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Table of Contents
Country Reports
Mine_Action.html

Mine Action

S27.tif
© Gwenn Dubourthoumieu/UNMACC, April 2011
Clearance operations in the DR Congo.

Summary of Progress

As of August 2011, 72 states including 44 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as seven areas not generally recognized as states, were confirmed or suspected to be mine-affected. In June 2011, Nigeria reported that it had completed its clearance obligations under the treaty, making it the 18th State Party to do so.[1] In December 2010, Gambia reported that it no longer had mined areas on its territory. In June 2010, Nicaragua declared completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations.[2] In addition, in June 2011 it was reported that Nepal, a state not party, had cleared all mined areas from its territory.

In 2010, mine action programs cleared at least 200km2 of mined areas,[3] a small increase on the previous highest total recorded by the Monitor. A further 460km2 of battle areas[4] was cleared in 2010 including more than 18.5km2 of cluster munition contaminated areas.[5] In 2009, mine action programs cleared at least 198km2 of mined areas and 359km2 of battle areas, including 38km2 of cluster munition contaminated areas.

Mine-Affected States and Other Areas

As of August 2011, 72 states, as well as seven other areas, were confirmed or suspected to be mine-affected, as set out in the table below.[6]

Affected states not party

A total of 26 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are believed to be mine affected: Armenia, Azerbaijan, China,[7] Cuba, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. In June 2011, the UN announced that Nepal had cleared its last known mined area.[8]

Mine-affected states and other areas as of August 2011

Africa

Americas

Asia-Pacific

Europe and CIS

Middle East and
North Africa

Angola

Burundi

Chad

Congo, Republic of the
Djibouti

Congo Democratic Republic of the (DRC)

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Guinea-Bissau

Mauritania

Mali

Mozambique

Namibia

Niger

Senegal

Somalia
South Sudan

Sudan

Uganda

Zimbabwe

Somaliland

Argentina**

Chile

Colombia

Cuba

Ecuador

Peru

Venezuela

Afghanistan
Bhutan

Cambodia

China
India

Korea, North

Korea, South
Lao PDR

Myanmar

Palau

Pakistan

Philippines

Sri Lanka

Thailand

Vietnam

Taiwan

Armenia

Azerbaijan

Bosnia and
Herzegovina (BiH)

Croatia

Cyprus

Denmark

Georgia
Germany
Greece

Kyrgyzstan

Moldova

Montenegro

Russia

Serbia

Tajikistan

Turkey

United Kingdom(UK)**

Uzbekistan

Abkhazia

Nagorno-Karabakh

Kosovo

Algeria

Egypt

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Jordan

Lebanon

Libya

Morocco

Oman

Syria

Yemen

Palestine

Western Sahara

Note: Other areas are indicated by italics. States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. States with a residual mine problem not in known mined areas are not included, such as Belarus, Finland, Honduras, Kuwait, Poland, and Ukraine, and, since its declaration of compliance with Article 5, Tunisia. Both Argentina and the UK claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which are mine-affected, and so both are included in the list. Djibouti and Namibia have completed major mine clearance operations, but contamination is still suspected so remain on the list.

** Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.

Affected states with mine contamination of more than 100km2

State

Afghanistan

Angola

BiH

Cambodia

Chad

Croatia

Iran

Iraq

Morocco

Sri Lanka

Thailand

Turkey

Zimbabwe

Mine-affected “other areas”

Seven other areas not internationally recognized as states are also mine-affected: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan, and Western Sahara. Abkhazia was expected to be cleared of all known mined areas before the end of 2011, while Taiwan has set a deadline of 2013 for completion of mine clearance operations.

Extent of contamination

The Monitor does not publish a global table of the estimated size of mine contamination by state because it believes that many of the estimates cited by states are far higher than the true extent of contamination. Instead, an order of magnitude for contamination as of August 2011 is given in the table below, which list states with very heavy contamination (more than 100km2).

Mine Clearance in 2010

There are continuing problems in discerning true mine clearance from battle area clearance (BAC) or land release by survey, in large part due to poor quality of reporting.[9] However, the Monitor believes at least 200km2 of mined areas were cleared by 45 mine action programs in 2010 (compared with 198km2 in 2009, the previous record), with the destruction of more than 388,000 antipersonnel mines and over 27,000 antivehicle mines. This includes more than 11,000 antipersonnel mines and 830 antivehicle mines destroyed during BAC and roving explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. The global clearance figure is conservative and understates the extent of clearance.[10] The largest total clearance of mined areas was by mine action programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, and Sri Lanka, which together accounted for more than 80% of recorded clearance.[11]

Mine clearance in select states and other areas in 2010

Country/area

Area cleared in

2010 (km2)

Area cleared in

2009 (km2)

Afghanistan

64.76

52.29

Cambodia

50.99

44.73*

Croatia

31.81

37.89

Sri Lanka

13.22**

17.78

Iraq

10.06

9.90

Sudan

5.82

5.65

Nagorno-Karabakh

5.31

5.95

Angola

4.00

3.75***

Mozambique

3.52

2.63

Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.

* Very large area clearance reported for the army is not included in these totals as it has not been independently verified and it is not known how much of the reported clearance is either BAC or the result of release by technical survey or cancellation of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).

** In August 2011, concerns were expressed about whether some of the clearance in Sri Lanka has met national and international mine action standards. For this reason, although the figure reported here is unchanged, a more conservative figure for total clearance worldwide has been employed.

*** Major area clearance reported for the Angolan National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem) was not included as it is not known how much of the reported clearance was either BAC or the result of release by technical survey or cancellation of SHAs.

Of the mined area cleared in 2010, almost half was cleared by national NGO mine action operators (especially in Afghanistan and Cambodia), with a further quarter cleared by international NGO mine action operators.

Operators, however, remain at risk of attacks and abductions in some areas where non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operate, in particular in Afghanistan. The Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (MACCA) reported 11 cases of abductions in 2010, but in all cases the personnel seized were released.[12] In one of these incidents 16 community-based deminers working for Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR) were abducted in eastern Nangahar province in December 2010. Nine deminers were freed within hours and the remaining seven two days later. Two vehicles and all the team’s equipment were burnt.[13]

MACCA observed that despite a 40% jump in the number of people working in mine action to 14,000, which made it one of the biggest UN-funded programs in the country, it suffered only 59 of 59,000 reported security incidents.[14] Of the 59 incidents, however, 21 involved death or injury, including 10 people killed and 20 injured by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and three people killed and eight injured in attacks.[15] HALO Trust reported two attacks in 2010 resulting in one fatality and the forced retirement of another worker. Its country program manager was abducted in Kabul in February 2011 and held for 27 days.[16] The Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA) and its community-based deminers suffered the worst setback, reporting eight people killed and eight injured in an IED attack in 2010.[17] In July 2011, DAFA suffered another attack in western Farah province when 20 deminers were abducted and four of them killed.[18]

NSAGs have been regularly encouraged to cooperate with mine action activities. The only group to do so in the reporting period was the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC), whose April 2011 communiqué, in addition to a ban on use pledged to “destroy all landmines in their possession” and to “cooperate in the provision of mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.” Members of the NTC’s forces were subsequently involved in ad hoc clearance of some mines in conflict areas, removing hundreds of minimum-metal antipersonnel mines.[19] HAWPAR, an apparatus created by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in Turkey reported clearing 2,000 mines in Sidiqan in northern Iraq. HAWPAR pursues clearance according to an annual workplan based on requests from communities or HAWPAR’s assessment of the threat of dangerous areas near communities it identifies.[20]

Battle Area Clearance in 2010

In 2010, at least 460km2 of battle area was reportedly cleared, destroying in the process more than 1.2 million items of UXO and almost 3,000 items of AXO.[21]

BAC reported by major clearance programs in 2010

Country

BAC in 2010 (km2)

Afghanistan

105.3

Cambodia

21.3

Lao PDR

35.0

Sri Lanka

255.9

A further 180,000 items of UXO were destroyed during mine clearance operations while more than 36,000 were destroyed during roving and other EOD. In addition, at least 18.5km2 of cluster munition contaminated area was cleared, destroying in the process almost 60,000 unexploded submunitions. A total of 359km2 of battle areas were cleared in 2009, including 38km2 of cluster munition contaminated areas.

