

SOMALIA

2008 Key Data

Mine Ban Treaty status	Not a State Party
Contamination	Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO, AXO
Estimated area of contamination	Unknown
Casualties in 2008	116 (2007: 74)
Estimated mine/ERW survivors	Unknown but at least 1,405
Demining in 2008	Spot clearance of ERW only
Risk education recipients in 2008	Unquantified
Support for mine action in 2008	\$0.8 million (2007: \$6.3 million)

Ten-Year Summary

There has been continuous conflict in Somalia, including use of antipersonnel mines by various factions, throughout most of the past decade. Since 2002, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia has published a number of reports with allegations of the transfer of antipersonnel mines to various Somali parties from a number of countries, including Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Eritrea and Ethiopia. From 2002 to 2005, 17 Somali factions signed the NGO Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel mines.

Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) affect Somalia as a result of internal and international conflicts which have taken place in the country since 1964. The Landmine Impact Survey identified 35 impacted communities in nine districts in the Puntland area and a further 90 impacted communities in Sanaag and Sool regions. The extent of the problem in southern Somalia is less well known. There is no centralized mine action program in Somalia. In 2008, clearance of ERW was coordinated through mine action centers in Baidoa in south central Somalia and Garowe in the northeast of the country.

Landmine Monitor has identified 2,354 mine/ERW casualties (832 killed, 1,405 injured, and 117 unknown) in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) between 1999 and 2008. Risk education during that period has been sporadic and largely *ad hoc*, especially in the south of the country.

There are no specific victim assistance policies or activities in Somalia. The health care situation continued to deteriorate in 2008 and there was little capacity to provide emergency surgery or trauma care outside of Mogadishu. Rehabilitation and healthcare facilities are difficult to access and there was very little psychosocial or economic support for mine/ERW survivors.

Background

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Somali Republic was created under a 2004 charter; since then it has been engaged in various levels of armed conflict.¹ Since early 2007, al-Shabaab (the Youth) and other armed groups have carried out attacks and at times engaged in intense fighting against government forces, Ethiopian troops, and the African Union peacekeeping mission to Somalia (AMISOM). In September 2007, a number of other

¹ In January 2004, leaders of many Somali groups signed an agreement to adopt a Transitional Federal Charter under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development-facilitated process in Nairobi, Kenya. The charter provides the legal framework for a five-year transitional period of government in Somalia. The charter, government, and parliament make up the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia.

opposition groups created a formal coalition, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).² In February 2009, after signing a peace agreement with and incorporating the ARS into the government, the TFG became the Government of National Unity (GNU). As of June 2009, al-Shabaab and another group, Hezbul Islam, continued to fight against the GNU, including in Mogadishu.³

Mine Ban Policy

Somalia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Prime Minister attended as an observer the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi in November–December 2004 where he stated the TFG’s intention to outlaw antipersonnel mines.⁴ The government did not attend any Mine Ban Treaty meetings in 2008 or 2009.

Somalia was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 in December 2008 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It voted in favor of a similar annual resolution for the first time in December 2007.

Somalia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not yet ratified as of 1 July 2009.⁵

Several Somali factions have renounced use of antipersonnel landmines by signing the Deed of Commitment administered by Geneva Call. Most of these signatories are members of the Transitional Federal Institutions (government and parliament), but some may also continue to control independent militia forces and territory.⁶

In June 2009, Geneva Call and the Puntland Mine Action Center (PMAC), the institution responsible for mine action in the northern Somali region of Puntland (see Program Management and Coordination section below), held a workshop on implementation of the Deed of Commitment. Participants included the President of Puntland and representatives from the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Mine Action, the House of Representatives, the Puntland military, UN agencies, and mine action NGOs.⁷ The meeting reviewed progress in implementing the Deed of Commitment in Puntland and explored future actions to fulfill the obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸

Production and stockpiling

Somalia has never been known to manufacture landmines, but mines are thought to be widely available (see Transfer section below). Most factions involved in armed conflict in Somalia are believed to possess landmines.⁹ Demobilizing militias have turned in landmines: photographs of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program available on the AMISOM

² “Somali opposition alliance begins fight against Ethiopia,” *Agence France-Presse* (Asmara), 20 September 2007, afp.google.com.

³ See for example, “Heavy Clashes in Mogadishu Leaves 15 Dead,” *Xinhua* (Mogadishu), 2 July 2009, www.philstar.com; and IMDC Information Page, “Somalia: Causes of displacement,” www.internal-displacement.org.

⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 869. The only other treaty meeting attended by a Somali delegation was the intersectoral Standing Committee meetings in June 2005, at which the then-Deputy Prime Minister reaffirmed the TFG’s resolve to accede to the treaty.

⁵ For further details on Somalia’s cluster munitions policy, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice*, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, p. 153.

⁶ Between 2002 and 2005, Geneva Call received signatures from 17 factions. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 1064. Geneva Call informed Landmine Monitor that eight signatories were no longer active. Emails from Pascal Bongard, Program Director, Geneva Call, 3 May 2007 and 12 August 2008, and from Nicholas Florquin, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 26 August 2009.

⁷ Email from Nicholas Florquin, Geneva Call, 26 August 2009.

⁸ Geneva Call, “Puntland authorities and stakeholders review progress in the implementation of Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment banning anti-personnel mines,” 22 June 2009, www.reliefweb.int.

⁹ The former TFG Deputy Prime Minister told Landmine Monitor in 2005 that he believed militias in Mogadishu alone held at least 10,000 antipersonnel mines. Interview with Hussein Mohamed Aided, Deputy Prime Minister, in Geneva, 15 June 2005. See also, *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 1,003–1,004; *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 978; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 1,064.

website in July 2009 showed antivehicle mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).¹⁰ In June 2008, Ethiopian troops based in Luuq district reportedly seized a vehicle transporting antipersonnel mines, as well as antivehicle mines and a variety of other weapons.¹¹

The armed groups in Somalia that signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment have pledged to undertake stockpile destruction. In June 2009, Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere” of the Jowhar Administration informed Geneva Call that it only possessed antivehicle mines.¹² Also in June 2009, United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) chair Hussein Mohamed Farah Aideed informed Geneva Call that it had handed over its stockpiles to AMISOM in Mogadishu in early 2007, and AMISOM then destroyed them.¹³ The USC/SNA had previously stated it had 1,800 antipersonnel landmines in its stockpile.¹⁴

