Landmine Monitor Report 2009

Landmine Monitor Report 2009 is the eleventh annual report by Landmine Monitor, an unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition.

Landmine Monitor collects information and assesses the international community’s response to the global landmine, cluster munition, and explosive remnants of war problem, especially with regard to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Since 1999, Landmine Monitor has assessed and reported annual progress in the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor Report 2009 presents information on activities in 2008 and key developments from January to May 2009. It also includes a special ten-year review of progress since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999. Reports cover every country in the world and eight other areas not internationally recognized as states, and include information on ban policy, mine action, casualties, risk education, victim assistance, and support for mine action.

Cover photo © Nasret Rezayee, 23 March 2009

Farid Ahmad repairs bicycles in Kabul, Afghanistan, but dreams of becoming a doctor. The 16 year old lost his leg at age three after detonating a mine left in an abandoned tank where he was playing. His family was displaced because of conflict and they were unable to afford the medical care he needed. After returning to Afghanistan he joined the family bicycle repair business. He realized that “there are many disabled people in Afghanistan and we need to work hard and show people our abilities, which is not easy.” Farid would like to study to become a doctor to help lift his family out of poverty and help his community.
LANDMINE MONITOR REPORT 2009
Toward a Mine-Free World

Special Ten-Year Review of the Mine Ban Treaty

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

Landmine Monitor Editorial Board
Mines Action Canada · Handicap International
Human Rights Watch
Landmine Action · Norwegian People’s Aid
Landmine Monitor provides research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). For more information visit www.lm.icbl.org or email lm@icbl.org.

The ICBL is committed to limiting the environmental footprint of Landmine Monitor reports.

This report is printed on paper manufactured from 100% post-consumer recycled fiber that has been processed without using chlorine. Biogas Energy, an energy source produced from decomposing waste collected from landfill sites, was used in paper production to reduce greenhouse emissions and depletion of the ozone layer. Using one ton (1,000 kg) of this paper instead of virgin paper reduces our ecological footprint by: 17 mature trees, 490 kg of solid waste, 46,352 L of water, and 1,076 kg of air emissions.

Our printer, St. Joseph Communications, is certified by the EcoLogo Environmental Choice Program. St. Joseph Communications uses vegetable-based inks that are less toxic than chemical inks, and runs the Partners in Growth Program. For every ton of paper used on our behalf, they contribute three seedlings to Scouts Canada for planting in parks, recreation and conservation areas, and other public spaces across Canada. Since its inception, the program has planted more than two million trees.

This report is available online at www.lm.icbl.org/lm/2009. Please use the online version whenever possible. If you have unused print copies of this report, please share them with others, donate them to a local library or recycle them.
International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines is committed to an international ban on the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) offers the best framework for putting the mine ban into practice, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities. The ICBL calls for:

- universalization of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty;
- full and timely implementation of all treaty provisions;
- increased resources for stockpile destruction, demining, mine/ERW risk education, and victim assistance sustained over the long-term; and
- firm establishment of the antipersonnel landmine ban as an international standard of behavior by all.

Cluster Munition Coalition

The Cluster Munition Coalition’s goal is to protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions.

The CMC has a number of strategic objectives to achieve this goal:

- promotion of universal adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the emerging global norm against the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions;
- promotion of the maximum number of signatures to and ratifications of the convention in the shortest possible time to ensure its rapid entry into force;
- promotion of effective implementation of and full compliance with the convention by States Parties, and compatible steps by states not party to the treaty, and to ensure effective monitoring of all such efforts by civil society; and
- raising public awareness of the harm to civilians caused by cluster munitions and efforts made by civil society and concerned states to eliminate this harm.
Dedication

On 10 August 2009 Landmine Monitor’s researcher for Chechnya, Zarema “Rayana” Sadulayeva, was abducted from her office in Grozny along with her husband, Alik Dzhabrailov. Their bodies were found riddled with gunshot wounds on 11 August 2009.

Landmine Monitor would like to dedicate this report to Zarema Sadulayeva, who tirelessly campaigned to promote the rights of children and persons with disabilities through the provision of social, psychological, financial, and legal support primarily to conflict-affected children and landmine survivors. She dedicated her life to improving the quality of life for some of Chechnya’s most vulnerable people.

We would also like to dedicate this report to others like her, who continue to defend human rights in Chechnya and around the world.
Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or the air, the containers open and disperse submunitions over a wide area, putting civilians at risk both during attacks due to their wide area effect and after attacks due to unexploded ordnance.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive devices are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict but has been left behind and is no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers' fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and clear all antipersonnel landmines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

The Convention on Cluster Munitions was opened for signature on 3 December 2008 and is a legally-binding agreement prohibiting cluster munitions because of their indiscriminate area effects and risk of unexploded ordnance. The treaty also provides a framework for tackling the problems that cluster munitions have caused. For an overview of government policies and practices on cluster munitions see www.lm.icbl.org/cm/2009. The treaty obliges states to stop the use, production, and transfer of cluster munitions immediately. States must destroy all stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years of becoming party to the treaty, and clear all unexploded cluster munition remnants in areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. Building on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Convention
on Cluster Munitions includes ground-breaking provisions for victim assistance, and includes those killed or injured by cluster munitions, their families and communities in the definition of a cluster munition victim. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the clearance of cluster munition remnant, risk education programs to help prevent cluster munition casualties, and for the assistance of victims.

The only international legislation explicitly covering ERW in general is Protocol V of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). While its provisions have been recognized as insufficient to address the problems caused by cluster munitions, Protocol V does establish general responsibilities for ERW clearance, information sharing to facilitate clearance and risk education, victim assistance, and for support to mine action. Protocol V establishes a special responsibility on the users of explosive weapons to work to address the post-conflict humanitarian problems that these weapons may cause.

These legal instruments provide a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations, and it is the task of NGOs to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and the CMC is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, and where children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy.

**International Campaign to Ban Landmines**

The ICBL is a coalition of more than 1,000 organizations in over 70 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams, in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network, whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel landmines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in more than 70 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It is in part due to sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL’s success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty, and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.
Preface

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use, and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to join the treaty. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL’s work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

In 2007, the ICBL began actively campaigning in support of the Oslo Process to negotiate a treaty prohibiting cluster munitions. This marked the first time that the ICBL engaged substantively on an issue other than antipersonnel mines. The ICBL began working with other CMC member organizations to address the cluster munition threat at the beginning of the Convention on Cluster Munitions negotiation process. The goal was to help prevent another humanitarian crisis similar to the global mine problem, because cluster munitions leave behind unexploded submunitions with effects similar to antipersonnel mines. The ICBL is dedicated to working toward the full universalization and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and many ICBL member organizations are also actively campaigning against cluster munitions.

The ICBL is committed to pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

Cluster Munition Coalition

The CMC is an international coalition working to protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions by promoting universal adherence to and full implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The CMC has a membership of around 300 civil society organizations from more than 80 countries, and includes organizations working on disarmament, peace and security, human rights, victim assistance, clearance, women’s rights, and faith issues. The CMC facilitates the efforts of NGOs worldwide to educate governments, the public and the media about the global cluster munition problem and its solutions.

Like the ICBL, the CMC was established by a group of NGOs in response to a global problem, in this case the suffering caused by cluster munitions. From 2003 to 2006 the CMC called for negotiations towards new international law to address the cluster munition problem. Throughout 2007 and 2008 the CMC actively participated in the diplomatic Oslo Process facilitating and leading the global civil society action in favor of a ban on cluster munitions. This effort resulted in the adoption and signature of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2008 and has been recognized as a largely preventive effort, given that only a tiny fraction of the cluster munitions in global stockpiles have ever been used.

In 2009, the CMC’s priority was to conclude an intensive global ratification campaign to ensure that 30 countries ratify the convention without delay in order to bring the convention into force and begin the formal process of implementation. The CMC will also continue to campaign in countries that have not yet signed the convention to encourage them to sign the treaty as soon as possible at the UN in New York. Beyond this the CMC is preparing for the First Meeting of States Parties to the convention and working with states to ensure their early and effective implementation of the convention’s obligations.

Landmine Monitor

Landmine Monitor Report 2009 is the eleventh annual Landmine Monitor report. Since 1999, each of the ten previous reports has been presented to the respective annual meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor is the ICBL’s research and monitoring program program and it provides research and monitoring for the CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty, a role it plans to undertake for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with,
the Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response to
the humanitarian problem caused by landmines and ERW. Landmine Monitor represents the first
time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor
a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly document progress and problems,
thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL formally agreed to create Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In
2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the
CMC. A five-member Editorial Board coordinates the Landmine Monitor system: Mines Action
Canada, Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action, and Norwegian
People’s Aid. Mines Action Canada serves as the lead agency. The Editorial Board assumes
overall responsibility for, and decision-making on, the Landmine Monitor system.

Landmine Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is
an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken
on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive
collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases
it does entail investigative missions, Landmine Monitor is not designed to send researchers into
harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

The Landmine Monitor report is designed to complement the States Parties’ transparency
reporting required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It reflects the shared view that
transparency, trust and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication
of antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for
independent reporting and evaluation.

Landmine Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine and ERW-related issues,
and to seek clarifications, to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and
other ERW. Landmine Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues
it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Landmine Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A
network of 60 Landmine Monitor researchers from 45 countries and other areas, and a 20-person
Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the
ICBL’s campaigning coalition and from other elements of civil society, including journalists,
academics, and research institutions.

Landmine Monitor Report 2009 presents information on activities in 2008 and key
developments in January–May 2009. A special ten-year review assesses progress in implementing
and universalizing the Mine Ban Treaty since its entry into force on 1 March 2009. Reports
cover every country in the world and eight other areas not internationally recognized as states,
and include information on ban policy (policy, use, production, trade, stockpiling), mine action,
casualties, risk education, victim assistance, and support for mine action. All report contents are
available online at www.lm.icbl.org/lm/2009.

Unless otherwise specified all translations were done by Landmine Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, Landmine Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious
report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. Landmine Monitor
is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications,
and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the
common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

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and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

This report contains country and area updates researched by 60 Landmine Monitor researchers
from 45 countries and other areas, selected by the Landmine Monitor Editorial Board with
input from the Editorial Team. The researchers are cited separately in the List of Contributors.
Landmine Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish
Preface

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Responsibility for the coordination of Landmine Monitor’s reporting network lies with the five Editorial Board organizations: Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon) manages Landmine Monitor’s production and editing, and coordinates research on support for mine action and non-state armed groups; Handicap International (Stan Brabant) coordinates research on mine/ERW risk education, casualty data, and victim assistance; Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose) is responsible for ban policy; Landmine Action (Richard Moyes) specializes in research on cluster munitions; and Norwegian People’s Aid (Stuart Casey-Maslen and Atle Karlsen) coordinates research on mine action. Jacqueline Hansen manages Landmine Monitor.

The Editorial Team undertook research and initial country report edits for Landmine Monitor Report 2009 from March to August 2009. The Editorial Team was led by five principal editors: Stephen Goose (ban policy), Stuart Casey-Maslen (mine action), Katleen Maes (casualties and victim assistance), Jenny Najar (risk education), and Anthony Forrest (support for mine action).

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MAJOR FINDINGS

Major Findings: 1999–2009

- Government use of antipersonnel mines has greatly decreased over the last decade. In 1999, Landmine Monitor recorded probable use of antipersonnel mines by 15 states, compared to just two since 2007: Myanmar and Russia.
- Use by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) has also decreased; at least 59 NSAGs across 13 countries have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines in the last 10 years.
- One hundred and fifty-six states—more than three-quarters of the world’s states—are party to the Mine Ban Treaty. A total of 39 countries, including China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States, have still to join. Two of these are signatories: the Marshall Islands and Poland.
- At least 38 former producers of antipersonnel mines have stopped, leaving only 13 states as actual or potential producers.
- For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.
- The only confirmed serious violations of the treaty have been in stockpile destruction. Belarus, Greece, and Turkey missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, and all three remained in serious violation of the treaty as of September 2009.
- Eighty-six States Parties have completed the destruction of their stockpiles, and four more are in the process. Together, they have destroyed about 44 million antipersonnel mines.
- Eleven states have cleared all known mined areas from their territory: Bulgaria, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Suriname, Swaziland, and Tunisia.
- Since 1999, at least 1,100km² of mined areas and a further 2,100km² of battle areas, an area twice the size of London, have been cleared in more than 90 states and other areas. Operations have resulted in the destruction of more than 2.2 million emplaced antipersonnel mines, 250,000 antivehicle mines, and 17 million explosive remnants of war (ERW).
- As of August 2009, more than 70 states were believed to be mine-affected.
- Mine and ERW risk education (RE) has evolved significantly in the last decade. Many programs have shifted from a purely message-based approach to more engaged efforts to bring about broader behavior change and risk reduction.
- Clearance, supported by RE, has resulted in a significant reduction in casualties. Casualties are at a level far below earlier estimates of more than 20,000 casualties per year, with recorded casualties down to under 5,200 in 2008.
- Despite data collection challenges, Landmine Monitor has identified at least 73,576 casualties of landmines, ERW, and victim-activated improvised explosive devices in 119 states and areas in the past 10 years.
- Total international support for mine action for 1992–2008 was US$4.27 billion.
- Despite this high level of overall funding, over the past decade victim assistance has made the least progress of all the major sectors of mine action, with funding and action falling far short of what was needed. Most efforts remained focused on medical care and physical rehabilitation, often only when supported by international organizations and funding, rather than on promoting economic self-reliance for survivors, their families, and communities.
At the First Review Conference of the treaty, States Parties agreed that 23 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors should make special efforts to meet their needs. Throughout 2005–2009, progress among the now VA26 States Parties has been variable. Progress was most visible in coordination, rather than in implementation of actual services. Progress on activities was often unrelated to the plans the 26 countries set for themselves.

**Major Findings: 2008–2009**

- Only two states have used antipersonnel mines in 2008–2009: Myanmar and Russia. NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least seven countries, two fewer than the previous year.
- As few as three countries may have been producing antipersonnel mines in 2008: India, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Landmine Monitor has identified 10 other producing countries, but it is not known if they were actively manufacturing mines in the past year.
- Belarus, Greece, and Turkey missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, and all three remained in serious violation of the treaty as of September 2009.
- Three countries completed stockpile destruction: Indonesia (November 2008), Ethiopia (April 2009), and Kuwait (declared in July 2009).
- In December 2008, 94 states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions, and requires clearance of contaminated areas and assistance to victims and affected communities. As of September 2009, 17 states had ratified the convention, which required 30 ratifications to trigger entry into force.
- Mine-affected states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years of becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The first deadlines expired on 1 March 2009, but 15 States Parties with 2009 deadlines failed to meet them and were granted extensions: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. All of the requests (which ranged from one to 10 years, the maximum period permitted for any extension period) were granted by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008.
- In 2009, four more States Parties (Argentina, Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Uganda) formally requested extensions for periods ranging from three to 10 years.
- In 2008, mine action programs cleared almost 160km² of mined areas—the size of Brussels—the highest total ever recorded by Landmine Monitor.
- In May 2009, Tunisia became the eleventh State Party to formally declare completion of clearance obligations under the treaty.
- There were at least 5,197 casualties caused by mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs in 2008, which continued a downward trend of the last few years.
- In 2008, RE was provided in 57 states and areas, compared to 61 states and areas in 2007. RE activities increased significantly in Yemen and Somaliland, and also increased to some degree in 10 other states. In Palestine, RE decreased in 2008 but rose sharply in response to conflict in Gaza in December 2008–January 2009.
- In 2008 in at least 26 states and areas, RE programs were still being implemented without comprehensive needs assessments. In Afghanistan, for instance, which has the world’s oldest mine action program, a European Union evaluation in 2008 found that RE was not based on a good understanding of the target audience.
- For 2008 Landmine Monitor identified a total of US$626 million in funding for mine action worldwide, combining international and national funding. The almost $518 million (some €346 million) of international funding allocated for mine action in 2008 from 23 countries and the European Commission was the highest reported total to date, surpassing the previously highest total—$475 million in 2006.
Executive Summary

Major Findings

- Funding in 2008 was channeled to at least 54 recipient states and other areas. The top five recipients of mine action funding in 2008 were, in descending order: Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Cambodia.
- In 2008–2009, there was a continued lack of psychosocial support and economic reintegration for survivors even where there were improvements to national healthcare, physical rehabilitation, or disability laws/policies. Pakistan and Sri Lanka saw deterioration of services nationwide or in certain areas because of conflict and natural disasters. The period also saw the closure of several national NGOs/disabled people’s organizations, continued capacity problems for others, and persistent funding challenges.
- Other trends included the continuing handover of physical rehabilitation programs to national management and a continued increase of survivor associations and/or their capacities.
1999–2009 Overview

More than three-quarters (156 countries) of the world’s states are party to the Mine Ban Treaty, although the most recent to join (Palau) was in November 2007. Major powers such as China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States have still to join, yet one of the treaty’s most significant achievements has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by anyone has been stigmatized throughout the world.

During the course of the past decade, the use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become rare. In 1999, Landmine Monitor recorded probable use of landmines by 15 states. In the decade since then a total of 21 governments have likely used antipersonnel mines, but only four since 2004 (Georgia, Nepal, Myanmar, and the Russian Federation). This year’s report, as in 2007 and 2008, confirms use by only two states: Myanmar and Russia. The normative effect of the treaty’s comprehensive ban has also resulted in decreased use by non-state armed groups (NSAGs). Over the past 10 years, at least 59 NSAGs across 13 countries have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.

There have been no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Landmine Monitor reported that there were serious and credible allegations that Ugandan forces used antipersonnel mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2000, and that Zimbabwean forces used mines in the DRC in 1999 and 2000, although both strongly denied it.

The only confirmed serious violations of the treaty have been in stockpile destruction. Belarus, Greece, and Turkey missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008, and all three remained in serious violation of the treaty as of September 2009. Through 2007, only four States Parties missed their stockpile destruction deadlines: Afghanistan, Cape Verde, Guinea, and Turkmenistan.

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines, but 38 have since ceased production, including four countries that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Finland, Israel, and Poland. Landmine Monitor identifies 13 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines, but reserves the right to do so. As few as three countries may have been producing antipersonnel mines in 2008.

A de facto ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s; this prohibition is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma that the Mine Ban Treaty has attached to the weapon. Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines. For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.

In the mid-1990s, prior to the Mine Ban Treaty, more than 130 states possessed stockpiles estimated at more than 260 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor now estimates that as many as 35 states not party to the treaty stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel mines. In addition, four States Parties are still in the process of destroying some 12 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.
2008–2009 Key Developments

- No use, production, or transfer of antipersonnel mines was recorded by any State Party.
- States not party Myanmar and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines, as did non-state armed groups in at least seven countries, including three States Parties (Afghanistan, Colombia, and Peru) and four states not party to the treaty (Myanmar, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka).
- In December 2008, 94 states signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. The number of signatories stood at 98 as of 1 September 2009, of which 17 had ratified.

Universalization

The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. Since entry into force, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify later.1 Outreach by States Parties to the treaty, the ICBL, and others has helped to expand the ban on antipersonnel mines to many countries that at one time expressed difficulties with joining. Of the 156 States Parties, 131 signed and ratified the treaty, and 25 acceded.2 Thirty-nine countries are not yet States Parties, including two that signed long ago but have not yet ratified (Marshall Islands and Poland).

Ratifications and Accessions

Not a single state has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since Palau acceded on 18 November 2007; the treaty entered into force for Palau on 1 May 2008. Others which have joined since the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004 are Iraq (adherence in August 2007), Kuwait (July 2007), Indonesia (February 2007), Montenegro (October 2006), Brunei (April 2006), Cook Islands (March 2006), Haiti (February 2006), Ukraine (December 2005), Vanuatu (September 2005), Bhutan (August 2005), Latvia (July 2005), and Ethiopia (December 2004). Most of these nations were stockpilers of antipersonnel mines, several were users of the weapon, and several are contaminated by antipersonnel mines.

1 For a state that ratifies (having become a signatory prior to 1 March 1999) or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for that state on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which it deposited its instrument of ratification with the Depositary. That state (now a party) is then required to make its initial transparency report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days (and annually thereafter), destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years, and destroy antipersonnel mines in the ground in areas under its jurisdiction or control within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.

2 The 25 accessions include Montenegro, which technically “succeeded” to the treaty after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro. Of the 131 ratifications, 43 came on or before entry into force of the treaty on 1 March 1999 and 88 came afterward.
Of the two remaining signatories, **Poland** decided in February 2009 that it would ratify in 2012, rather than 2015 as it had announced in January 2007. The **Marshall Islands** re-engaged in the Mine Ban Treaty process in 2008 by attending key treaty meetings, but it has not committed to ratify within a specific period.

For the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, a series of regional conferences was held to promote universalization and effective implementation of the treaty in the lead-up to the Second Review Conference (also known as the Cartagena Summit) in Cartagena, Colombia, 30 November–4 December 2009. Regional conferences took place in Nicaragua (February), Thailand (April), Tajikistan (July), South Africa (September), and Albania (October).

**UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42**

One opportunity for states to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines is their vote on the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. UNGA Resolution 63/42 was adopted on 2 December 2008 by a vote of 163 in favor, none opposed, and 18 abstentions. Of the 39 states not party to the treaty, 18 voted in favor, 18 abstained, and three were absent.

Since the first UNGA resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997, the number of states voting in favor has ranged from a low of 139 in 1999 to a high of 164 in 2007. The number of states abstaining has ranged from a high of 23 in 2002 and 2003 to a low of 17 in 2005 and 2006. Several states that used to consistently abstain or be absent now vote in favor, including **Azerbaijan**, **China**, **Kazakhstan**, **Lao People’s Democratic Republic** (Lao PDR), the **Marshall Islands**, and **Morocco**.

**Ten-year review by region: universalization**

As of 1 September 2009, the percentage of nations in each region that were States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty was as follows: Africa 98%; Europe 95%; Americas 94%; Asia-Pacific 60%; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 42%; and Middle East and North Africa 39% (see table below).

**Africa**: Somalia is the only country in the region that has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty. By the First Review Conference in November 2004, all signatories had ratified except Ethiopia, and all non-signatories had acceded except Somalia. Ethiopia ratified in December 2004. Somalia voted in favor of the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution for the first time in December 2007.

**Americas**: Cuba and the US are the only countries in the region that have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty. By the First Review Conference in November 2004, all signatories had ratified, except Haiti, which did so in February 2006. In February 2004, the Bush Administration

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3 Eighteen States abstained from voting on UNGA Resolution 63/42 in December 2008: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. With the exception of Nepal, none of these states have voted in favor of a pro-Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1999. Nepal abstained for the first time in 2007, after voting in favor of the resolution in past years, except in 2004 and 2006 when it was absent.

4 This included two signatory countries (Marshall Islands and Poland) and 16 non-signatories: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Finland, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu, and UAE.

5 The three absent were Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Tonga. Somalia and Tonga have supported the resolution in the past, while Saudi Arabia has always been absent. Eight States Parties were also absent: Central African Republic, Chad, Fiji, Gambia, Kiribati, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, and Saint Kitts and Nevis.

6 Voting results by year on the annual UNGA resolution calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty: 1997 (Resolution 52/38 A) – 142 in favor, none against, 18 abstaining; 1998 (Resolution 53/77 N) – 147 in favor, none against, 21 abstaining; 1999 (Resolution 54/54 B) – 139 in favor, one against, 20 abstaining; 2000 (Resolution 55/33 V) – 143 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2001 (Resolution 56/24 M) – 138 in favor, none against, 19 abstaining; 2002 (Resolution 57/74) – 143 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2003 (Resolution 58/53) – 153 in favor, none against, 23 abstaining; 2004 (Resolution 59/84) – 157 in favor, none against, 22 abstaining; 2005 (Resolution 60/80) – 158 in favor, none against, 17 abstaining; 2006 (Resolution 61/84) – 161 in favor, none against, 17 abstaining; and 2007 (Resolution 62/41) – 164 in favor, none against, 18 abstaining.
completed a review of US landmine policy, announcing that the US did not intend to join the Mine Ban Treaty at any point, abandoning the objective of the previous administration to join in 2006. Cuba’s policy has not changed in the past decade.

**Asia-Pacific:** 16 countries remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty, more than in any other region. However, since 2004, six Asia-Pacific states have joined—more than in any other region. This includes ratification by four signatories (Brunei, Cook Islands, Indonesia, and Vanuatu) and two accessions (Bhutan and Palau).

Since 2003, China has shown increased interest in the Mine Ban Treaty, and has voted in favor of the annual pro-ban treaty UNGA resolution since 2005. Since the First Review Conference in 2004, India has sent an observer to every Meeting of States Parties and every intersessional Standing Committee meeting. Since 2007, Vietnam has more frequently attended meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, and welcomed the efforts of others to ban the weapon.

In 2004, Lao PDR decided that it would join the Mine Ban Treaty at some point, but did not set a timeline. Lao PDR voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution for the first time in 2007 and did so again in 2008. Mongolia announced in 2004 its intention to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty by 2008, but did not do so.

**Commonwealth of Independent States:** Five of the 12 countries in the region are States Parties. At entry into force in March 1999, only one was a State Party (Turkmenistan), and another two were signatories (Moldova and Ukraine). By the First Review Conference in November 2004, there were four States Parties, as Tajikistan acceded in October 1999, Moldova ratified in September 2000, and Belarus acceded in September 2003. Ukraine ratified in December 2005. Armenia and Georgia have consistently supported the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution and attended Mine Ban Treaty meetings. Azerbaijan has shown greater support for the treaty in recent years, notably by submitting voluntary Article 7 reports in 2008 and 2009, and voting in favor of the UNGA resolution every year since 2005. Kazakhstan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution in 2007 and 2008, after abstaining every previous year.

**Europe:** Finland and Poland, which has signed but not ratified, are the only countries in the region that are not party to the treaty. By the First Review Conference in November 2004, 39 were States Parties. All of the signatories had ratified except Poland. Three of the non-signatories had acceded (Estonia, Serbia and Montenegro, and Turkey). Latvia acceded in July 2005, and Montenegro joined in October 2006 after its separation from Serbia. In September 2004, Finland announced that it would join the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012, six years later than its previously stated goal. In February 2009, Poland also set 2012 as the year it would join.

**Middle East and North Africa:** Seven of the 18 countries in the Middle East and North Africa are States Parties. At entry into force in March 1999, three countries were States Parties (Jordan, Qatar, and Yemen) and two were signatories (Algeria and Tunisia). Tunisia ratified in July 1999 and Algeria in October 2001. Kuwait acceded in July 2007 and Iraq in August 2007. Morocco has declared itself in de facto compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty: it has submitted three voluntary Article 7 reports and voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution each year since 2004. Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have also expressed support for the treaty and regularly voted for the UNGA resolution.

**2008–2009 key developments by region: universalization**

**Africa:** Somalia, the only state outside the Mine Ban Treaty in Sub-Saharan Africa, did not make any notable steps towards joining the treaty, and was absent from the pro-ban UNGA vote in December 2008. Somalia did not attend the September 2009 regional conference in South Africa for the lead-up to the Second Review Conference.

**Americas:** Nicaragua hosted the Managua Workshop in February 2009, the first in the series of regional meetings prior to the Review Conference, which neither Cuba nor the US attended. As of August 2009, the Obama Administration had not made a statement on its landmine policy.

**Asia-Pacific:** Thailand hosted the Bangkok Workshop in April 2009, the second regional meeting prior to the Review Conference. Eighteen countries participated, including non-signatories Lao PDR, Myanmar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam.
Having signed and then ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR appeared to be moving closer to joining the Mine Ban Treaty. It attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, and the Bangkok Workshop. For the second consecutive year, it voted in favor of the pro-ban UNGA resolution in December 2008. In May 2009, Lao PDR said it was considering submission of a voluntary Article 7 transparency report.

In 2008, the Marshall Islands re-engaged in the Mine Ban Treaty process, including attending its first annual Meeting of States Parties in November. The Federated States of Micronesia said in December 2008 that it was very close to acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty; a draft resolution approving accession has been awaiting congressional approval since mid-2008.

Mongolia did not meet its stated objective of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in 2008, but in mid-2009, Mongolia’s Defense Minister and Foreign Minister told the ICBL that they would work to accelerate the accession process. Vietnam attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, as well as the Bangkok Workshop.

Commonwealth of Independent States: In July 2009, Tajikistan hosted the third regional meeting leading up to the Second Review Conference, and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan attended.

Middle East and North Africa: Egypt attended the regional conference in South Africa but Libya did not. Morocco submitted its third voluntary Article 7 report and voted for the annual pro-ban UNGA resolution.

Ten-year review: universalization and non-state armed groups

There has been a growing awareness of the need to involve NSAGs in the global efforts to ban antipersonnel mines. In the past five years, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have discussed the issue more regularly.

A significant number of NSAGs have indicated their willingness to observe a ban on antipersonnel mines. This has taken place through unilateral statements, bilateral agreements, signature to the Deed of Commitment administered by Geneva Call, and most recently through the “Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines” developed by the Philippines Campaign to Ban Landmines.

At least 59 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines over the past 10 years. The exact number is difficult to determine, since NSAGs may split into factions with different policies, go out of existence, or merge with a state.

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7 Geneva Call is a Swiss-based NGO. Under the Deed of Commitment a signatory agrees to prohibit use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action. Geneva Call has received signatures from NSAGs in Burundi, India, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar/Burma, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Western Sahara.

8 This declaration of adherence unilaterally commits the signatory to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines, and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) (see below), as well as customary international humanitarian law rules regarding use of mines and explosive devices. As of July 2008, it had been signed by three rebel groups in the Philippines. In February 2008, the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Mindanao/Revolutionary People’s Army (RPMM/RPA) was the first group to sign the declaration, followed by the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary People’s Army (RPMP/RPA) (Nilo de la Cruz faction) in May 2008, and the Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas (MLPP) and its Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (RHB) military wing in July 2008.

9 As of 2009, 39 have through the Deed of Commitment, 18 by self declaration, and 4 by Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). Prior to 2000 several declarations were issued regarding the landmine ban by non-state armed groups, some of whom later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.

10 Of 17 Somali groups which signed the Deed of Commitment from 2002–2005, Geneva Call considers 10 to be active as of 2009. Four other former Deed of Commitment signatories are now part of governments which are parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and therefore bound by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least two other Deed of Commitment signatories in Myanmar/Burma are no longer militarily active.
Since 1999, NSAGs in 13 countries have agreed to abide by either a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines or a ban on use. Geneva Call has received signatures to the Deed of Commitment from NSAGs in Burundi, India, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar/Burma, the Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, and Turkey, as well as Western Sahara. NSAGs have agreed to a ban on use of antipersonnel mines through bilateral agreements with governments in Angola, Burundi, DRC, Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, and Sudan. Four armed groups which had indicated their willingness to ban antipersonnel mines are now part of state governing structures in three States Parties: Burundi, Iraq, and Sudan.

Since the First Review Conference, NSAGs agreeing to ban antipersonnel mines include: the Juba Valley Alliance in Somalia (January 2005), the Polisario Front in Western Sahara (November 2005), the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in Turkey (July 2006), the Chin National Front/Army of Burma (July 2006), the Kuki National Organization in India (August 2006), the National Forces of Liberation (Forces Nationales de Libération) in Burundi (September 2006), the Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist (November 2006), three more Myanmar/Burma groups—Lahu Democratic Front, Palaung State Liberation Army, Pa’O People’s Liberation Organization/Pa’O Peoples Liberation Army (April 2007), the 18 members of the United Jihad Council in Kashmir (October 2007), the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (December 2007), the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Mindanao/Revolutionary People’s Army in the Philippines (February 2008), the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncaya Brigade in the Philippines (May 2008), the Marxist-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas/Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan in the Philippines (July 2008), plus the groups in the following section on key developments in 2008–2009.

2008–2009 key developments: universalization and non-state armed groups
In October 2008, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed the “Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines.” In March 2009, in northeast India, the Zomi Re-unification Organisation signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. In April and June 2009, three factions of the Komala party (the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran, the Komala Party of Kurdistan, and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan) signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

Ten-year review: use by government forces
One of the most significant achievements of the Mine Ban Treaty has been the degree to which any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor has been stigmatized throughout the world. During the course of the past decade, the use of antipersonnel mines, especially by governments, has become a rare phenomenon. Landmine Monitor identified the probable use of antipersonnel mines by 15 governments in its initial report in 1999; 12 in its 2000 report; 13 in its 2001 report; 14 in its 2002 report; nine in its 2003 report; four in its 2004 report; four in its 2005 report; three in its 2006 report; two in its 2007 report; two in its 2008 report; and two in this 2009 report.

Landmine Monitor has identified 21 governments that have probably used antipersonnel mines since 1999, but only four since 2004 (Georgia, Nepal, Myanmar, and Russia).11 The armed forces of Myanmar and Russia have used antipersonnel mines each year over the past decade. It appears that Georgian armed forces used antipersonnel mines on occasion every year from 2001 to 2004, and again in 2006, although the government has denied using them. In Nepal, government forces used antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devises (IEDs) in the decade-long conflict that ended in 2006.

11 Since 1999 there has been confirmed use by 16 governments: Afghanistan, Angola, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Sri Lanka, Uzbekistan, and FR Yugoslavia. There is compelling evidence that five more used antipersonnel mines: Burundi, Georgia, Rwanda, Sudan, and Uganda. All five of these states denied use.
Since 1999, there have been three instances in which government forces have made very extensive use of antipersonnel mines: India and Pakistan during the period of tensions from December 2001 to mid-2002; Russia in Chechnya in 1999 and 2000; and Ethiopia and Eritrea in their border conflict from 1998 to mid-2000.

There have been no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Landmine Monitor reported that there were strong and credible allegations that forces of Uganda used antipersonnel mines in the DRC in 2000, and that Zimbabwe forces used mines in the DRC in 1999 and 2000, although both denied it. In addition, a number of countries used antipersonnel mines after signing the Mine Ban Treaty, but before ratification and entry into force. Angola openly admitted using antipersonnel mines until 2002, Ecuador’s Article 7 reporting on mined areas indicated that it laid mines in 1995–1998; and Ethiopia tacitly acknowledged use during its 1998–2000 border war. There were also credible use allegations concerning signatories Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, Senegal, and Sudan, although all denied it.12

Ten-year review: use by non-state armed groups

The number of countries in which NSAGs have been using antipersonnel mines has also decreased markedly over the past decade. Landmine Monitor identified use by NSAGs in 13 countries in its first annual report in 1999, then in 18 countries in its 2000 report, 19 countries in its 2001 report, 14 countries in its 2002 report, 11 countries in its 2003 report, 16 countries in its 2004 report, 13 countries in its 2005 report, 10 countries in its 2006 report, eight countries in its 2007 report, nine countries in its 2008 report, and seven countries in this 2009 report.

Since 1999, Landmine Monitor has identified NSAG use of antipersonnel mines in at least 28 countries, as follows:

- **Africa**: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda;
- **Americas**: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru;
- **Asia-Pacific**: Afghanistan, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka;
- **Commonwealth of Independent States**: Georgia (including Abkhazia) and Russia (including Chechnya, Dagestan, and North Ossetia);
- **Europe**: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia), Turkey, and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia); and
- **Middle East and North Africa**: Iraq and Lebanon.

There have also been very sporadic and isolated incidents of new use in a number of other countries by rebel groups, criminal elements, and other NSAGs.

The rebel groups that have made the most extensive use of antipersonnel mines and mine-like IEDs since 1999 are probably the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, followed by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) in Myanmar/Burma.


2008–2009 key developments: use

**Government forces**

From 2008–2009, the armed forces of Myanmar and Russia continued to use antipersonnel mines. Myanmar’s military forces used antipersonnel mines extensively, in numerous areas of the country, as they have every year since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999. Among

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government forces, the security forces of Myanmar have probably been the most prolific users of antipersonnel mines in the world since 2004.

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields. In discussions with Landmine Monitor since 2006, Russian officials have declined to state that use of antipersonnel mines has stopped. Landmine Monitor will continue to cite Russia as an ongoing user of antipersonnel mines until an official denial is made and confirmed by the facts on the ground.

Thailand made a serious allegation of new use of antipersonnel mines by Cambodia on their border in October 2008 in an incident in which two Thai Rangers were injured. Cambodia stated that the incident occurred in a confirmed minefield on Cambodian territory, and it created a Fact Finding Commission to review the incident. It would appear from available evidence that this incident may have involved new use of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor is not able to determine who was responsible for laying the mines.

Georgia and Russia accused each other of using antipersonnel mines during their conflict in August 2008, but several investigations by Human Rights Watch found no evidence of mine use. There were also allegations, mostly by opposition forces, of use since May 2008 by the armed forces of Armenia, Sri Lanka, and Yemen, but Landmine Monitor could not verify them.13

Non-state armed groups

Use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs declined modestly in the past year. NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or mine-like IEDs in at least seven countries, including three States Parties (Afghanistan, Colombia, and Peru) and four states not party to the treaty (India, Myanmar/Burma, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka). This is two fewer countries than cited in the previous edition of Landmine Monitor, with the removal of Ecuador and Iraq.

Some NSAG use may have taken place in Iraq, the Philippines, Somalia, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen, but Landmine Monitor has been unable to confirm from available information. Insurgent and rebel groups have used improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in increasing numbers. An IED that is victim-activated (i.e. it explodes from the contact, presence, or proximity of a person) is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated (i.e. the user decides when to explode it) is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such devices is often in violation of international humanitarian law, such as when civilians are directly targeted. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been frequently reported by the media, militaries and governments as “landmines.” This has led to some confusion, and Landmine Monitor has consistently attempted to determine if an IED was victim-activated or detonated by some other means.

In Afghanistan, new use of antipersonnel mines by the Taliban has been reported. Notably, in June 2008, there were several reports of Taliban mine use in the Arghandab district of Kandahar province. In Colombia, FARC continued to be the largest user of landmines in the country, and among the largest in the world, causing hundreds of casualties each year. The National Liberation Army (ELN) also used mines. In India, there were a few reports of victim-activated explosive weapons being used, including in Manipur in an area known to be a United National Liberation Front stronghold. Government forces reportedly recovered antipersonnel mines from other armed groups in the northeast of India during the year. In Myanmar/Burma, the Karen National Liberation Army, the Karen Army, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, and several other NSAGs continued to use antipersonnel mines.

13 Last year, Landmine Monitor noted that knowledgeable sources in Sri Lanka who wished to remain anonymous, including those engaged in mine action activities in the field, alleged that Sri Lankan security forces used antipersonnel landmines in 2007 and 2008. Although Landmine Monitor was not able to confirm the allegations, it said it considered this the first serious charge of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Sri Lanka since the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Sri Lanka Army strongly denied the allegations when asked by Landmine Monitor.
In Pakistan, NSAGs sporadically used antipersonnel mines in Balochistan, some districts of the North-West Frontier Province, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in attacks on Pakistani security forces and civil administration, and in sectarian, inter-tribal and inter-family conflicts. In May 2009, Taliban groups were reported to have used antipersonnel landmines in the Swat Valley. In Peru, remnants of Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, referred to as “explosive traps,” to protect illegal coca fields. In August 2008, Peru launched an offensive in Vizcatan province against the Shining Path during which members of the security forces were reportedly injured by these explosive traps. In Sri Lanka, as the war intensified in 2008 and 2009, culminating in the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, it appears that the LTTE laid very large numbers of antipersonnel mines in defense of its military installations throughout the north of the island. The Sri Lanka Army reportedly found many newly laid mines, IEDs, and booby-traps, especially between late November 2008 and March 2009.

In Iraq, insurgent forces used command-detonated IEDs extensively, but no specific incidence of victim-activated mine use was found during the year, despite documented instances of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines by Iraqi and foreign forces. In the Philippines, there were no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs, although some incidents in news reports appear to have involved victim-activated devices. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) continued to allege use of banned explosive devices by the New People’s Army. In August 2008, the AFP also alleged use of antipersonnel mines by the MILF in North Cotabato and Maguindanao. Both the New People’s Army and MILF rejected the allegations. In Somalia, despite the ready availability of antipersonnel mines, Landmine Monitor has not identified any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines in several years by any armed organization operating in the country. Landmine Monitor analysis of news reports indicates that most if not all of the explosive attacks were command-detonated.

In Thailand, the insurgency in the south has made extensive use of command-detonated IEDs and there may have been isolated instances of use of homemade landmines or victim-activated IEDs. Turkey reported that in 2008, 158 military personnel and civilians were killed or injured by landmines laid by the PKK/Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (Kongreya Azad z Demokrasiya Kurdista)/Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel). But it did not differentiate between casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines or IEDs, nor between victim-activated and command-detonated mines/IEDs. There were also media reports of use of antipersonnel mines, but it has not been possible to verify the nature of the devices, who laid them, or the date of placement. In Yemen, the government has on a few occasions accused the Al-Houthi rebels of using antipersonnel mines, but there has been no independent confirmation.

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Iraq, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. NSAGs reportedly used command-detonated IEDs in Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey.

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states are known to have produced antipersonnel mines. There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. In addition, Jordan declared possessing a small number of mines of Syrian origin in 2000. It is unclear if this represents the result of production, export, or capture.

Thirty-four States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines include: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, UK, and Zimbabwe.
big producers from the 1970s to 1990s. With the notable exceptions of China, Russia and the US, the former biggest producers and exporters are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Landmine Monitor identifies 13 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. In some cases, the country is not actively producing mines, but reserves the right to do so. As few as three countries may have been producing antipersonnel mines in 2008.16

No countries were added or removed from the list of producers in this reporting period. Since it began reporting in 1999, Landmine Monitor removed Egypt, Iraq, Turkey, and FR Yugoslavia from its list of producers. Nepal was added to the list in 2003 following admissions by military officers that production was occurring in state factories. More recently, Nepal officials have denied past or current production, and the situation remains unclear (see 2008–2009 key developments: production section below).

NSAGs in Colombia, India, Myanmar/Burma, and Peru are known to produce victim-activated improvised mines. The sophistication of such mines varies greatly. Prior to its defeat in 2009, the LTTE in Sri Lanka probably produced the most sophisticated antipersonnel mines among NSAGs.

2008–2009 key developments: production

• China: In April 2008, several sources in Beijing told Landmine Monitor that facilities to produce antipersonnel mines are idle, or have shut down, or have been converted for production of other products. There has been no official confirmation of this information.

• India: In its first ever response to a Right to Information Act (RTI) request on landmines, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that it was actively producing antipersonnel mines in 2007 and 2008, including NM-14 and NM-16 mines, as well as the APER 1B mine. Landmine Monitor is not familiar with the APER 1B mine, presumably an antipersonnel mine. India has in the past informed Landmine Monitor that it does not produce remotely-delivered mines.

• Nepal: In December 2008, an Army General told the ICBL that Nepal had no capacity to produce landmines, nor did it ever have such capacity. Similarly, in March 2008, an army official told Landmine Monitor that Nepal did not produce or use any victim-activated mines or IEDs, and in 2007, an army officer denied any past or current antipersonnel mine production, while acknowledging that soldiers frequently made command-detonated IEDs. These comments contradicted statements made in 2003 and 2005, when Nepali officials told Landmine Monitor that Nepal produced antipersonnel mines. While it does not appear that Nepal is currently producing antipersonnel mines, the conflicting information about past production remains to be clarified. Landmine Monitor will continue to list Nepal as a producer until Nepal makes an official, formal statement that it does not produce antipersonnel mines and does not intend to do so in the future.

• South Korea: South Korea reported that it did not engage in any production of antipersonnel mines in 2008. In June 2008, South Korea told Landmine Monitor that a government-managed research project on alternatives to antipersonnel mines was scheduled for 2009 to 2012. A private company, the Hanwha Corporation, began production of self-destructing antipersonnel mines in 2006, manufacturing 18,900 in 2006 and 2007.

• US: In May 2008, the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army stated that the XM-7 Spider Networked Munition would be procured in a configuration that only allowed command detonation. Previously, the Spider system contained a feature that would

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16 India and Pakistan acknowledge ongoing production, and it seems certain Myanmar is actively producing. South Korea reported production in 2006 and 2007, but not in 2008. China, Iran, Nepal, the US, and Vietnam have all said they are not currently producing. It is unclear if Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and Singapore are actively producing.
permit it to function in a victim-activated mode, making it incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. This would have constituted the first production of antipersonnel mines by the US since 1997.

- **Vietnam**: In May 2008, representatives of the Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a visiting Canadian governmental delegation that Vietnam has not produced mines since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force. However, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs official also emphasized that Vietnam reserves the right to use and produce landmines in the future.

**Ten-year review: production**

- **Cuba**: Cuba has not provided any information about its production of antipersonnel mines. The state-owned Union of Military Industries is believed, in the absence of any denial or clarification from the government, to continue to produce antipersonnel mines.

- **Egypt**: At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, Egypt’s Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister stated that the Egyptian government had imposed a moratorium on all production activities related to antipersonnel mines. This was the first time that Egypt publicly and officially announced a moratorium on production. Egyptian officials had unofficially said for a number of years that Egypt stopped producing antipersonnel mines in 1988.

- **India**: India has been actively producing antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II. In October 2000, India said that it had designed a remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system, for trial evaluation and prototype production. But, in August 2005, India told Landmine Monitor that it was not producing remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines.

- **Iran**: The Director of the Iran Mine Action Center told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that Iran does not produce landmines, echoing an assertion from the Ministry of Defense in 2002 that Iran had not produced antipersonnel mines since 1988. However, mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan have since 2002 found many hundreds of Iranian antipersonnel mines date-stamped 1999 and 2000.

- **Iraq**: Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 invasion. An Iraqi diplomat told Landmine Monitor in 2004 that all mine production capacity had been destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign. Iraq confirmed this in its initial Article 7 report in August 2008.

- **Myanmar**: In 2007, Landmine Monitor learned that Myanmar was producing blast mines based on the US M-14 plastic mine design, in addition to the previously identified MM1 (modeled on the Chinese Type 59 stake-mounted fragmentation mine), the MM2 (similar to the Chinese Type 58 blast mine), and a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine.

- **Pakistan**: Pakistan has been actively producing antipersonnel mines that are compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II, including for the first time, remotely-delivered mine systems.

- **Russia**: Russia stated in December 2000 that it was decommissioning facilities for the production of antipersonnel blast mines.

- **Singapore**: In 2002, the Norwegian Petroleum Fund removed Singapore Technologies Engineering (STE) from its investment portfolio due to STE’s involvement in the production of antipersonnel mines. The New Zealand Superannuation Fund divested from STE in 2006. In April 2007, the Netherlands’ biggest pension fund, ABP, announced that it had stopped investing in landmine-producing companies, including STE.
• **South Korea:** South Korea reported that it did not produce any antipersonnel mines, other than Claymore mines, from 2000 to 2005. It gave assurances only command-detonated Claymores were made. It produced self-destructing antipersonnel mines for the first time in 2006, and again in 2007.

• **US:** The US cancelled planned production of two weapons that would have been inconsistent with the Mine Ban Treaty: RADAM in fiscal year 2002 and Spider with battlefield override feature in 2008.

• **Vietnam:** Vietnam began stating in 2005 that it no longer produces antipersonnel mines, but it reserves the right to do so in the future.

### Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

A *de facto* ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. For the past decade, global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted solely of a low-level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers.

A significant number of states outside the Mine Ban Treaty have formal moratoria on the export of antipersonnel mines, including China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. In December 2007, the US extended its comprehensive antipersonnel mine export moratorium, in place since 1992, for another six years, until 2014. In July 2008, Israel extended its export moratorium for another three years. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they do not export now, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.

In this reporting period, there were only a small number of reports of trafficking in antipersonnel mines. Perhaps most notably, in 2008 Niger discovered more than 1,000 abandoned mines on the Niger-Chad border, which it believed were lifted from minefields by smugglers for resale. Niger also initiated a program to buy mines from arms traffickers to prevent them from falling into the hands of rebels.

