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Table of Contents
Country Reports
Yemen, Landmine Monitor Report 2008

Yemen

State Party since

1 March 1999

Treaty implementing legislation

Adopted: 20 April 2005

Last Article 7 report submitted on

31 March 2008

Article 4 (stockpile destruction)

Deadline: 1 March 2003

Completed: 27 April 2002

Article 3 (mines retained)

Initially: 4,000

March 2008: 3,760

Contamination

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO

Estimated area of contamination

243km2

Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)

Deadline: 1 March 2009

Likelihood of meeting deadline

None: extension requested

Demining progress in 2007

Mined areas: 2.6km2 (2006: 2km2—mined and battle areas)

Area reduced/cancelled: 216km2 (2006: 179km2)

Mine/ERW casualties in 2007

Total: 26 (2006: 17)

Mines: 19 (2006: 6)

ERW: 3 (2006: 11)

Unknown devices: 4 (2006: 0)

Casualty analysis

Killed: 5 (2006: 7)

Injured: 21 (2006: 10)

Estimated mine/ERW survivors

2,900

RE capacity

Unchanged—adequate

Availability of services in 2007

Unchanged—inadequate

Progress towards victim assistance (VA25) aims

Slow

Mine action funding in 2007

International: $1.1 million (2006: $4 million)

National: $3.5 million (2006: $3.5 million)

Key developments since May 2007

On 16 December 2007, Yemen destroyed an additional 30,000 antipersonnel mines that were found in November 2006 in an old military warehouse. Allegations of use of landmines during the conflict between government troops and rebel forces in the northern Sa’ada governorate continued in 2007–2008. Landmine Monitor was unable to verify details of any of the allegations. In 2007, the ICRC began supporting the Aden Rehabilitation Center, which had been struggling since the departure of HI on 1 January 2006. As a result of 2007 clearance, the governorates of Aden, Al Hodaida, Hajjah, Raymah, and Sana’a were cleared of mined and battle areas. In March 2008, Yemen requested an extension to its Article deadline of five-and-a-half years.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Yemen signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 1 September 1998, and it entered into force on 1 March 1999. National implementation legislation was enacted on 20 April 2005.[1] Yemen submitted its tenth Article 7 report on 31 March 2008, covering 31 March 2007 to 31 March 2008.[2]

Yemen participated in the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007, where it made statements on mine clearance, land release, and victim assistance. Yemen did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2008.

Yemen elaborated its views on key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty in a letter to Landmine Monitor in April 2006, and again during the intersessional meetings in May 2006. It articulated strong positions mirroring those of the ICBL and many other States Parties.[3]

Yemen is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It did not attend the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions in May 2008.

Use

Since an insurgency started in June 2004, there have been several reports of the use of landmines during conflict between government troops and rebel forces led by Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi in the northern mountainous Sa’ada governorate.[4] In October 2007, a member of parliament and brother of the rebel leader, Hussein Al-Houthi, accused the government of planting mines in the governorate.[5] In April 2008, rebels accused the government of planting antipersonnel mines since late 2007 in Haydan district, claiming the mines had killed one person and injured six others between October 2007 and April 2008, as well as claiming the lives of livestock.[6] Also in April 2008, an apparent antivehicle mine blast reportedly killed two soldiers in the city of Mareb.[7] In July 2008, an Al-Houthi rebel allegedly placed a mine in the town of Sa’ada, which killed at least five people.[8] Later in July, a landmine reportedly exploded in Amran governorate, killing three local security personnel and wounding one.[9] Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm the information in these reports, including if they were in fact antipersonnel mine incidents.

Transfer, Production, Stockpile Destruction, and Retention

Yemen has stated that it has never exported antipersonnel mines. In November 2006, the UN arms embargo monitoring group for Somalia reported allegations of transfers of arms from Yemen to Somalia by both the government and Yemeni arms trading networks, but antipersonnel mines were not specified.[10] An October 2005 report by the monitoring group alleged transfers of mines from the government of Yemen to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in July 2005; the report did not specify if the mines were antipersonnel or antivehicle. In a July 2006 letter to Landmine Monitor, Yemen strongly denied transferring mines.[11]

Yemen has stated that it has never produced antipersonnel mines. It completed destruction of 74,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 27 April 2002,[12] although the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) claims that the amount destroyed was actually 78,000.[13] On 16 December 2007, Yemen destroyed an additional 30,000 POMZ-2 antipersonnel mines that were found in November 2006 in an old military warehouse undergoing transformation into a tourist site. The mines had been transferred by Yemen’s mine action program for destruction in 2007.[14]

In May 2007, it was reported that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were among the weapons which were bought from the public in various parts of the country as part of a governmental arms reduction and arms collection program. The different types of weapons were in the hands of “regular civilians, tribal sheikhs and clans from around the country.”[15]

Mines retained for research and training

As of March 2008, Yemen reported that it had retained 3,760 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes under Article 3 of the treaty.[16] This is 240 fewer mines than reported in 2007. In every previous year since 2003, Yemen has reported having 4,000 retained mines. It has also reported each year that it has used 240 of the retained mines to train mine detection dogs (MDD), but has never before subtracted the 240 from the 4,000 total, indicating either that the mines were not consumed (exploded) during the training or that mines collected from demining activities were used for the training.[17]

Yemen has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines as agreed by States Parties in 2004. It has not used the expanded Article 7 Form D for reporting on retained mines agreed by States Parties in 2005.

