Peru

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Peru signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 17 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. On 22 July 2006, Peru enacted Law 28824 imposing penal sanctions of five to eight years imprisonment for violations of the Mine Ban Treaty.^[1]

In April 2008, Peru submitted its ninth Article 7 report, covering the period from March 2007 to March 2008.^[2]

Peru participated in the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008. It made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance at both meetings. At the Meeting of States Parties, it also delivered a joint statement with Canada after they became the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, both having served as co-rapporteurs the previous year.

In August 2007, Peru attended a regional meeting in Chile to consider implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty’s mine clearance provisions (Article 5), including the ten-year clearance deadline. On 1 September 2007, the Executive Council of the Peruvian Center for Mine Action (Contraminas) approved the “National Action Plan Against Antipersonnel Mines,” which was subsequently submitted for ministerial approval. This action plan contains Peruvian policy on landmines, including objectives and relevant activities, identification of mined areas and resources needed, and a plan to assure assistance to victims of antipersonnel mines.^[3]

Peru has made few formal statements on key issues of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3, concerning joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices, and the permissible number of mines retained for training purposes.

Peru is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It attended the Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol on 6 November 2007. It has not submitted an annual Article 13 report since February 2006. Peru is not a party to Protocol V on explosive remnants of war, but it attended the protocol’s First Annual Conference of States Parties on 5 November 2007 as an observer.

Peru participated in the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 and adopted the final treaty text. It was one of the Core Group countries responsible for promoting the Oslo Process to ban cluster munitions, and hosted an international preparatory conference in May 2007. 

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Peru is a former producer of antipersonnel mines.^[4] The Ministry of Defense has stated that Peru never exported antipersonnel mines.^[5] Peru used antipersonnel mines to protect electricity towers and public infrastructure during and after the internal conflict of 1980–1992 with guerrillas of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, MRTA).^[6]

From 1999 to December 2001, Peru destroyed its stockpile of 338,356 antipersonnel mines.^[7] In its latest Article 7 report, Peru declared a stockpile of 4,000 antipersonnel mines retained for training.^[8]

That is 12 fewer than the previous year.^[9] Peru has not reported in any detail on the intended purpose and actual use of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004. In 2005, a military official told Landmine Monitor that mines are held by different army Combat Engineer Units for use in instruction on the safe storage and transportation of mines, so the mines are not usually destroyed during training.^[10]

Use by Shining Path

Since early 2007, remnants of Shining Path have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, referred to as “explosive traps,” to protect illegal coca fields in the Alto Huallaga sector of Huánuco department, and in San Martín department. According to reports from the Peruvian-based media agency InfoRegion, as of May 2008, 75 explosive traps in Huánuco and San Martín departments had caused 40 casualties among national police, village defense organizations, and coca eradicators employed by the state.^[11] Since Landmine Monitor was launched in 1998, the only other reports of use of antipersonnel mines, or antipersonnel mine-like devices, by Shining Path have come in June and July 2003.^[12] Victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)are also prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

In June 2007, a media report stated that two antipersonnel mines and six IEDs were laid on 21km of the Fernando Belaúnde Terry road in Tocache province, San Martín department, one day before a rebel attack in which three police and one official were killed. These weapons were found by the army and national police forces. According to the report, none of the weapons exploded. The Ministry of Interior blamed Shining Path and drug dealers.^[13]

Landmine/ERW Problem

Peru is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), mainly unexploded ordnance (UXO), in the center of the country and the Condor Mountain Range, in the sparsely populated Amazon basin. In 1995 during an armed conflict with Ecuador, antipersonnel mines were emplaced along the border in Amazonas, Cajamarca, Piura, and Tumbes departments. Only Amazonas department remains mine-affected.^[14]

In the 1980s, mines were also planted to protect infrastructure (primarily high-tension electricity pylons) against attacks from Shining Path and the MRTA.^[15] In 1986, when Shining Path destroyed 10 pylons in one day, resulting in a nationwide blackout, the government of Peru decided to mine the pylons to protect them.^[16] Mines were also planted around three maximum security prisons in 1993–1996 to prevent prisoners from escaping, and around police anti-narcotics bases as a defensive measure.^[17]

