

IRAQ

2008 Key Data

State Party since	1 February 2008
Contamination	Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW including cluster munition remnants
Estimated area of contamination	No credible estimate for entire country; 1,730km ² in 13 governorates (2006 Iraq Landmine Impact Survey results)
Casualties in 2008	263 (2007: 216)
Estimated mine/ERW survivors	Unknown
Demining in 2008	15.74km ² of battle areas 9.4km ² of mined areas
Risk education recipients in 2008	At least 134,000
Support for mine action in 2008	International: \$35.9 million (2007: \$37.2 million) National: Unknown (2007: estimated \$15 million)

Ten-Year Summary

The government of Saddam Hussein did not engage in the global effort to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It used antipersonnel mines prior to the 2003 Coalition invasion, and also continued to produce mines until 2003 when its capacity was destroyed. Coalition forces did not use antipersonnel mines, but did use large numbers of cluster munitions. The Iraqi government that was subsequently formed became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 February 2008. Since 2003, there has been a dramatic increase in the use and sophistication of command-detonated improvised explosive devices by Iraqi insurgents, as well as some sporadic use of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

Since 2003, mine action in the north has continued steadily and attracted growing interest from commercial companies, but in the rest of Iraq efforts to configure an effective mine action response to extensive mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination have faltered as a result of the lack of security and a complex political environment. According to the UN, mine action activities in Iraq have not received the necessary attention and priority of the government.

Iraq has a significant number of mine/ERW casualties, but due to continuous conflict and a lack of data collection, the figures are unknown. Landmine Monitor identified more than 5,000 casualties occurring between 1999 and 2008.

Mine/ERW risk education (RE) has been conducted in the north since before 1999, and limited RE was conducted in the south by the ICRC and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society from 2001. In 2008, RE was adequate in the north, but remained inadequate in the center and south, and was implemented by NGOs and regional mine action centers with support from UNICEF.

Through its initial Article 7 report in 2008, Iraq declared being responsible for significant numbers of survivors, and therefore also having the greatest needs and expectations for assistance. It thus became the 26th State Party in the VA26 group, whose members have significant numbers of mine survivors and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors. Services for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities were limited in Iraq and varied regionally, with significantly more services and capacity in northern Iraq than elsewhere. Assistance to survivors was hampered

by years of conflict and sanctions, and deteriorated since 2003. No national victim assistance (VA) or disability strategies or coordination capacity existed, further exacerbating the situation.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2008. Since 2004, government representatives indicated on many occasions that Iraq was favorably inclined toward the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

Iraq has not reported any national legal measures or implementation legislation for mine action. It is not known if new national implementation legislation is being pursued or if existing laws are considered adequate.²

Iraq submitted its initial Article 7 report on 31 July 2008, covering the period until 31 July 2008. It submitted its second report on 8 May 2009, covering the period from 1 August 2008 to 31 December 2008.

Iraq attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008 in Geneva where it made a statement on mine clearance. Iraq also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it made a statement on the status of implementation of Article 5 on mine clearance, highlighting its need for international cooperation and assistance to fulfill its obligations.

Iraq has not yet made its views known on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty that have been widely discussed by other States Parties. These issues include joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training.

Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It attended as an observer the Oslo Signing Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but has not yet signed the convention.³

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 Coalition invasion. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign.⁴ In its initial transparency report in 2008, Iraq reported that the Al Qaqa Factory that “produced anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines before the 2003 war...has been completely destroyed during the 2003 war and there is no intention from the side of the Iraqi Government to reconstruct this facility.”⁵ Landmine Monitor is not aware of any mine transfers from Iraq since the 1990s.

¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 436. Iraq voted in favor of each annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty since 2004, when it first became eligible to vote.

² In the report submitted in 2009, Article 7 report, Form A on national implementation measures is blank. In the report submitted in 2008, Form A only refers to the legal framework for mine action.

³ For details on cluster munition policy and practice, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice*, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, pp. 211–212.

⁴ Landmine Monitor (HRW) interview with Mowafak Ayoub, Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 10 February 2004. Iraqi and US sources requesting anonymity indicated that the Aloa’oa’a and Hutten factories in Alexandria and the Aloudisie factory in Al Youssfiz were destroyed. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 886–887, for details on previous production. In 2005, Landmine Monitor removed Iraq from its list of countries producing antipersonnel mines or reserving the right to produce them, following the destruction of Iraq’s production facilities and the government’s statements in support of banning antipersonnel mines.

⁵ Article 7 Report, Form E, 31 July 2008. The report also states: “The PMN Anti-Personnel mine was produced in this factory. Shortly before the war of 2003 however, a defect in these mines resulted in restricting the use of these mines. As far as can be determined, the stocks of these mines in military ammunition dumps have been dealt with by the US Corps of Military Engineering Conventional Munitions Destruction Project. Iraq also developed the capacity to produce Valmara 69 mines but apparently this capacity was never used to physically produce Valmara mines.”

Iraq's treaty deadline for destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 February 2012. Iraq did not include any information on stockpiles or destruction in its Article 7 report submitted in May 2009.⁶ In its initial Article 7 report, Iraq stated that it did not hold stockpiles of antipersonnel mines and that "this matter will be further investigated and if required, corrected in the next report."⁷ It also said, "If such stockpiled [antipersonnel mines] APMs are identified during further investigation of the matter, appropriate plans will be developed for the destruction of such and it will be reported in the next Article 7 Report."⁸ Landmine Monitor has previously noted that Iraq was believed to stockpile, at some point, mines manufactured by Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union, and the United States, in addition to Iraqi-manufactured mines.

From May 2008 to July 2009, according to Coalition press releases and local media reports, Iraqi forces recovered at least 41 antipersonnel mines in weapons caches. More than 1,800 "landmines" and "mines," type unknown, were also reported to have been recovered by Iraqi forces, as well as more than 300 antivehicle and Claymore-type mines.⁹ The Central, Northern, and Baghdad Multi-National Divisions were also reported to have recovered antipersonnel, antivehicle, Claymore, and unidentified mines.¹⁰ The jurisdiction over and arrangements for antipersonnel mines collected by multinational forces is not clear. The Iraqi government has not reported on these recovered mines or their destruction in its Article 7 reports.

In November 2008, the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program ended after destroying more than 822,980 kg of munitions from more than 100 weapons storage facilities of the Saddam Hussein regime and 10,000 smaller caches reportedly created shortly before the 2003 invasion.¹¹ An unknown number of landmines were among the weapons destroyed.¹²

According to a November 2005 American Forces Press Service (AFPS) news article, a total of 410,000 mines captured in Iraq and another 100,000 mines shipped to Iraq from the US were used to help blow up other weapons.¹³ The type of mine (antipersonnel or antivehicle) was not specified.

Mines retained for research and training

In its initial Article 7 report, Iraq indicated it was retaining 1,234 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes.¹⁴ In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, it appears to indicate that 297 mines are retained. The change in number is not explained.

Iraq reported that for the period from 1 August to 31 December 2008, the NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) retained 288 antipersonnel mines for "training and as targets during clearance operations and possible use as donor charges." Of these, the report noted that 36 PMN mines

⁶ Iraq's Article 7 report contains a blank form on stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Article 7 Report, Form B, 8 May 2009.

⁷ Article 7 Report, Form B, 31 July 2008.

⁸ Ibid, Form F. Landmine Monitor had previously noted that the size of Iraq's mine stockpile will be difficult to determine, given the dispersal of ammunition storage areas around the country. Mines and a full range of ammunition were dispersed to storage locations across the country and subsequently abandoned as the Iraq army disintegrated after the March 2003 invasion.

⁹ Landmine Monitor monitoring of Multi-National Force-Iraq press releases and additional media reports, 1 May 2008–1 July 2009, www.mnf-iraq.com.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ The caches were reportedly placed in residential areas, mosques, hospitals, and schools under the assumption that Coalition forces would not target these areas. Munitions recovered in the future will be collected and destroyed in a central location somewhere near Baghdad. Debra Valine, "Ordnance clearance mission in Iraq ends, new mission emerges," *ARNews* (Army News Service), US Army Corps of Engineers, 24 November 2008, www.globalsecurity.org. See also, Col. Mark D. Klingelhofer, "Captured Enemy Ammunition in Operation Iraqi Freedom and its Strategic Importance in Post-Conflict Operations," US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 18 March 2005, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.

¹² Ret. Col. George Zahaczewsky, "Destroying the 'Mother of All Arsenals': Captured Enemy Ammunition Operations in Iraq," *Journal of Mine Action*, Issue 9.2, February 2006, maic.jmu.edu.

¹³ Elaine Eliah, "U.S. Contractors Work to Destroy, Recycle Munitions in Iraq," *AFPS*, Baghdad, 10 November 2005, www.gulag.net.

¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 July 2008.

retained by MAG were “buried in the MDD [mine detection dog] training and accreditation area at Chamchamal.”¹⁵ UNDP also retained nine mines for training.¹⁶ The Ministry of the Environment/Regional Mine Action Center was reported to have transferred and destroyed 153 retained antipersonnel mines.¹⁷ Iraq did not report on any mines retained by the Ministry of Interior or the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), which it had previously listed as retaining antipersonnel mines in its initial Article 7 report.

