Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor@icblcmc.org.

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International Campaign to Ban Landmines
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is committed to an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) offers the best framework for putting the mine ban into practice, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for:

- A total ban on the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines;
- Accelerated clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW);
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims; and
- Universal adherence to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all.
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or dropped from the air, the containers open and disperse submunitions over a wide area. Many fail to explode on impact, but remain dangerous, functioning like antipersonnel landmines. Thus, cluster munitions put civilians at risk both during attacks due to their wide area effect and after attacks due to unexploded ordnance.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive devices are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict but has been left behind and is no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and clear all antipersonnel mines within mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010. It is a legally-binding international agreement banning cluster munitions because of their indiscriminate area effects and risk of UXO. The convention also provides a framework for tackling the existing problems that cluster munitions have caused. The convention obliges states to stop the use, production, and transfer of cluster munitions immediately. States must destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years of becoming party to the
convention, and clear all cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. The Convention on Cluster Munitions includes ground-breaking provisions for victim assistance, and includes those killed or injured by cluster munitions, their families and communities in the definition of a cluster munition victim. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the clearance of unexploded submunitions, for risk education programs to help prevent cluster munition casualties, for assistance to victims, and for stockpile destruction.

These legal instruments provide a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations, and it is the task of NGOs to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and the CMC is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, and where children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy.

### International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The ICBL is a global network in close to 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams, in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network, whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in close to 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL's success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty, and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use, and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to join the treaty. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL's work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

On 1 January 2011 the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) merged with the ICBL to become the ICBL-CMC. The CMC and ICBL remain two separate and strong campaigns with a dedicated team of staff for both. For the last few years the ICBL, CMC, and the Monitor have increasingly been sharing resources to achieve their similar goals: to rid the world of landmines and cluster munitions. Work towards these goals has been strengthened with the merge, while still ensuring the three components (CMC, ICBL, and the Monitor) continue to be the global authorities in their distinct areas of work.

The ICBL is committed to pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

### Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor
represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties, and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. A five-member Editorial Board coordinates the Monitor system: Mines Action Canada, Action on Armed Violence, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, and Norwegian People’s Aid. Mines Action Canada serves as the lead agency. The Editorial Board assumes overall responsibility for, and decision-making on, the Monitor system.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting by states required under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine, cluster munition, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications, to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of 69 Monitor researchers from areas almost as many countries, and a 15-person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL’s campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

About this Report
This is the 13th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. Landmine Monitor 2011 provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.

Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling in every country in the world, and also includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2010, with information included up to August 2011 when possible.
Acknowledgements

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Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/About-Us/Experts. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information.

We are grateful to ICBL and CMC staff for their review of the content of the report, and their crucial assistance in the release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Responsibility for the coordination of Monitor’s reporting network lies with the five Editorial Board organizations: Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon) manages the Monitor’s production and editing, and coordinates research on non-state armed groups; Action on Armed Violence (Katherine Harrison) specializes in research on cluster munition ban policy; Handicap International (Bruno Leclercq) coordinates research on casualty data and victim assistance; Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose) is responsible for ban policy; and Norwegian People’s Aid (Atle Karlsen) coordinates research on mine action. Jacqueline Hansen manages the Monitor.

The Editorial Team undertook research and initial country report edits for Landmine Monitor from January to August 2011.

The Editorial Team included:
• Ban policy: Mark Hiznay (principal editor), Kate Castenson, Stephen Goose, Katherine Harrison, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Mary Wareham;
• Mine action: Stuart Casey-Maslen (principal editor), Nick Cumming-Bruce, Mike Kendellen;
• Casualties and victim assistance: Megan Burke, Stéphane De Greef, Loren Persi Vicentic, Rashmi Thapa; and
• Support for mine action: Mike Kendellen, Tatiana Stephens.

Mark Hiznay provided final editing from August to September 2011 with assistance from Jacqueline Hansen (Program Manager); Andria King (Publications Consultant); and Céline Chang and Gretel Lahmann (ICBL-CMC Interns). Soesi Atantri provided administrative support.

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1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

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Table Key
- States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of September 2011
- Signatories: Signed, but not yet ratified
- States not Party: Not yet acceded
Global Landmine Overview 2010–2011

The Monitor identified three governments laying antipersonnel mines: Israel, Libya, and Myanmar.

- This is an increase since the previous report, with confirmed new use in Israel and Libya.
- Use by non-state armed groups was confirmed in four countries—Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, and Pakistan—down from six countries in the last report.

The Monitor identified 12 producers of antipersonnel mines (the same number as reported in 2010 and the lowest total ever): China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United States (US), and Vietnam.

A total of 4,191 new casualties were recorded in 2010, 5% more than in 2009 when 4,010 casualties were identified.

- The slight increase in recorded casualties is not yet indicative of a trend, due to poor quality of casualty data in some countries. The 2010 total is, however, lower than the 5,502 casualties recorded for 2008.
- Due to incomplete data collection, the actual number of casualties was certainly higher than what was recorded. A total of 72 states, as well as seven disputed areas, were confirmed or suspected to be mine-affected.
- Emergency risk education is needed in Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Somalia; Libya, too, became a risk education priority following the outbreak of armed conflict in February 2011.

At least 200km² of mined areas were cleared by 45 mine action programs in 2010, the highest annual total ever recorded by the Monitor (compared with 198km² in 2009, the previous record, and 160 km² in 2008).

- More than 388,000 antipersonnel mines and over 27,000 antivehicle mines were destroyed during this clearance.
- The largest total clearance of mined areas was achieved by programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, and Sri Lanka, which together accounted for more than 80% of recorded clearance.
- An additional 460km² of former battle area was reportedly cleared, destroying in the process more than 1.2 million items of unexploded ordnance. The largest totals were reported in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Lao PDR.

Victim assistance in 2010 benefitted from a reoriented focus on service accessibility and availability, as well as some early efforts in a few states to combine the implementation of various complementary legal instruments.

- However, these improvements were at least in part offset by increases in armed violence that eroded accessibility and availability of services in several states with significant numbers of survivors.
- Donors reported providing US$41.6 million to support victim assistance activities, an increase of over $5 million from the previous year. However, this is only 9% of the global total of international assistance for mine action, the same percentage of total funding as in 2009.

Donors and affected states contributed approximately $637 million in international and national support for mine action in 2010.

- 31 donors contributed $480 million in international support for mine action in 57 affected states and areas, an increase of $34 million from 2009.
- This is the largest amount of donor contributions recorded by the Monitor and the fifth consecutive year that international contributions totaled over $400 million per year.
- Contributions from the top five mine action donors—the US, European Commission, Japan, Norway, and Canada—accounted for 64% of all donor funding.
- The top six recipient states—Afghanistan, Angola, Iraq, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia—received 55% of all international mine action contributions in 2010.
• Twenty-four affected states provided $157 million in national support for mine action towards their own mine action programs, a decrease of $7 million from 2009, with lower contributions from Croatia and Angola accounting for most of the decrease.

### Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance

<table>
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<tr>
<th>The Good</th>
<th>The Bad</th>
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<tr>
<td>157 countries have joined the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty—80% of the world’s nations.</td>
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<td>Two longstanding treaty holdouts—<strong>Finland</strong> and <strong>Poland</strong>—confirmed that measures are underway to join the treaty in 2012.</td>
<td>Highly disturbing allegations that security forces in <strong>Turkey</strong> used antipersonnel mines in 2009 remain unresolved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>87 states have completed the destruction of their stockpiles: <strong>Iraq</strong> was added to this list in June 2011.</td>
<td>While taking positive steps toward rectifying their non-compliance, <strong>Belarus</strong>, <strong>Greece</strong>, <strong>Turkey</strong>, and <strong>Ukraine</strong> remain in violation of the treaty’s obligation to destroy their stockpiles of antipersonnel mines within a four-year period.</td>
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<td>A total of 18 States Parties have reported completion of their obligation to clear antipersonnel mines in known mined areas: <strong>Nigeria</strong> joined this group in June 2011.</td>
<td>The rate of compliance with submitting annual transparency reports is at an all-time low (52%).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victim assistance in 2010 benefitted from a reoriented focus on service accessibility, availability, and some early efforts in a few states to combine the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.</td>
<td>Requests for extending the deadline for clearance are becoming the norm rather than the exception; only <strong>Nicaragua</strong> has so far declared that it has completed its obligation after receiving an extension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the first year implementing the Cartagena Action Plan’s provisions on victim assistance, States Parties mostly maintained existing coordination mechanisms and national victim assistance plans and, in a limited number of countries, began to address gaps in services in remote and rural areas.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Major Findings**

- Twenty-four affected states provided $157 million in national support for mine action towards their own mine action programs, a decrease of $7 million from 2009, with lower contributions from Croatia and Angola accounting for most of the decrease.

### Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Good</th>
<th>The Bad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>157 countries have joined the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty—80% of the world’s nations.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two longstanding treaty holdouts—<strong>Finland</strong> and <strong>Poland</strong>—confirmed that measures are underway to join the treaty in 2012.</td>
<td>Highly disturbing allegations that security forces in <strong>Turkey</strong> used antipersonnel mines in 2009 remain unresolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87 states have completed the destruction of their stockpiles: <strong>Iraq</strong> was added to this list in June 2011.</td>
<td>While taking positive steps toward rectifying their non-compliance, <strong>Belarus</strong>, <strong>Greece</strong>, <strong>Turkey</strong>, and <strong>Ukraine</strong> remain in violation of the treaty’s obligation to destroy their stockpiles of antipersonnel mines within a four-year period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A total of 18 States Parties have reported completion of their obligation to clear antipersonnel mines in known mined areas: <strong>Nigeria</strong> joined this group in June 2011.</td>
<td>The rate of compliance with submitting annual transparency reports is at an all-time low (52%).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim assistance in 2010 benefitted from a reoriented focus on service accessibility, availability, and some early efforts in a few states to combine the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Mine Ban Treaty is one of the great success stories in disarmament and in broader global humanitarian efforts, as demonstrated by its impressive implementation and by the widespread adherence to the norm it establishes against antipersonnel mines.

Opened for signature on 3 December 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force 12 years ago on 1 March 1999. The Pacific nation of Tuvalu acceded in September 2011, becoming the Mine Ban Treaty’s 157th State Party. While several major states remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty, such a high number of States Parties constitutes near-universal acceptance of the antipersonnel mine ban.

But major challenges remain. Full implementation and universalization of the treaty remain key objectives for the cooperative and enduring partnership of governments, international organizations, and the ICBL, that work on the Mine Ban Treaty’s behalf.

The Mine Ban Treaty continues to have a strong impact even on those that have not yet joined as the vast majority of states not party are adhering to its provisions. Yet in 2011, Israel and Libya laid new antipersonnel mines, joining Myanmar, the only other government to plant antipersonnel mines in recent years. Two long-standing treaty hold-outs—Finland and Poland—confirmed that measures are underway to join the Mine Ban Treaty next year, while a United States (US) policy review of the Mine Ban Treaty appeared to slow down in 2011.

This chapter has two parts. The first examines the implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty by its States Parties. The second section provides a global overview of mine ban policy, use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines by the 39 states not party to the treaty. The focus of the reporting is on the period from May 2010 to August 2011.

Mine Ban Treaty Implementation and Compliance

As a general matter, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have been respected and when ambiguities have arisen, they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. The treaty’s compliance provisions—contained in Article 8—have not been formally invoked to clarify any compliance question.

However, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. Other States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including victim assistance, and ensure that the norm they established against antipersonnel mines continues to be respected and universalized.

As the ICBL warned in November 2010, there is a danger that the Mine Ban Treaty’s effectiveness will be eroded in the future if the challenges are not acknowledged, discussed, and addressed.

Prohibition on use (Article 1)

There has never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became law in 1999. However, previous allegations of mine use by the armed forces of Turkey in 2009 and Cambodia in 2008 and 2009 remain
Ban Policy

Iraqi campaigners meet with UN representatives to discuss disability rights.

unanswered, and warrant ongoing attention and resolution by those governments and other States Parties.4

In this reporting period, since May 2010 there have been allegations of new mine use in Sudan by government and rebel forces. Due to the security situation, the Monitor has not been able to investigate the allegations, but based on concerns expressed by UN personnel, the allegations are serious and merit careful investigation and finding of facts.1

Allegations of new mine use during the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire do not appear credible.4

**Destruction of stockpiles (Article 4)**

A total of 153 of the 157 States Parties do not have stockpiles, including 87 States Parties that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, 64 that have declared never possessing antipersonnel mine stocks (except in some cases for training purposes), and two that have not made an official declaration but are not thought to possess stocks (Equatorial Guinea and newest member Tuvalu).1

The most recent states to complete destruction were Iraq (declared in June 2011), Kuwait (declared in July 2009), and Ethiopia (April 2009). Iraq, which has a stockpile destruction deadline of 1 February 2012, reported in June 2011 that it destroyed 645 out of 690 antipersonnel mines that had been stockpiled in the Kurdistan region, retaining 45 mines for training purposes.6

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 45 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

The four States Parties that have not completed the destruction of their stockpiles are Belarus, Greece, Turkey, and Ukraine.

Since 1 March 2008, Belarus, Greece, and Turkey have been in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty after failing to complete their stockpile destruction by that deadline. Ukraine joined this group after missing its 1 June 2010 stockpile destruction deadline.7 This issue of non-compliance with the treaty has been of particular concern to States Parties since 2010, when States Parties adopted the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014, which calls on the States Parties that are in violation of the treaty to comply without delay and to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date. While it is encouraging that some of these states have made progress in stockpile destruction by providing additional information about projected completion dates, requesting assistance, and destroying stocks, it is a threat to the integrity of the treaty that four States Parties have remained in violation of the treaty.

Belarus completed destruction of its non-PFM antipersonnel mines in 2006, but has not been able to destroy any of its stock of almost 3.4 million PFM mines since that time. In December 2010, Belarus made

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1 In October 2008, two Thai soldiers stepped on antipersonnel mines while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. Thai authorities maintained that the area was previously clear of mines and that the mines had been newly placed by Cambodian forces. Cambodia denied the charges and stated that the Thai soldiers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts. In April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries. In June 2011, a Cambodian official informed the Monitor that Cambodia had not received cooperation from Thailand regarding investigation into the issue and has, therefore, not pursued it further. In April 2010, a Turkish newspaper published a document allegedly belonging to the 22nd Gendarmerie Division Command indicating that on 9 April 2009, members of the Turkish Armed Forces laid M2A4 anti-personnel mines in the southeastern province of Siverek. In May 2009, the media reported that seven Turkish soldiers were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Cukurca in Hakkari province. In June 2010, the Turkish government informed other States Parties that a “legal investigation” into allegations of use was underway and said that once concluded the results would be shared “in full transpar-ency.” It said that commenting further on an ongoing legal procedure would be inappropriate.

2 In 2011, there were reports of new mine use in South Sudan as part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the northern branch of SPLM/A. The Monitor has not been able to confirm these reports. There is a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. The Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines. There have been no confirmed instances of government forces using antipersonnel mines since Sudan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004.

3 Côte d’Ivoire experienced six months of post-election armed conflict between forces loyal to former president Laurent Gbagbo and then-president-elect Alassane Ouattara. Media articles reported allegations of mine use by both Gbagbo’s and Ouattara’s forces and each side accused the other of use of antipersonnel mines, but the Monitor has found no evidence of any use of antipersonnel mines during the conflict. In an interview with the Monitor, an officer from Côte d’Ivoire’s gendarmerie stated that the allegations of mine use were false, and that what media reports described as mines were actually plastic packaging caps from containers for P17 rockets. Interview with Patrick M’Bahia, Focal Point/Officer, Gendarmerie, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, 21 June 2011.

4 Tuvalu stated in 2002 that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.


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I © Moaffak Alkfhaji/IADO, 2 November 2010
progress towards the destruction of these mines after signing a contract with a Spanish company to destroy its PFM mines within 28 months, which would mean that Belarus’s stockpile destruction should conclude in 2013. As of June 2011, Belarus was still finalizing the administrative arrangements of the contract, and the physical destruction had not yet commenced.  

Greece started its stockpile destruction of almost 1.6 million mines eight months after its deadline, and eventually halted stockpile destruction operations in early 2010 after an explosion at the destruction facility located in Bulgaria. In June 2011, Greece announced that it had established a new contract between the Ministry of Defense and the same company (Hellenic Defense Systems S.A., or EAS) that it had originally contracted. However, the proposal for stockpile destruction with EAS was still under negotiation as of June 2011. Greece has stated that it plans to re-initiate the contract by the end of 2011, and complete its stockpile destruction within 22 months. In a demonstration of transparency regarding stockpile destruction, Greece revealed that the 480 Greek mines that were missing from a shipment to Bulgaria were found in a Greek warehouse, prompting Greece to conduct a review of its stockpile.  

Turkey is the closest of the four States Parties in non-compliance with the treaty to completing its stockpile destruction obligation. By the end of October 2010, Turkey had destroyed all of its stockpiled mines in the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility, with the exception of 22,716 Area Denial Antipersonnel Mines (ADAM) type mines, which were transferred to Germany in February 2011 to be destroyed. The destruction of these mines began on 23 March 2011, and was scheduled to conclude by 31 August 2011. As of September 2011, the Monitor had not received an update about the status of this stockpile destruction process.  

Ukraine previously destroyed all its non-PFM mines and over 100,000 PFM mines, but still had nearly six million PFM mines to destroy. In June 2011, Ukraine announced that it is conducting some destruction activities by ejecting mines into a “closed water reservoir,” enabling it to destroy 500,000 mines per year, and it expects to support its stockpile destruction efforts in part through an agreement with NATO’s Partnership for Peace Trust Fund. Norway also provided assistance to Ukraine in 2011 in the form of equipment that will increase Ukraine’s stockpile destruction capacity and modernize its facilities, bringing them up to international environmental standards. Taking this assistance into consideration, Ukraine reported in June 2011 that it projects that stockpile destruction will still take at least another four years to complete.  

States Parties have an obligation to provide international cooperation and assistance for stockpile destruction under Article 6, and have recommitted to providing support for stockpile destruction in Actions 37 and 42 of the Cartagena Action Plan.  

Retained mines (Article 3)  

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques.... The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”  

Seventy-six States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 44 have each retained more than 1,000 mines and two (Bangladesh and Turkey) have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Seventy-eight States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 25 states that stocked antipersonnel mines in the past.  