Peru has reported that 35 mined areas remain to be cleared in the Achuime river area, and the Cenepa and Río Santiago districts of Amazonas department in the Condor Mountain Range border area. As of March 2008, the estimated area of contamination in this area was 192,061m²; there was said to be 29,084 mines.^[18] In addition, Peru has estimated that a total of 10,500 mines remain around the following: 837 electricity pylons; three antenna transmitters; one electricity substation; three high-security prisons; and two police bases. The total suspected hazardous area outside the Condor Mountain Range is 334,667m².^[19]

In 2003, it was decided that the 1,711 high-tension electric towers that had been cleared would have to be cleared again, when four incidents occurred after the area had been cleared. Inquiries into the incidents established they had been triggered by remnants or components of undetonated mines in the previously cleared areas.^[20]

Although the Chilean border is not contaminated on Peru’s side, according to Contraminas it is considered a problem for the government because the main casualties—on the Chilean side of the border—are Peruvian citizens who illegally cross the border.^[21]

Most of the casualties in Peru have been recorded around the electricity pylons, where approximately 500 communities are at risk.^[22] Many of these high-tension pylons cross Andean mountain areas and grazing lands that range from 3,000m to 5,000m in height and are accessible only by foot. Consequently teenagers, typically shepherds, are particularly exposed to mines when they are out in the fields with their sheep and llamas.^[23]

Mined infrastructure as of March 2008

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

According to Peru’s Article 5 deadline extension request, Contraminas was established in December 2002 by government decree “to centralize planning and operations with a view to meeting the obligations set out in the Ottawa Convention and facilitating coordination among the national bodies in charge of its implementation.” Contraminas, located in the Ministry of External Relations, had three staff as of early 2008.^[24]

The Organization of American States (OAS) has assisted Peru in mine clearance since May 2001. The Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South America (Misión de Asistencia a la Remoción de Minas en Suramérica, MARMINAS), established by the Inter-American Defense Board in May 2003 to support mine clearance in both Ecuador and Peru, provides technical advice to the OAS and monitors demining operations.^[25] In 2007 and early 2008, OAS monitors from Brazil and Chile were based in Ecuador to support the Peruvian army’s clearance operations.^[26]

In the reporting period, Peru and Ecuador held three bilateral meetings between June 2007 and February 2008.^[27] According to Peru, agreement was reached at these meetings to cooperate on humanitarian demining of the common border areas, on medical evacuation of deminers, on sharing demining information and equipment, and on creating a joint training and information center for deminers.^[28] Another result was the first meeting on 8–9 May 2008 between the Ecuadorian Mine Clearance Center (CENDESMI) and Contraminas, at which agreement was reached to hold subsequent meetings biannually.

In August 2007, Peru attended a regional meeting held in Santiago, Chile to consider implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty’s mine clearance provisions (Article 5) including the 10-year clearance deadline.

The Peruvian Armed Forces follow procedures drafted by Contraminas in 2004 and the army’s technical manual drafted in 2002, which are both said to be based on international standards.^[29] Demining by the police also follows the army manual, which has a chapter dedicated to procedures for demining the high-tension electricity pylons.^[30]

Status of strategic mine action planning

At the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006, the objectives of the National Mine Action Plan were stated as: to identify all minefields before 1 March 2007; to complete clearance of 1,711 electricity towers before 1 July 2007; to demine the police stations before 1 July 2008; to demine the rest of the towers and the prisons before March 2009; and to finish demining of Santiago district before 1 March 2009. Deadlines for clearance of the Cenepa and Achuime districts in Amazonas department were to be set later.^[31] In January 2007, however, Peru announced it would not be able to meet its treaty deadline in 2009 since there was insufficient time and funding to finish clearing the border areas with Ecuador.^[32] Peru presented a draft request for a 10-year deadline extension at the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings.^[33]

On 1 September 2007, the Executive Council of Contraminas approved the “National Action Plan Against Antipersonnel Mines,” which was subsequently submitted for ministerial approval. This action plan includes mine action objectives and relevant activities, identification of mined areas and resources needed, as well as a plan to assure assistance to victims of antipersonnel mines.^[34]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

Although in 1999 the International Development Bank and the Andean Development Corporation pledged more than US$1 billion to assist development in the Peru-Ecuador border region,^[35] and although the mined areas on the Peru side of the border are located in highly impoverished areas, the government of Peru has never reported any strong links between mine clearance and development, other than the possibility of extracting minerals from the Condor Mountain Range area after all mines have been removed.