Landmine/ERW Problem

Yemen is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily unexploded ordnance (UXO), as a result of several conflicts dating back to 1962.[18] Most mines were laid in border areas between northern and southern Yemen, prior to unification. As of August 2008, all governorates were contaminated, with the exception of Aden, Al Hodaida, and Hajjah, all of which had been fully cleared and handed over, and Sana’a and Dhamar, in which clearance was completed but where handover had not yet occurred.[19] Hadramout governorate remained the most affected, although resurvey had significantly reduced the amount of suspected land.[20]

A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), completed in July 2000, identified 1,078 suspected mined areas totaling 922km2, impacting 592 villages in 18 out of the country’s 21 governorates. In 2002 and 2006, a further 10 mined areas estimated to cover a total of some 600,000m2 were located in Al-Dhale’, Ibb, and Lahij governorates.[21] ERW in 59 affected areas across the country are estimated to cover a further 38km2.[22] In its Article 5 deadline extension request of 31 March 2008, Yemen reported that through 31 December 2007, it had released 76.91% (710km2) of the original LIS suspected mined area, having cancelled or cleared 631 areas from the adjusted total of 1,088.[23] As of August 2008, the total estimated suspected hazardous area (SHA) for Yemen was some 243km2.[24]

Yemen claims that the mine and ERW problem has had a serious impact on access to critical resources, blocking access to grazing and agricultural land as well as water sources for drinking and irrigation. It has also impeded infrastructure development and implementation of social development projects in affected communities.[25] Most of Yemen’s oil, which contributes more than half of the state budget, is believed to be located in Hadramout; oil exploration has been affected by mines.[26]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

Mine action in Yemen dates from 1997 when the United States provided training for mine clearance personnel. In June 1998, the Prime Minister issued a decree creating a National Mine Action Committee (NMAC).[27] NMAC, chaired by the Minister of State (a member of the cabinet), brings together representatives of seven concerned ministries and is responsible for formulating the national mine action plan and for oversight of YEMAC. It met four times in 2007.[28]

YEMAC, with its headquarters in Sana’a and a Regional Executive Mine Action Branch (REMAB) and a National Training Center in Aden, was established in 1998. Another REMAB was added in March 2004 in al-Mukalla (Hadramout governorate).[29] REMABs are responsible for field implementation of the national mine action plan.[30]

YEMAC installed and began training on a newer version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in August 2008.[31] YEMAC’s headquarters has 55 personnel, and the demining program as a whole employs 1,136 people.[32]

In May 1999, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) initiated support to YEMAC. In October 2003, the program moved from direct (UN) execution to national execution.[33] Since the beginning of 2007, UNDP has provided support for resource mobilization (including procurements and recruitment services), and to project quality assurance.[34] Support from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) enabled the construction of an MDD center in Sana’a and training of MDD handlers.[35]

National mine action legislation and standards

There is no detailed mine action law in Yemen. NMAC was established by decree in June 1998 and YEMAC was established in October 1998 as its implementing body.[36] In 2006, the Yemen national mine action standards and YEMAC’s standing operating procedures (SOPs) were approved by NMAC.[37] There were plans to revise the SOPs in 2008.[38]

Strategic mine action planning

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan was based on the LIS results and covered the period 2001–2005. The plan was revised in June 2004 for 2004–2009. The plan’s vision is to “put an end to the suffering of the people and the casualties caused by antipersonnel mines in mine-affected areas by the end of March 2009.”[39] In May 2006, Yemen stated that by 2009 it aimed to “clear, fence or mark all hazard areas that present a threat to people, economic and social livelihood of communities.”[40] As a result of resurvey in Hadramout governorate in June 2006, the total SHA was reduced from 391km2 to just under 23km2. Hadramout governorate previously comprised 42% of the total SHA in Yemen.[41]

In March 2008, YEMAC updated its Strategic Mine Action Plan and applied to the State Parties for an extension of its Article 5 deadline. The requested extension covers April 2009 to September 2014.[42]

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

Yemen mostly concentrates its demining activity on high priority areas in Hadramout governorate because of the importance of oil production.[43]

Mine action evaluations

An evaluation of UNDP support to the Yemeni mine action program in 2005 recommended that Yemen should conduct a socio-economic assessment of the use of released land.[44] This was carried out in 2006.[45] Based on the results of the assessment, YEMAC planned to establish a department to promote socio-economic development of cleared areas. This had not yet occurred as of February 2008.[46] Projects were planned to include construction of schools, hospitals, roads, and wells, focusing on areas covered in the land use survey.[47] It was not clear who would be responsible for the development work.

Demining

Mine clearance in Yemen is undertaken solely by YEMAC, using staff seconded from the Engineering Forces of the Ministry of Defense. YEMAC uses all demining tools—manual demining, MDDs, and, since early 2007, machines. A Backhoe demining machine, delivered to YEMAC by the US Department of Defense for testing, has been used on mined areas since January 2007. The machine is intended to clear antipersonnel mines deeper than 1.5m in desert areas, but as most minefields consist of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, it has not proved particularly efficient.[48]

In January 2008, YEMAC deployed three mobile platoons (18 deminers in each, plus one paramedic) for “special tasks,” such as clearance in difficult-to-access mountainous areas. Two additional mobile platoons had been deployed as of August 2008.[49] In 2008, YEMAC planned to replace all its old demining equipment, and to breed nine new MDDs in its MDD center to replace the existing dogs which were becoming too old.[50]

The major obstacles to demining in 2007 were said to be a lack of funds and the late arrival of funds.[51] There have also been problems with shortfalls as a result of inflation.[52]

Identifying hazardous areas

YEMAC conducts land release on SHAs through technical survey by applying one of its demining tools. YEMAC never releases any land without technical survey and quality assurance (QA). QA teams have to visit every mined area to cross-check the information on the ground.[53]

Marking and fencing of affected areas

In 2007, YEMAC marked 3.66km2 of suspected land, bringing the total area marked to almost 20km2 in 642 mined areas.[54] For marking, YEMAC sometimes paints stones to make people aware of a mine threat.[55] In August 2008, it was reported that YEMAC had found solutions to clear some of the “permanently marked” minefields that it previously announced it could not clear with existing technology.[56]

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

In 2007, YEMAC reported clearing 2.61km2 of mined areas; no battle area clearance was conducted. As a result, 51 antipersonnel mines, 23 antivehicle mines, and 8,218 items of UXO were found and destroyed. A total of 216km2 of SHA was released through area reduction or cancellation.[57] According to YEMAC, not many mines were found because demining units are re-clearing, according to humanitarian standards, areas previously cleared by army personnel.[58]

From January to June 2008, YEMAC reported further clearing 1.69km2 of mined areas; again no battle area clearance was reportedly conducted, despite the high number of UXO cleared. A total of 44 antipersonnel mines, 12 antivehicle mines, and 3,758 items of UXO were destroyed. A further 11.63km2 was released through area reduction.[59]

