

ANGOLA

2008 Key Data

State Party since	1 January 2003
Contamination	Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, cluster munition remnants, other ERW
Estimated area of contamination	2007 LIS estimate of between 242km ² and 1,239km ² of mined areas across 2,889 SHAs
Casualties in 2008	At least 52 (2007: at least 48)
Estimated mine/ERW survivors	Unknown but many thousands
Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)	Deadline: 1 January 2013
Demining in 2008	8.32km ² of mined areas 0.27km ² of battle areas 34.96km ² released by survey
Risk education recipients in 2008	Unknown
Progress towards victim assistance aims	Slow
Support for mine action in 2008	International: \$22,136,534 (2007: 19.8 million)

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Angola acknowledged using antipersonnel mines as a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty from December 1997 to April 2002. Angola became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 January 2003. Angola has not enacted national legal measures to implement the treaty. Angola completed destruction of its stockpile of 88,117 antipersonnel mines in December 2006. As of 2007, it reported retaining 2,512 mines for training purposes.

Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Angola are the legacy of four decades of armed conflict which ended in 2002. Although mine clearance began in 1994 during the UN Angola Verification Mission, a national baseline of the extent of the problem was not known until a Landmine Impact Survey was completed in 2005. In 2008, the Angolan mine action program included national and international demining operators working in all 18 provinces of the country.

Since April 2002, UNDP has provided support to develop the capacities of the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH), the national mine action coordination body, and the National Demining Institute (INAD), the government's operational arm for mine action. Significant problems in coordination of the mine action program and reporting on its achievements have persisted, largely as a result of insufficient government commitment to mine action. As of June 2009, it looked unlikely that Angola would meet its January 2013 Article 5 deadline for clearance of mined areas.

There is no complete and reliable set of casualty data in Angola, but between 2000 and 2008 Landmine Monitor identified at least 2,664 casualties (no data was available for 1999). Total casualty estimates run as high as 80,000.

Risk education (RE) has been conducted since 1999 by more than 15 organizations, including UNICEF, international and national NGOs, the ICRC and INAD, and through the mass media and schools, coordinated by CNIDAH. Since 1999, emergency RE has gradually moved to a more community-based approach focusing on risk reduction. In 2006, a development approach using participatory methods was introduced. By the end of 2008, the level of RE had decreased significantly, becoming inadequate.

While overall services for mine/ERW survivors improved after the end of the conflict in 2002, services for survivors and other persons with disabilities remained limited as of 2009. In some sectors, deterioration has been noted since 2005. As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009, Angola created a victim assistance plan, but it remained largely unimplemented due to a lack of funds and capacity.

Mine Ban Policy

Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 5 July 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2003. Angola has not formally reported any legal measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.

As of July 2009, Angola had not submitted its annual updated Article 7 transparency report, due 30 April 2009. Angola did not provide a report in 2008. It has submitted four previous reports.¹

Angola attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it commented on the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted by Zimbabwe, and made statements on victim assistance and mine clearance. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance.

Angola has not made known its views on key issues of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training). It is particularly notable that Angola has not spoken on these issues, given its history of mine use and participation in joint military operations.²

Angola is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not ratified as of 1 July 2009.³

Production, transfer, use, stockpile destruction, and retention

Angola states that it has never manufactured antipersonnel mines.⁴ It is not believed to have exported them in the past. While Landmine Monitor has not confirmed any instances of use of antipersonnel mines since Angola ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, the government has acknowledged using antipersonnel mines while it was a signatory to the treaty, from December 1997 to April 2002, when a peace agreement was signed with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA).⁵

Angola completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines on 28 December 2006, just ahead of its 1 January 2007 treaty deadline. It destroyed 81,045 mines between October and December 2006, in addition to 7,072 antipersonnel mines of 12 types apparently destroyed between September and December 2003.⁶

¹ Angola submitted an undated report in 2007, covering the period from April 2006 to March 2007. Previous reports were submitted on 3 August 2006, 3 May 2005, and 14 September 2004. The initial report was due 30 June 2003.

² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, pp. 81–83; *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 123–125, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*, p. 362.

³ For details on cluster munition policy and practice see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice*, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, pp. 29–30.

⁴ Article 7 Report (for the period April 2006 to March 2007), Form E.

⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, pp. 121–122. Although the treaty had not entered into force for Angola, the ICBL and some States Parties protested Angola's use of mines, noting that it could be considered a breach of its international obligations as a signatory. There have been sporadic and unconfirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines since the end of the war, with allegations focused on criminal groups.

⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, pp. 141–143, for additional details.

In its most recent Article 7 report, Angola reported retaining 2,512 antipersonnel mines under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁷ Angola has not provided an update on mines retained since 2007, and has yet to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Angola is heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants. Contamination is the result of more than four decades of armed conflict, which ended in 2002. More than 40 different types of mines from 15 countries have been found during clearance operations.⁸

Estimates of the extent of the mine problem in 1993 spoke of millions of landmines littering one-third of the country's land.⁹ It was not until June 2007, following completion of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), that a more measured and realistic description of contamination in each of the country's 18 provinces (all of which are contaminated) was achieved.¹⁰

The LIS identified 3,293 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 1,988 mine/ERW-impacted communities in 383 of Angola's 557 comunas (districts). These impacted communities represent 8% of the 23,504 communities in the country, affecting an estimated 2.4 million people. Three-quarters of all impacted communities and casualties were in just eight provinces: Benguela, Bié, Cunene, Kuando-Kubango, Kuanza Sul, Malanje, Moxico, and Uíge, with Moxico the most heavily impacted province. Cabinda, Luanda, and Namibe provinces were found to have the least impact from mines.¹¹ As of March 2009, the national database managed by the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) showed that 998 SHAs from the LIS—30% of the total—had been released (through cancellation, technical survey, or clearance) or clearance was either ongoing or CNIDAH had not received a completion report.¹²

Yet the extent of residual contamination is not known with any precision, and different operators have contrasting views on estimates of the total size of mined and battle areas in the country. In the four provinces where it carried out survey for the LIS (Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando-Kubango), HALO Trust applied a more rigorous methodology for measuring suspected areas, which resulted in an average SHA size only one-ninth of those measured by the other LIS operators.¹³ The results from the LIS show that HALO identified 35% of the total number of SHAs, but as a result of polygon mapping (more precise delineation of the perimeters of suspected areas) measured only 6.4% of the total suspect area.¹⁴ Furthermore, in June 2008, HALO, based on data from its polygon-mapped areas and from its own past clearance records, indicated that on average only one-quarter of the SHAs required physical clearance.¹⁵

⁷ Article 7 Report (for the period April 2006 to March 2007), Form D. This is considerably more than the 1,460 mines Angola previously indicated it would retain. It includes 13 types of mines not previously listed as retained, and the amounts of all 12 types previously listed have changed. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 144.

⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 131.

⁹ Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy* (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 151.

¹⁰ Statement of Angola, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 20 November 2007, p. 2.

¹¹ Survey Action Center (SAC), "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report," Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 31; and interviews with DCA staff, Luena, 16 May 2009; Johan P. Botha, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, Luena, 17 May 2009; and with Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, Director General, INAD, Luanda, 21 May 2009.

¹² Information provided by Mohammad Qasim, 27 April 2009.

¹³ SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report," Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 48.

¹⁴ Email from Southern Craib, Programme Manager, HALO, 20 June 2008.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

CNIDAH, for planning purposes, based on the results of HALO's polygon mapping, estimated the total area might be as little as 242km² compared to the 1,239km² measured by the LIS.¹⁶ The former UNDP Information Management Advisor, Mohammad Qasim, however, could not see any consistent pattern when analyzing tasks completed by all demining operators since the LIS and he concluded it was "premature" to estimate there was as little as 242km² of contaminated area.¹⁷ Moreover, despite the extensive coverage of the LIS, which included all but 19 of the 563 comunas, the community-based survey did not identify contamination on all of the bridges, roads, and other infrastructure not directly associated with local villages. CNIDAH planned to survey the 19 comunas in 2009 that were not accessible during the LIS, pending funding for the project.¹⁸ The return of internally displaced persons and refugees may also lead to the discovery of new SHAs that were not recorded by the LIS. Demining operators believe that many mined areas remain to be identified.¹⁹

The extent to which Angola continues to be affected by cluster munition remnants is also unclear. Prior to 2009 at least two types of cluster munitions had been found in Angola: the Russian-made PTAB-2.5 K0 and the AO-2.5 RT. As of February 2008, according to data and completion reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) had reported clearing 13 submunitions in the municipality of Ebo in Kuanza Sul province; Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had reported clearing 140 submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO had reported clearing 230 submunitions in Kunhinga municipality in Bié province.²⁰ As of 29 June 2009, demining NGOs in Angola reported they had not found more submunitions since those reported in February 2008.²¹

Casualties

As in previous years, there is no reliable and complete data on the number of casualties in 2008 in Angola. Landmine Monitor received "nationwide" information from CNIDAH and the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD); data for Moxico province from CNIDAH, MAG, and DanChurchAid (DCA); and demining accident information from NPA, HALO, and Santa Barbara Foundation (StB). However, the formats made available did not allow cross-checking and assembling a cumulative total. In addition, CNIDAH information provided in 2009 did not match the January–June 2008 casualty data CNIDAH provided in July 2008, reportedly because the date in the files received was said to be the date of entry and not the date of incident.²²

INAD provided summary data on 67 new mine/ERW casualties in 2008 (12 killed and 55 injured). At least 40 casualties were men, seven women, 18 boys, and two girls. INAD declined to provide incident dates, locations, civilian-military status, device type, or activity at the time of the incident to allow cross-checking with other data sources.²³

¹⁶ SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report," Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 31.

¹⁷ Email from Mohammad Qasim, Acting Chief Technical Advisor and Information Management Advisor, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009. Analysis is, however, impeded by the failure to systematically include the amount of land released in clearance reports. For example, if a SHA measures 100,000m² and after technical or other survey it is necessary to clear only 20,000m², the other 80,000m² are not reported as released. Mohammad Qasim did not provide an explanation for this reporting method but believed CNIDAH sees a more accurate estimate of the landmine problem as counting the number of SHAs that have been cleared. Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009; and email from Mohammad Qasim, 6 May 2009.

¹⁸ UN, "2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2008, p. 31. DCA had previously expressed concern to Landmine Monitor that CNIDAH might not have the capacity to update the LIS with the results of the survey. Email from Eva Veble, Head, Humanitarian Mine Action Unit, DCA, 25 June 2008.

¹⁹ Interviews with Johan P. Botha, MAG, Luena, 17 May 2009; and with Adriano Gonçalves, Senior Officer, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

²⁰ Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 22 February 2008.

²¹ Emails from Zlatko Vezilic, Operations Manager, NPA, 29 June 2009; Richard Grindle, Programme Manager, HALO, 27 June 2009; and Thomas Roth, Director, StB, 29 June 2009.

²² Email from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, Information Systems National Advisor, UNDP/CNIDAH, 19 June 2009.

²³ Data provided by email from Luke Atkinson, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP/INAD, 19 June 2009.

From other sources, Landmine Monitor was only able to verify 52 new mine/ERW casualties in Angola in 2008 (23 killed and 29 injured); information that could not be cross-checked was excluded and casualties are certainly higher. At least 41 of the casualties identified by Landmine Monitor were civilian, including 17 boys, 12 men, four girls, three women, and four females and one male of unknown age. Four were military and three were deminers; all age/gender/status were unknown for four casualties. Antipersonnel mines caused 16 casualties, antivehicle mines eight, ERW 15, and unknown devices 13.

