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Table of Contents
Country Reports
SRI LANKA, Landmine Monitor Report 2006

Sri Lanka

Key developments since May 2005: Since December 2005, suspected LTTE use of command-detonated Claymore mines has escalated greatly, and the Army has in a few instances alleged use of antipersonnel mines by the rebels. Eleven operators demined 19.5 million square meters of land in 2005, more than five times as much as in 2004, as a result of increased manual and mechanical clearance capacity and increased area reduction. However, renewed hostilities in early 2006 severely constrained demining operations in contested areas, resulting in much reduced clearance. Mine risk education expanded, reaching more than 630,000 people in 2005; 80 percent of schoolteachers in the mine-affected provinces have been trained in mine risk education. There were 38 new landmine/UXO casualties in 2005, significantly fewer than the 56 casualties in 2004.

Mine Ban Policy

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Since October 2002, the government has stated on several occasions that it would be in a position to accede to the treaty once an agreement is reached with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on non-use of the weapon.[1] On 8 December 2005, Sri Lanka voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 60/80, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has for every annual pro-ban UNGA resolution since 1996.

Sri Lanka did not attend as an observer the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Zagreb, Croatia in November-December 2005, nor the May 2006 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva. However, Sri Lanka did attend the intersessional meetings in June 2005, where it announced the submission of its first voluntary transparency report under Article 7 of the treaty. While detailed in many respects, the report does not include information on stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[2]

Sri Lanka acceded to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in September 2004. It attended the Seventh Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in Geneva on 23 November 2005, but did not submit the annual Article 13 report.

Non-State Armed Group

The LTTE has shown a willingness to engage in discussions on banning antipersonnel mines, but has taken the position that significant progress toward peace is required before it can consider any commitment to a ban.[3] LTTE representatives have participated in events organized by the Swiss-based NGO Geneva Call to engage non-state armed groups in a mine ban.[4] Switzerland, among other Mine Ban Treaty States Parties, has repeatedly encouraged the LTTE to sign the Geneva Call�s Deed of Commitment renouncing antipersonnel mines.[5] In 2005, the LTTE asked a member of Geneva Call what specific concrete advantages they would gain by committing to a ban on antipersonnel mines, and Geneva Call indicated it would approach donors to determine what level of increased funds for mine action would be available to the LTTE if it banned mines.[6] The Tamil Diaspora raises many of the funds necessary for LTTE operations, through a variety of Tamil overseas organizations.[7] At a meeting organized by Geneva Call in Zurich on 10 April 2006, Tamil Diaspora representatives from Europe, Canada and other countries expressed the view that the LTTE should attempt to become a party to the Mine Ban Treaty as the de facto state of Tamil Elam.[8]

NGO Activities

The cross-conflict project, initiated at the beginning of 2003 by the Sri Lanka-based Inter-Religious Peace Foundation (IRPF) and Geneva Call to encourage the LTTE to renounce antipersonnel mines, continued in 2005 and 2006.[9] The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), under which all mine action and other relief and rehabilitation work takes place in areas controlled by the LTTE, continued to cooperate with Geneva Call and IRPF to advocate a ban on mines by both the government and LTTE.[10] Geneva Call organized a workshop in France to mobilize the European Tamil Diaspora on 23 July 2005.[11] The IRPF organized a workshop on Youth in Mine Action in collaboration with Mines Action Canada in Colombo from 15 to 19 August 2005.[12]

A workshop on the National Implementation of the CCW, co-hosted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Sri Lanka National Committee on International Humanitarian Law, was held in Colombo on 28 September 2005.[13] The workshop provided an opportunity for members of the armed forces to enhance their understanding of the CCW and its protocols, and in particular implementation of Amended Protocol II on mines.

The Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum (LBAF), formed in December 2003, has met monthly since 2005 to exchange information on mines and undertake joint advocacy initiatives.[14] In 2005, LBAF launched its web site, issued several press releases and sent letters to legislators.[15] In April 2005, the Senior Advisor to the Secretary of the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation stated in reply to an LBAF letter that funds allocated to advocacy would be a waste and should instead be used to clear mines.[16]

Use

There have been no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by either government forces or the LTTE since fighting halted in December 2001, other than command-detonated Claymore-type mines.[17] Human Rights Watch reported in November 2004 that the LTTE continued to train child soldiers in mine use.[18] Prior to the cease-fire, both parties used antipersonnel mines extensively during the nearly two decade-long conflict.

Following the presidential elections in November 2005, civil unrest and violence escalated in the north and east of the country and the security situation deteriorated. Since that time, the government has blamed the LTTE for numerous attacks on Sri Lankan military forces with command-detonated Claymore-type mines. The government and LTTE resumed peace talks in Geneva on 22-23 February 2006, though fighting has continued.

In May 2006, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) said that since December, suspected LTTE rebels had exploded dozens of Claymore mines in a significant escalation of use of the weapon, and that in the past two months the SLMM had recorded use of 122 Claymore mines. A spokesperson said the Claymores seem to be made in China, but some appear to be handmade, and that the LTTE has trained �civilians� to help them lay the mines, which are usually detonated remotely.[19] A press account in April 2006, citing Sri Lankan military sources, said LTTE Claymore attacks had killed dozens of troops and police, as well as some civilians. The military said the LTTE were using both industrially-made and improvised Claymores, and were detonating them by remote control. The account said that while the mines could be triggered with tripwires, there were no reports of this being done in recent attacks. It also noted that the LTTE deny responsibility for the attacks and accuse government forces of launching their own Claymore attacks in rebel areas, a charge the army denies.[20]

In May 2006, the Army accused the LTTE of planting an antipersonnel mine for the first time since the cease-fire, when a soldier was injured stepping on a mine in Trincomalee on 16 May. The Army said another soldier was injured by an LTTE antipersonnel mine on 17 May in Nagarkovil, and a third in Kilaly on 1 June. The Army also reported that it recovered an LTTE antipersonnel mine planted on the roadside in Thunnalai on 5 June.[21]

On 15 June 2006, the ICRC expressed its deep concern that the number of civilian casualties caused by explosive devices in Sri Lanka had increased sharply in recent weeks. It issued its statement on the day that a mine blew up a bus in Kebitigollawe killing at least 50 civilians and wounding at least 30 others; the ICRC noted that the previous week at least 60 civilians were killed as a result of at least 16 mine explosions and other violent incidents.[22]

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

There is no evidence that the government of Sri Lanka has produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It appears that it imported antipersonnel mines from Pakistan, Portugal, China, Italy (and/or Singapore), and perhaps Belgium, the United States and others.[23] In its voluntary Article 7 report, Sri Lanka failed to include information on the number or types of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, but it noted that �with regard to future reports, the position will be reviewed, taking into account all relevant factors.�[24]

In its Article 7 report, Sri Lanka provided technical details of the Jony-95 and Jony-99 mines, which it identifies as �produced and used� by the LTTE.[25] The current status of the LTTE�s landmine production facilities remains unknown. In the past, the LTTE has produced three types of antipersonnel mines: Jony 95 (a small wooden box mine), Rangan 99 or Jony 99 (a copy of the P4 MK1 Pakistani mine), and SN 96 (a Claymore-type mine). The LTTE has also manufactured antivehicle mines, including the Amman 2000. The LTTE is considered expert in making improvised explosive devices.