As a result of 2007 clearance, the governorates of Aden, Al Hodaida, Hajjah, Raymah, and Sana’a were cleared of mined and battle areas.[60] Clearance output in 2007 was higher than the previous year (2.6km2 against 2km2 in 2006) as was the amount of land released.[61]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Yemen is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. On 31 March 2008, Yemen submitted its extension request with a strategic plan covering its requested extension period of five-and-a-half years from April 2009 to 1 September 2014. Yemen cites a series of factors for its failure to meet its 1 March 2009 deadline, including shortfalls in funding (in 2003, 2005 and 2006) and the presence of mines in shifting sands as well as their depth (some may lie in sand dunes up to 6m below the surface), as well as its difficult-to-access mountainous areas where it is very difficult to use mine detectors in the ferrous soil.[62]

Overall, Yemen’s extension request seems reasonable. There is some evidence, however, that YEMAC could make more use of mechanical demining equipment. New sifting and vegetation cutting machines can increase productivity and help to clear areas with dense vegetation and deeply buried mines (those from 2–6m below the surface).

It also needs to be confirmed that no mined areas will be excluded from the demining program during the extension period. Previously, Yemen had claimed that certain mined areas would be “permanently marked” due to the “impossibility” of clearance.

Demining in 2003–2007[63]

Year

Mine clearance (km2)

Area reduced or cancelled (km2)

2007

2.61

216.07

2006

2.0

179.93

2005

1.70

41.85

2004

2.72

140.07

2003

2.93

38.03

Total

11.96

615.95

Landmine/ERW Casualties[64]

In 2007, Landmine Monitor identified at least 26 new mine/ERW casualties in Yemen, including five people killed and 21 injured. Of these, YEMAC recorded 23 new mine/ERW casualties (five killed and 18 injured). YEMAC did not record any mine/ERW casualties in the restive Sa’ada governorate although it was reported in April 2007 that people with mine injuries had been admitted to hospitals during clashes.[65] Yemeni media reported on at least three casualties in Sa’ada during the second half of 2007 (two women and one girl injured). Although there is no confirmation of mine use in Sa’ada, the injuries of the casualties appear to be consistent with those caused by antipersonnel mines/victim-activated devices.[66]

The majority of casualties were civilian (22); two were military and two were deminers.[67] As in 2006, but contrary to previous years, most of the casualties were adults, including four women. Only six casualties were children (three boys and three girls). The three girl casualties occurred while tending animals, traditionally the most risky activity for girls.[68]

Five casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, including the two clearance casualties, two each were caused by ERW and unspecified mines, one by a fuze and four by unknown devices. The 12 other casualties were caused by antivehicle mines, mainly due to one incident involving 10 people traveling by car. Most casualties occurred in Lahij governorate (14), again due to the large antivehicle mine incident. No casualties had been recorded in Lahij in 2006. Five casualties occurred in Ibb governorate, three in Sa’ada and one each in Hadramout, al Jawf, Abyan, and Aden. The casualty in Aden was a soldier killed by an unknown device in an army camp.

Due to the antivehicle mine incident, the 2007 casualty rate is an increase compared to 2006 when at least 17 casualties were identified by Landmine Monitor. However in April 2007, YEMAC’s general director reported 36 casualties for 2006.[69] In its Article 5 extension request Yemen reported 18 casualties for 2006,[70] and YEMAC revised its 2006 total to 19 in March 2008.[71] None of these totals include an incident causing six casualties in Al-Dhale’ in January 2006 (one killed and five injured).[72]

Casualties continued to occur in 2008 with at least 18 casualties to 15 August, including nine people killed and nine injured. YEMAC reported that five children were injured in Lahij governorate on 28 February.[73] Landmine Monitor identified 13 casualties through the media: nine mine casualties in Sa’ada governorate and four military casualties in neighboring Amran governorate. Among the casualties in Sa’ada were two boys and two women.[74]

One additional incident killing two military and injuring five more while they were parking their car in Mareb governorate on 16 April was most likely caused by a remote-detonated device and was excluded from total casualties.[75]

Data collection

YEMAC maintains casualty data received though its field teams, hospitals, police, security departments, and other government bodies in IMSMA. Data from the LIS is also incorporated into the database.[76] Although YEMAC stated in July 2007 that casualty data was nationwide[77] this does not appear to be the case, as none of the casualties occurring in Sa’ada governorate in 2007–2008 or casualties reported in the media in previous years have been included.[78] In early 2007, it was noted that there were four to six new casualties per month (48 to 72 annually).[79] In 2008, it was said that there are one to three casualties per month (12 to 36 annually).[80]

Analysis of 2007 casualty data shows an improvement in recording activities at the time of the incident and provides sufficient details on the casualty, device type, and location.[81] However, examination of Yemen’s Article 5 deadline extension request and information provided to Landmine Monitor by YEMAC appear to show that the data management problem identified by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in 2006 and Landmine Monitor in 2007 was not resolved as of August 2008.[82] Between May 2006 and March 2008, YEMAC has provided varying figures on the number of casualties recorded between 1999 and 2007. In March 2008, YEMAC informed Landmine Monitor that it had recorded 129 casualties between 2000 and the end of 2007 (55 killed and 74 injured).[83] In the Article 5 extension request 128 casualties were reported for the same period (49 killed and 79 injured).[84]

Calendar year data for various years (particularly for 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006) differed from casualty data provided in the extension request and what was provided to Landmine Monitor in June 2007.[85] In March 2006, YEMAC reported 264 mine/ERW casualties between 2000 and 2005. When totaling the data provided by YEMAC to Landmine Monitor between 2000 and 2007 the total is 149 (60 killed and 89 injured).[86]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Yemen is unknown. According to the LIS, by 2000 there were 4,904 mine/ERW casualties (2,560 people killed and 2,344 injured). In May 2006, YEMAC estimated there were approximately 2,900 mine/ERW survivors.[87] The Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation stated in October 2006 that there were 5,478 mine/ERW casualties, mostly women and children, and 828,000 people living in affected communities.[88]

There are no reliable statistics on the number of persons with disabilities in Yemen and estimates range from 1.9–6.5% of the total population, with the highest rate in Aden governorate (11%). It is believed that the actual rate is even higher because available surveys excluded some types of disability.[89]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

Yemen has reported that mine/ERW risk education (RE) is a “major component” in reducing casualty numbers.[90] YEMAC noted that people are most at risk in pasture areas, mainly in the mountains.[91] YMAA added that farmers, people tampering with ERW, and people in conflict areas were also at risk.[92] The rainy seasons are the most dangerous period because flooding can shift mines.[93] It was noted that, despite RE, economic necessity in many mine/ERW-affected villages leads to risk-taking behavior.[94]

In 2007, 80,931 people received RE in Yemen,[95] a significant increase compared to 45,524 people in 2006. In 2007, however, RE was carried out mainly by YEMAC. Due to funding difficulties, the NGO Yemen Mine Awareness Association (YMAA) only operated in January and February.[96] The increase in RE provision has not been explained.

