

CAMBODIA

2008 Key Data

State Party since	1 January 2000
Contamination	Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other ERW
Estimated area of contamination	649km ² of mined areas was expected to require full clearance (August 2009)
Casualties in 2008	269 (2007: 352)
Estimated mine/ERW survivors	43,926
Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)	Deadline: 1 January 2010
Demining in 2008	63.26km ² (2007: 55.31km ²)
Risk education recipients in 2008	380,300
Progress towards victim assistance aims	Slow
Support for mine action in 2008	International: \$28 million (2007: \$30.8 million) National: \$1.8 million (2007: \$1.15 million)

Ten-Year Summary

The Kingdom of Cambodia became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 January 2000. In 1999, Cambodia adopted national ban legislation and declared completion of its destruction of 71,991 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Yet it continues to discover and destroy thousands of additional stockpiled mines each year, more than 133,000 from 2000 to 2008. Thailand made a serious allegation of new use of antipersonnel mines by Cambodia on their border in October 2008. Cambodia served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Technologies for Mine Action from 1999 to 2000, and as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies from 2002 to 2004, as well as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from 2006 to 2008. Cambodia hosted regional Mine Ban Treaty meetings in 2003 and 2007.

Cambodia remains one of the world's most mine- and explosive remnants of war (ERW)-affected states—and is also affected by cluster munition remnants—but clearance of mined areas has increased sharply in recent years with the adoption of new methods and equipment while land reclamation by farmers and cancellation of suspected land through survey has drastically increased land release by the demining program. In April 2009, Cambodia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its treaty deadline for clearance of 1 January 2010.

At least 7,300 mine/ERW casualties were recorded between 1999 and 2008 of a total of more than 60,000 casualties since 1979. Extensive risk education has been conducted in Cambodia for over 10 years, implemented by the Cambodian Mine Action Center and other NGOs, and the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports. Over the years the approach has shifted from awareness-raising to risk reduction, with stronger integration into mine action, and links with development. An evaluation in 2008 acknowledged the achievements of RE in Cambodia but concluded that a more targeted and cross-sectoral approach combined with improved communications will be needed to change behavior.

Throughout 1999 to 2008, even the basic needs of many mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities were not fulfilled; assistance was almost exclusively provided by NGOs that were facing increasing donor fatigue. As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action

Plan, Cambodia developed a national disability plan for 2009–2011 after a nearly two-year consultation process.

Mine Ban Policy

Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 28 July 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2000. Domestic implementation legislation—the Law to Prohibit the Use of Anti-personnel Mines—took effect on 28 May 1999.¹ Cambodia submitted its tenth Article 7 report in 2009, covering calendar year 2008.²

Cambodia participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where its year-long term as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration ended. Cambodia made statements during the general exchange of views and a session on compliance that mostly addressed Thailand’s allegation of new mine use (see Use section below). Cambodia also spoke on victim assistance, its 2010 mine clearance deadline, and the United Kingdom’s extension request.

Cambodia participated in the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia from 1–3 April 2009, the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the treaty’s Second Review Conference. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Cambodia made statements on victim assistance and its Article 5 mine clearance extension request (see Plans section below).

Cambodia has not made its views known on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Cambodia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It has not submitted an annual report under Article 13 of the protocol since April 2008. Cambodia is not a party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, Cambodia had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.³

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

The government has reported that it does not have any antipersonnel mine production facilities, and that it has not exported antipersonnel mines.⁴

The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) destroyed its declared stockpile of 71,991 antipersonnel mines between 1994 and 1998, and in February 1999 the RCAF Deputy Commander in Chief formally stated that the RCAF no longer had stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.⁵ In 2000, Cambodia reported an additional stockpile of 2,035 antipersonnel mines held by the national police, which were subsequently destroyed.⁶ Cambodia regularly declares that there have been no antipersonnel mine stockpiles in the country since 2001.⁷

However, police and military units still frequently discover antipersonnel mines in various locations and from various sources around the country. Many are from previously unknown arms caches left from decades of war.⁸ Informal (“village”) demining and the scrap metal trade also account for some of the newly discovered stocks of mines.

¹ The law bans the production, use, possession, transfer, trade, sale, import, and export of antipersonnel mines. It provides for criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment for offenses committed by civilians or members of the police and the armed forces. It also provides for the destruction of mine stockpiles.

² The report is undated, but was submitted to the UN in April 2009. The report submitted in 2008 was also undated, covering calendar year 2007. Previous reports were submitted on 27 April 2007, 11 May 2006, 22 April 2005, 30 April 2004, 15 April 2003, 19 April 2002, 30 June 2001, and 26 June 2000.

³ For details on cluster munitions policy and practice see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice*, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, pp. 193–195.

⁴ Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Forms D and E. In the 1970s Cambodia manufactured one type of antipersonnel mine, the KN-10 Claymore-type mine, and various armed groups made improvised mines in the past.

⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 391, for annual destruction totals.

⁶ Article 7 Report, Form B, 26 June 2000.

⁷ Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form F. This has been repeated since 2004.

⁸ *Ibid.*

Discovered mines are supposed to be reported to the Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), and handed over to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) for destruction.⁹ In February 2008, Cambodia stated that it destroys newly discovered stocks immediately.¹⁰

Cambodia has declared that a total of 133,478 antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed from 2000 to 2008, including 13,665 in 2008 (9,698 by CMAC; 2,713 by HALO Trust; and 1,254 by Mines Advisory Group).¹¹ Cambodia stated these mines were “reported by local communities.”¹²

Mines retained for research and training

As in previous years, in its Article 7 report covering 2008, Cambodia declared that it does not retain any antipersonnel mines for training or development purposes.¹³ However, Cambodia has reported transfer of mines for training and development purposes to the CMAC training center each year.¹⁴ It reported that in 2008 Cambodia transferred for training purposes 519 antipersonnel mines “from various sources and Demining Units/CMAC that were found in the Mined Areas.”¹⁵ This is the first time Cambodia has been explicit that these mines used for training were removed from the ground by deminers, and were not newly discovered caches.

Cambodia has not yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of mines kept for training—a step agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004. Cambodia has not utilized expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2005.

Use

Until 2008, there had not been any specific allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces since Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.

On 6 October 2008, a Thai paramilitary Ranger stepped on an antipersonnel landmine while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. A second soldier stepped on an antipersonnel mine while attempting to aid the first injured. Both lost their legs. This took place three days after an exchange of gunfire between Thai and Cambodian military units at the same location.

Thai authorities maintain that the area was previously clear of landmines. The Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) sent a team to investigate which found some PMN2-type antipersonnel mines. TMAC stated that the mines were newly placed. The sequence of discovery was detailed on the Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.¹⁶

Cambodian authorities stated that the Thai investigation of the incident site was a unilateral incursion on Cambodian territory undertaken without their consent or participation, and denounced the action. The Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Thai Rangers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts.¹⁷

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 206.

¹¹ Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form G. Mines destroyed in previous years included: 8,739 in 2000; 7,357 in 2001; 13,509 in 2002; 9,207 in 2003; 15,446 in 2004; 16,878 in 2005; 23,409 in 2006; and 20,268 in 2007.

¹² Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form G.

¹³ Ibid, Form D1a.

¹⁴ Cambodia reported in 2007 that 594 mines were transferred for development and training. See Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form D2. Cambodia has reported a total of 3,450 mines transferred for training purposes from 1998–2007.

¹⁵ Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D2.

¹⁶ Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Diplomatic Corps briefed on Thailand-Cambodia Border Incidents,” Press release, 4 February 2009, www.mfa.go.th.

¹⁷ Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “Statement of the Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation,” Press release, 17 October 2008, www.mfaic.gov.kh and Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, “MFA.IC Note,” 23 October 2008, www.mfaic.gov.kh.

The Coordinator of the Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines (TCBL) visited the site at the invitation of TMAC and Thailand's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She observed, "The mines which were displayed as recovered from the site showed no rust on their metal parts. Identification numbers on the mines were clearly visible, and did not appear to have been exposed to the elements very long. Local villagers informed me that they regularly used the path where the incidents took place."¹⁸

Thailand stated that the Royal Thai Army has never possessed PMN2 mines.¹⁹ Cambodia's annual transparency reports indicate that PMN2 mines are commonly found during mine clearance operations.²⁰ It has also reported stockpiling PMN2 mines in the past.²¹

On 17 October 2008, representatives of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and TMAC met an ICBL/TCBL mission and presented information from Thailand's investigations into the incident. Subsequently Thailand made this information available to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November.²²

Cambodia made several statements on the incident at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties. Cambodia said that "it was with great sadness that we learned of the allegations that Cambodia had contravened their obligations under the Ottawa Convention by laying new mines along the Thai Cambodian border. For a country that has suffered such heavy losses, the claim that we had contravened the most basic and fundamental tenet of the Convention came as a great surprise. In the clearest possible language, we deny the insinuations made to that effect. Cambodia has written two official letters through the Implementation Support Unit of the AP Mine Ban Convention to provide clarification, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia sent out an official bilateral response last week outlining its response to specific allegations."²³

Cambodia also said, "Given the seriousness of the claims and the importance which Cambodia places on its international commitments, the Royal Government of Cambodia immediately ordered the formation of a Fact Finding Commission to thoroughly review the situation 3 days after receiving the request for clarification from Thailand... The Commission will complete its work in the near future, and we will share the findings of the report with Thailand and those concerned and other interested parties. To clarify to the meeting, I would like to confirm that the accident happened in a confirmed minefield on Cambodian territory."²⁴ Cambodia has not subsequently made a Fact Finding Commission's report publicly available.

It would appear from available evidence that this incident involved new use of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor is not able to determine who was responsible for the use. To Landmine Monitor's knowledge, other States Parties have not pursued a resolution to this issue between Cambodia and Thailand.

On 1 April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries.²⁵

¹⁸ Interview with Emilie Ketudat, Coordinator, TCBL, Bangkok, 18 October 2008.

¹⁹ Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Diplomatic Corps briefed on Thailand-Cambodia Border Incidents," 4 February 2009, www.mfa.go.th. Thailand's Article 7 report submitted in April 2008 stated that the Royal Thai Army retained 10 "PMN2" mines. However, its April 2009 report records that the Royal Thai Army retained 10 "PMN" mines; reports from 2004–2006 also cite "PMN."

²⁰ Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form F, and earlier reports.

²¹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 15 April 2003.

²² Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "A Decade of Commitment: Thailand and the Mine Ban Convention," material made available to 9MSP delegates, November 2008.