The peace agreement that ended the territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador included the creation of jointly managed contiguous national parks called the Condor Mountain Range Transboundary Protected Area. The “peace parks,” as they are known, are rich in bio-diversity and generate interest in eco-tourism. A travel magazine put the Peru-Ecuador peace parks on a list of the world’s top ten journeys to make but cautioned “be careful of unmarked mined areas.”^[36]

Mine action evaluations

In January 2008, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an evaluation of the 2005–2007 European Commission (EC) Mine Action Strategy in Latin America, including a case study on Peru. The focus of the evaluation was the EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level.^[37] As of July 2008, the results of the evaluation were not publicly available.

Demining

The Peruvian Armed Forces General Directorate of Humanitarian Demining (DIGEDEHUME) is responsible for clearance of the border with Ecuador. Clearance of the high-tension electricity pylons is the responsibility of the privately owned electricity companies, ETECEN, EDEGEL and CAHUA, which have contracted a specialized unit of the national police, División de Seguridad Contraminas (DIVSECOM). Previously, the Industrial Services of the Navy had conducted clearance operations around the pylons.^[38]

Identifying, marking and fencing of affected areas

After the war with Ecuador, Peru initially denied it had used landmines. However, in late 1998, the “Families Shuar and Achuar of the Frontier” and the Ecuadorian Indian Confederation of the Amazonia (COICA) demanded clearance of the mines along the border and issued a joint declaration to the international community, asking for the governments of both countries to demine the border. In subsequent years, Peru revealed its landmine problem slowly through its Article 7 reports, which according to Contraminas, are based on reports received from the military and the people living in the mine-affected areas. As of August 2008, no national survey had been conducted.

In 2000, the Peruvian government estimated there were approximately 120,000 antipersonnel mines along the border with Ecuador. Two years later they provided additional information on departments in the northern border areas due to mine incidents. An independent study published by the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoría del Pueblo) in 2000, and media reports, said that mined high-tension electricity towers posed the greatest threat to the civilian population in Peru. In May 2005, the new administration at the National Penitentiary Institute (INPE) penal centers was informed for the first time that some prisons were mined. While detailed, Peru’s Article 5 deadline extension request remains vague on data concerning the remaining 35 mined areas near the border with Ecuador.^[39]

The number of antipersonnel mines in the police bases of Santa Lucía in the San Martín department and Tulumayo in Huánuco department is not known. The Peruvian National Police Anti-Drug Directorate and Special Operations Unit reported that no more than 500 antipersonnel mines were laid in each base. It was also claimed they have been removed but documentation confirming clearance is not available; therefore, these bases are still considered mined areas until technical surveys are conducted.^[40]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

Peru’s Article 5 deadline extension request contains data describing the original problem and what remains to be done. With the exception of 1999–2000, when more than 200,000m² of land was cleared on the border with Ecuador and 1,600 mines found and destroyed, demining efforts in Peru have focused on clearing the 2,519 electricity pylons.

Peru has not reported fully on clearance during 2007. Its latest Article 7 report declares that 112 antipersonnel mines were destroyed between 15 March 2007 and 29 March 2008 around the electricity pylons, while a further 170 mines were destroyed in the Chiqueiza area of Río Santiago district (Amazonas department) in the Condor Mountain Range.^[41] The area covered by this clearance is not stated.

From 1998 to December 2007, 34 of the 69 mined areas on the border with Ecuador were cleared, with the destruction of 1,722 mines, while 82,123 antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed in an area of 685,400m² around 1,682 electricity pylons.^[42] Contraminas conducts quality assurance after the completion of clearance tasks.^[43]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Peru is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. In previous years, Peru made several statements that it would meet its Article 5 deadline. In November 2005, an OAS-EC agreement for joint demining in Peru and Ecuador stated that the activities being funded should enable Peru to “achieve the objective of declaring its national territory free from antipersonnel mines in 2010.”^[44] A year later in September 2006, Peru informed other States Parties that it would develop a national plan for mine action, in order to complete clearance by 2009. Peru stated all minefields associated with 1,711 high-tension electricity towers would be cleared by 1 July 2007, all police stations would be cleared by 1 July 2008, and the remainder of the electricity towers would be cleared by March 2009.^[45]