Landmine and UXO Problem

Sri Lanka is affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). After two decades of armed conflict over demands by the LTTE for a separate homeland, mines and UXO remain a serious obstacle to economic reconstruction and resettlement of people displaced by fighting. The number of mine incidents, however, has fallen from 15 to 20 a month before the 2002 cease-fire to four to seven in 2004, and three to four in 2005.[26]

The government has estimated that a million landmines were laid in Sri Lanka by both sides during the conflict (the LTTE has put the number at two million[27] and reported that more than 550 villages were affected, including 250 villages where demining had started and 307 that remained to be cleared. Government estimates of the area of contamination range from 98 square kilometers (excluding high security zones occupied by the Sri Lankan army)[28] to nearly 150 square kilometers.[29] However, a technical survey of suspect areas planned for 2006 was expected to result in a significantly lower figure.[30]

The northern Jaffna peninsula, the main base of the LTTE and a focal point of fighting, is the most severely affected area. About half of all landmines laid in Sri Lanka are estimated to be in the peninsula and to affect some 228 villages, excluding high security zones (areas near military emplacements, camps, barracks or checkpoints, often protected by a defensive perimeter of mines).[31] The Jaffna peninsula also accounted for most casualties.[32]

At the end of 2005, Sri Lanka still had more than 324,000 people displaced from the north and east by the conflict.[33] Many people forced to leave the Jaffna peninsula have been unable to return to land, which is now designated as high security zones; reportedly, some had to settle instead on land that was previously uninhabited because of the presence of landmines.[34] After the December 2004 tsunami, some land previously classified as low priority for mine clearance became a high priority due to the urgent housing needs of tsunami survivors, particularly in the Jaffna peninsula.[35]

Mine Action Program

National Mine Action Authority

A National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), established in August 2002, is responsible for setting mine action policy and priorities and coordinating mine action, mine risk education and victim assistance.[36] Chaired by the Secretary to the Ministry of Nation Building and Development, the NSCMA meets every six weeks and includes representatives from relevant ministries, government agents, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, donors, mine action operators, UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UNICEF.[37]

Sri Lanka has not enacted any mine action legislation.[38] The Ministry of Nation Building and Development published a new set of national mine action standards on 4 April 2006. Standards were first drafted by UNDP in 2003, based on the international mine action standards (IMAS).[39] This draft was reviewed by stakeholders and submitted to the former Ministry of Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Refugees in 2003. In November 2005, the ministry was closed and replaced by the Ministry of Nation Building and Development, which approved the standards.[40]

Mine Action Centers

UNDP coordinates humanitarian mine action through offices in Colombo under a three-year agreement with the government; the agreement was signed in 2003 and will expire at the end of 2006. Its core functions have included drawing up standards, installing and maintaining a mine action database, coordinating demining operations and mobilizing resources through contact with donors.[41]

Regional mine action offices in Jaffna, Kilinochchi and Vavuniya coordinate mine clearance in their areas and also service the districts of Mannar, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara, where mine action focal points have been appointed.[42] General mine action priorities are clearance that supports resettlement of displaced people, reconstruction of infrastructure such as roads, power lines and drinking water supply, and community needs such as schools and hospitals.[43] Tasks and local priorities are selected by �Government Agents�?the local authority head in each district, who draws up a task list from clearance needs identified by the divisional secretaries heading the administration in each district�s divisions, in consultation with mine action operators.[44]

Strategic Planning and Progress

In February 2004, Sri Lanka declared that it had embarked on a comprehensive humanitarian mine action program with the broad objective of becoming mine-free by the end of 2006.[45] A senior ministry official subsequently stated that, �all the landmines in Sri Lanka will be cleared by the end of 2008.�[46] However, a 2006 review by the Ministry of Nation Building and Development set Sri Lanka�s mine action goals only as completing clearance of all high priority and most medium priority areas by the end of 2006, and clearing all other areas except the high security zones by the end of 2008.[47]

Humanitarian demining started in Sri Lanka in 1999, but was suspended nine months later because of the escalation of conflict. Clearance resumed after the cease-fire of February 2002, conducted mainly by the Sri Lankan Army.[48] Six months later, Sri Lanka set up the NSCMA to �own, coordinate and manage� the demining program,[49] which increasingly involved national and international NGOs as well as the army. In 2003 and 2004, demining agencies stepped up clearance and also increased procurement and training. In 2005, agencies reached full capacity and concentrated on productivity. As a result, clearance accelerated from 2.2 million square meters in 2003 and 3.8 million square meters in 2004 to 18 million square meters in 2005.[50] In the first months of 2006, however, escalating violence adversely affected demining operations, threatening to reduce recent gains in productivity (see later).

Evaluations of Mine Action

UNDP commissioned an independent evaluation of its role and operations in Sri Lanka in 2006. A team of three consultants concluded a three-week visit to Sri Lanka to prepare their assessment on 28 May 2006. The report was expected to provide a basis for discussion of UNDP�s future role in Sri Lanka after expiry of its existing agreement with the government at the end of the year.[51]

Demining

Eleven organizations carried out demining operations in Sri Lanka in 2005: the Sri Lanka Army (SLA), the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) and its Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), and a national NGO, Milinda Moragoda Institute for People�s Empowerment (MMIPE); the Indian NGOs Horizon and Sarvatra; six international NGOs, including Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People�s Aid (NPA), Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and Japan Center for Conflict Prevention (JCCP).[52] Some operators worked jointly.

Mine Free Planet, a Sri Lankan NGO, continued training of mine detection dogs and dog handlers in preparation for future operations.[53]

Identification of Mined and UXO-Affected Areas: Surveys and Assessments

Sri Lanka�s 11 demining and seven mine risk education organizations have undertaken surveys within their areas of operation or competence, but there has been no comprehensive national survey of mine/UXO contamination.[54] There are, therefore, varying estimates of the extent of contamination.

The Article 7 report submitted in June 2005 identified a total area of 12.6 square kilometers of land (308 mined areas in eight regions) as known to be contaminated by antipersonnel mines, and 136 square kilometers of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs; 2,341 in 10 regions).[55] The estimate is based in part on 3,008 maps of minefields provided by the army.[56] The Article 7 report, however, pointed out that these are rough estimates and that technical survey may reduce the actual mined area.[57]

The NSCMA planned to carry out a technical survey through UNDP of all mine-affected areas in 2006 intended to �establish unequivocably [sic] the extent of mine contamination in Sri Lanka� and �to remove or replace all SHA by identifying, confirming and quantifying all minefields in Sri Lanka excluding high security zones.�[58] The outcome was expected to provide a basis for planning and prioritization and also for preparing for an exit strategy by international NGOs as Sri Lanka achieves its clearance objectives.[59]

The NSCMA�s technical survey plan set out five mine-affected areas to be surveyed by four demining agencies with experience in the respective areas: Jaffna and Trincomalee by DDG, Vanni by NPA, Mannar, Vavuniya and Anuradhapura by FSD, and Batticaloa, Ampara and Polonnaruwa by MAG.[60]

Mine and UXO Clearance

In 2005, a total of 19.5 square kilometers of land was demined. This substantial increase from 3.8 square kilometers in 2004 was achieved mainly by deployment of more manual deminers, who had been undergoing training in 2005, and increased mechanical capacity.[61] Demining progress in 2005 is summarized in the table below. Data reported to Landmine Monitor by the UN and by individual operators, particularly the SLA, differ, sometimes substantially. The SLA attributes discrepancies to time lags between its submissions of clearance statistics through regional mine action offices and their eventual appearance in the UNDP IMSMA database in Colombo.[62]

Demining and Battle Area Clearance (square meters) and Mines/UXO Destroyed in Sri Lanka in 2005[63]

Operator Area demined Manual clearance Battle area clearance Antipersonnel mines Antivehicle mines UXO
DDG 405,093 226,608 178,485 4,132 1 111
FSD 73,091 73,091 0 3,497 1 257
HALO 223,462 223,462 0 9,957 2 126
Horizon 147,677 29,140 118,537 981 0 29
JCCP 48,076 48,076 0 175 0 8
MAG/HDU 7,433,363 37,388 7,395,975 121 1 2,249
MAG/TRO 1,422,926 35,080 1,387,846 874 0 384
MMIPE 7,713 7,713 0 64 0 0
NPA/HDU 7,674,141 662,160 7,011,981 5,060 14 625
Sarvatra 68,836 54,836 14,000 53 0 6
SLA 1,994,480 126,372 1,868,108 5,004 0 46
Total 19,498,858 1,523,926 17,974,932 29,918 19 3,841

Notes: Area demined includes, where applicable, land released through area reduction, including technical survey. The area demined for HALO does not include 28,580 square meters cleared mechanically in 2005.