²³ Statement by Amb. Sam Sotha, Head of Cambodian Delegation, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2008.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ "Cambodia, Thai border clash leaves two dead," *Agence France-Presse* (Phnom Penh), 2 April 2009.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Nearly three decades of war left Cambodia as one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and ERW. After more than 15 years of humanitarian demining, the landmine threat is mainly concentrated in 21 districts in six provinces along Cambodia's western and northern border with Thailand, including the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt. This was installed by the Vietnamese-backed government in the mid-1980s in an attempt to seal the border against infiltration by anti-regime guerrilla groups based on the Thai border. It represents Cambodia's densest contamination, reportedly with up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer.²⁶

UXO, including cluster munition remnants, and abandoned explosive ordnance is found throughout the country. During the Vietnam War, the United States dropped more than a million tons (one billion kg) of general purpose bombs and at least 26 million submunitions on Cambodia, mainly BLU-24, BLU-26, and BLU-61 submunitions. This bombing is estimated to have left between 1.9 million and 5.8 million cluster munition remnants, mostly in the southeast and the sparsely populated northeast, along the border with Vietnam.²⁷ However, a 2006 study of ERW in Cambodia found that more than 80% of the ordnance being cleared was ground artillery and munitions, and less than 20% was air ordnance.²⁸

By 2009, Cambodia had yet to fully determine the extent of contamination. In April 2009, Cambodia submitted an initial request for an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline for mine clearance, which put forward an estimate that 672km² of mined areas remained for full clearance, 1,864km² remained to be released through technical and non-technical survey, and 2,008km² were to be released through cancellation of database entries.²⁹ It also stated, however, that current data "presents a suspect area that all in the sector know is a massive, inaccurate and highly distorting snap-shot."³⁰ A revised request submitted in August 2009 put the area requiring clearance at 648.8km² but said stakeholders believed a Baseline Survey started in August 2008 would reduce this figure.³¹

A national ERW strategy published by the CMAA in January 2008 says a 2004 estimate that Cambodia had 427km² of "priority minefields requiring formal clearance" had been "validated by recent trends, even if some of these areas remain to be further defined by current area reduction efforts."³²

In the past three years, demining NGOs have identified more than 1,000km² of land which the LIS identified as suspect that has been reclaimed by the population. Accordingly, the CMAA has removed this area from the database of land requiring clearance.³³ A clearer estimate is expected from a baseline survey by demining NGOs of 21 districts with the most landmine casualties in recent years, which started in August 2008 and was due to be completed in a year.³⁴

Casualties³⁵

In 2008, the Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System (CMVIS) recorded 269 new mine/ERW casualties in Cambodia (47 people killed and 222 injured) in 154 incidents. This is a 24% decrease compared to 2007 (352) and confirms the downward casualty trend started in 2006.

²⁶ HALO, "Mine clearance in Cambodia-2009," January 2009, p. 8.

²⁷ South East Asia Air Sortie Database, cited in Dave McCracken, "National Explosive Remnants of War Study, Cambodia," NPA in collaboration with CMAA, Phnom Penh, March 2006, p. 15; Human Rights Watch, "Cluster Munitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," April 2008, www.hrw.org; and HI, "Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions," November 2006, p. 11.

²⁸ Interview with Dave McCracken, Consultant, NPA, Phnom Penh, 21 March 2006.

²⁹ Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, p. 48.

³⁰ Ibid, p. 44.

³¹ Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, p. 41.

³² CMAA, "National Strategy on Explosive Remnants of War," Phnom Penh, January 2008, p. 4.

³³ Statement of Cambodia, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 5 June 2008.

³⁴ Email from Pascal Rapillard, Policy and External Relations, GICHD, 4 September 2009.

³⁵ Unless noted otherwise, casualty data 1979-May 2009 provided by Cheng Lo, Data Management Officer, CMVIS, 19 June 2009.

Reasons for the continued decrease were said to include continued community involvement in mine action and risk education (RE).³⁶

The vast majority of casualties were civilian (251), including 136 men, 75 boys, 22 girls, and 18 women. Seven casualties were deminers (all men); six were injured during antipersonnel mine clearance and one while off-duty. Nine casualties were soldiers, including three Thai soldiers injured in two incidents in Preah Vihear, and two were police. The nationality of one person was unknown and the remaining people were Cambodian. As has been the case since 2001,³⁷ most casualties were caused by ERW (146 or 54%), including seven by unexploded submunitions. Antipersonnel mines caused 72 casualties, antivehicle mines 45, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) five, and one casualty was caused by an unknown device.

More than half of the ERW casualties were children: 65 boys (or 86% of total mine/ERW child casualties) and 11 girls. Three-quarters of child ERW casualties happened while handling ERW or standing-by when others were doing this (38 and 19 respectively). In total, there were 76 civilian casualties due to handling (64 ERW, seven mines, and five improvised explosive devices, IEDs) and 50 casualties because of standing near such activities (32 ERW and 18 mines). Motives for handling mines/ERW were: playing/curiosity, usually by hitting or throwing the device (51); fishing (10); selling scrap metal (seven); making the area safe (five), and reusing it as a weapon (three). CMVIS data shows that two IED casualties were caused by handling a device while fishing and three others while trying to re-use the IED as a weapon.

The other most common activities leading to incidents were traveling (33), clearing new land for use (23), or collecting wood (16). People were most at risk of becoming casualties in or near their livelihood areas: villages/built-up areas (77), agricultural land (62), orchards (39), and foraging areas (34). Eleven casualties happened on or near military bases; no civilian or military casualties happened on demining sites. No casualties were reported due to “informal demining,” probably because this activity decreased due to penalties or fewer reports because of the penalties.

Casualties occurred in 19 of 24 provinces, including two where there were no casualties in 2007 (Kampong Chhnang and Prey Veang). Mine casualties occurred in eight provinces.³⁸ Four provinces with casualties in 2007 did not record casualties in 2008 (Kampot, Krong Preah Sihanouk, Phnom Penh, and Stueng Traeng). However, as in 2007, just two provinces accounted for 44% of all casualties—Battambang (32% or 87, up from 82 in 2007), followed by Banteay Meanchey (31, down from 55 in 2007). Other provinces with 20 or more casualties were, as in 2007, Oddar Meanchey (27), Krong Pailin (22), and Preah Vihear (22). The most significant decrease was noted in Siem Reap (14, down from 32).

In total, 63% of casualties reported receiving RE, compared with 83% in 2007.

The number of reported casualties continued to fall in 2009, with 128 (19 killed and 109 injured) by the end of May; casualties for the same period in 2008 were 152. Twelve casualties were soldiers, including two Thai soldiers and two deminers. ERW caused 60 casualties (23 handling and 12 by-standing), antipersonnel mines 48, antivehicle mines 17, and IEDs three.

Ten-year summary

As of 31 May 2009, the CMVIS database contained records on 63,402 mine/ERW casualties in Cambodia: 19,476 killed and 43,926 injured since 1979. Of these, 7,300 were recorded between 1999 and 2008, including 1,385 killed and 5,915 injured.³⁹ Some 14% of casualties suffered amputations and of these, 84% were caused by mines.⁴⁰ Between 2000 and 2005, casualties

³⁶ CMAC, “Integrated Work Plan 2009,” Phnom Penh, 20 February 2009, p. 44.

³⁷ CMVIS, “Annual Report 2007,” Phnom Penh, August 2008, p. 18.

³⁸ Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Krong Pailin, Mondol Kiri, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear, Pursat, and Svay Rieng.

³⁹ 1999: 1,153; 2000: 858; 2001: 826; 2002: 847; 2003: 772; 2004: 898; 2005: 875; 2006: 450; 2007: 352; and 2008: 269. See also, Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011,” Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 9 (mentioning 63,217 casualties between 1979 and August 2008).

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

remained relatively constant, but a sudden 50% drop occurred in 2006 and has continued since. The drop was then ascribed to favorably seasonal conditions, greater economic opportunities, and increased community involvement in mine action planning and prioritization. Additionally, policing of the scrap metal trade and informal demining in some provinces might have contributed.⁴¹ No follow-up study has been made, but it is assumed that demining and priority-setting contributed most to the decrease.⁴²

The largest casualty group between 1999 and 2008 were men (4,544), followed by boys (1,823), women (520), and girls (413). The majority of casualties were civilian (3,973); 191 were security forces, 106 deminers, 28 informal deminers, and 62 other/unknown. For 2,940 people the military-civilian status was not recorded, but their activities showed that only 192 of these were engaged in military, demining or “other” activity, and 951 were children or women. It can, thus, be assumed that up to 6,721 casualties (92%) were civilian.

Half of the casualties were caused by ERW (3,676), including 159 submunition casualties. It is likely that submunitions casualties are under-reported as CMVIS only started differentiating these from other ERW casualties in September 2006.⁴³ Antipersonnel mines caused 1,970 casualties (27%), antivehicle mines 690, unknown mines 822, IEDs 141, and an unknown device one. Most common activities at the time of the incident were: handling mines/ERW (2,565 including 1,075 boys); farming (1,045); traveling (943); and being a by-stander (823). Casualties occurred in all provinces in Cambodia, but most in Battambang (1,942), Banteay Meanchey (1,172), Oddar Meanchey (690), Krong Pailin (612), and Preah Vihear (457). Most casualties happened in villages or built-up areas (2,057) or in rice fields (1,082).

Accurate information about the number of persons with disabilities in Cambodia and their living circumstances is lacking. Limited information was included in the 2008 census but was not available as of July 2009. In early 2009, the National Institute of Statistics developed a test form for a pilot survey on disability. If suitable, this could become part of the national disability survey planned by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY).⁴⁴

Risk profile

People are at risk from landmines in the northwest and northern provinces bordering Thailand, and from UXO in these areas and the northeastern provinces bordering Vietnam.⁴⁵ The majority of areas have not been marked.⁴⁶

Incidents are caused by involuntary contact through routine livelihood activities, such as farming and forestry,⁴⁷ and by the intentional handling of UXO, especially by adolescent males. People may move UXO to a perceived safe place. Scrap metal collection remains a significant problem, although a law against scrap metal collection and possibly a drop in metal prices has had a positive impact on trends.⁴⁸ Out-of-school youth may be particularly vulnerable.⁴⁹

Increasing population and demand for agricultural land continues to prompt people to move into mine- and UXO-affected areas.⁵⁰ The region east of the Mekong river may become a higher priority for RE as areas open up for development and people migrate there.⁵¹

⁴¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 229.

⁴² Interview with Chhiv Lim, Project Manager, CMVIS, Kampong Thom, 9 April 2009.

⁴³ HI, *Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities*, Brussels, May 2007, p. 23.

⁴⁴ Interview with Po Mao, Deputy Director, Department of Social Affairs Statistics, Ministry of Planning, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.

⁴⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ruth Bottomley, Community Liaison Manager Southeast Asia, MAG, 6 July 2009.

⁴⁶ Interview with Oum Sang Onn, Director of Planning and Operations, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.

⁴⁷ “Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia,” CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ruth Bottomley, MAG, 6 July 2009.

⁴⁸ Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ruth Bottomley, MAG, 6 July 2009.

⁴⁹ “Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia,” CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008.

⁵⁰ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ruth Bottomley, MAG, 6 July 2009; and interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.

⁵¹ “Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia,” CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008, p. 7.

Socio-economic impact

Despite the sharp fall in casualties in recent years, Cambodia's mine and ERW problem still represents a major obstacle to social and economic development. According to the CMAA, ERW "severely affect rural livelihoods by impeding access to productive resources, markets and basic social services, land for agriculture and resettlement, irrigation, roads, access to water, health centers, schools and other rural infrastructures. When located near archeological sites, landmines and ERW also severely affect economic activities and the development of tourism, which is a major source of revenues for Cambodia."⁵²

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

The CMAA, set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates mine action, responsibilities previously assigned to CMAC.⁵³ The CMAA has six departments whose responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparing strategic plans, managing data, and quality control.⁵⁴ Prime Minister Hun Sen is the CMAA President, and a senior government minister (Secretary of State of the Council of Ministers), Prak Sokhonn, brought in as second CMAA Vice President in June 2005, leads the dialogue with donors as the chair of a Government-Donor Technical Working Group for Mine Action.⁵⁵

The CMAA's day-to-day management is in the hands of the Secretary-General. In January 2008, the government appointed Secretary-General Sam Sotha additionally as Cambodia's ambassador on mines and cluster bombs.⁵⁶ In December 2008, however, Prime Minister Hun Sen replaced him in both jobs with Chum Bun Rong, a former General Director of the Social Fund without previous experience in mine action.⁵⁷

Risk education

The CMAA also regulates and coordinates mine/ERW RE. An external evaluation was conducted by UNICEF in October 2008 to look at the capacity needed for the government to facilitate the transition to national implementation of programs and to inform the forthcoming revision of strategy.⁵⁸

Coordination meetings of the Technical Working Group for Mine Risk Education (MRE TWG), consisting of stakeholders from government institutions, operators, and development partners occur at the national level, and operators meet regularly to refine messages.⁵⁹ The CMAA/UNICEF evaluation reported that coordination is generally good, although it suggested that less formal CMAA coordination would also be useful.⁶⁰

⁵² CMAA, "National Strategy on Explosive Remnants of War," Phnom Penh, January 2008, p. 6.