In August 2008, Geneva Call informed Landmine Monitor that the Somali National Front (SNF) had reportedly completed an inventory of its stockpile and had approached UNDP in Baidoa to request technical assistance for stockpile destruction.¹⁵ In June 2009, the SNF told Geneva Call that its stockpiles had been moved to Dolow in the Gedo region and that it needed technical and financial support for their destruction.¹⁶

On 24 July 2008, PMAC destroyed 48 stockpiled PMP-71 antipersonnel mines near Garowe on behalf of the Puntland authorities. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) provided technical assistance to PMAC.¹⁷ In April 2009, MAG and a Puntland police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team destroyed 78 Pakistani-made P4 antipersonnel mines in Bosasso.¹⁸ The Juba Valley Alliance and Rahanweyn Resistance Army previously stated to Geneva Call that they possessed antipersonnel mines, but did not reveal the types or numbers or any action taken to destroy them.¹⁹

Transfer

Since 2002, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia has published a number of reports containing allegations of the transfer of antipersonnel and other mines from a number of countries to various Somali parties.²⁰ The most recent report was submitted on 10 December 2008.²¹ Neither that report, nor the two previous ones (24 April 2008 and 18 July 2007) make new allegations of transfers of antipersonnel mines from states into Somalia.²² In response to past claims by the UN

¹⁰ See AMISOM, “Pictures of some collected/surrendered Weapons and Ammunitions to AMISOM,” undated, www.africa-union.org.

¹¹ SPAS, “Weekly reports from “Report Number – 52/07 & 01/08,” 19 December 2007–7 January 2008; and SPAS, “Weekly Report Number – 31/08,” 23–29 July 2008. See www.somaliangoconsortium.org.

¹² Email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 27 July 2009.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 977.

¹⁵ Email from Pascal Bongard, Geneva Call, 8 August 2008; and email from Katherine Kramer, Program Director, Geneva Call, 5 September 2008.

¹⁶ Email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Geneva Call, 27 July 2009.

¹⁷ Geneva Call, “Somalia: Puntland authorities destroy anti-personnel mines,” Press release, Geneva, 24 July 2008. In August 2008, the US Department of State announced that it would provide funding for the destruction of conventional weapons stockpiles and EOD in Puntland. US Department of State, “Conventional Weapons Destruction and Landmine Clearance in Somalia,” Media note, Washington, DC, 4 August 2008, www.state.gov.

¹⁸ MAG, “Somalia: Munitions stockpile clearance in Puntland,” 1 May 2009, www.maginternational.org.

¹⁹ Geneva Call, “Engaging Armed Non-State Actors in a Landmine Ban: The Geneva Call Progress Report (2000–2007),” November 2007, pp. 16–17. It is unclear if the stockpiled mines declared by the Juba Valley Alliance are antipersonnel or antivehicle. Email from Katherine Kramer, Geneva Call, 5 September 2008.

²⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, pp. 978–979; *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, pp. 1,065–1,066; *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, pp. 870–871; and *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 1,112. See also, “Report of the team of experts appointed pursuant to Security Council resolution 1407 (2002), paragraph 1, concerning Somalia,” S/2002/722, Annex 4.

²¹ “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council resolution 1811 (2008),” S/2008/769, 10 December 2008.

²² The April 2008 report cites the transfer of antitank mines and components from Eritrea in 2008 in support of al-Shabaab. The July 2007 report provides new information about two alleged shipments of antipersonnel mines in July 2006 from Eritrea to Somalia that the Monitoring Group previously reported on. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008* country reports on Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea for the most recent Monitoring Group claims of mine and mine component transfers.

Monitoring Group, the Presidents of the Seventh and Eighth Meetings of States Parties wrote to the chair of the group for clarification and further information of relevant evidence presented in reports, including seeking further details on the specific types of mines allegedly transferred.²³ As of July 2009, no response to either request, or further progress in analyzing the Monitoring Group's allegations, had been reported.

In February 2009, it was reported that the Russian Navy had captured three boats of "Somali pirates" smuggling arms in the Indian Ocean, and a spokesperson cited landmines (type unspecified) among the weapons seized.²⁴

Landmines are evidently still being bought and sold at arms markets in Somalia.²⁵ In June 2009, *Reuters* reported the continued sale of landmines and other weapons at markets in Mogadishu. It said that one dealer claimed to sell landmines (type unspecified, but likely antivehicle) for approximately US\$100 apiece.²⁶

Use

Landmine Monitor has not identified any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines from May 2008 to May 2009 by government forces or any of the non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in Somalia. NSAGs continued to use IEDs in large numbers, with media sources often referring to command-detonated bombs and IEDs as "landmines." While all victim-activated mines and other explosive devices are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, command-detonated mines and devices are not. Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports indicates that most, if not all, of the explosive attacks attributed to landmines were command-detonated devices.

For 2008, the Somali NGO Security Preparedness and Support Program (SPAS) reported at least 84 incidents (including seizures and recoveries, as well as attacks) involving "landmines," resulting in 237 casualties. None involved use of victim-activated antipersonnel mines, although there were nine incidents involving IEDs without reported remote-control capabilities.²⁷

In March 2009, GNU Interior Minister Sheikh Abdulkadir Ali Omar reportedly suffered minor injuries when an explosive device detonated in the Bakaraaha market, killing one of his bodyguards and injuring another.²⁸ Although the media reported the device as a "landmine," the type of explosive device could not be confirmed.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Landmines and explosive remnants of war—both abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and UXO—affect many parts of Somalia.²⁹ In a March 2007 evaluation (see Program evaluations section below), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) concluded that ERW were "very widespread" and, in most of the country, "constitute a greater threat than do minefields."³⁰

²³ Statement by the President of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007; statement by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 6 June 2008.

²⁴ "Russian navy captures armed Somali pirates," *France 24*, 13 February 2009, www.france24.com.

²⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 1,003–1,005, for details. In April 2008, the Monitoring Group stated that mines (type unspecified) were purchased at Arjantin or other arms markets in 2007 and 2008, by al-Shabaab and representatives of Somali clans. The report also stated that at the Arjantin arms market or other arms markets, mines (type unspecified) were sold in 2008 by TFG military officers, the Somali National Security Agency and Mohamed Omar Habeeb "Dheere."

