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Table of Contents
Country Reports
Sub-Sections:
Lebanon, Landmine Monitor Report 2007

Lebanon

Mine Ban Treaty status

Not a State Party

Stockpile

Unknown

Contamination

APMs, AVMs, CBUs, other UXO

Estimated area of contamination

91.3 km2

Demining progress in 2006

Mined area clearance: 0.069 km2 (2005: 2 km2)

Battle area clearance of more than 95,000 CBUs after cessation of hostilities in August 2006

MRE capacity

Adequate

Mine/ERW casualties in 2006

Total: 207 (2005: 22)

Mines: 11 (2005: 3)

Cluster submunitions: 182 (2005: 6)

Other ERW: 4 (2005: 3)

IEDs: 10 (2005: 0)

Unknown devices: 0 (2005: 10)

Casualty analysis

Killed: 31 (17 civilians, 6 children, 8 military) (2005: 5)

Injured: 176 (102 civilians, 61 children, 13 military) (2005: 17)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

2,659

Availability of services in 2006

Emergency medical care: unchanged-inadequate

Other services: unchanged-inadequate

Mine action funding in 2006

International: $68,845,934//€54,800,553

(2005: $6,300,000)

(Lebanon received over 100% of UN Portfolio appeal)

National: $4,015,000/€3,195,893

Key developments since May 2006

The UN Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon accused Israel of laying antipersonnel mines during the July-August 2006 conflict in Lebanon. Israel denied the charge. A local Hezbollah commander allegedly ordered the use of antipersonnel mines in ambushes on at least two occasions. Fatah al-Islam reportedly used booby-traps during fighting in the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in 2007. Clearance of an estimated one million unexploded submunitions left by the Israeli invasion was the primary focus of demining operations from mid-2006; almost 120,000 submunitions had been disposed of by end-May. Lebanon approved a new national mine action policy in March 2007, transforming the National Demining Office into the Lebanon Mine Action Center. The 2006 conflict caused an upsurge in casualties, which data collection is inadequate to capture. A new mine action policy included survivor assistance but relied on NGOs for implementation with international donor support. Service provision was severely hampered by the 2006 conflict.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Lebanon has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Its long-held position has been that it is unable to join the treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel.[1] There were some important positive developments in 2005, but the July-August 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah appears to have stalled any further movement.[2]

On 6 December 2006 Lebanon abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 61/84, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. In October 2005 Lebanon had for the first time voted in favor of the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolution in the General Assembly First Committee, but it was subsequently absent from the final vote.[3] In June 2006 the ICBL’s Diplomatic Advisor, retired Ambassador Satnam Jit Singh, undertook a special advocacy mission to Lebanon. He met with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of the Armed Forces and other political, military and social leaders. The prime minister and army chief indicated that they were not averse to accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. The foreign minister said that Lebanon was giving serious consideration to accession, that interministerial consultations were underway, and it was only a matter of a time until Lebanon accedes to the treaty. All officials pointed to Israel’s position on landmines as being an obstacle.[4]

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 2005 initiated a process of consultations with the Lebanese army, Ministry of Defense and National Demining Office (NDO) regarding the ramifications of and procedures for accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. This process was, at the time, expected to lead to a recommendation to the government that Lebanon accede.[5]

In its 2005 annual report the NDO reported that it had completed position papers recommending the submission of a voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report, as well as accession to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.[6] No apparent action had been taken as of July 2007.

Lebanon attended the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2006, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2006 and April 2007. It made no statements at any of these meetings.[7]

In November 2004, Lebanon confirmed that it “has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.”[8] The Lebanese army stockpiles an unknown number of antipersonnel mines.

Use

The UN component of the Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon (MACC SL) accused Israel of laying antipersonnel mines during the July-August 2006 conflict in Lebanon. The accusation came after two mine incidents near the town of Deir Mimas in November 2006, in which deminers and medical staff were injured.[9]

MACC SL said that its investigation “confirms that these mines were laid during the recent conflict by Israeli troops with intent to interdict access to the immediate area.”[10] The UN reported that “from the condition of the mine and the earth surrounding the mine, it is clear that the mine was laid recently. Prior to the conflict, the area in question had been actively used by local villagers.”[11] The area was demined completely between 2002 and 2004.[12] The mines in the Deir Mimas incidents were identified as Israeli No. 4 antipersonnel mines.[13]

Anonymous Israel Defense Forces (IDF) sources expressed skepticism to the media that the mines were laid by Israeli forces and posited, “It could be a Hezbollah or Syrian land mine and the land mine might not even be from the latest conflict.”[14] In April 2007 a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that “to this day, Israel is not aware of any use of landmines in the last conflict in Lebanon.”[15] In its annual CCW Amended Protocol II report, Israel states, “There were no newly emplaced minefields this year.”[16]

There were two other incidents in Lebanon where individual antipersonnel mines with IDF markings were used in explosive ambushes. These incidents occurred near the town of Kfar Shooba and south of the town of Fraidiss. Knowledgeable sources told Landmine Monitor a local Hezbollah commander was likely responsible, acting on his own initiative.

Peacekeeping troops from the UN Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) encountered antipersonnel mines with IDF markings both buried individually (No. 4 mines, not laid as part of a classic tactical minefield) and installed with tripwire detonation devices (No. 4 and M18/M18A1 Claymores). These were being used to initiate explosive ambushes known as “traps” along trails. 

Referring to one of these incidents, the UN Secretary-General reported, “On 5 December 2006, a UNIFIL patrol came across a significant number of mortar shells and rockets in the general area of Kafr Shuba and informed the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces]. The following day, a UNIFIL patrol revisited the area and discovered five, apparently newly laid, booby trapped or mined obstacles in the same location. UNIFIL dismantled the obstacles and the LAF confiscated the ammunition.”[17]

Photographic evidence provided to Landmine Monitor shows two emplaced No. 4 antipersonnel mines, a No. 4 mine laid on top of an 81mm mortar round linked to a tripwire, and three M18/M18A1 Claymore type mines attached to tripwires. The mines were laid along a series of footpaths and were apparently intended to protect the approaches to the living area for the crew of a nearby mortar/rocket firing position. The tripwire fuzes were of the Soviet manufactured MUV pull type and were connected to the mines by detonating cord, reportedly of Iranian manufacture. The detonating cord appeared to be new and showed no signs of weathering.[18]

Another series of photographs provided to Landmine Monitor details another ambush site approximately six kilometers from Kafr Shuba that was reportedly set up at nearly the same time. Another UNIFIL patrol encountered five “booby-traps” emplaced along a well-traveled path approximately two kilometers south of the town of Fraidiss. The booby-traps consisted of tripwires with MUV pull type fuzes, five chest-high metal posts to rig the tripwires, three No. 4 antipersonnel mines, two blocks of explosives, and the same type of detonating cord used in the Kafr Shuba incident.[19]

At the end of May 2007 fighting erupted in the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese army. Fatah al-Islam is reported to have booby-trapped buildings throughout the camp, in addition to laying unspecified mines and roadside bombs.[20] As of late July fighting continued on a regular basis, despite the Lebanese army’s declaration on 21 June that the war was over.[21] During this period a major part of the Lebanese army’s operations consisted of clearing booby-traps and clearing buildings of explosive materials.[22] One army source said that Fatah al-Islam “booby-trapped everything.”[23] The use of explosive booby-traps that are victim-activated is prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty because they function like antipersonnel mines.

The Lebanese army sustained numerous casualties as a result of booby-traps. On 15 June 2007 six soldiers were killed by an explosion in a booby-trapped building.[24] Four other soldiers were killed the same day while trying to defuse booby-traps in another building.[25] On 21 July three soldiers on a demining mission were killed by a booby-trap blast.[26]

In anticipation of the return of refugees to Nahr al-Bared, UNICEF, the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and other organizations launched extensive public awareness campaigns to warn civilians about unexploded ordnance, booby-traps and mines.[27]

Landmine and ERW Problem

Lebanon is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW) including cluster submunitions, booby-traps and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). Mines and explosive ordnance were used extensively from the beginning of the civil war in 1975 until the end of the Israeli occupation in 2000.[28] The 2003 Landmine Impact Survey found 306 mine-impacted communities affected by 933 mine and UXO contaminated sites over an estimated 137 square kilometers of contaminated land.[29] When Israel withdrew from South Lebanon in May 2000 it left behind some 400,000 landmines. To significantly reduce the contamination, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) supported Operation Emirates Solidarity Project (OES), which provided the operational capacity to clear some 60,000 landmines between 2001 and 2004. After the 2006 conflict, the UAE renewed the OES project and committed to clear remaining landmines and booby-traps in Area 6 by the end of 2007. This will leave South Lebanon mine-free, except for mines laid along or adjacent to the Blue Line.[30]

The war between Israel and Hezbollah from 12 July to 14 August 2006 resulted in significant new contamination. Since the cease-fire, it has been estimated that approximately four million cluster submunitions were fired on Lebanon, of which up to one million did not detonate; Israel has admitted to firing only 1.2 million submunitions.[31] However, after 12 months of clearance activities, this estimate was adjusted to about 500,000 unexploded submunitions.[32] Despite numerous calls by UN senior officials, including the Secretary-General, for information regarding the firing data, as of mid-August 2007 Israel had not provided detailed strike information on the type, quantity and location of cluster bombs dropped.[33] As of 31 May 2007 904 cluster bomb strike locations had been recorded, initially contaminating 36.6 square kilometers. By that date, according to the UN Secretary-General, clearance operations had already removed 28 percent of the surface and 15 percent of the sub-surface contamination, destroying 117,872 submunitions.[34] Between April and July 2007 an additional 59 cluster strike locations were identified by MACC SL, which increased the estimate of the initially contaminated area to 37.1 square kilometers.[35] The initial estimate of some 32 million square meters of contaminated land when operational planning began after the war had risen to 34 million square meters by February 2007 and 37.5 million square meters as of 31 July 2007.[36]

The UN further estimated that, in addition to cluster munitions, approximately 15,300 other items of UXO fell on the ground in South Lebanon. This ordnance includes air-dropped 500lb to 2,000lb bombs (found in residential areas), artillery rounds and air-delivered rockets.[37] Most of the contamination was in the south, but areas in the center and north of Lebanon were also contaminated by unexploded bombs dropped in the July-August 2006 war.[38]

In addition, a new, small “nuisance” minefield was discovered in 2006 in Deir Mimas, which the National Demining Office and the UN component of MACC SL allege was laid by Israeli forces.[39] As of February 2007, remaining contaminated areas throughout Lebanon were estimated to total 91.3 square kilometers, of which 65 square kilometers were minefields, and 26 square kilometers were still contaminated with submunitions from the war with Israel in 2006.