In 2008, CNIDAH stated that annual casualties had decreased from some 250 per year in 2002–2005 to 50 per year due to increased demining and RE efforts. It was further added that most casualties were children and the majority of incidents were caused by ERW.²⁴

According to the United States Department of State, CNIDAH reported 18 people killed and 43 injured in 2008.²⁵ However, national data provided to Landmine Monitor by CNIDAH only included 26 casualties in 2008 (13 killed and 13 injured),²⁶ which did not include at least 16 of 19 casualties recorded by CNIDAH in Moxico (9 killed and 10 injured).²⁷ MAG in Moxico recorded three injured casualties that were not included in CNIDAH Moxico data (two soldiers and one civilian).²⁸ DCA recorded eight casualties in Moxico, which were all included in the regional CNIDAH data.²⁹ In July 2008, CNIDAH reported 47 casualties to the end of June 2008 (10 killed and 37 injured); these were all excluded by Landmine Monitor from casualty totals because the incident data could not be re-verified.³⁰

Additionally, NPA recorded one person injured in a demining accident in 2008³¹ and HALO recorded one deminer injured when a vegetation cutter set off a fragmentation mine in Bié. StB reported one accident in Kuanza Sul when one deminer was injured due to a failure to follow procedures.³² None of these casualties were recorded in CNIDAH data. Landmine Monitor also identified one incident in the media when on 6 October 2008 two people were killed and two injured in an antivehicle mine incident when their car drove off the main road in Kibala, Kuanza Sul province.³³ The US Department of State further reported landmine incidents involving “construction workers, mostly Chinese, while rebuilding roads and railroads.”³⁴ None of the casualty data received included foreign nationals.

Due to the incompleteness of the data, comparisons with previous years are impossible. For 2007, casualty figures ranging between 48 and 127 were reported.³⁵

²⁴ “Poucos acidentes com artefactos” (“Few incidents with artifacts”), *Jornal de Angola* (Luanda), 1 September 2008. TEH EPORTEO ON 16 MAY

²⁵ US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Angola,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

²⁶ Data provided by email from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17 June 2009.

²⁷ CNIDAH, “Relatório Provincial” (“Provincial Report”), Luena, 16 December 2008; and CNIDAH data provided during Landmine Monitor field mission in Moxico province, May 2009. For one casualty included in the national CNIDAH data, insufficient data was available to verify whether it was included in the data provided to Landmine Monitor.

²⁸ Email from Danny Kavanagh, Country Programme Manager, MAG, 24 June 2009.

²⁹ Email from Hendrix Chilongu, Mine RE/CL Supervisor, DCA, 22 June 2009.

³⁰ Casualty data for 2005–2008 provided by email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 8 July 2008; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 142.

³¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 142.

³² Email from Anna Kudarewska, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 30 April 2009.

³³ “Kwanza-Sul: Mina faz dois mortos e igual número de feridos” (“Kwanza-Sul: Mine kills two and injured the same number”), *Jornal de Angola* (Luanda), 8 October 2008.

³⁴ US Department of State, “2008 Country reports on Human Rights Practices: Angola,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

³⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 140–142.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009 with at least eight casualties (four killed and four injured) to the end of May. In Moxico, CNIDAH recorded five casualties and MAG recorded one additional person injured. CNIDAH in Luanda recorded two additional casualties in Lunda Sul.³⁶ INAD recorded one woman killed and one man injured.³⁷

The cumulative number of mine/ERW casualties is not known. Angola has stated several times that there are an estimated 80,000 survivors.³⁸ In 2006, however, the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS) stated that 70% of 89,170 registered persons with disabilities were mine/ERW survivors.³⁹ This would amount to approximately 62,500 people. The media reported in 2008 that the UN estimates there are some 23,000 mine survivors.⁴⁰

The LIS data is considered to be the most reliable source of casualty information; it identified 341 recent casualties (168 killed, 159 injured, and 14 unknown) in 173 communities.⁴¹ The number of non-recent casualties is unknown. Most casualties were male (232 or 68%), which is also below the international average of about 80%. Some 75% of casualties were aged between 15 and 44 years. Of total casualties, 15% were military. The most common activity at the time of the incident was traveling (30%), followed by collecting wood/water (17%), and farming (11%). One-third of casualties occurred in Moxico province (111), followed by Bié (58).⁴² Most of those killed or injured while traveling were not from the communities where the incidents occurred, which resulted in a lack of detail about these casualties.⁴³

In addition to the LIS, fewer than 300 casualty records were entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database at CNIDAH in Luanda. The first casualties were entered at the start of the LIS and “almost no data before that.”⁴⁴ Landmine Monitor identified at least 2,664 mine/ERW casualties between 2000 and 2008 (no data is available for 1999), including 877 people killed, 1,644 injured, and 143 of unknown status.⁴⁵

Risk profile

People are at most risk in Moxico, followed by the provinces in northern Angola.⁴⁶ While there is a high level of awareness, people are at risk while conducting livelihood activities including collecting water and food, firewood, making charcoal, and hunting.⁴⁷ Most mined areas are not marked.⁴⁸

Socio-economic impact

Landmines affect the daily lives of the people of Angola in many ways. The LIS identified access to drinking water, housing, and public services as problems related to mines and ERW. Lack of access to drinking water is a problem nationwide but is particularly acute in Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Malanje, and Moxico provinces. Water and electricity distribution for much of the country is also affected, due to the widespread practice of mining high-voltage electricity pylons, reservoirs, and dams during the years of conflict.⁴⁹

³⁶ Emails from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17 June 2009; Danny Kavanagh, MAG, 24 June 2009; and from Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, 22 June 2009.

³⁷ Email from Luke Atkinson, UNDP/INAD, 19 June 2009.

³⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 144; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, pp. 175–177.

³⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 182.

⁴⁰ “Angola to stage ‘Miss Landmine Survivor’ pageant,” *Agence France-Presse* (Luanda), 26 March 2008.

⁴¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 143–144. Recent casualties are those occurring within the two year period preceding LIS fieldwork, which was conducted between April 2004 and April 2007.

⁴² SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report,” Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 13.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 35–39.

⁴⁴ Emails from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17, 18, and 19 June 2009. Three cumulative sheets were sent to Landmine Monitor, only including 155 records for 1999–2009, one with 251 records for the same time period and one including 281 records (but no incident dates). The data did not match data provided separately for 2008 and 2009 or provided to Landmine Monitor in the past. LIS data was kept separately.

⁴⁵ See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

⁴⁶ Interview with Carlos Seixas, Mine Risk Education Officer, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

⁴⁷ Interview with Graza Monteiro, Liaison Officer, NPA, Malanje, 13 May 2009; and email from Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, 22 June 2009.

⁴⁸ Interview with Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 15 May 2009.

⁴⁹ SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report,” Washington, DC, November 2007, pp. 48–51.

Two World Bank papers on Angola address the impact of landmines. The Environmental and Social Management Framework Final Report concludes that the presence of landmines throughout the country inhibits access to land and is an environmental limitation that undermines development.⁵⁰ The areas cleared are being primarily used for housing and farming: sometimes construction and farming begins before formal handover tasks with local officials are completed.⁵¹ An unpublished World Bank study on the economic impact of landmines reports that although economic models show that mines have affected the overall economy, in Angola there is largely a lack of evidence and studies to back up general statements about that impact.⁵²

Landmines also have an environmental impact in Angola. Mine contamination in Kuando-Kubango province was cited as one of the obstacles to creating the new Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, the world's largest game park on the borders of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. *National Geographic* reported that "since the end of the war in 2002, elephants have begun to go back to the Luiana Partial Reserve in Angola's sparsely populated Kuando-Kubango province that borders southwest Zambia and Namibia. When the initial migration began a number of elephants had their trunks and legs blown off by mines, condemning the animals to agonizing deaths. But the elephants that followed have since avoided those areas." According to Elephants Without Borders, "in order to re-establish and sustain wildlife communities in Luiana Partial Reserve, it is critical that the area be declared a national park and that the land mines are cleared." More than 130,000 elephants are waiting to be allowed to move from Botswana through the park. This process has been held up until the park is free of the threat of mines.⁵³

Mine action has created thousands of jobs in rural areas where in March 2009 unemployment was reported to be as high as 48%.⁵⁴ With dozens of international and national organizations and commercial demining companies⁵⁵ operating in Angola, mine clearance projects provide "a good number of jobs" in the rural areas. This has created a dynamic and competitive labor market in which turnover among deminers, in particular with some NGOs, is high as a result of commercial demining companies offering higher salaries. NGOs reported the turnover causes disruptions in operations and lower outputs as more time is needed for recruiting and training.⁵⁶

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

The mine action structure in Angola has evolved into a complicated mix of government bodies that coordinate poorly, if at all, and which lack financial transparency. CNIDAH, created in 2001 by presidential decree 54/2001,⁵⁷ is responsible for mine action policy development, planning, priority-setting, coordination, and management of the implementation of Angola's obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, and reports directly to the Council of Ministers. CNIDAH is also

⁵⁰ World Bank, "Environmental and Social Management Framework: FAS IV. Final Report," E2059, January 2009, p. 35.

⁵¹ Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fatmire Uka, Operations Manager, DCA, 3 March 2009; and Aubrey Sutherland, Programme Manager, NPA, 9 March 2009.

⁵² World Bank, "Landmine Contamination, Casualties and Clearance Database Study," Washington, DC, unpublished draft provided to Landmine Monitor in February 2009.

⁵³ "Wildlife Relocation Through Landmine Clearance," in UNMAS, "2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2007, p. 31; *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 145; interview with Hendrik Ehlers, CEO, Chairman and Director General, MgM, Windhoek, 17 March 2008; and Leon Marshall, "Elephants 'Learn' to Avoid Land Mines in War-Torn Angola," *National Geographic News* (Johannesburg), 16 July 2007, news.nationalgeographic.com.

⁵⁴ Phoebe Natanson, "Rich in Oil and Diamonds, Is Luanda Africa's Dubai?" *ABC News*, 24 March 2009, abcnews.go.com.

⁵⁵ Statement of Angola, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, 27 November 2008. For instance, an evaluation of the UNDP RRF project in December 2008 claimed there were 42 national mine action operators accredited by CNIDAH. Kjell Björk and Guillermino Tuluka, "Evaluation: UNDP Angola Rapid Response Fund (RRF) Mine Action 2005–2008," 12 December 2008.

⁵⁶ Thomas Cromwell, "Angola: One of the fastest-growing economies in the world," *Diplomatic Traffic*, undated, www.diplomatictraffic.com; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 9 March 2009.

