Landmine Monitor 2013

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC
Governance Board

Handicap International
Human Rights Watch
Mines Action Canada
Norwegian People’s Aid
Research team leaders
ICBL-CMC staff experts
International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
Preface

Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive devices are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict but has been left behind and is no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

These legal instruments provide a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations, and it is the task of NGOs to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, and communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come.

Published since 1999, this year marks the fifteenth Landmine Monitor. Cover images from 1999 to 2012 pictured above.
International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network, whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty, and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use, and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

On 1 January 2011 the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) merged with the ICBL to become the ICBL-CMC. The CMC and ICBL remain two separate and strong campaigns with a dedicated team of staff for both. In the few years prior to the merger, the ICBL, CMC, and the Monitor had increasingly been sharing resources to achieve their similar goals: to rid the world of landmines and cluster munitions. Work towards these goals has been strengthened with the merger, while still ensuring the three components (CMC, ICBL, and the Monitor) continue to be the global authorities in their distinct areas of work.

The ICBL-CMC is committed to pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available
information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting by states required under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of more than 30 researchers and a 12-person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

About this report

This is the 15th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. Landmine Monitor 2013 provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.

Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling in every country in the world, and also includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2012, with information included up to October 2013 when possible.
Acknowledgements

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors. Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information.

We are grateful to ICBL and CMC staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial assistance in the release, distribution, publication, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board, which is comprised of research team leaders, ICBL-CMC staff experts, and four NGOs. Members include: Handicap International (Marion Libertucci), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose, ban policy team leader), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Norwegian People’s Aid (Atle Karlsen, mine action and support for mine action team leader), Loren Persi Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team co-coordinator), Tamar Gabelnick (ICBL-CMC policy director), and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager). Sylvie Brigot-Vilain (ICBL-CMC executive director) is an ex-officio member. The Editorial Team undertook research for Landmine Monitor primarily from January to June 2013.

The Editorial Team included:
• Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Kate Castenson, Stephen Goose, Andrew Haag, Katherine Harrison, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Mary Wareham;
• Contamination, clearance, and support: Kathryn Millett, Nick Cumming-Bruce, Atle Karlsen, Mike Kendellen; and,
• Casualties and victim assistance: Megan Burke and Loren Persi Vicentic with research assistance from Clémence Caraux, Kerryn Clarke, Hugh Hosman, and Marianne Schulze.

Jeff Abramson provided final editing from August to November 2013 with assistance from Vincent Farnsworth and Morgan McKenna (publication consultants), and Arthur Brocato and Patrick Dürst (Monitor interns).

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* List accurate as of November 2013.
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largely as a result of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, in 2012 Landmine Monitor recorded the lowest number of new casualties ever, the largest amount of contaminated land released ever, and the highest level of global funding for mine action ever.

**Treaty Status**
There are 161 States Parties and one signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty.
- Poland ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 December 2012; now all 28 European Union member states are States Parties.
- The United States stated in December 2012 that a decision on the US landmine policy review and the matter of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty would be announced “soon.”

**Use**
Antipersonnel landmines were laid in large numbers, apparently by government forces, in Yemen at two locations in 2011: Bani Jarmooz and the Ministry of Trade and Industry compound in the capital, Sana’a. Yemen, as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, is obligated to quickly and thoroughly investigate the use, determine who was responsible, hold those responsible accountable, and report on these activities to States Parties.
- Additionally, lingering and new allegations of antipersonnel mine use in States Parties South Sudan, Sudan, and Turkey warrant further investigation.
- Forces in the internationally unrecognized breakaway area of Nagorno-Karabakh emplaced new antipersonnel mines in 2013.
- Non-state armed groups used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen.
- With the addition of Syria and Tunisia, the number of countries where non-state armed groups have used mines has reached its highest level in five years.

**Stockpile Destruction**
Collectively, 87 States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 47 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 250,000 destroyed in 2012.
- Nearly 11 million antipersonnel mines await destruction by eight States Parties.
- Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation of the treaty after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline. Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.

**Transfer and Production**
For the past decade, the global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers, but the abrupt appearance of mines in Sudan and Yemen indicates that some form of market for, and trade in, antipersonnel mines exists.
- Down from a total of more than 50 states before the Mine Ban Treaty’s existence, currently only 12 states are identified as potential producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United States, and Vietnam. This list has not changed in recent years.

**Casualties**
In 2012, recorded casualties caused by mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices, cluster munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) decreased to the lowest level since the Monitor started recording casualties in 1999.
- In 2012, a global total of 3,628 casualties were recorded, a 19% decline compared with 4,474 in 2011.
- The incidence rate of 10 casualties per day for 2012 is a 60% decrease from what was reported for 1999, when there were approximately 25 casualties each day.

**Manual demining demonstration in Somalia on the International Day for Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action. In 2012, a record amount of land was cleared of landmines.**
Major Findings

In many states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher. Nevertheless, the decrease in casualties is likely even more significant because of improvements in recording over time.

Casualties were identified in 62 states and other areas in 2012, of which 42 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians; the proportion of civilian casualties as compared with military casualties increased to 78% in 2012, five percentage points higher than in 2011.

In 2012, child casualties increased as a proportion of all casualties (to 13%, three percentage points higher than in 2011). Seventy percent of recorded global casualties occurred in States Parties.

Steady declines in annual casualty totals continued in the three States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that have regularly recorded the highest number of annual casualties over the past 14 years: Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Colombia.

Contamination and Land Release

Some 59 states and four other areas were confirmed to be mine-affected as of October 2013. A further eight states have either suspected or residual mine contamination.

A record high of at least 281 km² of mined areas were released through clearance or survey by 40 mine action programs in 2012—up from at least 190 km² in 2011—destroying almost 240,000 antipersonnel mines and 9,300 antivehicle mines.

The largest total clearance of mined areas in 2012 was achieved in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Sri Lanka, which together accounted for 62% of recorded clearance.

Over the past decade, almost 1.98 km² has been released through clearance or survey; more than 3.3 million mines were removed from the ground.

In addition, some 245 km² of battle areas were cleared in 2012 including 78 km² of area contamination by cluster munitions and destroying just over 300,000 items of unexploded ordnance.

In 2012, five States Parties formally declared fulfillment of their Article 5 obligations to clear all known or suspected areas containing antipersonnel mines in territory under their jurisdiction or control since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force in 1999.

A total of 24 States Parties have officially reported completion of their obligation to clear all known or suspected areas containing antipersonnel mines in territory under their jurisdiction or control since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force in 1999.

Of the 35 States Parties that have confirmed outstanding mine clearance obligations, 29 (83%) have been granted at least one extension period, more than half of which are deemed to either not be on track with their extension requests or their progress is unclear.

Victim Assistance

Since 2009, significant progress has been made in victim assistance as measured against the commitments States Parties made that year through the Cartagena Action Plan. Progress was recorded in:

- Improving the understanding of mine/ERW victims’ needs;
- Coordinating and planning measures to better address those needs;
- Linking victim assistance coordination with multisectoral coordination mechanisms, such as those for disability and development;
- Informing mine/ERW victims about existing programs and services and, in some cases, facilitating their access to available services; and
- Strengthening legal frameworks to promote the rights of victims, including by advancing the right to physical accessibility for persons with disabilities.

Challenges remain in:

- Increasing the availability and sustainability of relevant programs and services, especially to survivors in remote areas;
- Ensuring that all mine/ERW victims have access to programs that meet their specific needs, particularly in employment and livelihoods as well as psychological support; and
- Ensuring that all victims, along with other people with similar needs, have equal access to age and gender appropriate services.

Support for Mine Action

Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$681 million in international and national support for mine action in 2012, the largest combined total ever recorded and $19 million more than in 2011.

International assistance in 2012 was a record $497 million, an increase of $30 million as compared with 2011.

- A total of 52 states and four other areas received $439 million from 39 donors in 2012. A further $58 million was provided without a designated recipient state or other area. Seven states and the EU contributed 80% of this funding.

- Afghanistan received more funding than any other country for the tenth consecutive year. The largest increases among recipients were in Mali, Myanmar, and Somalia, with $41.2 million combined in 2012 compared with $4.7 million in 2011.

- Of the six new recipients in 2012, Mali received the most support with $7.7 million. The other five new recipients—the Philippines, Syria, India, Senegal, and Zimbabwe—received a total of $9.2 million.

Twenty-eight affected states provided $184 million in national support for their own mine action programs, a decrease of $11 million compared with 2011.

In addition to the support detailed above, appropriations from the UN General Assembly for mine action within nine peacekeeping operations provided more than $113 million in 2012—a 25% increase compared with 2011.
The Mine Ban Treaty is one of the great success stories in disarmament and in broader global humanitarian efforts, as demonstrated by its impressive implementation and the widespread adherence to the norm it is establishing against antipersonnel landmines.

Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty was signed on 3 December 1997 by 122 countries and entered into force more than 13 years ago on 1 March 1999. One country, signatory Poland, has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since the last Landmine Monitor report, making a total of 161 States Parties, or more than 80% of the world’s nations. Most of those still outside the treaty nevertheless abide by its key provisions, indicating near-universal acceptance of the landmine ban.

Yet challenges remain. Several major states are not yet party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including the United States (US), where an ongoing landmine ban policy review is not expected to be decided until late 2013. Syria and Myanmar were both confirmed to be using antipersonnel mines in 2012 and 2013. Moreover, while overall implementation has been impressive, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties related to destruction of stockpiles by the treaty-mandated deadlines and use of the weapon.

Full implementation and universalization of the treaty remain key objectives for the cooperative and enduring partnership of governments, international organizations, and the ICBL.

This overview chapter has two parts. The first examines the implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty by its States Parties. The second section provides a global overview of banning antipersonnel mines, as well as the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines by the 36 states not party to the treaty. The focus of the reporting is on the period from September 2012 to October 2013.

**Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance**

In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. However, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of other States Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition, some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including those concerning mine clearance and victim assistance.

The treaty’s compliance provisions—contained in Article 8—have not been formally invoked to clarify any compliance question. However, the ICBL has on numerous occasions called for States Parties to operationalize Article 8’s formal mechanisms in order to be prepared for any eventual need. The ICBL believes it may become necessary for States Parties to consider this process if the apparent use of antipersonnel mines by forces loyal to the government of Yemen in 2011 and other serious allegations of use by States Parties are not adequately addressed by the concerned states.

**Prohibition on use (Article 1)**

All previous editions of Landmine Monitor have stated that there has never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became law in 1999. This achievement appears to be in jeopardy given the weight of evidence that has emerged that government forces in Yemen used antipersonnel mines at two locations in 2011. The ICBL believes that States Parties should put a high priority on ascertaining the facts, and should consider the initiation of the formal compliance clarification mechanism provided for by the Mine Ban Treaty.
Treaty if the government of Yemen cannot adequately explain the circumstances at Bani Jarmooz and at the Ministry of Trade and Industry compound in the capital, Sana’a. In addition, a Turkish military court convicted a Turkish general under the charge of negligence in an incident where his troops used antipersonnel mines in 2009—this initial verdict is likely to be appealed.

In this reporting period, commencing in September 2012, there has been no confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in States Parties. However, there was an unconfirmed allegation of use in South Sudan. In July 2013, after a visit to Jonglei state, the NGO Refugees International issued a report that stated that government forces have been laying antipersonnel mines in the town of Pibor in the southeast of Jonglei state, adding to previous allegations of use in South Sudan.

Additionally, a number of previous allegations of mine use by the armed forces of Sudan (in 2011), Turkey in (another case from 2009), and Cambodia (2008 and 2009) remain unresolved and warrant ongoing attention and resolution by those governments and other States Parties.

**Yemen**

Credible new information emerged this year from three independent sources indicating that the government’s Republican Guard planted thousands of antipersonnel mines in late 2011 at Bani Jarmooz, north of Yemen’s capital city. From their descriptions and drawings by local residents, Human Rights Watch (HRW) identified PMN antipersonnel mines that were found in the area, while photographs taken by a journalist indicate that other types of mines may have been included, using the PMD-6 antipersonnel mine.

In total, HRW estimates that at least 15 civilian casualties, including nine children, have resulted from landmines in the area from September 2011 to May 2013. The most recent victim was Fawaz Mohsin Saleh Husn, a 9-year-old boy from al-Khabsha village, who was injured by a mine at Bani Jarmooz on 12 April 2013. The casualties all occurred in the vicinity of military camps that the 63rd and 81st Brigades of the Republican Guard established in July 2011 and which remain in place as of September 2013. There has been no other military activity in the area that could explain the presence of the mines. HRW did not observe any fencing or warning signs when it visited the site in April 2013.

Yemen’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Ali Mohamed Saeed Majawar, responded to the allegations late May 2013, stating, “we have contacted the relevant government bodies and Yemen Mission in Geneva. It was agreed that an official investigation will be conducted on the use of AP [antipersonnel] mines in the mentioned area, by whom and the guilty will be punished. YEMAC will implement a level one survey to locate the mines and clear them to stop any further casualties.”

Sometime after May 2011, antipersonnel mines were laid inside a building compound of the Ministry of Industry and Trade in the capital city, Sana’a. Deminers from the Army Engineering Corps were seen in a video recording obtained by HRW removing at least 25 antipersonnel mines from the compound on 7 March 2012, including one mine type not encountered before in Yemen, either in stock or emplaced. The forces that used

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1. According to a resident who became a mine victim in November 2011, in late September or early October 2011 he had used binoculars to watch between 10 and 15 soldiers in Republican Guard uniforms lay mines in a nearby wadi, or river bed. HRW interviewed a medic from the district of Milhin who lost his leg in an incident on 30 November 2011 in a minefield outside the camp of the 63rd Brigade of the Republican Guard, which caused five other casualties. According to 21-year-old Ibrahim Abdallah Hussain Hotrom from Milhin district in Sana’a, three people were walking near the camp when one was shot. The other two men called the local medical team to help and tried to take the injured man to a safe place. Those two men stepped on land-mines. The medical team went in and all except one of the four medics stepped on landmines and were wounded. Hotrom said the mined area was about 1,200 meters from a Republican Guard checkpoint and about 800 meters from the 63rd Brigade.

2. During a visit to Bani Jormooz in April 2013, an international journalist said “residents produced bags of mines recovered from the ground using rudimentary methods. They included four different types of anti-personnel mines, including large numbers of Hungarian manufactured GYATA-64 type mines...Locals also produced plastic East German PPM-2 mines and two variations of Soviet wooden PMD-5 [sic] mines.” See, Joe Sheffer, “Revenge Landmines of the Arab Spring.” Foreign Policy, 24 May 2013, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/24/revenge_landmines_of_the_arab_spring_yemen.

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the mines at the compound could not be conclusively determined.8

South Sudan

During 2011 and 2013, there were several incidents in which landmines were apparently laid in South Sudan, including in the states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile; however, the Monitor could not determine who was responsible for the mine use. The ICBL expressed concern at “alarming reports” of new landmine use by non-state armed groups (NSAGs).5 In May 2012, the ICBL again drew States Parties’ attention to apparent new mine-laying in 2011, but noted it was not possible to determine who was responsible or whether antipersonnel mines in addition to antivehicle mines had been laid.9

In July 2013, after a visit to Jonglei state, the NGO Refugees International issued a report that stated that “multiple UN and NGO sources have...reported that members of the [Sudan People’s Liberation Army, SPLA] have been laying anti-personnel mines in civilian areas. However the UN Mine Action Service has been unable to conduct a investigation that would confirm this.”10 The report also cited recent civilian injuries from antipersonnel mines. Refugees International informed the ICBL that the mine use was in the town of Pibor in the southeast of Jonglei state.11

Sudan

It is clear from evidence and testimony from various sources that antipersonnel mines are available for use in the southern part of the country, but the Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines. There is also a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. In its Article 7 reports and statements, the government of Sudan has provided little to no official information on the mine use allegations.12

During early 2012, discoveries of stockpiles or allegations of mine use were reported in South Kordofan in the towns of Taroji, Heglig,13 Heiban,14 and at the Jebel Kwo military base located near the village of Toss.15 In August 2013, the South Kordofan state secretary for the rebel Justice & Equality Movement (JEM), Engineer al-Rehema Ismail Fedail, accused the government of Sudan of planting landmines in North and South Kordofan states, identifying several newly-mined locations including Um ‘Djamen, southern al-Dabek, southern Abu Zabad and al-Tamnoyah, in addition to al-Dashol and Abu Janok areas.16

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8 Before the conflict, government employees used the ministry building daily. On 23 May 2011, al-Ahmar tribal militia entered the ministry around midday causing employees to flee, according to local shop-keepers and residents. Al-Ahmar fighters occupied the building for approximately 10 days while fighting with government forces, several residents and merchants told HRW. Cadets of the Supreme Military College subsequently occupied the premises. According to neighbor-hood residents, troops from the Republican Guard assumed control of the recaptured building around 16 October 2011. In January 2012, Central Security officers began guarding the building compound, they told HRW. HRW interviews with six uniformed guards from the Central Security forces at the Ministry of Industry and Trade compound and interviews with local shop owners and residents, Jomhoria Street, Hassaba neighborhood, Sana’a, 24–25 March 2012.


13 In 2011, reports emerged of new mine-laying in South Kordofan state in the Nuba Mountains near the border with South Sudan as part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the northern branch of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army now called SPLM-N. UN reports stated that both the SAF and the SPLM-N were reported to have laid antipersonnel mines in strategic areas of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan state. See, UNHCR, “Thirteenth periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan: Preliminary report on violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Southern Kordofan from 5 to 30 June 2011,” August 2011, para. 25; and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “South, Sudan – South Kordofan – Situation Report No. 12,” covering the period 12–17 July 2011, reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA Situation Report %26%23132; South Kordofan 12 to 17 July 2011.pdf.

14 Three crates containing at least 100 Iranian-made No. 4 antipersonnel mines were found in a structure previously used by Sudan government forces to store ammunition. This type of mine has been reported by Sudan in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports to be present in this part of the country as part of the mine contamination. The mines were contained in shipping boxes stenciled in Arabic with “Yarmouk Industrial Complex,” a Sudanese Military Industrial Corporation subsidiary. Small Arms Survey, Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) weapons documented in South Kordofan,” April 2012, www.smallarmssurvey.org/pdfs/facts-figures/weapons-tracing-desk/HSBA-Tracing-Desk-SAF-weapons-SK.pdf. Locals also said the hills surrounding Taroji had been mined by Sudan government forces. The Monitor has a set of the landmine photographs on file. See also, Peter Moszynski, “Intervention is urgently needed to prevent humanitarian catastrophe on Sudan’s border,” British Medical Journal, 19 March 2012.

15 The Small Arms Survey, a Swiss NGO, reported that the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and/or SPLA seized antipersonnel mines after occupying an SAF base. Small Arms Survey, Sudan Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Weapons identified in Heglig/Parthou and Bentiu,” June 2012, www.smallarmssurvey.org/pdfs/facts-figures/weapons-tracing-desk/HSBA-Tracing-Desk-Bentiu.pdf. Geneva Call said the JEM reacted to this discovery and responded, “JEM forces have not taken a single mine at all from Heglig and they consider them dangerous objects and they have no use for them.” Contained in email from Adrian Goodliffe, Programme Officer – Africa, Geneva Call, 24 July 2012.


17 Fighters showed weapons, including Iranian antipersonnel mines, to two Irish Times reporters that the fighters said they had captured from government forces. Paulo Nunes Dos Santos and Mary Fitzgerald, “War in Sudan: the Kerry connection,” The Irish Times, 1 September 2012, www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/weekend/2012/0901/1224375344168.html.

The ICBL has expressed “grave concern” at allegations of antipersonnel mine use by armed forces of the Republic of Sudan in South Kordofan and urged the government to clarify whether its forces used antipersonnel mines. It has called on Sudan to clarify if it has new contamination resulting from antipersonnel mine use and urged the government to allow international NGOs to continue mine action operations across the country.

In May 2012, a representative of the government of Sudan stated that regarding use allegations reported in February 2012, it would “carry out an investigation” and “declare the findings” in its next annual Article 7 report. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2012, Sudan publicly committed to investigate the allegation.

Yet the Article 7 report provided in April 2013 contains no new information with respect to the use allegation in South Kordofan. In December 2012, Sudan said the mine use allegations were “not accurate” because they come from “rebel groups” and urged that information concerning new mine use be shared with the government’s national mine action center.

Turkey

In 2009, there were serious allegations of at least two instances of use of antipersonnel mines by members of the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey near the border with Iraq, in Sirnak province (April 2009) and Hakkari province (May 2009).

In May 2013, Turkish army informed States Parties, “A detailed investigation comprising a consequent administrative legal scrutiny were undertaken. Let me share with you, for the record, that there has not been an explosion. Moreover the registry of Turkish Armed Forces shows that the mine allegedly in question was destroyed before the end of 2009, together with the stockpiled ones.”

The second case relates to seven Turkish soldiers who were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Çukurca on 27 May 2009. The Turkish Army initially alleged that the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) planted the mine, but in June 2009 Turkish media reported that the mine was in fact laid by Turkish forces not long before its detonation. An investigation by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office in Van determined that the mine belonged to the Turkish military and was planted on the orders of a Turkish Commander. That case was forwarded to the Turkish General Staff Military Prosecutor’s Office in 2010.

According to media accounts, in September 2010 a report on the incident to the military’s prosecutor’s office found that the device used was an “anti-personnel landmine.” Brigadier General Zeki Es, who allegedly ordered the emplacement of the mine, was arrested in November 2010 and a case was opened in the Turkish Martial Court. General Es was released in February 2011 after several soldiers recanted their previous testimony. In October 2011, according to a media account, an expert report prepared at the request of the military court found that commanders were responsible for the deaths due to negligence and poor planning. In May 2013, Turkish informed States Parties, “The most recent hearing of the trial was held by this Military Court on April 19, 2013. The court rendered its verdict and sentenced a Turkish Brigadier General to 6 years and 8 months


29 Ibid.

30 Metin Arslan and Fatih Karakiliç, “General who planted deadly Çukurca mines sent to jail,” Today’s Zaman, 8 November 2010, www.today-szaman.com/newsDetailGet-NewsById.action;jsessionid=C51025604FCF37FED73457DcB8C4D2E7newsid=2166416ezollumstid=0.


of imprisonment due to ‘causing death and injury by negligence.’” Turkey informed States Parties that this was an initial verdict and not a final decision.35

Cambodia

Previous allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Cambodian forces on the Cambodian-Thai border, made by Thailand in 2008 and 2009, have not been resolved.36 In May 2011, in response to a request by the Monitor for an update regarding a promised fact-finding mission report into the allegations, a government official stated that the report could not be completed due to a lack of response by Thailand to a request for further details.37

Cambodia, according to a request for information made by the ICBL, conducted a fact-finding mission from 10–12 May 2013 to investigate an incident in March 2013 in which three Thai soldiers were injured by what the Thai military alleged were newly planted mines near the Ta Kwai Temple in Phnom Dong Rak district.38 Cambodia informed States Parties that its fact-finding mission determined that the Thai soldiers were injured by mines laid in the past during the Cambodian civil war. Cambodia’s investigation stated that its soldiers found indications of the incident on the same day, and provided a GPS reference that was different than the reference where the Thai military stated the incident took place. The Cambodian fact-finding mission stated that the incident took place to the side of, and not on, a specially cleared path used for military-to-military meetings between the Thai and Cambodian military in that particular area. The Cambodian delegation informed States Parties that it had discussed its investigations with the ICBL. Cambodia provided a copy of its investigation report to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit and the ICBL at the May 2013 intersessional meeting and to the government of Thailand through diplomatic channels.39

Destruction of stockpiles (Article 4)

A total of at least 150 of the 161 States Parties do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, including 87 States Parties that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 63 that have declared never possessing antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training purposes).

