guards or others) had
used them in that time.[13]
(For more information on mine use in Chechnya, see report on Chechnya in this
edition of Landmine Monitor).
Landmine and ERW Problem
The Russian Federation is heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive
remnants of war (ERW). Both mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination
results from World War II; there are also substantial quantities of abandoned
explosive ordnance (AXO) in some
areas.[14]Clearance teams are said
to destroy about 100,000 ERW and mines every
year.[15]
Mines and UXO remain a major problem in Chechnya due to continued
combat.[16]
Mine incidents have also been reported in other republics, notably
Ingushetia, Dagestan and North Ossetia. ERW remain an acute problem in
Dagestan, specifically in Novolaksk, Botlikh and Buynaks districts, which were
the scenes of conflict in 1999. It was claimed in 2004 that complete clearance
of ERW in these areas would take a further five to six years.
[17]
Mine Action Program
There is no civilian mine action program in Russia.
Mine clearance remains the responsibility of three governmental bodies: the
Engineer Forces of the Ministry of Defense; demining brigades of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs; and the Russian National Corps of Emergency Humanitarian
Operations of the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and of Consequences of
Natural Disasters (EMERCOM). The main responsibility for mine clearance lies
with the Engineer Forces. The Russian National Corps deals mainly with
unexploded aircraft bombs.[18]
Commercial companies, such as Uniexpl and Fort in Moscow and Iskatel in St.
Petersburg, also conduct demining activities. Employees of these companies are
said to be mainly retired officers of the Ministry of Defense’s Engineer
Forces.[19]No information on
demining by these companies was available.
It has not been revealed how the Russian authorities prioritize and plan
mine/ERW clearance, or how they store and use relevant data. The division of
responsibilities between planned clearance and response activities such as
explosive ordnance disposal, and between state and private clearance capacities,
has not been reported.[20]
Demining
The Head of the Engineering Forces of the North Caucasian Military District
reported that clearance teams had undertaken more than 300 tasks in 2005 to deal
with mines and ERW from World War II, destroying in the process more than 40,000
explosive items, including 10,500 mines. It is not known whether this included
abandoned stocks of landmines and ordnance. He claimed that in Chechnya and
Ingushetia, demining teams of the Engineering Forces checked more than 138,000
kilometers of roads and column routes, disposing of 32 landmines. In total, the
teams disposed of 5,500 items of explosive ordnance in the two regions in
2005.[21]
A “short” humanitarian demining mission (the first ever recorded
in Chechnya since the outbreak of the second conflict in autumn 1999) was
organized by Russia’s EMERCOM in March-April
2005.[22]
Demining teams of the Engineering Forces are said to use mine detection dogs,
especially to survey roads.[23]It
is claimed that quality assurance of clearance operations is the responsibility
of the three government bodies responsible for
demining.[24]
In August 2005, it was reported that the Ministry of Defense had a new device
to identify explosive devices on railroads under development. Col-Gen. Grigory
Kogatko, the commander of the Russian railroad troops, stated that mine
detectors often fail to identify explosives on rails, because the railroad
groundwork contains metal.[25]
Landmine/ERW/IED Casualties
There is no comprehensive official information on mine/ERW casualties in
Russia. However, casualties continue to be reported in all parts of the Russian
Federation as a result of mines, ERW and improvised explosive devices
(IEDs).
Landmine Monitor media analysis identified at least 305 new mine/UXO/IED
casualties in at least 82 incidents reported in Russia in 2005, including 72
killed and 211 injured; the status of 22 casualties was unknown. There were 257
civilian casualties: 57 killed (six children) and 178 injured (13 children),
with the status of 22 unknown; and 48 military and police casualties (15 killed
and 33 injured, including six
women).[26]
Mines accounted for eight casualties (all tampering), with six killed and two
injured (five children); UXO caused 39 casualties, with 15 killed (three
children), 23 injured (one child) and one unknown, with tampering the leading
cause of UXO incidents; IEDs accounted for at least 226 casualties, with 44
killed (two children), 160 injured (six children) and 22 unknown. The explosive
device(s) causing the additional 32 casualties is unknown. Confirmed casualties
of victim-activated IEDs totaled 16, with three killed, 11 injured (three
children), and two unknown; these incidents were scattered throughout the
Russian Federation. Examples of victim-activated explosions include an incident
on 25 April when two children found a box at the entrance of their home with a
50 ruble note sticking out of it. They took the box inside, where it exploded,
and both were injured.[27]The
leading causes of casualties were targeted violence: 18 killed and 96 injured,
including one child; followed by handling explosives, UXO or AXO: 16 killed
(three children), 40 injured (two children), and one unknown; and by tampering
with mines/UXO: 18 killed and 21 injured (13 children).