Use

In the ongoing armed conflict, there have been no reports of new mine-laying by Iraqi government military forces. There have never been confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by Coalition forces.¹⁸

Non-state armed groups

Despite documented cases of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines between May 2008 and 1 July 2009, Landmine Monitor found no confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by the insurgency. In April 2009, a US soldier died when reportedly a mine detonated near him during combat operations near Baghdad.¹⁹ The type of mine was not known nor whether it was recently placed. Civilians continue to be killed by mines laid in previous years (see Casualties section below).

Insurgent forces have used command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in large numbers. An IED that is victim-activated—one that explodes on contact by a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated—where the user decides when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been frequently referred to in media reports as “landmines.”

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Iraq is massively affected by landmines and ERW, the result of internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War (first Gulf War), and the conflict that has continued since the 2003 invasion by the US-led Coalition. Since then, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other IEDs on civilians, the military, and the police indicate the huge amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. Much of this AXO has subsequently been plundered and is assisting ongoing insurgencies. A joint report by UNICEF and UNDP issued in 2009 observed that the task of clearance “might take decades to complete.”²⁰

The first phase of the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented in 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in 2004–2006 and published in August 2007, found 1,622 communities affected by 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 1,730km² of land. Five governorates could not be surveyed because of insecurity. Moreover, there is substantial contamination in uninhabited areas or areas that were depopulated in the course of recent wars: this is not reported in the ILIS (which was based on community interviews).²¹

¹⁵ Ibid, 8 May 2009. MAG holds 12 types (40 PMN; 2 SB 33; 2 M14; 12 V69; 1 VST; 121 VS-50; 61 Type 72; 40 TS 50; 4 PSM 1; 1 PRBM 413; 1 VAR 40; and 3 POMZ.)

¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Form D, 8 May 2009.

¹⁷ Ibid. The Ministry of Environment/Regional Center of the South transferred and destroyed 149 VS-50 and 4 M14 mines.

¹⁸ As of July 2009, only the US maintained foreign armed forces in Iraq. US forces will remain in Iraq until 2011 under a status of forces agreement between the US and Iraq. The agreement contains no references to Iraq’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, for example, reporting on antipersonnel mines stockpiled or seized by the US forces, and disposition of seized mines. “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq,” ratified version, 17 November 2008.

¹⁹ “US and Coalition Casualties, Iraq,” *CNN*, www.cnn.com.

²⁰ UNICEF/UNDP, “Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq,” June 2009.

²¹ iMMAP, “Landmine Impact Survey: The Republic of Iraq, 2004–2006,” Washington, DC, August 2007, p. 88.

Preliminary results of a second phase of the ILIS covering the remaining five governorates, which started in 2008 and was still continuing in September 2009, indicate that of nearly 3,000 communities visited, only 86 remain contaminated (see Identification of hazardous areas below). More than 1,000 communities were previously affected, but contamination has been cleared by local actors, military forces, and/or humanitarian mine action implementers.²²

Border minefields alone have been estimated by one source to total an area of 6,370km².²³ Iraq's initial Article 7 report states that Iraqi forces emplaced more than 18 million mines on the border with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and another one million mines ahead of both the first Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.²⁴

Types of contamination and impact vary significantly between regions. The northern Kurdish governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah comprise one of the world's most heavily mine-contaminated areas, particularly along borders with Iran and Turkey and along the Green Line—the former frontline between Kurdish forces and former President Saddam Hussein's army. All three governorates also suffer from UXO contamination.

South-central Iraq is particularly affected by cluster munition remnants and unexploded air and ground ordnance. In the First Gulf War alone, US-led forces dropped 15 million submunitions and the failure rate of the cluster munitions used is unknown.²⁵ The 2003 invasion resulted in extensive further contamination along the routes followed in the advance on Baghdad.

Other governorates bordering Iran also have minefields dating from the 1980–1988 war and some newer mines were laid by Saddam Hussein's army on the border with Saudi Arabia before the 2003 invasion in Muthanna governorate. However, many villages in these areas are abandoned.²⁶

Casualties²⁷

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 263 new casualties due to mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs in Iraq, including 81 people killed, 159 injured, and 23 of unknown status.²⁸ Of these casualties, 39 were recorded by the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA), 42 by IKMAA, and 46 by the Kurdish Organization for Rehabilitation of the Disabled (KORD) in northern Iraq, and the rest (136) were identified through media monitoring, including by the NGO Iraq Body Count. Under-reporting is certain, as there is no systematic casualty data collection, particularly in southern and central Iraq.

At least 139 of the casualties were civilian, seven deminers, 47 security forces, and 70 unknown. Men were the largest casualty group (147, 84 civilians), 41 casualties were children (10 boys, remainder unknown), and nine were women. For the remainder, age and gender information was unknown. Some 45% of casualties were caused by ERW (118, including four cluster submunitions casualties), mines caused 106 casualties (including five due to antipersonnel mines), and victim-activated IEDs caused 39 casualties. Incidents were recorded in 12 governorates. Since there is no data collection mechanism in southern or central Iraq, most casualties were recorded in northern Iraq: 59 in Sulaymaniyah, and 42 in Erbil and Dahuk. KORD also recorded 19 casualties from

²² Email from Joe Donahue, Chief Executive Officer, iMMAP, 9 September 2009.

²³ Mine Action Support Group (MASG), "UNDP Country Briefing on Iraq," New York, January 2005.

²⁴ Article 7 Report, Form C, 31 July 2008.

²⁵ Interview with Kent Paulusson, Senior Mine Action Advisor for Iraq, UNDP, Amman, 10 March 2008.

²⁶ See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 438.

²⁷ Unless noted otherwise, Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty information (1999–2009), provided by email from Soran Majeed, Victim Assistance Officer, GDMA, 15 June 2009; Niazi Argoshi, Director General of Technical Affairs, IKMAA, 24 June 2009; Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, Executive Director, KORD, 17 June 2009; John Sloboda, Executive Director, Iraq Body Count/Oxford Research Group, 14 April 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring, 1 January 2008–16 June 2009.

²⁸ Due to the lack of detail and standard terminology in media articles, many incidents were excluded. Unspecified landmines were only included when sufficient detail was available to exclude remote-detonated attacks; IEDs were only considered victim-activated when a person triggered the explosion, for example by stepping on it or by touching it. A common and gruesome tactic is to attach IEDs to corpses or emplace IEDs in houses which explode when a person enters the house.

Diyala and 19 additional casualties were recorded in booby-trapped houses in Diyala.²⁹ When known, the most common activities at the time of the incident were security/military (46), traveling (38) handling devices (31), and tending animals (20).

Almost all casualties of victim-activated devices identified in 2008 were Iraqi (261), while one was a US soldier and one an Israeli volunteer in the US Army. IEDs caused numerous casualties among foreign troops but most IED incidents were caused by remote-detonated devices. For example, 124 US military were killed by IEDs as reported on the US Department of Defense website in 2008.³⁰

The 2008 casualty rate is an increase compared to 2007 when 216 casualties were recorded (101 killed, 114 injured, and one unknown). This increase is partly due to improved casualty data collection in northern Iraq and the increased level of detail in records compiled by Iraq Body Count.

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009 with at least 45 casualties to 16 June 2009 (17 killed, 24 injured, and four unknown). Of these, the GDMA recorded seven, IKMAA 11, and KORD five; the others were identified through Landmine Monitor media monitoring. At least 42 of the casualties were civilian, including 23 children. Two casualties were deminers and one was a US soldier. All were Iraqis except the US soldier. ERW caused 23 casualties, mines 21, and one casualty was caused by a victim-activated IED. At least 16 casualties were caused while playing (all children). Additionally, three Iraqis were injured by an antipersonnel mine while trying to cross the buffer zone in Cyprus.³¹

Ten-year summary

According to the 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report, there are “no reliable nation-wide figures” for the number of mine/ERW casualties in Iraq.³² Landmine Monitor analysis of the five National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) databases in August 2007 showed there were approximately 21,492 records entered since 2001 (including casualties occurring before this time). These figures are incomplete, particularly since 2003, as only one database was kept updated in 2004–2005 after which data entry stopped. Most casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah governorate (12,573).

In its Article 7 report, Iraq noted that between 1991 and March 2008, 5,348 casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah (2,427 killed and 2,921 injured); 2,403 in Erbil (855 killed, 1,528 injured, and the status of the remainder is unknown); and 443 in Dahuk (209 killed and 234 injured). Nearly 60% of casualties (4,801) were caused by mines.³³ However, the UN noted that, “These figures are only indicative... and there is a rather large number of victims that remain uncounted.”³⁴ A UNICEF knowledge, attitudes, and practices study (KAP) in 2008, recorded 656 casualties since 2003 in the three northern governorates (46 killed and 610 injured).³⁵

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 5,184 casualties in Iraq, including 789 killed, 2,798 injured, and 1,597 unknown. A significant percentage of these were foreign troops, but the vast majority were probably Iraqi civilians. Most casualties occurred in 2003, as a result of conflict (2,192). The ILIS estimated that there were on average some 300 casualties per year.³⁶

²⁹ As noted previously, only booby-traps set off directly by a person, for example by stepping on it or by touching it, were included in this total.

³⁰ HRW analysis of US Department of Defense news releases, www.defenselink.mil, provided by email from Kerry West, Associate, Arms Division, HRW, 23 June 2009.