The Sri Lanka Army conducted humanitarian demining operations until the end of November 2005.[64] It reported clearing 2,218,841 square meters of land (slightly less than in 2004), removing 10,480 antipersonnel mines, seven antivehicle mines and 827 UXO. In 2005, SLA formulated standing operating procedures for demining for the first time.[65] It operated with four field engineer regiments including 505 deminers, and deployed its first mechanical assets.[66] SLA conducted only manual clearance until 2004, when it received seven mine detecting dogs from the US Marshall Legacy Institute. In 2005, the number of dogs increased to 12.[67] SLA was trained in humanitarian demining by RONCO Consulting Corporation.[68]

The Humanitarian Demining Unit, an implementing arm of the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, received support from Norwegian People�s Aid, Mines Advisory Group, Danish Demining Group and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action.

NPA/HDU, operating mainly in the Vanni region, employs 12 teams of 40 deminers, including one team of female deminers, and one team of 20 deminers engaged in battle area clearance. These teams are supported by one flail and three excavators. It also operates one explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team.[69] In 2005, NPA reported that its teams had cleared 7,654,706 square meters of land; this included 505,779 square meters of manual clearance, mechanically verifying 303,404 square meters, and battle area clearance of 6,848,233 square meters; 6,462 antipersonnel mines and 1,027 UXO were destroyed.[70]

MAG/HDU operates a mixture of manual clearance, battle area clearance, mechanical clearance, survey, community liaison and EOD teams. In Vanni region, MAG operated two general survey teams, and two technical survey/demining teams, as well as a battle area clearance team, a Bozena mechanical clearance team, four EOD teams and two community liaison teams. In addition to mine and UXO clearance, the teams undertook impact and technical surveys, and fencing and marking.

In partnership with TRO, MAG also operated in Batticaloa where it deployed six demining teams, a mechanical clearance team and two community liaison teams. It also worked in Ampara district, where it had one mine action team and a mine risk education team.

In 2005, MAG teams manually cleared some 74,137 square meters of land. It also employed other clearance and area reduction techniques that enabled it to free much more land for resettlement and cultivation, including battle area clearance of 323,303 square meters and mechanical verification of 534,061 square meters. MAG also completed surface battle area clearance, confirming as clear 8,545,092 square meters of land that was previously identified by local communities as the scene of past battles and therefore marked as suspect.[71]

Swiss Foundation for Mine Action, operating with three expatriates and 106 national staff, worked in Mannar and Vavuniya with two mine action teams, a quick response team and a mechanical team, undertaking manual and battle area clearance and EOD, as well as impact and technical surveys. FSD/HDU also deployed one mine action team in an LTTE-controlled area in Mannar. In 2005, FSD manually cleared 76,311 square meters, mechanically verified 249,713 square meters and removed over 4,016 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine and 270 UXO.[72]

Danish Demining Group, which started working in Sri Lanka in November 2003, operated with 517 local and five expatriate staff in Jaffna, Trincomalee and Vanni, undertaking technical survey, manual demining, battle area clearance and EOD. In Jaffna, it deployed six manual demining teams and two survey sections; in Trincomalee, it had four manual demining teams, one survey section and one quick response team for EOD tasks; and in Vanni, it operated two manual demining teams in partnership with HDU. In 2005, DDG demined 405,093 square meters.[73] Since January 2004, DDG has handed over more than two million square meters of land to local authorities and destroyed 7,789 antipersonnel mines, three antivehicle mines and 1,407 UXO.[74]

HALO Trust works in government-controlled areas of Jaffna peninsula and conducted manual and mechanical mine clearance, marking, area reduction, survey and EOD. HALO increased its workforce by half in 2005, employing 357 local staff and two expatriates, split between 31 manual demining sections, two survey teams and 13 mechanical units. In 2005, HALO reported manually clearing 215,591 square meters of land, more than double its productivity in 2004 (90,967 square meters manually cleared). HALO also mechanically cleared 28,580 square meters in 2005 and removed a total of 10,485 antipersonnel landmines, 10 antivehicle mines and 275 UXO. HALO carried out 165 surveys during the year. HALO attributed its accelerated clearance to the expansion of its workforce, the greater experience of its deminers and more effective use of vegetation cutters to support manual clearance.[75]

Japan Center for Conflict Prevention started manual mine clearance in March 2004 in Vavuniya district with a DDG technical advisor, two Japanese technical advisors and a team of 44 Sri Lankan deminers.[76] By August 2005, it had expanded its capacity to four expatriate advisors and 100 national deminers working in four teams.[77]

Milinda Moragoda Institute for People�s Empowerment, in collaboration with Horizon and Sarvatra, conducted mine clearance in government-controlled areas. MMIPE, which operated with 115 deminers, cleared 15,514 square meters and removed 47 antipersonnel mines. Horizon reportedly cleared 7,873 square meters in 2005. Sarvatra, with 40 deminers, cleared 68,836 square meters in 2005. [78]

UNDP reported that, in 2005, six deminers were injured during clearance operations, including two deminers working with HALO, two working with SLA and one deminer each working for DDG and NPA/HDU.[79] A DDG deminer was injured in a February 2006 accident.[80]

Demining Progress in 2006

Following the presidential elections in November 2005, escalating hostilities between the LTTE and the government compromised the planning and conduct of demining operations in 2006. Some demining operators suffered staff abductions and many deminers working in LTTE-controlled territory left to join �local security forces.�[81] On 12 April, deteriorating security prompted the SLA to halt clearance by the two engineer regiments deployed in Jaffna; despite escalating violence, they resumed clearance operations on 2 May. Two other SLA regiments deployed in Trincomalee and Vavuniya stopped demining on 24 April.[82]

MAG temporarily suspended demining operations in the east on 22 February. It conducted a security assessment and as of May, expected to resume operations after consultation with partners, donors and mine action authorities in the area.[83] DDG also temporarily halted demining in Trincomalee on 17 April, but restarted on 8 May after reassigning two teams from the Mutur area to a more trouble-free area.[84]

As of May 2006, most operators were able to maintain some operations; HALO said it had not missed a single day of work,[85] but by then conditions had had a serious impact on productivity. In the first three months of 2006, the total area cleared by demining operators amounted to only 1,417,996 square meters (7.2 percent of the land released in 2005), including 254,038 square meters cleared manually and 1,163,959 of battle area clearance.[86] This is much less than needed to match the clearance productivity achieved in 2005.

Mine Risk Education

During 2005, 630,211 people attended mine risk education (MRE) sessions in northern and eastern Sri Lanka, compared to 280,000 in 2004. Since 2002, UNICEF estimates about 1,211,171 people have received direct exposure to MRE; this does not include people reached through mass media campaigns such as national radio programs.[87] Some MRE recipients have been targeted multiple times, in particular children who receive MRE in both school and community settings.[88]

Sri Lanka included MRE in its voluntary Article 7 report of 13 June 2005.