Mine and UXO contamination in Lebanon resulted in a large number of casualties, the vast majority of which were caused by submunitions.[40] Some 26 percent of the affected area was agricultural land.[41] On 30 August 2006 the UN Undersecretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs stated that the cluster bombs “have affected large areas, lots of homes, lots of farmland, lots of commercial businesses and shops.”[42] According to the British NGO Landmine Action, approximately 60 percent of Israeli cluster strikes hit built-up areas, blocking water supplies, disrupting work to restore powerlines and preventing the removal of rubble. Unexploded cluster munitions prevented or endangered the harvesting of remaining tobacco, olive, wheat and fruit crops and would prevent or endanger the replanting of winter grain and vegetable crops. Landmine Action also claimed that the massive clear-up operation means that fewer resources would be available for other humanitarian needs.[43]

In May 2007 fighting between the Lebanese military and Islamic militants in Nahr al-Bared refugee camp resulted in additional UXO and the laying of booby-traps by Fatah al-Islam.[44] This obstructed the efforts of humanitarian aid workers to assist up to 8,000 Palestinian refugees caught up in the combat.[45] As of July 2007 it was still not possible for the estimated 35,000 displaced people to return.[46]

Mine Action Program

The Lebanese National Mine Action Authority is an interministerial body responsible for mine action policy. It decided to take full national ownership of mine action management by the end of 2007, including an independent quality management system and national operations center for mine clearance.[47] However, on 8 May 2007 the Lebanon Mine Action Center director requested MACC SL to maintain its liaison function between UNIFIL and the LAF, to maintain its current structure and to provide technical, operational and strategic advice to the LAF Engineering Regiment and LMAC throughout 2008. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) agreed that MACC SL would remain until the end of 2008.[48]

The National Demining Office, a part of the Lebanese Armed Forces, is responsible for implementing the mine action strategy and coordinating, managing and implementing all mine action.[49] As of early 2007 the NDO reported that it was holding monthly meetings with relevant stakeholders in the ministries, municipalities and with village mukhtars (local leaders) to discuss prioritization of tasks.[50]

In 2006 the NDO drafted a mine action policy which gave it responsibility for the “management” of the mine action program. This was approved in May 2007.[51] In accordance with the new policy, the NDO was renamed the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), under the command of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Lebanese Armed Forces.[52]

The Mine Action Coordination Center South Lebanon is responsible for the area below the Litani River and Nabatiyah/Jezzine.[53] MACC SL provides planning, coordination and quality-assurance support to mine action operations in South Lebanon, including UNIFIL’s area of operations.[54] In the south, MACC SL conducts accreditation on behalf of the NDO.[55]

MACC SL is a tripartite structure comprising the UN, Lebanese Armed Forces and United Arab Emirates representation, with approximately 49 people, 29 of whom are international staff. As of 16 August 2007 MACC SL’s implementing partners employed 1,070 national and 246 international staff.[56] The UN component is called the UNMACC. MACC SL was due to hand over responsibility for the south to the LMAC by end-2008.[57]

Through coordination with UNIFIL, MACC SL gained agreement from the Force Commander for explosive ordnance disposal/battle area clearance teams to contribute to the humanitarian clearance of cluster munitions and other UXO within the UNIFIL area of operations. Around 60 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and battle area clearance (BAC) teams from UNIFIL, contractors and NGOs were under the direct coordination of MACC SL following the end of the conflict in August 2006.[58]

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) has supported the institutional development of the NDO (now LMAC), especially its management capacity, through a chief technical advisor and a national mine action program officer since 2003.[59]

LMAC and MACC SL use version 3 of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), with MACC SL managing the data in its area of responsibility. All the data is synchronized periodically so that the LMAC and MACC SL databases are fully updated. The UNIFIL Demining Coordination Cell has a read-only IMSMA terminal.[60]

Veterans for America (VFA), formerly Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), was given emergency funding by the US Department of State for information management support after the conflict. VFA’s iMMAP (Information Management and Mine Action Program) produced maps combining information from cluster bombs, mines or other UXO with infrastructure such as destroyed or damaged bridges, cratered roads, debris and barriers for use by humanitarian organizations.[61]

In May 2007 Lebanon approved a new mine action policy intended to strengthen national capacity for mine action and “ensure increased transparency in the setting of national mine action priorities.” The new policy also describes Lebanon’s aspiration to become a State Party to CCW Protocol II and the Mine Ban Treaty.[62]

National mine action standards for Lebanon were under development in early 2007. The NDO had started working on standards in mid-2006, but the work was placed on hold when the war started.[63] Mine action is said to be conducted to international standards.[64]

Strategic Mine Action Planning

The End-State Strategy of Mine Action in Lebanon, drafted in 2004, remained in force in 2007.[65] It was an attempt to integrate mine action with the country’s overall development strategy, and sought to create a national capacity to deal with residual contamination after the mine action program has been completed.[66]

Lebanon had also adopted a 2005-2009 Long Term Plan but by 2007, LMAC had ceased all mine action activities based on this, in order to concentrate on cluster munitions and UXO clearance after the 2006 conflict. In 2007 Lebanon issued a new Long Term Plan for 2008-2012 to reflect the 2006 conflict and clearance scheduled for 2007. A primary goal was to address contamination in all high and medium impacted communities indicated in the 2003 Landmine Impact Survey.[67]

By February 2007 MACC SL had developed a 2007 operational plan for mine/UXO clearance in South Lebanon.[68] According to UNMAS, the objective was to have South Lebanon free of the impact of mines and cluster munitions by December 2007, except for the UN-delineated Blue Line along the Lebanese border with Israel, provided that the necessary funding was available. By the end of 2007, UNMACC expected to have cleared 30 of the original 32 million square meters, close to its initial goal. In absence of detailed cluster strike information, UNMACC considers that up to 10 million square meters remains to be cleared in 2008.[69]

Integration of Mine Action with Reconstruction and Development

MACC SL has five community liaison officers who gather information at a local level to prioritize areas for clearance. Priorities in 2006 were based on area recovery after the cease-fire and the support of relief missions. The next priorities were areas near houses and blocked infrastructure, then agriculture. Agricultural land is prioritized according to the crop seasons. The community liaison officers bring local officials to the area before, during and after clearance.[70]

Evaluation of Mine Action

A review of the NDO mine action program was undertaken by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining in May 2006. Although it concluded that Lebanon had “a finite and definable mine problem.… With political will and adequate (reasonably modest) resources it would still be possible to deal with the majority of the mine problem within a short time frame (5 years).” It was superseded by the conflict in July 2006. [71]

A comprehensive review of UNMAS activities in Lebanon found that the overall response was rapid and effective, despite the lack of early contingency planning, and that the UN rapid response framework was well-suited to large, high-profile emergencies. Areas for improvement included coordination where different UN agencies have independent mine action responsibilities and an increased emphasis on mine risk education, which was found to have been overwhelmed by the rush of returnees in the days immediately following the end of the conflict.[72]

Demining

Immediately after the July-August 2006 war, clearance, EOD and information gathering was carried out by the Lebanese Armed Forces, UNMACC, UNIFIL and several NGOs.[73] In addition, there were approximately nine international organizations operational in Lebanon in 2006-2007. In February 2007 MACC SL reported a total of 61 BAC teams, 8 EOD teams, 16 demining teams, three flail teams, three mine detection dog teams and five mechanical support teams.[74]

The LAF Engineering Regiment’s demining teams were involved in clearance in 2006 and continued in 2007, with other sections of the army.[75]

All humanitarian clearance in South Lebanon is coordinated through MACC SL. UNIFIL’s existing demining unit became involved in humanitarian clearance after mid-2006, and several countries sent troops to support humanitarian clearance. They go through the same accreditation process as the other operators; as of mid-July 2007 there were 10 demining and battle area clearance teams from seven countries accredited by MACC SL.[76]

In 2006 several NGOs were involved in EOD and BAC in South Lebanon: Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Handicap International (HI), the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and DanChurchAid. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) also conducted humanitarian clearance. Commercial companies working in Lebanon include BACTEC, ArmorGroup and RONCO.[77]

Local people have also engaged in clearing UXO since the 2006 war ended, despite mine risk education campaigns and appeals to leave this work to the experts. One individual was shown on Lebanese TV claiming to have disarmed 13,000 bomblets without charge, as a service to neighbors.[78] According to MACC SL, “In some cases they have tried to clear the bomblets themselves, and some people have begun charging a small fee to clear away bombs, a practice that officials have discouraged as dangerous. But people are desperate.”[79] Local clearance makes it harder for the professional operators to clear, as it removes evidence indicating what the strike pattern is.[80] Although the level of local clearance is said to have reduced, operators report that it was still happening in early 2007.

There have been many reports that Hezbollah cleared UXO immediately after the conflict. The NDO and MACC SL deny that clearance was conducted officially by Hezbollah, but point out that Hezbollah members are part of the local community and may have conducted clearance in that capacity.[81] In November 2006 Hezbollah made its first statement that units were formed to clear cluster submunitions.[82] In August 2007 Hassan Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah, stated that during the previous year Hezbollah members cleared 40,000 cluster bombs and lost five “experts” during these clearance activities.[83] It is not known if Hezbollah clearance operations were conducted according to national or international standards, and all of these areas are being re-checked.

Identification of Affected Areas

As of mid-2007 Israel continued to refuse to provide detailed information on cluster munitions strikes from Israel. During 2006 the IDF provided maps of minefields laid in South Lebanon before its withdrawal in 2000. UNIFIL turned the maps over to MACC SL and Lebanese army for review.[84]

The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) conducted in 2002-2003 by MAG was certified by UNMAS in September 2004 and released in August 2005. The LIS data has been entered into the NDO/LMAC and MACC SL databases. VFA supported the NDO in the use of LIS data in planning and prioritization.[85]

A nationwide technical survey began in 2005, undertaken by the NDO and the Army Engineering Regiment, with the support of RONCO. It was based on LIS results and was expected to last 24 months. A total of 9.8 square kilometers of suspected area had been surveyed by May 2006, resulting in the cancellation of 7.2 square kilometers as being not contaminated. The United States provided equipment and training for technical survey and area reduction, in collaboration with RONCO in 2005. In 2006, RONCO added a new category of “skip areas,” which are not surveyed either because they are being cleared or are politically sensitive (for example, Palestinian military bases). The technical survey was abruptly halted in July 2006 by the war, and clearance of cluster munition contamination took over as a priority. The NDO planned to recommence technical survey work in 2007.[86]

Marking and Fencing

According to the NDO in February 2007, 95 percent of known mined areas are marked and fenced. MACC SL stated that in Area 6 (Nabatiyah and Jezzine) all known minefields are fenced and marked, but technical survey is required on the other suspected areas.[87] BACTEC confirmed in February 2007 that not all the areas where it was working were marked and fenced.[88] MAG noted that local people tend to remove minefield marking; the UN-delineated Blue Line was fenced but it was taken away by locals.[89]

The marking of cluster munition strike areas is said not to be feasible because of the size of the area contaminated, and because the perimeter of the area contaminated is not known. Many of the strikes overlap.[90]