#### Ten-year review: trade

The most disturbing developments regarding transfers of antipersonnel mines were the reports by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia that both Ethiopia and Eritrea—States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—provided antipersonnel mines to forces in Somalia in 2006, and possibly in other years as well. Both Ethiopia and Eritrea strongly denied the allegations. The Monitoring Group also reported that mines continued to be available at arms markets in Somalia.

Local inhabitants and the media have reported that antipersonnel mines are available on the clandestine market in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. There have been reports of mines being smuggled from Afghanistan into Pakistan, and from Sudan into the DRC.

Landmine Monitor received information in 2002, 2003, and 2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were removing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines.

There were reports of attempts by representatives of Pakistan Ordnance Factories to sell antipersonnel mines to British journalists posing as representatives of private companies in both November 1999 and April 2002.

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17 Two Presidents of the Meetings of States Parties made inquiries about these reports, but the ICBL has regretted the fact that States Parties have not vigorously pursued these serious and specific allegations as potential violations of the Mine Ban Treaty.
Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction (Article 4)

States Parties

As of August 2009, 149 of the 156 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have stated that they do not have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Eighty-six States Parties have completed the destruction of their stockpiles. Sixty-three States Parties declared that they did not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, except in some cases those retained for research and training purposes.

An additional two states, Equatorial Guinea and the Gambia, have not yet formally declared the presence or absence of stockpiles, but are not believed to possess any mines. One other state, Iraq, has reported uncertainty about the existence of a stockpile (see below). Four States Parties are in the process of destroying stocks: Belarus, Greece, Turkey, and Ukraine.

States Parties collectively have destroyed about 44 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 1.6 million from May 2008 to May 2009. In addition, treaty signatory Poland destroyed 651,117 antipersonnel mines in 2008. The most recent States Parties to complete their stockpile destruction obligation are Kuwait (declared in July 2009), Ethiopia (April 2009), and Indonesia (November 2008).

Overall, compliance with this core obligation of the treaty has been impressive. Most States Parties have completed destruction far in advance of their deadlines. Through 2007, only four States Parties missed their deadlines: Turkmenistan, Guinea, Cape Verde, and Afghanistan.

18 New to this list are Ethiopia, Indonesia, and Kuwait. As of 31 August 2009, the following states have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Republic of the Congo, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, Germany, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, UK, Uruguay, Yemen, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

19 New to this list are Haiti and Palau. The following States Parties have declared not possessing antipersonnel mine stockpiles (note: a number of these apparently had stockpiles in the past, but used or destroyed them prior to joining the Mine Ban Treaty, including Eritrea, Rwanda, and Senegal): Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Comoros, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Estonia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Nauru, Niger, Niue, Panama, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Vanuatu.

20 Turkey destroyed most of the mines, nearly 1.3 million. Greece destroyed 225,962; Kuwait 91,432; Ethiopia 32,650; and Indonesia 11,603. In addition, Iraq reported in July 2008 that it had destroyed 200,125 stockpiled antipersonnel mines since 2003, but did not indicate how many each year.

21 Turkmenistan reported the completion of its stockpile destruction on 28 February 2003, just ahead of its deadline, but also reported that it was retaining 69,200 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. The ICBL and a number of States Parties severely criticized this as an unacceptable high number of retained mines that constituted continued stockpiling of the weapon. In February 2004, Turkmenistan said it would destroy the mines, which it did later in the year. It turned out Turkmenistan had in fact been retaining 572,200 individual antipersonnel mines, as most of the retained mines were of the remotely-delivered type and Turkmenistan had been counting only the containers and not the mines inside. Guinea and Cape Verde had not revealed that they possessed small stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. This fact was discovered only when reports came out of the destruction of their antipersonnel mines stockpiles. The provincial authorities apparently did not make the mines available for destruction in a timely fashion. Afghanistan then finished destruction in October 2007. For more details, see Stephen D. Goose, “Goodwill Yields Good Results: Cooperative Compliance and the Mine Ban Treaty,” in Jody Williams, Stephen D. Goose and Mary Wareham, (eds.), Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 105–126.
However, this record has been tarnished by three States Parties—Belarus, Greece, and Turkey—that missed their stockpile destruction deadlines of 1 March 2008. All three remain in serious violation of the treaty.

Belarus finished destroying its 294,775 non-PFM type antipersonnel mines in 2006, but still possesses 3.37 million PFM-type mines. It is in the process of finalizing a new joint project with the European Commission to complete stockpile destruction. It has not established a new completion date. Greece did not even begin destroying mines until November 2008, and had destroyed only 225,962 mines as of May 2009. It hoped to destroy the remaining 1.36 million mines by the end of 2009. Turkey destroyed 1.6 million antipersonnel mines between 2006 and April 2009, leaving a total of 1.32 million to destroy. It intends to complete destruction in 2010.

Ukraine informed States Parties in May 2009 that it was unlikely to meet its 1 June 2010 stockpile destruction deadline. It still possesses 5.95 million PFM-type mines and 149,096 POM-2 mines. It destroyed 101,088 PFM-1 mines in 1999 and 404,903 PMN-type mines in 2002 and 2003, as well as more than 254,000 other antipersonnel mines.

Thus, as of mid-2009, more than 12 million antipersonnel mines remained to be destroyed by four States Parties, including Belarus (3.4 million), Greece (1.4 million), Turkey (1.3 million), and Ukraine (6.1 million).

It is not clear if Iraq has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. In its initial Article 7 report, dated 31 July 2008, Iraq stated that while it had not yet identified any stockpiles, “this matter will be further investigated and if required, corrected in the next report.” Its subsequent report in May 2009 did not include any information on stockpiles or destruction. Iraq stated in its July 2008 report that it had destroyed 200,125 stockpiled antipersonnel mines since 2003.

States not party
Landmine Monitor estimates that as many as 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile more than 160 million antipersonnel mines. The vast majority of these stockpiles belong to just three states: China (estimated 110 million), Russia (estimated 24.5 million), and the US (10.4 million). Other states with large stockpiles include Pakistan (estimated six million) and India (estimated four to five million).

Poland, a signatory state, declared a stockpile of 1,055,971 mines at the end of 2002, but had reduced it to 333,573 mines by the end of 2008, including the destruction of 651,117 mines in 2008.

In 2008, China continued to destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines that had either expired or were not compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II. It has reported destruction of more than 2 million such mines since the late 1990s. It reported in September 2008 that new techniques would allow it to accelerate the process of destroying obsolete mines.

In November 2008, Russia stated that “about 10 million anti-personnel mines” had been destroyed in “recent years.” It has apparently been destroying about one million mines per year since 2005. In November 2004, Russia for the first time revealed that it had a stockpile of 26.5 million antipersonnel mines, stating that it had destroyed 19.5 million since 2000.

In May 2008, an army official in Vietnam informed a Canadian delegation that Vietnam’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines will expire in a few years, and stated that Vietnam has gradually started to destroy the mines.

Of the 39 states not party, four have stated that they do not stockpile any antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Some other states not party may not have stocks. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks. A Libyan defense official said in 2004 that Libya no longer stockpiles, but that information has not been confirmed. Bahrain and Morocco state that they only have small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Stockpile Destruction Deadline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>1 March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1 March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 March 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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22 Of the 39 states not party, four have stated that they do not stockpile any antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Tonga, and Tuvalu. Some other states not party may not have stocks. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks. A Libyan defense official said in 2004 that Libya no longer stockpiles, but that information has not been confirmed. Bahrain and Morocco state that they only have small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.
Non-state armed groups

Compared to a decade ago, very few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel landmines. This is directly linked to the halt in trade and production, and the destruction of stocks, brought about by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some NSAGs have access to the mine stocks of previous regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia).

In addition to producing their own improvised mines, NSAGs in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have also acquired mines by lifting them from the ground, capturing them, stealing them from arsenals, and purchasing them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Iraq, Myanmar/Burma, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Turkey. Most often, Landmine Monitor identifies whether an NSAG possesses stocks through reports of seizures by government forces.

At least two NSAGs which have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment destroyed some stocks of antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. In Puntland (Somalia), in April 2009, Mines Advisory Group and a Puntland police explosive ordnance disposal team destroyed 78 Pakistani-made P4 mines in Bosasso. In Iraq, in September 2008, the PDKI destroyed 392 antipersonnel mines in Koya, northern Iraq.

Reporting on and destroying captured, seized, or newly discovered stockpiles

Action #15 of the Nairobi Action Plan states: “When previously unknown stockpiles are discovered after stockpile destruction deadlines have passed, [all States Parties will] report such discoveries in accordance with their obligations under Article 7, take advantage of other informal means to share such information, and destroy these mines as a matter of urgent priority.” States Parties took this a step further by agreeing to adopt a modified voluntary reporting format for reporting on these mines.

Some States Parties routinely discover, capture, seize, or receive turned-in arms caches containing antipersonnel mines. In this reporting period, the following countries officially noted new discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in their Article 7 reports: Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Republic of the Congo, Niger, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda. In addition, there were government or media reports of discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in Colombia, Iraq, Peru, and Turkey, although these were not included in Article 7 reporting.

Afghanistan reported that 62,498 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2008, in 160 events in 20 provinces. It previously reported that 81,595 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in 2007, including many that were discovered, seized, or handed over during the year. Cambodia has declared that a total of 133,478 antipersonnel mines were newly found and destroyed from 2000–2008, including 13,665 in 2008.

The Republic of the Congo reported that on 3 April 2009 it destroyed 4,000 PPM-2 and PMN mines discovered in abandoned ammunition storage areas. Niger destroyed 1,772 antipersonnel mines in August and October 2008. The mines apparently came from two sources, with some discovered on the border with Chad and some purchased from traffickers. Sudan reported that caches containing 523 antipersonnel mines were discovered in various locations of Southern Sudan and destroyed from October–December 2008.

Since the First Review Conference in 2004, the following States Parties have reported new discoveries or seizures of mines in their Article 7 reports: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Burundi, Cambodia, Republic of the Congo, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Yemen. There have also been official or media reports of new discoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines in Algeria, DRC, Kenya, and the Philippines, in addition to Colombia, Iraq, Peru, and Turkey.

It is a State Party’s responsibility to account for the disposition of captured, seized, or turned-in antipersonnel landmines. States Parties should reveal in Article 7 reports the details of newly found antipersonnel landmines, depending on whether they are maintained for a period as stockpiled mines (Form B), transferred for destruction or training purposes (Form D), actually
destroyed (Form G), or retained for training purposes (Form D). This reporting should occur for discoveries and seizures made both before and after the completion of stockpile destruction programs.

**Mines Retained for Research and Training (Article 3)**

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

**Ten-year review: mines retained**

The ICBL, and a number of States Parties, have consistently questioned the need for live mines for training purposes. At least 23 states that once stockpiled antipersonnel mines have declared that they no longer possess any mines, even for research and training purposes. Several states have indicated that some or all of their retained mines are fuzeless.

Over the years, States Parties have had extensive discussions about “the minimum number absolutely necessary.” During the Oslo negotiations in 1997 and during Standing Committee discussions since 1999, most States Parties have agreed that, for those that decide to retain mines, the minimum number of mines retained should be in the hundreds or thousands or less, but not tens of thousands.

With strong urging from the ICBL, State Parties agreed at the First Review Conference in 2004 that those retaining mines should report in detail each year on the intended purposes and actual uses of those mines. In 2005, States Parties agreed to a new, voluntary Article 7 form to facilitate such reporting.

Despite these measures, the ICBL has continued to express concern in recent years that a large number of States Parties are still retaining mines, but apparently not using them for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same year after year, indicating none are consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities, and no or few details are provided about how the mines are being used. Some states retain mines even though they are not known to engage in any research or training activities.

**Mines Retained for Research and Training, 2002–2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
<th>No. of States Parties reporting retained mines</th>
<th>No. of retained mines (approximately)</th>
<th>No. of States Parties reporting retained mines consumed</th>
<th>No. of retained mines consumed</th>
<th>No. of States Parties not retaining mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>197,000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>20,449</td>
<td>at least 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>216,000</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>14,758</td>
<td>at least 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>228,000</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12,416</td>
<td>at least 77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>227,000</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3,702</td>
<td>at least 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>248,000</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6,761</td>
<td>at least 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>233,000</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3,112</td>
<td>at least 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3,806</td>
<td>at least 55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ICBL told States Parties in April 2007 that it “is increasingly convinced that there is widespread abuse” of the Article 3 exception. It said, “It appears that many States Parties are retaining more antipersonnel mines than ‘absolutely necessary’ and are not using mines...for the permitted purposes. It is time for States Parties to think about this as a serious compliance issue,
and not just a reporting or transparency issue...Some States Parties have yet to use their retained mines at all; they are simply sitting in storage—the equivalent to continued stockpiling...Unless a State Party is clearly retaining the minimum number of antipersonnel mines, is actively utilizing the mines for the permitted purposes, and is being fully transparent about the process, there may rightly be concerns that the mines are in essence still being stockpiled and could be used for war fighting purposes.23

At least 15% of States Parties retaining mines in 2008 have not reported a reduction in mines retained since the treaty’s entry into force for these states. Even more states have reported consuming mines only sporadically, with many reporting no consumption for two or more consecutive years.

Since 2005, the number of States Parties not retaining mines for research and training purposes has exceeded the number choosing to retain. The total number of mines retained has decreased substantially, from about 280,000 in 2002 to about 197,000 in 2008. This has reflected not only the consumption of retained mines during training and development activities, but also the decision by many states to significantly reduce—and in some cases completely eliminate—mines retained as they have deemed the mines excessive to their needs.

At least 30 States Parties have reviewed and decided to reduce their number of retained mines, or even eliminate the mines altogether (as Moldova and FYR Macedonia did in 2006).24 Among those who decided to significantly reduce their number of retained mines in 2007 and 2008 were Algeria, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, and Zambia.

2008 key developments: mines retained
In 2008, 71 of the 156 States Parties retained a total of more than 197,000 antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 3.

At least 78 States Parties have chosen not to retain any mines for training. During this reporting period, Haiti and Palau formally indicated for the first time in their initial Article 7 reports that they were not retaining any antipersonnel mines. Seven other States Parties may not retain mines, but greater clarity and confirmation of their status is needed. Botswana, Cape Verde, and Equatorial Guinea have never declared a number of mines retained in an Article 7 report.25 Cambodia, DRC, Nigeria, and Senegal have declared in the past that they were not retaining any mines for research and training, but have reported information in their recent Article 7 reports that makes their status uncertain.26

24 States that decided to reduce the number of mines they retained include: Argentina, Algeria, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mauritania, Moldova, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sudan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, UK, Venezuela, and Zambia. Eleven of these originally intended to keep 10,000 or more mines.
25 Cape Verde and Equatorial Guinea are thought not to possess any antipersonnel mines for training, but have never submitted their initial Article 7 reports formally declaring this fact. Botswana indicated in its 2001 Article 7 report, the only one it has ever submitted, that it would retain a “small quantity” of antipersonnel mines, without providing details. An official told Landmine Monitor in 2001 that this consisted of seven inert antipersonnel mines.
26 Cambodia has not reported any mines retained for training, but has indicated that antipersonnel mines removed from the ground each year have been used for research and training purposes. In past years, the DRC has reported that information on mines retained for training purposes was “not applicable,” but in 2008 and 2009 it reported instead that the information was not yet available, leaving it unknown as to whether the DRC is considering retaining or has already retained an unspecified number of mines for research and training purposes. Nigeria listed 3,364 “British made [antipersonnel] AP mines” as retained in its most recent Article 7 report, but Nigeria had previously reported destroying all 3,364 of its retained mines in 2005 and declared that it was no longer retaining mines. Senegal for the first time reported in its 2007 Article 7 report that 24 antipersonnel mines, taken from demining operations or discovered among rebel stockpiles, were used for training purposes before their destruction. It has repeated this in its 2008 and 2009 reports, identifying the same mine types each year; it is unclear if this indicates additional mines used for training or refers to the initial instance.
Three States Parties retain more than 10,000 antipersonnel mines: Turkey, Bangladesh, and Brazil (ordered by number of mines retained). Together, these three states account for almost 20% of all mines retained under the treaty. A further six States Parties retain between 5,000 and 10,000 mines: Sweden, Greece, Australia, Algeria, Croatia, and Belarus. (See table below for details).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>No. of retained mines</th>
<th>No. of mines previously destroyed in 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>15,125</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>10,986</td>
<td>1,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>7,364</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>6,785</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>6,090</td>
<td>8,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>6,038</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>6,030</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>78,142</td>
<td>10,830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of States Parties that retain mines, a total of 38, retain between 1,000 and 5,000 mines. Another 24 States Parties retain fewer than 1,000 mines.

In 2008, 29 States Parties reported retaining fewer mines than in 2007, resulting in an overall decrease of 20,449 mines. This includes mines consumed during training and research activities, as well as reductions of mines considered excess to needs. Algeria, which in 2007 had the second highest number of retained mines of all States Parties, destroyed 8,940 mines, leaving 6,090 remaining. Guinea-Bissau destroyed 100 of its 109 retained mines, indicating that no research or training activities were currently underway. Iraq decided to retain 297 mines, 937 less than the total previously reported. Serbia reported a reduction of 1,976 mines, to a total of 3,589. Sudan, which completed its stockpile destruction in March 2008, reported retaining 1,938 mines, which is 3,059 less than last reported. Additionally, Brazil and the Czech Republic reported consuming a significant number of mines in 2008 in the course of training activities, reducing their totals by 1,395 and 2,156 respectively.

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27 Thirty-eight States Parties retain between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Belgium, Bhutan, BiH, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, France, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Peru, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Uganda, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.

28 Twenty-four States Parties retain fewer than 1,000 antipersonnel mines: Benin, Burundi, Colombia, Republic of the Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritania, Portugal, Rwanda, Togo, UK, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe.

29 Twenty-nine states reported retaining fewer mines than in 2007: Afghanistan (62), Algeria (8,940), Argentina (112), Australia (213), Belgium (42), Brazil (1,395), Canada (24), Chile (70), Republic of Congo (50), Croatia (65), Czech Republic (2,156), France (8), Germany (7), Guinea-Bissau (100), Iraq (937), Ireland (3), Italy (32), Japan (392), Serbia (1,976), Slovenia (1), Spain (197), Sudan (3,059), Sweden (167), Tanzania (322), Thailand (12), Tunisia (20), Turkey (25), Ukraine (12), and Zimbabwe (50). Of these 29 states, 22 explicitly reported the number of mines consumed since 2007, while seven listed a lower total number of retained mines without any further explanation.
At least 42 States Parties did not report consuming any mines for permitted purposes in 2008. In 2007, a total of 38 states did not report consuming any mines; in 2006, 44 states; in 2005, 51 states; in 2004, 36 states; in 2003, 26 states; and in 2002, 29 states did not consume any mines. Twelve States Parties have not reported consuming any mines for permitted purposes since entry into force for that country: Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin, Bhutan, Burundi, Cyprus, Djibouti, Greece, Indonesia, Togo, and Venezuela. During this reporting period, several states, including Algeria, Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau, and Serbia reported a reduction in the number of their retained mines for the first time since the treaty entered into force for them.

For 2008, at least two states reported an increase in retained antipersonnel mines through the discovery of previously unknown stocks, including Peru (increase of 47) and Mozambique (520). Another two states—BiH (655) and the United Kingdom (UK) (294)—reported an increase in the number of mines retained without explanation.

In 2008, only 18 States Parties made use of the expanded voluntary Form D in their Article 7 reports to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses on mines retained: Afghanistan, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Mauritania, Portugal, Rwanda, Serbia, Turkey, and the UK. However, several other States Parties provided such information on regular Form D or elsewhere in their Article 7 reports.

Transparency Reporting (Article 7)

The overall compliance rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency measures reports is an impressive 98%. This compares to 97% in 2007, 96% in 2006 and 2005, 91% in 2004, 88% in 2003, and 75% in 2002. Three States Parties have yet to submit long overdue initial reports: Equatorial Guinea (due 28 August 1999), Cape Verde (due 30 April 2002), and the Gambia (due 28 August 2003).

Two States Parties have submitted initial reports since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Haiti and Palau. Haiti submitted its initial report in March 2009, over two years late, and Palau submitted its report by its October 2008 deadline. There are no States Parties with pending deadlines for an initial report.

As of the end of August 2009, only 88 States Parties had submitted annual updates for calendar year 2008. A total of 64 states had not submitted updates. This equates to a compliance rate of 58%, a rate that will likely go up somewhat in the coming months.
The compliance rate for annual updates has been dropping steadily in recent years. The final rate of compliance was 62% for calendar year 2007, 64% for 2006, 71% for 2005, 74% for 2004, 79% for 2003, and 70% for 2002.

Several states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have submitted voluntary Article 7 reports as a demonstration of their commitment to the goals of the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^{34}\) Poland, a signatory, has submitted voluntary reports every year since 2003, most recently in April 2009. Morocco submitted its third voluntary report in April 2009, and Azerbaijan submitted its second voluntary report in July 2009. Mongolia (in 2007) and Sri Lanka (in 2005) have also submitted voluntary reports. In these reports, only Poland and Mongolia have included information on their stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, while Morocco, Azerbaijan, and Sri Lanka have not done so.\(^{35}\) Other countries have stated their intention to submit voluntary reports, including Armenia, China, and, in May 2009, Lao PDR.

**National Implementation Measures (Article 9)**

Article 9 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty. The ICBL believes that all States Parties should have legislation that includes penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and provides for full implementation of all aspects of the treaty.

Only 59 of the 156 States Parties have passed new domestic laws to implement the treaty and fulfill the obligations of Article 9.\(^{36}\) This is an increase of two States Parties in this reporting period: Burundi and Togo. Additionally, Ireland, which originally enacted domestic legislation to enforce the treaty in 1996, passed updated legislation in 2008 (the Cluster Munitions and Anti-Personnel Landmines Act, 2008).

A total of 26 States Parties report that steps to enact legislation are underway. Sudan joined this group this year. Some states have been reporting legislation is underway for a number of years without any specific updates on progress.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{35}\) In May 2009, Morocco told Landmine Monitor that this was because Morocco has no stocks. Permanent Mission of Morocco to the UN in Geneva, “Response to Questions from the Canadian NGO Mines Action Canada,” 18 May 2009. In December 2008, Sri Lanka told the ICBL that it would endeavor in 2009 to submit an update to its report including information on stockpiles, but it has not done so. Interview with Sumeed Ekanayake, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

\(^{36}\) A total of 59 States Parties have enacted implementation legislation: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, BiH, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Colombia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Djibouti, El Salvador, France, Germany, Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

\(^{37}\) Legislation has been reported to be in progress for more than two years in the following states: Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Republic of the Congo, DRC, Jamaica, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Philippines, Rwanda, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, and Uganda. Among these, only the DRC, Mozambique, Philippines, and Thailand reported specific progress in 2008, indicating that they hoped to have legislation enacted soon. Other states reported to be in progress more recently include: Brunei, Ecuador, Haiti, Kuwait, Palau, Sudan, and Vanuatu. Chile, while stating in May 2009 that it believes its existing laws to be sufficient, has also reported that it is in the process of enacting additional legislation.
A total of 40 States Parties have indicated that they do not believe any new law is required to implement the treaty. Ethiopia and Ukraine joined this category in the past year.

Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress in 31 States Parties to enact appropriate domestic measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.

Special Issues of Concern

Since the inception of the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL has identified special issues of concern regarding interpretation and implementation of aspects of Articles 1, 2, and 3. These have included: what acts are permitted or not under the treaty’s ban on assistance with prohibited acts, especially in the context of joint military operations with states not party; foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines; the applicability of the treaty to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive antihandling devices; and the acceptable number of mines retained for training purposes (see Mines Retained for Research and Training section above).

Ever since the treaty entered into force in 1999, States Parties have regularly discussed these issues at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings and Meetings of States Parties, and many have tried to reach common understandings, as urged by the ICBL and the ICRC. States Parties agreed in the Nairobi Action Plan in 2004, and in the subsequent Progress Reports from the annual Meetings of States Parties, that there should be ongoing discussion and exchange of views on these matters.

However, too few states have expressed their views in recent years, especially with respect to Articles 1 and 2. For detailed information on States Parties policies and practices on these matters of interpretation and implementation, which the ICBL considers essential to the integrity of the Mine Ban Treaty, see past editions of Landmine Monitor.

Article 1: Joint military operations and the prohibition on assistance

Article 1 of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty obligates State Parties to “never under any circumstances ... assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.”

Initially, there was a lack of clarity, however, regarding what types of acts are permitted or prohibited within the context of the prohibition on assistance, particularly with respect to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty. States Parties recognized the need to

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38 A total of 40 States Parties have deemed existing law sufficient or do not consider new legislation necessary: Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belarus, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Central African Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Greece, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Indonesia, Kiribati, Lesotho, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Venezuela.

39 Ethiopia indicated this in its 2009 Article 7 report. Ukraine is listed in this category in the draft Review of the Operation and Status of the Convention for the Second Review Conference, Annex X, and in the ICRC’s Article 9 table, citing information provided by its mission in October 2008.

40 The 31 states without progress toward national implementation measures include: Angola, Afghanistan, Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Iraq, Liberia, Maldives, Nauru, Niue, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, São Tomé e Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan, and Uruguay. Several of these states have reported legislation in progress in the past, but they have provided no recent updates, leaving it unclear as to whether work is still underway.

41 The Final Report and President’s Action Program agreed upon at the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in Bangkok in September 2003 states that “the meeting called upon States Parties to continue to share information and views, particularly with respect to articles 1, 2, and 3, with a view to developing understandings on various matters by the First Review Conference.” The co-chairs of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention (Mexico and the Netherlands) at the February and June 2004 intersessional meetings undertook significant consultations on reaching understandings or conclusions on these issues, but a number of States Parties remained opposed, and no formal understanding was reached at the First Review Conference.

42 The Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009 indicates that the States Parties will “exchange views and share their experiences in a cooperative and informal manner on the practical implementation of the various provisions of the Convention, including Articles 1, 2 and 3, to continue to promote effective and consistent application of these provisions.”
address ambiguities about the prohibition and over the years have shared views on policy and practice. A general, albeit informal, understanding of how Article 1 applies to joint military operations and the meaning of “assist” has emerged during the years of discussion.

A total of 44 States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty who may use antipersonnel mines. Among those who have made statements consistent with this since the First Review Conference in 2004 are Albania, Chad, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia, and Yemen. More specifically, a prevailing view has emerged that States Parties may not:

- participate in the planning for use of antipersonnel mines;
- agree to rules of engagement that permit use of the weapon;
- accept orders to use, request others to use, or train others to use the weapon;
- knowingly derive military benefit from the use of the weapon by others; or
- provide security, storage, or transportation for antipersonnel mines.

In terms of state practice, no State Party is known to have engaged in any of these activities since the First Review Conference but, in the period from 1999 to 2004, Landmine Monitor expressed concerns about a number of States Parties assisting with the use of antipersonnel mines by others, including Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe with various forces in the DRC; Sudan with militia in the south of the country; and Namibia with Angolan troops before Angola became a State Party.

Eight States Parties have declared that only “active” or “direct” participation in joint operations in which antipersonnel mines are used is prohibited: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. However, each country’s understanding of what constitutes “active” or “direct” assistance varies. Over the years, the ICBL has raised concerns with these states about their national declarations and/or clauses in their national implementation legislation with respect to joint operations and “assist.”

**Statements since May 2008**

In November 2008, Algerian officials told Landmine Monitor that Algeria does not participate in joint military operations, but should it ever do so with a state not party, it will under no circumstances use antipersonnel mines.

In July 2008, BiH told Landmine Monitor that during joint military operations with its allies, it cannot be engaged in the process of planning and preparing military action where antipersonnel mines will be used.

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43 Forty-four States Parties have declared that they will not participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines in joint operations with a state not Party to the Mine Ban Treaty who may use antipersonnel mines: Albania, Australia, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Senegal, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, UK, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.


45 A highly regarded legal commentary on the Mine Ban Treaty examined Australia’s National Declaration and a statement by Zimbabwe on the prohibition on “assist,” and concluded that “it is not clear how these interpretations can be legally sustained. Reservations are prohibited by Article 19 of the treaty. The commentary draws particular attention to Australia’s position that the treaty would allow “indirect support such as the provision of security for the personnel of a State not party to the Convention engaging in such [prohibited] activities,” including presumably the laying of antipersonnel mines by the state not party. Stuart Maslen, Commentaries on Arms Control Treaties, Volume 1, The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2004), pp. 92–95.
Foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines
With a few exceptions, States Parties have agreed that the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits “transit” and foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. With respect to transit, the main issue is whether a state not party’s aircraft, ships, or vehicles carrying antipersonnel mines can pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in, restock in) a State Party, including on their way to a conflict in which those mines would be used. Nearly all states that have addressed the issue, as well as the ICBL and ICRC, believe that if a State Party permits transit of antipersonnel mines, it is violating the Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer.

A total of 32 States Parties have declared they prohibit transfer through, foreign stockpiling on, or authorizing foreign antipersonnel mines on national territory. Canada, Germany, Japan, and Norway believe that the Mine Ban Treaty does not prohibit the transit of antipersonnel mines, at least in certain circumstances. Canada has stated that it nevertheless discourages the use of Canadian territory, equipment, or personnel for the purpose of transit of antipersonnel mines. Germany and Japan view the issue in terms of the US mines stored in their countries, and maintain that because they do not exercise jurisdiction or control over the mines, they cannot prohibit transit.

With respect to foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, three States Parties required the US to remove US stocks on their soil: Italy (announced in May 2000), Norway (November 2002), and Spain (November 1999). Tajikistan has reported it is negotiating with Russia regarding removal of its 18,200 stockpiled mines. Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare in its Article 7 report the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled on its territory by a state not party. However, Germany, Japan, Qatar, and the UK have stated that US antipersonnel mine stocks in their countries are not under their national jurisdiction or control, and thus not covered by the Mine Ban Treaty.

Statements since May 2008
In March 2009, an official of Indonesia wrote to Landmine Monitor that “transit is also an activity that is prohibited under the Convention.”

At the June 2008 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Zambia stated its understanding that transit of antipersonnel mines is prohibited. In July 2007 (but not previously reported by Landmine Monitor), Nigeria wrote that its draft implementation legislation “prohibits transfer of anti-personnel mines through any part of the Nigerian territory.”

Article 2: Mines with sensitive fuzes and sensitive antihandling devices
Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty, many States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC have emphasized that, according to the treaty’s definitions, any mine—even if it is labeled as an antivehicle mine—equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited.

However, for a small number of States Parties this remains a contentious issue. The way that States Parties agree—or disagree—on what mines are banned may have a significant impact on how the Mine Ban Treaty is implemented and universalized.

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46 Thirty-two States Parties prohibit transfer or foreign stockpiling: Albania, Austria, BiH, Brazil, Cameroon, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, FYR Macedonia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Namibia, New Zealand, Portugal, Samoa, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, Yemen, and Zambia.

47 Email from Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director, Directorate for International Security and Disarmament, Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 2009.

48 Letter from Dr. Martin I. Uhomoibhi, Ambassador of Nigeria to the UN in Geneva, 10 July 2007.
At least 28 States Parties have expressed the view that any mine, despite its label or design intent, capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is an antipersonnel mine and is prohibited. Among those that have made statements consistent with this view since the First Review Conference are Argentina, BiH, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Guatemala, Kenya, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Slovenia, and Yemen.

Five States Parties (Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Japan, and the UK) have said that the Mine Ban Treaty does not apply to antivehicle mines at all, regardless of their employment with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices.

There appears to be agreement, with some exceptions, that a mine that relies on a tripwire, breakwire, or a tilt rod as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine. However, the Czech Republic has stated it does not consider the use of tripwires with an antivehicle mine to be a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Sweden has antivehicle mines with tilt rods, but has not formally expressed a view on their legality under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Several States Parties have reported that they have removed from service and destroyed certain antivehicle mines and/or ordnance items that, when used with mines, can cause them to function as antipersonnel mines. Belgium has banned pressure and tension release firing devices (igniters) used as booby-traps. Bulgaria destroyed its stock of antivehicle mines with antihandling devices. Canada, France, Hungary, Mali, and the UK have removed tilt rod fuzes from their inventories. The Netherlands and the UK retired from service mines with breakwire fuzes. France has destroyed other unspecified pressure and tension release fuzes. Germany and Slovakia have retired and destroyed antilift mechanisms that could be attached to mines. Slovakia has prohibited the use of the Ro-3 fuze as an antihandling device.

Statements since May 2008

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, five countries spoke on Article 2: Austria, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Zambia.

Austria expressed its view that if a mine explodes from the presence, proximity or contact of a person, it is banned, regardless of any other purpose or design of the mine, and that States Parties should remove any such mines from their inventories and destroy them. It stated its willingness to have States Parties elaborate a formal understanding on the matter.

Canada stated that any mine that can be victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine and prohibited.

The Netherlands agreed that any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine is banned, including antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices that can explode from the unintentional act of a person.

Norway also stressed that any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine, that can explode from human contact, is banned. It stated, “It does not matter whether the main purpose of usage for that mine is directed toward vehicles. It does not matter whether it is called something else than anti-personnel mine.” It called for the issue to be dealt with directly within the framework of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Zambia stated that it joins others in calling for a common understanding that any mine that can be set off unintentionally by a person, thereby functioning as an antipersonnel mine, is banned, including antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive antihandling devices.

49 The 28 States Parties expressing the view that any mine that functions as an antipersonnel mine is prohibited are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, BiH, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, Germany, Guatemala, Kenya, Ireland, FYR Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, Yemen, and Zambia. In addition, Albania has not taken a legal position, but has stated that it is destroying its antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes.

50 The Czech Republic has also acknowledged possessing tilt rod fuzes, but has noted that the mines that are capable of using them are considered to be obsolete and will be retired within 15 years. Slovenia, while stating that antivehicle mines with fuzes that cause them to function as an antipersonnel mines are prohibited, has also acknowledged possessing TMRP-6 mines that are equipped with both pressure and tilt rod fuzes; it is considering how to deal with them.
In July 2008, BiH told Landmine Monitor that it will consider ways to ensure that mines such as TMRP-6 antivehicle mines with tilt rods cannot be victim-activated and function as antipersonnel mines.

**Claymore and OZM-72 command-detonated mines**

Certain types of mines are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty in all instances because they are designed to be capable of being both command-detonated by electric means (which is permissible under the treaty) and victim-activated by using mechanical pull/tension release tripwire fuzes (which is prohibited by the treaty). In the past, options for both means of utilization have often been packaged with the mine.

In order to be compliant and fully transparent, States Parties should take steps, and report on them in Article 7 reports, to ensure that the means for victim-activation is permanently removed and that their armed forces are instructed as to their legal obligations.

The most common mines in this category are Claymore-type directional fragmentation munitions. The M18A1 (produced originally by the US but also widely copied or license-produced by other countries), MON series (produced in the former USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries), and the MRUD (produced in FR Yugoslavia) are the most well known and widely held examples of Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines.

Several States Parties have extended this command and target activation distinction to a type of bounding fragmentation mine, the OZM-72, which also possesses these inherent dual-use capabilities.

A total of 31 States Parties have declared that they retain stocks of Claymore-type and/or OZM-72 mines.51

Some States Parties have chosen to physically modify the mines to accept only electric detonation and some have physically removed and destroyed the tripwire assembly and appropriate blasting cap. Belarus, Denmark, Lithuania, Moldova, New Zealand, and Sweden have reported on the measures taken to modify these mines in their Article 7 reports. In 2006, Belarus destroyed the victim-activated components of its 5,536 MON mines and 200,826 OZM-72 mines.

Thirty States Parties have declared that they do not possess or have destroyed Claymore-type and/or OZM-72 mines.52

The vast majority of States Parties have not declared whether their forces possess these types of mines. While the majority of these States Parties have declared that they do not possess any antipersonnel mine stockpiles, in some cases it cannot be presumed that this includes dual-use command-detonated mines.

**Treaty-Related Meetings**

**Ninth Meeting of States Parties**

States Parties, observer states, and other participants met for the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva, Switzerland from 24–28 November 2008 under the Presidency of Ambassador Jürg Streuli of Switzerland. The focus of the meeting was on the first formal decision-making regarding requests for extensions of mine clearance deadlines. Requests were granted to 15 States Parties, with the UK’s the most contentious. The ICBL expressed its appreciation for the fact that the extension request process was taken seriously by all States Parties, but felt that the final decisions did not always apply the same rigorous standards to all, citing the UK and Venezuela, neither of which had even begun demining operations.

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51 The 31 States Parties that acknowledge possessing Claymore-type or OZM-72 mines include: Australia, Austria, Belarus, BiH, Brunei, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Honduras, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UK, and Zimbabwe.

52 The 30 States Parties that declare not possessing or having destroyed Claymore-type or OZM-72 mines are: Albania, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chad, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, France, Germany, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Luxembourg, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan, Uruguay, and Yemen.
While stating its grave concern that Belarus, Greece, and Turkey remained in serious violation of the treaty after missing their March 2008 stockpile destruction deadlines, the ICBL also expressed appreciation for the serious concerns stated by numerous States Parties about the need for those nations to urgently comply with their obligations. With the aim of preventing future instances of non-compliance, States Parties warmly welcomed a proposal submitted by Lithuania and Serbia on ensuring the full implementation of Article 4 on stockpile destruction.53

Fifteen mine survivors from the ICBL delegation deplored that victim assistance remains seen as a lower priority, and urged concrete actions, citing the need for socio-economic inclusion of survivors in addition to medical assistance.

The ICBL regretted that for the first time since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, no new state had joined the treaty over a 12-month period, and called on all States Parties to increase their universalization efforts. On the positive side, 22 countries not yet party to the treaty participated as observers, demonstrating the continuing spread of the international norm against antipersonnel mines.54


New co-chairs and co-rapporteurs of the Standing Committees were selected for the period until the Second Review Conference in Cartagena, Colombia from 30 November to 4 December 2009, with Ambassador Susan Eckey of Norway as President-Designate.

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Participation in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties was high—nearly 800 people—with a total of 125 country delegations attending, including delegations from 103 States Parties. The range of participants—diplomats, campaigners, UN personnel, and, most notably, significant numbers of mine action practitioners and landmine survivors—again demonstrated that the Mine Ban Treaty has become the framework for addressing all aspects of the antipersonnel mine problem. More than 150 members of the ICBL attended.

**Implementation and intersessional work program**

A notable feature of the Mine Ban Treaty is the attention which States Parties have paid to ensuring implementation of the treaty’s provisions. Structures created to monitor progress toward implementation and to allow discussion among States Parties include the annual

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53 The proposal calls for States Parties to take actions if a state does not have a plan for destruction within one year of entry into force, or has not started destruction within two years. It calls for pro-active consultations by Standing Committee co-chairs, and for stockpiling states to report on progress at every annual Meeting of States Parties and intersessional meeting, as well as in Article 7 reports. Non-compliant states are urged to provide a formal communication about reasons for failure to comply, and a plan to complete destruction with an expected completion date.

54 Some of the more notable “holdouts” attended, including China, Egypt, India, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Vietnam. Others included Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland, Georgia, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and UAE.
Meetings of States Parties, the intersessional work program with its four Standing Committees, a coordinating committee, and contact groups on universalization of the treaty, Article 7, resource utilization, and linking mine action and development.

The intersessional Standing Committees met for one week in May 2009. Details on Standing Committee discussions and interventions can be found below in various thematic sections. A separate formal session was held devoted to preparations for the Second Review Conference.

**The Oslo Process and the Convention on Cluster Munitions**

With the failure of the CCW Third Review Conference in November 2006 to adequately address cluster munitions (see below), Norway announced it would start an independent process outside the CCW to negotiate a treaty banning cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm. It subsequently held the first meeting of the “Oslo Process” in February 2007, where 46 states committed themselves to conclude a new international treaty banning cluster munitions “that cause unacceptable harm to civilians” by 2008. A “Core Group” of nations took responsibility for the initiative, including Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, and Peru.

At the first follow-up meeting in Lima, Peru, in May 2007, a draft treaty text was distributed and discussed. Additional sessions to develop the treaty took place in Vienna, Austria, in December 2007 and Wellington, New Zealand, in February 2008. A total of about 140 countries participated in at least one of these Oslo Process preparatory meetings. Regional meetings to build support for the treaty were also held in Costa Rica in September 2007, Serbia in October 2007 (for affected states), Zambia in April 2008, and Thailand in April 2008 (sponsored by the ICRC).

Formal negotiations were held in Dublin, Ireland from 19–30 May 2008. At the conclusion, all 107 of the participating states adopted the new Convention on Cluster Munitions which comprehensively bans the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of cluster munitions. An additional 20 states attended the negotiations as observers.

The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the ICBL praised the new treaty as one that will save thousands of lives for decades to come. Like the Mine Ban Treaty, it takes an integrated approach to the cluster munition problem, and requires clearance of contaminated areas as well as assistance to survivors and affected communities. The victim assistance provisions are especially laudable and much stronger than those included in the Mine Ban Treaty. Efforts to weaken the treaty with exceptions for certain cluster munitions, and to have a transition period allowing use of banned weapons for a number of years, were defeated. The most highly criticized aspect of the new convention is a provision that could be seen by some as a loophole allowing States Parties to assist in some way with the use of cluster munitions by non-States Parties in joint military operations.

In August 2008, Georgia and Russia both used cluster munitions in their conflict over South Ossetia, resulting in 70 civilian casualties and creating socio-economic harm. Around the world, CMC protests and media editorials condemned this new use of cluster munition so soon after the convention’s adoption.

However, this period also saw intensive activities to ensure that as many states signed the convention in Oslo as possible. Regional conferences held in Sofia, Bulgaria (18–19 September), Kampala, Uganda (29–30 September), Xieng Khouang, Lao PDR (20–22 October), Quito, Ecuador (6–7 November), and Beirut, Lebanon (11–12 November) helped secure commitments to sign and also provided useful venues to start considering implementation.

From 3–4 December 2008—two years after the Oslo Process began—Norway welcomed states back to Oslo for the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference. Ministers and senior officials from 94 governments signed the convention at Oslo City Hall, applauded

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by a CMC delegation comprised of 250 campaigners from 75 countries. Another 28 countries attended but did not sign.

The number of signatories had grown to 98 as of early September 2009, and 17 states had ratified. The convention will enter into force six months after the 30th ratification.

The first significant gathering of signatories was held in Berlin from 25–26 June 2009, with a focus on stockpile destruction. Regional meetings to promote the convention were scheduled in Chile from 14–15 September and in Indonesia from 16–17 November 2009. The First Meeting of States Parties is being planned for Lao PDR in late 2010.

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Amended Protocol II
CCW Amended Protocol II regulates the production, transfer and use of landmines, booby-traps and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the 1996 protocol gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. A total of 93 states were party to Amended Protocol II as of September 2009. Two states, Georgia (8 June 2009) and Jamaica (25 September 2008), joined since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2008. Just 11 of the 93 have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Finland, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Thus, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 11 countries as the remainder are held to the higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II took place in November 2008, with an informal meeting of experts in April 2009.

The nine-year deadline for states that chose to defer compliance with the requirements on detectability of antipersonnel mines and the requirements for self-destruction and self-deactivation for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines, as provided in the Technical Annex, was 3 December 2007. China, Latvia, Pakistan, and Russia deferred on detectability, while Belarus, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine deferred on self-destruction and self-deactivation.

In its September 2007 Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, China stated that it had met its December deadline to comply with the protocol’s technical specifications. In November 2007, China stated that it had made technical modification to or destroyed stockpiled antipersonnel mines which failed to meet the requirements of the protocol. It has provided few additional details.

Pakistan stated in November 2007 that it had made all the necessary technical changes to be compliant with the protocol, but it provided no details.

A Russian official said in November 2007, “By the end of this year a set of measures to implement requirements of the Protocol...will be nearing its completion. In particular, a national system of technical requirements to land mines, including anti-personnel ones, will be finalized and adopted for practical application, a planned disposal of obsolete types of mines is being carried out...” Russia has not subsequently announced completion of the work, and over the years has provided few details about how it is complying with the technical requirements of the protocol.

56 Mine Ban Treaty signatory Poland is party to CCW Amended Protocol II. Though it has not yet ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, as a signatory, it cannot do anything contrary to the object and purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty, so is already bound by a higher standard than Amended Protocol II.

57 Remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine systems are stockpiled by Amended Protocol II States Parties Belarus, China, Greece, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, Ukraine, and US. The Mine Ban Treaty required Belarus, Greece and Turkey to destroy their remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008. Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Bulgaria, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Turkmenistan, and UK have already destroyed their stockpiles of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines.

Latvia’s deferral is presumably irrelevant since it already destroyed its stockpile as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has retained some mines for training purposes. Belarus was obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2008, but has not yet complied (see Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Their Destruction section above). Ukraine is obligated by the Mine Ban Treaty to complete the destruction of its stocks of PFM remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines by 1 June 2010.

**Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War**

Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War is intended to address the post-conflict dangers posed by unexploded ordnance and abandoned ordnance. It was adopted in November 2003 and entered into force on 12 November 2006. As of August 2009, 60 states had ratified the protocol. Fourteen states ratified Protocol V since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*: Belarus, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Georgia, Jamaica, Mali, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Senegal, the UAE, and the US. The first annual meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva in November 2007 and the second in November 2008, with informal meetings of experts in July 2008 and April 2009.

**Cluster Munitions**

At the Third CCW Review Conference held in Geneva from 7–17 November 2006, States Parties rejected a proposal to begin negotiations within the CCW on a “legally-binding instrument that addresses the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions” and instead agreed to a weak mandate to continue discussions on ERW, with a focus on cluster munitions, in 2007.

CCW’s Group of Governmental Experts met for one week in June 2007 with the sole substantive topic being cluster munitions. However, the outcome was again weak, with a statement that the Group “without prejudice to the outcome, recommends to the [November 2007 Meeting of States Parties] to decide how best to address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions as a matter of urgency, including the possibility of a new instrument. Striking the right balance between military and humanitarian considerations should be part of the decision.”

During the week-long November 2007 meeting, a proposal from the European Union to negotiate in 2008 a legally-binding instrument that prohibits cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians was rejected. States considered several ever-weaker proposals to begin negotiations on cluster munitions in 2008, and settled for an agreement to “negotiate a proposal to address urgently the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, while striking a balance between military and humanitarian considerations.” The mandate did not specify that negotiations should lead to a new legally binding protocol, or include any kind of prohibition, and had no timeline.

Meetings were held in accordance with the mandate from 14–18 January, 7–11 April, 7–25 July, and 1–5 September 2008. By the end of the September session, the chairperson had developed a draft protocol text, but there were still wildly divergent views on the need for a protocol and what it should contain. States Parties were unable to reach an agreement at the annual meeting of States Parties in November 2008, but decided to extend the mandate and hold a negotiating session from 16–20 February, and 14–17 April 2009.

However, States Parties remained far apart on key issues, even after an additional informal session held on 17–21 August 2009. Following that session, the chairperson produced a new draft protocol, presented in his personal capacity, for possible consideration at the annual meeting of States Parties. Most observers felt there would be little chance to conclude a new protocol at the annual meeting from 12–13 November 2009, and the main issue would be whether to extend the work again into 2010.
MINE ACTION

1999–2009 Overview

Since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999, at least 1,100km² of mined areas and a further 2,100km² of battle areas have been cleared in more than 90 countries and other areas.¹ Operations have resulted in the destruction of more than 2.2 million emplaced antipersonnel mines, 250,000 antivehicle mines, and 17 million explosive remnants of war (ERW).