The National Steering Committee for Mine Action coordinates MRE implementation through regular reports provided by UNICEF, and through the district-based IMSMA maintained by UNDP. At the district level, government agents decide on MRE priorities and methodologies.[89] MRE standards in compliance with IMAS were developed in 2004.[90] They were translated into Tamil and, in 2006, were translated into other national languages.[91] UNICEF continued to support the national coordination of MRE, working with district mine action authorities, the Ministry of Education, other UN agencies and NGOs.[92] In total, around 100 field officers/supervisors work on MRE in Sri Lanka.[93]

MRE strategies used in Sri Lanka include community-based initiatives, mass media campaigns and school-based programs. Community liaison is undertaken in all areas where mine clearance is planned or ongoing.[94] Target groups for MRE are males aged 18 to 45 years (the most at-risk group, according to casualty statistics), and people displaced by the conflict and, since December 2004, by the tsunami. As of 31 December 2005, UNHCR listed 324,699 displaced people due to conflict and 457,576 due to the tsunami; during 2005, only 27,185 people had resettled.[95] MRE in Sri Lanka also targets people undertaking risky activities including collectors (of scrap metal, honey, forest fruits, firewood), fishermen, hunters and children.[96] Risk, and therefore MRE activities, are affected by seasonality; risk is greatest in September when planting and harvesting begins. Therefore, mine action weeks are organized prior to the harvest season; in 2005, one took place on a nationwide scale and covered all aspects of mine action.[97]

MRE was conducted in 2005 by three national NGOs, Sarvodaya, White Pigeon, Community Trust Fund, and by MAG working with White Pigeon and HDU. The Tamil Rehabilitation Organization stopped providing MRE in December 2004. School-based MRE was provided by more than 9,000 trained teachers in mine-affected and neighboring districts in the north and east. UNICEF continued to provide assistance to local NGOs and the Ministry of Education. MAG, HDU, White Pigeon, Community Trust Fund and Sarvodaya ensured that community liaison activities were undertaken amongst all communities receiving mine clearance.[98]

A total of 8,548 MRE-related activities were registered in 2005. UNICEF supported 7,557 of those activities, including 2,742 undertaken by Community Trust Fund, 1,848 by Sarvodaya and 2,967 by White Pigeon.[99] An additional 2,610 activities were in direct community liaison support of mine clearance/EOD and related operations.[100]

MRE programs target all villages affected by mines and UXO, usually with several visits due to the ongoing return of internally displaced persons. Methodologies include participatory discussions, house-to-house MRE, drama and songs, group presentations, and school or health center-based discussions.[101] In Jaffna, White Pigeon�s six two-person teams, and Sarvodaya�s 10 two-person teams, undertake a mixture of community liaison and MRE activities.[102] During 2005, according to data entered into IMSMA, there were 3,790 house visits, 752 group discussions, 471 community briefings, 40 community mapping exercises, 497 safety briefings for local service providers and 269 follow-up activities. MRE activities in 2005 were �tailored to suit the post-tsunami situation,� including briefings for UN and other staff.[103]

School-based MRE in 2005 included 420 lectures/classroom sessions, 79 games, 121 child-to-child sessions and 102 child-to-adult sessions.[104] In the mine-affected north and east of Sri Lanka, MRE is integrated into school curricula.[105] Children are exposed to MRE in the formal school system at least four to five times a year; many schools are also visited by local NGOs from the MRE community-based program.[106] As of January 2006, 80 percent of primary and secondary school teachers in the mine-affected provinces had been trained in delivering MRE since 2003. In 2005, a total of 890 trainee teachers received a two-day MRE training. During the second semester, 3,346 street drama books in Tamil and Sinhala were disseminated to the schools in the north and east.[107]

To reach out-of-school children, UNICEF established around 130 children�s clubs with an average of 60 members in Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara districts in 2004 and 2005.[108]

In 2005, 2,605 community liaison MRE activities were conducted in support of mine clearance/mine action activities. Liaison activities are undertaken before, during and after the actual clearing or disposal. The community liaison role of the MRE teams has been particularly relevant in the Jaffna peninsula where clearance operations by the predominantly Singhalese army have been disrupted by antagonism with local people. In December 2005, volunteers were trained to work side by side with the MRE field officers to facilitate the link between DDG deminers and communities.[109]

MRE organizations working in the field are the main source of information on new dangerous areas and isolated UXO. For instance, in the LTTE-controlled areas of Vanni and Jaffna, 10 to 15 new dangerous areas were reported to EOD teams each month by White Pigeon and Sarvodaya; these local NGOs provided 86 percent of the 158 dangerous areas reports sent to the district mine action office in Jaffna in 2005, with the remainder sent directly by the general public.[110]

MAG community liaison/MRE teams supplied over 700 dangerous area reports affecting over 250 villages and over 1,000 UXO reports affecting 400 villages in Vanni from September 2003 to 31 December 2005; over 140 dangerous area reports affecting over 80 villages and over 200 UXO reports in Batticaloa from January 2004 to 31 December 2005; and 10 dangerous area reports and reports of 12 visible UXO identified in Ampara from June 2005 to 31 December 2005.[111]

Between January to December 2005, quality assurance inspectors in Jaffna randomly selected 108 MRE sites. In the majority of the cases, they found the MRE field officers were doing good work and implementing the activities according to their workplan.[112]

As public information dissemination, MRE messages were included in 43 �radio activities,� 807 material distributions, 258 television and cinema shows, 167 dramatic events, 96 music/song/poetry events, 48 story-telling events, and seven festivals and mine action weeks in 2005. Radio announcements were made by two Tamil-language radio stations and one Singhalese station only in January 2005; it was planned to resume radio messages in 2006.[113]

Evaluations

In October 2005, UNICEF and UNDP analyzed mine/UXO casualties from January 2002 to June 2005. This showed a significant decrease from 154 casualties in 2002, to 112 in 2003, to 56 in 2004 and 38 in 2005. The analysis noted that this was less than the 50 percent reduction originally aimed for.[114] The decrease in casualties was attributed to various factors, �such as reduction in movement of displaced populations and the intensification of mine action activities in general but more specifically, the increase of MRE communication tools used and geographical coverage.� [115]

Funding and Assistance

In 2005, 10 countries and the European Commission (EC) reported US$19,045,929 in funding for mine action in Sri Lanka, representing a decrease in funding of $23.6 million contributed in 2004 by 12 countries and the EC.[116] The Sri Lankan government provides all salaries, expenses and most operational costs for the Army demining contingents; the total cost in 2005 is not known.[117] International donors in 2005 included:

  • Australia: A$1,747,866 ($1,333,097), consisting of A$1,397,866 ($1,066,152) to FSD for mine/UXO clearance, and A$350,000 ($266,945) to UNDP for mine action coordination and information management;[118]
  • Austria: �160,000 ($199,184) to UNICEF for survivor assistance and MRE;[119]
  • Denmark: DKK14 million ($2,335,163) to DDG for mine clearance, MRE and survivor assistance;[120]
  • EC: �1,300,000 ($1,618,370) to UNDP for technical survey, marking and fencing;[121]
  • Finland: �280,000 ($348,572), consisting of �150,000 ($186,735) to HALO for mine clearance team training, and �130,000 ($161,837) to MAG for post-conflict rehabilitation;[122]
  • Japan: �497,322,447 ($4,516,597) for mine clearance, consisting of �99,871,090 ($907,012) to the JCCP, �99,991,540 ($908,106) to the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation for demining in Jaffna district, and �99,967,670 ($907,889) for demining in Vavuniya, Mannar and Trinkomalee, �27,724,663 ($251,791) to MAG, �66,126,000 ($600,545) to NPA, �34,423,612 ($312,629) to HALO, �52,324,498 ($475,202) to DDG, and �16,893,374 ($153,423) to Swiss Foundation for Mine Action;[123]
  • Norway: NOK26,772,105 ($4,156,385), consisting of NOK1,900,000 ($294,976) to Geneva Call for advocacy, NOK8,399,619 ($1,304,046) to Milinda Moragoda Institute for People�s Empowerment (MMIPE) and implementing partners Horizon and Sarvartra for demining, NOK800,000 ($124,200) to MMIPE and implementing partners for training in humanitarian demining, and NOK15,672,486 ($2,433,163) to Norwegian People�s Aid for mine clearance;[124]
  • Sweden: SEK5 million ($669,254) to MAG for mine clearance;[125]
  • Switzerland: CHF284,000 ($227,948), consisting of CHF230,000 ($184,606) to FSD for mine clearance, CHF29,000 ($23,276) to FSD for assessment and CHF25,000 ($20,066) to HALO for mine clearance;[126]
  • UK: �242,505 ($441,359) for integrated demining, consisting of �125,735 ($228,838) to HALO and �116,770 ($212,521) to MAG;[127]
  • US: $3,200,000, consisting of $2,700,000 from the Department of State ($183,000 going to HALO and $2,517,000 through the US contractor RONCO to develop SLA�s demining capacity), and $500,000 through the Leahy War Victims Fund to support victim rehabilitation services.[128]