Of the remaining 11 States Parties:

• Equatorial Guinea and Tuvalu have not made an official declaration, but are not thought to possess stockpiles;40

• Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline. Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010;

• Finland and Poland are in the process of destroying their stockpiles;

• Somalia, while initially declaring not to possess any antipersonnel mines, is in the process of assessing whether any are currently possessed;

• Côte d’Ivoire reported in November 2012 that it discovered 1,526 antipersonnel mines of four types during an inventory;

• Both Côte d’Ivoire and South Sudan need to formally confirm to States Parties that they no longer possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines; and

• Guinea-Bissau apparently still needs to destroy a small quantity of antipersonnel mines that were discovered after its 1 November 2005 deadline had passed.

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 47 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 250,000 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2012. Eight States Parties possess nearly 11 million antipersonnel mines awaiting destruction: Belarus (3,356,636), Côte d’Ivoire (1,526), Finland (809,308), Greece (953,285), Guinea-Bissau (at least seven), Poland (13,585), South Sudan (at least four), and Ukraine (5,767,600).


34 In October 2008, two Thai soldiers stepped on antipersonnel mines while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. Thai authorities maintained that the area was previously clear of mines and that the mines had been newly placed by Cambodian forces. Cambodia denied the charges and stated that the Thai soldiers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts. In April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries. In September 2009, Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, Gen. Anupong Paochinda, stated that Cambodian troops were laying fresh mines along the disputed areas and close to routes where Thai soldiers make regular patrols. See Landmine Monitor Report 2009, pp. 243–244, 719–720, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/displayact=submit&pp_year=2009&pp_type=map&pp报告期内-report=thailand&ppsection=; and also ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Cambodia: Mine Ban Policy,” 6 August 2010, www.the-monitor.org.

35 “Cambodia has been waiting for the responses from Thailand to five core questions, without which the result of the investigation conducted by the Fact Finding Commission of Cambodia cannot be substantiated and evidently concluded. Thailand has not responded to...” Email from Vanndy Hem, Assistant to the Prime Minister, Deputy Head of Secretariat, Mine Ban Policy, Tuvalu stated in 2002 that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.

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LANDMINE MONITOR 2013
Stockpile Destruction Deadlines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Deadline</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1 July 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1 June 2017</td>
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Finland has commenced the destruction of its stockpile that once totaled more than one million mines, destroying 220,455 mines in 2012, and has reported it will complete the destruction of the remainder of its stockpile before the end of 2015, prior to its July 2016 deadline.39 Poland destroyed more than one million mines during the decade while it was a signatory and has 13,585 antipersonnel mines left to destroy by its June 2017 stockpile destruction deadline. South Sudan declared the completion of stockpile destruction before independence from Sudan, but it has also reported discovering small quantities of antipersonnel mines since entry into force. In a statement to States Parties in May 2013, South Sudan indicated this stockpile has not yet been destroyed and it has given no indication of when this task will be accomplished.40

Somalia has declared possessing no stocks, but also cautions that “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals” and that it “is currently putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles.”41

During a national inventory of its ammunition stockpiles, Côte d’Ivoire discovered 1,526 antipersonnel mines and it apparently intends to retain 290 of these mines for training purposes.42 It previously declared not possessing stockpiles, including for training purposes, and its stockpile destruction deadline was 1 December 2004.43 During its statement on stockpile destruction at the April 2013 Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings, Côte d’Ivoire reported having destroyed all of its mines under the Mine Ban Treaty.44 Guinea-Bissau, which reported completion of stockpile destruction in 2005, stated in December 2011 it had discovered a small number of mines in storage and intended to destroy them by the end of March 2012, but destruction had not taken place as of May 2013.45

The inability of Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine to complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep concern for States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 calls on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date.

Belarus has repeatedly stated that it requires international assistance in order to destroy its remaining antipersonnel mines. An attempt to provide assistance through a project financed through the European Commission collapsed in 2006.46 A new program was “re-launched” by the European Union (EU) on 30 June 2010 with a period of performance stipulated at 28 months.47 On 30 December 2010, the EU officially announced that the contract was awarded to the Spanish company Explosivos Alaveses SA (EXPAL), for a total value of €3,900,000 (US$5,171,790).48 In December 2012, Belarus informed States Parties that there had been delays in the construction of the facility, including a change in subcontractors in mid-2012, but it said the destruction should begin in the first half of 2013.49 In May 2013, Belarus stated that EXPAL was completing installation of the destruction facility, which it said was “90 percent operational.” Belarus said it could not give an exact deadline for when the mines will be destroyed and committed to “continue to keep States Parties updated” on its progress towards stockpile destruction.50

Greece started its stockpile destruction almost eight months after its deadline under a contract with Hellenic Defense Systems S.A. (EAS), but then halted stockpile destruction operations in early 2010 after an explosion at the subcontractor’s destruction facility located in Bulgaria and other problems led Greece to cancel the contract with EAS.51 In May 2012, Greece stated that stockpile destruction was suspended pending the conclusion of a contractual dispute between the government and the contractor and subsequent appeal.52 In December 2012, Greece announced that it would resume work with EAS rather than prolong a

40 Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, 27 May 2013.
44 Presentation by Côte d’Ivoire, Convention on Cluster Munitions Standing Committee, Session on Stockpile Destruction and Retention, Geneva, 14 April 2013. Notes by the ICBL.
delayed legal process. In 2013, Greece signed a modified contract for the destruction of the remaining 60% of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines, following “extensive negotiations” between the Ministry of National Defence and EAS. In July 2013, a Greek official confirmed to the negotiations between the Ministry of National Defence and EAS. Greece’s ministerial decision had been signed at the end of November 2012, but gave no indication that destruction had recommenced. In December 2012, Ukraine stated that the “large-scale” destruction of the landmine stockpile would begin in January 2013 and said that one million mines will be destroyed each year. In May 2013, however, Ukraine said it was only able to undertake a lower level of destruction with small funds from Germany, noting that “since 2010” it has been waiting for the EU funds to be dispensed. Additionally, Ukraine has not provided clear information on plans to destroy the PFM mines contained in 220mm rocket warheads not covered by its agreement with NPSA. Nor has Ukraine publicly announced plans to destroy its stockpile of 149,096 POM-2 mines. It did report that the US was providing funding for a kiln for other weapon destruction that could then be used to destroy further mines, noting that it was taking steps to complete the construction of the facilities where the mines will be dismantled. Ukraine said the “capabilities we are putting in place demonstrate we are doing everything in our power to get there” but noted that the deadline for destroying the stockpile will depend on funding from the EU.

Mines Retained for Training and Research (Article 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 44 have retained more than 1,000 mines and three (Finland, Bangladesh, and Turkey) have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-one States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 29 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past. A total of 28% of the States Parties that retain mines failed to submit an annual Article 7 report for calendar year 2012, which was due by 30 April 2013.

Reporting is necessary to understand the intended purposes or actual uses of retained mines. Because of this lack of information, it is not possible to present a total figure of mines retained for 2012 that would serve as a basis of meaningful comparison for previous years.

Key updates from calendar year 2012 were:

- Sudan destroyed its entire remaining stock of retained mines, a total of 1,938 mines;
- Zambia eliminated more than half of its retained mines, a total of 1,213 mines;
- Australia eliminated more than half of its retained mines, a total of 3,654 mines;
- Brazil used nearly 20% of its retained mines, a total of 1,326 mines; and
- Côte d’Ivoire has acquired 290 retained mines from a stockpile of 1,526 antipersonnel mines it discovered in November 2012.

In addition to those listed below, an additional 31 States Parties each retain less than 1,000 mines for a total of 11,979 retained mines. A major concern for the ICBL is the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being consumed.
### States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Last known declaration (for year)</th>
<th>Initial declaration</th>
<th>Reported consumed in 2012</th>
<th>Year of last declared consumption</th>
<th>Reduced as excess to needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>16,500 (2012)</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>15,041 (2012)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,500 (2012)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6,930 (2012)</td>
<td>13,948</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>6,587 (2012)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6,158 (2012)</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>6,022 (2012)</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5,970 (2012)</td>
<td>15,030</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>5,717 (2012)</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4,874 (2011)</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4,840 (2012)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>4,491 (2006)</td>
<td>4,491</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4,367 (2012)</td>
<td>4,830</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,956 (2012)</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3,760 (2012)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3,672 (2012)</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,364 (2011)</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3,149 (2012)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3,134 (2012)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>3,654</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3,012 (2012)</td>
<td>28,647</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>23,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,996 (2004)</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,980 (2012)</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2,569 (2012)</td>
<td>5,980</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2,500 (2012)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,454 (2012)</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,161 (2012)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,111 (2012)</td>
<td>3,006</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2,015 (2012)</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,921 (2012)</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,832 (2012)</td>
<td>4,991</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,780 (2008)</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,764 (2011)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,750 (2012)</td>
<td>4,076</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,710 (2012)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,634 (2009)</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>1,624 (2011)</td>
<td>2,405</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,363 (2012)</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,304 (2012)</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1,272 (2012)</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1,190 (2012)</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,020 (2007)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>1,019 (2012)</td>
<td>1,019</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partial Total</td>
<td>170,723</td>
<td>335,383</td>
<td>7,043</td>
<td>72,567</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The category “Reduced as excess to needs” represents circumstances, since entry into force, when a State Party reduces the quantity retained for reasons not related to permitted purposes.
(destroyed) during training or research activities, which is typically the case for most countries, and no other details have been provided about how the mines are being used. Eleven States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Angola, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.

Numerous States Parties have reported decreases in the number of mines retained, but only a few have explained the reductions in their Article 7 reports. Among the states that reduced the number of mines retained without explanation for calendar year 2012 were Brazil (1,326 fewer mines), Czech Republic (83 fewer mines), Denmark (47 fewer mines), Eritrea (71 fewer mines), Iraq (706 fewer mines), Ireland (1 fewer mine), Lithuania (26 fewer mines), the Netherlands (80 fewer mines), Peru (25 fewer mines), Slovenia (2 fewer mines), Spain (8 fewer mines), Sudan (1,938 fewer mines), Turkey (59 fewer mines), Zambia (1,213 fewer mines), and Zimbabwe (50 fewer mines).

Four States Parties have increased the number of their retained mines in the reporting period. Cambodia retained an additional 72 mines cleared in its demining operations. South Africa’s total increased by 11 mines. France consumed 98 mines in training, but also obtained 113 mines from an unknown source. As a result, France’s net total of retained mines went up by 15. Ukraine transferred 605 antipersonnel mines from its stockpiles, after previously declaring the destruction of all its retained mines.

While laudable for their transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty:

- Australia keeps no serviceable detonators for more than 3,100 retained mines in stock;
- Canada reported it has transferred 86 mines from Afghanistan without fuzes;
- Serbia reported that 1,045 of its mines were fuzeless; and
- Mozambique, Eritrea, Germany, and Senegal also reported that some of the mines they retained were inert or fuzeless, or were otherwise incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines.

A total of 21 States Parties have over time used expanded Form D of annual Article 7 reports to voluntarily report additional information on retained mines.64

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

During the reporting period, since September 2012, initial reports were submitted by Finland, Somalia, and South Sudan. Poland’s initial Article 7 report is due by 28 November 2013. Equatorial Guinea and Tuvalu have never submitted initial reports.

As of 16 October 2013, only 53% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar year 2012. Encouragingly, six States Parties (Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Iceland, Somalia, and Swaziland) submitted an annual Article 7 report in 2012 after not turning in a report for two or more years.

Of the 74 States Parties65 which have failed to meet this legal obligation, 59 have failed to submit an annual Article 7 report for two or more years. Among the States Parties that did not submit reports for 2012 are eleven States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations (BiH, Republic of Congo (Congo), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Niger, Palau, Uganda, and Venezuela).

Morocco was the only state not party to submit an Article 7 report for 2012, its sixth voluntary report. In previous years, Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Laos (2010), Mongolia (2007), Palestine (2011), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary reports.

Twelfth Meeting of States Parties

The Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty was held at the UN in Geneva on 3–7 December 2012. A total of 123 states attended: 107 States Parties and observer delegations from 16 states not party to the treaty.64 An ICBL delegation of more than 185 campaigners from 47 countries, including landmine and cluster munition survivors, participated in the meeting.

The meeting’s opening ceremony featured addresses by the foreign ministers of Slovenia and Switzerland, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, as well as the head of the ICRC, Peter Maurer, and the head of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Barbara Haering.

Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, BiH, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, DRC, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Nij, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.

64 The 17 states not party were: China, Egypt, India, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Tonga, United Arab Emirates (UAE), US, and Vietnam.
Nobel Peace laureate Jody Williams and landmine survivor Tun Channereth of Cambodia spoke on behalf of the ICBL.

The Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Matjaž Kovačič, was appointed president of the meeting, taking over from Cambodia’s Prak Sokhion who served as president of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties.

Poland announced that it was about to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty, an action that it completed on 27 December 2012. Palestine declared its strong desire to join the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible.

Five States Parties—Congo, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, and Uganda—announced the completion of their mine clearance programs, fulfilling their Article 5 mine clearance obligations. The decision was made at the meeting to grant mine clearance deadline extension requests to four states: Afghanistan (until 2013), Angola (2017), Cyprus (2016), and Zimbabwe (2015). The ICBL expressed concern at the high number of states needing deadline extensions since 2009 and said that while some requests are justified, many of these states should have been able to finish within the treaty’s 10-year deadline.

Finland announced that its stockpile destruction has begun and should be completed by the end of 2013. The three States Parties that remain in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty for missing their deadlines for destroying stockpiled antipersonnel mines—Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine—all reported on their stockpile destruction efforts.

The main outcome of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties was the Geneva Progress Report, a mid-term assessment of efforts by States Parties to apply the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent state from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

The 29 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty since Landmine Monitor 2012 went to print in September 2012; Poland ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 December 2012.

With the addition of Poland, all 28 EU member states are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, thus completing universalization in the EU. In May 2013, the president of the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties, Ambassador Matjaž Kovačič of Slovenia, urged other regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, African Union, and Pacific Islands Forum to follow the EU’s example by working to achieve universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty by their member states.

The 36 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty includes the Marshall Islands, which is now the last signatory remaining to ratify.

In March–April 2013, ICBL campaigners in 50 countries promoted the Mine Ban Treaty’s universalization as part of the “Lend Your Leg” global action, including in non-signatories Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Georgia, India, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Nepal, Pakistan, South Korea, Sri Lanka, the US, and Vietnam.

Representatives from 17 states not party attended the Mine Ban Treaty’s Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012, including from China, India, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Oman, Palestine, Singapore, United Arab Emirates (UAE), the US, and Vietnam.

Several states indicated in 2012 or 2013 that they are actively considering accession, including Lao PDR, Myanmar, Palestine, and the US. Significant developments during the reporting period regarding universalization of the treaty include:

- Lao PDR stated in December 2012 that it will “continue to work hard” to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty and has “organized a regular review on where we are in terms of readiness to accede”;
- Myanmar informed States Parties in December 2012: “We are reviewing our current status” with respect to the Mine Ban Treaty;
- Palestine declared its strong desire in December 2012 to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible, which it is now eligible to join following its new status at the UN; and
- The US informed States Parties in December 2012 that a decision on the US landmine policy review and on US accession to the Mine Ban Treaty would be announced “soon.”

Global Overview: States Not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Universalizing the ban

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states may no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 161 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 29 acceded.

One country has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since Landmine Monitor 2012 went to print in September 2012; Poland ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 December 2012.

With the addition of Poland, all 28 EU member states are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, thus completing universalization in the EU. In May 2013, the

Annual UN General Assembly resolution

On 3 December 2012, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 67/32 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted

65 The 29 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent state from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.


by a vote of 165 nations in favor, none opposed, and 19 abstentions.69

This was three more votes in favor and one more abstention than the previous vote in 2011.70 Mine Ban Treaty State Party Japan mistakenly abstained from voting on the 2012 resolution. 71 After being absent for nearly every vote since 1997, Saudi Arabia has abstained from voting for the resolution since 2011. 72 Lebanon again abstained from the vote on the 2012 resolution. 73

The annual resolution provides an important opportunity for states outside the Mine Ban Treaty to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines and the objective of its universalization. 74 Many countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 have done so after voting in support of consecutive UNGA resolutions, including Finland. 75

Of the 18 states not party (at the time) that voted in support of Resolution 67/32 on 3 December 2012, eight have voted in favor of every Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1997 (Armenia, Bahrain, Georgia, Oman, Poland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the UAE), while 10 that consistently abstained or were absent previously now vote in favor (Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, and Tonga).

From the resolution’s voting record, the states that could be described as most opposed to the Mine Ban Treaty are the 15 states not party that have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Libya (since 1998), Myanmar, North Korea (since 2007), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan (since 1999), the US, and Vietnam (since 1998). 76

Non-state armed groups
A significant number of NSAGs have indicated their willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines since the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence, showing the strength of the growing international norm. At least 63 NSAGs have committed to halt the use of antipersonnel mines over the past 12 years. 77 The exact number is difficult to determine, because NSAGs may split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. More than 40 NSAGs have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, most recently the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), a Sudanese NSAG, in August 2013. 78

Use of antipersonnel mines

In this reporting period, September 2012 through October 2013, the Monitor has confirmed the new use of antipersonnel mines by forces of the governments of Syria and Myanmar. New use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen is also detailed below. Additionally, it was reported in July 2013 that forces in the internationally unrecognized breakaway area of Nagorno-Karabakh emplaced new antipersonnel mines.

Government Forces

Syria

In late 2011, Syrian government forces began using antipersonnel mines along the borders with Lebanon and Turkey. 79 New landmine use on the Lebanese border was reported in al-Buni, Tel Kakh, Kneissi, Heet, and

Use of antipersonnel mines

Locations of New Use of Antipersonnel Mines: 2012–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use by government forces</th>
<th>Use by NSAGs</th>
<th>Use in Other Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar, Syria</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Yemen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of October 2012, 42 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). Prior to 2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.


Masharh al-Qaa. On 1 November 2011, a Syrian official told the media that “Syria has undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.”

There have been reports of civilian casualties from this mine use. For example, Syrian forces emplaced up to 200 PMN-2 antipersonnel mines before they abandoned a military position in the village of Kharbit al-Jouz, near the Turkish border, which wounded three civilians in October 2012. 82

HRW received an allegation that government forces used antipersonnel mines during the May/June 2013 battle for Qusair, a town on the border with Lebanon. In June, a witness who was helping to evacuate civilians from Qusair informed HRW that civilians were warned against attempting to enter Lebanon without using government checkpoints because routes across the border are affected by government-planted landmines. 83

The ICBL expressed concern at Syria’s “disregard” for the safety of civilians seeking to cross the border to flee the violence in Syria, calling on the Syrian army to stop using mines immediately and clear those already planted. 84 In early 2012, several states condemned Syria for attempting to enter Lebanon without using mines and cluster bombs on civilians: campaigners, “Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border,” The Associated Press, 1 November 2011, www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/assad-troops-plant-land-mines-on-syria-lebanon-border-1.133200.


Email from HRW employee, 5 June 2013.


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Email from HRW employee, 5 June 2013.


Ban Policy

Landmine Monitor 2013

Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, and the US, as well as EU High Representative Catherine Ashton.

Myanmar

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, the Monitor has consistently documented the extensive use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and NSAGs in many areas of Myanmar (Burma). During this reporting period (since September 2012), information available to the Monitor indicates a lower level of new mine use, and use in more limited geographic areas.

The Monitor received an allegation of new use of antipersonnel mines by the Tatmadaw (the name of Myanmar’s Army) in November 2012 in Pa Yeh village in Kachin State which resulted in at least one casualty. 86 In February 2013, cross-border traders in Rakhine State informed the Monitor that Nasaka (Myanmar’s Border Forces) officers had warned them that an operation to lay landmines along the border between Myanmar and Bangladesh would begin soon. A trader from Kha Maung Seik 87 told the Monitor, “I cannot return to my village directly from here because the paths we have been using are now mined. When I arrived still there was no mine; army planted landmines within last two day and Nasaka officer, who gives me permission, told me this over phone; so that I don’t return by using same path.” 88

A news report noted that mines had been planted in the areas near border pillars 37 to 40. Later in February, Border Guard of Bangladesh personnel issued a warning to locals to avoid some border areas due to the presence of mines and increased their surveillance to prevent people from getting near the border. 89

Border Guard Forces (BGF) within Myanmar are militias under the control of the regional Tatmadaw commander, but comprised of various former insurgent organizations. BGF maintains the force structures and areas of operation they had previously as an armed group.

It is not clear how often BGF units are operating under Tatmadaw instructions or are acting independently. BGF have used antipersonnel mines sporadically since that


87 Kha Maung Seik is in north Maungdaw, under Nasaka Sector 2.

88 This information was provided to the Monitor by Bangladeshis nationals living near the border with Myanmar or who regularly cross it for business purposes. All requested anonymity. Naikongchari, February 2013.


Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution requires that the many armed groups within the country’s ethnic areas be placed under national military command. To fulfill this obligation, the former State Peace and Development Council regime demanded in April 2010 that all of the armed groups which had no-hostility pacts with the Tatmadaw be transformed into BGF, or Home Guard Forces in areas where there was no border. The process of transformation required initial disarmament followed by the issuance of government weapons and organization of their troops to be subordinate to regional Tatmadaw military commanders. The requirement led to an increase in tensions across the country and armed conflict, particularly in Kachin State.
time, but no specifically attributed instance of use could be
identified since mid-2012. However, a member of a BGF unit in
Kachin State which was fighting the Kachin Independence
Army (KIA) alongside government forces stated to the Monitor that, if necessary, they could engage in mine warfare.91

Pakistan allegations

There have been a number of reports that may indicate recent use of antipersonnel mines by Pakistani security
forces, although the Monitor cannot verify who laid the
mines, or the precise dates mines were laid. In 2012, newspaper reports in Pakistan began to identify victims of
antipersonnel mines reportedly laid as part of perimeter
defenses at Pakistani Army outposts in Pakistan. In
October 2012, three Frontier Corps officers were injured
after stepping on a landmine that reportedly had been
laid by the security forces near a military checkpoint
on the border with Afghanistan in Bazai Tehsil of Mohmand
Agency.92 In November 2012, one civilian was killed and
another injured by a mine reportedly laid by the security
forces near the Afghan border in the Dattakhel area of
North Waziristan.93 As recently as April 2013, Pakistan
has stated that it has not laid mines since the 2001–2002
escalation on the Pakistan-India border.94

Other Areas

Nagorno-Karabakh

In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief General
Moyes Hakobian was reported to be meetings that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel
landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of
contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.”95

General Hakobian said the use was aimed at preventing
sabotage attacks by Azerbaijani troops. In a 4 September 2013 response to an ICBL letter seeking clarification, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh did not deny the allegations and said that “due to the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan... today we are not in a position to refrain from using AP [antipersonnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of
contact.” He also wrote that “these mines are neither
[antipersonnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of contact nor at the extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances and ceasing
any possible military aggression against us.”96

Non-state armed groups

Since January 2012, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
that fall under the Mine Ban Treaty’s definition of antipersonnel mines in at least eight countries: States
Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Thailand, Tunisia, and
Yemen, and states not party Myanmar, Pakistan, and
Syria. This is an increase in the number of countries previously cited by the Monitor and is more countries
than was reported in the past five years.97

In Afghanistan, there has been extensive use of victim-activated IEDs by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the
Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, which are opposing the Kabul government and NATO/International Security
Assistance Force forces. The UN Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported a steep rise in incidents
cased by pressure-plate IEDs that had been planted on
roads routinely used by civilians in 2012. However, in the
first six months of 2013 UNAMA recorded a decrease in
incidents caused by victim-activated IEDs from the same
period in 2012. UNAMA stated that the majority of IEDs used in Afghanistan now are victim-activated IEDs,
most of which utilize pressure plates.98 UNAMA has
called on armed groups in Afghanistan to prohibit their
members from using pressure-plate IEDs.99

In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia,
FARC) continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on
a regular basis. FARC is probably the most prolific user
of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere
in the world. Colombian NSAGs lay mines near their
campsites or bases, on paths that lead to areas of strategic
importance (such as to their bases, or to main transit
routes), and to protect caches of explosives, weapons,
medicine, and clothing. In 2012, FARC was accused of
laying mines near destroyed infrastructure to prevent or
delay its reconstruction.100 NSAGs, predominantly FARC,
also plant antipersonnel mines in or near coca fields to

91 Interview with a member of a Kachin BGF, Yangon, February 2013.


97 Previous reports found NSAGs used mines in at least six countries (Landmine Monitor 2012), four countries (2011), six countries (2010), seven countries (2009), and nine countries (2008).