²⁶ "Arms Trade-Dealers revel in Somali war business," *Reuters* (Mogadishu), 9 June 2009, af.reuters.com.

²⁷ Incident and casualty data taken from SPAS weekly reports for calendar year 2008, www.somaliangoconsortium.org.

²⁸ "Somali minister wounded in landmine blast," *Daily Nation* (Nairobi), 26 March 2009, www.nation.co.ke.

²⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 1,066.

³⁰ GICHD, "Somalia report: Mission to Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)," Draft, 15 May 2007, p. 4. A Joint UN Assessment co-led by UNMAS and UNDP Somalia in June 2007 concluded that the perception of the mine problem in south central Somalia was greater than the reality. UN, "Report from the Inter-agency Mine Action Assessment Mission to Somalia (South Central)," June 2007, p. 2, www.mineaction.org.

Two phases of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) have been conducted in the regions of Puntland (in 2004–2005), and Sool and Sanaag (in 2007).³¹ In total, 125 communities were found to be impacted by 263 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Roads and pastures are most heavily contaminated in terms of land of socio-economic value.³² The communities in Sanaag and Sool under the jurisdiction of the Somaliland Mine Action Center are being resurveyed by the British NGO HALO Trust. HALO planned to complete the survey in September 2009.³³

No LIS has been undertaken for south central Somalia, but surveys undertaken in four districts in 2008 indicate a contamination level of 10% of all communities,³⁴ a lower rate than found elsewhere in Somalia. The office of the UN mine action team in Somalia reported that the survey did not include Mogadishu where fighting has been the most severe and it is believed the final results will show that contamination is scattered across south central Somalia. In Bay region, for example, 26 communities in Baidoa district were found to be contaminated, a number much higher than in the other surveyed areas.³⁵

Fighting between Ethiopian troops—who entered the country in 2007 in support of the TFG—and non-state armed groups added to the contamination in the south, and media reports have attested to the use of roadside bombs, IEDs, and mines, as well as to resultant casualties.³⁶ Danish Demining Group (DDG), a demining NGO operating in Somalia, has conducted surveys in Mogadishu which found that some parts of the city have a serious UXO problem.³⁷ According to David Bax, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Mine Action Programme Manager,³⁸ “communities in South Central Somalia are exposed to large quantities of Explosive Remnants of War... and the socio-economic impact on the local population is immeasurable.”³⁹ Fighting continued in central Somalia and Mogadishu as of June 2009, with heavy artillery bombardment of urban areas.⁴⁰

Casualties

Landmine Monitor identified 116 mine/ERW casualties (39 killed and 77 injured) in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) in 2008.

Of the total for Somalia, PMAC identified 58 mine/ERW casualties (17 killed and 41 injured) in the Puntland region in 2008. The majority of these casualties were boys (30), followed by adult men (17), girls (nine), and women (two). This data lacked details on device type, civil status, and/or activity at the time of the incident.⁴¹ According to UNMAS, the majority of casualties were caused by ERW.⁴²

The remaining 58 casualties (22 killed and 36 injured) were identified by Landmine Monitor using data from media, UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), and SPAS reports covering the south and central regions of the country.⁴³ The South Central Mine Action Center

³¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 1007; and UN, “Country Profile: Somalia,” www.mineaction.org.

³² Survey Action Center, “Ongoing Surveys: Somalia,” www.sac-na.org.

³³ Email from Neil Ferrao, Programme Manager, HALO, 21 May 2009. Somaliland is covered in a separate chapter in this edition of *Landmine Monitor*.

³⁴ UN Mine Action Team, “UN Somalia Mine Action: Project Update & Achievements 2008,” 3 March 2009.

³⁵ Email from Tammy Orr, Program Officer, Mine Action Somalia, UNMAS, 26 June 2009. Data is taken from the UN Somalia Mine Action Team’s IMSMA database for south central Somalia.

³⁶ “Somalia: Land Mine Kills Ethiopian Soldier,” *Shabelle Media Network* (Mogadishu), 17 December 2008, allafrica.com; “6 die in Mogadishu landmine blasts,” *Presstv*, 27 November 2008, www.presstv.ir; and “Land Mine Inflicts Losses On Ethiopian Troops in Afgoi,” *Shabelle Media Network* (Mogadishu), 27 October 2008, allafrica.com.

³⁷ Information from DDG, “Survey, EOD & MRE in Mogadishu, Somalia,” Project proposal submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2009.

³⁸ Formerly, David Bax was the UNDP Chief Technical Advisor for mine action in Somalia.

³⁹ Email from David Bax, UNDP, 30 April 2008.

⁴⁰ Stephanie McCrummen, “U.S. Sends Weapons to Help Somali Government Repel Rebels Tied to Al-Qaeda,” *Washington Post*, 25 June 2009, www.washingtonpost.com.

⁴¹ Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.

⁴² UN Mine Action Team, “UN Somalia Mine Action: Project Update & Achievements 2008,” 3 March 2009, p. 2.

⁴³ *Landmine Monitor* media monitoring for calendar year 2008.

(SCMAC), which covers the south central region of the country, identified six casualties (three killed and three injured) in the south and central regions of Somalia in 2008. No further details on these casualties were available⁴⁴ and there was no way to tell if the SCMAC figures overlapped with media, UNDSS, and SPAS figures. SCMAC figures were thus not included in *Landmine Monitor Report 2008* casualty figures. Likewise, the Somalia Red Crescent Society (SRCS) reported 58 injured mine casualties in 2008 (18 injured casualties reported at Howlwadag branch clinic and three at Isha branch clinic in Baidoa; 11 at Farjanno branch clinic in Kismayo; five at Lafole, four at Km-13; and two at T-da emergency branch clinics in Mogadishu; and one at Bal'ad branch clinic). However, it was not possible to determine whether these casualties overlapped with the Landmine Monitor figures above.⁴⁵

The 116 casualties identified in 2008 represents an increase compared with 2007, when Landmine Monitor identified 74 casualties (26 killed, 40 injured, and eight unknown). Given the lack of systematic data collection, this should not be necessarily considered indicative of a trend.