In October 2006, however, having decided that it would not be possible to clear the 35 hazardous areas in the Condor Mountain Range by 2009 and meet its Article 5 deadline, Peru developed a 12-year strategy for 2007–2019.^[46] Peru presented a draft request for a deadline extension at the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings.^[47] On 28 March 2008, Peru requested a ten-year extension to its Article 5 deadline—until 1 March 2019.^[48]

Many reasons are cited for not meeting its Article 5 obligations within the deadline: troop rotations, logistics, weather, lack of helicopter support, and possibly a failing economy. Nonetheless, after two productive years in 1999 and 2000 when 34 mined areas covering 298,954m² were cleared, its mine clearance program on the border in the subsequent eight years has cleared only 33,000m². In its extension request, Peru did not include plans to increase clearance capacity despite the poor level of progress so far. Peru submitted an operational plan to clear all mined areas around high tension electricity pylons, antenna transmitters, penitentiaries, and police substations by 2010.

In May 2008, the ICBL noted that “even allowing for the difficult terrain, granting a blanket 10-year extension is not recommended to a country that has not adequately addressed contamination on its border with a former adversary. An extension of no more than six years is recommended, and Peru should re-submit an operational plan that includes addressing the number of deminers, logistics and communications and new arrangements with Ecuador.”^[49] On 3 July 2008, Peru submitted a revised “Executive Summary,” which included statements that a training center would be established to train more deminers in order to increase mine clearance outputs. Peru also stated they would ensure helicopter support for evacuations.^[50] The increase in deminers did not, however, include a shortened timeframe to clear all known mined areas, nor any target dates for establishing a training center and training more deminers. On 18 August, Peru submitted a revised request, this time asking for an eight-year extension.^[51]

Landmine/ERW Casualties

In 2007, Landmine Monitor identified at least 48 casualties involving mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs, including five people killed and 43 injured.^[52] Two casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 12 by ERW, and 34 by victim-activated IEDs planted to prevent coca eradication. In 2007, an unspecified number of incidents resulted in the death of one civilian coca eradicator; 18 others, as well as 13 police protecting them, were injured. Victim-activated IEDs emplaced to prevent coca eradication also killed one civilian man, who stepped on the device on his way home, and severely injured one boy.^[53] The police and the media stated that the “explosive traps” were possibly placed by Shining Path.^[54] In October 2007, Contraminas, DIVSECOM, and DIGEDEHUME met to discuss the IED issue and concluded it was not within their mandate. As of May 2008, the Ministry of Interior was responsible for IED disposal.^[55]

At least eight of the casualties in 2007 were children (one girl and seven boys), and all but one were caused by ERW. Two boys were injured when collecting scrap metal from a police training field.^[56] Scrap metal collection caused eight more casualties—a family collecting scrap metal on a field frequently used for practice by the armed forces in Zarumilla province.^[57] A police deminer was injured by an antipersonnel mine near an electricity pylon in Barba Blanca (Huarochiri province).^[58] Two more incidents occurred near electricity pylons.^[59]

The 2007 casualty rate is a significant increase from the 13 casualties (five killed and eight injured) reported in 2006.^[60] However, this increase is largely due to increased media attention on incidents during coca eradication operations.^[61]

The Association of Victims and Survivors of Minefields (Asociación de Víctimas y Sobrevivientes de Campos Minados, AVISCAM) reported an additional “mine/ERW” incident near an electricity pylon in January 2007 in Yauli province injuring a 16-year-old boy. However, Contraminas and DIVSECOM concluded that the incident was likely the result of handling fireworks.^[62]

In 2007, a Peruvian man was killed by an antipersonnel mine in northern Chile while crossing a mined area to re-enter Peru.^[63]

Casualties due to victim-activated IEDs used to prevent coca eradication continued to occur in 2008; two civilian community guards (“ronderos”) were killed while guiding an army patrol looking for members of Shining Path in Chungui district (La Mar province).^[64]