⁵⁷ Presidential Decree No. 54/2001.

responsible for the accreditation of commercial demining companies and, in principle, these companies send their clearance reports to CNIDAH.⁵⁸ CNIDAH's 18 provincial operations offices (one in each province) determine annual priorities based on NGO priority tasks, the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs.⁵⁹

In order to separate coordination and operational responsibilities, in 2002 the government of Angola also created INAD as a public institute responsible for demining and training operations under the auspices of the Minister of Assistance and Social Reintegration.⁶⁰ INAD takes directions from the government rather than CNIDAH. Araújo Kapapelo Nunda, the general assistant to the director of INAD's Technical Department, declared in February 2008: "Our priorities are defined by the central Government. At the moment, we are demining the railways, enlarging the roadsides and intervening on places where undertakings helping with the process of reconstruction and development of the country will be built or rehabilitated."⁶¹ In May 2009, INAD stated that they were fully funded by the government and had "everything" they needed, but the director general would not provide any figures for the level of support it was receiving.⁶²

Coordination problems have seemingly been compounded since the establishment of the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) in December 2005 to coordinate and manage mine clearance by INAD, the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA), and the National Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GRN).⁶³ The CED is composed of representatives from the three operators, reports to the President of Angola, and is managed by the Minister of Assistance and Social Reintegration. It functions exclusively at the operational level and participates in the planning process with the same status as other mine action operators. The CED does not have a fixed budget for mine action.⁶⁴

Two reports suggest that the GRN has ample assets to carry out its mission and maintain some independence from CNIDAH. The Ministry of Finance reported the GRN reconstruction budget for 2007 was AO\$8,693,107,667 (approximately US\$118 million). It was also reported by *Le Monde diplomatique* in June 2008 that the GRN raised its own money, estimated to be in the billions of dollars, using future oil revenues as leverage.⁶⁵

According to CNIDAH, the work performed by certain commercial companies does not follow the priorities set out in CNIDAH's annual workplan. Private contractors take orders from their client, the GRN, whose mandate is funding infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, bridges, dams, hospitals, schools, and other buildings under the national development plan.⁶⁶

In 2008, the Council of Ministers was scheduled to vote on legislation that would clarify the roles of the CED, INAD, FAA, and CNIDAH. Under the proposed legislation the CED and CNIDAH would remain separate entities. Under Angolan law, a commission has only a temporary life. The proposed legislation would change CNIDAH's status from a commission to an agency, thereby granting CNIDAH a more permanent status.⁶⁷ However, as of May 2009 the Council of Ministers had not voted on the legislation.⁶⁸

⁵⁸ Government of Angola/CNIDAH, "Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011," Luanda, 2006; and UN, "2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2008, p. 22.

⁵⁹ Interview with Nigel Wilson, Programme Director, MAG, Luanda, 12 March 2008; and email from Megan Latimer, Project Officer, HALO, 13 August 2008.

⁶⁰ UNDP/Government of Angola, "Capacity Development of the National Institute for Demining (INAD)," 2006, p. 1.
⁶¹ "National Institute Priorities Railways Demining," *Angola Press Agency* (Luanda), 29 February 2008, allafrica.com.

⁶² Interview with Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 21 May 2009.

⁶³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, pp. 157–158; and email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 14 August 2008.

⁶⁴ Jan Isaksen and Christian Larssen, CMI, *NPA Mine Action Programme in Angola Review 2004–2007 Appraisal 2008–2010* (Oslo: NORAD, January 2009), p. 14, www.norad.no.

⁶⁵ Ministry of Finance, www.minfin.gv.ao; and Augusta Conchiglia, "Angola After the Wars," *Le Monde diplomatique*, 11 June 2008, www.agenceglobal.com.

⁶⁶ Information from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.

⁶⁷ Interview with Augusto Santana, National Planning and Programming Advisor, UNDP/CNIDAH, Luanda, 10 March 2008.

⁶⁸ Interview with Adriano Gonçalves, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

Risk education

CNIDAH is responsible for the management, coordination, and monitoring of RE. It was supported by UNICEF until the end of 2008. Three national coordination meetings were held in 2008.⁶⁹ RE is also coordinated at the provincial level, through regular meetings run by the CNIDAH provincial offices. UNICEF reported that coordination is variable, and NPA reported that the frequency of meetings had decreased in Malanje province.⁷⁰ Organizations are accredited to carry out RE activities by CNIDAH.⁷¹

National standards for RE exist, and it is conducted according to a methodology developed in 2006 with UNICEF and NGOs called the Solution Based Methodology (SBM). SBM involves the establishment of community focus groups, consisting of community leaders and members, with whom NGOs meet to discuss the mine/ERW problem and to come up with solutions. Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques such as community mapping and seasonal calendars are used. This is a shift from the previously used message-based methodology. A guidebook for SBM has been produced.⁷²

RE activities are recorded in IMSMA,⁷³ although data provided to Landmine Monitor does not include all RE activities.⁷⁴

Victim assistance

CNIDAH is responsible for the planning, coordination, and monitoring of all victim assistance (VA) activities through its Sub-commission for Assistance and Reintegration. The Sub-commission is made up of relevant ministries, the UN, and NGOs.⁷⁵ However, CNIDAH's VA coordinator noted that coordination had been difficult due to internal reorganization and logistical challenges at CNIDAH. Coordination meetings had been irregular, partly because of the elections in 2008.⁷⁶ Overall coordination within ministries and with civil society was weak.⁷⁷

MINARS is responsible for disability issues in general and, in the context of VA, it is responsible for reintegration services. The Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for medical care for survivors and for one of the main programs coordinating assistance to survivors and persons with disabilities, the National Program for the Rehabilitation of People with Physical and Sensorial Disability (PNR).⁷⁸

CNIDAH is responsible for producing an annual VA progress report to monitor assistance provided to survivors.⁷⁹ In 2008, it produced two reports covering its own coordination efforts but not implementation achievements in the sector.⁸⁰ CNIDAH stated that it needed technical support and increased cooperation from ministries and implementers to compile this kind of information.⁸¹

⁶⁹ Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

⁷⁰ Interview with Nelson Hiyonanye, Mine Risk Education, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009; interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009; and interview with Graza Monteiro, NPA, Malanje, 13 May 2009.

⁷¹ Email from Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, 26 June 2009.

⁷² Interview with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009.

⁷³ Interview with Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

⁷⁴ Information from CNIDAH's database provided by email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009. Luanda shows a lower number of recipients of RE in 2008 (38,382) than the totals provided to Landmine Monitor by individual operators.

⁷⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 149.

⁷⁶ Interview with Madalena Neto, VA Coordinator, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

⁷⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Raul Feio, Health Expert, EC Delegation in Angola, 29 June 2009.

⁷⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 149–150.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ CNIDAH, "Relatório de Balanço das Actividades Realizadas pela Subcomissão de Apoio e Reinserção Social durante o Primeiro Semestre de 2008" ("Report on the Activities carried out by the Sub-Commission on Assistance and Social Reintegration during the First Semester of 2008"), Luanda, 18 July 2008; and CNIDAH, "Relatório de Balanço das Actividades Realizadas pela Subcomissão de Apoio e Reinserção Social durante o Segundo Semestre de 2008" ("Report on the Activities carried out by the Sub-Commission on Assistance and Social Reintegration during the Second Semester of 2008"), Luanda, undated but 2009.

⁸¹ Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

Due to the increased decentralization, the National VA Plan 2007–2011 (see Strategic mine action plan section below) needs to filter down to provincial authorities. The vice-governors are responsible for provincial coordination, and local authorities are responsible for allocating relevant budgets,⁸² but VA is often not seen as a priority and budget allocations vary accordingly.⁸³

Data collection and management

Data collection and management are also at the heart of problems with Angola's mine action program. In Geneva in May 2009 at the Standing Committee meetings, CNIDAH stated it did not have all of the clearance data because of a rapid expansion of commercial companies and INAD's increased capacity. CNIDAH requested assistance from other States Parties in information management, though it did not specify the type of assistance it was seeking.⁸⁴ As a result of database problems, Angola decided not to submit an Article 7 report for 2008.⁸⁵

The data collection system begins in the provinces where mine clearance operators send their reports each month to the CNIDAH provincial office. The provincial offices do not enter the data into IMSMA, which Angola uses to record mine action information. Instead they forward it to CNIDAH in Luanda where it is entered into the database. Some NGOs also email duplicate copies of their data directly to CNIDAH in Luanda each month. However, all of the information does not seem to arrive in Luanda. The NGO operators reported that they are often requested to resend data weeks or months after having submitted it to the provincial CNIDAH office and sending it direct to Luanda. Based on the requests, the NGOs assume the previously sent data had been lost.⁸⁶

Luanda then sends each provincial office an updated "read-only" database.⁸⁷ In turn, however, the provincial offices do not always receive the updated database. For example, according to Chile Manuel Chicanha, the Liaison Officer at CNIDAH in Luena, the "read-only" database in Moxico in May 2009 did not show any change from the LIS data—even though for more than three years MAG, DCA, and others have been clearing high and medium-impact communities. "Luanda is still working on it," Chicanha told Landmine Monitor.⁸⁸ INAD, based in Luanda a short distance from CNIDAH, also reported not receiving an updated database as promised.⁸⁹ According to UNDP, the return time could take "a couple of months," leaving the provincial offices with a frequently outdated database on which to base its planning.⁹⁰

Despite all these problems, on 31 March 2009 the UNDP capacity-building project ended, leaving CNIDAH without an international advisor for the database.⁹¹ In May 2009, however, it was reported that UNDP was restructuring its support for mine action in Angola within a broader framework that combined work on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and small arms and light weapons. A key component of the new structure would be efforts to secure and disseminate mine action data between CNIDAH at the national level, its provincial offices, and all mine action operators.⁹²

⁸² Government of Angola/CNIDAH, "Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011," Luanda, 2006, pp. 20, 34–35; and CNIDAH, Revised 2005–2009 objectives, November 2007, provided by email from Anna Kudarewska, Landmine Monitor, 9 May 2008.

⁸³ Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and email from Claude-Alain Amiet, Orthopedic Technical Advisor, MoH/GTZ, 18 June 2009.

⁸⁴ Statement of Angola, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

⁸⁵ Interview with Adriano Gonçalves, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

⁸⁶ Interviews with Johan P. Botha and Douglas Kilama, CL Manager, MAG; and with Fatmire Uka, DCA, Luena, 16–17 May 2009. UNDP confirmed in March 2009 to Landmine Monitor that not all reports from mine clearance operators had reached Luanda and a review of the CNIDAH provincial offices was ongoing. Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009.

⁸⁷ Interviews with Johan P. Botha, and Douglas Kilama, MAG; and with Fatmire Uka, DCA, Luena, 16–17 May 2009; email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009; and interview with Chile Manuel Chicanha, Liaison Officer, CNIDAH Moxico Office, Luena, 18 May 2009.

⁸⁸ Interview with Chile Manuel Chicanha, CNIDAH Moxico Office, Luena, 18 May 2009.

⁸⁹ Interview with Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 21 May 2009.

⁹⁰ Interview with Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

⁹¹ Email from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.

⁹² UNDP, "Technical Specialist (Information Management Systems for Mine Action)," www.reliefweb.int.