In 2008 alone, mine action programs cleared almost 160km² of mined areas, the highest total ever recorded by Landmine Monitor. In May 2009, Tunisia formally declared that it had completed its clearance obligations under the treaty, the eleventh State Party to do so. The 10 others are Bulgaria, Costa Rica, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, FYR Macedonia, Malawi, Suriname, and Swaziland.²

Yet significant challenges remain in the ongoing struggle against landmines. Mine-affected states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years of becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty.³ The first deadlines expired on 1 March 2009, but 15 States Parties with 2009 deadlines failed to meet them and were

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Mine Action Terminology</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A <strong>mined area</strong> contains antipersonnel or antivehicle mines or a mix of the two; such areas often also include items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A <strong>battle area</strong> is an area of combat affected by ERW but which does not contain mines. ERW includes both UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Battle area clearance</strong> may involve only a visual inspection of a suspected hazardous area by professional clearance personnel, but is more often an instrument-assisted search of ground, i.e. using UXO detectors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearance of mined areas refers to physical coverage of an area to a specified depth using manual deminers, mine detection dogs, and/or machines to detect and destroy (or remove for later destruction) all explosive devices found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land release</strong> means release of contaminated land through survey or clearance.</td>
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<td><strong>Survey</strong> in mine action means a formal process to identify areas containing mines or ERW.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Suspected hazardous area</strong> means an area suspected—but not confirmed—to contain mines and/or ERW.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

¹ “Other areas” are distinct areas or regions with a specific mine or ERW threat but which are not—or only partially—internationally recognized as states: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Somaliland, Taiwan, and Western Sahara.

² Fulfilling the requirements of Article 5 does not mean that a country is “mine-free,” a status that very few countries actually achieve. It is a statement that all known mined areas have been cleared of antipersonnel mines to humanitarian standards, and that all reasonable efforts have been made to identify all mined areas within a state’s jurisdiction or control. Thus, a small residual mine threat may be believed to exist even after a declaration of compliance with Article 5 has been made thus requiring the affected state to maintain the capacity to deal quickly with any residual contamination that may be discovered.

³ Jurisdiction means sovereign territory while control of territory means areas occupied by a state outside its sovereign territory.
granted extensions. In 2009, four more States Parties (three with 2010 deadlines and one, Uganda, whose deadline expired on 1 August 2009) formally requested extensions for periods ranging from three to 10 years. By contrast, at the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, States Parties pledged that by the Second Review Conference in 2009 “few, if any, States Parties” would require an extension to their treaty deadlines.

Scope of the Problem

With the Mine Ban Treaty already in force for 10 years, a reliable determination of the size of the global landmine problem still does not exist. Early estimates of the numbers of mines laid were merely speculative and often proved to be wildly inaccurate. Similarly, surveys, particularly some Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS), have overestimated the size of contaminated areas. Nonetheless, a more accurate understanding of the extent of contamination in both mined areas and battle areas does now exist, with many earlier estimates reduced significantly, largely as a result of more widespread land release procedures.

Mine contamination

As of August 2009, more than 70 states were believed to be mine-affected, as well as seven areas not internationally recognized (see table below). In the past year Landmine Monitor has removed two states from the list: the Gambia and Tunisia. Although any estimate should be treated with caution, Landmine Monitor believes that less than 3,000km² of land worldwide was mine contaminated as of August 2009. Increasingly, data gathering efforts are—rightly—seeking to define more accurately the perimeters of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and to ensure there is sufficient evidence of contamination for these SHAs to be entered into national mine action databases.

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4 In accordance with the treaty, BiH, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the UK, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all made requests for an extension to their Article 5 deadlines ranging from one to 10 years, the maximum period permitted for any extension period (though more than one extension period can be requested). All of these requests were granted by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008.

5 These four states are: Argentina, Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Uganda.


7 Land release encompasses the range of techniques that ensure the efficient release of formerly suspect mined or battle areas other than purely by clearance, particularly technical survey. In addition, non-technical survey and database clean-up can lead to the cancellation of SHAs that are not in fact contaminated.

8 The Gambia has been removed from the list as there is no evidence of residual contamination following an accident in December 2007. Tunisia has a residual threat from mines laid by NSAGs, but has reported completing clearance of all confirmed mined areas. Zambia has not yet been removed from the list although a nationwide survey of contamination had not found any mined areas as of August 2009 as it has still formally to declare completion of its Article 5 obligations.

9 An area roughly the size of Luxembourg.

10 According to the IMAS on land release, a SHA refers to “an area suspected of having a mine/ERW hazard. A SHA can be identified by an impact survey, other form of national survey, or a claim of presence of explosive hazard.” UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “IMAS 08.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 1. Often, these are very rough estimates represented by a large circle in the national database that overestimates the size of a SHA. In Afghanistan, for example, the results of polygon surveys—more accurate delineation of the perimeter of a SHA—by HALO in its area of operations in 2007 prompted the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) to plan such surveys in most of the rest of the country in 2008–2009. MACCA reported in April 2009 that polygon surveys had resulted in a 9% reduction in the total estimated SHA. Email from MACCA, 31 March 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 86.
Executive Summary

Mine action

**Mine-affected states and other areas as of August 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Commonwealth of Independent States</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>China</td>
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<td>Congo, Democratic Republic of the (DRC)</td>
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<td>Congo, Republic of</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td>Somaliland</td>
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</table>

**21 states, 1 area**

| 8 states | 14 states, 1 area | 10 states, 1 area | 8 states, 2 areas | 12 states, 2 areas |

This table includes states and other areas with confirmed mined areas. States with a residual mine problem are not included, such as Belarus, Honduras, Kuwait, Poland, Ukraine, and, since its declaration of compliance with Article 5, Tunisia. The precise extent to which the Republic of the Congo, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Niger, Oman, and the Philippines are mine-contaminated remained unclear as of August 2009. Both Argentina and the UK claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which are mine-affected, and so both are included in the list. It is believed that both Djibouti and Montenegro have completed mine clearance, but this has not been formally confirmed so they remain on the list. Affected areas not internationally recognized as states are in italics.
Mine Clearance

Advances are being made in demining efficiency with standard mine clearance tools that are rudimentary but practical. The primary clearance technique remains the manual deminer equipped with a metal detector proceeding slowly along one-meter-wide lanes. When a signal is heard, the deminer must stop and either the deminer or a colleague must carefully excavate the object to determine if it is an item of explosive ordnance or a harmless piece of metal. The overwhelming majority of signals lead to innocuous metal fragments being discovered (e.g. nails, barbed wire, and tin cans). This painstaking process—is why mine clearance is expensive and time consuming. The key to cost efficiency is minimizing the overall area to be cleared through good initial survey and ongoing refinement of the clearance plan for a minefield.

Other demining tools—especially mine detection dogs (MDDs) and machines—are widely used in mine action programs, particularly to contribute to more efficient land release rather than as a sole clearance tool. In Rwanda, for example, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) redeployed a MineWolf machine from its Sudan program in August 2008 to prepare approximately half a square kilometer of mine-suspected land for manual clearance by National Demining Office demining teams. At the end of the project in December 2008, the use of the machine meant that only 15,303m² (3% of the SHA, equivalent to about three football fields in size) needed to be physically cleared.

Clearance in 2008

Despite continuing problems in distinguishing true mine clearance from release by survey, Landmine Monitor believes at least 158km² of suspected mined areas were cleared in 2008, resulting in the destruction of 476,875 antipersonnel mines and 99,466 antivehicle mines. Greater precision is not possible due to the poor quality of reporting in a number of cases. The term demining encompasses survey, mapping, marking, community liaison, and post-clearance handover as well as physical clearance itself.

HALO in Afghanistan and HALO and MAG in Cambodia are using the Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System metal detector, which has ground penetrating radar incorporated to reduce the number of false signals. The detectors are considered effective and raise productivity, but they are also expensive and complex to use. See reports on Afghanistan and Cambodia in this edition of Landmine Monitor; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 35.

The use of a metal detector in mineralized soil (soil with high metal content) or along railway lines is generally not feasible and other approaches must be used, sometimes requiring prodding. Prodding, by which a metal rod is carefully inserted into the ground at a 30 degree angle to check for mines, is more dangerous than the use of a metal detector as the risk of accidental detonation of a mine or item of explosive ordnance is significantly higher. Raking is a technique used in sandy soil, which has proved effective in a number of mine action programs, notably Jordan, Somaliland, and Sri Lanka. It would appear that some organizations have done this well but that many others have been exceedingly wasteful.

MDDs locate mines through sense of smell, believed to be the vapor from explosives. Concerns persist, however, in certain quarters about their ability to consistently detect all explosive devices in a given area. Their use as a sole clearance tool remains controversial because of concerns that mines are missed. In addition, machines cannot be used on steep inclines or rocky ground, and dogs do not function effectively in extreme temperatures.

Uganda has calculated that use of a machine on several of its remaining SHAs will save about one year of manual clearance time.

The high total of items destroyed in 2008 is largely explained by reporting by Iran of clearance of more than 77,000 antivehicle mines. It is likely, therefore, that previous years significantly under-reported the number of items cleared.

Thus, for example, the 412km² of clearance reported by Morocco are not included in this estimate because, although there are said to be 10,000 deminers engaged in a massive clearance effort, they only have 400 detectors and sets of personal protective equipment and clearance appears to include a very significant amount of release by survey.

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17 Their use as a sole clearance tool remains controversial because of concerns that mines are missed. In addition, machines cannot be used on steep inclines or rocky ground, and dogs do not function effectively in extreme temperatures.
18 Uganda has calculated that use of a machine on several of its remaining SHAs will save about one year of manual clearance time.
19 Equivalent to an area roughly twice the size of Paris. This figure excludes the area said to have been cleared in Iran, which has reported conducting more than 2,000km² of mine clearance in 2008.
20 The high total of items destroyed in 2008 is largely explained by reporting by Iran of clearance of more than 77,000 antivehicle mines. It is likely, therefore, that previous years significantly under-reported the number of items cleared.
21 Thus, for example, the 412km² of clearance reported by Morocco are not included in this estimate because, although there are said to be 10,000 deminers engaged in a massive clearance effort, they only have 400 detectors and sets of personal protective equipment and clearance appears to include a very significant amount of release by survey.
largest areas of land were cleared by mine action programs in eight countries—Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen—which accounted for more than three-quarters of the total recorded clearance (see table below). Mine clearance in 2008 increased compared to 2007, when programs cleared at least 122 km² of mined areas.

**Compliance with Article 5 obligations**

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. Ensuring full compliance with these mine clearance obligations is arguably the greatest challenge facing States Parties.

Since the last edition of Landmine Monitor and as of August 2009, one State Party declared fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations: Tunisia. This makes a total of only 11 States Parties that have declared fulfillment of their Article 5 obligations (see table below). At least three other States Parties could also be in a position to report formally they had fully complied with those obligations at the Second Review Conference in November 2009: Albania and Rwanda (both with 2010 deadlines) and Zambia (2011 deadline). Furthermore, Montenegro (deadline of 1 April 2017) is believed to have completed mine clearance operations, but no formal declaration has so far been made as suspected area still needs to be surveyed. The situation in Djibouti, whose deadline expired on 1 March 2009, remains unclear, ostensibly due to an unresolved border conflict with Eritrea.

There has also been significant progress in demining over the past 10 years in areas and states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, notably in China, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, as well as in Taiwan. Georgia and Libya have recently expressed a willingness to engage in further mine clearance operations on their territory.

Against this, 19 mine-affected States Parties have either missed their deadlines or have formally declared that they are not in a position to complete clearance operations before the Treaty’s 10-year deadline. One State Party, Uganda, declared at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009 that it would meet its 1 August 2009 deadline, only to submit a three-

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22 This excludes the 27.5 km² of land reportedly cleared by the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces as the quality of clearance and the extent of area cleared have not been independently verified.

23 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area (ASA) in Djibouti in November 2008.
year extension request on 19 August.\textsuperscript{24} Until States Parties decide on its request, Uganda will be in violation of the provisions of Article 5. Of particular concern, two of the four States Parties that formally requested an extension to their Article 5 deadlines in 2009 were unable to provide reliable figures for the extent of contamination (see table below).

In the case of Cambodia, a state that has had a mine action program since 1992, its initial extension request stated that available data did not permit a reliable estimate to be made and noted that a new survey would begin to determine the remaining contamination.\textsuperscript{25} The ICBL suggested that Cambodia follow the approach taken by Chad, Denmark, and Zimbabwe: to request a shorter period to conduct the relevant survey and data analysis, and then make a second request properly informed by a reliable assessment of mined areas. For Tajikistan, survey of SHAs is ongoing and the mine action center has noted that its final estimate of contaminated area may increase.

Several States Parties granted extensions in 2008 have since made disappointing progress.\textsuperscript{26} BiH failed to meet the first target set by its extension request, namely that by 2009 it was to have reduced the estimated area of contamination to 1,573km\textsuperscript{2}. To achieve this, BiH should have released 165km\textsuperscript{2} of SHAs in 2008, but it achieved only a little over half of this amount (85km\textsuperscript{2}) of which only just over 3km\textsuperscript{2} was through clearance.\textsuperscript{27} Moreover, the extent of the remaining task remains unclear and the assumptions on which completion within 10 years are based appear unrealistic when compared with past performance.\textsuperscript{28}

By mid-2009, Thailand was already having difficulty meeting the goals it had set out in its extension request. The rate of demining by the national mine action center in the first half of 2009 (1.3km\textsuperscript{2}) was well behind what was needed to achieve the projected annual rate (43km\textsuperscript{2}), while the estimated area of contamination had actually increased as a result of survey (from 528km\textsuperscript{2} to 562km\textsuperscript{2}).

The request by Croatia estimated that at the beginning of its extension period in March 2009 it would have 944km\textsuperscript{2} of suspect land, meaning that it would reduce its total SHA through clearance and technical survey by 53km\textsuperscript{2} in 2008.\textsuperscript{29} Yet Croatia missed the target by 10.5km\textsuperscript{2}, releasing a total of 42.5km\textsuperscript{2} in 2008 and bringing the total SHA down to 954.5km\textsuperscript{2}, still far in excess of probable contaminated area.\textsuperscript{30}

Ecuador and Peru have continued to make slow progress in clearing SHAs along their common border (both were granted eight-year extensions by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties).\textsuperscript{31} Both the United Kingdom and Venezuela, which were granted a 10-year and a five-year extension, respectively, have still to initiate formal clearance operations.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{State} & \textbf{Estimated area of mine contamination (km\textsuperscript{2})} & \textbf{Length of extension request sought (in years)} \\
\hline
Argentina & 13 & 10 \\
Cambodia & 672 (estimated) & 10 \\
Tajikistan & 14.4 (estimated, partial) & 10 \\
Uganda & 0.26 & 3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{States Parties requesting an extension to their Article 5 deadline in 2009}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{24} Uganda Article 5 deadline Extension Request, July 2009.
\textsuperscript{25} Cambodia Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{26} Moreover, certain extension requests were poorly prepared, suggesting an under-performing mine action program.
\textsuperscript{27} BiH Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 27 June 2008, p. 26.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, p. 306.
\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, Head of Department for Planning and Analysis, Croatian Mine Action Center, Sisak, 9 February 2009.
\textsuperscript{31} Ecuador cleared 6,215m\textsuperscript{2} of mined areas, leaving 517,312m\textsuperscript{2} of mined areas to be cleared, while Peru cleared 1,155m\textsuperscript{2} of mined areas on the border with Ecuador, leaving 192,000m\textsuperscript{2} of mined areas as well as some mined areas surrounding national infrastructure inside the country.
Future compliance with Article 5 deadlines is likely to be similarly disappointing. Based on progress to date, Landmine Monitor believes that the following States Parties are not on track to comply with the treaty by their respective deadlines: Mauritania (2011); Algeria (2012); Chile (2012); DRC (2012); and Eritrea (2012). In some cases, the problem is inadequate funding; more often, delays in initiating a program, poor management, and insufficient political will are the root causes. Colombia (with a 2011 deadline) will almost certainly remain contaminated with mines laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) as security concerns have prevented the safe clearance of some areas. Among States Parties with later deadlines, Iraq is a particular concern. Less than a year after it became party to the treaty as one of the world’s worst affected countries, Iraq not only had done nothing to mobilize resources needed to address its contamination but had even suspended all clearance outside Kurdish areas, raising serious concerns about the extent to which political leaders understood the severity of the problem or their treaty obligations.

In certain cases, there has been a lack of progress in demining contested borders (particularly in the case of Thailand/Cambodia, and Tajikistan and its neighbors): this is partly a result of a lack of clear delineation or demarcation of borders. Jordan, on the other hand, informed the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009 that, although a dispute over the border with Syria had not been fully resolved, the two countries had agreed demining could proceed unhindered. Some States Parties have not yet acknowledged that they are legally obliged by the treaty to clear areas they control outside their sovereign territory. As of August 2009, neither Turkey nor Cyprus had formally accepted responsibility for clearance in northern Cyprus, which is occupied by Turkish forces. A statement in June 2008 from Moldova, which had raised hopes that it had acknowledged its responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction, was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Finally, the extent of any mined areas containing antipersonnel mines in four states with Article 5 deadlines in 2009 and 2010 remained unclear (see table below); none has so far formally reported mined areas containing antipersonnel mines or requested an extension.

**States Parties with Article 5 deadlines in 2009 and 2010 whose compliance is uncertain**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Compliance issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Clearance of known mined areas complete but no formal declaration of compliance; possible new contamination from combat with neighboring Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mine contamination not confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mine contamination not confirmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mine contamination not confirmed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Explosive remnants of war contamination**

With firm action having been taken to address the global threat from mines, today ERW still represents a huge challenge, with tens of millions of items of UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) contaminating countries affected by armed conflict. For example, Lao

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33 See Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, which lays down the obligation to clear areas under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party; and Statement of ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.
34 See report on Moldova in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
35 See the relevant reports in this edition of Landmine Monitor for details.
36 There are also a small number of states (for example, Albania, Republic of the Congo, and Kenya,) in which UXO contamination has occurred as a result of military training or the undesired explosion of ammunition in an ASA. AXO can result from a lack of proper ASA management and control.
PDR and Vietnam are still massively contaminated as a result of US bombing campaigns four decades ago, although no credible estimates of the full extent of contamination currently exist. The adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 highlighted a specific threat that Landmine Monitor has reported on for many years—that of cluster munition remnants, especially unexploded submunitions. Although the full extent of contamination is still to be determined, survey and clearance operations in 2008 and 2009 revealed at least 27 states and three areas with some degree of unexploded submunition contamination on their territory, as set out in the table below. It is hoped that reporting under the new convention once it enters into force will clarify the global extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants.

| States and other areas affected by cluster munition remnants as of August 2009 |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Africa | Americas | Asia-Pacific | Europe | Commonwealth of Independent States | Middle East and North Africa |
| Angola | Argentina | Afghanistan | Albania | Azerbaijan | Iraq |
| Chad | Cambodia | BiH | Georgia | Kuwait |
| Congo, Republic of the | Lao PDR | Croatia | Russia | Lebanon |
| DRC | Vietnam | Montenegro | Tajikistan | Syria |
| Mauritania | Serbia | Nagorno-Karabakh | |
| Sudan | UK | |
| Uganda | Kosovo | |
| Zambia | |
| 8 states | 1 state | 4 states | 6 states, 1 area | 4 states, 1 area | 4 states, 1 area |

37 The convention defines cluster munition remnants as including the following: unexploded submunitions, unexploded bomblets (submunition dropped from a fixed-wing dispenser), failed cluster munitions (i.e. the canister failed to disperse the submunitions as intended during deployment), and abandoned cluster munitions.

38 Certain states have already clarified the extent of the area affected by cluster munition remnants. In Serbia, for example, NPA’s general survey of submunition contamination, conducted between 9 November 2007 and 30 November 2008, identified 105 “deployment zones” where cluster munitions were used and 390 polygons or suspect areas covering a total of 30.7km². These affected 28 communities in 16 municipalities. Mauritania has reported plans to conduct survey over 6km² of SHA reported to contain cluster munition remnants. See, further, the respective reports on these two states in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

39 Zambia has been added to the list of affected states since last year based on a nationwide survey by NPA, which found two areas containing unexploded submunitions. Guinea-Bissau has been removed from the list as it is reported that the last known cluster munition remnants were destroyed by a UK commercial demining operator, Cleared Ground Demining, in August 2008. Israel has also reported clearing all unexploded submunitions fired by Hezbollah into Israel during the August 2006 conflict in Lebanon. Whether Eritrea, Ethiopia, Grenada, and Saudi Arabia remained contaminated was unclear as of August 2009, so they have not been included in the list. As noted above, both Argentina and the UK claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which are affected by cluster munition remnants, and so both are included in the list. Affected areas not internationally recognized as states are in italics. There may be contamination from cluster munition remnants resulting from training or testing in a number of other states, including Chile, Jordan, and the US.
Executive Summary

**Battle Area Clearance**

Battle area clearance (BAC) seeks to clean former combat areas of ERW. BAC tends to be far quicker than mine clearance for two main reasons. First, in certain circumstances visual inspection of an area may be sufficient, sometimes without the need to conduct instrument-assisted search of the surface. Second, even when sub-surface clearance is deemed necessary, it does not need such sensitive detectors as are used for mine clearance: BAC seeks to detect far greater quantities of metal than occur in common antipersonnel mines and it does not normally have to leave an area metal free. Accordingly, operations endure far fewer false positive signals from harmless metal fragments and coverage of SHAs tends to be far quicker than mine clearance as a result.

**Battle area clearance in 2008**

Despite problems in ensuring that BAC is not double reported (i.e. sub-surface clearance is repeated in surface clearance figures), Landmine Monitor believes at least 270km² of battle areas were cleared in 2008, resulting in the destruction of more than 48,000 unexploded submunitions and some 2.3 million other items of ERW. The largest areas cleared by mine action programs in Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, and Lao PDR, which together accounted for 80% of the total recorded BAC (see table below). BAC in 2008 decreased compared to 2007, when programs reported clearance of at least 412km² of battle areas.

**Clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions**

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party “undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control” as soon as possible but not later than 10 years after becoming party. Should cluster munitions be used after the treaty enters into force for a particular state, that state is required to fulfill the same clearance obligations “as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants.” Upon fulfilling either of these obligations, the relevant State Party is required to make a declaration of compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.

Negotiations for the convention benefited from the experiences in implementation of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. The text is far more detailed as to reporting obligations in its Article 7 reporting on transparency measures, which will assist the future oversight of cluster munition clearance efforts. In particular, States Parties will be required to report on the size of areas both estimated to be contaminated and subsequently cleared, not just on the location of areas and the number of items cleared, as with the Mine Ban Treaty.

**Clearance obligations under Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol V**

Under Article 3 of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), after the “cessation of active hostilities and as soon as feasible,” each State Party and party to an armed conflict is required to “mark and clear, remove or destroy, or ensure the clearing and destruction of, cluster munition remnants.”

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40 Thus, as mentioned above, BAC is conducted on areas that do not contain a mine threat. Care must be taken in making this determination: casualties occurred in Lebanon, for example, as a result of BAC being conducted on land that was, in fact, contaminated with mines.

41 The actual total is probably much higher as Vietnam did not report comprehensive figures for the destruction of cluster munition remnants, and Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Sudan, and Uganda did not disaggregate cluster munition clearance figures from other ERW. Full or partial cluster munition clearance figures were reported for the following states: Albania, Croatia, DRC, Georgia, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Serbia, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Zambia, as well as the areas of Kosovo and Western Sahara.

42 Reported figures for the Sri Lanka Army of 121km² (which resulted in the destruction of only 121 items of UXO) are not included in this total as it has not been possible to verify the clearance.

43 Article 4.1, Convention on Cluster Munitions.

44 Including NSAGs.
destroy explosive remnants of war in affected territories under its control.”

In addition, the users of explosive ordnance are placed under a special responsibility to record their use of these weapons, and to provide data and assistance for the clearance of any resulting UXO in territory that they do not control.

Land Release

If the mine and ERW problem is to be addressed efficiently, national authorities will have to develop transparent systems to reduce SHAs to confirmed mined areas. As the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) on land release state: “on some occasions, land has been subjected to full clearance unnecessarily.” Any land that is not contaminated but is physically cleared represents inefficiency and a potentially huge waste of resources for a national demining program.

In part, land release is a recognition that some surveys have led to excessive estimates of the size and number of SHAs. Due to the efforts of many, particularly the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), which has spearheaded the development of land release processes along with the government of Norway and others, there is now a better understanding that an array of techniques in addition to full clearance can enable SHAs to be addressed efficiently and with a high degree of safety for both program personnel and the intended beneficiaries. These techniques include better information gathering and verification, and greater use of high-quality non-technical and technical survey.

Care must be taken, however, when applying land release to ensure that certain basic principles are followed. In particular, any land confirmed to be contaminated must be fully cleared to humanitarian standards to meet the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty, and the process of land release by both technical and non-technical means must be accountable and follow applicable mine action standards.

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46 Land release principles are also applicable to battle areas, including areas affected by cluster munition remnants, but procedures tailored to battle areas are to be elaborated in a separate IMAS. Telephone interview with Havard Bach, Head, Operational Methods Section, GICHD, 11 September 2009.
48 That is not to suggest that this applies to all countries or demining organizations. A number of these have consistently insisted on the importance of careful survey and mapping of SHAs prior to clearance.
49 See, for example, Coordinator of the Resource Utilization Contact Group (Norway), “Applying all available methods to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5,” Discussion paper (Revision), July 2008.
50 HALO stresses the efficiency of a four-stage approach to addressing SHAs: 1. Good non-technical survey. 2. Find the mines, using technical survey/clearance. 3. Clear from the inside out to the limit of the threat. 4. Hand over to local people. Email from Christian Richmond, Desk Officer, HALO, 3 September 2009.
51 Non-technical survey is defined by the relevant IMAS as survey which involves “collecting and analysing new and/or existing information about a hazardous area. Its purpose is to confirm whether there is evidence of a hazard or not, to identify the type and extent of hazards within any hazardous area and to define, as far as is possible, the perimeter of the actual hazardous areas without physical intervention. A non-technical survey does not normally involve the use of clearance or verification assets. Exceptions occur when assets are used for the sole purpose of providing access for non-technical survey teams. The results from a non-technical survey cannot be used by any previous data relating to the survey of an area.” UNMAS, “IMAS 08.21: Non-Technical Survey, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, pp. 1–2.
52 IMAS defines technical survey as “a detailed intervention with clearance or verification assets into a CHA, or part of a CHA. It should confirm the presence of mines/ERW leading to the definition of one or more DHA and may indicate the absence of mines/ERW which could allow land to be released when combined with other evidence.” UNMAS, “IMAS 08.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 2.
Techniques
The IMAS on land release describes the approach as “an evidence-based information assessment process that can help determine with confidence which land needs to be cleared and which does not.” It adds new terms—and potentially new interventions—to the mine action lexicon (and therefore also to the mine action database). The term “Confirmed Hazardous Area” (CHA) refers to “an area identified by a non-technical survey in which the necessity for further intervention through either technical survey or clearance has been confirmed.” The term “Defined Hazardous Area” (DHA) refers to “an area, generally within a CHA, that requires full clearance. A DHA is normally identified through thorough survey.” Thus, a SHA should be subjected to non-technical survey to either confirm or discredit suspicions of the presence of mines. If no—or possibly scant—evidence is found, the land is cancelled. If, on the other hand, evidence of contamination is found, the area is normally defined as a CHA and is then subjected to technical survey. Technical survey then reduces the CHA to a DHA, which is then subjected to full clearance. All stages of the land release process must be carefully documented.

Achievements
A paper by Norway in July 2008 concluded that: “States Parties [to the Mine Ban Treaty] should acknowledge that land reassessment and release through non-technical means, when undertaken in accordance with high quality national policies and standards that incorporate key principles highlighted in this paper, is not a short-cut to implementing Article 5.1 but rather is a means to more expediently release, with confidence, areas at one time deemed to be ‘mined areas’.” The concept of land release was formally endorsed by the Ninth Meeting of State Parties, and an increasing number of States Parties have been employing land release principles to improve program performance.

Information Management
Reliable land release (and efficient demining overall) benefits from effective information management. This begins with systematic, high-quality data gathering, a fundamental prerequisite that has too often been lacking in mine action, despite the huge sums of money donors have contributed to the sector. It also befits a sector receiving more than half a billion dollars

57 According to the IMAS, “Before land can be released from suspicion, it should be established, with a sufficiently high level of confidence, that there is no longer any evidence that the area contains any explosive hazards. This confidence can only be gained after all reasonable efforts to investigate whether mines/ERW are present have been made… ‘All reasonable effort’ may, at one extreme, only be the conduct of a non-technical survey which finds absolutely no evidence of mines/ERW… However, if the non-technical survey confirms some evidence of mines/ERW, it would be reasonable to expend more effort to gain more confidence about which areas are free of mines/ERW and which are not. In this case, ‘all reasonable effort’ may mean that a technical survey or clearance should be conducted.” UNMAS, “IMAS 08.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 5.
58 In certain circumstances, the evidence may be sufficient to define the area of contamination and this DHA is then subjected to full clearance.
60 Coordinator of the Resource Utilization Contact Group (Norway), “Applying all available methods to achieve the full, efficient and expedient implementation of Article 5,” Discussion paper (Revision), July 2008.
62 As IMAS state, “Proper management procedures, including adequate decision-making mechanisms, recording, training, monitoring and adjustment, are essential requirements of the process.” UNMAS, “IMAS 08.20: Land release, Draft First Edition,” New York, 10 June 2009, p. 6.
annually to report accurately and promptly on its achievements. In Angola, for instance, the National Demining Institute, despite having 2,000 operational staff across the country, was unable to provide detailed reporting on its demining activities in 2008, as in 2007, because its data management system was said to be not functioning properly.

The primary mine action information management software remains the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), managed by GICHD. This is the standard database software for mine action, used by some 50 demining programs around the world, but it remains the subject of criticism. Some blame the software while others suggest the operators are at fault. Certainly, the old adage of “poor data in, poor data out” will always apply. In a number of instances, however, notably in Cambodia and Lao PDR, accessing data from the latest version of IMSMA has proved challenging.

Mine Action by Non-State Armed Groups

During the last 10 years NSAGs have sometimes carried out limited mine clearance or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations. NSAG mine clearance or EOD has taken place in Colombia, Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, and Sri Lanka, as well as in Western Sahara.

In Kurdish areas of northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan undertook mine clearance through the Northern Iraq Mine Action Program, supported by UNOPS, from 1997 until the 2004 integration of the Kurdish groups into the Iraqi Interim Government. In northern Iraq, the Hawpar organization, linked to the Turkish Kurdistan Workers Party has carried out limited clearance in 2007 and 2008 with support from NPA.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah volunteers cleared a possibly large number of submunitions after the armed conflict in 2006. In Southern Sudan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army undertook mine clearance through the Operation Save Innocent Lives initiative supported by UNICEF from 1997 until the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the formation of the Government of National Unity. In northern Sri Lanka, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization Humanitarian Demining Unit, which was linked to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), undertook clearance activities in cooperation with international clearance organizations between 2002 and 2006.

In 2008 in Myanmar/Burma, the Karen National Union, which controls small amounts of territory in the east of the country, was provided with metal detectors for mine clearance and trained in their use. Also in Myanmar, the Chin National Front/Army stated to the NGO Geneva Call that it had cleared mines from three sites along Myanmar’s border with India during 2008.

Deminer Security

In recent years, armed violence has inflicted losses on demining operators, who have also lost staff as well as vehicles and equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars in attacks or raids by insurgent or criminal groups.

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63 The quality of reporting is uneven but is generally poor. Strictly, the Mine Ban Treaty only requires reporting on locations of areas cleared and the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed; good practice demands far more detailed reporting, as a minimum: the size as well as the location of areas released; the form(s) of clearance or other means used to release the land, disaggregated by area, and all devices encountered and destroyed.

64 As Landmine Monitor noted last year, it is surprising that data recording and entry has been so difficult in several programs that have received extensive international support and assistance. In Somaliland, for example, the problems are so significant that as of late 2008 the IMSMA database had not been effectively updated since 2003. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 22.

65 In March 2009, GICHD reported that it would be making changes to IMSMA “to enhance the support that information management can provide to national mine action centres and other mine action partners.” See GICHD, “GICHD Information Management Programme – Changes,” March 2009, www.gichd.org.

66 The Chin National Front/Army signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment in August 2006. The Turkish PKK and its People’s Defense Forces militia signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment in July 2006. Signatories agree to prohibit use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, and to undertake and cooperate in mine action. The clearance activities of both groups were reported as compliance with their pledges under the Deed of Commitment.
In Afghanistan, deminers and support staff have been kidnapped and killed since 2007. In May 2008, three security guards and a logistics clerk were killed and a driver wounded in an attack by insurgents. In July, gunmen kidnapped 16 deminers working for the Mine Detection and Dog Centre in eastern Paktia province but released them after the intervention of local community leaders. The same month, separate attacks took place on the Danish Demining Group compound in Balkh province and on deminers returning from clearance, fatally wounding one supervisor. In May 2009, a HALO Trust vehicle was damaged in a vehicle-activated improvised explosive device explosion, slightly injuring several staff.

In Iraq, political instability and insecurity have periodically halted clearance. In June 2007 the National Mine Action Authority was shut down after the kidnap and subsequent murder of its director general. Work resumed from April until December 2008, when the Ministry of Defense suspended clearance in all parts of Iraq, except the north, on grounds of security and the need to vet personnel engaged by demining operators (due to their access to mines and/or explosive ordnance).

In Sri Lanka, demining launched in 2002 became more difficult after 2007 and largely came to a halt due to increased armed conflict, including mine use, until May 2009. In 2008, operators experienced abductions of deminers in areas controlled by security forces or pro-government militias, while some deminers working in LTTE-controlled territory were forcibly recruited into local militias.

In Senegal, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) attacked an army mine clearance unit killing three and injuring seven in 2005. In 2006, an army demining unit accompanied by Moroccan soldiers was attacked by the MFDC resulting in the death of two soldiers and leaving 14 injured. In 2008, Senegal requested an extension of its Article 5 deadline citing, among other things, deminer security as a reason for its inability to clear the mines in time.

In Sudan, several operators and UN agencies reported increased insecurity since 2006 when the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army ambushed a team from the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action near Juba, killing two deminers. Several other demining organizations halted operations due to movements of NSAGs or armed conflict in their areas. In January 2007, an Indian peacekeeper in Southern Sudan was killed and two others wounded while escorting a mine clearance team. In 2008, insecurity prevented survey activities taking place in Western Darfur.

**The Future of Mine Action**

The next few years may come to be seen as the high water mark of demining. In most countries, the mine threat is being reduced significantly and better demining approaches and procedures have widely—though not always—increased both productivity and effectiveness. Redoubled efforts to complete mine clearance in all affected states, whether party to the treaty or not, remains a priority. Significant resources—from both national and international sources—will continue to be needed for many years. And the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions will surely see major inroads into global contamination from unexploded submunitions.
CASUALTIES AND DATA COLLECTION

1999–2009 Overview

Landmine Monitor has identified at least 73,576 casualties in 119 countries/areas in the past 10 years. The total number of survivors worldwide is not known but is estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands. This figure includes at least 5,197 casualties caused by mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2008, slightly fewer than the 5,473 casualties recorded in 2007. This decrease was markedly less than in most previous years of the past decade. As before, these figures were incomplete due to inadequate or non-existent data collection.

Casualties from 1999–2008

Despite data collection challenges, Between 1999 and the end of 2008, Landmine Monitor collected information on 73,576 recorded mine/ERW/IED casualties in 119 countries and areas, of which 17,867 were killed, 51,711 injured, and 3,998 of unknown status.¹

While tragically high, the number of casualties in the past decade is incomplete because it includes only recorded casualties. There was certainly under-reporting throughout the decade due to the lack of adequate data collection mechanisms worldwide, a lack of retrospective data collection, and under-reporting of certain groups of casualties, such as foreign nationals, refugees or internally displaced persons, non-state armed groups (NSAG), or ethnic minorities. Mine/ERW casualties during conflicts are also under-reported.

Also, many countries with mine/ERW contamination transitioned out of conflict prior to 1999, meaning that most of their casualties would also have occurred before 1999, for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Lao PDR, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Syria, or Vietnam.

A regional breakdown of the total global casualties recorded by Landmine Monitor from 1999–2008 is set out in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region and no. of states</th>
<th>No. of states with casualties</th>
<th>No. of casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific (40)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>33,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa (48)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa (18)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas (35)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States (12)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (42)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>119</strong></td>
<td><strong>73,576</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ These figures only include casualties occurring on a country’s territory, and only include some of the many casualties among soldiers, peacekeepers, deminers or humanitarian workers from many other countries, for example Australia, France, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, or the United States.
Most casualties (49,617 or 67%) occurred in 82 States Parties. Among States Parties, nine in every 10 casualties happened in the so-called VA26 countries (44,694). Some 26% of total casualties during the decade happened in just two countries: Afghanistan (16%) and Cambodia (10%). In states not party and areas not internationally recognized there were 23,755 casualties.

Recorded casualties reduced gradually throughout the decade from more than 8,000 per year between 1999 and 2003, to just over 7,000 in 2005, and fewer than 5,500 per year since 2007.

Among the VA26 countries, 71% of casualties where the civil/military status was known were civilians and 2% were humanitarian deminers. Additionally, 24% were security forces (the majority in Colombia), and 3% were paramilitary or NSAGs.

When the age was known, 68% of casualties were adults and 32% were children. The vast majority of casualties were male (90%) and men made up the largest casualty group (63%), followed by boys (27%), then women and girls (5% each).

Some 44% of casualties were caused by ERW (excluding cluster munitions), 30% by antipersonnel mines, 13% by unspecified mines, 10% by antivehicle mines, 2% by cluster submunitions, and the remainder by victim-activated IEDs (less than 1%).

At least 34% of casualties where the activity at the time of the incident was recorded occurred during livelihood activities. Some 20% of casualties happened by directly interacting with an explosive device and 18% occurred while traveling.

### Casualties in 2008

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 5,197 recorded casualties caused by mines, ERW and victim-activated IEDs. Some 1,266 people were killed, 3,891 injured, and the status of 40 people was unknown. Casualties in 2008 were recorded in fewer countries and areas than in 2007:

#### States with 1,000 casualties or more from 1999-2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Total 1999–2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>12,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>6,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>5,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>2,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>2,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo, Democratic Republic of (DRC)</td>
<td>1,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>1,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1,272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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2 This is the informal name given to the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors, and, therefore, with the greatest responsibility to act but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BHI, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. For further details, see the Victim Assistance chapter.

3 In Poland, the only Mine Ban Treaty signatory with casualties, 204 casualties were reported between 1999 and 2008.

4 These figures do not include casualties from explosive devices, such as cluster munitions, at the time of attacks. They do include casualties from ERW and from mines during conflict.

5 Figures include individuals killed or injured in incidents involving devices detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, such as all antipersonnel mines (whether factory or home-made), antivehicle mines, unexploded ordnance, abandoned explosive ordnance, victim-activated IEDs and vehicle-activated IEDs. Not included in the totals are: estimates of casualties where exact numbers are not given; incidents clearly caused by remote-detected mines or IEDs; and devices that were clearly not victim-activated. Also not included are people killed or injured while manufacturing devices. For some countries, such as Iraq or India, where verification of reported incidents was particularly difficult, even stricter criteria were applied as IED incidents were only included if the device was set off by direct (hand or foot) contact.

6 This figure is the number of casualties recorded in formal data collection mechanisms and/or identified by hospitals, NGOs, or through the media. The actual number of casualties is certainly higher, as many countries do not have data collection mechanisms, data collection is not nationwide, does not include all groups of the population, or is hampered by security or geographic difficulties.
75 compared to 78. Ten countries with recorded casualties in 2007 did not record any casualties in 2008, most notably Mauritania, which had recorded casualties every year since 2000. Seven countries that did not record casualties in 2007 suffered casualties in 2008, including Libya, where Landmine Monitor identified casualties for the first time since 1999 (despite regular but unconfirmed reports of high casualty rates). Casualties again occurred in Mali, which recorded its first-ever casualties in 2007, and in Niger, which had not recorded casualties for several years before 2007.

States and other areas with mine/IED/ERW casualties in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>Asia-Pacific</th>
<th>Europe</th>
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19 states, 1 area
5 states
17 states
8 states, 1 area
8 states, 2 areas
12 states, 2 areas

7 The 10 countries without new casualties were Albania, Armenia, Chile, France, Gambia, Honduras, Latvia, Mauritania, Namibia, and South Africa.
8 The seven countries with new casualties were Bangladesh, Cyprus, Greece, Libya, Malaysia, Moldova, and Montenegro.
9 IED refers to victim-activated improvised explosive device.
In earlier years there was an average annual decrease of at least 9%, but casualty rates in 2008 were 5% lower than 2007. It is even possible that 2008 will be the first year since 2005 in which there is no decrease in the casualty rate compared to the previous year. This is because 2008 casualty figures only include casualties recorded in formal data collection mechanisms and identified by Landmine Monitor through other means, which are incomplete in nearly all countries (see Data collection section below). Additionally, data collection is slow in many countries/areas, meaning that casualties are “discovered” long after the incident date.

Casualty demographics
In 2008, some 61% of casualties (where civilian/military status was known) were civilians (2,821 of 4,611). While civilians still make up most casualties, as a percentage of total casualties they continued to decrease from 71% in 2007 and 81% in 2005. This is mainly due to the high number of military casualties in Colombia (507) and Myanmar (508). Other reasons were possible over-reporting of military casualties in the media and major incidents causing multiple military casualties. In total, there were 1,694 casualties among security forces, with Colombia and Myanmar accounting for 60% of these casualties.

There were 96 demining casualties in 14 countries in 2008, a 20% decrease compared to 2007, when there were 120 casualties. By far the most clearance casualties occurred in Afghanistan (51 casualties, 53% of all demining casualties in 2008), followed by BiH (eight, but 30% of total mine/ERW casualties in that country), Iran (eight), and Cambodia and Iraq (seven each). The drop is largely due to a sharp decrease in demining casualties in Cambodia (seven, down from 17 in 2007) and Lebanon (one, down from 16). Just one female demining casualty was recorded in Mozambique. In addition, among the total military casualties, 12 were conducting clearance when the incident occurred.

The vast majority of casualties where the gender was known were male (3,754, or 91% of 4,115), 361 were female (9%). The gender of 1,082 recorded casualties was unknown (21%, compared to 19% in 2007). For civilian casualties only, females made up 12% of casualties (309 of 2,478 where the gender is known). Females were the majority casualty group in three countries (Bangladesh, Mozambique, and Rwanda), but this was related to specific incidents causing multiple casualties and not to a pattern of activities putting women at particular risk.

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10 Landmine Monitor Report 2008 identified 5,426 casualties in 78 countries and areas in 2007. Due to slow data collection and data verification the total of 5,426 was revised to 5,473, with changes in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Chad, Colombia, Georgia, Jordan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Niger, Russia, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan.

11 For example in 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 256 additional casualties for 2006 in Afghanistan alone compared to data available in 2007. This data was made available to Landmine Monitor only in mid-2008. Casualty updates for 2008 have already been received from several countries, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad and Colombia in early September 2009, which could not be included due the incomplete nature of the data provided.

12 The civilian/military status of 586 casualties was unknown.


14 The 14 countries with demining casualties included Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Cyprus, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Yemen.
In Lao PDR, Nepal, Somaliland, and Yemen, the percentage of female casualties was significantly higher than the 2008 average, because certain livelihood activities that women typically engage in put them at higher risk. For example, in Yemen women traditionally tend the animals or collect water, food or wood. In both Lao PDR and Nepal, women are more extensively involved in scrap-metal collection or related activities.

Children accounted for 28% of casualties where the age was known (1,184 of 4,214). For some 19% of people, no age information was known (983). For civilian casualties only, children constituted 41% of casualties where the age was known. Nearly three-quarters of child casualties were boys (869) and 193 were girls; the gender of 122 child casualties was not known. In an increasing number of countries and areas, boys were the single largest casualty group: Chad, El Salvador, Eritrea, Jordan, Lao PDR, Nepal, Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan, and Yemen (compared to just three countries in 2007: Chad, Kosovo, and Lao PDR). In Afghanistan, nearly half of all civilian casualties were boys, a significant increase compared to 2007.

For all adult casualties, 93% were men (2,828 of 3,030), but less than half of these men were civilians (1,358 or 48% of adult male casualties). Some 5% of casualties were women (164), including 137 civilians (84% of adult female casualties).

**Devices causing casualties**

In more than one-quarter of cases, the device that caused the casualty was unknown (1,342). For the 3,078 cases where the device type was known:

- antipersonnel mines caused 715 casualties (23%), a decrease compared to 25% in 2007;
- antivehicle mines caused 440 casualties (14% up from 13% in 2007);
- unspecified mines caused 486 casualties (16% up from 11% in 2007);
- cluster munitions caused 125 casualties (4% down from 5% in 2007);
- other ERW caused 1,227 casualties (40% up from 36% in 2007); and
- victim-activated IEDs caused 80 casualties (below 3%, down from some 10% in 2007).

ERW casualties (excluding those caused by cluster munitions) occurred in 49 states/areas, antipersonnel mines casualties in 31 countries, antivehicle mines casualties in 19, victim-activated IEDs in 10, and cluster munitions casualties in nine.

Where age was known, most antipersonnel mine casualties were adults (80%). Nearly all adult antipersonnel mine casualties were men (94%), including 54 deminers. Civilians were most affected by antipersonnel mines in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Similarly, most casualties caused by antivehicle mines were adults (88%), and 95% of these were men. Civilians traveling were at particular risk from antivehicle mines in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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15 This equals 1,040 civilian child casualties of 2,566 civilian casualties where the age was known. In addition to this there were a few child soldier casualties and several children for whom the civilian/military status could not be determined.

16 For 38 adults no gender details were known.

17 As in all previous years, casualties from Colombia (777) were also excluded, because casualties are incorrectly labeled as caused by antipersonnel mines.

18 As in all previous years, this does not include direct casualties from cluster munition strikes.

19 An additional five casualties were caused by an IED that was vehicle-activated, thus functioning as an antivehicle mine.

20 556 of the 692 antipersonnel mine casualties whose age was known.
As in previous years, cluster munitions were the only device type where the child-adult ratio was 50-50. Lao PDR was the only severely affected country where children constituted the largest group of cluster munition casualties. In Cambodia, which is less-affected by unexploded submunitions than Lao PDR, children also made up the largest group of cluster munitions casualties.

When looking at ERW other than cluster munitions, the majority of casualties were children (57%).\textsuperscript{21} When the gender was known, some 45% of ERW casualties were boys, 42% men, 9% girls and 4% women. Boys were particularly affected by ERW in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Eritrea, Lao PDR, Nepal, Sudan, and Yemen.

**Activity at time of incident**

While in many cases crucial information about the activities being carried out by casualties at the time of the mine/ERW incident is lacking, Landmine Monitor was able to collect this type of information for 3,617 (or 70%) of the casualties it identified. Due to the large percentage of military casualties, “security” was the most common type of activity (1,305), although security

\textsuperscript{21} 640 of 1,117 ERW casualties where the age was known, excluding cluster munitions.
forces were also involved in incidents, for example while traveling, carrying out clearance, tampering with devices, and handling devices.

The second most common activity at the time of incidents was traveling (516), most often caused by antivehicle mines (44%) or antipersonnel mines (23%).

This was followed by tending animals (247), standing near/passing by during an incident (207), playing/recreation (197) and collecting food/wood/water (182). All livelihood activities combined resulted in 651 or 18% of casualties for whom activity information is known;22 92% of those carrying out livelihood activities were civilians (602). Some 56% of casualties occurring during livelihood activities were adults and 44% were children. Most livelihood casualties were caused by mines (311), usually antipersonnel mines (210). But children were much more at risk from ERW during livelihood activities. These figures exclude those deliberately dealing with explosive devices for economic gain.

Activities involving people who, intentionally or unintentionally, interact directly with explosive devices caused 452 casualties. These include 188 people tampering, 145 people handling explosive devices (excluding demining accidents), 88 people collecting scrap metal, 29 playing and two burning explosive devices. It needs to be noted that many casualties among those fishing or tending animals probably also involved deliberate handling of explosive devices. This could explain why children were at more risk from ERW than from mines while conducting livelihood activities. Three-quarters of casualties in which the device was handled were caused by ERW, and casualties were usually male (85%). The largest casualty group was boys (45%), followed by men (40%), girls (10%), and women (5%). Boys are particularly at risk in Cambodia and Nepal (where girls were also at high risk). Scrap metal collection became an increasing problem among men in Egypt.