Data collection

Contraminas registers landmine casualties in its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, receiving information from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), army, police, AVISCAM, and the Office of the Ombudsperson.^[65] Contraminas acknowledged that casualty data was not complete,^[66] stating at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties that it was a “constant process that needs permanent maintenance.”^[67]

In 2007, Contraminas started house visits to assess the needs of 20 mine/ERW survivors in Lima province as the first phase of the Victim Assistance Pilot Project supported by the OAS;^[68] this project had been planned since 2004.^[69] In August 2007, however, a Contraminas representative stated that, so far, the pilot project had largely meant “intellectual progress” and not practical progress.^[70]

DIGEDEHUME was said to conduct impact studies in the border areas near Ecuador, which include information on casualties.^[71]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Peru is not known. In November 2007, Peru stated there were 317 mine casualties in the country: 306 male and 11 female, including 99 civilians. Some 56% of incidents occurred near electricity pylons and 44% in the border areas. It further stated that 90% of casualties “have been fully identified.”^[72] As of April 2008, only one additional casualty had been added, the Peruvian killed in Chile, resulting in 318 mine casualties registered since 1991 (49 killed, 265 injured and four unknown).^[73] Contraminas also recorded 107 ERW survivors to June 2008,^[74] but records are incomplete and not entered into the IMSMA database as ERW casualties “do not fall under Contraminas’ mandate.”^[75]

AVISCAM stated in August 2007 that there were more than 500 mine/ERW casualties but that people preferred not to be registered for fear of being labeled as part of the Shining Path insurgency.^[76] The ICRC added that many casualty reports provided to police at the provincial level were not passed on to Contraminas and that a comprehensive survey was needed.^[77]

The 2007 National Household and Population Census found that 10.9% of households had at least one member with a disability (735,400 households). The mine-affected Amazonas department recorded the lowest percentage of disability (7.4%).

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Peru reported that shepherds, often children, are at most risk from antipersonnel mines close to high-tension electricity towers because of their “lack of knowledge of the risks and the failure of local and regional authorities to provide them with information.”^[78]

Mine/ERW risk education (RE), often in conjunction with clearance activity, was focused on people living near electricity pylons in Lima department and along the border with Ecuador. RE was provided by the army, AVISCAM, Contraminas, DIVSECOM, the ICRC,^[79] and the Ministry of Education.^[80] The OAS and EDEGEL provided technical and financial support.^[81] In 2007, at least 8,342 people received RE.

In a response to the increased number of victim-activated IED casualties during coca eradication, the Ministry of Interior launched an awareness-raising campaign in late 2007 in Pucallpa city (Coronel Portillo province, Ucayali department), Tingo María city (Leoncio Prado province, Huánuco department), and Tocache province (San Martín department). The TV and radio mass media campaign called “Fields that kill” targeted the population living near coca fields, and called on people to report dangerous activities to local authorities.^[82] RE was also provided to children in areas near recent incident locations.^[83] Statistics on the number of people reached were not available.

Contraminas did not try to prevent civilian access to military and police areas where casualties due to scrap metal collection occurred, as it does not have the mandate to do so.^[84]

Contraminas coordinates all RE activities and conducts internal meetings with relevant stakeholders, for example, police and Ministry of Education, prior to new RE campaigns. All RE operators worked in permanent coordination with Contraminas.^[85] RE was not included in Peru’s mine action goals for 2002–2006. Although the new mine action strategy for 2008–2019 was said to include RE,^[86] it had not been approved as of 7 August 2008 and details were not available.^[87]

RE is primarily conducted through one-day trainings, mass media, drama and music aimed at schoolchildren, and other ad hoc activities in communities where clearance occurs or where there have been recent incidents.^[88] In its most recent Article 7 report, Peru reported that billboards were emplaced near mined areas, and that booklets and brochures describing ways to prevent mine incidents were distributed.^[89] It was reported in the media that in some places the warning signs around the pylons had disappeared and that barbed wire had been stolen. In other places, the minefields were fenced but people working near the pylons or scrap metal collectors were unaware of the dangers. In other cases, destruction of mines had left UXO: for example, in March 2007 one child was injured by the fuze of a DEXA mine near a pylon that was supposedly cleared.^[90]