Landmine Monitor has identified 2,354 mine/ERW casualties (832 killed, 1,405 injured, and 117 unknown) in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) between 1999 and 2008. PMAC was able to provide cumulative data (lacking details of device type, civil status, or activity) for 207 of these mine/ERW casualties (71 killed and 136 injured) between 2005 and 2008.⁴⁶ SCMAC was able to provide cumulative data (lacking details of device type, civil status, gender, or activity) for 18 of these mine/ERW casualties (12 killed and six injured) between 2005 and 2008.⁴⁷ At the end of 2008, SCMAC's Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database had a total of 96 casualties (50 killed and 46 injured) with varying amounts of detail. The earliest incident recorded was in 1996 but some records are missing the dates of the incidents.⁴⁸

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with Landmine Monitor identifying 25 casualties (eight killed and 17 injured), as of 31 May. PMAC recorded 17 casualties (five killed and 12 injured) and SCMAC recorded four (two killed and two injured), as of 31 May.⁴⁹ An additional four casualties (one killed and three injured) were reported by UNMAS in an ERW incident at Baidoa market.⁵⁰ The ICRC identified 33 "cases of explosive ordnance related incidents from our two hospitals in Mogadishu" in January–May 2009, but did not have information about whether incidents involved victim-activated or command-detonated devices.⁵¹

Risk profile

In Puntland, most casualties are male adults engaged in herding or traveling.⁵² A knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP) survey found that men and older people had a better knowledge and understanding of the risk, and recommended targeting females and younger people with risk education messages.⁵³ In south central Somalia people are most at risk from ERW, including AXO, mainly in urban centers, in particular Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Dhusa Mareb.⁵⁴ Particular risk groups include children playing, adult men harvesting explosives, women street cleaners in Mogadishu, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and nomads.⁵⁵

⁴⁴ Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.

⁴⁵ SRCS, "2008 Annual Report," Nairobi, 2008, pp. 26–35.

⁴⁶ Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Email from and telephone interview with Hugo van den Eertwegh, Deputy Head of Delegation, ICRC, 29 June 2009; and email from Camilla Waszink, Arms Division, Legal Unit, ICRC, 26 August 2009.

⁵² Noe Falk Nielsen, "Mine Risk Education Project Somalia," SRSA, 4 March 2009, p. 8.

⁵³ HI, "KAP Survey Report 2008," November 2008, p. 4.

⁵⁴ Noe Falk Nielsen, "Mine Risk Education Project Somalia," SRSA, 4 March 2009, pp. 6–7; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Katherine Grant, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 24 March 2009.

⁵⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Katherine Grant, UNICEF, 24 March 2009; Noe Falk Nielsen, "Mine Risk Education Project Somalia," SRSA, 4 March 2009 p. 16; and interview with Noe Falk Nielsen, Mine Risk Education Officer, UNDP/SRSA, Nairobi, 4 March 2009.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

There is no centralized mine action program in Somalia. A number of UN agencies are involved in supporting mine action in Somalia, known collectively as the UN Mine Action Team. UNDP Somalia Mine Action (executed by the UN Office for Project Services, UNOPS), headquartered in Nairobi, provides assistance to authorities in Somalia through the UNDP multiyear Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme.⁵⁶ Since 6 February 2009, UNMAS has been the lead agency for mine action in south central Somalia. After many years of UNDP facilitating UN activities it was recognized that under the prevailing security situation it would be unrealistic for it to continue implementing mine action activities in south central Somalia. Consequently, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia formally requested that UNMAS take responsibility for mine action activities in south central Somalia. UNMAS, as a department of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is accustomed to implementing mine action programs in complex humanitarian emergencies.⁵⁷ UNICEF provides support for risk education.⁵⁸

Activities are coordinated through mine action centers in Baidoa in south central Somalia and Garowe in the northeast.⁵⁹

Northeast Somalia

PMAC, which was established by Presidential Decree No. 097/2003 in 2003, coordinates and facilitates mine action activities, including risk education (RE), in Puntland. PMAC is directly supported both financially and operationally by UNDP. An interministerial committee provides governmental oversight and supervision: it consists of the ministries of interior, planning, health, education, information, and justice.

South central Somalia

In 2008, the UN Mine Action Team in Somalia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the TFG on mine action in collaboration with Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security, and the SCMAC was established in Baidoa. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) began conducting surveys, RE, and EOD in collaboration with UNDP Somalia Mine Action in the region. Surveys were conducted in 791 villages in Bakol, Bay, Gedo, and Hiran regions. Approximately one in 10 (a total of 79) villages were found to be contaminated. The mine and ERW-affected villages are in the districts of Baidoa, Bioley, Huddur, Qansah Dere, and Wajid.⁶⁰ RE is also coordinated by SCMAC.⁶¹

Risk education

Capacity development and support in managing RE was provided to SCMAC and PMAC by UNDP Somalia Mine Action through an in-kind SRSA technical advisor.⁶² In addition, Handicap International (HI) provided a four-day RE training course in May 2008 to PMAC staff, MAG, police EOD personnel, and the Puntland Ministry of Security.⁶³

⁵⁶ UN, "2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2008, p. 297.

⁵⁷ Email from David Bax, Program Manager, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.

⁵⁸ Email from Katherine Grant, UNICEF, 31 March 2009.

⁵⁹ Emails from Yngvil Foss, Program Officer Mine Action, UNDP, 27 May 2008; and from David Bax, UNDP, 31 July 2008.

⁶⁰ UN, "2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2008, p. 298; and UN Mine Action Team, "UN Somalia Mine Action: Project Update & Achievements 2008," 3 March 2009.

⁶¹ Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 30 April 2009.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Interview with Xhevdet Gegollaj, Mine Risk Education Project Coordinator, HI, Hargeisa, 8 April 2009; and email from Xhevdet Gegollaj, HI, 30 March 2009.

Victim assistance

PMAC and SCMAC are mandated to coordinate victim assistance (VA) in their respective areas of operation. However, there are no specific VA policies, strategies, plans or functioning coordination mechanisms.⁶⁴

Data collection and management

The PMAC office in Garowe manages the mine action database using IMSMA while the office of the UN Mine Action Team in Baidoa manages the IMSMA database for south central Somalia.⁶⁵ RE data is entered into IMSMA, but it is not complete.⁶⁶

PMAC has collected information on mine/ERW casualties since 2005 through its regional liaison officers, resulting in what UNMAS called, “a relatively comprehensive understanding of the casualty trends. . . .”⁶⁷ Casualty information collected by PMAC is entered into IMSMA.