According to Yemen’s latest Article 7 report, 808,677 people have received RE since the start of the RE program in 1997 (423,066 males and 385,611 females).[97]

Strategic framework

RE is coordinated and implemented by YEMAC at the national level in cooperation with its regional branch in Aden governorate and the YMAA chairperson. Since February 2007, coordination ceased as YMAA was no longer able to carry out RE activities.[98] The NMAC’s Mine Awareness Advisory Committee was not active in 2007–2008. However, the NMAC met four times in 2007, and the RE providers were present.[99]

RE is part of the 2005–2009 national mine action strategy and in 2006 a new RE strategy was developed in response to the GICHD livelihoods recommendations and in accordance with national RE standards.[100] The mine action strategy was updated in March 2008, but RE priorities would not be formally revised until Yemen’s Article 5 deadline extension request has been considered.[101] YEMAC uses annual workplans. Progress in RE was said to be slow due to a lack of coordination and funding.[102]

Priority setting for RE is based on the LIS but as of 2008 recent casualties and emergency situations were given more importance in determining RE priorities.[103] The main RE challenges are continued weapons proliferation, ongoing conflict, and inaccessible terrain.[104] QA and monitoring are undertaken by YEMAC for all mine action components including RE. However, YMAA stated that YEMAC does “not really” monitor the adequacy of RE activities and finds there is a need for better monitoring and more focused attention on at-risk groups.[105]

Coverage and response

In 2007–2008, as in previous years, follow-up RE activities were lacking and targeting of most at-risk groups was uneven.[106] YEMAC cannot reach women and girls at gatherings without support from YMAA female trainers, but YMAA has not been active since February 2007.[107] No RE activities were identified in Sa’ada governorate in 2007–2008.

Methods used are house-to-house visits, workshops, theater, public information dissemination and child-to-child approaches[108] (although the latter was mainly conducted by YMAA). RE trainer capacity is sufficient, but there is a need to develop more interactive RE techniques to respond to needs in the field and increase community participation.[109]

In 2007, YEMAC conducted RE in Abyan, Al-Dhale’, Ibb, and Lahij governorates. RE is conducted before, during, and after clearance activities and as a stand-alone activity;[110] 78,814 people in 94 villages were reached.[111] However, comparison of Yemen’s two most recent Article 7 reports shows that the increase in the number of RE beneficiaries does not correspond to the statistics provided in YEMAC’s annual report nor the Article 5 deadline extension request.[112]

Victim Assistance

Service provision for persons with disabilities in Yemen is weak, primarily urban-based, and largely inaccessible to those who need it. It is estimated that only 1.5% of persons with disabilities have access to services, with women having even more limited access.[113] Cross-sector initiatives such as community-based rehabilitation (CBR) are “virtually non-existent.”[114] Various disability NGOs and disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) exist, and although coordination is good and they receive government support, they lack appropriate financial and human resources.[115]

A 2006 GICHD survey noted that although the YEMAC victim assistance (VA) program in Yemen is doing some excellent work “its coverage to date is limited.” It further noted that very few of the survivors had received significant assistance and most had not heard of the YEMAC program.[116] Landmine Monitor enquiries about how the GICHD recommendations were integrated into the YEMAC program remained unanswered.[117] Yemen’s statement to the Eighth Meeting of States Parties and previous responses, however, clearly indicate that no changes were made to the program in 2007–2008, which continued to focus on medical attention.[118]

Health and rehabilitation services are highly centralized and mainly located in the major cities (Aden, Sana’a and Ta’izz).[119] In rural areas, three-quarters of persons with disabilities have to travel outside their communities to reach health services.[120] Although the Ministry of Public Health and Population provides free medical care to persons with disabilities, they usually cannot afford the transport. [121] Few persons with disabilities received government health support, and services are poor quality.[122]

The Ministry of Public Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs are responsible for the physical rehabilitation sector, but coordination between the two ministries was lacking, hampering functioning of the centers, which are dependent on ministry funding.[123] The Social Fund for Development and the Rehabilitation Fund and Care of Handicapped Persons (Disability Fund) provide funding.[124] Only one center operates in the remote Hadramout governorate.[125] Patients from Sa’ada governorate need to be referred to Sana’a.[126] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is the only international organization providing extensive support,[127] on which the centers are very dependent.[128]

Although the 2006 GICHD survey “emphasised that mental health care needs [of survivors] were sometimes as important as physical health needs,”[129] psychosocial services for survivors continued to be limited in 2007 and were not considered a priority.[130] There is also a great need for socio-economic reintegration projects for mine/ERW survivors and existing programs are weak.[131] Educational and economic opportunities for persons with disabilities are limited: fewer than one in a thousand people had received government support to access education. Mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities receive an allowance of YR1,000 (about US$5) per month, which is insufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of living.[132]

Yemen has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but it is not enforced and discrimination remained.[133] Yemen signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 30 March 2007 and its Optional Protocol on 11 April 2007. As of 31 July 2008, Yemen had not ratified either instrument.