In November and December 2007, AVISCAM, Contraminas, DIVSECOM, EDEGEL, and the Ministry of Education organized 12 one-day RE workshops in schools in communities located near high-tension electricity towers in Lima province; 7,461 people (students and teachers) were reached. Short RE theater sessions were also conducted for all community members.^[91]

In 2007, AVISCAM provided basic RE to people and communities at risk. In March 2007, AVISCAM organized a one-day RE session for workers maintaining electricity towers in Lima province.^[92] During September and October 2007, AVISCAM organized one-day RE workshops at three schools located near the sites of recent incidents in Lima province; 881 people (teachers, students and parents) were reached.^[93]

Within the framework of the mine action project in the Condor Mountain Range, six RE campaigns targeting 149 communities in the Amazonas department were scheduled.^[94] Activities were conducted in the communities of Escudero and Papaycu along the Santiago river and in Santa María de Nieva, Condorcanqui province.^[95] No activities were reported in the Cenepa and Achuime river areas although these areas were included in the plan.^[96] The ICRC and the OAS provided support.^[97]

The ICRC held a one-day train-the-trainer workshop on RE for 21 teachers as part of its International Humanitarian Law workshop in March 2007.^[98]

Victim Assistance

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Peru said that “much remained to be done” in the field of victim assistance (VA) to guarantee that mine survivors receive the necessary services for their comprehensive reintegration. It added that the “task is large, complex and difficult, but we have the firm intention to guarantee [mine survivors] their right to health, well-being and integral development.”^[99]

In 2007, the majority of persons with disabilities in Peru did not receive adequate services.^[100] While specialized services for emergency care and physical rehabilitation existed in Lima, not all services were accessible to civilian mine/ERW survivors and services in rural areas were limited.^[101] The police and armed forces provide pensions and comprehensive assistance to personnel injured by mines or ERW.^[102]

As in previous years, the National Human Rights Coordinator reported in June 2008 that, despite an increase in health facilities throughout the country, 25% of the population still lacked access to services for economic or geographical reasons.^[103] Emergency medical care for mine/ERW casualties depended on the incident location and the availability of emergency transport. Regional and local health centers lack funding and trained personnel.^[104] In 2007, one casualty was carried by his mother “for hours” before reaching a police station from where the boy was transported by helicopter to the nearest hospital.^[105]

Comprehensive rehabilitation services only exist at the National Institute of Rehabilitation (Instituto Especializado de Rehabilitación, INR) near Lima, the capital, which is difficult to reach for most survivors.^[106] Physiotherapy and psychosocial support services are free of charge,^[107] but patients must pay for prosthetic/orthotic devices (at cost prices), travel, and accommodation.^[108] The quality and quantity of devices produced needs to be increased.^[109]

Ministry of Health regional health centers are also staffed and equipped to provide basic rehabilitation services.^[110] Community-based rehabilitation (CBR) services exist in poor neighborhoods in Lima, and it was envisioned to expand the program to other parts of the country. As of June 2008, this had not happened due to a lack of funding.^[111]

Civilians with a disability certificate who have demonstrated that their disability makes them unable to work receive a small pension from the government.^[112] In November 2007, Peru stated that the National Council for Reparations for Political Violence (Consejo Nacional de Reparaciones por la Violencia Política) had amended its regulations so that mine casualties and their families can benefit from collective compensation.^[113]

Peru has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The government did not allocate sufficient resources to enforcement of the law and implementation of activities, and many persons were economically and socially marginalized.^[114] In 2008, reform started on the General Law on Persons with Disabilities.^[115] On 30 January 2008, Peru ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol.^[116]

Progress in meeting VA25 victim assistance objectives

Peru is one of 25 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.^[117] As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Peru presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005.^[118] It has not updated the objectives since, nor has it developed formal plans to achieve the objectives.

Deadlines for seven of the nine objectives have elapsed without significant progress being reported. More importantly, only one of the objectives is related to actual implementation of activities: “work with representatives of survivor groups, like AVISCAM, to facilitate access to services offering psychosocial support…”^[119] All the other objectives are related to information compilation/verification and strategy-making. The development of a strategy to “provide direct and appropriate assistance for all registered mine survivors” is only foreseen for 2009,^[120] possibly implying that Peru does not intend to engage in improving the lives of survivors before that time.