Article 5 Obligations

States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

Forty-four States Parties were confirmed or suspected to be affected by antipersonnel mines as of August 2011, as set out in the table below.

 

Africa

Americas

Asia-Pacific

Europe and CIS

Middle East and
North Africa

Angola

Burundi

Chad

Congo,
Republic of the

Djibouti

DRC

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Guinea-Bissau

Mauritania

Mozambique

Namibia

Niger

Senegal

Sudan

Uganda

Zimbabwe

Argentina

Chile

Colombia

Ecuador

Peru

Venezuela

Afghanistan
Bhutan

Cambodia

Palau

Philippines

Thailand

BiH

Croatia

Cyprus

Denmark

Germany
Greece

Moldova

Montenegro

Serbia

Tajikistan

Turkey

UK

Algeria

Iraq

Jordan

Yemen

16 States Parties

6 States Parties

6 States Parties

12 States Parties

4 States Parties

Six of these States Parties have not formally declared themselves to have, or still have, Article 5 obligations but the Monitor believes they may be mine-affected, and thus their completion of their Article 5 obligations may be in doubt: Djibouti,[22] Greece (see below), Montenegro (see below), Namibia,[23] Moldova,[24] and the Philippines.[25]

At the June 2011 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Germany informed States Parties for the first time that it had discovered a suspected mined area at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg. Its Article 5 deadline expired in 2009. Also at the June 2011 meetings, Bhutan reiterated that it had two mined areas on its territory that had not yet been cleared.

Palau submitted an Article 7 report in 2011 (for calendar year 2010) in which it declared for the first time that it had mined areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory. These are mines remaining from World War II, although based on a clearance operator’s report contamination may be only from abandoned stockpiles rather than emplaced mines.

The precise extent to which the Republic of the Congo, whose Article 5 deadline expired on 1 November 2011, is mine-contaminated remains unclear. At the June 2011 Standing Committee meetings, it announced plans to conduct a survey of the suspected region (the southwest of the country, close to the border with Angola) by February 2012.[26] As of the end of August 2011, however, no extension request had yet been submitted.

The Monitor does not list Gambia, which declared at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2010 that it no longer has areas containing antipersonnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control.[27] In June 2011, Nigeria announced that it had cleared all known mined areas from its territory. It pledged to make a detailed, formal declaration of completion to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.[28] In May 2009, Nigeria had reported a possible mine threat left over from the Biafra conflict in the 1960s to the Standing Committee meetings.[29] However, the list maintained by the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of affected States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations continued to include both Nigeria and Gambia as of 1 September 2011.[30]

The Monitor does not list Mali or Niger as having outstanding Article 5 clearance obligations since both are believed to be contaminated by antivehicle mines only.[31] It has not yet listed Hungary, as press reports of possible mine contamination inside Hungary along its border with Croatia have not yet been confirmed.[32] A request by the ICBL for clarification from Hungary had not yet received a response as of 14 September 2011.

A total of 18 States Parties have reported completion of their respective Article 5 obligations. However, serious concern remained about Greece’s status as of 1 September 2011. Greece has an area on the island of Rhodes that is marked as being mined. In June 2011, at the Standing Committee meetings, Greece stated that it had checked the area numerous times since clearance was originally conducted (in 1987), most recently in May 2011, as not all the mines had been accounted for, and a further examination of the area was planned for September 2011.

States Parties reporting completion of Mine Ban Treaty clearance obligations

State Party

Year of reported

compliance

Article 5

deadline

Albania

2009

2010

Bulgaria

1999

2009

Costa Rica

2002

2009

El Salvador

1994*

2009

France

2008

2009

Gambia

2010

2013

Greece

2009

2014

Guatemala

2006

2009

Honduras

2005

2009

FYR Macedonia

2006

2009

Malawi

2008

2009

Nicaragua

2010

2010

(extended

from 2009)

Nigeria

2011

2012

Rwanda

2009

2010

Suriname

2005

2012

Swaziland

2007

2009

Tunisia

2009

2010

Zambia

2009

2011

* Date of completion of demining program (prior to entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty).

States Parties and Article 5 deadline extensions

Significant challenges remain in implementing the obligation upon all affected States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty to clear all antipersonnel mines from their territory or on areas they control. In accordance with Article 5, states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas on territory under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. The first clearance deadlines expired on 1 March 2009, but 15 States Parties with 2009 deadlines failed to meet them and were granted extensions by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.[33] In 2009, a further three States Parties with 2010 deadlines (Argentina, Cambodia, and Tajikistan) and one with a 2009 deadline that had already expired (Uganda) formally requested and were granted extensions by the Second Review Conference. The extension periods ranged from three to 10 years.[34] In 2010, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania all applied for extensions ranging from two months to 10 years while Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe applied for second extensions, ranging from 18 months to three years. All the extension periods sought were granted by the Tenth Meeting of States Parties.

Thus, of the 44 States Parties that may have outstanding mine clearance obligations under the treaty, 22 were already taking advantage of a first or second Article 5 deadline extension period as of 1 September 2011. In addition, four more States Parties have submitted requests to be considered by the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Cambodia in November–December 2011: Algeria, Chile, DRC, and Eritrea. The periods sought ranged from 26 months to eight years. Extension requests were also expected in 2011 from the Republic of the Congo[35] (whose deadline will already have expired by the time the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties has the opportunity to decide whether or not to grant an extension, thereby putting it in violation of the treaty) and possibly also Germany, a State Party whose deadline expired in 2009, but which in 2011 reported suspected antipersonnel mine contamination for the first time.

The ICBL urges the States Parties that receive extensions to fully implement Action Point 13 of the Cartagena Action Plan adopted by the Second Review Conference, which calls on them to work towards rapid implementation of Article 5 “in accordance with the commitments made in their extension requests and the decisions taken on their requests,” as well as to report regularly on such progress. The ICBL has consistently urged all States Parties that have received an extension to keep the time planned for completion under regular review with an aim to finishing as soon as possible, and called on the international community to support their efforts by providing the necessary financial, technical, and other support in a timely manner.

Progress in States Parties granted extensions in 2008, 2009, and 2010

Many of the States Parties granted extensions to their Article 5 deadlines have since made disappointing progress (see table below). Of the States Parties granted an extension, only Nicaragua has so far declared that it has completed its Article 5 obligations.[36] Of the remaining States Parties granted extensions in 2009, only two (Mozambique and Venezuela) appeared likely to complete their Article 5 obligations in accordance with their first extended deadline.

As noted above, Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe had all sought relatively short extension periods in order to conduct necessary survey activities with the understanding that they would seek a second extension to complete their Article 5 obligations. Of these three states, however, only Denmark was expected to complete clearance by the expiry of its second extension request. Indeed, neither Chad nor Zimbabwe was able to conduct the respective surveys of contamination during the initial extension periods and sought second extensions for the same purpose as the first extensions. There were even concerns as to whether they would complete nationwide surveys of contamination in these second extension periods.

