

SUDAN

2008 Key Data

State Party since	1 April 2004
Contamination	Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW
Estimated area of contamination	556 confirmed minefields and SHAs covering 107km ² (September 2009)
Casualties in 2008	At least 65 (2007: 91)
Estimated mine/ERW survivors	Unknown
Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)	Deadline: 1 April 2014
Demining in 2008	Mined area clearance: 4.07km ² Battle area clearance: 5.74km ²
Risk education recipients in 2008	691,464
Progress towards victim assistance aims	Slow
Support for mine action in 2008	International: \$39 million (2007: \$29.2 million) National: \$4.9 million (2007: \$7.5 million)

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of the Sudan ratified the Mine Ban Treaty in October 2003 and became a State Party on 1 April 2004. Sudan has drafted but not enacted national implementation legislation. Sudan served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from 2005–2007. Sudan completed destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines in March 2008. Additional mines were later discovered and destroyed. From 1999–2004, there were serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and other rebel groups; the government denied any use.

Sudan is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of more than 20 years of armed struggle between the government of Sudan and non-state armed groups in the south, mainly the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army. A Landmine Impact Survey was completed in 16 Sudanese states in June 2009, with the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAS) estimating that total residual contamination covered 107km². UNMAS began mine action operations in 2002 in the Nuba Mountains with international and local NGOs carrying out demining and risk education. More than 44km² of land have since been released and a further 29,000km of road verified. Mine action centers have been set up in Khartoum in the north and in Juba in the south.

There have been at least 4,213 mine/ ERW casualties in Sudan, including 1,748 casualties between 1999 and 2008, but data collection has been incomplete and not nationwide. Mine/ ERW risk education was undertaken from 1999–2008 by an increasing number of operators and with increasing effectiveness, but some areas remained uncovered. Activities were also organized for refugees from other countries as well as Sudanese refugees in countries such as Kenya.

Despite an increase in activities due to long-term funding for victim assistance (VA) since 2007, service provision has remained limited both in terms of geographic coverage and the types of services provided. The situation of survivors and persons with disabilities was hampered by a general lack of capacity, infrastructure, ongoing conflict, and poverty. Government interest in VA/disability action has increased since 2007, but this has not yet been matched with increased financial commitments or better implementation by government ministries.

Background

Following a three-year peace process, the government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. An interim implementation period of six years will last until July 2011, when a referendum on self-determination for the south will be held. Sudan is now ruled by the Government of National Unity (GONU)—an entity containing the former ruling party, the National Congress, SPLM/A, and others—and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS).

Mine Ban Policy

Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004. The CPA incorporates previous agreements between the government and SPLM/A that explicitly prohibit use of all landmines. An agreement reached on 31 December 2004 states that the “laying of mines, explosive devices or booby traps of whatever type shall be prohibited.”¹

Sudan submitted its annual Article 7 report on 13 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008. It has submitted five previous Article 7 reports.² In its Article 7 report covering 2008, Sudan reported that draft national implementation legislation had been cleared by the GONU Ministry of Justice and “endorsed by the concerned committee of the National Assembly responsible for the validations of humanitarian laws.” The legislation is expected to pass into law during 2009.³

Sudan participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made a statement during the general exchange of views, as well as statements on mine clearance, VA, and cooperation and assistance. Sudan participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it made statements on stockpile destruction, mine clearance, risk education (RE), and VA.

Sudan has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 10 April 1981, but has never ratified it. Sudan has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁴

¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 652. Under a previous memorandum of understanding on cessation of hostilities reached in October 2002, both parties agreed to “cease laying of landmines.” The government and SPLM/A also agreed to stop using mines in the January 2002 Nuba Mountains cease-fire agreement. Prior to these agreements, the SPLM/A signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in October 2001.

² Sudan prepared an initial Article 7 report, dated 1 October 2004; the period covered was not stated. The Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit received this initial report, but Sudan apparently never officially submitted it to the UN. Sudan submitted a second Article 7 report dated 30 April 2005, but the date of submission is listed by the UN as 17 February 2006, covering the period from 1 October 2004 to 30 April 2005. Sudan submitted a third, undated, Article 7 report, listed by the UN as submitted on 20 May 2006, covering 1 May 2005 to 31 December 2005. Sudan submitted a fourth Article 7 report, dated 30 April 2007, after August 2007, covering calendar year 2006, and a fifth report in August 2008, covering calendar year 2007. Prior to the submission deadline of 30 April 2008, Sudan submitted an interim letter to the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit regarding completion of its stockpile destruction obligations. Letter to GICHD from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the UN, Geneva, 4 April 2008.

³ Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

⁴ For details on cluster munition policy and practice, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, *Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice*, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, pp. 243–244.

Production, transfer, and use

Sudan has repeatedly stated that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁵ Landmine Monitor has not received any serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the government, the SPLA, or other forces anywhere in Sudan since early 2004.⁶

The UN has reported one suspected mined area in Darfur region. It is not known when the mines may have been laid.⁷ Many groups remain outside the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, which prohibits mine use.⁸

Stockpiling and destruction

Sudan completed destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines on 31 March 2008, ahead of its 1 April 2008 treaty-mandated deadline. The reported size and composition of Sudan's stockpile, as well as the number of mines to be retained for training purposes, have varied in accounts by Sudan leading up to and following stockpile destruction events in 2007 and 2008.

In its Article 7 report submitted in February 2006, Sudan declared a total of 14,485 antipersonnel mines of eight types held in army and SPLA stockpiles, and stated that 5,000 mines of various types would be retained for training purposes by the Engineer Corps of the Sudan Armed Forces.⁹ In its Article 7 reports submitted in May 2006 and April 2007, Sudan declared a total of 4,485 stockpiled antipersonnel mines of 18 types, all under the control of GONU, and an additional 10,000 mines of unspecified types to be retained for training purposes, with GONU and GOSS each retaining 5,000 mines.¹⁰

Sudan carried out an initial stockpile destruction event on 30 April 2007 in northern Sudan, during which 4,488 mines were destroyed. On 31 March 2008, a second destruction event took place in Southern Sudan, during which an additional 6,078 mines were destroyed, bringing the total number of mines destroyed to 10,566.¹¹ In an April 2008 letter to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Sudan stated that, of a total stockpile of 15,566 antipersonnel mines, it had destroyed 10,566 and retained 5,000. Sudan stated that the adjusted figure of 15,566 mines (rather than the 14,485 mines previously reported) was the result of additional mines stockpiled by SPLA forces not being previously included in inventories.¹²

In its Article 7 report covering 2008, Sudan revised its number of mines retained for training purposes, this time reporting a total of 1,938 mines of six types (see Mines retained for training purposes section below).¹³ In a presentation during the May 2009 intersessional Standing

⁵ Previous editions of Landmine Monitor have noted no evidence of production of antipersonnel mines by Sudan, but have cited allegations of transfer to militant groups in neighboring countries prior to Sudan becoming a State Party. See, for example, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 223.

⁶ Landmine Monitor received allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government-supported militias in Upper Nile state as late as April 2004. A Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) commander in Northern Darfur state said the SLA had captured a Sudanese government cache of landmines when it overran a government army position in early 2004. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, pp. 753–755. For descriptions of past use and denials of use, see previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

⁷ UNMAO information sheet on Darfur, provided by Christina Greene, Program Officer, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

⁸ Darfur Peace Agreement, Abuja, 5 May 2006, www.unmis.org. Other factions and non-state armed groups have rejected the Abuja agreement. Previously, the SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement signed a humanitarian cease-fire for Darfur with the Government of Sudan in April 2004. This agreement required a halt in mine use and required the marking of any mined areas. "Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur," (N'Djamena Agreement), Articles 2, 4, and 6, N'Djamena, Chad, 8 April 2004. The UN has identified 30 armed parties, classified into different groups. Email from Ida Margarita Hyllested, Assistant Project Officer, UNICEF, 30 March 2008.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 17 February 2006.

¹⁰ Article 7 Reports, Form B, 20 May 2006 and 30 April 2007; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, pp. 621–622.

¹¹ UNDP, "Brief Report on the Official Ceremony of the Destruction of the First Batch of Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mine – Sudan," 20 April 2007; and Statement of Sudan, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008. For details of the composition of the stockpiles destroyed, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 633–634.

¹² Letter to GICHD from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 4 April 2008.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form D, 13 April 2009.

Committee meetings, Sudan revised its total number of stockpiled mines, reporting that in spite of its original declaration of 14,485 stockpiled mines, only 12,513 were “accounted for” during physical stock-taking.¹⁴ It is likely that number is supposed to be 12,504 (the 10,566 destroyed mines plus the 1,938 retained mines).¹⁵ Sudan noted, “As no proper records have been maintained, determining the exact number and types of APMs [antipersonnel mines] was a challenge.”¹⁶

In its Article 7 report for 2008, Sudan stated, “In addition to the destruction of known stockpiles of APMs, caches of APM were discovered in various locations of Southern Sudan which contained 523 APM. All these mines were destroyed in 2008. The destruction took place in various parts of Blue Nile State, Southern Sudan during October–December 2008.”¹⁷

Mines retained for training purposes

As noted above, in recent years Sudan has reported differing numbers of mines retained for training purposes, based on varying estimates of overall stockpiles. In April 2008, shortly after the completion of stockpile destruction, Sudan reported retaining 5,000 mines of unspecified types “for the purposes of research and [the] demining training process.”¹⁸ In June 2008, it reported retaining 4,979 mines, again without specifying types.¹⁹ In August 2008, Sudan reported retaining 4,997 mines of 18 types, without specifying numbers retained for each type. The list provided was evidently provisional, as Sudan stated that “Details of each type of mine and the quantities are being sorted out and will be reported in the next report.”²⁰ The same number of mines retained was repeated in a statement by Sudan at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008.²¹ However, in its Article 7 report covering 2008, Sudan reported retaining only 1,938 mines, consisting of PMN (178), Type 14 (130), “Desert plastic” (85), Type 35 (1,194), Valmara (46), and PPM mines (307).²² This number was confirmed in a presentation by Sudan at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Sudan has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004.

In June 2008, the head of the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) stated that all mines retained by Sudan for training and research purposes are held under the authority of GONU and are not accessible to mine action authorities or operators in Southern Sudan. Mines required for training purposes in Southern Sudan must be obtained from sources other than GONU stocks, at least until the 2011 referendum on the status of Southern Sudan, at which time common access to stocks may result from the establishment of a joint government.²³

¹⁴ Presentation by Sudan, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

¹⁵ In looking at the presentation, it appears the extra nine mines were the result of incorrectly counting the March 2008 destruction as 6,087 instead of 6,078.