Mine/ERW Clearance in 2006

Prior to the conflict in July-August 2006, two areas of South Lebanon were contaminated with landmines and ERW: the Blue Line bordering Israel and the area north of the Litani River (Area 6). MACC SL completed surveys in Area 6 to cancel or confirm contaminated areas. Between January and June, MACC SL clearance operations with the LAF and MAG resulted in 69,435 square meters of land being cleared and handed over to local communities.[91] Destruction included 312 antipersonnel mines, 47 antivehicle mines and 143 items of UXO.[92]

All mine clearance activities were suspended in July 2006, with efforts being redirected towards rapid response EOD. While limited mine clearance restarted in Area 6 in October, the focus throughout South Lebanon remained clearance of unexploded submunitions. All staff involved in operations, quality assurance and community liaison were reorganized into reconnaissance teams and tasked to systematically move throughout South Lebanon locating cluster bomb strikes in the absence of IDF firing data. According to UNMAS, the existing community liaison system provided a regular flow of information that greatly assisted in identifying strike locations.[93]

As of 31 December 2006 some 3.4 square kilometers of affected areas had been cleared, resulting in the destruction of 94,544 submunitions, 7,462 other items of UXO and 449 other unexploded bombs. MACC SL teams (ArmorGroup, BACTEC, MAG, NPA and SRSA) cleared 24,306 submunitions; UNIFIL contingents (Chinbatt, Frenchbatt, Italbatt, Spanbatt, Belubatt, Turkbatt and Finbatt) cleared 15,418 submunitions; and the LAF cleared 54,820 submunitions.[94] Battle area clearance teams were tasked to clear cluster munitions based on priorities starting with homes, schools, roads and hospitals. The teams then prioritized clearing agricultural areas.[95]

During the last quarter of 2006, eight deminers were killed and 17 injured in a number of demining and submunition accidents involving clearance organizations and LAF teams.[96] In the minefield alleged to have been laid by Israel in 2006, there were three accidents. BACTEC had one accident in the minefield resulting in injury. ArmorGroup had an accident in the same location resulting in injury to two staff members. MAG had three accidents in 2006 (one outside working hours).[97]

Quality Management and Land Release

Each organization has its own internal quality management system. External quality management is conducted by the NDO or MACC SL depending on the area of operation. The LAF has a sampling team which conducts quality management. MACC SL has a quality assurance department with 13 officers; they avoid sampling as they believe that this sends the wrong message and instead use confirmation. For demining MACC SL uses dogs and machines as quality control.[98]

In the north and center of Lebanon, areas are handed over by the headquarters of the army and delivered to the mukhtar and head of the municipality.[99] In MACC SL areas of responsibility there is a completion officer who checks the task. Usually the handover is conducted with a representative from the villages, the mukhtar and the landowner who sign a document to confirm they have received the cleared land.[100] Areas cleared of cluster munition contamination have not been formally handed over yet, and the methodology has still to be decided. It may be necessary to “hand over” whole villages at a time.[101]

MACC SL subscribes to the post-clearance review process, based on socioeconomic studies conducted prior to clearance. At least 95 percent of people are said to be confident that the land is safe. If they are not using it fully and efficiently, then MACC SL tries to identify reasons and develops potential livelihood projects to seek funding.[102]

Mine/ERW Clearance in 2007

Clean-up of unexploded cluster munitions continued in the south in early 2007. During the first quarter, 4,934,124 square meters of the surface and 834,731 square meters of the sub-surface were cleared, locating and destroying over 113,000 unexploded cluster munitions.[103] In addition, from January to end-May 164,689 square meters of mined areas were cleared, destroying 157 antipersonnel mines, five antivehicle mines and 79 items of UXO.[104]

In early March 2007 a joint UNDP/MACC SL project funded by the UN Trust Fund for Human Security began, fielding two BAC teams trained by MAG to conduct unexploded submunitions clearance around the village of Maifadoun (Area 6), one of the areas most affected by cluster munitions in South Lebanon; the project was funded for two years.[105]

As of July 2007 the LMAC, MAG and UN Relief and Works Agency had issued plans for the clearance of UXO and possible improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the Nahr al-Bared Camp in northern Lebanon. MAG was to conduct clearance inside the area known as the Old Camp and the LAF would clear all remaining areas, with LMAC coordinating both activities. Clearance was expected to take at least a month.[106]

Mine Risk Education

Mine risk education (MRE) in Lebanon was conducted by national and international NGOs, which significantly increased their coverage in response to the July-August 2006 war and the May 2007 Nahr al-Bared crisis. Local NGOs with a network of 318 MRE activists (increased from 200 in 2005), the World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) and mine clearance organizations provided MRE and community liaison, coordinated by the NDO. International NGOs newly involved in MRE in Lebanon after the 2006 war were DanChurchAid, Handicap International and INTERSOS.

The Lebanon Mine Resource Center (LMRC) at the Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of Balamand provided training support.[107] NPA, WRF and UNICEF continued to support MRE in Lebanon technically and financially.

When the cease-fire was declared on 14 August 2006 an “urgent appeal” on the dangers of UXO to civilians was issued by UNICEF, UNDP and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); warnings about approaching “suspicious objects” were also issued by the army and Hezbollah. The Islamic Risala Scouts Association distributed 100,000 MRE flyers at checkpoints for the returnees the day of the cease-fire.[108] NPA placed 350 banners at the entrances to villages affected by cluster submunitions, as part of the emergency interventions developed by the National Steering Committee.[109] MACC SL disseminated threat information, provided landmine/ERW safety briefings and included community liaison as part of demining/EOD and data gathering.[110] In response to the emergency situation MACC SL restructured staff into reconnaissance teams, which in addition to locating strike sites, informed locals to avoid and report any suspect devices.[111]

In October-November 2006 all areas affected in the south, some 150 villages, were covered by national NGOs; in total 300,000 people (135,000 children) received MRE.[112] Capacity-building of the NGOs involved in MRE provision continued throughout 2006; seven training workshops were held, all co-financed by NPA, UNICEF and LMRC.[113]

The Lebanese army through its NDO and Engineer Regiment also provided more than 30 MRE presentations in villages, schools and organizations in South Lebanon and West Bekaa.[114]

Mines Advisory Group reinforced its capacity including community liaison and informal MRE, with the addition of several Lebanese staff. From January to June 2007 MAG teams undertook data collection, liaison before, during and at handover of cleared land, and quality control. These activities led to 20 minefield information reports, 48 UXO tasking requests and nine dangerous area reports.[115]

INTERSOS, in partnership with UNICEF, started social protection activities including MRE for and by children and youth in Tyre and Nabatiyah districts in September 2006. It implemented MRE by creating two child friendly spaces, and by working in schools and villages 6,500 children were reached in 230 sessions in child friendly spaces and 110 in schools during 2006. Additionally, two mobile teams with nine educators started operating in January 2007 aiming to reach schools and women.[116]

From December 2006 to July 2007 the World Rehabilitation Fund implemented an emergency MRE project in South Lebanon in collaboration with the LMRC, NDO and local NGOs. Direct MRE interventions were undertaken through community and school meetings in high-risk villages, as well as puppet theater and MRE clubs using the child-to-child approach. WRF also employed indirect approaches in two billboard campaigns covering all of South Lebanon each lasting three weeks.[117]

DanChurchAid started MRE in support of the NDO in February 2007, focusing on Palestinian communities in South Lebanon and 21 designated villages, concentrating on children with direct sessions using role plays, puppet shows and materials. From February to May 2007 four National Days against Cluster Munitions, financially supported by UNICEF and NPA, were organized in Tyre, Bint Jbeil, Nabatiyah and Hasbaya, reaching about 15,500 people.[118]

In spite of prevention and clearance efforts there were more than 200 casualties from August 2006 to May 2007 (almost half of all casualties recorded in Lebanon since May 2000).[119] Typical risk-taking behavior included “reconnaissance of home and workplace,” seemingly including deliberate handling and removing of submunitions. Other causes ranking high were farming and herding; scrap metal trade did not figure highly but previously caused most incidents prior to the 34 day war.[120] INTERSOS described the difficulty in promoting behavioral change in adults regarding tampering with UXO; the high threat from cluster submunitions is different from what they were used to before the war (mostly antipersonnel mines in known areas). To address this category of risk-takers, INTERSOS enlarged its MRE activities in 2007.[121]

From 20 May 2007 the conflict between militants and the Lebanese army in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli created a new threat from UXO and booby-traps, particularly for some 35,000 Palestinian refugees wanting to return as quickly as possible to their camp. UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) launched campaigns to raise awareness of the dangers posed by UXO. UNICEF, NPA and LMRC trained UNRWA staff and social workers/volunteers from UNICEF and NPA partners in North Lebanon to teach young people in Beddawi camp to avoid and report ERW.[122] Context-specific flyers, posters and banners were also produced for the displaced population.[123] The ICRC together with Lebanese Red Cross and Palestinian Red Crescent volunteers distributed 25,000 UXO awareness brochures in Beddawi camp and in schools hosting Nahr al-Bared refugees in Tripoli.[124] UNRWA disseminated information via a local satellite channel.[125]

FSD, Canada Fund and Save the Children sponsored the production of a special MRE issue of a magazine for children produced by the University of Balamand in Arabic, English and French; Canada Fund sponsored the production of an MRE game.[126] UNICEF, NPA and LMRC made efforts to integrate MRE in the national school curriculum. MRE school sessions were held in 293 schools targeting all age groups in April and May 2007; the sessions were co-funded by NPA and UNICEF, and implemented by local NGO members of the National Steering Committee.[127]

Under the 2007 mine action policy, LMAC will define MRE priorities “in order to limit the risk of injuries through the dissemination of effective prevention measures.” Within this framework the LMAC will chair the MRE Steering Committee consisting of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Social Affairs and MRE implementers who have a Memorandum of Understanding with LMAC. The main aims of the committee are to reduce mine/ERW casualties through MRE to the general public in accordance with national standards and adequate priority-setting.[128]

Landmine/ERW/IED Casualties

Landmine Monitor has been unable to obtain reliable statistics on the number of mine/ERW/IED casualties in 2006-2007 from stakeholders in Lebanon, due to the crisis situation after the conflict; other factors appear to be lack of cooperation between stakeholders, lack of verification and difficulties in providing casualty data by calendar year. According to the Lebanon Mine Action Center, which is the national repository of casualty data, there were at least 207 mine/ERW/IED casualties (31 killed and 176 injured) from January to December 2006. At least 67 of the casualties were children and 119 were adult civilian men; 21 were Lebanese military personnel. Cluster submunitions caused 182 casualties, antipersonnel mines seven, antivehicle mines four, other ERW four and IEDs 10.[129]

However, for the period 14 August 2006 to 23 July 2007, monthly LMAC/UNDP updates provide the exact same number of child casualties (67) and LAF casualties (21); the breakdown for adult male casualties was also exactly the same (17 male civilian adults killed and 102 injured);[130] making the accuracy of casualty data provided questionable. Total casualties between August 2006 and July 2007 as recorded by LMAC/UNDP were 248 (21 military and 227 civilian). During this same period of time MACC SL recorded 205 civilian casualties in South Lebanon (21 killed and 184 injured), 21 LAF casualties and 16 civilian clearance casualties (UNIFIL Demining Coordination Cell: six; ArmorGroup, BACTEC and MAG: three each; SRSA: one).[131] Of the civilian casualties, 173 were due to cluster submunitions.[132]

Landmine Monitor estimated there may be an additional 73 casualties from sources supplying information to the LMAC casualty database, media reports and research reports. This means that there could be up to 280 mine/ERW/IED casualties in Lebanon in 2006; the vast majority were civilian (244 or 87 percent).[133] This is more than a tenfold increase from 2005 (22 new casualties, all civilians). The NDO reportedly recorded 26 casualties in 2005 (five killed and 21 injured).[134] The increase in 2006 is solely due to the July-August conflict and the unexploded cluster submunitions littering South Lebanon or reportedly newly emplaced landmines, as only four casualties were reported prior to the conflict.