For three States Parties, the status of retained mines is not known. Equatorial Guinea has never submitted an initial transparency report, so its status is uncertain, but it is not thought to retain any mines. The newest State Party, Tuvalu, has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to retain any mines. Botswana has indicated its intention to retain some mines for training, but has never made a formal declaration. Slightly less than 30% of the States Parties that retain mines failed to submit an annual transparency update for calendar year 2010, which was due by 30 April 2011.
States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Last known declaration (for year)</th>
<th>Initial declaration</th>
<th>Reported consumed in 2010</th>
<th>Year of last declared consumption</th>
<th>Reduced as excess to needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>15,100 (2010)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,500 (2009)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>8,976 (2010)</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7,150 (2010)</td>
<td>13,948</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>6,927 (2010)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>2,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6,158 (2010)</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>6,030 (2010)</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5,970 (2010)</td>
<td>15,030</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>5,848 (2010)</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>10,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4,910 (2010)</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4,874 (2010)</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>4,491 (2006)</td>
<td>4,491</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4,355 (2010)</td>
<td>4,830</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4,017 (2010)</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3,760 (2009)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3,672 (2010)</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3,466 (2010)</td>
<td>15,604</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,364 (2009)</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3,346 (2009)</td>
<td>28,647</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>23,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3,159 (2010)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3,100 (2010)</td>
<td>5,980</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,996 (2004)</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,991 (2008)</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2,673 (2010)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2,618 (2009)</td>
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<td>Unclear</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2,512 (2009)</td>
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<td>Not available</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2,500 (2010)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,454 (2010)</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,201 (2010)</td>
<td>3,006</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>3,345</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>7,487</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2,021 (2010)</td>
<td>4,076</td>
<td>Some</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>4,991</td>
<td>Not available</td>
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<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1,943 (2009)</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,938 (2010)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,921 (2010)</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td>Not available</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>2,400</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2003</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,729 (2010)</td>
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<td>Unclear</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1,441 (2010)</td>
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<td>118</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>Some</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>5,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1,046 (2010)</td>
<td>13,025</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>12,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,020 (2007)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partial total</strong></td>
<td><strong>170,253</strong></td>
<td><strong>345,784</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,449</strong></td>
<td><strong>103,503</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

States in italics did not submit a transparency report for calendar year 2010.
Not available = It is not possible to determine the number from the information provided by the State Party.
Reporting is necessary to understand the intended purposes or actual uses of retained mines. Because of this lack of information, it is not possible to present a total figure of mines retained for 2010 that would serve as a basis of meaningful comparison with previous years.

Key updates from calendar year 2010 were:
- Brazil destroyed 1,075 retained mines;
- Cyprus destroyed almost half of its stock of retained mines following a re-evaluation of its requirements in accordance with the Cartagena Action Plan Action #56;
- Latvia completed the destruction of its 118 retained mines—it no longer retains mines;
- Thailand disclosed that an additional unreported 40 antipersonnel mines were found in the possession of the Thai National Police Department and will apparently retain them; and
- Venezuela reported that it consumed 86 mines in 2010 in training activities—the first time it has consumed retained mines.

In addition to those listed above, an additional 30 States Parties that retain less than 1,000 mines possessed a total of 12,247 retained mines. 17

A major concern for the ICBL is the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines, but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remained each year, indicating none were consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities, which is typically the case for most countries, and no other details were provided about how the mines were being used. A dozen States Parties have never reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bhutan, Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.

Numerous States Parties have reported decreases in the number of mines retained, but few have explained the reductions in their transparency reports. Among the states that reduced the number of mines retained without explanation for calendar year 2010 were Australia (20 fewer mines), Cambodia (144 fewer mines), Czech Republic (24 fewer mines), Denmark (57 fewer mines), Ecuador (90 fewer mines), Luxembourg (201 fewer mines), the Netherlands (193 fewer mines), Peru (20 fewer mines), Portugal (3 fewer mines), Slovakia (50 fewer mines), Spain (6 fewer mines), and the United Kingdom (UK) (160 fewer mines).

While laudable for transparency, several States Parties were unnecessarily reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, or otherwise rendered incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines. Technically these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty:
- Afghanistan, BiH, and Cambodia, reported that all of their retained mines do not have fuzes;
- Serbia reported that 1,045 of its mines were fuzeless;
- Australia retained only 100 serviceable detonators for over 6,900 retained mines; and
- Belgium, Eritrea, Iraq, Portugal, and Sweden also reported that some of the mines they retained were inert or fuzeless, or were otherwise incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines.

A total of 29 States Parties have used expanded Form D of annual transparency reports to voluntarily report additional information on retained mines (note that some States Parties on this list only used some voluntary elements of Form D). 18

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty states that “Each State Party shall report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

As of 1 October 2011, only 52% of States Parties submitted reports for calendar year 2010. This is the lowest annual compliance rate in the past decade, undercutting the previous low of 56% for calendar year 2009.

Of the 74 States Parties that had not submitted a report for 2010, most failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more years. Among the States Parties that did not submit reports for 2010 are nine States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations (Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Uganda).

However, five States Parties (Cook Islands, Ghana, Lesotho, Palau, and Zimbabwe) submitted an annual transparency report after not turning in a report for two or more years. Equatorial Guinea is the only State Party to have never submitted an initial transparency report; it was due on 28 August 1999. Tuvalu’s initial transparency report is due by 30 April 2012.

Three states submitted voluntary transparency reports for 2010. Treaty signatory Poland submitted its ninth voluntary transparency report, while state not

17 States retaining less than 1,000 mines under Article 5: Nicaragua (96), Ecuador (910), Jordan (850), Cambodia (858), Honduras (855), Mauritania (248), Portugal (1654), the UK (877), Italy (669), Mali (600), Luxembourg (1599), Colombia (886), Zimbabwe (150), Cyprus (500), Togo (456), Republic of the Congo (406), Ethiopia (503), Uruguay (260), Eritrea (172), Ukraine (700), Cape Verde (120), Zambia (100), El Salvador (32), Rwanda (65), Ireland (64), Senegal (28), Benin (16), Guinea-Bissau (3), Burundi (4), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“some”). In 2010, the DRC indicated that there were some live antipersonnel mines retained for training at the Military Engineers’ School in Likasi, but the types and numbers had not yet been reported.

18 Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, BiH, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Malawi, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and the UK.
There were some positive developments on protracted implementation issues, particularly for three of the States Parties that missed their four-year treaty-mandated deadline for destroying all their stockpiles of antipersonnel mines: Belarus, Turkey, and Ukraine.

The 10MSP agreed to hold the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties (11MSP) to the Mine Ban Treaty in Phnom Penh, Cambodia from 28 November–2 December 2011. Cambodia is one of the most heavily mine-affected countries in world. Prak Sokhonn, Minister Attached to Cambodia Prime Minister and Vice-Chair of the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority, was designated President of the 11MSP.

Global Overview: States not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Universalizing the Mine Ban Treaty

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states may no longer sign and ratify the treaty, but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 157 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 26 acceded.20

On 13 September 2011, the Pacific nation of Tuvalu acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, becoming the first accession since Palau joined in November 2007.21 Thirty-nine countries remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty as states not party, including two signatories that have not yet ratified (Marshall Islands and Poland).22

States Parties, the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit, the ICBL, ICRC, and UN agencies cooperate and coordinate their efforts promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2011, focus was on universalization in the Asia-Pacific region in advance of the 11MSP. The treaty’s Special Envoy Prince Mired of Jordan visited the Pacific countries of Tuvalu (2–4 August) and Tonga (6–7 October) to discuss accession with government leaders. On 21–22 September 2011, five states not party from Asia (China, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Myanmar, and Vietnam) attended a regional seminar convened by Cambodia in Phnom Penh to address the human cost of antipersonnel mines. Additionally, the President-Designate of the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties Cambodian Minister Prak Sokhonn visited Singapore and Vietnam in October 2011.

Several states were preparing to join the Mine Ban Treaty within one to two years including Finland, Poland, and South Sudan. Significant developments during the reporting period regarding universalization of the treaty include:

- Finland confirmed its intention to accede in 2012 and submitted the legislation for accession to the treaty to its parliament in August 2011.23 In September 2011, the parliament approved the proposal and referred it for consideration to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
- Lao PDR voluntarily submitted a transparency report in June 2011 and noted in a statement at the June 2010 meetings of the Intersessional Standing Committee its “desire and intention” to accede in “coming years.”

20 The 26 accessions include Montenegro, which technically “succeeded” to the treaty after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro. Of the 151 signatories, 43 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

21 With Tuvalu’s accession, only three Pacific states have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: of Micronesia, Tonga, and the Marshall Islands, which has signed but not ratified.

22 While Tuvalu acceded in the past year, the total number of states not party remains 39 as South Sudan became an independent state in 2011 and has not yet joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

In February 2010, Nepal’s Minister of Peace and Reconstruction initiated a ministerial-level committee to study the responsibilities of and opportunities for becoming a State Party.

Poland confirmed its commitment to complete ratification in 2012, but the procedure had not been initiated in parliament. On 11 August 2011, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulated the ratification proposal (motion) for informal interministerial consultation. The bill will be introduced to the new parliament in late 2011 or early 2012.

The Southern Sudan Mine Action Authority chair, Brigadier Jurkuch Barach, said in June 2011 that once the government of South Sudan is established “we fully intend to join [the Mine Ban Treaty] as soon as we are able and will endeavour to adhere to its principals and obligations.”

US officials confirmed in June 2011 that the comprehensive review initiated in late 2009 of US mine policy and its position on joining the Mine Ban Treaty was continuing. During 2010, the US Department of State coordinated a series of consultations, but in 2011 the pace of the review appeared to slow. Since the Second Review Conference in November 2009, the US continued to participate as an observer in Mine Ban Treaty meetings.

Additionally, during meetings in 2010 and 2011, several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty reiterated their positive views of the treaty as expressed in prior years, but noted little progress toward joining, including Lebanon, Mongolia, and Morocco. In June 2011, a representative from Vietnam disappoiningly said it was unlikely that the country would join the Mine Ban Treaty at this time as they are still using mines on their borders “as a form of defense,” but clarified that Vietnam was not necessarily laying new mines.

**Annual UN General Assembly resolution**

On 8 December 2010, UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 65/48 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 165 states in favor, none opposed, and 17 abstentions. This was the highest number to vote in support of the Mine Ban Treaty since the first UNGA resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 (the lowest was 138 in 2001), and equaled the lowest number of abstentions ever.

The annual resolution provides an important opportunity for states outside the Mine Ban Treaty to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines and the objective of its universalization. Nine states not party have voted in favor of every Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1997: Armenia, Bahrain, Finland, Georgia, Oman, Poland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Ten states not party that used to consistently abstain or be absent now vote in favor: Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Somalia, and Tonga. Many countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 have done so after voting in support of consecutive UNGA resolutions.

The number of states abstaining from supporting the resolution has ranged from a high of 23 in 2002 and 2003 to a low of 17 in 2006, 2005, and 2010. A group of states that could be described as most actively opposed to the Mine Ban Treaty are the 15 states not party that have abstained on consecutive resolutions since 1997 (unless noted in parentheses): Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Libya (since 1998), Myanmar, North Korea (since 2007), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan (since 1999), the US, and Vietnam (since 1998).

The US was the first country to introduce a resolution to ban mines in 1996, urging nations “to pursue vigorously” an international ban treaty “with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible.” UNGA Resolution 51/45S was passed on 10 December 1996 by a vote of 156-0, with 10 abstentions. The resolution also called on governments to unilaterally implement “bans, moratoria or other restrictions” on production, stockpiling, export, and use of antipersonnel mines “at the earliest date possible.” Since 1997, it has abstained on every UNGA resolution in support of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

The first resolution in support of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, UNGA Resolution 51/45S, secured a vote of 142 in favor, none against, and 18 abstained.


26 CMC meeting with Phan Hai Anh, Assistant Director General, Department of International Organizations, Geneva, 27 June 2011.

27 The US was the first country to introduce a resolution to ban mines in 1996, urging nations “to pursue vigorously” an international ban treaty “with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible.” UNGA Resolution 51/45S was passed on 10 December 1996 by a vote of 156-0, with 10 abstentions. The resolution also called on governments to unilaterally implement “bans, moratoria or other restrictions” on production, stockpiling, export, and use of antipersonnel mines “at the earliest date possible.” Since 1997, it has abstained on every UNGA resolution in support of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.

28 The first resolution in support of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, UNGA Resolution 51/45S, secured a vote of 142 in favor, none against, and 18 abstained.

29 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey.

30 Uzbekistan actually voted in support of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.
Non-state armed groups

A significant number of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have indicated their willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines. At least 62 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines over the past 12 years.29 The exact number is difficult to determine, since NSAGs may split into factions with different policies, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. More than 40 NSAGs have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, most recently factions of Kurdish groups operating along the Iran-Iraq border in June 2009.29

Efforts have continued to engage NSAGs in the global ban on antipersonnel mines. Following outreach by Human Rights Watch (HRW), Handicap International, Mines Advisory Group, and the UN, the National Transitional Council (NTC), the opposition authority in Libya, issued a communiqué on 28 April 2011 formally pledging that “no forces under the command and control of the [NTC] will use antipersonnel or anti-vehicle landmines.”30 The NTC committed to “destroy all landmines in their possession” and to “cooperate in the provision of mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.” The communiqué also stated that “any future Libyan government should relinquish landmines and join the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.”31 In late August, after seizing the capital of Tripoli, the NTC proclaimed an interim government.

Government forces

Myanmar

Units of Myanmar’s Army (Tatmadaw) have laid mines in numerous parts of the country every year since the Monitor began reporting in 1999. In February 2010, Tatmadaw Light Infantry Battalions (LIB) 363 and 367 allegedly laid mines in Kheh Der village tract, Kyaukkyi township, Nyaunglebin district; militia forces accompanying returning villagers subsequently discovered 11 mines.33 In March 2010, villagers in Htantabin township blamed Tatmadaw LIB 427 for laying mines that injured two villagers and an animal.34 Also in March, a former Tatmadaw soldier from LIB 102 in Karenni state noted that he had been given a mine to use while in the military, and that before he deserted in March 2010 he witnessed other soldiers being ordered to lay mines near his unit’s camp in Khaw Daw Koh area, Tantabin township, Bago division.35 In April 2010, villagers in the Ma No Roh area, Tenasserim division stated that Tatmadaw LIB 561 planted mines near their village.36

In October 2010, the Tatmadaw laid mines around four bridges between Thaton and Bilin townships. The mined area was marked with a “Caution Mines” sign at each bridge. The Tatmadaw stated that the mines were laid to prevent the Karen National Liberation Army

29 As of September 2011, 41 through the Deed of Commitment, 15 by self declaration, and four by Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). Prior to 2000 several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.

30 The Deed of Commitment includes a ban on any use, production, trade, or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. In April and June 2009, three factions of the Komala party (the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran, the Komala Party of Kurdistan, and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan) signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. See Landmine Monitor Report 2009, p. 945.


35 Unpublished information provided to the Monitor by the KHRG, 12 April 2011.

(KNLA) from using the bridges. In December 2010 in Bilin township of Thaton district, Border Guard Force Battalion 1016, led by Par Ke Re, and Tatmadaw IB 3, led by Major Zaw Lwin Moe, placed mines in Kyaw Blaw Khi Blo and Htee Nyar Khar Blo. These mines subsequently injured villagers and killed cattle. Another Tatmadaw unit is alleged by the Free Burma Rangers (FBR) to have laid mines for the first time in many years in Chin state. The FBR claims that Battalion 232 laid new mines in the vicinity of Nygeletwa, Pommyamwa, Aumthiwa, Mariw, Setalumwa, and Putuwa villages in Paletwa township of Chin state. On 25 December 2010, Tatmadaw soldiers placed mines on trails and village land, in Mone township. A rebel soldier was sent to remove the mines, and found four M-14 mines before being injured by a fifth mine.

**Libya**

The first reports of pro-Gaddafi forces using antipersonnel and antivehicle mines began to emerge in late March 2011 in the east of the country, then in the Nafusa mountain range in the northwest, and finally around Tripoli and coastal towns in the west. HRW has confirmed the use of five types of mines in six separate locations. Additionally, three types of mines have been found abandoned at three other locations.

The Brazilian T-AB-1 antipersonnel mine appears to be the most frequently used mine by pro-Gaddafi forces. Its low metal content makes the mine particularly challenging for detection and clearance efforts. Amnesty International documented the use T-AB-1 mines in the Tammina neighborhood of Misrata on 25 May 2011. There have been multiple instances of T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines laid together with Chinese Type-72SP antivehicle mines. In July, rebel forces also reported witnessing pro-Gaddafi troops laying T-AB-1 and Type-72SP mines around western towns near the Tunisian border including Ghazaya, Ruwas, and Kiklah. The same mines have been found in al-Qawalish.

**Israel**

In early August 2011, *Barnachaneh*, the journal of the Israel Defense Force (IDF), reported that IDF soldiers were planting antipersonnel mines in the Golan Heights along the border with Syria. The mines were laid openly and in daylight by Combat Engineering Corps officer cadets and placed beyond the border security fence, but within the “Alpha Line” that marks the border with Syria.

The mines were laid after hundreds of civilians entered Israeli territory on 15 May 2011, during the annual Palestinian commemoration of “Nakba Day,” apparently crossing through minefields uninjured. According to IDF Major Ariel Ilouz, “Because of age, rain and other natural hazards the antipersonnel mines that were laid along the border were full of mud. They were simply stuck. These mines are as old as 35–36 years and have not been touched.”

The ICBL publicly condemned mine use by the IDF, while the President of the 10th 10MSP expressed his deep concern.

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37 Source requested anonymity, Yangon, 2 March 2011.
38 Source requested anonymity, Bangkok, 15 March 2011.
41 Brazil has confirmed that production and exports of T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines ceased in 1989, even before Brazil joined the Mine Ban Treaty in 1993. There is no export record of the shipments, because arms export records are not held for longer than 10 years. An internal investigation has been opened into the origins and transfer of the T-AB-1 mines to Libya. HRW meeting with Brazilian delegation to intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 27 June 2011. In June 2011, the ICBL asked Brazil to publicly condemn the use of antipersonnel mines in Libya and provide detailed information on the transfer of T-AB-1 into antipersonnel mines to Libya, including the date of manufacture and transfer, as well as the number of mines exported. The ICBL had not yet received a reply as of 25 September 2011. ICBL letter to Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, 13 June 2011.
Non-state armed groups

In this reporting period, since May 2010, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least four countries: States Parties Afghanistan and Colombia and states not party Myanmar and Pakistan. This is two fewer countries than previously cited by the Monitor, with the removal of India and Yemen. It is the lowest number of countries with use by NSAGs ever reported by the Monitor. There were serious but as of yet unconfirmed allegations of NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in State Party Sudan and state not party South Sudan.

In Afghanistan, there has been a notable increase in the number of reports of use of antipersonnel mines, especially victim-activated IEDs, by armed groups opposing the government and international forces. In July 2011, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) released a report that found that the majority (approximately two-thirds) of IEDs encountered in Afghanistan were pressure plate-detonated, victim-activated devices.51 UNAMA has called on the Taliban to cease using pressure plate IEDs and to publicly reaffirm its 1998 decree banning mines.52 On the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan website, the Taliban denied the allegation and said their explosive devices are command-detonated and do not use pressure plates.53

In Colombia, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world. In September 2010, the Colombian army recovered over 3,100 antipersonnel mines from a cache belonging to the National Liberation Army in Tolima.

In Myanmar, at least 17 NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines since 1999 including the KNLA, the Karen Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), and the Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A). In October 2010 the KIO released a statement that warned the public of more mines in the area. The KIO stated that they had planted more mines as a result of increased tensions with the junta over the KIOs refusal to bring its troops under Burmese Army command. In some other specific instances, in September 2010, the KNLA informed local inhabitants that they had planted mines beside the road between Phapun township and Kamamaung sub-township in Karen state. In March 2010, villagers in Ma Lay Ler village tract, Dweh Loh township, Papun District allege that DKBA Battalion 333 laid mines to prevent attacks by the KNLA in the area, leading to the loss of several cattle. In January 2010, villagers from Meh Nyoo, Meh Gkoo, Meh Mweh, and Meh Gklaw village tracts in Bu Tho township, Karen state that soldiers from DKBA Battalion 666 placed mines in areas near the villages and gave verbal warnings of dangerous areas.