The situation in south central Somalia is very different, with “only sporadic and unverified casualty data.”⁶⁸ The quality of information has improved since 2007, when the UN Mine Action Team and its partner, DDG, began to verify information in the Bakool, Bay, and Mogadishu regions. However, the “volatile security situation continues to restrict movement, at times preventing verification of casualties.”⁶⁹ Therefore, there is likely to be significant under-reporting of casualties in the south central region.

Basic data on mine/ERW/IED casualties was gathered in Mogadishu hospitals and in SRCS branch clinics, which are supported by the ICRC. However, the ICRC and SRCS data was reportedly very “rough.”⁷⁰ Patients are themselves often unable to determine the kind of device that injured them.⁷¹ UNDSS in Somalia⁷² and SPAS⁷³ also collected data on mine/ERW/IED incidents, along with other security information. They also were not always able to distinguish between victim-activated and command-detonated devices.⁷⁴

Plans

Strategic mine action plan

The UN has stated that its mine action program works to ensure that all mine action activities in Somalia are implemented according to the 2006–2010 UN Inter-Agency Strategy. The project is headquartered in Nairobi with staff rotating between there and the three regions of Somalia. As a consequence of the differing security, development, and capacity issues in Puntland and south central Somalia, the strategy for mine action in each region is distinct.⁷⁵

The short-term strategy (2009–2010) is to strengthen support and technical assistance for PMAC to develop its coordination capacities across all five pillars of mine action. New EOD teams will also be trained, equipped, and capable of conducting EOD under the supervision of technical advisors.⁷⁶ In the medium-term (2010–2012), technical assistance and capacity development support to PMAC will be scaled down. In the long-term it is planned that PMAC

⁶⁴ Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.

⁶⁵ UN Mine Action Team, “UN Somalia Mine Action: Project Update & Achievements 2008,” 3 March 2009.

⁶⁶ Email from Noe Falk Nielsen, UNDP/SRSA, 26 June 2009.

⁶⁷ Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Email from and telephone interview with Hugo van den Eertwegh, ICRC, 29 June 2009.

⁷¹ Interview with Dr. Ahmed M. Hassan, President, SRCS, and Afi Abdulkadir Ibrahim, Communication Officer, SRCS, Nairobi, 30 March 2009.

⁷² UN, “United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS),” 30 June 2009, www.un-somalia.org.

⁷³ Somalia NGO Consortium, “The NGO SPAS,” www.somaliangoconsortium.org.

⁷⁴ Landmine Monitor analysis of SPAS and UNDSS data.

⁷⁵ UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 298.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 299; and UN Mine Action Team, “UN Somalia Mine Action: Project Update & Achievements 2008,” 3 March 2009.

will operate independently to deal with the residual mine and ERW problem with only minor monitoring assistance to ensure quality control.⁷⁷

Mine action program operators

National operators	EOD	RE	Casualty data collection	VA
PMAC				
Puntland police	x	x	x	
Somali Demining and UXO Action Group Center		x		
International operators	EOD	RE	Casualty data collection	VA
Abilis Foundation				x
HI		x		
ICRC				x
MAG	x	x		
SRSA	x	x	x	x
Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims Aid				x
UNDP Somalia Mine Action	x	x	x	x
UNICEF		x		
UNMAS	x	x	x	x

Until the security situation in south central Somalia stabilizes and a more permissive operational environment emerges it is not possible to determine the level of activities that can be undertaken. As a result the mine action program operates with a high degree of flexibility.⁷⁸ The primary aim for 2009 was to support the SCMAC and clearance capacities. This includes developing capacities to undertake high-priority clearance, continually training EOD teams, and enhancing the capacities of existing *ad hoc* survey, RE, and emergency medical teams.⁷⁹ It was also planned, depending on the security situation, to provide assistance to AMISOM to enhance their EOD capacities; this initiative had begun by June (see Demining and battle area clearance in 2008 section below).⁸⁰

There are no national standards or a strategy for RE.⁸¹ UNDP Somalia Mine Action has developed their own RE plan which consists of three main activities: transfer of the UNDP national RE coordinator and some UNDP/SRSA facilitators to the SCMAC as RE implementation staff, implementing direct RE activities in all areas of south central Somalia, and ensuring the sustainability of RE activities by training local RE community focal points in all targeted areas.⁸² The transfer of RE teams to SCMAC had not taken place as of June 2009.⁸³

⁷⁷ UN, "2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2008, p. 299.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Interview with Noe Falk Nielsen, UNDP/SRSA, Nairobi, 4 March 2009.

⁸² Noe Falk Nielsen, "Mine Risk Education Project Somalia," SRSA, 4 March 2009, pp. 18–19.

⁸³ Email from Noe Falk Nielsen, UNDP/SRSA, 26 June 2009.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

A GICHD evaluation in 2007 (see Program evaluations section below) concluded that mine action contributes to other pillars of international support to Somalia. It stated that by clearing pastureland and traditional migration routes, mine clearance enhances livelihoods and reduces vulnerability for pastoralists. In this regard, all aspects of mine action could be viewed simply as public services, the effective delivery of which restores public confidence in the state and its organs.⁸⁴

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

In the absence of effective national governance, commitment to mine action in Somalia has been demonstrated through agreements between local officials, the UN, and Geneva Call. Despite several years of UN assistance to mine action in Puntland, PMAC is not yet ready to take full ownership of mine action in this region. In a letter to Geneva Call on 10 January 2007, however, the Vice President of Puntland Hassan Dahir Mohamud reiterated Puntland's commitment to banning landmines and reducing the risks from mines.⁸⁵

National management

In the absence of a functioning central government, the UN maintains *de facto* responsibility for coordinating, planning, managing, and monitoring mine action activities on behalf of the TFG and the Puntland and Somaliland authorities.⁸⁶

National mine action legislation

PMAC was established by presidential decree in 2003, which formally makes it responsible for mine action in Puntland.⁸⁷ Mine action legislation has not been passed in south central Somalia.

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

Police EOD teams follow standing operating procedures developed by MAG.⁸⁸

Program evaluations

From March–April 2007, GICHD conducted an evaluation of European Commission (EC)-funded mine action in Africa, including Somalia.⁸⁹ GICHD recommended that UNDP/UNOPS should assist PMAC in revising its mine action strategy and continue capacity development of core local capacities (while formulating an exit strategy). As already noted, some of these recommendations are now being acted upon by the UN (see Strategic mine action planning section above).