Progress in meeting VA25 victim assistance objectives

Yemen is one of 25 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.[134] Yemen prepared its 2005–2009 objectives for the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb,[135] and submitted plans to achieve some objectives at the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007.[136] The objectives or plans have not been revised since and remain largely non-SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) and incomplete.[137]

Plans to achieve the objectives do not detail specific actions and are limited to the phased program that Yemen has been executing since 2001. This program includes three phases almost exclusively focused on medical and rehabilitation services with a largely non-functioning fourth socio-economic phase, which was added in 2004.[138] Yemen regularly provides statistics on the people assisted under the first three phases of the YEMAC program. However, annual achievements in 2007, as in 2006, remained significantly under the target of assisting 500 persons per year with medical care, 500 with physical rehabilitation, and 500 with socio-economic reintegration.[139] In 2008, as in 2007, it was reported that not all the survivors identified in the 2000 LIS had received services.[140]

Progress on socio-economic reintegration has been particularly weak as the Yemen Association for Landmine and UXO Survivors (YALS), the national NGO tasked to carry out this component, has lacked capacity and funding since 2006.[141] No progress was noted for needs assessments and infrastructure improvements by the Ministry of Public Health and Population (deadline 2006), the establishment of six vocational training centers, or disability awareness-raising.[142] Progress was noted in 2007–2008 on the strategic plan for persons with disabilities within the framework of a World Bank project.[143]

In August 2008, YEMAC told Landmine Monitor that it was solely responsible for achieving the 2005–2009 VA objectives.[144] Coordination with relevant government organizations or civil society appears to be limited to referral of people to services and some limited information exchange with ministries.[145] Yemen was not present at the June 2008 Standing Committee meetings, but a VA expert provided statistics on YEMAC program beneficiaries at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties.[146]

Victim assistance strategic framework

YEMAC coordinates and implements VA activities under the supervision of NMAC. The Victim Assistance Advisory Committee, under NMAC, comprised of various ministries, is to assist with the planning and evaluation of VA activities. However, the committee is called upon “only when needed” and had no decision- or policy-making capacity. YEMAC does not involve disability NGOs or DPOs in its policy-making process.[147]

VA is included in the national mine action strategy 2005–2009 and its main strategic objective is: “All landmine/ERW survivors should receive medical care, and the centre should provide them with corrective surgery, physical therapy, prosthetic devices, wheelchairs, eyeglasses and hearing aids, as needed…This objective will be met when all known survivors are registered and provided with assistance as per the centre’s medical and rehabilitation programme.”[148] YEMAC’s strategy for VA has not changed significantly since the program started in 2001.

As of May 2008, YEMAC had not established the socio-economic development department as recommended by a 2005 UNDP evaluation.[149] The department’s work would include the construction of schools, hospitals, and other services to promote development in areas that had been cleared. According to UNDP, YEMAC was considering the Social Fund for Development, among other donors and UN agencies, as a possible partner for this project.[150] The Social Fund for Development, an independent body under the Prime Minister, is a major component of the social safety net program for poverty alleviation. It has a national disability program and is the only public institution working on disability policy reform and service delivery. It is considered to be one of the most efficient poverty alleviation networks in the region.[151]

The main ministries in charge of disability issues are the Ministry of Public Health and Population and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Their capacity is said to be “fair” but not adequate in all areas, due to the limited budget.[152]

In 2008, YEMAC reported that it aimed to close its VA program by 2014, but it is unclear if any transition mechanisms are in place.[153] Reportedly the 2007 budget for VA and RE was $200,000 from Sweden.[154]

Assistance activities

YEMAC has reported varying statistics for the number of services provided to survivors in 2007. It is not possible to determine how many individuals have benefited from these services.[155] According to YEMAC statistics, 1,447 case files were opened, 1,165 medical examinations were carried out and 1,313 services provided between 2001 and the end of December 2007.[156] NMAC noted that 195 survivors received assistance through YEMAC in 2007 (5 surgical care, 25 prosthetic devices and 165 “other” assistance).[157]

In 2007, the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), one of the few international NGOs working on disability in Yemen, continued its rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration program for persons with disabilities in Al Hodaida governorate. In 2007, it continued to suffer financial constraints resulting in staff loss and less capacity-building, but constraints were less than in previous years. It assisted four survivors with prosthetic devices (including one injured in 2007), provided mobility devices to 200 persons with disabilities (80 survivors), physiotherapy to 32 (18 survivors), vocational training to 32 (18 survivors), educational support to 11 (seven survivors), and income-generating projects to 100 persons with disabilities.[158]

The Aden Association of People with Special Needs runs the Aden Vocational Training Center and Aden Rehabilitation Center. Socio-economic reintegration programs are funded by the Social Fund for Development and the Disability Fund. Some 100 people received vocational training in 2007 (survivors unspecified) and at least 45 staff members were disabled. The main challenges were the shortage of vocational trainers, difficulties in finding employment for persons with disabilities after they completed their course, a lack of external training opportunities for staff, and a lack of transportation for beneficiaries.[159]

In 2007, the ICRC began supporting the Aden Rehabilitation Center, which had been struggling since the departure of Handicap International on 1 January 2006. The ICRC provided material and technical support.[160] The Aden Rehabilitation Center assisted 1,294 people in 2007 (23 survivors) and operated a medical outreach team in Abyan and Aden governorates assisting 279 more people.[161] The ICRC also continued to support the centers in Sana’a and Mukalla (in Hadramout governorate); the centers assisted 4,863 people and produced 1,171 prostheses (43% for survivors) and 2,517 orthoses.[162]

YALS reported providing socio-economic reintegration for 180 survivors between 2005 and 2007 and 59 set up micro-businesses, all of which faced difficulties in establishing themselves.[163]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Yemen. Yemen has reported a total cost estimate of $31,216,667 (€22,767,608) for completing mine clearance during 2009–2014.[164] This does not take into account costs required to fulfill RE and VA obligations. NMAC is responsible for management of national funds and allocation of national and international funds for mine action in Yemen, for preparing strategic and annual plans, and for implementing funds in mine action operations.[165]