98 In 2012, UNAMA confirmed 298 incidents causing 913 civilian casualties from pressure-plate IEDs that had been planted on roads routinely used by civilians. This was an enormous increase from 141 casualties in 2011. However, in the first six months of 2013, UNAMA documented 227 victim-activated IED casualties, a decrease from the same

called on the Taliban to publicly reaffirm its 1998 decree banning mine use. See, statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the
on=submit&p=1&y=1999&p_type=lm&taxp__report=afghanistan&pp=section,.

prevent eradication efforts, which caused casualties among coca eradicators. Government forces continued to recover mines from the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilla-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).

In Myanmar, at least 17 NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines since 1999, including the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Karenni Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A). For the second year in a row, there was a decrease in reports of mine use by NSAGs as the government engaged almost all the groups in the country in a peace dialogue. In March 2013, two Tatmadaw soldiers were killed and four injured when one reportedly stepped on a landmine while patrolling a pipeline in Namtu township in northern Shan State. It is not known which group laid the mine.103 In February 2013, four Tatmadaw soldiers were injured reportedly by a mine laid by the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army in Tanyang township in northern Shan State.104 In January 2013, a village reportedly stepped on a landmine in Kaukriek Township that was allegedly laid by the DKBA.105 In Mone Township, villagers stated that some incidents in their area were from newly laid mines, but they were unsure who was responsible.106 In November 2012, a villager in Mone Township stated that the KNLA was still using landmines and they had to be careful whenever they walked near their bases.107

In Pakistan, the government has reported that antipersonnel mines have been used throughout the country, and attributes the use to “terrorists.”108 The Monitor has reported a large number of casualties, apparently from newly laid mines, in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province), where the Pakistan Army and security forces have been engaged in armed conflict with Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Baloch insurgents. In August 2012, one civilian was killed by a mine reported to have been laid by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in Safi Tehsil of Mohmand agency in FATA.109 In October 2012, an electrical repairman was injured by a mine laid near the base of a power pylon he was repairing in Miranshah in North Waziristan,110 and another electrical repairman was killed by a mine laid near the base of a power pylon he was repairing in July 2013 in the Machh area of Bolan district in Baluchistan.111 Several other civilians were killed or injured in what appeared to be incidents of new use by unknown perpetrators in Dera Bughti and Kohlu district of Baluchistan in August and September 2012; in Saafi Tehsil of Mohmand agency in FATA in November 2012; in the Tirah valley in Khyber Agency in FATA in April and July of 2013; and in the Shahwazan area of Kurram Agency in FATA in August 2013.112

In Syria, anti-regime rebels have apparently used antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs. Rebels reportedly used antipersonnel landmines in the fighting at Qusair, which fell to government forces in early June 2013.113 According to the Associated Press, in the year prior to the defeat at Qusair “rebels holding the town had heavily fortified it with tunnels, mine fields, and booby traps.”114 According to one witness from the town, the Syrian military removed mines from around Qusair and cleared roads after the town fell.115 In August 2012, a Syrian rebel told the media that they intended to re-use government antipersonnel mines that have been

removed from the ground. The ICBL called on the Free Syrian Army and all forces involved in the conflict in Syria to forbid their combatants from using landmines.

A July 2013 media report featured a rebel engineer who designed a victim-activated explosive device.

In Thailand, an insurgent group in southern Thailand has continued sporadic use of victim-activated IEDs. On 25 September 2012, a government employee clearing brush from the side of a highway was injured when he stepped on a victim-activated IED containing about one kilogram of explosive. On 10 September 2012, a man who stopped his vehicle on a road was injured when he stepped on a victim-activated IED on the road berm. Both were assumed to have been laid by the southern insurgents. This follows a pattern of use observed by the Monitor since 2009.

In Tunisia, in a new development a number of soldiers and national guardsmen have reportedly been killed or injured by “landmine explosions” since April 2013 during ongoing operations by the Tunisian military against Islamist rebel forces in the region of Jebel Al-Cha‘anby in Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate, an area on the Algerian border. The Monitor has received reports of both military casualties and a civilian casualty from April to September 2013. In early May, the Ministry of Defense stated that the mines causing injuries in April were homemade mines laid in a “professional manner” and were constructed from plastic with a chemical initiator, making detection difficult. On 6 May 2013, two more soldiers were killed in a blast roughly nine kilometers away from where the previous two explosions reported in April had occurred. A defense ministry spokesperson was quoted as explaining that “the mines that exploded were made of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and flammable materials that can easily explode when exposed to heat.”

In Yemen, there were credible reports of use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Sa‘ada governorate and Abyan governorate in 2011–2012. It is unclear if antipersonnel mines are still being used as of October 2013. In its 2013 Article 7 Report, Yemen stated that the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) could fulfill its mine action plans in Sa‘ada and Abyan in 2012 because “the security situation became much better than 2011.” But the report also states that “YEMAC face new challenge in Sa‘ada governorate after insurgences war. New kinds of mines made manually by insurgencies and planted in Sa‘ada, some of them demined by the insurgencies and they missed others…lot of mine accidents happened and many of people killed and injured.”

Since June 2004, the government of Yemen has been fighting rebel forces led by Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi in the mountainous northern Sa‘ada governorate, which has seen occasional reports and allegations of the use of antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs.

Hajijah governorate, which borders Sa‘ada governorate and where Houthi rebels have been fighting local Sunni tribes backed by the government, has also suffered casualties from landmines. In March 2012, a local representative said that Houthi rebels had planted approximately 3,000 landmines in Kushar and Ahim in Hajja governorate. In September 2013, a representative of the district of Al-Asha bordering Sa‘ada governorate told media that Houthi rebels were planting landmines “in the mountainous areas under their control.”

According to media reports in June 2012, the governor’s office in Zinjibar (the capital of Abyan governorate) said that engineering teams have removed some landmines from around the city and the nearby city of Jaar. Government forces regained control of both cities in May 2012, a year after they were occupied by Ansar al-Sharia, an armed organization linked to al-Qaeda. Photographs of weapons recovered by deminers from Ansar al-Sharia positions after the withdrawal, which HRW examined in October 2012, included antipersonnel mines planted by the Assad army and we will plant these mines for...
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mines, antivehicle mines, explosive booby-traps, and IEDs.127

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Mali, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.128 Thirty-nine of these have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including three that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.129 A majority of major producers from the 1970s to 1990s are among those states that have stopped manufacturing and joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Monitor identifies 12 states as potential producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not actively producing mines but reserve the right to do so. Active production may be ongoing in as few as four countries: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.

China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed the Monitor that most of its mine production has been shut down, but a small number of antipersonnel mines are produced by the military for research purposes.130

NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Myanmar, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen produce antipersonnel mines, mostly in the form of victim-activated IEDs. In 2012, the Colombian Army reported that FARC was producing non-detectable antipersonnel mines.131

Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has not conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines.

While the Monitor has reported for the past decade that the global trade in antipersonnel mines had consisted of a low level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers, the abrupt appearance of mines in Sudan and Yemen raises the specter that some form of market for antipersonnel mines exists.

In Yemen, the appearance of East German PPM-2 antipersonnel mines, in connection with two allegations of new use, suggests that a new supply channel is in place given that Yemen did not declare the type to be in stockpile or as part of existing mine contamination. PPM-2 antipersonnel mines are known to be present in Somalia, across the Gulf of Aden.

In Sudan, the appearance in the past two years of significant numbers of No. 4 antipersonnel mines with Farsi-language markings also seemingly indicates that stockpiles of antipersonnel mines are available to the various actors engaged in the conflict in the southern provinces of Sudan.

At least 10 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including seven landmine producers, have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they now have stopped exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

Stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

The Monitor estimates that of the 36 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, as many as 32 stockpile a collective total of about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Four states not party have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Palestine, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga.

127 The Monitor identified Soviet-made POMZ-2 and PMN antipersonnel mines among unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) recovered in Abyan in an Agence France-Presse photograph taken in Abyan in June 2012. See, “Mines and weapons are laid on the ground as a de-mining operation gets underway in the southern province of Abyan,” Agence France-Presse, 20 June 2012, www.google.com/hostednews/afp/sldshow/ALexqMqgjULUazCVYyYzHbKz-DzH6HtKZEqTQdocid-CNG.1978737261b17134b25989462d454.5c6. index=0&hl=en. PMN antipersonnel mines were also identified in a Yemen Ministry of Defense photograph published by Reuters showing explosive weapons seized “from positions of Al-Qaeda militants in Abyan” in June 2012. See, “Yemen says Islamists retreat from southern town,” Reuters, 17 June 2012, www.trust.org/item/2012/07/yemen-says-islamists-retreat-from-southern-town/. In a personal blog entry on mine clearance in Abyan, a Yemen Observer journalist reported in July 2012 that YEMAC had found and destroyed 12 antipersonnel mines as well as 22 antivehicle mines and 347 booby-traps. See, Majid al-Kibsi, “Landmines threaten IDPs return to Abyan,” 27 July 2012, m-kibsi.blogspot.ca/2012/07/landmines-threaten-ids-return-to-abyan.html.

128 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has been a producer.

129 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 35 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.

130 Emails from Lai Haiyang, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2012 and 7 September 2011.
States not party that may stockpile antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Korea, North</th>
<th>Pakistan</th>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>China</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Georgia</td>
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<td>India</td>
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<td>Iran</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Oman</td>
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It is not certain that all of these states stockpile antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.

The vast majority of global stockpiles belong to China (estimated 110 million) and Russia (estimated 24.5 million). Based on 2002 data, the Monitor has cited a US stockpile of 10.4 million antipersonnel mines, but the Monitor was informed in 2010 that the US stockpile may be considerably smaller now. Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated six million) and India (estimated four to five million).

Prolific mine use during 2011 by forces of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the discovery of hundreds of thousands of stockpiled mines have shown how Libya’s previous denial of possessing a mine stockpile was patently untrue. The National Transitional Council pledged in 2011 to destroy all stocks of mines under its control.

Destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely occurs as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

Non-state armed groups

Few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago due to the halt in trade and production and due to destruction of stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty. A few NSAGs have access to mine stocks from former regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), while others produce their own improvised mines or acquire mines by removing them from minefields. In states not party, NSAGs have also been known to capture antipersonnel mines, steal them from arsenals, or purchase them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria. The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the protocol gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2013, a total of 100 states were party to Amended Protocol II. Two states joined the protocol since the publication of Landmine Monitor 2012: Kuwait (24 May 2013) and Zambia (25 September 2013).

Only 10 of the 100 states that are party to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and, while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol II, there are still 10 states that are party to the original protocol that have not ratified the amended protocol: Cuba, Djibouti, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.132

A total of 19 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also producers of antipersonnel mines.

States that stockpile antipersonnel mines but are not party to CCW protocols133

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Kyrgyzstan</th>
<th>Singapore</th>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>Bahrain</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korea, North</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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Italics indicate states that also produce antipersonnel mines.

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132 Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Togo, and Uganda are party to the Mine Ban Treaty and are thus bound to the higher standard.

133 The countries listed in the table are also not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
**Summary of Progress**

As of October 2013, 59 states and four other areas were confirmed to be mine-affected. Of the 59 affected states, 35 were party to the Mine Ban Treaty. A further seven States Parties and one state not party had either suspected or residual mine contamination.

Five States Parties formally declared completion of clearance of all known mined areas in 2012: the Republic of the Congo (Congo), Denmark, Gambia, Jordan, and Uganda. In May 2013, Greece reported that its verification efforts in a previously mined area in Rhodes were completed in March 2013. Also in May, States Parties Bhutan and Venezuela announced that all known mined areas had been cleared and each expected to table a formal declaration of completion at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013. Hungary reported in October 2013 that it planned to declare fulfillment of its Article 5 treaty obligations to clear all known mined areas at the Thirteenth Meeting following the release of a mined area on the border with Croatia in September 2013. In addition to the States Parties, an other area, Taiwan, announced in June 2013 that it had cleared all known mined areas by the end of 2012.

Four States Parties submitted Article 5 deadline Extension Requests in 2012 that were subsequently approved at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties: Afghanistan, Angola, Cyprus, and Zimbabwe. A further seven States Parties—Chad, Germany, Mozambique, Niger, Serbia, Sudan, and Turkey—submitted deadline extension requests in 2013 for approval at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013. Germany and Niger submitted requests in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of a state’s Article 5 deadline.

In 2012, mine action programs released at least 281km² of mined areas through clearance and survey, in addition to 245km² of battle areas, of which 78km² were cluster munition-contaminated areas. In 2011, mine action programs cleared at least 190km² of mined areas and some 285km² of battle areas, including 55km² of areas contaminated by cluster munitions.

### Mine-Affected States and Other Areas

As of October 2013, 59 states and four other areas were confirmed to be mine-affected, as set out in the table on the following page.

**Mali** is believed to be contaminated by antivehicle mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and explosive remnants of war (ERW) only. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) set up a presence in Mali in September 2012 and reported around 50 people had been killed and injured by landmines between March and December 2012. As of March 2013, however, UNMAS could only point to contamination by antivehicle mines in northern Mali’s Kidal region.

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1 Guinea-Bissau completed clearance of all known mined areas in 2011 but did not make an official declaration of completion until December 2012. The Monitor considers Guinea-Bissau to have fulfilled its Article 5 treaty obligations in 2011 and is therefore not on this list.


3 The term “clearance of mined areas” refers to physical clearance to humanitarian standards of an area to a specified depth using manual deminers, mine detection dogs, and/or machines to detect and destroy (or remove for later destruction) all explosive devices found.

4 A “battle area” is an area of combat affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW), but which does not contain mines. The term “ERW” includes both unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). “Battle area clearance” (BAC) may, under certain circumstances, involve only a visual inspection of a suspected hazardous area (SHA) by professional clearance personnel, but is more often an instrument-assisted search of ground to a set depth, for example using detectors.

5 “Note to correspondents on UNMAS action in Mali,” UN Information Service, Geneva, 22 February 2013.

6 Email from Charles Frisby, Programme Manager, UNMAS Mali, 13 March 2013.
Mine-affected states and other areas with confirmed mined areas as of October 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Bhutan**</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>United Kingdom*</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Other areas are indicated by italics; States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.
** Bhutan and Venezuela have unofficially declared in 2013 that they have completed their Article 5 obligations. Their official Declaration of Completion is expected in December 2013 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties.

Affected states not party

Twenty-four (41%) of the 59 states believed to be affected by landmines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Palestine, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

Mine-affected “other areas”

Four other areas not internationally recognized as states were also mine-affected as of October 2013: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

States and other areas with suspected or residual mine contamination

In addition to states in which mine contamination is confirmed, a further eight states—of which all but one (Oman) are party to the Mine Ban Treaty—have either suspected or residual mine contamination, as set out in the table below. These States Parties have an obligation to make “every effort” to identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines and then to clear any that they find. In cases when they are unable to complete this work by the expiration of their Article 5 deadline, they must request an extension in order to remain in compliance with the treaty.

Extent of contamination

The Monitor does not publish a global table of the estimated size of mine contamination by state because it believes that many of the estimates cited by states are far higher than the true extent of contamination. Instead, an order of magnitude for contamination as of October 2013 is given in the table below, which lists states with very heavy (more than 100km²) and heavy contamination (10–100km²).

Mine Clearance in 2012

There are continuing problems in accurately counting true mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), and land release by survey, in large part due to the poor quality of record-keeping and reporting. However, some states have made strides in improving their data collection and transparency. For example, states as well as certain demining operators sometimes report cancellation by non-technical survey or reduction by technical survey as clearance. Furthermore, despite reported release of large areas of land, conducting general survey of possibly contaminated areas does not constitute land release, according to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
The Monitor believes at least 281 km$^2$ of mined areas were cleared by 40 mine action programs in 2012 (compared with 190 km$^2$ in 2011), with the destruction of more than 239,000 antipersonnel mines and almost 9,300 antivehicle mines. The global clearance figure is conservative and understates the extent of clearance due to the fact that several states do not report while others do not disaggregate clearance figures.\footnote{Far greater land release is achieved through cancellation by non-technical survey or reduction by technical survey than by physical clearance. Some states do not disaggregate clearance from cancellation by non-technical survey or reduction by technical survey. Where states have not disaggregated clearance data, the Monitor has not included their reported figures.}

The largest total clearance of mined areas was achieved in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Sri Lanka, which together accounted for 62% of recorded clearance.

To promote more efficient release of land, amendments to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) approved by the IMAS Review Board in April 2013 remove General Assessment and set out to simplify and clarify standards on Land Release, Non-Technical Survey, and Technical Survey. The amendments seek to make clear distinctions between suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and provide more guidance on use of evidence to avoid inflating estimates of contamination where evidence does not justify it. They also seek to clarify basic principles of technical survey, the distinctions between area reduction and clearance, and the requirement to apply “all reasonable effort” in use of evidence to plan and interpret the results of technical survey.

### Battle Area Clearance in 2012

In 2012, at least 167 km$^2$ of mined battle area was reportedly cleared, destroying in the process more than 310,400 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO) as compared to at least 233 km$^2$ of mined battle area reported as cleared in 2011.

### Mined Area BAC in major clearance programs in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/area</th>
<th>BAC in 2012 (km$^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>54.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>51.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>10.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>7.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>5.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties are indicated in bold, other areas in italics.

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### Estimated extent of mine contamination in affected states as of October 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States with very heavy contamination (more than 100 km$^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (Western Sahara)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States with heavy contamination (10–100 km$^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (Somaliland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties are indicated in bold, other areas in italics.

### Mine clearance in major mine action programs in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/area</th>
<th>Area cleared in 2012 (km$^2$)</th>
<th>Area cleared in 2011 (km$^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.
Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Obligations

In 2012, five States Parties formally declared fulfillment of their Article 5 obligations: Congo, Denmark, Gambia, Jordan, and Uganda.

States Parties reporting completion of their Mine Ban Treaty clearance obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Year of reported compliance</th>
<th>Article 5 deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi*</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador**</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece***</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan****</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Burundi followed its initial declaration of completion in 2011 with reports in May 2012 and May 2013 that it still had suspected mined areas to release.

** Date of completion of demining program (prior to entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty).

*** Greece made a formal declaration of completion in 2009 and further released a suspected area on the island of Rhodes in 2013.

**** Djibouti and Jordan are believed to have residual contamination.

In May 2013, Greece, which initially declared completion of clearance in 2009, reported that it had concluded its verification efforts concerning possible contamination in an area on the island of Rhodes on 8 March 2013, and that no contamination had been found.13

In total, 24 States Parties have formally reported completion of their Article 5 obligations since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force, as set out in the table above.

In addition to these 24 States Parties, three others are expected to announce completion at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013. Bhutan and Venezuela announced in May 2013 that they had completed their mine clearance obligations and intended to make a formal declaration of completion at the Thirteenth Meeting. Hungary reported in October 2013 that, in cooperation with Croatia, it had completed both survey and clearance activities of its suspected mined area by September 2013, and expected to declare fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations at the Thirteenth Meeting.14

States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires each State Party to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. Ensuring full compliance with these mine clearance obligations is one of the greatest challenges faced by States Parties to the treaty.

Forty-three States Parties, as set out in the following table, were confirmed or suspected to be affected by antipersonnel mines as of October 2013, and therefore had obligations under Article 5 of the treaty.

Seven states listed above have not declared that they have (or still have) Article 5 obligations, but the Monitor believes they may be mine-affected, and thus their fulfillment of their treaty obligations may be in doubt: Djibouti, Jordan, Moldova, Montenegro, Namibia, Venezuela, and Venezuela.

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14 Email from Zita Huszay, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, 15 October 2013.

15 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

16 Montenegro reported to the media in November 2007 that it had completed clearance of mines on its territory. Its Article 7 report for 2008 stated, “There are no areas under Montenegro’s jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.” However, Montenegro still had to survey a mountainous area on its borders with BiH and Croatia to clarify if the contamination that affects the Croatian side of the border also affects Montenegro. By October 2012, Montenegro had not officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations.

17 Despite a statement by Namibia that it was in full compliance with Article 5 given at the Second Review Conference, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.
States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Bhutanb</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Jordan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Hungaryb</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6 Bhutan, Hungary, and Venezuela have informally announced completion of their Article 5 obligations. A formal declaration of completion is expected in December 2013.

Palau, and the Philippines.19

**Burundi** had previously declared completion of clearance of all known mined areas at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November 2011,20 but in May 2012 reported that it still had suspected mined areas to release.21 In May 2013, Burundi confirmed its previous statements and requested assistance in surveying and clearing the suspected areas, if needed, in order to meet its Article 5 obligations by 1 April 2014.22

Jordan officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations on 24 April 2012 and submitted its formal declaration of completion to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012.23 However, Jordan acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas where landmines have been emplaced.”24 Verification and clearance continued in 2012 in the Jordan Valley as well as along the northern border with Syria. Jordan said it expected verification efforts to continue a further two years.25 Since then it has suspended verification work on its northern border in light of the conflict in Syria.

**Palau** submitted an Article 7 report in 2011 in which it declared for the first time that it had areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory. In its 2012 Article 7 report, Palau reported suspected contamination in the Umubrogol Mountains (on Bloody Nose Ridge).26 In May 2013, Palau reported that two mine clearance operators were working in Palau to clear UXO, including land and sea mines, but that it faced a “bottle neck from the government permitting bodies due to lack of Standard Operating Procedures and the technical knowledge to review and approve clearance methodologies.”27

Discovery of previously unknown mined areas after deadlines have passed

Germany, Hungary, and Niger have found themselves in the exceptional circumstance whereby they have reported


the discovery of new suspected or confirmed mined areas following expiry of their initial clearance deadlines. Germany and Hungary reported new mined areas in 2011 and Niger in 2012. All three states had initial Article 5 clearance deadlines in 2009.

At the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012, States Parties committed to a process in situations where States Parties discover previously unknown mined areas under their jurisdiction or control after their clearance deadline has passed. States Parties agreed that in such cases they would:

- immediately inform all States Parties of such a discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in the mined area as soon as possible;
- submit an extension request that is as short as possible, but not longer than 10 years, if it is believed that destruction could not occur before the next Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference, whichever falls earlier; and
- report on the location of all mined areas in their Article 7 reporting and on the status of programs for their destruction, as well as provide relevant updates at meetings of the Standing Committees, States Parties, and Review Conferences.28

Both Niger and Germany have applied for two-year deadline extensions in 2013, while Hungary has reported that it completed clearance of the mined area in question by September 2013. The procedure would apply to four other states that the Monitor believes have residual or suspected mine contamination, including Djibouti, Jordan, Moldova, and Namibia.