Other activities causing casualties were coca eradication (68 in Colombia) and portering/forced labor (eight in Myanmar).

**Regional distribution**

Casualties were recorded in every region of the world in 2008 (see table below). There were significant increases in the Asia-Pacific region and in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

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<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<td>Europe</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The 26 States Parties responsible for significant numbers of survivors accounted for 55% of total casualties in 2008 (2,867) and just two of these countries (Afghanistan and Colombia) accounted for 34% of total casualties (1,769).

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22 This increases to 28% when excluding the casualties resulting from “security” activities from the total number of casualties where the activity at the time of the incident is known.
In 2008, 35 countries recorded increased casualties compared to 2007, in some cases significantly, for example in Egypt (40 up from 25), Iraq (263 up from 216), and Pakistan (341 up from 271).

- Afghanistan also saw the first increase in casualties since 2005 making it the country with the highest number of casualties in 2008 (992 up from 842).
- In Georgia casualties increased due to the 2008 conflict (to 26 up from three the previous year).
- In Myanmar the increase was due to access to information about military casualties (721 up from 438).
- In 37 countries there were fewer casualties in 2008 than in 2007, for example in Chad, Nepal, and Vietnam.
- Cambodia continued the downward trend started in 2006 (269 down from 352 in 2007); the 2008 rate is only 31% of the 2005 rate when 875 casualties were recorded.
- In Colombia the decline in casualties started in 2007 continued (777 down from 904), the first time since 2005 that it is not the country with the most casualties.
- In Lebanon, for the first time since the 2006 conflict, casualties returned to levels similar to 2005 (28 down from 130 in 2007 and 207 in 2006).
- In many other countries, however, decreased casualty rates were at least partly attributable to worse data collection, for example in Burundi, Ethiopia, and Namibia.23

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23 In three countries (Israel, Lao PDR, and Syria) there were just as many casualties in 2008 as in 2007.
**New casualties in 2009**

Casualties continued to be recorded in 2009, in at least 59 countries and areas as of September 2009, including three countries where no casualties had been recorded in 2008 (Albania, Japan, and Uzbekistan). In Chechnya, Guinea-Bissau, and Western Sahara the recorded totals were almost as high or higher than the annual total for 2008.

**Data Collection**

In 1999, Landmine Monitor noted that, “Concrete information on mine victims remains difficult to obtain” and “seriously lacking.” In 1999, most available information was patient information from ICRC rehabilitation programs, thus not actual casualty data. Landmine Monitor also noted that data collection methods “can do more harm than good if they proliferate and are not closely linked to action that is tangible to the survivor community.”

In 2009, it is accepted that comprehensive casualty data is crucial to understanding the scope of the challenges and the needs of survivors. The main purpose of casualty (and service) data collection is its use for planning purposes, not only for victim assistance but also other mine action tasks (such as clearance and mine/ERW risk education).

While data collection has improved since 1999, Landmine Monitor has reported consistently throughout the decade that mine/ERW casualties are certainly under-reported because of inadequate data collection mechanisms, inaccessible terrain, conflict, under-reporting of fatal casualties, fear, or political sensitivities.

Still, 28 of 75 countries/areas with casualties in 2008 did not have formal data collection mechanisms, including some with persistently high casualty figures, for example Iran, Myanmar, and Pakistan, or to a lesser extent Algeria, and Uganda. These 28 countries accounted for 1,408 casualties in 2008 (or 27% of the total–up from 25% in 2007 and 19% in 2006), which Landmine Monitor mainly identified through media reports. The remaining 47 countries/areas had data collection systems, and 29 of these used the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to store data collected.

However, even when data collection mechanisms existed, these were incomplete in the vast majority of countries (43). Only in Cambodia, Jordan, Kosovo, and Tajikistan could casualty data for calendar year 2008 be considered “complete.” These accounted for 306 casualties (6%) in 2008, meaning that 94% of casualties in 2008 were recorded in countries with incomplete or no data collection (up from 93% in 2007 and from 92% in 2006). Another country with complete data collection, Albania, recorded casualties in 2009. Through media, hospital or NGO information, Landmine Monitor identified additional casualties that were not recorded in 28 of the 47 countries with data collection mechanisms in 2008 (955 or 18% of total casualties).

When data collection mechanisms exist, the most common problems were: limited geographic and demographic coverage; a lack of standard methodology, terminology or types of information collected; a lack of useful detail on devices, demographics, socio-economic indicators, or activities; a lack of capacity impeding proactive data collection; poor quality control and verification; and multiple actors collecting overlapping and contradictory data in separate databases. Further problems are that casualty data is insufficiently linked to contamination or

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24 In 2009, Landmine Monitor identified five new ERW casualties, one killed and four injured in two incidents in Okinawa, Japan. Three of these casualties occurred on 24 March 2009, in the worst incident since 1974. A US marine was killed and another marine and sailor were injured while disposing of ordnance at an US military facility. Eric Talmadge, “60 years after Second World War, Okinawa still rife with bombs,” The Canadian Press, 3 May 2009.


26 Ibid, p. 20.

27 In comparison Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 40, reported that, “Of the 65 countries, and seven areas, reporting new mine casualties in 2002–2003, only 25 countries and four areas report using IMSMA, or other databases, to record casualty data. Of those, only 18 countries and two areas provided Landmine Monitor with full year data.”
Executive Summary

Casualties and Data Collection

victim assistance data, data is not shared for planning purposes or linked to referral mechanisms, resulting in data collection for compilation purposes rather than the provision of assistance.

Conclusion

Although recorded casualties have decreased significantly over the past five years, the number remains unacceptably high—there were still more than 5,000 recorded casualties in 2008. This is a far cry from the common estimate of 26,000 per year in the 1990s—even if it is not possible to gauge the accuracy of that estimate. For we will never know exactly how many people were killed or injured by mines or ERW returning to Afghanistan, gathering food in Angola, or growing rice in Cambodia. What is certain is that casualty data collection still remains inadequate in many countries. It is a fundamental responsibility of states to assist those most directly affected by mines and ERW, and a pre-requisite to such assistance is an accurate determination of the number of survivors as well as the dependants of those who did not survive.
1999–2009 Overview

Mine and explosive remnants of war risk education (RE) has evolved significantly since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999 as many programs have shifted from a purely message-based approach towards efforts to bring about broader behavior change and risk reduction. Overall, there has been a marked—though not universal—shift from “mine awareness” in 1999 to “mine/ERW risk education” in 2008. Influencing risk-taking behavior is very challenging, however, as it is often related to complex economic, cultural, and social factors.

RE seeks to reduce incidents caused by mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices, and explosive remnants of war (ERW). When done well, RE involves a combination of actions: raising awareness of the threat, working with communities to identify ways to reduce risk and promote behavior change, providing information to clearance operators (and sometimes even contributing to demining prioritization), identifying development interventions to reduce risk, and contributing to victim assistance by supporting casualty data collection and providing information to survivors about services.

Broader risk reduction approaches were identified within RE programs in at least six states in 2008 (Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam). In these states, programs worked with communities to explore alternative behaviors, improve input into clearance decision-making, and link with other development sectors to decrease the impact of mines and ERW. Similarly, the support of RE to mine action through community liaison has increased. In Vietnam, it has made clearance more efficient, and in Angola it has contributed to land release.

Effective programs are based on a solid understanding of the target groups for RE, and why they are at risk. According to Landmine Monitor’s review, thorough analysis has unfortunately been lacking in almost all RE programs. Indeed, in 2008 in at least 26 states and areas, RE programs were still being implemented without comprehensive needs assessments. In Afghanistan, for instance, which has the world’s oldest mine action program, a European Union evaluation in 2008 found that RE was not based on a good understanding of the target audience.

Risk Education in 2008

In 2008, RE was provided in 57 states and areas, compared to 61 states and areas in 2007. RE activities increased significantly in Yemen and Somaliland, and also increased to some degree in 10 other states. In Palestine, RE decreased in 2008 but rose sharply in response to conflict in Gaza in December 2008–January 2009.

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1 The term “education” reflects a change from simple awareness-raising of the threat—people in affected areas are often already aware there is a problem—to engaging with communities in a dialogue about the problem and possible solutions.
2 The reference to ERW as well as mines recognizes the fact that UXO or abandoned explosive ordnance causes as many, if not more, casualties than mines in most affected states/areas.
3 For instance, a 2006 study by MAG and UNICEF in Lao PDR challenged the common assumption that people engage in dangerous livelihood activities through lack of choice, and found that: “[W]hile contributing factors of voluntary exposure were often rooted in poverty, it was rarely perceived by communities or individuals as the only option. More commonly, intentional UXO risk-taking was found to be based on a rational decision-making process involving weighing the potential costs and benefits of a range of available options.” Jo Durham, “Needs Assessment in Lao PDR,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 11.1, Summer 2007.
4 No needs assessments have been conducted in the last three years in the following states and areas: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, DRC, Croatia, Egypt, Iran, South Korea, Mauritania, Nagorno-Karabakh, Pakistan, Peru, Russia, Senegal, Somaliland, Syria, Thailand, Uganda, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
6 Ten states with increased RE included: BiH (though it still represented a decrease from 2006), DRC, Cyprus, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mali (in response to an incident), Peru, Tajikistan, and Somalia.
### States and other areas with RE in 2008

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<td>Somaliland</td>
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A decrease in RE due to reduced funding or capacity was reported in 10 states. Activities decreased in several states and areas in line with a reduced need for RE: Abkhazia, Burundi, Kenya, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Nicaragua. In Mozambique the number of RE beneficiaries reportedly decreased, but there was greater integration of RE activities with clearance activities.

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7 Ten states with decreased RE due to funding or capacity included: Angola, Chad, Chile, El Salvador, India, Mauritania, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
There were no RE programs in several states, although contamination and casualty data indicated that there was probably a need: China, Republic of the Congo, India, North Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Philippines, Rwanda, and Turkey. In Myanmar, several needs assessments have been conducted in the past few years, but only limited RE activities have been undertaken due to the ongoing conflict.

In most other states and areas, the level of RE remained the same as in 2007, or data for 2008 were not available for comparison.

Risk education targeting
Information about who is at risk, and why, should be analyzed from contamination data, casualty data, landmine impact surveys, and knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) surveys. Casualty data has shown that the overwhelming number of incidents result from engagement in livelihood activities, particularly farming, herding, and collecting food, fuel, water, building materials, and scrap metal for sale. Scrap metal collection was reported as a risk activity in at least 14 states and areas.8 In Lao PDR it caused 32% of casualties in 2008.

Traveling (including crossing borders, sometimes illegally, as in Greece and Thailand) results in casualties, as does tampering either to defuze ordnance or because of curiosity, particularly among children and young adults. The majority of casualties were men, although in some states women and children made up a significant proportion of casualties (see Casualty data section above).

Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are particularly vulnerable, whether in the place they are displaced to, while traveling, or on their return home. In 2008, RE programs targeting refugees and IDPs were reported in at least 19 states.9 In 2008, in Cyprus and Greece, illegal immigrants became mine casualties.

People are also at risk when hazardous areas are unmarked, or where marking is inadequate or not maintained, as is the case in a large proportion of states, for example in Angola and Turkey. Areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants, such as in south Lebanon, are very difficult to mark.

In many states, needs assessments, including KAP surveys, are conducted as part of ongoing information-gathering during RE activities. In 2008, assessments and surveys for nine states were made available to Landmine Monitor: in Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, northern Iraq, Nepal, Pakistan, Serbia, Somalia, and Vietnam. Only three—Ethiopia, Nepal, and Somalia—suggested that people lacked awareness or knowledge.10 Most research found that people were generally aware of the risks posed by mines/ERW but still engaged in dangerous behavior.

In Serbia, for instance, high-risk behavior was reported in more than 90% of surveyed contaminated areas. According to a 2009 report by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), inhabitants of affected communities “seem to underestimate the threat” from unexploded submunitions.”11 The “frequency of incidents is such that the probability of activating unexploded submunitions will rise with the growing needs of the population to use the blocked land.”12

In northern Iraq, a UNICEF/Handicap International (HI) survey said that general knowledge about mines and UXO was good and most affected people had participated in at least one RE session. Even so, some of their knowledge was still rather superficial (for example about marking signs and evacuation procedures from a minefield) and some impacted villages had not yet received RE. In some districts women were usually “less knowledgeable” than males.

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8 Scrap metal collection was reported in: Albania, Algeria, BiH, Egypt, Georgia, Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, Lao PDR, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Vietnam, and Yemen.
9 There were RE programs for IDPs and refugees in: Afghanistan, Croatia, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Georgia, Greece, Iraq, Kenya, Kuwait, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, and Zambia.
Executive Summary

Risk Education

(but also less exposed to the risk). Children, thanks to the schools program, were usually “more knowledgeable” than adults.13

Methods of implementing risk education

Although there has been an increase in integrated efforts, RE in 2008 often focused on the dissemination of simple messages about the threat, rather than an integrated effort to reduce risk-taking behavior. These messages continued to be delivered in a number of ways: by teams hired for the purpose; community-based methods, through the training of community leaders, religious leaders, or churches; integration into the school curriculum; mass media; and the distribution of materials.

While most programs acknowledged the importance of ‘communication-for-behavior-change’ within a broader risk reduction strategy, only a minority was able to turn theory into practice during 2008. Angola used a solution-based methodology in which NGOs worked with community focus groups to discuss the mine/ERW problem and identify solutions. Participatory rural appraisal techniques such as community mapping and seasonal calendars were applied. Cambodia used livelihood/integrated mine action approaches, law enforcement, and monitoring of the scrap metal trade to reduce risk.

In Colombia, the ICRC and Colombian Red Cross conducted risk reduction activities to ensure communities had safe access to important resources such as water, schools and agricultural land. Lao PDR adopted a behavior-change-communication approach in 2008 based on discussions of options and minimizing risk for intentional adult risk takers. A foundry project implemented by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in Lao PDR conducted safety training for scrap metal collectors. In Sri Lanka, RE teams acted as a link to emergency relief agencies. In Vietnam, the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation launched a project to reduce the risk of scrap metal collection by setting up 28 “safe holding areas.”

In at least 24 states and areas, community liaison, particularly links between affected communities and demining, was reported to take place.14 The level and type of links varied from country to country. In Angola, for example, RE organizations liaised closely with provincial mine action centers and provided information to communities on how to report contamination and casualties. MAG’s community liaison teams were mainly engaged in survey in support of land release and impact assessments. In BiH, Community Integrated Mine Action Plans involved communities in decision-making. In Vietnam, MAG reported that its community liaison capacity, established in late 2007, had led to an improvement in clearance productivity by approximately one-quarter, as a result of improved quality of information and trusted reporting structures developed with stakeholders.15 At least four states operated hotline numbers for civilians to report contamination.16

About half of all RE programs in 2008 could be described as community-based.17 Community members, often volunteers, were trained (usually by NGOs, but also by national authorities) to disseminate RE messages, and often to act as mine action focal points, providing information about contamination and casualties, and sometimes feeding into local priority-setting. Some programs included child-to-child methods.18 In at least 15 states and areas, the national Red

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14 The 24 states/areas with some form of community liaison were: Abkhazia, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Kosovo, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mozambique, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Somaliland, Sudan, Uganda, Vietnam, and Yemen.

15 Email from Ruth Bottomley, Community Liaison Manager Southeast Asia, MAG, 23 July 2009.

16 Examples of states with hotlines for civilians: Ecuador, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, and Vietnam.


18 Child-to-child methodology uses children and youth as a resource in RE.
Cross and Red Crescent societies delivered RE and engaged in mine action through their volunteer networks.  

RE was implemented directly by the mine action centers in only a few cases, and then often by military personnel. In several states the army and police were involved in the dissemination of RE messages. In a small number of cases, RE was also reported to be conducted alongside clearance by the clearance teams themselves: in Moldova and Poland this was the only type of RE provided.  

In Vietnam, district mobile communication teams operating in 2008 were funded by UNICEF, and while a UNICEF evaluation commended the project as an innovative experiment, it concluded that the project was "not a cost effective, efficient or appropriate vehicle for disseminating messages to the public."  

School-based RE is an effective way of reaching many children, and integrating RE into existing structures can make it more cost effective and sustainable. By 2008, RE had been integrated into the curriculum in 13 states and areas and was conducted in schools in at least 15 other states and areas. However, school-based RE has its limitations and, therefore, cannot be used as the sole tool for RE. School-based RE is essentially a one-way provision of information and in some states children are not even the primary target group, based on analysis of risk. In BiH school-based RE did not appear to be fully functional, and in Vietnam UNICEF found that results in schools without RE in the curriculum were indistinguishable from those where it was included. In some states efforts to integrate RE fully into the curriculum were unsuccessful, due to a lack of resources or commitment from education ministries (though some school-based RE was still conducted).  

RE messages were sometimes integrated with other non-mine action messages and other sectors: in Sri Lanka with child protection messages; in Nepal as part of a social mobilization program; in Angola with HIV/AIDS messages; in Senegal with child protection and stress management/conflict prevention; in Afghanistan with disability advocacy; and in a number of states with small arms and light weapons (SALW) messages.  

Emergency risk education  

Emergency RE was conducted during and after conflict in 2008 in Chad, Georgia, Somalia, and Sri Lanka, and in early 2009 in Gaza. Other states that reported emergency RE were Nepal and the DRC.  

Legal obligations to provide risk education  

Article 6(3) of the Mine Ban Treaty calls on each State Party “in a position to do so” to provide assistance for mine awareness programs. There is no specific requirement on affected states to provide RE to those at risk. The Convention on Cluster Munitions provides stronger support

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19 Red Cross and Red Crescent RE activities in: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, Tajikistan, and Western Sahara (Moroccan Red Crescent Society).

20 Mine action center RE in: Chad, Eritrea, northern Iraq, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

21 RE alongside clearance in, for example, Albania, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.


24 RE conducted in schools in: El Salvador, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Palestine, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Syria, Thailand, and Uganda.

25 Efforts to integrate RE into curriculums were not successful in: Albania, Angola, Belarus, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan.

for programs in areas affected by unexploded submunitions; it specifically obliges affected States Parties to conduct “risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such remnants,” taking into consideration the provisions of Article 6 on international cooperation and assistance. In conducting RE, States Parties are also required to take into account international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

Measuring the impact of risk education

Evaluations of RE programs were conducted in at least six states in 2008, and several needs assessments also provided information on the effectiveness of RE programs. All evaluations recommended a greater focus on behavior change interventions and less emphasis on conventional information dissemination, with a better understanding of the target audience as none of the programs in question were assessed as doing this effectively or sufficiently. Other recommendations included better planning, implementation of standards, making RE sustainable, and using lessons learned from elsewhere.

According to a joint article by UNICEF and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “as with all mine-action activities, [for RE] distinguishing between outputs and outcomes has proven elusive.” In other words it is easier to measure the number of people attending RE sessions, or the number of posters distributed, than it is to measure behavior change or whether RE is the determining factor in a reduction of casualties. Several evaluations reported that although it is difficult to measure the impact in a short period of time, the projects had resulted in behavior change. However, a review by Landmine Monitor of RE programs over the last 10 years provides next to no examples of where baseline data on knowledge, attitudes, and practice has been collected and then used as an indicator of change.

In many states, statements were issued in 2008 to the effect that RE has contributed to the reduction of incidents. Yet a correlation between casualty figures and RE activities, while an important indicator, is not sufficient alone to show the effectiveness of an RE program, as other factors may result in a reduction in casualties such as clearance, community awareness through the occurrence of incidents, or population movements. The Centre for Community Empowerment’s (CECEM) RE evaluation in Vietnam in 2008 admitted that “it is difficult to determine causality of association between UNICEF’s MRE program and its project aim of reducing the incidence and severity of injuries caused by UXO/landmines,” but believed that “UNICEF can claim due credit for contributing towards a decline in mortality and morbidity rates linked to UXO/mines in recent years.” In BiH, however, neither of two major evaluations in 2007 identified a causal relationship between RE implementation and casualty rates.

While beneficiary numbers are useful to show the extent of RE activity, alone they do not provide an indicator of its effectiveness. They say nothing about the quality of RE and whether it is targeted to at-risk groups, and are usually not compared with the number of people at risk. Moreover, it is very difficult to gather accurate beneficiary numbers, particularly when,
as is usually the case, RE is conducted through community volunteers or integrated in other institutions, such as schools or the health sector. A much better indicator of the effectiveness of RE is the extent of reporting of contamination by the public. In several states this was noted as a positive indicator for the RE programs.35

Risk education coordination, management, and capacity-building

In the overwhelming majority of concerned states and areas, RE in 2008 was managed and coordinated by national authorities. In a small handful, UNICEF was the de facto coordinator, or played a significant role in coordination and management.36 In Somalia, UNDP and the Swedish Rescue Services Agency managed RE.

In some states technical advisors were placed with the national authorities by the UN or an NGO.37 The ICRC provided support to the many national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies conducting RE. In at least nine other states, UNICEF, the ICRC and international NGOs provided some capacity-building support through coordination meetings and funding.38

Other methods of capacity-building included study visits (for instance, UNICEF supported Iraqi managers to visit Cambodia, and Eritrean managers to visit Kenya). International organizations provided short courses or training workshops to mine action centers and NGO personnel.39 In a number of states, international NGOs partnered with national NGOs to build capacity, as in Angola, the DRC, and Vietnam.

The provision of international expertise, however, does not guarantee that best practices based on lessons learned over 10 years of RE are being put in place. Thus, an International Mine Risk Education Advisory Group was set up in 2008 to help disseminate best practices, and it had met twice by August 2009. New resources developed for use at an international level include the “Mine and ERW Risk Education: a project management guide” by GICHD in November 2008 and an “Emergency Mine Risk Education Resource Kit” developed by UNICEF in 2008.40

The IMAS for RE were under revision as of September 2009. In 2008, the IMAS or national standards were reported as being used in at least 12 states.41

Risk Education from 1999 to 2008

In 1999, RE programs were identified in just 14 states: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Sudan, and Yemen. Other limited mine awareness activities, mainly material distribution and the delivery of messages through the mass media, were identified in a further 21 states and areas.42 Over the last ten years, the number of states where RE has been conducted has increased significantly, to 57 in 2008, as has the level of activity within these states.

The understanding of the most effective way of delivering RE has changed since 1999. Back then, the prevailing assumption was that incidents took place because people were unaware of the risk from mines and ERW. In 1999, Landmine Monitor stated that, “The local population must learn how to live their daily lives in mine and UXO infested areas until the threat is

35 Reporting by the public was noted in, for example, Azerbaijan, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Sri Lanka.
36 UNICEF had a key role in, for example, DRC, Iraq, Nepal, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Vietnam.
37 For instance, in Lao PDR by MAG, Uganda by DDG, and in Eritrea and Jordan by UNICEF.
38 There was UNICEF, ICRC, and NGO capacity-building in, for example, Angola, Chad, Columbia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lebanon, and Senegal.
39 There were international organization courses in: BiH, Somalia and Sri Lanka.
40 According to UNICEF, since its production the Emergency MRE Toolkit has been used to develop an MRE intervention in Gaza (2008–2009), Pakistan (2009), and by UNICEF in the Philippines (September 2009). Email from Judy Grayson, Senior Adviser, Landmines and Small Arms Cluster, Child Protection Section, UNICEF, 14 September 2009.
41 IMAS or national standards were used in: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, DRC, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zambia.
42 RE activities were also identified in: Albania, Belarus, Burundi, Costa Rica, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Jordan, Namibia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Palestine, Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, Western Sahara, the former Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe.
removed.” 43 In Cambodia, a significant number of people had received RE by 1999, but Landmine Monitor reported that, “it is evident given the number of accidents that result from tampering with mines that many people lack or have incorrect knowledge about the dangers of mines/UXO, especially children.” 44 The use of mass media and posters were highlighted as an important component of RE. 45

By 2000, Landmine Monitor stated that RE, “is a community-level education program that seeks to provide (or generate) viable alternatives to high-risk behavior to populations living or working in, or traveling through, mine-affected areas. It works best on the basis of two-way information exchange, learning from communities how they survive the daily threat of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), and working cooperatively to identify how the risk of death and injury can be minimized. Mine awareness is frequently confused with public information about the effects of mines and UXO. Such information campaigns are extremely valuable but do not in a strict sense constitute mine/UXO awareness programs.” 46 Landmine Monitor emphasized the importance of needs assessments and the gathering of baseline data to understand the target audience, 47 and questioned the effectiveness of the use of mass media and posters. 48 This understanding of RE is the one that has prevailed over the last 10 years, and is the one reflected in the IMAS for Mine Risk Education (MRE) which were first released in December 2003. The number of programs that have adopted this approach has grown, though, as Landmine Monitor 2009 research has shown, many have failed to do so sufficiently.

The Future of Risk Education

In order for RE to effectively contribute to casualty reduction through behavior change, and to support clearance activities and victim assistance, a number of areas need to be strengthened. First and foremost, all RE programs that seek to be effective should be based on a thorough understanding of the needs of the target audience, and greater effort should be invested in needs assessments, not just to know activity at the time of incident, but to understand the reasons for risk-taking (economic, social, cultural), and how behavior change or risk reduction strategies can address this.

Greater efforts will need to be exerted to ensure best practices are put in place and to share lessons learned from RE programs across the world. International advisors should have the appropriate skills, experience, and expertise, and more effort should be made to transfer knowledge and experience across mine/ERW-affected states. New projects are frequently established that fail to take on the lessons learned in other programs. Good resources have been produced, and their use should be promoted.

For RE to become more effective in changing behavior, reducing risk, and reducing the number of casualties, programs need to be more systematically evaluated, using appropriate evaluation methodologies and indicators and, where recommendations are made, they should be implemented. Thus, evaluations in 2008 in Cambodia, Eritrea, and Vietnam recommended the implementation of behavior-change strategies. Other states and areas, which have not had adequate evaluations, would likely benefit from similar approaches.

While it is true that evaluating behavior change is very difficult, it must be acknowledged that the majority of programs have not made efforts to do this. Programs in at least 28 states and areas have not been evaluated for at least three years, including some dealing with significant mine and UXO problems such as Angola, Iraq, Sudan, and Yemen. 49

44 Ibid, p. 403.
48 Ibid, pp. 34–35.
49 Programs without evaluations for at least three years include: Angola, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritania, Nagorno-Karabakh, Nepal, Palestine, Peru, Russia, Senegal, Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, Western Sahara, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. States with smaller RE programs that have not been evaluated in the last three years are: Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Syria.
In the next few years, the need for RE will probably decrease in most cases as a result of clearance, and stand-alone RE programs will no longer be required in many. Programs should increasingly look at integration into national structures to ensure sustainable and more cost-effective ways of implementing RE. This includes linkages with other messages, for example on SALW.

Finally, effective rapid-response emergency capacities need to remain in place. While conducting RE during conflict is challenging, a number of programs have been able to carry out emergency RE interventions with some success, such as in Afghanistan (2001–2003), Sudan (2005), Nepal (2006–2007), and Gaza (2008–2009).
Victim assistance

During the Mine Ban Treaty’s first decade, victim assistance (VA) has made the least progress of all the major sectors of mine action, with both funding and the provision of assistance falling far short of what was needed. This is despite the treaty’s promise in Article 6.3 that, “each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims…”

At the First Review Conference in Nairobi in November–December 2004, States Parties reaffirmed their promise to do “their utmost” to assist survivors by agreeing to undertake a set of actions to improve services, strengthen coordination, and ensure participation of survivors in decisions that affect them from 2005–2009.1 Yet, by May 2009, the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration indicated that this promise had not been fulfilled. According to the co-chairs, “The challenges faced in 2009 are to a large extent identical to those faced in 2004 and likely will be the same as those to be faced in 2014.”2

Certainly, VA coordination has improved and there is greater awareness of survivors’ needs, but service provision has not improved significantly, particularly in the last five years. While many survivors have received some form of assistance through the years, services have had too many gaps, and been too unsystematic and unsustainable to improve the living conditions of most in any lasting way. Most efforts remained focused on medical care and physical rehabilitation, often supported by international organizations and funding, rather than on promoting economic self-reliance for survivors, their families, and communities.

At the First Review Conference, States Parties agreed that 23 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors should make special efforts to meet their needs. Throughout 2005–2009, progress among these now 26 States Parties has been variable, with some countries actively engaging and others hardly at all. Progress was mostly visible in coordination aspects, rather than in implementation of actual services, even by those who made significant advances, as many of the so-called VA26’s objectives related to data collection, strategies, awareness-raising, and coordination. Progress on activities was often unrelated to the plans the 26 countries set for themselves.

At the Second Review Conference in November 2009, States Parties are expected to renew, if not reinforce, their political commitment to “ensure the full and effective participation and inclusion” of the “victims.”3 Yet these individuals—hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children across more than 120 countries—need more and better assistance, not more unfulfilled promises, and they need it now.

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1 “Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-Personnel Mines: Revised Draft Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009,” APLC/CONF-2004/L.4/Rev.1, 5 November 2004, Actions 29–39. The 11 concrete actions include pledges to increase and improve medical, rehabilitation, psychosocial and economic reintegration services, as well as casualty data collection capacities and legal frameworks. Additionally, States Parties were called upon to allocate sufficient resources, include survivors and experts in relevant discussions, and report regularly on progress.


Survivor Inclusion

According to the Nairobi Action Plan, States Parties need to “ensure effective integration of mine victims in the work of the Convention.”4 The draft Cartagena Progress Review notes that, “States Parties have come to recognise the importance of the inclusion and active participation of mine victims and other persons with disabilities” in VA.5

Drawing on lessons from the Mine Ban Treaty, the negotiation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions involved survivors more extensively, contributing to stronger VA obligations. Many States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have joined the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in which participation of persons with disabilities was underscored by the call “nothing about us without us.” In practice, however, only a few Mine Ban Treaty States Parties (for example, Afghanistan, Albania, Tajikistan, and Uganda) have fulfilled their commitment to involve survivors in planning, implementation, and monitoring of VA activities at local, national, regional, or international levels.

From 2000–2001, “raising the voices of landmine survivors” was one of the key themes at intersessional Standing Committee Meetings. In 2003–2004, Croatia, as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, encouraged the participation of survivors in State Party delegations to improve coordination with civil society and was one of very few delegations to Meetings of States Parties to regularly include a survivor from 2005–2009.

Most survivors participating in international meetings were sponsored by civil society, such as the Raising the Voices program run by Landmine Survivors Network and its successors, or the ICBL VA focal point network.6 Civil society-organized survivor participation culminated in the Survivor Summit in November 2004 bringing together survivors from 30 countries and government representatives to discuss survivors’ needs. They submitted a declaration to the First Review Conference reiterating that governments should do more to ensure the rights and needs of survivors are met, and that survivors should be included in decision-making.7

At the national level, assessing survivors’ needs by consulting them directly is key to increasing both effectiveness and efficiency of services. Yet a survey of more than 1,500 survivors published by Handicap International (HI) in September 2009 found that just one in five respondents thought that survivors were included in VA/disability coordination and only one in four thought that VA plans were based on the needs of survivors. The study noted that 38% of respondents believed that survivors were involved in implementation of activities, but added that, “this percentage is likely too high as many respondents were NGO, DPO [disabled people’s organizations] or survivor organization members.”8

At international meetings, States Parties reported regularly on VA, although this was often not accompanied by the provision of regular information domestically, resulting in a lack of information on services and on VA achievements among survivors. The HI study noted that just 17% of survivors thought that they received regular information on VA/disability achievements: “When asked if they had a final comment, survivors most often said that this survey was an opportunity to get people to finally ‘Listen to Us’.”10

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6 Between 2000 and 2004, 62 survivors from 37 countries/areas participated in the Raising the Voices program, which later became Widening the Voices, and Expanding the Voices.
10 Ibid, p. 2.
Landmine Monitor has found that while some countries made efforts to include survivors in activities, this was not systematic and was hampered by the limited means and capacities of survivor organizations or DPOs.

**Afghanistan** made concerted efforts to include survivors in workshops, though DPOs and survivors noted that coordination with the government remained difficult and that more activist organizations were often excluded. In **Colombia**, most survivors were not aware of their rights or services available to them, and occasional “survivor meetings” of the mine action program reached only a few of them. After initially excluding survivor organizations, **El Salvador** included them in VA work as of mid-2007, though most survivors still felt excluded as improved planning had done little to improve their daily lives. In **Uganda**, stakeholders said the main achievement since 1999 had been the increased autonomy of survivor associations. However, the government was unable to assist the national umbrella organization; blocked international funding hindered associations’ activities; and logistical challenges made it difficult for associations, particularly from the west, to participate in meetings.

**Victim Assistance Implementation**

**2008–2009: A status quo?**

From 2008–2009, there was a continued lack of psychosocial support and economic reintegration even where there were improvements to national healthcare, physical rehabilitation, or disability laws/policies. The global economic crisis was cited for setbacks in placing survivors in jobs, for example by government representatives in **Serbia** and by survivors themselves in **Thailand**. Some countries, such as **Pakistan** and **Sri Lanka**, saw deterioration of services nationwide or in certain areas because of conflict and natural disasters.

Other trends included: the continuing handover of physical rehabilitation programs to national management and a continued increase of survivor associations and/or their capacities. On the downside, this period also saw the closure of several national NGOs/DPOs, continued capacity problems for others, and persistent funding challenges.

**Understanding the needs**

Accurate data about the number of survivors and their needs is critical to VA. Mostly, even countries with relatively complete casualty data continued to lack usable information about survivors’ needs or services received. As in previous years, certain states aimed to improve this type of information through surveys or data consolidation, such as **Chile** or **Lao PDR**. A number of states (e.g. **India**) conducted disability surveys which could indirectly improve services relevant to mine/ERW survivors. **Azerbaijan** initiated a needs assessment of persons with disabilities and started offering skills development services as a result. **Thailand** completed a comprehensive casualty survey and needs assessment establishing the baseline for future planning and implementation of services.

Elsewhere, delays in setting up disability or injury surveillance mechanisms were cited as a reason for not collecting information on survivors’ needs. At the same time, a few states made progress in VA entirely dependent on better data, notably in **Angola**, **Croatia**, and **Serbia**. As of 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina (**BiH**) had not completed the casualty data revision project planned since 2006, and data on VA services, which had previously been available, had not been collected. In **Cambodia**, a survivor survey was shelved because it was deemed discriminatory towards other persons with disabilities by external technical advisors. This survey was one of Cambodia’s main 2005–2009 objectives to mitigate the negative impact of the continued lack of disability information on VA.

**Emergency and continuing medical care**

Improvements in medical care received by survivors were nearly always the result of efforts to improve healthcare for all, thus also benefiting survivors. As in earlier years, these gains were unrelated to VA planning, and were part of large-scale international development assistance or post-conflict reconstruction programs (**Ethiopia**, **Iraq**, and **Lao PDR**), improved economic situations (**Armenia**, **Azerbaijan**, and **Chechnya**), or more socially-oriented government programs (**Nicaragua**).
Notable exceptions in 2008–2009 were in **Albania**, where improvements to emergency medical care were based on the needs of survivors in its mine-affected northeast region and resulted from strategic VA planning; and **Thailand**, where general emergency medical services were expanded to reach adequate coverage, which was at the same time coherent with VA needs and plans.

Sometimes, infrastructure improvements happened but states lacked the capacity to utilize these improvements to enhance service provision, as in **Angola**. Conflict damaged or prevented the maintenance of medical systems in several countries (**Pakistan**, **Somalia**, and **Sri Lanka**). Conflict also prevented survivors from accessing existing facilities, such as in the Casamance region (**Senegal**) and the Kivu region (**Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC**).

**Physical rehabilitation**

From 2008–2009, as in all previous years of the last decade, steady advances were made to physical rehabilitation. Services improved because of increased availability (new facilities or increased production), as in **BiH**, **Jordan**, and **Western Sahara**. In other cases, more efficient management and planning, sustained training and on-the-job capacity-building, or the establishment of minimum standards and curricula led to advances (**Afghanistan** and **El Salvador**). In **Nicaragua**, the government restructured the management of physical rehabilitation, began developing a national plan specifically for physical rehabilitation, and increased national funding.

Transition to national structures continued (**Azerbaijan**, **Ethiopia**, and **Tajikistan**), and a number of handovers prior to 2008–2009 were evaluated positively (for instance, the Juba Teaching Hospital in **Sudan**). Elsewhere, a deterioration of services in 2008–2009 was directly linked to the reduction of international support and the failure of national players to increase their role accordingly, such as **Algeria**. Despite a handover process started in 2001, none of the **Angolan** rehabilitation centers were fully functional—and services had deteriorated to levels worse than 2005—after the last international operator departed in August 2008. Some said the handover to national ownership was insufficiently prepared; many experts thought the main reason was a lack of Ministry of Health interest.

Some countries were able to operate solely on national capacity (**Armenia**, **Chile**, **Croatia**, and **Thailand**). In many more countries improvements to services remained heavily dependent on international support. While a three-year handover of rehabilitation services in **Cambodia** was initiated in mid-2008, the government achieved less than 50% of its targets for 2008 and international operators guaranteed all services. International operators expected that the government would not be capable of managing the sector by the end of 2010 as foreseen, although international funding for NGOs was decreasing. In **Guinea-Bissau**, the only operating physical rehabilitation center, which was NGO-run, lacked personnel for most of 2008 and its production decreased by 50% compared to 2007, despite increased international support.

Most services remained centralized although a few countries sought to increase the number of mobile workshops and outreach services, such as **El Salvador** and northern **Sudan** (albeit planned since 2005). The HI survivor study revealed that, in **Albania**, few survivors thought they could access services closer to home, even though a new center opened by early 2008 and a repair unit had been upgraded. In **Iraq**, although rehabilitation centers were made operational nationwide so that patients would not have to travel great distances, fewer people came to the centers due to transport costs, insecurity, and a lack of information about the availability of services.

**Psychological support and social reintegration**

Despite a chronic lack of psychosocial support services for survivors, government institutions often failed to address the issue, leaving this type of assistance to family or friends, local NGOs, and DPOs or survivor organizations. The latter gradually gained more attention and some managed to expand activities, but for the vast majority of organizations, sustainability remained precarious due to a lack of financial support or capacity-building. Moreover, 2008–2009 saw the closure of several well-established survivor organizations citing financial and sustainability issues (**Serbia**), and reduced capacity due to management changes (**Peru**).

11 Ibid, p. 25.
In BiH, El Salvador, and Ethiopia, existing survivor networks previously depending on the NGO Survivor Corps were transitioning to national organizations and in doing so expanded the scope of their work. In Cambodia, self-help groups continued to multiply, although coordination or exchanges of lessons learned between groups or the NGOs supporting them did not happen. Also, the groups’ primary function was financial rather than psychosocial, and some were contribution-based, thereby excluding many survivors. The only remaining survivor NGO in Croatia closed in 2008, following the closure of the largest one, the Croatian Mine Victim Association, in 2007.

In countries such as Burundi and Senegal, international NGOs provided psychosocial services but usually targeted all war-traumatized people, or increasingly focused on other groups of war victims rather than mine/ERW survivors, for example rape victims in the DRC.

**Economic reintegration**

The HI survey noted that 85% of survivors thought that they were the last to get jobs. Indeed, few advances were made to increase survivors’ access to education and vocational training, to help secure employment, or to receive sufficient pensions. Many countries recognized economic reintegration as an absolute priority, but also acknowledged making the least progress in this area (Afghanistan, El Salvador, and Serbia). Others reported that economic reintegration projects were postponed or ended due to lack of funds (Guinea-Bissau).

Elsewhere, VA programs remained more focused on medical interventions and failed to recognize the importance of economic reintegration, for example in Yemen. Two long-term international funding commitments (to 2011) enabled national NGOs to boost economic reintegration activities in Sudan. However, most were small-scale pilot projects, not all were reselected for second-phase contributions, and insufficient attention was given to following training programs with work opportunities.

Some countries reported advances in economic reintegration opportunities through the disability sector or, at least, adhered to the theory of integrating survivors in broader disability and development projects, for example in India and Nicaragua. Even when measures to this effect were taken, they did not necessarily lead to increased opportunities for mine/ERW survivors, since they were only one among many vulnerable groups seeking to receive assistance. The general economic slowdown in 2008–2009 further reduced economic prospects.

In some countries pensions increased, such as El Salvador and UK. Croatia established a department for persons with disabilities within the national employment agency and gave financial incentives to those employing persons with disabilities. In 2009, however, a government representative reported that employment rates remained low and that persons with disabilities were often fired as soon as companies’ financial benefits ended.

**Laws and public policy**

New disability laws, policies, and/or coordination structures were developed in many countries, such as Afghanistan, Montenegro, BiH, China, Namibia, and South Korea. Elsewhere, legislation had been pending for so long that it was in need of adjustment by the time of approval (for example, in Cambodia). In other countries, legislative changes intended to benefit survivors remained pending for most of the last decade, for example in Eritrea and Guinea-Bissau. In other cases, the development of new legislation had an adverse effect, making the legal framework too complex, laws mutually exclusive, or reducing the number of sources for assistance. Colombia, for example, aimed to mainstream complex compensation mechanisms because survivors could not navigate the bureaucracy. While bureaucracy remained complex, a new decree actually limited access to services because the time to apply was reduced, documentation requirements were made stricter, and funding channels reduced.

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12 This means that a survivor needs to be able to make monthly (or other) payments into the group’s fund in order to be able to make use of the group’s support.


14 Of the 75 countries with casualties in 2008, 62 had specific or general legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities. Legislative efforts were pending in two more (Eritrea and Guinea-Bissau).
Much of this legislative activity was the result of countries starting to align their disability legislation with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD); this effort should benefit survivors as well as other persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{15} Sometimes survivors have been mentioned as a specific target group, for example in \textit{Sudan}. It is still too early to determine if these laws will be enforced and positively impact survivors.

\textbf{1999–2009: Decade of known and unresolved challenges}

Information and understanding about survivors have improved significantly since 1999. Since then, however, Landmine Monitor reported the same unmet challenges to VA service provision, i.e. that in the vast majority of countries “one or more aspects of [VA] were inadequate to meet the needs of mine survivors.”\textsuperscript{16}

The conclusion in 2009 can only be that, although there is better knowledge and more services, this has failed to impact survivors in a systematic way. In the 2009 HI survey, survivors reached similar conclusions: just over 25\% found they received more services in 2009 than in 2005 and 28\% thought that services were better in 2009 compared to 2005.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Survivor challenges}

Survivors did not receive the assistance they needed when they needed it due to access, cost, availability, bureaucratic, and discrimination challenges.

Already in 2001, it was noted that most resources were dedicated to medical and physical rehabilitation;\textsuperscript{18} in 2009 economic reintegration and psychosocial support remained neglected. HI’s survey found that from 2005–2009, survivors saw most progress in medical care (36\%). Apart from being virtually non-existent, psychosocial services remained under-valued and stigmatized.\textsuperscript{19}

Since 1999, better national legislation and an increasingly strong international framework (with the UNCRPD), has resulted in increased disability awareness among the general public and legislators. In practice, disability legislation remained poorly implemented, budgets not allocated to disability strategies, and activities virtually not monitored. Recourse to action if rights were not respected was often unavailable, bureaucratic procedures complicated, and compensation payments not worth their while. The lack of legislative enforcement was most felt in the areas of economic opportunities and physical accessibility.

Economic reintegration was the area where nearly a quarter of survivors in the HI study saw deterioration.\textsuperscript{20} Programs remained limited in number of beneficiaries, geographic coverage, and timeframe, and were mainly operated by NGOs with fluctuating funding. Programs did not meet market demands or survivors’ needs and training was not followed by job placement or business opportunities. Vocational training required educational levels many survivors did not have, did not cater to the aging survivor population, and was not inclusive of family members. Survivors were often not granted loans because they were considered high-risk groups and employment quotas were not enforced.

Almost everywhere, basic (mostly medical) services in 2009 were available at the community level. In contrast, specialized services remained, as noted in 2002,\textsuperscript{21} centralized in urban areas far away from the mine-affected rural areas where most survivors live. Community-based

\textsuperscript{15} As of 15 September 2009, there were 142 signatories to the UNCRPD, and 66 ratifications. In addition, 85 states signed the Optional Protocol and 44 ratified it. Of the so-called VA26, 17 signed the UNCRPD (16 on 1 September 2008) and 10 ratified it (six on 1 September 2008); 13 signed the Optional Protocol (10 on 1 September 2008) and seven ratified it (three on 1 September 2008). See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2008}, p. 43.


\textsuperscript{17} HI, “Voices from the Ground,” Brussels, 2 September 2009, p. 230.

\textsuperscript{18} See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2001}, p. 41.


\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p. 231.

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rehabilitation increased though it remained limited. Rural facilities had difficulties coping with emergency and trauma situations and emergency transport or fast response times were inadequate, despite road and infrastructure improvements in many countries. This led the ICRC in 2009 to call for more investment in emergency services in affected areas because too many casualties “never become survivors.”

Whereas basic services are often free, specialized or follow-up care usually are not, especially for the uninsured, nor are costs of transportation, accommodation, or accompaniment by a caregiver. NGOs have increased their efforts in providing transport and accommodation, sometimes with local authorities, although these efforts only cover the identified beneficiaries and are often by reimbursement, which does not solve survivors’ initial financial problems. Many survivors’ economic situation does not allow them to be away from home or work for a long time, causing them to postpone or forego essential treatment. Long waiting lists further complicate the situation.

Despite calls for a holistic approach to VA, many actors focus on one aspect, do not refer systematically to other types of services, and teams in centers are not multi-disciplinary. Referral systems were often non-existent or deficient. A lack of awareness about available services, as well as bureaucratic obstacles to survivors receiving them, further exacerbated already significant difficulties for survivors. Overall, services for military survivors remained better than those for civilians.

Operator challenges

Most operators have had to face significant challenges in delivering assistance to mine/ERW survivors. First, while steady progress has been made in training physical rehabilitation staff, nurses, and first-aid responders since 1999, professionals trained in trauma care or formal psychological support, and teachers educated in disability issues, remained uncommon. Increased technical and management training was still needed for many staff, DPOs, and government stakeholders. Qualified staff, particularly specialized professionals, are usually concentrated in urban centers. Retaining well-trained staff has also proved to be a problem, particularly when programs were handed over to national management, or when competing with neighboring countries, the private sector, or NGO salaries.

Infrastructure, equipment, and supply shortages remained more common in rural areas, even though they were also a challenge in urban facilities. Cost issues were a particular problem for continuing medical care and physical rehabilitation (often requiring purchase of equipment and goods from abroad).

Increasingly, minimum standards and guidelines have been developed for the physical treatment and care of survivors, and also for mental health, though their systematic implementation as well as the sharing of lessons learned remains a challenge. VA continued to be carried out without sufficient casualty and service data. When data exists, it is not always used for planning, shared, or stored centrally, as evidenced by the difficulties of the VA26 countries in compiling statistical information for the Cartagena Progress Review.

International cooperation

The draft Cartagena Progress Review noted that, “a lack of financial resources and/or technical support continues to limit the potential for progress in some States Parties to develop and/or implement plans…States Parties in a position to do so are obliged to provide assistance…”

Throughout 1999–2009, VA remained the smallest component of mine action funding, despite calls for increased and sustainable funding to match the long-term nature of VA/disability assistance. Increasingly, handovers and NGO pullouts were hurried by donor fatigue, even

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22 “Proposals for the Cartagena Action Plan: compilation of key issues highlighted by the ICRC during the Standing Committee Meetings and the First Preparatory Meeting,” provided by email from Camilla Waszink, Policy Adviser, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 9 June 2009.

when national entities were only slowly increasing their contributions and lacked the financial resources to continue programs after international organizations had withdrawn.