In its statements in November 2007 and June 2008, Peru provided general information on government bodies and policies dealing with disability issues, activities conducted by the INR, the Contraminas pilot project, and VA in the 2008–2019 mine action plan. It did not report on progress directly related to its 2005–2009 objectives, other than that they appear to be delayed (see below).^[121] At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, a VA expert was included in the Peruvian delegation but not at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties. Limited information on casualties and beneficiary statistics was reported in Form J of its latest Article 7 report.^[122]

Victim assistance strategic framework

Contraminas coordinates all mine action activities, including VA, and a working group was created in 2006.^[123] The group is responsible for developing a VA strategy but it met irregularly in 2007–2008.^[124] The head of Contraminas stated that this strategy is needed, otherwise “the various sectors do not feel obliged to provide assistance and allocated funds for this.”^[125] In March 2008, the United States-based NGO the Polus Center started exploring possible assistance to the working group for development of the strategy;^[126] it was still looking for funding in August 2008.^[127]

In November 2007, Peru announced that Contraminas had approved the draft of the 2008–2019 mine action plan which aims to “assure assistance to victims of antipersonnel mines, including medical attention, physical and psychosocial rehabilitation, prosthetics, economic reinsertion and social reintegration.”^[128] At the June 2008 Standing Committee meetings, Peru elaborated on the VA objectives of the plan, which are largely the same as its 2005–2009 objectives:^[129] identify/register mine casualties before 1 March 2009 (same deadline); identify available services before July 2008 (postponed from 2006^[130]); develop a VA pilot project in 2008 (planned since February 2004^[131]); and implement a VA plan (no deadline).^[132]

State policy towards mine survivors is part of its “Plan of Equality and Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities 2007–2016” which is designed to improve the quality of life for all persons with disabilities by increasing access to services and through affirmative action. The National Health Plan of the Ministry of Health also includes objectives to improve access to healthcare for persons with disabilities.^[133] In November 2007, it was reported that the Ministry of Health was developing a plan to cover medical assistance to civilian mine survivors under the national health insurance plan.^[134] As of April 2008, the policy was pending approval.^[135]

In June 2007, the National Council for the Integration of Disabled Persons (Consejo Nacional para la Integración de la Persona con Discapacidad, CONADIS), responsible for disability policy, was transformed into the Directorate-General of the Persons with Disabilities (Dirección General de la Persona con Discapacidad, DGPD) under the Ministry of Women and Social Development.^[136] However, on 13 December 2007, Law 29146 reinstituted CONADIS as an autonomous entity, charged with advocating for the rights of persons with disabilities.^[137]

Departments are responsible for incorporating disability issues into regional policies, and municipalities are responsible for the coordination and implementation of relevant activities.^[138] The Office of the Public Advocate for Persons with Disabilities receives complaints of discrimination.^[139]

In 2007, Contraminas started the first phase of the Victim Assistance Pilot Project in cooperation with the Ministry of Health, INR and the National Institute of Ophthalmology. Funding was available through the OAS, which had resources to assist 23 people. However, several survivors did not agree to participate and others could not be located. Contraminas cited high internal migration and the lack of “a registration culture” as reasons.^[140] As a result, only five people were undergoing treatment at INR between June 2007 and June 2008.^[141] In June 2008, INR reported that one additional survivor had completed treatment in 2007 and one more started treatment in 2008; it was unknown if they were covered under the pilot project.^[142] In 2008, the INR also launched a rehabilitation training course for 240 medical professionals; as of June 2008, two of six groups had received training.^[143]

AVISCAM facilitated medical treatment and the provision of mobility devices to 10 mine survivors two of whom were identified for the pilot project.^[144] Contraminas and AVISCAM also worked on a project to include mine survivors in RE and VA planning and as “observers” during humanitarian demining operations.^[145]

In March 2007, CONADIS reopened the Center for Technical and Occupational Training in El Callao; services are not free.^[146] The center conducted five three-month employment training courses for 120 persons with disabilities between March 2007 and May 2008. In October 2007, CONADIS also initiated free workshops on project design but it is unknown if any survivors participated.^[147]