National support for mine action

As in previous years, Yemen reported providing $3.5 million to mine action in 2007. Funds were used to cover deminers’ salaries and insurance, social security, compensation, field allowances, food and offices.[166] National funding has been stable since 1999. In its strategic plan for completing mine clearance, Yemen projected reduced government funding in 2009 ($2.8 million) followed by a return to previous levels. It noted that the government had assumed a 10% annual inflation rate in setting its annual funding levels. Government funds were projected to account for approximately 60% of total required funds. In addition to international funds, accounting for roughly 34% of the total required, Yemen identified 6% of required funds, or almost $1.9 million to be provided in “resources available from other sources.”[167]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, five countries reported providing $1,103,039 (€804,492) to mine action in Yemen. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was approximately 73% less than reported in 2006. Funding at current levels is insufficient to meet the annual amount reported by Yemen as required to carry out its mine clearance strategy—averaging approximately $1.7 million—and does not directly address RE or VA needs.[168] As of mid-2007, YEMAC reported that two projects—one for RE and one for post-clearance community development— were dropped from the 2007 UN Mine Action Portfolio because of lack of funding.[169]

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Yemen: Monetary[170]

Donor

Implementing Agencies/Organizations

Project Details

Amount

US

From the Department of State

$375,000

Germany

UNDP

Support of MDD center

$318,193 (€232,071)

United Kingdom

UNDP

Mine/UXO clearance

$200,200 (£100,000)

Italy

UNDP

Mine clearance

$137,110 (€100,000)

Japan

YALS

VA

$72,536 (¥8,533,656)

Total

$1,103,039 (€804,492)

Yemen reported receiving $2,400,282 in funding in 2007, including $700,000 from the US and €750,000 from the European Commission (EC).[171] This amount included funds reported to Landmine Monitor for 2006 by the EC (€2 million).[172] The EC did not report new funding for Yemen in 2007.

UNDP reported receiving $715,184 in 2007, consisting of $326,966 from Germany, $188,218 from Italy, and $200,000 from Sweden.[173]


[1] Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 March 2007. On 16 December 2004, the Yemeni Parliament endorsed national implementation legislation and on 20 April 2005, Presidential Law No. 25 was issued to bring the legislation into force.

[2] Previous reports were submitted on 30 March 2007, 3 May 2006, 7 April 2005, 30 March 2004, 10 April 2003, 27 April 2002, 18 September 2001, 14 November 2000, and 30 November 1999.

[3] For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 782. Yemen supported the view that any mine (even if it is called an antivehicle mine) equipped with a sensitive fuze or sensitive antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. It supported the view that the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the transit and foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. Regarding the issue of joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, Yemen stated the view that it is prohibited to participate in any activity related to the use of antipersonnel mines.

[4] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 729–730. There were two unconfirmed reports of the use of antipersonnel mines in April 2007.

[5] “Yemen: Aid agencies say humanitarian situation could worsen in north,” IRIN (Sana’a), 24 October 2007, www.irinnews.org. The report states, “Officials in Saada province contacted by IRIN refused to comment.”

[6] Mohammed Bin Sallam, “Sa’ada landmines kill more than 8 women and children,” Yemen Times (Sa’ada), Vol. 18, Issue 1146, 14–16 April 2008, www.yementimes.com.

[7] “Two soldiers killed by landmine in Yemen,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 16 April 2008.

[8] UN High Commissioner for Refugees (Yemen), “Daily Security Report,” 6 July 2008; and “Deadly blast in northern Yemen,” Al Jazeera.net, 5 July 2008, www.english.aljazeera.net.

[9] “Yemen says fighting over but rebels seize village,” Agence France-Presse (Sana’a), 17 July 2008, www.metimes.com.

[10] “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006),” S/2006/913, 22 November 2006, p. 27. The government of Yemen has denied the charges, offered to cooperate with investigations by the monitoring group and requested its help in identifying any instances of arms smuggling. “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1676 (2006),” S/2006/913, 22 November 2006, pp. 67–68.

[11] Letter from Amb. Abdulla Nasher, Embassy of the Republic of Yemen to Canada, on behalf of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Stephen Goose, Landmine Monitor Ban Policy Coordinator, 24 July 2006. In addition, a May 2006 report by the Monitoring Group said that in August 2005, traders at the Bakaraaha arms market in Somalia reportedly purchased mines and other arms from a Yemen arms trading network, and a 2003 report said that mines had been shipped from Yemen to Somalia. For more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 783.

[12] See previous Landmine Monitor reports.

[13] Email from Mansour al-Azi, Director, YEMAC, 31 August 2008; and see also Article 7 Report, Form G, 31 March 2008, which reports total destruction of 108,000 mines, including the 30,000 mines destroyed in December 2007.

[14] Article 7 Reports, Form G, 31 March 2008; and Form B, 30 March 2007. Yemen also informed States Parties during the meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction on 23 April 2007 about the discovery of the 30,000 mines, and indicated they had been handed over for destruction by the end of 2007. Notes by Landmine Monitor/HRW.

[15] Saddam al-Ashmouri, “Weapon buy-backs showcased in Sana’a,” Yemen Times, 29 May 2007, www.yementimes.com.

[16] Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 March 2008. The retained mines consist of 940 PPMISR-2, 940 PMD-6, 940 POMZ-2, and 940 PMN. It consumed 60 of each type of mine.

[17] Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 March 2007, and earlier Article 7 reports. YEMAC confirmed that the 240 mines used for MDD training will only be subtracted when they are destroyed. Email from Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 31 August 2008.

[18] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 866–867.

[19] Email from Ahmed Alawi, Information Management System Officer, Operations Department, YEMAC, 13 August 2008.

[20] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 731.

[21] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, pp. 2, 3; and email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008.

[22] Interview with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 28 February 2008.

[23] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 8.

[24] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008.

[25] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 3.

[26] Ibid, p. 13.

[27] Faiz Mohammad, “Mine Action in Yemen: An Example of Success,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.1, August 2005, www.maic.jmu.edu.

[28] Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2008; and interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Aden, 25 February 2008.

[29] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008. Yemen’s extension request, however, reports that YEMAC was established in January 1999. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 2.

[30] “Five Year National Strategic Mine Action Plan for Yemen, 2004–2009,” June 2004, p. 3.

[31] Email from Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 31 August 2008.

[32] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Aden, 25 February 2008.

[33] Faiz Mohammad, “Mine Action in Yemen: An Example of Success,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 9.1, August 2005, www.maic.jmu.edu.

[34] Email from Yuka Ogata, Programme Officer, Crisis Prevention and Recovery, Pro-Poor Economic Growth Team, UNDP, 31 August 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 732.