Of the 20 countries with significant numbers of survivors which responded to an open question on their expectations for VA from 2005–2009, 18 had expected to receive increased financial and technical assistance, and 14 felt they had not received such support. Just one in seven donors deemed international contributions to VA sufficient, most often citing the continuing high levels of need and competing public health priorities in many recipient countries. Nevertheless, they added that unless affected countries could cover their own VA needs in 10 years or less, they would never be fully able to.24

**Victim Assistance Strategic Framework**

2008–2009: cementing slow-paced progress

In 2008, Landmine Monitor stated that, with one year left, the VA26 States Parties 25 would have to increase their efforts if they truly wanted to make a difference in the lives of survivors in 2005–2009.26 In 2008–2009, most progress was made in the following countries:

- **Albania**, the most consistent performer on VA from 2005 to 2009, completed or made significant progress towards all its objectives.
- **Afghanistan** and **Sudan** both started implementing their action plans and could demonstrate significant advances even though a good number of objectives remained unachieved.
- **Tajikistan** for the first time received funding sufficient to further its needs-based plan, although it had been able to maintain some small-scale activities and consistent coordination throughout 2005–2009.
- **Thailand**’s improvements were based on finding a more appropriate VA coordination body and increased prioritization.
- **Jordan** made a promising start by identifying a focal point with a significant mandate, starting stakeholder consultations on how to effectively integrate VA into the disability sector while still ensuring that the special needs of survivors are met.
- **Cambodia** finalized its VA/disability action plan in February 2009, though operators have indicated the plan is too broad and may be unrealistic given current government capacity.
- In **Nicaragua**, the more socially-oriented government made progress in the health and disability sectors. This benefited survivors but was unrelated to VA planning.
- The **Peruvian** mine action center focused more on VA in 2009 by expanding the VA committee and holding regular meetings, though the benefits had yet to be felt by survivors.

Deterioration was seen in **Yemen** during the reporting period because the mine action program’s VA department was forced to scale back its operations due to reduced national funding. The funds given were earmarked for clearance. As the program did not link with the disability sector, it was unable to identify funding and assistance alternatives, creating a dire situation for survivors solely dependent on the VA department. **Iraq** expected to have a VA focal point by the Second Review Conference but remained largely unengaged despite indicating in July 2008 that it was responsible for a significant number of survivors.

For the remainder of the VA26 countries, activities continued, though the status quo appears largely to have prevailed.

- **Burundi, Chad,** and **Guinea-Bissau** were unable to make progress due to incessant capacity and funding gaps.

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25 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.

• In Senegal, the mine action center was unable to raise funding for VA and did not know which ministry it had to turn to for disability issues.
• Despite elaborate plans and well-established disability structures, progress in Uganda remained hindered by funding blockages and the lack of a technical advisor in 2008.
• In Angola, BiH, El Salvador, and Mozambique the main obstacle was a lack of authority by the coordinating body (often combined with funding/capacity constraints).
• Progress in the DRC and Ethiopia was hampered by continued ambiguity about who was in charge of coordination and a lack of government backing, among other reasons.
• In Colombia the VA coordinating body focused on planning rather than implementation, while in Serbia the focus was purely on physical rehabilitation.
• In several cases a lack of political will or involvement was noted, as in Croatia or Eritrea.

1999–2009: coordination successful while implementation failed?
The co-chairs noted in May 2009 that “Of course the most identifiable gains have been process-related…” This is confirmed in the draft Cartagena Progress Review which lists developing objectives/plans, establishing coordination mechanisms, and VA/disability expert participation at international meetings among the main successes for 2005–2009. In 2004, Landmine Monitor similarly concluded that the main progress since 1999 had been awareness-raising.

Increased state participation
Whereas in 1999 international NGOs and the ICBL dominated the VA discourse, in more recent years the co-chairs gradually succeeded in engaging affected and donor states on VA, although interventions were usually “one-off” or just listed international NGO activities. More importantly since 2005, States Parties started to send appropriate people from health or social affairs ministries or from the disability sector to discuss VA at Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings. Whereas in 2004 just two of 19 statements were given by VA/disability experts, by 2009 this increased to 15 of 22. Some government experts have continuously participated from 2005–2009, although for most states the expert changed frequently and/or was present irregularly.

Already in 1999, the establishment of national coordination bodies was seen as necessary to bring together stakeholders and improve services. A 2002 UN Mine Action Service consultation concluded that national coordination and planning was a key priority to ensure adequate assistance. Affected countries were encouraged to report more often and to use the so-called 4P’s format (plans, priorities, progress, and problems). By 2004, at least 22 States Parties had started developing VA action plans, including at least 13 of the future VA26, some of whom still did not have complete plans as of 2009.

Narrowing the focus to 26 states
Although all States Parties have a commitment towards survivors, the primary responsibility for the period 2005–2009 was placed on affected states. Because of significantly different development, contamination, and political contexts, affected countries should be directly in charge of determining the goals they wanted to achieve by the next milestone Review Conference.

of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2009. Since 2004, “this responsibility is most pertinent” for 23 (now 26) States Parties declaring responsibility for significant numbers of survivors, but also with the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.

During 2005–2009, these 26 countries participated in an informal process to ensure more measurable action by committing to:

- assess their VA situation;
- develop SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) objectives to be achieved by 2009;
- create plans to achieve the objectives; and
- identify resources to realize the plans.

These states were also encouraged to set up inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms. Their main tool was a questionnaire provided by the co-chairs in 2005. No other States Parties and just one state not party to the Mine Ban Treaty (Lebanon) have used the questionnaire to guide their activities.

Throughout 2005–2009, progress among the VA26 has been variable, with some countries actively engaging and others hardly at all. Progress was mostly visible in coordination aspects, rather than in implementation of services, even by those who made significant advances, as many of the VA26’s objectives related to data collection, strategies, awareness raising and coordination. Progress on activities was often unrelated to the plans the 26 countries set for themselves. In many cases, achievements owed much to sustained UN support or to continuity in the VA focal point position. Gaps in capacity and financial means have been reported throughout the period.

Between 2005 and July 2009:

- 22 of the 26 States Parties presented the scope of their problem and objectives, although the latter were often not SMART and incomplete;
- 13 countries convened workshops on VA and/or action plans, which did not always lead to the development of plans or better coordination;
- 12 states refined their objectives to make them SMART-er, which sometimes meant making objectives less ambitious, extending timeframes, or removing specific beneficiary targets;
- 12 countries developed inter-ministerial coordination mechanisms to implement action plans; in at least 50% of these countries, these mechanisms are not functioning;
- 10 developed VA/disability plans. Because of the slow pace in developing them, most plans did not cover the first part of the 2005–2009 timeframe and extend past 2009.

34 Ethiopia became the 24th State Party shortly after the First Review Conference, Jordan the 25th in 2007, and Iraq the 26th in 2008.
35 They received “process support” for this from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) Implementation Support Unit Victim Assistance Specialist Support through in-country visits, requested by all of the 26 States Parties except Eritrea, distance support (for example via email), outreach to other relevant organizations, and assistance with workshop organization.
37 Burundi, Chad, Iraq and Jordan did not present this, although the latter two joined the informal process more than half-way through.
38 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda.
39 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Cambodia, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda.
40 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, DRC, El Salvador, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda. The coordination body is not functioning in Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, DRC, and El Salvador.
41 Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen.
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- seven countries implemented plans, though several only started in 2008–2009 because of the time taken to develop and/or approve plans and a lack of financial means;42
- six "have reported progress in the achievement of specific objectives;"43 and
- three states adequately monitored progress made against the plan (Albania, Sudan, and Tajikistan); and
- just two report on progress systematically (Albania and Tajikistan).

Reporting

It was recognized in the first years of Mine Ban Treaty implementation that better VA reporting was needed to assess progress. The development of Form J of the Article 7 reports started in 1999–2000 and the (ultimately blank) Form J was adopted in 2001. Since then, the need to further develop progress indicators has been a recurrent theme. As of 2009, the challenge of measuring progress, particularly in states’ own reporting, has not been remedied even though the questionnaire of the co-chairs was to serve as a baseline for “an unambiguous assessment of success or failure” by the Second Review Conference.44

Very few states have adequate monitoring mechanisms. A review of VA statements and Article 7 reports in 2008–2009 by Landmine Monitor showed clearly that states’ reports were usually unrelated to objectives or plans, did not clarify progress compared to previous years, or explain the impact of activities on survivors.

The focus on the VA26 also made statements from other affected states increasingly infrequent throughout 2005–2009, even though some, such as Algeria or Turkey, struggled with a significant VA challenge. In May 2009, the ICRC stated, “We urge States [P]arties at the Review Conference to call for the development of more standardized and rigorous reporting and monitoring of the implementation of victim assistance commitments,” adding that this was “essential to maintaining a focus on victim assistance beyond the Review Conference and demonstrating that it is an area of implementation that merits increased investment.”45

National Commitment and Capacity

In June 2008, the co-chairs noted that national ownership was “not a specific aim of the Nairobi Action Plan, perhaps because it should go without saying…”46 More national ownership means improved VA coordination, ideally by the relevant ministries assessing needs and developing strategies adapted to local realities; placing organizations under national management; and increasing national budgets and abilities to mobilize external resources.

Since 2004, the co-chairs aimed to “work intensively, on a national basis with relevant States Parties in order to reinforce national ownership and ensure […] long-term sustainability.”47 VA became more effective when there was an ongoing, active involvement of national coordination bodies. Better coordination also helped to ensure participation of key stakeholders, more balanced priority-setting, better defined responsibilities, and increased accountability. Dialogue remained flawed when strategies were developed by one key player, often an expatriate, without consulting others, meaning that plans were not realistic nor had a broad base of support.

42 Afghanistan, Albania, Sudan, Thailand, Tajikistan, Uganda, and Yemen.
Even when coordinating bodies existed this did not mean that they could coordinate without assistance, or could do so systematically. Their merit was often limited to awareness raising or liaison, without much effect on activity implementation. Giving the VA focal point or coordinating body more authority, as happened in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Thailand, is a sign of increased ownership. The most common problems related to the lack of a mandate to direct other relevant government partners; competing claims of who is in charge; a lack of continuity in the coordination position; a lack of ministerial budgets; and a lack of political will. Responsibility for VA was often scattered among several bodies, just one of many competing priorities, or not integrated with the broader disability sector.

In 2001, Landmine Monitor noted that “it is essential that the international community focuses on local capacity-building…” Increased government involvement has resulted in VA no longer being ‘a mere NGO program’ with national NGOs and DPOs increasingly participating and some sustainable handovers of programs to national authorities. Yet sustained international support remained indispensable in many more countries. In Eritrea, UNDP noted in 2004 that the “most comprehensive [VA] program in the world” could be established, though activities seem to have halted as soon as Eritrea requested its UN technical advisors leave in mid-2005 and very little has been done since to assist mine/ERW survivors there.

In 2008–2009, international operators noted in several countries that no handover could be foreseen in the near future because of a lack of government capacity and/or will. In other places, transitions were hastened by decreasing funding or long-planned handover processes were not successful due to a lack of government interest, funding or capacity, directly impacting availability and quality of services (see Physical rehabilitation section above).

Sometimes, international operators have been substituting for the government for so long that there is an overdependence on them and decreased ownership, interest, and room for action by those who are primarily responsible—the national authorities. Additionally, there is increasing awareness that international operators have not invested sufficiently in training local counterparts.

As a result, nearly all the VA challenges listed in the draft Cartagena Progress Review relate to a lack of national commitment and capacities, mainly:

- non-prioritization of, and weak capacity to address disability issues and a lack of national ownership or interest to tackle VA/disability issues when faced with other competing priorities;
- weak state structures lacking bureaucratic, human resource, technical, and financial capacity to develop, implement, and monitor objectives, national plans, and legislation;
- inadequate resources to build government capacity; and
- inadequate long-term international assistance to remedy the national challenges.

**Conclusion: Victim Assistance to 2014**

It is hard to explain why assistance to mine and ERW survivors has been poorly supported in the past, particularly when donors have been generous to other mine action sectors. One factor is that VA has been the “least developed of the Convention’s core aims.” Additionally, throughout the past decade VA has been seen as a complicated field dependent on broader development, poverty reduction, public health, social services, and legislative efforts, requiring a long-term commitment for which concrete results might not be directly or visibly measurable. Improving

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50 See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 413.
VA is of course a difficult task when public health systems are beset with problems, especially in war-torn or developing societies. In providing VA, however, states are also reinforcing broader human rights, public health, and promoting social inclusion of vulnerable groups.

While the Mine Ban Treaty was the first conventional weapons treaty to include victim assistance provisions, more advanced VA frameworks are now provided in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UNCRPD. Combined with the clear lack of implementation progress, the Mine Ban Treaty will need a strong and implementation-oriented action plan to ensure more success in 2010–2014.

Synergies should be sought with both the Convention on Cluster Munitions and UN the UNCRPD which aim to provide a more systematic, sustainable approach to VA, bringing it into the broader disability and development context. The stricter obligations of both new treaties pave the path for more measurable action. The States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty can again lead the way by implementing a concrete 2010–2014 Cartagena Action Plan in which survivors can access comprehensive services, fully exercise their rights, and participate in decisions when and where needed.
For 2008 Landmine Monitor identified a total of US$626.5 million in funding for mine action worldwide, combining international and national funding. International funding increased significantly, while national funding decreased slightly compared to 2007. Total international support for mine action for 1992–2008 was $4.27 billion.

Landmine Monitor identified roughly $517.8 million (some €351.7 million) of international funding allocated for mine action in 2008 from 23 countries and the European Commission (EC). This is an increase of approximately $87.9 million (20%) compared to 2007 and the highest reported total to date, surpassing the previously highest total—$475 million in 2006—by some $43 million (9%). In national currency terms, 16 donors increased funding in 2008 compared to 2007, while six decreased funding. (The Czech Republic reported funds in Euros in 2008, but in Koruna in 2007.) Funding in 2008 was channeled to at least 53 recipient states and other areas. The top five recipients of mine action funding in 2008 were, in descending order, Afghanistan, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Cambodia.

Landmine Monitor also identified at least $108.7 million (€73.8 million) in national funding (monetary or in-kind assistance contributed to their own mine action programs) in 2008 by 22 states affected by mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW). This is a decrease of roughly $8.7 million (7%) compared to 2007.

Introduction

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty (international cooperation and assistance) recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in fulfilling its treaty obligations. Landmine Monitor reports annually on support for mine action based on monetary and in-kind assistance reported by mine/ERW-affected states and on international mine action assistance reported by donor states. Landmine Monitor also reports on the estimated costs and resource mobilization strategies for fulfilling treaty obligations on the part of mine/ERW-affected states, and the priorities and strategies for mine action assistance on the part of donor states.
reporting is limited by the ability and willingness of states to track and report their own funding and other forms of support, and by the availability of cost estimates, budgets, strategic plans, and other financial reporting.

Although several mine-affected countries have reported annual national funding for at least two consecutive years, reporting and comparison of annual national funding levels remains imprecise. A continued absence of standard methods of tracking and reporting by mine/ERW-affected states and, in some cases, a lack of information available on actual expenditures, makes overall annual comparisons difficult.

The biggest contributors to mine action in 2008 were the EC ($89.5 million), the United States ($85 million), Japan ($51.6 million), Canada ($43.1 million), Norway ($36.7 million), the Netherlands ($28.2 million), Germany ($26.7 million), the United Kingdom ($24.9 million), Spain ($20.4 million), Sweden ($18.9 million), and Australia ($18.2 million). The largest contribution came from the EC combined with national funding by European Union (EU) member states, a total of $264.2 million (€179.4 million), as reported below.

As in 2007, changes in the average exchange rates between national currencies and the US dollar in some cases had a significant effect on the US dollar value of international contributions to mine action. The average exchange value of the Euro, for example, increased by roughly 7% in US dollar terms in 2008 compared to 2007, affecting the US dollar value of contributions by 10 of the 20 largest international donors; and as a result of the decline of the British pound in relation to the US dollar, UK contributions fell in US dollar terms during 2008 despite rising in UK pound terms.

**National Contributions to Mine Action**

At least 22 mine/ERW-affected states contributed $108.7 million in funding (including in-kind contributions) to their own mine action programs during 2008, compared to roughly $117.4 million in 2007. Of the 15 mine-affected states submitting Article 5 deadline extension requests in 2008, 11 reported national funding during 2008, totaling $77,430,891. Of the four states submitting Article 5 deadline extension requests in 2009, two reported national funding in 2008, totaling $2.37 million (see Funding Article 5 deadline extensions section below).

Eight countries (Afghanistan, Ecuador, Egypt, Iraq, Mauritania, Rwanda, South Korea, and Uganda) reported national funding in 2007 but did not report funds in 2008. Together, these countries represented $20.9 million in national funding in 2007, though of this total, $18.2 million was contributed by Iraq alone. Two countries (Cyprus and Somalia) newly reported national funding in 2008. Together, these countries represent $158,219 in reported national funds.

Among the 20 states reporting national mine action support in both 2007 and 2008, 10 reported increases in levels of support in US dollar terms: Chile ($9.4 million increase), Azerbaijan ($4.1 million), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) ($2.5 million), Cambodia ($650,000), Thailand ($550,470), Mozambique ($263,270), Yemen ($100,000), Albania ($65,000), Peru ($45,414), and Tajikistan ($9,000). Three states—Lebanon, Jordan, and Zimbabwe—reported no change in funding levels. Seven states reported decreases in funding: Croatia ($325,335 decrease), Colombia ($390,500), Nicaragua ($400,000), Chad ($479,418), Senegal ($623,000), Zambia ($824,844), and Sudan ($2,565,120).

Eleven mine/ERW-affected states contributed, according to their own estimates, more than 0.01% of their gross national income (GNI) to mine action in 2008: Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mozambique, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Yemen.1

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1 GNI data for Somalia and Zimbabwe is not available.
National Mine Action Funding for 2008: $108.7 million

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<th>Donor</th>
<th>(US$ million)</th>
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<td>Croatia</td>
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<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is assumed that, globally, national funding is under-reported. Assessment of national contributions remains limited by a lack of consistent and complete reporting on national assistance, and by the absence of a standard method of reporting and applying monetary value to in-kind contributions.

International Contributions to Mine Action

Landmine Monitor identified approximately $517.8 million (€351.7 million) of international funding for mine action in 2008, donated by 23 countries and the EC. Of this, at least $1.4 million was contributed in support of the negotiation and adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including funding for advocacy and regional conferences and workshops.

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2 Includes monetary and in-kind contributions. Table does not add to $108.7 as figures are rounded to the nearest $100,000. Average exchange rates for 2008 vary; see list of exchange rates in this edition of Landmine Monitor for further details.

3 Reporting does not enable a disaggregation of funding by mine action activity. There was almost no identified funding specifically for cluster munitions in 2008.

4 The total does not include funding to mine action in countries and other areas affected by cluster munitions, as donor reporting to these recipients was variously identified for cluster munitions, landmines, and ERW.
Executive Summary

Support for Mine Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992–1997</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for 1992–2008</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,268</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EC funding together with national funding by EU member states totaled $264.2 million (€179.4 million) in 2008. Combined EC/EU member funding remained the largest source of mine action funding in 2008, as it was in 2007. Reported EC/EU funding in 2008 was approximately 25% more in Euro terms than in 2007, and 34% more in US dollar terms.

In national currency terms, three donor states—Sweden, Spain, and Italy—provided more mine action funding in 2008 than they had in any previous year. New Zealand’s contribution of NZ$3.7 million in 2008–2009 almost matched its previously highest contribution, in 2004–2005. Of the 20 largest donors in 2008, 16 provided more funding in US dollars terms in 2008 than 2007, and four provided less. Those increasing their contribution were: Italy (138% increase), Austria (132%), the EC (96%), Spain (74%), Finland (47%), Germany (45%), Japan (45%), New Zealand (31%), Switzerland (26%), the US (22%), Denmark (21%), the Netherlands (21%), Australia (9%), Sweden (8%) and Ireland (3%). Saudi Arabia, which did not report funding in 2007, provided $1.5 million in 2008. Donors with decreased contributions were: Norway (27%), Canada (6%), Belgium (3%), and the UK (1%). Slovakia, which was among the 20 largest donors in 2007, did not report funding in 2008.

5 The 1992–2007 total and 1998 annual figure include contributions by some states for which the exact amounts are not known, and contributions by some states for which amounts for specific years are not known, including $50 million from the UAE to Lebanon in 2002–2004.

6 The total of EC and EU member states’ funding in 2008 has been calculated by adding Landmine Monitor’s estimate of EC funding in 2008 ($60,758,061) to EU member states’ mine action funding provided bilaterally or otherwise (not including that provided through the EC). EU member states as of August 2009 are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.

7 Three donor states—Czech Republic, Japan and the Netherlands—reported some funding items in US$, which have been converted to national currencies using the relevant average annual rates; see list of exchange rates in this edition of Landmine Monitor for further details.
The 15 states which provided funding in 2008 equivalent to more than 0.001% of GNI, in descending order, were: Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Ireland, Canada, Finland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Spain, Slovenia, and Japan. Among Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, the UK was 16th according to this ranking; the US 20th; and France 23rd. No monetary funding for mine action was reported by China or Russia in 2008. No donors contributed more than 0.01% of GNI in 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>(US$ million)</th>
<th>(€ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>57.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[8\] World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database; Total GNI 2008, Atlas method.”, 1 July 2009, www.worldbank.org. For EU member states, the calculation of mine action funding as a percentage of GNI is based solely on their reported contributions bilaterally or otherwise (not including that provided through the EC); individual EU member states’ contributions to mine action through the EC has not been reported.
### Funding by Donor States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>(€ million)</th>
<th>Additional R&amp;D Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>87.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>69.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2008, EC and EU member states together committed $264.2 million (€179.4 million) in mine action funding, compared to $196.8 million (€143.6 million) in 2007. This represents an overall increase of approximately $67.4 million (€35.8 million) compared to 2007. Among the 27 member states of the EU, 16 reported mine action funding in 2008 independent of EC funding mechanisms. Of these, 12 reported funding increases in terms of original currency, while four reported declines in funding. The remaining 11 member states either did not report funding or did not provide valuations of in-kind contributions.

The EC contributed €60,758,061 ($89,472,321) in 2008. This consisted of €21,758,061 ($32,040,921) in funds disbursed in 2008, and €39 million ($57,431,400) in commitments made in 2008 to future mine action projects in countries which could include: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Belarus, BiH, Colombia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Lebanon, Nepal, Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Serbia. The amount of funds disbursed decreased by 25% compared to €33,280,659 ($45,631,112) in 2007, but total 2008 funding, including both disbursements and funds committed to future projects, increased by 45% compared to the previous year.

No country-specific allocations have been made from the overall commitment; in May 2009 the Directorate-General for External Relations stated that the funding commitment would be applied to “planned activities to be defined at a later stage.” Although Landmine Monitor reports EC funding on the basis of annual commitments, actual EC disbursements for 2008 remain undetermined and subject to change until the finalization and release of funds by the EC, and may be subject to revision.

Eleven countries actually received funds from the EC in 2008, totaling €21,758,061 ($32,040,921). All of these countries are also among the 14 for which the EC reported commitments in 2008 to future mine action projects. The EC contributed to mine action in 11 countries and other areas in 2007.

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10 As noted in previous years, neither the EC nor EU member states were able to provide a breakdown of how much of EC funding should be ascribed to individual member states in 2008. Therefore, it is not possible for Landmine Monitor to provide a complete picture of EU members’ mine action funding.
11 2007 funding figures are based on the average 2007 exchange rate: €1=1.3711.
12 EU member states as of August 2009: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. EU, “Gateway to the European Union,” europa.eu.
13 The Czech Republic retains the Koruna as its national currency, but reported 2008 funding in Euros. For comparison of 2007 and 2008 funding, values have been converted according to the average exchange rate for 2008: €1=CZK24.9898.
15 Email from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009.
16 Ibid, 12 June 2009.
The US provided $85 million to mine action in 32 countries and other areas in 2008, a 22% increase compared to $69.8 million to 30 recipients in 2007. Starting in fiscal year 2009, the US has integrated three separate accounts—Humanitarian Demining, International Trust Fund, and Small Arms/Light Weapons—into a single account for Conventional Weapons Destruction (Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs-Conventional Weapons Destruction, NADR-CWD). The transition to a combined account did not evidently affect US funding levels for mine action; however, long-term funding projections have not been reported.

In 2008, Japan contributed ¥5,318,480,480 ($51,589,261) compared to ¥4,175,698,717 ($35,493,439) in 2007, an increase of approximately 27% in Yen terms. Japan gave funds to 13 countries in 2008, compared to 17 in 2007.

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>Additional R&amp;D Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>626.4</td>
<td>132.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>957.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>187.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**JAPAN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>(¥ million)</th>
<th>Additional R&amp;D Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>51.6</td>
<td>5,318</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>4,176</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>2,944</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>4,323</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>178.0</td>
<td>20,612</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>329.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>37,373</strong></td>
<td><strong>34.3</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CANADA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>(C$ million)</th>
<th>Additional R&amp;D Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>127.6</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>265.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>337.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>17.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Email from Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department.
19 Emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009.
Canada contributed C$45,969,874 ($43,124,339) to mine action in fiscal year 2008–2009, a decrease of 7% in Canadian dollar terms compared to 2007–2008 (C$49,195,671/$45,830,687). Canada provided funding to 13 countries, including contributions to Afghanistan totaling approximately C$28.7 million ($27 million).

Canadian funding remained roughly stable between 2007 and 2008, as the dedicated Canadian Landmine Fund, in place from 1999 to March 2008, was replaced by funding structures integrated within Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In May 2009, Canada reported that the “vast majority” of new funds are provided by CIDA, in order to align mine action funding with development priorities and to support the Millennium Development Goals. As a result of the new funding structures, Canada reported that mine action funds have been difficult to access for countries outside CIDA’s geographic areas of priority, and for mine action projects unrelated to field activities, such as advocacy.20

From November 2008 to August 2009, Canada chaired the Contact Group on Linking Mine Action and Development.

### NORWAY21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($) million</th>
<th>(NOK million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>206.6</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>293.7</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>223.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>235.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>219.1</td>
<td>1,649.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>377.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,609.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Norway contributed NOK206,631,608 ($36,656,447) to mine action in 2008, an approximately 30% decrease in Norwegian kroner terms from 2007 (NOK293,650,490/$50,155,504). Funds were allocated to 17 countries and other areas. The decline in funds is in line with statements by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2008, that the pattern of increased funding in previous years may end in the near future, as some programs were reduced (such as clearance in Jordan) and as Norwegian embassies give priority to other humanitarian aid sectors.22

In a statement to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Norway reported that it will continue to provide “a high level” of mine action assistance in the future, and will consider multi-year funding arrangements with selected partners to ensure stable funding to mine action programs. It called on both donor states and mine-affected states to develop mine action methods that “can be sustained over time… when cooperation and assistance parameters change.”23

From November 2008 to August 2009, Norway chaired the Contact Group on Resource Mobilization.

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21 Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009.
22 Email from Yngvild Berggrav, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 2008.

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, the Netherlands outlined five principles guiding its mine action funding policy: geographic spread, with emphasis on the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, the Western Balkans, and Afghanistan; effectiveness and socio-economic impact of programs; capacity-building; application of the International Mine Action Standards principles and procedures; and additional support to other mine action sectors. The Netherlands reported that at least €10 million of its contributions in 2008 were channeled through NGOs.25

Germany’s funding of €18,148,899 ($26,725,921) in 2008 was an increase of 35% in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€13,400,957/$18,374,052). Germany contributed to 21 states in 2008, compared to 17 states and other areas in 2007. Germany’s funding for 2008 exceeded its earlier projection of €17.6 million.

In May 2009, Germany reported contributing a total of $100 million to the EC budget for mine action, in addition to its direct assistance to mine action. Germany projected donations in 2008 and 2009 totaling $46 million. In allocating funds, Germany reportedly has no geographic areas of priority, but focuses support on States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.27

In a statement on mine clearance in May 2009, Germany stressed the importance for mine-affected states to take national ownership of their mine action programs, and to build up “efficient and sustainable local capacities” in mine action.28

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### THE NETHERLANDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($) million</th>
<th>(£ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>114.6</td>
<td>102.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>212.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>176.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### GERMANY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($) million</th>
<th>(£ million)</th>
<th>Additional R&amp;D Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>\</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>122.9</td>
<td>115.6</td>
<td>\</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>207.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>178.9</strong></td>
<td>\</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

24 Email from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009.
26 Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009.
28 Ibid.
UK funding of £13,451,597 ($24,945,987) in fiscal year 2008–2009 represented an increase of 7% in British pound terms compared to fiscal year 2007–2008 (£12,586,513/$25,198,199). In 2008–2009, the UK Department for International Development (DfID) reported mine action funding for 20 states and other areas, compared to 22 in 2007–2008.

Spain provided €13,886,118 ($20,448,697) in 2008, a 62% increase in Euro terms compared to €8,558,008 ($11,733,885) in 2007. Funds were contributed to 15 countries and other areas, including in-kind contributions through training at its International Demining Center, compared to 11 countries and other areas in 2007.

In 2008, Sweden contributed SEK124,458,455 ($18,905,239), a 5% increase in SEK terms compared to 2007 (SEK118,287,250 or $17,506,513). Sweden reported contributions to eight countries and other areas in 2008, compared to nine in 2007.

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29 Email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, DfID, 17 March 2009.
30 Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
31 Email from Amb. Lars-Erik Wingren, Department for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009.
AUSTRALIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>(A$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008–2009</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–2007</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005–2006</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>66.2</td>
<td>104.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>126.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>179.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Australia’s funding of A$21,263,137 ($18,152,340) in fiscal year July 2008–June 2009 represented a 7% increase in Australian dollar terms from fiscal year 2007–2008 (A$19,906,343 or $16,703,412). In 2005, Australia made a five-year, A$75 million commitment to mine action. Having spent A$60.3 million over four years, Australia remains on track to meet its five-year commitment. Australia’s support was provided to seven countries in 2008, the same number as in 2007.

As of November 2008, Australia projected contributions in 2008–2009 totaling roughly A$8.8 million, which was surpassed by actual contributions.

SWITZERLAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>(CHF million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>91.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>121.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>154.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Switzerland’s mine action strategy for the period 2008 to 2011 calls for maintenance of funding levels around CHF16 million per year. Switzerland prioritizes integration of mine action funding within peace and development programs.

In a statement to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, Switzerland called for additional efforts by States Parties to improve mechanisms for technical assistance and exchange of information, and called on States Parties fulfilling obligations under Article 5 to strengthen cooperation at the regional level to develop joint mine action strategies.

32 Emails from Caroline Mulas, Mine Action Coordinator, AUSAID, 22 June 2009; and Kathleen Bombell, Mine Action Unit, AUSAID, 21 July 2009.
34 Email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009.
36 Ibid.
DENMARK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>(DKK million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>86.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>67.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>705.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>151.1</td>
<td>999.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Denmark contributed DKK74,630,000 ($14,664,795) in 2008, compared to DKK65,702,278 ($12,076,079) in 2007, an increase of 14% in Danish krone terms. Denmark contributed to nine countries and other areas in 2008, compared to 12 countries in 2007.

BELGIUM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>(€ million)</th>
<th>Additional R&amp;D Funding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Belgium’s mine action funding in 2008 of €7,145,951 ($10,523,127) was a decrease of 9% in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€7,881,710 or $10,806,613). Belgium provided mine action funding and assistance to 10 countries in 2007, compared to seven countries in 2007.

ITALY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>($ million)</th>
<th>(€ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 2005</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Italy’s mine action funding of €6,662,587 ($9,811,325) was a 121% increase in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€3,012,488 or $4,130,422). Italy contributed funds to 12 countries in 2008, compared to eight countries in 2007.

37 Email from Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.
38 Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
39 Email from Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.
Finland contributed €4,982,526 ($7,337,268) in 2008, a 37% increase in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€3,636,279 or $4,985,702). Funding was allocated to six countries and other areas in 2008, compared to five countries and other areas in 2007.

Ireland’s mine action funding of €4,900,000 ($7,215,740) is a 4% decrease in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€5,115,103 or $7,013,318). Ireland contributed to six countries and one area in 2008, compared to nine countries in 2007.

Austria provided €1,823,320 ($2,685,021) in mine action funding in 2008, a 116% increase in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€845,723 or $1,159,571). Austria contributed to six countries in 2008, compared to three countries in 2007.
New Zealand reported contributions totaling NZ$3,705,000 ($2,649,446) during fiscal year July 2008–June 2009, an increase of 35% in New Zealand dollar terms compared to 2007–2008 (NZ$2,740,981 or $2,018,733). As well as its global funding, New Zealand reported the value of its funding to Egypt, and its support to four other countries, but without providing valuations.

France reported contributing €300,994 ($443,244) for mine action in 2008, an 83% decrease in Euro terms compared to 2007 (€1,744,055 or $2,391,274). This included in-kind contributions and training for mine-affected states. As of August 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported to Landmine Monitor that complete funding data for 2008 was unavailable. In 2007 France reported a similar absence of data from its embassies, and stated actual 2007 funding may have been greater than reported.

**Other mine action donors**

*Saudi Arabia* contributed $1.5 million to mine action in Lebanon in 2008.46

*Luxembourg* contributed €800,488 ($1,178,799) to five countries in 2008.47 Luxembourg provided €637,943 ($874,684) in 2007. Total mine action funding to date was $9.3 million.

The *Czech Republic* contributed €703,986 ($1,036,689) to mine action in 2008.48 The Czech Republic provided CZK23,867,286 ($1.2 million) for mine action in 2007. Estimated total mine action funding to August 2009 was $5.5 million.

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44 New Zealand Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
47 Email from Daniel Gengler, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2009.
48 Czech Republic Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J. The Czech Republic reported funding in both US$ and € for 2008. Values have been converted using the average annual US$–€ exchange rate for 2008.
Slovenia reported contributing €379,736 ($559,199) in 2008. It provided €506,093 ($693,904) in 2007. Total mine action funding as of August 2009 was $5.9 million.

Poland reported in-kind contributions to mine action in 2008–2009 in the form of mine clearance personnel in support of international peacekeeping operations, but did not report a value for these contributions. Poland reported in-kind contributions without valuations in 2007. Total mine action funding for the period 2005–2008 (excluding contributions without valuation) was $3.3 million.

China reported in-kind contributions to mine action during 2008 but did not report valuations. China contributed a total of RMB6 million ($789,000) in support of mine action in 2007. Estimated total mine action funding to August 2009 (excluding in-kind assistance without valuation) was $7 million.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) did not report new international funding in 2008. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported receiving $600,000 (€437,605) from the UAE during 2007 for mine and cluster munitions clearance in southern Lebanon. Total mine action funding to August 2009 was $69.9 million.

Slovakia did not report international funding in 2008. Slovakia’s in-kind assistance to mine action in Iraq, via contributions of the Slovak Armed Forces, ended in 2007. Slovakia continued to provide in-kind assistance to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, but did not report a value for its contributions in 2008. In-kind assistance to Iraq and Afghanistan totaled SKK236,348,798 ($9,619,396) in 2007. Total reported funding to date is roughly $34.5 million.


Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding by South Korea in 2008. South Korea contributed $1 million to the UN Development Group Iraq Trust Fund in 2007. Total mine action funding as of August 2009 was $6.2 million.

Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding by Iceland in 2008. Iceland last reported providing $1.5 million for victim assistance in 2005. Total mine action funding was $2.8 million from 1997–2008.

Major Recipients

Landmine Monitor has identified international funding totaling $386.8 million (€262.6 million) to 53 recipient states and other areas in 2008, down from 70 recipients in 2007. This is in addition to $130.4 million (€88.5 million) in funds for mine action for which no recipient state is specified (or with multiple and undifferentiated recipients), and $14.1 million (€9.6 million) contributed to research and development.

The top recipients of mine action funding in 2008 were Afghanistan ($105.2 million), Sudan ($39.1 million), Iraq ($35.9 million), Lebanon ($28.2 million), Cambodia ($28.1 million), BiH ($23.6 million), Angola ($22.1 million), Ethiopia ($18.9 million), Lao PDR ($12.7 million) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC ($12.4 million).

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49 Email from Gregor Kaplan, Security Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2009.
50 Poland Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
51 “Global and Other” funding includes €39 million in EC commitments during 2008 for which specific amounts to recipient countries have not yet been determined.
**Executive Summary**

**Support for Mine Action**

93% of total international funding went to Mine Action Recipients in 2008.

**Mine Action Recipients Receiving $1 Million or More in 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Area</th>
<th>$ million</th>
<th>€ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>105.2</td>
<td>71.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Country/Area** | **$ million** | **€ million**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagorno-Karabkh</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

52 Figures are rounded to the nearest 0.1% and do not add to 100%.

53 Mine-affected countries and other areas receiving at least $1 million. Figures are rounded to the nearest $100,000.
Increases of at least $5 million were seen in 2008 in Afghanistan (up $19 million), Ethiopia ($13.1 million), Sudan ($9.9 million), Georgia ($8.7 million), BiH ($6.5 million), and the DRC ($6.5 million).

Significant reductions in mine action funding—of at least $2 million—occurred in Azerbaijan (down $2 million), Cambodia ($2.7 million), Nicaragua ($3 million), Guinea-Bissau ($4 million), Jordan ($5 million), Somalia ($5.5 million), Belarus ($5.5 million), Cyprus ($5.5 million), and Senegal ($7.3 million).54

In regional terms, where recipient states or regional implementing organizations were identified, annual funding increased, most notably in Africa ($118.1 million in 2008 compared to $81.2 million in 2007), followed by Asia-Pacific ($166.3 million in 2008 compared to $144.4 million in 2007) and Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States ($54.5 million in 2008 compared to $44.3 million in 2007).55 Funding declined in the Middle East and North Africa ($77.5 million in 2008 compared to $94.7 million in 2007) and the Americas ($14.2 million in 2008 compared to $15.8 million in 2007).

In 2008, 31 countries and other areas received at least $1 million in funding, compared to 34 countries and other areas in 2007. States and other areas directly receiving funds in 2007 but not in 2008 were: Algeria, Belarus, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chechnya, Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ecuador, Gabon, Guinea, Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, and Zambia.57

States and other areas directly receiving funds in 2008 but not in 2007 were: Armenia, Eritrea, Georgia, Palestine, the Philippines, and Rwanda.

54 In some cases international funds committed in prior years may have been applied to programming in 2008.
55 In its regional comparison of funding in 2007, Landmine Monitor reported funds to Europe and Central Asia, here reported as Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.
56 By US$ value of contributions, where a recipient country is specified (not including global or regional funding), except in the case of Americas, which includes general funding to the Organization of American States, and Europe/Central Asia, which includes funding to the ITF.
57 Donors reported funding to joint mine action programming on the Ecuador-Peru border in 2008, but no funding was reported exclusively to Ecuador.
Executive Summary

Trust Funds

Landmine Monitor has identified at least $140.7 million contributed to mine action via international trust funds in 2008, compared to $136.6 million in 2007.

The UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, operated by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), received $92.5 million in 2008, compared to about $93 million in 2007, including core and multiyear funding.\(^58\)

The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), based in Slovenia, received $34 million in donations from 13 countries in 2008, as well as from the UN and its agencies, local authorities, government agencies, and private donors.\(^59\) The ITF received $25.7 million in donations in 2007.

The UNDP Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery received contributions totaling $14.2 million in 2008, compared to $16.1 million in 2007. Funds were directed to mine action in 13 countries, and to regional workshops in support of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.\(^60\)

Implementing agencies, organizations and institutions

International funds were directed to mine action in 2008 through nearly 100 agencies, organizations, and institutions identified by donor states as responsible for allocation of funds to operating partners or for direct implementation of programs.\(^61\) As in 2007, some donors reported the operators responsible at the local level for project implementation, others identified an international mine action organization, which may or may not have undertaken projects with local partners, and others identified the UN or another agency through which funds were dedicated to projects at the national level.\(^62\)

Implementing and coordinating NGOs, trust funds, and other agencies were identified for approximately $387 million of the $518 million in total mine action funding. Landmine Monitor identified at least 39 agencies receiving more than $1 million in international funds in 2008. These included contributions identified only generally by donors, where allocations through specific agencies can be assumed but were not reported. Overall, the UN, its agencies, peacekeeping operations and trust funds acted as implementers for at least $142.7 million in funds, or some 28% of total reported funding worldwide.

Research and Development

Landmine Monitor identified $14,110,068 (€9,581,738) in international funding by two donor states for research and development (R&D) in 2008, a decrease of approximately 29% compared to 2007 ($19,980,298 or €14,572,459).

The US Department of Defense spent $13.63 million on humanitarian demining R&D projects in fiscal year 2008, compared to $14.4 million in fiscal year 2007.\(^63\)

Belgium contributed $480,068 (€326,000), consisting of contributions to the Belgium Royal Military Academy for demining research, as well as to the International Test and Evaluation Program for Humanitarian Demining to support testing of demining equipment.

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\(^60\) Email from Maria Vardis, Advisor and Inter-Agency Liaison, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 22 September 2009.

\(^61\) This excludes direct bilateral funding to governments and government agencies in mine-affected states, and funding via UN peacekeeping missions.

\(^62\) In its initial submission of data to Landmine Monitor, the US reported allocation of funds without identifying the implementing agency, with the exception of funds contributed to the ITF, which were earmarked by the US Department of State. In some cases the US Department of State later identified implementing agencies for specific funding items.

Switzerland continued to provide general support to GICHD, including R&D, but R&D amounts are not consistently differentiated from non-R&D funding.


### Funding Article 5 Deadline Extensions

Fifteen countries submitted requests to extend their Article 5 deadlines in 2008: BiH, Chad, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, the UK, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Of these, four states (Denmark, Jordan, the UK, and Yemen) reported the capacity to fund their own clearance initiatives or to raise all required funds, while 11 expressed the need for international assistance. As of July 2008, the total projected cost for the 11 extension requests requiring international funding was approximately $2.26 billion through 2019.

Between August and November 2008, five states—Ecuador, Mozambique, Peru, Thailand, and Zimbabwe—submitted revised extension requests including budget projections. (Yemen submitted a revised extension request in November 2008, but with no changes to its budget projections.) Of these, two reported reduced cost estimates: Mozambique ($28.4 million, down from $32 million); and Thailand ($528.9 million from $575 million). Two states reported increased cost estimates: Ecuador ($16.7 million, up from $10.6 million), and Peru ($25.9 million from $17.9 million). Zimbabwe withdrew its original budget of $45.5 million and submitted a three-year cost estimate of $6.9 million, to complete the first phase of its extension plan, after which it will provide a plan and budget for the remaining tasks. As a result of all budget revisions, the total projected cost for states submitting Article 5 extension requests in 2008 declined by some $66 million, from $2.26 billion to roughly $2.19 billion through 2019.

Four additional states submitted Article 5 extension requests between January and August 2009: Argentina, Cambodia, Tajikistan, and Uganda. All have expressed the need for international assistance in completing their clearance obligations, and all included cost projections in their extension requests. The projected costs for these requests total roughly $595 million, with Cambodia’s request accounting for $307.4 million, Argentina’s for $250 million, Tajikistan’s for $32.6 million, and Uganda’s for $5.2 million.\textsuperscript{65}

Taking together the revised 2008 extension requests and extension requests newly submitted between January and August 2009, the projected costs for all Article 5 extension requests total roughly $2.78 billion for the period 2009–2019. Given that the timelines and annual budgets of each extension request are different, the annual projected costs for all extension requests are as follows:

\textsuperscript{64} Email from Yasuhiro Kitagawa, JCBL, 2 September 2009.

\textsuperscript{65} Argentina’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request covers clearance of the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which is also covered in the UK’s extension request. The UK request, however, does not include cost estimates for completion.
Total annual cost estimates for Article 5 deadline extension requests (as of August 2009)\textsuperscript{66}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total cost (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>253.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>297.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>302.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>295.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>292.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>302.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>278.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>256.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>237.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>222.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>68.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cost projections for 2009 represent 40% of all international and national funding reported for 2008, for all mine action sectors, and 49% of all international funds reported for the year. The projected costs, as shown above, average approximately $300 million for 2011–2014 before decreasing each after that until 2019 when $68.4 million of international assistance will be sought for Article 5 extension requests. It is assumed the annual needs for 2015–2019 will increase until 2014 as future extension requests are approved, before declining for the remainder of the period.

Given that other states will in all likelihood submit Article 5 extension requests, and that victim assistance obligations are not included in the majority of plans contained in Article 5 extension requests, it is likely that mine action funding will need to increase over the next five to 10 years. This will challenge not only fulfillment of the extension plans themselves, but also assistance to other mine action sectors, such as risk education, stockpile destruction, training, and victim assistance, and to mine/ERW-affected states that do not require an Article 5 deadline extension.

\textsuperscript{66} Figures are rounded to the nearest $100,000.
AFGHANISTAN

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, IEDs, submunitions, other UXO, AXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>668km² (31 July 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but estimated 52,000–60,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Mined area clearance: 51.5km² Battle area clearance: 121.1km² Total clearance: 172.6km² Other land release: 85.1km²</td>
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<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>1.4 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $105.1 million ($86.3 million)</td>
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</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2003. It has not adopted national implementation legislation. Afghanistan completed destruction of its known stockpiles of more than 486,000 antipersonnel mines in October 2007, eight months after its treaty deadline. It has discovered or recovered and destroyed tens of thousands of additional mines since then. Taliban forces have used antipersonnel mines sporadically since 2001.

Afghanistan’s demining program is the world’s largest and oldest, but in 2006–2007 it underwent extensive operational reform, restructuring, and refocusing to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of the UN’s implementing partners as well as to reflect the threat to mine clearance from growing insurgency. In 2008, demining organizations released more than 250km², a record for the program.

The Mine Action Center for Afghanistan recorded at least 12,069 casualties from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) between 1999 and 2008, including 1,612 killed and 10,457 injured. Casualties are likely under-reported due to the difficult terrain, ongoing insecurity which impedes access for data collectors, and because fatal casualties were often not reported from 1999–2002. The overwhelming majority of recorded casualties were civilians. The casualty toll in 2008 was less than half the level in 2001, but rose for the first time since that year. It is estimated there are up to 60,000 survivors.

Extensive mine/ERW risk education (RE) conducted over the last 10 years by approximately 15 organizations reached up to 3.5 million people a year. RE has focused on communities, internally displaced persons, and returning refugees. From 2002–2006, UNICEF supported RE technically and financially. In 2003, RE began to focus more on community-based activities and behavioral change strategies. School-based RE programs have also been developed. However,

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1 The UN coordinated the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) through the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan, (UNMACA), until 2007 when it became referred to as the Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA) and in January 2009 it was renamed the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA).
two evaluations in 2008 found that RE programs needed more understanding of the problem and to work more through established institutions.

Despite increased national ownership and interest in victim assistance (VA) and disability issues, increased survivor inclusion and better policy frameworks, there was little real improvement in the situation of survivors. This is in part due to the very low development level in Afghanistan and continued conflict, but also because of a lack of capacity and prioritization. Afghanistan has developed a VA plan as part of its 2005–2009 commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, but implementation is facing significant challenges.

**Mine Ban Policy**


Afghanistan participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, making statements on VA and mine clearance. Afghanistan also attended the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, making statements on VA, RE, and mine clearance. Afghanistan has not made known its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Afghanistan signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not yet ratified it as of 1 July 2009.

Afghanistan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons in April 1981, but has never ratified it, and thus is not party to the convention or its protocols on mines and ERW.

**Production, transfer, use, stockpiling, and destruction**

Afghanistan is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Throughout many years of armed conflict large numbers of mines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan. There have been no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in recent years.

Afghanistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction obligation in October 2007. This was eight months after its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 March 2007. It is unclear how many stockpiled mines Afghanistan had destroyed at the time it declared completion of the program. It reported that as of April 2007, it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Afghanistan formally notified the Implementation Support Unit of the Mine Ban Treaty that “Afghanistan has now fully completed the destruction of all its known stockpiles of Anti-Personnel Mines.” Letter from Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spania, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Kerry Brinkert, Manager, Implementation Support Unit, GICHD, 11 October 2007.

On 11 October 2007, Afghanistan formally notified the Implementation Support Unit of the Mine Ban Treaty that “Afghanistan has now fully completed the destruction of all its known stockpiles of Anti-Personnel Mines.” Letter from Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spania, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Kerry Brinkert, Manager, Implementation Support Unit, GICHD, 11 October 2007.

mines, and later reported that in calendar year 2007, it destroyed 81,595 antipersonnel mines. How many of those were found and destroyed after the October 2007 declaration of completion is not known.