The most-affected regions were Dagestan: 60 casualties (nine killed and 51
injured); Chechnya: 24 casualties recorded by UNICEF; Ingushetia: 15 casualties
(one killed and 14 injured); and Bushkiria: 14 casualties (all
injured).[28]
On 17 June 2005, a soldier of the Russian battalion of the Joint Peacekeeping
Forces and two Georgian police officers were injured during mine clearance in
South Ossetia.[29]
In Nepal, two Russian tourists were injured when their vehicle hit a landmine
on 9 April 2005.[30]
Casualties continued to be reported by media in 2006 with at least 107 new
mine/UXO/IED causalities in 35 incidents as of May; 102 casualties were
civilians (21 killed, including one child, and 49 injured, including 10
children); five were military or police (two killed and three injured); the
status of 32 casualties was unknown.
In Afghanistan, two Russian embassy personnel were injured by a mine in the
northern city of Hairatan, and were treated in a hospital in
Uzbekistan.[31]
The total number of casualties in Russia is not known, but there are believed
to be significant numbers of mine/UXO survivors from World War II, the 1980s war
with Afghanistan and the conflict in Chechnya. From 1999 to December 2003, more
than 2,500 mine casualties, including at least 600 killed and 1,700 injured,
were recorded by Russian federal forces in Chechnya. According to the Dagestan
Ministry of Civil Defense, from 1999 to 2004, there were 28 local residents
killed and 115 injured by UXO in Botlikh
district.[32]
Survivor Assistance, Disability Policy and
Practice[33]
Russian military medical practice has accumulated experience in the treatment
of blast injuries. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation and
reintegration services are available for mine/UXO survivors. However,
assistance and rehabilitation services are inadequate to meet
needs.[34]
Medical assistance is also provided by the Zaschita (Protection) All-Russian
Center of Catastrophe Medicine, including mobile hospitals in Chechnya, under
the Russian Federation Ministry of Health.
The International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine
Survivors and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics,
also assist mine survivors with surgical and rehabilitation assistance,
vocational training and socioeconomic reintegration.
The All-Russian Public National Military Foundation focuses its efforts on
the support of military personnel injured in Chechnya.
The rights of mine survivors and other people with disabilities are protected
under the 1995 Federal Law on Social Security of Disabled. The Ministry of
Labor and Social Development is responsible for all disability
issues.[35]Government bodies
specifically charged with protecting human rights also protect the rights of
people with disabilities. However, the laws are not enforced and people with
disabilities are denied equal opportunities to education, employment, and access
to social life. According to official sources there are an estimated 12.2
million people with disabilities in the Russian Federation; approximately 90
percent are unemployed despite hiring
quotas.[36]
[1] Statement by Amb. Leonid
Skotnikov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, Plenary Meeting
of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 January 2005. [2] For details of the
declarations, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 854-855. [3] Statement by Russia, Third
Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, 10 December
2001. In January 2005, Russia said it had not developed, produced or supplied
blast mines to its Armed Forces for more than nine years. Statement by Amb.
Leonid Skotnikov, Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27
January 2005. [4] Maj. Gen. Alexander Averchenko,
“Traditional and New Tasks,” Amreysky Sbornik Magazine, No.