⁵³ CMAC is the leading national demining operator, but does not exercise the wider responsibilities associated with the term "center." Set up in 1992, CMAC was assigned the role of coordinator in the mid-1990s. It surrendered this function in a restructuring of mine action in 2000 that separated the roles of regulator and implementing agency and led to the creation of the CMAA.

⁵⁴ "A Study of the Development of National Mine Action Legislation," GICHD, November 2004, pp. 64–66. The departments are: regulation and legislation, planning, monitoring and database, VA, coordination and public relations, administration, personnel and logistics, and finance.

⁵⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, pp. 249–250. Prak Sokhonn is now the only vice-president of CMAA. Email from Pascal Rapillard, GICHD, 4 September 2009.

⁵⁶ Technical Working Group for Mine Action, "Summary Report," Meeting, 19 February 2008, pp. 3–4; and interview with Amb. Sam Sotha, Secretary-General, CMAA, in Geneva, 3 June 2008.

⁵⁷ Sam Rith, "Demining head loses two posts in reshuffle," *Phnom Penh Post*, 30 December 2008, khmernz.blogspot.com.

⁵⁸ "Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia," CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008.

⁵⁹ Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ruth Bottomley, MAG, 6 July 2009.

⁶⁰ "Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia," CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008.

RE activities are monitored internally by individual operators and externally by the CMAA. However, the CMAA/UNICEF evaluation found that, “strategy and program indicators are mainly quantitative, without specific target groups being described, and focus primarily on program activities and outputs, rather than behavioral outcomes and impacts.”⁶¹

Victim assistance

The CMAA delegated coordination of victim assistance (VA) to the MoSVY and Disability Action Council (DAC) by subdecree in 2001.⁶²

In April 2009, the process started to transform the Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance into the National Disability Coordination Committee (NDCC). The committee’s work would be expanded from coordinating VA plans to a general coordination role for the disability sector. The NDCC will be chaired by the minister of MoSVY; DAC is the secretariat; and relevant ministries, service providers and disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) would be members.⁶³ The NDCC was approved by the Prime Minister in early August⁶⁴ although members had met regularly before approval was granted. However, practical coordination between ministries was limited and even more limited between the CMAA and MoSVY.⁶⁵

The MoSVY is responsible for disability issues in general, favoring a mainstreaming approach to VA in its general structures.⁶⁶ The MoSVY delegates responsibilities to provincial and district offices. However, due to its initial focus on veterans only, its structure at all levels is insufficient to deal with the broader disability mandate. Its branches are “often under-resourced, inexperienced, or reluctant to implement MoSVY directives.”⁶⁷ Commitment of local offices varies.⁶⁸

DAC and its various working groups, which include national and international operators and advisors, provide technical advice to the MoSVY, but since 2006 have had limited capacity to do so.⁶⁹

Data collection and management

In 2008, the CMAA gave priority to overhauling its database, with technical support from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), as a critical requirement for preparing a new 10-year strategic plan. The plan was intended to accompany its request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline under the Mine Ban Treaty (see Summary of efforts to comply with Article 5 section below).⁷⁰

An assessment of the CMAA’s database needs by Australian Volunteers International in 2007 found that the CMAA had not set documentation or reporting standards, that these differed between operators, and that the CMAA had difficulty obtaining data in a useable format and on a regular basis. Individual data providers had some good data management procedures but worked in isolation. Moreover, the RCAF, police, and newly established commercial operators were “not reporting any clearance or EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] information to the

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 11.

⁶² Interview with Thong Vinal, Executive Director, DAC, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.

⁶³ NDCC Terms of Reference, distributed at the Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance meeting, MoSVY, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.

⁶⁴ Email from Sheree Bailey, Victim Assistance Specialist, Implementation Support Unit, GICHD, 6 September 2009.

⁶⁵ Email from Teresa Carney, Programme Coordinator, ARC, 3 July 2009; email from Ket Chanto, Education Program Manager, WVC, Phnom Penh, 14 July 2009; and interview with and email from Ngin Saorath, Executive Director, CDPO, Phnom Penh, 7 April and 13 July 2009.

⁶⁶ Interview with Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and interview with Bruno Leclercq, Country Director, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.

⁶⁷ Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011,” Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 8.

⁶⁸ Interview with Sok Sophorn, Manager Rehabilitation Center, HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009; email from Meas Vicheth, Project Manager, Operations Enfants du Cambodge (OEC), 10 July 2009.

⁶⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 222; interview with Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and interview with Bruno Leclercq, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.

⁷⁰ Interview with Amb. Sam Sotha, CMAA, in Geneva, 2 June 2008; and interview with Steve Munroe, Mine Action Programme Manager, UNDP, Phnom Penh, 28 April 2008.

CMAA on a regular basis.⁷¹ In June 2008, operators started reporting clearance data to the CMAA using a standard format which underwent further revision in 2009.⁷²

Until 2007, the CMAA operated with a self-built database adapted from an old version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). In 2007, the CMAA installed the latest version of IMSMA and staff received training from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), but the system had difficulties accepting existing data. As a result, NPA prepared an updated dataset of contamination in 2008 using an alternative tool (Microsoft Access).⁷³ By August 2008, NPA had reconciled existing data but the CMAA continued to have difficulties providing a coherent assessment of contamination, because of data losses and differences in operators' survey procedures and classifications of demining interventions.⁷⁴

RE data is kept only in paper form, and the CMAA/UNICEF evaluation recommended the integration of RE data into a central CMAA database to facilitate a more integrated approach to implementation.⁷⁵

CMVIS has operated a casualty database since 1994. Casualties are reported through a network of Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) field staff and by CMVIS data gatherers deployed at the district and provincial levels, and then entered into the database. Throughout 1999–2008, CMVIS data collection has been adequate and continuous improvements were made to the system, most recently at the end of 2007.⁷⁶ CMVIS data is used for planning and prioritization of VA, RE, clearance, and EOD tasks. It widely distributes monthly and annual reports.⁷⁷

Handicap International-Belgium (HI-B) ended its technical assistance to CMVIS at the end of June 2009 and planned to finish its financial support at the end of 2009,⁷⁸ stating that CMVIS should progressively be taken over by national partners. HI-B noted that in 2007–2008 Cambodian counterparts were reluctant to proceed with this integration.⁷⁹ In April 2009, the CRC and CMAA signed a memorandum of understanding to ensure the future sustainability and integration of CMVIS in mine action.⁸⁰ But it was noted that it was "important that CRC gains the necessary skills to maintain the standards currently delivered by CMVIS."⁸¹

HI-B continued to state that the ongoing decrease in casualties indicated a diminished need for data collection; it added that CMVIS should concentrate on its core business of casualty data collection and not implement its VA services survey, or RE and VA activities. Therefore further decreases in CMVIS staff could be envisioned.⁸² CMVIS noted that while casualties decreased the territory to cover remained the same, resulting in challenges to continuing nationwide coverage and maintaining links with community focal points. The main issue was that data gatherers covering several provinces were not always familiar with the communities, which often resulted in certain communities providing less information. CMVIS also noted that increased dependence on volunteers could in the longer term affect the quality of collected data. But it did not think there was significant under-reporting.⁸³

⁷¹ Australian Volunteers International, "Recommendations for a Collective Information Management Strategy for the Cambodian ERW Action Sector, (Draft)," Phnom Penh, May 2007, pp. 1–7.

⁷² Interview with Arleen Engeset, Advisor, IMSMA in Southeast Asia, NPA, Phnom Penh, 30 March 2009.

⁷³ Interviews with Rune Engeset, Regional Program Manager, NPA, Phnom Penh, 28 April 2008; and Amb. Sam Sotha, CMAA, in Geneva, 2 June 2008.

⁷⁴ Interview with Arleen Engeset, NPA, Phnom Penh, 30 March 2009.

⁷⁵ "Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia," CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008, pp. 7, 8.

⁷⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 216.

⁷⁷ CMVIS, "Annual Report 2007," Phnom Penh, August 2008, pp. 9–11.

⁷⁸ Email from Chhiv Lim, CMVIS, 13 July 2009.

⁷⁹ Interview with Hugo Hotte, Mine Action Project Coordinator, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

⁸⁰ Interview with Chan Rotha, Deputy Secretary-General, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.

⁸¹ Kingdom of Cambodia, "National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011," Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 10.

⁸² Interview with Hugo Hotte, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

⁸³ Interview with Chhiv Lim, CMVIS, Kampong Thom, 9 April 2009.

Mine action program operators

National operators and activities	Demining	RE	Casualty data collection	VA
Association for Aid and Relief (AAR)				x
Cambodian Development Mission for Disability				x
Capacity Building of People with Disabilities in Community Organizations				x
Cambodian Disabled People's Organization				x
CMAC	x	x		
CMVIS		x	x	x
CRC		x	x	x
Disability Development Services Pursat (DDSP)				x
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport		x		
National Police		x		
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces	x	x		
World Vision Cambodia		x		x
International operators and activities	Demining	RE	Casualty data collection	VA
Australian Red Cross				x
Cambodia Trust				x
Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society				x
Economic and Social Relaunch of Northwest Provinces in Cambodia				x
Emergency				x
HALO Trust	x	x		
HI-B		x	x	x
Handicap International–France (HI-F)				x
ICRC				x
Mines Advisory Group	x	x		
Jesuit Service Cambodia				x
Opération Enfants du Cambodge				x
Spirit of Soccer		x		
Veterans International				x

In April 2007, as part of its agreement with HI-B, CMVIS began a survivor survey to collect data on assistance received and socio-economic indicators. HI-B found that this information existed elsewhere and that focusing on mine/ERW survivors was discriminatory and consequently withdrew technical support in August 2008.⁸⁴ As of July 2009, the survey remained suspended pending improvements to the questionnaire.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, other operators have repeatedly stated that this information is needed for more effective VA and that gathering “information to assess quality of life of survivors and victim assistance services received, on an ongoing basis” is one of the key objectives in Cambodia’s 2009–2011 VA plan.⁸⁶ The MoSVY was also seeking CMVIS advice on management of disability data.⁸⁷

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

The CMAA, supported by other stakeholders, worked in 2009 on a new national mine action strategy (NMAS) in conjunction with its preparation of an Article 5 deadline extension request. The strategy was due to include: an agenda for transparent use of aid; “a basic mine action strategy” drafted with GICHD assistance; “a combination of strategies” for demining, ERW, and RE; and a national action plan for disabled people, as well as the extension request. The CMAA expected to present it to the Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference in November–December 2009.⁸⁸

The CMAA set up a task force to draft the strategy under its Deputy Secretary-General, Prum Sophamonkol, and included representatives of UNDP, NGO operators, the National Center for Peace Keeping, and six technical reference groups, which in the past had met only when required and which were reactivated to work on the NMAS in June 2009. The Task Force was to report to a Review Committee led by CMAA Secretary-General Chum Bun Rong.⁸⁹

Cambodia’s initial Article 5 extension request submitted in April 2009 acknowledged problems in drawing up a detailed workplan in the absence of precise data on the extent of the residual problem, but set out a range of initiatives to be pursued including:⁹⁰

- a Baseline Survey, starting in August 2009, focusing on the 21 most contaminated districts to be completed in 2010, and to be completed countrywide by 2012;
- development of a national standard for land release (CMAS 15), regarded as a “critical activity” that will contribute to increased productivity;
- release through clearance by operators who will commit the majority of their resources to the 21 most affected districts and concentrate “the overwhelming majority” of clearance on Classification A mined areas (the extension request states that some 470km² will be cleared by 2019 with a clearance rate of 40km² a year from 2011 and an annual productivity increase of 2% a year); and
- drafting a sector-wide NMAS and improving planning and prioritization processes.