In its latest Article 7 report, Afghanistan indicated that an additional 62,498 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2008. The bulk—58,588—were PFM-1 mines destroyed in Balkh, Kapisa, and Parwan provinces. The mines were destroyed at 160 events in 20 provinces, all by open detonation. The type and number of mines destroyed in each location, and the dates of destruction, have been recorded in detail in Afghanistan’s Article 7 report.

**Mines retained for training and development**

Afghanistan reported that during 2008 the maximum number of antipersonnel mines retained for training purposes was 2,618. This total is 62 mines fewer than the number retained at the end of 2007. Afghanistan has previously informed Landmine Monitor that it retains a fluctuating number of mines (depending on the needs of its training programs), and that the number is approved by the Ministry of Defense. The mines it retains come from discoveries and seizures that continue to occur within the country.

In June 2008, the Program Director of the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) told Landmine Monitor that all of the mines Afghanistan listed as retained are fuzeless, and that the fuzes are destroyed separately prior to use in training.

In its latest Article 7 report, in expanded Form D on retained mines, Afghanistan stated, “MACCA uses retained antipersonnel mines in its test centers in Kabul, Logar, Herat, Kunduz, Jalalabad and Kandahar to accredit the mine detection dogs of implementing partners... The implementing partners, under the oversight of MACCA, use antipersonnel mines for training of their mine detection dogs and deminers.” It also noted that MACCA, “stores mines that may be needed for testing and accreditation in the future in a secured bunker.” Afghanistan did not report how many mines were transferred to the training program, their origin, or the number that were consumed during training.

**Use**

According to the UN, 2008 was the most violent year in Afghanistan since 2001. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) force levels increased, insurgent attacks increased, and violence rose sharply in the south, southeast, and southwest of the country. The insurgency attacked in previously stable areas, including high-profile coordinated attacks against multiple government ministries in Kabul in February 2009.

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9 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form G. PFM-1 mines have been identified by other States Parties as especially problematic to destroy. Other mines destroyed included (as listed by Afghanistan): 52 Claymore, four LO-6, three M18, 11 M-4, 23 MON-100, five MON-50, four MS-3, six No. 4, three OZM, 247 OZM-72, one P-2, 60 P-4, two PMD-6, 774 PMN, 102 PMN-2, 267 POMZ-2, seven PPMISR, three TS-50, 10 Type 69, 65 Type 72, 2,231 YM-1, and 40 unknown mines.
10 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form F. Mines were destroyed in Baghlan, Balkh, Bamayan, Faryab, Herat, Jawzjan, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunar, Kunduz, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Paktya, Parwan, Samangan, Sari Pul, Shiberghan, Takhar, and Wardak provinces.
11 Afghanistan provides very detailed reporting, however, it should make unambiguously clear that the mines in Form G are acquired through recoveries, and that the mines in Form F indicate the destruction of same. Landmine Monitor clarified this only through communications in June 2008.
12 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D.
13 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 80–81; Article 7 report (for calendar year 2008), Form D, states, “MACCA and implementing partners retained these mines from stockpile destructions.”
15 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D.
Yet neither Afghan nor coalition forces are reported to have used antipersonnel mines. United States forces have reportedly deployed and used Claymore directional fragmentation mines in command-detonated mode, which is not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.17

Non-state armed groups
While the level of insurgent activity increased sharply, the vast majority of reports of explosive attacks did not involve victim-activated antipersonnel mines, even though media reports frequently attributed attacks to “landmines.” Instead, attacks were mostly carried out with remotely-detoniaed improvised explosive devices (IEDs), often targeting vehicles.18 On its website, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban) claimed responsibility for an extensive number of attacks against military personnel and vehicles using command-detonated IEDs.19 The Hizb-e-Islami militia of Gulbudin Hekmatyar has also claimed responsibility for IED attacks on ISAF troops.20

In June 2008, there were several reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by the Taliban in Arghandab district of Kandahar province.21 A spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense was quoted as saying, “The Taliban had laid landmines—anti-vehicle and anti-personnel—on roads and footpaths in Arghandab District.”22 The ICBL expressed concern at the reports of ongoing Taliban use of antipersonnel mines.23 In January 2009, a US Army captain asserted that the insurgency was using antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as IEDs with pressure plates to trigger explosives, but did not provide specific incidents.24

There were some media reports of ISAF forces recovering antipersonnel mines. In August 2008, three persons were arrested with 30 antipersonnel mines and one antivehicle mine in Pul-i-Khumri in Baghlan province.25 In October 2008, coalition forces recovered several antipersonnel mines among other weapons in Kandahar province.26 In December 2008, ISAF forces recovered one antipersonnel mine and some antivehicle mines in Ghorak district, Kandahar.27 In January 2009, coalition forces recovered antipersonnel mines and pressure plates for mines among other weapons in Kandahar province.28 Other media reports also mention seizures of landmines, but do not identify the type.29

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17 See, for example, “U.S. troops strike hard at Taliban, 13 insurgents killed in surprise attack in Afghanistan valley,” New York Times (Korangal Outpost, Afghanistan), 18 April 2009.
18 These explosive devices have killed and injured international and national troops, government officials, and national and international aid workers, including mine action personnel, and other civilians. Antivehicle devices are often made from shells, rockets, mines, and other munitions, and are transported to the site by bicycle or donkey, placed, and detonated from a distance once a target comes into sight.
19 In May 2009, the website listed the details of 247 different attacks with dozens of vehicles allegedly destroyed and many alleged military casualties. See www.alemarahl.org.
The government’s Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) program collects mines. In November 2008, a local security department discovered 10 antipersonnel mines among other weapons in the Koran area, Gusfandi district of Sari Pul province and turned them over to DIAG. The mines were left over from the Soviet occupation, and commanders were planning to sell them instead of handing them over to DIAG. Antipersonnel mines collected under the DIAG program are turned over to the government’s Anti-Personnel Mine & Ammunition Stockpile Destruction program run by UNDP.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Afghanistan remains one of the states with the highest level of contamination from landmines and ERW, mainly the result of the 1992–1996 internal armed conflict, the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, and the US-led coalition’s intervention in late 2001, which added considerable quantities of UXO.

Increased insurgency in the past two years has resulted in additional ERW contamination and more use by NSAGs of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and victim-activated IEDs. Security forces, the government, and the UN have continued to uncover large caches of weapons and munitions, including landmines; more than 2,900 tons (2.9 million kg) of munitions were discovered in northern Afghanistan by the joint Afghan-UNDP Afghanistan New Beginnings Project.

Estimates of contamination have fluctuated in the last two years as MACCA conducted an audit of data. The Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey (ALIS), completed in 2005, had found 2,368 communities and more than four million people affected by mines, and identified some 715km² of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Consolidation of different data sets and discovery of new minefields not identified in the ALIS saw the estimate of contamination rise to 852km² as of 31 December 2007. After further clearance and data consolidation, MACCA estimated the number of hazards as of the end of July 2009 at 6,502, covering 668km², and thought this figure could rise with the results of further survey.

Soviet forces used air-dropped and rocket-delivered submunitions in the 1979–1989 conflict, and US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster munitions containing some 248,056 submunitions between October 2001 and early 2002. However, clearance operations followed in 2002–2003 guided by US cluster strike data, and the ALIS found that 89% of affected communities reported only antipersonnel and/or antivehicle mines. Demining operators say they now encounter few cluster munition remnants.

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33 Emails from MACCA, 18 June 2009 and from MACCA Deputy Programme Director, 20 August 2009.
36 HALO, the biggest demining operator in Afghanistan, reports that it continues to find abandoned Soviet cluster munitions but has not cleared a Soviet cluster strike in more than five years and finds only occasional Soviet submunitions in the course of demining or BAC operations. HALO reports it cleared 9,000 unexploded US submunitions from 2002–2003 and a further 1,780 unexploded submunitions between 2004 and 2008. In the first half of 2009 it cleared 76 unexploded submunitions. Email from Ollie Pile, Weapons and Ammunition Disposal Officer, HALO, 30 June 2009.
Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 992 new casualties in 553 incidents due to mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs in Afghanistan, including 266 people killed and 726 injured. Of these, MACCA recorded 831 casualties in 515 incidents (187 killed and 644 injured). MACCA data did not include information on foreign nationals or on people injured by victim-activated IEDs, as this is a security issue outside the scope of its operations. Landmine Monitor media analysis identified 161 additional casualties from 38 incidents (79 killed and 82 injured), including foreign soldiers from the United Kingdom, US, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Denmark, and Canada (including four military deminers).

The 2008 casualty rate is the first marked increase since 2005 and is due to intensified conflict. This can be seen from the increasing number of civilian casualties in conflict areas such as Kandahar, Helmand, and Ghazni and from the increasing number of military casualties among foreign troops as well as Afghan forces. In 2007, Landmine Monitor identified 842 casualties: 781 through MACCA and 61 through other sources. The average monthly casualty rate of 83 in 2008 is still significantly lower than 172 per month in 2001 or 94 in 2005. Due to ongoing conflict and inaccessibility of the conflict areas, casualties were likely to be under-reported, especially in southern Afghanistan.

Analysis of MACCA casualty data for 2008 shows that most mine/ERW casualties were civilian (704, including three government officials), 51 were deminers, 35 were from the Afghan National Security Forces, and 41 were unknown or “other.” Children constituted 56% of civilian casualties (393); a significant increase from 48% in 2007. Nearly half of the civilian casualties were boys (342, up from 41% in 2007). This can be explained by an increase in ERW incidents among children, particularly boys (up to 33% from 20% in 2007). The number of child casualties deliberately handling the device did not increase. The second largest group was men (280), followed by girls (51), and women (25); the age of six males was unknown.

MACCA reported antipersonnel mines caused 153 casualties, antivehicle mines 125, ERW 474, and unknown devices 25. Due to changes in the data collection mechanism MACCA was unable to provide a more detailed breakdown of types of ERW causing casualties in 2008.

The most common activity at the time of the incident was traveling (139), followed by tending animals (132), playing/recreation (130), unknown (104), and collecting wood/food/water (91). While traveling casualties remained relatively stable compared to 2007 (down to 17% from 20%), more casualties were recorded while carrying out livelihood activities (up to 34% from 27%), possibly due to harsher living circumstances caused by conflict. Only 38 casualties were caused by tampering (40 in 2007). No casualties were reported in three provinces (Daykondi, Farah, and Samangan). Three provinces without casualties in 2007 recorded casualties in 2008 (Nimruz, Nuristan, and Panjshir). Most incidents occurred in the conflict-ridden provinces in the south (227), mostly in Kandahar (130), Helmand (75), and Ghazni (91) in the restive southeastern part of Afghanistan, followed by Kabul (60) and Baghlan (51). Only 21 casualties (3%, similar to 2007) reported receiving mine/ERW RE and 364 stated they had not received

41 Several more US casualties were reported in IED incidents, but insufficient information was available to determine whether these were victim-activated or remote-detonated devices; statistics from www.defenselink.mil.
42 HALO noted that the increase in casualties might also be due to increased recording of people involved in ISAF attacks as ERW casualties and reporting of IED casualties as mine casualties. Email from Tom Dibb, Senior Operations Manager, HALO, 18 August 2009.
43 This total is higher than reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 90, due to the continuous updating of the casualty database. In August 2009, MACCA subsequently revised its total to 777, but this information could not be included in Landmine Monitor since detailed casualty data was not provided for analysis.
45 Email from Deputy Programme Director, MACCA, 20 August 2009.
46 Email from MACCA, 27 May 2009.
RE; for the remaining casualties (446) this information was not known. Some 60% of incidents occurred in areas that were not marked.

ISAF maintained records on IED casualties and noted that the number of victim-activated IED incidents increased sharply compared to 2007. From 1 January to 22 May 2008, ISAF recorded 10 ISAF soldiers and 10 Afghan civilians killed, and 75 ISAF soldiers and 20 civilians injured by victim-activated IEDs. These casualties could not be included in the 2008 casualty total as insufficient information was available for cross-checking.

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009 with at least 177 casualties in 84 incidents as of 31 May (45 killed and 132 injured). MACCA recorded 150 casualties in 78 incidents (29 killed and 121 injured), including 141 civilians, six deminers, and three of unknown status. More than 60% of casualties were children (93), including 83 boys. ERW caused 99 casualties, antipersonnel mines 29, and antivehicle mines 22. Most casualties occurred in Kandahar and Nangarhar (18 each), Kabul (17), and Helmand (14) provinces. Landmine Monitor identified 27 additional casualties in six incidents (16 killed and 11 injured) including 18 Afghan civilians.

Between 1999 and the end of 2008, MACA recorded 12,069 mine/ERW casualties, including 1,612 killed and 10,457 injured. Most casualties occurred in 2001 (2,062), due to conflict and population movements. Fatal casualties appear to be underreported, particularly between 1999 and 2002. At least 5,607 casualties were civilians, 441 deminers and 504 military; the status of 4,793 was unknown and 724 had ‘other’ as status. Most casualties were men (5,555), followed by boys (4,994), girls (642), and women (350).

Of the total, 3,282 casualties were due to antipersonnel mines, 831 due to antivehicle mines, 4,646 due to ERW, and 3,310 due to unknown devices. Only in 1999 did antipersonnel mines cause more casualties than ERW. The percentage of casualties due to unknown devices decreased every year from 32% in 1999 to 13% in 2008. Most antivehicle mine casualties happened in 2007 (155 or 20% of casualties) due to alleged increased use.

MACCA recorded 19,706 casualties between 1979 and 26 May 2009. According to estimates drawn from the 2005 Afghanistan National Disability Survey, Afghanistan has some 52,000 to 60,000 mine/ERW survivors.

Risk profile
People are at risk from both mines and ERW, particularly in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, and new contamination in 2008 increased the risk. Risk activities include traveling, recreation, tending animals, and collecting wood/water/food. Children make up almost half of all casualties.

Socio-economic impact
Although some three-quarters of impacted communities are located in 12 of the country’s 34 provinces, mines and ERW still pose a formidable challenge to the country’s social and economic reconstruction, which is critical for political stabilization. Mine and ERW contamination is particularly concentrated in central and key food-producing eastern provinces, affecting towns and urban commercial areas as well as villages, farm and grazing land, and roads. The ALIS found that the main economic blockages caused by mine/ERW contamination were on pastureland, cropland, and roads. However, the extent of contamination makes battle area clearance and/or demining a prerequisite for most infrastructure and major construction projects.

49 Cluster submunitions casualties were not specified in MACA data due to a change in the recording mechanism. For more information on cluster submunitions casualties in Afghanistan see, Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), pp. 93–103.
50 Email from MACCA, 24 June 2009.
52 MAPA, “National Operational Work Plan 1385 (1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007),” Kabul, 1 April 2006.
Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA), set up by the UN in 1989, has been coordinated by what started as the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA), in 2007 became the Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA), and since January 2009 has been called the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA).

Until 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided the government focal point on mine action.54 A symposium on mine action organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MACA on 10 December 2007 decided that an interministerial board should be set up to provide guidance to MACA and that existing institutions should continue to provide support to the government on mine action until 2013,55 when responsibility for mine action is to be handed over to national ownership.56 The Interministerial Board (IMB) had reportedly met three times as of May 2009 and appointed the Department of Mine Clearance (DMC) to act as its secretariat.57

An interministerial meeting convened by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 16 January 2008 assigned the lead role in mine action to the DMC, a department set up in the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority in 1989, which reports to the Office of the President.58 In May 2008, the DMC set up its offices in MACA’s Kabul headquarters but has continued to be funded through the national budget.59

Until 2009, MACA was responsible for managing, planning, and coordinating all aspects of mine action undertaken by MAPA.60 It updated strategic and operational mine action plans and policies, drew up an annual operational workplan, and coordinated the monitoring of RE. It also accredited and quality assured mine action operators, and was responsible for maintaining the mine action database, resource mobilization, support to and coordination of implementing partners, and oversight of national mine action standards.61 In 2008, MACA established a body to manage contracts with implementing partners on behalf of the UN Mine Action Service Voluntary Trust Fund.62 The DMC has increasingly become the interface between MACCA and other government departments.

In the Afghan year 1388 (1 April 2009–30 March 2010), MACCA and the DMC have joint responsibility for coordinating all mine action activities. The DMC, with 15 staff, was due to take over responsibility for accrediting mine action organizations, coordinating external quality assurance, acting as lead coordinator for RE with the Ministry of Education, and preparation of Afghanistan’s Article 7 reports, working with existing staff at MACCA.63 The MAPA 1388 workplan also provided for the possibility of setting up a contracting entity within the DMC, the development of transition plans for mine action and the Interministerial Board, and the preparation of a capacity development plan for the DMC.64

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55 Email from MACA, 30 April 2008.
56 MAPA, “1388 Integrated Operational Plan” (Version 1.0), Kabul, 20 October 2008, p. 61. Hereinafter, this document is referred to as the “1388 Integrated Operational Plan.”
57 Interview with MACCA and Abdul Haq Rahim, Director, DMC, Kabul, 18 May 2009. A GICHD assessment of MACA based on a staff mission in June 2008 reported that up to that date the IMB had met only once.
58 Interviews with MACA, Kabul, 25 May 2008; and interview with Abdul Haq Rahim, DMC, Kabul, 26 May 2008.
60 Thus, commercial clearance, which MACCA does not contract directly, and demining by ISAF are outside of its purview.
62 Email from MACCA, 23 June 2009.
63 Interview with MACCA and Abdul Haq Rahim, DMC, Kabul, 18 May 2009; and emails from MACCA, 31 March 2009 and 20 August 2009.
However, a European Union (UN) evaluation, which issued its report in April 2009 (see Program evaluations section below) noted a “lack of clarity” about MACCA’s role as the agency coordinating the MAPA. It also found “several reasons to be concerned with this process and to question the capacity and commitment of the DMC to assume the current role of the MACCA.” It noted that the relationship between the MACCA and DMC had not been clarified in a Memorandum of Understanding, or formally detailed in any other way.65

MACCA has seven Area Mine Action Centers (AMACs) in Gardez (Southeast), Herat (West), Jalalabad (East), Kabul (Central), Kandahar (South), Kunduz (Northeast), and Mazar-e-Sharif (North). Staffed entirely by Afghans, the AMACs coordinate, oversee, and monitor demining activities at the regional and provincial levels. The regional offices also work directly with communities, UN offices, government representatives, and development organizations to ensure that operations are coordinated and meet local needs.66 Regional coordination meetings are held once a month and national coordination meetings are held every one or two months.67

**Risk education**

MACCA is the coordinating body for mine/ERW RE, and coordinates at a regional level through the seven AMACs.68 They provide implementing agencies with data, with which they then develop their own plans based on MACCA’s priorities. MACCA also monitors the activities69 and holds quarterly technical working group meetings, attended by all RE implementing organizations.70 Monthly coordination meetings are also held at the AMACs.71 MACCA’s international staff provides technical support to their national counterparts at MACCA and the AMACs.72 Handicap International (HI) reported that coordination between ministries and MACCA has increased, and that the capacity of government staff has grown.73 RE is also part of the technical working group for mine action, which includes implementing partners and MACCA personnel.74

**Victim Assistance**

The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MoLSAMD), through its Department of Disabled Affairs and dedicated deputy minister, is responsible for coordination, monitoring, and reporting on disability/VA activities within all relevant ministries and stakeholders.75 In October 2008, the first inter-ministerial meeting on disability issues, led by MoLSAMD, was held to improve government coordination.76 The group meets quarterly and its main mandate is raising awareness and advocating for inclusion of survivors/persons with disabilities in government programs.77 The public health and education ministries are also involved.78

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67 Ibid.
68 Email from MACCA, 30 March 2009.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Email from Awlia Mayar, CBMRE Project Manager, HI, 2 April 2009.
72 Email from MACCA, 30 March 2009.
73 Email from Awlia Mayar, HI, 2 April 2009.
74 Interview with Deputy Programme Director, MACA, in Geneva, 29 May 2008.
75 Letter to Landmine Monitor from Prof. Wasi Noor Mohammad, MoLSAMD, 11 June 2008.
77 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by MACCA, 29 March 2009.
Coordination with the disability/VA sector is carried out through various coordinating bodies at the relevant ministries. The most important is the Disability Stakeholder Coordination Group under MoLSAMD. International and national organizations participate regularly in these meetings. The Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) strengthened its coordination mechanisms in 2008 by upgrading the Disability Unit to a department and the informal community-based rehabilitation network to a formal mechanism under the ministry. MACCA provides technical and financial support to the concerned ministries.

Overall, coordination was considered to function relatively well, but the MoPH noted some challenges due to low awareness, frequent changes in the disability structure and weak coordination on how services are distributed geographically. Representatives from disabled people’s organizations (DPO) and survivor organizations noted that coordination with the ministries remained challenging.

Data collection and management
MACCA manages a database that has used the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Version 3. In June 2009, MACCA started a two-month pilot program importing all existing data into IMSMA Version 5 to test the system, while at the same time continuing to maintain its existing database.

Until March 2009, MACCA used a decentralized data entry system in which staff at the AMACs entered clearance data and completion reports provided by operators into the database, and MACCA was responsible for quality control, updating of information, and sending updates to the AMACs. From April 2009, the AMACs continued collecting and verifying clearance data but data entry was undertaken by MACCA staff in Kabul. RE activity reports are also provided to MACCA and entered into IMSMA.

Casualty data collection in Afghanistan remains incomplete due to the security situation, communication constraints, unequal coverage, and the time needed to centralize information. Data collectors estimate under-reporting of 10–15%. MACCA is responsible for maintaining and verifying the IMSMA casualty database. Casualty data is collected mainly by the Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS). At the end of 2006, the ICRC handed its casualty database over to UNMACA and handed responsibility for maintaining the data collection network over to the ARCS. The ICRC continued to monitor data collection throughout 2007. In Kandahar, HI is an important source of casualty data. An EU evaluation of the mine action program noted that ARCS data collection deteriorated in 2008 because of the ICRC withdrawal.
### Mine action program operators

<table>
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</table>
The MACCA database contains standardized and detailed information on personal details, device type, activity, incident location, RE provision, and marked areas. Unlike the ICRC database, no detail on sustained injuries is recorded, nor does the database contain information on services received. The data is not complete as it does not contain information on casualties among foreign troops or victim-activated IED casualties (with the exception of 2007) and, since 2008, reduced device type detail. The EU evaluation noted that MACCA needs to analyze its data better for RE and other purposes.91

**Plans**

*Strategic Mine Action Plan*

The core objectives of MACCA plans are to achieve the goals set out in the Afghan Compact which the government agreed with international donors in 2006 and Afghanistan’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.92 The workplan for Afghan year 1388 (1 April 2009–31 March 2010) targets, in order of priority:

- the “killing zones” (communities that have recorded casualties every year since 2003);
- high-impact districts and communities;
- suspected hazardous areas with victims recorded in the ALIS;
- small hazards (less than 5,000m²);
- all hazards within 500m of the center of a community;
- medium-impacted communities;
- mountain-top and flat land that did not fit the categories above;
- donor priorities, including areas with cultural or other benefits;
- demining organization priorities (funded bilaterally);
- non-classified hazards that need further investigation; and
- highly contaminated districts, focusing on those most heavily impacted.93

The 1388 workplan calls for clearance of 946 mine/ERW hazards covering 128.7km² and affecting 484 communities, and “release by technical survey” of a further 75.2km². Nearly three-quarters of the hazards (73%) and of the estimated area for clearance (71%) are located in the central area (around Kabul) and the northeast of the country. The plan aims to free a total of 320 communities and nearly 80,000 affected families from mine/ERW hazards. It also includes 51 hazards whose clearance will allow MACCA to declare 29 districts free of hazards.94

MACCA has also drawn up plans, and was seeking funding, for two additional projects: a US$5 million project to clear 107 hazardous areas within Kabul city limits, covering just under 7km² of land which are unavailable for housing and pasture but are badly needed by the city’s fast expanding population; and a $40 million, two-year community-based demining project to completely clear four eastern provinces (Kunar, Laghman, Nangahar, and Nuristan). MACCA was also preparing a third project to propose to donors for the complete clearance of Ghazni city, southwest of Kabul, which is to be the Islamic City of Culture in 2013.95

MACCA’s three year (2007–2009) internal RE plan is updated annually. A new plan for 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 has been developed.96 Areas are prioritized for RE on the basis of: incidents, proximity to minefields, previous RE coverage, and presence of recent returnees and internally displaced peoples (IDPs).97 LIS data, which has been refined over the years, supports prioritization.98

93 There are four districts in Afghanistan with more than 75 SHAs within the district boundaries.
95 Telephone interview with MACCA, 18 June 2009; and email from MACCA, 23 June 2009.
96 Email from MACCA, 30 March 2009.
97 Ibid; and interview with Deputy Programme Director, MACCA, in Geneva, 29 May 2009.
98 Interview with Deputy Programme Director, MACCA, in Geneva, 29 May 2009.
Victim assistance

The long-term strategy, “The Way Ahead,” set the following goal for VA: “The End Goal for Mine/ERW survivor assistance will be achieved when mine/ERW survivors are reintegrated into Afghan society, with support provided through a national system that incorporates the rights and needs of people with disabilities.” 99

In the second half of 2008, the Afghanistan National Disability Action Plan 2008–2011 (ANDAP)—prepared by MoLSAMD with extensive stakeholder consultation100—was approved by the government.101 Development of this plan started as part of Afghanistan’s commitment to the 2004 Nairobi Action Plan but it has become the de facto workplan for the disability sector (see below).

While a sophisticated mechanism was developed to monitor every objective in ANDAP, monitoring of this scope was found to be beyond MoLSAMD’s capacity. ANDAP will be monitored in accordance with the relevant indicators of the development strategy.102 MACCA supports MoLSAMD in building monitoring capacity.103 The MoPH started collecting rehabilitation statistics in 2008 to improve referral.104

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Afghanistan has the oldest and largest mine action program in the world. It reports that between 1988 and 2006 the MAPA cleared 12,000 minefields, 300,000 landmines, and more than seven million ERW.105 It also increased its financial support for mine action. In 2008, the government committed $2.6 million to clearance of an area targeted for Chinese investment in copper mining.106

A Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) report summarized the government’s view of mine action as “a moderately high priority but…it’s not broken so there’s no need to fix it.” The report observed “the government has never had to make a collective decision concerning mine action, and its political will has not been tested.”107

Between 2005 and 2009, Afghanistan has gradually increased national ownership of VA/disability issues, with the Deputy Minister for Disability Affairs stating that “some of the most significant achievements have been in the transition of responsibility for victim assistance from the UN to the Government of Afghanistan.”108 Increased involvement started in 2006 and continued with subsequent organizational reinforcements in 2007.109 MACCA believed that activities of VA/disability operators have “become more prominent” and “the services they provide are considered important if not priorities among the public sector.”110

The situation of survivors has not changed significantly despite increased attention to VA/disability. One major achievement was the increased participation of persons with disabilities and their organizations in planning. But DPOs added that survivors were not included more

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102 Interview with Deputy Programme Director, MACCA, in Geneva, 26 May 2009; and responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fiona Gall, Senior Technical Advisor and Amin Qanet, CBR Senior Technical Officer, SCA, Kabul, 4 May 2009; and DAO, 18 June 2009.
103 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by MACCA, 29 March 2009. A first ANDAP progress report was planned for March 2010 (the end of Afghan year 1388).
104 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
105 Statement of Afghanistan, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008. As of July 2009, MACCA reported over 18,000 minefields had been cleared together with more than 470,000 antipersonnel landmines, 27,000 antivehicle mines, and 11 million ERW.
frequently in social, political, cultural issues or employment and that negative attitudes persisted.\textsuperscript{111}

An EU evaluation noted that VA was among the “less effective” of MACCA’s program areas.\textsuperscript{112} The evaluation noted that VA under MACCA coordination “seemed overly focused” on policy and awareness-raising and that “for mine survivors it is unlikely that such initiatives will generate much in the way of tangible benefits in the short term.” It added that in MACCA planning there was insufficient focus on “practical skills training and income generation measures.”\textsuperscript{113} MACCA disagreed with this recommendation.\textsuperscript{114}

**National management**

Current planning provides for transition to full national responsibility for mine action by 2013 and MACCA’s workplan for 1388 provided for MACCA to draw up a draft transition plan and to work with the Inter Ministerial Board on a plan to develop the role of the DMC. MACA appointed an Afghan as the program director for the MAPA for the first time in June 2007 and has progressively nationalized senior staff posts.\textsuperscript{115} By 2009, MACCA employed 14 international staff, down from 23 the previous year.\textsuperscript{116}

The EU evaluation, however, said the “key stumbling block” to the transition was that the government “has little or no interest in owning either the problem of, or solution to, ERW contamination in Afghanistan.” It added MACCA’s Afghan implementing partners also expressed no interest in changing the status quo. It concluded: “Until these issues are resolved talk of transition is largely meaningless.”\textsuperscript{117}

A GICHD assessment in 2008 reported “some progress” in bringing Afghans into decision-making positions and promoting national ownership but also observed that “the DMC presently has little capability and unknown commitment.” The DMC’s endorsement as the focal point for mine action was the result of an ad hoc process which may not represent the final position of the government, and that a broader institutional framework had not been agreed. The report said MACCA should assess whether DMC personnel had the basic skills and commitment and if the DMC’s senior management included a “champion for change.” If not, GICHD recommended “the UN should not waste time and money on capacity development support until changes are agreed.”\textsuperscript{118}

VA has been integrated in the disability work of MoLSAMD, MoPH, the Ministry of Education (MoE), and in relevant development plans. Coordination structures and disability departments and mechanisms have been set up in the three ministries and reinforced in 2008.\textsuperscript{119} A Deputy Minister for Disability Affairs was appointed at MoLSAMD in August 2008 which, according to MACCA, was “critical to address issues related to social and economic reintegration, and to keep disability on the radar of other ministries and, hopefully, begin better resource mobilization and monitoring of activities.”\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{111} Email from AABRAR Jalalabad office, 23 June 2009; responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by DAO, 18 June 2009; and Nasem Khan Ali Yar, Senior Coordinator, ALSO, Kabul, 25 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{112} Paul Davies and Bruce Todd, “Mid Term Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan – Final Report,” EU, April 2009, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, p. 39.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid, p. 63.

\textsuperscript{115} Email from Deputy Programme Director, MACCA, 20 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{116} Interview with MACCA, Kabul, 18 May 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{117} Paul Davies and Bruce Todd, “Mid Term Evaluation of the Mine Action Programme in Afghanistan – Final Report,” EU, April 2009, p. 27.


\textsuperscript{120} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by MACCA, 29 March 2009.
Despite this, MoLSAMD still lacked capacity to coordinate VA and monitor implementation; it was also heavily dependent on external funding. MoLSAMD traditionally focused on payment of pensions and had little budget for other services, such as education and employment. Funding challenges were common among all relevant ministries. The unstable political context also hampered the functioning of the ministries. ANDAP will assist in achieving the Afghanistan National Development Strategy. Implementation of ANDAP is largely left to non-governmental operators (see below). National NGOs were taking on more substantial roles in implementation but also in training and support to DPOs. Two of the largest disability operators in Afghanistan, the ICRC and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), noted that no end dates were envisioned for their support. The ICRC reported that Afghanistan was the only country in which it “had completely assumed the task of ensuring access to rehabilitation services.” SCA added there was no end date because “there are a few actors working in the field of disability and, for the time being, the government is also not in a position to take over services nor are DPOs in a position to support all advocacy activities.”

National mine action legislation
The DMC, created in 1998 as a department of the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority, was seeking a presidential decree confirming the status and lead role assigned to it by the interministerial symposium in January 2008. The DMC also resumed discussions in 2009 with the Ministry of Justice on a draft mine action law it first submitted in 2006. National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
MACA conducted a review of national mine action standards (AMAS) from 2006–2007 to ensure consistency with a new concept of operations and restructuring of demining teams. In 2007, MACA also developed a specific chapter of the AMAS to deal with systematic handover of cancelled or otherwise released land to end users. In 2008, amendments to eight chapters of the AMAS, including a rewritten chapter on quality management, were reviewed by a Review Board, made up of representatives of MACCA, international and national NGOs, and international and national commercial companies. There are national standards for RE based on the International Mine Action Standards.

Program evaluations
An EU evaluation said that overall, mine action “represents an extremely successful sector of international development aid programming in Afghanistan” with a track record of delivering results and highly regarded by a wide range of stakeholders. It noted that innovations such as community-based demining “may make mine action even more strategically important” as one of the few international aid interventions capable of working in areas where insecurity is high. As a result it recommended the EU “substantially increase funding” for mine action, “perhaps by 100%.”

121 MoLSAMD Disability Support Unit, “Disability Stakeholders Coordination Group (DSCG) – Meeting Minutes,” Kabul, 21 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fiona Gall and Amin Qanet, SCA, 4 May 2009.
122 MoLSAMD Disability Support Unit, “Minutes of the DCG meeting,” Kabul, 8 October 2008.
124 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by MACA, 30 April 2008.
126 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fiona Gall and Amin Qanet, SCA, 4 May 2009.
127 Interview with MACCA and Abdul Haq Rahim, DMC, 18 May 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 92.
129 Email from MACA, 30 April 2008.
130 Emails from MACCA, 18 May and 17 June 2009.
131 Email from MACCA, 30 March 2009.
The evaluation said MACCA was “adding more value to the MAPA by better analysis of the mines problem as recorded in the national database, and is co-ordinating a more intelligently crafted solution that is driven far more by qualitative factors than ever before.” It described the 1388 annual workplan as “the most systematically intelligent planning process at national programme level observed anywhere in the global mine action industry, possibly to date.”

Part of its success was that national operators were developing their own workplans, breaking a past “culture of dependency” on the UN. “MACCA now sees its role as ensuring that the IPs [implementing partners] are working towards a common strategic vision, represented in progress towards the mine action benchmarks, with responsibility on the staff of the IPs to come up with detailed operational plans in support of the national programme vision.”

The evaluation found mine action “much improved” by operational reforms since 2006, but it also flagged a number of significant concerns. It observed that many national operators lacked the ability and confidence to fulfil the role of full service providers under the new concept of operations and suggested that this could affect safety. The evaluation found “unacceptable” that at least 48 demining accidents were reported by MACCA among Afghan implementing partners in 2008. It also drew attention to problems of missed mines and incidents on previously cleared land. It said MACCA had not responded to requests for information, seemed “defensive” about holding an open review of operational quality standards, and seemed “torn between defending the operational standards of the (implementing partners)...and admitting there is a quality problem.” The evaluation recommended quality assurance should be outsourced to a technically competent agency not operating in Afghanistan.

A GICHD assessment in 2008 said MACA and MAPA organizations “have, collectively great capacity to address contamination problems but also to make more substantial contributions to peace building, reconstruction and poverty reduction.” The report noted that “years of paternalism and micro-management by MACA has stunted some of the capabilities of the Afghan NGOs,” but it concluded MACA had a strong management team which had initiated “excellent” reforms, although it still did not have, and should formulate, a formal, written strategy and medium-term plan.

An evaluation by an independent consultant of MACCA’s post-demining impact assessments (PDIA) found that the Landmine Impact Assessment Teams (LIATs) which conduct PDIA were “conscientious” but also “mechanical.” The report found “information collection analysis and use are still very much top-down processes. They are focused on satisfying donors and headquarters that targets have been reached and money has been well spent, rather than checking that operations are on the right track.” LIATs stuck closely to questionnaires and were more comfortable with figures than community interaction and social impact assessment. AMAC staff, to whom LIATs reported, did not appear to receive information about what percentage of cleared land was not being used and why, and no shift was apparent to community involvement in operational planning and priority-setting.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

In 2008, some 8,000 Afghans worked for organizations coordinated by MACCA. These included five Afghan NGOs: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog

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133 Ibid, p. 15.
134 Ibid, p. 16.
135 Ibid, pp. 32–33.
138 Ibid, p. 15.
139 Ibid, pp. 16–18.
Centre (MDC), and Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR); and two international NGOs, Danish Demining Group (DDG) and HALO Trust. There were also 11 commercial companies operating in 2008, including four Afghan companies (Afghan Campaign for Landmines, Hemayatbrothers Demining International, Kardan Demining Group, and National Demining Support Services); and seven international companies (ArmorGroup, DynCorp International, EOD Technology, MineTech International, RONCO, The Development Initiative—TDI, and UXB International).

Since UNMACA introduced a new concept of operations in November 2006, demining has undergone substantial reform. Operators restructured demining teams into smaller units gaining greater operational flexibility and switched from two to one-person, one-lane drills; all operators were trained for survey, which previously had been conducted exclusively by one NGO, MCPA, and under a policy of regionalization, NGOs concentrated assets in particular geographic areas.140

In 2008, MACA introduced a Request for Proposals system for competitive bidding by NGOs and commercial operators for clearance contracts awarded by UNOPS, in an effort both to increase annual clearance and raise efficiency. ArmorGroup won one contract for clearance of a 7km² airfield at Shindand in western Herat province and completed it.141 MineTech won a contract for clearance in two locations in Badghis province, but was unable to complete work for what, according to MineTech and MACA, were security reasons. MineTech was assigned a smaller contract close to Herat which was completed in July 2009.142 As of June 2009, MACCA had not issued any further Requests for Proposals.

MACA also promoted community-based demining (CBD) in 2008 in order to mobilize clearance capacity in areas deemed too insecure to deploy NGO or commercial operators. MACCA planned to employ CBD in 43 communities in southern and eastern Afghanistan, including parts of Ghor, Helmand, Kandahar, Kunar, Nimruz, Paktia, and Zabul provinces.143 By May 2009, three NGOs had set up a total of 13 CBD teams: three supported by OMAR in Kunar province; two supported by MDC in Uruzgan; and eight teams backed by DAFA in Lashkargah in Helmand province.144 Quality management of the Kunar CBD was conducted by AMAC Eastern area and for Helmand and Uruzgan by AMAC Southern area. In June 2009, OMAR started operations by four CBD teams in Ghor, and MCPA started six teams operating in Kandahar.145

Identification of hazardous areas

The ALIS, completed in January 2005 and certified by the UN on 30 September 2005, provided a basis for significantly refocusing mine action. The survey identified 2,368 mine and UXO-impacted communities and 4,514 SHAs, of which 718 (16%) were high-impact, 1,055 (23%) medium-impact, and 2,741 (61%) low-impact.146 As a result of the survey, the total SHA in the MACA database fell by 15%, from 850km² to 715km².147

The ALIS also found that all but two of Afghanistan’s 32 provinces (Daykondi and Uruzgan) were mine-affected, but three-quarters of SHAs—and of recent casualties—were located in only 12 provinces, and half the SHAs were located in just six provinces, led by Kabul.148 Moreover, 45% of recent casualties recorded by the survey were in the three provinces of Kabul, Parwan, and Takhar.

141 Email from MACCA, 18 May 2009; and interview with Rob Hallam, Country Manager, ArmorGroup, Kabul, 18 May 2009.
142 Email from MACCA, 18 May 2009; interview with Bobby de Beer, Program Manager, MineTech, Herat, 19 May 2009; and email from Deputy Programme Director, MACCA, 20 August 2009.
144 Email from MACCA, 18 May 2009. In three months (16 December 2008 to 12 March 2009) the CBD teams cleared a total of 242,754m² of mined areas and 173,799m² of battle areas, with the destruction of 42 antipersonnel mines and 4,369 items of UXO.
145 Email from MACCA, 18 May 2009.
147 Ibid, pp. 8–9.
148 Ibid, pp. 19–26; and email from unnamed program officer, UNMAS, 20 July 2006. Kabul accounted for 313 affected communities (13% of affected communities), 155 SHAs (18%), and 420 recent victims (19%).
A polygon survey—more accurate delineation of the perimeter of a SHA—by HALO in its area of operations in 2007 identified 32km² of affected land not included in the ALIS, but enabled HALO to reduce previously identified suspected hazardous areas by an average of 40%. Those outcomes led MACA to proceed with polygon surveys in most of the rest of the country in 2008–2009, employing HALO and MCPA survey teams. MACCA rated 79 districts inaccessible for security reasons and planned polygon surveys in a total of 150 districts. HALO and MCPA deployed eight survey teams each and by mid-2009 had completed 123 districts. Surveys in a further 16 districts were suspended for security reasons leaving 27 to be completed, expected by the end of 2009.

MACCA reported in April 2009 that polygon surveys had resulted in a 9% reduction in the total estimated SHA. However, 624 minefield reports submitted by HALO in July and early August 2009 revealed 337 previously unrecorded minefields, adding 20km² to the total hazardous area in the IMSMA database. As of August 2009, MACCA had a further 200 mined area and 144 battle area reports to process. These included some resurveyed areas but MACCA expected would result in a further increase in the estimated hazardous area.

Mine and battle area clearance in 2008

Despite operational constraints resulting from deteriorating security, total clearance rose by 10% in 2008, partly a result of improved planning and management resulting in more focused operations and improved efficiency on the part of Afghan implementing partners. The amount of mined area cleared was 87% higher than the previous year, pushed up by big increases in clearance by all the demining NGOs, particularly HALO and MDC, but battle area clearance was down by 18% over the previous year. An additional 85km² was released through area reduction or cancellation (see table below).

Armed opposition and criminal groups have inflicted losses on demining operators in the past two years. After three MDC deminers were shot dead in southern Kandahar province in September 2007, seven more deminers were killed in March 2008: five from Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) were shot in northern Jawzjan province, and two MDC deminers were killed in Kunduz province. Demining operators also lost vehicles and equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars in attacks or raids by insurgent or criminal groups. Security threats have prompted commercial companies to stop moving personnel and assets by road and to use air transport, substantially raising operating costs.

Direct attacks on deminers appeared to diminish in 2009, but three security guards and a MineTech logistics clerk were killed and a driver injured in an attack by insurgents or criminals as they left a MineTech demining site near Herat on 28 May. MineTech concluded the attack was well planned and had targeted international staff working at the site. In July, gunmen kidnapped 16 deminers working for MDC in eastern Paktia province but released them reportedly without any ransom payment after the intervention of local community leaders. DDG experienced two attacks in 2009, the first on 15 July when gunmen fired two rocket-propelled grenade rounds and small arms at a DDG compound in Balkh province and the second on 20 July when two gunmen opened fire at deminers returning from a clearance site, fatally wounding a group supervisor. Initial assessments concluded the attacks were random and had not targeted DDG. A HALO truck suffered damage in a vehicle-activated IED explosion on 20 May 2009 as it delivered ammunition for destruction to a site outside Kabul. Staff in the

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150 Emails from MACCA, 18 June 2009; and from MACCA Deputy Programme Director, 20 August 2009.
151 Email from MACCA, 31 March 2009.
152 Email from Deputy Programme Manager, MACCA, 20 August 2009.
154 Interviews with commercial clearance companies, Kabul, 17–22 May 2009.
157 Telephone interview with Pi Tauber, Program Assistant, DDG, 12 August 2009.
vehicle suffered only light injuries. Only HALO was using that site and it therefore assumed it was the target.  

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<th>Battle area clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
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<td>3.12</td>
<td>5,093</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>68,718</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RONCO</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12,026</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXB</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,079</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>51.53</strong></td>
<td><strong>120.43</strong></td>
<td><strong>84,057</strong></td>
<td><strong>922</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,177,237</strong></td>
<td><strong>66.46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clearance capacity is concentrated among NGOs, with about 8,000 deminers in total. HALO, the biggest operator in Afghanistan, had increased capacity to 3,200 personnel as of April 2009 (from 2,800 in 2007). It deployed 98 demining teams, 29 mechanical teams, 12 battle area clearance (BAC) teams, nine explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, and eight survey teams, working in western Herat province, in the north and in the vicinity of Bagram. HALO accounted for two-thirds of the mines and more than half (54%) of UXO cleared through demining operations in 2008 (see table above). It also had 16 weapons and ammunition disposal (WAD) teams and seven WAD survey teams, which destroyed a further 62,925 antipersonnel mines, 435 antivehicle mines, and 1.1 million items of UXO. The other international NGO, DDG with a total staff of 540 in 60 sections, shifted operations from western to northern Afghanistan as part of MACA’s regionalization strategy. It also completed cross-training of its field staff for manual demining, BAC, and EOD.

159 Email from MACCA, 31 March 2009.
160 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 5 May 2009.
161 Email from Clinton Smith, Country Program Manager, DDG, 19 May 2009.
Among Afghan NGOs, ATC remained the biggest operator with 48 demining teams in 2008, together with eight EOD teams and nine mechanical demining units concentrated in central and southeastern Afghanistan. Its demining teams cleared 45% more land in 2008 than in 2007, but conducted less BAC.\textsuperscript{162} MDC operated with 1,260 staff in 32 mine detection dog (MDD) groups (128 MDD), five demining teams, two EOD teams, and six mechanical units, working in the south and southeast.\textsuperscript{163} OMAR, with 29 manual demining teams, two EOD teams, six mechanical demining units, and three mine detection dog (MDD) sets, focused on operations in western and eastern Afghanistan, also increased the area demined manually by 45%.\textsuperscript{164} MCPA, with 490 staff making up 18 demining teams (including six community-based), two EOD teams, three mechanical units, and five MDD sets, focused on clearance in the south and southeast,\textsuperscript{165} while DAFA, with 32 demining teams, three mechanical units, and three MDD sets, also operated in the south.\textsuperscript{166}

DynCorp International, with 16 international and 172 national staff, managed seven Conventional Weapons Destruction teams set up in 2008 on behalf of the US Department of State’s Weapons Removal and Abatement Program. Three teams operated in Herat on tasks assigned by the Afghan Ministry of Defense. The others operated in the northern provinces of Baghlan, Kunduz, and Samangan, undertaking village clearance tasked by the regional AMAC, but threats against its security prompted the team in Baghlan to move to Kunduz.\textsuperscript{167}

Other commercial companies mainly undertake clearance to support infrastructure development such as roads, airfields, power lines, and military and police installations. RONCO has some 700 staff working at Bagram airbase under a contract to the US Air Force renewed in 2008 for four years and some 365 staff, including 10 expatriates, who in 2008 undertook contracts for the US Army Corps of Engineers and NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency.\textsuperscript{168} ArmorGroup cleared 4.5km\textsuperscript{2} in Shindand airfield under MACA’s Request for Proposals program.\textsuperscript{169} Among Afghan commercial companies, Hemayatbrothers Demining International (HDI), employing some 200 staff, undertook clearance and BAC in support of construction projects in Farah, Kunduz, and Uruzgan provinces and in April 2008 started a contract for clearance around Bagram airfield.\textsuperscript{170}

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2013 (which falls within Afghan Year 1391). This obligation is a key influence in Afghanistan’s strategic planning. The Afghan Compact of 2006 set the target of clearing 70% of hazards and contaminated areas by 2010, and The Way Ahead draft strategy for mine action released in 2006 set the target of completing clearance of all known mined areas by 2013.\textsuperscript{171}

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Afghanistan said it had made “strenuous efforts to improve all aspects of our organization and operation so that we might achieve our vision of a mine-free Afghanistan by 2013.”\textsuperscript{172} At the intersessional Standing Committee meeting six months later Afghanistan estimated the cost of completion at just over $500 million. Afghanistan

\textsuperscript{162} Interview with Kefayatullah Eblagh, Director, ATC, Kabul, 18 May 2009.  
\textsuperscript{163} Email from Shah Wali Aybui, Executive Operations Manager, MDC, 9 July 2009.  
\textsuperscript{164} Email from MACCA, 31 March 2009.  
\textsuperscript{165} Interview with Haji Attiqullah, Director, MCPA, Kabul, 18 May 2009.  
\textsuperscript{166} Email from MACCA, 31 March 2009.  
\textsuperscript{167} Email from Skip Hartberger, Task Order Project Manager, DynCorp International, 4 July 2009. DynCorp reports that clearance data provided by MACCA includes only results of its three northern teams and that its teams cleared 160,833m\textsuperscript{2} of battle area, and destroyed 420,077 items of UXO.  
\textsuperscript{168} Interview with Peter Williams, Operations Manager, RONCO, Kabul, 17 May 2009.  
\textsuperscript{169} Interview with Rob Hallam, ArmorGroup, Kabul, 17 May 2009.  
\textsuperscript{170} Email from Hizbullah Abid, Program Manager, HDI, 3 June 2009.  
\textsuperscript{171} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 84.  
stated, “We have the technical ability to achieve this goal. Our only barrier is sufficient funds to get the job done.”