³¹ “Saddam army general finally felled by Cyprus mine,” *AFP* (Larnaca), 17 April 2008. See Cyprus chapter in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

³² UNICEF/UNDP, “Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq,” June 2009, p. 10.

³³ Article 7 Report 2007, Form J, 31 July 2008.

³⁴ UNICEF/UNDP, “Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq,” June 2009, p. 11.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁶ Annual totals: 1999: 807, 2000: 206, 2001: 317, 2002: 465, 2003: 2,192, 2004: 261, 2005: 358, 2006: 99, 2007: 216, and 2008: 263. See previous editions of Landmine Monitor. For 1999–2001, casualty records received by HI on 25 April 2007 were used. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 452 for more information. ILIS, “Executive Summary, Summary of Conclusions,” July 2007, provided by email from Dennis Hadrick, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 30 July 2007.

Risk profile

People are at mainly at risk from landmines and UXO in the north, and mainly from cluster submunitions and UXO in the center and south. Most minefields in the north are marked, but those on the border, in areas where there is a security risk, and newly discovered minefields are not marked.³⁷ Few areas in the rest of the country are marked.³⁸ In urban areas people are at risk from AXO.³⁹

The ILIS found that the typical casualty was a male of productive age, killed or injured while tending animals or farming. The low incidence of tampering may be due to under-reporting. People are also at risk foraging for wood and plants, and fishing. Children help their families in this work. Shepherds traveling north to graze sheep are also at risk.⁴⁰

According to Danish Demining Group (DDG), in the south the risk has decreased due to behavior change, RE activities, and demining.⁴¹ In the south, common activities at the time of the incident are transferring explosives to cultivate the ground, grazing cattle, and scrap metal collection.⁴²

Socio-economic impact

Mines and UXO represent “an issue of national importance” that “endanger the overall state of Iraq’s national economy,” according to the 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report.⁴³ The report states that: “With large areas of agricultural land, numerous oil and gas fields, and hundreds of infrastructure and public facilities sown with mines, riddled with cluster bomblets or unexploded mortar and bomb shells, these would first need to be cleared before sustainable economic development and diversification could take place on a large nation-wide scale.”⁴⁴

A specific example of economic activity and development blocked by mine/UXO contamination cited by Iraq includes exploration of the Rumailah oil fields, one of Iraq’s biggest oil reserves.⁴⁵ In addition to oil and gas sector blockages, the 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report cites delays in construction of a water treatment plant in Basra which would permit the return of local communities to cultivate land as well as fishing by communities near the port of Fao. The report observes that mines and UXO prevent the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees to their communities, and “prevent the use of roads, water resources and residential areas.”⁴⁶

Affected communities are mostly rural, agricultural, and small. According to the ILIS, “The type of resource to which landmines and UXO block access are chiefly pasture and crop land, as well as in the north, scrubland used for firewood collection. In the south, irrigated farmland is an important asset type impacted by the contamination.”⁴⁷ High-impacted communities make up 4% of those affected.⁴⁸

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

Efforts to establish a new structure for mine action management and regulation continued in 2009. The NMAA, created in 2003 under the Ministry of Planning, had become inactive by 2007 and the government shut it down in June 2007. After discussion of whether a military or a

³⁷ Email from Mohammad Tahir, MRE Officer, GDMA, 27 March 2009.

³⁸ Email from Jilan al-Qurainy, MRE Officer, RMAC South, 12 May 2009.

³⁹ Email from Shanti Kaphle, MRE Officer, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

⁴⁰ Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, MRE Director, IKMAA, 31 March 2009; email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009; email from Ayoub Allain, Executive Manager, BACMA, 31 March 2009; and email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

⁴¹ Email from Nige Rees, Operations Manager, and Hussam Falah, MRE Manager, DDG, 16 March 2009.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ UNICEF/UNDP, “Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq,” June 2009, p. 17.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 9.

⁴⁵ Article 7 Report, 31 July 2008, Form J.

⁴⁶ UNICEF/UNDP, “Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq,” June 2009, pp. 13–15.

⁴⁷ iMMAP, “Landmine Impact Survey: The Republic of Iraq, 2004–2006,” Washington, DC, August 2007, p. 9.

⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 10.

civilian ministry should take the lead in mine action, the government decided at the end of 2007 to place mine action under the Ministry of Environment, which took over in April 2008 and set up the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in place of the NMAA.⁴⁹

The DMA is responsible for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality assurance (QA), and managing a database. The DMA is supported by a Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south. However, the DMA's development has been hampered by the lack of any regulatory framework establishing its mandate. A regulatory structure proposed by UNDP would provide for the creation of an Iraqi Higher Committee for Mine Action consisting of 20 deputy ministers from concerned ministries to act as a policy-making body, with the DMA functioning as the implementing body coordinating mine action.⁵⁰

In the meantime, Iraq's security ministries, including the ministries of defense, interior, and state security affairs have also asserted the need for security screening of organizations and personnel engaging in mine action as part of the accreditation process. As of August 2009, the DMA had forwarded documents submitted by demining organizations to the Ministry of Defense but had received no feedback.⁵¹

Mine action in the northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah continues to function semi-autonomously under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority and the General Directorate of Mine Action. Both organizations accredit operators in their area of responsibility. The KRG passed a law merging IKMAA and the GDMA in April 2007 but the merger had not taken place as of August 2009, although there is said to be ongoing coordination and cooperation.⁵²

Risk education

The DMA is responsible for the management of RE, and has an RE officer. However, UNICEF remained the *de facto* coordinating body in 2008, and also worked on capacity-building of the DMA with the aim of gradually handing over RE to the government by the end of 2010.⁵³ There is no coordination between the DMA and the two mine action centers in the north.⁵⁴

The RMAC in the south has one RE officer and covers Basra, Muthanna, Maysan, and Thi Qar governorates.⁵⁵ It held coordination meetings in 2008 with agriculture and civil defense directorates, DDG, the national NGO Rafidain Demining Organisation (RDO), and the Iraqi Red Crescent Societies.⁵⁶

IKMAA is responsible for RE in Erbil and Dahuk governorates.⁵⁷ The GDMA is responsible for RE in Sulaymaniyah and part of Kirkuk and Diyala governorates.⁵⁸ The KRG funds RE in northern Iraq.⁵⁹ IKMAA and the GDMA organize quarterly coordination meetings attended by representatives of the KRG's Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, GDMA, MAG, ICRC, UNDP, and UNICEF.⁶⁰ In addition there are weekly mine action meetings of all sectors in the north.⁶¹

⁴⁹ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 27 May 2009. As of 3 September 2009, however, this change was not reflected on the Iraq Mine Action website, www.iraqmineaction.org.

⁵⁰ UNICEF/UNDP, "Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq," June 2009, p. 29.

⁵¹ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 27 May 2009; and telephone interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 21 August 2009.

⁵² Email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 8 April 2008.

⁵³ Email from Shanti Kaple, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

⁵⁴ Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.

⁵⁵ Email from Jilan al-Qurainy, RMAC, 12 May 2009.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.

⁵⁸ Email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.

⁵⁹ Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009 and email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.

The DMA developed an RE plan for 2008 that it shared during a UNICEF and government annual workplan meeting for 2008.⁶² However, in practice it was not implemented and all organizations worked separately, with the result that some areas were over-resourced while other areas were not covered.⁶³

UNICEF provides technical support to the DMA and partners.⁶⁴ An RE/VA study tour to Cambodia took place in September 2008, with the participation of 12 staff from the national authorities and NGOs, to learn about the roles and responsibilities of a national coordination body, working with communities, prioritization of activities, and coordination.⁶⁵

RE operators use national RE standards and curriculum (2005 version) and modify them to meet their needs.⁶⁶ The planned review of national standards did not happen in 2008, but was to take place in 2009.⁶⁷

Victim assistance

In principle, the DMA is in charge of coordinating VA at the national level and has had a VA director since 2006 but very few VA activities have originated from the national level.⁶⁸ Coordination between the DMA and relevant government bodies was limited and unsatisfactory.⁶⁹ There was also limited coordination between regional and national levels.⁷⁰

In northern Iraq, both the GDMA and IKMAA were actively involved in coordinating and monitoring VA activities. Although they have not yet merged, they coordinate regularly. VA activities are carried out in coordination with the regional Ministry of Health. Coordination and information-sharing between the KRG, GDMA, IKMAA, and NGOs was sufficient.⁷¹ At IKMAA, the VA officer position was open from October 2008 to the end of June 2009, slowing down activities.⁷² In southern Iraq, a new VA manager was recruited for the RMAC in 2009.⁷³ There was coordination with DMA and with the local health authorities, but not with other regional mine action centers or NGOs.⁷⁴

At the national level, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs are responsible for disability issues. The Ministry of Health's Higher Committee for Physical Rehabilitation is responsible for the health and physical rehabilitation sectors,⁷⁵ but this committee does not meet regularly.⁷⁶ The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for socio-economic reintegration issues.⁷⁷

⁶² Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

⁶³ Email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009; email from Nige Rees and Hussam Falah, DDG, 16 March 2009; and email from Ahmed Zubeidi, Director, IHSCO, 20 April 2009.