The CMAA published a national ERW strategy in January 2008 which sets out a vision that “by 2015, Cambodia will be a country where ERW do not represent an immediate threat for the civilian population (work towards zero victims), and where national resources are available to deal with the remaining ERW contamination through an efficient reporting network and

⁸⁴ Interview with Hugo Hotte, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; and emails from Hugo Hotte, 18 March and 7 September 2009.

⁸⁵ Email from Chhiv Lim, CMVIS, 13 July 2009.

⁸⁶ Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011,” Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 11; interview with Chan Rotha, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and interview with Plong Chhaya, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

⁸⁷ Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011,” Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 10.

⁸⁸ Statement by Chum Bun Rong, Secretary-General, CMAA, NMAS workshop, Phnom Penh, 6 July 2009.

⁸⁹ CMAA, “Plan for the development of a National Mine Action Strategy,” Phnom Penh, undated but June 2009, p. 3; and telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, Mine Action Program Manager, UNDP, 13 July 2009. The six TRGs were for: Demining (survey, marking, and clearance); Information Management; Mine Risk Education; Victim Assistance; Gender; and Monitoring and Evaluation.

⁹⁰ Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, pp. 53–54.

appropriate intervention/disposal capacity, under Government coordination and regulation.”⁹¹ The ERW strategy was not put into operation but was expected to feed into the provisions for ERW in the new NMA. ⁹² It recommended that Cambodia ratify CCW Protocol V, thus committing Cambodia to clearing all ERW. ⁹³

The strategy identified the CMAA as the regulatory and policy-making authority for ERW action. Short-term goals included:

- develop the RCAF’s capacity as a “national ERW operator;”
- develop CMAC’s response capacity by increasing the number of EOD teams, strengthening skills, including multi-item demolition;
- pilot and expand a response system involving the police, community networks, and operators;
- safe storage of munitions; and
- reduce the number of annual ERW victims to 115 by 2010. ⁹⁴

By 2015, the strategy called for:

- the creation of a “national ERW center” as a repository of expertise and as a training center, allowing the phasing out of international assistance;
- a national intervention capacity provided by RCAF, which is to be involved “as a matter of priority in ERW clearance related to major national infrastructures,” and by a reformed CMAC “focused mostly on ERW response, fully integrated in Government and with national budget;”
- a central database located in the CMAA; and
- quality assurance and monitoring by the CMAA. ⁹⁵

Risk education plans

The RE strategy for 2006–2012 aims to reduce casualties by empowering affected communities to identify appropriate and effective risk education/reduction approaches, and integrate these efforts with broader humanitarian and development activities, including VA. ⁹⁶

Victim assistance plans

The National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011, is Cambodia’s VA plan. It was developed as part of Cambodia’s commitment to the so-called VA26 process (see Victim Assistance section below). The drafting process started in July 2007 under the coordination of an international consultant and later a national coordinator in an AUSAID-funded project through the Australian Red Cross (ARC) and was finalized in February 2009. The plan was approved by the MoSVY and CMAA in April 2009, and by the Prime Minister in August 2009. ⁹⁷ The initial timeframe for the plan, which was also presented at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, was 2008–2011. ⁹⁸

The plan was created in broad consultation with stakeholders and through focus group meetings. One of its main aims was to strengthen MoSVY capacity, while linking this to “direct actions and building a solid relationship... with the clients whether they be landmine/ERW survivors or other persons with disabilities, advocacy groups, or NGO implementing agencies.”⁹⁹ The plan contains objectives and plans for data collection, medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support, economic reintegration and laws, and public policies, and it assigns responsibilities to relevant ministries. The future roles of DAC and the CMAA are unclear. ¹⁰⁰

⁹¹ CMAA, “National Strategy on Explosive Remnants of War,” Phnom Penh, January 2008, p. 9.

⁹² Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009.

⁹³ CMAA, “National Strategy on Explosive Remnants of War,” Phnom Penh, January 2008, p. 12.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 12–13.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

⁹⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 217.

⁹⁷ Notes from Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance meeting, MoSVY, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.

⁹⁸ Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2008–2011,” November 2008.

⁹⁹ Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011,” Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 8.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

Non-governmental stakeholders estimated that the plan was not conducive to real action and contained plans that were too broad, unclear and in some cases unrealistic, particularly because of the level of responsibility placed on the MoSVY with its limited capacity.¹⁰¹ Monitoring of the plan will be conducted through visits to relevant ministries and operators. This effort started in 2009 to complete the status report template developed by the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration for the purpose of the Second Review Conference.¹⁰²

In addition to the 2009–2011 VA plan, the MoSVY and the five international physical rehabilitation service providers signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2008 under which the ministry committed to gradually take over all financial responsibility for the management of physical rehabilitation services by 2011.¹⁰³

The CMAA expressed interest in increased involvement in VA, but noted that it did not have sufficient human and financial resources.¹⁰⁴ The CMAA's VA department is responsible for providing regular reports on VA. In 2007, DAC was delegated responsibility for compiling the annual VA report. While a report was prepared for 2007, it did not exist for any other years. The CMAA noted that this was due to a lack of data provided from the MoSVY and DAC.¹⁰⁵

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

Cambodia's "Rectangular Strategy," setting out the government's platform for national economic and social development in 2004–2008, identified agricultural development as the "first rectangle" and clearance of mines as a component of agricultural development.¹⁰⁶ The National Social Development Plan 2006–2010, based on the Rectangular Strategy, gives priority to rural development as the quickest route to alleviating poverty and recognizes mine clearance as "very important for making arable land safe for cultivation and to prevent death and lifelong handicaps caused by severe injuries." It also includes demining, UXO clearance, and VA among Cambodia's Millennium Development Goals.¹⁰⁷ Senior Minister Prak Sokhonn stated in July 2009 that the NMAS would be aligned with the second phase of the Rectangular Strategy and the update of the National Social Development Plan for 2009–2013.¹⁰⁸

A GICHD study reported "there is a consensus among government ministries that the mine action programme should begin 'mainstreaming' itself (i.e. using government systems established at the national, provincial, and commune levels for planning, priority-setting, etc., rather than 'stand-alone' mechanisms for mine action)."¹⁰⁹

The practical mechanism for integrating mine action and broader community needs are eight Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs), which are responsible for planning and prioritizing clearance under guidelines laid down by a subdecree issued in November 2004, and operational guidelines issued by the CMAA in February 2007.¹¹⁰ MAPUs work with local authorities to identify community priorities, and with operators to prepare annual task lists which are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Councils. Mine action in provinces without MAPUs is coordinated with provincial authorities.

¹⁰¹ Interviews with Josefina McAndrew, Country Representative, Volunteers International (VI), Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; Bruno Leclercq, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; Yann Drouet, Head of Physical Rehabilitation Project, ICRC, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; CDPO, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; and Sam Oeurn Pok, Managing Director, CWARS, Phnom Penh, 5 April 2009.

¹⁰² Email from Teresa Carney, ARC, 3 July 2009.

¹⁰³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 223.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Chum Bun Rong, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Chan Rotha, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.

¹⁰⁶ "The Rectangular Strategy: Royal Government's Economic Policy Agenda," Council for the Development of Cambodia, www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh.

¹⁰⁷ "National Strategic Development Plan, 2006–10," Phnom Penh, undated but 2006, pp. 6, 20, 36.

¹⁰⁸ CMAA, "Minutes from Stakeholders' Workshop on a National Mine Action Strategy," Phnom Penh, undated but July 2009, p. 3.

¹⁰⁹ Ted Paterson, Chan Rotha, and Mao Vanna, "Toward a new mine action strategy for Cambodia," GICHD, Geneva, August 2008, p. i.

¹¹⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 223.

Operators express support for the MAPU system, under which they also propose sites for clearance and make a selection of tasks for the coming year in negotiation with MAPUs; but they have also expressed concern that the units are under-resourced, raising questions about their long-term sustainability after training support from Australian Volunteers International stopped in mid-2008.¹¹¹

HALO also noted a contradiction between the 2007 guidelines, which state that clearance should target “worst contaminated areas,” and the MAPU focus on task selection according to socio-economic impact. HALO noted that the K5 mine belt represents the heaviest concentration of mines, but sections of the belt that are not close to communities “are therefore being left off MAPU workplans (despite a persistence of incidents) in favor of land that can demonstrate post-clearance beneficiaries.”¹¹²

The Cambodian Millennium Development Goals, and the National Strategic Development Plan 2006–2010 have linked mine action to poverty reduction, and both plans support activities to reintegrate mine/ERW survivors. The NSDP also aimed to reduce mine/ERW casualties to zero by 2020. However, neither plan mentions activities or targets for persons with disabilities (including survivors).¹¹³

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Government commitment to mine action is reflected by Prime Minister Hun Sen’s position as President of the CMAA and reference to mine action in national development plans.¹¹⁴ A report by GICHD on the need for a new national mine action strategy found “strong support both among mine action stakeholders and government ministries/agencies.”¹¹⁵

Government capacity to conduct VA/disability activities is “in its infancy,” according to an NGO assessment.¹¹⁶ The fulfillment of the 2009–2011 VA plan is largely dependent on the MoSVY’s capacity to take on a leadership role. Actors noted that the MoSVY was becoming more involved but were also concerned that disability was not a priority.¹¹⁷ It was also noted that the MoSVY lacked sufficient financial resources and that it was understaffed, but a national disability advisor, funded by AUSAID, started in the ministry on 1 July 2009.¹¹⁸ Involvement of other ministries was limited.¹¹⁹

DAC noted in May 2009 that the national budget allocation to disability was low, and that “structures lack human resources and technical and financial capacity to fully respond to the needs of the disability sector.”¹²⁰

In 2007–2008, the ARC (funded by AusAID) provided extensive support to coordination of VA/disability efforts to re-engage and reactivate mechanisms that had been defunct under DAC.¹²¹ HI-F and HI-B continued to support DAC through various projects in 2008 in its efforts to remain the coordination body for the disability sector.¹²²

¹¹¹ HALO, “Mine clearance in Cambodia–2009,” January 2009, p. 9.

¹¹² HALO, “Mine clearance in Cambodia–2008,” 2008, p. 9.

¹¹³ Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011,” Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 6.

¹¹⁴ Statement by Senior Minister Prak Sokhonn, “Minutes from Stakeholders’ Workshop on a National Mine Action Strategy,” Phnom Penh, 6–7 July 2009.