[35] Interview with Ahmed Al Khader, Director, MDD Center, YEMAC, Sana’a, 28 February 2008.

[36] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 2.

[37] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Aden, 26 February 2008.

[38] Email from Enas Alarashi, Project Officer, YEMAC, 10 May 2008.

[39] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 732.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Mine Action Support Group (MASG), “Newsletter: Second Quarter of 2007,” Washington, DC, 2 August 2007, www.state.gov.

[42] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 13.

[43] Ibid, p. 6

[44] GICHD, “Mid-Term Outcome Evaluation for Strengthening National Capacity for Mine Action in Yemen—Phase II,” Geneva, June 2005, p. 49. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 733.

[45] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen, Volume 1, Main Report,” GICHD, Geneva, 2006, p. I; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 733.

[46] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Aden, 27 February 2008.

[47] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 733.

[48] Ibid, p. 733.

[49] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008; and interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Aden, 27 February 2008.

[50] Email from Enas Alarashi, YEMAC, 18 March 2008; and see also YEMAC, “Five Year National Strategic Mine Action Plan for Yemen, 2004–2009, Revised and Extended,” June 2004.

[51]Interview with Yuka Ogata, UNDP, Aden, 27 March 2008; and email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008.

[52] Interview with Enas Alarashi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 March 2008.

[53] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 9; and email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008.

[54] Interview with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 March 2008.

[55] Interview with Qaid Haitham Attef Halbob, Operations Officer, YEMAC, Aden, 26 February 2008.

[56] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 735.

[57] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 17 July 2008.

[58] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 734.

[59] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 17 July 2008.

[60] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Aden, 25 February 2008; and email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008.

[61] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Aden, 25 February 2008.

[62] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, pp. 3, 4.

[63] Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 17 July 2008. There is a concern regarding data accuracy due to some differences in figures presented in 2008 regarding 2007 and 2006. YEMAC explained that this was due to revision of previous figures and re-survey.

[64] Unless noted otherwise Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by email from Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, Head of Victim Assistance Department, YEMAC, 3 August 2008; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring for calendar year 2007.

[65] US Department of State, “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Yemen,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2008; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 738.

[66] Mohammed Bin Sallam, “Sa’ada landmines kill more than 8 women and children,” Yemen Times (Sa’ada), 13 April 2008, www.yementimes.com. The title incorrectly states that eight women and children were killed but only gives details on six people injured and one killed between October 2007 and April 2008.

[67] Email from Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, 3 August 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 738.

[68] See, for example, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 792.

[69] Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 1 April 2007.

[70] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 9.

[71] Fax from Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, 23 March 2008; and see also US Department of State, “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Yemen,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2008.

[72] “One Person dead and injury of five others of which two women in two AP explosions in al-Shuaib, al-Dale Governorate,” al-Ayam, 14 January 2006; and analysis of casualty data provided in Yemen’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, pp. 10–11. According to YEMAC, this incident was the result of clashes between police and demonstrators, which involved a thrown hand grenade (no antipersonnel mines). Email from Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 31 August 2008. For the year 2005, 12 casualties identified by Landmine Monitor media analysis were not included in the total either.

[73] Interview with Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Sana’a, 28 February 2008.

[74] Hammoud Mounassar, “Yemen says fighting over but rebels seize village,” Agence France-Presse, 17 July 2008; “Deadly blast in northern Yemen,” Al-Jazeera, 5 July 2008, www.english.aljazeera.net; and Mohammed Bin Sallam, “Sa’ada landmines kill more than 8 women and children,” Yemen Times (Sa’ada), 13 April 2008, yementimes.com. The title incorrectly states that eight women and children were killed but only gives details on six people injured and one killed between October 2007 and April 2008.

[75] “Two soldiers were martyred and five injured in a landmine,” Saba Net (Mareb), 16 April 2008, www.sabanews.net; “Landmine explosion kills two soldiers in Yemen,” Saba Net (Mareb), 16 April 2008, www.sabanews.net; and “Bomb attack kills three police in Yemen,” Agence France-Presse (Sana’a), 16 April 2008, afp.google.com. The AFP article states: “A security source in Marib told AFP that the bomb was detonated by remote control at 8:15 am (0515 GMT), while Marib’s governor was quoted as saying the blast resulted from a landmine.”

[76] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 738.

[77] Telephone interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 3 June 2007.

[78] See above and also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 738; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 792–793; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, pp. 10–11. Casualty data in Yemen’s Article 5 deadline extension request indicates that six casualties in 2006 identified by Landmine Monitor were not included in IMSMA. For 2005, 12 casualties identified by Landmine Monitor were not included.

[79] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 738.

[80] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 10.

[81] Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by email from Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, 3 August 2008.

[82] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 739.

[83] Fax from Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, 23 March 2008.

[84] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, pp. 8–9.

[85] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 739.

[86] See previous editions of Landmine Monitor: 2000: 12, 2001: 20, 2002: 19, 2003: 18, 2004: 17, 2005: 23, 2006: 17, and 2007: 23.

[87] Presentation by Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 8 May 2006.

[88] Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, “The Socio-Economic Development Plan for Poverty Reduction,” Sana’a, October 2006, p. 109.

[89] World Bank, “Yemen, an Integrated Approach to Social Sectors Towards a Social Protection Strategy, Phase I Report,” Sana’a, 29 June 2007, pp. 31, 132. This document is not publicly available.

[90] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 10.

[91] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Nabel Mohammed Rasam, Director of Mine Risk Education, YEMAC, 3 August 2008.

[92] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aisha Saeed, Chairperson, YMAA, 25 May 2008.

[93] Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Nabel Mohammed Rasam, Director of Mine Risk Education Department, YEMAC, 3 August 2008; and Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 25 May 2008.

[94] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 6; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 25 May 2008.

[95] YEMAC, “Annual Report 2007,” Sana’a, 2008.

[96] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 25 May 2008. YMAA has had difficulties sustaining its activities since Japanese funding ended in mid-2005. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 737.

[97] Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2008.

[98] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 25 May 2008.

[99] Ibid.

[100] B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,” Volume I, Main Report, GICHD, Geneva, 2006, p. 86. The main GICHD observation was that gender-related procedures were needed in all aspects of mine action to ensure participation of women; there should be greater involvement of women and girls in RE and awareness campaigns by recruiting more women’s awareness teams and by extending the house to house approach.