The evaluation also recommended that HALO consider initiating mine clearance in Puntland, focusing on the larger minefields in the border regions of northern Mudug.⁹⁰ HALO has indicated that it is considering a move into Puntland, once most of the high- and medium-priority SHAs in HALO's current area of operations in Somaliland are completed and the security situation allows for safe operations.⁹¹

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Police teams undertake EOD activities in Puntland and south central Somalia under direct supervision by MAG. In Puntland, EOD operations are coordinated with UNDP, and in south central Somalia, activities are supervised by SRSA and coordinated with UNDP/UNMAS.⁹² SRSA staff provide in-kind support to UNDP Somalia Mine Action.⁹³

⁸⁴ GICHD, "Somalia report: Mission to Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)," Final report, October 2007, pp. 20–21.

⁸⁵ Letter from Hassan Dahir Mohamud, Vice President of Puntland, to Geneva Call, 10 January 2007.

⁸⁶ UN, "2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2008, p. 299.

⁸⁷ Puntland Region Presidential Decree No. 79, dated 13 July 2003.

⁸⁸ Email from John McFarlane, Team Leader, MAG, 26 June 2009.

⁸⁹ Email from Ted Paterson, Head of Evaluation Section, GICHD, 21 May 2007.

⁹⁰ GICHD, "Somalia report: Mission to Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland)," Final report, October 2007, pp. 23–24.

⁹¹ Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 21 May 2009.

⁹² UN, "2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," New York, November 2008, p. 299.

⁹³ Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 26 June 2009.

No mine clearance has occurred in Somalia since the Puntland LIS was conducted in 2004–2005. The priorities have been training police EOD units, conducting EOD and, since 2007, seeking to establish a mine action program in south central Somalia.⁹⁴

In 2008, MAG trained six members of the Puntland police in basic EOD. The police EOD team is supported financially by UNDP Somalia Mine Action. MAG also trained nine members of the Puntland police and military (the Darawish) as EOD team medics. In June 2009, MAG planned to assess the six EOD police personnel to determine if they are qualified to become EOD Level 2 operators.⁹⁵

In May 2008, MAG, in collaboration with UNDP, started a Conventional Weapons Management and Destruction (CWMD) project in Puntland with funding from the United States Department of State. As part of the project MAG established a basic explosives and UXO warehouse and improved the Central Demolition Site in Garowe.⁹⁶

SRSA conducted a basic EOD course for Somali police officers in Baidoa, south central Somalia, in January–April 2008. Following the training, 17 men and four women graduated as EOD operators, trained to International Mine Action Standards Level 2. Three EOD teams, including the four women graduates, were then based in Baidoa.⁹⁷

Demining and battle area clearance in 2008

In 2008, in Puntland, the Puntland EOD police team disposed of “visible ammunition.” Under the MAG project, a total of 2,594 ERW were disposed of in 45 EOD tasks.⁹⁸

No mine clearance was possible either in south central Somalia due to the ongoing conflicts.⁹⁹ UXO spot clearance in and around Mogadishu, however, was reported as being carried out by AMISOM troops from Burundi and Uganda.¹⁰⁰ Also in 2008, DDG marked for safe disposal 264 ERW, completed 57 dangerous area reports in IMSMA format, updated ERW threat maps for Mogadishu, and facilitated the disposal of 56 items of UXO by AMISOM.¹⁰¹ DDG teams also found two landmines in a former military bunker in an IDP camp near Arbis in the Afgooye corridor outside Mogadishu. The mines were not active.¹⁰²

Clearance efforts in Puntland appeared to gather momentum in 2009. In January–June in Garowe, Puntland’s administrative capital, EOD teams conducted 240,000m² of visual battle area clearance and 1,000m² of subsurface clearance, destroying a total of 109 items of UXO.¹⁰³ The EOD teams also discovered 100kg of explosives from the 1980s that had been buried in the rubble of an abandoned ammunition storage area. The contents of the storage area were subsequently destroyed with the cooperation of the Puntland authorities. An estimated 1,000 people live very close to the area, which has now been cleared and verified as free of UXO.¹⁰⁴

Also in 2009, in Galkayo, a large town near the Ethiopian border in Puntland that has often been off limits because of security concerns, EOD teams found and destroyed 454 ERW from the main police station. The munitions destroyed included 370 new hand grenades.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁴ UN, “Country Profile: Somalia,” www.mineaction.org; and UNDP, “Mine Action,” Somalia, www.so.undp.org.

⁹⁵ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Simon Wooldridge, Project Manager, Somalia Program, MAG, 18 February 2009; and email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 26 June 2009.

⁹⁶ UN Mine Action Team, “UN Somalia Mine Action: Project Update & Achievements 2008,” 3 March 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Simon Wooldridge, MAG, February 2009.

⁹⁷ Email from David Bax, UNDP, 30 April 2008.

⁹⁸ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Simon Wooldridge, MAG, 18 February 2009.

⁹⁹ Email from Yngvil Foss, UNDP, 27 May 2008.

¹⁰⁰ MAG, “Somalia: Project launched to support peacekeeping work in Mogadishu,” 15 June 2009, www.maginternational.org.

¹⁰¹ Information from DDG, “Survey, EOD & MRE in Mogadishu, Somalia,” Project proposal submitted to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2009.

¹⁰² Email from Klaus Pedersen, Representative Horn of Africa and Armed Violence Reduction, DDG, 5 May 2009.

¹⁰³ MAG, “CWMD, Global Update,” March 2009, www.maginternational.org; and MAG, “Why Does MAG Work in Somalia,” www.maginternational.org.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

In June 2009, through the UN Mine Action Team in Somalia, MAG began training peacekeeping forces deployed with AMISOM in Mogadishu in EOD techniques.¹⁰⁶

Risk Education

RE in 2008 consisted primarily of emergency RE through direct presentations in IDP camps, to at-risk communities and in schools, and through radio broadcasts.¹⁰⁷ Training of trainers was conducted for SCMAC staff, national NGOs, and teachers.