¹¹⁵ Ted Paterson, Chan Rotha, and Mao Vanna, “Toward a new mine action strategy for Cambodia,” GICHD, Geneva, August 2008, p. i.

¹¹⁶ Email from Teresa Carney, ARC, 3 July 2009.

¹¹⁷ Interviews with VI, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; CDPO, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; CWARS, Phnom Penh, 5 April 2009; and Huoy Socheat, Director, AAR, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.

¹¹⁸ Email from Sheree Bailey, ISU, GICHD, 6 September 2009.

¹¹⁹ Interview with and email from Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April and 3 July 2009.

¹²⁰ Statement by Thong Vinal, DAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

¹²¹ DAC, “Annual Report 2007,” Phnom Penh, 2008, pp. 11–22; Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011,” Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 7; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 222.

¹²² Email from Marie-Pierre Guicherd, South East Asia Desk Officer, HI-F, 4 September 2009.

All actors agreed that service provision was almost exclusively carried out by NGOs and DPOs and that this would remain unchanged. It was noted that even after the end of the VA plan in 2011, the MoSVY would not have the financial capacity to conduct VA/disability activities.¹²³ Several operators also mentioned donor fatigue and increased funding challenges, which would make it difficult to maintain the same level of operations in Cambodia in the medium- to long-term.¹²⁴ Equally, the viability and sustainability of DAC, which depended exclusively on external funding, was questioned, unless national contributions increase.¹²⁵

National management

The CMAA, supported by UNDP and working closely with stakeholders, is the focal point for mine action and developing a national mine action strategy. A concept paper in June 2009 said the NMAA should incorporate “concrete measures to enhance Government ownership and capacity to deal with Cambodia’s landmine/ERW problem over the long term.”¹²⁶

National mine action legislation

A royal decree dated 4 September 2000, and a subdecree dated 8 August 2001, define the CMAA’s roles and responsibilities; the 2001 subdecree also confirmed CMAC’s status as a service provider.¹²⁷

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

The CMAA has drafted 29 chapters of Cambodian mine action standards, of which the first five came into effect in August 2006, covering accreditation and licensing; monitoring demining organizations; the storage, transportation, and handling of explosives; and the reporting of demining accidents. Another six chapters covering, among other issues, standards for mine and UXO clearance, were approved and came into effect in February 2007. As of April 2009, two chapters on marking and baseline survey had been provisionally approved, a chapter on mechanical clearance was awaiting approval, and the remaining 15 chapters were in draft form.¹²⁸ In 2009, work started on drafting standards for land release.¹²⁹ There are draft national standards for RE but as of April 2009 they had not been completed.¹³⁰

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Demining is conducted by three NGOs: CMAC, HALO, and MAG, which have operated in Cambodia since the 1990s. The CMAA began accrediting operators in 2006 and accredited all three NGOs in October 2006. In 2007, CMAC also started demining on behalf of Australian mining company BHP Billiton, which was exploring for bauxite in the northeastern province of Mondulkiri; in April 2009 CMAC reported it had completed its engagement and the site was mine-free.¹³¹

The CMAA has also accredited three international commercial companies and a Cambodian company: BACTEC, Milsearch (International), Phoenix PCL, and the Cambodian Demining Service.¹³² BACTEC mainly provides support to mineral exploration companies.¹³³

¹²³ Interview with Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.

¹²⁴ Interviews with HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2007; VI, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and CWARS, Phnom Penh, 5 April 2009.

¹²⁵ Interviews ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

¹²⁶ CMAA, “Plan for the Development of a National Mine Action Strategy,” undated but June 2009, p.2.

¹²⁷ For details of legislation regarding the CMAA and CMAC, see GICHD, “A Study of the Development of Mine Action Legislation,” Geneva, 2004, pp. 64–66.

¹²⁸ Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, Annex 5, p. 73; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 208.

¹²⁹ Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009.

¹³⁰ Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.

¹³¹ Nguon Sovann, “Demining completed for BHP,” *Phnom Penh Post*, 2 April 2009, www.phnompenhpost.com.

¹³² CMAA, “Mine Action Achievements Report 2007 and Work Plan 2008,” p. 8, received by email from Tong Try, Project Officer, CMAA, 18 August 2008, p. 8. The CMAA reported that of the four companies only BACTEC was active.

¹³³ Interview with Burt Kearney, General Manager, Asia, BACTEC, Phnom Penh, 30 April 2008.

The RCAF had not applied for accreditation as of July 2009, but with backing from the Prime Minister it has conducted demining on behalf of government ministries, mainly in support of infrastructure projects.¹³⁴ Discussions were underway with the CMAA on accrediting at least some of the RCAF engineers for demining. Cambodia's initial Article 5 deadline extension request projected the RCAF would clear more than one-third of the remaining mined area but the revised submission dropped this projection. It stated, however, that RCAF accreditation would make a significant contribution to increased productivity and as such was "seen as a major priority for the CMAA." It included RCAF's accreditation as a milestone to be achieved in 2009.¹³⁵

RCAF engineers have also conducted demining for the UN Mission in Sudan since 2006, rotating a new unit every year.¹³⁶ The third contingent, comprising 139 engineers, deployed in June 2008,¹³⁷ and a fourth team of 52 deminers was due in Sudan in June 2009.¹³⁸ Cambodia also announced in March 2009 that it would send soldiers to Chad and the Central African Republic, also to undertake demining in support of UN peacekeeping operations.¹³⁹

Identification of hazardous areas

As part of its Article 5 extension request preparations, the CMAA and operators recognized the need for a Baseline Survey to provide more reliable data on which to determine the extent of remaining mine and ERW contamination and to set priorities for clearance. The extension request outlined plans to conduct the survey in two phases. The first phase was to cover the 21 "focus" districts, which accounted for 93% of mine casualties in the past five years. The survey's first phase started in August 2009 and was due to take one year to complete.¹⁴⁰ The second phase covering the remainder of the country was to be completed in 2012. Operators agreed the results of the survey will supersede the LIS.¹⁴¹ CMAC was due to conduct the survey with 13 survey teams for 13 districts, HALO with six teams for six districts, and MAG with two teams for two districts.¹⁴²

The Baseline Survey is seen as an important opportunity to get around flaws in available data on mine action contamination and operations, and to present the first coherent dataset since the start of mine action in Cambodia (see Data collection and management section above). The CMAA and operators paved the way for the survey by agreeing to standing operating procedures, a common survey report form, and a system of classifying affected or suspected land agreed by CMAA and operators.¹⁴³ This provides a platform for strategic planning and prioritization and for a process of releasing or reclassifying land.¹⁴⁴ Operators started a pilot survey to field test the survey methodology on 6 July 2009.¹⁴⁵

Under the land classification matrix, land will be categorized as either:

- *Mined area*, including land with dense concentrations of antipersonnel mines (A1), a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines (A2), just antivehicle mines (A3), or land containing scattered or nuisance mines (A4);
- *Residual threat*, land including ERW (B1), or land with no verifiable mine threat (B2); or

¹³⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 221.

¹³⁵ Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009; Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, pp. 59–60; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision) 24 August 2009, p. 54.

¹³⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 211.

¹³⁷ "2nd batch of Cambodian deminers return from UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan," *Xinhua* (Phnom Penh), 10 June 2008, news.xinhuanet.com.

¹³⁸ "Cambodia to send fresh soldiers for de-mining operation," *Sudan Tribune*, 22 May 2009, www.sudantribune.com.

¹³⁹ Associated Press, "Cambodian troops for Africa," *Straits Times*, 24 March 2009, www.straitstimes.com; and CMAA, "Minutes from Stakeholders' Workshop on a National Mine Action Strategy," undated but July 2009.

¹⁴⁰ Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, p. 6.

¹⁴¹ Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, pp. 55–56.

¹⁴² Email from Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 15 July 2009.

¹⁴³ Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, p. 46.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 55–56.

¹⁴⁵ Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009.

- *End state*, including reclaimed land returned to productive use for three years or more without accident or evidence of mines (C1), land released by survey (C2), cleared land (C3), and “unmined land” (with no indication from local communities or previous survey) (C4).

The formula calls for concentrating clearance assets on land classified as A1 or A2 and for further investigation of A3 and A4 land before deploying clearance teams. It says clearance assets should only be deployed to B-classification land where there is a community need, and should not be deployed to C-classified land.¹⁴⁶

Mine clearance

Demining operations continued in 2008 at about the same level as in previous years, increasing clearance of mined areas about 4% over 2007 although numbers of items cleared were lower. The amount of land area reduced or canceled also dropped, to 482km² in 2008 from 557km² the previous year.¹⁴⁷

Debate continued among operators, MAPUs, and other stakeholders on whether clearance should concentrate on densest concentrations of mines or tasks supporting community and development priorities.¹⁴⁸ Tensions between Thailand and Cambodia led to interruptions in tackling some border tasks. In 2009, Senior Minister Prak Sokhonn stated that the CMAA and the Ministry of National Defense had agreed that no orders would be issued to halt border demining; that, in areas where the border is not clearly demarcated, demining operations required the approval of the two countries’ Joint Border Commission; and that demining should concentrate on other priorities rather than border areas that are disputed.¹⁴⁹

CMAC, with some 2,400 personnel, reported it had targeted clearance of nearly 30km² in 2008 and fell short of that figure mainly as a result of cross-training 650 deminers on courses that included EOD and battle area clearance, mapping, and minefield management. CMAC expected the training to raise productivity, and in 2009 it targeted clearance of 35.1km². CMAC also worked with NPA in developing technical survey and land release protocols intended both to meet international standards and increase the rate of land release. GICHD also provided assistance on technical survey and land release.¹⁵⁰ In 2009, it was preparing its own five-year strategic plan (for 2009–2013) in parallel with its involvement in discussions on the Article 5 extension request and a new NMAS.¹⁵¹

CMAC set up eight battle area clearance teams in 2007 for its BHP Billiton contract. It also sees a long-term role in tackling ERW contamination as economic development and demand for land expand into areas mainly affected by ERW and in response to heightened international attention resulting from the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 2008, it moved demining teams from the western border with Thailand to eastern Cambodia, partly in response to US interest in funding clearance of ERW contamination resulting from US bombing in the 1970s.¹⁵²

HALO, with five international and some 1,200 national staff, operated about 100 eight-person manual clearance sections, two mechanical teams, three EOD teams, and eight survey teams. HALO concentrated operations on areas close to the Thai-Cambodian border with heavy concentrations of mines, including parts of the K5 mine belt,¹⁵³ and accounted for more than half (54%) the total antipersonnel mines cleared in 2008 (see table below). Productivity has been helped by use of HSTAMID detectors, which reduce the number of signals for investigation and are now used by 20 of its clearance sections.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁶ Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, Annex 4, p. 72.

¹⁴⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 213.

¹⁴⁸ Interviews with operators, Phnom Penh and Siem Reap, 30 March–1 April 2009.

¹⁴⁹ CMAA, “Minutes from Stakeholders’ Workshop on a National Mine Action Strategy,” Phnom Penh, undated but July 2009.

¹⁵⁰ Email from Pascal Rapillard, GICHD, 4 September 2009.

¹⁵¹ CMAC, “Integrated Work Plan 2009,” Phnom Penh, undated but 2009, pp. 6, 9–13.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 5 and 9–13; and interview with Heng Rattana, Director General, CMAC, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.

¹⁵³ Interview with Tim Porter, Program Manager, HALO, Siem Reap, 1 April 2009.