In Pakistan, NSAGs continued to use mines in Baluchistan province as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, while the government again stated that “terrorists all over the country” were using IEDs in attacks that caused large numbers of casualties.54

In Sudan, there were reports in 2011 of new mine use in South Kordofan state near the border with South Sudan as part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces and the northern branch of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).55 The Monitor has not been able to confirm these reports. There is a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. The Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines.

While the Monitor has not been able to do an independent investigation, it appears that new mine-laying has also occurred in South Sudan. However, it is difficult to determine who was responsible for new mine-laying and the extent to which antipersonnel mines, as opposed to antivehicle mines, were being laid. A variety of actors in different locations have been accused of mine-laying, including in the states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile. There have also been reports of new mine-laying in Southern Kordofan.

51 The majority of pressure plate IEDs are set to detonate from approximately 10kg of pressure and contain approximately 20kg of explosives, more than twice that of a standard antivehicle mine. As a result of this design and configuration, “each pressure plate IED serves as a massive anti-personnel mine with the capability of destroying a tank. Civilians who step or drive on these IEDs have no defense against them and little chance of survival.” UNAMA, “Afghanistan: Mid Year Report 2011, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, July 2011, p. 2.


53 “UNAMA accuses Mujahideen of the Islamic Emirate of having caused casualties to the common people by planting land mines. However, all the country men know that Mujahideen use landmines which are controlled remotely, i.e. they are not detonated by heavy pressure. So Mujahideen’s mines aim only at a specific targets.” Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, “Statement of the Islamic Emirate Regarding the Repeatedly Baseless Accusations of UNAMA,” 19 July 2011, alemara.cz.


use in South Kordofan state in Sudan, which is home to many communities from South Sudan.

Additionally, some use by NSAGs may have taken place in Algeria, Mali, Peru, and Thailand, which the Monitor has been unable to independently confirm from available information. There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, and Yemen.

Production of antipersonnel mines

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past. Thirty-nine of these states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including five countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Israel, Nepal, and Poland. A majority of major producers from the 1970s to 1990s are among those nations that have stopped manufacturing and joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Monitor identifies 12 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. In most cases, these countries were not actively producing mines, but reserve the right to do so. Active production may be ongoing in as few as three countries: India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

In September 2011, a Foreign Ministry official confirmed to the Monitor that most of China’s mine production has been shut down, and only a small number of mines are produced for the purpose of research by the army.

NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, and Myanmar produce antipersonnel mines, mostly victim-activated IEDs. Prior to its defeat in 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka probably produced the most sophisticated antipersonnel mines among NSAGs.

Trade in antipersonnel mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has not conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines. For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.

At least 10 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including seven mine producers, have enacted formal moratoria on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they do not export now, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

Stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

The Monitor estimates that of the 39 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, as many as 35 stockpile a collective total of more than 160 million antipersonnel mines. Three states not party, all Pacific nations, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga. It is not known if the newly independent state of South Sudan has any stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

56 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced.

57 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 34 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.

Ban Policy

States not party that stockpile antipersonnel mines

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<th>Armenia</th>
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It is not certain that all of these states not party stockpile antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.

The vast majority of global stockpiles belong to China (estimated 110 million) and Russia (estimated 24.5 million). Based on 2002 data, the Monitor has cited a US stockpile of 10.4 million antipersonnel mines, but the Monitor was informed in 2010 that the US stockpile may be considerably smaller now. Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated six million) and India (estimated four to five million).

Prolific mine use during 2011 by forces of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the discovery of hundreds of thousands of stockpiled mines have shown how Libya’s previous denial of a mine stockpile was patently untrue. The NTC has pledged to destroy all stockpiles of mines under its control.

In June 2011, Mongolia reported that it had 206,417 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, and that 110 had been destroyed to “define an appropriate mine destruction technique friendly to the environment.”

Non-state armed groups

Few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago due to the halt in trade and production, and destruction of stocks under the Mine Ban Treaty. A few NSAGs have access to mine stocks from old regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), while others produce their own improvised mines or acquire mines by removing them from minefields. In states not party NSAGs have also been known to capture antipersonnel mines or steal them from arsenals or purchase them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines or their own craft-produced mines in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Colombia, Iraq, and Pakistan. The Monitor relies on reports of seizures by government forces to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the protocol gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of September 2011, a total of 97 states were party to Amended Protocol II including three Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that ratified the protocol since the publication of Landmine Monitor 2010: Gabon (on 22 September 2010), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (6 December 2010), and Serbia (14 February 2011). Only 11 of the 97 states that are party to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Thus, for stockpile of 206,417 antipersonnel mines, inherited from the Soviet Union. In November 2010, it stated that it had a stockpile of 206,317 antipersonnel mines and would destroy another 380 mines in 2011 to demonstrate “our step-by-step approach to join the Convention.”

Miner Ban Treaty signatory Poland is party to CCW Amended Protocol II. Though it has not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, as a signatory it is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty, so is already bound by a higher standard than Amended Protocol II.

© Moaffak Alkfhaji/IADO, 24 April 2011

Iraqi campaigners meeting with the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs.

Landmine Monitor final editor at the report’s global launch in Geneva.

© Mary Wareham/Human Rights Watch, 24 November 2010
antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 11 countries as the rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and, while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol II, there are still 11 states that are party to the original but have not joined the amended protocol: Cuba, Djibouti, Lao PDR, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. In 2010, CCW States Parties began discussing mechanisms to terminate the original Protocol II at the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference in November 2011.

A total of 19 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also producers of antipersonnel mines.

### States that stockpile antipersonnel mines but are not party to CCW protocols

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<th>Armenia</th>
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*Italics indicated states which also produce antipersonnel mines.*

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61 Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Togo, and Uganda are party to the Mine Ban Treaty and are thus bound to the higher standard.

62 None of the countries listed in the table are party to the Mine Ban Treaty either.
Summary of Progress

As of August 2011, 72 states including 44 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as seven areas not generally recognized as states, were confirmed or suspected to be mine-affected. In June 2011, Nigeria reported that it had completed its clearance obligations under the treaty, making it the 18th State Party to do so. In December 2010, Gambia reported that it no longer had mined areas on its territory. In June 2010, Nicaragua declared completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations. In addition, in June 2011 it was reported that Nepal, a state not party, had cleared all mined areas from its territory.

In 2010, mine action programs cleared at least 200km² of mined areas, a small increase on the previous highest total recorded by the Monitor. A further 460km² of battle areas was cleared in 2010 including more than 18.5km² of cluster munition contaminated areas.

Mine-Affected States and Other Areas

As of August 2011, 72 states, as well as seven other areas, were confirmed or suspected to be mine-affected, as set out in the table below.

Affected states not party

A total of 26 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are believed to be mine affected: Armenia, Azerbaijan, China, Cuba, Egypt, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Russia, Somalia, South Korea, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. In June 2011, the UN announced that Nepal had cleared its last known mined area.
## Mine-affected states and other areas as of August 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe and CIS</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Argentina**</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Republic of the</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Democratic Republic of the (DRC)</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Korea, North</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td></td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>Oman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<td>Namibia</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>7 states</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>20 states and 1 area</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 states and 1 area</td>
<td>15 states and 1 area</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 states and 1 area</td>
<td>18 states and 3 area</td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 states and 1 area</td>
<td>12 states and 2 areas</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note: Other areas are indicated by itsalics. States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. States with a residual mine problem not in known mined areas are not included, such as Belarus, Finland, Honduras, Kuwait, Poland, and Ukraine, and, since its declaration of compliance with Article 5, Tunisia. Both Argentina and the UK claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which are mine-affected, and so both are included in the list. Djibouti and Namibia have completed major mine clearance operations, but contamination is still suspected so remain on the list.

** Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.**

### Affected states with mine contamination of more than 100km²

- Afghanistan
- Angola
- BiH
- Cambodia
- Chad
- Croatia
- Iran
- Iraq
- Morocco
- Sri Lanka
- Thailand
- Turkey
- Zimbabwe

### Mine-affected “other areas”

Seven other areas not internationally recognized as states are also mine-affected: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan, and Western Sahara. Abkhazia was expected to be cleared of all known mined areas before the end of 2011, while Taiwan has set a deadline of 2013 for completion of mine clearance operations.

### Extent of contamination

The Monitor does not publish a global table of the estimated size of mine contamination by state because it believes that many of the estimates cited by states are far higher than the true extent of contamination. Instead, an order of magnitude for contamination as of August 2011 is given in the table below, which lists states with very heavy contamination (more than 100km²).

### Mine Clearance in 2010

There are continuing problems in discerning true mine clearance from battle area clearance (BAC) or land release by survey, in large part due to poor quality of reporting.  

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9 For example, states as well as certain demining operators sometimes report cancellation by non-technical survey or release by technical survey as clearance. Furthermore, despite reported release of large areas of land, conducting general survey of possibly contaminated areas is often difficult, if not impossible.
However, the Monitor believes at least 200 km² of mined areas were cleared by 45 mine action programs in 2010 (compared with 198 km² in 2009, the previous record), with the destruction of more than 388,000 antipersonnel mines and over 27,000 antivehicle mines. This includes more than 11,000 antipersonnel mines and 830 antivehicle mines destroyed during BAC and roving explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. The global clearance figure is conservative and understates the extent of clearance. The largest total clearance of mined areas was by mine action programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, and Sri Lanka, which together accounted for more than 80% of recorded clearance.

Of the mined area cleared in 2010, almost half was cleared by national NGO mine action operators (especially in Afghanistan and Cambodia), with a further quarter cleared by international NGO mine action operators.

Operators, however, remain at risk of attacks and abductions in some areas where non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operate, in particular in Afghanistan. The Mine Action Coordination Center for Afghanistan (MACCA) reported 11 cases of abductions in 2010, but in all cases the personnel seized were released. In one of these incidents 16 community-based deminers working for Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR) were abducted in eastern Nangahar province in December 2010. Nine deminers were freed within hours and the remaining seven two days later. Two vehicles and all the team’s equipment were burnt.

MACCA observed that despite a 40% jump in the number of people working in mine action to 14,000, which made it one of the biggest UN-funded programs in the country, it suffered only 59 of 59,000 reported security incidents. Of the 59 incidents, however, 21 involved death or injury, including 10 people killed and 20 injured by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and three people killed and eight injured in an IED attack in 2010. In July 2011, DAFA suffered another attack in western Farah province when 20 deminers were abducted and four of them killed.

Mine clearance in select states and other areas in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/area</th>
<th>Area cleared in 2010 (km²)</th>
<th>Area cleared in 2009 (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>64.76</td>
<td>52.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>50.99</td>
<td>44.73∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>31.81</td>
<td>37.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>13.22∗</td>
<td>17.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>10.06</td>
<td>9.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5.82</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>5.31</td>
<td>5.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.75∗∗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>2.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.  
* Very large area clearance reported for the army is not included in these totals as it has not been independently verified and it is not known how much of the reported clearance is either BAC or the result of release by technical survey or cancellation of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).

** In August 2011, concerns were expressed about whether some of the clearance in Sri Lanka has met national and international mine action standards. For this reason, although the figure reported here is unchanged, a more conservative figure for total clearance worldwide has been employed.

*** Major area clearance reported for the Angolan National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem) was not included as it is not known how much of the reported clearance was either BAC or the result of release by technical survey or cancellation of SHAs.

NSAGs have been regularly encouraged to cooperate with mine action activities. The only group to do so in the reporting period was the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC), whose April 2011 communiqué, in addition to a ban on use pledged to “destroy all landmines in their possession” and to “cooperate in the provision of mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.” Members of the NTC’s forces were subsequently involved in ad hoc clearance of some mines in conflict areas, removing hundreds of minimum-metal antipersonnel mines. HAWPAR, an apparatus created by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in Turkey reported clearing 2,000 mines in Sidiqan in northern Iraq. HAWPAR pursues clearance according to an annual workplan based on requests from communities or HAWPAR’s assessment of the threat of dangerous areas near communities it identifies.

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10 Ethiopia, which is believed to have cleared large areas in 2009 as it did the year before, did not formally report on its clearance during 2010, despite significant donor funding and external technical support. No figures for clearance (as opposed to cancellation or release by survey), or at least no credible figures, were made public by a number of states, such as Iran and Morocco.

11 This excludes the land reportedly cleared by the Royal Cambodian Armed Force as the quality of clearance and the extent of area cleared have not been independently verified.

12 Email from MACCA, 12 April 2011.

13 Interview with Zekria Payyab, OMAR, Kabul, 30 May 2011.

14 Email from MACCA, 12 April 2011.

15 Ibid.

16 Interview with Farid Hormayoun, HALO, Kabul, 30 May 2011; and email, 11 August 2011.

17 Interview with Mohammad Daud Farahi, Executive Manager, DAFA, Kabul, 31 May 2011.


20 Email from Katherine Kramer, Programme Director, Asia, and Coordinator on Landmines & Other Explosive Devices, Geneva Call, 15 April 2011. The precise information of the mine types as well as the date during which these mines were accumulated is not known. As of April 2011, they were said to be awaiting destruction.
Battle Area Clearance in 2010

In 2010, at least 460km$^2$ of battle area was reportedly cleared, destroying in the process more than 1.2 million items of UXO and almost 3,000 items of AXO.

BAC reported by major clearance programs in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>BAC in 2010 (km$^2$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>105.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>255.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A further 180,000 items of UXO were destroyed during mine clearance operations while more than 36,000 were destroyed during roving and other EOD. In addition, at least 18.5km$^2$ of cluster munition contaminated area was cleared, destroying in the process almost 60,000 unexploded submunitions. A total of 359km$^2$ of battle areas were cleared in 2009, including 38km$^2$ of cluster munition contaminated areas.

Article 5 Obligations

States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

Forty-four States Parties were confirmed or suspected to be affected by antipersonnel mines as of August 2011, as set out in the table below.

Six of these States Parties have not formally declared themselves to have, or still have, Article 5 obligations but the Monitor believes they may be mine-affected, and thus their completion of their Article 5 obligations may be in doubt: Djibouti, Greece (see below), Montenegro (see below), Namibia, Moldova, and the Philippines.

At the June 2011 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Germany informed States Parties for the first time that it had discovered a suspected mined area at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg. Its Article 5 deadline expired in 2009. Also at the June 2011 meetings, Bhutan reiterated that it had two mined areas on its territory that had not yet been cleared.

Palau submitted an Article 7 report in 2011 (for calendar year 2010) in which it declared for the first time that it had mined areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory. These are mines remaining from World War II, although based on a clearance operator’s report contamination may be only from abandoned stockpiles rather than emplaced mines.

The precise extent to which the Republic of the Congo, whose Article 5 deadline expired on 1 November 2011, is mine-contaminated remains unclear. At the June 2011 Standing Committee meetings, it announced plans to conduct a survey of the suspected region (the southwest of the country, close to the border with Angola) by February 2012. As of the end of August 2011, however, no extension request had yet been submitted.

The Monitor does not list Gambia, which declared at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2010 that it no longer has areas containing antipersonnel mines.

21 The number of AXO destroyed is an underestimate as many states and individual operators do not disaggregate between AXO and UXO. A huge area cleared (almost 700km$^2$) was reported by Vietnam, although the figures, reported for the first time to the Monitor by the state’s clearance operator, the Technology Center for Bomb and Mine Disposal (BOMICEN), did not include the number of items destroyed and appear to include unknown amounts of release of land by survey.

22 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

23 Despite a statement that Namibia was in full compliance with Article 5 at the Second Review Conference, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.

24 Moldova, which had a 1 March 2011 Article 5 deadline, made a statement in June 2008 which suggested that it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. This statement was, however, later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

25 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs consistently over recent years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.

26 Statement of the Republic of the Congo, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 21 June 2011. The actual statement as delivered concerned the intention to seek a four-month extension, but the formal written statement declared that the Republic of the Congo would seek a 12-month extension. The written statement also suggested that this would extend the Republic of the Congo’s deadline to 1 November 2013, but this is believed to be a typographical error as the correct date, if the extension is granted by the States Parties at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, will be 1 November 2012.
in areas under its jurisdiction or control.\(^27\) In June 2011, Nigeria announced that it had cleared all known mined areas from its territory. It pledged to make a detailed, formal declaration of completion to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^28\) In May 2009, Nigeria had reported a possible mine threat left over from the Biafra conflict in the 1960s to the Standing Committee meetings.\(^29\) However, the list maintained by the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) of affected States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations continued to include both Nigeria and Gambia as of 1 September 2011.\(^30\)

The Monitor does not list Mali or Niger as having outstanding Article 5 clearance obligations since both are believed to be contaminated by antivehicle mines only.\(^31\) It has not yet listed Hungary, as press reports of possible mine contamination inside Hungary along its border with Croatia have not yet been confirmed.\(^32\) A request by the ICBL for clarification from Hungary had not yet received a response as of 14 September 2011.

A total of 18 States Parties have reported completion of their respective Article 5 obligations. However, serious concern remained about Greece’s status as of 1 September 2011. Greece has an area on the island of Rhodes that is marked as being mined. In June 2011, at the Standing Committee meetings, Greece stated that it had checked the area numerous times since clearance was originally conducted (in 1987), most recently in May 2011, as not all the mines had been accounted for, and a further examination of the area was planned for September 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe and CIS</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo,</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Republic of</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Greece</td>
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<tr>
<td>the DRC</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>16 States Parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 States Parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>6 States Parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>12 States Parties</strong></td>
<td><strong>4 States Parties</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{29}\) Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 2006–2009), Forms C and F.


\(^{31}\) As of August 2011, however, there were unconfirmed reports suggesting possible use of antipersonnel mines by Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in an area towards the border between Mali and Mauritania. See, for example, “AQIM accused of laying mines in Mali-Mauritania border,” 24 June 2011, Ennahar Online, www.ennaharonline.com. Other reports suggested that AQIM were laying antivehicle mines only. See, for example, “Al-Qaeda: Mali troops build up defences,” News24, m.news24.com.

States Parties reporting completion of Mine Ban Treaty clearance obligations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Year of reported compliance</th>
<th>Article 5 deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010 (extended from 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Date of completion of demining program (prior to entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty).

States Parties and Article 5 deadline extensions

Significant challenges remain in implementing the obligation upon all affected States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty to clear all antipersonnel mines from their territory or on areas they control. In accordance with Article 5, states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas on territory under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. The first clearance deadlines expired on 1 March 2009, but 15 States Parties with 2009 deadlines failed to meet them and were granted extensions by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties. In 2009, a further three States Parties with 2010 deadlines (Argentina, Cambodia, and Tajikistan) and one with a 2009 deadline that had already expired (Uganda) formally requested and were granted extensions by the Second Review Conference. The extension periods ranged from three to 10 years. In 2010, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, and Mauritania all applied for extensions ranging from two months to 10 years while Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe applied for second extensions, ranging from 18 months to three years. All the extension periods sought were granted by the Tenth Meeting of States Parties.

Thus, of the 44 States Parties that may have outstanding mine clearance obligations under the treaty, 22 were already taking advantage of a first or second Article 5 deadline extension period as of 1 September 2011. In addition, four more States Parties have submitted requests to be considered by the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Cambodia in November–December 2011: Algeria, Chile, DRC, and Eritrea. The periods sought ranged from 26 months to eight years. Extension requests were also expected in 2011 from the Republic of the Congo (whose deadline will already have expired by the time the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties has the opportunity to decide whether or not to grant an extension, thereby putting it in violation of the treaty) and possibly also Germany, a State Party whose deadline expired in 2009, but which in 2011 reported suspected antipersonnel mine contamination for the first time.