⁶⁴ Email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009; and email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

⁶⁵ Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

⁶⁶ Email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009; email from Nige Rees and Hussam Falah, DDG, 16 March 2009; email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009; email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009; and email from Ahmed Zubeidi, IHSCO, 20 April 2009.

⁶⁷ Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

⁶⁸ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Moaffak al-Khafaji, Director, Iraqi Association of the Disabled, 14 July 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, KORD, 27 July 2009.

⁶⁹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, Programme Specialist Mine Action, UNDP, 17 August 2009; email from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, IHSCO, 3 August 2009; and email from Essam Namk, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Health, 1 September 2009.

⁷⁰ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Faiq A. Jumaa, VA Manager, RMAC, 19 August 2009.

⁷¹ Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Soran Majeed, GDMA, 21 July 2009; and by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009; and see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 453–454.

⁷² Email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 24 June 2009.

⁷³ Email from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 27 May 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Faiq A. Jumaa, RMAC, 19 August 2009.

⁷⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Faiq A. Jumaa, RMAC, 19 August 2009.

⁷⁵ UNICEF/UNDP, "Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq," June 2009, p. 18.

⁷⁶ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008," Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 62.

⁷⁷ UNICEF/UNDP, "Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq," June 2009, p. 18.

Data collection and management

The DMA operates a database using an older version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which is due to be upgraded to the latest version (V.5) in 2010. The database includes all data from the ILIS and records of mine action. Clearance results in southern Iraq are recorded by RMAC and then passed to the DMA. Data from operations in the north is entered into IKMAA and GDMA databases. A Technical Advisor (TA) from Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP) has supported the DMA and IKMAA since 2007. The TA, among other activities, supervised a clean-up of DMA and IKMAA data.⁷⁸

As of 2009, no systematic data collection or unified casualty database existed in Iraq.⁷⁹ Particularly in southern and central Iraq, casualty information was lacking. The DMA collects casualty information in an *ad hoc* manner, by attempting to verify incidents when reported in the media. There is no systematic cooperation on data collection with relevant ministries,⁸⁰ although cooperation between the DMA and the Ministry of Health reportedly improved in 2009. Some information was contained in the EpiInfo database at the DMA, but it was not updated and needed more involvement from the DMA's VA department, which lacked capacity.⁸¹

RMAC started coordinating with the health directorates in Basra and Muthanna, the general hospitals in Basra and Maysan, and the Basra Prosthetics Center to collect casualty information. No NGOs in the south collected casualty information.⁸²

In northern Iraq, the regional mine action authorities and operators continued to collect reliable data and share it.⁸³

The casualty surveillance project started in 2006 in cooperation between UNDP, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization (WHO), with the Ministry of Health as implementing partner, was not fully functional as of 2009. A pilot project was completed in three areas, but the results and the project needed evaluation before continuing.⁸⁴ Verification and unification of five defunct databases handed over to the DMA was completed for clearance and contamination and mostly entered into IMSMA as of June 2009, but the casualty records remained untouched.⁸⁵

RE activities are not yet recorded in IMSMA at the DMA or RMAC as they do not have the capacity. UNICEF maintains reports of activities implemented by its partners.⁸⁶ IKMAA teams and MAG enter their activity records into the IKMAA IMSMA database,⁸⁷ while the GDMA and its partners enter data into their own database.⁸⁸

⁷⁸ Telephone interview with Joe Donahue, iMMAP, 19 August 2009; and email from Joe Donahue, 9 September 2009.

⁷⁹ Article 7 Report, Form J, 8 May 2009.

⁸⁰ Interview with Essa Rahim al-Fayadh, Director-General, DMA, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

⁸¹ Email from Richard Shdeed, Information Management and GIS Officer, iMMAP, 5 June 2009.

⁸² Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Faiq A. Jumaa, RMAC, 19 August 2009.

⁸³ Email from Soran Majeed, GDMA, 15 June 2009; and email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 24 June 2009.

⁸⁴ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Soran Majeed, GDMA, 21 July 2009.

⁸⁵ Email from Richard Shdeed, iMMAP, 10 June 2009.

⁸⁶ Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009; and email from Jilan al-Qurainy, RMAC, 12 May 2009.

⁸⁷ Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.

⁸⁸ Email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.

Mine action program operators

National operators and activities	Demining	RE	Casualty data collection	VA
Basra Prosthetics Center			x	x
Bustan Association for Children's Media and Culture		x		
Darestan		x		
Diana Prosthetic Limbs Center Erbil			x	x
GDMA	x	x	x	x
IKMAA	x	x	x	x
Iraq armed forces	x			
Iraq Mine and UXO Clearance Organization	x			
Iraqi Association of the Disabled			x	x
Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization		x	x	x
KORD			x	x
Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center Dahuk			x	x
RDO	x			
Rosht Society				x
International operators and activities	Demining	RE	Casualty data collection	VA
DDG	x	x		
Handicap International				x
ICRC		x	x	x
MAG	x	x		
Mercy Corps				x
Norwegian People's Aid	x			
RONCO	x			
UNICEF		x		

Plans

Strategic mine action plan

In June 2009, the DMA started drafting a plan for mine action in consultation with the ministries of defense and interior. The DMA expected to submit the draft to government ministries to review data and then provide input on their priorities. The plan was intended to provide the basis for mine action over the next two to three years, allowing time for the preparation of a comprehensive strategic plan in 2011.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

A draft plan for 2010–2012 prepared by UNDP sets out a vision of “an Iraqi society free from the fear and impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war” and identifies clearance priorities as agricultural land, oil fields, power lines, roads and railway lines.⁹⁰

Victim assistance

In 2009, the DMA with support from UNDP was in the process of developing a mine action strategy. It was said that this strategy would be a general framework document, which would contain some objectives for VA but subsequent specific action plans would need developing.⁹¹

The DMA noted in May 2009 that a high-level meeting on VA involving experts, ministries, and NGOs would be held “in the near future” to discuss VA requirements under the Mine Ban Treaty, the current status of services, ways to solve gaps, and roles and responsibilities.⁹² No date or agenda for the meeting was set, and it appeared that not all stakeholders were aware of these efforts.⁹³ One main challenge was said to be that the government does not have “a strategizing culture.”⁹⁴

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report noted that the National Development Strategy mentioned mine action only once, and then only with the phrase “accelerating demining actions.”⁹⁵ The report also noted that mine action was not mentioned at all in the International Compact with Iraq launched in May 2007 to provide a partnership with international donors and development agencies, despite UNDP urging attention to the sector. The report concluded, “It is not surprising, therefore, that some international donors overlooked Mine Action activities altogether when making their decisions on how to best support the development of Iraq.”⁹⁶

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report stated that, despite the size of the challenge posed by mines and ERW to Iraq’s recovery, “little attention has been given to unexploded ordnance and mines within and outside the country. Consequently, a very limited national capacity exists to tackle the issue and the large number of injuries caused by it.”⁹⁷ The report expressed concern that mine action in Iraq had not received the necessary attention and priority of the government: “Consequently, the issue of landmines and unexploded ordnance is not fully integrated into and supported by key government strategic documents and policies. This lack of attention has resulted in limited support for a long-term and comprehensive approach to the issue.”⁹⁸

In northern Iraq, the mine action centers have sufficient capacity and have benefited from the continuous support provided by the UNDP program specialist and UNICEF.⁹⁹ The KRG has gradually increased its interest and involvement in VA since 2006 and was said to have adequate capacity to address VA/disability issues.¹⁰⁰ The KRG provided some funding to VA but this needed to be supplemented by international funding so as not to endanger service provision, which was adequate overall.¹⁰¹ The main obstacle was the lack of a strategy and disability

⁹⁰ UNDP, “Draft Mine Action Strategy 2010–2012, (First Draft),” provided by email from Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 21 August 2009.

⁹¹ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

⁹² Interview with Essa Rahim al-Fayadh, DMA, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and email from Richard Shdeed, iMMAP, 5 June 2009.

⁹³ Email from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 9 July 2009.

⁹⁴ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

⁹⁵ UNICEF/UNDP, “Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq,” June 2009, p. 18.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁹⁹ HI, *Voices from the Ground: Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War Survivors Speak Out on Victim Assistance*, Brussels, 2 September 2009, p. 131; and see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 453.

¹⁰⁰ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*; and interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

legislation to guide the KRG in properly assessing the resources needed.¹⁰² For RMAC, the new VA manager appeared to be active, but was dependent on guidance from the national level, which was lacking.¹⁰³

In early 2008, a component to reform Iraq's physical rehabilitation sector was added to the World Bank-funded Emergency Disability Project (EDP). The reform was to include policy development and the establishment of a multi-sectoral disability working group headed by the Ministry of Health, but the reform was shelved in November 2008 due to a lack of institutional capacity at the ministry. The EDP project is financed by a US\$16.8 million (€11.4 million) World Bank grant.¹⁰⁴ VA/mine action operators were not involved in or aware of activities under this project.¹⁰⁵

Few NGOs were active on VA/disability,¹⁰⁶ particularly in southern and central Iraq, and their capacities were weak.¹⁰⁷ NGOs working on VA in the north since the 1990s have sufficient capacity to carry out VA/disability activities, but depend on fluctuating funding.¹⁰⁸ Disabled people's organizations were often linked to political factions, had insufficient knowledge to implement activities, and did not coordinate with each other.¹⁰⁹

National management

Iraq is creating national structures for management of mine action but lacks the human resources and a regulatory framework in which to operate. The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report concluded the DMA and the regional centers, "were unable to coordinate, plan and strategize Mine Action at the national level. They could not advocate for a prioritisation of Mine Action in the development strategies and plans of the country."¹¹⁰

External advisors

UNDP provides technical advice and capacity-building support through an advisor based in Amman, Jordan, supported by four national technical advisors in Iraq.¹¹¹ RONCO has two expatriate technical advisors with the DMA assisting accreditation and planning and any other issues by request.¹¹² iMMAP provides data management support to the DMA and other government offices as requested, working with five expatriate staff (and around 50 nationals).¹¹³

National mine action legislation

There is no national mine action legislation in place. The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report noted that development and implementation of mine action standards had been hindered by the absence of a legal framework for mine action.¹¹⁴ According to the report, the lack of government attention to mine action has "caused a situation where a number of critical reconstruction projects are on hold due to the fact that available resources are only a fraction of what is needed. At the same time there is no regulatory framework for the possible contracting of commercial demining operators."¹¹⁵

¹⁰² Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009; and Soran Majeed, GDMA, 21 July 2009.