¹⁵⁴ HALO, “Mine clearance in Cambodia–2009,” January 2009, p. 12.

MAG continued to operate in northwestern Cambodia with around 500 staff, deploying 21 manual clearance teams, three mine detection dog teams, one technical survey team, seven community liaison teams, three brush-cutting teams, six mapping teams, and three research and development teams. It increased the number of EOD teams from five to seven, reflecting the demand for collecting ordnance from villagers. Operations benefited from wider use of brush-cutting trimmers and the use by two teams of dual sensor HSTAMIDS detectors. MAG also invested in new Minelab detectors after encountering difficulties with other equipment finding minimum-metal mines below depths of 7cm.¹⁵⁵

Demining in 2008¹⁵⁶

Demining operators	Mine clearance (km ²)	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed	UXO destroyed*	Area reduced or cancelled (km ²)
CMAC	27.65	25,543	497	114,101	201.52
HALO	6.97	37,542	215	8,308	90.35
MAG	3.24	4,538	119	19,813	190.29
NGO total	37.86	67,623	831	142,222	482.16
RCAF**	27.50	1,878	37	9,822	0
Total	65.36	69,501	868	152,044	482.16

* Operators do not distinguish in their reporting between UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance.

** It is not known how much of this total is area reduction or cancellation rather than physical clearance, but it is likely to be substantial.

Quality assurance/Quality control

The CMAA undertakes quality assurance (QA), supported by UNDP, which in 2007 contracted BACTEC to provide technical assistance. BACTEC's contract ended in mid-July 2009 when UNDP recruited a technical adviser to support QA.¹⁵⁷ In February 2008, the CMAA raised the number of QA teams from two to four, with two of them working from bases in the provinces (Battambang and Kampong Cham).¹⁵⁸ Operators reported QA teams had become more effective as they gained experience.¹⁵⁹ In a final report on its engagement, BACTEC observed "the entire CMAA organization is geared to react rather than to be proactive" and suffered from lack of funding, and weak administration and logistics.¹⁶⁰

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Cambodia is required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2010.

In April 2009, Cambodia submitted a request for a 10-year extension "commencing January 2010 and concluding December 2019." The request estimated the area requiring full manual clearance at 672km² necessitating annual clearance of about 80km² a year from 2011, more than double the annual clearance by NGOs in recent years, and costing a total of US\$529

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Rupert Leighton, Country Programme Manager, MAG, Phnom Penh, 30 March 2009; and email from Rupert Leighton, MAG, 23 March 2009.

¹⁵⁶ Emails from Eang Kamrang, Deputy Database Manager, CMAA, 7 and 20 April 2009; and CMAC, "Integrated Work Plan 2009," Phnom Penh, undated but 2009, p. 63.

¹⁵⁷ Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with Amb. Sam Sotha, CMAA, in Geneva, 2 June 2008; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 208–209.

¹⁵⁹ Interviews with operators, Phnom Penh, 28–30 April 2008.

¹⁶⁰ BACTEC, "End of Project Report," Phnom Penh, March/April 2009, pp. 6, 56.

million.¹⁶¹ Four months later in August 2009, Cambodia submitted a revised request that estimated 648.8km² of land required demining and projected the cost at \$330 million.

The revised request observed that the current capacity of demining organizations would clear some 470 km² and thus would be insufficient to complete clearance within 10 years. It added that “with a 38% increase of financial resources made available to the sector and a greater involvement of the RCAF in addressing the remaining challenge, productivity rates can be increased which may make completion of clearance of all known minefields within the extension period possible.” However, it warns that on current estimates “the problem for Cambodia will go beyond 2019 if funding levels do not increase” and acknowledges that competing demands for funding, locally and globally “will make it very challenging for Cambodia’s mine action sector to maintain the current capacities.”¹⁶²

The ICBL concluded that Cambodia would only be able to provide States Parties with a meaningful estimate of remaining mine contamination, workplan, and cost estimate after the results of the first phase of the Baseline Survey. ICBL recommended States Parties give Cambodia a two-year extension to allow for completion of the survey’s first phase and analysis of its findings.¹⁶³

Demining from 1999–2008

Year	Mine clearance (km ²)*	Area reduced or cancelled (km ²)
2008	37.86 (63.26)	482.16
2007	36.34 (55.3)	557.02
2006	35.4 (51.9)	303
2005	30.8 (40.6)	85.4
2004	18.9 (32.0)	0
2003	17.3 (41.7)	0
2002	17.6 (34.71)	0
2001	15.4 (21.87)	0
2000	12.18 (32.19)	0
1999	12.53 (N/R)	0
Total	234.31 (373.53)	1,427.58

* Brackets indicate clearance including RCAF’s reported results.

Risk Education

There are four main approaches to RE in Cambodia: message-based approaches (awareness-raising, public information, and education); livelihood/integrated mine action approaches; law enforcement and monitoring of the scrap metal trade; and community participation in mine action processes.¹⁶⁴ In 2008, RE was conducted by CMAC, Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports (MoEYS), National Police, CRC, clearance operators, and other NGOs. At the provincial level the Provincial Mine Action Committee prioritizes and coordinates messages.¹⁶⁵ CMVIS data informs operator activities.¹⁶⁶

Although the RE strategy aims to empower affected communities to identify appropriate and effective risk education/reduction approaches, the CMAA/UNICEF evaluation found that, “direct RE activities are still essentially awareness raising however with a focus on risk avoidance. The main strategy is information dissemination, targeting a broad target population, although some specific risk behaviours have been incorporated into the messages.”¹⁶⁷

¹⁶¹ Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, pp. 8, 54, 56–59.

¹⁶² Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, pp. 6, 56.

¹⁶³ ICBL, “ICBL critique of Cambodia’s Article 5 Deadline Extension Request,” May 2009, www.icbl.org.

¹⁶⁴ “Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia,” CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008, p. 24.

¹⁶⁵ Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.

¹⁶⁶ “Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia,” CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008, p. 8.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 6.

One method of RE delivery is through CMAC's program, "Community Based Mine UXO Risk Education and Reduction through national police and community resource mobilization."¹⁶⁸ Since late 2001, CMAC has operated networks that link communities to district authorities. Community-based Mine UXO Committees (MUCs), comprised of government employees and community volunteers, form a link with District Focal Points, which are members of the local authorities.¹⁶⁹ In the northwest, the approach is called community-based mine risk reduction (CBMRR). In the southeast, it is called community-based UXO risk reduction (CBURR), but this is less well developed at the community level.¹⁷⁰ The MUCs use Participatory Learning in Action to understand the problem and then work with development agencies and government authorities to incorporate mine action in the community development plan. Contamination reports are passed to the District Focal Points who request clearance from operators. An increase in CBURRs in 2008 resulted in an increase in spot UXO reports, which were usually met with a response.¹⁷¹ The MUCs also deliver RE messages through schools, and maintain minefield markings.¹⁷² Messages are cross-sectoral, along with HIV, gender issues, etc.¹⁷³ CMAC intends that every district in the country will have the capacity for community-based risk reduction.¹⁷⁴

RE continued to be included in the school curriculum in a project implemented by the MoEYS, with support from RE operators.¹⁷⁵ In 2008, directors and inspectors were trained and supported to observe teaching practices, interview children and parents to assess behavior change, and meet with teachers to provide advice and refresher training.¹⁷⁶

RE campaigns also take place at the district level on television and radio.¹⁷⁷

RE is well integrated into other components of mine action.¹⁷⁸ Clearance organizations conduct community liaison. MAG undertakes CL as a core activity that ensures affected communities are consulted and involved at every stage of the mine action process. EOD teams routinely provide informal RE on practicalities such as how to report mines or UXO, as well as safety briefings during clearance operations.¹⁷⁹ Challenges in 2008 included lack of resources and collecting reports from the MoEYS.¹⁸⁰

RE materials are shared among the implementing organizations, and are all in Khmer language. Informal evaluations of material are conducted at the MRE TWG meetings. The CMAA prepares materials for the army and police while other operators prepare their own.¹⁸¹

¹⁶⁸ CMAA, "Annual Activity Report, 1 January–31 December 2008, National Mine/UXO Risk Education and Risk Reduction Coordination in Cambodia," Phnom Penh, 2009, p. 8.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁵ "Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia," CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008, p. 24; and Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.

¹⁷⁶ CMAA, "Annual Activity Report, 1 January–31 December 2008, National Mine/UXO Risk Education and Risk Reduction Coordination in Cambodia," Phnom Penh, 2009, p. 17.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.

¹⁷⁸ "Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia," CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008, p. 34.

¹⁷⁹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ruth Bottomley, MAG, 6 July 2009.

¹⁸⁰ CMAA, "Annual Activity Report, 1 January–31 December 2008, National Mine/UXO Risk Education and Risk Reduction Coordination in Cambodia," Phnom Penh, 2009, p. 6.

¹⁸¹ Interview with Khuon Pheng, MRE Officer, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 2 July 2009.

RE Activities in 2008¹⁸²

Organization	Type	Type of activity	Location	No. of beneficiaries
CMAC	National organization	Five programs: Mine Risk Education and Reduction; Community-Based Mine Risk Reduction; Mass Media (television, radio); UXO Risk Reduction through Scrap Metal Dealers; and Community-Based UXO Risk Reduction	17 of the 24 affected provinces: Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Speu, Kampong Thom, Kandal, Kratie, Mondolkiri, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Preah Vihear, Prey Veng, Pursat, Ratanakiri, Siem Reap, Stueng Traeng, and Svay Rieng	434 CBMRR networks (total beneficiary numbers unavailable); CBURR network reached 89,908 beneficiaries including 397 scrap dealers/collectors
CRC	International organization	Volunteers working with fishermen, hunters, newcomers, wood collectors, veterans, scrap metal collectors, and in and out of school children; CMVIS project staff (employed by CRC); emergency RE where they collect data and where incidents have occurred, and on request from other operators in remote areas	All provinces	31,958
HALO	NGO	RE alongside clearance activities	Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, and Siem Reap	35,915
HI	NGO	RE in cooperation with the National Police, and development operators; focus on scrap metal trade	Pailin, Rattanak Mondoul, Sala Krau, and Samlot	1,534
MAG	NGO	Informal RE through community liaison staff, primarily during EOD tasks	Banteay, Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Pailin, and Preah Vihear	RE to 25,171, Community liaison to 27,233
MoEYS	Government	Trained members of the education system: school directors, district education officials, inspectors and staff of teacher training, planning and pedagogical departments	Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Speu, Kratie, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Preah Vihear, and Pursat	2,195 teachers and 145,377 students

¹⁸² Ibid, pp. 15, 17, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 36.