As evidenced above, casualty data collection in Angola remains incomplete and inconsistent and has possibly deteriorated compared to previous years. It is believed that casualties remain under-reported.⁹³ CNIDAH is responsible for storing casualty data in IMSMA, which was reportedly functioning properly. However, only casualties since 2004 that were received on IMSMA forms were entered. Data from some organizations was not included in IMSMA because it was incomplete or not submitted for inclusion in the IMSMA database.⁹⁴ Analysis of national and regional CNIDAH IMSMA data shows many discrepancies. Landmine Monitor received, as in previous years, information submitted to CNIDAH, which did not appear to be included in the data provided by CNIDAH.⁹⁵

Mine action program operators

National operators and activities	Demining	RE	VA
INAD	x	x	
Armed Forces of Angola	x		
19 operational commercial companies	x		
Two operational demining NGOs	x		
International operators and activities	Demining	RE	VA
DCA	x	x	
HALO	x	x	
MAG	x	x	
NPA	x	x	
StB	x		
Stiftung Menschen gegen Minen	x		
Handicap International			x
Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit			x
Angolan Association of Disabled Persons			x
Center for the Promotion and Development of Communities			x
Disability and Development Partners			x

In 2008 and 2009, Landmine Monitor field visits noted that sources traditionally aware of incidents, such as the police and village chiefs, did not report incidents to CNIDAH.⁹⁶ CNIDAH noted that challenges in collecting data included the fact that CNIDAH only played a coordinating role and depended on operators for information while not one operator was assigned to collect the information.⁹⁷ INAD also records casualty data but it was not known if this was shared with CNIDAH in 2008.

⁹³ Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009; and email from Mohammad Qasim, 28 April 2009.

⁹⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by and email from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17 June 2009 and 19 June 2009.

⁹⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 140–144.

⁹⁶ Observations and discussions with operators during Landmine Monitor field mission, Moxico province and Luanda, 9–14 March 2008 and 11–22 May 2009.

⁹⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17 June 2009.

Analysis of the data provided to Landmine Monitor shows unsystematic information provision by data collectors as well as a lack of person, device type, and activity information. Database fields are often not filled, are completed unsystematically, and are contradictory.⁹⁸ It was also noted that the incident date was not the actual date of the incident but the date the report was entered into IMSMA, sometimes years later. This would include all the information provided to Landmine Monitor previously,⁹⁹ making the data's reliability even more questionable.

In May 2009, CNIDAH reported that it had started a nationwide survivor survey, which would be completed in 2011.¹⁰⁰

Plans

Strategic mine action plan

LIS data (interim results from 12 provinces) served as the basis for developing Angola's latest strategic mine action plan.¹⁰¹ On 6 September 2006, the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2006–2011 was approved by the Council of Ministers.¹⁰² Within the time period it aims to resolve the mine issues in all high-impact communities and half of the medium-impact communities.¹⁰³

CNIDAH planned to review the strategic plan in October 2009 with the help of an international consultant.¹⁰⁴ In preparation for the strategy review, a second annual meeting on demining was held in Luanda on 14 May 2009 at the army's General Headquarters to review the results of clearance operations from 2006–2008 and identify activities that would support the implementation of Angola's development plan.¹⁰⁵ According to Engineer Leonardo Sapalo, INAD's director general, the meeting concluded that more time was needed to clear all mines and this would be reflected in the revised strategic plan.¹⁰⁶

As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009, Angola developed a set of objectives in 2005, which were reworked in 2007 to become the national VA plan (Action Plan on National Integrated Action 2007–2011).¹⁰⁷ One version was published in 2007 in the Mid-Term Review of the Status of Victim Assistance in the 24 Relevant States Parties,¹⁰⁸ but Landmine Monitor received a more detailed version from CNIDAH in 2008.¹⁰⁹ A final version had not been presented as of May 2009.

Overall, the aim of the plan was to improve service provision for all components of VA for 80% of mine/ERW survivors and/or affected communities. Given that there could be up to 80,000 mine/ERW survivors, this is a challenging target. In addition, many of the objectives focused on capacity-building and institutional strengthening, awareness-raising, and information gathering, rather than service provision.¹¹⁰ In 2008, it was reported that full implementation of the plan was scheduled to start in 2009,¹¹¹ but due to a lack of capacity and financial means, CNIDAH had

⁹⁸ Analysis of casualty data for 1999–2009 in emails from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17–19 June 2009.

⁹⁹ Email from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 19 June 2009.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, Geneva, 28 May 2009; and see also statement of Angola, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

¹⁰¹ Government of Angola/CNIDAH, "Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011," Luanda, 2006. See SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report," Washington, DC, November 2007, p 7; and UN, "2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2007, pp. 22, 23.

¹⁰² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 135.

¹⁰³ UN, "2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2008, p. 22.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Brig. Jose Roqué de Oliveira, Deputy Director, CNIDAH, Luanda, 21 May 2009; and Government of Angola/CNIDAH, "Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011," Luanda, 2006, p. 31.

¹⁰⁵ "National meeting on demining happens today," *Agencia Angola Press*, 14 May 2009, www.portalangop.co.ao.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 21 May 2009.

¹⁰⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 148–149.

¹⁰⁸ "Mid-Term Review of the Status of VA in the 24 Relevant States Parties," Dead Sea, 21 November 2007, pp. 19–21.

¹⁰⁹ CNIDAH, "Revised 2005–2009 objectives," November 2007, received by email from Anna Kudarewska, Landmine Monitor, 9 May 2008.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ Government of Angola/CNIDAH, "Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011," Luanda, 2006, p. 50.

not been able to operationalize the plan or monitor relevant activities as of May.¹¹² CNIDAH has met with several ministries and operators to discuss how they envisioned implementing their responsibilities under the plan. It also had several fundraising meetings and visited projects to assess their needs.¹¹³ VA is also included in the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006–2011 as one of its strategic goals.¹¹⁴

Priority-setting

Provincial authorities are responsible for annual operational workplans.¹¹⁵ At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola stated its priorities as: clearing agricultural areas, schools, hospitals, and recreation areas, and demining and rebuilding roads and bridges.¹¹⁶ CNIDAH provincial offices provide a priority task list to demining NGOs from which the NGOs then select the tasks they will undertake during the year.¹¹⁷ According to NPA, many of the provincial priority tasks focus on roads, houses, and official buildings.¹¹⁸

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

In its 2007 annual report on Angola, UNDP cited the incorporation of mine action operations into the government's development plans at both the national and provincial levels as one of its main challenges in 2008.¹¹⁹ From 2008–2010, government priorities include making more land accessible to expand agricultural output in order to diversify national revenue that relies mostly on oil and minerals; developing an infrastructure for the 2010 African Cup of Nations football tournament, which will be hosted in Angola; and building one million houses and improving communication networks throughout Angola.¹²⁰ In two positive developments towards achieving these targets, agricultural production increased 28% in 2007, and 2008 clearance results from INAD indicate they verified and cleared 160km² to permit the laying of fiber-optic cables.¹²¹

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Angola has demonstrated some commitment to mine action, in particular through its adoption of a five-year strategic plan and by providing funding to mine action (even though the exact amount is unknown). Nevertheless, as this report indicates, there are significant problems with issues such as financial transparency, information management, and technical capacity within the key national institutions, seemingly with no ready solutions.

At the ministerial level, there appears to be a lack of progress in creating national ownership on VA/disability issues. The government was said to have other priorities, and 2008 elections diverted attention elsewhere.¹²² Yet some awareness was raised to include disability in the national political agenda, to improve legislative frameworks, and to more actively involve

¹¹² Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

¹¹³ CNIDAH, “Relatório de Balanço das Atividades Realizadas pela Subcomissão de Apoio e Reinserção Social durante o Primeiro Semestre de 2008” (“Report on the Activities carried out by the Sub-Commission on Assistance and Social Reintegration during the First Semester of 2008”), Luanda, 18 July 2008; and CNIDAH, “Relatório de Balanço das Atividades Realizadas pela Subcomissão de Apoio e Reinserção Social durante o Segundo Semestre de 2008” (“Report on the Activities carried out by the Sub-Commission on Assistance and Social Reintegration during the Second Semester of 2008”), Luanda, undated but 2009.

¹¹⁴ Statement of Angola, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 21 November 2007.

¹¹⁵ UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 21.

¹¹⁶ Statement of Angola, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 20 November 2007, p. 2.

¹¹⁷ Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 22 February 2008; and responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaires by Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 9 March 2009; Megan Latimer, HALO, 4 March 2009; and Danny Kavanagh, MAG, 22 February 2009.

¹¹⁸ Interview with Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, Malanje, 13 May 2009.

¹¹⁹ UNDP, “2007 Annual Report,” Luanda, p. 34.

¹²⁰ Interview with Adriano Gonçalves, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

¹²¹ SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report,” Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 26; and EC, “Republic of Angola – European Community Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for the period 2008–2013,” p. 16. INAD 2008 data provided to Landmine Monitor in Luanda, 21 May 2009.

¹²² Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

persons with disabilities. Even though service provision remained fragmented and was mainly carried out by non-governmental operators, the number of persons with disabilities visibly living in undignified conditions decreased and they were more able to assert their rights.¹²³

As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009, CNIDAH has worked on improving coordination on VA/disability issues. It organized broad stakeholder meetings and created thematic working groups in 2006–2007,¹²⁴ with the help of a short-term international consultant who also stimulated the development of the VA plan.¹²⁵ CNIDAH acknowledged that, without international technical support, these efforts had slowed in 2008 and that longer-term technical assistance was needed to improve its coordination efforts. CNIDAH continued to raise the importance of VA with the relevant ministries, but it does not have the mandate to direct ministries responsible for implementation of VA/disability activities.¹²⁶

National management

Angola is fully in charge of its mine action program although its management of the program is plagued with persistent problems, with overlapping or unclear mandates between the different government institutions that have responsibilities for mine action. Moreover, Angola still relies heavily on international advisors and organizations for key parts of its mine action program. UNDP has supported mine action through three separate projects, of which one remained ongoing as of June 2009.¹²⁷

In May 2005, UNDP established the Rapid Response Fund (RRF) in order to have a mechanism to quickly access funding for mine action after the departure of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2004. The RRF provided funds to 23 projects in mine clearance, RE, and VA as well as for the LIS, with mixed results. The evaluation team granted “highly successful” status to only eight of the 23 projects. The RRF ended in 2008 after three extensions.¹²⁸

UNDP supported CNIDAH through an 18-month project that ended on 31 March 2009 to train the management, planning, quality control, and data processing departments, as well as the staff for 18 provincial offices and the funding of national technical advisors. At the end of the project CNIDAH was left without technical support for its national mine action database.¹²⁹

As of May 2009, the remaining UNDP mine action support project was the three-year direct execution project with funding from Japan. The aim of the project, which includes six technical advisors, was to enhance INAD’s role as the national mine clearance operator.¹³⁰

In 2008–2009, the PNR, one of main disability programs, was increasingly dysfunctional (see Victim assistance section below) due to a lack of involvement from the responsible ministry (MoH). Since its inception, the PNR has not been able to function without support from international technical advisors. Its main challenges are related to budgeting, management, staff training and retention, and ensuring quality.¹³¹ It was added that sufficient budget should be available for VA/disability issues, but that it was unclear if it was actually used.¹³²

¹²³ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Raul Feio, EC Delegation in Angola, 29 June 2009.

¹²⁴ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, “Status of Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention in the 26 Relevant States Parties 2005–2008,” Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008, pp. 9–10.

¹²⁵ Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 150; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 155.

¹²⁶ Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

¹²⁷ Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009.

¹²⁸ Kjell Björk and Guilhermino Tuluka, “Evaluation: UNDP Angola Rapid Response Fund (RRF), Mine Action, 2005–2008,” 12 December 2008.

¹²⁹ Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009.

¹³⁰ “Annex 3: Terms of Reference for the CTA” in Government of Angola/UNDP, “Project document: Capacity Development for the National Institute of Demining,” 9 September 2006; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 134–135.

¹³¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 150.