The 2005 casualty rate was itself a significant increase from 2004 (14 casualties).[135] In 2005 the NDO attributed the increase in casualties to the economic situation, landowners reclaiming fenced land which had not been cleared, and an upsurge in the scrap metal trade.[136]

Landmine Monitor analysis identified at least 221 casualties due to unexploded cluster submunitions in 2006. Four additional casualties identified by Landmine Monitor were due to antipersonnel mines; seven casualties were due to antivehicle mines, and 23 due to unspecified mines. Foreign peacekeepers and clearance personnel from Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the UK were among the casualties. Among the civilian casualties there were Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi citizens. At least 11 IDF soldiers were casualties of mines in Lebanon (six killed and five injured). On 12 July four soldiers were killed in an antivehicle mine incident.[137] On 24 July one soldier was killed and two injured when their tank drove over a mine near Bint Jbeil.[138] On 23 August one soldier died and three were injured when they walked into an old IDF minefield two kilometers from the northern border with Israel.[139]

Two expatriate deminers and a Lebanese medical officer were injured by antipersonnel mines when entering what they believed to be a cluster munition strike area on 24 November 2006. The next day, another deminer was injured by an antipersonnel mine in the same area.[140] Several Hezbollah militants were said to be injured or killed in clearance activities immediately after the cease-fire; this was confirmed by both Hezbollah and local authorities but denied by the national government.[141]

The Landmine Resource Center recorded four mine/ERW casualties prior to the conflict.[142] It is impossible to determine if these were included in LMAC casualty statistics.

The US Department of State reported seven people killed due to landmines before the conflict and 19 after, including eight deminers.[143]

Casualties continued to occur in 2007. Landmine Monitor identified at least 59 new mine/ERW casualties by the end of July, including 14 killed and 30 injured; insufficient information was provided to determine the status of the others. Within this total the LMRC recorded at least 28 cluster submunition casualties and one antipersonnel landmine casualty.[144] LMAC did not provide casualty data requested, and referred to the regular UNDP casualty updates which indicated there were at least 39 mine/ERW casualties by 23 July. However these updates do not provide calendar year information and aggregated information does not allow extrapolation of the number of people killed and injured, gender, types of device or civilian/military status for 2006 or 2007.[145] UNIFIL recorded six clearance accidents in which one French deminer was killed, and one Chinese and four Belgian EOD experts were injured.[146] Thirteen LAF personnel were killed in three booby-trap incidents in June and July.[147] In June a Zimbabwean deminer was injured by a landmine.[148]

Cluster Submunition Casualties

As most people left South Lebanon prior to 10 August 2006, this undoubtedly reduced the number of civilian cluster submunitions casualties during the conflict. Only two casualties due to an unexploded cluster submunition have been identified by Landmine Monitor during the conflict period: an 11 year-old boy and his father were injured when their motorcycle drove over a failed submunition on the road near Tyre on 11 August 2006. In addition, at least 16 cluster submunitions casualties (four killed, 12 injured) occurred during strikes in the 2006 conflict, nine were children; they have not been included in the totals, because they were a direct result of strikes. These records do not include up to 30 unconfirmed cluster submunition casualties occurring during or shortly after the conflict, or up to 145 people treated by UNIFIL, or Hezbollah casualties caused during cluster munitions strikes or clearance activities.[149]

In the first month after the cease-fire, there were on average three cluster submunition casualties per day, which dropped to an average of two per day by the end of 2006 and two per week as of January 2007. In June 2007 the rate dropped to one per week. Prior to the 2006 conflict, there were on average two new cluster submunitions casualties per year.[150]

The most common activities of civilians at the time of the cluster submunitions incident were house reconnaissance, especially immediately after the cease-fire (79) and livelihood activities (45) or just walking in the village (29). Shepherds were especially at risk, as pasture lands have not been identified as priority areas for clearance. The majority of civilian casualties occurred in Tyre (70), Nabatiyah (66) and Bint Jbeil (31).[151]

Civilian foreign workers, mainly Palestinians and Syrians, were said to be at risk of becoming casualties due to the nature of their work, being day laborers who need to work in contaminated land for a living. However, casualty data does not accurately report on the number of foreign casualties, because many of them do not have adequate insurance to receive treatment or are afraid to be evicted from the country. In 2006 only five foreign casualties were reported.[152] It was reported that they were asked to carry out ‘artisanal clearance’ of cluster submunitions on farmland. Various sources reported that farmers “are paying approximately US$6.50 per bomblet for “artisanal” bomb disposal in order to resume farming.” This task was, according to various sources, carried out by the poorest agricultural laborers including Palestinians “as they will be too desperate not to accept work to clear the fields.”[153]

Data Collection

The NDO/LMAC IMSMA database, supported by UNDP, is the national repository of casualty data and receives information from the LMRC, MACC SL and MRE providers. The LMRC and MACC SL each have a casualty data collection system, but do not appear to exchange information. Reportedly, the NDO/LMAC database is synchronized regularly with information received from the field.[154]

MACC SL collects data in South Lebanon via its community liaison officers and clearance teams. Data on casualties occurring after the 2006 conflict contained the minimum necessary information. MACC SL was in the process of re-surveying and verification as of March 2007. Unconfirmed casualties were also recorded pending verification.[155]

LMRC continuously updates its database by visiting new casualties and verifying and re-surveying previously recorded casualties and affected communities. It developed a new data collection form which includes detailed information on the incident, services received and living standards of the casualty and/or family. However, detailed data does not seem to be collected systematically and verified. There also is a lack of systematic use of terminology for data entering, impeding meaningful analysis. In December 2006 it was decided that LMRC should extend its mine/ERW casualty survey to those injured and killed after the 2006 cease-fire. As of January data was collected in conjunction with MRE.[156]

Data collection was considered to be nearly complete prior to the 2006 conflict. But the post-conflict situation severely hampered data collection and several groups, such as foreign workers, foreign military and Hezbollah members are not adequately included in the databases or not recorded as such. Several casualties due to mines are likely erroneously recorded as cluster submunition casualties; for example, one database recorded the international clearance staff injured in antipersonnel mine incidents in November 2006 as cluster submunition casualties.

Further inconsistencies in the spelling of names, and in ages, activities at the time of the incident and incident dates were identified. None of the casualty data collectors possessed all the information on foreign deminers or peacekeepers.

The new 2007 mine action policy states that the information management system is to be used for decision-making and planning of mine action including survivor assistance. However, it is also stated that the information is “strictly controlled by the LMAC” and that information will be issued “to mine action practitioners for a specific task of limited duration only.”[157] It is unclear if casualty data is actively used for MRE or survivor assistance planning purposes, but it appears to be used to some extent by certain actors.

Since the 2006 conflict the total (multi-year) number of mine/ERW/IED casualties in Lebanon is unknown. In June 2005 Lebanon stated that 3,975 landmine casualties (1,835 killed, 2,140 injured) had been identified since 1970, with 34 percent of casualties aged 31-40 years.[158] As of 12 April 2007 the LMRC database contained records of 2,659 survivors: 993 were injured by antipersonnel mines, 212 by antivehicle mines, 448 by cluster submunitions, 888 by other ERW or unknown ERW; mines, grenades, unknown and other devices make up the remaining 118 survivors. Before 12 July 2006 cluster submunition casualties constituted 12 percent of recorded casualties, but as of 12 April 2007 they constituted approximately 17 percent. The majority of casualties are from South Lebanon, mainly Marjayoun, Tyre and Nabatiyah, but also from West Bekaa.[159]

It is thought that some 300 Hezbollah mine/ERW casualties which occurred prior to the 2006 conflict are not included in any of the databases.[160]

HI released two reports comprehensively covering the global humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, including Lebanon, in November 2006 and May 2007.[161]

Survivor Assistance

A significant number of people in Lebanon have been disabled by conflict and this number increased significantly due to the 2006 conflict. It was reported that approximately 100,000 people were disabled (0.025 percent of the population) as a result of the 2006 conflict and were mainly cared for by families and some 100 NGOs and private organizations.[162] A small percentage of these were permanently disabled, including at least 500 children.[163]

The civil society and non-governmental disability sector is strong and provides services the government is unable to provide, however, it relies heavily on international donor support.

Compensation for victims of the conflict is paid by the government, but also by militant groups such as Hezbollah; many people reported that only Hezbollah was able to provide compensation, housing and the costs of survivor assistance services.[164]

Healthcare services and other emergency services were stretched to their limits during and in the immediate aftermath of the 2006 conflict but could generally cope. The ICRC provided extensive support to the Lebanese medical infrastructure and the Lebanese Red Cross during the conflict, but a post-conflict assessment indicated that its presence in rehabilitation and emergency care was not needed.[165] Large hospitals are usually well-equipped, have capable staff and are able to assist mine/ERW casualties; in smaller hospitals sufficient stabilizing aid can be provided.[166] However, there are significant regional disparities in access to services, especially in southern Lebanon.[167]

The government covers emergency medical costs but not long-term hospital care; in both government and private hospitals patients have to contribute financially (five to 15 percent).[168] Additional costs can be covered for those with insurance at the National Social Security Fund, but it had funding difficulties prior to the conflict.[169] People with disabilities can apply for a disability card, access to accredited centers and service vouchers through the Right and Access program of the Ministry of Social Affairs; however the national budget is insufficient to effectively implement the program. It was also reported that many holders of a disability card were charged at hospitals nevertheless.[170] Problems in obtaining a disability card have also been reported.[171]

Non-Lebanese nationals are not eligible for benefits.