The UNDP/SRSA mine risk education officer trained 112 RE facilitators across south central Somalia between April and September 2008. Of these, 38 were selected to be deployed as SRSA RE facilitators.¹⁰⁸

The lack of information available constrained the development of an RE strategy.¹⁰⁹ In Puntland, a KAP survey in three districts conducted by HI found that more than half of those surveyed “used ERW” for selling and making money, and for digging wells, and one-quarter entered mined areas. It found that only a small proportion of those surveyed had received RE, and thus concluded there was a low level of knowledge.¹¹⁰

Security issues plagued RE plans throughout Somalia in 2008 and both national and international staff had restricted access, resulting in delays and reduced activities.¹¹¹

Specific RE materials have been developed for Somalia by the UNDP/SRSA mine risk education officer and field teams, using a participatory approach and taking into account the low literacy rates, targeting dangerous behavior, and reflecting the greater risks from ERW than mines.¹¹²

The UNDP/SRSA mine risk education officer monitored activities in the Baidoa area in August and September 2008 and concluded that RE was satisfactory, and was having a positive impact on risk behavior. The officer identified a need for more RE, using more creative approaches, with increased sustainability through the training of more community focal points. Severe security restrictions and the lack of standards restricted the monitoring of UNDP partner organizations.¹¹³

Very little RE has been conducted over the last 10 years in Somalia.¹¹⁴ In 2000, UNDP ran a mine awareness program in Somali refugee camps in Djibouti.¹¹⁵ In 2005, SOMMAC organized a seminar to raise awareness among journalists.¹¹⁶ In 2005, HI produced RE materials for Puntland and trained members of PMAC and the Puntland police EOD teams who then continued to deliver limited RE through to 2008. This activity resulted, for the first time, in communities reporting UXO to EOD teams. In January 2006, GICHD also provided training to PMAC staff.¹¹⁷ In 2007, HI launched an RE project in Puntland, and DDG delivered RE messages in IDP camps and Mogadishu.¹¹⁸

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Noe Falk Nielsen, “Somalia Mine Risk Education Project,” SRSA, 4 March 2009, pp. 34–35.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 17.

¹¹⁰ Washington Okevo, “KAP Survey Report 2008,” HI, November 2008, p. 2.

¹¹¹ Noe Falk Nielsen, “Somalia Mine Risk Education Project,” SRSA, 4 March 2009, p. 38; and interview with Noe Falk Nielsen, UNDP/SRSA, Nairobi, 4 March 2009.

¹¹² Interview with Noe Falk Nielsen, UNDP/SRSA, Nairobi, 4 March 2009; and Noe Falk Nielsen, “Somalia Mine Risk Education Project,” SRSA, 4 March 2009, pp. 24–26.

¹¹³ Noe Falk Nielsen, “Somalia Mine Risk Education Project,” SRSA, 4 March 2009, pp. 40–42.

¹¹⁴ See previous editions of *Landmine Monitor*.

¹¹⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 260.

¹¹⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 874.

¹¹⁷ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 1069.

¹¹⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 982.

Activities in 2008¹¹⁹

Organization	Type of activity	Geographical area	No. of beneficiaries
UNDP/SRSA	Train the trainers and direct RE	South central Somalia – Baidoa area, Bay region	26,343
UNICEF	RE in child protection activities in IDP camps and vulnerable communities. Life skills-based education and child-to-child clubs program started end 2008	Throughout Somalia	Est. 30,000
SOMMAC	RE	Mogadishu	Not known
DDG	Emergency RE	Mogadishu and IDP camps	26,776
HI	Training of trainers, mass media, materials production and support to PMAC	Radio across whole of Puntland; training courses in Galkayo, Galdogob, Bossaso, and Burtinle; RE materials in Galkayo.	350,511
MAG	Limited one-off emergency RE in response to one major incident	Garowe, Puntland	80 teachers
Diaspora Action Group	Awareness activities	Near Hagar in Lower Juba (southern Somalia close to Kenyan border) at the end of October	Not known

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be 1,405. There were no specific VA policies or activities in Somalia in 2008 and mine/ERW survivors faced the same challenges as other persons with disabilities. The health care situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate in 2008, with NGOs facing increasing security risks. There is little capacity for emergency surgery or trauma care outside of Mogadishu. Rehabilitation and healthcare facilities are difficult to access in remote areas. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that “external assistance is dwindling in quality and quantity due to high insecurity and increased targeting of humanitarian workers.”¹²⁰

With intensified fighting in May and June 2009, Mogadishu hospitals were reportedly “overwhelmed” and “overcrowded.”¹²¹ Medical personnel in the city faced routine “threats and intimidation” by armed groups.¹²² The Medina Hospital in Mogadishu reported in June 2009 that it was unable to feed its patients.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ Email from Katherine Grant, UNICEF, 31 March 2009; interview with David Bax, UNMAS, Nairobi, 4 March 2009; World Health Organization, “Somali Health Cluster Bulletin,” November 2008, www.emro.who.int; and emails from Xhevdet Gegollaj, HI, 30 and 31 March 2009.

¹²⁰ MSF, “Trapped Somali Populations Need Immediate Life-Saving Assistance,” Press release, 26 June 2008, Geneva/Nairobi, doctorswithoutborders.org.

¹²¹ “Hunger stalks Mogadishu hospitals,” *IRIN*, 22 June 2009, www.irinnews.org.

¹²² “Coping with humanitarian tragedy in Mogadishu,” *IRIN*, 5 June 2009, www.irinnews.org.

¹²³ “Providing healthcare against all odds in Mogadishu,” *IRIN*, 7 April 2009, www.irinnews.org.

¹²⁴ “Hunger stalks Mogadishu hospitals,” *IRIN*, 22 June 2009.

The UNMAS/UNDP Mine Action Medical team, consisting of a trauma nurse seconded from SRSA and eight medics, can provide care for mine/ERW/IED casualties on an *ad hoc* basis when they are not in the field supporting the south central Somalia EOD operations. For instance, in early 2009, the team provided emergency care at the Bay Regional Hospital in Baidoa to four casualties of an ERW incident at Baidoa market.¹²⁵ The team also provided support to the Bay Regional Hospital, training staff in first-aid and traumatology and treating some 1,200 patients.¹²⁶

Following an ERW accident in Garowe in October 2008, MAG medic trainers provided first-aid to the casualties. Through liaising with the Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims Aid, MAG helped arrange for one of the injured survivors to get further medical treatment in Ethiopia.¹²⁷