¹⁰³ Interview with Essa Rahim al-Fayadh, DMA, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

¹⁰⁴ World Bank, "World Bank Iraq Trust Fund Report to Donors," Washington, DC, 31 December 2008, p. 22; World Bank, "World Bank Operations in Iraq," 31 May 2009, siteresources.worldbank.org, p. 2, and email from Essam Namk, Ministry of Health, 1 September 2009.

¹⁰⁵ Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009, and by Faiq A. Jumaa, RMAC, 19 August 2009; interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and email from Soran Majeed, GDMA, 31 May 2009.

¹⁰⁶ Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, KORD, 27 July 2009; and Soran Majeed, GDMA, 21 July 2009.

¹⁰⁷ Email from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, IHSCO, 3 August 2009; and UNICEF/UNDP, "Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq," June 2009, pp. 17–18.

¹⁰⁸ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009.

¹⁰⁹ Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, KORD, 27 July 2009; and Moaffak al-Khafaji, Iraqi Association of the Disabled, 14 July 2009.

¹¹⁰ UNICEF/UNDP, "Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq," June 2009, p. 25.

¹¹¹ Telephone interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 21 August 2009.

¹¹² Email from Lance Height, Program Manager, RONCO, 12 August 2009.

¹¹³ Telephone interview with Joe Donahue, iMMAP, 19 August 2009.

¹¹⁴ UNICEF/UNDP, "Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq," June 2009, p. 35.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

The NMAA drafted 29 national standards based on the International Mine Action Standards in 2006, but these never received government approval. Iraq's first Article 7 report said that with the formation of a new national mine action authority the process for approving these standards would be reactivated.¹¹⁶

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

In addition to the Iraqi army and Coalition forces, demining was conducted in 2008 by three international and two Iraqi NGOs, commercial demining operators, and IKMAA. Among NGO operators, MAG and Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) were working in the north, the Iraqi Mine and UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO) worked mainly in central Iraq, and DDG and RDO worked in the south.¹¹⁷

Kurdish commercial companies coordinated by the GDMA included Ararat, Araz Mahmood Maroof, Asa, Chamy Rezan, Khabat, and the Arabian Gulf Mine Clearance Organization reportedly undertook tasks in south central Iraq.¹¹⁸

The Iraqi army had 10 divisions, each with one company that conducted mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). The Iraqi army and police are mainly engaged in spot EOD and IED clearance tasks.¹¹⁹ Coalition forces also conduct EOD and IED clearance for force protection purposes.¹²⁰

Identification of hazardous areas

The ILIS, implemented by iMMAP with US Department of State funding, provided the first comprehensive national survey of mine/ERW contamination but lack of security limited its completion to only 13 of Iraq's 18 governorates. Even within the 13 governorates completed, two districts and 346 other communities were omitted.¹²¹ In 2008, survey teams started survey of the other five governorates and as of mid-2009 had completed three. iMMAP expected to finish remaining areas, including areas on the border with Iran, by the end of 2009.¹²²

In the first 13 governorates, the ILIS found contamination covering an estimated 1,730km² of land (776km² in the northern region, 12km² around Kirkuk, 87.6km² in the partially surveyed south-central region, and 854.5km² in the southern region). Although the survey found mine contamination was densest in the north, which had 3,024 SHAs (82% of the total), casualties were heaviest in the southern four governorates where most of the contamination was more recent and communities were less aware of the dangers of mines and ERW.¹²³

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report commented that many hazardous areas and victims remained uncounted and called for "an urgent increased effort to gather information regarding the extent of land mine and explosive remnants of war contamination, as well as its implications and impact on the daily lives of the Iraqis and the country's development." According to the report, this "should include both the location of the contaminated areas and surveying the victims and their needs."¹²⁴

¹¹⁶ Article 7 Report, Annex B, 31 July 2008.

¹¹⁷ Iraq also reports "limited" and "erratic" clearance by contractors working on infrastructure projects, including work conducted by South Oil Company and Al Safsafa Company in Rumailah oil fields and by Al Khalij Al Arabi on the Basra-Al Shalamja railway line. Article 7 Report, Form F, 31 July 2008.

¹¹⁸ See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 441–442.

¹¹⁹ Email from Daniel Eriksson, E-Governance Advisor, UNDP, 14 April 2008.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 444; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 442–443. Governorates surveyed were Babil, Basra, Dahuk, Erbil, Karbala, Kirkuk (Tameem), Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiyah, Sulaymaniyah, Dhi Qar, and Wasit.

¹²² Telephone interview with Joe Donahue, iMMAP, 19 August 2009; and email from Joe Donahue, 9 September 2009.

¹²³ iMMAP, "Landmine Impact Survey: The Republic of Iraq, 2004–2006," Washington, DC, August 2007, pp. 10–13.

¹²⁴ UNICEF/UNDP, "Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq," June 2009, pp. 27–28.

Demining and battle area clearance in 2008

Operators achieved higher productivity in 2008, with the amount of battle area cleared continuing at close to the same levels as in 2007 but nearly tripling the amount of mined area cleared to 9.4km² (from 3.7km² in 2007) while more than tripling the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed (to 22,000) and the number of UXO destroyed (to nearly 73,000).

Clearance rates will plunge in 2009, however, as a result of the suspension of clearance in all parts of Iraq—except the north—imposed by the Ministry of Defense with effect from 23 December 2008. The ministry halted operations on grounds of security and the need to vet personnel engaged by demining operators who would therefore have access to mines and/or explosive ordnance.¹²⁵ The suspension remained in force as of August 2009. The ban halted work on 25 projects around Basra alone, according to media reports citing a UNDP technical advisor.¹²⁶

In northern Iraq, IKMAA had a total staff of 360 (58 permanent and 302 on contract) operating in 13 demining teams, two EOD teams, two general survey teams, six preliminary technical survey (PTS) teams, eight external QA teams, and two RE teams. The PTS teams were tasked with updating and refining data on known minefields with a view to defining resource needs for full clearance.¹²⁷ The GDMA also coordinated and issued contracts for clearance to Kurdish commercial companies and similarly coordinated the work of international organizations in its area of operations.¹²⁸

MAG operated with a total of 11 expatriate and 850 national staff working in 19 mine action teams, eight small arms and light weapons teams, and 14 community liaison teams, backed by mechanical and mechanical support teams. MAG also acquired a mine detection dog (MDD) team of three dogs, which were accredited with the GDMA and assigned to work in Kirkuk governorate. It expected to expand its MDD capacity in 2009. In 2007, MAG operated in Dahuk, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninawa (Mosul), Salah ad Din, and Sulaymaniyah governorates, and in 2008 expanded operations into areas of Diyala governorate. The teams handed over 33 former mined areas and 17 battle area clearance (BAC) tasks to local communities.¹²⁹

NPA had 80 staff working in 2008 with five multi-skilled teams conducting manual demining, BAC, EOD, and survey for land release. In addition to items cleared by its own teams, NPA destroyed 2,315 antipersonnel mines, 19 antivehicle mines, and 106 submunitions found by commercial companies. NPA reported that decisions on whether land could be cancelled, required sampling, or full clearance were taken in cooperation with a QA team from the GDMA and handover documents were signed by NPA, the GDMA, local authorities and the landowner. NPA decided to phase out its mine clearance program in 2009 and as of July had cut staff to 23.¹³⁰

IMCO was set up in 2003 with support from RONCO until it became financially independent from RONCO in August 2008 and started to receive funding direct from the US Department of State. By 2008, IMCO had 203 staff, including 88 conducting BAC and 20 for EOD. It also had seven MDDs and seven handlers. Major tasks undertaken in 2008 included clearing agricultural land in the Mukaseb and Hay Al Furat areas near Baghdad airport, the Wassit entry point on the border with Iran, and the Al Qanat nursery, also in the Baghdad area. IMCO planned to add another 40–50 staff by the end of 2009 and to use them for BAC, survey, and marking.¹³¹

¹²⁵ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

¹²⁶ Jack Dolan and Jenan Hussein, "Iraq would need 'an army' to remove all landmines," *McClatchy Newspapers*, 2 June 2009, www.mcclatchydc.com.

¹²⁷ Email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 29 June 2009.