It is difficult to assess the impact of the December 2004 tsunami on mine action funding in 2005, particularly in relation to costs incurred by operators for additional technical assessments. In the case of FSD, total 2005 expenditure of CHF1,774,865 ($1,375,118) included CHF1,510,792 ($1,170,521) for demining; a further CHF264,073 ($204,597) was provided through specific contributions for tsunami operations from Swiss Solidarity and Alertnet.[129]

Some donors have withheld funding for demining in Sri Lanka until more evidence of momentum towards the Mine Ban Treaty has been demonstrated. The Netherlands, a core donor though HALO in 2003, withheld funds in 2004 and 2005.[130] In 2006, the Netherlands did not list Sri Lanka amongst those countries likely to gain future funding in its donor strategy.[131]

The total amount required for mine action in Sri Lanka in 2006, by all operators including the Sri Lanka Army, was some $20 million.[132]

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2005, UNDP recorded 38 new landmine/UXO casualties, including five people killed and 33 injured; seven were female; nine were children.  This represents a significant reduction from the 56 mine/UXO casualties (17 killed and 39 injured) recorded in 2004.[133] The majority of casualties in 2005 occurred in Jaffna, with two people killed and 21 injured. Antipersonnel mines caused 17 casualties and UXO caused 15 casualties; the cause of six casualties was unknown.[134] UNICEF estimates that by the end of 2005, casualties reduced to an average of two per month, a significant decrease from 15 to 20 at the time of the ceasefire in 2002.[135] Six deminers were injured during mine clearance operations in 2005 to February 2006.[136]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2006, with at least 14 injured from January to May. UNDP reported 12 casualties in three districts; four adult males were injured by antipersonnel mines while farming in Jaffna, one child was injured by UXO while playing in Mullaitivu, and seven people were injured (including two women) by an antivehicle mine in Puttlam.[137] White Pigeon reported two mine/UXO incidents in the LTTE-controlled areas in Vanni in February.[138]

The UNDP IMSMA database is the most reliable source of information on landmine and UXO casualties in Sri Lanka.  The database contains records of 1,282 civilian mine/UXO casualties from 1985 to December 2005, of which 190 people were killed and 1,092 injured; children accounted for 253 (20 percent) and women 190 (15 percent).  The Jaffna peninsula, with 678 casualties, represented 53 percent of all casualties in Sri Lanka. The database is updated and corrected as information on mine incidents becomes available; UNDP believes that the actual number of casualties is higher than currently recorded.[139]

Survivor Assistance

In Sri Lanka, six district mine action offices coordinate survivor assistance and provide technical assistance.[140] UNICEF has four district coordinators for MRE and survivor assistance in Jaffna, Vavuniya, Trincomalee/Batticaloa and Kilinochchi to plan and coordinate activities and support the government and LTTE capacity in providing survivor assistance.[141]

In 2005, UNICEF developed its survivor assistance strategy, which prioritizes assessing the needs of survivors, increasing access to services and education, and supporting rehabilitation centers in mine/UXO-affected districts, in cooperation with the government and NGOs. The strategy provides assistance to mine/UXO survivors through existing services for people with disabilities rather than creating new structures; other people with disabilities will also be assisted by the UNICEF strategy.[142]

The government�s new Strategy for Mine Action, released in January 2006, noted that the survivor assistance program �needs expansion and support,� especially in the area of economic reintegration. The National Steering Committee on Mine Action will review and approve a national policy on survivor assistance, improving physical rehabilitation, avoiding duplication, and increasing economic reintegration through more vocational training and income-generating activities. The committee requested UNICEF and UNDP to expand their economic reintegration programs.[143]

As of April 2006, many people in areas hit by the December 2004 tsunami continued to receive healthcare services in camps or semi-permanent constructions.[144] Numerous domestic and international NGOs were active in the reconstruction of healthcare infrastructure in the mine- and tsunami-affected areas of Sri Lanka in 2005, including Guardian Foundation, Foundation for Social Welfare, Direct Relief International, American Rescue Committee and the World Federation of Occupational Therapists.[145]

In 2005, ICRC continued to work with the Sri Lankan Red Cross and the Canadian Red Cross to provide basic health services in remote areas of Sri Lanka by supporting public health centers.

The Jaffna Teaching Hospital and the Point Pedro Hospital provide secondary surgical treatment; three other hospitals in the area have limited capacities for emergency care.[146] In July 2005, the government agent stated that a new building would be constructed at Chavakachcheri hospital in Jaffna to increase the hospital�s capacity; for this and other renovations of healthcare facilities the Japanese government, the Asian Development Bank and a Japanese organization have contributed funds.[147]

Sri Lanka has several prosthetic clinics. UNICEF supports four rehabilitation centers in the north and east with equipment and training for staff.[148] The UNICEF-supported centers are run by Handicap International in Batticaloa, White Pigeon in Kilinochchi, Valvuthayam Caritas in Mannar, and the Jaipur Center for Disability Rehabilitation in Jaffna.

The Batticaloa center and two satellites in Arayampathy and Kaluwancikudy, also run by Handicap International, produce mobility devices and provide physical rehabilitation. There are over 5,000 people with disabilities, including many amputees and landmine survivors, in Batticaloa. In 2005, the Batticaloa center assisted 2,373 clients, provided 1,676 therapeutic consultations and delivered 41 prosthetic devices to 570 persons; of those, 557 also received physiotherapy.[149] A database of people with disabilities was established in Hambantota, Ampara and Batticaloa to assess immediate needs.[150]

In 2005, at least 746 people with disabilities received physiotherapy and/or prosthetic devices in the three other UNICEF-supported rehabilitation centers. The center, run by Valvuthayam Caritas in Mannar, assisted 124 people with disabilities with 68 new prostheses, 35 prosthesis repairs and 21 crutches, and 103 people received physiotherapy treatments in 2005. The White Pigeon rehabilitation center in Kilinochchi produced 240 new prostheses and 276 other mobility devices, and repaired 2,211 devices. Over 2,500 amputees were reportedly waiting for prostheses.[151] The Jaffna Jaipur Center for Disability Rehabilitation, in partnership with Motivation, provides referrals, prosthetic devices, physiotherapy and post-amputation care at patients� homes. UNICEF-trained fieldworkers visit an average of 20 mine/UXO survivors and people with disabilities per month in their homes. In 2005, the center assisted 382 people, including 293 mine/UXO survivors, with 499 physiotherapy sessions, 932 home visits and 114 referrals to other services; 185 people benefited from new prostheses, including 132 mine/UXO survivors. The center produced 53 orthoses, 18 wheelchairs, 62 crutches, 27 tricycles, and 16 walkers and walking aids in 2005.[152]

However, there seems to be a continuing lack of trained rehabilitation staff. In 2005, UNICEF continued to organize coordination meetings between actors in the physical rehabilitation sector and to address the continued lack of physiotherapists in the most mine/UXO affected provinces.[153] In May 2005, the Sri Lanka School of Prosthetics and Orthotics opened, in collaboration with the Nippon Foundation of Japan and Cambodia Trust; 15 students are enrolled in the second year of the three-year training program.[154]

Motivation�s five-year Disability Support Program implemented a wide range of initiatives in partnership with over 20 NGOs and organizations for people with disabilities, including physical rehabilitation, production of prosthetics, orthotics and other assistive devices, socioeconomic reintegration, and advocacy. Motivation opened its regional office in Colombo in 2005.[155] In the second half of 2006, the training unit will host training for ICRC expatriates to improve wheelchair services for other international programs.[156] The program is funded by the US government�s Leahy War Victims Fund.[157]

The Friends-in-Need Society in Colombo provides prostheses and physiotherapy, including a mobile unit that travels to remote areas. Since the program began in 1998, 463 children received prostheses, and of those, 43 received educational grants; no information was available on how many children are landmine survivors.[158]