**States Parties and Article 5 deadline extensions**

Significant challenges remain in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty’s survey and clearance obligations; the number of Article 5 deadline extension requests that have been made far exceed the number of States Parties that have declared completion of their Article 5 obligations. In accordance with Article 5, states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years under Article 5.3.

However, in accordance with Action #27 of the Nairobi Action Plan adopted at the First Review Conference in 2004, States Parties committed to “strive to ensure that few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension.”29 The Cartagena Action Plan adopted at the Second Review Conference in 2009 went further, stating that extensions should only be needed “due to exceptional circumstances.”30 These are clear indications that States Parties believe that deadline extensions should be the exception and not the rule. Considering the high percentage of states granted, or seeking, deadline extensions—some for the second and third time—as well as the number that will likely need extensions in the future, the ICBL has encouraged States Parties to act with greater urgency in fulfilling their clearance obligations, and has noted that the trend toward requesting extensions has been "disappointing.”29

As of October 2013, 35 States Parties in total have requested deadline extensions since 2009,31 of which only six have reported completion of their Article 5 obligations: Congo, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Uganda.32 Four States Parties have requested multiple extensions since 2009: Chad (third extension pending decision), Zimbabwe (three extensions), Denmark (two extensions), and Mozambique (second extension pending decision).

Of the 35 States Parties with outstanding Article 5 clearance obligations (not including those States Parties deemed by the Monitor to have suspected or residual risk of contamination), a highly disappointing 83% (29) have current deadline extensions in place.33 Seven States Parties are deemed not to be on track with their extension requests: BiH, Chad, Croatia, Ecuador, Senegal, Thailand, and the UK. The progress in an additional eight States Parties is unclear: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Cyprus, Peru, Tajikistan, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

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32 With entry into force of the treaty in March 1999, the first clearance deadlines were March 2009. The 35 States Parties are: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, DRC, Ecuador, Eritrea, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Seven of the States Parties listed above have submitted Extension Requests for consideration at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2013.
33 This list does not include Venezuela which has informally declared completion and is expected to make a formal declaration in December 2013.
34 Contaminated States Parties still within their initial deadlines include: Burundi (2014); Ethiopia (2015); Iraq (2016); South Sudan (2017); Somalia (2020); and Bhutan and Hungary (completion declaration pending).
An overview of the status of Article 5 deadline extensions as of October 2013*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period</th>
<th>New deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2013</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1 April 2012</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 April 2017</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 January 2018</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1 March 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>No change since extension requested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 January 2020</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad**</td>
<td>1 November 2009</td>
<td>14 months (1st extn.), then 3 years (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2014</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 March 2020</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1 November 2011</td>
<td>14 months</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1 July 2013</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1 July 2016</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>22 months (1st extn.) then 18 months (2nd extn.)</td>
<td>1 July 2012</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1 November 2012</td>
<td>26 months</td>
<td>1 January 2015</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 October 2017</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1 February 2015</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1 November 2011</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>1 January 2012</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan***</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1 May 2012</td>
<td>Completed but residual contamination reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2011</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 January 2016</td>
<td>On track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique**</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>1 May 2010</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1 March 2017</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>7 years</td>
<td>1 March 2016</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1 April 2010</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 April 2020</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>9.5 years</td>
<td>1 November 2018</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1 August 2009</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1 August 2012</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>1 March 2019</td>
<td>Not on track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1 October 2014</td>
<td>Completed clearance; declaration of completion pending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>6 years</td>
<td>1 March 2015</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>22 months (1st extn.) then 2 years (2nd extn.) then 2 years (3rd extn.)</td>
<td>1 January 2015</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table does not include the five States Parties that have submitted their first ever deadline Extension Requests for decision at the forthcoming Mine Ban Treaty Meeting of States Parties in December 2013: Germany, Serbia, Sudan, Niger, and Turkey.
** New extension requested, decision pending.
*** Verification surveys reported as ongoing.


Many of the States Parties granted extensions to their Article 5 deadlines have since made only limited progress and risk not being able to complete the plans they put forward along with their extension requests (see table). The ICBL has called on states that have fallen significantly behind the benchmarks they laid out in their extension requests to submit revised plans to States Parties.35

Congo, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Uganda formally declared that they have completed their Article 5 obligations in 2012. Venezuela announced

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completion in May 2013 and expected to make a formal Declaration of Completion at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013.36

Afghanistan

Afghanistan’s 2012 Article 5 extension request, based on data as of the end of November 2011, estimated total contamination at 617km². By the end of 2012, cancellation through survey and clearance had reduced that figure to 558.6km².37

At the start of 2013, Afghanistan estimated that, out of total ERW contamination of 558.6km², it had 270.7km² affected by antipersonnel mines that also included 253.3km² affected by antivehicle mines, and a further 34.7km² by other forms of ordnance, including 7.6km² by cluster munition remnants. Survey in 2012 added 204 hazards totaling 15.4km² of mine and battle area hazards to the database, but also resulted in the cancellation of 258 suspected hazards totaling 19.6km². As a result of clearance and survey, the extent of mine contamination was nearly 12% less at the end of 2012 than a year earlier and total ERW contamination was down 9%.

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted in 2012, Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 March 2023. Afghanistan’s extension request provided for clearing the entirety of its ERW contamination, including 4,151 antipersonnel minefields covering 306.8km², 1,319 antivehicle minefields covering 253.9km², and 191 ERW contaminated areas covering 56.2km².38 The ICBL noted that the request was among the most comprehensive requests yet submitted, but also concluded that the workplan represented a best-case scenario and faced a range of challenges including donor support, security, and political uncertainties.39

The funding challenges became particularly evident in 2013. Despite rising productivity in 2012, the program embarked on the first year of implementing the extension request with the equivalent of about 20km² of clearance unfunded. As a result, many implementing partners were working with lower levels of manpower than in the previous year and with less capacity than was called for in the workplan.40

Angola

In December 2012, States Parties granted Angola an extension of its Article 5 deadline for five years through 1 January 2018. In May 2013, Angola reported that there were 1,110 SHAs and 965 confirmed hazards covering a combined 1,246,700km², an area considered widely inaccurate by all stakeholders. Ten of the 18 provinces have at least 80 SHAs, indicating the extent and high level of remaining contamination, although half of the remaining contamination is in the four provinces of Moxico, Cuando Kubango, Bié, and Kwanza Sul.

It is planned that a national non-technical survey begun in 2011 and a mapping project that started in May 2013 would clarify the extent of the contamination by 2016. These would be used to establish a new baseline for both the planning and the submission of a second extension request.41 Angola has stated that it already projects it will need more than 10 years beyond 2018.42 Meanwhile, international NGOs and the National Institute of Demining continue clearance operations.

Argentina

At the Second Review Conference in Cartagena, Colombia in 2009, Argentina said it was unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it did not have access to the Malvinas Islands due to the “illegal occupation” by the UK. Argentina said for this reason it had no other choice than to request an extension to its clearance deadline43 which was set for 1 January 2020.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In 2012, as in all the years since it received the extension to its Article 5 deadline in 2008, BiH fell far short of its land release targets as contained in its Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019.44 It released a total of 77.24km², just 43% of the projected total of 179.40km². As a result, four years into its extension period, BiH had achieved only 70% of the land release planned for this period and barely a quarter of the planned clearance.

In accordance with the 10-year extension request granted in 2008, BiH is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019.

Funding presents the main obstacle to progress in view of a downward trend in donor support and BiH’s inability to generate the additional funding that the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC)

39 ICBL Critique on Afghanistan Article 5 Extension Request, undated but March 2012.
40 Interview with Mohammed Sedig Rashid, Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan, and Abigail Hartley, UNMAS, in Kabul, 19 May 2013; and interviews with implementing partners, Kabul, 15–24 May 2013.
expected to come from domestic sources. In 2012, BHMAC reported a shortfall in domestic funding of BAM139.55 million (US$26.1 million), or about half the budget projected for that year. In December 2012, the government said it would seek additional domestic sources for funding and would ask the European Union (EU) to give mine action more momentum, but as of April 2013, the financial outlook remained uncertain.46

Cambodia

Cambodia’s baseline survey of 124 mine-affected districts completed in 2012 found a total of 1,043km² affected to some degree by antipersonnel mines.47 The Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA) says the figure cannot be compared with the estimate in its Article 5 deadline extension request that 648km² needed full clearance, the CMAA to plan a joint demining operation.50 Vihear and assigned the Thailand Mine Action Centre and Thai joint working group agreed in principle in 2012 to mine clearance in 2012, with the 53.66km² of land cleared representing an increase of 45% from the previous year and of 75% from two years earlier, although operators recorded substantially lower numbers of items cleared.51

The outlook for donor support, however, is uncertain, particularly after 2015. So does the government’s willingness to increase funding for humanitarian mine action. An additional complication for Cambodia has been heightened insecurity along its border with Thailand, including cross-border clashes in April 2011, which have led Cambodian authorities to block demining activity in some heavily-contaminated border areas.48 A Cambodian-Thai joint working group agreed in principle in 2012 to clear landmines from a contested border area in Prey Vihear and assigned the Thailand Mine Action Centre and the CMAA to plan a joint demining operation.52

Chad

Demining operations started in August 2000 but stopped at the end of December 2005 due to lack of funding. There has since been only intermittent clearance of mined areas and much of it poorly documented. The mine action program since 2008 has suffered from a lack of international funding; weak government oversight; and mismanagement within the National Demining Center (Centre National de Déménage), resulting in no demining until October 2012 when the EU provided funding to the Mines Advisory Group (MAG).53

In 2012, Chad completed a survey of the northern and eastern parts of the country and, on 2 May 2013, submitted a third extension request that asked for an additional five years until 2019.54

In May 2013, Chad presented a new mine action strategy for 2013–2017. The UNDP technical advisor to Chad left his post at the end of May 2013 when his contract expired.55 As of September 2013, no replacement had been announced and it is certain if the government of Chad and UNDP planned to recruit an international technical advisor.

Chile

In 2011, Chile was granted an eight-year extension of its Article 5 deadline until 1 March 2020. Chile cited weather, the remote locations of mined areas in high altitudes, the difficult terrain, and the different types and conditions of the mines as the main reasons for needing the additional time.56

While the pace of clearance slowed in 2012, reportedly due to two earthquakes and severe flooding, there is some optimism that Chile may be able to release the remaining 15.24km² of contaminated area before 2020.57


51 Chad, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request (Third Extension Request), 2 May 2013, pp. 2–3, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/clearing-mined-areas/arts_extensions/Chad_Article_5_request_received_2013-05-02_COMPILEDF.pdf.

52 Email from Emmanuel Sauvage, former UNDP Technical Advisor, 27 June 2013.


Colombia

In December 2010, States Parties granted Colombia a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline to 2020. Colombia’s extension request predicted that all mined areas would be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.” Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan was a central component of the extension request. Fifteen of 660 possibly mine-affected municipalities in five of Colombia’s 32 departments, with contamination covering an estimated 15km², were deemed priorities for clearance by 2013.57 So far, Colombia has been far behind these targets.

Colombia did not include an operational plan for 2014–2020 in its extension request because of the lack of information on contamination and the uncertainty of the role and capacity of NGOs. In 2011–2012, the laws and standards were passed to allow NGOs to clear mines, and HALO Trust, the only international NGO to receive accreditation, began clearance in September 2013. Based on the decision of States Parties in approving Colombia’s extension request, Colombia is due to submit an operational plan for 2014–2020 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2013.58

Croatia

Croatia released a total of 67.28km² of mine-affected land in 2012, slightly less than the previous year (70.36km²).59 and in May 2013, Croatia reported it had reduced the suspected mine contaminated area by 19.4km² through clearance (9.2km²) and survey.60 Croatia has consistently failed to meet the targets set out in its extension request in the five years since it was granted. In 2012, Croatia released 67.28km² compared with 122km² projected in the extension request and further widening the existing significant gap between projected and actual land release since the extension came into effect. By the end of 2012, Croatia had released 312.67km² of the target of 457km² set out in its extension request—a shortfall of 154.33km².61

This widening gap accentuated the challenge Croatia faces in meeting its revised Article 5 clearance deadline of 1 March 2019. The prospects for reversing this trend appear uncertain, which is further complicated by funding constraints.

The Croatian Mine Action Centre’s (CROMAC) initial work plan for 2012–2014 was never considered by the government because of elections and a change of leadership. By July 2013, CROMAC said it was finalizing a new three-year plan for 2013–2015, which it expected the government to adopt by the end of the year.62 In the meantime, a demining plan for 2013 provided for release of 68.08km², including 27.23km² through clearance and 40.85km² through cancellation by non-technical survey.

Cyprus

In accordance with a three-year extension request granted in 2012, Cyprus’ extended deadline is 1 July 2016. In its extension request, Cyprus cited ongoing difficulties in accessing the remaining mined areas located adjacent to the buffer zone that it reported as being under the control of the Turkish military and therefore de facto out of Cyprus’ control.63 In December 2012, Cyprus stated that due to the concentrated nature of the mined area, clearance was not expected to take a long amount of time once begun.64

Democratic Republic of the Congo

In its extension request approved in 2011, the DRC reported 70 SHAs and 12 CHAs.65 In March 2013, the DRC launched a national survey to address database discrepancies and establish a baseline level of landmine and cluster munition contamination.66 The survey is scheduled for completion in December 2013 and will be used as the basis for submitting a second extension request in 2014.67 As of 30 August, the National Landmine Contamination Survey was on track to be completed by the end of 2013.

The National Mine Action Strategy 2012–2016 sets 2016 as the target by when all mined areas will be cleared. However, it will not be known if this target can be met until the completion of the national survey in December

57 Ibid., Annex 3, Table 12, pp. 57-58.
59 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 11 July 2013; and interview, 1 March 2012.
64 Ibid.
65 Interview with Pascal Simon, UN Advisor, UN Mine Action Coordination Center/UNMAS, in Geneva, 17 April 2013.
2013. While it appears mine clearance has progressed slowly in the DRC, the achievements are difficult to assess without baseline data.

**Ecuador**

In 2009, States Parties granted Ecuador an eight-year extension of its Article 5 deadline requiring it to clear all mined areas by 1 October 2017. Land release in Ecuador continues at a slow pace, although there was a substantial increase in output in 2010–2012 compared to previous years. At the end of 2012, Ecuador reported that there remained 26 mined areas covering 466,873 m² and containing 15,595 antipersonnel mines. As of April 2013, Ecuador had released over 276,000 m² of the original estimate of contamination of more than 640,000 m².

Although Ecuador has met the clearance goals it set out in its 2010–2018 operational plan, it is still not clear how Ecuador can meet its 2017 deadline with its current capacity: the remaining contaminated area is more than has been cleared in total by Ecuador since 1998. In addition, weather conditions continue to cancel work days, making annual clearance projections somewhat unpredictable. Border markings and verification have become additional tasks for the Demining General Command, cutting into the time available for clearing mines. In 2010, Ecuador and Peru exchanged information on 13 mined areas on their common border. The additional 13 SHAs from Peru has added 91,000 m² of contaminated area which, at 2012 productivity rates, is approximately 18 months of work.

**Eritrea**

In 2009, at the Second Review Conference, Eritrea had said that in the absence of significant international funding it would take much longer than initially planned to clear all mined areas, and that it would need to request an extension of its deadline to meet its treaty obligations. In December 2011, States Parties granted Eritrea a three-year extension to complete re-surveying by the end of 2014. As of April 2013, approximately 50% of the surveys had been completed. After the Eritrean Demining Agency (EDA) completes the surveys, it will submit a second extension request that will include an operational plan to clear the remaining mined areas. Eritrea’s extension request relies heavily on a level of international funding that has not been seen since the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea departed the country in 2006 and demining NGOs were expelled in 2004. Eritrea asserts that the EDA has sufficient capacity, that international operators are not needed, and that it would complete the survey by the end of 2014 as planned.

**Mauritania**

In 2010, States Parties granted Mauritania a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. Mauritania cited a lack of financial resources, insufficient progress in demining operations, the use of only manual demining techniques, and difficult soil and climatic factors as the reasons for its failure to meet its deadline. Minimal mine clearance was conducted between 2009–2011, but following the establishment of a new program set up by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2011, 13 mined areas covering more than 3 km² were released through technical survey, full clearance, and cancellation in 2012.

In 2012, NPA conducted technical and non-technical surveys. As of September 2013, Mauritania had not released the results, and it remains unclear if Mauritania is on target to meet its 2016 deadline.

**Mozambique**

Since States Parties granted Mozambique an extension of its Article 5 deadline in 2008, it has identified many new SHAs through the Mine Free District Assessment approach, as well as from a survey on the Zimbabwe border and from reports of residual contamination in the four northern provinces. This has resulted in an increase of almost 300% more area to clear than was predicted in its extension request. While Mozambique had previously been on schedule, in May 2013 it requested a second short deadline extension until December 2014, by which time it hopes to complete clearance of the remaining 9.26 km² of mine contamination, including the mined border areas with Zimbabwe.

**Peru**

In 2009, States Parties granted Peru an eight-year extension of its Article 5 deadline requiring it to clear all mined areas by 1 October 2017. In 2013, Peru revised upward its remaining contamination to 64 mined areas containing 13,325 antipersonnel mines, adding 48 mined areas.

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areas that were previously thought to be located in Ecuador.⁷⁹ Peru reported clearing 13,791m² of mined area in 2012—significantly less than in 2011—which was attributed to logistical difficulties posed by operating at a higher terrain.⁸⁰

In 2012, it was reported that Peru’s Defense Minister Alberto Otárola said the border with Ecuador “would be free of landmines by 2016.” In light of the new additional mined areas and the low clearance output of 2012, it is unclear if Peru can meet its 2017 deadline with its current capacity.⁸¹ Peru is reviewing its operational plans in light of the additional mined areas.⁸²

### Senegal

Senegal has not formally reported in detail on its progress in demining over the last few years and has still to determine the extent of remaining contamination with any degree of precision. In May 2012, Senegal claimed that 36 suspected “localities” covering an estimated total of 3.5km² required technical survey and, if necessary, clearance.⁸³ At the Second Review Conference in 2009, Senegal expressed its hope that it would have fulfilled its Article 5 obligations before 2015 if the peace process continued.⁸⁴ As of May 2012, a total of only 320,000m² (0.3km²) had been released in five years of demining.⁸⁵ NPA opened operations in Senegal in September 2012, but the Senegalese Mine Action Centre ordered a suspension of clearance activities for many months after the abduction of 12 deminers from commercial operator Mechem in May 2013.

### Tajikistan

In general, mine clearance in Tajikistan has proceeded slowly and operations were only initiated several years after it became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Furthermore, Tajikistan has still to establish the precise extent of mine contamination, although re-survey has clarified the mine threat on the border with Afghanistan. In January 2013, it was reported that there were 4.89km² of SHAs along Tajikistan’s Afghan border and a further 2.28km² of SHAs in the central region.⁸⁶ It was planned that most of the 7.2km² of remaining area would be manually cleared and very little would be released through non-technical survey.⁸⁷ However, in September 2013 at an EU/Implementation Support Unit Workshop in Dushanbe, the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre unexpectedly revised its estimates of the remaining contamination and reported that as much as 14km² remained because additional mined areas on the Tajik-Afghan border were identified.⁸⁸

### Thailand

Thailand is already extremely behind schedule (by almost 140km²) in terms of the targets in its Article 5 extension request. UNDP observed in a report at the end of January 2011 that, at the current rate of clearance, “it is estimated that it will take Thailand several decades to clear all landmines.”⁹⁰ The use of better land release methodologies in 2012 led to the release of a total of 20.6km² in 2012⁹¹—almost five times the area released in 2011 and more than 68% of the total area released since 2009. Virtually all of it was released through survey in 2012 while clearance accounted for just 288,980m² (0.3km²).⁹² However, land release in 2012 still fell short of the extension request clearance target for the year by 50%.⁹³ Without a greater political will on the part of the government and without greater resources and manpower devoted to mine action, Thailand has little chance of fulfilling its clearance obligations by its November 2018 deadline.

### United Kingdom

The UK conducted no mine clearance in 2011 and 2012, but at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012 the UK reported release of 3.49km² through technical survey and an unspecified amount of battle area clearance that resulted in destruction of 79

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⁸⁰ Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Peruvian Centre for Mine Action (CONTRAMINAS), 21 June 2013.
⁸¹ Ibid.
⁸³ Email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, General Coordinator, CONTRAMINAS, 21 June 2013.
⁸⁴ Ibid.
⁸⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdulmain Karimov, Information Officer, Tajikistan Mine Action Centre, 11 June 2013.
⁹² Information provided by the Special Affairs Unit, Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC), Bangkok, 20 May 2013, and by the Database Unit, TMAC, 16 August 2013.
items of UXO in the Falkland Islands. It followed up at the Standing Committee meeting in May 2013 by reporting clearance of four minefields (resulting in clearance of 296 antipersonnel mines and six booby-traps) and the release of an additional area found to contain no mines. Fifteen years after becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, the reported operations increased the total amount of mined land cleared by the UK to 220,000m² (0.22 km²). In addition, it had cleared 4.7km² of battle area and reduced a further 4.6km² through survey.

The ICBL has regularly called upon the UK to provide a concrete plan and budget for fulfilling its Article 5 clearance obligations. It also reiterated that affected States Parties must clear all mined areas, not only those with a “humanitarian” impact.

### Venezuela

Venezuela was granted a deadline extension at the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties in 2009, and a new deadline set for 1 October 2012. Venezuela did not begin clearing mines until 2010, more than 10 years after becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty. In December 2010, Venezuela estimated that clearance of all mined areas should be completed by June 2013. At the meeting of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance in May 2013, Venezuela announced that it had completed mine clearance operations a year ahead of schedule and that it would be tabling a formal Declaration of Completion at the Thirteenth Meeting of the States Parties.

### Yemen

By April 2013, Yemen reported 107.4km² of SHA in three districts and confirmed hazards amounting to 9.82km². The Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) reported that it conducted an emergency survey in Abyan after government forces regained control of the 22 SHAs covering 19.32km² affected. Fifteen years after becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, the reported operations increased the total amount of mined land cleared by the UK to 220,000m² (0.22 km²). In addition, it had cleared 4.7km² of battle area and reduced a further 4.6km² through survey.

The ICBL has regularly called upon the UK to provide a concrete plan and budget for fulfilling its Article 5 clearance obligations. It also reiterated that affected States Parties must clear all mined areas, not only those with a “humanitarian” impact.

### Compliance with Article 5 among States Parties still within their initial clearance deadlines

#### Ethiopia

In June 2010 at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Ethiopia said it would clear all mined areas by 2013, two years ahead of its deadline, if sufficient funding were available. Despite this plan, Ethiopia will not have cleared all remaining mined areas by the end of 2013. In June 2012, there was a total of some 1,200km² remaining to re-survey from the Landmine Impact Survey data, most of which is located in the Somali region. The Ministry of National Defense, which assumed responsibility for

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99 Ibid.


99 Interview with Abdul Raqeeb Fare, Deputy Director, Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC), Sana’a, 7 February 2013; and information from YEMAC forwarded by email from Rosemary Willey-Al’Sanah, UNDP, 27 April 2013.

99 Presentation to donors by Mansour al-Azi, Director, YEMAC, Sana’a, 19 September 2012.
clearing the remaining mined area in August, has given no indication of whether it will re-survey this area and has not provided an update on its survey and clearance activities. Previously, the Ethiopian Mine Action Office claimed that 315 SHAs covering only approximately 5.9km² of this area needed to be released; it made the claim before transferring its operations to the Ministry of National Defense.