¹²⁸ Email from Diyar Sadiq, Information Officer, GDMA, 23 August 2009.

¹²⁹ Email from Meredith Wotten, Iraq Projects Manager, MAG, 9 June 2009.

¹³⁰ Email from Sherko Rashid, Program Manager, NPA, 20 July 2009.

¹³¹ Email from John Lytle, RONCO, 25 July 2009.

RONCO continued to provide technical support to the DMA, with two technical advisors assisting planning and accreditation and on other issues as requested. It also continued to advise IMCO on all aspects of its operation. RONCO was also working in the north undertaking survey, clearance, and infrastructure support tasks for commercial companies.¹³²

DDG, based in Basra governorate, added 63 personnel in 2008 bringing its total to 115, who worked in five BAC and five EOD teams, three RE teams, and two teams each for survey and QA. With its new staff, DDG opened a new forward operating base on the outskirts of Nasiriyah to take on clearance operations in Dhi Qar governorate.¹³³ In 2009, with the ban on clearance operations, teams were active conducting survey.¹³⁴

RDO, with a total of 82 staff, operated two BAC and two EOD teams in 2008 and in 2009 added two RE/community liaison teams that were expected to undertake post-clearance land use assessments. RDO had relied initially on DDG survey capacity but in 2009 also planned to reconfigure its resources to make up two survey teams.¹³⁵

Demining in 2008¹³⁶

Demining operators	Mine clearance (km ²)	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed	BAC (km ²)	UXO destroyed	AXO destroyed	Area released by survey (km ²)
IKMAA	0.44	1,372	3	1.88	4,234	0	0.47
GDMA	6.1	15,630	252	0	3,411	0	8.50
NPA	0.21	1,399	0	0.17	6,065	0	0.38
MAG	2.00	3,585	60	4.26	27,290	0	0
IMCO	0	0	0	1.31	677	0	0
RONCO	0.65	15	3	0	311	0	0
DDG/RDO	0	0	0	8.12	30,996	632	0
Total	9.4	22,001	318	15.74	72,984	632	9.35

Quality assurance/Quality control

The DMA's QA capacity is limited to desk evaluation of operators applying for accreditation. QA and quality control in field operations were undertaken internally by operators.

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018. Progress in mine clearance stalled, however, after the December 2008 ban by the Ministry of Defense on all clearance activities except those in the north.¹³⁷

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report expressed concern that mine action had not received enough attention and stated "at the current slow pace of demining operations, it is clear the goal of an 'Iraq free of the impact of mines and unexploded ordnance' will not be reached by the 2018 Mine

¹³² Email from Lance Height, RONCO, 12 August 2009.

¹³³ Email from Andrew Twigg, Program Manager, DDG, 19 July 2009.

¹³⁴ Telephone interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 20 August 2009.

¹³⁵ Email from Andrew Twigg, DDG, 19 July 2009.

¹³⁶ Data provided by emails from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 29 June 2009; Diyar Sadiq, GDMA, 23 August 2009; Sherko Rashid, NPA, 20 July 2009; John Lytle, RONCO, 25 July 2009; Andrew Twigg, DDG, 19 July 2009; and Meredith Wotten, MAG, 9 June 2009 and 1 September 2009.

¹³⁷ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

Ban Convention deadline.”¹³⁸ UNICEF and UNDP emphasized that “it is clear that the current demining capacities in Iraq are far from meeting the requirements of the Mine Ban Convention” and called for “the urgent development of a nation-wide Mine Action Programme. This much-needed capacity increase can only be met by inviting international de-mining organizations to work in Iraq, as well as developing national Iraqi organizations and/or allocating and training more military resources for this purpose.”¹³⁹

Risk Education

RE in 2008 was conducted by national and international NGOs, IKMAA, and the GMDA. RE coverage was fairly adequate in the north, and in Basra and Thi Qar. It was inadequate in Maysan, Muthanna, Wasit, Karbala, and Qadisiyah governorates, as very few communities were reached.¹⁴⁰ In the remaining governorates no RE was reported. According to UNICEF, community engagement remained very poor, which was not realized at the national level, hence the few RE efforts in only a few areas.¹⁴¹

Risk reduction messages concentrated on informing people about the risk, threats, and safe behavior in general. Both general and tailored messages were provided in 2008.¹⁴² In IKMAA’s area of operations, activities were prioritized based on the size of the mine and ERW problem, type of behavior and number of casualties.¹⁴³ RE was also provided on request to oil and construction companies.¹⁴⁴

In the north, Handicap International (HI) conducted a KAP survey in 2008.¹⁴⁵ It found that general knowledge was good, with most people having participated in at least one RE session. As a result of the school program, children were generally found to be more knowledgeable about mine/ERW risks than adults. However, general attitude and practice was limited.¹⁴⁶ It recommended more evaluations of the impact of RE interventions, which it found had not taken into account economic and cultural factors. It also recommended targeting high-impact communities in Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah, more community-based interventions, the use of risk reduction activities (for example, the construction of wells), use of participatory rural appraisal techniques and more innovative approaches, house-to-house RE to reach women, and peer-to-peer education for children.¹⁴⁷

In central Iraq, the Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO) conducted a second needs assessment in an additional four governorates in central Iraq (Anbar, Baghdad, Salah ad Din, and Babil).¹⁴⁸ Bustan Association for Children’s Media and Culture (BACMA, formerly Darastan Group for Child and Media) collected information in Baghdad for its project, mainly case studies, and entered data into its own database. It found that children in Baghdad lack correct knowledge about mine/ERW risks.¹⁴⁹ With its mobile teams in the field, DDG gathered information through RE sessions on dangerous areas, livestock, and cash crops, and used this to prioritize teams’ deployment.¹⁵⁰

¹³⁸ UNICEF/UNDP, “Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq,” June 2009, p. 8.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴² *Ibid.*

¹⁴³ Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.

¹⁴⁴ Email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.

¹⁴⁵ Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.

¹⁴⁶ HI/UNICEF “Mine Risk Education Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) survey in Northern Iraq, impact monitoring report,” 2008, p. 76.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 79–80.

¹⁴⁸ Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

¹⁴⁹ Email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009.

¹⁵⁰ Email from Nige Rees and Hussam Falah, DDG, 16 March 2009.

Activities in 2008¹⁵¹

Organization	Type of activity	Location	No. of beneficiaries
North			
GDMA	Direct RE in communities, training forest police, commemorating awareness day, posting of billboards, summer programs for children, TV broadcasts, educational materials, and sending reports to clearance teams.	Sulaymaniyah	112 villages, 900 forest police trained, summer school to 500 children
IKMAA	Mass media, direct RE, training of community members—religious leaders and teachers—and community liaison. RE teams reported discovered to EOD teams for destruction.	Dahuk and Erbil governorates	463 teachers. Direct RE 6,245 people in 196 communities. RE to 654 government and NGO staff
MAG	Direct RE to nomads, shepherds, IDPs, and children. Training of teachers (in coordination with the Ministry of Education) and religious leaders, posting of billboards, distribution of leaflets at checkpoints, contamination data collection and community assessments.	Dahuk, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninawa, and Sulaymaniyah.	56,947 people; 2,352 teachers trained
Center and South			
BACMA	School awareness sessions and distribution of RE materials	Baghdad and Basra governorates	4,300 students in 21 primary schools.
Civil Defense	RE in areas near fire stations	Southern governorates	Not available
DDG	Direct RE and community liaison	Basra governorate	12,439
ICRC	Emergency RE in April 2008 — distribution of materials	Baghdad and Basra governorates	3,000
IHSCO/MAG	Training and emergency RE	5 governorates in the center and south	5,314 teachers
Iraqi Red Crescent Society	Presentations, group discussions, distribution of materials.	15 governorates	39,135
UNICEF in partnership with INTERSOS, Darstan, and IHSCO	School-based and community-based RE	Baghdad, Basra, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Thi Qar, Wasit, and Qadisiya.	1,500 schools, 1,000 communities, 850 teachers, 150 community volunteers, 100 local NGOs and government officials, 800 child peer trainers

¹⁵¹ Emails from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009; Jilan al-Qurainy, RMAC, 12 May 2009; Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009; Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009; Ahmed Zubeidi, IHSCO, 20 April 2009; Srdjan Jovanovic, Regional Mine Action Coordinator, ICRC, 6 August 2009; and Meredith Wotten, MAG, 11 August 2009.

Both print and media materials were used. Some 60,000 copies of various information, education, and communication materials on RE have been distributed to key target groups throughout Iraq.¹⁵² An RE guidebook for schoolteachers was produced by IKMAA. Special materials were produced for shepherds travelling to the north.¹⁵³

UNICEF produced two TV spots for children in 2008, which were aired three times a week for six months on Spacetoons Arabic channel and provided to other partners.¹⁵⁴

The DMA does no RE monitoring, while RMAC, IKMAA, and the GDMA monitor their own activities. UNICEF monitors its projects with partners through regular progress reports, monitoring questionnaires, and through field visits by contracted facilitators.¹⁵⁵ DDG has an internal monitoring system.¹⁵⁶ IKMAA's RE director monitored training of teachers and the work of IKMAA teams.¹⁵⁷ MAG monitored the work of the teachers and religious leaders they trained to deliver RE.¹⁵⁸

RE has been conducted in Iraq for more than 10 years by several government bodies and international and national NGOs, with the support of UNICEF, but it has been severely affected by ongoing security problems, and has been inadequate. In the north, RE has been mainly conducted by MAG¹⁵⁹ since before 1999, by the Kurdish Organization for Mines Awareness from 2000 to 2005, and then by IKMAA and the GDMA. It was conducted through direct presentations, training of teachers and religious leaders and community liaison. In the south, the ICRC and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society started conducting RE in 2001, reaching all 15 governorates in the center and south by the end of 2003, and RE activities are still carried out.