¹⁶ Presentation by Sudan, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 25 May 2009.

¹⁷ Article 7 Report, Form G, 13 April 2009. The mines were 283 No. 4; 121 TS-50; 80 Type 69; 19 M14; 17 M35; 11 PoMZ-2; and one PMN. At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, Sudan said that it had found “additional abandoned caches” of mines and would destroy them. Statement of Sudan, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2008. In March 2008, Sudan indicated that it expects additional stockpiled antipersonnel mines will be identified and destroyed, given the difficulties of doing a comprehensive inventory and collection of all the stockpiled antipersonnel mines belonging to all former combatants in Sudan. At the March 2008 destruction event, the GOSS Minister of Interior expressed his hope to “gather again to destroy even bigger number of mines than today.” A UN official told Landmine Monitor that on 1 April 2008, one day after the destruction event, a stock of 10 boxes of Type 69 antipersonnel mines was found. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 634.

¹⁸ Letter to GICHD from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 4 April 2008.

¹⁹ Statement of Sudan, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008.

²⁰ Article 7 Report, Form D, August 2008.

²¹ Statement of Sudan, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2008.

²² Article 7 Report, Form D, 13 April 2009.

²³ Interview with Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, Chairperson, SSDA, in Geneva, 4 June 2008.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Sudan is contaminated with mines and ERW, primarily as a result of more than 20 years of armed struggle between the Government of Sudan and non-state armed groups in the south, mainly the SPLA. The struggle ended with the signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005, although continued violence raised fears of a return to conflict.²⁴

Of Sudan's 25 states, 19 have previously been suspected to be mine-affected,²⁵ although survey has discounted Sennar in central Sudan. (See Identification of hazardous areas section below). To better determine the scope of contamination in Sudan, in 2005 the UN launched the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) with the Survey Action Center (SAC). In the 16 states where the LIS was conducted, of an estimated 5,445 villages the survey identified 296 as impacted by landmines—a prevalence rate of 5.4%. As a comparison, the prevalence rate across Angola and Afghanistan was 8%.²⁶

With little evidence of a mine problem in Darfur region, it was planned to survey the region for UXO sites but the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) decided not to proceed after 13 international NGOs were expelled from Darfur in March 2009. As of August 2009, the survey had not started.²⁷

Prior to the LIS, the Sudanese government considered the five states of Gezira, Khartoum, Northern, Northern Kordofan, and White Nile as not being affected, and they were not surveyed as a result, although the borders with Libya and Egypt in Northern and Nile states may be contaminated with mines laid during World War II.²⁸

A more complete view of the mine/ERW problem in Sudan may be contained in UNMAO records, which covered 5,511 "hazardous areas" across 18 states in 2002 through June 2009. Hazardous areas are classified in three ways: a dangerous area (DA), a (confirmed) mined area, or a suspected hazardous area (SHA). DAs represent 85% of all hazardous areas, of which more than half are designated as UXO spot-clearance tasks. Almost half of the DAs are associated with roads and open land while approximately one in five are located inside buildings, including military installations. As of June 2009, DAs in buildings represented approximately 12% of the DAs awaiting clearance.²⁹ In Darfur region, 148 hazardous areas—all classified as DAs—had been identified, but as of June 2009 only 37 sites with a residual UXO threat remained to be released.³⁰

Of the 5,511 identified hazardous areas, 3,467 have been "closed" (i.e. released by clearance, cancelled, or changed to a SHA or minefield³¹), mainly through the retrofit of DAs found by the LIS, leaving 2,044 for release. Of these 2,044 areas, 192 were confirmed mined areas and 364 were SHAs (see table below).³² The confirmed mined areas were estimated to cover 26km² of land and as of June 2009 the SHAs remaining from the LIS cover an estimated 94km² for a total estimated area of contamination of 119km².³³

²⁴ See, for example, Amber Henshaw, "Sudan to deploy troops in Abyei," *BBC News*, 15 June 2008, news.bbc.co.uk; and Reverend Daniel A. Odwel, "Malakal Clashes: South Sudan won't taste peaceful co-existence with this illusive mentality," 17 January 2009, www.torit1955.wordpress.com..

²⁵ Interview with Al Awad Al-Bashir, Director, NMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008; and see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 623.

²⁶ SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) Status in Sudan as of July 2009," provided to Landmine Monitor, 4 July 2009.

²⁷ UNMAO, "Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan," www.sudan-map.org, p. 10. .

²⁸ SAC, "Final Report for Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Unity, Warrab and Lakes States," July 2008, www.sac-na.org.

²⁹ UNMAO, "IMSMA Monthly Report," June 2009, Table 1.1, p. 1, www.sudan-map.org.

³⁰ Ibid, Tables, 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4, pp. 1–2, www.sudan-map.org; and email from David McMahon, Chief of Operations and Planning, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

³¹ Email from Mohammad Kabir, Chief Information Officer, UNMAO, 11 August 2009.

³² UNMAO, "IMSMA Monthly Report," June 2009, Table 1.1, p. 1, www.sudan-map.org.

³³ Ibid; and email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 3 August 2009.

Hazardous areas as of June 2009³⁴

State	No. of hazardous areas	No. of DAs	No. of mined areas	No. of SHAs
Central Equatoria	524	387	4	133
South Kordofan	334	175	88	71
Eastern Equatoria	213	172	34	7
Western Bahr el Ghazal	196	191	0	5
Blue Nile	139	78	29	32
Western Equatoria	135	118	0	17
Kassala	112	44	18	50
Subtotal	1,653	1,165	173	315
Percentage	80.87%	70.48%	10.47%	19.06%
Other 11 affected states	391	323	19	49
Total	2,044	1,488	192	364

Data on the type of munitions found indicates more of a UXO/ERW problem than a landmine problem. As of September 2009, UNMAO reported that 15,217 antipersonnel mines and 3,050 antivehicle mines had been found compared to 834,112 ERW and 1,098,828 pieces of small arms ammunition.³⁵

Casualties³⁶

In 2008, there were at least 65 new mine/ERW casualties, including 19 people killed and 46 injured. Of these, UNMAO recorded 61 casualties and Landmine Monitor identified four additional casualties. Three casualties were military and one was a Bangladeshi deminer. At least 29 casualties were children (25 boys and four girls), 17 were adults (13 men and four women), and for the remainder the age was unknown. Antipersonnel mines caused seven casualties, antivehicle mines 12, cluster munitions eight, and other ERW 15. One casualty was caused by a fuze and for 22 casualties the device type was unknown. For 17 casualties the activity at the time of the incident was unknown.

Tending animals was the main cause of casualties where the activity was known (13), followed by tampering (12). Casualties occurred in 12 states, mostly in Kassala (18), followed by Unity (10), and Northern Darfur and Western Bahr el Ghazal (seven each). Just two of the casualties in 2008 reported receiving mine/ERW RE (39 said no and the remainder was unknown), and seven reported knowing the area they entered was dangerous.

The casualties recorded in 2008 decreased in comparison to 2007, when 91 casualties (28 killed and 63 injured) were recorded. Ultimately, the 2008 casualty figures are likely to be higher due to slow data collection and the lack of a universal data collection system. Further reasons noted were the varying presence and absence of mine action operators in certain areas, decreased survey activity, and the impact of RE activities.³⁷

³⁴ UNMAO, "IMSMA Monthly Report," June 2009, Table 1.1, p. 1, www.sudan-map.org.

³⁵ Ibid, Table 2.5, p. 5, www.sudan-map.org; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

³⁶ Unless noted otherwise, casualty data (1964–June 2009) provided by Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 4 June 2009; and Landmine Monitor media analysis from 1 January 2008 and 2 June 2009.

³⁷ Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 July 2009.

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with at least 41 casualties as of 14 July 2009, including six people killed and 35 injured. UNMAO recorded 40 casualties until the end of May and Landmine Monitor identified one boy injured on 14 July 2009.³⁸ At least 22 casualties were civilian, one was a Pakistani military deminer, and four were military. The status of the others was unknown. For 30 casualties the device causing the incident was not known, cluster munitions caused six casualties, other ERW three, and a fuze two. Incidents occurred in 11 states, mostly in Lakes (10) and Northern Darfur (seven).

Ten-year summary

To July 2009, UNMAO recorded 4,213 mine/ERW casualties, including 1,402 people killed and 2,811 injured.³⁹ Of these, 1,748 occurred between 1999 and the end of 2008 (553 killed and 1,195 injured). Most casualties from 1999–2008 were male (1,441) and 234 were female (70 unknown). For 631 casualties, their status was unknown; 503 were civilians, 257 military, five mine action personnel (four demining casualties), and 352 “others.” Casualties occurred in 18 states, mostly in Western Bahr el Ghazal (564) followed by Southern Kordofan (328), Kassala (239), and Central Equatoria (183). When known, the most common activity at the time of incident was traveling (422), followed by military activity (198), and playing/recreation (117).

By July 2009, the LIS identified 104 casualties in 16 states within the two years preceding the survey (37 killed and 67 injured), including 92 civilians. Most casualties (86) were male.⁴⁰ At least 1,158 less recent casualties (664 killed and 494 injured) were also recorded. Most recent casualties occurred in Kassala (32), Eastern Equatoria (28), and Central Equatoria (20) states. Most of the less recent casualties were recorded in Eastern Equatoria (498), Central Equatoria (320), and Kassala (227) states.⁴¹

Landmine Monitor also identified at least seven casualties from 1999–2008 not included in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, including five deminers and two Eritrean children (one killed and six injured).⁴²

Risk profile

The majority of casualties are male and a significant proportion are children. The most common activities by civilians at the time of incident are traveling, collecting food, water, and wood, playing and recreation, and farming.⁴³ Where information was available, a significant proportion of casualties (850) reported that they had not received RE, and only 22 casualties had received RE. However, for the majority of casualties (1,188) this information was not available.⁴⁴

Socio-economic impact

In addition to causing casualties, mines and ERW contaminate agricultural land, livestock-grazing areas, land used for collecting firewood and producing charcoal, access routes, and roads.⁴⁵ A GICHD evaluation in 2007 concluded that mine contamination in Sudan was modest but the fear of landmines constrained recovery and development efforts.⁴⁶ Fear of mines and ERW has resulted in extensive road closures including key logistical/supply routes that hamper

³⁸ Médecins Sans Frontières, “Field News Sudan: Children Seriously Injured by Unexploded Ordnances,” updated 21 July 2009, www.doctorswithoutborders.org.

³⁹ UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” Khartoum, July 2009, p. 9.