Iraq
In 2013, Iraq reached the halfway point in its 10-year Article 5 deadline, but no closer to demonstrating how it will fulfill its legal obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. Non-technical surveys conducted in 2011 and 2012 started to build a better picture of the extent of mine contamination, but the absence of centralized or comprehensive reporting of clearance operations prevents a determination of the progress or quality of mine action in Iraq. However, Deputy Environment Minister Kamal Latif stated in 2012 that Iraq will not meet its 1 February 2018 clearance deadline. In three northern governorates under the Kurdistan Regional Government, the mine action program in 2012 put into effect a long-discussed agreement that consolidated management of mine action, previously conducted by two organizations, under the umbrella of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA). Operations by 20 demining operators, most of them national, coordinated by IKMAA resulted in clearance of 10.56km² of mined area in 2012, an increase from 5.68km² the previous year. In central and southern Iraq, the Monitor received reports of clearance by humanitarian operators of just 0.2km² of mined area and 11km² of battle area. Most clearance is conducted by commercial companies on behalf of the oil industry, as well as by government ministries together with the army and civil defense, but no details are published.

That lack of reporting reflects the extent to which wider political developments have impeded the creation of a functioning institutional framework for planning, coordinating, and managing mine action, let alone upholding international standards. Among the major obstacles to progress in central and southern Iraq, mine action stakeholders cite the division of responsibility for the sector between several different ministries, the absence of high-level policy coordination, poor communication and cooperation between ministries, and complicated, slow-moving bureaucratic procedures.

Serbia
In March 2013, Serbia submitted a request for a five-year extension of its original 1 March 2014 Article 5 clearance deadline. That request that sets out plans for survey of 2.1km² and clearance of 2.28km² at a projected cost of €2.5 million ($3.2 million). The plan projected that

Survey would result in cancelling approximately half the mine-suspected area. It provided for state funding of €150,000 ($192,885) a year to cover the costs of survey and Serbian Mine Action Centre activities. It expected costs of clearance to be met by donor funding. With confirmed and suspected mine contamination estimated at less than 5km², as late as May 2012 Serbia still held out hope of meeting its initial deadline. After applying for an extension in March 2013, Serbia told the Standing Committee meeting in May 2013, “[T]he dynamics of demining is affected by lack of funds” and by difficult terrain where demining is not possible throughout the year. The ICBL said the plan was insufficiently ambitious and encouraged Serbia to review its request with a view to shortening the timeline by at least two years and increasing the modest financial contribution Serbia proposed to make towards completion.

Sudan
At the intersessional meetings in May 2012, Sudan said it needed funding to support 30 clearance teams to meet its Article 5 deadline. If the funding was not available, Sudan would have to request an extension of its Article 5 deadline. In March 2013, Sudan submitted a request to extend its deadline until 2019, citing instability and lack of access in the states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile as the primary reasons for the extension. Sudan plans to release all the contaminated areas in the other states before 2016, when it plans to begin clearance in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

As of May 2013, 257 suspected hazardous and contaminated areas covering 38km² remained in 10 of the 18 states that comprise Sudan. The 10 states are: Blue Nile, Central/East/North/South/West Darfur, Gadaref, Kassala, Red Sea, and South Kordofan. Almost 80% of the suspected and confirmed contaminated areas are located in Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and Kassala; both Blue Nile and South Kordofan are inaccessible because of ongoing conflict.


Ibid.


Ibid.

National Mine Action Center, “IMSMA Monthly Report May 2013,” p. 2; and Sudan response to questions received from Analysing Group on Sudan’s Extension request to Article 5 Mine Ban Treaty deadline, 22 May 2013.
Turkey

Turkey has been slow to fulfill its obligations under Article 5. In the nine years after acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey cleared a total of 1.15km² of mined area and three-quarters of this occurred in one year (2011). It did not record any land release in 2012.

Turkey reported in 2013 that it had a total of 3,174 mined areas covering 214.73km² with a further 346 suspected mined areas yet to be investigated.124 At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in December 2011, Turkey disclosed that clearance of its border with Syria would not be completed until 2016 and, a year later, it acknowledged to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties that it would seek an extension to its deadline.125

Turkey submitted a request in March 2013 asking for an eight-year extension until 2022 but also said this was “provisional” and only an “initial estimate” of the time needed.126 It cited delays in setting up a national mine action authority, inconvenient weather, and insecurity among factors that had obstructed progress. The extension request reported plans to complete clearance of all mined areas by 2022, with priority given to clearing the border with Syria. By mid-2012, 11 demining companies had bid for the first stage of Syrian border clearance, but in July 2013 the Ministry of National Defense reportedly canceled tenders for clearing the border because of developments in Syria.127 The status of that project is now unclear.

Turkey’s extension request also set out plans for a three-phase clearance of its eastern and southeastern borders. Work was expected to start before the end of 2014 and last for two years, although a table of the timelines borders. Work was expected to start before the end of 2014 and last for two years, although a table of the timelines:

- Phase 1: Clearing mined areas in northern Cyprus, but debate continues on where to set out and implement plans for clearance of affected areas in northern Cyprus, but debate continues on where responsibility for clearing this territory lies.
- Phase 2: Clearing mined areas in Turkey’s eastern border areas.
- Phase 3: Clearing mined areas in Turkey’s southeastern border areas.

To meet its treaty requirements regarding areas under its jurisdiction or control, Turkey may also need to set out and implement plans for clearance of affected areas in northern Cyprus, but debate continues on where responsibility for clearing this territory lies.

125 Ibid., p. 6.

Risks to Deminers

Demining operators remain at risk of attacks and abductions in some areas where non-state armed groups operate, especially in Afghanistan and more recently in Senegal. Insurgency and banditry continued to pose the main threat to the safety of Afghan deminers in 2012, which saw six deminers killed and 10 injured in 53 security incidents. A further 20 staff were also abducted but later released in 2012.128 The precarious security situation persisted in 2013 when 11 deminers were abducted and three vehicles seized.129 Implementing partners also reported interruptions to operations caused by security incidents or IED attacks in the vicinity of clearance tasks, as well as having to contend with the presence of IED detonations on roads in their operating areas. In June 2013, one community-based deminer was killed by a missile fired by international forces that apparently mistakenly believed he was planting IEDs.130

In May 2013, 12 demining personnel from Mechem were held prisoner at a camp run by the Movement for the Democratic Forces of Casamance in Guinea-Bissau for several weeks, prompting an order from Senegalese authorities to halt all survey and clearance operations in the country.131

An attack by a suicide bomber and armed attackers on a UN compound in Mogadishu, Somalia, in June 2013 by al-Shabab militia resulted in the deaths of three deminers from Mechem.132

Amid ongoing instability and internal conflict in Yemen in 2012, YEMAC reported that four deminers were killed and one injured as a result of security incidents.133

Conclusion

With a significant area of land remaining to be cleared of antipersonnel mines by States Parties and an increasing trend among them of extending their Article 5 clearance deadlines, there remain serious concerns about the implementation of clearance obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty as it heads toward its next Review Conference in June 2014.

The ICBL has expressed its concern over the number of States Parties that continue to rely on outdated baseline surveys that overestimate the level of contamination leading to the inappropriate allocation of time and resources, and the number of States Parties that have not employed the full range of methodologies that would

130 “Al’Sanah, UNDP, 27 April 2013.”
131 Interview with Mohammad Shohab Hakimi, Director, Mine Detection Center, Kabul, 16 May 2013.
132 “Afghanistan, Mid-Year Report 2013, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” UN Mission in Afghanistan, Kabul, 31 July 2013, p. 41, unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=E2oxNqUdp6s%3d&tabid=12254&language=en-US.

assist in more efficient land release. Inaccurate and incomplete reporting by several States Parties compound the difficulty in achieving a clear overall picture of contamination and land release efforts.133

As noted by States Parties, Article 5 compliance is “part of the Convention’s overall comprehensive approach to ending the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, for all people, for all time.”134 Failure by States Parties to implement full and effective clearance activities as soon as possible, as mandated under the treaty, has significant and detrimental implications for the safety and well-being of affected individuals and their communities.135 As the ICBL noted at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012: “Ultimately states should remember that deadlines are just not mere targets—they are legal obligations that reflect a state’s commitment to its own people and to the international community.”136


Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties

In 2012, recorded casualties caused by mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), cluster munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth: mine/ERW casualties—decreased to the lowest level since 1999. This was the year the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force and the Monitor began tracking casualties. This continued a trend of fewer total annually-recorded mine/ERW casualties that has been fairly steady, with some minor annual aberrations, since 1999. Over the period, annual casualty totals have decreased by more than 60%.

The vast majority of recorded mine/ERW casualties were civilians. They continued to be disproportionally victimized as compared to military and security forces. The percentage of civilian casualties as compared with military casualties increased considerably in 2012 from 2011 and annual averages in previous years.

In 2012, a total of 3,628 mine/ERW casualties were recorded by the Monitor. At least 1,066 people were killed and another 2,552 people were injured; for 10 casualties it was not known if the person survived the incident. In many states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher.

The 2012 casualty figure of 3,628 is a 19% decrease compared with the 4,474 casualties recorded in 2011 and 10% fewer than the second lowest casualty total recorded by the Monitor of 4,224, in 2009. In 2012, there was an average of 10 casualties per day, globally, as compared with approximately 11–12 casualties per day from 2009–2011. The annual incidence rate for

1 Figures include individuals killed or injured in incidents involving devices detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and victim-activated IEDs. AXO and UXO, including cluster munition remnants, are collectively referred to as ERW. Not included in the totals are: estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not given, incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been caused by remote-detonated mines or IEDs (those that were not victim-activated), and people killed or injured while manufacturing or emplacing devices. For more details on casualty figures or sources of casualty data by state or area, please see country profiles online at: www.the-monitor.org.

2 The outcome of just 10 casualties, or less than 1% of all casualties, was unknown in 2012, the lowest number of unknowns in terms of outcome since Monitor recording began in 1999. This is an indication of improved data collection over the 14 year period. By way of comparison, in 1999 the outcome was unknown of 974 casualties or 10% of all casualties recorded in that year.

3 Annual casualty figures for 2010 and 2011 were revised and updated in subsequent years with new data available to the Monitor. Originally, the Monitor reported 3,956 casualties for 2009, a figure that has now reached 4,224 with updated data. Previously, the Monitor reported 4,448 casualties for 2011; the revised 2011 figure is 4,474. This is the number to which the 2012 casualty total is compared. Updated figures for previous years have been used to recalculate all casualty country totals and percentages throughout the overview.


5 Security personnel/forces include military personnel, police, and representatives of non-state armed groups.

6 Since 2005, civilians have represented approximately 75% of casualties for which the civilian status was known, annually. In the first five years of Monitor reporting, the percentage of civilian casualties averaged 81% per year. See the Monitor Victim Assistance Overview from Landmine Monitor 2008, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/es/landmine_casualties_and_survivor_assistance.html.

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Casualties in 2012

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Casualties and Victim Assistance

Number of mine/ERW casualties per year (1999–2012): Retrospectively adjusted totals

Number of mine/ERW casualties per year (1999–2012): Annual totals as originally reported in the Monitor, unadjusted

In 1999, the Monitor identified 9,200 mine/ERW casualties. The 58 states and four other areas where casualties were identified in 2012 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe; as well as other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

Countries registering casualties in 2012 but not in 2011 were: Chile, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Greece, Mauritania, Montenegro, Niger, and Serbia. States with casualties in 2011 but none in 2012 were: Armenia, China, Cuba, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Casualties were identified in 62 states and other areas in 2012, similar to the 61 states and other areas in which casualties were identified in 2011 and down from 72 states and other areas the Monitor first recorded for 1999. Of the total casualties in 2012, 2,367 occurred in 30 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty identified by the Monitor as having responsibility for significant numbers of survivors; a total of 2,530 occurred in all (42) States Parties.

For years prior to 2012, the Monitor adjusted global cumulative casualty data retrospectively by adding additional data that had become available and removing past anomalies related to changing data collection techniques and the classification of explosive device types, particularly where there had been unclear differentiation between victim-activated and command-detonated IEDs. Standardizing casualty data from previous years based on the criteria and methodology currently used by the Monitor makes all data since 1999 more consistent for comparison between years and over the whole period, and provides the best possible picture of change during the period. In all years there were estimated to be significantly higher casualties. It is notable that the overall trend in declining casualties is consistent in both the original and the updated data.

Steady declines in annual casualty totals continued in the three States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that have regularly recorded the highest number of annual casualties over the past 14 years: Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Colombia. Together, these three countries represent 38% of all global casualties since 1999, as recorded by the Monitor. Gradual decreases in the number of casualties in these countries each year have significantly reduced the global casualty figure.

Afghanistan, which has recorded more people directly affected by mine and ERW incidents every year than any other country, had the most annual casualties again in 2012, with 766 people killed and injured. This number was down slightly from the 812 casualties identified in 2011 and was about 90% less than the estimated 9,000 casualties in Afghanistan per year prior to the Mine Ban Treaty. At that time, Afghanistan alone was suffering nearly three times the total global casualty rate in 2012.

Colombia was the second most impacted country, with 496 casualties. The 2012 figure was an 11% decrease compared with the 549 recorded in 2011, and about 60% less than the mine/ERW casualty rate in Colombia when it peaked in 2005 and 2006 at around 1,200 casualties recorded annually.

Cambodia, with the fifth most casualties in 2012, also continued to record fewer casualties than in most other years prior to 2012. The 11% decrease compared with the 549 recorded in 2011, and about 60% less than the mine/ERW casualty rate in Afghanistan when it peaked in 2005 and 2006 at around 1,200 casualties recorded annually.

Some of the large decreases were due to entire datasets being removed in cases where it became apparent that there was a high probability that many of the casualties were victims of armed conflict from numerous causes and not only mine/ERW casualties, even though there were likely to be mine casualties among the conflict casualties from these datasets.
previous years: the 186 casualties recorded in 2012 were 13% fewer than the 211 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2011 and more than 90% less than the over 3,000 casualties identified in 1996.

Other significant changes in casualty totals among States Parties in 2012 were mainly due to changing dynamics in relation to armed conflicts. In one of the Mine Ban Treaty’s newest States Parties, South Sudan, mine/ERW casualties dropped from 206 in 2011 to 22 in 2012 as the movement of displaced populations from the north into South Sudan reduced considerably, compared with a peak in casualties just after independence in 2011.

Yemen was the only State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty where there was a significant increase in the number of mine/ERW casualties between 2011 and 2012. At 263, the number of casualties recorded in 2012 was the highest annual number recorded by the Monitor for Yemen since research began in 1999. It was more than 10 times higher than the 23 casualties recorded in 2011 and five times the 52 casualties identified in 2010. This significant increase was due to the increased population movement immediately after fighting subsided in early 2012 and the new use of mines during the armed conflict.

States with 100 or more recorded casualties in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>No. of casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty indicated in bold.

Among states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, two of the countries with the largest numbers of casualties in previous years, Myanmar and Pakistan, registered significant decreases in the number of casualties identified in 2012 as compared with 2011. There were 247 casualties in Pakistan, down from 569 casualties in 2011, or a decrease of 57%. In Myanmar, the decrease was even more dramatic, down from 381 casualties in 2011 to 106 in 2012, marking a drop of 72%.

However, neither Myanmar nor Pakistan has a data collection mechanism for mine/ERW casualties and the data may be incomplete. The data is taken from media and other local sources that Monitor researchers have available. Both countries have shown large fluctuations in casualty data over the years, due to a combination of the poor quality of available data, real changes in the casualty occurrence rate, and the way casualties were reported due to the dynamics of ongoing conflict. For example, in Pakistan, where the Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO), a national NGO, collects data via media reports and field workers, recorded casualties tend to decrease when armed conflict prevents journalists and field workers from accessing the very regions of the country where casualties are most likely to occur. Therefore, the reduced number of casualties in both countries should be viewed cautiously and possible discrepancies taken into consideration regarding the global casualty total.

Libya also saw a significant decrease in casualties, from 226 in 2011 to 66 in 2012. While there was believed to be a decline in mine/ERW casualties, this significant drop is also related to the lack of availability of casualty data for 2012, as compared with 2011.

In 2013, the unprecedented availability of detailed annual and cumulative casualty data over time from Iran, another state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of casualties, made clear the steady decreases in annual casualty totals in that country, following a peak of 918 casualties in 1995. There were 129 casualties in Iran in 2011 and 127 in 2012.

Methodology

The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely-used annual dataset of casualties caused by mines and ERW. For the year 2012, the Monitor collected casualty data from 32 different national or UN mine action centers in 31 states and other areas with mine/ERW casualties during the year. Mine action centers recorded nearly half of the casualties identified during the year.¹³ For all other states and areas, the Monitor collected data on casualties from various mine clearance operators and victim assistance service providers, as well as from a range of national and international media sources.¹⁴

¹³ Of the 32 mine action centers which collected casualty data, 30 were national mine action centers. The other two were UN mine action centers or UN missions which also maintained mine/ERW data collection mechanisms. Mine action centers registered 1,620 of the 3,628 casualties identified in 2012.

¹⁴ The Monitor identified 1,389 mine/ERW casualties (35% of all casualties identified in 2012) through the media that had not been collected via official data collection mechanisms. The majority of these casualties occurred in countries without any data collection mechanism, although a significant number also occurred in countries with a data collection system in place and/or other sources such as mine action operators and victim assistance service providers.
It must be stressed that, as in previous years, the 3,628 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2012 only include recorded casualties. Due to incomplete data collection at the national level, the true casualty total is higher. Based on the updated Monitor research methodology in place since 2009, it is estimated that there are approximately an additional 800–1,000 casualties each year that are not captured in its global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries.

As in previous years, data collection in various countries such as Afghanistan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen was believed to be incomplete due either to the lack of a functioning official data collection system and/or to the challenges posed by ongoing armed conflict. However, the level of underreporting has declined over time as many countries have initiated and improved casualty data collection mechanisms. In addition, for the first time, in 2012, the Monitor received detailed cumulative casualty data from Iran (as noted above).

The 2012 estimate is a significant drop from the estimated total from 1999. By way of comparison, the Monitor identified some 9,000 casualties in 1999, but estimated that another 7,000–13,000 annual casualties went unrecorded.

**Casualty demographics**

Since ICBL monitoring began in 1999, every year there have been about 1,000 child casualties from mines/ERW, with significantly greater numbers of children killed and injured in 1999 and 2001. There were 1,168 child casualties in 2012, an increase from 1,063 in 2011, despite the overall decrease in the global casualty total between the two years. Child casualties in 2012 accounted for 47% of all civilian casualties for whom the age was known. This was an increase of five percentage points from the 42% in 2011 and a slight increase from the average annual rate of child casualties since 2005 of 44%. In some of the states with the greatest numbers of casualties, the percentage was even higher in 2012. Children constituted 72% of all civilian casualties in India; 70% in Somalia, 65% in Sudan, 61% in Afghanistan, and 50% in Yemen.

Between 2011 and 2012, significant increases in the number of child casualties were seen in Yemen, Colombia, and Cambodia. In Yemen, where the percentage of child casualties has consistently been high, 105 children were killed or injured by mine/ERW in 2012, seven times the number in 2011 (15). In both Colombia and Cambodia, between 2011 and 2012, the actual number of child casualties increased while the total number of annual casualties decreased, indicating a possible shift in the risk factors related to mine and ERW contamination. In Colombia, there were 66 child casualties in 2012, compared to 44 in 2011, and this represented 30% of all civilian casualties versus 22% in 2011. In Cambodia, the annual number of child casualties increased from 51 to 61 and from 27% to 33% of civilian casualties.

As in previous years, the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (80%), while 20% were girls. More than two-thirds of child casualties were caused by ERW. Among casualties of all ages, children were also disproportionately the victims of ERW; 60% of all ERW casualties were children despite ERW being the cause of just 32% of all casualties, with military casualties included.

**Child casualties in significantly affected countries, as a percentage of civilian casualties in 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Child casualties</th>
<th>Total civilian casualties</th>
<th>Percent of child casualties of Total Civilian Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In 2012, the percentage of female casualties among all casualties for which the sex was known was 13%, 410 of 3,183. This was an increase from 2011, when females

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17 The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties, to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.
18 The Monitor identified more than 1,500 child casualties in 1999 and more than 1,600 in 2001.
19 Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the incident.
20 Between 2005 and 2012, there were 8,392 child casualties of a total of 19,234 civilian casualties for which the age and outcome was known. The Monitor began to be able to systematically collect age-disaggregated mine/ERW casualty data for all states and areas in 2005. The 44% average has fluctuated by just 2% per year, with the exception of 2007 when children constituted 49% of all civilian casualties and 2012, with children making up 47% of all civilian casualties.
21 This includes only the civilian casualties for which the sex was known.
22 The sex of 141 child casualties was not recorded.
23 This includes only the casualties for which the civilian/security status and the age were known.
Casualties and Victim Assistance

Between 1999 and 2012, the Monitor identified more than 1,000 deminers who have been killed or injured while undertaking demining operations to ensure the safety of the civilian population. With 132 casualties identified among deminers in 13 states in 2012, this figure was very similar to the number of demining casualties reported to the Monitor in 2011. However, it was significantly higher than the average of 75 casualties among deminers per year since 1999. All casualties of demining accidents in 2012 were men.

In 2012, the highest numbers of casualties among deminers were in Iran (71), Yemen (19), and Afghanistan (16). The 71 deminer casualties in Iran was nearly double the 36 recorded there in 2011; 217 deminer casualties have been identified in Iran since 2008. Demining casualties in Afghanistan decreased by 36% compared between 2011 and 2012. No deminer casualties were identified in Yemen in 2011 and the 19 that occurred in 2012 represented 54% of all demining casualties that have occurred in Yemen since 1999. Together, these three countries represented 80% of all deminer casualties globally. In 2012, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) recorded no deminer casualties for the first year since Monitor reporting began.

Mine/ERW casualties by sex in 2012

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Mine/ERW casualties by civilian/military status in 2012

Civilian casualties represented 78% of casualties where the civilian/military status was known (2,763 of 3,564), compared to 73% in 2011. In absolute terms, military casualties decreased by 33% between 2011 and 2012 while civilian casualties decreased by 10%. More than half the drop in military casualties from 2011 to 2012 can be accounted for by decreases in military casualties in just three states—Colombia, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

As in previous years, in 2012 the vast majority (65%) of casualties among military forces were recorded in a small number of countries with ongoing conflict or armed violence: Colombia (270), Pakistan (77), and Afghanistan (77). In 2012, Colombia alone accounted for 42% of all reported global military casualties.

Victim-activated weapons and other explosive items causing casualties

In 2012, 45% of all casualties for which the specific type of victim-activated explosive item was known were caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (29%) and victim-activated IEDs acting as antipersonnel mines (15%).

24 Females made up 379 of 3,666 casualties for which the sex was known in 2011.
25 Between 1999 and 2012, female casualties have represented 10.5% of all casualties on average for which the sex was known, with the percentage ranging from 8% to 13% per year. In that period, the sex of 55,063 casualties was known and of these 5,785 were females.
26 This includes only the casualties for which the sex was known.
27 There have been 1,067 casualties among deminers between 1999 and 2012. Since 1999, the annual number of demining casualties identified has fluctuated widely from 29 to 178, making it difficult to discern trends. Most major fluctuations have been related to the exceptional availability or unavailability of deminer casualty data from a particular country in any given year and therefore cannot be correlated to substantive changes in operating procedures in international demining standards or demining equipment.
28 Casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Yemen.
29 There were 125 demining casualties identified in 2011.
30 No data on deminer casualties in Iran prior to 2008 was available to the Monitor for inclusion in this report. Even based on partial data, Iran exceeded all countries except Afghanistan in the total number of demining casualties since 1999.
31 This includes only the casualties for which the civilian/military status was known.
32 In Colombia and Afghanistan, the number of military casualties declined in 2011 while the number increased significantly in Pakistan (from 186 to 236) and in Myanmar (21 to 133).
33 Due to rounding, the sum percent of casualties from factory-made mines and victim-activated IEDs is 1% higher than the two percentages without decimal points. In 2012, there were casualties from factory-made antipersonnel mines in 30 states: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Djibouti, Georgia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Senegal, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe; and the following four other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
Casualties and Victim Assistance

This was almost the same as the 46% of casualties from antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs recorded in 2011. There was a marginal difference, in that casualties caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines decreased by four percentage points while this was somewhat offset by an increase of two percentage points in casualties caused by victim-activated IEDs. In 2011, 33% of casualties resulted from antipersonnel mines and 13% from victim-activated IEDs.