The ICBL urges the States Parties that receive extensions to fully implement Action Point 13 of the Cartagena Action Plan adopted by the Second Review Conference, which calls on them to work towards rapid implementation of Article 5 “in accordance with the commitments made in their extension requests and the decisions taken on their requests,” as well as to report regularly on such progress. The ICBL has consistently urged all States Parties that have received an extension to keep the time planned for completion under regular review with an aim to finishing as soon as possible, and called on the international community to support their efforts by providing the necessary financial, technical, and other support in a timely manner.


Many of the States Parties granted extensions to their Article 5 deadlines have since made disappointing progress (see table below). Of the States Parties granted an extension, only Nicaragua has so far declared that it has completed its Article 5 obligations. Of the remaining States Parties granted extensions in 2009, only two (Mozambique and Venezuela) appeared likely to complete their Article 5 obligations in accordance with their first extended deadline.

As noted above, Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe had all sought relatively short extension periods in order to conduct necessary survey activities with the understanding that they would seek a second extension to complete their Article 5 obligations. Of these three states, however, only Denmark was expected to complete clearance by the expiry
of its second extension request. Indeed, neither Chad nor Zimbabwe was able to conduct the respective surveys of contamination during the initial extension periods and sought second extensions for the same purpose as the first extensions. There were even concerns as to whether they would complete nationwide surveys of contamination in these second extension periods.

Also of great concern is the UK, which was one of only two States Parties that was known to be contaminated (the other being Venezuela), and which did not initiate formal clearance operations during the original Article 5 deadline. The UK released four mined areas in December 2009–June 2010, but did not conduct any further clearance in 2010 and was planning to release part or all of only two SHAs only by survey in 2011–2012, leaving 111 mined areas to clear or otherwise release in less than seven years. After prolonged delays, Venezuela, which has a small area of mine contamination, finally initiated clearance operations in 2010 and appeared on track to complete clearance on or before its extended deadline.

Of the four States Parties granted an extension in 2009, only Tajikistan appeared on track to complete its obligations in time.37 Of the three States Parties granted initial extensions to their Article 5 deadlines in 2010, both Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania appeared to be on track, while the status of Colombia, given the ongoing armed conflict, was unclear.

## Argentina

At the Second Review Conference Argentina said it was unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it

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37 The ICBL considered Tajikistan’s 10-year extension to be excessive when compared to the level of contamination and believes that it can complete its clearance obligations far earlier.
did not have access to the Malvinas due to the “illegal occupation” by the UK. Argentina said for this reason it had no other choice than to request an extension to its clearance deadline.\footnote{47 Decisions on the Request Submitted by Chad for an Extension of the Deadline for Completing the Destruction of Anti-Personnel Mines in Accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, 3 December 2010.}

**BiH**

BiH’s Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019 was presented as the blueprint for fulfilling its Article 5 obligations, but it has failed to achieve the strategy’s targets every year since it started. The strategy projected release of 30km\(^2\) a year through clearance and technical survey, two-and-a-half times more than its 2010 achievement.\footnote{39 Darvin Lisica, “Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Context of the Global Mine Problem – Analysis and Strategic Preconditions for Fulfillment of Obligations Arising from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and Convention on Cluster Munitions,” NPA, June 2010.} The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) continues to assert that BiH could achieve its target if it received adequate external financing.\footnote{40 Interview with Dusan Gavran, Director, and Tarik Serak, Mine Action Planning Manager, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 13 May 2010.} In June 2011, at the Standing Committee meetings, BiH repeated its view that “reduction of the remaining mine suspected area planned for the period 2011–2019 will largely depend on allocated local and donor funds.”\footnote{41 Statement of BiH, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.}

**Cambodia**

In Cambodia, the extent of clearance that will be needed to fulfill its Article 5 obligations will not be known before completion of the baseline survey (BLS), which is scheduled to occur by the end of 2012. Results from survey of the first 23 of the 122 districts due to be covered by the BLS identified 714.8km\(^2\) of mine and ERW contamination. The amount of land in these districts identified as contaminated with either only antipersonnel mines or a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines amounted to 643km\(^2\). This did not include some areas of reported contamination on the border with Thailand that were not surveyed for security reasons. With the results of the BLS in 99 districts still to come, Cambodia’s extension request estimate of antipersonnel mine contamination (648.8km\(^2\)) is therefore expected to rise.\footnote{42 Interview with Heng Rattana, Director General, Cambodian Mine Action Center, Phnom Penh, 26 April 2011.}

In the meantime, humanitarian demining operators in Cambodia were forced to reduce capacity because of funding shortfalls, and clearance rates have suffered as a result. In 2010, the first year of implementing its extension request, Cambodia continued to report increased land release but this included greater amounts of BAC. Mine clearance by humanitarian deminers (29.69km\(^2\)) was significantly below the Article 5 extension request target for the year of 39.4km\(^2\). Cambodia could be said to have achieved the target only if the unverified clearance results reported by the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (27.86km\(^2\)) are included.\footnote{43 Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), “Demining Progress Report 1992 – December 2010,” received by email from Eang Kamrang, Database Unit Manager, CMAA, 26 April 2011.}

At the Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Cambodia warned that “without an increase in the current level of funding Cambodia is unlikely to mobilize resources required for 2010 and even less likely to obtain the 38% increase that has been foreseen to complete Article 5 obligations.”\footnote{44 Statement of Cambodia, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 November 2010.}

**Chad**

At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Chad announced that it would be submitting a second, short Article 5 deadline extension request to enable the survey for which it had been granted the first extension period to be finally conducted.\footnote{45 Statement of Chad, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.} The ICBL stated its deep disappointment that the UN’s internal processes in managing allocated funds had prevented the survey from being conducted during Chad’s first extension request, as had been planned.\footnote{46 Statement of ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 22 June 2010.} A second extension request was submitted on 20 September 2010, seeking an additional three years to conduct the survey. In granting the request, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties noted that, “it would appear that Chad does not possess much more knowledge now than it did in 2008 to develop a plan to meet its Article 5 obligations.”\footnote{47 Decisions on the Request Submitted by Chad for an Extension for an Extension of the Deadline for Completing the Destruction of Anti-Personnel Mines in Accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, 3 December 2010.}

Although survey activities had progressed through June 2011, it is regrettable that no concrete plans have been made to survey Tibesti, and that the first phase of the survey of other areas has ended in June 2011 without completing survey of two regions and without having a clear date for resumption of survey activities. Demining operations started in August 2000, but stopped at the end of December 2005 due to lack of funding. There was subsequently only intermittent clearance of mined areas until Mines Advisory Group (MAG) returned to Chad in 2010.

**Colombia**

On 30 March 2010, Colombia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline of 1 March
2011, and then on 5 August 2011 submitted a revised request. The major differences between the original and the revised extension request were the decrease in the predicted number of NGO demining teams from 85 to 49 in 2014–2020, while required funds for the same period decreased by almost US$150 million. The operational plan and the assets and funding needed in 2011–2013 remained at 17 NGO teams and $25 million. During this period the government of Colombia planned to contribute $21 million for 14 demining Platoons. 46

The extension request predicts that all mined areas will be released by 2020, even though “it is not possible to establish an operational plan which determines the exact number of squads, squadrons and municipalities where the organizations must operate.” 47 Colombia’s 2011–2013 operational plan is a central component of the extension request. Fifteen of 660 possibly mine-affected municipalities in five of Colombia’s 32 departments, with contamination covering an estimated 15km², were deemed priorities for clearance by 2013. 48

Colombia did not include an operational plan for 2014–2020 in its extension request because of the lack of information on contamination and the uncertainty of the role and capacity of NGOs. 49

**Croatia**

Croatia cleared and otherwise released or cancelled a total of 340km² of SHAs between 1998, when the Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) was set up, and the end of 2010. 50 It has, however, consistently not met the targets set out in its extension request in the three years since it was granted. In 2008, it released 42.5km² compared with the target of 53km²; in 2009 it released 62.59km² while the target was 73km²; and in 2010 it released 69.95km², significantly less than the 100km² projected in the extension request. 51 As a result, Croatia still had 815.3km² at the start of 2011 compared with the 771km² projected in the extension request. 52

Croatia’s National Mine Action Plan (NMAP) sets targets that differ from those in the extension request, providing for slightly lower rates of clearance than those in the extension request up to 2012 and higher rates of clearance in subsequent years. 53 However, Croatia says meeting the targets of both the extension request and the NMAP has been frustrated by cuts in funding as a result of the global financial crisis. These were expected to result in even less funding for mine action in 2011 than the previous year, forcing CROMAC to review its operations and methodology and place greater emphasis on land release by non-technical and technical survey. By these measures and other fundraising initiatives, Croatia said it hoped it would be able to achieve its extension request targets. 54

**Denmark**

In December 2010, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties granted Denmark’s request for a second extension to its Article 5 deadline, until 1 July 2012. 55 In granting the request, the meeting noted that Denmark had “complied with the commitments it had made, as recorded in the decisions of the Ninth Meeting of the States Parties, to obtain clarity regarding the remaining challenge, produce a detailed plan and submit a second extension request.” It noted that this affirmed “the importance of a State Party, should it find itself in a situation similar to that of Denmark in 2008, requesting only the period of time necessary to assess relevant facts and develop a meaningful forward looking plan based on these facts.” 56

In June 2011, Denmark stated that 310,000m² of area was still to be cleared from the World War II minefield on the Skallingen peninsula and again affirmed that the remaining area would be cleared at the latest by its July 2012 deadline. It noted, however, that clearing the dunes has been “challenging.” The contractor engaged for clearance had been expected to complete clearance by May 2011, but this was later expected to occur before the end of 2011. If possible, the area would be released earlier than July 2012. 57

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46 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, pp. 52–53; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 5 August 2010, pp. 57–58.
47 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2010, pp. 41–42.
48 Ibid, Annex 3, Table 12, pp. 57–58.
49 Ibid, p. 60.
51 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, pp. 35–36.
52 Ibid, p. 76.
54 Ibid.
Ecuador
In 2010, Ecuador exchanged information with Peru on mined areas located on and across the border between the two countries. This resulted in a significantly increased total figure of almost 1.9 km² of contaminated area across four provinces in Ecuador (Loja, Morona Santiago, Pastaza, and Zamora Chinchipe) and more than tripled the size of the problem it reported in 2009. In June 2011, at the Standing Committee meetings, Ecuador noted that mine clearance was occurring in accordance with the timeline set out in its Article 5 deadline extension request and that it had increased the number of deminers from 60 to around 100 as planned. However, although Ecuador has met the clearance goals it set out in its 2010–2018 operational plan, it has so far released a total of less than 0.2 km² of mined area, leaving almost 0.5 km² still to be released from its original estimate of contamination and more than 1.7 km² based on its new estimate of contamination.

Guinea-Bissau
On 8 September 2010, Guinea-Bissau submitted a request for a two-month extension to its Article 5 deadline. In granting the request, the Tenth Meeting of States Parties stated that, given that a financial shortfall could affect the realization of Guinea-Bissau’s plan, resource mobilization could be greatly aided if Guinea-Bissau demonstrated greater national ownership by making a national financial investment into Article 5 implementation. The meeting further noted that while Guinea-Bissau has been slow to adopt efficient land release practices and that while its progress to date has been modest, Guinea-Bissau was making a commitment through its extension request to more efficiently and expeditiously proceed with Article 5 implementation.

Indeed, clearance of mined areas has been extremely slow in Guinea-Bissau, with only about 1.3 km² of mined areas cleared in the last five years, and data, especially for 2009, does not appear to be reliable. However, as a result of a nationwide survey of contamination in 2010–2011, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported in March 2011 that it expected clearance of mined areas to be completed before the end of 2011, in time for Guinea-Bissau to meet its extended Article 5 deadline.

Jordan
At the Tenth Meeting of States Parties Jordan stated it would complete clearance of all known mined areas by the end of 2011 and it would complete quality assurance of the area by its extended Article 5 deadline of May 2012. In June 2011, Jordan expressed confidence the northern border project would meet its May 2012 clearance deadline, although NPA reports verification of land around the known minefields will take longer. The outlook for Jordan’s ongoing Sampling and Verification Project, however, appears more uncertain. Jordan told the Standing Committee meeting in June 2011 that it is conducting a review in which “a new plan will be developed to calculate the project’s estimated completion date.”

Mauritania
On 10 April 2010, Mauritania submitted a request for a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. Mauritania explained that the reasons for its failure to meet its deadline were a lack of financial resources, insufficient progress in demining operations, use of only manual demining techniques, and difficult soil and climatic factors. In presenting the request to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2010, Mauritania stated that it had a coherent plan that combined land release by survey and clearance and that it hoped to involve Handicap International (HI) and NPA in its demining program.

Only minimal mine clearance occurred in 2009, and no mined area was projected to be cleared during 2010 according to the extension request. Mauritania has, however, set explicit targets for clearance during the five-year extension period, and noted its intention to seek additional demining capacity from international NGOs as well as additional funding from both national and international sources, and to enhance demining productivity with the use of machines. In 2011, NPA set up a program in Mauritania to support the national mine

64 Email from Mário Penedo Tomé Nunes, Programme Manager, NPA, 11 March 2011.
67 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 February 2010, pp. 3–4.
69 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 3 February 2010, p. 28 (Annex 3).
70 Ibid, pp. 4–5, p. 28 (Annex 3).
action authority in addressing mine and cluster munition contamination.

Mozambique
Since Mozambique submitted its Article 5 Extension Request in 2008 it has identified new SHAs through the Mine Free District Assessment approach, from a HALO survey on the Zimbabwe border, and from reports of residual contamination in the four northern provinces. This has resulted in almost twice as much area to clear as reported in its extension request. Despite this new contamination, at the end of 2010 Mozambique was still believed to be in a position to meet its extended Article 5 deadline of March 2014. The National Demining Institute reported that approximately 10km² of mined areas remained, plus 2.9km² on the Zimbabwe border and contaminated area along the railway lines. If, however, funding falls short, new mine areas are found, and 2011 clearance targets are not met, it is far less likely that Mozambique will be able to meet its 2014 deadline.

Nicaragua
In accordance with its one-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, Nicaragua was required to complete mine clearance operations by 1 May 2010. In June 2010, Nicaragua announced it had cleared all known mined areas in time and had thus completed its Article 5 obligations. Over a 17-year period, Nicaragua cleared almost 12km² of mined areas, destroying in the process almost 180,000 mines at an estimated total cost of $82 million.

Peru
In June 2010, Peru reported 36 mined areas remained, covering a total of 192,700m² in Amazonas department, and containing 28,514 mines. In May 2011, Peru reported the same number of mined areas after having cleared 36,000m² of contaminated area. However, there appears to be significant additional contamination. As noted above, Peru and Ecuador have been exchanging information about mined areas on the border between the two countries since May 2010. In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2010, Peru included 10 previously unreported areas. The extent of this contamination has not, though, been reported. Thus, while Peru has made good progress in clearing the mined areas around state infrastructure, it is not clear how the 10 newly identified mined areas will affect Peru’s ability to meet its 2017 Article 5 deadline.

Senegal
Senegal has not formally reported in detail on its progress in demining in 2009 or 2010 and has still to determine the extent of remaining contamination with any degree of precision. At the Second Review Conference, Senegal expressed its hope that it would have fulfilled its Article 5 obligations before 2015 if the peace process continues. Senegal previously stated its intention not to seek a second extension period, except for “truly exceptional circumstances.” In the past five years, however, demining has cleared only a very small extent of mine contamination, and the total estimate for mined areas to be released has increased, leading to growing concerns that Senegal will not meet its extended Article 5 deadline. In June 2011, Senegal reported that it had cleared a total of only 121,637m² since demining operations effectively began in 2008, with clearance output decreasing year on year.

Tajikistan
In general, mine clearance in Tajikistan has proceeded slowly, and operations were only initiated several years after it became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Furthermore, Tajikistan has still to establish the precise extent of mine contamination, although re-survey has clarified the mine threat on the border with Afghanistan. New national and international capacity now in place, including machines and mine detection dogs, should speed up land release significantly, and should enable Tajikistan to complete its Article 5 obligations well before its extended deadline of 2020.

Thailand
Thailand has already fallen far behind the targets set out in its Article 5 extension request. Land released in


Ibid.

2010 totaled 5.23 km², representing less than 1% of the 546.8 km² Thailand identifies as mine contaminated. UNDP observed in a report at the end of January 2011 that at the current rate of clearance, "it is estimated that it will take Thailand several decades to clear all landmines."\(^{26}\)

Lack of attention to mine action on the part of political leaders has become one of the biggest constraints on progress resulting in a lack of funds for the Thai Mine Action Center (TMAC) or the mine action sector. TMAC reported a 60% increase in the budget allocated for fiscal 2011 (year beginning October 2010) to $2.5 million but noted this represented 10% of what it had sought under the Article 5 extension plan.\(^{21}\) In a bid to attract international support, Thailand organized a conference on mine action with donor countries and international organizations in January 2011 and introduced a concept of "Mine-free Provinces" focusing on all pillars of mine action in individual provinces so as to raise donor awareness of needs.\(^{23}\) Nonetheless, in June 2011 Thailand again identified fundraising as a major challenge.\(^{44}\)

New demining capacity was added in 2011. Under a memorandum of understanding signed with TMAC in November 2010, NPA started a land release pilot project in early 2011 working with a 10-strong survey team undertaking technical and non-technical survey along the border with Cambodia.\(^{36}\)

**Uganda**

In July 2009, Uganda declared that it had underestimated the complexity of its clearance operations and the time required to clear them; subsequently it would not meet its 1 August 2009 Article 5 deadline. It applied for a three-year extension,\(^{45}\) which was approved at the Second Review Conference in December 2009. An essential element in Uganda’s three-year plan was the use of a MineWolf vegetation cutting machine belonging to NPA in Sudan. In March 2010, the Uganda Mine Action Centre (UMAC) reported to the Monitor that NPA had brought a MineWolf into Uganda and that it had helped to clear the Ngomoromo area by the middle of that month, several months ahead of schedule, indicating that Uganda might be in a position to complete its Article 5 obligations before 2012.\(^{27}\) In December 2010, however, Uganda announced it had identified five small SHAs covered in heavy vegetation that required a MineWolf.\(^{69}\)

In July 2011, UMAC provided an update of the original and remaining problem, which more than doubled the number of SHAs believed to contain antipersonnel mines and increased the total estimate of contaminated area by more than 700,000 m². It also included a completely new mined area some 300,000 m² in size at Bibia, a town in Amuru district on the Sudan border. Of the total of 20 SHAs identified in Agoro, Bibia, and Ngomoromo three had been cleared and quality controlled as of July 2011, and two discredited, leaving 15 SHAs and almost 0.9 km² to release by August 2012.\(^{52}\) It was not clear whether the August 2012 deadline will be met.