1, 1997. In 2004, Russia said it has spent or plans to spend 3.33 billion
rubles (about $116 million) on research, development, and production of new
engineer munitions, including alternatives to antipersonnel mines. Statement by
Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings on ratification of
Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004. Average exchange rate for 2004: US$1 =
RUB28.8170. Landmine Monitor estimate based on www.oanda.com. [5] For example, in November 2004,
the Defense Minister said that Russia is abiding by the moratorium on the export
and transfer of antipersonnel mines that fall under the restrictions of Amended
Protocol II. Statement by Sergei Ivanov, parliamentary hearings on ratification
of Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004. [6] Ibid. As noted in previous
editions of Landmine Monitor, Russian officials have given different totals for
destroyed stocks. In January 2005, an official said over seven million
stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been destroyed. Statement by Amb. Leonid
Skotnikov, Plenary Meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 27 January
2005. [7] Statement by Sergei Ivanov,
parliamentary hearings on ratification of Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004.
[8] Bilateral negotiations
concerning the disposition of Russian stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in
Tajikistan were ongoing; Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form B, 3 February
2003. [9] Letter from the Russian
Embassy in Chisinau, Moldova, No. 282, to Ana Rudico, Landmine Monitor
researcher for Moldova, 18 May 2006; email from Ana Rudico, 14 June 2006. [10] Letter from Kenneth Pickles,
Deputy Head, OSCE Mission to Moldova, Chisinau, 31 March 2006. [11] See, for example, the
statement by Amb. Anatoly Antonov to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts,
“On the Landmines Other Than Antipersonnel Mines (MOTAPM),” Geneva,
18 November 2003. [12] Interview with members of
the delegation of the Russian Federation to the fourteenth session of the CCW
Group of Government Experts, Geneva, 23 June 2006; translation provided by the
Russian delegation and notes by Human Rights Watch (HRW). [13] Interview with members of
the delegation of the Russian Federation to the eleventh session of the CCW
Group of Government Experts, Geneva, 8 August 2005. For a summary of use from
1999-2004, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1186-1187. [14] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, p. 1100. [15] CCW Amended Protocol II
Article 13 Report, Form B, 22 November 2005. Under Protocol V of the Convention
on Conventional Weapons, ERW are defined as UXO and AXO. Mines are explicitly
excluded from the definition. [16] See report on Chechnya in
this edition of Landmine Monitor. [17] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 858; Musa Musaev, “How to Prevent Unknown
Threat,” Severnyi Kavkaz (regional newspaper in the northern
Caucasus), #17, 27 April 2004. [18] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 858. [19] Ibid. [20] Ibid. [21] “Major-General
Alexander Krasnikov, Head of the Engineering Troops of the North Caucasian
Military District, Hero of Russia, About the Activities of his
Subordinates,” WPS Russian Media Monitoring Agency, 6 March 2006,
www.wps.ru/en. [22] UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Inter-Agency Transitional Workplan
for the North Caucasus, Russian Federation, 2006,” undated, p. 34; see
Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 859. [23] “Major-General
Alexander Krasnikov, Head of the Engineering Troops of the North Caucasian
Military District, Hero of Russia, About the Activities of his
Subordinates,” WPS Russian Media Monitoring Agency, 6 March
2006. [24] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 859. [25] “The Russian Defense
Ministry is developing a new gadget to identify explosive devices on
railroads,” RIA Novosti, Zagoryanka Village (Moscow region), 3
August 2005. [26] Landmine Monitor examined
press reports from January 2005 to May 2006 in Russian language media. News
items of incidents involving devices not victim-activated, or due to interaction
with explosives (tampering, handling) were not counted. [27] “The found box with an
explosive has blown up in hands of children,” Regnum News
(Novouralsk), 25 April 2005. [28] Email from Eliza Murtazaeva,
Assistant Project Officer, Child Protection Section, UNICEF North Caucasus, 29
June 2006; data provided by Zaur Tsitsaev, Program Assistant, Child Protection
Section, UNICEF North Caucasus, 29 June 2006. (See report on Chechnya in this
edition of Landmine Monitor). [29] Information from the
Georgian Campaign of ICBL casualty database, which records information obtained
from hospitals throughout Georgia as well as media reports and surveys since
2001. [30] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 862. [31] “Russian embassy
staffers wounded in mine blast,” Pajhwok Afghan News
(Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan), 25 February 2006. [32] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, p. 862. [33] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2004, pp. 1105-1106; Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.
907-908. [34] See Landmine Monitor
Report 2005, pp. 862-863. [35] Ibid, p. 863. [36] US Department of State,
“Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Russia,” Washington
DC, 8 March 2006.
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