⁴⁰ SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey Status in Sudan as of July 2009,” provided to Landmine Monitor, 4 July 2009; and email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 4 June 2009.

⁴¹ Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2009.

⁴² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 644 (Bangladeshi deminer); *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 675 (two FSD deminers and an NPA deminer); *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 544 (two Eritrean children); and *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 231 (OSIL deminer).

⁴³ Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 26 March 2009.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Interview with Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008; and SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) Status in Sudan as of July 2009,” provided to Landmine Monitor, 4 July 2009.

⁴⁶ Ted Paterson and Vera Bohle, “Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project,” GICHD, Geneva, February 2008, p. 36, www.gichd.org.

movement, the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, trade, and humanitarian interventions.⁴⁷

According to a study conducted by the World Food Program (WFP), its combined demining and road rehabilitation program has yielded significant socio-economic benefits. Based on interviews with local residents, verifying and clearing roads has reduced travel time by 50% and the cost of transportation by 40%. In one location, the WFP noted a 65% increase in the number of businesses following the opening of a road. It has also greatly reduced the WFP's costs for moving food. According to the study, opening up the major roads to traffic, commerce, and the return of refugees is mine action's signal achievement in Sudan, an achievement the WFP said should be given more credence. The study also concluded that the benefits of demining outweighed the costs: although it was quite expensive to open the roads, perhaps it could have been done for less money.⁴⁸

A research paper by Professor Dawood H. Sultan of Indiana University on the impact of landmines in the Nuba Mountains in Sudan's Kordofan region found that mines limited access to water and land-based resources, causing socio-economic, psychological, public-health, and ecological problems. The author argued that mines have disrupted ancient tribal land patterns, thereby affecting agriculture and food security, and he questioned whether targeting high- and medium-impacted communities for clearance is the correct strategy unless clearance includes also farmland, pasture, and water.⁴⁹

The LIS identified 48 communities with 98 SHAs in South Kordofan. Of the 98 SHAs, 62 were reported to cause agricultural blockages. However, with only 11 of the communities classified as high- or medium-impacted, just 32 SHAs are scheduled for clearance before 2011,⁵⁰ leaving 66 SHAs for clearance afterwards.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is the institution responsible for coordination and management of mine action in Sudan. The NMAA⁵¹ includes a National Mine Action Committee; a General Secretariat; the National Mine Action Center (NMAC), based in Khartoum; and the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA), based in Juba.⁵² With support from UNDP, the authorities in the north and the south of the country have also established field offices in Kassala, Malakal, and Wau, with plans to set up new offices in Kadugli and Ed Damazin in 2009.⁵³

UNDP and UNMAS provide technical assistance through UNMAO,⁵⁴ which is mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the CPA to coordinate, facilitate, accredit, and conduct quality assurance of all mine action activities in Sudan. Following the 1 January 2008 establishment of the UN-African Union Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to support the effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, UNMAO opened offices in Al Fasher, Nyala, and El-Geneina in Darfur region.⁵⁵

⁴⁷ UNDP, "Mine Action Capacity Development," Project Document, p. 3.

⁴⁸ Matthew Bolton, "Sudan's Expensive Minefields: An Evaluation of Political and Economic Problems in Sudanese Mine Clearance," Human Security and Mine Action Discussion Paper, *London School of Economics and Political Science*, 2008 Version 2.0, p. 25, politicalminefields.files.wordpress.com

⁴⁹ Dawood H. Sultan, "Landmines and Recovery in Sudan's Nuba Mountains," *Africa Today*, Vol. 55, No. 3, Spring 2009, pp. 46–60.

⁵⁰ SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) Status in Sudan as of July 2009," provided to Landmine Monitor, 4 July 2009.

⁵¹ The NMAA was established by Presidential Decree No. 299 of 24 December 2005 in accordance with Article 58(1) of the Interim Constitution for the year 2005, and Chapter VI (8.6.6) of the CPA.

⁵² UNMAO, "Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan," p. 7, www.sudan-map.org.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, pp. 624–625.

⁵⁵ UNMAS, "UNMAS Annual Report 2008," p. 1, provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, Program and Public Information Officer, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.

UNMAO operations consist of three regional offices and 9 suboffices and its headquarters in Khartoum. The North Regional Mine Action Office is in Kadugli, South Kordofan state, supported by three suboffices in Kadugli, Ed Damazin in Blue Nile state, and Kassala in eastern Sudan. The South Regional Mine Action Office in Juba has suboffices in Juba, Malakal in Upper Nile state and Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal state. The suboffice in Rumbek was closed in 2008. The Western Regional Mine Action Office in Al Fasher, in Northern Darfur state, coordinates its work with suboffices in Al Fasher for Northern Darfur state, in Nyala for Southern Darfur state, and in El-Geneina for Western Darfur.⁵⁶

Risk education

Within the UNMAO framework, UNICEF is responsible for the management and coordination of RE. However, a transition process for mine action is working towards responsibility for RE passing to the respective authorities in the north (NMAC) and south (SSDA, also called the South Sudan Demining Commission, SSDC). The transition process should be completed in 2011, prior to the referendum on independence for south Sudan.⁵⁷ In the north, the NMAC is more involved in coordination than in the south, and their RE staff chair the coordination meetings.⁵⁸

UNICEF supported the planning, implementation, and management of RE activities at the national and regional levels through advisory and coordination groups. Sudan reported that in 2008 there was enhanced and broadened coordination and collaboration between the UN, government officials, and NGOs at the national and local levels.⁵⁹

Victim assistance

Under the NMAA, NMAC coordinates VA activities in the northern part of the country. For Southern Sudan, a July 2008 workshop decided that the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs would be the VA focal point. Both these “VA coordination platforms” hold monthly meetings with all stakeholders⁶⁰ and were considered effective.⁶¹ But meetings between the two platforms are infrequent, in part due to logistical challenges, and information-sharing between government bodies responsible for north and south was not satisfactory; however, it was noted that a number of communications were exchanged between NMAA and SSDC.⁶²

UNMAO provides technical assistance to both coordination platforms.⁶³ The National Council for Disability is in charge of implementing and monitoring disability legislation.⁶⁴

Data collection and management

UNMAO manages mine action data using IMSMA software. Data is entered in the UNMAO regional offices and sent to Khartoum each month for quality assurance purposes. The updated database is then sent back to the regional offices. UNMAO provides the NMAC and the SSDA

⁵⁶ UNMAO, “Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan,” p. 48, www.sudan-map.org.

⁵⁷ Interviews with Nigel Forrester, Program Manager, and Severine Flores, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 March 2009; and Qadeem Khan Tariq, Senior Technical Advisor, Mine Action Capacity Development, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2009.

⁵⁸ Interview with Insaf Nizam, RE Coordinator, UNICEF, Khartoum, 18 March 2009.

⁵⁹ Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009; and UNMAO, “Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan,” p. 25, www.sudan-map.org.

⁶⁰ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009; and Co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, “Status of Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention in the 26 Relevant States Parties 2005–2008,” Geneva, 28 November 2008.

⁶¹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ida Kadyamatimba, Project Coordinator, MCDI, 11 July 2009; email from Nagat Salih, Managing Director, ABRAR, 16 July 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Abu Osama Abdallah, Coordinator, JASMAR, 23 July 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Hiba Mustafa Abdallah, Program Manager, Friends of Peace and Development Organization (FPDO), 16 July 2009.

⁶² Emails from Davide Naggi, Victim Assistance Specialist, UNMAO, 24 July and 7 September 2009.

⁶³ Ibid, 24 July 2009.

⁶⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 653.

with monthly read-only copies of the database. The database in Khartoum includes maps and is a major source of information for most stakeholders.⁶⁵

Although the number of actors collecting data increased, there was no nationwide casualty data collection mechanism in Sudan as of July 2009. Data was collected by operators and authorities present in a specific area.⁶⁶ The speed at which data is collected was considered to be satisfactory and all VA partners used the standard IMSMA form. The quality was said to be adequate. UNMAO also provided refresher training for data collectors. LIS data was integrated into IMSMA and checked for duplicates.⁶⁷

However, some other bodies (e.g. ICRC, local authorities) also collected data in their own formats, which were not always compatible with IMSMA, and could not be integrated with the IMSMA database. This was reported to be “a serious challenge in terms of optimization of resources, geographical coverage and creation of a common understanding about data collection for mine action and disability.”⁶⁸

Casualty data was used for RE and VA planning, but was not the only source of information, partly because many survivors move to areas with more opportunities or better services. RE activity data is collected by implementing organizations and entered into IMSMA.⁶⁹

All VA operators and UNMAO partners had a contractual agreement to collect and share information on mine/ERW casualties and persons with disabilities.⁷⁰ Survivor information was also collected through needs assessments and surveys by NGOs and authorities in Southern Sudan.⁷¹

UNMAO maintains casualty data in the central IMSMA database: three regional modules and seven read-only versions have been installed.⁷² The Khartoum office provides detailed casualty data analysis on request.⁷³

A UNICEF assessment of data collection in Southern Sudan in 2008 recommended: more analytical use of IMSMA data in designing, developing and implementing RE/VA; wider circulation of IMSMA reports; establishment of a comprehensive injury surveillance mechanism of which mine/ERW injuries are a part; and making existing data collection efforts more systematic and including the Ministry of Health and Police in the process.⁷⁴

Mine action program operators⁷⁵

National operators and activities	Demining	RE	Casualty data collection	VA
Organization for Care of War Disabled and Protection from Landmines (ABRAR)		x		x
Charity Organization for Rehabilitation and Development (CORD)				x

⁶⁵ NMAA, “Sudan Mine Action Programme Transition Plan, Empowering National Ownership of the Sudan Mine Action Programme,” undated but 2009, pp. 25, 44.

⁶⁶ Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 July 2009; and statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva 26 May 2009.

⁶⁷ Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 July 2009.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ NMAA, “Sudan Mine Action Programme Transition Plan, Empowering National Ownership of the Sudan Mine Action Programme,” undated but 2009, p. 57; and interview with Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, Khartoum, 19 March 2009.

⁷⁰ Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 July 2009.

⁷¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 646.

⁷² Email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

⁷³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 635.

⁷⁴ Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 5 July 2009.