In 2003, emergency RE was implemented by several organizations, including HI with UNICEF in Baghdad, MAG in the north and south, INTERSOS in Basra, and UNICEF conducting mass media campaigns. But the security situation forced most international organizations to leave the center and south. IHSCO received support from MAG and HI to deliver direct RE and train trainers. In 2007, UNICEF started working with the ministries of education, and youth and sports to deliver RE.

The ILIS noted, "the significant number of communities whose key informants had a clear recollection of past [mine risk education] MRE and clearance events... suggests that this response has been active in many of those communities."

The DMA (until 2008 the NMAA) has been responsible for coordinating RE since 2003, with technical support from UNICEF, MAG, and RONCO. However, by 2007 the status of the NMAA was unclear, and UNICEF became the *de facto* RE coordinator. Several national RE stakeholder workshops to develop needs assessments and strategies were held. Regular coordination meetings were also held in the north and Basra, but the security situation prevented coordination meetings in Baghdad. In 2006, UNICEF conducted a review of materials, which led to some revisions.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Iraq is unknown, but is at least several thousand. Although conflict decreased in 2008, the number of war-disabled continued to grow as it was reported that 60% of hospital admissions were due to war-related injuries.¹⁶⁰ The improved security situation resulted in little improvement in access to basic services, and the quality

¹⁵² Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

¹⁵³ Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.

¹⁵⁴ Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid; and email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009.

¹⁵⁶ Email from Nige Rees and Hussam Falah, DDG, 16 March 2009.

¹⁵⁷ Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.

¹⁵⁸ Email from Meredith Wotten, MAG, 11 August 2009.

¹⁵⁹ MAG has conducted RE in the north since 1993; and email from Rob White, Director of Operations, MAG, 11 September 2009.

¹⁶⁰ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008," Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 62.

of services continued to erode.¹⁶¹ Assistance providers continued to be the target of attacks. Government bodies were only able to provide basic services.¹⁶²

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report noted that, “there is little doubt that a considerable number of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war suffer from severe disabilities, poverty, unemployment, discrimination and stigmatization, negligence and deprivation of their basic rights across Iraq.”¹⁶³ The UNICEF KAP study in three northern governorates in 2008 found that only 12% of survivors identified had received any form of assistance.¹⁶⁴ The IHSCO found that in central and southern Iraq only 4% of survivors had received assistance and that services had been in continuous decline since 2003.¹⁶⁵ Most persons with disabilities were cared for within the family network and 90% of them lived below the local poverty line.¹⁶⁶

In 2008, hospitals still often lacked medicines, equipment, suitable infrastructure, and experienced staff.¹⁶⁷ It was estimated that some 75% of medical staff have left Iraq while demand increased, particularly in rural areas where most mine/ERW casualties occur and health professionals “are almost completely absent.”¹⁶⁸

Government or NGO-operated physical rehabilitation centers are available in major cities, but in 2008, the ICRC reported that a low level of services was provided not because “the national capacity is overwhelmed” but rather because “patients are not coming to existing structures.”¹⁶⁹ This was due to the risk and cost of traveling, ethnic tensions, and a lack of information about services. In 2008, 17 centers were operating, including a newly-built center in Fallujah.¹⁷⁰ Many centers needed international support (mostly from the ICRC) and services remained more accessible in northern Iraq, where many services are operated by local NGOs with government and international funding.¹⁷¹

War and insecurity have had a major impact on mental health, but psychosocial care is stigmatized and only provided in hospitals in the main cities and by some NGOs, particularly in northern Iraq.¹⁷² Unemployment remained high in Iraq, and economic reintegration opportunities for persons with disabilities were limited and they faced discrimination. In northern Iraq, more constant support for NGOs providing economic reintegration opportunities has helped improve the living standard of program beneficiaries, resulting in a “dramatic decrease” of disabled beggars on the streets. The programs remained limited, however, and the GDMA estimated that only some 20% of those needing urgent assistance had received it during 2005–2009.¹⁷³

The Ministry of Health managed six rehabilitation centers and facilitated the procurement of equipment to eight centers in 2008. It also operated three “disability centers,” which facilitated capacity-building of rehabilitation staff (all under a World Bank Project) and provided 38,000 medical services to persons with disabilities.¹⁷⁴

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs operates the Social Safety Net program for vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities, with \$8 million from the World Bank. This support contained funding for a pension survey and a beneficiary assessment, which were delayed as of

¹⁶¹ UNICEF, “Humanitarian Action Report 2009,” New York, 2009, pp. 126, 133.

¹⁶² Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Moaffak al-Khafaji, Iraqi Association of the Disabled, 14 July 2009.

¹⁶³ UNICEF/UNDP, “Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq,” June 2009, p. 11.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁶⁵ Email from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, IHSCO, 3 August 2009; and see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 451.

¹⁶⁶ Kevin Fagan, “Berkeley man on mission to aid disabled Iraqis,” *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1 May 2008, www.sfgate.com.

¹⁶⁷ ICRC, “Iraq: urgent need to safeguard life-saving medical action,” Geneva, 29 October 2008, www.icrc.org.

¹⁶⁸ Medact, “Rehabilitation under fire: Health care in Iraq 2003–7,” London, 2008, p. 5.

¹⁶⁹ ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 62.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 452.

¹⁷² Medact, “Rehabilitation under fire: Health care in Iraq 2003–7,” London, 2008, p. 10.

¹⁷³ Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Soran Majeed, GDMA, 21 July 2009, and Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009.

¹⁷⁴ Email from Essam Namk, Ministry of Health, 1 September 2009.

May 2009.¹⁷⁵ The government provides benefits to disabled war veterans, but many supplement it with employment.¹⁷⁶ The KRG also paid small monthly pensions.¹⁷⁷

Iraq has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but this is reportedly only enforced in the public sector and not in the private sector.¹⁷⁸ Discrimination remained common,¹⁷⁹ and reforms to the disability sector were halted in late 2008. As of May 2009, a draft disability law remained pending in the parliament of the KRG. Disabled people's organizations and NGOs held a two-day conference in May 2009 to lobby political parties and members of parliament to approve the law after the elections in July.¹⁸⁰ As of 1 July 2009, Iraq had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

In 2008, Iraq "clarified through its initial Article 7 transparency report that it also has a responsibility for significant numbers of mine survivors."¹⁸¹ This made Iraq the 26th State Party to join the VA26, one of the States Parties with the "greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance."¹⁸² However, as of July 2009, many stakeholders were not aware of the implications and possible benefits of Iraq's declaration.¹⁸³

A process was underway to identify "an appropriate in-country victim assistance/disability expert."¹⁸⁴ As of August 2009, this expert had not been identified. It was anticipated to have an expert present at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2009.¹⁸⁵ In 2008–2009, Iraq did not make statements on VA, but UNDP issued a message in July 2009 asking relevant stakeholders to start compiling information for a report to the Second Review Conference.¹⁸⁶ Additionally, the UNDP started assisting the government in mapping existing VA capacity and projecting required VA capacity, and to bring together stakeholders. It was scheduled to complete these activities by mid-2010.¹⁸⁷

Iraq reported on VA in its Article 7 reports submitted in 2008 and 2009.¹⁸⁸

¹⁷⁵ World Bank, "World Bank Operations in Iraq," 31 May 2009, siteresources.worldbank.org.

¹⁷⁶ US Department of State, "2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq," Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

¹⁷⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Soran Majeed, GDMA, 21 July 2009.

¹⁷⁸ US Department of State, "2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq," Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

¹⁷⁹ Kevin Fagan, "Berkeley man on mission to aid disabled Iraqis," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 1 May 2008, www.sfgate.com.

¹⁸⁰ Email from Soran Majeed, GDMA, 31 May 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, KORD, 27 July 2009.

¹⁸¹ "Achieving the Aims of the Nairobi Action Plan: the Geneva Progress Report 2007–2008," Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24–28 November 2008, APLC/MSP.9/2008/WP.1, 2 October 2008, p. 15.

¹⁸² UN, "Final Report, First Review Conference," Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99.

¹⁸³ Email from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, IHSCO, 3 August 2009; email from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 9 July 2009; responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Faiq A. Jumaa, RMAC, 19 August 2009; Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, KORD, 27 July 2009; Moaffak al-Khafaji, Iraqi Association of the Disabled, 14 July 2009; and Soran Majeed, GDMA, 21 July 2009; and interview with Essa Rahim al-Fayadh, DMA, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

¹⁸⁴ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, "Status of Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention in the 26 Relevant States Parties 2005–2008," Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008, p. 14.

¹⁸⁵ HI, "Voices from the Ground: Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War Survivors Speak Out on Victim Assistance," Brussels, 2 September 2009, p. 131.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009.

¹⁸⁸ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, "Status of Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention in the 26 Relevant States Parties 2005–2008," Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008, p. 14; and Article 7 Report, Form J, 8 May 2009.