**United Kingdom**

At the June 2010 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, the UK reported the completion of its four-site pilot project that started on 4 December 2009 and was completed on 4 June 2010.\(^{90}\) The UK stated that it would report the findings of its analysis and agreed next steps to States Parties at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2010.\(^{91}\) The UK did not, however, announce any further clearance plans at that meeting. In a statement to the meeting, the ICBL regretted the failure of the UK to meet its undertaking to provide “as soon as possible, but not later than 30 June 2010 a detailed explanation of... the implications for future demining” in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5 of the treaty.\(^{92}\)

In June 2011, the UK announced that it would be seeking contractors for land release of at least part of one or possibly two SHAs, one behind the Stanley Common Fence, which borders the capital, Port Stanley; the other at the Murrell Peninsula, some 4 km from Port Stanley.\(^{93}\) However, it was not foreseen that any mine

\(^{86}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Gen. Attanop Sirisak, Director-General, TMAC, 20 May 2011.
\(^{88}\) Interview with Lt.-Gen. Attanop Sirisak, TMAC, in Geneva, 2 November 2011.
\(^{89}\) Vipunjit Ketunuti, “Executive Summary, Mine-free Provinces, A Step Closer to Mine-free Thailand and a Mine-free World, 1 January 2012 — 31 December 2014.”
\(^{91}\) Interview with Lee Moroney, Country Programme Manager, NPA, Bangkok, 28 April 2011.
\(^{92}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Vicent Woboya, UMAC, 10 June 2011.
\(^{93}\) Interview with Vicent Woboya, Director, UMAC, in Geneva, 15 March 2010; and ICBL, “Critique of Uganda’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request,” www.icbl.org.
\(^{94}\) Interview with Vicent Woboya, UMAC, in Geneva, 20 June 2011.
\(^{96}\) Ibid.
clearance would take place. According to the UK: “The identification of the exact location and extent of the minefields in this area will be useful for subsequent clearance programmes.”

In an annex to its Article 5 deadline extension request, the UK included the Feasibility Study conducted in 2007, which concluded with respect to the Murrell Peninsula that: “The whole of the Murrell peninsula was classified as suspect on the basis of very little evidence, except for the five coves, which are assumed as mined. Since then, the whole area has been heavily pastured for 25 years by sheep and possibly cattle without accident, and a colony of penguins lives in the middle of it. The entire peninsula, except for its coves, could probably be re-classified as clear if some confidence-building clearance activity took place.”

The UK reported in its extension request that the SHAs in the Murrell Peninsula total some 5.5km² in size. The Feasibility Study also suggested that SHA M65 beside the Stanley Common Fence (some 0.2km² in size) may contain no mines.

The ICBL called upon the UK to provide a concrete plan and budget for fulfilling its Article 5 clearance obligations. It also reiterated that affected States Parties must clear all mined areas, not only those with a humanitarian impact. In response, the UK stated that it had foreseen a two-year pilot project in its extension request before it would be in a position to set out a full plan to meet its legal obligations.

Venezuela

Venezuela did not begin clearing mines until 2010, more than 10 years after becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty. By April 2011, it appeared that Venezuela had cleared four of its 13 mined areas, leaving nine to be released. Venezuela had earlier cited the weather, prolonged procurement procedures, a fall in Gross National Product, as well as new priorities for its government as the reasons for failing to conduct mine clearance in accordance with its treaty deadline. In December 2010, Venezuela said new procurement procedures for demining equipment should allow the total additional time needed to clear all mined areas to be reduced from five years to four and that clearance of all mined areas should be completed by June 2013.

Yemen

It is not known whether Yemen will meet its extended Article 5 deadline. Yemen did not update the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies either in June 2010 or in June 2011, or the Tenth Meeting of States Parties, on its progress in implementing its Article 5 obligations. Under Action Point 13 of the Cartagena Action Plan adopted by the Second Review Conference in 2009, States Parties undertake to: “Complete implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible but not later than their extended deadlines, ensure progress toward completion proceeds in accordance with the commitments made in their extension requests and the decisions taken on their requests, and report regularly on such progress to the meetings of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Meetings of the States Parties and Review Conferences.” It is not known what impact the upsurge in violence in 2011 has had on the mine action program.

Zimbabwe

At the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Zimbabwe said since the beginning of 2009 “no significant progress” had been made in its clearance program due to the lack of both international and national support.

In June 2010 at the Standing Committee meetings, Zimbabwe repeated that it would not be able to complete the planned surveying in the 22-month extension period and stated that it would request another extension.

In July 2010, the ISU sent a consultant to Zimbabwe for one week to conduct a needs assessment and develop a plan, including a budget, for the necessary survey. On
3 August 2010, Zimbabwe submitted a second extension request based on the ISU consultancy findings. The second extension requested 24 months to conduct surveys of four areas that have never been surveyed but have always been suspected to contain mines. Zimbabwe stated they were confident of accessing international assistance for the survey although they had not accessed significant funding since 2000 and did not indicate who the donors would be or who would provide the technical assistance.106

After the survey is completed Zimbabwe will submit a third extension request.107 In December 2010, the States Parties granted the 24-month extension request and noted the commitments by Zimbabwe whereby within 12 months (by August 2011) non-technical survey would be conducted of the four “unknown areas” (Kariba, Lusulu, Mukumbura, and Rushinga) as would technical survey of parts of the five “known minefields.”108

In June 2011, at the Standing Committee meetings, Zimbabwe reported it had not received any international funding or technical support, nor had much progress been made on surveying. In its second Article 5 deadline extension request, the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre indicated it would need $100 million to clear the remaining 225km² of contaminated area.109

Compliance with Article 5 among States Parties with later deadlines

Without enhanced efforts, future compliance with Article 5 deadlines seems likely to be similarly disappointing. Based on progress to date, the Monitor believes that the following States Parties are not on track to comply with their treaty clearance obligations by their deadlines, indicated below in parentheses: Afghanistan (2013); Angola (2013); Cyprus (2013); Sudan (2014); and Turkey (2014). Regrettably, Article 5 clearance deadline extension requests are becoming the norm rather than the exception.

Iraq

Among States Parties with later Article 5 deadlines, Iraq (2018 deadline) is a particular concern. Three years after it adhered to the treaty, Iraq has still to demonstrate how it expects to progress towards fulfilling its international legal obligations. Mine action continued to be held back by lack of precise data on the mine threat and political uncertainties have impeded the development of an effective institutional framework for mine action.

Clearance operations in the center and south of Iraq were halted by a suspension of operations order imposed by the Ministry of Defense on 23 December 2008. The ministry halted operations on grounds of security and in order to vet personnel engaged by demining operators who would therefore have access to mines and/or explosive ordnance.110 The Ministry of Defense partially lifted the suspension in May 2009 to allow operators to conduct non-technical survey and risk education, but the ban on clearance and demolitions of cleared items remained in place until August 2009. Even then, however, accrediting organizations for operations was slow, and no demolitions of cleared items by any organization except the military were possible until May 2010.111

Only in three northern Iraqi governorates, where mine action is under the management of the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency and the General Directorate of Mine Action, has there been concerted action to deal with the mine threat. In central and southern Iraq, most of the reported commercial and humanitarian clearance consists of BAC of unexploded submunitions and other UXO. The army has embarked on survey of the mine threat and as of mid-2011 was the only operator in central and southern Iraq to be tackling it.

Montenegro

Montenegro (2017 deadline) reported to the media in November 2007 that it had completed clearance of mines

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106 Article 5 deadline Second Extension Request, 3 August 2010, p. 18.
108 Article 5 deadline Second Extension Request, 3 August 2010, p. 22.
109 Ibid., p. 20.
on its territory.” Its Article 7 report for 2008 it stated, “There are no areas under Montenegro’s jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.” However, Montenegro still had to survey a mountainous area on its borders with BiH to clarify if the contamination that affects the Croatian side of the border also affects Montenegro. By September 2011, Montenegro had not officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations.

Turkey
Certain States Parties have still to acknowledge that they are legally obliged by the treaty to clear areas they either control or over which they assert jurisdiction. As of September 2010, Turkey had not yet formally acknowledged its responsibility for clearance in northern Cyprus, which is controlled by Turkish forces.

Cyprus
The government of Cyprus has not yet declared whether it will seek an extension if contamination remains in areas of the island it does not control. In June 2011, Cyprus stated that it: “takes its international responsibilities very seriously, respects the letter of the Convention and values its contractual obligations stemming therefrom. Given the continuation of the well-known situation on the island, the government is currently contemplating whether further measures might be considered as necessary for duly implementing its obligations under Article 5...”

Moldova
In the case of Moldova, whose Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2011, a statement in June 2008 by a government official had raised hopes that it had acknowledged its responsibility for clearance of any mined areas containing antipersonnel mines in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. This statement was, however, later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leaving its compliance with Article 5 uncertain.

Risk Education: Evolving Needs and Changing Approaches
Mine and ERW risk education (RE) continues to adapt to the evolving patterns of contamination and impact of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, cluster munition remnants, and other ERW. Twenty years of mine and battle area clearance have made significant inroads into the explosive threat, especially from antipersonnel mines, with the result that in many countries there is not, or no longer, a humanitarian crisis of casualties from explosive ordnance. Indeed, in addition to the 10 states that have claimed completion of clearance of known mined areas, many others have a low or residual threat that would typically need only limited RE activities.

Even in some of the most heavily mine-affected countries, such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia, mine casualties have been generally declining for several years. In Cambodia, where recorded mine casualties increased in 2010 compared with the previous year, only 10 fatalities and 53 injured were from antipersonnel mines, a significant reduction compared to five years ago.

Emergency RE, though, continues to be sorely needed in Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Somalia especially, while Libya too became a priority following the outbreak of armed conflict in February 2011. Other situations potentially requiring an emergency response included Eritrea, Yemen (where casualties significantly increased in 2010 compared with the previous year), and Sudan/South Sudan.

Persisting, significant obstacles to safe access indicate that the needs of the civilian population in Myanmar for RE continue to be grossly underserved. In Pakistan, however, where international engagement in mine action is limited to RE, interventions seem to be making headway—reaching more people in, or from, the

112 “Montenegro is the only one without mines in Balkans,” Pobjeda (Montenegrin daily newspaper), 8 November 2007; “Montenegro cleared,” Dan (Montenegrin daily newspaper), 9 November 2007; and interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, Director, Regional Centre for Divers’ Training and Underwater, Podgorica, 16 March 2008.

113 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Forms C and I.

114 Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, Regional Centre for Underwater Demining, Podgorica, 18 February 2009.

115 See Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, which lays down the obligation to clear areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party; and statement of the ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.


117 The IMAS on Mine and ERW Risk Education (see, for example, IMAS 12:10) use MRE as the relevant acronym.

118 Albania, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Tunisia, and Zambia. Of these, both Albania and Zambia have also completed clearance of unexploded submunitions.

119 There is no RE in Angola following the decision by the government not to authorize funding in 2010 and UNICEF no longer supports RE in Angola. Clearance operators report conducting limited RE in communities where they are clearing mines.

120 This compares to 29 killed and 49 injured by antivehicle mines and 32 killed and 115 injured by ERW.

121 In 2005, 875 new mine/ERW casualties were reported, of whom 168 were killed and 707 injured; 525 were men, 83 were women, and 267 were children. Cambodia’s National Mine Action Strategy 2010–2019 identifies RE as an “important component” in achieving its goal of reducing both casualties and the social impact of mines. CMAA, “National Mine Action Strategy 2010–2019 (Draft),” undated but 2010, p. 6.
conflict-affected border tribal areas—and contacts with communities have resulted in some roving clearance/destruction of items of UXO.

Colombia continues to implement a major RE program involving many national organizations. In 2010, the Presidential Antipersonnel Mine Action Program (PAICMA) designed specific RE materials for coca eradicators since, increasingly, this is one of the most vulnerable groups to mine incidents, based on casualty rates. The rate of casualties among coca eradicators rose from 8% of all civilian casualties in 2006 and 2007, to 34% in 2010.122

In Libya, which faced a new mine and ERW threat in 2011, including from unexploded submunitions, UNICEF and HI initiated a program and other international mine action NGOs have included an RE component in their work. As of July 2011, direct RE sessions were underway in internally displaced person (IDP) camps in eastern Libya and more than 30,000 information leaflets had been distributed to IDP communities in Ajdabiya, Benghazi, Brega, and Misrata in addition to Tunisian border areas.123

In Somalia, also in 2011, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) planned to provide emergency RE messages in Mogadishu, Afgooye, Galgaduud, and other priority areas affected by the ongoing armed conflict.124 Sudan has an extensive RE program throughout the country. In 2010, RE was provided in 22 states, to more than 3 million people. UNICEF provided support to planning, implementation, and the management of RE at the state and national level. More than 400,000 persons, primarily refugees, IDPs, and communities impacted by mines and ERW, received RE through UNICEF-supported programs in 2010.125

Recognizing that standardized “don’t touch” messages have relatively short-lived effectiveness, especially beyond the initial emergency phase, some states are looking to more sophisticated approaches to RE, including through community liaison. Lao PDR, for example, a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with consequent obligations to conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by cluster munition remnants,126 conducted a review of RE in 2010 and decided to move away from “traditional awareness-raising” to more targeted interventions. At the Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting in June 2011 it reported that RE strategies “are evolving...to more complex and targeted processes focused on behavior change. Such processes involve data analysis to identify high-risk groups, development of new MRE materials (in local languages where appropriate), community liaison, development of government policies on scrap metal, as well as teacher training programmes and the growing involvement of Buddhist monks.”127 In June 2011, the Lao National Regulatory Authority initiated a survey of knowledge, attitudes, and practices to assess the effectiveness of RE materials and strategies.128

There is also a continuing trend to institutionalize RE within the school system, sometimes in tandem with other life skills or response to other threats, such as from the proliferation of small arms. In Afghanistan, for example, there has been further progress in developing the provision of RE in schools with training of teachers (some 19,000 had been trained to deliver RE by 2011). In Sri Lanka, where UNICEF has led the post-conflict development of RE, in December 2010 the Ministry of Education’s academic affairs board approved an RE curriculum for schools paving the way for training teachers in the new curriculum in 2011.129 The National Strategy for Mine Action notes that the general level of understanding of the threat from mines and ERW is high but the need for continuing RE remains since many communities in the north remain close to contaminated or un-surveyed

122 Response to Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, 21 March 2011.
125 Email from Insaf Nizam, Child Protection Specialist (Mine Action), UNICEF, 8 May 2011.
126 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 5, paragraph 2(e).
128 Ibid.
129 Email from Mihlar Mohamed, Program Officer Mine Action, UNICEF, 18 August 2011.
areas and because of large numbers of people from the south visiting northern districts.\textsuperscript{130} In 2010, with UNICEF support, the National Mine Action Authority in \textit{Sudan} and the Ministry of Education began integrating RE into the school curriculum in the Nuba Mountains, Western and Southern Darfur, and southern Sudan.

In \textit{Kosovo}, the NGO Center for Promotion of Education (QPEA) implemented a school-based RE project from November 2009 to October 2010 in cooperation with the Serbian NGO “Future,” which aimed to increase the role of teachers and schools in RE activities.\textsuperscript{131} In \textit{Somaliland}, Danish Demining Group (DDG), MAG, HI, and the Somaliland Mine Action Center collaborated in a joint effort to develop RE materials for children that may become part of the social science school curriculum. In collaboration with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and UNICEF, operators provided initial input on mine risks as well as firearms safety and conflict management.\textsuperscript{132}


Casualties in 2010

The Monitor identified 4,191 casualties occurring in 2010 that were caused by mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), cluster munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) in 60 states and areas. At least 1,155 people were killed and another 2,848 people were injured; for 188 casualties the outcome of the incident was unknown. Since 2008 the greatest number of casualties has been recorded in Afghanistan (1,211 in 2010) and Colombia (512 in 2010). The global casualty total in 2010 is almost the same as that recorded in 2009, when 4,010 casualties were identified.

**Casualties and Victim Assistance**

States with 100 or more casualties in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>No. of casualties in 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As in previous years, Asia-Pacific had by far the greatest number of casualties; five of the eight countries with more than 100 casualties in 2010 were from the region.

2010 casualties by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of casualties</th>
<th>No. of states and areas in the region with casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>2,477</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and CIS</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,191</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the slight increase (5%) in recorded casualties from 2009 to 2010 was likely not indicative of a trend given the poor quality of casualty data in some countries, this was the first annual increase recorded by the Monitor since 2005. However, the total remained much lower than the 5,502 casualties recorded for 2008 and lower than any year since monitoring began in 1999. The small rise in recorded casualties was due in most part to increases in two countries with large numbers of annual casualties: Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent,....
Casualties and Victim Assistance

Cambodia. In addition, significant increases in casualties were recorded in other countries with fewer casualties, such as Iran, Sudan, and Yemen. Increased casualty numbers in Sudan and Yemen have been attributed to greater movement of people in hazardous areas, related to the escalation of armed violence. The increase in Iran was due to the availability of casualty data for 2010 that was not available for 2009.

These increases were somewhat offset by a continuing overall decline in annual casualty rates in most other countries, largely due to clearance and increased risk awareness. The continued trend of decreasing casualties in Colombia remained one of the major contributors to this global decline. Overall, the number of states and areas recording casualties was fairly steady with a decrease of just four fewer states recording casualties in 2010 as compared with 2009, when 64 states and areas recorded casualties.

It must be stressed that, as in previous years, the 4,191 figure only includes recorded casualties and, due to incomplete data collection, the true casualty total is definitely higher. Past reporting has indicated that hundreds or thousands more casualties occur, but are not captured by annual data. As in previous years, data collection in various countries such as Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, Iraq, Lao PDR, Libya, Myanmar, and Pakistan was believed to be incomplete due either to the lack of a functioning official data collection system and/or to the challenges posed by ongoing armed conflict.

Casualty demographics

In 2010, civilians made up 75% of all casualties for which the civilian/military status was known (2,952 of 3,914). This was an increase from 2009 when civilians made up 70% of all casualties. Three quarters of the military casualties recorded for 2010 were identified in just three states, where there was ongoing conflict or armed violence: Colombia (357), Pakistan (186), and Afghanistan (84).

Mine/ERW casualties by civilian/military status: 2010

In 2010, the number of casualties among humanitarian clearance operators was double that recorded for 2009. There were 131 deminer casualties (36 deminers killed; 95 injured) recorded in 15 states/areas in 2010, compared to 67 deminer casualties in 2009. The large increase can mainly be attributed to the availability of casualty data from Iran, where there were 47 demining casualties recorded in 2010 and for which there was no data on demining casualties in 2009. However, there were also small increases in several other countries such as Germany (nine casualties); Lebanon and Sudan, with seven casualties each; and Angola with six casualties. After Iran, Afghanistan recorded the second largest number of casualties from clearance accidents with 31 as compared with 34 in 2009. While most demining casualties involved nationals of the country where the demining took place, there were three casualties among British deminers working in Afghanistan (one) and Sudan (two).

The category of “civilian casualties” did not include humanitarian clearance personnel, who are also civilians but were, as in previous years, recorded in a separate category for deminers, to ensure more detailed analysis.

In 2009, the vast majority of military casualties were also recorded in the same three states: Afghanistan, Colombia, and Pakistan. In Colombia and Afghanistan, the number of military casualties declined in 2010 while the number increased significantly (from 103 to 186) in Pakistan.

The term “deminer” is used here to refer to professional clearance operators clearing all kinds of explosive items including mines, unexploded submunitions, and other ERW.

States/areas with casualties among deminers in 2010 are: Afghanistan, Angola, BIH, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Germany, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Abkhazia.

“WWII-era bomb explodes in Germany,” Al Jazeera, 2 June 2010, english.aljazeera.net.
As in previous years, the vast majority of casualties where the sex was known were male (88%); the other 12% were female. Among civilian casualties for whom the sex was known, female casualties made up a larger proportion at 17% of the total (420 of 2,479). In 2010 there were no states where girls and/or women were the majority of casualties; for 25 states/areas with casualties in 2010, no female casualties were recorded.

Mine/ERW casualties by sex: 2010

When looking only at civilian casualties for whom the age was known, children made up 43% of all casualties (1,066 of 2,479). The vast majority of child casualties were boys (73%); 18% were girls. In 25 states/areas, children made up half or more of civilian casualties for whom the age was known, more than double the number of states/areas where children were the majority in 2009. States with the largest number of child casualties were Afghanistan (469 or 53%), Cambodia (80 or 31%), Sudan (74 or 58%), and Lao PDR (67 or 59%).