⁷⁵ UNMAO, “Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan,” pp. 58–76, www.sudan-map.org; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

National operators and activities	Demining	RE	Casualty data collection	VA
Friends of Peace and Development Organization		x		x
International Sisterhood Charity Organization			x	x
Islamic Relief Agency				x
JASMAR		x		x
NMAC	x			
NAPO				x
Nuba Mountains International Association for Development				x
Nuba Mountains Mine Action Sudan	x			
OSIL		x		
Rufaida				x
SEM				x
SIMAS	x			
SLR		x		
SSDRA		x		
International operators and activities	Demining	RE	Casualty data collection	VA
Association for Aid and Relief Japan		x		
ArmorGroup	x			
The Association of Volunteers in International Service		x		
Christian Blind Mission				x
DCA	x	x		
DDG	x	x		
HI		x	x	x
MAG	x	x	x	
MCDI				x
Mechem	x			
MineWolf	x			
MTI	x			
NPA	x			
Organization of Volunteers for International Cooperation				x
RONCO Consulting Corporation	x			
TDI	x			
War Child Holland		x		

Plans

Strategic mine action plan

The National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006–2011, adopted in 2006, serves as the key strategic planning document for mine action in Sudan. Strategic goals for mine action include:

- continued emergency mine/ERW clearance and survey in high-priority areas;
- mapping of SHAs;
- strengthening national mine action institutions;
- expanding national mine action operational capacities;
- national mine action planning and budgeting;
- mobilizing national and international funding;
- planning and implementing the transition of mine action management from the UN to national authorities;
- integration of mine action into national recovery and development plans; and
- ensuring that Sudan honors its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty and other relevant treaties.⁷⁶

By 2011 Sudan plans to clear 80% of the high- and medium-impacted communities identified by the LIS.⁷⁷ This represents 88 of the 110 high- and medium-impacted communities.⁷⁸

In 2008, UNMAO developed a plan in consultation with the authorities to transfer ownership of the mine action program to the government in 2011.⁷⁹ The plan involves the transferring of 10 core management responsibilities to the NMAC and SSDA. They are to:

1. coordinate all aspects of mine action;
2. prioritize, task, and authorize all mine action activities;
3. accredit mine action organizations in accordance with National Technical Standards and Guidelines;
4. ensure quality management of all mine action activities;
5. revise the national standards according to in-country needs and conditions;
6. maintain the integrity of the national mine action database;
7. mobilize necessary funds from national and international sources;
8. coordinate and manage the implementation of RE;
9. coordinate and manage assistance to survivors; and
10. ensure that Sudan meets its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸⁰

The Mine Action Multi-Year Plan covering the period 2009–2011 is the implementation plan of the National Strategic Framework and the transition to national ownership. It is reviewed quarterly with adjustments made as necessary. The plan calls for annual revisions and the first is scheduled for release in late 2009.⁸¹ Transition implementation began in January 2009.⁸² UNMAO, in turn, will implement an exit strategy while placing key national and international staff among national authorities' technical advisors.⁸³

The National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework 2007–2011 was approved in July 2007.⁸⁴ It has six main lines of action: improving information management; ensuring medical and physical rehabilitation assistance; developing programs for social reintegration and

⁷⁶ NMAA, "Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006–2011," Version 1.0, May 2006, pp. 5–11.

⁷⁷ Statement of Sudan, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.

⁷⁸ SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) Status in Sudan as of July 2009," provided to Landmine Monitor, 4 July 2009.

⁷⁹ Interview with Nigel Forrestal and Severine Flores, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 March 2009.

⁸⁰ UNMAO, "Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan," p. 15, www.sudan-map.org.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8, www.sudan-map.org

⁸² Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2009; and see also Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

⁸³ UNMAS, "UNMAS Annual Report 2008," p. 1 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.

⁸⁴ Response to Landmine Monitor letter by Yousif Osman, Victim Assistance Officer, NMAC, Khartoum, 14 April 2008; interview with Davide Naggi, UNMAO, in Juba, 1 April 2008; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, pp. 639–640.

economic empowerment; strengthening advocacy and policy programs; mobilizing resources; and streamlining coordination mechanisms at various levels.⁸⁵

The subsequent Victim Assistance Work Plan September 2007–August 2009 was finalized in September 2007. It set clear objectives, targets, responsible agencies, timeframes, and budget. Several objectives were drawn from earlier workplans and have been postponed continuously since early 2005, and had not been completed as of May 2009,⁸⁶ such as the establishment of a nationwide data collection mechanism by December 2005.⁸⁷ Progress under the 2007–August 2009 plan had been reviewed, but results were not scheduled for release until August 2009.⁸⁸

The strategic framework and the workplan are integrated into the Transitional Plan towards National Ownership for Mine Action. After a national workshop on 4–5 February 2009, a workplan for the second phase of implementation was integrated into the Multi Year Plan for the mine action sector (2009–2011) at an estimated cost of US\$4.3 million. As with the previous workplan, the 2009–2011 plan also contains targets, timeframes, and responsible agencies.⁸⁹ Both the VA workplan and the Multi Year Plan were due to be finalized by August 2009.⁹⁰ Some NGO representatives complained that the delay in obtaining the plan was hampering their activities.⁹¹

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

The UN and national authorities are trying to integrate mine action with relief, reconstruction, and development efforts through a joint priority-setting process with GONU and GOSS.⁹² Previously, it was reported that “slow progress” had been made towards integration with development efforts⁹³ but, according to UNMAO, support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance has occurred through the opening of primary and secondary transportation routes.⁹⁴

Verification and clearance of roads linking remote regions in the south, and linking the south and north, as well as roads leading to international borders has been a major achievement of the mine action program in Sudan. Several examples illustrate the impact of clearing the roads. Roads have opened linking Wau to its surrounding areas and creating links to the west, towards Southern Darfur and to the southwest.⁹⁵ The opening of routes linking Kenya, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo with major towns in the south has reportedly enabled commerce to flourish. The opening of the road from Kassala to Hameshkoreib in eastern Sudan has provided critical access to a community cut off for several years due to fear of mines.⁹⁶ At the request of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNMAO verified the Maban–Chali route, from Ethiopia to facilitate refugee returns, while the Malakal–Kodok–Malut–Kosti route has created a valuable link between the north and south.

UNMAO also receives a growing number of requests to widen roads, particularly in the south, in order to enable pedestrians to better cope with the increased traffic as a result of growing economic demand.⁹⁷ The extensive road verification and assessment has also resulted

⁸⁵ Republic of Sudan, “National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, March 2007, p. 6.

⁸⁶ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

⁸⁷ NMAA, “Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, 27 August 2004, pp. 6–7; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 546.

⁸⁸ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

⁸⁹ UNMAO, “Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan,” p. 18, www.sudan-map.org.

⁹⁰ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

⁹¹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Abu Osama Abdallah, JASMAR, 23 July 2009.

⁹² Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

⁹³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 223.

⁹⁴ UNMAO information sheets, provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

⁹⁵ UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2008,” provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.

⁹⁶ UNMAO, “UNMAO in brief,” brochure provided during interview with Severine Flores, UNMAO, Khartoum, 17 March 2009.

⁹⁷ UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2008,” p. 2, provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.

in more internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees returning home, safer travel, faster and less costly travel, and a significant decrease of the costs of delivering humanitarian aid.⁹⁸

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Sudan has demonstrated a growing commitment to mine action through the establishment of mine action centers in the north and south and the adoption of national mine action legislation. Sudan included mine action in its national budget for the first time in 2006, but operations remain heavily dependent on foreign support.

In May 2009, Sudan stated that “The main priorities of the VA program in Sudan are to progressively transition the VA Program to the Government and to ensure that all relevant ministries will include the support to mine survivors in their annual financial and work plans and that [they] will use the available resources accordingly.”⁹⁹ VA coordination capacity was deemed to be stronger in northern Sudan, where NMAC proactively organized coordination meetings and project monitoring visits. In Southern Sudan continuous UNMAO support for coordination was needed and a staff member of the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs was seconded to UNMAO for capacity-building in 2009. Coordination between ministries remained sporadic.¹⁰⁰

Government involvement in VA coordination meetings and planning, which was boosted in 2007 and early 2008, continued to develop, though at a slower pace, in the second half of 2008 and in 2009. In several states, awareness was raised with the local authorities due to the increased number of small-scale VA projects that were being carried out. Yet the government still largely depended on NGOs and international organizations for VA implementation and further capacity building was needed.¹⁰¹ In 2008, national NGOs continued to be more involved in VA/disability issues and strengthened their capacities, partly sustained by the availability of multi-year funding through to 2011. Nevertheless, they were in need of constant technical guidance (see below).¹⁰² One NGO also noted that NGO coverage remained limited and variable depending on the sector, adding that associations of persons with disabilities were increasingly active, particularly on income-generating activities.¹⁰³

National management

Mine action remains under UN management in Sudan, while the NMAA, NMAC, and the SSDA continue to develop their capacities to take over management of mine action.¹⁰⁴ Five UN agencies have been involved in mine action activities within the unified framework of UNMAO, namely: the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), in cooperation with UNMAS, which conducts demining and provides coordination and technical advice in support of the UNMIS mandate and the CPA; UNDP, which provides support to national authorities in building national mine action capacities and which is coordinating the transition of the mine action program to national ownership; UNICEF, which coordinates and undertakes RE; the WFP, which conducts clearance of key supply and access routes as part of the road reconstruction process; and UNHCR, which provides RE to returning refugees and IDPs.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁸ Matthew Bolton, “Sudan’s Expensive Minefields: An Evaluation of Political and Economic Problems in Sudanese Mine Clearance,” London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008 Version 2.0, pp. 7–10, politicalminefields.files.wordpress.com.

⁹⁹ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

¹⁰⁰ Information received in email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Hiba Mustafa Abdallah, FDPO, 16 July 2009.

¹⁰¹ Information received in email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009; responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ida Kadyamatimba, MCDI, 11 July 2009; Abu Osama Abdallah, JASMAR, 23 July 2009; and Hiba Mustafa Abdallah, FDPO, 16 July 2009.

¹⁰² Information received in email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

¹⁰³ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ida Kadyamatimba, MCDI, 11 July 2009.

¹⁰⁴ Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

¹⁰⁵ UNMAO, “Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan,” pp. 15–35, www.sudan-map.org.