Psychosocial rehabilitation services for mine/UXO survivors and their families are available in most mine-affected districts, particularly in Kilinochchi and Jaffna. Families are encouraged to send child survivors back to school as soon as possible after an incident and education grants to poor families are available. Various NGOs have developed income-generating projects for landmine survivors, but services remain limited.[159]

The Department of Social Services operated eight vocational training schools for people with disabilities and sponsored job training and placement programs for graduates. The Department has helped approximately 200,000 people with disabilities find jobs. The government also provided some financial support to NGOs that assisted people with disabilities including subsidized mobility devices, purchasing from disabled suppliers and registering 74 NGO-run schools and training institutions for people with disabilities.[160]

UNICEF supported psychosocial rehabilitation and community-based rehabilitation through local NGOs, including the Kilinochchi Association for Rehabilitation of Displaced (KAROD), Shanthiham (Jaffna), White Pigeon, Sarvodaya and Family Rehabilitation Center (FRC). Additionally, UNICEF trained counselors about the needs of people with disabilities to increase access to psychosocial support for mine/UXO survivors and the families of those injured or killed by mines/UXO.[161]

White Pigeon, which employs nine people with disabilities on its staff, provides prosthetic fitting, rehabilitation services, vocational training, income generation opportunities, and micro-credit services for landmine survivors and their families in Kilinochchi, Jaffna, Trincomalee and Batticaloa; over 991 families have registered for survivor assistance. Education grants are available via White Pigeon MRE field officers. Over 1,700 people were waiting for assistance through income generation activities. Field officers in Kilinochchi are trained in basic physiotherapy and counseling to facilitate follow-up home visits. In 2005, they identified and referred 41 landmine/UXO survivors to a new loan project.[162] The UNDP-supported Revolving Loan Fund program began in April 2005 in the districts of Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu. By February 2006, 187 people with disabilities had benefited and the program had gone into the redistribution cycle. The Mullaitivu section had recovered funds from 64 beneficiaries, and redistributed to another 18 beneficiaries.[163]

In Jaffna, Family Rehabilitation Center conducted 442 home visits and 163 counseling sessions to provide direct psychological support for mine/UXO survivors and others people with disabilities in 2005. Sarvodaya in Jaffna organizes income-generating activities with technical assistance and monitoring by UNICEF. In 2005, Sarvodaya expanded loan services to another 150 landmine survivors. In June 2005, Community Trust Fund in Puttalam recruited a survivor assistance officer, seconded to the district mine action office in Vavuniya, who was tasked to conduct survivor needs assessments and identify available services for people with disabilities.[164]

In December 2005, the World Federation of Occupational Therapists conducted a five-day training to educate Sri Lankan healthcare workers in occupational therapy methodologies. Funding for the training was provided by Direct Relief International.[165]

Military mine survivors receive full rehabilitation, and free bus and train passes.[166]

Disability Policy and Practice

Sri Lanka has legislation protecting the rights of people to non-discrimination in employment and education, and creating the National Council for Persons with Disabilities.[167] The National Policy on Disability was approved in August 2003.[168]

Mine/UXO survivors receive a one-time grant of $75-$250 depending on the severity of their disability.[169] The Minister of Social Services obtained approval from the Cabinet of Ministers to ensure that all post-tsunami construction projects consider the issue of accessibility for people with disabilities; all new, renovated or reconstructed public buildings will be made accessible for people with disabilities within seven years.[170]

The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka conducted a National Conference on Disability Rights from 22 to 24 February 2006. Representatives from major development, disability and related sectors discussed implementation approaches that will promote the rights of people with disabilities, with the aim of obtaining commitments to carry out specific activities towards the implementation of the National Policy on Disability.[171]

[1] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1116; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 878.

[2] Statement by Sri Lanka, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 13 June 2005. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 878, for more details of the Article 7 Report.

[3] Email from Katherine Kramer, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 9 March 2004.

[4] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 879.

[5] Comments by Martin Stuerzinger, Advisor for Peace-Building, Embassy of Switzerland, Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum (LBAF) meeting, Colombo, 30 May 2005 (notes taken by Landmine Monitor).

[6] Katherine Kramer, Geneva Call, �Mission Report Sri Lanka, 11-18 October 2005,� p. 3. Circulated on LBAF mailing list on 22 November 2005.

[7] Human Rights Watch, �Funding the �Final War�: LTTE Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora,� Vol. 18, No. 1 (c), March 2006.

[8] Interview with Canadian organizer for Geneva Call, 22 May 2006.

[9] IRPF is a member of the Sri Lanka Campaign to Ban Landmines (CBL).

[10] At Geneva Call�s seminar, Mine Action in the Midst of Internal Conflict, held in Zagreb prior to the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, a presentation prepared by Chandru Pararajasingham from the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO) was read by Katherine Kramer of Geneva Call.  Email from Katherine Kramer, Geneva Call, 11 January 2006.

[11] �Advancing Mine Action in Sri Lanka: Mobilising the European Tamil Diaspora� was facilitated by Rev. Perera, IRPF, Christoph Hebeisen, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action on behalf of UN Development Programme (UNDP), Chandru Pararajasingham, TRO, Anne Capelle, ICBL, and Katherine Kramer, Geneva Call. Email from Katherine Kramer, Geneva Call, 4 August 2005.

[12] Interview with Rev. Freddy De Alwis, Sri Lanka CBL, Colombo, 19 August 2005.

[13] Email from Sumede Ekanayake, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Colombo, 12 October 2005.

[14] LBAF members are representatives of UN agencies, the European Union, donor countries, campaigners, mine action agencies and NGOs. Representatives from the Sri Lanka Army and Ministry of Foreign Affairs attend as observers. Meetings are facilitated by UNDP and UNICEF. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 879.

[15] The official website of the LBAF is www.banlandmines.lk. LBAF issued press statements when Amended Protocol II took effect in Sri Lanka (12 May 2005) and when the government submitted its voluntary Article 7 report (24 July 2005). Also in July 2005, LBAF sent letters to all members of parliament highlighting the impact of landmines on civilians and urging them to join the effort to make Sri Lanka free of landmines.

[16] Letter to LBAF from Dr. A. S. Kunasingham, Senior Advisor for Secretary, Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation, 27 April 2005. This contrasted with the January 2005 statement of the Director General of the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation that �the effort of landmine ban advocates are [sic] important for maintaining the dialogue and momentum on this issue,� and his promise that the government would �continue to work with civil society and all of its partners in moving forward.� Letter to ICBL representative from Harim Peiris, Director General, Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation, 20 January 2005. In November 2005, the ministry was renamed the Ministry of Nation Building and Development.

[17] Under the Mine Ban Treaty, use of Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines is permissible in command-detonate mode (initiated by the soldier), but is prohibited if used with tripwires (exploded by the target/victim). Apart from Claymores, the LTTE accused security forces of involvement in landmine incidents once in 2004 and once in 2005, but the government denied any complicity. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 880. Since April 2004, the LTTE has been fighting with the breakaway Karuna Amman faction in the Eastern Province, but no mine use has been reported.

[18] Human Rights Watch, �Living in Fear: Child Soldiers and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka,� Vol. 16, No. 13 (c), November 2004; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 880.

[19] �Claymore mines: �Awful� weapon of Sri Lanka�s rebels,� Agence France-Presse (Trincomalee), 8 May 2006.

[20] Peter Apps, �Sri Lanka claymore attacks lethal and hard to foil,� Reuters (Trincomalee), 24 April 2006.

[21] The incidents are reported on the Sri Lanka Army website May and June situation reports. There is no indication of how the Army concluded the mines were laid after the cease-fire. www.army.lk.

[22] ICRC Press Release No.06/62, �Sri Lanka: ICRC deeply concerned about increasing mine casualties,� 15 June 2006.

[23] Landmine Monitor has identified the following antipersonnel mines as having been used by government troops: P4 and P3 MK (manufactured by Pakistan); Type 72, Type 72A and Type 69 (China); VS 50 (Italy or Singapore); NR409/PRB (Belgium); M409 and M696 (Portugal); and M18A1 Claymore (US). See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1118; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 881. In its voluntary Article 7 report, Sri Lanka notes the presence of these antipersonnel mines in minefields: Pakistani P4 MK1; Pakistani Type 69; Portuguese/Pakistani PRB 413; Portuguese PRB 409; Chinese Type 72; and Italian/Singaporean VS 50. Article 7 Report, Forms C and H, 13 June 2005.