In 2012, casualties from victim-activated IEDs were identified in 12 states, an increase from the 10 states in all previous years since 2008. Starting in 2008, the Monitor began identifying more casualties from these improvised antipersonnel mines, likely due to both an increase in their use and better data collection that made the distinction more possible to discern both between factory-made antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs and between command-detonated IEDs and victim-activated IEDs.

In 2012, antivehicle mines killed and injured people in 18 states and other areas. The states with greatest numbers of casualties from antivehicle mines were Pakistan (100), Sudan (41), and Niger (40). Between 2011 and 2012, the percentage of casualties caused by antivehicle mines, which are not prohibited or regulated under the Mine Ban Treaty, declined compared to the total, but were similar to levels in 2010. In 2012, 325 casualties, or 10% of casualties for which the device was known, were caused by antivehicle mines, compared with 677 or 17% of casualties in 2011. Antivehicle mines caused 10% of casualties for which the cause was known in 2010.

The sharp increase in antivehicle mine casualties recorded in 2011 had been due, for the most part, to a huge increase as compared to 2010 in just three states—Pakistan, Sudan, and South Sudan. Following this peak, in 2012, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chile, Georgia, Iran, Montenegro, Nger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen; and the following other areas: Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold, other areas in italics.
both Pakistan and South Sudan casualties in 2012 due to antivehicle mines returned to 2010 levels. Antivehicle mine casualties also decreased in Sudan in 2012 as compared to 2011, but still remained high compared to 2010.

In 2012, 37% of casualties were caused by other ERW in 46 states and areas, an increase from 30% in 2011. Some notable increases by country occurred in Yemen, where there were 108 casualties due to ERW in 2012, as compared to just one in 2011. In both Cambodia and Colombia, the total figure of casualties caused by ERW increased while the overall casualty totals per country decreased. The increase in Colombia may be due to enhanced accuracy in the reporting of incidents caused by ERW following awareness-raising efforts in 2012, including by the ICRC, to inform people that legal benefits to victims of explosives were not limited to victims of antipersonnel mines but also included victims of ERW and IEDs.

**Victim Assistance**

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty in which states committed to provide “assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration” to those people harmed.

Since 1999, the Monitor has tracked the provision of victim assistance to landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims under the Mine Ban Treaty and its subsequent five-year action plans. In practice, victim assistance addresses the overlapping and interconnected needs of persons with disabilities, including survivors of landmines, cluster munitions, ERW, and other weapons, as well as people in their communities with similar requirements for assistance. In addition, some victim assistance efforts reach family members and other people in the communities of those people who have been killed or have suffered trauma, loss, or other harm due to landmines and ERW.

The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014, agreed upon at the Mine Ban Treaty Second Review Conference in 2009, further developed the concept of victim assistance by combining the various elements of victim assistance into an integrated approach to addressing victims’ needs. This approach stressed the importance of cross-cutting themes, particularly the accessibility of services and information, inclusion and participation of victims, particularly survivors, and the concept that there should be no discrimination against mine/ERW victims, among victims, nor between survivors with disabilities and other persons with disabilities in relation to the assistance provided.

During 2013, with preparations for the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty underway and the time period to implement the Cartagena Action Plan coming to an end, States Parties and other victim assistance actors were taking stock of the progress made and mapping a new course to ensure the fulfillment of victim assistance commitments in the period to follow the upcoming review conference. Monitor reporting since 2009 shows that significant progress has been made as measured against the commitments of the Cartagena Action Plan, particularly in better understanding the needs of mine/ERW victims, coordinating and planning measures to better address those needs, and linking victim assistance coordination with other relevant multisectoral coordination mechanisms. Reporting demonstrates that concerted efforts have been made to make mine/ERW victims more aware of available programs and services and, in some cases, to facilitate their access to these services.

Legal frameworks to promote the rights of victims have improved, including through the regulation of physical accessibility, although discriminatory practices remain in many States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty towards some groups of survivors, or even all survivors, and/or toward other persons with disabilities. In order to address the needs of mine/ERW victims, all States Parties need to further improve the availability and sustainability of relevant programs and services and ensure that all mine/ERW victims have access to programs that meet their specific needs.

This victim assistance overview focuses on progress under the Cartagena Action Plan since 2009 in the 30 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant

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37 In Pakistan, there were 100 casualties from antivehicle mines in 2012, 293 in 2011, and 91 in 2010. In South Sudan, there were zero casualties from antivehicle mines in 2012, 145 in 2011, and two in 2010. In Sudan, there were 42 casualties from antivehicle mines in 2012, 53 in 2011, and zero in 2010.

38 In 2012, casualties from ERW, including cluster submunitions, were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Laos PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe; and in the following other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Somaliland.

39 In Cambodia, there were 88 casualties from ERW in 2011 and 119 in 2012. In Colombia, there were 19 casualties from ERW in 2011 and 31 in 2012.

40 The ICRC observed that, in previous years, nearly all casualties by antipersonnel landmines, victim-activated IEDs acting as antipersonnel landmines, and ERW in Colombia were reported to authorities as “landmine” incidents. This was done to ensure access to benefits for victims since it had not been well understood that victims of ERW were entitled to the same benefits.


42 The full definition of “victim” includes the family members of those who are killed by mines/ERW as well as the family members of survivors, although victim assistance efforts have mainly been limited to survivors to date.


44 “Victim” refers to those who have been injured or killed by a landmine and their families who suffer emotional, social, and financial loss. Mine/ERW survivors are a subset of victims who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, cluster munition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.
numbers of mine/ERW victims in need of assistance. It also highlights some efforts during the same time period to assist thousands of mine/ERW victims living in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty that also have significant numbers of victims. Greater detail of progress and challenges in providing effective victim assistance at the national level is available through some 70 individual country profiles available online.47

Understanding the needs and challenges of victims

During the period of the Cartagena Action Plan, considerable progress has been made by those States Parties with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims to better understand their needs. Many states also mapped the available services to determine what gaps exist to meet these needs. As of June 2013, 21 of the 30 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of victims had undertaken a complete or partial assessment or survey of the needs of mine/ERW survivors, disaggregated by sex and age. In 10 of these states, needs assessments were underway in 2012 and into 2013;48 nine other states completed surveys between 2009 and 201149 and the remaining two states had carried assessments out prior to 2009.50 Before the Cartagena Action Plan went into effect, just five of these States Parties had started or completed needs assessments.51

Some needs assessments have covered all areas where survivors are registered or known to live. Others have focused on specific geographic areas with high concentrations of survivors or done samplings of the survivor population to extrapolate the needs. In some states, such as Angola, Iraq, South Sudan, and Sudan, needs assessments have been carried out in different regions successively over multiple years. In nearly all cases, surveys have been carried out through a partnership of government agencies and NGOs, including survivor networks and disabled persons' organizations (DPOs). Exceptions include Serbia, where a national assessment of victims needs was carried out by the NGO Assistance Advocacy Access–Serbia (AAA-S)52 and requests for government collaboration to provide existing data went unheeded, and Yemen, where ongoing surveys of medical and rehabilitation needs have been carried out by the national mine action center without engaging civil society.

Inclusion of persons with disabilities and victims of armed conflict and violence

The majority of needs assessments since 2009 have surveyed mine/ERW survivors, family members of survivors, persons with disabilities, and/or other victims of armed conflict. Based on available information, “survivor” needs assessments in Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, South Sudan, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, and Yemen. This includes all of the original “VA-24,” or States Parties with significant numbers of victims in need of assistance, as designated during the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004.

The following states not party: India, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Other area: Western Sahara.

All country profiles are available at www.the-monitor.org. Findings specific to victim assistance in states and other areas with victims of cluster munitions are available through Landmine Monitor 2013’s companion publication, Cluster Munition Monitor 2013, which can be found at www.the-monitor.org/cmm/2013.

In 2012 and 2013, needs assessments were underway or completed in Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

Between 2009 and 2011, needs assessments were undertaken in Albania, Algeria, BIH, DRC, Croatia, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, and Yemen.


Afghanistan, Albania, Peru (pilot), Tajikistan, and Thailand.
however, there was a lack of updated information on the needs of survivors from incidents occurring in previous years. In Nicaragua, a general disability survey was carried out in 2011, including mine/ERW survivors with disabilities. In El Salvador, the Protection Fund for the Wounded and Disabled (Protection Fund) collected information on the needs of its beneficiaries on an ongoing basis but only for its own program planning. Between 2009 and 2013, Burundi, Chad, and Guinea-Bissau all highlighted the lack of information on the needs of mine/ERW survivors as an obstacle to adequate victim assistance but pointed to insufficient resources as an impediment to carrying out surveys. Work on a national database of persons with disabilities including mine/ERW survivors in Eritrea stalled when UN funding ended in 2011. Ethiopia lacked a needs assessment and information on mine survivors but planned to include mine survivors and other persons with disabilities in its census survey in 2017. No needs assessment was carried out in Turkey.

In the majority of cases, data collected was used to develop victim assistance and/or disability plans or to adjust existing plans and was shared with other victim assistance actors, such as national disability councils, ministries of social protection, and service providers. In Mozambique, data collected in 2012 was to be used in 2013 by the Ministry of Social Affairs to develop a component specific to mine/ERW survivors within the broader disability plan. In Serbia, AAA-S shared results of its survey with the ministry responsible for disability and veterans’ affairs, although no planning process was underway as of September 2013.

Sustainable data collection

Less progress was made in establishing sustainable ongoing mechanisms for data collection, including integrating data in national injury surveillance systems, as called for by the Cartagena Action Plan. As of September 2013, no State Party had fully integrated ongoing casualty and needs assessment data collection into a national surveillance system. In Colombia, this was done in the department of Antioquia in 2009 with plans to expand throughout the country. After delays of close to three years, the process to expand resumed in 2013. In Uganda and Eritrea, efforts began, but were not completed. A pilot project in Eritrea, supported by UNICEF, included data on mine/ERW survivors and was to have been extended nationally, but ended in 2011. In Sudan, a national health surveillance system that was to include data related to mine/ERW survivors was underway as of May 2013.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Croatia, data was to be integrated into injury surveillance systems but plans were never implemented. In Albania, an ongoing mechanism was established to collect information on the needs and services received of both survivors and family members. However, the system was maintained by a national NGO that struggled to secure sufficient funding to continue operating. In seven other States Parties, data on the needs of mine/ERW victims (or at least survivors) was shared with disability councils or other relevant ministries, but not specifically as part of an ongoing surveillance system. In at least 10 other States Parties where needs were assessed—nearly half of all states having collected data—no ongoing, sustainable mechanism was established to maintain and manage data on mine/ERW victims’ needs.

Coordination and planning

By the start of the Cartagena Action Plan in 2009, many states with significant numbers of victims had already established victim assistance focal points and multisectoral victim assistance coordination mechanisms. Progress in this area continued under the Cartagena Action Plan as more coordination mechanisms were formed and fewer of these mechanisms relied on UN assistance to operate.

The review of progress in achieving victim assistance under the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009 found that “the most identifiable gains have been process-related,” referring to coordination and planning. Between 2005 and 2009, 12 states developed interministerial coordination mechanisms to implement action plans, six of which were supported by UN mine action centers or advisors. However, in 2009 the Monitor found that these mechanisms were not functioning in at least 50% of these countries.

As of June 2013, nearly all of the 30 States Parties with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims had a victim assistance focal point. The number of states with multisectoral coordination for victim assistance and/or inclusion of mine/ERW victims (such as coordination for persons with disabilities or victims of armed conflict) had increased to 22. In addition, fewer States Parties, down to three from six, were reliant on the UN to support victim assistance coordination. However, in several cases effective coordination was not continuously sustained by national actors throughout

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54 Cambodia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan.
55 Afghanistan, Angola, DRC, El Salvador, Iraq, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Thailand, and Yemen. No data was collected in Burundi, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, and Nicaragua.
57 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, DRC, El Salvador, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. States in bold received support for victim assistance, including for its coordination, from the UN.
58 In 2009, the coordination body was not functioning in Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, DRC, and El Salvador. See the Victim Assistance Overview in Landmine Monitor 2009: www.the-monitor.org.
59 Nicaragua and Somalia did not have a victim assistance focal point.
60 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.
the period. In 2012, victim assistance coordination in Croatia was temporarily suspended during administrative reorganization following national elections. In Uganda, coordination meetings were less frequent than in other recent years due to reduced international support. Victim assistance coordination mechanisms were inactive in Algeria, Chad, and Yemen in 2012.

Among the eight States Parties without multisectoral coordination, El Salvador’s Protection Fund for the victims of armed conflict coordinated victim assistance but without regular coordination with other government ministries. In Iraq, there was a functioning regional multisectoral coordination mechanism in the region of Kurdistan, chaired by the Kurdistan mine action centre and supported by UNDP, but no coordination mechanism for the rest of the country.

Coordination of victim assistance through or in coordination with other relevant frameworks

Since 2009, victim assistance has increasingly been coordinated by disability ministries or councils, rather than by mine action centers. Coordination of victim assistance in many States Parties has been combined with disability coordination, or greater collaboration has emerged between these two sectoral coordinating mechanisms.

In 12 of 30 States Parties with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims, the victim assistance focal point was the ministry responsible for disabilities issues. In at least three of these States Parties, this marked a change since 2009 from a victim assistance focal point based at a mine action center. However, in all three of these States Parties, the mine action centers remained critical in supporting the ministries responsible for disability issues in this new role. In Serbia, the victim assistance focal point changed from the national rehabilitation center to the Ministry of Social Policy, marking an important shift from a medical focus for victim assistance to a social approach.

Among the 21 States Parties with active victim assistance coordination mechanisms, all but two (El Salvador and Senegal) were either combined with disability coordination mechanisms (seven plus Darfur) or there was collaboration across the two coordination mechanisms (12 plus Iraqi Kurdistan). In countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan, disability coordination mechanisms grew out of victim assistance coordination, adding the coordination of disability issues to their existing victim assistance mandate. Such collaboration in these countries was inherent from the start.

Since 2009, victim assistance coordination has been increasingly integrated with what, in many cases, are emerging disability coordination mechanisms, yet this has not been effective in all cases in improving coordination overall or in ensuring greater integration of survivors within the disability community or among the beneficiaries of programs targeting persons with disabilities. In 2012, BiH’s victim assistance focal point, based at the mine action center, had limited coordination with relevant disability actors. In Colombia, coordination between victim assistance and disability sectors was not effective in integrating mine/ERW survivors into government efforts to address issues of disability. In DRC, while there was victim assistance and disability collaboration, both coordination mechanisms were irregular, ineffective, and dependent on international technical assistance. In Mozambique, coordination by the national disability council, into which victim assistance coordination was integrated, was found to be weak, under-resourced, and largely ineffective, with little impact on the lives of persons with disabilities.

Victim assistance coordination was also linked to efforts to coordinate and implement national policies to compensate, rehabilitate, and/or provide reparations to armed conflict victims, including victims of mines and ERW, in at least 13 States Parties. In many cases, these policies, sometimes referred to as transitional justice or “victims’ laws,” explicitly included efforts to address the needs of mine/ERW victims. In five states, policies were limited to military victims (either disabled veterans or the families of those killed). In Colombia and El Salvador, laws for victims of armed conflict require comprehensive rehabilitation for both civilian and military victims, including family members of people killed. In Turkey, some victims could apply to receive a one-time payment under laws dedicated to compensating victims of terrorism or counter-terrorism. Mine survivors in Thailand could receive a one-time compensatory payment immediately after injury. In Peru, in theory, the program to provide reparations to victims of armed violence included victims of landmines but, in practice, bureaucratic procedures made it nearly impossible for victims to access assistance through this program.

Coordination of victim assistance through or in coordination with other relevant frameworks

In Colombia, in 2012 mine/ERW victim assistance coordination was largely replaced by the coordination mechanism for the implementation of the country’s law of reparations for all victims of armed conflict. While some saw this as a more effective way to coordinate victim assistance, for others the shift raised concerns that the specific needs of mine/ERW survivors might be lost within the much larger group of armed conflict victims with divergent needs, such as displaced persons.

62 There was no multisectoral victim assistance coordination, or other coordination inclusive of mine/ERW victims in Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, or Turkey.
63 Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Mozambique.
64 As the victim assistance focal point, the Mozambican mine action center had already shared responsibility for victim assistance coordination with the ministries of health and social affairs for many years.
65 Of the 30 States Parties with significant numbers of mine/ERW survivors, the 21 States Parties with active victim coordination mechanisms include: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda.
66 Monitor research has identified such programs in: Afghanistan, Algeria, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Peru, South Sudan, Serbia, Thailand, and Turkey. It is possible that they exist in others.
67 Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Serbia.
Planning

The Cartagena Action Plan calls on States Parties to develop and implement a comprehensive plan of action, with a budget, to meet the needs and human rights of mine victims, including by ensuring that broader relevant national policies, plans, and legal frameworks take account of mine victims. Between 2005 and 2009, under the Nairobi Action Plan, 10 states68 with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims had already developed victim assistance plans and seven69 of these were actively being implemented in 2009.

By 2013, more than three-quarters of the States Parties with significant numbers of victims had a victim assistance plan of action or a broader plan that included victims, or were in the process of developing such a plan.70 Nineteen of 30 71 had an approved plan in place, 20 three of 30 States Parties had or were developing plans. Eritrea, Iraq, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, and Turkey did not have plans, nor was there a plan actively being developed as of the end of 2012. Among states without plans, Serbia had started a planning process in 2012, but this effort was put on hold during elections. Sudan’s plan expired in 2011 and was to be updated to include Darfur, but international technical and financial assistance was needed.

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21 Albania, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, Ethiopia, El Salvador, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. Both Colombia and El Salvador had plans to implement laws regarding comprehensive rehabilitation for victims of armed conflict.

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Casualties and Victim Assistance

and of these, seven were new in 2012. An additional four states had plans under development. Afghanistan and Angola were developing victim assistance plans to replace previous plans that had expired while Algeria and Guinea-Bissau were developing their first victim assistance plans. However, while many states made considerable efforts and received international support to develop plans aligned with the Cartagena Action Plan, and in several cases also aligned with victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, progress in implementing plans was limited in many states. Plans in Croatia and Yemen were inactive in 2012. In Burundi, Chad, Mozambique, and Uganda, a lack of dedicated funding prevented the implementation of plans. The victim assistance plan in BiH lacked clearly defined responsibilities and was reported to be ineffective as a tool to support adequate victim assistance. In DRC and South Sudan, reduced funding for victim assistance halfway through 2012 greatly slowed progress in implementing these plans.

Planning through, or with, other relevant frameworks

In 2012, in a growing number of States Parties victim assistance planning was integrated into broader frameworks, most especially disability planning and/or plans to address the rights and rehabilitation of victims of armed conflict.

In six states, mine/ERW survivors or their representative organizations were explicitly included in the national disability plan and/or its development. For example, Mozambique’s disability plan for 2012 to 2019 includes a specific section related to assistance for landmine survivors with the objective to “provide psychosocial support and socioeconomic reintegration for mine victims with disabilities.” The section included a budget for its implementation but lacked dedicated funding. In two additional states, Algeria and South Sudan, disability plans were under development as of June 2013 that included mine/ERW survivors.

Several states had both victim assistance and disability plans that were developed to be complementary and mutually reinforcing. For example, Albania’s victim assistance plan referred to the national disability plan and South Sudan’s victim assistance plan included efforts to promote the ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) for the benefit of survivors and other persons with disabilities. Burundi’s victim assistance plan contained actions to promote the rights of all persons with disabilities. In Peru, the annual victim assistance work plan included a component to assist survivors in registering as persons with disabilities in order to access benefits available to that population.

Ethiopia adopted a national disability plan in 2012 that it also intended to apply to victim assistance efforts. Guinea-Bissau lacked a specific national plan on victim assistance in 2012; however, its National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2011–2015 includes the aim of the “rehabilitation and reintegration of all victims (victims of war and mines/ERW included) and their full participation in the socio-economic reconstruction to [sic] the country as an actor for development, and thus re-establish their rights and dignity.” In 2012, Colombia approved a national plan for the implementation of its victims’ law. In Uganda, the perspective of survivors was included in planning national community-based rehabilitation efforts.

Monitoring, evaluation, and reporting

While several victim assistance coordination mechanisms included the monitoring of the implementation of victim assistance plans within their mandate, little information was available on an annual basis on the results of such monitoring. In 2011, Mozambique undertook a comprehensive evaluation of the results of the national disability plan at the plan’s conclusion, and Angola made a similar effort in 2012 after its victim assistance plan expired. In Uganda, a tool to monitor the implementation of the national victim assistance plan was developed and piloted in 2012. A full evaluation of the plan was programmed for early 2014. An evaluation of Senegal’s victim assistance plan was underway as of May 2013.

Experts from States Parties noted that most existing victim assistance plans (and disability plans that included victim assistance) lacked functioning monitoring mechanisms, and requested training on monitoring and evaluation. The Mine Ban Treaty’s sessions of the Victim Assistance Experts’ Parallel Programme in May and December 2012 were dedicated to improving these technical skills.

Between 2009 and 2013, most States Parties with significant numbers of victims regularly reported on their efforts to implement victim assistance, either through statements at meetings of States Parties or through completion of the voluntary form J of the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, or both. In 2012, all but three of the 30 States Parties with significant numbers of victims provided reporting in some form. Only South Sudan directly linked its reporting through the Article 7 report to its planning process, providing its victim assistance plan as an annex to the report. Several states gave detailed reports on progress and challenges in implementing victim assistance, including Afghanistan, Albania, Colombia, Eritrea, and Tajikistan. Mozambique provided detailed reporting on victim assistance through its Article 7 reporting under the Convention on Cluster

23 Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen. Yemen’s plan was developed in 2010, but was not officially approved until 2012.

24 Yemen’s victim assistance plan was approved part way through 2012 but not budgeted for until 2013.

25 Cambodia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, and Sudan. In addition, Ethiopia’s disability plan was said to include survivors, although this was not confirmed.


27 BIH, El Salvador, and Nicaragua did not report in any form. These three states plus Algeria, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, and Uganda did not provide updates on victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 voluntary form J.
other relevant frameworks. In all but four of the 18, assistance coordination or in the coordination of mine/ERW victims, survivors participated in victim survivor networks, often as staff or board members of NGOs, including organizations in those mechanisms. Survivors were also actively involved in the implementation of victim assistance involved survivors or their representative organizations in those mechanisms. Survivors were also actively involved in the implementation of victim assistance in nearly all States Parties, although most often as staff or board members of NGOs, including survivor networks.

In 18 of 30 States Parties with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims and active coordinating mechanisms for victim assistance involved survivors or their representative organizations in those mechanisms. Survivors were also actively involved in the implementation of victim assistance in nearly all States Parties, although most often as staff or board members of NGOs, including survivor networks.