In 2008, UNDP provided two technical advisors and three consultants to work with the two national mine action centers for the transition to national ownership in 2011.¹⁰⁶ It was scheduled to completely nationalize the mine action program by 2011 and a transition plan was prepared in 2008. According to UNMAO, the transition plan became fully operational during 2009, with “ongoing work placements” since April.¹⁰⁷ However, it had been decided that VA will be transitioned to NMAC in the north and to the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs in the south by 2011. The transition will be the main focus and challenge for 2010, but had started in the north in 2009. In the south “no significant activities” were undertaken due to the slow response from the government, the recent reshuffle of ministers, and financial difficulties.¹⁰⁸

National budget

During 2007 and the first half of 2008, GONU reported contributing \$5.5 million to mine action, while GOSS contributed \$1.5 million. Funds covered the cost of local personnel in the national mine action centers and the field operations of the national demining teams (Joint Integrated Demining Units, JIDUs, see Demining and Battle Area Clearance section below).¹⁰⁹ VA projects were to be included in the budgets of relevant ministries, but no funding was allocated by any in 2008–2009.¹¹⁰ It was estimated that GOSS spent some 8% of its annual budget on healthcare.¹¹¹

National mine action legislation

Mine action in Sudan operates within a variety of legal frameworks. The CPA, signed in January 2005, provides the overall legal framework for mine action in Sudan including the NMAC and the SSDA. It is supplemented by the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, presidential decrees in December 2005 which set up the NMAA, and the 1 January 2008 mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission which authorizes peacekeepers to conduct humanitarian demining.¹¹²

Sudan has not passed specific national legislation regulating mine action in Sudan. In April 2009, Sudan reported that a draft national mine action law had been cleared by the GONU Ministry of Justice and endorsed by the relevant committee of the National Assembly, and was expected to be formally adopted in 2009.¹¹³ A mine action framework specific to Southern Sudan has been drafted with support from UNDP and the GOSS Ministry of Legal Affairs, which was to be finalized in 2009 and then presented to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly for approval.¹¹⁴ As of April 2009 the legislation had not been approved.¹¹⁵

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) were originally developed in 2003 by the UN in English and as of August 2009 had been translated into Arabic in full collaboration with the national authorities.¹¹⁶ Additionally, UNMAO had not received feedback on the NTSGs from

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Email from David McMahon, Chief of Operations and Planning, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

¹⁰⁸ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

¹⁰⁹ Statement of Sudan, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2008

¹¹⁰ Information received in email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

¹¹¹ Petra Vergeer, Ann Canavan, and Ines Rothmann, “A rethink on the use of aid mechanisms in health sector early recovery,” *Development Policy & Practice*, Amsterdam, 28 January 2009, p. 19.

¹¹² See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 625. The Darfur Peace Agreement includes demining in its definition of disarmament; however, while it makes detailed reference to securing and decommissioning other types of weaponry it makes no such references to antipersonnel mines, does not make clear how demining relates to broader disarmament provisions, nor how long-term demining programs might be implemented or under what authority. UNMIS, “Darfur Peace Agreement,” www.unmis.org.

¹¹³ Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2009; and see Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

¹¹⁴ Interviews with Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, SSDA, Juba, 3 April 2009; and Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2009; and see Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

¹¹⁵ Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2009. Presidential Decree No. 45/2006 issued by GOSS, which appoints the chairperson and members of the SSDA, states: “The Authority shall collaborate with the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitution Development in the formulation of its Draft Act and determination of the terms and conditions of service and the regulations that shall govern its work.”

¹¹⁶ Email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

the NMAC and the SSDA.¹¹⁷ Organizations operating in Sudan are reported to be accredited according to the International Mine Action Standards and national standards.¹¹⁸

Program evaluations

In 2007, an evaluation of the UNDP mine action program's development and capacity-building project, conducted by GICHD, emphasized the important contribution of mine action to broader processes and programs in Sudan. It found that mine action was one of the fields in which GONU and GOSS cooperated most effectively with one another as well as with the international community. At the time of the evaluation, however, GICHD found no clear vision of the future composition and functions of the mine action program in Sudan post-2011. Sudan lacked a long-term plan that clarified the mine action capacities that would be required following the departure of UNMIS, and how to build those capacities.¹¹⁹ Since the evaluation, UNDP has developed a detailed plan to transition from the UN-led mine action program to national ownership in 2011.¹²⁰

VA projects are monitored regularly through the VA focal point in the north or through UNMAO: GOSS and SSDC were involved less frequently. Evaluation visits were intended to guide organizations in the implementation of their projects or to provide technical support, as it was noted that the national implementers needed continuous technical capacity reinforcement. Another aim was to carry out semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries. Some of the findings from these missions were that:

- data collection conducted only in rural areas missed a large target group as many survivors relocate to trading centers looking for economic opportunities;
- the needs of survivors remained poorly addressed and documented, partly because they were not organized into associations;
- local authorities were interested in VA/disability issues, but lacked knowledge and resources;
- economic reintegration activities were usually understood to mean just training opportunities, not assistance in finding employment or setting up a business;
- the programs did not discriminate against persons with disabilities due to causes other than mines/ERW; and
- a concerted effort was put in place to address the identified gaps.¹²¹

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

As of June 2009, Sudan had 16 national and international mine clearance operators. These included a network of JIDUs (see below), operating under the NMAC, three international NGOs (DanChurchAid, Norwegian People's Aid, and Mines Advisory Group); five UN peacekeeping battalions (from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya, and Pakistan); the local NGO Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS); and six commercial demining companies (ArmorGroup, Mechem, MineTech International, RONCO, Mine Wolf, and The Development Initiative). Through 31 December 2008, eight of the 16 mine action operators were responsible for three-quarters of the total area cleared. In the first six months of 2009 the distribution of available assets for clearance narrowed further as ArmorGroup and MineTech International alone cleared 76.5% of the 9.5km² reported as having been cleared.¹²²

¹¹⁷ NMAA, "Sudan Mine Action Programme Transition Plan, Empowering National Ownership of the Sudan Mine Action Programme," undated but 2009, pp. 25, 41.

¹¹⁸ Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

¹¹⁹ Ted Paterson and Vera Bohle, "Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project," GICHD, Geneva, February 2008, p. 35, www.gichd.org.

¹²⁰ Article 7, Form A, 13 April 2009.

¹²¹ Emails from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July and 7 September 2009.

¹²² UNMAO, "IMSMA Monthly Report," June 2009, Table 2.2, p. 3, www.sudan-map.org; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

Sudan has posed several challenges to effective demining. Although the implementation of the CPA is proceeding, security issues have hampered clearance in some locations. For example, in May 2008, fighting erupted between the Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLA in Abyei, an oil-rich area at the heart of a longstanding dispute between north and south. The fighting forced up to 50,000 people to flee the area, and there was new ERW contamination.¹²³ In the south, activity by the Lords' Resistance Army along the Ugandan border delayed clearance, while in Darfur all movements had to be accompanied by armed escorts. Other impediments to demining operations in 2008 included a longer than usual rainy season in most regions of the south, and difficulties in importing equipment.¹²⁴ Complicated logistics and local labor law can also affect operations.¹²⁵ Another constraint is that contractors are responsible for securing their own explosives for demolition, which is time consuming and difficult.¹²⁶

There remains concern about the effectiveness of the national demining assets, the JIDUs. Although they continue to make significant progress in releasing SHAs,¹²⁷ they are still not accredited for mine action operations.¹²⁸ A GICHD evaluation of mine action stated that allowing the JIDUs to engage in demining in support of infrastructure reconstruction without being accredited in accordance with the IMAS could have "serious repercussions."¹²⁹ Nonetheless, the JIDUs, which have mechanical clearance assets as well as manual deminers, represent the bulk of the local demining capacity in Sudan.¹³⁰ In 2008, a further 120 deminers, to add to the 110 already employed, were trained at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Nairobi, Kenya.¹³¹ The main responsibilities of the JIDUs are assessment, land release, and quality assurance.¹³²

Identification of hazardous areas

The three-year-long LIS, managed by SAC with Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Handicap International (HI), and JASMAR as implementing partners was completed in June 2009. It covered 16 states, of which only Sennar in central Sudan, was found not to be affected (although Red Sea had a very limited problem). During the Preliminary Opinion Collection stage of the survey 1,727 communities had been identified as possibly impacted by mines or UXO. Community visits confirmed 296 were impacted. In total, 605 SHAs were identified covering an area of 106km².¹³³ The results show that the mine problem is heavily concentrated in Central Equatoria, South Kordofan, Eastern Equatoria, Blue Nile, Kassala, and Jonglei states where 77% of the impacted communities and 84% of the SHAs identified are in these five states. Of the 605 SHAs, incidents involving victims occurred in 58. In addition, 423 UXO spot clearance tasks had been identified. Sennar had no impacted communities and three others had only one each.

¹²³ UNMAS, "UNMAS Annual Report 2008," p. 1, provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Matthew Bolton, "Sudan's Expensive Minefields: An Evaluation of Political and Economic Problems in Sudanese Mine Clearance," London School of Economics and Political Science, 2008 Version 2.0, pp. 14–21, politicalminefields.files.wordpress.com.

¹²⁶ Interview with Paul Eldred, Regional Operations Coordinator, UNMAO, Juba, 2 April 2008; and email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

¹²⁷ Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

¹²⁸ Interview with Nigel Forrestal, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 March 2009.

¹²⁹ Ted Paterson and Vera Bohle, "Evaluation of the UNDP Sudan Mine Action Capacity Building and Development Project," GICHD, Geneva, February 2008, pp. 43, 44, www.gichd.org.

¹³⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 627.

¹³¹ Interview with Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.

¹³² Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 August 2009.

¹³³ SAC, "Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) Status in Sudan as of July 2009," provided to Landmine Monitor, 4 July 2009.

Preliminary LIS Results¹³⁴

State	No. of impacted communities	No. of SHAs
Central Equatoria	77	214
South Kordofan	48	98
Eastern Equatoria	43	83
Blue Nile	33	61
Kassala	28	56
Jonglei	17	21
Western Equatoria	16	30
Upper Nile	11	12
Western Bahr el Ghazal	9	10
North Bahr el Ghazal	5	7
Gedaref	3	4
Warrab	3	4
Lakes	1	1
Red Sea	1	2
Unity	1	2
Sennar	0	0
Total	296	605

Mine clearance in 2008

In 2008, international commercial companies, and national and international NGOs cleared 4.07km² of mined areas. Approximately three-quarters of all clearance since 2002 has been conducted in only three states: Central Equatoria, Kassala, and South Kordofan.¹³⁵ During clearance in 2008, 4,400 antipersonnel mines and 258 antivehicle mines were destroyed.¹³⁶

Mine and battle area clearance in 2008¹³⁷

Demining operators	Clearance (km ²)*	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed	ERW destroyed**
ArmorGroup	0.20	48	38	25,093
Bangladesh demining company	1.33	2,563	121	7,217
Cambodia demining company	2.53	812	18	23,054
DCA	0.04	60	0	6,925

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ UNMAO, "IMSMA Monthly Report," June 2009, Table 2.1, p. 3, www.sudan-map.org.

¹³⁶ Ibid, Table 2.4.