¹³² Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

National budget

There is no centralized reporting for government of Angola allocations to mine action. Instead any knowledge of government funding to national mine action operators since 2002 has been sporadic, although funding appears substantial. The FAA received \$7 million for mine action from the government in the period immediately following the signing of April 2002 peace accords.¹³³ On 8 September 2004, the media reported a government announcement that it was investing \$16 million in mine clearing equipment and the training of nine new demining brigades for INAD.¹³⁴ In 2005, the government reportedly allocated \$3 million for mine action to INAD.¹³⁵ All mine clearance and verification for national development is now said to be funded by the government through the GRN, but the amount of this support is unknown.¹³⁶

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

National mine action legislation to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of CNIDAH, the CED, INAD, FAA, and government ministries, and to provide the framework for funding policies and regulations was drafted in 2007.¹³⁷ As of May 2009, the Council of Ministers had not approved it.¹³⁸

Angola has not developed national mine action standards. Each demining operator uses its own standing operating procedures (SOPs).¹³⁹ INAD, which also has its own SOPs, does not conduct clearance to international standards.¹⁴⁰

Program evaluation

No evaluation of Angola's mine action program has yet been conducted. In 2008, UNDP commissioned an evaluation of the 2005–2008 RRF and found that the RRF provided positive but limited outcomes. Among its contributions was funding to complete the LIS, mine clearance of more than 500,000m², and the marking of 92km of suspected roads. It also funded some RE and VA projects. The RRF was established as a means to rapidly respond to a need. However, the evaluation deemed the RRF ineffective, with limited impact when compared to its original aims, owing to disorganization, insufficient staff, and inadequate monitoring.¹⁴¹

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Demining in Angola began in 1994 in the midst of armed conflict. International NGOs were the predominant demining operators until 2007, when INAD greatly expanded its operational capacities and commercial companies were formed to benefit from significant government funding for mine action through its infrastructure reconstruction projects. The international NGOs largely concentrate on provincial priorities based on the LIS results while INAD, the FAA, and the commercial companies are tasked by the government to clear and verify areas tied to national development priorities. As of March 2009, 89% of the work reported to CNIDAH had been done by seven NGOs (DCA, HALO, MAG, MgM, NPA, StB, and INTERSOS, which closed its demining operations in 2007).¹⁴²

INAD is the government's operational arm for mine action. It conducts clearance in every province and, somewhat unusually, reports its results as well as the results of the police and army demining units to the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration.¹⁴³ INAD also

¹³³ Interview with Rogério Neves e Castro, UNDP, Luanda, 3 March 2003.

¹³⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 131.

¹³⁵ Government of Angola/CNIDAH, "Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011," Luanda, 2006, p. 14.

¹³⁶ Interview with Brig. Jose Roqué de Oliveira, CNIDAH, Luanda, 21 May 2009.

¹³⁷ Government of Angola/CNIDAH, "Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011," Luanda, 2006, pp. 22, 24.

¹³⁸ Interview with Adriano Gonçalves, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

¹³⁹ Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 30 June 2009.

¹⁴⁰ Interview with Luke Atkinson, UNDP/INAD, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

¹⁴¹ Kjell Björk and Guilhermino Tuluka, "Evaluation: UNDP Angola Rapid Response Fund (RRF), Mine Action, 2005–2008," 12 December 2008, pp. 1–4, 34–36.

¹⁴² Email from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.

¹⁴³ Interview with Luke Atkinson, UNDP/INAD, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

operates a training center in Viana, a town outside Luanda, with technical support from UNDP. INAD certifies the graduates of the school as deminers. INAD reported they asked a number of NGOs to send their new deminers to the school for training.¹⁴⁴

CNIDAH's list of demining operators in Angola in 2008 included INAD, the FAA, and 46 registered national commercial and NGO mine clearance companies, of which CNIDAH had accredited 21.¹⁴⁵ The bulk of clearance has been conducted by international NGOs.

Demining by NGOs in 2008

In November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola reported clearance of 5.4km² of SHAs, 423km of road, and 19.3km of railway between January and July 2008. During these operations, 91,311 antipersonnel mines, 74 antivehicle mines, and 915,177 items of UXO were said to have been destroyed.¹⁴⁶ In comparison, NGO operators reported to Landmine Monitor 4.56km² cleared and another 34.96km² either cancelled or reduced for calendar year 2008 (see table below) and found many fewer mines and UXO than reported by Angola at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.¹⁴⁷

Demining in 2008 by NGO operators (not including roads)

Demining operators	Mine clearance (m ²)	Battle area clearance (m ²)	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed	UXO destroyed	Area cancelled (km ²)	Area reduced (km ²)
DCA	200,463	0	33	1	430	N/R	N/R
HALO	2,550,000	0	7,338	4,686	10,033	1.80	0
MAG	500,000	0	144	29	1,239	0.00	28.00
MgM	239,537	0	1,114	1	140	N/R	N/R
NPA	980,000	270,000	441	64	5,707	4.80	0.22
StB	91,000	0	1,023	0	2	0.00	0.14
Total	4,561,000	270,000	10,093	4,781	17,551	6.60	28.36

N/R= not reported

INAD reports clearance according to the type of task (e.g. whether it was clearance of a road, school, or powerline). In 2008, INAD conducted clearance or verification on nine different kinds of SHA. Landmines (or other ordnance) were found at only seven of the 29 work sites. The majority of INAD's work was in clearing 1.4km² of land and verifying another 159km² in order to lay fiber-optic cables as part of Angola's national development program. Although almost 250km² of land was said to have been verified or cleared (see table below), INAD found just 102 mines and 336 items of UXO. INAD also conducted clearance at five airports, including in Benguela, where 76 mines were found. No mines were found at the other airports.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ INAD reported it cleared 244km of road in 2008. Interview with Eng. Leonard Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 21 May 2009.

¹⁴⁵ "Situação da Acreditação dos Operadores de Desminagem em Angola" ("The status of accreditation of demining operators in Angola"), 19 March 2009. Table provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.

¹⁴⁶ Statement of Angola, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

¹⁴⁷ Emails from Ken O'Connell, Country Director, MgM, 12 May 2009; Thomas Roth, StB, 20 March 2009; Danny Kavanagh, MAG, 2 April 2009; Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 9 March 2009; Megan Latimer, HALO, 4 March 2009; and Fatmire Uka, DCA, 3 March 2009.

¹⁴⁸ Landmine Monitor analysis based on the data table provided by INAD in May 2009.

Demining in 2008 by INAD

Task Description	Province	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed	UXO destroyed	SHAs cleared (m ²)	Roads released (km)
Road clearance	Cabinda, Kuando-Kubango	0	0	21	993,624	38.16
Minefields	Bié, Huíla, Kuanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Malanje	5	0	239	48,455	0.00
Fiber-optic cables	Bengo, Bié, Kunene, Lunda Sul, Malanje, Zaire	5	10	26	1,403,651	158.98
Bridges	Huambo	15	0	0	2,102	0.00
Railways	Moxico	0	0	0	1,694	46.99
Airports	Benguela, Huambo, Huíla, Kuando-Kubango, Uíge	76	0	47	83,288	0.00
Schools	Bié	0	0	0	3,627	0.00
Powerlines	Lunda Norte	0	0		6,750	0.23
Other	Bengo	1	0	3	12,801	0
Total		102	10	336	2,555,992	244.36

Demining by commercial companies

Commercial demining operators are contracted by other companies working on construction, communications, energy, and diamond projects.¹⁴⁹ It is believed much of the work is verifying land as being free from mines, rather than conducting full clearance to remove mines.¹⁵⁰ The little data available on the work of the commercial companies seems to indicate that the output does not contribute very much to clearing SHAs according to the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011.

CNIDAH conducts quality assurance on commercial demining projects and determines when the cleared land should be handed over to the community for use.¹⁵¹ INAD reported, however, that in agreement with CNIDAH they certify their own clearance work on electricity towers, railways, roads, and other infrastructure as it is difficult for CNIDAH to keep up with the work. If not, according to INAD, clearance would come to a stop. However, it is planned that CNIDAH will eventually certify all infrastructure projects.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Interview with Luke Atkinson, UNDP/INAD, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

¹⁵⁰ Email from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.

¹⁵¹ Interview with Balbina Malheiros Dias da Silva, Coordinator, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 4 June 2008.

¹⁵² Interview with Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 17 May 2009.

Battle area clearance in 2008

In 2008, NPA reported battle area clearance (BAC) on 270,000m² of land.¹⁵³ No other operator, including government and national NGOs and commercial companies, reported BAC in 2008.

Explosive ordnance disposal

In March 2009, CNIDAH for the first time provided data on the extent of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations conducted from 2004 to April 2009. During this period CNIDAH recorded 5,225 EOD tasks, in which 85,507 items of UXO and 287,954 items of abandoned explosive ordnance were found, most reportedly in Zaire province.¹⁵⁴ MAG, in Moxico, is said to be responsible for more than 20% of completed EOD tasks. According to MAG's technical operations manager, it conducts EOD tasks nearly every day.¹⁵⁵ In 2008, HALO responded to 301 EOD callouts, and destroyed 7,843 items of UXO and 2,004 items of stray ammunition. Between 2004 and April 2009 HALO responded to 1,150 EOD callouts and destroyed a total of 18,553 items of UXO and 9,556 items of stray ammunition.¹⁵⁶

Road clearance

The LIS identified blocked roads as a nationwide problem with a particularly high impact in Bié, Huambo, and Moxico provinces.¹⁵⁷ According to INAD, all major roads have been cleared and were being paved with asphalt as planned by the Ministry of Public Works and Road Institute of Angola, who are responsible for the road project. The clearance of secondary roads over the next four years is one of the current reconstruction priorities.¹⁵⁸ At the end of 2008, NPA stopped clearing roads, because the government had declared that commercial companies and INAD would conduct these tasks, and began clearing only SHAs.¹⁵⁹

Angola reported 423km² of road had been cleared or verified in 2008.¹⁶⁰ HALO reported that investment in rebuilding roads and bridges has vastly improved movement for its mine clearance teams and improved logistics in the Benguela, Bié, and Huambo provinces, a region known as Plano Alto.¹⁶¹

Land release

Angola has been trying—so far without success—to adopt a land release policy since the completion of the LIS in 2007. Data from the LIS indicated that the Angolan landmine problem could take decades to resolve if clearance capacity was not increased and if the same methods of operation continued.¹⁶² Although CNIDAH did not adopt a land release policy in 2008 as it planned, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) assisted NPA in developing and implementing the Land Release Concept, a model for non-technical survey methods to release land. CNIDAH has endorsed NPA as a partner for developing the Land Release Concept in Angola.¹⁶³

¹⁵³ Email from Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 9 March 2009.

¹⁵⁴ Information provided by email from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.

¹⁵⁵ Email from Johan P. Botha, MAG, 17 June 2009.

¹⁵⁶ Email from Christian Richmond, Southern Africa Desk Officer, HALO, 21 August 2009.

¹⁵⁷ The LIS as a community-based survey, however, did not completely capture the road and infrastructure mine contamination. Bridges, railways, and road systems were damaged as well as mined during the long conflict. SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report," Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 10.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 21 May 2009; and "Angola: A Seedbed of Workmanship," *Imbondeiro* (Official magazine of the Embassy of Angola in the US), Summer 2008, p. 14, www.angola.org.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, Luanda, 20 May 2009.