In 18 of 30 States Parties with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims, survivors participated in victim assistance coordination or in the coordination of other relevant frameworks. In all but four of the 18, representation was organized through national or local survivor networks. In Sudan, where there was no specific survivor network, survivors were represented in both the national victim assistance coordination mechanism and the national disability council through DPOs that included survivors.

Even where there was no regular victim assistance coordination, in a further three States Parties, survivors who were organized in groups and networks found opportunities to present and have their views included in victim assistance-related programs and plans in 2012. In Serbia, where there was no active victim assistance coordination, survivors and their representative organizations included themselves in other relevant spaces, such as committees to revise the law on veterans with disabilities and to reform regulations requiring accessibility for all to buildings and public spaces. The national network of survivors in El Salvador coordinated regularly with the Protection Fund for victims of armed conflict. In Iraq, the national alliance of persons with disabilities, an organization led by a survivor, met with government representatives in Colombia noted, for example.

While survivor participation in national victim assistance coordination increased under the Cartagena Action Plan, it was not always effective in terms of the ability of survivors to contribute to decision-making, often due to a lack of resources. The vast majority of survivor networks had very small or no budgets and were dependent on small amounts of international financial support and/or voluntary contributions of time and in-kind support from their members. This restricted the ability of many networks to maintain regular contact with members in order to properly represent their views and needs, as well as to cover travel costs to participate in coordination meetings, which government representatives in Colombia noted, for example.

In some cases, a lack of financial support forced survivor networks to close down during the period of the Cartagena Action Plan, such as in Ethiopia, Jordan, Peru, and Serbia. The closure of the international NGO Survivor Corps (formerly Landmine Survivor Network) in 2010 eliminated an important source of financial and technical support for survivor networks. Between 1997 and 2010, Survivor Corps supported and/or organized survivor networks in some 20 different mine-affected countries, championing survivor-led advocacy and peer support among survivors. The launch of the ICBL-CMC’s Survivor Network Project in 2012 at least partially began to fill the gap created by the closure of Survivor Corps and to meet civil society’s demand for support of survivor participation. By mid-2013, it had provided financial support to 11 survivor networks in as many countries.

Overall, national government support for survivor networks was limited, although at least 10 States Parties did provide support of some kind to survivor networks or disabled veteran organizations between 2009 and 2013. Generally, the support was in-kind or in the form of training and capacity-building. For example, in Tajikistan, the national mine action center strengthened the capacity of emerging networks and helped link the networks with international financial assistance. Local authorities provided the survivor network with spaces for meetings and training courses. In Colombia, the Medellin City Council trained local survivor associations in providing psychological support in 2011 and the national mine action center launched a survivor network capacity building project in 2012. In South Sudan, the Ministry of Social Affairs supported the formation of a survivor network and included it in training for other DPOs. In Thailand, the government facilitated the participation of survivor groups in meetings and in conducting outreach.

Between 2009 and 2013, survivors and survivor networks were also active in implementing victim assistance in at least 23 States Parties. Survivors, through survivor networks, were most often active in peer support, including raising awareness of services and providing transportation, social inclusion, and advocacy on survivors’ rights. In several states they were also active in the fields of physical rehabilitation and economic

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78 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda.

79 Exceptions were Angola, Jordan, Peru, and Sudan.

80 Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, DRC, Entrea, Ethiopia, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen.

81 Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. The survivor network in Yemen suspended its operations in 2011 due to armed conflict, and the network in Peru ceased to operate during the period.
Casualties and Victim Assistance

Survivors and survivor networks also had a key role in monitoring national victim assistance implementation for Monitor reporting. Between 2009 and 2013, survivors or survivor networks from 10 States Parties formed part of the Monitor research network, investigating all aspects of victim assistance coordination and implementation.

Less progress was seen between 2009 and 2013 by States Parties in the participation of survivors at international levels, either through their involvement in preparing statements on victim assistance for international meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty or through their direct participation in these meetings as members of states’ delegations. In 2009, seven States Parties included a survivor or person with a disability as a member of their delegation at intersessional meetings and/or the review conference. For the entire period from 2010 to 2013, the Monitor identified just six States Parties with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims with a survivor or person with a disability as a member of their delegation.

In just five other States Parties, survivors contributed in other ways to the work of their states’ international representation under the time period of the Cartagena Action Plan. Survivors from El Salvador, Ethiopia, and Tajikistan contributed to the drafting of national victim assistance statements prior to some international meetings. Uganda’s government victim assistance focal point shared statements prepared for international meetings with survivors’ representatives prior to the meetings. In Cambodia, survivors were involved in the organization of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in their country.

**Survivor participation in other frameworks**

In addition to their participation in victim assistance coordination and implementation, several survivors and their representative organizations participated in other forums and frameworks. In 11 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, survivor networks were actively involved in efforts to join and/or implement the CRPD. In Afghanistan, Albania, DRC, and Iraq, survivors along with other DPOs were successful in advocating for ratification of the CRPD in 2012 and 2013. In BiH, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Peru, and Uganda, survivors and their representative groups supported effective implementation of the CRPD, including through the development of an implementation plan (in Peru), assessing the needs of persons with disabilities and monitoring the CRPD’s implementation (in BiH and El Salvador), and raising awareness of rights of persons with disabilities and obligations of national and local authorities under the CRPD (in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Uganda).

In several cases, work on the CRPD or efforts to promote disability rights more generally was facilitated by increased collaboration between survivor networks and DPOs over the last five years. In Albania, Algeria, BiH, Burundi, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Senegal, and Thailand, survivor networks worked with DPOs, in most cases around CRPD implementation and ratification campaigns. In Algeria and Mozambique, the survivor network and DPOs worked together to implement needs assessments and service referral programs. In El Salvador, the survivor network participated in a national coalition of DPOs that drafted El Salvador’s alternative report on CRPD implementation. In Senegal’s Casamance region, the local survivor network shared office space with a DPO. Despite generally improved and increased collaboration among survivor networks and DPOs, some survivor networks, including in Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Uganda, reported resistance to their participation in the national disability rights movement on the part of DPOs, particularly national federations of DPOs.

At the provincial and local levels, survivor groups were also active through a range of different frameworks in several States Parties. In BiH, El Salvador, and Serbia, survivor groups worked with local authorities to promote physical accessibility to buildings and public spaces. Regional committees for the implementation of the Victims’ Law in Colombia included representatives of survivor groups. In Thailand, an increasing number of survivors held leadership roles in their communities. In Uganda, a local survivor group was elected to serve on a committee responsible for the design and implementation of local development projects.

**Service accessibility and availability**

The Cartagena Action Plan calls on States Parties to increase the availability of and accessibility to appropriate services for mine/ERW victims while also raising awareness among mine/ERW victims and within government authorities about available services. Following the Nairobi Action Plan, it was determined that there remained a particular lack of opportunities available to victims for psychological support and economic inclusion, while many victims in rural and remote areas still struggled to access all types of assistance, including healthcare and rehabilitation.

Under the Cartagena Action Plan, some progress was made in increasing awareness of available services, although by 2013 there remained a need to facilitate access to services and programs for most mine/ERW victims. Availability of services increased during the period in some States Parties, but mostly in the area of physical rehabilitation as funding targeted for victim assistance supported the opening of new rehabilitation centers in regions of mine-affected countries where there were significant numbers of mine/ERW survivors.

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82 Some examples of States Parties where survivors were involved in providing physical rehabilitation include Afghanistan, DRC, El Salvador, and Iraq; and in economic inclusion activities include BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, and Senegal.

83 Survivors networks and/or their representatives in Afghanistan, Cambodia, DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Serbia, Senegal, Turkey, and Uganda were researchers or provided information.

84 BiH, Ethiopia, Peru, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand.

85 Afghanistan, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, DRC, El Salvador, Iraq, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, and Uganda.
However, in other States Parties, the availability of victim assistance decreased as international support declined, underscoring the continued importance of finding solutions to sustain programs that benefit survivors along with other persons with disabilities. As of September 2013, several national NGOs promoting and providing a range of assistance, including social and economic inclusion and psychological support, were reporting funding shortfalls that could result in their closure unless immediate funding was secured.

**Access to victim assistance**

Between 2009 and 2013, there have been important efforts in 17 of the 30 States Parties with the most significant numbers of mine/ERW victims to increase access to mainstream services and programs by making survivors aware of available services through service directories and referrals. In Colombia and Sudan, mine action centers have produced directories of victim assistance. Handicap International (HI) has done the same in Algeria, DRC, Iraq, Mozambique, and Uganda, working with local survivor networks and DPOs in the production and distribution of the directories. In various States Parties where the ICRC or the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled operates, the ICRC has established referral networks, often in cooperation with the local Red Cross or Red Crescent, to make survivors and other persons with disabilities more aware of rehabilitation programs.

In 11 of the 17 States Parties, survivor networks and other DPOs have continuously referred survivors to services as a component of peer support (BIH, DRC, El Salvador, Senegal, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen) and/or while undertaking needs assessments (Cambodia, Mozambique, Serbia, Senegal, and Sudan).

In 2012, programs to facilitate access to victim assistance decreased in Colombia and Uganda as international funding and support to victim assistance actors in both countries declined. In these states, various NGOs have supported access by funding transportation and accommodation and paying for services on behalf of survivors who would have been unable to reach services otherwise.

Improvements in physical accessibility in several countries, due to an increase in accessibility laws and regulations (see below), have made some services, particularly health centers and schools, more accessible to mine/ERW survivors since 2009. However, improvements have been modest to date and have largely been limited to urban centers, while most survivors are based in rural areas.

**Availability of victim assistance**

In 2012, increases in the availability of services for mine/ERW survivors were identified in eight States Parties. Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, and Nicaragua, all saw an increase in physical rehabilitation centers with new centers in Colombia, Jordan, and Nicaragua located in parts of the country where there were significant numbers of mine/ERW survivors. In El Salvador, the annual budget of the Protection Fund increased in 2012, making physical rehabilitation services and economic inclusion opportunities, including pensions, available to a larger group of mine/ERW survivors and other victims of armed conflict. In Nicaragua and Peru, there were increased opportunities for economic inclusion through victim assistance projects that also benefited other persons with disabilities. The community-based rehabilitation program in Thailand expanded, reaching more survivors in remote and rural areas. In Yemen, the increased availability of assistance was a result of the restarting of the mine action center’s victim assistance program following its suspension in 2011.

At the same time, availability of services decreased in nine other States Parties, either due to reduced international assistance (including both funding to or technical support from international NGOs) or decreased national investment in physical rehabilitation. In Cambodia, Mozambique, and Uganda, international dedicated victim assistance support—either through the UN or international NGOs—decreased or was suspended, thus reducing the number of economic inclusion projects that targeted mine/ERW victims and also benefited other persons with disabilities. In Angola, Mozambique, and Senegal, prosthetic production declined or ceased altogether in 2012. In Angola, the availability of physical rehabilitation declined through the period, following the transition of rehabilitation centers to national management. In Mozambique, there were no prosthetics produced from mid-2011 through early 2013 due to a lack of materials. In Senegal’s Casamance region, a lack of trained technicians forced the rehabilitation center to suspend production until the center could be properly staffed.

**International legislation and policies**

The Cartagena Action Plan calls for a holistic and integrated approach to victim assistance that is sensitive to both age and gender, as well as being undertaken in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law. The Cartagena Action Plan refers to the need for “adequate” assistance, without defining what adequate means. Relevant international humanitarian and human rights law should guide States Parties on the scope of their responsibilities and must in any case be applied by those countries that are party to the relevant conventions and treaties. For example, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) clearly recognizes the right “to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” Similar applicable provisions with specific age and gender focus, respectively, are found in

87 Algeria, BIH, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, El Salvador, Iraq, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.

88 Angola, Cambodia, DRC, Eritrea, Mozambique, Senegal, South Sudan, Turkey, and Uganda.

89 The majority of states in the world are parties to the ICESCR. As of June 2012, other than Mozambique, all States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with survivors were also parties to ICESCR.
in the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).90

Other international instruments with close relevance to victim assistance that may be used synergistically with the Mine Ban Treaty include the CRPD, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.91

The right to equality and non-discrimination

States Parties have committed not to discriminate in the provision of assistance either against or among mine victims and also not to discriminate between mine survivors with disabilities and other persons with disabilities.92 However, between 2009 and 2013, some types of discrimination persisted in many different States Parties.

In some States Parties, national organizations of persons with disabilities were part of intersectoral decision-making bodies or had influence over the distribution of states resources designated for assisting persons with disabilities, while local mine survivors’ organizations were not able to attain the same access, for example in Croatia and Ethiopia. In Uganda, the national mine survivor network struggled for acceptance by the national disability federation for several years before finally gaining a non-voting seat in mid-2013. In Albania, certain groups of persons with disabilities had benefits and privileges for themselves and their families which were not available to landmine survivors with disabilities. Conversely, facilities and services established through the victim assistance program in Albania were available to all persons with needs similar to those of mine/ERW survivors.

In some States Parties both military and civilian war victims received privileged or different treatment. In Afghanistan, BiH, Croatia, Eritrea, Senegal, Serbia, and Thailand, Jordan reported having made efforts to reduce the preferential treatment of military survivors by increasing victim assistance available to civilians.

War veterans, including injured war veterans and former combatants with disabilities from mine/ERW and other causes, received greater services and benefits than civilian survivors in many countries, including in Afghanistan, BiH, Croatia, Eritrea, Senegal, Serbia, and Thailand. Jordan reported having made efforts to redress the preferential treatment of military survivors by increasing victim assistance available to civilians.

In some States Parties, national organizations of persons with disabilities were part of intersectoral decision-making bodies or had influence over the distribution of states resources designated for assisting persons with disabilities, while local mine survivors’ organizations were not able to attain the same access, for example in Croatia and Ethiopia. In Uganda, the national mine survivor network struggled for acceptance by the national disability federation for several years before finally gaining a non-voting seat in mid-2013. In Albania, certain groups of persons with disabilities had benefits and privileges for themselves and their families which were not available to landmine survivors with disabilities. Conversely, facilities and services established through the victim assistance program in Albania were available to all persons with needs similar to those of mine/ERW survivors.

In some States Parties, both military and civilian war victims received privileged or different treatment. In Colombia and in El Salvador, certain benefits were available to all registered conflict victims, including both civilian and military mine/ERW survivors, which were not available to other persons with disabilities. In September 2013, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities called on El Salvador to develop a system of social protections for all persons with disabilities similar to what was available for persons with disabilities as a result of armed conflict.93

The rights of the children

Many survivors are children, especially boys, yet age-sensitive assistance has remained one of the least considered aspects of the victim assistance activities under the Mine Ban Treaty. Children whose injuries result in amputated limbs require more complicated rehabilitative assistance; they need to have prostheses made more often as they grow and may require corrective surgery for the changing shape of a residual limb (stump).94

In many countries, child survivors have to end their education prematurely due to the period of recovery needed and the accompanying financial burden of rehabilitation on families. A lack of physical access to schooling and other public services essential to social and economic inclusion was an ongoing challenge for child survivors in many countries. Access to education was often further hindered by the lack of appropriate training for teachers.

Most efforts reported by states to address the needs of child victims have been limited to disaggregating data on survivors, not on their efforts to address the specific needs of all child victims according to their age. Victim assistance providers rarely keep statistics that provide reliable records of how many child mine/ERW survivors or other children with disabilities have been assisted and which services have been rendered. Where age-sensitive assistance were present, most reported services were for child survivors, although children of people killed were covered by laws on victims of armed conflict in Colombia and El Salvador.

Recognizing the need for improvements in the area of victim assistance for children, the Co-Chairs of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-economic Reintegration initiated a process to develop international guidelines on providing assistance to children, adolescents, and their families. The process began with a two-day workshop of victim assistance experts in May 2013. This coincided with efforts by UNICEF and the Committee of Persons with Disabilities, “Observaciones finales sobre el informe inicial de El Salvador, aprobadas por el Comité su décimo periodo de sesiones, 2 a 13 de septiembre de 2013” (“Final observations of El Salvador’s initial report, approved by the Committee in its 10th Session, 2-13 September 2013”), CRPD/C/SLV(CO)/1, 13 September 2013, p. 10, www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/10thSession/CRPD-C-SLV-CO-1_sp.doc.


States Parties to the CRPD also recognize “that children with disabilities should have full enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis with other children,” and recall the obligations undertaken by States Parties to the CRC. All states are States Parties to the CRC with the exception of the Somalia, South Sudan, and the US.


in 2013; the theme of its flagship report “The State of the World’s Children” was children with disabilities and included a focus on the impact of mines/ERW.96

Since 2009, efforts to assist children or make their rights available have been isolated and sometimes cursory. In 2012 and 2013, an increasing, although small, number of activities to address the specific needs of survivors according to their age were reported in States Parties. These developments included progress in several countries, but also recognition of the remaining and ongoing challenges in most States Parties with responsibilities for child victims.

In Colombia, most hospitals were able to provide emergency medical care specific to the needs of child survivors, but access to appropriate ongoing medical care was hampered by administrative and bureaucratic obstacles. Child survivors in rural areas faced a scarcity of school transportation and schools themselves were not adapted to the needs of children with disabilities. In response to a significant increase in child casualties in 2011 and 2012, Colombia established a special coordination committee for child victims.

The Regional Center for Psychosocial Rehabilitation of Children and Young People, Including Mine Victims, “Model of Active Rehabilitation and Education (M.A.R.E.),” was successfully established in Croatia by mid-2012.

In Uganda, a government-launched program on inclusive education and a national accessibility campaign contributed to some increased access to schools for children with disabilities, although this was mainly limited to urban areas.

Since 2008, a government-run inclusive education program has been operating in Afghanistan that increased the enrollment of children with disabilities. Inclusive education training for teachers, as well as children with disabilities and their parents, continued to increase in 2012.

In South Sudan, a school for children with disabilities opened in 2012; however, there was a lack of teachers trained in working with children with disabilities. In Senegal, there was an increased focus on education for child survivors. In Yemen, some schools were made physically accessible in the reporting period.

**Gender-sensitive victim assistance and the rights of female victims**

In considering what constitutes a rights-based approach to gender-sensitive victim assistance, CEDAW includes relevant provisions on rights of women to health, education, employment, and economic and social benefits on an equal basis with others; it also includes provisions for States Parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure the application of the convention to women in rural areas.97

However, similar to the situation of age-sensitive victim assistance, most efforts reported over the last five years regarding gender have been in the disaggregation of casualty data and assessment survey information. Addressing the needs of female survivors and female family of men or children killed and injured by mines/ERW has received far less attention in reporting by states and service providers. Yet, several specific activities were recorded in 2012 and there has been an overall increase in such activities being reported since 2009.

The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA-RAD) increased the number of beneficiaries of its services in Afghanistan, including the number of women provided with transportation and accommodation at their facilities with an outreach program and mobile orthopedic workshop.

In Algeria, HI expanded its programs for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities to increase access to the labor market for youth and women with disabilities. In Burundi and El Salvador, there were increased economic inclusion opportunities for women mine/ERW survivors than there had been in previous years. The Yemen Landmine Survivors’ Association increased the participation of women and girl mine/ERW survivors in its peer support and economic and advocacy activities in 2012.

Some organizations working with mine/ERW victims particularly addressed the needs of women. In South Sudan, the national NGO Christian Women’s Empowerment Program provided vocational training and income-generating activities for women. In Uganda, a local DPO, Kasese District Women with Disabilities, provided ongoing support to members through advocacy and referral to physical rehabilitation.

In Mozambique, an evaluation found that, despite the efforts of many programs for persons with disabilities to promote the inclusion of women with disabilities, women with disabilities still suffered greater discrimination than men with disabilities, with more living in poverty and experiencing lower rates of employment. This situation is far from exceptional and similar findings from other countries were presented periodically in surveys since 2009.

Recent surveys for Europe and central Asia in 201298 and Cambodia in early 201399 also demonstrated that women with disabilities in countries with mine/ERW survivors faced multiple forms of discrimination.

Often, where assistance existed, the focus was on survivors who are predominately male. Few instances have been reported of fulfillment of the rights to assistance for family members who are often female heads of households and who often have the greatest responsibility for the care and assistance of child


99 CEDAW, Articles 11–14, www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/eConvention.htm - article1. Of the 30 States Parties referred to here, only Somalia, South Sudan, and Sudan are not yet States Parties to CEDAW. The CRPD also has a dedicated article on the rights of women with disabilities, Article 6.
survivors. An area where this differs to some extent is under laws for veterans and victims of violence and armed conflict. Women who have lost their husbands are entitled to receive some benefits in countries, including Afghanistan, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, and others. In Iraq, the ICRC provided assistance to register for benefits and supported income-generating activities for thousands of female heads of households whose spouses were victims of conflict, including due to mines/ERW.

Regulation of the right to physical accessibility
Physical accessibility to healthcare, education, job training programs, other public services, and community spaces can be a first step toward broader accessibility to services for mine/ERW survivors. Through the Cartagena Action Plan, States Parties committed to increasing accessibility to appropriate services by removing barriers, by the application of relevant standards and accessibility guidelines, as well as by the application of good practices. To this end it was recommended that states assess the accessibility of the physical environment and adapt inaccessible construction to be fully accessible, based on international standards.100

The CRPD also recognizes the importance of accessibility, including access to the physical environment, in enabling persons with disabilities to fully enjoy all human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Monitor found that as of mid-2013, many States Parties still lacked laws or standards on physical accessibility, and several states that had such legislation were not implementing it.

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
The CRPD is an international human rights convention that recognizes the dignity and human rights of persons with disabilities, not by creating new rights, but rather by identifying existing human rights and providing for the implementation of those rights.101 In the Mine Ban Treaty context, the CRPD is considered to “provide the States Parties with a more systematic, sustainable, gender sensitive and human rights based approach by bringing victim assistance into the broader context of persons with disabilities.”102

The ICBL has noted that synergies between victim assistance obligations and CRPD obligations require efforts on both fronts in order for survivors and other persons with disabilities to benefit to the greatest extent possible. The ICBL also has cautioned that the mainstreaming of victim assistance within the broader field of disability without championing assistance for mine/ERW victims who are not persons with disabilities will likely lead to some victim assistance obligations not being fulfilled.103

In June 2013, Thailand, Co-Chair of the Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation, and Assistance, hosted the Bangkok Symposium on Cooperation and Assistance: Building Synergy Towards Effective Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation. The event had a particular focus on victim assistance, disability rights, and development. The ICBL noted that victim assistance cooperation resources must be understood to be those that actually reach the victims. The ICBL highlighted a need to continue supporting dedicated victim assistance activities, including survivors’ own networks, while monitoring the impact of support that may reach survivors through other frameworks.104

The Cartagena Action Plan often refers to a rights-based approach to assistance. As mentioned above, several states have referred to the ratification and implementation of the CRPD as part of victim assistance activities and sometimes as a concrete objective of their victim assistance planning. The efforts of victim assistance actors, including survivor networks in many States Parties, have contributed to national advocacy efforts around the CRPD.

By September 2013, 20 of the 30 countries with significant numbers of survivors among States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had ratified the CRPD. Of these, five ratified during this reporting period: Mozambique in January 2012, Afghanistan in September 2012, Cambodia in December 2012, Albania in February 2013, and Iraq in March 2013.105 ICBL-CMC victim assistance focal points and member survivor networks in all these countries strongly advocated for ratification and/or effective implementation. In addition, Chad signed the CRPD in September 2012, Guinea-Bissau signed in September 2013, and Burundi remained a signatory state. Legislation for the ratification of the CRPD was passed nationally in the DRC in September 2013.