Also of great concern is the UK, which was one of only two States Parties that was known to be contaminated (the other being Venezuela), and which did not initiate formal clearance operations during the original Article 5 deadline. The UK released four mined areas in December 2009–June 2010, but did not conduct any further clearance in 2010 and was planning to release part or all of only two SHAs only by survey in 2011–2012, leaving 111 mined areas to clear or otherwise release in less than seven years. After prolonged delays, Venezuela, which has a small area of mine contamination, finally initiated clearance operations in 2010 and appeared on track to complete clearance on or before its extended deadline.

Of the four States Parties granted an extension in 2009, only Tajikistan appeared on track to complete its obligations in time.[37] Of the three States Parties granted initial extensions to their Article 5 deadlines in 2010, both Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania appeared to be on track, while the status of Colombia, given the ongoing armed conflict, was unclear.

An overview of the status of Article 5 deadline extensions

States Parties

Original deadline

Extension period

New deadline

Status

Argentina

1 March 2010

10 years

1 March 2020

No information

BiH

1 March 2009

10 years

1 March 2019

Falling behind

Cambodia

1 January 2010

10 years

1 January 2020

Unclear

Chad

1 November 2009

14 months (1st extn.) and then

3 years (2nd extn.)

1 January 2014

Unclear

Colombia

1 March 2011

10 years

1 March 2021

Unclear

Croatia

1 March 2009

10 years

1 March 2019

Falling behind

Denmark

1 March 2009

22 months (1st extn.) and then

2 years (2nd extn.)

1 January 2012

On track

Ecuador

1 October 2009

8 years

1 October 2017

Falling behind

Guinea-Bissau

1 November 2011

2 months

1 January 2012

On track

Jordan

1 May 2009

3 years

1 May 2012

Status Unclear

Mauritania

1 January 2011

5 years

1 January 2016

On track

Mozambique

1 March 2009

5 years

1 March 2014

On track

Nicaragua

1 May 2009

1 year

1 May 2010

Completed

Peru

1 March 2009

8 years

1 March 2017

Status Unclear

Senegal

1 March 2009

7 years

1 March 2016

Falling behind

Tajikistan

1 April 2010

10 years

1 April 2020

On track

Thailand

1 May 2009

9.5 years

1 November 2018

Falling behind

Uganda

1 August 2009

3 years

1 August 2012

Falling behind

UK

1 March 2009

10 years

1 March 2019

Falling behind

Venezuela

1 October 2009

5 years

1 October 2014

On track

Yemen

1 March 2009

6 years

1 March 2015

Unclear

Zimbabwe

1 March 2009

22 months (1st extn.) and then

2 years (2nd extn.)

1 January 2013

Falling behind

Argentina

At the Second Review Conference Argentina said it was unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it did not have access to the Malvinas due to the “illegal occupation” by the UK. Argentina said for this reason it had no other choice than to request an extension to its clearance deadline.[38]

BiH

BiH’s Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019 was presented as the blueprint for fulfilling its Article 5 obligations, but it has failed to achieve the strategy’s targets every year since it started. The strategy projected release of 30km2 a year through clearance and technical survey, two-and-a-half times more than its 2010 achievement.[39] The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) continues to assert that BiH could achieve its target if it received adequate external financing.[40] In June 2011, at the Standing Committee meetings, BiH repeated its view that “reduction of the remaining mine suspected area planned for the period 2011–2019 will largely depend on allocated local and donor funds.”[41]

Cambodia

In Cambodia, the extent of clearance that will be needed to fulfill its Article 5 obligations will not be known before completion of the baseline survey (BLS), which is scheduled to occur by the end of 2012. Results from survey of the first 23 of the 122 districts due to be covered by the BLS identified 714.8km2 of mine and ERW contamination. The amount of land in these districts identified as contaminated with either only antipersonnel mines or a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines amounted to 643km2. This did not include some areas of reported contamination on the border with Thailand that were not surveyed for security reasons. With the results of the BLS in 99 districts still to come, Cambodia’s extension request estimate of antipersonnel mine contamination (648.8km2) is therefore expected to rise.[42]

In the meantime, humanitarian demining operators in Cambodia were forced to reduce capacity because of funding shortfalls, and clearance rates have suffered as a result. In 2010, the first year of implementing its extension request, Cambodia continued to report increased land release but this included greater amounts of BAC. Mined area clearance by humanitarian deminers (29.69km2) was significantly below the Article 5 extension request target for the year of 39.4km2. Cambodia could be said to have achieved the target only if the unverified clearance results reported by the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (27.86km2) are included.[43]

At the Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Cambodia warned that “without an increase in the current level of funding Cambodia is unlikely to mobilize resources required for 2010 and even less likely to obtain the 38% increase that has been foreseen to complete Article 5 obligations.”[44]

Chad

At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Chad announced that it would be submitting a second, short Article 5 deadline extension request to enable the survey for which it had been granted the first extension period to be finally conducted.[45] The ICBL stated its deep disappointment that the UN’s internal processes in managing allocated funds had prevented the survey from being conducted during Chad’s first extension request, as had been planned.[46] A second extension request was submitted on 20 September 2010, seeking an additional three years to conduct the survey. In granting the request, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties noted that, “it would appear that Chad does not possess much more knowledge now than it did in 2008 to develop a plan to meet its Article 5 obligations.”[47]

Although survey activities had progressed through June 2011, it is regrettable that no concrete plans have been made to survey Tibesti, and that the first phase of the survey of other areas has ended in June 2011 without completing survey of two regions and without having a clear date for resumption of survey activities. Demining operations started in August 2000, but stopped at the end of December 2005 due to lack of funding. There was subsequently only intermittent clearance of mined areas until Mines Advisory Group (MAG) returned to Chad in 2010.

Colombia

On 30 March 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, and then on 5 August 2011 submitted a revised request. The major differences between the original and the revised extension request were the decrease in the predicted number of NGO demining teams from 85 to 49 in 2014–2020, while required funds for the same period decreased by almost US$150 million. The operational plan and the assets and funding needed in 2011–2013 remained at 17 NGO teams and $25 million. During this period the government of Colombia planned to contribute $21 million for 14 demining platoons.[48]

The extension request predicts that all mined areas will be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.”[49] Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan is a central component of the extension request. Fifteen of 660 possibly mine-affected municipalities in five of Colombia’s 32 departments, with contamination covering an estimated 15km2, were deemed priorities for clearance by 2013.[50]

Colombia did not include an operational plan for 2014–2020 in its extension request because of the lack of information on contamination and the uncertainty of the role and capacity of NGOs.[51]

Croatia

Croatia cleared and otherwise released or cancelled a total of 340km2 of SHAs between 1998, when the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) was set up, and the end of 2010.[52] It has, however, consistently not met the targets set out in its extension request in the three years since it was granted. In 2008, it released 42.5km2 compared with the target of 53km2; in 2009 it released 62.59km2 while the target was 73km2; and in 2010 it released 69.95km2, significantly less than the 100km2 projected in the extension request.[53] As a result, Croatia still had 815.3km2 at the start of 2011 compared with the 771km2 projected in the extension request.[54]

Croatia’s National Mine Action Plan (NMAP) sets targets that differ from those in the extension request, providing for slightly lower rates of clearance than those in the extension request up to 2012 and higher rates of clearance in subsequent years.[55] However, Croatia says meeting the targets of both the extension request and the NMAP has been frustrated by cuts in funding as a result of the global financial crisis. These were expected to result in even less funding for mine action in 2011 than the previous year, forcing CROMAC to review its operations and methodology and place greater emphasis on land release by non-technical and technical survey. By these measures and other fundraising initiatives, Croatia said it hoped it would be able to achieve its extension request targets.[56]