During the emergency conflict phase in 2006, hospitals did not receive Ministry of Public Health funds in due time, which forced certain hospitals to charge for war-related surgery. This meant patients had to borrow money to pay, travel to other hospitals or do without the necessary treatment.[172]

According to the LMRC post-conflict survey of 180 recent survivors, most had severe shrapnel injuries to limbs, abdomen and the head; upper limb amputations were frequent but lower limb amputations were not, which is consistent with cluster submunition injuries. Most survivors complained about the poor provision of healthcare services and the costs of medication and of continuing medical and rehabilitation care.[173]

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Ministry of Public Health supervise physical rehabilitation centers to guarantee minimum standards. Services are provided mainly by national NGOs with international donor support.[174] Some physical rehabilitation costs are covered by the state, which reimburses NGOs for the services; but repayments were already hampered prior to the 2006 conflict. Prior to the conflict the centers were considered to be sufficient despite some affordability issues.[175] But in 2007 it was reported that prosthetic and orthotic centers “were struggling to cope with the rising toll from one million unexploded munitions left” as a result of the 2006 conflict.[176] After the conflict at least 1,169 people were in need of prosthetic devices and only 35 percent had received them as of 2007.[177] A prosthetic device costs between $1,000 and $1,800, which is beyond the means of most people in South Lebanon.[178]

Many survivors are in need of psychosocial support, but are not aware of existing programs.[179] Psychological support is provided when the individual expresses the need for it, but programs lack a systematic approach.[180] Some services appear to have increased with international NGO support since end 2006.

Whereas the 2006 conflict did not cause the collapse of services, the most significant consequence was the exacerbation of structural poverty and the limitation of economic activities due to ERW contamination in South Lebanon. This particularly affected people with disabilities, but also increased risk-taking by other vulnerable groups out of economic necessity resulting in more disability, despite rapid clearance.[181] Many people in South Lebanon live off subsistence farming; in March 2007 the UN estimated that of total contaminated land, 26 percent was cultivated land, three percent olive groves and seven percent grazing land; this might be considerably higher as tobacco fields and some other crops were not included.[182] The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) said that agricultural land constitutes more than 62 percent of contaminated land.[183] Casualties appeared to increase in peak agricultural months.[184]

General unemployment was estimated to rise from nine to 20 percent due to the conflict; however unemployment in rural southern Lebanon was estimated at 70 percent after the conflict.[185] In 2006 the number of people with disabilities of working age was estimated at 33,923; only 7,052 were employed (21 percent).[186]

Vocational training services are limited and centers are usually in urban areas. Most programs are conducted by NGOs but also by the National Employment Institute run by the Ministry of Labor. A 2005 LMRC survivor survey identified socioeconomic hardship and lack of opportunities for survivors.[187] The 2007 post-conflict survey reiterated this with most survivors stating their main needs were employment and education opportunities. [188]

Lebanon has legislation to protect the rights of people with disabilities including free healthcare and wheelchair accessible buildings. The Ministry of Social Affairs runs the Excess and Rights Commission to ensure the implementation of this legislation (Law 220/2000); but the law remained largely ineffective.[189] The Civil Service Board, in charge of recruiting government employees, continued to refuse applications from disabled people (the law stipulates three percent of jobs should go to people with disabilities).[190] In 2002 the Ministry of Finance informed employees it would not “settle obligations with them” unless they could prove that three percent of their workforce was composed of people with disabilities; as of July 2007 the ministry had not enforced this decision.[191]

On 14 June 2007 Lebanon signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol allowing for the monitoring of disability activities.

Survivor Assistance Strategic Framework[192]

The May 2007 National Mine Action Policy stated that the “Government of Lebanon, conscious of the damage and suffering caused by landmine[s] and explosive remnants of war, shall take full responsibility for the humanitarian, socio-economic and environmental impact caused by these devices….” The policy aims to support “landmine/ERW victims in all medical, psychological, and economical aspects and support activities to help ensure that victims re-gain their full legal rights, and can smoothly reintegrate within the society,” in accordance with national and international standards.

The policy assigned responsibilities; the Ministry of Public Health is responsible for healthcare, Ministry of Social Affairs for disability treatment and the National Social Security Fund and the LAF will cover the needs of its disabled staff. The LMAC will coordinate implementation of survivor assistance through the National Mine Victims Steering Committee (NMVSC) chaired by the LMAC Head of the Mine Victim Assistance Department and constituted of ministries of public health and social affairs, national and international NGOs. The new policy does not state clear objectives or activities to be undertaken by the committee. The chairing role of LMAC is limited to supervision; it does not provide financial or technical support due to the political/factional impasse; the supporting role is left to national and international organizations.[193]

The Lebanon Mine Action Authority will coordinate and promote cooperation between government, civil society and the international community for mine action, including MRE and survivor assistance. There also is an Inter-ministerial Advisory Committee, but this does not include ministries directly involved in survivor assistance or disability issues.

The Long Term Plan 2005-2009 stated that, “Victim Assistance continues to suffer from a lack of funding.”[194] However, this plan was revised to cover the period 2008-2012 in light of the new contamination resulting from the 2006 conflict and has a clear focus on clearance activities.[195] It is feared that this will result in even fewer resources for survivor assistance.[196]

By February 2007 MACC SL had developed a 2007 Mine Action Strategy for South Lebanon which contains strategic objectives for survivor assistance, including: establish baseline casualty information, assemble a survivor assistance referral database accessible to the public, provide vocational training, advocate for increased resources for survivor assistance and the signing/ratification of relevant treaties. The lead agencies in these activities will be the World Health Organization (data collection) and UNDP (socioeconomic reintegration) with support from MACC SL, UNICEF, UN Population Fund, UNHCR, ICRC, and to a lesser extent LMAC.[197] However this strategy appears to be relatively isolated from other policy initiatives, as NMVSC members do not seem to be implicated in the MACC SL strategy. 

In general, the role of ministries in disability issues is limited to coordination; due to the ministries’ lack of direct involvement, political (confessional) factions extend their influence into this vacuum to recruit support through the services they provide. Fewer resources are channeled by the government to the south and the confessional divide can also influence coordination between local organizations.[198]

As a result of the 2006 conflict many organizations have extended programs or started new programs assisting communities affected by conflict, including mine/ERW survivors and people with disabilities. Handicap International created Disability Focal Points (DFPs) in partnership with the Lebanese Physically Disabled Union and NGOs. The DFPs provided service information, partly paid for medical and rehabilitation services for those unable to pay the fees, distributed assistive devices and contacted municipalities and relief providers to advocate for the rights of people with disabilities. The project started in October 2006 and ended in June 2007. HI also created a Recovery Coordination Support platform and website (www.lebanon-support.org) to coordinate aid efforts and ensure integrated conflict recovery, in partnership with the local organization MADA and with support from UNDP and the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO). The website also contains donor information, meeting reports and relevant research. In April 2007 135 national community-based organizations and NGOs and 85 international NGOs were registered through the platform and its support team.[199] These coordination mechanisms were used in the 2007 Nahr al-Bared crisis.

At least 30,872 people with disabilities or injured by conflict, including at least 321 mine/ERW survivors, received assistance in 2006. This overview cannot be considered exhaustive, as many implementers did not keep complete records due to the conflict and many organizations assisted people with disabilities, mine survivors and new casualties in the emergency and post-conflict phase.

Long-term survivor assistance in Lebanon was implemented by the same organizations with support from Norwegian People’s Aid as listed in last year’s Landmine Monitor.[200] During the conflict and in its immediate aftermath, these organizations focused on emergency aid. In a second phase, they scaled up rehabilitation and socioeconomic reintegration interventions. The most common challenges due to the conflict were a significantly increased target group of newly disabled people and economic losses of previous beneficiaries and delays in scheduled programs, infrastructure damage, financial constraints, lack of government support and national disability policy, and coordination. As of July 2007 most organizations had returned to their standard ways of operating. More details can be provided upon request.

During the conflict emergency aid was mainly provided by the Lebanese Red Cross (LRC) with support from the ICRC, civil defense and political/confessional factions. All reported that ambulances and aid workers were hit during conflict aid operations.[201]

As most hospitals in the south were evacuated during the conflict access to healthcare was reduced severely. In response, the ICRC supplied medical and other materials (such as generators) and medicines. It gave logistical and material support to the LRC, and refurbished 12 LRC emergency medical service centers.[202] It also continued its support to the Sidon Orphan Welfare Society, covering Sidon and two neighboring Palestinian refugee camps, but services decreased compared to 2005.[203] During the conflict the LRC operated 200 ambulances and approximately 2,500 aid workers conducting 285 emergency transports between 12 July and 14 August 2006.[204]

The Palestinian Red Crescent Society operates free of charge health facilities inside Palestinian refugee camps with international donor support but usually the facilities are ill-equipped for more complex health services.[205] HI implemented livelihood and home adaptation activities in southern Lebanon.[206]

For other organizations involved in survivor assistance in Lebanon, see last year’s Landmine Monitor.[207]

Funding and Assistance

International funding for mine action in Lebanon rose steeply in 2006, mainly in response to the mine/UXO contamination resulting from the war in South Lebanon. Following the end of hostilities, a UN Flash Appeal and the Stockholm Conference for Lebanon’s Early Recovery (August 2006), in addition to bilateral funding agreements, raised funds to respond to the crisis.[208] Landmine Monitor identified donations totaling $68,845,934 (€54,800,553) for emergency and other mine action, reported by 20 countries and the European Commission (EC), compared to $6,300,000 provided by six countries and other funding channels in 2005. [209] Donors reporting funding in 2006 were:

  • Australia: A$1,500,000 ($1,130,250) to UNMAS for cluster munition clearance;[210]
  • Austria: €400,000 ($502,520) to UNMAS for clearance in South Lebanon;[211]
  • Belgium: €760,000 ($954,788) in-kind contribution of EOD personnel to UNIFIL for mine action “reconnaissance”;[212]
  • Canada: C$3,123,205 ($2,754,042) consisting of C$63,865 to Veterans for America, C$209,340 to the Canadian International Demining Corps (CIDC)for emergency MRE, C$1,250,000 to UNMAS for emergency mine action, and C$1,600,000 to UNMAS to support mine clearance;[213]
  • Czech Republic: CZK2 million ($88,600) for EOD and mine action;[214]
  • Denmark: DKK5,750,000 ($967,725) to UNMAS for mine clearance;[215]
  • EC: €7,495,813 ($9,416,990) consisting of €987,190 to MAG for emergency battle area clearance, €1,335,000 to Premiere Urgence for income generation and support, €1,572,518 to FSD for emergency demining, €1,754,105 to HI for battle area clearance, and €1,847,000 to DanChurchAid for mine action;[216]
  • Finland: €1 million ($1,256,300) to UNMAS for ERW clearance;[217]
  • France: €126,196 ($158,540) consisting of €91,625 for demining equipment, €14,571 for evaluation and training, and €20,000 for MRE;[218]
  • Ireland: €250,000 ($314,075) earmarked funds to UNVTF;[219]
  • Italy: $2,512,900 to UNMAS for mine clearance;[220]
  • Japan: ¥225,100,000 ($1,935,860) via the UN Trust Fund for Human Security to UNMAS for mine action and socioeconomic programs;[221]
  • Netherlands: €4,150,000 ($5,213,645) to UNMAS for mine/UXO/cluster submunition clearance;[222]
  • Norway: NOK14,416,537 ($2,248,979) consisting of NOK7,199,163 to MAG for mine clearance, and NOK7,217,374 to NPA for emergency mine action;[223]
  • Slovenia: SIT17,100,000 ($88,920) for mine action and coordination;[224]
  • Spain: €125,000 ($157,037) in-kind of mine clearance/EOD personnel to UNIFIL;[225]
  • Sweden: SEK25,200,000 ($3,419,640) consisting of SEK20 million to Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) for unspecified mine action, and SEK5,200,000 to SRSA for unspecified mine action;[226]
  • Switzerland: CHF650,000 ($518,700) to UNMAS for mine action;[227]
  • UAE: $19,881,982 via the Operation Emirates Solidarity II Project for clearance of cluster bomb strike areas in South Lebanon;[228]
  • UK: £2,312,814 ($4,263,441) consisting of £108,814 to UNMAS for coordination, £204,000 to MAG for mine clearance, and £2 million to UNMAS for mine clearance;[229]
  • US: $11,061,000, consisting of $1,420,000 from the Department of State, $7,000 from the Department of Defense, and $9,634,000 of emergency funding, consisting of $1,200,000 to MAG for mine and UXO clearance, $600,000 to WRF for MRE and victim assistance, $2 million to UNMAS, $420,000 and $2,800,000 to MAG for mine/UXO clearance, $384,000 and $2,200,000 to RONCO for mine/UXO clearance, and $30,000 to VFA for mapping of UXO.[230]