¹⁶⁰ Statement of Angola, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

¹⁶¹ Email from Megan Latimer, HALO, 4 March 2009.

¹⁶² SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report," Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 16; and email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009.

¹⁶³ Jan Isaksen and Christian Larssen, CMI, *NPA Mine Action Programme in Angola Review 2004–2007 Appraisal 2008–2010* (Oslo: NORAD, January 2009), p. 22, www.norad.no.

Using the Land Release Concept, NPA conducted 125 non-technical surveys on SHAs identified by the LIS, covering 24.3km², and cancelled 29 SHAs, measuring 4.8km² in total.¹⁶⁴ Similarly, in Moxico province MAG cancelled 28km² in 27 communities using their own methodologies. In the process, 43 SHAs that originally measured 33km² in the LIS were reduced by 85% to 5km². Another 18 SHAs were cancelled because the land had been in use for more than two years for construction and three years for farming without a mine incident. All cancellation reports were submitted to CNIDAH.¹⁶⁵

HALO cancelled 88 SHAs from its database in 2008. Cancellation criteria for HALO includes: land that has been farmed for three years or more without any incidents, land that is being used for other purposes (housing and infrastructure) with no incidents reported for three years, and SHAs that have been cleared by another operator which follows the same safety practices and clearance standards. If a SHA meets the criteria, both the beneficiaries and the local authorities must sign a statement declaring the area is not mined and is safe to use. CNIDAH is provided with a copy of the statement. Periodically, HALO also uses technical survey and mechanical assets for area reduction.¹⁶⁶

INAD has not adopted a land release policy, although UNDP advisors have introduced the concept to them.¹⁶⁷ In recognition of the importance of land release in meeting its Article 5 obligations, at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Angola requested assistance from other States Parties to adopt a land release policy.¹⁶⁸

Marking and fencing

A CNIDAH workshop on area reduction and marking, held in Benguela province in February 2008, decided that concrete pillars should be placed every 15m and linked with barbed wire. It was suggested that national institutions should buy and place the pillars, but this marking system was considered too expensive by the demining operators.¹⁶⁹ In general, fencing and marking is not widely practiced in Angola. For example, HALO does not mark low-impact SHAs because marking materials are often taken by local residents and end up as roofing tiles or building materials. As tasks are surveyed, HALO marks the perimeter with red paint or stones in order to indicate that the area within is a SHA, especially in areas that are close to villages or areas of activity. This marking is explained to the local authorities and the community, who are often already avoiding the area.¹⁷⁰

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2013. It is difficult to measure the progress being made in Angola. The government, through the CED, FAA, and INAD, has substantially increased clearance assets since 2005, but data on their achievements is scarce and of poor quality. INAD, for example, believes the lack of a complete database of known mined areas will prevent Angola from meeting its Article 5 deadline for the clearance of mined areas.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 9 March 2009.

¹⁶⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Danny Kavanagh, MAG, 22 February 2009.

¹⁶⁶ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Megan Latimer, HALO, 4 March 2009.

¹⁶⁷ Interview with Luke Atkinson, UNDP/INAD, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

¹⁶⁸ Statement of Angola, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education, and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

¹⁶⁹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 9 March 2009.

¹⁷⁰ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Megan Latimer, HALO, 4 March 2009.

¹⁷¹ Interview with Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 17 May 2009.

Demining from 2003–2008 (includes only international NGOs)

Year	Mine clearance (km ²)	Battle area clearance (km ²)	Other land release (km ²)
2008	4.56	0.27	34.96
2007	3.24	0.09	1.75
2006	4.64	0.32	16.58
2005	12.25	0.04	0.24
2004	10.67	N/A	N/A
2003	3.53	N/A	N/A
Total	38.89	0.72	43.53

N/A = not available

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Angola stated that it had allocated human and financial resources to tackle the mine problem in the whole country, but the target set was achievable only if technical and operational demining capacity was doubled by the government and NGOs. The statement did not mention the likelihood of a need to request a deadline extension.¹⁷²

In the UN 2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, published in November 2007, Angola's entry states, "The strategic plan is a basis for fulfilling the Government's commitment to the anti-personnel mine-ban treaty. If it is achieved on time, the Government will have one more year to remove all marked SHAs, thus meeting the mine clearance deadline of 1 January 2013."¹⁷³ However, after a meeting in Luanda in May 2009 convened to review demining achievements in 2006–2008 and to prepare for a revision of the previous five-year strategy, participants from INAD and CNIDAH stated their belief that it would be difficult to meet the current Article 5 deadline.¹⁷⁴

Risk Education

The level of mine/ERW RE activity had reduced significantly by the end of 2008, even though the need is high. RE was implemented by 14 national and international NGOs in 15 provinces. INAD also has an RE team in each of its 15 brigades operating throughout the country,¹⁷⁵ although its activities are limited and the teams do not appear to be active everywhere.¹⁷⁶ Some national NGOs were supported by UNICEF and Handicap International (HI) until December 2008. UNICEF phased out RE because it was no longer a national program priority, they had been working on it for 10 years, and casualties had been reduced.¹⁷⁷

Most national NGOs, including those supported by UNICEF and HI, use the SBM methodology, although some also conduct emergency message-based RE. International NGOs implementing clearance activities conduct community liaison, including non-technical survey.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷² Statement of Angola, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 20 November 2007.

¹⁷³ UN, "2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2007, p. 24.

¹⁷⁴ Interviews with Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, INAD and Jose Roqué de Oliveira, CNIDAH, Luanda, 21 May 2009; and "National meeting on demining happens today," *Agencia Angola Press*, 14 May 2009, www.portalangop.co.ao.

¹⁷⁵ Interviews with Luke Atkinson, UNDP/INAD, Luanda, 11 May 2009; and Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 21 May 2009.

¹⁷⁶ Interviews with Bernardo das Mercês, National Program Director, CVA, Luanda, 12 May 2009; and Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 15 May 2009.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009.

Materials are used sparingly in Angola, and mainly as visual aids to support RE sessions. DCA does not give out leaflets or other materials to communities, as they are not found to be useful.¹⁷⁹

RE is not integrated into the school curriculum because it was developed in 2002, and it was not possible to include RE at the time. RE is conducted in schools in high-impact areas, and training and resources are provided to teachers.¹⁸⁰ UNICEF reported that more than 200,000 primary school students were reached in 2008.¹⁸¹

In some provinces RE was conducted through radio¹⁸² but not in Moxico, because it was expensive and the radio frequency did not reach the areas required.¹⁸³

RE is now closely integrated with mine action. Organizations carrying out RE liaise closely with CNIDAH provincial offices and provide information to communities on how to report contamination and casualties, generally to municipality offices, as the information will then go to the CNIDAH provincial office. RE teams gather information on contamination and casualties and record it on IMSMA forms to provide to CNIDAH provincial offices (see Data collection and management section above). They also liaise directly with clearance organizations and VA organizations in their locale.¹⁸⁴ MAG, DCA, and HALO respond to reports of contamination.¹⁸⁵ MAG's community liaison (CL) teams are mainly engaged in survey and impact assessment. MAG acquired a geographic information system capacity in 2008, which is managed by the CL department. Community marking is included in the SBM, and NGOs supported by UNICEF and HI implement this, as well as Angola Red Cross (Cruz Vermelha de Angola, CVA) volunteers.¹⁸⁶ CNIDAH provides paint to communities for this purpose.¹⁸⁷ DCA does not encourage community marking, and Exame de Abelhas reported that they do not have the capacity to do it.¹⁸⁸ A GICHD CL workshop was conducted in early 2008.¹⁸⁹

In 2008, UNICEF conducted regular monitoring visits to its partners, and was always accompanied by CNIDAH personnel, who also conducted their own separate monitoring visits. Both CNIDAH and UNICEF reported that they were happy with the way RE was being implemented according to the new methodology developed.¹⁹⁰ HI monitored the work of its partners, and the international NGOs have their own internal monitoring system.

As well as a shortage of funding, RE also faces logistical challenges. Although UNICEF lent its partners vehicles, they were often damaged by the poor road conditions.¹⁹¹

Through the national coordination meetings, CNIDAH and UNICEF's NGO partners discussed the achievements of RE, noting that implementation of the SBM had allowed more communities to be reached (allowing better identification of risk areas), that there was a decrease in casualties, but that the decrease in funding meant an uncertain future for RE, data collection, and reporting of casualties.¹⁹² No other evaluations have been conducted.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 21 May 2009.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

¹⁸¹ Email from Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, 26 June 2009.

¹⁸² Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

¹⁸³ Interview with Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 21 May 2009.

¹⁸⁴ Interviews with Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 21 May 2009; Douglas Kilama, MAG, Luena, 17 May 2009; Maleca Jose, Coordinator, Kalofilofitu, Luena, 15 May 2009; Hermene Gildo Simao, Mine Risk Education Instructor and Vitorino Luarindo Figura, Vice-Project Coordinator, Exame de Abelhas, Luena, 15 May 2009; Alberto Cauina, Secretary, CVA Moxico, Luena, 18 May 2009; and Julie Nuttens, Country Director, HI, Luanda, 21 May 2009.

¹⁸⁵ Interviews with Douglas Kilama, MAG, Luena, 17 May 2009; Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 21 May 2009; and Julie Nuttens, HI, Luanda, 21 May 2009.

¹⁸⁶ Interviews with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009; Bernardo das Mercês, CVA, Luanda, 12 May 2009; and Julie Nuttens, HI, Luanda, 21 May 2009; and email from Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, 26 June 2009.

¹⁸⁷ Interview with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009.

¹⁸⁸ Interview with Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 21 May 2009; and interview with Hermene Gildo Simao and Vitorino Luarindo Figura, Exame de Abelhas, Luena, 15 May 2009.

¹⁸⁹ GICHD, "A study of community liaison in mine action: the case of Angola," first draft, March 2008.

¹⁹⁰ Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009; and interview with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009.

¹⁹¹ Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

¹⁹² Email from Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, 26 June 2009.

RE Activities in 2008¹⁹³

Organization	Type of activity	Location	No. of beneficiaries
CVA	Working with focus groups in communities	15 out of 18 provinces	Not available
Palanca Negro	SBM	Malanje	6 municipalities, 19 comunas
CAPDC	SBM	Luanda Sol	3 municipalities, 11 comunas
Club de Jovens	SBM	Huíla	6 municipalities, 23 comunas
Secut Bagos	SBM	Uíge	5 municipalities, 7 comunas
Exame de Abelhas	SBM	Moxico	4 municipalities, 7 comunas, total 29,762 people
Kalofulofu	N/A	Moxico	3,080
International Humanitarian Organisation (OHI)	SBM	Bié	100 communities
Mines Victim Association (AVMI)	SBM	Benguela	36 communities
Child Support Group (GAC)	SBM	Huambo	30 communities
MAG	Community Liaison: survey, impact assessment, and RE	Moxico	11,302 people
DCA	CL and RE	Moxico	17,702 people
HALO	RE/CL conducted by minefield and survey supervisors alongside demining	N/A	15,930 people
NPA	Limited CL and RE with clearance operations	N/A	No figures available
INAD	Limited RE, message-based	Capacity, but not necessarily active, in all provinces	N/A

N/A = not available

¹⁹³ Interviews with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009; Bernardo das Mercês, CVA, Luanda, 12 May 2009; Alberto Cauina, CVA Moxico, Luena, 18 May 2009; Julie Nuttens, HI, Luanda, 21 May 2009; Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 21 May 2009; Douglas Kilama, MAG, Luena, 17 May 2009; Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009; Hermene Gildo Simao and Vitorino Luarindo Figura, Exame de Abelhas, Luena, 15 May 2009; Maleca Jose, Kalofulofu, Luena, 15 May; Luke Atkinson, UNDP/INAD, Luanda, 11 May 2009, and with Eng. Leonardo Severino Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 21 May 2009; and email from Megan Latimer, HALO, 26 March 2009.