Denmark

In December 2010, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties granted Denmark’s request for a second extension to its Article 5 deadline, until 1 July 2012.[57] In granting the request, the meeting noted that Denmark had “complied with the commitments it had made, as recorded in the decisions of the Ninth Meeting of the States Parties, to obtain clarity regarding the remaining challenge, produce a detailed plan and submit a second extension request.” It noted that this affirmed “the importance of a State Party, should it find itself in a situation similar to that of Denmark in 2008, requesting only the period of time necessary to assess relevant facts and develop a meaningful forward looking plan based on these facts.”[58]

In June 2011, Denmark stated that 310,000m2 of area was still to be cleared from the World War II minefield on the Skallingen peninsula and again affirmed that the remaining area would be cleared at the latest by its July 2012 deadline. It noted, however, that clearing the dunes has been “challenging.” The contractor engaged for clearance had been expected to complete clearance by May 2011, but this was later expected to occur before the end of 2011. If possible, the area would be released earlier than July 2012.[59]

Ecuador

In 2010, Ecuador exchanged information with Peru on mined areas located on and across the border between the two countries. This resulted in a significantly increased total figure of almost 1.9km2 of contaminated area[60] across four provinces in Ecuador (Loja, Morona Santiago, Pastaza, and Zamora Chinchipe) and more than tripled the size of the problem it reported in 2009. In June 2011, at the Standing Committee meetings, Ecuador noted that mine clearance was occurring in accordance with the timeline set out in its Article 5 deadline extension request and that it had increased the number of deminers from 60 to around 100 as planned.[61] However, although Ecuador has met the clearance goals it set out in its 2010–2018 operational plan, it has so far released a total of less than 0.2km2 of mined area, leaving almost 0.5km2 still to be released from its original estimate of contamination and more than 1.7km2 based on its new estimate of contamination.[62]

Guinea-Bissau

On 8 September 2010, Guinea-Bissau submitted a request for a two-month extension to its Article 5 deadline. In granting the request, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties stated that, given that a financial shortfall could affect the realization of Guinea-Bissau’s plan, resource mobilization could be greatly aided if Guinea-Bissau demonstrated greater national ownership by making a national financial investment into Article 5 implementation. The meeting further noted that while Guinea-Bissau has been slow to adopt efficient land release practices and that while its progress to date has been modest, Guinea-Bissau was making a commitment through its extension request to more efficiently and expediently proceed with Article 5 implementation.[63]

Indeed, clearance of mined areas has been extremely slow in Guinea-Bissau, with only about 1.3km2 of mined areas cleared in the last five years, and data, especially for 2009, does not appear to be reliable. However, as a result of a nationwide survey of contamination in 2010–2011, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported in March 2011 that it expected clearance of mined areas to be completed before the end of 2011,[64] in time for Guinea-Bissau to meet its extended Article 5 deadline.

Jordan

At the Tenth Meeting of States Parties Jordan stated it would complete clearance of all known mined areas by the end of 2011 and it would complete quality assurance of the area by its extended Article 5 deadline of May 2012.[65] In June 2011, Jordan expressed confidence the northern border project would meet its May 2012 clearance deadline, although NPA reports verification of land around the known minefields will take longer. The outlook for Jordan’s ongoing Sampling and Verification Project, however, appears more uncertain. Jordan told the Standing Committee meeting in June 2011 that it is conducting a review in which “a new plan will be developed to calculate the project’s estimated completion date.”[66]

Mauritania

On 10 April 2010, Mauritania submitted a request for a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. Mauritania explained that the reasons for its failure to meet its deadline were a lack of financial resources, insufficient progress in demining operations, use of only manual demining techniques, and difficult soil and climatic factors.[67] In presenting the request to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2010, Mauritania stated that it had a coherent plan that combined land release by survey and clearance and that it hoped to involve Handicap International (HI) and NPA in its demining program.[68]

Only minimal mine clearance occurred in 2009, and no mined area was projected to be cleared during 2010 according to the extension request.[69] Mauritania has, however, set explicit targets for clearance during the five-year extension period, and noted its intention to seek additional demining capacity from international NGOs as well as additional funding from both national and international sources, and to enhance demining productivity with the use of machines.[70] In 2011, NPA set up a program in Mauritania to support the national mine action authority in addressing mine and cluster munition contamination.

Mozambique

Since Mozambique submitted its Article 5 Extension Request in 2008 it has identified new SHAs through the Mine Free District Assessment approach, from a HALO survey on the Zimbabwe border, and from reports of residual contamination in the four northern provinces. This has resulted in almost twice as much area to clear as reported in its extension request. Despite this new contamination, at the end of 2010 Mozambique was still believed to be in a position to meet its extended Article 5 deadline of March 2014. The National Demining Institute reported that approximately 10km2 of mined areas remained, plus 2.9km2 on the Zimbabwe border and contaminated area along the railway lines. If, however, funding falls short, more new mined areas are found, and 2011 clearance targets are not met, it is far less likely that Mozambique will be able to meet its 2014 deadline.

Nicaragua

In accordance with its one-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, Nicaragua was required to complete mine clearance operations by 1 May 2010. In June 2010, Nicaragua announced it had cleared all known mined areas in time and had thus completed its Article 5 obligations.[71] Over a 17-year period, Nicaragua cleared almost 12km2 of mined areas, destroying in the process almost 180,000 mines at an estimated total cost of $82 million.[72]

Peru

In June 2010, Peru reported 36 mined areas remained, covering a total of 192,700m2 in Amazonas department, and containing 28,514 mines[73]. In May 2011, Peru reported the same number of mined areas after having cleared 36,000m2 of contaminated area.[74] However, there appears to be significant additional contamination. As noted above, Peru and Ecuador have been exchanging information about mined areas on the border between the two countries since May 2010.[75] In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2010, Peru included 10 previously unreported areas.[76] The extent of this contamination has not, though, been reported. Thus, while Peru has made good progress in clearing the mined areas around state infrastructure, it is not clear how the 10 newly identified mined areas will affect Peru’s ability to meet its 2017 Article 5 deadline.

Senegal

Senegal has not formally reported in detail on its progress in demining in 2009 or 2010 and has still to determine the extent of remaining contamination with any degree of precision. At the Second Review Conference, Senegal expressed its hope that it would have fulfilled its Article 5 obligations before 2015 if the peace process continues.[77] Senegal previously stated its intention not to seek a second extension period, except for “truly exceptional circumstances.”[78] In the past five years, however, demining has cleared only a very small extent of mine contamination, and the total estimate for mined areas to be released has increased, leading to growing concerns that Senegal will not meet its extended Article 5 deadline. In June 2011, Senegal reported that it had cleared a total of only 121,637m2 since demining operations effectively began in 2008, with clearance output decreasing year on year.[79]

Tajikistan

In general, mine clearance in Tajikistan has proceeded slowly, and operations were only initiated several years after it became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Furthermore, Tajikistan has still to establish the precise extent of mine contamination, although re-survey has clarified the mine threat on the border with Afghanistan. New national and international capacity now in place, including machines and mine detection dogs, should speed up land release significantly, and should enable Tajikistan to complete its Article 5 obligations well before its extended deadline of 2020.