¹³⁷ UNMAO, "IMSMA Monthly Report," December 2008, Tables 3.1 and 4.1, www.sudan-map.org

Mine and battle area clearance in 2008

Demining operators	Clearance (km ²)*	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed	ERW destroyed**
DDG	NR	23	7	32,630
Egypt demining company	0.05	1	0	3,235
Kenyan demining company	0.02	3	1	12,502
MECHEM	0.16	0	0	0
MAG	0.99	184	22	3,980
Mine Tech International	0.95	225	5	1,743
Mine Wolf	0.07	4	1	0
NMAC	NR	0	7	4
NPA	1.32	86	26	1,527
Pakistan demining company	0.06	19	0	16
RONCO	1.42	221	7	1,260
Swedish Rescue Services Agency	NR	3	0	4
Sudan Integrated Mine Action System	0.02	0	0	53
TDI	0.65	148	5	1,590
Total	9.81	4,400	258	120,833

* UNMAO does not disaggregate between mine clearance and BAC in detailed reporting.

** No distinction is made between AXO and UXO in demining reporting by UNMAO.

NR=not reported

Battle area clearance in 2008

For 2008, UNMAO reported battle area clearance (BAC) over almost 5.74km² of land in nine states, of which 80% occurred in Upper Nile and Central Equatoria.¹³⁸ Through June 2009, of the 54km² of all clearance in Sudan, more than 40km² was from BAC. Unexploded submunitions were reported to have been found in Blue Nile state and Kadugli in South Kordofan, but UNMAO does not distinguish between different types of UXO in their reporting.¹³⁹

Progress since becoming a State Party

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2014.

The precise extent of the problem remains unknown as new hazardous areas were still being identified each month according to UNMAO reports from 2007–2009.¹⁴⁰ Nevertheless, it is clear that the known mine problem is much smaller than originally believed and operations have

¹³⁸ Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 3 August 2009. NMAC claims 18.26km² of BAC, which is not included in these statistics as it has not been possible to verify the figures.

¹³⁹ Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 3 August 2009.

¹⁴⁰ UNMAO, "Recording Data," www.sudan-map.org.

greatly reduced the threat and the level of risk in the last six years. As of the end of 2008, more than 44km² of land had been cleared (see table below).¹⁴¹

Demining from 2003–2008¹⁴²

Year	Mine clearance (km ²)	BAC (km ²)	Total
2008	4.07	5.74	9.81
2007	5.91	18.40	24.31
2006	1.34	6.44	7.78
2005	0.71	0.56	1.27
2004	0.29	0.17	0.46
2003	0.47	0	0.47
Total	12.79	31.31	44.10

In terms of an annual budget for mine clearance, Sudan was second only to Afghanistan in 2008. While much has been achieved, particularly in opening roads and allowing for more movement of people, a key development in achieving its Article 5 obligations will be the success of the planned transition to national ownership in 2011 and whether significant international support will continue for several more years.

Risk Education

In 2008, extensive RE was provided to at least 691,464 people. In Southern Sudan the plan to reach 250,000 people was exceeded, with 396,772 people reached.¹⁴³ RE focused on IDPs, returnees, and local communities.¹⁴⁴ It was conducted through the training of community volunteers, direct presentations, training of teachers for school-based RE, and mass media. Community liaison (CL) was conducted by MAG, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL).¹⁴⁵

Twelve local and international organizations, as well as UN agencies, were engaged in RE activities, through the deployment of a total of 47 RE teams.¹⁴⁶ The number of teams in the south fluctuated throughout 2008, while 18 teams were active in the north including three teams in Darfur.¹⁴⁷ In the south only international NGOs were operational until June 2008, when three local NGOs, OSIL, Sudan Landmine Response (SLR) and South Sudan Development and Relief Agency (SSDRA), were funded by the European Commission (EC) through UNMAO.¹⁴⁸ DDG's RE and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams collected information on RE activities undertaken by the community volunteers in subsequent visits to these communities.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴¹ UNMAO, "Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan," p. 7, www.sudan-map.org.

¹⁴² UNMAO, "IMSMAS Monthly Report," June 2009, p. 4, www.sudan-map.org; and email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 3 August 2009. Subsequently, UNMAO reported that for year 2007 the clearance figure should be reduced to 2.9km² and BAC increased to 21.45km². Email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

¹⁴³ Email from Bojan Vukovic, RE/VA Coordinator, UNMAO, 20 April 2009; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

¹⁴⁴ Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.

¹⁴⁵ Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 17 July 2009.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, Khartoum, 18 March 2009.

¹⁴⁷ UNMAS, "UNMAS Annual Report 2008," p. 3 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

¹⁴⁸ Interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 24 March 2009.

¹⁴⁹ Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.

To support the building of local capacity and UNMAO's plans for transition to government ownership of mine action, 18 participants, including government, NGO, and UNMAO staff, were provided with advanced RE training in December 2008 in Nairobi organized by UNMAO and conducted by Cranfield University.¹⁵⁰

National prioritization of RE activities was based on UNMAO's analysis of secondary data sources (IMSMA data, LIS, etc). Needs assessments were also undertaken by implementing organizations in RE which collected primary data in the field. Once deployed, RE organizations conducted field-level needs assessments to target exact locations and audience, and to develop RE strategies.¹⁵¹ MAG started household surveys at the end of 2008 and developed an impact assessment tool kit to measure the baseline situation before the RE session to monitor the impact of RE. The analysis of the results was due to be released in late 2009.¹⁵²

Efforts to include RE in the school curriculum by UNMAO and UNICEF through the Ministry of Education, with the NMAC taking the lead in coordination, increased in 2008 with the training of 862 teachers.¹⁵³ These activities took place in the Nuba Mountains, Western and Southern Darfur, and Southern Sudan. A monitoring system was set up in each state.¹⁵⁴ A total of 535 teachers were trained in the north.¹⁵⁵ UNMAO conducted the training in the south where three training courses were organized for 327 teachers in Arapi-Nimule (Eastern Equatoria state), Rumbek (Lakes state), and Juba (Central Equatoria state). The training will continue throughout 2009, for teachers and for inspectors to monitor the work of teachers.¹⁵⁶ Other RE organizations also conducted RE in schools, at the request of individual schools and communities.¹⁵⁷

Public information campaigns were conducted in collaboration with UNMIS in the north and south, consisting of the distribution of posters and other materials, open air presentations, and radio interviews. In the south two sets of RE radio messages were broadcast, on Radio Miraya, a UN radio station, and local radio station Liberty, and were ongoing since June 2008.¹⁵⁸ In the north, three public information campaigns were organized in White Nile state at Kosti town, a transitional point for refugees, in Kadugli, capital of South Kordofan, and in Kassala.¹⁵⁹

More than 400,000 copies of various RE materials (including "Safe Way Home" materials) were distributed in 2008.¹⁶⁰ A review of RE materials was conducted in two workshops organized in 2008, in Juba in March and in Khartoum in May. As a result of the workshop, an additional 150,000 copies of "Safe Way Home" leaflets were reprinted for refugees both in the south and north.¹⁶¹ Further discussion was focused on design and production of materials for teachers, peer education, IDPs, and general and direct presentations for people at risk.¹⁶²

¹⁵⁰ UNMAS, "UNMAS Annual Report 2008," p. 3 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.

¹⁵¹ NMAA, "Sudan Mine Action Programme Transition Plan, Empowering National Ownership of the Sudan Mine Action Programme," undated but 2009, p. 58; email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 20 April 2009; interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 24 March 2009; and Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.

¹⁵² Interview with Hannah Bryce, Program Officer, MAG, Juba, 25 March 2009

¹⁵³ Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009. Note these figures differ from those provided in the Article 7 Report.

¹⁵⁴ Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.

¹⁵⁵ UNMAS, "UNMAS Annual Report 2008," p. 3 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 24 March 2009.

¹⁵⁷ Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009.

¹⁵⁸ UNMAS, "UNMAS Annual Report 2008," p. 3 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

¹⁵⁹ Email from Ahmed Gangari, Senior RE Associate, UNMAO, 22 July 2009.

¹⁶⁰ Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.

¹⁶¹ UNMAS, "UNMAS Annual Report 2008," p. 3 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.

¹⁶² Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009.

Risk education activities in 2008¹⁶³

Organization	Type of activity	Geographical area	No. of beneficiaries
North			
Association for Aid and Relief Japan	Designing and printing various RE materials; training of trainers for primary school students; distribution of posters for public information campaign; and provision of direct RE to people at risk	South Kordofan state	17,815
Friends of Peace and Development Organization	Direct RE, public campaigns on RE six projects; information days on mine awareness; targeting IDPs in Khartoum returning to center and south	Khartoum, Kassala state, Hamishkorieb, and Elfasher in Northern Darfur state	78,153
JASMAR	Provision of direct RE and CL; targeting IDPs in Khartoum returning to center and south	Khartoum, Kosti, South Darfur, Eddaïen, and El Geneina in Western Darfur	106,486
South			
The Association of Volunteers in International Service	Training of trainers for teachers, community, youth and women leaders and health workers; sensitization of people at risk; production of RE materials; and training drama groups to carry out RE in communities.	Imotong, Imehejeh, and Kiyala in Eastern Equatoria	14,742
DDG	Direct RE presentations; CL; training of community leaders; targeting local population and recently returned IDPs and refugees; distribution of materials	Magwi and Loa in Southern Sudan	23,742
DCA	Direct RE presentations through teams attached to EOD teams to respond to reports	Northern and southern areas of Nuba Mountains; Duk county, and Jongley state	87,702
HI	Direct RE to IDPs	Bor Way Station in Jongley state	32,856
MAG	Direct RE presentations; CL; training of community leaders; peer-to-peer education; and focus on work with IDPs and returning refugees in way-stations and IDP camps	Southern Sudan and Blue Nile state	251,466

¹⁶³ Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 20 April 2009; interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 24 March 2009; Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009; and IMSMA monthly report generated July 2009, provided by email by Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009. Note that the total number only approximately equals the total number of beneficiaries provided, due to very small differences in IMSMA data.