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## Physical accessibility legislation and implementation in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Accessibility legislation/standard</th>
<th>State of implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Majority of buildings remained inaccessible; modifications undertaken by NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Few government buildings accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Law not regularly enforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No legislation for accessibility to public or private facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Buildings were rarely retrofitted to be accessible as prescribed by law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No regulation of access to buildings or government services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Inaccessibility prevented persons with disabilities from participating in social and economic activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No regulation of access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>National and local government projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited to larger cities and new construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No regulation of access to buildings or government services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited progress, only in cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Many new buildings being built to be accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Process happening to promote implementation in future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No efforts were made to ensure access to buildings or streets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>New accessibility law in 2012, but the law was not adequately enforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Majority of offices had limited or no access and streets were not accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Slow progress, limited to Maputo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Some accessible buses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Very limited progress overall; “Tumbes Accessible” pilot project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lack of implementation and necessary infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>In Belgrade - limited to some new buildings; some activities in other areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Has never had accessible public services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No efforts to make buildings accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Almost no buildings and public spaces accessible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Efforts underway in 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Accessibility legislation not consistently enforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>In large cities, but limited in mine-affected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Regulations in place, law pending; some modifications in cities, mostly limited to Kampala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Inaccessible buildings and public transport systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: For more information, including an early version of this table, see: Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Physical Accessibility for Landmine Survivors (Briefing Paper),” May 2013, Annex I.*
Casualties and Victim Assistance

Convention on Cluster Munitions
The Convention on Cluster Munitions ensures the full realization of the rights of all persons in communities affected by cluster munitions by obligating states to adequately provide assistance, without discriminating between people affected by cluster munitions and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other causes. Therefore, it includes mine survivors under its victim assistance obligations and commitments. The principles of the convention’s Vientiane Action Plan mirror most of those of the Mine Ban Treaty Cartagena Action Plan, but unlike the Mine Ban Treaty’s plan, the Vientiane Action Plan contains a range of concrete timeframes for actions.106

As of 1 August 2013, except for Lao PDR and Lebanon (both of which also have significant numbers of mine survivors), all Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties and signatories with cluster munition victims were also party to the Mine Ban Treaty. In total, 21 of the 31 states with cluster munition victims were party to the Mine Ban Treaty.107

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty continued to coordinate their implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions victim assistance obligations with their efforts under the Mine Ban Treaty. All but one of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that had designated a victim assistance focal point under Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions had chosen the same focal point as those active under the Mine Ban Treaty, including government ministries that act as focal points. The exception, BiH, designated the national mine action center as the focal point for the Mine Ban Treaty but designated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the focal point for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Convention on Conventional Weapons
The Plan of Action on Victim Assistance under CCW Protocol V on ERW, adopted on 11 November 2008, contains provisions similar to the Cartagena Action Plan and the Convention on Cluster Munitions on victim assistance, although without the specific and time-bound obligations for States Parties.108 As of 1 September 2013, seven States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with responsibility for survivors were party to Protocol V.109

While reporting on victim assistance in ERW-affected countries under Protocol V has been intermittent, inconsistent, and incomplete, it was given increased attention with the use of a specific questionnaire on victim assistance, introduced in 2008.110 Ukraine, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, reports ERW casualties, disaggregated by age and gender, only in its annual Protocol V reporting.

Victim assistance in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty111

Awareness raising and coordination
Since 2009, awareness of the rights and needs of mine/ERW victims increased in states not party with significant numbers of mine survivors. Particularly from 2011 through 2013, media reports about the situation of survivors increased substantially in India,112 Myanmar,113 Nepal,114 Pakistan,115 and Sri Lanka.116 This was influenced by civil society activities, including advocacy by NGOs working closely with survivors and survivor networks.

More attention was also given to mine/ERW survivors in Lao PDR and Lebanon, both States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with obligations to provide victim assistance under that convention. Awareness of the needs of survivors increased in both states in 2010–2011, coinciding with their hosting the First and Second Meetings of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, respectively. Although the focus times presented otherwise unavailable insights into states reporting on victim assistance in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty such as Georgia, India, Israel, Pakistan, and Russia.

107 States not party with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims: India, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Disputed area: Western Sahara.


109 More attention was also given to mine/ERW casualties: India, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. Disputed area: Western Sahara.


on the needs of victims subsequently diminished, both countries’ governments continued to raise the issue of
the need for renewed or improved needs assessment and Lebanon highlighted the need for international financial
support to address the needs of victims. In Lebanon, the plight of refugees from Syria, including persons
injured by conflict and mines/ERW, as well as the overall security situation in 2012 and 2013, impeded progress in
addressing the needs of victims while also putting more pressure on limited resources available to assist victims.

The government of Iran raised the profile of survivors’ needs through extensive documentation of findings
from two quality of life assessments of both civilian and military survivors and others injured as a result of armed
conflict. The government research agency, working with survivors and other groups of victims, made the results
public through awareness-raising events.

Focal points and coordination of victim assistance
issues remained wanting in many of these same states.
India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka lacked coordination
of victim assistance, although each had ministries with
responsibilities for persons with disabilities. The Ministry
for Martyrs and Veterans Affairs in Iran and the Ministry
of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs in Vietnam played
more direct roles in coordinating assistance to mine/ERW
victims as a subset among other persons with disabilities,
including those disabled by armed conflict and its ongoing
impact. Only Lao PDR and Lebanon had victim assistance
focal points and coordination mechanisms operating
through their respective national mine action centers. This
was in line with their efforts to implement the Convention
on Cluster Munitions, although in both cases, focal points
and coordination mechanisms pre-dated entry into force
of the convention.

In Western Sahara, following a survey of mine/ERW
survivors by the Saharawi survivors’ organization in 2012,
the Polisario government took steps to raise awareness
and address the needs of war victims, including by
starting to develop a law to promote the rights of victims
and persons with disabilities in February 2013.

The rights of survivors and the CRPD
Among the nine states not party to the Mine Ban
Treaty with significant numbers of mine/ERW survivors
discussed above, all were States Parties or signatories
to the CRPD as of September 2013. Survivor networks
in both CRPD State Party Nepal and signatory Vietnam
have actively participated in national campaigns for
ratification and implementation of the CRPD to improve
the situation for mine/ERW survivors with disabilities.

However, while all six states that are party to the CRPD
ratified it before 2012, as of September 2013, progress in
implementation had been slow. Discrimination against
persons with disabilities persisted in all states, although
there was some limited progress in improving legal
frameworks. Lao PDR and Myanmar had draft disability
laws pending adoption in 2013; however, the Lao PDR
law had been pending approval since 2008. India and

Iran had disability laws in place that were not yet aligned
with the CRPD, despite having ratified in 2010 and 2011,
respectively. In Nepal and Pakistan, laws were in place
but lacked implementation. CRPD signatory Vietnam
passed its first comprehensive disability law in 2011 and
efforts were underway by a national survivor network and
other DPOs to promote its full implementation. Some
progress in improving physical accessibility for persons
with disabilities was identified in Iran and Lao PDR, as
well as in signatory Vietnam.

As of September 2013, all six of the states that have
ratified the CRPD had failed to meet their deadlines
for submitting initial CRPD Article 35 reporting
documentation, and India was more than three years
late.


118 Deadlines for submitting reporting on CRPD implementation were as
follows: India (June 2010), Iran (November 2011), Lao PDR (October
2011), Myanmar (January 2013), Nepal (June 2012), and Pakistan
(August 2013).
Support for Mine Action

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in fulfilling its treaty obligations. The Monitor reports annually on support for mine action by affected countries and on international mine action assistance reported by donor states. In most cases, the Monitor relies on responses to requests for information sent to donors and affected states.

Key developments in 2012

Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$681 million in international and national support for mine action in 2012, $19 million more than in 2011, and $44 million more than in 2010. In addition to those contributions, appropriations from the UN General Assembly for mine action within nine peacekeeping operations provided $113 million in 2012, a 25% increase compared with 2011.

International support for victim assistance from mine action funding sources totaled $32 million, compared to $30 million in 2011, which was the lowest annual total for direct international support for victim assistance activities since the Monitor began reporting by sector in 2007. This sum accounts only for contributions dedicated to victim assistance activities from mine action funding sources, while many donors support victim assistance activities through other development or disability activities.¹

The top 10 donors and recipients remained mostly the same as they have since 2006. Afghanistan received more funding than any other country for the tenth consecutive year, and seven states and the European Union (EU) contributed 80% of funding in 2012.

A study² commissioned by the UN Global Protection Cluster³ concluded that mine action was well funded, largely because of its unique structure, donor funding strategies, and the need to meet treaty obligations.

International contributions

In 2012, 39 donors contributed $497 million in international support for mine action in 52 affected states and four other areas, representing an increase of $30 million (6.4%) from 2011.¹ This is the largest annual total of donor contributions ever recorded by the Monitor, dating back to 1992.

The vast majority of funding came from just a few sources. Contributions from the top eight mine action donors—the United States (US), the EU, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, Australia, Germany, and the United Kingdom (UK)—accounted for 80% of all donor funding. This is similar to 2011.

The top six recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Iraq, Cambodia, Somalia, and Libya—received 47% of the total international support. Donors contributed $57.6 million to institutions, organizations, and trust funds without designating a recipient state, including nearly $34.7 million to the ICRC, Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The UN and

¹ This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs. For more information on funding contributed via other mechanisms, see Other Funding Paths section below. Mine action support includes funding related to landmines, cluster munitions, and unexploded ordnance.

² It is difficult to assess the amount of funding for victim assistance activities because many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs for development and the rights of persons with disabilities.


⁵ The 52 states and four other areas identified in 2012 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Palau, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe; as well as Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.
organizations engaged in advocacy efforts also received global funds.6

The majority of funding was provided for activities in the following sectors: clearance and risk education (84% of all funding), victim assistance (6%), advocacy (3%), and various funding that was not disaggregated by the donors (7%). Of the total contribution to victim assistance, 55% was provided to international and domestic NGOs.

National contributions

Twenty-eight affected states provided $184 million, 27% of global funding, in national support for their own mine action programs, a decrease of $11 million (6%) compared with 2011.

International Contributions in 2012

In 2012, 39 donors reported contributing $497 million in international support for mine action. This represents an increase of $30 million (6.4%) from the $467 million reported in 2011, and is the largest annual amount of donor contributions recorded by the Monitor. Support went to 52 states and four areas, with $57.6 million not earmarked for any specific country.

International contributions for mine action in 2012 totaled more than $430 million for a seventh consecutive year. Since 2006, when international assistance for mine action jumped from $371 million to $464 million, funding has ranged from $437 million to $497 million per year.

Summary of Annual changes: 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU, UAE, and Japan</td>
<td>$67.4 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, and US</td>
<td>$12.6 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 other donors</td>
<td>Less than in 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia and Canada</td>
<td>$31.9 million decrease</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Brazil was the only new donor in 2012, contributing $100,000 through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) for Libya.

Three donors from 2011—the Czech Republic, Romania, and the International Road Union in Afghanistan—did not contribute to mine action in 2012.

Funding paths

In addition to bilateral aid, donors provided funding via several trust fund mechanisms, including: the VTF, administered by UNMAS; the Cluster Munition Trust Fund for Lao PDR, administered by the UNDP; the ITF Enhancing Human Security established by the government of Slovenia; the Common Humanitarian Fund in South Sudan; and the NATO Partnership for Peace Fund (PfP).

In 2012, 28 donors9 contributed $59 million to the VTF, of which 96% was earmarked, compared to 28 donors and $75 million in 2011 and 19 donors and $63 million in 2010. Australia, the EU, Japan, the Netherlands, and the UK were the largest donors to the VTF, representing 67% of all contributions. Several small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action, including Andorra, Brazil, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Oman, and South Korea.10

1. The increase of $41.4 million in 2012 from the EU is largely the result of support to mine action programs in 15 countries, compared to eight in 2011.


9. Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Common Humanitarian Fund, Denmark, Estonia, EU, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.

Donors allocated $21 million in 2012 through the ITF Enhancing Human Security trust fund, down from $25 million in 2011,\textsuperscript{11} and $4.1 million to the Organization of American States (OAS) for mine action programs in Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.\textsuperscript{12}

In 2012 the Global Protection Cluster\textsuperscript{14} commissioned a study\textsuperscript{15} to assess the apparent decline in protection funding, which includes mine action. The study concluded overall funding was not in decline but rather was uncertain and fluctuates by country from year to year. It concluded mine action, in contrast to the other areas, was consistently well-funded. It found that geopolitical factors, particularly Mine Ban Treaty obligations, were the primary reasons for this consistent overall annual funding even if there were annual fluctuations or volatility among donors and recipient countries. Additionally, most donors have a mine action funding strategy and separate budget lines for allocating the funding to a limited number of mine-affected countries, unlike most other sectors.

Recipients

A total of 52 states and four other areas received $439 million from 39 donors in 2012. A further $58 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area. The number of donors for each country, and the amount of support each country received, ranged from one donor contributing several hundred thousand dollars to 19 donors contributing $90 million (for Afghanistan).\textsuperscript{16} Fourteen states and one area, or 29% of recipients, had only one donor, a clear indication

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\textsuperscript{11} The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. Source information can be found in the respective Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org.


\textsuperscript{13} Email from Carl Case, General Coordinator, OAS, 27 June 2013.

\textsuperscript{14} The Global Protection Cluster is an inter-agency forum for coordination of activities in response to humanitarian emergencies. UNMAS represents mine action in the Global Protection Cluster, www.global-protectioncluster.org.


\textsuperscript{16} Afghanistan alone received more than $500 million from 2008-2012, representing 22% of funding over the five-year period.
of weak support. The funding for eight of these 15 single-donor recipients was either for victim assistance or risk education. The other seven recipients received funding for clearance operations.

Of the 56 recipients in 2012, 11 received less than $1 million. As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of the funding. The top recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Iraq, Somalia, Cambodia, Libya, and South Sudan—received nearly half of the total international support, the same as in 2011. For the five years from 2008 to 2012, support to Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Lebanon, and Sudan, in addition to funds categorized as “global,” consumed 62% of all contributions.

The largest increases were in Mali, Myanmar, and Somalia with $41.2 million combined in 2012 compared to $4.7 million in 2011.

Of the six new recipients in 2012, Mali received the most support with $7.7 million, including $6 million from Japan as well as contributions from France, Sweden, and the UK. The other five new recipients—the Philippines, Syria, India, Senegal, and Zimbabwe—received a total of $9.2 million.

Top recipients of international contributions: 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>41.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Global refers to funds from donors which were not earmarked for use within a designated recipient state or area and were allocated to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, the UN, the ICRC, or GICHD. Most advocacy funding is contained within this category of funding.

Other recipients include Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Burundi, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guinea-Bissau, India, FYR Macedonia, the Philippines, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and Uganda, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.

Funding by Thematic Sector

More than 80% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities in 2012. Victim assistance contributions from mine action funding sources were $32 million compared to $30 million in 2011. In both 2011 and 2012, 6% of mine action support was allocated to victim assistance, down from 9% in 2008–2010, which indicates reflecting that victim assistance did not benefit from the overall increase in global mine action funding.

Contributions by thematic sector: 2010–2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance/ risk education</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim assistance</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile destruction</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>480</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Victim assistance

Dedicated international support for victim assistance activities totaled $32 million in 2012, about the same as in 2011 ($30 million).

The Monitor does not provide a global breakdown of nationally-allocated resources for victim assistance because adequate data is not available. As the Monitor’s country profiles on victim assistance indicate, nationally-allocated resources through health, education, labor, and social welfare agencies and organizations (both governmental and non-governmental) largely support programs and activities that target persons with disabilities, regardless of the cause of the injury or disability, including landmine and cluster munition survivors. Funding and expenditures for programs that benefit the larger disability community are not disaggregated in Article 7 annual reports or other sources to account for support that reaches mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors.

Of the $32 million in direct contributions for victim assistance in 2012, almost 80% came from the US, Norway, Australia, and New Zealand. Twenty-two mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance. Of the countries and other...
areas that received mine action support in 2012, those receiving victim assistance funding included 19 States Parties, 10 states not party, and one other area.¹¹

Victim assistance funding by donor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>15,464,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>4,174,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2,797,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2,512,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>967,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>945,137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>863,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>771,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>732,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>514,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>479,898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>405,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>305,877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>280,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>245,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>202,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>198,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>83,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>53,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32,199,864</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Victim assistance funding by recipient

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Amount ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>8,947,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>3,875,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2,937,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2,522,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2,103,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1,938,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,685,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>1,607,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1,016,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>644,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>548,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>519,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>514,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>321,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>267,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>210,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>168,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>168,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>160,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Americas</td>
<td>158,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>144,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>133,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>124,719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>122,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>107,540</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>98,340</td>
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<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>63,561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>51,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>14,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>13,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR</td>
<td>12,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>11,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32,199,864</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties are indicated in bold. States not party and other areas (Kosovo) are indicated in italics.

Of the $32 million in contributions toward victim assistance activities in 2012, $17.7 million (55%) went directly to international and national NGOs, $11.3 million (35%) went through the ICRC and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, $1.5 million (5%) went to the UN and the OAS, and $1.5 million (5%) went through ITF Enhancing Human Security.

Advocacy

In 2012, 3% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities ($13 million). Of the 39 donors reporting international contributions to mine action in 2012, 12 reported a supporting-advocacy activity, which was a decline of two donors from 2011, and four fewer than in 2010. Norway provided 65% of all funding for advocacy activities.

Advocacy activities included: support for the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva and for the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Geneva, travel sponsorship through UNDP for government personnel, and the sponsorship program of the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit. The CMC, the ICBL, Geneva Call, Handicap International, Norwegian People’s Aid, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, and GICHD also received donor support for advocacy.

National Contributions

While there has been more transparency from affected states, national contributions for mine action activities continue to be under-reported overall as few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports. Countries such as Algeria, India, Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam (all mine-affected states with significant contamination and major clearance operations, usually by the army) have never reported annual expenditures. Some unofficial estimates put annual government contributions to demining in Vietnam to be as much as $100 million.¹⁹ Twenty-eight states and other areas reported $184 million in contributions to mine action from their national budgets in 2012. Angola ($77 million) and Croatia ($40 million) accounted for 64% of the total. Chile, Denmark, and Venezuela, as well as Taiwan, receive all of their mine action funding from domestic sources. The mine action program in Angola, Azerbaijan, and Croatia receive more than 80% of their funding from national sources.

Few states reported national contributions to victim assistance, exceptions being El Salvador ($3.4 million)²⁰ and Libya ($1.46 million).²¹ In addition, though not generally reported, many affected states contributed to victim assistance through national funding for rehabilitation staff and other medical professionals.


¹⁹ Fondo de Protección de Lisiados y Discapacitados a Consecuencia del Conflicto Armado (Protection Fund for the Disabled and Injured as a Result of the Armed Conflict), or “The Protection Fund,” 190.120.23.13 (especial).

Other Funding Paths

The $497 million in international support to mine action in 2012 represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs. It does not represent the complete expenditures for field operations. Other funding sources include national funding, foundations, private fundraising by NGOs, and mine action allocations in countries with peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping operations

Peacekeeping operations in Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lebanon, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Western Sahara have mine action programs that are partially funded by UNGA assessments as part of peacekeeping mission budgets. In 2012, more than $113 million, which was a 25% increase, was allocated for mine action to peacekeeping missions globally, including $62 million in Sudan (Darfur) and South Sudan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State/other area</th>
<th>Peacekeeping operation</th>
<th>Assessed funds for mine action ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)</td>
<td>37,258,583</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td>32,377,750</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>10,115,000</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)</td>
<td>7,760,280</td>
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<td>6,188,450</td>
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<td>1,362,750</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>113,596,485</strong></td>
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</table>


Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 1 November 2013 there were 161 State Parties.

States Parties

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a)
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
Côte d Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 5 Jan 12 (a)
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98

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**Signatories**

Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

**States not Party**

- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Bahrain
- Burma/Myanmar
- China
- Cuba
- Egypt
- Georgia
- India
- Iran
- Israel
- Kazakhstan
- Korea, North
- Korea, South
- Kyrgyzstan
- Lao PDR
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Micronesia
- Mongolia
- Morocco
- Nepal
- Oman
- Pakistan
- Palestine
- Russian Federation
- Saudi Arabia
- Singapore
- Sri Lanka
- Syria
- Tonga
- United Arab Emirates
- United States
- Uzbekistan
- Vietnam
18 September 1997

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Preamble

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;

c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article 2
Definitions
1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

Article 3
Exceptions
1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines
Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas
1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:

   a) The duration of the proposed extension;

   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:

      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;

      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and

      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;

   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and

   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6
International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;

b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;

c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

e) Assistance to mine victims;

f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

Article 7
Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;

b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

e) The status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines
Article 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the Requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party

Article 2

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party
declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

   a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;

   b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or

   c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

**Article 9**

**National implementation measures**

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

**Article 10**

**Settlement of disputes**

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.
Article 11
Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12
Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13
Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14
Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
Article 15
Signature
This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 17
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

Article 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

Article 21
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22
Authentic texts
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASEAN  Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AXO   abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC   battle area clearance
CCW   1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA   confirmed hazardous area
CIS   Commonwealth of Independent States
CMC   Cluster Munition Coalition
DfID  UK Department for International Development
DPO   disabled people’s organization
EC    European Commission
EOD   explosive ordnance disposal
ERW   explosive remnants of war
EU    European Union
GICHD Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI    Handicap International
HRW   Human Rights Watch
ICBL  International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC  International Committee of the Red Cross
IED   improvised explosive device
IMAS  International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU   Implementation Support Unit
NAM   Non-Aligned Movement
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO   non-governmental organization
NPA   Norwegian People’s Aid
NSAG  non-state armed group
OAS   Organization of American States
PfP   Partnership for Peace (NATO)
SHA   suspected hazardous area
UN    United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
USAID US Agency for International Development
UXO   unexploded ordnance
VA    victim assistance

Glossary

Abandoned explosive ordnance – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intention ally disturb the mine.”

Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”
Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g., mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Community-based rehabilitation – Programs in affected communities (often rural areas) that are designed to supplement facility-based programs in urban centers. These programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities, and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to service, due to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and limited human resource capacity.

Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Explosive remnants of war – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Improved explosive device – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

International Mine Action Standards – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

Information Management System for Mine Action – The UN’s preferred information system for the management of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA provides users with support for data collection, data storage, reporting, information analysis, and project management activities.

Landmine Impact Survey – A national or regional assessment of the socioeconomic impact on communities caused by the actual or perceived presence of mines and ERW, in order to assist the planning and prioritization of mine action programs and projects.

Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

National mine action authority – A governmental body, normally interministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.

Non-state armed groups – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritiza-
tion and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

**Reduced land** – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

**Residual risk** – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Risk reduction** – Those actions which lessen the probability and/or severity of physical injury to people, property, or the environment due to mines/ERW. Risk reduction can be achieved by physical measures such as clearance, fencing or marking, or through behavioral changes brought about by mine/ERW risk education.

**Submunition** – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).

**Survivors** – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

**Suspected hazardous area** – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Technical survey** – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

**Unexploded cluster submunitions** – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

**Unexploded ordnance** – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate; unexploded submunitions are known as “blinds” or “duds.”

**Victim** – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her family, and community.

**Victim assistance** – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.
Landmine Monitor 2013 provides a global overview of efforts in 2012 and the first part of 2013 to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally assess the international community’s response to the global landmine and explosive remnants of war problem. It covers developments in the areas of antipersonnel landmine use, production, stockpiling, mine action, casualties, victim assistance, and mine action funding.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community’s response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Left: Do Thienn Dang, a landmine survivor in Vietnam, reinforcing his mushroom growing house. Dang and other survivor families grow mushrooms to earn a sustainable income, with support from Project RENEW.
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Cover photo: A Tajik mine clearance operator, employed by Norwegian People’s Aid, searching for old Soviet landmines near the border of Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where estimates of landmine contamination were increased by Tajik authorities in September 2013.
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