In addition, Poland was reported to have committed mine clearance equipment valued at $1,270,000.[231] Also, $1,414,900 was provided for mine action from UNIFIL peacekeeping assessed funds in 2006.[232] From September to December 2006 China provided demining training for Lebanon and Jordan, and provided both countries with demining equipment, but did not report a value for this support.[233]

MACC SL reported $51,435,277 in funding for mine action programs in 2006-2007 from 23 countries, UN assessed budgets and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.[234]

The 2006 end-year review of the UN’s Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Lebanon received more than 100 percent of funds requested through the appeal process in 2006; $27,180,138 was requested and $27,531,373 was received.[235]

The 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects includes 13 project appeals for Lebanon totaling $48,427,828, of which $26,699,099 had been funded at the time of publication (November 2006).[236]

National Contribution to Mine Action

National in-kind contributions by Lebanon were reported by UNDP to be approximately $4 million in 2006. [237] In addition, in April 2006 MACC SL raised $15,000 through a fundraising dinner to support MAG mine/UXO clearance operations in South Lebanon.[238] Appraisal of in-kind contributions did not include additional assets from the Lebanese Armed Forces, which were responsible for clearing approximately 60 percent of cluster munitions in Lebanon in 2006.[239]


[1] See for example, Statement of Amb. Michel Haddad, First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Nairobi, 3 December 2004. The Ambassador cited the “failure of the Government of Israel to submit all the maps showing the deployment of landmines,” and the “continued occupation by Israel of parts of Southern Lebanon.” He also stated, “Israel, which continues to produce and use landmines, has not instituted a national demining program, willingly makes statements through its officials that demining is no longer Israel’s priority. In addition, Israel refuses to adhere to the Ottawa Convention in order to escape its obligations towards peace and human rights.”

[2] The 2006 conflict likely increased Lebanon’s concerns about border security, while dampening its political willingness to join the treaty while Israel stays outside of it.

[3] In December 1999 Lebanon became the first and only country to ever vote against the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution. It was among the small number of countries abstaining from voting each year from 2000 to 2004.

[4] Email reports from Amb. Satnam Jit Singh, ICBL Diplomatic Advisor, 15, 18 and 19 June 2006.

[5] Confidential interviews in Beirut, 13 and 18 December 2005, 7, 12, 16 and 28 January 2006. In public remarks at the opening ceremony on 16 January 2006 of the Engaging Youth in Mine Action workshop, the ambassadors of Canada and the Netherlands spoke of Lebanon’s important steps towards joining the Mine Ban Treaty. The UN Mine Action Coordination Center for South Lebanon (MACC SL) stated in its 2005 annual report that Lebanon was studying the possibility of acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty with a real willingness to do so. MACC SL, “2005 Annual Report,” 23 January 2006, p. 8.

[6] NDO, Lebanon Mine Action Program, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 9.

[7] Lebanon attended the First Review Conference in Nairobi in November-December 2004, as well as all Standing Committee meetings in 2003, 2004, and 2005. It was, however, not present at the Sixth Meetings of States Parties in 2005.

[8] Statement by Amb. Michel Haddad, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 3 December 2004.

[9] MACC SL, “Accidents caused by newly discovered landmines,” press release, 25 November 2006. See also, “Accident reveals newly laid Israeli mines, UN says,” IRIN (Jerusalem), 26 November 2006; “UN says Israel planted landmines in Lebanon as four wounded,” Agence France-Presse (Beirut), 25 November 2006; “IDF Officials: Mines in Lebanon could have been laid by Syria, Hezbollah,” Associated Press (Tel Aviv), 26 November 2006. For details of these incidents, see later section on Landmine/ERW/IED Casualties.

[10] MACC SL, “Accidents caused by newly discovered landmines,” press release, 25 November 2006. An UNMACC spokesperson said, “It is an Israeli No. 4 antipersonnel mine. It was newly planted during the summer conflict. It is the first evidence we have at the United Nations that Israel used landmines during the latest war.” “UN says Israel planted landmines in Lebanon as four wounded,” Agence France-Presse (Beirut), 25 November 2006.

[11] UN Department of Public Information, Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, New York, 28 November 2006.

[12] “IDF Officials: Mines in Lebanon could have been laid by Syria, Hezbollah,” Associated Press (Tel Aviv), 26 November 2006.

[13] MACC SL, “Accidents caused by newly discovered landmines,” press release, 25 November 2006; “UN says Israel planted landmines in Lebanon as four wounded,” Agence France-Presse (Beirut), 25 November 2006.

[14] “IDF Officials: Mines in Lebanon could have been laid by Syria, Hezbollah,” Associated Press (Tel Aviv), 26 November 2006.

[15] Email from Joshua Zarka, Counselor for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2007.

[16] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 10 November 2006, p. 6. This report covers the period from 1 November 2005 to 1 November 2006.

[17] Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) S/2007/147, 14 March 2007, p. 4.

[18] The photographs were provided to Landmine Monitor by a confidential source.

[19] Ibid.

[20] “Lebanese Army Pounds Fighters at Refugee Camp,” Washington Post, 3 June 2007; “In fight against militants, Lebanon bolstered by US, Gulf countries,” Christian Science Monitor, 4 June 2007.

[21] Nadim Ladki, “Update 5-Lebanon declares victory in war on militants,” Reuters, 21 June 2007; “Update 1-Militants kill 3 Lebanese soldiers in camp battle,” Reuters, 24 July 2007.

[22] “Army goes back on offensive against Fatah al-Islam; Senior militant denies report that seven fighters surrendered at Nahr al-Bared,” Daily Star (Beirut), 6 June 2007; “Lebanon camp battles kill 17,” SBS World News Headline Services, 11 June 2007; Naziq Siddiq, “Update 1-Lebanon army, Islamist militants clash at camp,” Reuters, 17 June 2007; Rym Ghazal, “Army clears booby traps, advances in Nahr al-Bared,” Daily Star, 23 July 2007.

[23] Hani M. Bathish, “Fatah al-Islam fires rockets into civilians areas; 2 more soldiers die as battle heats up,” Daily Star, 14 July 2007.

[24] Nazih Siddiq, “Update 3-Booby trap kills 6 soldiers at Lebanon camp,” Reuters, 15 June 2007.

[25] Rym Ghazal, “Booby-trap kills four soldiers at Nahr al-Bared; Army vows to ‘push forward’,” Daily Star, 16 June 2007.

[26] “Update 1-Islamists snipe, bomb kills four Lebanese troops,” Reuters, 23 July 2007.

[27] “PM promises to keep welfare of civilians in mind,” Daily Star, 13 June 2007; “Nahr al-Bared refugees will go home to new dangers; UN, private agencies work to increase awareness of threat posed by unexploded ordnance,” Daily Star, 22 June 2007.

[28]Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 989.

[29] Survey Action Center (SAC), “Lebanon Landmine Impact Survey,” Washington, DC, p. 7, www.mineaction.org, accessed 31 July 2007.

[30] Email from Julia Goehsing, Programme Officer, MACC SL, 17 August 2007.

[31] “Two Lebanese men wounded by Israeli bombs,” Agence France-Presse, 4 October 2006, quoting Israeli newspaper Haaretz stating that the Israeli army fired at least 1.2 million bomblets into Lebanon. See also, “Save Lebanon response,” OCHA situation report No. 39, Relief Web, quoting Chris Clarke, Program Manager, MACC SL at UN press conference, 26 September 2006. OCHA = UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

[32] Email from Julia Goehsing, MACC SL, 17 August 2007.

[33] Ibid.

[34] “Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006),” S/2007/392, 28 June 2007, para. 41-43. Chris Clarke, MACC SL, gave different figures in April 2007, claiming that, by 13 April 2007, 144,049 individual submunitions had been located and destroyed. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Humanitarian, Military, Technical and Legal Challenges of Cluster Munitions, Expert Meeting,” Montreux, 18-20 April 2007, Geneva, p. 41.

[35] Mine Action Support Group (MASG), “Newsletter–Second Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 2 August 2007, www.state.gov, accessed 3 August 2007.

[36] Email from Julia Goehsing, MACC SL, 17 August 2007.

[37] MACC SL, “Unexploded Ordnance Fact Sheet,” 23 September 2006.

[38] Interview with Col. Mohamad Fehmi, Director, NDO, and Allan Poston, UNDP Chief Technical Advisor, NDO, Beirut, 20 February 2007.

[39] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert, Chief of Operations, and Dalya Farran, Head of Information, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[40] “De-mining official expects South to be clear of cluster bombs by year’s end,” Daily Star (Lebanon), January 2006.

[41]MACC SL presentation to Handicap International, Tyre, 19 March 2007.

[42] “Cluster Munitions Under New Scrutiny,” Arms Control Today, October 2006.

[43] Landmine Action, “Foreseeable Harm: The use and impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon: 2006,” London, 19 October 2006, pp. 4-30.

[44] “Deminers urge patience as Palestinians grow restless for return home,” IRIN (Beirut), 4 July 2007.

[45] “Lebanon: Unexploded ordnance hampering aid deliveries to refugees,” 7 June 2007, www.reliefweb.int, accessed 29 June 2007; CARE, “CARE helps refugees caught in Lebanon crossfire,” 31 May 2007, www.reliefweb.int, accessed 29 June 2007.

[46] “Deminers urge patience as Palestinians grow restless for return home,” IRIN (Beirut), 4 July 2007.

[47] MASG, “Newsletter–Second Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 2 August 2007.

[48] Email from Julia Goehsing, MACC SL, 17 August 2007.

[49] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 989.

[50] Interview with Col. Mohamed Fehmi, NDO, Beirut, 20 February 2007.

[51] MASG, “Newsletter–Second Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 2 August 2007.