Organization	Type	Type of activity	Location	No. of beneficiaries
National Police	Government	Education RE laws pertaining to scrap metal and ERW RE by police UXO teams, gathering information about contamination	Seven target provinces: Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Speu, Kandal, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, and Siem Reap	35,516
RCAF	Military	RE alongside clearance activities, training of trainers	Provinces with ongoing demining	
Spirit of Soccer	NGO	RE through soccer training in schools; Limited RE delivered indirectly through disabled volleyball league according to CMAC	Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, and Pailin provinces	12,726 students
World Vision Cambodia	NGO	RE in communities through RE representatives; house-to-house visits; and RE during community meetings	Rattanak Mondoul, Samlot district of Battambang province, Rovieng district of Preah Vihear province	15 communities, 93 families through house-to-house visits

The CMAA/UNICEF external evaluation in October 2008 concluded: “the MRE sector in Cambodia has been remarkable in adapting its response to the different phases. Overall, coverage has been good with the most affected areas targeted. The program has also been effective in raising awareness and knowledge of risk avoidance strategies. Messages while relevant in the early stages of the program are less relevant in the current context and need some revision to ensure they are more contextually specific. Impact is harder to assess and it is difficult to gauge the extent to which MRE has resulted in changes to the reduction of mine/UXO risk taking behavior... A more targeted and cross-sectoral approach based on principles of Communication for Behavioural Impact (COMBI) will be needed to change behavior... MRE should also increasingly be integrated into wider development and clearance interventions with the ultimate aim of mine/UXO risk being perceived as a cross-cutting issue, integrated into overall safety strategies and managed by existing local government structures. This is a key strength of the CBMRR approach which could potentially be expanded to aid the transition to national ownership.”¹⁸³

Extensive mine awareness has been conducted in Cambodia for over 10 years. CMAC coordinated RE until 2000, when it became the role of the CMAA. RE has evolved with the recognition that awareness-raising alone was insufficient as people were driven to take risks through economic necessity.¹⁸⁴ Traditional mine awareness needed to broaden its approach to develop the capacity of communities to fully participate in mine action and providing RE. In 2004, UNICEF began to fund a full-time RE coordinator for the CMAA.¹⁸⁵ In 2005, a strategy was developed to improve integration of RE in mine action and community development, to strengthen national coordination, and to integrate RE in the school curriculum.¹⁸⁶ Because of the continued high rate of incidents, a revised strategy for 2006–2012 was developed, which

¹⁸³ “Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia,” CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008, p. 7.

¹⁸⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 446; and *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 403.

¹⁸⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 259.

¹⁸⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 220.

sought to empower affected communities to identify appropriate and effective RE/reduction approaches and integrate these efforts with broader humanitarian and development activities. In 2006, RE capacity increased, but beneficiary numbers decreased as RE increasingly targeted at-risk groups through integration with community development and small income-generation activities.¹⁸⁷

Victim Assistance

The national VA plan mentioned that households headed by a “person disabled by war or landmines live in poverty at levels almost three times higher than if the disability was due to other causes.”¹⁸⁸

Medical care is usually not free of charge and the cost of continuing care is especially prohibitive. Emergency transport is not widely available and the lack of roads in remote areas is also an obstacle. Emergency care to mine/ERW survivors is usually limited to government facilities. Complex trauma care is only provided by an Italian NGO, Emergency, in Battambang. Training of health staff is basic and coordination in the sector is limited. Under the Health Equity Funds, some medical costs can be covered, but this is not systematic for all persons with disabilities.¹⁸⁹

Physical rehabilitation services, run with the support of, or by, five international operators, are well organized and good quality, particularly for amputees. Accommodation, transport, and meals may also be included.¹⁹⁰ However, transport costs are often only reimbursed afterwards, which still poses problems for patients.¹⁹¹ Coordination among service providers is good.

The physical rehabilitation sector in Cambodia is under the authority of the MoSVY, which also provides limited assistance, including some government staff, minimal monetary contributions towards the operational costs, tax exemptions, land and buildings. However services are predominantly provided by international operators.¹⁹² The MoSVY started a process of taking over responsibility for the rehabilitation sector by the end of 2010 (see Plans section above) but the sector continued to operate almost exclusively on international funds.

A review in 2008 showed that the MoSVY on average completed 50% or less of its management, financial, and technical responsibilities, whereas the operators scored much higher.¹⁹³ Operators noted that the MoSVY had not started paying its small financial contribution (less than 5%) to the running costs of the centers as of April 2009. But their main concern was keeping staff who would now be paid at government salary levels that are much lower than those they previously received and who might not meet civil service criteria for employment.¹⁹⁴ The ICRC foresaw fewer challenges as it already worked with government staff on government salaries, although it did pay incentives.¹⁹⁵

As in previous years, there were 11 physical rehabilitation centers and orthopedic workshops covering 24 provinces. But operators noted that this number might decline after 2011 due to decreasing donor commitments. It was estimated the MoSVY would not have the financial

¹⁸⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, p. 403; *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 446; *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 259; *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 220; *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 259; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 277.

¹⁸⁸ Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011,” Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 6.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁹⁰ Kingdom of Cambodia, “National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011,” Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 18.

¹⁹¹ Landmine Monitor interviews with survivors, Pursat, 5 April 2009; and Kampong Thom, 9 April 2009; and interview with Sok Sophorn, HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009.

¹⁹² Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 7 September 2009.

¹⁹³ “The 3-Year Physical Rehabilitation Working Project (Review of responsibilities to be completed in 2008),” Phnom Penh, 26 March 2009.

¹⁹⁴ Interviews with VI, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009; HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; and UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

¹⁹⁵ Interview with Yann Drouet, ICRC, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

capacity to completely manage the centers after 2011 and that further international contributions would be needed.¹⁹⁶ Only HI-B envisioned exiting by 2011, and HI-F handed over the Spinal Cord Injury Centre to the MoSVY in December 2008. However, the MoSVY started its financial contributions only in April 2009,¹⁹⁷ severely hampering the center's operations.¹⁹⁸ Operators also noted that there was an over-concentration of centers near Phnom Penh¹⁹⁹ and improvements could be made in outreach and referral.²⁰⁰

Community-based rehabilitation services under the MoSVY and with UNICEF financial and technical support expanded to 19 provinces by 2009. UNICEF was also finalizing guidelines for community-based organizations.²⁰¹ The physical rehabilitation services also extended their services to include community-based rehabilitation activities such as on-the-spot repairs of assistive devices, patient follow-up and referral and home care.²⁰²

As of 2008, there was no national mechanism to provide psychological or psychiatric support. Some limited services are offered through the Ministry of Health's mental health units or referral hospitals, but they do not function well. There is only one facility providing training for health staff on basic psychological issues. After reviewing performance of province and district branches of the MoSVY, it was considered necessary to develop a psychosocial support policy. NGOs providing psychosocial support and activities were expanded through the community-based rehabilitation network and the development of self-help groups.²⁰³ The number of self-help groups continued to grow, providing psychosocial peer support, economic benefits and awareness-raising. Most self-help groups are supported by NGOs, but these did not coordinate sufficiently and exchanges of experiences were lacking.²⁰⁴

Few persons with disabilities have access to education and survivors can often not afford education for their children. Efforts were made to improve this through the MoEYS. The Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training is responsible for vocational training centers, but services for persons with disabilities at these centers need strengthening. Vocational training and economic reintegration for survivors are carried out mostly by NGOs, but the success rate of job placements is low.²⁰⁵ Cambodia noted in its Article 7 report for 2008 that, "many [economic reintegration] projects have been postponed or ended due to the lack of funding."²⁰⁶

On 3 July 2009, the King of Cambodia signed the Law for the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of People with Disabilities.²⁰⁷ The law was first drafted in 2000, redrafted in 2004, and submitted to the government in 2006.²⁰⁸ All actors in Cambodia stated that having approved legislation was crucial to improved VA and disability implementation. The Cambodia Disabled People's Organization (CDPO) acknowledged, however, that some amendments

¹⁹⁶ Interviews with VI, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009; HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

¹⁹⁷ Email from Marie-Pierre Guicherd, HI-F, 4 September 2009.

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Ung Sambath, Program Officer, DAC, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.

¹⁹⁹ Interviews with VI, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009; and ICRC, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

²⁰⁰ Kingdom of Cambodia, "National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011," Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 19.

²⁰¹ Interview with Plong Chhaya, UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

²⁰² Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, ICRC, 7 September 2009.

²⁰³ Kingdom of Cambodia, "National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011," Phnom Penh, February 2009, p. 22; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 220.

²⁰⁴ Interviews with UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; VI, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; DDSF, Pursat, 5 April 2009; and with survivors in Pursat, 5 April 2009, and Kampong Thom, 9 April 2009.

²⁰⁵ Statement by Thong Vinal, DAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009; and Kingdom of Cambodia, "National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011," Phnom Penh, February 2009, pp 25–26, 31.

²⁰⁶ Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J. Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration (Cambodia and New Zealand), "Status of Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention in the 26 Relevant States Parties 2005–2008," Geneva, 28 November 2008, pp. 10–11.

²⁰⁷ Email from Thong Vinal, DAC, 8 July 2009.

²⁰⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 221; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 272.

were needed to bring the legislation in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.²⁰⁹ Cambodia signed this convention and its Optional Protocol on 1 October 2007, but had not ratified as of 1 July 2009. Social and employment discrimination remained considerable.²¹⁰ Buildings remained inaccessible.²¹¹

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Cambodia is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.²¹² As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Cambodia presented its objectives in 2005;²¹³ most of these objectives were not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) criteria.²¹⁴ At the end of 2008, revised objectives and plans to achieve the objectives were presented in the form of the National Plan for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011.²¹⁵

As the 2009–2011 VA plan was only finalized in early 2009, some operators who had been consulted had not yet received the final plan.²¹⁶ Others found it too early to comment on its implementation. However, they noted that their activities were in line with the plan.²¹⁷ Some noted that a further implementation plan was needed and that implementation of the plan would probably be limited to what is realistically feasible.²¹⁸ Another main challenge would be to find funding for the plan.²¹⁹

When looking at the 2005–2009 objectives, uneven progress was made:

- Data collection: CMVIS activities continued throughout, but the survey of assistance received by survivors was not conducted.
- Emergency and continuing medical care: no progress reported on specific health sector strategy development or on the plan to provide free hospital care for survivors.
- Physical rehabilitation: services functioned adequately, but long-term national sustainability remained questionable (see above).
- Psychological support and social reintegration: plans and guidelines for psycho-social support were not developed.
- Economic reintegration: self-help groups were established, but income generation, employment and educational opportunities did not increase.
- Laws and public policy: the draft disability law was adopted and the VA action plan was developed, but other legislation was not under revision and there was limited disability awareness.

²⁰⁹ Interview with Ngin Saorath, CDPO, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

²¹⁰ US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cambodia,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

²¹¹ Statement by Thong Vinal, DAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

²¹² UN, “Final Report, First Review Conference,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99.

²¹³ “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties/Zagreb Progress Report,” Zagreb, 28 November–2 December 2005, APLC/MSP.6/2005/5, 5 April 2006, Part II, Annex V, pp. 122–128.

²¹⁴ Statement of Cambodia on Victim Assistance and National Objectives, Ottawa Convention Implementation and Universalization Workshop, Bali, Indonesia, 25–27 February 2008.

²¹⁵ Statement of Cambodia, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.

²¹⁶ Interview with Pheng Samnang, Director, DDSP, Pursat, 5 April 2009.

²¹⁷ Interviews with DDSP, Pursat, 5 April 2009; HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; AAR, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and Rudi Kohnert, then Country Representative, Austcare, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and email from Meas Vicheth, OEC, 10 July 2009.

²¹⁸ Interviews with UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; DAC, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; and CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.