Thailand

Thailand has already fallen far behind the targets set out in its Article 5 extension request. Land released in 2010 totaled 5.23km2,[80] representing less than 1% of the 546.8km2 Thailand identifies as mine contaminated. UNDP observed in a report at the end of January 2011 that at the current rate of clearance, “it is estimated that it will take Thailand several decades to clear all landmines.”[81]

Lack of attention to mine action on the part of political leaders has become one of the biggest constraints on progress resulting in a lack of funds for the Thai Mine Action Center (TMAC) or the mine action sector. TMAC reported a 60% increase in the budget allocated for fiscal 2011 (year beginning October 2010) to $2.5 million but noted this represented 10% of what it had sought under the Article 5 extension plan.[82] In a bid to attract international support, Thailand organized a conference on mine action with donor countries and international organizations in January 2011 and introduced a concept of “Mine-free Provinces” focusing on all pillars of mine action in individual provinces so as to raise donor awareness of needs.[83] Nonetheless, in June 2011 Thailand again identified fundraising as a major challenge.[84] New demining capacity was added in 2011. Under a memorandum of understanding signed with TMAC in November 2010, NPA started a land release pilot project in early 2011 working with a 10-strong survey team undertaking technical and non-technical survey along the border with Cambodia.[85]

Uganda

In July 2009, Uganda declared that it had underestimated the complexity of its clearance operations and the time required to clear them; subsequently it would not meet its 1 August 2009 Article 5 deadline. It applied for a three-year extension,[86] which was approved at the Second Review Conference in December 2009. An essential element in Uganda’s three-year plan was the use of a MineWolf vegetation cutting machine belonging to NPA in Sudan.

In March 2010, the Uganda Mine Action Centre (UMAC) reported to the Monitor that NPA had brought a MineWolf into Uganda and that it had helped to clear the Ngomoromo area by the middle of that month, several months ahead of schedule, indicating that Uganda might be in a position to complete its Article 5 obligations before 2012.[87] In December 2010, however, Uganda announced it had identified five small SHAs covered in heavy vegetation that required a MineWolf.[88]

In July 2011, UMAC provided an update of the original and remaining problem, which more than doubled the number of SHAs believed to contain antipersonnel mines and increased the total estimate of contaminated area by more than 700,000m2. It also included a completely new mined area some 300,000m2 in size at Bibia, a town in Amuru district on the Sudan border. Of the total of 20 SHAs identified in Agoro, Bibia, and Ngomoromo three had been cleared and quality controlled as of July 2011, and two discredited, leaving 15 SHAs and almost 0.9km2 to release by August 2012.[89] It was not clear whether the August 2012 deadline will be met.

United Kingdom

At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, the UK reported the completion of its four-site pilot project that started on 4 December 2009 and was completed on 4 June 2010.[90] The UK stated that it would report the findings of its analysis and agreed next steps to States Parties at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.[91] The UK did not, however, announce any further clearance plans at that meeting. In a statement to the meeting, the ICBL regretted the failure of the UK to meet its undertaking to provide “as soon as possible, but not later than 30 June 2010 a detailed explanation of…the implications for future demining” in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5 of the treaty.[92]

In June 2011, the UK announced that it would be seeking contractors for land release of at least part of one or possibly two SHAs, one behind the Stanley Common Fence, which borders the capital, Port Stanley; the other at the Murrell Peninsula, some 4km from Port Stanley.[93] However, it was not foreseen that any mine clearance would take place. According to the UK: “The identification of the exact location and extent of the minefields in this area will be useful for subsequent clearance programmes.”[94]

In an annex to its Article 5 deadline extension request, the UK included the Feasibility Study conducted in 2007, which concluded with respect to the Murrell Peninsula that: “The whole of the Murrell peninsula was classified as suspect on the basis of very little evidence, except for the five coves, which are assumed as mined. Since then, the whole area has been heavily pastured for 25 years by sheep and possibly cattle without accident, and a colony of penguins lives in the middle of it. The entire peninsula, except for its coves, could probably be re-classified as clear if some confidence-building clearance activity took place.”[95] The UK reported in its extension request that the SHAs in the Murrell Peninsula total some 5.5km2 in size.[96] The Feasibility Study also suggested that SHA M65 beside the Stanley Common Fence (some 0.2km2 in size) may contain no mines.[97]

The ICBL called upon the UK to provide a concrete plan and budget for fulfilling its Article 5 clearance obligations. It also reiterated that affected States Parties must clear all mined areas, not only those with a humanitarian impact.[98] In response, the UK stated that it had foreseen a two-year pilot project in its extension request before it would be in a position to set out a full plan to meet its legal obligations.[99]

Venezuela

Venezuela did not begin clearing mines until 2010, more than 10 years after becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty. By April 2011, it appeared that Venezuela had cleared four of its 13 mined areas, leaving nine to be released.[100] Venezuela had earlier cited the weather, prolonged procurement procedures, a fall in Gross National Product, as well as new priorities for its government as the reasons for failing to conduct mine clearance in accordance with its treaty deadline.[101] In December 2010, Venezuela said new procurement procedures for demining equipment should allow the total additional time needed to clear all mined areas to be reduced from five years to four and that clearance of all mined areas should be completed by June 2013.[102]

Yemen

It is not known whether Yemen will meet its extended Article 5 deadline. Yemen did not update the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies either in June 2010 or in June 2011, or the Tenth Meeting of States Parties, on its progress in implementing its Article 5 obligations. Under Action Point 13 of the Cartagena Action Plan adopted by the Second Review Conference in 2009, States Parties undertake to: “Complete implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible but not later than their extended deadlines, ensure progress toward completion proceeds in accordance with the commitments made in their extension requests and the decisions taken on their requests, and report regularly on such progress to the meetings of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Meetings of the States Parties and Review Conferences.”[103] It is not known what impact the upsurge in violence in 2011 has had on the mine action program.

Zimbabwe

At the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Zimbabwe said since the beginning of 2009 “no significant progress” had been made in its clearance program due to the lack of both international and national support.[104] In June 2010 at the Standing Committee meetings, Zimbabwe repeated that it w ould not be able to complete the planned surveying in the 22-month extension period and stated that it would request another extension.[105]

In July 2010, the ISU sent a consultant to Zimbabwe for one week to conduct a needs assessment and develop a plan, including a budget, for the necessary survey. On 3 August 2010, Zimbabwe submitted a second extension request based on the ISU consultancy findings. The second extension requested 24 months to conduct surveys of four areas that have never been surveyed but have always been suspected to contain mines. Zimbabwe stated they were confident of accessing international assistance for the survey although they had not accessed significant funding since 2000 and did not indicate who the donors would be or who would provide the technical assistance.[106]

After the survey is completed Zimbabwe will submit a third extension request.[107] In December 2010, the States Parties granted the 24-month extension request and noted the commitments by Zimbabwe whereby within 12 months (by August 2011) non-technical survey would be conducted of the four “unknown areas” (Kariba, Lusulu, Mukumbura, and Rushinga) as would technical survey of parts of the five “known minefields.”[108]

In June 2011, at the Standing Committee meetings, Zimbabwe reported it had not received any international funding or technical support, nor had much progress been made on surveying. In its second Article 5 deadline extension request, the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre indicated it would need $100 million to clear the remaining 225km2 of contaminated area.[109]

Compliance with Article 5 among States Parties with later deadlines

Without enhanced efforts, future compliance with Article 5 deadlines seems likely to be similarly disappointing. Based on progress to date, the Monitor believes that the following States Parties are not on track to comply with their treaty clearance obligations by their deadlines, indicated below in parentheses: Afghanistan (2013); Angola (2013); Cyprus (2013); Sudan (2014); and Turkey (2014). Regrettably, Article 5 clearance deadline extension requests are becoming the norm rather than the exception.