Overall, children made up 30% of all casualties for whom the age was known (1,066 of 3,564)—an increase in absolute terms from the 1,001 recorded in 2009 and similar as a proportion of all casualties in 2009. For 85% of all casualties, information about their age was known (627 unknown), which was an increase from 80% in 2009 and an improvement in the age disaggregation of casualty data as called for by the Mine Ban Treaty’s Cartagena Action Plan.

Mine/ERW casualties by age: 2010

When looking only at civilian casualties for whom the age was known, children made up 43% of all casualties (1,066 of 2,479).

Items causing casualties

In 2010, antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated IEDs which are regarded as antipersonnel mines under the Mine Ban Treaty, caused the majority of casualties (52% or 1,959 of 3,769) for which the type of explosive item was known. For 3,769 casualties, or 90% of all recorded casualties, the item type that caused the casualty was known. Of these:

- Mines, including antipersonnel mines, victim-activated IEDs, antivehicle mines, and mines of unspecified type, were the most common at 2,671 (71% of the 2010 total)—an increase as compared to 2009
- Antipersonnel mines caused 1,275 casualties (34% of the 2010 total), an increase as compared with recent years.

This includes 505 of the 512 casualties identified in Colombia in 2010. While recorded as antipersonnel mines by the national mine action center, it was widely accepted that this figure includes casualties caused both by factory-made antipersonnel mines and by victim-activated IEDs that are antipersonnel mines but not factory-made.

For all recorded casualties caused by victim-activated IEDs, the explosive item type has been considered as antipersonnel victim-activated IEDs in Monitor casualty data analysis because available information indicates that the fuze of nearly all victim-activated IEDs allows them to be activated by a person as well as a vehicle. It was not possible to distinguish between the types of victim-activated IEDs in casualty data as there is no clear means of determining the sensitivity of the fuze. Even excluding victim-activated IEDs, antipersonnel mines remain the cause of the largest number of casualties by explosive item type in 2010.

For 422 casualties, the explosive item type was not known. A significant reevaluation of the percentage of casualties for which the explosive item was unknown in 2009 was made in 2011. The change was largely due to the inclusion of Colombian casualties as casualties caused by antipersonnel mines (and/or de facto antipersonnel mines). Previously, these casualties had been included among those casualties for which the item was unknown because of uncertainty regarding the type of explosive items recorded. For updated data see Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Victim-activated IED Casualties,” Fact sheet, June 2011, www.the-monitor.org. Of the 3,956 casualties identified in 2009, the type of explosive item was known for 3,652. In contrast, previously, in ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), www.the-monitor.org, it had been reported that the item type was known for just 3,018 of the 3,956 casualties in 2009.

The Monitor identified 2,548 casualties of mines for 2009; mines were defined to include antipersonnel mines, victim-activated IEDs, antivehicle mines, and mines of unspecified type. This constituted an adjustment from the way explosive items were differentiated in ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), www.the-monitor.org. For updated data see Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Victim-activated IED Casualties,” Fact sheet, June 2011, www.the-monitor.org.

Most of the increase in the number of antipersonnel mine casualties from 573 in 2009 can be attributed to the inclusion of Colombian antipersonnel mine casualties within this total. Including the casualties in Colombia, there would have been 1,187 antipersonnel mine casualties globally in 2009.
States/areas with casualties, by item type where known*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item type</th>
<th>State/area with casualties in 2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antipersonnel mines</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Georgia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kenya, Kuwait, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen, Abkhazia, Somaliland, Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antivehicle mines</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Jordan, Lebanon, Myanmar, Niger, Pakistan, Senegal, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Somaliland, Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified mine type (antipersonnel or antivehicle)</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mozambique, Pakistan, Russia, Turkey, Yemen, Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Belarus, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nger, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexploded Submunitions</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Cambodia, DRC, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Vietnam, Nagorno-Karabakh, Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim-activated IEDs</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.

* While the specific number of victim-activated IED casualties in Colombia and Myanmar is not known, there were known to have been some. Casualties from unexploded submunitions were recorded in Libya for the first time in 2011, outside the reporting period for casualty data collection for Landmine Monitor 2011.

- victim-activated IEDs, or *de facto* antipersonnel mines, caused 684 casualties (18% of the 2010 total), the same percentage as recorded in 2009 but a significant increase from previous years;
- antivehicle mines caused 375 casualties (10% of the 2010 total), a slight increase from 2009; and
- mines of unspecified type caused 337 casualties (9% of the 2010 total).24
- ERW, including cluster munition remnants, caused 1,098 (29% of the 2010 total), a decrease compared to 38% in 2009;
- ERW caused 1,038 casualties (28% of the 2010 total), down from 2009;25 and
- cluster munition remnants or unexploded submunitions, caused at least 60 casualties where information was available (2% of the 2010 total), a decrease from 2009.26

The most significant change in items causing casualties in 2010 was the increase in the number and percentage of casualties caused by antipersonnel mines. While this is largely due to the reclassification of casualty data in Colombia to include most casualties in this category, rather than as casualties by unknown explosive items, there was an overall increase in antipersonnel mine casualties in other states and areas.

There was also a continued increase in casualties from victim-activated IEDs, which function as *de facto* antipersonnel mines. Most victim-activated IED casualties were civilians (almost 70%). The two states with the highest numbers of casualties from victim-activated IEDs both saw increases in 2010: Afghanistan from 293 to 383 casualties and Pakistan from 190 to 203 casualties.27 As in 2009, Afghanistan continued to account for the majority of casualties from victim-activated IEDs with 56% of the total in 2010. There was also an increase in the number of states and areas reporting these casualties from eight to 10.28

![Casualties by item: 2010](Image)

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24 Mines of unspecified types refers to reporting in which it is unclear if an explosive item is a mine or IED, if antipersonnel or antivehicle; it does not include command-detonated IEDs and mines.

25 ERW including UXO and AXO, other than cluster munitions remnants.

26 Much of this decrease can be attributed to a lack of casualty data disaggregated by explosive item type from Lao PDR, the country with the highest numbers of cluster munition casualties in recent years.

27 Preliminary casualty data for 2011 showed still greater increases in victim-activated IED casualties in both Afghanistan and Pakistan as compared with 2010 and all other previous years.

28 In 2010, victim-activated IED casualties were recorded in: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal, Turkey, Thailand, Iraq, India, Peru, Russia, and Yemen. No victim-activated IED casualties were identified in Russia, Thailand, Turkey, or Yemen in 2010. Victim-activated IED casualties were recorded in Cambodia and the DRC in 2009, but not in 2010.
As in previous years, most casualties from antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated IEDs, were adults while children were the majority of casualties caused by ERW. In 2010, among antipersonnel mine casualties for which the age was known, 89% were adults and of these nearly all were men and 3% were women. Antipersonnel mines caused 69% (or 91 of 131) of all demining casualties and 53% of military casualties (444 of 831). Among casualties caused by victim-activated IEDs, 80% were adults and, of these, most were males and 12% were female. A quarter of all military casualties were caused by victim-activated IEDs.

In 2010 children constituted 59% of casualties caused by ERW where the age was known (597 of 1,015) compared to 61% in 2009; and 45% of the casualties were caused by unexploded submunitions. Among those ERW casualties for whom both age and sex were known, 32 boys made up the single largest casualty group, as in 2009, with 48% or 465 of 968 of those reported. Some 34% of ERW casualties were men, 12% were girls, and 6% were women.

**Victim Assistance**

**Introduction**

Victim assistance in 2010 benefited from a reoriented focus on service accessibility, availability, and some early efforts in a few states to combine the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, these improvements were at least in part offset by increases in armed violence that eroded accessibility and availability of services in several states with significant numbers of mine/ERW survivors.

Overall, slow progress was made by states in turning the vital promises of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 into progress in the lives of survivors on the ground. Yet despite irregular funding and challenges in sustainability, most victim assistance programs managed to hold their own and continued to provide much needed assistance to their beneficiaries.

In the first year implementing the Cartagena Action Plan, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty mostly maintained existing coordination mechanisms and national victim assistance plans and, in a limited number of countries, began to address gaps in services in remote and rural areas. As the aspect of mine action that had been most neglected prior to the Second Review Conference in December 2009 and the area with the greatest potential to have a positive impact in the daily lives of survivors, increasing access to these services was a key action within the Cartagena Action Plan. However, the impact from the actions to provide appropriate services where and when survivors needed them was yet to reach most survivors.

While the vast majority of survivors experienced little benefit during 2010 despite these activities, in some cases groundwork was laid for future progress.

The second major theme of 2010 was promoting the effective—and coordinated—implementation of victim assistance obligations and broader obligations to support persons with disabilities, across the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the CRPD in those cases where states were parties to two or more of these complementary conventions. Overall, most efforts in this area could be seen on paper, through reporting and planning, rather than in the lives of survivors. In some cases, however, the potential to combine resources and energies made some projects to benefit survivors seem more possible, especially in an environment of ever-tightening funding.

These two positive developments were clouded in many states and areas throughout 2010, and increasingly into 2011, by the challenges and obstacles to service provision that come with increased armed violence.

In this reporting period, the Monitor examined all mine and ERW-affected states and areas with mine/ERW survivors, identifying casualties in 60 states and areas, and profiled changes and developments in victim assistance in 41 states and areas. Of the 41 states and areas profiled, 25 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Of the remaining 16 states and areas, 14 had not...
yet joined the Mine Ban Treaty and another two were areas that were ineligible to join international conventions.36

The Monitor measured progress in victim assistance in 2010 in four key areas that correspond to the victim assistance obligations included in the Mine Ban Treaty and its Cartagena Action Plan, which are also consistent with the Convention on Cluster Munitions and its Vientiane Action Plan:

- **Victim assistance needs assessments:** The completeness of information on mine/ERW casualties, the needs of survivors, and existing services is essential to planning and implementing an effective victim assistance program that addresses survivors’ real needs.-

- **Victim assistance coordination:** This includes the planning, monitoring, and coordination of all aspects of victim assistance, with all relevant stakeholders, such as government ministries, survivors and their representative organizations, and civil society actors, and facilitated by a focal point with sufficient authority and resources to carry out the task.

- **Survivor inclusion:** The full participation of survivors and their representative organizations in all aspects of the Mine Ban Treaty (and other relevant legal mechanisms) and in all aspects of victim assistance decision-making, coordination, implementation, and monitoring is both their right and an important way to ensure the effectiveness of victim assistance.

- **Accessibility, availability, and quality of services:** Overcoming the lack of availability and the inaccessibility of appropriate services (including emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support, and social and economic inclusion), particularly in rural and remote areas where many survivors are based, was a central action point in both the Cartagena Action Plan and the Vientiane Action Plan.

The Monitor also reviewed national policies and international legal frameworks designed to address the four key areas mentioned above, looking at ways in which different frameworks were harmonized and how they considered specific age and gender appropriate needs of survivors, guaranteed their human rights and prevented discrimination among mine/ERW survivors or between survivors and other persons with disabilities.

### Assessing survivors’ needs

Recognizing that data collection had presented severe ongoing challenges to providing adequate and appropriate victim assistance, under the Cartagena Action Plan, States Parties committed to “Collect all necessary data, disaggregated by sex and age, in order to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate adequate national policies, plans and legal frameworks”37 and to be sure that such data includes information on both the needs of survivors and the availability of relevant services. This action also calls for “such data [to be made] available to all relevant stakeholders and that it contribute to other relevant, national data collection systems.”38

Progress in needs assessment was reported in 2010. Although data collection was not uniform or consistent, reporting indicated that information was disaggregated by sex and age in nearly every country with an official system for data collection.39 Five States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty conducted assessments of mine/ERW survivors needs in 2010:

- **In Angola,** the national demining commission began a national victim survey and needs assessment in two of 18 provinces to identify and register mine and cluster munition survivors with disabilities and promote their socio-economic inclusion.

- **In Chad,** survivors were surveyed in the most mine/ERW-affected areas of the country to develop a national victim assistance plan. However, there was still a lack of data available to determine the scope of victim assistance needs and the information collected had not been made available to service providers.

- **The DRC** also carried out a national needs assessment of mine/ERW survivors in the most mine/ERW affected areas of the country through NGOs and service providers to inform the national victim assistance plan.

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36 The 14 states profiled that remained outside the Mine Ban Treaty were: Azerbaijan, Egypt, Georgia, India, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan (part of Sudan, a State Party, for much of the reporting period), Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, as well as the areas of Abkhazia and Western Sahara.


39 Disaggregated data for Chad and Somalia was not available at press time.
- Although there were no large-scale efforts to collect data on the needs of mine/ERW survivors in El Salvador, the government increased efforts to identify and register mine/ERW survivors, along with others disabled by war, including specific information about economic inclusion needs in order to develop its 2010 five-year strategic plan.

- Peru, together with NGO partners, continued to assess the needs of all survivors; and had interviewed and designed individualized social and economic reintegration plans for 70% of registered survivors by the end of 2010.

In addition, in Colombia, registering those victim assistance services provided to survivors within the national Epidemiological Monitoring System became obligatory throughout Antioquia, one of the departments with the great number of mine survivors, though this had not been replicated on a national scale. Similarly, Uganda conducted a second pilot of the national casualty surveillance system following an initial pilot in 2008. NGOs also carried out survivor needs assessments in one district of western Uganda in 2010 and the mine action center used the information to design their program.

Several States Parties used the information from past surveys. BiH (2009), Senegal (2009), Sudan (2009), and Tajikistan (2008) relied on previous assessments, while Albania and Thailand continued to update earlier data in the most affected areas. Iraq began to implement a needs assessment through its health care sector in 2011. However, half of the States Parties profiled did not carry out needs assessments in 2010 and had not reported using or sharing such information to plan or improve the provision of victim assistance services to mine/ERW survivors.40

Among states not parties, limited needs assessments were reported in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, in two regions of South Sudan, and in Sri Lanka. Data from previous surveys was used in Egypt (2008) and Iran (2009). No needs assessment or assessment-based planning was reported for six of the 11 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty profiled, all of them countries with high numbers of survivors: India, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Somalia, and Vietnam.

Additionally, numerous NGOs and service providers continued to collect data on survivors’ needs and the services they had received. In several countries and areas, service providers reported ongoing collection of data on beneficiaries’ needs.41

**Victim assistance coordination**

The Cartagena Action Plan underscored the importance of coordination and planning of victim assistance calling on States Parties to: “Establish, if they have not yet done so, an inter-ministerial/inter-sectoral coordination mechanism for the development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of relevant national policies, plans and legal frameworks...”42

**Focal points and coordination mechanisms**

In 2010, 24 of the 25 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty profiled had victim assistance focal points; only Turkey had no focal point, but its national disability administration under the president was identified as the key body for victim assistance in 2011.43 In two States Parties, the government focal point changed in 2010, while all others remained the same as in 2009. In the DRC, the focal point was changed from the Ministry of Health to the Ministry of Social Affairs, which was also the ministry responsible for coordinating all issues related to persons with disabilities and victims of conflict.44 The change was seen as an improvement, moving government victim assistance responsibilities to a more appropriate ministry.45 In Serbia, after more than a year of inactivity on victim assistance coordination by a state-run rehabilitation hospital, a new individual was named as the focal point within the hospital in the second half of 2010.

40 Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Serbia, Turkey, and Yemen, as well as Colombia and Uganda which implemented limited or partial surveys.

41 Such data collection occurred in several States Parties including: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, El Salvador, Iraq, Mozambique, Serbia, Sudan and Uganda, but this list cannot be considered exhaustive as Monitor research did not explicitly request information about efforts by service providers to collect data on survivors’ needs.


43 The 24 States Parties with a victim assistance focal point in 2010 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.


45 Interview with Jean Marie Kiadi Ntoto, Victim Assistance Officer, UN Mine Action Coordination Center (UNMACC), Kinshasa, 17 April 2011.
Among states not parties, seven states and one area had victim assistance focal points. Of these, Lao PDR and Lebanon, as States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, were required to designate a government focal point for victim assistance in 2010; both chose the previously existing focal point from the mine action sector. India had no victim assistance focal point but did have a focal point for disability issues that was known to have included mine survivors. Six other states not parties and one area profiled had no victim assistance focal point.46

Among States Parties, three national victim assistance coordination mechanisms were established or began functioning in 2010 and one ceased to function. In total, at least 16 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had functional national victim assistance coordination mechanisms during the year.47

- In Cambodia, the National Disability Coordination Committee (NDCC) replaced the Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance and was tasked with monitoring the implementation of the National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, Including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011.
- In Colombia, the Presidential Program for Mine Action convened the first meeting of the National Roundtable on Victim Assistance in June 2010 with the purpose of developing a national victim assistance plan.
- Croatia began multi-stakeholder victim assistance coordination in 2010 with regular meetings held during the year. The establishment of an official coordination body was announced in early 2011, formalizing the coordination structure begun in 2010.48

Yemen’s national coordinating mechanism, the Victim Assistance Advisory Committee, became inactive in 2010. In northern Iraq, there was a victim assistance coordinating mechanism facilitated by UNDP, but there was no corresponding national body for the rest of Iraq.

In early 2011, Burundi and the DRC both launched national coordinating mechanisms. In Burundi, the Interministerial Coordinating Committee for Victim Assistance convened victim assistance stakeholders in January 2011 for its first national victim assistance planning meeting.49 In the DRC, the Interministerial Coordinating Committee for Victim Assistance, chaired by the Ministry of Social Affairs, held its first meeting in March 2011; this coordination mechanism remained dependent on support from UNDP.

Among states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Azerbaijan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, South Sudan, and Vietnam had national victim assistance coordinating mechanisms during 2010. In post-independence South Sudan, the Victim Assistance Working Group remained active and effective though it continued to rely on support from the UN Mine Action Service. In Vietnam, a non-governmental stakeholders’ working group on mine issues was a forum to discuss the coordination of victim assistance activities. In Georgia, the Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre ceased to have a role in victim assistance coordination in early 2011.

In 2010, while there were some changes in which states and areas had functioning national victim assistance coordination, the total number remained very much the same as in 2009, at some 19 states.50 However, as in previous years, the irregularity and effectiveness of this coordination and the degree to which it was integrated into or harmonized with broader disability frameworks varied among the coordination mechanisms. There were improvements to coordination identified during the year, though there were also countries profiled in which the level of coordination activity was significantly reduced, decreasing effectiveness.

Decentralization of victim assistance coordination allowed for increased involvement from local authorities and survivors in locations where many survivors were dependent on support from UNDP.

- States not parties and areas with victim assistance focal points: Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Nepal, South Sudan, and Abkhazia.
- States not parties and areas without victim assistance focal points or disability focal points inclusive of survivors in 2010 were: Georgia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Western Sahara.
- States Parties with national coordinating mechanisms in 2010 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. There was no functioning coordinating mechanism in: Algeria, Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Serbia, Turkey, and Yemen.

46 States not parties and areas with victim assistance focal points: Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Nepal, South Sudan, and Abkhazia.
47 States not parties and areas without victim assistance focal points or disability focal points inclusive of survivors in 2010 were: Georgia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Western Sahara.
48 States Parties with national coordinating mechanisms in 2010 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. There was no functioning coordinating mechanism in: Algeria, Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Serbia, Turkey, and Yemen.
51 South Sudan has not been included in this total since it remained part of Sudan throughout 2010 though it did operate a separate coordination mechanism. Vietnam has also not been included since victim assistance coordination is not carried out by the government. There was also some victim assistance coordinating mechanisms in at least two states not profiled in 2010, Jordan and Guinea-Bissau, but with low but steady levels of activity.
based in both Angola and El Salvador.