UNICEF has tried to help national NGOs with fundraising to continue their work into 2008, but only two received funding to continue work into 2009.¹⁹⁴ CNIDAH and the CVA have a draft agreement in place to conduct RE in 2009, but in May 2009 they were waiting for approval to work.¹⁹⁵ MAG was gathering knowledge, attitude, and practice data in mid-2009, planning to issue a report in August.¹⁹⁶

RE has been conducted in Angola for more than 10 years by UNICEF, international and national NGOs working in partnership. ICRC worked with the CVA, INAD, and school teachers. Some 20 organizations have been involved, with RE reaching a peak of over 800,000 beneficiaries in 2003, after which it decreased in scale.¹⁹⁷ The LIS reported that some areas were under-provided with RE.¹⁹⁸

UNICEF supported the national coordination body—the National Institute for Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Devices (Instituto Nacional de Remoção De Obstáculos E Engenhos Explosivos, INAROREE) until 2001, and then CNIDAH—in providing capacity-building to NGOs, supporting school-based RE programs, conducting mass media RE, and financial support. RE planning became decentralized to the provincial CNIDAH office level in 2004.¹⁹⁹ In 2004, community mine action committees were introduced. The committees were reported to be challenging to maintain, however, as the members asked for incentives.²⁰⁰ In 2006, RE shifted to a development approach. New participatory methods were introduced in order to consider local threats and risk-taking behavior.²⁰¹

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but there are many thousands. In May 2009, CNIDAH said that the situation of mine/ERW survivors had improved in recent years, mainly due to better medical and socio-economic services.²⁰² It was further noted that improvements to the road network enabled survivors to reach existing services.²⁰³ Nevertheless, most survivors and persons with disabilities had limited access to services, particularly in rural areas, due to insufficient transportation and financial means.²⁰⁴ Some of the main challenges noted were: providing comprehensive assistance to survivors/persons with disabilities, utilizing improved infrastructures/mechanisms to actually enhance service provision, and reinforcing coordination.²⁰⁵

Despite fast economic growth, Angola's health indicators remained among the worst in the world and social infrastructure, including health centers, schools and human resource capacity, remained "extremely poor."²⁰⁶ The US Department of State reported that "in many areas, health care was limited or nonexistent."²⁰⁷ In 2008, Angola reported that several provincial hospitals

¹⁹⁴ Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

¹⁹⁵ Interviews with Bernardo das Mercês, CVA, Luanda, 12 May 2009; and with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009.

¹⁹⁶ Interview with Douglas Kilama, MAG, Luena, 17 May 2009.

¹⁹⁷ See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

¹⁹⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 151.

¹⁹⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 143.

²⁰⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 171.

²⁰¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 152.

²⁰² Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

²⁰³ "Situação de vítimas de engenhos explosivos melhora em Angola" ("Situation of victims of explosive devices better in Angola"), *Jornal de Angola* (Luanda), 26 March 2009.

²⁰⁴ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008," Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 21.

²⁰⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Raul Feio, EC Delegation in Angola, 29 June 2009.

²⁰⁶ UNICEF, "Humanitarian Action Report 2009," New York, 2009, p. 64.

²⁰⁷ US Department of State, "2008 Country reports on Human Rights Practices: Angola," Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

had been upgraded and health centers had been constructed in several mine-affected areas, which also received ambulances.²⁰⁸

Angola also said in May 2009, that it “continued its efforts to guarantee the quality, sustainability and accessibility” of services by providing qualified staff and equipment.²⁰⁹ But it acknowledged that this was the area with the least progress.²¹⁰ In reality, access to physical rehabilitation seems to have deteriorated compared to 2007 and definitely compared to 2005. As of August 2008, all international organizations had withdrawn support to the physical rehabilitation sector for which the MoH is responsible through the PNR. The program aimed to create a national sustainable physical rehabilitation capacity, and was increasingly dysfunctional as a result of a lack of involvement by the ministry.²¹¹ In 2009, the program was still functioning though with more logistical constraints and a reduced capacity to respond after the end of European Commission funding in 2007.²¹² None of the centers are fully operational, salaries are not paid, and materials are not available.²¹³

Since the departure of the international supporting organizations, the rehabilitation centers have seen patient numbers decrease rapidly, as no one covers their transportation costs²¹⁴ and the government does not buy materials or components. It was also noted that international organizations pulled out of Angola without ensuring that sustainable alternatives were in place.²¹⁵ Services were said to be only available for those who could afford to receive treatment abroad.²¹⁶ All this would appear to contradict the situation Angola portrayed in its VA plan covering 2007–2011, which stated, “almost always survivors have access to [rehabilitation] services.”²¹⁷

For psychosocial support, the government mainly relied on the activities of national NGOs and disabled people’s organizations (DPO), and on the survivors’ family networks.²¹⁸ The government also maintained that the “Miss Landmine Beauty Pageant” contributed to raising awareness about the issue.²¹⁹ Services remained limited, due to the non-existence of formal counseling infrastructure and a lack of trained staff.²²⁰

Economic reintegration of mine/ERW survivors is a priority area for Angola and several government-sponsored and NGO initiatives exist, which are said to have more than 10,000 beneficiaries.²²¹ Angola also reported this figure of 10,000 beneficiaries reached in 2007 and

²⁰⁸ CNIDAH, “Relatório de Balanço das Atividades Realizadas pela Subcomissão de Apoio e Reinserção Social durante o Segundo Semestre de 2008” (“Report on the Activities carried out by the Sub-Commission on Assistance and Social Reintegration during the Second Semester of 2008”), Luanda, undated but 2009.

²⁰⁹ Statement of Angola, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

²¹⁰ Statement of Angola, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

²¹¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 147–148; HI, *Voices from the Ground: Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War Survivors Speak Out on Victim Assistance*, Brussels, 2 September 2009; and email from Claude-Alain Amiet, MoH/GTZ, 18 June 2009.

²¹² Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Raul Feio, EC Delegation in Angola, 29 June 2009; and see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 150.

²¹³ Email from Claude-Alain Amiet, MoH/GTZ, 18 June 2009; and interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, Geneva, 28 May 2009; and HI, *Voices from the Ground: Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War Survivors Speak Out on Victim Assistance*, Brussels, 2 September 2009.

²¹⁶ Email from Claude-Alain Amiet, MoH/GTZ, 18 June 2009.

²¹⁷ CNIDAH, “Revised 2005–2009 objectives,” November 2007, provided by email from Anna Kudarewska, Landmine Monitor, 9 May 2008.

²¹⁸ Statement of Angola, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

²¹⁹ CNIDAH, “Relatório de Balanço das Atividades Realizadas pela Subcomissão de Apoio e Reinserção Social durante o Segundo Semestre de 2008” (“Report on the Activities carried out by the Sub-Commission on Assistance and Social Reintegration during the Second Semester of 2008”), Luanda, undated but 2009.

²²⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 148.

²²¹ Statement of Angola, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

June 2008.²²² Despite more employment of young persons with disabilities in 2008, educational and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities remained limited.²²³ Survivors rarely had access to vocational training and employment schemes because they were not aware these services existed; the government rarely provided incentives to promote economic opportunities for persons with disabilities; and services were not accessible and limited in rural areas.²²⁴ In November 2008, Angola reported the development of a Strategy for Special Needs Education 2009–2015 and the construction of five accessible schools.²²⁵ Mine/ERW survivors do not appear to benefit from this plan, which was originally developed in 2006 (with a 2007–2015 timeframe).²²⁶

Angola has fragmented legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but the government did not effectively enforce it.²²⁷ Work on the compilation and unification of existing disability legislation has stalled due to election-related legislative work.²²⁸ In November 2008, the National Assembly reportedly started the approval procedure of the Protection Law for Disabled Persons created in 2000;²²⁹ no further progress was reported as of May 2009.²³⁰ As of 1 July 2009, Angola had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

An HI impact assessment showed that while people still feel “pity” for persons with disabilities, people are more aware of equal rights for persons with disabilities, increased community participation, employment, and education rather than just charity.²³¹

An evaluation of the UNDP Angola RRF between 2005 and 2008 noted that the VA component of the RRF had been “relatively cost efficient provided that the intended target groups in remote rural areas with little access... actually were the main beneficiaries.”²³² The evaluators were not able to visit beneficiaries and the evaluation had to be based on information provided by the implementers, which was sometimes missing and did not always include beneficiary statistics. It was also concluded that the support provided was not comprehensive.²³³

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Angola is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.²³⁴ Angola presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005 and revised them in 2006 and 2007. The latest revision was to be used as the National VA Plan 2007–2011 (see Strategic

²²² Statement of Angola, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 6 June 2008; and Statement of Angola, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 21 November 2007.

²²³ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Raul Feio, EC Delegation in Angola, 29 June 2009; and see US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Angola,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

²²⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 148.

²²⁵ Statement of Angola, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

²²⁶ National Institute for Special Education, “Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento da Educação Especial em Angola 2007–2015” (“Strategic Plan for the Development of Special Education in Angola 2007–2015”), Luanda, October 2006.

²²⁷ US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Angola,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2008.

²²⁸ Indira Campos, *Angola’s Elections: A Democratic Oil Giant?*, Africa Programme Paper 09/01 (London: Chatham House, September 2008), p. 4.

²²⁹ “Parlamento prepara discussão da Lei de Portadores de Deficiência” (“Parliament prepares discussion on the Law on Persons with Disabilities”), *Jornal de Angola*, 28 November 2008.

²³⁰ Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

²³¹ Email from Julie Nuttens, HI, 29 June 2009.

²³² Kjell Björk and Guilhermino Tuluka, “Evaluation: UNDP Angola Rapid Response Fund (RRF), Mine Action, 2005–2008,” 12 December 2008, p. 35.

²³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 31–33, 37.

²³⁴ UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99.

mine action plan section above). Most of the deadlines have been set for 2011 and objectives were not focused on service provision.²³⁵ Due to a lack of capacity impeding implementation and coordination of the plan, most of the objectives due for completion in 2009 do not appear to be on track:

- **Data collection:** No reliable data collection mechanism is functional, and comprehensive data is not available; despite a temporary improvement in 2007 there was no noticeable coordination and capacity improvement.
- **Medical care:** New health centers were constructed, but no progress was reported on improving first responder capacity and access to services.
- **Physical rehabilitation:** None of the objectives were achieved, notably improved national sustainability; increased training; increased repair/replacement capacity; and assumption of financial and technical responsibility for producing three-quarters of the mobility devices to assist 80% of survivors needing them.
- **Psychosocial support:** No progress was reported on expanding psychosocial services to rehabilitation centers and hospitals,²³⁶ strengthening capacity, the creation of a survivor network or projects at the regional level;²³⁷ the only area of progress might be in the inclusion of survivors in special education.
- **Economic reintegration:** Some cooperatives were created and small business projects started in cooperation with the private sector and multinational companies, and more young persons with disabilities were employed. But economic reintegration remained a weak point.²³⁸
- **Laws and public policy:** Disability legislation had not been approved and strengthened as scheduled. Advocacy efforts did take place (including the Miss Landmine Beauty Pageant).

The Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit undertook one process support visit in 2007. Angola included a VA/disability expert on its delegation at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2009, and at each Meeting of States Parties and reported on VA at all meetings. Angola provided VA information in its annual Article 7 transparency reports submitted in 2005 and 2006.²³⁹

Victim assistance activities

CNIDAH was not able to provide reliable and complete statistics on the number of survivors assisted in 2008. Due to the PNR's poor functioning, rehabilitation statistics were no longer available. MINARS stated that 21,350 persons with disabilities received socio-economic reintegration services in 2008.²⁴⁰ The ministry also claimed that it supported 89,170 out of an estimated 150,000 persons with disabilities in the country.²⁴¹ CNIDAH in Moxico province reported that the Luena rehabilitation center had assisted 480 survivors in 2008.²⁴²

²³⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 148–149.

²³⁶ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Raul Feio, EC Delegation in Angola, 29 June 2009.

²³⁷ Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

²³⁸ Statement of Angola, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009; CNIDAH, “Relatório de Balanço das Actividades Realizadas pela Subcomissão de Apoio e Reinserção Social durante o Segundo Semestre de 2008” (“Report on the Activities carried out by the Sub-Commission on Assistance and Social Reintegration during the Second Semester of 2008”), Luanda, undated but 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Raul Feio, EC Delegation in Angola, 29 June 2009.

²³⁹ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, “Status of Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention in the 26 Relevant States Parties 2005–2008,” Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008, pp. 9–10; Article 7 Report, Form A, 3 August 2006; and Article 7 Report, Form J, 3 May 2005.

²⁴⁰ “Milhões de angolanos já foram reintegrados” (“Millions of Angolans already reintegrated”), *Jornal de Angola* (Luanda), 30 December 2008.

²⁴¹ “Programas de apoio a deficientes criam empresas e cooperativas” (“Programs to support persons with disabilities starting businesses and cooperatives”), *Jornal de Angola*, 4 December 2008.

²⁴² CNIDAH, “Relatório Provincial” (“Provincial Report”), Luena, 16 December 2008.

The Angolan Association of Disabled Persons (Associação dos Deficientes de Angola, ANDA) reported supporting 1,500 persons socio-economically through the “Come with me” project in 2008. ANDA also distributed 248 motor-taxis in partnership with the local NGO Causa Solidaria.²⁴³ The Center for the Promotion and Development of Communities (CAPDC) suffered financial challenges and had to lay off most of its staff.²⁴⁴

In 2008, the German Society for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ), present in Angola since 1995, ended its collaboration agreement on physical rehabilitation with the MoH in August 2008, and also ended its support to the community-based rehabilitation (CBR) project of the NGO League for the Reintegration of Disabled Persons (Liga de Apoio à Integração dos Deficientes). It started a new collaboration with the Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration of Former Combatants for vocational training in Gabela, Kuanza Sul province; two cooperatives for disabled persons were also created in Porto Amboim, Kuanza Sul province.²⁴⁵

In 2008, HI continued its support for two disabled people’s organizations in Huambo in conducting socio-economic reintegration activities benefiting 102 persons with disabilities (30% mine survivors). It also supported 17 disabled people’s organizations or local NGOs in Benguela, Huíla, and Huambo provinces with training and with raising awareness of disability in public and private institutions. HI also continued its CBR projects and conducted 4,263 peer support home visits for persons with disabilities in Benguela, Huíla, and Namibe provinces; 309 people received medical care, 404 socio-economic support, 300 material support, and 853 were referred to other appropriate services (146 survivors). In 2008, HI conducted an impact assessment of its CBR activities and it was noted that perceptions of disability had improved in the target area after two years of implementation. Since HI started its activities in Angola in 1995, it has moved from direct implementation and support for physical rehabilitation (facing challenges similar to those explained above) to support of local associations, community-based and socio-economic activities.²⁴⁶

In July 2008, the ICRC ended its support to the physical rehabilitation sector after nearly 30 years in Angola, “believing that the country has all the necessary means to provide effective physical rehabilitation services.”²⁴⁷ Over the years, it constructed the rehabilitation centers in Huambo and Kuito, renovated the main center in Luanda, donated materials and components, provided institutional support to CNIDAH and the PNR, trained staff, and covered transport costs for patients. In 2008 to the end of June, the three centers supported by the ICRC produced 420 prostheses (72% for mine/ERW survivors) and 80 orthoses (1% for mine/ERW survivors); in total 3,048 people were assisted. Since 1979, the ICRC has produced 33,041 prostheses (41% for mine/ERW survivors) and 962 orthoses (7% for mine/ERW survivors).²⁴⁸ It was reported that the centers’ productivity and capacity decreased after the ICRC’s departure.²⁴⁹

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and victim assistance) in Angola. The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011 includes among its five primary goals the establishment of a national mine action capacity “sustainable by national resources” after the end of major international assistance.²⁵⁰ The plan projects an overall decline in international mine action funding from 2006 to 2011.²⁵¹

²⁴³ “Mais deficientes estão a trabalhar” (“More persons with disabilities working”), *Jornal de Angola* (Luanda), 29 December 2008.

²⁴⁴ Email from Manuel Gaiato, VA Coordinator, CAPDC, 2 March 2009.

²⁴⁵ Email from Liliana de Rojas, Project Coordinator, GTZ, 6 April 2009.

²⁴⁶ Email from Julie Nuttens, HI, 29 June 2009.

²⁴⁷ ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008, Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 20.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁹ Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

²⁵⁰ Government of Angola/CNIDAH, “Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011,” Luanda, 2006, p. 18.

²⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 14–15.

CNIDAH distributes and manages some funds allocated by national and international donors; advises the Angolan government on national funding issues; and liaises with government and donors on the impact on mine action of national development projects, and inclusion of mine action costs in relevant project budgets.²⁵² CNIDAH coordinates with the Council of Ministers on national development priorities, and acts as a strategic partner of the Ministry of Finance in coordinating the national budget for mine action.²⁵³

National support for mine action

Angola did not report national funding to mine action in 2008. It did not report national funding in 2007, but stated that the national government had allocated “both human and financial resources” to fulfill its Article 5 obligations, without specifying funding amounts.²⁵⁴ The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011 commits the Angolan government to providing substantial funds “from 2006 onwards” to resource, equip and train manual and mechanical demining brigades.²⁵⁵

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, 12 countries reported providing \$22,136,622 (€15,032,278) to mine action in Angola. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was 12% more than reported in 2007.

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola reported on the need for additional international assistance to support its VA programming.²⁵⁶ At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Angola reported increasing difficulties in gathering and reporting information on mine action results due to the large number of operators conducting programs in the country. It called for assistance in support of land release and Article 7 reporting, citing the obligations under Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁵⁷

Without adequate reporting of cost estimates or national support to mine action programs, it is not possible to evaluate the sufficiency of funds in meeting Angola’s mine action needs. Nevertheless, 2008 funding levels were relatively strong, and funds committed by the European Commission (EC) in 2009 (see below) will further strengthen Angola’s capacity to fulfill its treaty obligations.

Norwegian funding to NPA in Angola is part of a NOK24 million (approximately \$4.26 million) funding agreement signed in January 2008 and covering the period 2008 to 2010.²⁵⁸

HALO reported funding in 2008 from the United States, the European Commission (EC), the United Kingdom, Finland, Japan, Switzerland and Ireland.²⁵⁹ No funding to HALO was reported by Finland, Japan, or the US in 2008; the EC also did not report funding to Angola in 2008.

In addition to its specific monetary contributions in 2008 to national mine action initiatives, the EC announced in May 2009 that it had committed €39 million (\$57 million) during 2008 to mine action in a number of states. Although states receiving aid were specified, the amounts and projects supported were not differentiated, and as of June 2009 were still to be determined. The EC stated simply that funds are “to support future action” in recipient states.²⁶⁰ Angola was among the states named as recipients within the overall commitment. However, in June 2009 the EC reported to Landmine Monitor that the commitment “can be subject to changes” before its final adoption by the EC.²⁶¹

²⁵² Ibid, p. 43.

²⁵³ UN, “Country Profile: Angola,” www.mineaction.org; and Government of Angola/CNIDAH, “Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011,” Luanda, 2006, p. 21.

²⁵⁴ Statement of Angola, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 20 November 2008.

²⁵⁵ Government of Angola/CNIDAH, “Mine Action in Angola Strategic Plan 2006–2011,” Luanda, 2006, pp. 14–15.

²⁵⁶ Statement of Angola, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2009.

²⁵⁷ Statement of Angola, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

²⁵⁸ The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Luanda, “Norway Signs NOK 24 Million Contract to Support Demining in Angola,” 12 January 2009, www.noruega.ao.

²⁵⁹ Email from Christian Richmond, Desk Officer, HALO, 3 September 2009.

²⁶⁰ Statement of the EC, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 29 May 2009.

²⁶¹ Email from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Directorate-General for External Relations, EC, 12 June 2009.

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Angola: Monetary²⁶²

Donor	Implementing Agencies/ Organizations	Project Details	Amount
US	Department of State, Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related programs appropriation, Centers for Disease Control	Unspecified mine action	\$5,955,000
United Kingdom	MAG, HALO	Mine clearance	\$3,407,698 (£1,837,529)
Denmark	DCA	Integrated mine action	\$2,102,550 (DKK10,700,000)
Netherlands	MAG, NPA, HI	Unspecified mine action	\$2,020,407 (€1,372,000)
Norway	NPA	Integrated mine action	\$1,854,685 (NOK10,454,817)
Germany	StB, GTZ	Mine clearance, VA	\$1,760,926 (€1,195,794)
Finland	Finn Church Aid, Finnish Red Cross/ICRC	Mine clearance, VA	\$1,178,080 (€800,000)
Ireland	HALO	Mine clearance, VA	\$1,067,635 (€725,000)
Japan	Japan International Goodwill Foundation, Japan Mine Action Services	Mine clearance, mine/ERW RE	\$1,059,110 (¥109,186,608)
Switzerland	NPA, HALO	Mine clearance	\$482,641 (CHF522,000)
Italy	Bilateral	Mine clearance, RE	\$435,890 (€296,000)
Total			\$21,324,622 (€14,480,933)

2008 International Mine Action Support to Angola: In-Kind²⁶³

Donor	Form of In-Kind Support	Monetary Value (where available)
Switzerland	Mine clearance expert in support of NPA	\$184,920 (CHF200,000)
Spain	Mine clearance training and equipment to INAD	\$626,992 (€425,772)
Total		\$811,912 (€551,346)

²⁶² US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009," Washington, DC, July 2009; emails from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; and Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; emails from Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2009; David Keating, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2009; Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Japanese Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation; Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; and Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.

²⁶³ Email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; and Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.

In April 2009, the EC and the Angola Ministry of Planning signed an agreement securing €20 million (\$29.5 million) in EC funding for mine clearance over a period of four years, starting in 2010.²⁶⁴ Although the agreement evidently fulfills part of the above general commitment, as of June 2009 no specific project details or annual funding amounts were available.

²⁶⁴ “Angola: Planning Ministry, EU Sign Euro 37 Million Agreements”, *Angola Press Agency* (Luanda), 24 April 2009, allafrica.com.