Iraq

Among States Parties with later Article 5 deadlines, Iraq (2018 deadline) is a particular concern. Three years after it adhered to the treaty, Iraq has still to demonstrate how it expects to progress towards fulfilling its international legal obligations. Mine action continued to be held back by lack of precise data on the mine threat and political uncertainties have impeded the development of an effective institutional framework for mine action.

Clearance operations in the center and south of Iraq were halted by a suspension of operations order imposed by the Ministry of Defense on 23 December 2008. The ministry halted operations on grounds of security and in order to vet personnel engaged by demining operators who would therefore have access to mines and/or explosive ordnance.[110] The Ministry of Defense partially lifted the suspension in May 2009 to allow operators to conduct non-technical survey and risk education, but the ban on clearance and demolitions of cleared items remained in place until August 2009. Even then, however, accrediting organizations for operations was slow, and no demolitions of cleared items by any organization except the military were possible until May 2010.[111]

Only in three northern Iraqi governorates, where mine action is under the management of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency and the General Directorate of Mine Action, has there been concerted action to deal with the mine threat. In central and southern Iraq, most of the reported commercial and humanitarian clearance consists of BAC of unexploded submunitions and other UXO. The army has embarked on survey of the mine threat and as of mid-2011 was the only operator in central and southern Iraq to be tackling it.

Montenegro

Montenegro (2017 deadline) reported to the media in November 2007 that it had completed clearance of mines on its territory.[112] Its Article 7 report for 2008 it stated, “There are no areas under Montenegro’s jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.”[113] However, Montenegro still had to survey a mountainous area on its borders with BiH and Croatia to clarify if the contamination that affects the Croatian side of the border also affects Montenegro.[114] By September 2011, Montenegro had not officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations.

Turkey

Certain States Parties have still to acknowledge that they are legally obliged by the treaty to clear areas they either control or over which they assert jurisdiction.[115] As of September 2010, Turkey had not yet formally acknowledged its responsibility for clearance in northern Cyprus, which is controlled by Turkish forces.

Cyprus

The government of Cyprus has not yet declared whether it will seek an extension if contamination remains in areas of the island it does not control. In June 2011, Cyprus stated that it: “takes its international responsibilities very seriously, respects the letter of the Convention and values its contractual obligations stemming therefrom. Given the continuation of the well-known situation on the island, the government is currently contemplating whether further measures might be considered as necessary for duly implementing its obligations under Article 5….”[116]

Moldova

In the case of Moldova, whose Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2011, a statement in June 2008 by a government official had raised hopes that it had acknowledged its responsibility for clearance of any mined areas containing antipersonnel mines in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. This statement was, however, later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leaving its compliance with Article 5 uncertain.

Risk Education: Evolving Needs and Changing Approaches

Mine and ERW risk education (RE)[117] continues to adapt to the evolving patterns of contamination and impact of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, cluster munition remnants, and other ERW. Twenty years of mine and battle area clearance have made significant inroads into the explosive threat, especially from antipersonnel mines, with the result that in many countries there is not, or no longer, a humanitarian crisis of casualties from explosive ordnance. Indeed, in addition to the 19 states that have claimed completion of clearance of known mined areas,[118] many others have a low or residual threat that would typically need only limited RE activities.

Even in some of the most heavily mine-affected countries, such as Afghanistan, Angola,[119] and Cambodia, mine casualties have been generally declining for several years. In Cambodia, where recorded mine casualties increased in 2010 compared with the previous year, only 10 fatalities and 53 injured were from antipersonnel mines,[120] a significant reduction compared to five years ago.[121]

Emergency RE, though, continues to be sorely needed in Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Somalia especially, while Libya too became a priority following the outbreak of armed conflict in February 2011. Other situations potentially requiring an emergency response included Eritrea, Yemen (where casualties significantly increased in 2010 compared with the previous year), and Sudan/South Sudan.

Persisting, significant obstacles to safe access indicate that the needs of the civilian population in Myanmar for RE continue to be grossly underserved. In Pakistan, however, where international engagement in mine action is limited to RE, interventions seem to be making headway—reaching more people in, or from, the conflict-affected border tribal areas—and contacts with communities have resulted in some roving clearance/destruction of items of UXO.

Colombia continues to implement a major RE program involving many national organizations. In 2010, the Presidential Antipersonnel Mine Action Program (PAICMA) designed specific RE materials for coca eradicators since, increasingly, this is one of the most vulnerable groups to mine incidents, based on casualty rates. The rate of casualties among coca eradicators rose from 8% of all civilian casualties in 2006 and 2007, to 34% in 2010.[122]

In Libya, which faced a new mine and ERW threat in 2011, including from unexploded submunitions, UNICEF and HI initiated a program and other international mine action NGOs have included an RE component in their work. As of July 2011, direct RE sessions were underway in internally displaced person (IDP) camps in eastern Libya and more than 30,000 information leaflets had been distributed to IDP communities in Ajdabiya, Benghazi, Brega, and Misrata in addition to Tunisian border areas.[123]

In Somalia, also in 2011, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) planned to provide emergency RE messages in Mogadishu, Afgooye, Galgaduud, and other priority areas affected by the ongoing armed conflict.[124] Sudan has an extensive RE program throughout the country. In 2010, RE was provided in 22 states, to more than 3 million people. UNICEF provided support to planning, implementation, and the management of RE at the state and national level. More than 400,000 persons, primarily refugees, IDPs, and communities impacted by mines and ERW, received RE through UNICEF-supported programs in 2010.[125]

Recognizing that standardized “don’t touch” messages have relatively short-lived effectiveness, especially beyond the initial emergency phase, some states are looking to more sophisticated approaches to RE, including through community liaison. Lao PDR, for example, a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with consequent obligations to conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by cluster munition remnants,[126] conducted a review of RE in 2010 and decided to move away from “traditional awareness-raising” to more targeted interventions. At the Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting in June 2011 it reported that RE strategies “are evolving…to more complex and targeted processes focused on behavior change. Such processes involve data analysis to identify highrisk groups, development of new MRE materials (in local languages where appropriate), community liaison, development of government policies on scrap metal, as well as teacher training programmes and the growing involvement of Buddhist monks.”[127] In June 2011, the Lao National Regulatory Authority initiated a survey of knowledge, attitudes, and practices to assess the effectiveness of RE materials and strategies.[128]

There is also a continuing trend to institutionalize RE within the school system, sometimes in tandem with other life skills or response to other threats, such as from the proliferation of small arms. In Afghanistan, for example, there has been further progress in developing the provision of RE in schools with training of teachers (some 19,000 had been trained to deliver RE by 2011). In Sri Lanka, where UNICEF has led the post-conflict development of RE, in December 2010 the Ministry of Education’s academic affairs board approved an RE curriculum for schools paving the way for training teachers in the new curriculum in 2011.[129]The National Strategy for Mine Action notes that the general level of understanding of the threat from mines and ERW is high but the need for continuing RE remains since many communities in the north remain close to contaminated or un-surveyed areas and because of large numbers of people from the south visiting northern districts.[130] In 2010, with UNICEF support, the National Mine Action Authority in Sudan and the Ministry of Education began integrating RE into the school curriculum in the Nuba Mountains, Western and Southern Darfur, and southern Sudan.

In Kosovo, the NGO Center for Promotion of Education (QPEA) implemented a school-based RE project from November 2009 to October 2010 in cooperation with the Serbian NGO “Future,” which aimed to increase the role of teachers and schools in RE activities.[131] In Somaliland, Danish Demining Group (DDG), MAG, HI, and the Somaliland Mine Action Center collaborated in a joint effort to develop RE materials for children that may become part of the social science school curriculum. In collaboration with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and UNICEF, operators provided initial input on mine risks as well as firearms safety and conflict management.[132]


[1] The others that have reported completing clearance are: Albania, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Tunisia, and Zambia. Djibouti’s status is unclear and the Monitor does not consider that Djibouti has made a formal declaration of compliance, while Greece still has one mined area on the island of Rhodes to release.