Progress towards mine action benchmarks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of hazards</td>
<td>10,175</td>
<td>6,502</td>
<td>3,944</td>
<td>7,123</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>10,175</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazard area (km²)</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the past nine years, demining organizations have cleared more than 250 km² of mined area and 837 km² of battle area (see table below), but continuing new discoveries of contamination have hampered progress towards achieving targets. The area of estimated contamination rose from 656 km² at the end of March 2009 to 668 km² at the end of July as a result of adding in hazards discovered in the course of the polygon survey (see Identification of hazardous areas section above). At the end of May 2009, MAPA estimated it had achieved 89% of the Compact target, 62% of the Mine Ban Treaty target in relation to hazards, and 60% of the Compact target and 42% of the treaty target in relation to area. By the end of July, after processing polygon survey results, MACCA estimated it was about halfway to achieving the Compact targets and had completed 39% of hazards and 35% of the hazardous area due to be cleared to meet Afghanistan’s treaty obligations, lower than the levels reported in April 2008.

Clearance Activities from 2001–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>Other land release (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>51.53</td>
<td>121.10</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>27.51</td>
<td>148.83</td>
<td>78.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>25.93</td>
<td>107.69</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>39.72</td>
<td>99.49</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>21.78</td>
<td>69.23</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>16.65</td>
<td>53.42</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>27.47</td>
<td>76.83</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15.70</td>
<td>81.25</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000*</td>
<td>24.00</td>
<td>80.00</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>250.29</td>
<td>837.84</td>
<td>213.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Numbers for 2000 are approximate only.

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174 Email from Deputy Programme Director, MACCA, 20 August 2009.
175 Interview with MACCA, Kabul, 18 May 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 84. Comparable figures for end March 2009 were 81% and 54% respectively. Interview with MACCA, Kabul, 18 May 2009.
176 Email from Deputy Programme Director, MACCA, 20 August 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 84.
Risk Education

In 2008, MACA reported that more than 1.4 million Afghans received RE, of which over 40% were women and 70% were children. RE interventions are focused on antivehicle mines and ERW. By the end of 2008, more than 68% of the 428 high-impact communities targeted for RE had been reached. In addition, 202,239 returnees were provided with RE. RE teams also visited areas with medium- and low-impact communities during 2008 based on requirements.

A successful radio campaign was also implemented.

The Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) is the biggest implementer, and has activities in almost every province. The ICRC handed over its RE capacity to the ARCS in 2008.

RE has been integrated into the school curriculum for grades seven to 14 and has been produced in local languages with the support of MACA. The MoE has taken an increased role, providing funding, training staff, and monitoring activities. Disability advocacy is incorporated into RE messages in school and is regarded as a particular success of the program. The Ministry of Interior puts three child protection officers in every province, trained in RE and disability awareness, among other things. Each provincial team trains teachers in affected communities on RE and disability issues.

There is sufficient RE capacity to cover all affected areas, but security problems frequently prevent implementation, with RE personnel sometimes unable to leave their homes, and NGOs taking precautionary measures which slow down implementation. In the south, work was suspended by HI for several months in some districts in 2008. The ARCS has female staff in the south who work in clinics and deliver RE.

New RE training aids were developed, with assistance from AAR Japan, for use by all implementing organizations. The materials are illustrated with photographs, and are suitable for use with people with no or low literacy. The materials also included information on the rights of people with disabilities.

Many agencies submitted clearance requests to MACA. However, MAPA implementing agencies have finite resources and assets and therefore are not able to respond to all requests.

Monitoring was conducted both internally by the implementing organizations and externally by the operations departments of MACA and AMACs, through regular field visits by MACA’s national RE project manager. Feedback from monitoring fed into developing effective training, supplies of materials, and ensuring that the relevant authorities were informed about RE activities. RE in schools was monitored by the MoE.
### Risk Education Activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Operator type</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographical areas</th>
<th>No. of recipients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARCS</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>Direct RE in health clinics for women and community based RE</td>
<td>All country (but limited in areas of high insecurity)</td>
<td>340,174 (118,252 adults and 221,922 children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAR Japan</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Materials development, radio, mobile cinema</td>
<td>Baghlan, Balkh, Bamyan, Faryab, Kabul, Kunduz, Parwan, and Takhar</td>
<td>118 RE/disability awareness radio messages broadcast, 1404 mobile cinema sessions reaching 62,865 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMCC</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Theatre activities for adults and children</td>
<td>Heart, Baghland, Takhar, and Nangahar</td>
<td>95 performances reaching 93,800 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMAR</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE to returnees</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Teacher training for primary schools, Child Protection Officer training, direct RE in communities, emergency response and data collection</td>
<td>All country, except Ghoor province (for security reasons)</td>
<td>16,293 teachers (14,728 male and 1,565 female)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Direct RE to refugees, internally displaced persons, communities, schools, and indirect RE through volunteers and at bus stations to travelers; 92 community committees created</td>
<td>Helmand and Kandahar provinces</td>
<td>287,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE through seven teams</td>
<td>Balkh, Kabul, and Parwan</td>
<td>48,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE through two teams</td>
<td>Central and north</td>
<td>51,917 (8,857 men, 2,831 women, 28,876 boys, and 11,353 girls)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>ERW awareness day in Kabul in April 2008; very limited RE and distributed RE materials</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Overall, MACCA believes that RE is meeting the needs of its target audience and plays a role in reducing incidents, even if it cannot eliminate them completely, although there is a need to continually review the target audience. A gender survey revealed that women valued RE for their children and wished to see it continue. An evaluation of mine action by GICHD in 2008 found that, “The Afghan NGOs have been the principal providers of MRE since the start of mine action in Afghanistan. However, the ‘traditional MRE’ they provide (e.g. direct delivery of MRE in refugee transit points or to communities) is of limited benefit once conflict and population movements have stopped, and is unsustainable as a standalone activity. MRE needs to be more tightly targeted to at-risk groups and delivered through established institutions. Accordingly, MACA has been working effectively with the Ministry of Education and the Afghan Red Crescent Society to provide ‘residual’ MRE services.” An evaluation of the EU’s program for mine action in Afghanistan concluded that, “Mine risk education (MRE) is conceptually weak” and it recommended a further independent review as it was seen as under-performing. It stated that, “MACCA’s MRE department needs to improve its understanding of the problem, and its solution, by investing time in analyzing victim data within the IMSMA database, and trends that this contains.” It recommended that the European Commission (EC) earmark funding for the ARCS and that it may need a technical consultant.

Extensive RE over the last 10 years has been implemented by up to 15 organizations reaching between almost one million and up to 3.5 million people a year. RE has targeted communities in Afghanistan, including internally displaced persons and returning refugees in Pakistan and Iran. In 2002, UNICEF joined the program to provide coordination, technical assistance, and capacity-building to MAPA partners, and the Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META) became responsible for training and monitoring RE organizations and teachers, integrating RE into the school curriculum, and developing materials. In 2006, UNICEF ceased funding RE, and coordination was integrated into UNMACA. RE was coordinated and quality assured by the AMACs.

Several evaluations and surveys have been conducted related to RE. In March 2006, MAPA published a complete RE impact monitoring study based on Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice surveys conducted in 2004 and 2005. The two surveys showed an overwhelming majority of people were fully aware of the dangers of mines/ERW, but were not sure of safe behavior if they found themselves in a minefield. The MAPA also found that knowledge was higher among boys and young men than women and girls, although incidents were increasing among boys. It concluded that, “economic necessity leads to this subconscious ignoring of danger.” Community interviews conducted as part of the ALIS from November 2003 to November 2004 found only 27% of impacted communities in 32 provinces reported receiving RE in the previous 24 months. Six provinces with recent casualties reported no RE activities.

Afghanistan used Form I in its annual Article 7 report to provide information on RE activities from 2005–2009.

195 Ibid.
198 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
203 Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2005; Article 7 Report, Form I, 1 May 2006; Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2007; Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 May 2008; and Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form I.
Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown but is estimated to be between 52,000 and 60,000. In May 2009, Afghanistan stated that despite steady progress and increased commitment, key challenges remained, such as reconstructing health and social services after years of conflict, “increasing employment and education among persons with disability and ensuring the rights of persons with disability are respected.”

Representatives of DPOs noted that, since 1999, there had been “very little improvement” in services, because of the limited number of skilled professionals, and also due to a lack of funding as a result of low donor interest in disability.

As in previous years, the ICRC noted that access to services was hampered by a lack of awareness, professionalism, poverty, distances and transportation difficulties, violence, ethnic and political divisions, and prejudice against disability. Access to services for women was even more problematic due to cultural barriers, the lack of qualified female staff, and reluctance to let women work outside the house.

The MoPH coordinates healthcare through two strategies: the Basic Package of Health Services and the Essential Package of Hospital Services, implementation of which is mostly contracted to NGOs and international organizations. Despite increased coverage of these packages, healthcare in Afghanistan remains among the worst in the world. Increased conflict and attacks on health facilities and staff resulted in more than 600,000 Afghans lacking access to services according to April 2009 estimates by the MoPH. This number is twice as high as estimated in the same period of 2008.

Physiotherapy services are available in 19 provinces and through 14 rehabilitation centers. The lack of services in the remaining 15 provinces is problematic. Although the MoPH coordinates the sector, it only runs one center. In 2008, physical rehabilitation services were included in the MoPH health packages, awareness of the importance of rehabilitation services was raised, and training increased.

Conflict-related mental health problems are common in Afghanistan, including among mine/ERW survivors, and are exacerbated by stigma related to disability. Psychosocial support activities remained limited, despite increased attention by the MoPH through training and the establishment of a Mental Health Unit at the ministry.

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205 Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by DAO, 18 June 2009; and ALSO, 25 June 2009.


209 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Razi Khan Hamdard, MoPH, 2 April 2009.


211 “Growing number of Afghans lack health care – Ministry,” IRIN (Kabul), 7 April 2009.


213 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Razi Khan Hamdard, MoPH, 2 April 2009.


216 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Razi Khan Hamdard, MoPH, 2 April 2009.

States Parties Afghanistan

Stigma and high general unemployment limit the employment prospects of persons with disabilities. SCA noted that, in 2008, employment of persons with disabilities in the government and private sectors had decreased slightly compared to 2007. Unemployment among persons with disabilities was already estimated at 75%, and some 73% did not have access to education. Results of vocational training programs have been disappointing due to a lack of cooperation, funding and infrastructure, poor quality of education, and a lack of employment opportunities afterwards.

Persons with disabilities registered at MoLSAMD receive a pension of AFN300–500 ($6–10) per month depending on the degree of disability. This amount is not considered to be sufficient, and many persons with disabilities are not registered for payments. The National Law for the Rights and Privileges of Persons with Disabilities, developed in 2006, was approved by the parliament at the end of 2008 but still awaited presidential approval at the end of May 2009. As of 1 July 2009, Afghanistan had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UNCRPD), but the convention and supporting documents had been translated into local languages by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. A disability terminology guide was also under development. Several operators noted that the existence of the UNCRPD provided an opportunity to put pressure on the government to support the disability sector. However, the rights of persons with disabilities were generally not ensured due to the lack of a legislative framework.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

Afghanistan is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate assistance for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors. In May 2009, Afghanistan stated that its priorities for VA were: continued implementation of ANDAP (the national disability plan), disability awareness-raising, training and capacity development for implementing agencies, and better mechanisms for coordination, identification of gaps and fundraising. As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Afghanistan first presented its 2005–2009 victim assistance objectives in 2005 and its plan of action in 2006; the latter was revised to become ANDAP in 2007. ANDAP is SMART-er (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) than its predecessors and assigns clear responsibilities. In places, it is also “less ambitious to take into account the particular challenges faced by the disability sector.” Two components, inclusive education and community-based rehabilitation (CBR), were added.

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221 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fiona Gall and Amin Qanet, SCA, 4 May 2009.
March 2009, a third national workshop was held to discuss ANDAP and its implementation. Previous workshops were held in 2006 and 2007. MACA noted that the process leading to the development of the plan had been “very productive,” resulting in the actual plan and increased awareness on the needs, gaps, and challenges faced by both persons with disabilities and government. It further stated that the VA26 process, the informal commitment made by 26 States Parties to work in a more focused manner for achieving actions laid out in the 2005–2009 Nairobi Action Plan, is “not an activity engaged in by the government and is not really understood as a process for evaluation.”

ANDAP was only formally approved in late 2008, and there were delays in translating the plan. Therefore, most stakeholders reported in 2009, as they did in 2008, that they conducted their activities irrespective of the plan. But, as many stakeholders had been involved in the plan’s development, their activities in 2008 contributed to the achievement of a plan.

Overview of progress to June 2009:

- **Data collection:** Casualty data collection continued as in the past and was only hampered by the security situation. The implementation of a monitoring system for ANDAP was not achieved by the end of 2008, although the system was developed and some data is gathered through other mechanisms.

- **Emergency and continuing medical care:** Progress has been made on objectives scheduled for 2009 relating to staff training for emergencies and awareness. This might be due to greater MoPH involvement, but measures were being taken recently to assess their impact. Emergency evacuation abilities and access are likely adversely affected by increased conflict. Most significant objectives have deadlines for 2010.

- **Physical rehabilitation:** Progress was made on capacity-building, awareness-raising, and the regulation of the sector through the integration of physiotherapy in health packages, inclusion of physical rehabilitation in human resource strategies, staff training, collection of service provision statistics, and development of guidelines and curricula. In 2007 objectives were made less ambitious and progress was made mainly by external operators, but more rapid progress in strengthening the sector seems to have been made in 2008 (possibly due to more active MoPH involvement). However, this progress did not yet produce any visible improvement in assistance for survivors.

- **Psychological support and social reintegration:** Except for staff training and disability awareness-raising (particularly women with disabilities), no progress was reported for this part of the plan, although many deadlines were set for the end of 2009. Progress does not appear to have impacted lives of survivors or persons with disabilities (see above).

- **Economic reintegration:** As in previous years, this remained the weakest component and it was acknowledged as such by the government. None of the plan’s objectives appear to be on track.

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237 Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 21 August 2009.
• **Laws and public policy:** Progress has been made in achieving objectives with 2009 completion dates through the development of terminology, increased awareness-raising, implementation of disability benchmarks in the development strategy, and the establishment of resource centers. Making disability a priority issue was having mixed success due to the many competing challenges: similar mixed results are reported for increased DPO capacity and involvement. The two main objectives for 2008—approval of disability legislation and ratification of UNCRPD—have not been achieved, resulting in little de facto change for persons with disabilities (see above).

• **CBR:** In 2008, the CBR network was formalized and strengthened, strategies developed, and a conference bringing together government, NGOs and specialists was held to discuss further expansion and cooperation. It would appear that these objectives (originally elaborated from the physical rehabilitation objectives and with some of the earliest deadlines) are on track for achievement. Except for ongoing NGO activities, no notable progress in inclusive education was reported to Landmine Monitor.

Throughout the reporting period, Afghanistan was actively involved in VA at the international level, assuming the role of co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties. In this capacity, it stated its aim “to lead by example and develop a plan of action to meet the needs of landmine victims and other people with disabilities.” The Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit undertook six process support visits to Afghanistan. Afghanistan included VA/disability experts on its delegation at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held from 2005–2008, and for the meetings of States Parties in 2005, 2006, and 2008, including four deputy ministers and two survivors. Afghanistan provided status updates at all meetings between 2005 and 2009 and reported in detail on its activities in Form J of its Article 7 report throughout the period.

**Victim assistance activities**

There are many stakeholders in the VA/disability sector and MACA said that to its knowledge none ceased their activities in 2008 and it was not aware of new organizations starting. Therefore, only those providing updated information to Landmine Monitor are included below. Information on the others can be found in previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

**Government services**

MoLSAMD, with support from MACA, organized several regional workshops to raise awareness on ANDAP and the rights of persons with disabilities. Some 383 people participated in seven cities.

The newly established Disability and Rehabilitation Department at the MoPH trained 312 medical staff in 10 provinces, 400 graduate medical staff, 20 staff of implementing partners for the Basic Package of Health Services, and eight mobile medical teams assisting Kochi nomads, on disability and physical rehabilitation issues to facilitate access to services. In addition, 44 rehabilitation staff and 20 DPO staff were trained in psychosocial support and 20 surgeons in emergency care. The MoPH further integrated physiotherapy in services of 56 district hospitals, upgraded rehabilitation staff, and held a CBR workshop. The MoPH had a budget of $200,000 for disability in 2008, financed through the EC, MACA, and its own resources, but lacked funding to activate the physical rehabilitation center in Khost.

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241 Ibid.
243 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
244 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Razi Khan Hamdard, MoPH, 2 April 2009.
The MoE included disability awareness in the national school curriculum and 16,293 teachers received disability awareness (and RE) training. The curriculum was reviewed by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, which was also actively involved in awareness raising and production and distribution of materials on the UNCRPD.

**NGO services**

The Afghan Landmine Survivors’ Organization (ALSO), which started activities in 2008, provided peer support and referral services, especially to new survivors or newly disabled persons and their families through regular counseling sessions in several hospitals in Kabul and self-help groups. ALSO was also engaged in advocacy and VA related to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. ALSO invested in improving its organizational structure and planning but is dependent on ad hoc funding.

In 2008, Development and Ability Organization (DAO) provided rights and disability training in 10 provinces for community leaders and officials involved in service provision and for persons with disabilities involved in ANDAP implementation. It produced radio and television programs documenting the abilities and challenges of persons with disabilities. DAO reported providing social reintegration services to survivors and took a lead on developing standard disability terminology for MoLSAMD. As in previous years, the security and funding situation hampered DAO activities.

The Community Center for the Disabled (CCD) provides socio-economic reintegration to persons with disabilities, as well as disability awareness sessions which include RE. With its awareness-raising program it reached 4,800 people in 2008; 779 persons with disabilities received socio-economic services.

In 2008, Afghan Amputee Bicyclists for Rehabilitation and Recreation provided vocational training, basic education, bicycle rehabilitation, physiotherapy, wheelchair and bicycle repair services, sports, as well as training in proposal writing and problem identification in eight provinces. The main challenges to its work were long-term donor commitments and security.

Kabul Orthopedic Organization (KOO) is the only national NGO providing physical rehabilitation and run by a female director. KOO also provides awareness training and a new income-generating project repairing demining equipment for Afghan Technical Consultants. It provided physical rehabilitation to more than its target of 6,000 people in 2008 (7,359 receiving 15,033 services). It treated mostly military casualties and saw this number increase due to intensified conflict. KOO signed an agreement with the Ministry of Defense to provide services to the national army. Its biggest challenge was lack of funding.

The Physical Therapy Institute (PTI) supported by the International Assistance Mission provides professional physiotherapy training and rehabilitation services (to 869 persons with disabilities in 2008). PTI started the new physiotherapy curriculum at the end of May 2008 (18 students) and teachers and clinical staff received upgrade training in December 2008.

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245 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
248 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Omara Khan Muneeb, DAO, 18 June 2009.
250 Email from AABRAR Jalalabad office, 23 June 2009.
252 Jamil Danish, “UNAMA helps to promote leading orthopaedic centre in Kabul,” UNAMA (Kabul), 23 February 2009, p. 3.
students). A psychology manual was developed for inclusion in PTI’s training courses. PTI was also involved in the MoPH-coordinated disability rights training for services providers.\textsuperscript{253}

In 2008, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) continued to expand its comprehensive community-based Rehabilitation of Afghans with Disabilities (RAD) program in 42 districts in 13 provinces. It also started providing technical and financial support to four DPOs. As in 2007, it was challenged in certain provinces, particularly Ghazni, Logar, and Wardak, by the security situation and its limited number of female professionals. SCA-RAD assisted 175,477 persons with disabilities, slightly higher than its target of 166,100.\textsuperscript{254} More services were provided to survivors than in 2007 (27,097 vs. 21,549). The physical rehabilitation component was evaluated by Sandy Gall’s Afghanistan Appeal in 2008 and impact surveys were carried out for the employment and awareness-raising activities. SCA did not face funding challenges in 2008 but had to make some cuts in 2009 due to currency exchange rate fluctuations and increased fixed costs (fuel and supply prices).\textsuperscript{255}

Due to increased conflict in 2008, many areas outside the capitals in southern and eastern provinces were “off-limits” for the ICRC, which relied on local ARCS volunteers. The ICRC supported 12 health facilities and, in cooperation with the ARCS, enhanced referral, first-aid and surgical capacity, as well as hospital security to deal with the increased number of war-injured. It treated 2,388 weapon-injured (1,621 in 2007) and nearly double the number of mine/ERW casualties in 2008 (434 versus 286).\textsuperscript{256} The ICRC also continued to support six rehabilitation centers and the component factory, four non-ICRC rehabilitation centers (with material and training), as well as a socio-economic reintegration project.\textsuperscript{257} Some 66,595 people received physical rehabilitation services and more than 2,300 received socio-economic assistance; 600 persons with disabilities worked in the ICRC centers. The ICRC started a three-year prosthetics and orthotics course in coordination with the MoPH; 16 trainees enrolled (seven women).\textsuperscript{258} One of the main achievements of 2008 for the ICRC rehabilitation program was the increased transfer of managerial responsibilities to national staff, and quality improvements. Due to the increasing number of patients, however, it was challenged to balance quantity and quality of services. While no funding challenges have been encountered in 20 years of operations, the ICRC estimated that difficulties “could appear in the second part of 2009.”\textsuperscript{259}

In 2008 HI continued to expand the following programs in Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, and Helmand: physical rehabilitation and physiotherapy in the Afghan health systems at the national and community levels; developing and replicating models for socio-economic inclusion for people with disabilities; advocating for people with disabilities through lobbying Afghan authorities and supporting local civil society; and implementing community-based RE in the South. Challenges in this work included the volatile security situation, difficulties in monitoring activities, and long recruitment periods for expatriate staff, which cause continuity problems and increased pressure on the teams.\textsuperscript{260}


\textsuperscript{254} In 2007, 181,852 people received services but the decrease is solely due to fewer awareness raising activities.


\textsuperscript{257} Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, ICRC, 21 August 2009.


\textsuperscript{259} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 11 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{260} Email from Sami ul Haq Sami, Advocacy and Awareness Coordinator, HI, 25 August 2009.
### 2008 Victim Assistance Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of organization</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>National/ international</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Number of mine survivors assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALSO</td>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Peer support, advocacy</td>
<td>At least 214 survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCD</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Socio-economic reintegration, advocacy</td>
<td>At least 30 survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAO</td>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Social reintegration, advocacy</td>
<td>At least 1,240 survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Physical rehabilitation, socio-economic reintegration, advocacy, RE</td>
<td>8,019 multiple services provided to survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Medical care, physical rehabilitation, socio-economic reintegration, training, materials</td>
<td>Medical care for 434 mine/ERW casualties, 2,653 prostheses and orthoses for survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Physical rehabilitation, socio-economic reintegration</td>
<td>2,932 survivors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoLSAMD</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Coordination/training</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoPH</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Coordination/training</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTI-IAM</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>National/ international</td>
<td>Physical rehabilitation/training</td>
<td>35 people trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA-RAD</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>International</td>
<td>Data collection, CBR, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support, economic reintegration, inclusive education, advocacy, and capacity-building</td>
<td>27,097 multiple services to survivors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Support for Mine Action

Afghanistan has not reported a comprehensive long-term cost estimate for meeting all its mine action needs. In May 2009, Afghanistan reported that fulfillment of clearance obligations will cost roughly $500 million over a period of five years. The MAPA Integrated Operational Plan for the period from April 2009 to March 2010 includes a budget estimate of $104,028,000, including $11,319,000 for mine action coordination, transition of coordination to government and capacity-building; $90,015,000 for survey and clearance of mines and ERW; and $2,694,000

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261 See paragraphs on relevant organizations above.

for RE field operations. The plan assumes that funds would be raised from sources including the UN Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), bilateral donor contributions directly to implementing partners, and contributions from the government of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s latest Article 7 report states that among its management responsibilities, MACCA is expected to manage mine action implementation using VTF funding on behalf of the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).

### National support for mine action

Afghanistan did not report national funding for mine action in 2008. It reported contributing AFN14,364,447 ($288,725) for mine clearance in 2007. The Integrated Operational Plan for the period from April 2009 to March 2010 states that, “more substantive efforts will be made to further explore and strengthen options for funding humanitarian mine action activities through the Government of Afghanistan.” No reference is made in the plan to commitments from the government of Afghanistan during 2008. In May 2009, Afghanistan reported a commitment by the government of $2,600,000 during 2009 to carry out clearance in support of development of a copper mine.

### International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, 18 countries reported providing $105,070,944 (€71,350,633) to mine action in Afghanistan, approximately 22% more than mine action funding reported in 2007. Annual funding at 2008 levels appears sufficient to meet the requirements stated by Afghanistan for fulfilling its mine action targets. In January 2009, however, MACCA reported that funding to Afghanistan’s mine action program was threatened by the global economic situation. In March 2009, the UN Secretary General’s report on Afghanistan to the Security Council cited a funding shortfall of roughly $53 million in 2009 against requirements to meet the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks.

#### 2008 International Mine Action Support to Afghanistan: In-Kind

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Form of In-Kind Support</th>
<th>Monetary Value (where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>ERW/IED clearance personnel</td>
<td>$1,278,217 (€868,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Mine clearance EOD personnel via ISAF peacekeeping</td>
<td>$773,115 (€525,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,051,332 (€1,393,000)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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263 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by MACA, 23 April 2008.
264 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form A.
269 Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; and Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
## 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Afghanistan: Monetary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>GICHD, UNMAS</td>
<td>Capacity-building, integrated mine action</td>
<td>$26,963,492 (C$28,742,663)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Department of State, Centers for Disease Control</td>
<td>Mine clearance, EOD, BAC, survey, RE, VA, capacity-building</td>
<td>$17,169,000 ($17,169,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>UNMAS, Japan Mine Action Service, OMAR</td>
<td>Mine clearance, EOD, RE</td>
<td>$12,154,529 (¥1,253,044,194)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$7,762,805 (£4,185,929)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>DDG, HALO, MDC</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$7,201,013 (£4,889,999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>UNMAS, DDG</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$7,368,420.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>ICR, UNMAS</td>
<td>VA, mine clearance</td>
<td>$4,447,407 (€3,020,105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Community Clearpath</td>
<td>$4,268,500 (A$5,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$3,460,610 (€2,350,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Survey, mine clearance</td>
<td>$3,537,000 (DKK18,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$3,092,460 (£2,100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>HALO, Service d’enlèvement des engins explosifs (SEDEE-DÔVO)</td>
<td>Mine/ERW clearance</td>
<td>$391,937 (€266,153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$1,519,000 (SEK10,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,178,080 (£800,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Coordination, capacity-building</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$34,673 (CHF37,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$103,019,612 (€69,957,633)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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278 Emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” US Department of State, Washington, DC, July 2009; email from Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department; email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, DIID, 17 March 2009; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; email from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; email from Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; email from Caroline Mulca, Mine Action Coordinator, AUSAID, 22 June 2009; Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; email from Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; email from Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2009; email from Ingunn Valne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; email from Amb. Lars-Erik Wingren, Department for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009; email from David Keating, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2009; email from Daniel Gengler, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2009; email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; email from Stacy Bernard Davis, Public Engagement, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 21 August 2009; and email from Depute Programme Director, MACCA, 20 August 2009.
In addition to the above, New Zealand reported contributing a military liaison officer for mine action from ISAF to MACCA in 2008, but did not report a valuation. The EC reported in the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings that in 2008 it had made a €39 million ($57.4 million) general commitment “to support future action” in a number of states, including Afghanistan. It did not specify the amounts available to individual countries. The EC told Landmine Monitor in June 2009 that the commitment “can be subject to changes” before its final adoption by the EC.

HALO reported receiving funds from Japan, the Netherlands, Finland and the Czech Republic in 2008. None of these donors reported funding directly to HALO in 2008; however, Japan and the Netherlands reported funding to HALO in 2007.

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271 New Zealand Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
273 Email from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, EC, 12 June 2009.
274 Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 18 August 2009. HALO reported $202,000 from the Czech Republic for mine clearance, and unspecified amounts from the other donors. HALO also reported receiving $50,000 from AAR Japan for battle area clearance in 2008.
ALBANIA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 August 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other ERW, abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>747,114m² (as of May 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>0 (2007: 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 August 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Mine clearance: 122,433m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battle area clearance: 94,640m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area reduction: 471,698m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>25,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $5.7 million (2007: $1.2 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National: $300,000 (2007: $235,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary


Albania has made slow but steady progress in demining, and set itself the target of completing clearance of all mined areas and areas with cluster munition remnants by the end of 2009, well within its respective treaty deadlines.

As of May 2009, the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) recorded 272 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (34 killed and 238 injured) since 1999, all in the mine-affected Kukës region. AMAE also recorded a further 510 abandoned explosive ordnance casualties (72 killed and 438 injured) throughout the country. There have been no mine casualties since 2005 and casualties from abandoned ordnance have decreased.

Risk education activities were conducted by the local NGO Victims of Mines and Arms Association–Kukësi in the northeast of the country—the most affected region—and by the Albanian Red Cross in 10 other prefectures. Victim assistance in mine-affected areas improved significantly since 1999, with increased healthcare, rehabilitation, and psychological support. However, laws and public policy on disability were lacking.

Mine Ban Policy

Albania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 8 September 1998 and ratified it on 29 February 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 August 2000. It enacted national implementation legislation in 2006, which includes penal sanctions.¹

Albania submitted its annual Article 7 report in April 2009, covering calendar year 2008. It included voluntary Form J, which provides details on Albania’s victim assistance programs. Albania attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, and made statements on its mine clearance and victim assistance programs. It also announced that Albania would host a regional workshop in October 2009 in preparation of the Second Review Conference. Albania participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, and again made statements on victim assistance and mine clearance.

In August 2009, a Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor that there had not yet been an explicit order to destroy antivehicle mines with breakwires.

Albania is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. As in previous years, it did not submit an annual Article 13 report. Albania is also party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, but, as of June 2009, had not submitted an Article 10 transparency report covering 2008. Albania signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified it on 16 June 2009, becoming the ninth country to ratify the treaty.

Albania completed destruction of its stockpile of 1,683,860 antipersonnel mines on 4 April 2002, more than two years before its treaty deadline, in an internationally funded project carried out under NATO auspices. Albania has opted not to retain any antipersonnel mines for research or training purposes. It stated that “there were no justifiable reasons for the retention of APM [antipersonnel mines] for training or any other purpose.”

Production of antipersonnel mines in Albania was suspended in 1990 and officially ceased in 1991. Albania may have been a minor exporter of antipersonnel mines in the past. The most recent use of antipersonnel mines in Albania was in 1998 and 1999 in the northeast of the country during the Kosovo crisis.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

The northeast of Albania is contaminated by mines and ERW arising largely from the Kosovo crisis of 1998–1999, when forces of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia laid extensive minefields in the border districts of Kukës, Has, and Tropojë. In addition to antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, the area contains unexploded submunitions from at least six NATO cluster munition strikes, which fell within Albanian territory, as well as other UXO resulting from Yugoslav army artillery.

A general survey by the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) in 1999–2000 identified 102 affected border areas totaling some 15km². Following a decade of demining by the AAF and, since 2002, by DanChurchAid (DCA), Albania reported in May 2009 that the hazardous area had decreased

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3 Email from Anila Alibali, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 12 August 2009. Albania said it used the antivehicle mines for the disposal of old ammunition. The ICBL and many States Parties believe that antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes such as breakwires meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine in the Mine Ban Treaty and are therefore prohibited. Email from Lt.-Col. Sami Nezir, Head of Arms Control Section, Ministry of Defense, 20 April 2006; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 127, for more details on Albania’s position on Articles 1, 2, and 3.


5 Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2008.

6 Two production plants were converted to facilities for ammunition demilitarization by 2002. According to the UN, Russian antipersonnel mines found in Kosovo after the 1999 conflict may have been transferred from Albania. For more details on past production, trade, stockpiling and use, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 99–101.

to 743,100 m², comprising 11 mined areas (totaling 269,600 m²) and nine battle areas (totaling 473,500 m²).  

Albania also has a threat from abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). During a period of internal turmoil in 1997, at least 15 army ammunition storage areas were destroyed and looted, leaving tons of dangerous munitions scattered around. The AAF cleared 15 so-called “hot spots,” but incidents caused by AXO persist. Albania’s remaining substantial stocks of obsolete munitions, held in 52 poorly maintained military depots near populated areas, also pose a serious threat. Although Albania reports it has destroyed a large number of munitions in recent years, as of July 2008 it still had about 90,000 tons (90 million kg) of surplus dangerous munitions.

On 15 March 2008, a depot used for demolition of munitions exploded in Gerdec village, in the suburbs of Vora, about 13 km from the capital, Tirana, killing 26 people and injuring 300 others, scattering shells to four other villages and contaminating an area of approximately 3.5 km² with ERW. The explosion reportedly destroyed some 4,200 houses, 32 businesses, and 34 farms, inflicting damage estimated at US$18.75 million (€11.8 million).

Casualties
The Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) recorded no new mine/ERW casualties in 2008. The local NGO Victims of Mines and Arms Association-Kukesi (VMA) reported 44 ERW/explosives casualties in 2008 based on media monitoring; no further details were provided. However, AMAE insists on standardization, verification, and quality management of data before entering casualties into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. No IMSMA forms for casualties occurring in 2008 were submitted to AMAE as of 28 May 2009. This represents a decrease from the 18 AXO casualties recorded by AMAE in 2007 (two killed and 16 injured). The last mine casualties reported were in 2005.

In January 2009, there were two military casualties in one incident involving tampering with AXO. One woman died and one man was injured. Both were on duty at the time. AMAE maintains two databases on casualty information: one recording mine/ERW casualties in the mine-affected Kukës region (including the districts of Kukës, Has, and Tropojë), and the other recording AXO casualties in the whole of Albania. As of May 2009, the AMAE IMSMA database for the Kukës region contained information on 272 mine/ERW casualties (34 killed and 238 injured) since 1999. This included at least 53 casualties from submunitions (10 killed and 43 injured) between 1999 and 2006. The number of living survivors is corrected in the

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8 Interview with Arben Braha, Director, AMAE, in Geneva, 25 May 2009; and telephone interview with Arben Braha, AMAE, 19 June 2009.
14 Email from Jonuz Kola, Executive Director, VMA, 29 May 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 112–113. These casualties have not been recorded in the Landmine Monitor total for 2009.
15 Interview with Dr. Veri Dogjani, AMAE, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
18 Email from Dr. Veri Dogjani, AMAE, 30 April 2009.
Kukës database each time a survivor dies. Another two casualties reported in the media occurred during weapons use and are not included among submunition ERW casualties.20

The Albania-wide AXO casualty data for 1997–2009 included 510 casualties (72 killed and 438 injured).21 Most casualties were students, children, or unemployed adults. The most affected districts were Berat, Gramsh, Kukës, Puke, Shkodër, Tirana, and Vlore.22 AMAE has estimated there are at least 500 AXO survivors in Albania allowing for the possibility of unrecorded casualties.23

**Risk profile**

There have been no mine/ERW casualties since 2005. Prior to this, incidents took place in the northeast. Those most at risk are males intentionally handling AXO and cached explosive weapons. Most AXO casualties between 2005 and 2009 occurred during handling or playing with explosive devices and scrap metal collection.24 Approximately one third of these victims were aged between 15 and 45, and half of the victims were farming, grazing cattle, or on their way to school at the time of their incidents. Police officers have been wounded or killed by mines/UXO while patrolling the border.25

The risk of mines and UXO is also present in other parts of Albania, particularly from munitions stored in poorly maintained military depots. The concerns caused by the explosion in March 2008 also resulted in private arms caches being abandoned, increasing the AXO threat.26

**Socio-economic impact**

Although there have been no mine victims in the northeast for several years, mine contamination is said to have hampered development of infrastructure in this isolated, mountainous, and impoverished area. The contamination has blocked access to land and water resources needed by a population mostly dependent on subsistence farming and animal husbandry.27

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

The Albanian Mine Action Committee (AMAC), an interministerial body formed in October 1999, serves as the “executive and policy making body for mine action” in Albania.28 In 2008, AMAC held a series of meetings with stakeholders in 2008 to coordinate responses to the Gerdec explosion, as well as separate meetings with ministries and donors.29

The Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE), set up at the same time as AMAC, is responsible for coordinating and monitoring mine action activities, including risk education, in Albania.30 AMAE works through its headquarters in Tirana and a field office in Kukës.31

AMAE coordinated victim assistance (VA) activities in cooperation with local and international partners: the Ministry of Health, Kukës Regional Hospital, the Directorate of Primary Health Care, National Orthotic-Prosthetic Center (NOPC), ICRC, Victims of Mines

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21 Email from Dr. Veri Dogjani, AMAE, 25 May 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 113.
22 Ibid.
24 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 113. The number of casualties caused by ERW incidents is inseparable from the number caused by incidents involving illicitly stockpiled munitions not abandoned or fired.
and Arms Association–Kukësi (VMA), Handicap International (HI), the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), and the Institute for Rehabilitation, Republic of Slovenia (IRRS). Coordination by AMAE resulted in mine/ERW survivors receiving improved services. Survivors were involved in VA planning and coordination through regular meetings.

**Data collection and management**

AMAE maintains a mine action database using IMSMA at its Kukës office. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) updated the system in 2008, but AMAE decided not to transfer its data to the latest version of IMSMA to avoid errors in data transfer and because Albania expected to complete clearance in 2009.

Albania has two mine/ERW casualty surveillance systems. In northeast Albania, AMAE coordinates a well-established data collection mechanism using the IMSMA database installed in Kukës. Information is shared with all stakeholders and updated if a registered survivor dies. Due to lack of resources, no nationwide casualty surveillance system has been established, despite recommendations by GICHD and the ICRC that the Ministry of Health should do so.

In 2008 and 2009, the Albanian Red Cross Society (ARCS) collected and updated information on AXO casualties throughout the country. The ARCS casualty reporting uses IMSMA and is stored by AMAE in Tirana. AMAE is legally required to provide annual casualty updates to the Institute of Statistics of Albania.

Data in mine-affected areas was collected with the support of the ARCS and VMA through a network of “anti-mine committees” and risk education (RE) programs in 22 villages.

**Mine action program operators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Orthotic-Prosthetic Center</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based rehabilitation system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARCS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA/AMCO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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32 Email from Juliana Buzi, Program Specialist, AMAE, 27 April 2009.
33 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Jonuz Kola, VMA, 10 May 2009.
34 Email from Arben Braha, AMAE, 1 April 2008.
35 Interview with Arben Braha, AMAE, Tirana, 26 April 2009.
Plans

Strategic mine action plans

In December 2008, AMAC, in cooperation with UNDP, presented a revised National Mine Action Plan for Completion 2009–2010. The plan set out four main goals:

- **Coordination and monitoring** of all mine action activities will continue under AMAE until March 2010. After that date, responsibility will transfer to the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Response Section in the Ministry of Defense.
- **Survey and clearance:** Albania plans to complete clearance of the remaining 0.86 km² of contaminated land (as of December 2008) and release it to the community by December 2009, well within its Article 5 deadline for clearance of mined areas (1 August 2010). With the completion of clearance, demining operations in northeast Albania will close and technical skills may be used for EOD and destruction of UXO in other areas of the country.
- **Risk education** should be integrated into the school curriculum and implemented in all school districts by December 2009.
- **Victim assistance** aims to improve delivery and quality of emergency and ongoing healthcare for mine/ERW survivors in northeast Albania and provide vocational training for 90 mine/ERW survivors. The plan called for training of 30 physiotherapists and six prosthetics and orthotics technicians by June 2009 and the preparation of a Level II prosthetics curriculum. During 2009 and 2010, the NOPC should become fully functional with new premises and equipment.

The National Mine Action Plan for Completion was updated in November 2008 and again at the end of May 2009 to take account of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The revised plan provided for completing clearance of all known mine and UXO contamination by the end of 2009.

National ownership

Albania exercises full national ownership of mine action, with advisory support provided by UNDP. Since the end of 2007, the DanChurchAid (DCA) mine action program has been operated by national staff in all aspects, including planning, operations, training, finance, and administration. The staff is supervised by an international program manager and receives frequent quality assurance visits by technical staff from DCA headquarters.

UNDP has provided capacity-building to Albania’s mine action program since 2002. This support was due to end in December 2006, when a victim assistance advisor’s position closed, but it continued to support a quality management advisor until November 2007. UNDP has progressively reduced technical support to the program, but, under a Memorandum of Understanding signed with Albania’s Ministry of Defense in July 2007, it will continue to provide administrative and financial support to AMAE until the end of 2010.
National mine action legislation

Law No. 9515 on implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty passed by parliament in April 2006 confirmed the Minister of Defense as the national authority in charge of mine action and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty by AMAC and AMAE.48

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

In 2004, AMAE issued technical safety standards for mine action operations, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). In 2007, AMAE drew up national mine action standards (NMAS) adapted from IMAS with support from GICHD, which will become part of the existing law on the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.49 The incident in Gerdec in 2008 and elections scheduled for June 2009 held up progress, but AMAE expected that the NMAS would come into effect by the end of 2009.50 DCA uses standing operating procedures (SOPs) approved by AMAE as part of its accreditation process.51

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

DCA remained the only mine and battle area clearance (BAC) operator under AMAC in Albania during 2008.52 From 2004–2008, DCA conducted community assessments and technical surveys that provided the basis for clearance operations and area reduction.53 Under the Completion Plan for Albania, DCA was due to finish clearing the last known area of contamination by the end of 2009.54

In 2008, DCA deployed seven demining teams (six manual demining teams and one BAC team) and one technical survey team. Each demining team consists of one team leader, one deputy team leader, one medic, and six deminers. The technical survey team consists of one team leader, one medic, and four deminers.55 DCA maintained the same capacity for 2009.56

The Albanian Mine Action Program’s target for 2008 was to release 500,000 to 600,000m² of mined areas through clearance, technical survey, and land release activities.57 The program substantially exceeded the target and released 952,771m², almost double the 2007 figure (492,517m²).58 DCA released a total of 783,771m². This included clearance of 122,433m² of mined areas and 94,640m² of battle areas, resulting in the destruction of 264 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine, 192 items of UXO, and 84 unexploded submunitions.59 It also released a total of 566,698m² through survey (technical survey of 262,439m² and general survey of 304,259m²).60 AMAE also canceled 169,000m² through a process of community liaison conducted in accordance with AMAE’s Risk Management SOP.61 There were also 30 requests from local communities to deal with EOD tasks.62

After the Gerdec explosion on 15 March 2008, emergency BAC of surrounding areas involved AAF EOD teams with 392 personnel; DCA provided two BAC teams with 16 deminers for two weeks and one team for the month of April;63 the Kosovo Protection Corps deployed two EOD teams until 12 April; and Swedish Rescue Services Agency provided two advisers and

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48 Email from Arben Braha, AMAE, 20 May 2008.
51 Interview with Sali Salihi, AMAE, Kukës, 25 March 2008.
52 Interview with Arben Braha, AMAE, in Geneva, 25 May 2009. DCA is funded by the US Department of State through the ITF.
54 Ibid.
55 Email from Anthony Connell, DCA, 30 March 2009; and email from Signe Noermose, DCA, 5 August 2009.
56 Email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 22 April 2009; and email from Signe Noermose, DCA, 5 August 2009.
57 Email from Anthony Connell, DCA, 30 March 2009.
58 Email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 22 April 2009.
59 Ibid.
60 Email from Anthony Connell, DCA, 30 March 2009; and email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 22 April 2009.
61 Email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 22 April 2009.
62 Email from Anthony Connell, DCA, 30 March 2009.
63 Email from Signe Noermose, DCA, 5 August 2009.
two large-loop detectors for a month. These operations were coordinated by AMAE. In May, ArmorGroup North America started a program to clear UXO around the blast area expected to continue until 2011 with more than $6 million from the US Department of State. Albanian media reported that in the emergency clean-up phase between 17 March and 3 April, teams cleared 5,712 items of UXO as well as the remnants of 660 exploded shells. DCA teams cleared a total of 823,308m² and recovered 618 items of UXO and 1,000 pieces of small arms ammunition; 675 houses were released after searching.

As of July 2008, five Albanian AAF EOD teams were still clearing the area around Gerdec. The teams were joined by personnel from ArmorGroup in September 2008. AMAE conducts quality management (QM) of demining, RE, and VA to ensure they conform to the IMAS and Albania’s adopted Technical and Safety Standards. An AMAE regional office in Kukës that opened in 2002 has a QM section consisting of three operators in northeast Albania to monitor clearance and survey. After completion of clearance operations, the QM team conducts a final quality control check with methods adopted from IMAS.

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Albania is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2010. Albania’s National Mine Action Plan for Completion aims to complete clearance of all its known mined areas by the end of 2009, well ahead of its Article 5 deadline. In May 2009, AMAE’s director confirmed to Landmine Monitor Albania’s intention to complete clearance of all mined areas and thereby fulfill its Article 5 obligations by the end of 2009. It was hoped that completion of clearance could be announced at a regional meeting on mine action planned to take place in Albania in October 2009.

**Mineral and battle area clearance in 2000–2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m²)</th>
<th>BAC (m²)</th>
<th>Area released by other means (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>122,433</td>
<td>94,640</td>
<td>735,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>61,040</td>
<td>48,714</td>
<td>362,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>240,532</td>
<td>234,584</td>
<td>905,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>214,109</td>
<td>305,828</td>
<td>860,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>140,602</td>
<td>42,190</td>
<td>313,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>160,428</td>
<td>149,572</td>
<td>1,637,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>153,860</td>
<td>76,140</td>
<td>6,788,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2001</td>
<td>273,288</td>
<td>151,712</td>
<td>1,575,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,366,292</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,103,380</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,178,030</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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64 Email from Arben Braha, AMAE, 10 August 2009.
67 Email from Anthony Connell, DCA, 30 March 2009.
68 Email from Arben Braha, AMAE, 16 July 2008.
71 Email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 22 April 2009.
73 Telephone interview with Arben Braha, AMAE, 19 June 2009.
74 Email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 22 April 2009.
Risk Education

Mine and ERW RE activities were conducted in 2008 by the local NGO VMA in the northeast of the country, and by the ARCS in 10 other prefectures. A 2007 GICHD mine action program evaluation found that “it is reasonable to conclude that in Albania the extensive nature of the [RE] program has reduced accidents and casualties.”

AMAE organized regular coordination meetings between VMA, the ARCS, and UNICEF. There are national RE and community liaison standards, which were developed with GICHD support in 2007. The accreditations of VMA and the ARCS were renewed by AMAE in early 2008. An AMAE field monitor participates in VMA’s activities and conducts quality assurance. All RE activities are recorded in IMSMA. VMA RE activities received $79,800 in funding from the US Department of State through the ITF in 2008.

In 2008, the RE program aimed to keep the 25,500 members of the remaining 22 contaminated villages informed about the mine and UXO threat. By the end of 2008, clearance had reduced the number of mine contaminated villages to 16. Community-based RE was implemented through monthly gatherings with village anti-mine committees in all communities. RE mobile theater comedy performances were conducted. VMA reached 13,700 people in Kukës. In Gerdec, 11,630 people received RE; direct emergency RE was previously conducted in the area in response to an explosion at a munitions depot.

School-based activities such as competitions, leaflet distribution, songs, and role plays took place in 2008 to inform about minefields, mine risk signs, and environmental issues. The ARCS distributed around 1,300 books with mine awareness messages for pupils in schools near the Kosovo border. However, UNICEF was unable to mobilize resources as planned for the integration of RE into the school curriculum by the end of 2009. RE manuals had still not been revised as of June 2009, as had been recommended by GICHD, and no progress was reported on teacher training.