²¹⁹ Interview with Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Cambodia mentioned progress on establishing the National Disability Coordination Committee, recruitment of the disability advisor, the memorandum of understanding between the CMAA and CMVIS, and legislative progress. Challenges were also mentioned, but there was no discussion of implementation.²²⁰

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007, Cambodia assumed the role of co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. Cambodia included a VA/disability expert on its delegation to meetings of States Parties from 2006–2008, and at the intersessional Standing Committee Meetings in 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2009. It also reported on VA in its annual Article 7 report and at meetings every year from 2005–2009.²²¹

Victim assistance activities

Numerous organizations are active in the disability/VA sector. Only those that provided updated information for 2008 are included below. More detail on their activities and on other organizations is mentioned in previous Landmine Monitor reports and a listing is available from DAC.²²²

2008 VA activities²²³

Organization	Type	Activities	Number of mine survivors assisted
ARC	NGO	Support to partners including the CRC, CMVIS, and Landmine Survivors Assistance Fund (small grants)	See partners CRC and CMVIS
Association for Aid and Relief (AAR)	NGO	Vocational training	649 persons with disabilities (289 survivors), living standard of 70% increased
Austcare	NGO	Referral, economic reintegration self-help groups (with CDPO), awareness	338 survivors (215 income generation and 123 referral); total beneficiaries: 385

²²⁰ Statement by Thong Vinal, DAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

²²¹ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration (Cambodia and New Zealand), “Status of Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention in the 26 Relevant States Parties 2005–2008,” Geneva, 28 November 2008, pp. 10–11. A VA expert also participated at the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South East Asia.

²²² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 224.

²²³ Email from Teresa Carney, ARC, 3 July 2009; ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 7 May 2009, pp. 36–37; information provided by email from Plong Chhaya, UNICEF, 13 July 2009; interview with Josefina McAndrew, VI, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; MoSVY-DAC, “Physical Rehabilitation Statistics 2008,” VI, July 2009; interview with Sok Sophorn, HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009; annual rehabilitation statistics for 2008 provided by Sok Sophorn, 8 April 2009; email from Prum Sovann, Rehabilitation Programme Manager, CT, Phnom Penh, 13 July 2009; email from Meas Vicheth, OEC, 10 July 2009; interview with David Aston, Founder, CWARS, Phnom Penh, 5 April 2009; email from Mao Kong, Assistant Managing Director, CWARS, 14 July 2009; email from Ket Chanto, WVC, Phnom Penh, 14 July 2009; information provided by sectors of Jesuit Service and received by email from Denise Coghlan, Country Director, Jesuit Service, Phnom Penh, 25 April 2009; interview with and email from Huoy Socheat, AAR, Phnom Penh, 6 April and 8 July 2009; interview with and email from Pheng Samnang, DDSP, Pursat, 5 April and 8 July 2009; email from Theap Bunthourn, Provincial Coordinator (Oddar Meanchey), Austcare, 2 July 2009; email from Dara Chan, Community-based Rehabilitation Coordinator; CDMD, 9 July 2009; interview with and email from Ngin Saorath, CDPO, Phnom Penh, 7 April and 13 July 2009; email from Stan Brabant, Head of Policy Unit, HI-B, 8 September 2009; and email from Marie-Pierre Guicherd, HI-F, 4 September 2009.

Organization	Type	Activities	Number of mine survivors assisted
Cambodia Trust (CT)	NGO	Physical rehabilitation, training, economic reintegration	Mobility devices for 625 survivors; physical rehabilitation for 1,590; income generation for 185; vocational training for 149; educational support for 365 (all survivors); total beneficiaries: 6,432.
Cambodian Development Mission for Disability	NGO	Comprehensive community-based rehabilitation	48 survivors; total beneficiaries: 5,948.
Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society	NGO	Economic reintegration	Vocational training for 716 survivors and loans to 101; total beneficiaries: 991.
Capacity Building of People with Disabilities in Community Orgs.	NGO	Referral, awareness, educational support	
Cambodian Disabled People's Organization	DPO	National coordination	Policy and representing persons with disabilities nationally and in 20 provinces through 34 DPOs; 9,603 members (1,267 survivors)
CMVIS	National organization	Referral, material aid, transport and medical costs and disability awareness	21 survivors received transport or medical costs, 9 house repairs, 80 referrals, 16 funeral aid, 41 emergency food kits, 412 awareness
CRC	National society	Micro-finance loans and material aid	100 loan beneficiaries, 80 latrines and water filters, and 60 water tanks
Disability Development Services Pursat (DDSP)	NGO	Self-help groups, economic reintegration, referral, community-based rehabilitation	Multiple services for 98 survivors (various community-based rehabilitation for 20, social reintegration for 98, income-generating activities for 32); total beneficiaries: 1,015
Economic and Social Relaunch of Northwest Provinces in Cambodia	NGO	Agriculture training	31 survivors; total beneficiaries: unknown
Emergency	NGO	Medical care	95 survivors; total beneficiaries: unknown

Organization	Type	Activities	Number of mine survivors assisted
HI-B	NGO	Physical rehabilitation, partner support, extensive community-based rehabilitation	1,263 mobility devices produced; 2,484 repaired (55% for survivors in Siem Reap); 71 survivors included in self-help groups. Total beneficiaries: 5, 037.
HI-F	NGO	Physical rehabilitation, livelihood project	436 survivors assisted at rehabilitation center (170 prostheses provided); 254 survivors part of livelihood project
ICRC	International organization	Physical rehabilitation	1,675 prostheses (86% for survivors) and 1,394 orthoses (2.5% for survivors); total beneficiaries: 10,201
Jesuit Service Cambodia	NGO	Economic reintegration, rehabilitation, peer support, awareness, material support and referral	10 persons with disabilities received vocational training; 902 peer support; 85 access to education/accommodation; 1,012 wheelchairs; 63 tricycles; 1,512 referrals; total beneficiaries: unknown
National Center for Disabled Persons	NGO	Referral, education, awareness, self-help groups	Awareness for 1,832 and support to 30 self-help groups.
Opération Enfants du Cambodge	NGO	Home-based physical rehabilitation, education and economic reintegration	825 survivors received multiple services and 1,571 children of survivors were assisted; total beneficiaries: 2,926
Veterans International	NGO	Physical rehabilitation, self-help, economic reintegration	3,686 mobility devices including 1,560 repairs (45% for survivors); total beneficiaries: 5,870
World Vision Cambodia	NGO	Self-help groups	105 persons with disabilities; total beneficiaries: 1,059 households

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive cost estimates for all areas of mine action, including RE and VA, in Cambodia. Its revised Article 5 deadline extension request, estimated the cost of clearance of some 470km² up to 2019 at \$329.4 million, climbing from \$22 million in 2010 to \$28.7 million in 2014, \$35.2 million in 2017, and \$40.3 million in 2019. The total cost of completing clearance of the estimated 648.8km² of remaining mine contaminated land was put at \$455 million.²²⁴ Because the real extent and nature of contamination in Cambodia remains to be determined, cost estimates are expected to change as results of the Baseline Survey become known. The extension request does not include detailed resource mobilization strategies or plans.

²²⁴ Article 5 deadline Extension request (Revision), 24 August 2009, p. 55.

National support for mine action

In its CCW Article 13 report submitted in April 2008, Cambodia reported national funding to mine action of \$1,550,000 in 2007, which was the same amount as reported in 2006.²²⁵ Cambodia's revised Article 5 extension request reported national contributions had increased from an initial \$200,000 in 2003 to \$3.5 million in 2009 and totaled nearly \$11 million for 2003–2009. The request adds that external funding will “continue to play a crucial role in supporting mine action.”²²⁶

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, 14 countries reported providing \$28,072,304 (€19,063,088) to mine action in Cambodia, 8% less than reported in 2007. While the full extent of contamination and the total number of landmine survivors are unknown, funding at 2008 levels—combining reported international and national funding—is not sufficient to meet the financial requirements for 2010–2019 cited in Cambodia's Article 5 extension request, or to address the country's substantial victim assistance needs.

In addition to the above, New Zealand reported contributing to capacity development through the CMAC training center in 2008, but did not provide a value for its contribution.²²⁷ HI-F reported funding to support VA programs from the European Commission (EC) (\$439,589) and France (\$64,412) in 2008.²²⁸ Neither the EC nor France reported funding to Cambodia in 2008.

In March 2009, Japan reported ¥548 million (roughly \$5.5 million) in new funding to support the purchase of clearance equipment in Cambodia. The funding comprises phase five of a support agreement between Japan and CMAC, and the equipment includes mine detectors, mine/UXO detectors, and spare parts.²²⁹

International support by Cambodia for mine action

Cambodia has provided three contingents of demining personnel to UN Peacekeeping operations in Sudan since 2006 (see Demining section above).²³⁰ In June 2009, a contingent of 52 demining personnel were sent to Sudan to replace returning personnel.²³¹ Cambodia receives funding from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) assessed budget (independent of donor contributions earmarked for mine action) in order to defray the costs of its mine action support in Sudan.²³² Cambodia receives funding from the UN DPKO assessed budget (independent of donor contributions earmarked for mine action) in order to defray the costs of its mine action support in Sudan.²³³ Cambodia did not report the value of these contributions in 2008 or 2009.

²²⁵ CCW Article 13 Report, Form E, submitted 2 April 2008.

²²⁶ Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, pp. 38, 56.

²²⁷ Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.

²²⁸ Email from Marie-Pierre Guicherd, HI France, 4 September 2009.

²²⁹ “Exchange of Notes for Japan's ODA Loan and Grant Aid,” 18 March 2009, Japan Embassy in Cambodia, www.kh.emb-japan.go.jp.

²³⁰ “2nd batch of Cambodian deminers return from UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan,” *Xinhua* (Phnom Penh), 10 June 2008, news.xinhuanet.com.

²³¹ “52 Cambodian soldiers join demining operations in Sudan,” *Sudan Tribune* (Phnom Penh), 10 June 2009, www.sudantribune.com.

²³² Email from Pascal Rapillard, GICHD, 4 September 2009.

²³³ *Ibid.*

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Cambodia: Monetary²³⁴

Donor	Implementing Agencies/ Organizations	Project Details	Amount
Australia	UNDP, Austcare, Australian Volunteers International, ARC, World Vision, and International Women's Development Agency	Mine clearance, capacity development, integrated mine action, VA	\$6,163,862 (A\$7,220,173)
Japan	CMAC, HALO, Japan Mine Action Service	Mine clearance, EOD, capacity-building	\$5,936,996
US	CMAC/CMAA, HALO, MAG, Golden West, NPA, Spirit of Soccer	Mine/ERW clearance, capacity-building, RE, VA, advanced technology (HSTAMIDS and explosive harvesting)	\$4,117,000
United Kingdom	MAG, HALO	Mine clearance	\$3,510,359 (£1,892,887)
Canada	Geospatial International, UNDP	Clearance, agricultural development in mine-affected areas	\$2,702,240 (C\$2,880,546)
Finland	FinnChurchAid, HALO, HI	Mine clearance, VA	\$1,568,319 (€1,065,000)
Germany	CMAC	Mine clearance	\$1,197,283 (€813,040)
Spain	UNDP	Mine clearance	\$1,104,450 (€750,000)
Ireland	HALO	Mine clearance	\$736,300 (€500,000)
Netherlands	NPA	Unspecified	\$515,410 (€350,000)
Belgium	HI	VA	\$294,520 (€200,000)
Luxembourg	HI	VA	\$154,605 (€104,988)
Norway	Unspecified	Miss Landmine Cambodia	\$70,960 (NOK400,000)
Total			\$28,072,304 (€19,063,088)

²³⁴ Emails from Kathleen Bombell, Mine Action Unit, AUSAID, 21 July 2009; and Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation; US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009," Washington, DC, July 2009; emails from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; and Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2009; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; emails from David Keating, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2009; and Daniel Gengler, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2009; Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; and emails from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; and Stacy Davis, Public Engagement, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 2 September 2009.