Victim assistance activities

Various organizations work on VA-related issues and only those providing updated information for the reporting period have been included in this report. Information about other organizations can be found in previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

VA activities in northern Iraq were advanced by the joint UNDP/WHO project started in August 2007, channeling international funding to the main local service providers to supplement KRG funding. For the activities supported by UNDP, the first phase was concluded in February 2009.¹⁸⁹ WHO-funded projects faced some challenges and were not executed as planned. One NGO noted that the WHO did not have a clear vision and that the delays caused confusion among service providers, unlike the UNDP-supported component.¹⁹⁰ UNDP secured additional funding from Australia to continue its part of the project to the end of 2010. It was anticipated that the KRG would increase its contribution, but the government was facing budget difficulties in 2008–2009 due to the economic slowdown.¹⁹¹ The project's main challenges remained the long-term sustainability of the three implementing NGOs and securing direct bilateral funding to the KRG and NGOs.¹⁹²

Under the UNDP component, the Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center in Dahuk, the Diana Prosthetic Limbs Center in Erbil, and KORD in Sulaymaniyah provided physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration services. As of 31 December 2008, 7,784 physiotherapy sessions, 3,289 mobility aids, and 3,130 prosthetic and orthotic devices were provided. An additional 27 people completed vocational training and 110 started income-generating projects; 26 home adaptations were also made.¹⁹³

Under the WHO component, a needs assessment of the rehabilitation centers in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk was conducted and two physiotherapists and two psychotherapists recruited as a result. Twelve medical staff received a four-week emergency trauma training and 18 received a multi-disciplinary training in Jordan focusing on mental health. Mental health materials were translated for use.¹⁹⁴

KORD operates two physical rehabilitation centers and three outreach posts in northern Iraq. Its strategic plan for 2009–2013 focuses on continued capacity-building and increasing its socio-economic reintegration activities. Its main challenges were: a lack of sustained financial support from the KRG; skilled staff preferring to work for the government rather than NGOs or the private sector; and a lack of coordination mechanisms with the broader disability sector. In 2008, KORD provided services to mine/ERW survivors, including 3,016 physical therapy sessions, 1,218 prosthetic-orthotic services, and economic reintegration assistance to 80 people; 28 of the survivors assisted were injured in 2008. It also provided 3,647 services to other persons with disabilities.¹⁹⁵

In 2008–2009, the GDMA provided \$800,000 support to VA/disability service implementers. Its main challenges were a lack of a nationally regulated funding mechanism and delays in funding from the KRG. The GDMA had records of 10,081 services provided to survivors in 2008, mostly physical rehabilitation, and 9,156 other persons with disabilities were also assisted (these figures include beneficiaries under the UNDP-support project and KORD beneficiaries).¹⁹⁶

The Iraqi Association of the Disabled conducted awareness raising and lobbying of the government, NGOs and other stakeholders on VA/disability issues and provided material support to persons with disabilities. It also participated in the EDP World Bank project until policy reform work was halted.¹⁹⁷

¹⁸⁹ UNDP, "UNDP Conflict Victims Assistance-North," last updated 31 January 2009, www.iq.undp.org.

¹⁹⁰ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, KORD, 27 July 2009; and interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

¹⁹¹ Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

¹⁹² Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009.

¹⁹³ UNDP, "UNDP Conflict Victims Assistance-North," updated 31 January 2009, www.iq.undp.org.

¹⁹⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009.

¹⁹⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, KORD, 27 July 2009. Some of the statistics are already included in those of the UNDP-supported VA program.

¹⁹⁶ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Soran Majeed, GDMA, 27 July 2008.

¹⁹⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Moaffak al-Khafaji, Iraqi Association of the Disabled, 14 July 2009.

In 2008, the ICRC increased its support to the physical rehabilitation sector by adding support to the center in Fallujah which it completed in October. The center started operating in December 2008. The ICRC also supported the Prosthetics and Orthotics Training School and the al-Salam crutches production unit. The ICRC's aim was to ensure assistance to a network of centers covering most of the country so that patients would not have to travel long distances for treatment. An information leaflet on the location of the centers was produced. The centers received raw materials and components, training, and (for the Erbil center only) transport costs. The centers assisted 29,422 people, and produced 2,863 prostheses (450 for mine/ERW survivors) and 9,864 orthoses (76 for mine/ERW survivors).¹⁹⁸ The ICRC also supported 77 hospitals in all 18 governorates with supplies, equipment, and training. Some 5,438 weapon-injured people were assisted in 22 ICRC-supported hospitals and 83 medical staff attended seminars on war surgery, trauma management, and advanced first-aid.¹⁹⁹ In 2008, the ICRC started a micro-economic initiatives program for conflict-disabled heads of households in northern Iraq, benefiting some 324 persons with disabilities.²⁰⁰

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Iraq. The DMA, within the Ministry of Environment, has official responsibility for mine action throughout Iraq, including strategic planning, budgeting, and donor relations.²⁰¹ The KRG exercises responsibility for mine action in the three northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, including budget support to IKMAA and the GDMA, which plan mine action programming independently from the DMA.²⁰²

National support for mine action

Iraq did not report national funding for mine action in 2008. UNDP estimated Iraq's national mine action budget in 2007 to be \$15 million (€10,186,065).²⁰³ In addition, the KRG Ministry of Finance allocated funds totaling IQD4 billion (\$3.2 million) to IKMAA in 2007.²⁰⁴

In April 2008, the Iraqi government announced the creation of 2,000 new mine clearance jobs to support mine and UXO clearance throughout Iraq, with annual salaries totaling an estimated IQD4.8 billion (approximately \$4.32 million).²⁰⁵ As of May 2009, Iraq reported that fewer than 2,000 deminers were active overall, compared to an estimated need for more than 19,000 in order to complete clearance by its 2018 Article 5 clearance deadline.²⁰⁶ It did not report whether national or international funds were used to cover salaries for deminers.

The government provided a budget of \$15 million–\$20 million for the management of mine action in 2009. In addition, Iraqi ministries were expected to provide funding for mine clearance operations in 2009, but many did not have a budget for such activities.²⁰⁷

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, nine countries reported providing \$35,886,215 (€24,369,289) to mine action in Iraq. This was approximately 4% less than reported in 2007. Reported annual international funding has decreased from a high of \$58.7 million in 2004. There is not sufficient data on the full extent

¹⁹⁸ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008," Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 62; and ICRC, "Annual Report 2008," Geneva, 27 May 2009, p. 346 (contains the exact number of mine/ERW survivors treated).

¹⁹⁹ ICRC, "Annual Report 2008," Geneva, 27 May 2009, p. 345.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 344; ICRC, "Iraq: Mine victim takes a small step to a big new future," Geneva, 13 August 2009, www.icrc.org; and ICRC, "Iraq: prostheses and a motorcycle revive hope for Hassan," Geneva, 28 July 2009, www.icrc.org.

²⁰¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 440; UN, "Country Profile: Iraq," www.mineaction.org; and NMAA, "Iraq Mine Action," www.iraqmineaction.org.

²⁰² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, pp. 440, 441. UN, "Country Profile: Iraq," www.mineaction.org.

²⁰³ Email from Salomon Schreuder, Iraq Senior Mine Action Advisor, UNDP, 5 February 2008.

²⁰⁴ Email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 8 April 2008.

²⁰⁵ "Two thousand demining jobs up for grabs," *IRIN* (Baghdad), 4 April 2008.

²⁰⁶ Statement of Iraq, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 28 May 2009.

²⁰⁷ Telephone interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 21 August 2009.

of the landmine problem or the needs of landmine survivors to assess whether funding at 2008 levels is adequate.

As of April 2008, the UN Mine Action Team reported that its activities in Iraq were funded for the duration of the year, with contributions from the US, Australia, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the UNDP Iraq Trust Fund.²⁰⁸

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Iraq: Monetary²⁰⁹

Donor	Implementing Agencies/ Organizations	Project Details	Amount
US	Via the US Department of State	Mine/ERW clearance, stockpile destruction, RE, VA	\$21,550,000
Sweden	MAG	Mine clearance	\$3,265,850 (SEK21,500,000)
Australia	UNDP	ERW clearance, VA	\$2,902,580 (A3,400,000)
Netherlands	MAG, HI	Unspecified mine action	\$2,323,763 (€1,578,000)
Denmark	DDG	Integrated mine action	\$1,965,000 (DKK10,000,000)
Norway	NPA, Norwegian Red Cross	Mine clearance, VA	\$1,964,642 (NOK11,074,643)
Ireland	MAG	Mine clearance	\$1,251,710 (€850,000)
Belgium	MAG	Mine clearance	\$368,150 (€250,000)
Finland	ICRC	VA	\$294,520 (€200,000)
Total			\$35,886,215 (€24,369,289)

²⁰⁸ MASG, "Newsletter: 1 January 2008 to 30 April 2008," Washington, DC, p. 10.

²⁰⁹ US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009," Washington, DC, July 2009; emails from Dennis F. Hadrick, Program Manager, US Department of State, 11 September 2009; Amb. Lars-Erik Wingren, Department for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009; Kathleen Bombell, Mine Action Unit, AUSAID, 21 July 2009; Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; David Keating, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2009; Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; and email from Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2009.