South			
OSIL	Direct RE presentations; CL; training of community leaders; and RE at IDP way stations	Way stations in Yei and Kajo Keji	11,648
SLR	Media project with RE messages and radio clips broadcast	Southern Sudan	unknown
SSDRA	Direct RE presentations	Pagak and Maiwut, Upper Nile state	4,806
Both North and South			
UNMAO/SSDC/ UNHCR	Teacher training	South Sudan – Arapi-Nimule, Rumbek, and Juba	862 teachers (number of students receiving RE in 2008 unknown)
MTI	Direct RE and CL	South, East, and Darfur regions	66,513
War Child Holland	Direct RE presentations and use of youth groups for different activities within the communities	Central Equatoria	Project started end-2008 so no data yet

RE has been conducted in Sudan for more than 10 years by international and national NGOs, UN agencies, and the government.¹⁶⁴ By 2007, the number of NGOs involved had reached 19.¹⁶⁵ The number of beneficiaries has also risen each year, and the total recorded in IMSMA prior to 2009 was 2,673,870.¹⁶⁶ RE has been conducted through public awareness campaigns, direct presentations, in schools, through child-to-child methodology, radio, and the distribution of materials.¹⁶⁷ In 2003, Landmine Monitor reported that RE in Southern Sudan was at a standstill.¹⁶⁸ Yet by 2006 only Wau was considered to be underserved, and this was addressed by MAG in 2007.¹⁶⁹

Needs assessments conducted in 2003 and 2004 by DanChurchAid (DCA), the Sudanese Red Crescent Society, and Save the Children USA showed that the most at-risk groups were adult men and children, and the most dangerous activity was farming.¹⁷⁰ From 2005, the RE focus was IDPs and returnees.¹⁷¹ Since late 2007, the RE sector has also dispatched teams to Darfur region to deliver emergency RE sessions to IDPs and civilians in impacted communities.¹⁷² In 2007, LIS results were used to inform the RE program, but a lack of adequate casualty data affected the

¹⁶⁴ See previous Landmine Monitor reports.

¹⁶⁵ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 649.

¹⁶⁶ See previous Landmine Monitor reports; and IMSMA monthly report generated July 2009, provided by email by Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009.

¹⁶⁷ See previous Landmine Monitor reports.

¹⁶⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 701.

¹⁶⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 631; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 647.

¹⁷⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 701.

¹⁷¹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 540; and UNMAO, "Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan," www.sudan-map.org.

¹⁷² See *Landmine Monitor 2006*, p. 671; and UNMAO, "Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan," www.sudan-map.org, p. 25.

ability to target appropriately.¹⁷³ In 2007, the program started to evolve from emergency RE by NGOs to a more sustained approach through existing structures such as schools and community centers.¹⁷⁴ Implementation is gradually being nationalized with the number of national NGOs growing over the last few years.¹⁷⁵

Since January 2005, coordination was done by UNICEF through UNMAO, while it also provided technical and financial support.¹⁷⁶ International RE experts have been provided by UNMAO and UNICEF since 2002,¹⁷⁷ when provisional guidelines and standards were developed.¹⁷⁸

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is not known. Sudan's health and social services have been severely damaged by years of conflict, particularly in Southern Sudan. Increased conflict in Southern Sudan in 2008–2009, and the expulsion of 13 international NGOs and the closure of three national NGOs in March 2009, further decreased the availability of services.¹⁷⁹ Services are spread unevenly, with most service providers located in Khartoum and, to a lesser extent, in Juba. The main challenges were a lack of skilled organizations working on VA/disability, a lack of decentralized services, and a lack of financial commitments from the government. These were further compounded by poverty, long distances between clients and services, and an unstable security situation.¹⁸⁰ Service provision and capacity in the south were generally weaker than in the north.

Health services were lacking throughout the country and often lacked skilled staff.¹⁸¹ In Southern Sudan, general health coverage was estimated at 40%, and 86% of basic health services were carried out by NGOs, usually with international funding.¹⁸² Patients often need to travel long distances, resulting in many mine/ERW casualties dying on the way. Follow-up care and referral systems were virtually non-existent.¹⁸³ Fear of crossing frontlines and the lack of surgical resources to treat people severely injured by weapons¹⁸⁴ exacerbated the situation.

In northern Sudan, the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) is the main actor in physical rehabilitation, a state body linked to the Ministry of Social Welfare.¹⁸⁵ Its main rehabilitation center is in Khartoum and satellites exist in some state capitals. To improve services in 2008, NAPO signed agreements with state authorities to share responsibilities and better coordinate service provision.¹⁸⁶ NAPO also started operating mobile workshops in late 2008.¹⁸⁷ In Southern Sudan, physical rehabilitation was mainly provided by GOSS in Juba where the ICRC finished construction of the referral center for Southern Sudan in December 2008.¹⁸⁸ Small-scale NGO services existed in some other states, but they lacked qualified staff, materials, and good-quality assistive devices.¹⁸⁹

¹⁷³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 648.

¹⁷⁴ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 631.

¹⁷⁵ UNMAO, "Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan," p. 25, www.sudan-map.org.

¹⁷⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 540; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

¹⁷⁷ See previous editions of *Landmine Monitor*.

¹⁷⁸ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2003*, p. 542.

¹⁷⁹ UNICEF, "Humanitarian Action Report 2009," New York, 2009, p. 145.

¹⁸⁰ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

¹⁸¹ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Sudan Humanitarian Overview," Volume 5, Issue 2, 1 April–30 June 2009, pp. 1–2, 4; and "Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan," (New York: UN Security Council, 17 April 2009), S/2009/211, paragraphs 1–5 and 50–55, UNICEF, "Humanitarian Action Report 2009," New York, 2009, p. 145.

¹⁸² Petra Vergeer, Ann Canavan, and Ines Rothmann, "A rethink on the use of aid mechanisms in health sector early recovery," *Development Policy & Practice*, Amsterdam, 28 January 2009, p. 19.

¹⁸³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 650.

¹⁸⁴ ICRC, "Annual Report 2008," Geneva, 27 May 2009, p. 141.

¹⁸⁵ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 7 September 2009.

¹⁸⁶ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008," Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 27.

¹⁸⁷ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

¹⁸⁸ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008," Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 27.

¹⁸⁹ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 650.

Psychosocial support activities were virtually non-existent. In 2008, Sudan noted that the ministries of social welfare in the north and south were responsible for psychosocial support, but stated, “this area of VA is still to be empowered and needs more technical and financial support.”¹⁹⁰ In 2008–2009 psychosocial support was increasingly incorporated into projects carried out by national NGOs.¹⁹¹ In November 2008, the Federal Ministry of Health acknowledged that mental health problems due to war-related causes were a priority issue and announced its decision to establish a National Mental Health Council and a National Center for Mental Health.¹⁹²

In May 2009, Sudan reiterated that three survivor associations had been established,¹⁹³ in Ed Damazin, Kadugli, and Kassala with the support of the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines. However, these organizations were not well organized or active. In the south, there were no survivor initiatives.¹⁹⁴ Economic reintegration was also included more systematically in NGO VA projects, but these projects remained small and often limited to pilot projects.¹⁹⁵ Broader economic and employment programs were often not adjusted to the needs of survivors or not accessible to them. Awareness was lacking among employers.¹⁹⁶

Sudan has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but this is not consistently implemented or monitored. In late 2008, new disability legislation was approved by the government of Sudan; it includes mine/ERW survivors as a specific target group.¹⁹⁷ Sudan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 24 April 2009.¹⁹⁸ In Southern Sudan, GOSS was still in the process of developing a disability policy which would better fit into the context of the southern states as of July 2009;¹⁹⁹ this process started in 2007.²⁰⁰

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Sudan is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.²⁰¹ Sudan presented its 2005–2009 objectives in November 2005,²⁰² and revised them considerably in 2007, in extensive coordination with relevant stakeholders. While the objectives for economic reintegration remained weak, additional objectives on increased survivor inclusion, resource mobilization, and strengthening coordination mechanisms were added. Responsibilities were clearly defined, and involvement of governmental bodies was increased.²⁰³

This resulted in progress, especially in establishing coordination mechanisms, information provision, monitoring of activities, and advocacy. Broadly, implementation was on track and a review was to be completed by the end of August 2009. Even though UNMAO noted that

¹⁹⁰ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

¹⁹¹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gaffar Ahmed Abdallah, General Director, CORD, 25 June 2008; and email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 15 June 2008.

¹⁹² World Health Organization, “Sudan decides to establish two mental health entities to improve citizen’s wellbeing,” 25 November 2008, www.emro.who.int.

¹⁹³ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

¹⁹⁴ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 650–651.

¹⁹⁷ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

¹⁹⁸ Sudan stated it had ratified the convention on 15 March 2009. Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

¹⁹⁹ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

²⁰⁰ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 651.

²⁰¹ “Final Report, First Review Conference,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99. Jordan declared responsibility for significant numbers of survivors at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties and thus became the 25th state in the so-called VA25.

²⁰² “Final Report of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties/ Zagreb Progress Report,” Part II, Annex V, Zagreb, 28 November–2 December 2005, pp. 191–199.

²⁰³ See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, pp. 651–652.

stakeholders used the objectives and the 2007–2009 plan less than expected, NMAC and a few NGOs used the objectives/plan for coordination and, mainly, resource mobilization purposes.²⁰⁴ One NGO noted that a lot of work had been done but that more efforts were needed to achieve the objectives, as well as better monitoring, not of project implementation per se but of the long-term impact of the activities.²⁰⁵

In 2006–2007, Sudan co-chaired the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. At least one VA/disability expert attended the intersessional Standing Committee Meetings in 2006–2009 and all meetings of States Parties, making statements at every meeting. Sudan also reported on VA in its annual Article 7 reports submitted from 2006–2009.²⁰⁶

Victim assistance activities

Many organizations provide VA/disability services in Sudan, including an increasing number of national organizations. Only those providing updated information for 2008 have been included below.

Under the Human Security Trust Fund (HSTF) project, Sudan received \$1.7 million from Japan for RE and VA to be implemented over 18 months to the end of June 2008. Some \$680,000 was dedicated to the implementation of five VA projects in the south and five in the north: eight economic reintegration projects, one psychosocial support project, one health project, and one awareness-raising project. In total, 669 of the targeted 719 survivors (267 women) were reached.²⁰⁷

The overall evaluation of the 11 projects was positive, although several organizations faced challenges working in difficult to access or insecure areas and under tough security restrictions (particularly in eastern Sudan). Three projects were not successful due to a lack of management capacity and staff turnover. An evaluation noted that in some areas the projects were the first of their kind and thus provided much-needed information about the needs of survivors (for example in Kadugli) or tested new approaches (such as the radio awareness raising and a project designed by beneficiaries in Yei county).²⁰⁸

Some organizations were able to secure international funding under a 2008–2011 \$3 million Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) grant. Under this framework 15 VA/disability projects (six in the north and nine in the south) started in the second half of 2008 and were scheduled to run until the end of 2009.²⁰⁹ The program aimed to reach some 2,400 direct beneficiaries (survivors and other persons with disabilities).²¹⁰

UNMAO noted that the sustained international funding, together with improved coordination had resulted in the involvement of a larger number of national organizations, many of whom had not been involved in VA/disability before.²¹¹

Elsewhere, ABRAR provided health insurance coverage, economic reintegration, and awareness-raising for 170 survivors. It also conducted workshops and information dissemination through the media.²¹² Rufaida provided income-generating activities to 55 military survivors and war disabled soldiers in cooperation with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission.²¹³

²⁰⁴ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

²⁰⁵ Email from Nagat Salih, ABRAR, 16 July 2009.