[2] Fulfilling the requirements of Article 5 does not mean that a country is “mine-free,” a status that very few countries actually achieve. A declaration of full compliance with Article 5 is a statement that all known mined areas have been cleared of antipersonnel mines to humanitarian standards, and that all reasonable efforts have been made to identify all mined areas within a state’s jurisdiction or control. Thus, a small residual mine threat may exist or may be believed to exist even after a declaration of compliance with Article 5 has been made.

[3] The term “clearance of mined areas” refers to physical clearance to humanitarian standards of an area to a specified depth using manual deminers, mine detection dogs, and/or machines to detect and destroy (or remove for later destruction) all explosive devices found.

[4] A “battle area” is an area of combat affected by ERW, but which does not contain mines. The term “ERW” includes both UXO and AXO. “Battle area clearance” may under certain circumstances involve only a visual inspection of a SHA by professional clearance personnel, but is more often an instrument-assisted search of ground to a set depth, for example using detectors.

[5] The figures are conservative, owing to concerns about reporting and disaggregation of data on clearance of cluster munition clearance from BAC, and therefore understate total clearance.

[6] Bhutan, Germany, Greece, and Palau have all been added to the list of states confirmed or suspected to be contaminated during this reporting period while Nepal and Nigeria have been removed. South Sudan, a new state that seceded from Sudan on 9 July 2011, has been listed separately for the first time. In the case of both Mali and Niger, contamination was believed to be by antivehicle mines only.

[7] China’s December 2009 statement to the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty that it had completed “clearance of mine-affected areas within China’s territory” was put into doubt in September 2011 when a Foreign Ministry official reported to Human Rights Watch that China maintains a small number of minefields “for national defence.” Email response to Monitor request for information from Lai Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control & Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2011. In addition, there may be a residual mine threat in China along the border with Vietnam as mine injuries have been reported since its 2009 statement.

[8] UNMAS, “UN Declares Nepal Minefield-Free,” Press release, New York, 16 June 2011, www.mineaction.org.

[9] For example, states as well as certain demining operators sometimes report cancellation by non-technical survey or release by technical survey as clearance. Furthermore, despite reported release of large areas of land, conducting general survey of possibly contaminated areas does not constitute land release, according to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

[10] Ethiopia, which is believed to have cleared large areas in 2009 as it did the year before, did not formally report on its clearance during 2010, despite significant donor funding and external technical support. No figures for clearance (as opposed to cancellation or release by survey), or at least no credible figures, were made public by a number of states, such as Iran and Morocco.

[11] This excludes the land reportedly cleared by the Royal Cambodian Armed Force as the quality of clearance and the extent of area cleared have not been independently verified.

[12] Email from MACCA, 12 April 2011.

[13] Interview with Zekria Payyab, OMAR, Kabul, 30 May 2011.

[14] Email from MACCA, 12 April 2011.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Interview with Farid Homayoun, HALO, Kabul, 30 May 2011; and email, 11 August 2011.

[17] Interview with Mohammad Daud Farahi, Executive Manager, DAFA, Kabul, 31 May 2011.

[18] UNAMA, “UNAMA and MACCA condemn the killing of Afghan deminers,” Press release, Kabul, 11 July 2011.

[19] ICBL, “Nobel Peace Laureate Campaign Welcomes Libyan Rebel Pledge Not to Use Landmines, Urging the Government for Similar Action,” Press release, 30 April 2011, www.icbl.org.

[20] Email from Katherine Kramer, Programme Director, Asia, and Coordinator on Landmines & Other Explosive Devices, Geneva Call, 15 April 2011. The precise information of the mine types as well as the date during which these mines were accumulated is not known. As of April 2011, they were said to be awaiting destruction.

[21] The number of AXO destroyed is an underestimate as many states and individual operators do not disaggregate between AXO and UXO. A huge area cleared (almost 700km2) was reported by Vietnam, although the figures, reported for the first time to the Monitor by the state’s clearance operator, the Technology Center for Bomb and Mine Disposal (BOMICEN), did not include the number of items destroyed and appear to include unknown amounts of release of land by survey.

[22] Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

[23] Despite a statement that Namibia was in full compliance with Article 5 at the Second Review Conference, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.

[24] Moldova, which had a 1 March 2011 Article 5 deadline, made a statement in June 2008 which suggested that it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. This statement was, however, later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[25] The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs consistently over recent years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.

[26] Statement of the Republic of the Congo, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011. The actual statement as delivered concerned the intention to seek a four-month extension, but the formal written statement declared that the Republic of the Congo would seek a 12-month extension. The written statement also suggested that this would extend the Republic of the Congo’s deadline to 1 November 2013, but this is believed to be a typographical error as the correct date, if the extension is granted by the States Parties at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, will be 1 November 2012.

[27] Statement of Gambia, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2010, www.apminebanconvention.org.

[28] Statement of Nigeria, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[29] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 2006–2009), Forms C and F.

[30] “38 States Parties in the Process of Implementing Article 5,” undated, www.apminebanconvention.org.

[31] As of August 2011, however, there were unconfirmed reports suggesting possible use of antipersonnel mines by Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in an area towards the border between Mali and Mauritania. See, for example, “AQIM accused of laying mines in Mali-Mauritania border,” 24 June 2011, Ennahar Online, www.ennaharonline.com. Other reports suggested that AQIM were laying antivehicle mines only. See, for example, “Al-Qaeda: Mali troops build up defences,” News24, m.news24.com.

[32] See “Croatia continues with landmines cleaning,” Balkans.com, 5 May 2011, www.balkans.com.

[33] In accordance with the treaty, BiH, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the UK, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all made requests for an extension to their Article 5 deadlines ranging from one to 10 years. Ten years is the maximum period permitted for any extension (although more than one extension can be requested and granted). All of the 15 extension requests were granted by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008.

[34] Uganda sought an additional three years while Argentina, Cambodia, and Tajikistan all sought a 10-year extension.

[35] As noted above, at the June 2011 Standing Committee meetings, the Republic of the Congo declared it would be seeking an extension to allow a survey of the suspected region to be conducted. Its Article 5 deadline was expiring on 1 November 2011.

[36] Statement of Nicaragua, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[37] The ICBL considered Tajikistan’s 10-year extension to be excessive when compared to the level of contamination and believes that it can complete its clearance obligations far earlier.

[38] Statement of Argentina, Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 30 November 2009.

[39] Darvin Lisica, “Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Context of the Global Mine Problem – Analysis and Strategic Preconditions for Fulfillment of Obligations Arising from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and Convention on Cluster Munitions,” NPA, June 2011, p. 9.

[40] Interview with Dusan Gavran, Director, and Tarik Serak, Mine Action Planning Manager, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 13 May 2010.

[41] Statement of BiH, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[42] Interview with Heng Rattana, Director General, Cambodian Mine Action Center, Phnom Penh, 26 April 2011.

[43] Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), “Demining Progress Report 1992 December 2010,” received by email from Eang Kamrang, Database Unit Manager, CMAA, 26 April 2011.

[44] Statement of Cambodia, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 November 2010.

[45] Statement of Chad, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[46] Statement of ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[47] Decisions on the Request Submitted by Chad for an Extension of the Deadline for Completing the Destruction of Anti-Personnel Mines in Accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, 3 December 2010.

[48] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, pp. 52–53; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 5 August 2010, pp. 57–58.

[49] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, pp. 41–42.