[52] LMAC, “Lebanon National Mine Action Policy,” provided by UNDP, New York, in email, 12 June 2007.

[53] For operational purposes South Lebanon is divided into eight areas of operations. The various operators are assigned responsibilities in these areas by the MACC SL. Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[54] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2006,” New York, p. 50.

[55] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[56] Email from Julia Goehsing, MACC SL, 17 August 2007.

[57] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[58] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2006,” New York, p. 46.

[59] Interview with Allan Poston, UNDP, Beirut, 20 February 2007.

[60] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[61] “American specialists mapped aid hazards in Lebanese Conflict,” US Department of State press release, 26 October 2006.

[62] MASG, “Newsletter–Second Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 2 August 2007.

[63] Presentation by Col. Mohamad Fehmi, NDO, Tenth International Meeting of Mine Action Program Directors and UN Advisors, 21 March 2007, www.mineaction.org, accessed 10 June 2007.

[64] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[65] Information provided by Col. Mohamad Fehmi, National Director, LMAC, forwarded by email from Allan Poston, UNDP, 26 August 2007; NDO, “End-State Strategy (ESS) for Mine Action in Lebanon, Demining End-State Condition,” 2004, p. 9.

[66] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 991.

[67] MASG, “Newsletter–Second Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 2 August 2007; see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 991.

[68] MACC SL, “2007 Operational Plan for the Clearance of Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance in South Lebanon,” Annex G, 15 February 2007.

[69] Email from Julia Goehsing, MACC SL, 17 August 2007.

[70] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[71] GICHD, “A Review of the Mine Action Programme in Lebanon,” Draft, Geneva, 13 July 2006, pp. 5-6.

[72] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2006,” New York, p. 47.

[73] MACC SL, “Unexploded Ordnance Fact Sheet,” 23 September 2006.

[74] MACC SL, “2007 Operational Plan for the Clearance of Landmines and Un-exploded Ordnance in South Lebanon,” 15 February 2007, Annex B.

[75] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[76] Ibid.

[77] For details of some organizations, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 993-995; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1056-1057.

[78] “Palestinian volunteer to remove unexploded Israeli Cluster bombs in Lebanon,” IMEMC & Agencies, 3 October 2006.

[79] “Israeli Bomblets Plague Lebanon,” New York Times, 6 October 2006.

[80] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[81] Interview with Col. Mohamed Fehmi, NDO, and Allan Poston, UNDP, Beirut, 20 February 2007; interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[82] “Cluster bomb kills Hezbollah guerrilla in Lebanon,” Reuters, 10 November 2006.

[83] Email from Habbouba Aoun, Coordinator, Landmine Resource Center (LMRC), 20 August 2007.

[84] “UN: Israel provides maps of minefields in Lebanon,” Associated Press, 9 October 2006.

[85]Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 989.

[86] Interview with Mohamed Fehmi, NDO, and Allan Poston, UNDP, Beirut, 20 February 2007.

[87] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[88] Interview with Ousama Algosaibi, Programme Manager, BACTEC, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[89] Interview with David Horrocks, Country Programme Manager, and Andy Gleeson, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, Nabatiyah, 22 February 2007.

[90] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[91] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2006,” New York, p. 48.

[92] MACC SL, “2006 Annual Report,” Tyre, p. 4, www.maccsl.org, accessed 4 August 2007.

[93] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2006,” New York, p. 48.

[94] MACC SL, “2006 Annual Report,” Tyre, pp. 1-4.

[95] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2006,” New York, p. 48.

[96] MASG, “Newsletter–Fourth Quarter of 2006,” 31 December 2007, www.state.gov, accessed 31 July 2007; see also “Israel’s war of aggression on Lebanon set the country back for many years,” al Jazeera, 19 October 2006.

[97] Interview with David Horrocks and Andy Gleeson, MAG, Nabatiyah, 22 February 2007.

[98] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[99] Interview with Col. Mohamad Fehmi, NDO, and Allan Poston, UNDP, Beirut, 20 February 2007.

[100] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[101] Interview with David Horrocks and Andy Gleeson, MAG, Nabatiyah, 22 February 2007.

[102] Interview with Tekimiti Gilbert and Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 21 February 2007.

[103] MASG, “Newsletter–First Quarter of 2007,” 24 May 2007, www.state.gov.

[104] MACC SL, “May 2007 Report of the UN Mine Action Centre - South Lebanon,” 5 June 2007, p. 6,

www.maccsl.org, accessed 4 August 2007.

[105] MASG, “Newsletter–First Quarter of 2007,” 24 May 2007.

[106] MASG, “Newsletter–Second Quarter of 2007,” 2 August 2007; “Deminers urge patience as Palestinians grow restless for return home,” IRIN (Beirut), 4 July 2007.

[107] LMRC receive financial support from the Canada Fund, Canadian International Development Agency and Association for Aid and Relief Japan.

[108] Email from Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 20 August 2007.

[109] Email from Anissa Sabaayon, Mine Action Coordinator, NPA Lebanon, 20 August 2007.

[110] MACC SL, “Annual Report 2005,” p. 7.

[111] MACC SL, “2006 Legacy, Cluster Bombs in South Lebanon,” Newsletter, Issue Eight, January 2007, p. 6, www.maccsl.org, accessed 15 July 2007.

[112] NDO, “National Mine Action Update–[August 15 to] 19 October 2006,” Beirut, p. 2, www.ndo-lb.org, accessed 15 July 2007; email from Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 20 August 2007. The NGOs were: Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped, Islamic Health Fund, Al Jarha or Lebanese Welfare Association for the Injured and Disabled of War, LMRC, Islamic Risala Scouts Association, Philanthropic Association for the Handicapped in Nabatiyeh, Vision Association for Rehabilitation, Development, and Care.

[113] Response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by Lubna Izziddin, Youth Officer, UNICEF Lebanon, 2 July 2007; emails from Anissa Sabaayon, NPA Lebanon, 18 June and 20 July 2007.

[114] MACC SL, “2006 Legacy, Cluster Bombs in South Lebanon,” Newsletter, Issue Eight, January 2007, p. 6, www.maccsl.org, accessed 15 July 2007.

[115] MAG, “Conflict Recovery Programme for Lebanon, Donor Update, August-October 2006,” Manchester,

www.mag.org.uk, accessed 15 July 2007; MAG, “Iraqi-Kurd bomb clearance team flies into Lebanon,” MAG Lebanon Crisis Update 5, November 2006, www.mag.org.uk, accessed 15 July 2007.

[116] Response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by Sabrina Aguiari, Humanitarian Mine Action Coordinator, INTERSOS, Rome, 15 July 2007, and email, 30 July 2007.

[117] Email from Toufic Rizkallah, Assistant Director, WRF Lebanon, 25 July 2007; WRF, www.wrf.org.lb, accessed 16 July 2007.

[118] Response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by Noe Falk Nielsen, MRE Coordinator, DanChurchAid, Tyre, 12 June 2007, and email, 24 July 2007; email from Anissa Sabaayon, NPA Lebanon, 18 June 2007. NPA and UNICEF co-funded these campaigns.

[119] MACC SL, “2006 Legacy, Cluster Bombs in South Lebanon,” Newsletter, Issue Eight, January 2007, p. 6.

[120] NDO, “National Mine Action Update–[August 15 to] 19 October 2006,” p. 2, www.ndo-lb.org, accessed 15 July 2007; response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by Anissa Sabaayon, NPA Lebanon, 2 July 2007.

[121] Response to Landmine Monitor MRE Questionnaire by Sabrina Aguiari, INTERSOS, Rome, 15 July 2007.

[122] Email from Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 20 August 2007.

[123] Email from Anissa Sabaayon, NPA Lebanon, 20 August 2007.

[124] “Lebanon: Deminers urge patience as Palestinians grow restless for return home,” IRIN, 4 July, www.irinnews.org, accessed 16 July 2007.

[125] UNRWA, “2007 Lebanon Emergency, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, Archive for June 26th, 2007, Health Cluster Minutes-June 26,” www.unrwa-lebanon.org, accessed 1 July 2007.

[126] Email from Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 20 August 2007.

[127] Email from Anissa Sabaayon, NPA Lebanon, 20 August 2007.

[128] LMAC, National Mine Action Policy,” March 2007, pp. 3-4; received in email from Lt. Col. Youssef Mechref, Victim Assistance Coordinator, LMAC, 30 July 2007.

[129] Information provided by Lt. Col. Youssef Mechref, LMAC, 28 June 2007, and confirmed on 30 June 2007.

[130] UNDP, “Information on Mine and UXO Victims: Cumulative Casualties–Lebanon from August 14, 2006 to July 23, 2007,” provided by Richard Shdeed, Information Management and GIS Officer, UNDP, Beirut, 24 July 2007.

[131] MACC SL, “241 Casualties as at July 27, 2007,” www.maccsl.org, accessed 1 August 2007. The fact sheet erroneously states there were 204 casualties, but the breakdown indicated 205.

[132] Email from Bonnie Docherty, Researcher, Human Rights Watch, New York, 10 August 2007.

[133]Data analysis based on casualty data files received from the LMRC, Balamand University, Beirut, 25 September 2006, 15 January, 10 and 18 April, and 26 July 2007; HRW, “Israeli Cluster Munitions Hit Civilians in Lebanon,” Beirut, 24 July 2006, www.hrw.org; email from Laura Boushnak, Photographer, Agence France-Presse, Paris, 26 March 2007; IMSMA data provided by Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 20 March 2007; data provided by Lt. Col. Youssef Mechref, LMAC, 28 June 2007; Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports between 1 January and 31 December 2006. None of the data provided by data collectors was complete, nor did it cover all categories of casualties.

[134] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 999.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Interview with Lt. Col. Khaled El-Alieh, NDO, Geneva, 9 May 2006.

[137] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Israel-Hizbullah conflict: Victims of rocket attacks and IDF casualties,” www.mfa.gov.il, accessed 1 August 2007.

[138] Hanan Greenberg, “Officer, soldier killed in Lebanon battle,” YNet, 24 July 2007, www.ynetnews.com, accessed 1 August 2007.

[139] Hanan Greenberg, “Soldier killed in IDF minefield,” YNet, 23 August 2006, www.ynetnews.com, accessed 1 August 2007.

[140] MACC SL, “Accidents caused by newly discovered landmines,” 25 November 2006; “Accident reveals newly laid Israeli mines, UN says,” IRIN (Jerusalem), 26 November 2006.

[141] Interviews with mukhtars in Yohmour, Bint Jbeil and Kfar Sir during field mission, 16-20 March 2007.

[142] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 999-1000.

[143] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2006: Lebanon,” Washington, DC, 6 March 2007.

[144] Information provided by Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, Beirut, 26 July 2007. This information did not contain the booby-trap casualties or the Chinese EOD expert.