²⁰⁶ Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, "Status of Victim Assistance in the Context of the AP Mine Ban Convention in the 26 Relevant States Parties 2005–2008," Geneva, 28 November 2008, p. 16; and see www.apminebanconvention.org; and Article 7 Report, Form J, 13 April 2009.

²⁰⁷ Article 7 Report, Form J, 13 April 2009.

²⁰⁸ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

²⁰⁹ Article 7 Report, Form J, 13 April 2009 (mentioning 12 projects); and email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009 (mentioning 15 projects ongoing in 2008–2009).

²¹⁰ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

²¹¹ Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, Juba, 24 July 2009.

²¹² Email from Nagat Salih, ABRAR, 16 July 2009.

²¹³ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by RUFIDA staff, 15 July 2009.

With funding provided by Switzerland, the NMAC revised and distributed 18,000 copies of a leaflet on first-aid and trauma care among community health workers and NGOs in 2008.²¹⁴ In 2009, the United Arab Emirates started a mobile hospital providing assistance to underprivileged people in Southern Sudan.²¹⁵

In Southern Sudan, the GOSS Ministry of Health took over management of the Juba Teaching Hospital from the ICRC in 2008.²¹⁶ An ICRC evaluation conducted one year after the handover concluded that, “the hospital was providing acceptable and appropriate care” and noted that the hospital “is able to stand on its own and function properly.”²¹⁷

NAPO mobile workshops assisted some 425 persons with disabilities in 2008 (and 888 to May 2009) and NAPO also completed construction of a new workshop in its Khartoum complex with ICRC support.²¹⁸ Physiotherapy departments were established in Kadugli (with HI support) and in Kassala.²¹⁹

Construction of the ICRC rehabilitation center in Juba was completed in December 2008 and the center became fully operational in 2009. In 2008, the ICRC also continued its support to NAPO, including resuming its support to three NAPO satellite centers and renovating two satellite centers. A second group of 15 prosthetic and orthotic technicians started their ICRC-supported diploma course in 2008, and 17 others were sponsored for training abroad. In 2008, ICRC-supported centers assisted 3,158 people (slightly fewer than the 3,945 in 2007) and produced 1,172 prostheses (171 for survivors) and 1,227 orthoses (112 for survivors).²²⁰ An ICRC mobile surgical team also provided assistance to 128 weapon-injured people in Darfur region, south and central Sudan, and three war surgery seminars were organized.²²¹

Medical Care Development International (MCDI) provided physical and socio-economic rehabilitation for disabled war victims in Rumbek and extended its outreach activities to all of Bahr el Ghazal state in 2008. MCDI works with the state Ministry of Social Development on transitioning its rehabilitation center to the authorities. In 2008, it directly assisted 111 persons with disabilities with rehabilitation services (14 survivors) and two with educational support.²²²

HI provided basic physiotherapy training to nurses and other healthcare providers in Southern Sudan and assisted NAPO in developing a physical therapy curriculum in 2008.²²³

Support for Mine Action

The Sudan mine action sector multi-year plan for 2009–2011 provides a cost estimate totaling roughly \$245 million for mine action programs in all sectors from 2009 to 2011, including \$122.5 million for clearance and survey in Southern Sudan; \$41 million for impact survey; \$37.6 million for RE; \$20.6 million for clearance and survey in Darfur; \$10.8 million for coordination and technical assistance; \$8.3 million for capacity development of the NMAA; and \$4.3 million for VA.²²⁴ The plan includes broad resource mobilization strategies to anticipate and respond to

²¹⁴ Article 7 Report, Form J, 13 April 2009; and statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

²¹⁵ “UAE mobile hospital to go into operation within days in S. Sudan,” *Emirates News Agency* (Abu Dhabi), 11 July 2009, www.reliefweb.int.

²¹⁶ Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 6 September 2009.

²¹⁷ ICRC, “Sudan: medical care, clean water and other reasons for hope,” Operational update, 8 January 2009, www.icrc.org.

²¹⁸ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

²¹⁹ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Yousif Osman, NAPO, 15 July 2009.

²²⁰ ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 7 May 2009, p. 27; ICRC, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 27 May 2009, p. 141 (contains exact figures of mine survivors assisted); and ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: Annual Report 2007,” Geneva, May 2008, p. 26.

²²¹ ICRC, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 27 May 2009, p. 141.

²²² Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ida Kadyamatimba, MCDI, 11 July 2009.

²²³ Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

²²⁴ UNMAO, “Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan,” pp. 16, 18, 25, 37, 41, 44, 49. www.sudan-map.org.

risk factors impacting international funding.²²⁵ The National VA Strategic Framework 2007–2011 also includes resource mobilization goals among its strategic objectives.²²⁶

The NMAA and NMAC, along with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, are responsible for reviewing and updating resource mobilization strategies on behalf of GONU.²²⁷ GONU and GOSS coordinate with each other and with UNDP to develop the resource mobilization strategy and raise funds for mine action, as well as to allocate resources for mine action from the national budget.²²⁸ UNMAO conducts donor liaison and resource mobilization activities in support of mine action program implementation.²²⁹ In June 2008, NMAC reported a resource mobilization strategy based on lobbying efforts to include mine action within the government’s budget, seeking provision of funds for mine action programs, operational support to NMAC, and capacity-building.²³⁰

National support for mine action

Combined reported national funding by GONU and GOSS in 2008 totaled \$4,927,019. NMAC reported GONU funding to mine action in 2008 totaling \$3,345,000, including contributions to personnel salaries, operational costs of the mine action center and field offices, equipment purchase and rental, and staff expenses for mine clearance operations in the field. The largest contribution was reportedly \$1,737,000 to make partial payments on two flails and two water tankers for clearance operations.²³¹ Sudan reported GONU contributions totaling roughly \$6.8 million in 2007.²³²

The SSDA reported national funding totaling SDG3,233,890 (\$1,582,019) in 2008, including funding for SSDA personnel, equipment and running costs, insurance, and logistical and other operational costs. The projected budget for mine action in Southern Sudan during 2008 was SDG3,551,000 (\$1,737,149), including a supplemental budget request made in June to cover various operating expenses. The SSDA reported that not all 2008 disbursements were spent during the year.²³³ GOSS was reported by UNDP to have contributed roughly \$700,000 to mine action in 2007.²³⁴

During 2007 and the first half of 2008, GONU reported it contributed \$5.5 million to mine action, while GOSS contributed \$1.5 million. Funds covered the cost of local personnel in the national mine action centers and field operations of the national demining teams.²³⁵

In June 2009, UNDP reported that while 2009 national funding by GONU roughly matched 2008 funding levels, national funding by GOSS might decline in 2009 because of fluctuating oil prices. UNDP and UNMAO were reportedly working jointly with GONU and GOSS to secure as much funding as possible from state budgets.²³⁶ The SSDA reported that “this issue is likely to continue as long as the economy of Southern Sudan is reliant on oil revenues.”²³⁷

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, 13 countries and the EC reported providing \$39,077,807 (€26,536,607) to mine action in Sudan. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was 37% higher than reported in 2007.

²²⁵ Ibid, p. 53. www.sudan-map.org.

²²⁶ Republic of Sudan, “National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, March 2007, p. 6.

²²⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, 15 June 2008.

²²⁸ Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

²²⁹ UNMAO, “Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan,” p. 48. www.sudan-map.org.

²³⁰ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, 15 June 2008.

²³¹ NAMC response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, 24 June 2009.

²³² Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, 15 June 2008.

²³³ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, SSDA, 9 June 2009.

²³⁴ Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.

²³⁵ UNDP, Mine Action Capacity Development Project Document, p. 4.

²³⁶ Email from Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, 24 June 2009.

²³⁷ Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, SSDA, 9 June 2009.

As of October 2008, UNMAO reported receiving \$23,934,225 in donor funding for mine action compared to a requirement of \$70,400,407. Assessed mine action budgets for UNMIS and UNAMID totaled \$49,403,610.²³⁸ As of May 2009, it was reported that international funding for 2009 had reached \$31,045,632. Combined assessed and donor funds totaled \$68,813,582, compared to a requirement for 2009 of \$91,510,634.²³⁹

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Sudan: Monetary²⁴⁰

Donor	Implementing Agencies/Organizations	Project Details	Amount
Japan	WFP	Mine clearance	\$12,677,900 (¥1,307,000,000)
Canada	UNMAS, UNDP, MAG, UNICEF	Mine clearance, capacity-building, mine RE, VA	\$4,024,121 (CAD4,289,650)
Netherlands	DDG, MAG, NPA, UNMAS	Unspecified mine action	\$6,030,680
US	MAG, DCA, UNDP, Cranfield University, SIMAS, NPA	Capacity-building, mine clearance, RE, other mine action	\$3,643,000
Norway	NPA	Integrated mine action	\$3,548,000 (NOK20,000,000)
Sweden	Swedish Rescue Services Agency, DDG	Unspecified mine action	\$2,157,588 (SEK14,204,000)
United Kingdom	MAG, UNMAS, UNDP	Integrated mine action	\$1,919,982 (£1,035,310)
Denmark	DCA	Integrated mine action	\$1,420,695 (DKK7,230,000)
Germany	NPA	Mine clearance	\$1,243,332 (€844,311)
Spain	UN Voluntary Trust Fund	Unspecified mine action	\$736,300 (€500,000)
EC	HI	VA	\$736,300 (€500,000)
Italy	UNMAS	Mine clearance	\$485,958 (€330,000)
Switzerland	Swiss Federation for Mine Action (FSD)	Mine clearance	\$375,388 (CHF406,000)
Austria	FSD, Danish Refugee Council	Capacity-building, RE	\$78,563 (€53,350)
Total			\$39,077,807 (€26,536,607)

²³⁸ UNMAO, "Newsletter, Autumn 2008," October 2008, p. 6.

²³⁹ UNMAO "Newsletter, Spring 2009," May 2009, p. 6.

²⁴⁰ Emails from Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation; Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; and Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; US Department of State, "To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009," Washington, DC, July 2009; emails from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Amb. Lars-Erik Wingren, Department for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009; Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; emails from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Policy Assistant, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009; Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; and Daniela Krejdl, Humanitarian Aid, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2009.