- **In Angola**, workshops were held in four provinces with provincial office representatives and other governmental and nongovernmental victim assistance stakeholders to improve victim assistance planning and implementation at the provincial level. 52
- **In El Salvador**, the state fund for people injured or disabled in conflict opened two regional offices as part of its decentralization campaign. The fund also held consultations in various regions of the country to familiarize and connect eligible people, including mine/ERW survivors, with the fund's services. 53

In at least three cases, initiatives to integrate or transform victim assistance coordination into coordination for the broader disability sector were deepened in 2010. 54

- **In Afghanistan**, where victim assistance coordination was included in broader disability coordination mechanisms, the Inter-ministerial Task Force on Disability was established to improve coordination between relevant ministries. 55
- **In Cambodia**, the newly established NDCC, which includes victim assistance stakeholders, began its work in 2010. During the year, the NDCC strengthened and promoted its role in monitoring the implementation of the National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, Including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011.
- **In Mozambique**, to ensure the inclusion of mine/ERW survivors and their perspectives in broader disability coordination, the victim assistance focal point as well as survivors participated in the 2010 review of the five-year national disability plan.

In at least three states, activities to coordinate victim assistance were reduced in 2010, as compared with 2009. In **Yemen**, as mentioned above, the Victim Assistance Advisory Committee ceased to function in 2010. In **Uganda**, the Victim Assistance Forum, which had been established in 2009, held just one meeting in 2010 due to a lack of funding; budget cuts in January 2011 further limited support for the activities of the Forum. In **Lebanon**, the National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance reduced its frequency of meetings during the year due to decreased funding levels. This was seen to have decreased the efficiency of victim assistance planning. 56

**Development of national plans**

In 2010, at least 13 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had active victim assistance or broader disability plans that explicitly included mine/ERW survivors. 57 Another two plans were developed during the year and Mozambique and Uganda developed follow-up plans. Two states, **Burundi** and **Chad**, began developing victim assistance plans for the first time in 2010. In addition, **El Salvador** reported having a national victim assistance plan based on the Cartagena Action Plan, but no efforts to implement or monitor the plan in 2010 could be identified.

- **Croatia**’s “Action Plan of Assistance to Mine and UXO Survivors 2010–2014” was developed by the newly formed inter-ministerial victim assistance coordination group, including survivors’ representative organizations. The plan was approved by the victim assistance coordination

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52 Interview with Nsimba Paxe, Victim Assistance Specialist, Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance, Luanda, 16 June 2011.

53 Interview with Marlon Mendoza, General Manager, Protection Fund, San Salvador, 3 March 2011.

54 In the cases of Afghanistan and Cambodia, national disability plans were explicitly developed as part of efforts to implement the Mine Ban Treaty and its action plans, with the development process led by victim assistance stakeholders.


56 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Khaled Yaminout, Mine Risk Education/Victim Assistance Program Coordinator, Norwegian People’s Aid, 15 May 2011.

57 State parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with active victim assistance plans in 2010 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda.
body in February 2011 and was awaiting government endorsement as of June 2011.

- The DRC’s annual national plan for victim assistance and persons with disabilities (November 2010–October 2011) was developed based on the Cartagena Action Plan and the results of a 2010 survivor needs assessment. As of June 2011, the plan had not yet been approved.58

- In Mozambique, a new five-year National Disability Plan, inclusive of survivors, was under development in 2010, to come into effect in 2011.

In contrast to the planning efforts of States Parties, among the 16 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, just two, Azerbaijan and South Sudan had victim assistance plans in 2010. Throughout 2010, victim assistance in South Sudan continued to be implemented based on the plan for Sudan, a Mine Ban Treaty State Party.60 Lao PDR and Lebanon, both States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, reported on the development of national victim assistance plans in 2010 though neither had finalized a plan as of 1 September 2011. Nepal had previously reported having a victim assistance plan, but it was inactive in 2010. India had a disability plan that was said to include mine/ERW survivors.

Monitoring national plans

Numerous victim assistance coordinating mechanisms included within their functions the monitoring of the implementation of victim assistance and/or disability plans. However, among all 41 countries profiled, of which at least 17 had plans during 2010, just two countries, Mozambique and Uganda, where new plans were being developed, reported comprehensive efforts to monitor and evaluate their implementation.

Survivor inclusion

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, through subsequent action plans, have made it clear that mine survivors, their families, and representative organizations should not just be recipients of assistance but active participants in all aspects of treaty implementation. Through the Cartagena Action Plan, States Parties committed to ensure the continued involvement and effective contribution of experts, including mine survivors, in their delegations.61

In 2010, there were some improvements on the part of states to track and share information about this inclusion. Statements made by Sudan and Uganda at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in December 2010 and at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2011 noted progress was made in the inclusion of survivors and their representative organizations in victim assistance. At the intersessional meetings, Colombia spoke on their efforts to increase survivor participation in planning and service provision. South Sudan reported on the involvement of disabled persons organizations in implementing victim assistance and called for funding to support the development of survivors associations.62 However, in most cases, monitoring survivor inclusion remained difficult, particularly at the national level—the level at which survivors have the greatest impact on victim assistance.

59 Statement of Uganda, Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1

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A survivor in the DR Congo.

In 2010, Uganda published a new Comprehensive Plan of Action on Victim Assistance 2010–2014. Objectives from the previous 2008–2012 plan were reviewed and aligned to relevant national policies as well as to international legal mechanisms such as the Cartagena Action Plan, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the CRPD.59

60 As of June 2011, South Sudan expected to continue to develop victim assistance activities based on the components of the Sudanese victim assistance plan that were relevant to the situation in the newly independent country.
In 2010, just four States Parties—BiH, Peru, Tajikistan, and Thailand—including a mine/ERW survivor or other person with a disability in their delegations to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings or the Tenth Meeting of States Parties. This is a reduction from the seven identified in 2009.

At the national level, in 2010, 21 profiled States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty included mine/ERW survivors, or their representative organizations, in victim assistance coordination. This includes all 16 States Parties with functioning victim assistance coordination mechanisms as well as five other states in which survivors participated in ad hoc planning meetings or within broader disability coordination structures. However, in eight of the 21 states, this participation was seen to be limited, often in terms of the ability of survivors to contribute to decision-making.4

- In Angola, survivors' associations and disabled persons organizations were invited to provincial victim assistance coordination meetings, but felt that the meetings were used for the dissemination of information only and that survivors and other persons with disabilities were not included in decision-making.

- In Colombia, the survivors who participated in planning meetings changed from one meeting to the next, limiting their ability to follow important decisions.

- Croatia reported that survivor inclusion in drafting action plans or implementing victim assistance was “variable” and often a “tokenism.”

In general, the quality of survivor participation varied, often in correlation with the effectiveness of the coordinating mechanism itself.

Just five states not parties included survivors in victim assistance coordination in 2010 and this again included South Sudan, which remained part of Sudan throughout the year.44 Lao PDR and Lebanon, two of the five, were obligated to include survivors through their commitments under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In addition, India included survivors in the drafting of disability policy.

In 23 of 25 States Parties profiled, survivors were involved in the implementation of victim assistance. Only in Turkey did survivors report that they were not involved in the implementation of services relevant to their needs; there was no information available regarding survivor inclusion from Eritrea. As in previous years, most often this participation was through NGOs, survivor’s associations, or international organizations, such as the ICRC.45 However, in at least one case, Senegal reported on its efforts to build the capacity of survivors through management courses. In states where survivors were included in the implementation of victim assistance, it was not necessarily systematic or widespread.

Survivor inclusion in the implementation of victim assistance was identified in six states not parties as well as one area.46

Survivors were most often active in peer support, social inclusion, and advocacy on survivors’ rights, but in several states they were also active in the fields of physical rehabilitation and economic inclusion.47 In these cases however, survivors were implementing services through NGOs or international organizations, rather than state bodies. In Angola, Chad, DRC, and Peru, survivors were involved in data collection and in assessing the needs of survivors. In Peru, survivor data collectors also worked with survivors to design individualized economic inclusion programs.

Quality and accessibility of services

A central theme of The Cartagena Action Plan is ensuring that victim assistance has a tangible impact on the daily lives of survivors. In Cartagena, States Parties agreed to dedicate efforts to improving the availability, accessibility, and quality of services by removing “physical, social, cultural, economic, political, and other barriers, including by expanding quality services in rural and remote areas and paying particular attention to vulnerable groups.”48

Availability

General increases in the availability of victim assistance services were identified in just three States Parties profiled. In Senegal and Thailand, increasing resources and attention dedicated to victim assistance increased the availability of a range of services, including physical

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61 States with survivor inclusion in coordination in 2010 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda.

62 States with limited survivor participation in coordination were: Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, and Uganda.

63 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, (for the period 1 August 2010 to 1 January 2011), Form H.

64 States with limited survivor participation in coordination were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.

65 Most information on survivor inclusion in the implementation of services was provided by NGOs, not governments.

66 Azerbaijan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Nepal, South Sudan, and Abkhazia. There was no information available regarding survivor inclusion in the implementation of victim assistance in Egypt, Iran, or Pakistan.

67 Some examples of States Parties where survivors were involved in providing physical rehabilitation include: Afghanistan, DRC, El Salvador, and Iraq; and in economic inclusion activities include: BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, and Senegal.

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Braille training for mine and UXO survivors in Colombia.

rehabilitation and economic inclusion. In Mozambique, there was a slight increase in the availability of services as a result of an increased focus on disability. No States Parties reported a general decrease in the availability of all types of victim assistance.

Yemen saw an increase in emergency medical attention, largely as a result of the increased demand for such services following the increase in armed violence.

In Afghanistan, Chad, Colombia, and El Salvador, there were increases in the availability of physical rehabilitation; in all cases this was closer to where survivors were based. In Uganda, the availability increased in the western region of the country while declining in the north. At the same time, the availability of physical rehabilitation decreased in Albania, Angola, Cambodia, and Sudan due to a lack of dedicated government resources, in most cases following a transition to national management.

In Peru and Sudan, there was an increase in economic inclusion opportunities for survivors, while such opportunities decreased in Ethiopia. In Afghanistan and Albania, the availability of psychological support, including peer support, decreased during the year.

Among states not parties, increases in the availability of victim assistance were identified in five states. In Azerbaijan and Vietnam, these increases were mainly the result of greater investment in disability services, while in Egypt the increases targeted mine/ERW survivors. In Pakistan, medical attention and physical rehabilitation services increased as a result of an increased demand following an upsurge in violence. In Nepal, there was an increase in economic inclusion opportunities.

Accessibility

Recognizing the importance of improving accessibility to the physical environment, existing services, communications, and information as inextricably linked to improving access to victim assistance services, the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration dedicated the victim assistance parallel program at the June 2011 intersessional meetings to the topic. Civil society experts and representatives of States Parties shared experiences on accessibility challenges and ways to advance the Cartagena Action Plan through improved accessibility.

During 2010, actions were taken in nine States Parties profiled to improve accessibility for survivors and other persons with disabilities. In Ethiopia, Tajikistan, and Uganda, laws or guidelines on accessibility passed during the year were designed to increase access to public spaces, including sidewalks and public buildings. By the end of the year, in Ethiopia, there was evidence that the accessibility proclamation was being enforced. In Afghanistan, the survivors’ association made some 50 buildings accessible during the year and organized a multi-stakeholder conference to promote physical accessibility and peer support. As a result of the workshop, the ministry responsible for disability issues organized a training meeting in accessibility for all provincial mayors. In Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Peru, and Thailand, steps were taken to decentralize health and physical rehabilitation services outside of capitals and strengthen community-based rehabilitation as a means to increase access in remote and rural areas where many survivors live. In Serbia, survivors perceived there to be a small improvement in access to services as a result of civil society efforts to increase awareness among survivors about their rights. However, not all of these efforts had an immediate impact in improving survivors’ ability to access services.

In contrast, among states not parties, improvements in access to services were only identified in Vietnam which implemented numerous programs for persons with disabilities that also benefited mine/ERW survivors, while access decreased due to environmental factors, such as increased violence and natural disasters, in India, Pakistan, Somalia, and South Sudan.

Quality

While some 15 States Parties reported having undertaken activities to develop and/or implement capacity-building and training plans for victim assistance during 2010, improvements in the quality of victim assistance were only identified in four States Parties profiled. In Bih, training in physical rehabilitation, economic inclusion, and peer support improved the quality of activities in these areas.


In El Salvador, increased national funding for victim assistance improved the quality of nearly all services, but especially physical rehabilitation and economic inclusion programs. In Eritrea, improvements in quality were seen as a result of the community-based rehabilitation program. Tajikistan saw small improvements as a result of ongoing efforts to implement the national victim assistance plan. Outside of these four states, in Ethiopia there were some small improvements in the quality of physical rehabilitation while this declined in Angola. Among states not parties, improvements to the quality of victim assistance were only identified in Vietnam. However, it is worth noting that while some states not parties saw declines in the accessibility and/or availability of services, there were no states or areas where there was reporting of an overall worsening in the basic quality of victim assistance, despite numerous reports of decreased funding available for victim assistance.

**International legislation and policies**

The Cartagena Action Plan calls for a holistic and integrated approach to victim assistance that is both age and gender sensitive and in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law. Other international mechanisms with relevance to victim assistance include the CRPD, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and other frameworks such as the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

**Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities**

In the Mine Ban Treaty context, the CRPD is considered to “provide the States Parties with a more systematic, sustainable, gender sensitive and human rights based approach by bringing victim assistance into the broader context of persons with disabilities.”

The Cartagena Action Plan often refers to a rights-based approach to assistance. At an international level, to August 2011, the CRPD has remained a key focus of victim assistance discussions. During the intersessional meeting of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in June 2010, the Chair of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities presented on possible synergies in the implementation of the CRPD and the Mine Ban Treaty’s victim assistance obligations. Using the cooperation provisions of the CRPD was a central theme of the Tirana “International Symposium on Cooperation in the Pursuit of the Victim Assistance Aims of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention” which was held in the framework of the newly formed Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance in April 2011. While supportive of and interested in seeing the coordinated

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**The impact of armed conflict on victim assistance**

Sustaining peace and rebuilding a country in the midst of conflict or emerging from conflict or post-conflict have a significant impact on States Parties’ abilities to meet victim assistance commitments under the Mine Ban Treaty. As was clear in 2010, increasing violence in several of the profiled States Parties undercut efforts to improve access and availability of victim assistance by increasing the need for emergency medical care and physical rehabilitation services, further taxing available services, and by preventing survivors from traveling to services. Service providers, such as the ICRC as well as other international and national organizations, also reported limiting their areas of service, thus inhibiting access to survivors in conflict-affected areas. Ongoing violence also prevented the rebuilding of health centers and other vital services that had been destroyed or degraded by conflict.

In at least six States Parties, the security situation had a direct impact on access to services. In Iraq, where there was decreased armed violence, access to services increased as survivors were able to move around the country with reduced threats to their safety. In some cases services did not have the capacity to keep up the new demand. Conversely, in Afghanistan, Chad, Senegal, Sudan (South Sudan), and Yemen a deteriorating security situation decreased access to services, preventing travel and limiting the availability of mobile outreach services. The same occurred in states not parties India, Pakistan, and Somalia.

Improved security conditions provide opportunities for states to rebuild with the support of the international community. By considering survivors in post-conflict development plans, victim assistance obligations can be met as part of a wider effort to develop health and rehabilitation services, especially in rural areas, or by including survivors and other persons with disabilities in job creation programs and other income generating projects.
implementation of both conventions benefit survivors and other persons with disabilities, the ICBL has noted that synergies between victim assistance obligations and CRPD obligations require efforts on both fronts and cautioned that mainstreaming without the championing of assistance for mine/ERW victims will likely lead to some victim assistance obligations not being fulfilled.\(^{75}\)

Of the 39 states\(^{76}\) with victim assistance profiles for 2010, 21 had ratified the CRPD by 1 August 2011, including 14 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (four of these ratified the CRPD in 2010 or 2011 through August).\(^{77}\) Another seven states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty had ratified the CRPD by 1 August 2011.\(^{78}\) Also among those countries profiled, another five Mine Ban Treaty States Parties\(^8\) and four states not parties had signed, but not yet ratified, the treaty as of 1 August 2011.\(^{80}\) As of 15 September 2011, Afghanistan was preparing to finalize and deposit its ratification of the CRPD.\(^8\)

**Convention on Cluster Munitions**

The Convention on Cluster Munitions ensures the full realization of rights of all persons in communities affected by cluster munitions by obligating states to adequately provide assistance, without discriminating between people affected by cluster munitions and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other causes. The principles of the convention’s Vientiane Action Plan mirror most of those of the Mine Ban Treaty Cartagena Action Plan, but unlike the Mine Ban Treaty Plan, the Vientiane Action Plan contains a range of concrete timeframes for actions. As of 1 August 2011, four profiled Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with cluster munition victims had ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions.\(^{81}\) Afghanistan ratified in September 2011. Another eight had signed, but not yet ratified, the Convention on Cluster Munitions.\(^{82}\)

**Convention on Conventional Weapons**

The Plan of Action on Victim Assistance under CCW

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75 Statement by ICBL, Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance, Geneva, 24 June 2011.

76 Of the 41 states and areas profiled, two areas are not recognized by the UN and cannot join international conventions; therefore, they have not been included in this count.


78 The states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty profiled in the Monitor that have ratified the CRPD are: Azerbaijan (2009), Egypt (2008), India (2007), Iran (2009), Lao PDR (2009), Nepal (2010), and Pakistan (2011).

79 Albania, Cambodia, Burundi, Malta, and Mozambique.


81 Email from the Afghanistan Disability Support Programme, UN Office for Project Services, 15 August 2011.


83 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties: Angola, Chad, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, DRC, Iraq, Peru, and Uganda. All except Colombia and Peru have cluster munition casualties.
to monitor their impact in future years. Each of the three conventions provides useful strategies and priorities for providing comprehensive care and promoting the full realization of human rights for all survivors and persons with disabilities. To ensure the full rights of survivors, it is imperative that all countries apply the highest possible standard set by a convention.

In at least three states, steps taken to implement the CRPD in 2010 had the potential to impact mine/ERW survivors as well. For example, in Ethiopia efforts to improve accessibility and employment of persons with disabilities including mine survivors were linked with CRPD implementation. In Mozambique, the creation of the National Disability Council and the revision of the national disability plan have been undertaken as a means to implement the CRPD. Thailand strongly connected its work on victim assistance with the implementation of its obligations under the CRPD, by including the registration of survivors within a broader disability register to ensure access to pensions and other benefits.

Some states have also begun to coordinate their implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions with their efforts under the Mine Ban Treaty. As of 1 August 2011, all States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty which had designated a victim assistance focal point under Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions had chosen the same focal point that is active under the Mine Ban Treaty. BiH, Croatia, and Iraq presented basically the same information on progress and challenges in providing victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings in June 2011. The DRC did the same in preparing transparency reporting for both conventions.

Finally, a handful of states have begun to consider all three conventions together when planning the provision of services and the development of policies. For example, in 2010, Croatia and Uganda both considered common obligations within all three conventions as well as obligations that were specific to each in developing national victim assistance/disability plans. Other consolidated actions could be possible, such as survivor needs assessments, Action 25 of the Cartagena Action Plan and a time-bound action with the Vientiane Action Plan, which might appropriately be combined with overall disability needs assessments, implemented under the CRPD, as long as survivors are included and questions capture their particular needs. While not yet a State Party to the CRPD, in early 2011 Iraq made the decision to combine a planned survivor needs assessment with a broader disability assessment being advanced by the Ministry of Health after being unable to secure sufficient funding for a stand-alone survivor assessment.