The ICRC supported the main referral hospitals for surgery in both Mogadishu (Keysaney Hospital, run by the Somali Red Crescent Society, SRCS) and Medina. The ICRC provided funding, supplies, training, and supervision. The Keysaney hospital treated 1,209 weapon-wounded in 2008, though none of these casualties were caused by mines.¹²⁸ A team from the Qatar Red Crescent Society worked alongside local staff at Keysaney hospital but had to be withdrawn for security reasons at the end of 2008. The ICRC also delivered medical supplies to other hospitals around the country and first-aid posts in the Bay, Galgudud, Lower Juba, and Middle Shabelle regions.¹²⁹

Through its Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD), the ICRC, along with the Norwegian Red Cross Society, provided support to three SRCS rehabilitation centers: in Galkayo (Puntland), Hargeisa, and Mogadishu.¹³⁰ The centers provide prosthetic and orthotic services and physiotherapy. The ICRC provided training and supported staff to do courses on prosthetics, orthotics, and physiotherapy in Addis Ababa and Somaliland. The Galkayo Center assisted 114 patients with prostheses and 79 with orthoses and provided 885 patients with physiotherapy. The Mogadishu Center assisted 188 patients with prostheses and 238 with orthoses and provided 969 patients with physiotherapy.¹³¹ The ICRC said that the “quality of services improved in 2008” at the Galkayo Center but accessibility remained a problem, due to security issues and lack of public transport. Production of prostheses and orthoses at the Mogadishu center decreased by 40% in 2008, compared with 2007.¹³²

MSF continued to be the primary provider of free medical services in central and southern Somalia. This included facilities equipped for emergency surgery and trauma care in Belet Weyne, Daynile, Dinsor, and South Galkayo. However, ongoing insecurity hampered MSF’s operations. In 2008, four MSF employees were killed, projects in Bosasso, Kismayo, and Mogadishu had to be closed, and all international staff were evacuated in April.¹³³ In June 2009, MSF announced its withdrawal from the Bakool region, where it had run a health center and

¹²⁵ Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.

¹²⁶ Tammy Orr, “UN Somalia Mine Action: Project Update & Achievements 2008,” 3 March 2009, p. 2; and interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.

¹²⁷ Simon Wooldridge, “Monthly Update on Mines Advisory Group (MAG) Somalia Activities – July 2008,” 31 July 2008.

¹²⁸ SRCS, “2008 Annual Report,” Nairobi, 2008, p. 7.

¹²⁹ ICRC, “2008 Annual Report,” Geneva, May 2009, p. 136.

¹³⁰ Email from Camilla Waszink, ICRC, 26 August 2009.

¹³¹ SRCS, “2008 Annual Report,” Nairobi, 2008, p. 9.

¹³² ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, April 2009, pp. 24–25.

¹³³ MSF, “MSF in Somalia,” March 2009, doctorswithoutborders.org; MSF, “Somalia: Unacceptable Security Risks Leave Thousands Without Care in Mogadishu,” 2 September 2008, doctorswithoutborders.org; MSF, “MSF closes its medical project in Bossaso, Puntland State of Somalia,” Press release, 7 May 2008, Nairobi/Barcelona, doctorswithoutborders.org; and MSF, “MSF Closes Medical Project in Kismayo, Somalia,” Press release, 3 April 2008, New York/Nairobi, doctorswithoutborders.org.

four health posts, for security reasons.¹³⁴ MSF said, however, that “none of our projects treat a substantial number of landmine victims in Somalia.”¹³⁵

There is very little psychosocial or economic support for mine/ERW survivors or persons with disabilities in Somalia.¹³⁶ Abilis Foundation provided small grants to local organizations of persons with disabilities for income generation, including the Disabled Women for Bread in Janaale, Technical Aid for Disabled Community Organization in Wanlewey, and Banadir Disabled Concern Organization in Mogadishu.¹³⁷

Both the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and the Puntland Charter prohibit discrimination. The TFC gives the state responsibility for the welfare of persons with disabilities and the Puntland Charter protects the rights of persons with disabilities. However, the US Department of State said, “In the absence of functioning governance institutions, the needs of most persons with disabilities were not addressed.”¹³⁸ There was reportedly significant discrimination against them.¹³⁹

Somalia had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol as of 1 July 2009.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Somalia. The mine action program in Somalia is wholly funded from international sources with the exception of a monthly contribution to PMAC (see below) since January 2004.¹⁴⁰ UNDP coordinates mine action in cooperation with UNMAS, UNICEF, and other UN agencies, as well as national and international NGOs. PMAC coordinates mine action in the Puntland region.¹⁴¹

National support for mine action

The government of Puntland has reportedly contributed SOS1.5 million (\$1,095) to PMAC monthly—or SOS15 million (\$10,950) annually—since at least January 2004.¹⁴² The specific uses of the contributions have not been reported.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, two countries reported providing \$840,450 (€570,725) to mine action in Somalia.¹⁴³ There are no baseline estimates of mine/ERW contamination against which to measure the adequacy of funds in addressing mine clearance and RE needs. No international funds in 2008 addressed VA needs in Somalia, which remain extensive.

¹³⁴ MSF, “Growing Insecurity Forces MSF to Leave its Largest Health Center in Somalia,” Press release, Nairobi/Brussels, 17 June 2009, doctorswithoutborders.org.

¹³⁵ Email from Susan Sandars, Regional Information Officer, MSF, 23 March, 2009.

¹³⁶ Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.

¹³⁷ Abilis Foundation, “Projects,” 2009, www.abilis.fi.

¹³⁸ US Department of State, “2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Somalia,” Washington, DC, 25 February 2009.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Email from Abdirisak Issa Hussein, Manager, PMAC, 27 June 2009.

¹⁴¹ UN, “Country Profile: Somalia,” www.mineaction.org.

¹⁴² Email from Abdirisak Issa Hussein, PMAC, 27 July 2009.

¹⁴³ Comparison of funding in 2008 to funding 2007 is not provided because some funds reported by donors in 2007 as contributions to Somalia were evidently for mine action in Somaliland, which Landmine Monitor calculates separately. Funds reported for 2008 have been differentiated in greater detail. As a result, direct year-to-year comparisons may not be valid.

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Somalia: Monetary¹⁴⁴

Donor	Implementing Agencies/ Organizations	Project Details	Amount
US	MAG	EOD in Puntland, unspecified mine action	\$655,000
United Kingdom	UNMAS	Capacity-building, mine clearance, emergency response	\$185,450 (£100,000)
Total			\$840,450 (€570,725)

¹⁴⁴ USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2008, from “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” received by email from Timothy Groen, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 18 June 2009; and email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009.