The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) delivered materials to fit 50 patients with prostheses/orthoses at the INR and 50 at the Saint John Clinic and Home (Hogar Clínica San Juan de Dios, HCSJD) in Lima. The HCSJD is a charitable organization working mainly for disabled poor children and youth. It needs more qualified personnel and has obsolete equipment; it does not receive support from the local or central government. Both centers also received technical support and follow-up visits. Two technicians attended training on using polypropylene technology at the regional SFD center in Managua, Nicaragua. Future cooperation was discussed but “appeared somewhat hampered by the prevailing bureaucratic procedures” at the INR.^[148]

Support for Mine Action

Peru has reported a projected total estimated cost of $17,944,207 (€13,087,453) for fulfilling its mine clearance obligations during the requested extension period of 2009–2019. Of this amount, $16,236,207 (€11,841,738) is required for mine action operations by the armed forces and $1,708,000 (€1,245,715) for operations by the national police. Funding for the national police is reportedly required only during 2009 and 2010.^[149] Landmine Monitor is not aware of any long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting RE and VA needs in Peru.

Peru’s Article 5 deadline extension request cites national and international funding levels and implementation of funds as the most significant threats to completion of the plan within the deadlines. Risk factors included the lack of national and international funding and poor planning and resource management on the part of implementing agencies.^[150]

The extension request cites, among reasons for its failure to meet its 10-year clearance deadline, a lapse in international funding between 2000 and 2005 and a lack of stable funding for mine action programming by the national police. The request recommends finding alternative solutions to resource mobilization problems, including establishing funding agreements with public and private businesses impacted by mine contamination.^[151]

Ecuador and Peru continued in 2007 to coordinate resource mobilization as part of their overall cooperative efforts in mine action. Ecuador and Peru held joint meetings in 2007 with international donors to secure financial and technical assistance.^[152]

National support for mine action

Peru reported contributing $1,303,397 from national funds to mine action in 2007, consisting of $915,497 to the armed forces and $387,900 to the national police. Peru had previously reported contributing $795,413 in 2006, but as of March 2008 had revised the figure to $807,558.^[153] Peru re-established mine action as a specific item in the national budget in 2006, after suspending it in 1999.^[154] In July 2008, Peru reported contributing a total of $4,943,336 to mine clearance to date.^[155]

Of $16.2 million total funds required for armed forces mine action operations from 2009 to 2019, $1,708,000 had reportedly been contributed from national funds as of March 2008, covering 2009 and 2010. Of the $1.7 million required by the national police for 2009 and 2010, $1,248,000 had reportedly been contributed from national funds as of March 2008.^[156] Peru has stated that it will cover the majority of the total costs associated with its Article 5 extension proposal. Of the $17,944,207 required, Peru has committed to providing $11,984,207 from state funds.^[157]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, Spain reported providing $207,232 (€151,143) to mine action in Peru, consisting of €80,000 ($109,688) to the OAS for unspecified mine action and €71,143 ($97,545) in-kind for a mine clearance instructors’ course at the International Humanitarian Demining Center (Centro Internacional de Desminado Humanitario).^[158] As in previous years, regional funding was provided in 2007 for mine clearance at the Peru-Ecuador border with no breakdown of funds allocated for each country. Canada contributed C$171,505 ($159,774) and Italy contributed €14,000 ($19,195), both through the OAS Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines Program (AICMA).^[159] The OAS reported that previous EC funds for border mine clearance, committed in 2006 and totaling €1 million, were split equally between mine action in Peru and Ecuador.^[160] Specific funding to Peru in 2007 was reported to be $25,196, from the OAS for mine clearance.

Funding at 2007 levels is less than the $500,000 in international support reportedly required by Peru for fulfilling mine clearance obligations and does not address VA requirements, for which no cost estimates have been provided. Peru reported receiving $326,836 in international funding in 2006, but did not provide a breakdown of funding by donor. ^[161]

In July 2008, China contributed $100,000 to Peru for clearance in the border region between Peru and Ecuador.^[162] Additional monetary commitments in 2008 have been provided by the Republic of Korea and Germany, totaling $237,110, as well as monetary or in-kind commitments of unspecified amounts from Austria, Belgium, China, the EC, Japan, Norway, and the US.^[163]