Promoting age and gender sensitive victim assistance

Taking age and gender into consideration is important to ensuring appropriate victim assistance services to fulfill the needs of all survivors and family members of those people injured and killed. For example, growing children require new prosthesis more often than adults, and children’s psychological, social and educational needs also vary. However, a year into the Cartagena Action Plan, states were not yet reporting on their efforts to address the specific needs of survivors according to their ages.

Only slightly more information was available regarding gender-sensitive services. Among States Parties, the DRC and Uganda had both held gender trainings for victim assistance stakeholders as of 1 August 2011. In Senegal, a new program to provide psychosocial support for female mine survivors was launched. In Ethiopia, employment regulations recognized that women with disabilities faced multiple barriers to gaining work. In El Salvador, the state fund for victims of conflict also provides social protection for family members of those killed. There was increasing recognition that services should take into account the differing needs of women, men, boys, and girls and that although the vast majority of mine survivors are male, the particular needs of female survivors and of women as secondary victims must be addressed.

Yet the principles of equality and non-discrimination were far from being fulfilled. For example, in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, there was a persistent disparity in services based on age and gender and in Yemen, the absence of female medical professionals prevented many women from seeking services. It is likely that there was age and/or gender discrimination in other States Parties from which information was not available.
Support for Mine Action

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in fulfilling its treaty obligations. The Monitor reports annually on support for mine action by affected countries and on international mine action assistance reported by donor states. The Monitor relies in most cases on responses to requests for information sent to donors and affected states.

Key Developments in 2010

Donors and affected states contributed approximately US$637 million in international and national support for mine action in 2010, similar to the total recorded contribution in 2009. In addition, assessments from the UN General Assembly for mine action operations within peacekeeping operations provided $81 million in 2010, 17% more than in 2009.

International contributions

In 2010, 31 donors contributed $480 million in international support for mine action in 57 affected states and areas, an increase of $34 million (8%) from 2009. This is the largest annual amount of donor contributions recorded by the Monitor and the fifth consecutive year that international contributions totaled over $400 million per year.

Three donors—the United States (US), Norway, and Canada—reported significant increases, contributing a total of $37 million more than in 2009.

Contributions from the top five mine action donors—

1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs and in accordance with international treaty obligations. For more information on funding contributed via other mechanisms see “Other Funding Paths” section below.


Using sign language interpretation, Ethiopian women with disabilities discuss the challenges in finding accessible transportation.
International Contributions

International contributions for mine action in 2010 totaled over $400 million for a fifth consecutive year.

Contributions by donor: 2006–2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contribution ($ million)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>129.6</td>
<td>118.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
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<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
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<td>Ireland</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>480.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>446.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The 10 other donors in 2010 include Andorra, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovenia, UNDP, NATO/NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, Qatar, and South Korea.

In 2010, 31 donors reported contributing $480 million in international support for mine action. This represents an increase of $34 million (8%) from the $446 million in international contributions reported in 2009. This is the largest annual amount of donor contributions recorded by the Monitor and the fifth consecutive year that international contributions totaled over $400 million per year. The majority went towards 57 states and areas while $40 million was not earmarked for a specific country.

Donors

As in 2009, the US was the top mine action donor, with a contribution more than double the size of that of the next largest donor, Norway. The remaining top donors were the EC, Japan, and Canada. The top donor states were the same as in 2009 with the exception of Canada, which replaced Germany in the top five.

In 2010, the top five donors provided 64% of all international funding, a slight increase from 2009, when contributions from the top five donors made up 61% of the total contribution. Donors such as Canada have expressed concern at the trend, noting that a small number of donors are increasingly providing “the lion’s share of support.”

New international donors reporting contributions in 2010 included NATO through Partnership for Peace (PPP) Trust Funds and Cyprus.

The five donors with the largest increases in dollar terms in 2010 were Norway, Canada, the US, Australia,
and the Netherlands; each increased their contribution by over $4 million. Compared to 2009 contributions, Canada increased its contribution by 60%, Norway by 41%, Australia by 26%, the Netherlands by 24%, and the US by 9%.

Although 10 countries reported smaller contributions in 2010 than in 2009, the size of the decreases were not substantial and fell within the narrow range of $110,000 to $1.6 million, with the exception of Spain which contributed $9.2 million less than in 2010, a decrease of 63%.

Funding paths
Donors provided funding via several trust fund mechanisms, including: the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (UNVTF) administered by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS); the Cluster Munition Trust Fund for Lao PDR administered by UNDP; the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) established by the government of Slovenia; and several NATO PfP Trust Funds.

Donors provided $63 million, or 13% of all contributions, through UNDP. Other organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2010 included the ICRC ($13.6 million) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) ($12.3 million).

GICHD study on mine action funding
Donor strategies are sometimes difficult to determine based solely on the amount of their annual contributions. A study commissioned by the GICHD in May 2010 examined factors that mine action donors consider when allocating funding to mine-affected countries. The GICHD found, based on responses from 18 donors, that policy and funding strategies are based more on measuring socio-economic impact and the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons than on an emphasis to meet the goal of a mine-free world. The majority of donors surveyed viewed mine action as a subset of development cooperation. But the study noted that donor capacities have been weakened in recent years as fewer personnel at the donor level are directly involved in mine action. The result has been less focus and limited oversight capacity; limited capacity for essential tasks such as evaluation and monitoring, project assessment, field visits, and contacts with national mine action authorities; and loss of institutional memory and in-house expertise.

Recipients
A total of 57 states and areas received $440 million from 31 donors in 2010. A further $40 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area.

The top six recipient states—Afghanistan, Angola, Iraq, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Cambodia—received 55% of all international mine action contributions in 2010, as in 2009.

Seven recipients that did not receive support in 2009 received support in 2010—Algeria, Benin, Egypt, Falkland Islands/Malvinas, Liberia, Moldova, and Sierra Leone—compared to 13 new recipients in 2009. The new recipient that received the largest contribution in 2010 was the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which received £1.1 million ($1.7 million) from the UK for mine clearance.

In 2010, 34 states and areas experienced a change of 15% or more in funding compared to 2009. Although support to mine action has been stable since 2005 and increased by over $30 million in 2010, the large number of recipients affected by a significant fluctuation may indicate that annual shifts in donor priorities and changes in local situations affect the number of proposals received and approved from individual mine-affected countries.

Donors with the largest increases in contributions from 2009 to 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Amount of increase ($ million)</th>
<th>Contribution ($ million)</th>
<th>% change (+)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>129.6</td>
<td>118.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recipients receiving at least 15% more support in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>% change (+)</th>
<th>Amount of increase ($ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>142</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 Tajikistan was the only recipient to receive a 15% increase in both 2009 and 2010. No country received a decrease of 15% or more in both years.
## International contributions by recipient: 2010*

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<td>9.9</td>
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<td>87.4</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand, for contributions over $1 million, and to the nearest ten thousand for contributions under $1 million. Source information can be found in the respective Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org.
Twenty-one recipients received at least 15% more international mine action funding than in 2009.

Thirteen recipients received at least 15% less funding in 2010.

Recipients receiving at least 15% less support in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>% change (+)</th>
<th>Amount of increase ($ million)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>0.9</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
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</tr>
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Funding by Thematic Sector

Contributions by thematic sector: 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total contribution ($ million)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance/RE</td>
<td>408.7</td>
<td>85.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Assistance</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>9.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>2.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile destruction</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>480.4</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Other areas are indicated by italics.

** Global refers to funds from donors which were not earmarked for use within a designated recipient state or area and were allocated to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, the UN, ICRC or GICHD. Most advocacy funding is contained within this category of funding.

Victim assistance experts visit a rehabilitation facility during a conference in Albania.
Support for Mine Action

Support for Mine Action

In 2010, 85% of all reported support for mine action went toward clearance/risk education (RE) activities ($408.6 million).

Of the 31 donors reporting international contributions to mine action in 2010, 25 reported contributions for clearance/RE in 50 states and areas, with six of the ten largest donors allocating at least 93% of their support to clearance and RE.

Most donors reported clearance and RE as a combined figure, although clearance accounts for most of the reported funding. Twelve donors reported contributions totaling $10.3 million specifically for 27 RE projects in 14 countries, though RE programs are implemented in all 72 mine-affected countries and seven areas. The EC reported funding three RE projects in Sudan and Pakistan, providing the largest RE contribution, €1.95 million ($2.6 million). Pakistan received the most RE funding with $3.4 million.

Victim assistance

In 2010, 9% of all reported support for mine action went towards victim assistance (VA) activities ($43.6 million).

Of the 31 donors reporting international contributions to mine action in 2010, 21 reported supporting VA activities in 31 states and areas. In 2010, 73% of all reported VA funding was provided by the top four VA donors: the US ($15 million), Norway (NOK55.5 million/$9.2 million), Belgium (€3 million/$4 million) and Australia (A$3.7 million/$3.4 million). The top two VA donors, the US and Norway, provided 56% of all VA funding in 2010.

The US contribution of $15.3 million represents a 33% increase from 2009. In 2010 the US Agency for...
International Development (USAID) Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund provided $8.4 million to projects in Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, the International Society of Prosthetics and Orthotics, and the US-based NGO, Motivation, while the remainder of the US contributions towards VA activities was allocated by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.

Norway contributed $9.2 million towards the ICRC and VA activities in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Vietnam, and Lebanon—an increase of 30% from 2009.

The remainder of the VA funding was allocated for small projects through international NGOs such as Handicap International, CARE, World Vision, World Rehabilitation Fund, Clear Path International, and the POLUS Center. Unlike mine clearance funding, donors did not fund victim assistance through the UN Mine Action Team. Six donors reported no funding for victim assistance: Canada, Czech Republic, EC, Ireland, Sweden, and the UK.

Although there was a $5.6 million increase in VA contributions in 2010 there were four fewer donors, as well as fewer donors contributing a significant amount of their contribution towards victim assistance activities. For example, in 2010 three donors (France, Belgium, and New Zealand) allocated at least 20% of their funding to victim assistance compared to seven donors (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain) in 2009.

The majority of all VA funding assists persons with disabilities generally—and is not specifically provided for mine, explosive remnants of war, or cluster munition survivors—and most of the victim assistance support is provided at the local level through a wide range of government ministries and agencies, NGOs, social service agencies, and advocacy groups.

Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, and the US reported $16 million, just over one-third of all VA funding, in support to the ICRC or to national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. This funding included CHF4,546,110 ($4.4 million) in contributions from five donors (Australia, Austria, Liechtenstein, Norway, and the USAID Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund) to support the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) and its 64 projects in 32 countries in 2010.7

Advocacy

In 2010, 2% of all reported support for mine action in 2010 went towards advocacy activities ($11 million).

Of the 31 donors reporting international contributions to mine action in 2010, 16 reported supporting advocacy activities.

Austria, Ireland, Italy, and Norway allocated over 10% of their support towards advocacy activities, including: support for the Tenth Meeting of States Parties for the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva and the First Meeting of


States Parties to the Convention for Cluster Munitions in Vientiane, Lao PDR; government travel sponsorship through UNDP; and the sponsorship program of the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit. The CMC, the ICBL, GICHD, Geneva Call, and the Monitor also received donor support for advocacy.

Of the $11 million for advocacy activities, donors reported $3.3 million was specifically for mine ban advocacy, $3.2 million was specifically for cluster munition ban advocacy, and the remainder ($4.5 million) was for unspecified advocacy activities.

National Contributions

Since 2008, 27 affected states have reported contributions to domestic mine action programs. In 2010, 24 states reported $157 million in government financial support.9 Croatia, Angola, Colombia, and BiH accounted for 70% of all reported national contributions.

Chile, Denmark, and Venezuela are the only mine-affected countries that receive all of their mine action funding from national sources. The mine action programs in Azerbaijan and Croatia receive over 80% of their funding from national sources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of states reporting contributions</th>
<th>National contributions ($ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Funding Paths

The $480 million in support to mine action in 2010 represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs and in accordance with international treaty obligations. It does not represent the complete expenditures for field operations. Other funding sources include foundations, private fundraising.

8 They are: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Eritrea, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
by NGOs, and mine action allocations in countries with peacekeeping operations.

Sixteen governments contributed $63 million to the UNVTF, compared to 24 donors and $91 million in 2009 and 19 donors and $93 million in 2008. The donors with the largest contributions to the UNVTF in 2010 were Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands. Several small donors used the UNVTF to contribute to mine action, including: Andorra, Estonia, South Korea, Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg.

Donors allocated $28 million in contributions in 2010 through the ITF10 and $4 million to the Organization of American States (OAS)11 for mine action programs in Latin America. The OAS received $2.9 million less in 2010 compared to 2009, a decrease of 42%, largely because Nicaragua required less funding after it completed clearance of its mined areas in April 2010.12

Twelve governments reported contributing $12 million to GICHD in 2010, with Switzerland providing 72% of this total.13

Of the $480 million donors reported contributing in 2010 for mine action, $63 million went through UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery for Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Senegal, Somaliland, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and Yemen.14 The UNMAS Voluntary Trust Fund provided another $141,057 to UNDP for Lao PDR and funding reported by UNICEF for RE projects in Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Yemen.15

Peacekeeping operations

11 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Carl Case, Program Director, AICMA, OAS, 19 May 2011.
12 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Carl Case, OAS, 19 May 2011.
13 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Section for Multilateral Peace Policy, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, 31 May 2011.
15 Email from Eugen Secareanu, Project Officer, UNMAS, 15 September 2011.

Peacekeeping assessed funds for mine action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/area</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Assessed funds for mine action ($)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)</td>
<td>44,865,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
<td>13,987,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>African Union /UN Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID)</td>
<td>9,855,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO)</td>
<td>4,860,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
<td>4,323,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>UN Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
<td>1,782,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>UN Mission for the organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
<td>914,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>80,589,397</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The peacekeeping appropriation increased by 17% in 2010.16 Approximately $54 million in 2010 was allocated to the UNAMID and UNMIS missions.

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 1 October 2011 there were 157 States Parties.

States Parties

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Brunei Darussalem 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo (Brazzaville) 4 May 01 (a)
Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
Cote d Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00

Risk education workshop in Pakistan.
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
Indonesia (20 Feb 07)
Iraq (15 Aug 07) (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
Kuwait (30 Jul 07) (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
Macedonia FYR 9 Sep 98 (a)
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
Montenegro (23 Oct 06) (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
Palau 18 Nov 08 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
Sao Tome e Principe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Swaziland 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Turkey 25 Sep 03 (a)
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Tuvalu 13 September 2011 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

Signatories
Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97
Poland 4 Dec 97

States not Party
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Burma
China
Cuba
Egypt
Finland
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Libya
Micronesia
Mongolia
Morocco
Nepal
Oman
Pakistan
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Somalia
Syria
Tonga
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
Mine Ban Treaty

18 September 1997

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Preamble

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenseless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:

a) To use anti-personnel mines;
Article 2
Definitions

1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

Article 3
Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4
Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5
Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:

   a) The duration of the proposed extension;

   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:

      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;

      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and

      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;

   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and

   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

**Article 6**

**International cooperation and assistance**

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
   - a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
   - b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
   - c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
   - d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
   - e) Assistance to mine victims;
   - f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

**Article 7**

**Transparency measures**

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
   - a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
   - b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
   - c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
   - d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
   - e) The status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
   - f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   - g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines
Article 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

   a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;

   b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or

   c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative measures its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

Article 9
National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 10
Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.
Article 11
Meetings of the States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear antipersonnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13
Amendments
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14
Costs
1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
**Article 15**

**Signature**
This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

**Article 16**

**Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession**
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

**Article 17**

**Entry into force**
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

**Article 18**

**Provisional application**
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

**Article 19**

**Reservations**
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

**Article 20**

**Duration and withdrawal**
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

**Article 21**

**Depositary**
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

**Article 22**

**Authentic texts**
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AHD</td>
<td>antihandling device</td>
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<td>AOAV</td>
<td>Action On Armed Violence</td>
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<td>AP or APM</td>
<td>antipersonnel mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>AusAID</td>
<td>Australian Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>AV or AVM</td>
<td>antivehicle mine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>battle area clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBU</td>
<td>cluster bomb unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBR</td>
<td>community-based rehabilitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>CD</td>
<td>Conference on Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cluster Munition Coalition</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>UK Department for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>disabled people’s organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Handicap International</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Network (UN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>International Trust Fund (Slovenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIS</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Mine Action Center or Mines Action Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASHG</td>
<td>Mine Action Support Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>mine action team or Mines Awareness Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDD</td>
<td>mine detection dog</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAMSA</td>
<td>NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QA</td>
<td>quality assurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>QC</td>
<td>quality control</td>
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<tr>
<td>RE</td>
<td>mine/ERW risk education</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Survey Action Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>suspected hazardous area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMART goals</td>
<td>specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound goals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix

Appendix 70


falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed the perimeter of a suspect hazardous area. Those areas equipment) are used to gather information that locates location dogs, manual deminers or mechanical demining which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detector...

Area reduction describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based on the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.

Community liaison – According to IMAS, “liaison with mine/ERW affected communities to exchange information on the presence and impact of mines and UXO, to create a reporting link with the mine action programme and develop risk reduction strategies. Community mine action liaison aims to ensure community needs and priorities are central to the planning, implementation and monitoring of mine action operations.”

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Explosive remnants of war – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Failed cluster munition – A cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so.

Improvised explosive device – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

IMAS – International mine action standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action operations.
by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

**IM SMA** – The UN’s preferred information system for the management of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA provides users with support for data collection, data storage, reporting, information analysis, and project management activities.

**Landmine Impact Survey** – A national or regional assessment of the socioeconomic impact on communities caused by the actual or perceived presence of mines and ERW, in order to assist the planning and prioritization of mine action programs and projects.

**Land release** – The set of activities and methodologies intended to release previously suspect hazardous areas with the minimum possible risk.

**Mine action center** – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some MACs also implement mine action activities.

**Mine/ERW risk education** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training and community mine action liaison.

**National mine action authority** – A governmental body, normally interministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.

**Non-state armed groups** – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

**Risk reduction** – Those actions which lessen the probability and/or severity of physical injury to people, property, or the environment due to mines/ERW. Risk reduction can be achieved by physical measures such as clearance, fencing or marking, or through behavioral changes brought about by mine/ERW risk education.

**Submunition** – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).

**Survey** – A study of the assessment of the location and impact of mines and ERW at the local or national level. General survey focuses on the location of mined and battle areas and the type of contamination they contain. A landmine impact survey also assesses the impact of explosive contamination on nearby communities (see separate definition for landmine impact survey). Technical survey aims to confirm and identify the outer perimeters of the hazardous area using one or more demining tools and to gather other necessary information for clearance.

**Unexploded cluster munitions** – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

**Unexploded ordnance** – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate; unexploded submunitions are known as “blinds” or “duds.”

**Victim** – The individual directly hit by a mine/ERW explosion, his or her family and community.

**Victim assistance** – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, casualty data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social reintegration, economic reintegration, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families and communities in society.
Landmine Monitor 2011 provides a global overview of efforts in 2010 and the first part of 2011 to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally assesses the international community’s response to the global landmine and explosive remnants of war problem. It covers developments in the areas of mine ban policy, mine action, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community’s response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

www.the-monitor.org