[101] Telephone interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 17 May 2008.

[102] 102 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 25 May 2008.

[103] Interview with Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Sana’a, 19 May 2008.

[104] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 25 May 2008.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2008.

[109] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 25 May 2008.

[110] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Nabel Mohammed Rasam, YEMAC, 3 August 2008.

[111] YEMAC, “Annual Report 2007,” Sana’a, 2008.

[112] See Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 10; Article 7 Reports, Form I, 31 March 2008; and Form I, 30 March 2007; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 736.

[113] Email from Yuka Ogata, UNDP, 25 June 2008; and US Department of State, “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Yemen,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2008.

[114] World Bank, “Yemen, an Integrated Approach to Social Sectors Towards a Social Protection Strategy, Phase I Report,” Sana’a, 29 June 2007, pp. 31–32.

[115] Ibid, p. 139; responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by ADRA, 17 July 2008; Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 22 May 2008; and Rashida al-Hamdani, Member of Victim Assistance Advisory Committee, NMAC, 1 July 2008.

[116] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 744.

[117] Emails from Landmine Monitor to Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, on 28 May, 17 June, 5 July, 31 July, 4 and 6 August 2008.

[118] Statement by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 21 November 2007; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 3 August 2008.

[119] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p 740; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 795.

[120] World Bank, “Yemen, an Integrated Approach to Social Sectors Towards a Social Protection Strategy, Phase I Report,” Sana’a, 29 June 2007, p. 136.

[121] Ibid, p. 32.

[122] Ibid, p. 138.

[123] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 741.

[124] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2007,” Geneva, May 2008, p. 56.

[125] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 796.

[126] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2007,” Geneva, May 2008, p. 56.

[127] Ibid.

[128] See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 746.

[129] Ibid, p. 744; and B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,” Vol. I, Main Report, GIHCD, Geneva, 2006, p. 33.

[130] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 22 May 2008.

[131] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 1 July 2008.

[132]B. Pound et al., “Departure of the Devil: Landmines and Livelihoods in Yemen,” Vol. I, Main Report, GIHCD, Geneva, 2006, p. 174.

[133] US Department of State, “2007 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Yemen,” Washington, DC, 11 March 2008; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 1 July 2008.

[134] UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99.

[135] “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties/Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November–2 December 2005, pp. 219–226.

[136] Presentation by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 24 April 2007.

[137] “Mid-Term Review of the Status of Victim Assistance in the 24 Relevant States Parties,” Dead Sea, 21 November 2007, pp. 55–56.

[138] For more information on the YEMAC four-phase program, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 871; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 794–795.

[139] As shown in Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, 3 August 2008; and information from Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, by email from Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 23 March 2008. According to the figures provided, 192 people appear to have received medical and rehabilitation services, and three people have received support for socio-economic reintegration.

[140] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 1 July 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 745.

[141] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 798; Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 746; and Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2008.

[142] Yemen has not reported on these objectives since it submitted the objectives in 2005 and did not include an update on progress towards its 2005–2009 objectives in its response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, 3 August 2008.

[143] World Bank, “Yemen, an Integrated Approach to Social Sectors Towards a Social Protection Strategy, Phase I Report,” Sana’a, 29 June 2007, pp. 9, 164. The World Bank started the process to assist in the development of a national disability strategy in early 2006 and the publication of the strategy was foreseen for late 2007, but was not available as of July 2008.

[144] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, 3 August 2008.

[145] Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by ADRA, 17 July 2008; Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, 3 August 2008; and Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 1 July 2008.

[146] Statement by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 21 November 2007.

[147] Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by ADRA, 17 July 2008; and Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 1 July 2008; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 740–741, 745.

[148] UN, “2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2007, p. 460.

[149] Interview with Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Sana’a, 19 May 2008; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 1 July 2008.

[150] Emails from Yuka Ogata, UNDP, 25 June 2008 and 31 August 2008.

[151] World Bank, “Yemen, an Integrated Approach to Social Sectors Towards a Social Protection Strategy, Phase I Report,” Sana’a, 29 June 2007, pp. 116–117.

[152] Email from Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 7 July 2008.

[153] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, 3 August 2008.

[154] Emails from Yuka Ogata, UNDP, 25 June 2008 and 31 August 2008.

[155] Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2008; Statement by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 21 November 2007; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 3 August 2008; and information from Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, by email from Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 23 March 2008.

[156] Information from Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, by email from Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 23 March 2008. Likewise, these figures do not correspond with what was provided previously. According to YEMAC in April 2007 there were 1,532 cases files.

[157] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 1 July 2008.

[158] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by ADRA, 17 July 2008.

[159] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Layla Abu Bakr Bashumaila, Director, Aden Association of People with Special Needs, 13 February 2008.

[160] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2007,” Geneva, May 2008, p. 56.

[161] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Layla Abu Bakr Bashumaila, Aden Association of People with Special Needs, 13 February 2008; interview with Abdullah al-Duhaimi, Aden Rehabilitation Center, Aden, 13 February 2008; and statistical documents provided during interview.

[162] ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2007,” Geneva, May 2008, p. 56.

[163] Interview with Saleh al-Dahyani, Director, YALS, Sana’a, 10 April 2008.

[164] Ibid, p. 14.

[165] Ibid, p. 7.

[166] Ibid, p. 10. Food costs are mostly covered from the UNDP project. Email from Yuka Ogata, UNDP, 31 August 2008.

[167] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 7.

[168] Ibid, p. 14.

[169] UN, “Mid-Year Review of the Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2007,” undated, www.mineaction.org.

[170] USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2007, by email from Angela L. Jeffries, Financial Management Specialist, US Department of State, 22 May 2008; and emails from Johannes Dirscherl, Desk Officer, Federal Foreign Office, 1 February 2008; Tayo Nwaubani, Program Officer, DfID, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, 29 April 2008; email from Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 February 2008; and Yasuhiro Kitagawa, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 22 May 2008, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department.

[171] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 27; and email from Yuka Ogata, 31 August 2008.

[172] Email from Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 31 August 2008.

[173] Email from Yuka Ogata, UNDP, 31 August 2008.