[145] UNDP, “Information on Mine and UXO Victims: Cumulative Casualties–Lebanon from August 14, 2006 to July 23, 2007.” Casualties for the period 14 December-13 January 2007 indicated in this document could not be included (24).  The UNDP identified eight casualties between 14 January and 13 February 2007 but LMRC identified nine for the same period; from 14 February to 13 March UNDP identified four casualties and LMRC identified seven; between 14 March and 13 April UNDP identified 11 casualties but LMRC only four; between 14 April and 13 May UNDP identified two and LMRC none; between 14 May and 13 June UNDP identified five and LMRC only two; between 14 June and 13 July UNDP identified nine but LMRC only four.  This means the difference in casualties could be as high as 21 (maximum 43 casualties; minimum 22).

[146] UN, “UN secretary general’s 3rd report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701,” Daily Star (Beirut), 20 March 2007, www.dailystar.com.lb, accessed 20 March 2007.

[147] Nazih Siddiq, “Update 3-Booby trap kills 6 soldiers at Lebanon camp,” Reuters, 15 June 2007; Rym Ghazal, “Booby-trap kills four soldiers at Nahr al-Bared; Army vows to ‘push forward’,” Daily Star, 16 June 2007; “Update 1-Islamists snipe, bomb kills four Lebanese troops,” Reuters, 23 July 2007.

[148] “Landmine wounds ordnance expert in southern Lebanon,” Associated Press (Beirut), 19 June 2007.

[149] HI, “Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities,” Brussels, May 2007, p.122.

[150] UNDP, “Information on Mine and UXO Victims: Cumulative Casualties–Lebanon from August 14, 2006 to July 23, 2007.”

[151] Data analysis based on casualty data files received from the LMRC, Balamand University, Beirut, 25 September 2006, 15 January, 10 and 18 April, and 26 July 2007; IMSMA data provided by Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 20 March 2007.

[152] HI, “Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities,” Brussels, May 2007, p. 124.

[153] Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), “Damage and Early Recovery,” pp. 10-11; “Cluster munition spreadsheet,” provided during field mission in Lebanon, 16-20 March 2007.

[154] Interview with Col. Mohamad Fehmi, LMAC, Beirut, 4 September 2007.

[155] Interview with Dalya Farran, MACC SL, Tyre, 19 March 2007.

[156] LMRC, “Survey of Landmine Victims in Lebanon, 2006-2007: Results of the Visits of those Injured since the Ceasefire (14 August 2006-28 February 2007), Beirut, 12 March 2007, p. 1.

[157] LMAC, “National Mine Action Policy,” March 2007, p. 6; received in email from Youssef Mechref, LMAC, 30 July 2007.

[158] Presentation by Lt. Col. Khaled El-Alieh, NDO, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 17 June 2005.

[159] LMRC analysis of its survey results, sent by Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, Beirut, 18 April 2007.

[160] Information provided by person who requested anonymity during field mission to Lebanon, 31 August-10 September 2006.

[161] HI, “Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions,” Brussels, November 2006, pp. 34-37; HI, “Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities,” Brussels, May 2007, pp. 120-131.

[162] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2006: Lebanon,” Washington, DC, 6 March 2007.

[163] FAO, “Damage and Early Recovery Needs Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry,” Rome, November 2006, p. 7.

[164] Observations made during field mission to Lebanon, 31 August-10 September 2006 and 16-20 March 2007.

[165] HI telephone interview with ICRC delegate who wished to remain unnamed, Tyre, 25 April 2007.

[166] Observations made during field mission to Lebanon, 31 August-10 September 2006.

[167] FAO, “Damage and Early Recovery Needs Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry,” Rome, November 2006, p. 4.

[168] HI, “Final Report Role of MoPH and MoSA in Lebanon, Beirut, March 2007, p. 8.

[169] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1001.

[170] Email from Steffen Schwarz, independent disability consultant, 2 July 2007.

[171] HI, “Final Report Role of MoPH and MoSA in Lebanon,” Beirut, March 2007, p. 9.

[172] Email from Steffen Schwarz, independent disability consultant, 2 July 2007.

[173] LMRC, “Survey of Landmine Victims in Lebanon, 2006-2007: Results of the Visits of those Injured since the Ceasefire (14 August 2006-28 February 2007), Beirut, 12 March 2007, p. 1.

[174] Email from Steffen Schwarz, independent disability consultant, 2 July 2007.

[175] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1001. Only the first prosthetic device is covered by the government, but replacements and repairs are not.

[176] “Grim upsurge for Lebanon prosthetics,” Agence France-Presse (Tyre), 21 March 2007.

[177]HI “Assistance aux victimes” (“Victim assistance”), Beirut, undated 2007, p. 4, received in email from François-David Buquet, Country Director, HI, Beirut, 12 July 2007.

[178] “Grim upsurge for Lebanon prosthetics,” Agence France-Presse (Tyre), 21 March 2007.

[179] LMRC, “Survey of Landmine Victims in Lebanon, 2006-2007…,” Beirut, 12 March 2007, p. 1.

[180] Hirak Dertorossian, et al., “Silent Killers, War and Physical Disability: What’s left in times of peace? An assessment of the Lebanese case,” American University Beirut, September 2006.

[181] Observations made during field missions to southern Lebanon, 31 August-10 September 2006, 16-20 March 2007.

[182] MACC SL presentation for Handicap International, Tyre, 19 March 2007.

[183] UNEP, “Lebanon Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment,” Nairobi, January 2007, p. 155.

[184] UNDP, “Information on Mine and UXO Victims: Cumulative Casualties – Lebanon from August 14, 2006 to July 23, 2007.”

[185]FAO, “Damage and Early Recovery Needs Assessment of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry,” Rome, November 2006, p. 8-12.

[186] International Labour Organization, “An ILO Post Conflict Decent Work Programme for Lebanon,” Beirut, 2006, pp. 2-5; see also HI, “Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities,” Brussels, May 2007, pp. 23-124.

[187] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1002.

[188] LMRC, “Survey of Landmine Victims in Lebanon, 2006-2007…,” 12 March 2007, p. 1.

[189] Email from Steffen Schwarz, independent disability consultant, 2 July 2007.

[190] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices-2005: Lebanon,” Washington, DC, 8 March 2006.

[191] Email from Steffen Schwarz, independent disability consultant, 2 July 2007.

[192] Unless otherwise stated, information in this section is taken from: LMAC, “National Mine Action Policy,” March 2007.

[193] Email from Steffen Schwarz, independent disability consultant, 2 July 2007.

[194] NDO, “Long Term Plan 2005-2009,” Beirut, 8 December 2005, pp. 3, 7-8.

[195] MASG, “Newsletter–Second Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 2 August 2007.

[196] Observations during field mission to southern Lebanon, 16-20 March 2007; email from Signe Nørmose, Programme Officer Humanitarian Mine Action, DanChurchAid, Copenhagen, 11 July 2007.

[197] MACC SL, “2007 Operational Plan for the Clearance of Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance in South Lebanon,” 15 February 2007, p. 13 and Annex G.

[198] Hirak Dertorossian, et al., “Silent Killers, War and Physical Disability: What’s left in times of peace? An assessment of the Lebanese case,” American University Beirut, September 2006, p. 22, received in email from Kareem Osman, Liaison Officer, UN Population Fund, 30 March 2007; email from Steffen Schwarz, 2 July 2007; observations made during field missions between 31 August and 10 September 2006 and 16 and 20 March 2007.

[199]Email from François-David Buquet, HI, Beirut, 12 July 2007.

[200] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1002-1003.

[201] Interview with Georges Kettaneh, National Director of First Aid Teams and Emergency Services, LRC, Beirut, 4 September 2006.

[202] ICRC, “Annual Report 2006,” Geneva, May 2007, p. 339.

[203] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1001.

[204] Interview with Georges Kettaneh, LRC, Beirut, 4 September 2006.

[205] Email from Steffen Schwarz, independent disability consultant, 2 July 2007.

[206] Email from François-David Buquet, HI, Beirut, 17 August 2007.

[207] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 1001-1004. A complete list of organizations providing assistance to people with disabilities and conflict victims can be found at www.lebanon-support.org.

[208] UN, “2006 Portfolio End-Year Review,” New York, January 2007, p. 9.

[209] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 998. Average exchange rate for 2006: €1 = US$1.2563, used throughout this report. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[210] Email from Catherine Gill, Mine Action Coordinator, AUSAID, 10 July 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: A$1 = US$0.7535. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[211] Austria Article 7 Report, Form J, undated.

[212] Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007.

[213] Email from Carly Volkes, Program Officer, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 5 June 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: C$1 = US$0.8818. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[214] Email from Jan Kara, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 May 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: CZK1 = US$0.0443. European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse, Exchange rates, Bilateral, Annual; US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[215] Email from Jacob Bang Jeppesen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 February 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: DKK1 = US$0.1683. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[216] Email from Antoine Gouzée de Harven, EuropeAid Co-operation Office, EC, 6 August 2007.

[217] Email from Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 February 2007.

[218] Email from Anne Villeneuve, Advocacy Officer, HI, Lyon, 12 July 2007.

[219] Email from Michael Keaveney, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 20 July 2007.

[220] Mine Action Investments Database accessed 21 March 2007.

[221] Email from Conventional Arms Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 June 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: ¥1 = US$0.0086. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[222] Email from Vincent van Zeijst, Deputy Head, Arms Control and Arms Export Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 July 2007.

[223] Email from Yngvild Berggrav, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 August 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: NOK1 = US$0.1560. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[224] Email from Irina Gorsic, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 Mar 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: SIT1 = US$0.0052. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[225] Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007.

[226] Email from Sven Malmberg, Minister, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: SEK1 = US$0.1357. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[227] Email from Rémy Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 June 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: CHF1 = US$0.7980. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[228] MACC SL, “Funding Mechanisms and Partnerships Within UN Mine Action South Lebanon,” www.maccsl.org, accessed 29 May 2007.

[229] Email from Andy Willson, Program Officer, Department for International Development, 23 February 2007. Average exchange rate for 2006: £1 = US$1.8434. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2007.

[230] USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2006, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 20 July 2007; “United States Government Situation Report: Lebanon Humanitarian Emergency,” 29 December 2006, p. 2. www.usaid.gov, accessed 22 June 2007. The $2 million contribution to UNMAS was described as “reprogrammed FY 2005 funding.”

[231] Government of Lebanon, “Stockholm Conference for Lebanon’s Early Recovery: Stockholm, Sweden - August 31, 2006.” p. 6.

[232] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2006,” Washington, DC, p. 74.

[233] Information Office of the State Council, “China’s National Defense in 2006,” Xinhua, 29 December 2006, http://bandwidth.infogate.se, accessed 12 June 2007.

[234] Email from Julia Goehsing, MACC SL, 17 August 2007.

[235] UN, “2006 Portfolio End-Year Review,” New York, January 2007, p. 3.

[236] UN, “2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2006, List of Projects, pp. 406-423.

[237] MASG, “Newsletter-Third Quarter of 2006,” Washington, DC, p. 16.

[238] Ibid, p. 5.

[239] UN, “2006 Portfolio End-Year Review,” New York, January 2007, p. 7.