[24] Article 7 Report, Form B, 13 June 2005.

[25] Article 7 Report, Form H, 13 June 2005.

[26] UNDP, �Sri Lanka Mine Action Program Fact Sheet,� November 2004, pp. 1-2; UN, �Country Profile: Sri Lanka,� www.mineaction.org, accessed 16 May 2006. See later section for 2005 casualty data.

[27] See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 747-748; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1119.

[28] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 5.

[29] Article 7 Report, Form C, 13 June 2005.

[30] Telephone interview with Tim Horner, Mine Action Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, Colombo, 7 May 2006.

[31] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 18.

[32] Interview with Dhanushka Jayamaha, International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Officer, UNDP, Colombo, 22 February 2006. Jaffna district�s administration reported 31 casualties in 2005.

[33] UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), �Statistical Summary as at 31 December 2005,� Colombo, provided in email from Nihad Hota, Information Systems Officer, UNHCR, 21 February 2006.

[34] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 881.

[35] Telephone interview with Dr. A.S. Kunasingham, Secretary, National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA), Sri Lanka, 31 August 2005.

[36] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1120; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 882.

[37] UN, �Country Profile: Sri Lanka,� www.minesaction.org.

[38] Telephone interview with Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 29 May 2006.

[39] �Country specific mine action standards completed ahead of schedule,� Daily News, Colombo, 27 March 2004.

[40] Titled the Ministry of Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Refugees from 2002-2004, the ministry�s name was changed in 2004 to the Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconciliation. In November 2005, the ministry was again renamed the Ministry of Nation Building and Development. Telephone interview with Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 29 May 2006.

[41] Ibid.

[42] The Regional Mine Action Office in Kilinochchi managed by TRO coordinates and supports mine action in the LTTE-controlled areas of the north and east.

[43] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, pp. 4-5.

[44] Telephone interview with Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 7 May 2006; Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 8.

[45] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1119; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 883.

[46] Press conference by M.S. Jayasinghe, Secretary, Ministry of Nation Building and Development; �Sri Lanka aims to be rid of landmines by end-2008,� Reuters, Colombo, 7 March 2006.

[47] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 5.

[48] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1121.

[49] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. iii.

[50] Email from Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 16 May 2006. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1121; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 883.

[51] Telephone interview with Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 29 May 2006; email from Bob Keeley, Consultant, UNDP, 31 May 2006.

[52] Article 7 Report, Form F, 13 June 2005.

[53]Interview with Agim Hoti, Program Manager, Mine Free Planet, Colombo, 21 March 2006.

[54] Telephone interview with Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 7 May 2006.

[55] Article 7 Report, Form C, 13 June 2005.

[56] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. iii.

[57] Article 7 Report, Form C, 13 June 2005. For survey results in previous years, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1119-1120.

[58] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Mine Action Technical Survey Strategy,� Colombo, 4 April 2006.

[59] Telephone interview with Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 7 May 2006.

[60] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Mine Action Technical Survey Strategy,� Colombo, 4 April 2006.

[61] Interview with Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 17 March 2006.

[62] Telephone interview with Capt. Thushara Jayawardena, Staff Officer, Engineers Brigade, SLA, Colombo, 31 May 2006.

[63] Email from Tim Horner, UNDP, Sri Lanka, 16 May 2006. UNDP�s clearance statistics are based on weekly clearance reports filed by demining operators, but are not all consistent with details published separately by operators.

[64] SLA temporarily halted demining operations in the north at the end of November 2005 after a soldier was killed in a grenade attack on one of their vehicles; SLA resumed demining on 1 March 2006.

[65] Interviews with Brig. Ananda Chandrasiri, SLA, Colombo, 27 May 2005 and 23 January 2006; emails from Capt. Thushara Jayawardena, SLA, Colombo, 5 May 2005 and 5 February 2006.

[66] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, pp. 24-25.

[67] Interview with Fredrick Palsson, Chief of Party, RONCO Consulting Corporation, Colombo, 2 March 2006.

[68] This included a two-week IMSMA training session, conducted by Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation (VVAF), in December 2005. Email from William Barron, VVAF, 22 June 2006.

[69] Email from Charles Frisby, Project Manager, NPA, 23 March 2006.

[70] Email from Harshi Gunawardana, Project Associate, NPA, 23 June 2006.

[71] Interview with David Hayter, Country Program Manager, MAG, Colombo, 27 April 2006.

[72] Email from Franz Baer, FSD, Sri Lanka, 4 March 2006.

[73] Email from Dhanushka Jayamaha, UNDP, Colombo, 22 February, and telephone interview, Colombo, 4 May 2006.

[74] Interview with Steen Wetlesen, Country Program Manager, DDG, Colombo, 28 February 2006.

[75] Telephone interviews with Tom Dibbs, South East Asia Desk Officer, HALO, 22 May and 12 June 2006; email from Tom Dibbs, HALO, 12 June 2006; email from Steve Pritchard, Program Manager, HALO Sri Lanka, 20 March 2006; email from Guy Willoughby, Director, HALO, 10 July 2006.

[76] Email from Rukshan Rathnama, Public Information Officer, UNDP, 29 April 2005.

[77] Email from Yasuhiro Ichishi, Project Manager, JCCP, 17 March 2006.

[78] Email from Dhanushka Jayamaha, UNDP, Colombo, 22 February, and telephone interview, Colombo, 4 May 2006.

[79] Telephone interview with Dhanushka Jayamaha, UNDP, Colombo, 24 March 2006. DDG stated that the 2005 accident did not cause injury, due to protective equipment. Email from Steen Wetlesen, DDG, Sri Lanka, 22 June 2006.

[80] Email from Steen Wetlesen, DDG Sri Lanka, 22 June 2006.

[81] UNDP, �Situation Report,� in email from Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 25 May 2006.

[82] Telephone interview with Capt. Thushara Jayawardena, SLA, Colombo, 23 May 2006.

[83] Telephone interview with David Hayter, MAG, Sri Lanka, 25 May 2006.

[84] Telephone interview with Steen Wetlesen, DDG, Sri Lanka, 25 May 2006.

[85] Telephone interview with Tom Dibbs, HALO, 22 May 2006.

[86] Email from Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 17 May 2006.

[87] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005, Support to Mine Risk Education, Survivor Assistance, and Advocacy in Sri Lanka,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 9.

[88] Interview with Eric Debert, MRE Officer, UNICEF, Colombo, 11 May 2005.

[89] Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 June 2005; email from Eric Debert, UNICEF, Sri Lanka, 12 May 2006.

[90] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 10.

[91] Emails from Eric Debert, UNICEF, Sri Lanka, 12 May and 23 June 2006.

[92] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 886, for details of UNICEF�s role and capacities.

[93] Email from Eric Debert, UNICEF, Sri Lanka, 12 May 2006.

[94] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 13.

[95] UNICEF/UNDP, �Sri Lanka, Mine/UXO Casualties, Overview Jan 2002 to June 2005,� Colombo, 11 October 2005, p. 6. The analysis of male casualties is based on 337 casualties from January 2002 to June 2005, p. 3; UNHCR, �Statistical Summary as at 31 December 2005, Refugees and Internally Displaced, Repatriation and Returns to and within Sri Lanka,� Colombo, undated, p. 1.

[96] Response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by David Hayter, MAG Sri Lanka, Colombo, 3 March 2006.

[97] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, pp. 11, 17-18; emails from Eric Debert, MRE Officer, UNICEF, Sri Lanka, 12 May and 23 June 2006.

[98] Interview with David Hayter, MAG, Colombo, 21 March 2006.

[99] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 9 (IMSMA database accessed 30 January 2006).

[100] Ibid, p. 10.