[50] Ibid, Annex 3, Table 12, pp. 57–58.

[51] Ibid, p. 60.

[52] Republic of Croatia, “National Mine Action Strategy of Croatia 2009–2019,” Zagreb, June 2009, p. 6.

[53] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, pp. 35–36.

[54] Ibid, p. 76.

[55] Statement of Croatia, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[56] Interviews with Miljenko Vahtaric, Assistant Director, and Nataša Matesa Mateković, Head, Planning and Analysis Department, CROMAC, Sisak, 21 March 2011; and with Miljenko Vahtaric, CROMAC; Staff Sgt. Ed Batlak, Croatian Verification Center, Ministry of Defense; and Hrvoje Debač, Department for Humanitarian Demining, Directorate for Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[57] “Decisions on the Request Submitted by Denmark for an Extension of the Deadline for Completing the Destruction of Anti-Personnel Mines in Accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2010.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Statement of Denmark, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[60] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, 29 June 2011, pp. 6, 7, and 8.

[61] Statement of Ecuador, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[62] Data included in Article 7 reports in 2008 and 2009, in Ecuador’s Statement to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009; and in its presentation at the Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25–27 February 2009, is inconsistent insofar as the figures do not match or calculate correctly.

[63] “Decisions on the Request Submitted by Guinea-Bissau for an Extension of the Deadline for Completing the Destruction of Anti-Personnel Mines in Accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, December 2010.

[64] Email from Mário Penedo Tomé Nunes, Programme Manager, NPA, 11 March 2011.

[65] Statement of Jordan, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 November 2010.

[66] Statement of Jordan, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011; and email from Mikael Bold, Country Director, NPA, 25 June 2011.

[67] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 February 2010, pp. 3–4.

[68] Statement of Mauritania, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 23 June 2010.

[69] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 February 2010, p. 28 (Annex 3).

[70] Ibid, pp. 4–5, p. 28 (Annex 3).

[71] Statement of Nicaragua, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010; and Carlos Espinoza Flores, “Nicaragua libre de minas antipersonales,” (“Nicaragua is free of antipersonnel mines”), El 19, 10 June 2010, www.el19digital.com.

[72] Nicaraguan Army, “Memoria 2010: ProgramaNacional de DesminadoHumanitario” (“2010 Report: National Humanitarian Demining Program”), distributed at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2010, pp. 14, 16.

[73] Statement of Peru, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[74] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 16 May 2011.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Statement of Peru, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 16 May 2011.

[77] Statement of Senegal, Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 2 December 2009.

[78] Statement of Senegal, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2008. See also Senegal, “Observations on the Report of the Analysing Group,” 11 September 2008, pp. 2–3; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Amb. Papa Omar Ndiaye, Director, Senegal National Mine Action Centre, 1 May 2009.

[79] Statement of Senegal, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[80] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Gen. Attanop Sirisak, Director-General, TMAC, 20 May 2011.

[81] Vipunjit Ketunuti, “Executive Summary, Mine-free Provinces, A Step Closer to Mine-free Thailand and a Mine-free World, 1 January 2012 – 31 December 2014),” received by email from Vipunjit Ketunuti, Project Manager, UNDP, 14 February 2011.

[82] Interview with Lt.-Gen. Attanop Sirisak, TMAC, in Geneva, 2 November 2011.

[83] Vipunjit Ketunuti, “Executive Summary, Mine-free Provinces, A Step Closer to Mine-free Thailand and a Mine-free World, 1 January 2012 – 31 December 2014).”

[84] Statement of Thailand, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2011.

[85] Interview with Lee Moroney, Country Programme Manager, NPA, Bangkok, 28 April 2011.

[86] Ibid.

[87] Interview with Vicent Woboya, Director, UMAC, in Geneva, 15 March 2010; and ICBL, “Critique of Uganda’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request,” www.icbl.org.

[88] Interview with Vicent Woboya, UMAC, in Geneva, 20 June 2011.

[89] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Vicent Woboya, UMAC, 10 June 2011.

[90] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Statement of ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[93] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[94] Ibid.

[95] “Field Survey Report, Cranfield University,” 9 July 2007, p. 33.

[96] UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, Table B.4.

[97] “Field Survey Report, Cranfield University,” 9 July 2007, p. 104; and see UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, Table B.4.

[98] Statement of ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[99] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[100] Mien Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2011.

[101] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 8; statement of Venezuela, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010; and statement of Venezuela, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2010.

[102] Statement of Venezuela, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2010.

[103] UN, “Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the suffering cause by anti-personnel mines,” Cartagena, 11 December 2009.

[104] Statement of Zimbabwe, Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 2 December 2009.

[105] Statement of Zimbabwe, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.

[106] Article 5 deadline Second Extension Request, 3 August 2010, p. 18.

[107] Decision of States Parties on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 Second Extension Request, 3 December 2010.

[108] Article 5 deadline Second Extension Request, 3 August 2010, p. 22.

[109] Ibid, p. 20.

[110] Interview with Kent Paulusson, Senior Mine Action Advisor for Iraq, UNDP, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

[111] Ibid, 16 March 2010; and telephone interview, 23 August 2010.

[112] “Montenegro is the only one without mines in Balkans,” Pobjeda (Montenegrin daily newspaper), 8 November 2007; “Montenegro cleared,” Dan (Montenegrin daily newspaper), 9 November 2007; and interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, Director, Regional Centre for Divers’ Training and Underwater, Podgorica, 16 March 2008.

[113] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Forms C and I.

[114] Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, Regional Centre for Underwater Demining, Podgorica, 18 February 2009.

[115] See Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, which lays down the obligation to clear areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party; and statement of the ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[116] Statement of Cyprus, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[117] The IMAS on Mine and ERW Risk Education (see, for example, IMAS 12.10) use MRE as the relevant acronym.

[118] Albania, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Tunisia, and Zambia. Of these, both Albania and Zambia have also completed clearance of unexploded submunitions.

[119] There is no RE in Angola following the decision by the government not to authorize funding in 2010 and UNICEF no longer supports RE in Angola. Clearance operators report conducting limited RE in communities where they are clearing mines.

[120] This compares to 29 killed and 49 injured by antivehicle mines and 32 killed and 113 injured by ERW.

[121] In 2005, 875 new mine/ERW casualties were reported, of whom 168 were killed and 707 injured; 525 were men, 83 were women, and 267 were children. Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2010–2019 identifies RE as an “important component” in achieving its goal of reducing both casualties and the social impact of mines. CMAA, “National Mine Action Strategy 2010–2019 (Draft),” undated but 2010, p. 6.

[122] Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, 21 March 2011.

[123] HI, “Libye: Diffusion des messages de prévention contre les mines” (“Libya: Dissemination of mine risk education messages”), 12 July 2011, www.handicap-international.fr.

[124] UN, “2011 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, March 2011, p. 268.

[125] Email from Insaf Nizam, Child Protection Specialist (Mine Action), UNICEF, 8 May 2011.

[126] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 5, paragraph 2(e).

[127] Statement of Lao PDR, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting, Session on Clearance and Risk Reduction, Geneva, 28 June 2011.

[128] Ibid.

[129] Email from Mihlar Mohamed, Program Officer Mine Action, UNICEF, 18 August 2011.

[130] Ministry of Economic Development, “The National Strategy for Mine Action in Sri Lanka,” September 2010, p. 5.

[131] ITF, “Annual Report 2010,” March 2011, p. 72.

[132] Karina Lynge, “DDG Somaliland Quarterly Report: October–December 2009,” DDG, Hargeisa, 16 January 2010; and email from Tammy Orr, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 29 July 2010.