[101] Interview with Eric Debert, UNICEF, Colombo, 11 May 2005.

[102] Telephone Interview with Sri Shanmugam, MRE Coordinator, Sarvodaya, 8 March 2006; interview with Sarvodaya and Jaffna MRE team members, Jaffna, 16 May 2005.

[103] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 19.

[104] Ibid, pp. 9-10.

[105] Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 June 2005.

[106] Email from Eric Debert, UNICEF, Sri Lanka, 17 May 2006.

[107] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 12.

[108] Ibid, p. 10.

[109] Ibid, pp. 12, 14; see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 887.

[110] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, pp. 19-20.

[111] Response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by David Hayter, MAG, Colombo, 3 March 2006.

[112] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, pp. 21, 23. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 888, for details of quality assurance.

[113] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, pp. 9-10, 16.

[114] Ibid, pp. 8-9.

[115] UNICEF/UNDP, �Sri Lanka, Mine/UXO Casualties, Overview Jan 2002 to June 2005,� Colombo, 11 October 2005, pp. 3,4. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 888-889, for evaluations in 2004 and early 2005.

[116] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 889-890.

[117] Article 7 Report, Form J, 13 June 2005.

[118] Email from Katheryn Bennett, AusAID, 30 June 2006. A$1 = US$0.7627, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, �List of Exchange Rates (Annual),� 3 January 2006.

[119] Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2006; email from Alexander Kmentt, Deputy Director, Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: �1 = $1.2449, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, �List of Exchange Rates (Annual),� 3 January 2006.

[120] Mine Action Investments database; email from Rita Helmich-Olesen, Humanitarian Assistance & NGO Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = DKK5.9953. US Federal Reserve, �List of Exchange Rates (Annual),� 3 January 2006.

[121] Email from Laura Liguori, Security Policy Unit-Conventional Disarmament, European Commission, 20 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: �1 = $1.2449, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, �List of Exchange Rates (Annual),� 3 January 2006.

[122] Mine Action Investments database; email from Paula Sirki�, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 16 March 2006.

[123] Emails from Kitagawa Yasu, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), March-May 2006, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, 11 May 2005, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department, 11 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1= �110.11. US Federal Reserve, �List of Exchange Rates (Annual),� 3 January 2006.

[124] Email from Annette A. Landell-Mills, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 21 June 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = NOK6.4412, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, �List of Exchange Rates (Annual),� 3 January 2006.

[125] Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 May 2006; emails from Sara Brandt-Hansen, Desk Officer, Department for Global Security, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March-May 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = SEK7.4710. US Federal Reserve, �List of Exchange Rates (Annual),� 3 January 2006.

[126] Email from R�my Friedmann, Political Division IV, Human Security, Peace Policy, 28 April 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2459. US Federal Reserve, �List of Exchange Rates (Annual),� 3 January 2006. The Swiss Ministry of Defence also contributed an in-kind program manager to FSD Sri Lanka in 2005; email from Christoph Hebeisen, FSD, 20 June 2006.

[127] Email from Andrew Willson, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, Department for International Development, 20 March 2006. Average exchange rate for 2005: �1 = US$1.820, US Federal Reserve, �List of Exchange Rates (Annual),� 3 January 2006.

[128] USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2005, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 8 June 2006; email from H.Murphey McCloy Jr., Senior Military Advisor, US Department of State, 20 June 2006. 

[129] FSD, �Annual Report 2005,� p. 30; email from Ben Truniger, Deputy Director General, FSD, 22 May 2006. FSD exchange rate for 2005: US$1 = CHF1.2907.

[130] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 890.

[131] �Humanitarian Mine Action,� intervention by the Netherlands, Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 12 May 2006. The Netherlands� funding policy specifies the goal of promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty by directing funds primarily to States Parties. Statement by the Netherlands, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 28 November-2 December 2005.

[132] UN, �2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,� New York, p. 303.

[133] Interview with Eric Debert, UNICEF, Colombo, 21 February 2006; for more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1126 and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 891.

[134] Interview with Dhanushka Jayamaha, UNDP, Colombo, 22 February 2006.

[135] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 7.

[136] Interview with Dhanushka Jayamaha, UNDP, Colombo, 24 March 2006; email from Steen Wetlesen, DDG, Colombo, 22 June 2006.

[137] Email from Tim Horner, UNDP, Colombo, 27 June 2006; email from Mohamed Ashiff, Survivor Assistance Coordinator, Mine Action Office, Vanuniya, 27 June 2006.

[138] Telephone interview and fax from S.S. Pillai, Administrator, White Pigeon, Kilinochchi, 22 March 2006.

[139] Interview with Dhanushka Jayamaha, UNDP, Colombo, 22 February 2006; casualty data provided by Dhanushka Jayamaha, UNDP, Colombo, 30 April 2006.

[140] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 13.

[141] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 6.

[142] Ibid, p. 13.

[143] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, pp. 12, 21-22.

[144] International Organization for Migration, �Sri Lanka: Medical camps aid tsunami-affected communities,� Reliefweb, 21 April 2006, www.reliefweb.int, accessed 25 May 2006; Comit� d�Aide M�dicale, �D�une r�ponse d�urgence au soutien � la reconstruction du syst�me de sant� (From emergency response to the reconstruction of a health system),� Reliefweb, 25 April 2006, www.reliefweb.int, accessed 25 May 2006.

[145] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 891, for damage to the healthcare system caused by the tsunami. Examples of agencies involved in reconstruction of healthcare facilities are given in Direct Relief International, �Disaster Response, Sri Lanka,� www.directrelief.org.

[146] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 892.

[147] Caritas, �Situation Report � July 2005, Health, Human Development Centre (HUDEC) - Caritas Jaffna,� 13 August 2005, www.hudecjaffna.org, accessed 1 May 2006.

[148] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 19.

[149] Email from Matthieu Lefebvre, Program Coordinator, HI, Batticaloa, Sri Lanka, 6 April 2006.

[150] Email from Florent Milesi, Field Program Director, HI, Batticaloa, 25 May 2006.

[151] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005, Support to Mine Risk Education, Survivor Assistance, and Advocacy in Sri Lanka,� Colombo, April 2006, pp. 5, 14, 15; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 893.

[152] Email from N. Sivanatha, Administrative Secretary, Jaffna Jaipur Centre for Disability Rehabilitation, Jaffna, 11 April 2006; UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 15.

[153] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 13; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 894.

[154] Telephone interview with Michael Scott, Country Director, Cambodia Trust, Colombo, 22 February 2006; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 892.

[155] Interview with Thomas Keolker, Program Director, Motivation, Colombo, 15 March 2006.

[156] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Program, �Annual Report 2005,� (draft), Geneva, p. 8.

[157] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 892, for Motivation�s other partners in Sri Lanka.

[158] HOPE for Children, �Annual Review 2005: Sri Lanka,� www.hope-for-children.org, accessed 1 May 2006.

[159] Ministry of Nation Building and Development, �Strategy for Mine Action Sri Lanka,� Colombo, 26 January 2006, p. 19.

[160] US Department of State, �Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Sri Lanka,� Washington DC, 8 March 2006.

[161] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, p. 5.

[162] Ibid, p. 14; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 893.

[163] Telephone interview and fax from S.S. Pillai, White Pigeon, Kilinochchi, 22 March 2006.

[164] UNICEF, �Annual Report 2005,� Colombo, April 2006, pp. 14, 15.

[165] Direct Relief International, �Disaster Response, Sri Lanka,� www.directrelief.org, accessed 24 May 2006.

[166] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 892.

[167]Protection of the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities Act No 28 of 1996, www.dredf.org.

[168] Article 7 Report, Form J, 13 June 2005; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1129-1130; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 895.

[169] However, the grant has not been paid since 2002. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 892.

[170] Government Gazette, �Access to Common Places and Services by Persons with Disabilities, Regulation No. 1,� approved by the Cabinet of Ministers on 14 November 2005.

[171]Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka, �Report on the National Conference on Disability Rights,� Colombo, March 2006, pp. 2-3, 11-23.