A leaflet with messages promoting safe behavior toward mines and AXO was published by the ARCS, in consultation with AMAE and funded by the ICRC. The leaflet was distributed by ARCS volunteers in ammunition hotspot areas of 10 prefectures in Albania. TV spots were produced and aired for UXO awareness throughout the country in 2007 to 2009 under the ARCS project.

RE continued to be conducted with clearance activities in 2008. A 2007 GICHD evaluation recommendation that RE messages be adjusted to include assurances to communities about cleared land was implemented. Handover ceremonies took place, with RE organizations present.

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76 Email from Junoz Kola, VMA, 12 May 2009; and interview with Dr. Veri Dogjani, AMAE, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and telephone interview, 9 June 2009.
77 Email from Junoz Kola, VMA, 12 May 2009, and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 110.
78 Article 7 Report, Form J, 28 April 2009; and email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 27 April 2009.
79 Email from Junoz Kola, VMA, 12 May 2009.
80 Article 7 Report, Form J, 28 April 2009; and email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 27 April 2009.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Email from Dr. Veri Dogjani, AMAE, 28 April 2009.
84 Ibid.
85 Article 7 Report, Form J, 28 April 2009; and email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 27 April 2009.
86 Ibid.
87 Email from Aurora Bushati, Education Officer, UNICEF, Tirana, 2 June 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 114.
88 Article 7 Report, Form J, 28 April 2009; and email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 27 April 2009.
90 Interview with Dr. Veri Dogjani, AMAE, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
and community meetings were held to inform the population about the clearance results, and to promote usage of the land.91

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Albania’s RE program started in 1999 with UNICEF as the UN lead agency, and with coordination by AMAE.92 CARE International trained teachers and community committees from 2000–2002.93 The ICRC worked with ARCS volunteers to implement community-based RE, combined with food distribution.94 In 2001, UNICEF started to support VMA.95 UNICEF erected 7,000 warning signs from 1999 to 2004.96

In 2001–2002, AMAE and CARE conducted a needs assessment for a national strategy. It found that although there was good RE coverage, 70% of people surveyed were forced to enter contaminated areas for economic reasons. The target group was economically active 15- to 30-year-olds, and people in remote villages. The strategy made AMAE responsible for RE, and called for greater integration of RE with mine action.97 Activities consisted of school-based RE, and community RE through committees, theater, and media.98 UNICEF stopped funding RE in April 2006.99

In 2004, the Albanian Institute of Pedagogical Studies produced manuals for students and teachers for use in ERW hotspots in central Albania.100 A 2005 study by the National Demilitarization Center recommended that RE be conducted in the central part of Albania, and in June 2007, the ARCS started this.101

In 2005, community liaison (CL) was strengthened with the appointment of a CL officer at the AMAE regional office.102 RE standards based on IMAS were introduced in 2003.103

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors in Albania is unknown but at least 748, including at least 238 mine/ERW survivors in the Kukës region and at least 510 AXO survivors around the country.104

Health infrastructure in the mine-affected areas has improved significantly over the last five years, under AMAE coordination of VA, with new equipment, and staff training. VMA reported that overall the situation for mine survivors was good.105 However, outside the mine-affected areas there were no specific VA programs, and AXO survivors faced similar challenges to many other persons with disabilities in Albania, including “widespread poverty, unregulated working conditions, and poor medical care.”106 There remained a need for continuing VA in mine-affected areas and support services to survivors in AXO-affected areas.107

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91 Ibid.
State-run emergency and medical services are available throughout the country and the national referral system functioned adequately. Evacuation for trauma patients by helicopter ambulances was available. In 2008, emergency medical facilities were improved at Kukës regional hospital with the introduction of new equipment, including an electro-surgical unit and an x-ray machine. A community-based rehabilitation (CBR) nursing system, established in 2005 for mine-affected communities, provides basic medical care, rehabilitation, and referrals at the local level.

Access to quality continuing medical care remained problematic. The government provided incentives to prevent the loss of skilled medical staff, and resulting shortages of services in mine-affected areas. Corrective surgery was only available at the Mother Theresa Hospital in Tirana, but was sufficient.

Physical medicine and rehabilitation capacity improved nationally in 2008, including in mine-affected areas, through the project “Access to Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (PMR) in Albania-Phase II.” Six prosthetic/orthotic technicians, including two each from Kukës Hospital and the National Orthotic-Prosthetic Center (NOPC), continued to receive training as planned in Albania’s VA objectives. The course certification was recognized by the Ministry of Education in 2008. Continuing annual enrolment in the physiotherapy program at the Tirana Faculty of Nursing in 2008 brought the number of students to 90 over three years. In 2009, 20 medical doctors were receiving physical medicine upgrade training.

The total number of prosthetic workshops providing devices for civilians in Albania increased to three by 2008, including the Kukës workshop. Previously only the NOPC in Tirana had produced prosthetics. In 2008, the prosthetic workshop and physiotherapy unit in Kukës was rehoused in refurbished and re-equipped premises within Kukës Hospital, marking an improvement in services. With the availability of devices in mine-affected areas, survivors were spared the six-hour journey to Tirana, which was previously reported as a major accessibility problem. In an effort to support sustainable national capacity, only survivors with difficult lower limb or upper limb amputations were treated at the Institute for Rehabilitation, Republic of Slovenia (IRRS).

The quality of NOPC devices was reportedly “just about acceptable” in 2008 and had improved on past years due to the return of two trained staff since early 2008. Despite various commitments since 2004 by several organizations to provide adequate premises, the NOPC was moved three times since 2007. Each location was inadequate and inappropriate. The ICRC’s Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) support, on which the NOPC had previously relied, was scaled back in 2008 because the government had assured it would increase its support. In 2008, prosthetic production at the NOPC decreased to almost a quarter of the level in 2007 as a result of the move to inappropriate premises and the lack of materials that were due to be supplied by the Ministry of Health. This continued a sharp decline from 2006 and represented the NOPC’s lowest output since 2004.
Education, vocational, and income-generation opportunities continued to improve though VMA projects in 2008 and 2009. Psychological support was provided through social workers and VMA peer support. Professional psychosocial support capacity diminished with the departure of staff trained in 2005.

The Albanian constitution and law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities, and all new public buildings must be accessible. However, such legal provisions are not well enforced. Access to employment remained a major problem for persons with disabilities. As of June 2009, Albania had not signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Albania is one of 26 among the States Parties identified as having significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.” Albania presented its 2005–2009 victim assistance objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005, revised objectives in 2006 and 2007, and presented plans to achieve the objectives.

Albania has made significant and steady progress in achieving its objectives. Most objectives were achieved and, where appropriate, activities continued past the stated deadline. Some activities were delayed but were generally accommodated within the revised plans for 2005–2008.

There has been progress on objectives under all victim assistance pillars, despite initial holdups in some programs. Progress has included: data collection both in and outside of the Kukës region; the creation and maintenance of a community-based rehabilitation nursing network in mine-affected areas; improved facilities and training for medical and rehabilitation staff; increased national prosthetics capacity; prosthetic and rehabilitation services in the mine-affected region; the introduction of physiotherapy training; continuing psychological support including peer support for mine survivors; and exceeding objective targets for vocational training and micro-credit loans. In the area of law and public policy, there was some progress, particularly in informing survivors of their rights. Least progress was made on relocating the NOPC facilities, originally planned for 2005, and securing a separate state health budget for the center. However, due to ongoing efforts by AMAE, by early 2009 the Ministry of Health had committed to acting on the NOPC relocation.

Albania reported its progress on victim assistance objectives at all meetings of States Parties and intersessional Standing Committee meetings between 2005–2009. Albania’s victim assistance expert consistently attended meetings and parallel work programs. Albania included detailed updates on VA in voluntary Form J of its Article 7 reports from 2005 to 2009.

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122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
127 Interview with Dr. Veri Dogjani, AMAE, in Geneva 28 May 2009.
Victim assistance strategic framework

Albania presented VA objectives for 2005–2009 in November 2005 at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb. The 2009–2010 completion plan included the final phase objectives of mainstreaming VA into government structures by 2010.\(^{130}\)

The Kukës Regional Development Initiative includes a mine action focus. This has increased government and other development actors’ commitments to projects connected to mine-affected villages.\(^{131}\)

The long-term viability of VA relies on implementation of the National Strategy on People with Disabilities (NSPWD), although it does not specifically mention VA.\(^{132}\) The NSPWD aims to ensure the rights of persons with disabilities, improved services, and legislation.\(^{133}\) However, drawing on survey data from six regions, including the AXO-affected Tirana, Shkoder, and Vlore, the second NSPWD implementation report, released in October 2008, saw no progress in some 40% of measures. Only 2% of measures were accomplished according to timelines.\(^{134}\)

Victim assistance activities

No major changes in VA service providers were reported in 2008. VMA, the only local NGO providing VA in Kukës region, provided multiple services to its 238 members in 2008, including medical treatment, counseling, and peer support, sport activities, loans, vocational training, job placement, educational support, and essential logistical support services.\(^{135}\)

In 2008, materials for the Kukës prosthetics workshop were provided with international funding. Regional health authorities were involved in their procurement process, a step towards full integration into the national health budget in 2010.\(^{136}\) The workshop provided 12 survivors with prostheses and provided prosthetic repairs to another 97 survivors in 2008.

No landmine survivors were assisted at the NOPC in 2008.\(^{137}\)

The IRRS made a triage of the needs of some 45 AXO survivors in 2008 and subsequently 19 amputees received prostheses and physical rehabilitation. A further nine amputees received assistance at the institute from January to May 2009.\(^{138}\)

Support for Mine Action

The Albania National Mine Action Plan for Completion 2009–2010, published in December 2008 as a revision of an original plan for the period 2007–2010, estimated it would cost $3,771,309 to address treaty obligations for 2009 and 2010, of which $1,417,600 had been pledged at the time of publication by Albania and international donors. Mine action in 2009 was projected to cost $2,942,385, while costs in 2010 were projected to total $828,924, with mine clearance costs diminishing steeply. The plan’s costs include fulfillment of mine clearance obligations, and addressing RE and VA needs.\(^{139}\) The plan, which includes projected annual budget needs, but does not specify resource mobilization strategies, is reviewed and updated by AMAE in cooperation with UNDP.\(^{140}\)


\(^{131}\) Statement by Dr. Veri Dogjani, AMAE, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, in Geneva 26 May 2009.


\(^{133}\) Ibid, p. 118.


\(^{135}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Jonuz Kola, VMA, 10 May 2009.

\(^{136}\) Email from Juliana Buzi, AMAE, 27 April 2009; and Article 7 Report, Form J, 28 April 2009.


\(^{138}\) Article 7 Report, Form J, 28 April 2009.


\(^{140}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Arben Braha, AMAE, 20 June 2008.
National support for mine action
AMAE reported $300,000 in contributions by the government of Albania to the national mine action program in 2008. AMAE did not report on the use of national funding but Albania stated in May 2009 that its national support consisted of providing explosive and stand-by medical evacuation service for mine clearance operations. Albania reported $235,000 in national support in 2007.

International cooperation and assistance
In 2008, six countries and the European Commission (EC) reported providing $5,788,885 (€3,931,064) to mine action in Albania, 381% more than the amount reported in 2007. AMAE reported receiving an additional $328,085 from three other sources.

In May 2009, the EC announced that it may allocate additional funds “to support future action” in a number of countries, including Albania. The amount and nature of the funding was not confirmed as of 1 July 2009.

As of June 2009, AMAE reported international funding totaling $4,348,583 for 2008, including funds from Canada, the EC, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Funds reported for 2008 account for 75% of the total revised budget for 2008–2010 reported by AMAE in June 2008. Based on this, funding at 2008 levels appears to be sufficient to meet overall mine action needs in Albania.

In 2008, the ITF reported allocating $4,364,248 (14%) of its funds to Albania, compared to $2,137,859 (9.3%) of its funds in 2007.

### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Albania: Monetary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance, RE, VA</td>
<td>$4,045,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Coordination and monitoring</td>
<td>$736,300 (€500,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$564,976 (€383,659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Coordination and monitoring</td>
<td>$280,645 (£151,332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish Rescue Services Agency</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>$58,362 (SEK384,215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>$10,308 (€7,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$5,696,425 (€3,868,277)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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141 AMAE, “Donors - Funding to AMAP per donor and year”, www.amae.org.al.
144 AMAE, “Donors - Funding to AMAP per donor and year,” www.amae.org.al. 2007 funds reported in national currencies have been converted accorded to Landmine Monitor exchange rates for 2007.
145 ITF, “Annual Report 2008,” Ljubljana, p. 28. Percentage has been rounded to the nearest decimal.
146 ITF, “Annual Report 2007,” Ljubljana, p. 25. Percentage has been rounded to the nearest decimal.
2007 International Mine Action Support to Albania: In-Kind\textsuperscript{148}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Form of In-Kind Support</th>
<th>Monetary Value (where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Provision of expert assistance to AMAE</td>
<td>$92,460 (CHF100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$92,460 ($62,787)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EC funding via UNDP covers the period August 2008 to August 2010. AMAE reported additional funding during 2008 from Canada (C$104,013/$97,573) via the ITF for mine clearance, from Sweden ($200,000) via UNDP for VA, and from the ICRC (CHF33,000/$30,512) for RE.\textsuperscript{149} Neither Canada nor Sweden reported allocating these specific funds to Albania in 2008.

\textsuperscript{148} Email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{149} Email from Arben Braha, AMAE, 10 August 2009.
2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 April 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, IEDs, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>No reliable estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>At least 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (Clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 April 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 April 2002. It established an interministerial committee on the implementation of the treaty in 2003. Algeria completed destruction of its stockpile of 150,050 antipersonnel mines in November 2005, while retaining 15,030 mines for training purposes—one of the highest numbers of any State Party. In December 2008 and March 2009 it reduced the number to 6,090 mines. Algeria considers its existing laws as sufficient to implement the treaty. There have been unverifiable media reports of use of mines by insurgents or “terrorist groups.” In 2007, Algeria seized a cache of about 2,800 antipersonnel mines, one of the largest known seizures anywhere in the world since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force.

Algeria is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from conflicts dating back to World War II. A mine action program, which was established at the end of 2006 with UNDP assistance, has struggled to recover from the December 2007 bombing of the UN building in Algiers, which killed three UNDP mine action personnel, including the chief technical advisor.

From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 273 mine/ERW/victim-activated improvised explosive device (IED) casualties, including 90 killed and 183 injured, although in the absence of effective data collection casualties may have been under-reported. Algeria does not have a formal risk education program, but some basic awareness messages were provided by local organizations in 2008. Health, rehabilitation, and socio-economic reintegration services to assist persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, are in place but need to be strengthened. Discrimination against persons with disabilities was reported in 2008.

Mine Ban Policy

Algeria signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified it on 9 October 2001, and became a State Party on 1 April 2002. The Interministerial Committee on the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was established in 2003. Algeria considers its existing laws, including its penal law, as sufficient legal measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. In November 2008, an Algerian official reiterated this to Landmine Monitor.

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1 In August 2006, responsibility for the committee was transferred from the Prime Minister’s Office to the Ministry of Defense. Interview with Mohamed Masoud Adimi, former Executive Secretary, Interministerial Committee, Algiers, 18 January 2007.
2 This includes Law Number 97-06 on war material, arms, and munitions (enacted on 21 January 1997) and Executive Order Number 98-96 (18 March 1998) implementing Law 97-06. Article 7 Report, Sections 1.1 and 1.2, 1 May 2003, and repeated in more recent reports.
Algeria submitted its seventh Article 7 transparency report in April 2009.4 Algeria attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, where it called on states not party, particularly from the Maghreb region of North Africa, to join the treaty.5 It also commented on several other states’ Article 5 deadline extension requests and made statements on its own mine clearance obligations, and on mines retained for training. Algeria also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it provided an update on its efforts to meet its 2012 mine clearance deadline.

Algeria has not engaged in the extensive discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices). However, in November 2008, Algerian officials told Landmine Monitor that Algeria does not participate in joint military operations, but should it ever do so with a state not party, it will under no circumstances use antipersonnel mines.6

Algeria is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.7

Production, transfer, use, stockpiling, and retention
Algeria is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It imported antipersonnel mines from China, the former Soviet Union, and the former Yugoslavia.8 The government has acknowledged that it used mines against “terrorists” during the 1990s.9 On 21 November 2005, Algeria completed the destruction of its stockpile of 150,050 antipersonnel mines, four months in advance of its treaty-mandated deadline.10 The armed opposition group Al-Qaida Organization in the Islamic Maghreb11 has previously been reported to use landmines or IEDs.12 In August 2008, in Skikda province, the government accused Al-Qaida of setting off several landmines, apparently command-detonated, resulting in the deaths of both security forces and civilians.13 In the first three months of 2009, Algerian newspapers reported a number of incidents with “terrorist groups” allegedly using mines or IEDs, though it is not clear if these were antipersonnel or antivehicle, and if they were command-detonated or victim-activated.14

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4 Like all previous Article 7 reports, the April 2009 report does not state a specific reporting period and does not use the standard reporting format. Algeria previously submitted Article 7 reports in April 2008, April 2007, on 10 May 2006, 27 October 2005, 11 May 2004, and 1 May 2003.
8 Article 7 Report, Section 2, 1 May 2003.
9 Statement of Algeria, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18 September 2006, p. 2. The government first admitted this in May 2005. Previously, Algeria had only stated that landmines were used before 1962 by the “colonial army” along the country’s borders.
11 Formerly known as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (Salafist Group for Call and Combat).
12 Landmine Monitor has not received any specific reports of use of antipersonnel mines by insurgents since July 2003. See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 74.
Seizures of antipersonnel mines

Landmine Monitor has not seen any reports of seizures of mines during the reporting period (from May 2008 to May 2009). In June 2007, Algerian army intelligence agencies reportedly seized 2,815 antipersonnel mines from a house in the city of Maghnia, Tlemcen province, in western Algeria. The case went to the criminal court of Algiers in May 2008. The court ordered the Ministry of Justice to destroy the mines. This is one of the largest seizures of antipersonnel mines that Landmine Monitor has seen reported in the past decade. Algeria did not report on the seizure or destruction of the mines in its Article 7 reports submitted in April 2008 or April 2009.

Mines retained for training

On completion of stockpile destruction in November 2005, Algeria reported that it was keeping 15,030 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. Up until April 2008, the number of retained mines had not changed and was at the time the second highest number of all States Parties. In November 2008, however, Algeria announced it would destroy 9,000 of these mines. Subsequently, it destroyed 1,000 mines on 28 December 2008 and 7,940 mines on 23 March 2009. The destruction events were witnessed by members of the Interministerial Committee, diplomats from Belgium, Canada, and Sweden, and representatives of UNDP, ICRC, Handicap International, and the local media. This brought the number of retained mines down to 6,090, just 90 mines short of the goal of 6,000 mines as stated in its latest Article 7 report.

Algerian officials have said that the retained mines are being used by both military and police forces, and that they prefer to train deminers with live mines. Algeria has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines—a step agreed by States Parties in 2004.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Algeria is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from World War II, the conflict to end French colonial occupation, and the insurgency of the 1990s. The precise extent of residual contamination is not known. An impact survey planned with UNDP support to help prioritize clearance had not been initiated as of May 2009.

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15 There were reports in 2007 of another seizure of mines and of the discovery of a manufacturing shop by the authorities, with the latter most likely being for IEDs. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 123.
16 The mines were alleged to have been brought in by networks of smugglers across the Moroccan border, and were destined for “the terrorist groups in the mountains of Tizi Ouzou” in central Algeria. Reportedly, the mines were collected from the Algerian-Moroccan border with the intention to extract the explosives to make other kinds of explosive devices. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 123. A. Brahim, “Algerian Army uncovers anti-personnel mines cache,” El-Khabar, 25 June 2007. Translation by BBC Monitoring Middle East.
17 “Justice opened the file of 2500 antipersonnel mines on the way to Al-Qaeda,” El-Khabar, 31 March 2008.
19 In both reports, Section 2.2 covers antipersonnel mines discovered after the passage of the stockpile destruction deadline, and is marked “none.”
20 Article 7 Report, Section 4, April 2008.
22 Article 7 Report, April 2009, Section 4. The mines destroyed were 25 PMD-6, 190 PMD 6-M, 100 PMN, 100 PMA, 90 GLD-115, 100 OZM, 100 POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M, 40 PROM-1, 15 PMR-2A, and 240 GLD-125 on 28 December 2008, and 30 PMD-6, 2,310 PMD 6-M, 455 PMN, 310 PMA, 2,655 GLD-115, 200 OZM, 700 POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M, 80 PROM-1, 45 PMR-2A, and 1,155 GLD-125 on 23 March 2009.
23 Article 7 Report, Section 4, April 2009. The mines retained for training now consist of 545 PMD-6, 500 PMD, 245 PMN, 200 PMA, 3,015 GLD-115, 200 OZM, 200 POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M, 100 PROM-1, 80 PMR-2A, and 1,005 GLD-125. The report indicates that an additional 45 PMD-6 and 45 PMN are to be destroyed.
24 ICBL meeting with the Algerian delegation at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2005.
In 2003, the government estimated that 3,064,180 mines were laid by the French colonial army in the late 1950s along Algeria’s eastern border with Tunisia and the western border with Morocco.\(^{25}\) In April 2009, Algeria reported that demining operations through the end of 2008 had released an “estimated” total of almost 18.5 km\(^2\), mainly in Bechar in the southwest of the country.\(^{26}\)

The north of the country is contaminated by an unknown number of homemade mines and explosive items laid by insurgent groups and a reported 15,709 antipersonnel mines laid by the Algerian army around installations, particularly high-tension powerlines.\(^{27}\) Algeria has also stated that some “locations that still need clearance in the center of the country continue to be targeted by the insurgent groups.” As of April 2009, a total of 4,713 mines still remained to be cleared from the total laid by the army in the north: according to Algeria, the remaining areas in the north are still targeted by terrorist groups.\(^{28}\)

Mines continue to be found outside known mined areas. In April 2009, Algeria noted that in 2008, 132 “isolated” antipersonnel mines had been encountered and destroyed; this compares with 227 the previous year.\(^{29}\)

**Casualties**

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 19 new mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties including eight killed and 11 injured in 11 incidents.\(^{30}\) Four casualties were reported by the Interministerial Committee and 15 by local media. Ten casualties were civilians and nine were military and security forces. Among civilians were six men, three boys, and one girl. Activities include conducting military activities (nine), herding (four), hunting (two), and traveling (one); the activity of three casualties remains unknown. Mines caused eight casualties (five unknown mines and three antipersonnel mines), victim-activated IEDs six, and ERW one; four casualties were caused by unknown devices. Casualties were reported in eight provinces: Tizi Ouzou (seven), Biskra (three), Sidi Bel Abbes (three), Naama (two), Medea (one), Tebessa (one), Bouira (one), and Skikda (one).

The 2008 casualty rate represents a decrease compared to 2007 (78), 2006 (58), and 2005 (51), but is still higher than in 2004 (nine). Casualties may go unreported, as information on mine/ERW incidents remains limited. The total number of mine/ERW/IED casualties in Algeria remains unknown, and different sources report conflicting data. From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 273 mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties, including 90 killed and 183 injured, although in the absence of effective data collection casualties may have been under-reported.\(^{31}\)

Casualties continued to be reported by local media at an increased rate in 2009, with at least 34 mine casualties (14 killed, 16 injured, and four unknown) in 12 incidents, as of 31 May 2009.\(^{32}\) At least 10 were civilians and nine were military and security forces; the civil status of 15 remained unknown. Among civilians were four men, three women, one boy, one child of unknown gender, and one person of unknown gender and age. The activity at the time of the incident included traveling (11), herding (two), collecting olives (one), conducting security activities (one), and other types of activities (five); the activities of 14 casualties are unknown. All casualties were caused by mines (including 10 by antivehicle mines).

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\(^{25}\) See, for example, Article 7 Report, April 2008, Sections 2 and 3; and see also Article 7 Report, April 2009, Sections 2 and 3.

\(^{26}\) Article 7 Report, April 2009, Section 3.

\(^{27}\) See Article 7 Report, April 2009, Section 3; and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 132.

\(^{28}\) Article 7 Report, April 2009, Section 5.3. Algeria also reports that 4,813 mines remain to be cleared from the 1st Military Region. It is not known which figure is correct.

\(^{29}\) Article 7 Report, April 2009, Section 5.4.

\(^{30}\) Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 December 2008; Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by Salima Rebbah, Project Coordinator, HI, 13 June 2008; and Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by Col. Hacène Gherabi, Interministerial Committee, 3 June 2008.

\(^{31}\) See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

\(^{32}\) Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 May 2009.
There have been at least two Algerian casualties outside of Algeria. On 7 May 2004, an Algerian working for a Polish television crew was killed together with another crew member when their vehicle hit a landmine in Iraq. In May 2002, an Algerian peacekeeper was killed in a landmine incident in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.33

In 2008, some 1.9 million persons with disabilities were registered in Algeria, according to the Ministry of Labor and National Solidarity.34 A national disability survey has yet to be launched.35 Other sources estimated that there are three million persons with disabilities in Algeria.36

**Risk profile**
Based on analysis of Landmine Monitor data, military and males conducting livelihood activities are the most at-risk group. The Ministry of Defense reported that “children and nomads are considered to be the most at risk groups.”37 Local media reported also that young people engage in intentional risk-taking behaviors out of economic necessity, including clearing mines to remove the explosives and sell the scrap metal.

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**
The Interministerial Committee on the Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, set up in 2003 by presidential decree, was made responsible for implementing a joint mine action project with UNDP. In addition, a steering committee was established to oversee the project, chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

**Victim assistance**
Since 2003, the Interministerial Committee has been responsible for oversight of victim assistance (VA). Algeria reported that coordination is in place between the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and the Ministry of War Veterans in mine/ERW contaminated areas to ensure VA is provided.38

In January 2007, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, in cooperation with Handicap International (HI) hosted a VA workshop, which identified the following VA priorities: fully integrate economic reintegration; provide information and training on disability and labor issues; increase cooperation between stakeholders and share best practices; conduct training on project management and technical aspects of economic reintegration; and focus on the economic integration of young persons with disabilities.

**Data collection and management**
In October 2007, an Algerian newspaper reported that records relating to the minefields laid by French troops from 1956–1959 along the Challe and Morice lines in the east and west of the country had “finally” been handed over to Algeria. A statement from the French embassy in Algiers indicated that the move aims at “removing the obstacles inherited from the past and building relations of trust with Algeria.” In April 2008, however, Algeria stated that the maps had not resulted in any previously unknown mined areas being identified.39

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35 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009.
39 See Article 7 Reports, April 2008 and April 2009, Sections 2 and 3.
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) planned to install the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in Algeria before the end of 2007. In July 2009, GICHD stated that IMSMA was not installed as the authorities no longer wished to use the system.\textsuperscript{40}

There is no unified and comprehensive casualty data collection mechanism in Algeria and it is difficult to obtain detailed information on mine/ERW incidents. The recommendations of the 2007 VA workshop remain unimplemented. A UNDP project with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security aimed to create a casualty data collection mechanism by the first half of 2008; no progress toward this goal was reported, as of May 2009.\textsuperscript{41}

The Interministerial Committee reported that both the gendarmerie and police collect data, including device type, on “physical incidents” including those resulting in mine/ERW/IED casualties. The Ministry of Interior and Local Governments records and stores information on “casualties of terrorism” including mine/ERW/IED casualties.\textsuperscript{42} Data is shared with other ministries and local authorities for compensation, pensions, or other purposes.\textsuperscript{43} Data is also shared with associations working with persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW/IED survivors.\textsuperscript{44} The Ministry of Labor and Social Security records information related to persons with disabilities and the Ministry of War Veterans records information on “victims of colonialism,” including mine/ERW/IED casualties.\textsuperscript{45}

The media continues to be the main source of data, but the details of information collected remains insufficient.\textsuperscript{46} HI maintained a casualty database monitoring major Algerian newspapers until mid-2008.\textsuperscript{47}

In 2009, the National Research Center in Social and Cultural Anthropology (Centre National de Recherche en Anthropologie Sociale et Culturelle, CRASC), on behalf of the government and UNDP, conducted a study on the socio-economic impact of mines/ERW in Algeria, which included information on mine/ERW casualty data.\textsuperscript{48} In the framework of the HI risk education (RE) needs assessment (see Risk education section below), new mine/ERW casualty data was collected in the eastern and western provinces and shared with relevant partners, including the CRASC.\textsuperscript{49}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
National operators and activities & Demining & RE & Casualty data collection & VA \\
\hline
Algerian army engineers & x & & & \\
\hline
International operators and activities & Demining & RE & Casualty data collection & VA \\
\hline
HI & & x & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Mine action program operators}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{40} Email from Jean-Paul Rychener, Deputy Program Manager, Information Management, GICHD, 27 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{45} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 127; and see Landmine Monitor 2007, p. 135.
\textsuperscript{46} Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 December 2008 and 1 January to 31 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{48} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
Plans

**Strategic mine action plans**
In November 2006, the Algerian government and UNDP signed a project document to support Algeria’s mine action program within the framework of the Mine Ban Treaty. The project included the conduct of a survey, the development of a national strategy and annual plans, and the installation of an information system, as well as mine/ERW RE and VA activities. The project initially covered a two-year period through December 2008, but this was extended for an additional year as a result of the impact of the bombing in November 2007.\(^{50}\) One of the outputs of the UNDP project was to be a strategic mine action plan, but this had not been drafted as of late July 2009.\(^{51}\) The strategy would seek to address the needs of survivors and develop strategies for their socio-economic reintegration.\(^{52}\)

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**
Algeria has been slow to initiate a mine action program since becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2002. Algeria’s program is nationally managed but with UN technical support and funding. The program was significantly impacted by the December 2007 bombing of the UN building. As of July 2009, recruitment of a UNDP Chief Technical Advisor was underway.\(^{53}\) Algeria stated its commitment to ensure assistance to survivors at international meetings in 2004, 2006, and 2007.\(^{54}\) Since then it has not reported on VA achievements or challenges.

**National mine action legislation and standards**
With the exception of the May 2003 presidential decree, there has been no mine action legislation passed in Algeria. In 2006, the army was said to be conducting demining operations according to “common international standards,” which have been adapted to Algeria’s soil conditions.\(^{55}\)

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

All demining in Algeria is carried out by the military using manual clearance methods. A tender was launched in 2007 for an impact survey and an organization to conduct the survey was selected.\(^{56}\) As of July 2009, the survey was said to be close to completion by the selected contractor, CRASC, under the auspices of UNDP.\(^{57}\)

**Demining in 2008**
In 2008, the army destroyed 91,865 antipersonnel mines in the west, southwest, and east of the country, almost double the number destroyed in the same areas in 2007.\(^{58}\) Algeria has not formally reported the size of areas covered by demining operations in 2008 alone.

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\(^{51}\) Email from Faiza Bendriss, UNDP, 29 July 2009.

\(^{52}\) UNDP, “Appui à la formulation et la mise en œuvre d’un plan national d’action contre les mines antipersonnel” ("Support for the development and implementation of a national action plan against antipersonnel mines"), www.dz.undp.org.

\(^{53}\) Email from Faiza Bendriss, UNDP, 29 July 2009.


\(^{57}\) Email from Faiza Bendriss, UNDP, 29 July 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 125.

\(^{58}\) See Article 7 Report, April 2009, Section 5.2.1.1.
Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Algeria is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2012. In May 2009, Algeria stated it would not spare any effort to meet its deadline, although it noted that the context was “complex.”

Between November 2004 and March 2009, Algeria reported the destruction of 379,243 antipersonnel mines. Yet the current pace of demining continues to be insufficient if the deadline is to be met. Algeria has noted that productivity was subject to factors such as climatic conditions, the type of soil, thick vegetation, soil erosion, and movement of sand by the wind, shortage of funds, and a lack of personal protective equipment and demining tools.

As noted in its Article 7 report submitted in April 2009, Algeria has maintained two mined areas in the Challe minefields, one in the east and one in the west of the country, as a “historical site.” The size of both areas in Tébessa and Bechar regions is small, totaling 3,000m² and 2,000m², respectively, and Algeria has declared that the areas are “duly protected and marked” as a legacy of the War of National Liberation. Such retention of mined areas is, however, not permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty and therefore these areas must be cleared before its 2012 Article 5 deadline.

Risk Education

In 2008, as in previous years, there has been no formal RE program in Algeria. The government’s objective, however, is to reach “zero mines, zero victims” by 2012.

Some local organizations continued to provide basic awareness. Algeria reported that mined areas are marked. In addition, when mines are discovered, relevant authorities provide ad hoc awareness messages to affected communities. The last RE reported by the army was in 2006, when it provided awareness training as part of the military training for its staff, as well as for military academy students and the national police.

On 28 September 2008, a needs assessment was conducted by HI in the eastern and western regions of Algeria to identify the level of awareness and behaviors of affected communities. The results were presented in a meeting between the government, HI, and UNDP, but they were not made available to Landmine Monitor because the Interministerial Committee did not wish to make the study public at that stage. In March 2009, HI launched an RE project in partnership with UNDP and the government. HI started to provide RE capacity-building to eight local associations in six provinces.

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60 See Article 7 Report, April 2009, Section 5.2.
62 Article 7 Report, April 2009, Section 3.2.
65 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009.
66 Article 7 Report, April 2009.
67 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009.
69 Telephone interview with Faiza Bendriss, UNDP, 23 June 2009.
70 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009.
The first reports of RE activities for civilians were in 2007, when HI and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security organized a presentation on basic RE for local NGOs. Three local organizations reportedly carried out RE in Biskra, El Tarf, and Skikda provinces.71

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Algeria remains unknown, though from 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 183 people injured by mines/ERW/IEDs. In 2009, the Interministerial Committee reported that there have been more than 3,500 mine casualties in Algeria since independence and that the majority of them were identified in El Tarf, Souk Ahras, and Tebessa in the east and Tlemcen, Naama, and Bechar in the west; the highest casualty rate was recorded in 1974.72 The Ministry of Interior and Local Governments stated that between 1995 and 2005, mines and IEDs killed approximately 4,000 and injured 13,000.73 The Ministry of War Veterans provides support to 3,069 “victims of explosive devices.”74

Algeria has facilities to assist persons with disabilities including mine/ERW survivors. According to HI, overall assistance remains adequate and accessible, but services need to be strengthened and survivors need to be better informed and oriented.75 In 2008, one local media reported that mine survivors remain “without status, assistance and support.”76

Although Algeria made progress according to the Human Development Index, the health system reportedly needed further reinforcement.77 Emergency medical care is reasonably well developed, although transportation can be problematic when incidents happen in rural southern desert areas.78 Civilians have free access to government hospitals and medical centers. While health services are free of charge,79 patients have to cover the costs of accommodation, food and transportation, which not all survivors can afford.

Physical rehabilitation facilities are available nationwide, but services are free only for those registered in the national security system.80 The National Office for Equipment and Accessories for Disabled People (Office Nationale d’Appareillages et d’Accessoires pour Personnes handicapées, ONAAPH) under the Ministry of Labor and Social Security produces orthopedic appliances for all persons with disabilities. Appliances are covered by social security for those insured.81 Replacement devices are available free of charge every five years. The Ben Aknoun rehabilitation center received material, technical and financial support from the ICRC in 2008, but the center had largely ceased to function between July and December 2008. In 2009, the

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73 See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 149.
75 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009; and see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 128.
78 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009.
ICRC planned to end its support to the center as the “Ministry of Health has not shown any interest in the ICRC-assisted center.”

Social and economic reintegration is part of the government’s general action program for all persons with disabilities, and specialized programs are in place. Organizations of persons with disabilities reported that there is a lack of employment opportunities, despite the fact that 1% of jobs must be by law reserved for persons with disabilities.

The Ministry of War Veterans provides pensions for “victims of colonialism” and the Ministry of Interior and Local Governments provides pensions for “victims of terrorism.” In January 2008, the Ministry of War Veterans increased its monthly pensions. Other persons with disabilities receive pensions through the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Despite promised increases from the government, financial support remains the same as in 2006. Persons with disabilities reported that pensions do not cover basic needs.

Algeria has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but in 2008 the government did not enforce these provisions; “widespread social discrimination” continued to be reported. Some mine/ERW survivors have called for a review of existing legislation, which they view as inadequate. On 30 March 2007, Algeria signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol: neither had been ratified as of 1 July 2009.

Victim assistance activities

In 2008, the ICRC continued to support the Ben Aknoun rehabilitation center in Algiers. Four prostheses and 53 orthoses were fitted (a slight decrease compared to 2007, when 13 prostheses and 56 orthoses were fitted). The ICRC has also built a small physical rehabilitation center for refugees from Western Sahara in Rabbouni; this was operational as of May 2008 and provided orthopedic appliances mainly to mine survivors. As mentioned above, the center largely ceased activities in the latter half of 2008 due to a lack of support from the Ministry of Health.

In 2008, HI did not implement any VA activities, but provided capacity building to organizations working with persons with disabilities and worked to promote disability rights. In March 2009, it launched some VA activities (local capacity building in data collection and creating a list of available services) in the framework of its RE project.

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86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
91 Ibid, p. 60. For more information see the report on Western Sahara in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
93 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009.
95 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salima Rebbah, HI, 22 June 2009.
Support for Mine Action

No national or international mine action funding was reported for Algeria in 2008. In 2007, France reported providing US$24,548 (€17,904) of in-kind support. In December 2006, UNDP initiated a $1,200,000 two-year project to support mine action coordination and planning in Algeria. Full funding for the project was reported as of December 2006, with funds applied to programming until December 2008.96 The program was extended an additional year as a result of the bombing of the UN building in November 2007.97

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 January 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, cluster munition remnants, other ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>2007 LIS estimate of between 242km² and 1,239km² of mined areas across 2,889 SHAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>At least 52 (2007: at least 48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but many thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 January 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>8.32km² of mined areas, 0.27km² of battle areas, 34.96km² released by survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary


Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Angola are the legacy of four decades of armed conflict which ended in 2002. Although mine clearance began in 1994 during the UN Angola Verification Mission, a national baseline of the extent of the problem was not known until a Landmine Impact Survey was completed in 2005. In 2008, the Angolan mine action program included national and international demining operators working in all 18 provinces of the country.

Since April 2002, UNDP has provided support to develop the capacities of the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (CNIDAH), the national mine action coordination body, and the National Demining Institute (INAD), the government’s operational arm for mine action. Significant problems in coordination of the mine action program and reporting on its achievements have persisted, largely as a result of insufficient government commitment to mine action. As of June 2009, it looked unlikely that Angola would meet its January 2013 Article 5 deadline for clearance of mined areas.

There is no complete and reliable set of casualty data in Angola, but between 2000 and 2008 Landmine Monitor identified at least 2,664 casualties (no data was available for 1999). Total casualty estimates run as high as 80,000.

Risk education (RE) has been conducted since 1999 by more than 15 organizations, including UNICEF, international and national NGOs, the ICRC and INAD, and through the mass media and schools, coordinated by CNIDAH. Since 1999, emergency RE has gradually moved to a more community-based approach focusing on risk reduction. In 2006, a development approach using participatory methods was introduced. By the end of 2008, the level of RE had decreased significantly, becoming inadequate.
While overall services for mine/ERW survivors improved after the end of the conflict in 2002, services for survivors and other persons with disabilities remained limited as of 2009. In some sectors, deterioration has been noted since 2005. As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009, Angola created a victim assistance plan, but it remained largely unimplemented due to a lack of funds and capacity.

Mine Ban Policy

Angola signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 5 July 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2003. Angola has not formally reported any legal measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.


Angola attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it commented on the Article 5 deadline extension request submitted by Zimbabwe, and made statements on victim assistance and mine clearance. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance.

Angola has not made known its views on key issues of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or anti-handling devices, and mines retained for training). It is particularly notable that Angola has not spoken on these issues, given its history of mine use and participation in joint military operations.

Angola is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not ratified as of 1 July 2009.

Production, transfer, use, stockpile destruction, and retention

Angola states that it has never manufactured antipersonnel mines. It is not believed to have exported them in the past. While Landmine Monitor has not confirmed any instances of use of antipersonnel mines since Angola ratified the Mine Ban Treaty, the government has acknowledged using antipersonnel mines while it was a signatory to the treaty, from December 1997 to April 2002, when a peace agreement was signed with the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA).

Angola completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines on 28 December 2006, just ahead of its 1 January 2007 treaty deadline. It destroyed 81,045 mines between October and December 2006, in addition to 7,072 antipersonnel mines of 12 types apparently destroyed between September and December 2003.

1 Angola submitted an undated report in 2007, covering the period from April 2006 to March 2007. Previous reports were submitted on 3 August 2006, 3 May 2005, and 14 September 2004. The initial report was due 30 June 2003.


4 Article 7 Report (for the period April 2006 to March 2007), Form E.

5 See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 121–122. Although the treaty had not entered into force for Angola, the ICBL and some States Parties protested Angola’s use of mines, noting that it could be considered a breach of its international obligations as a signatory. There have been sporadic and unconfirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines since the end of the war, with allegations focused on criminal groups.

In its most recent Article 7 report, Angola reported retaining 2,512 antipersonnel mines under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Angola has not provided an update on mines retained since 2007, and has yet to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Angola is heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants. Contamination is the result of more than four decades of armed conflict, which ended in 2002. More than 40 different types of mines from 15 countries have been found during clearance operations.

Estimates of the extent of the mine problem in 1993 spoke of millions of landmines littering one-third of the country’s land. It was not until June 2007, following completion of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), that a more measured and realistic description of contamination in each of the country’s 18 provinces (all of which are contaminated) was achieved.

The LIS identified 3,293 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in 1,988 mine/ERW-impacted communities in 383 of Angola’s 557 comunas (districts). These impacted communities represent 8% of the 25,004 communities in the country, affecting an estimated 2.4 million people. Three-quarters of all impacted communities and casualties were in just eight provinces: Benguela, Bié, Cunene, Kuando-Kubango, Kwanza Sul, Malanje, Mexico, and Uíge, with Mexico the most heavily impacted province. Cabinda, Luanda, and Namibe provinces were found to have the least impact from mines. As of March 2009, the national database managed by the Inter-sectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) showed that 998 SHAs from the LIS—30% of the total—had been released (through cancellation, technical survey, or clearance) or clearance was either ongoing or CNIDAH had not received a completion report.

Yet the extent of residual contamination is not known with any precision, and different operators have contrasting views on estimates of the total size of mined and battle areas in the country. In the four provinces where it carried out survey for the LIS (Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando-Kubango), HALO Trust applied a more rigorous methodology for measuring suspected areas, which resulted in an average SHA size only one-ninth of those measured by the other LIS operators. The results from the LIS show that HALO identified 35% of the total number of SHAs, but as a result of polygon mapping (more precise delineation of the perimeters of suspected areas) measured only 6.4% of the total suspect area. Furthermore, in June 2008, HALO, based on data from its polygon-mapped areas and from its own past clearance records, indicated that on average only one-quarter of the SHAs required physical clearance.

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7 Article 7 Report (for the period April 2006 to March 2007), Form D. This is considerably more than the 1,460 mines Angola previously indicated it would retain. It includes 13 types of mines not previously listed as retained, and the amounts of all 12 types previously listed have changed. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 144.
12 Information provided by Mohammad Qasim, 27 April 2009
14 Email from Southern Craib, Programme Manager, HALO, 20 June 2008.
15 Ibid.
CNIDAH, for planning purposes, based on the results of HALO’s polygon mapping, estimated the total area might be as little as 242km² compared to the 1,239km² measured by the LIS.\footnote{SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report,” Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 31.} The former UNDP Information Management Advisor, Mohammad Qasim, however, could not see any consistent pattern when analyzing tasks completed by all demining operators since the LIS and he concluded it was “premature” to estimate there was as little as 242km² of contaminated area.\footnote{Email from Mohammad Qasim, Acting Chief Technical Advisor and Information Management Advisor, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009.} Moreover, despite the extensive coverage of the LIS, which included all but 19 of the 563 comunas, the community-based survey did not identify contamination on all of the bridges, roads, and other infrastructure not directly associated with local villages. CNIDAH planned to survey the 19 comunas in 2009 that were not accessible during the LIS, pending funding for the project.\footnote{UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, November 2008, p. 31. DCA had previously expressed concern to Landmine Monitor that CNIDAH might not have the capacity to update the LIS with the results of the survey. Email from Eva Veble, Head, Humanitarian Mine Action Unit, DCA, 25 June 2008.} The return of internally displaced persons and refugees may also lead to the discovery of new SHAs that were not recorded by the LIS. Demining operators believe that many mined areas remain to be identified.\footnote{Interviews with Johan P. Botha, MAG, Luena, 17 May 2009; and with Adriano Gonçales, Senior Officer, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.}

The extent to which Angola continues to be affected by cluster munition remnants is also unclear. Prior to 2009 at least two types of cluster munitions had been found in Angola: the Russian-made PTAB-2.5 K0 and the AO-2.5 RT. As of February 2008, according to data and completion reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had reported clearing 13 submunitions in the municipality of Ebo in Kuanza Sul province; Mines Advisory Group (MAG) had reported clearing 140 submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO had reported clearing 230 submunitions in Kunhinga municipality in Bié province.\footnote{Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 22 February 2008.} As of 29 June 2009, demining NGOs in Angola reported they had not found more submunitions since those reported in February 2008.\footnote{Emails from Zlatko Vezilic, Operations Manager, NPA, 29 June 2009; Richard Grindle, Programme Manager, HALO, 27 June 2009; and Thomas Roth, Director, StB, 29 June 2009.}

**Casualties**

As in previous years, there is no reliable and complete data on the number of casualties in 2008 in Angola. Landmine Monitor received “nationwide” information from CNIDAH and the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD); data for Moxico province from CNIDAH, MAG, and DanChurchAid (DCA); and demining accident information from NPA, HALO, and Santa Barbara Foundation (StB). However, the formats made available did not allow cross-checking and assembling a cumulative total. In addition, CNIDAH information provided in 2009 did not match the January–June 2008 casualty data CNIDAH provided in July 2008, reportedly because the date in the files received was said to be the date of entry and not the date of incident.\footnote{Email from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, Information Systems National Advisor, UNDP/CNIDAH, 19 June 2009.}

INAD provided summary data on 67 new mine/ERW casualties in 2008 (12 killed and 55 injured). At least 40 casualties were men, seven women, 18 boys, and two girls. INAD declined to provide incident dates, locations, civilian-military status, device type, or activity at the time of the incident to allow cross-checking with other data sources.\footnote{Data provided by email from Luke Atkinson, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP/INAD, 19 June 2009.}
From other sources, Landmine Monitor was only able to verify 52 new mine/ERW casualties in Angola in 2008 (23 killed and 29 injured); information that could not be cross-checked was excluded and casualties are certainly higher. At least 41 of the casualties identified by Landmine Monitor were civilian, including 17 boys, 12 men, four girls, three women, and four females and one male of unknown age. Four were military and three were deminers; all age/gender/status were unknown for four casualties. Antipersonnel mines caused 16 casualties, antivehicle mines eight, ERW 15, and unknown devices 13.

In 2008, CNIDAH stated that annual casualties had decreased from some 250 per year in 2002–2005 to 50 per year due to increased demining and RE efforts. It was further added that most casualties were children and the majority of incidents were caused by ERW.24 According to the United States Department of State, CNIDAH reported 18 people killed and 43 injured in 2008.25 However, national data provided to Landmine Monitor by CNIDAH only included 26 casualties in 2008 (13 killed and 13 injured),26 which did not include at least 16 of 19 casualties recorded by CNIDAH in Moçambico (9 killed and 10 injured).27 MAG in Moçambico recorded three injured casualties that were not included in CNIDAH Moçambico data (two soldiers and one civilian).28 DCA recorded eight casualties in Moçambico, which were all included in the regional CNIDAH data.29 In July 2008, CNIDAH reported 47 casualties to the end of June 2008 (10 killed and 37 injured); these were all excluded by Landmine Monitor from casualty totals because the incident data could not be re-verified.30

Additionally, NPA recorded one person injured in a demining accident in 200831 and HALO recorded one deminer injured when a vegetation cutter set off a fragmentation mine in Bié. StB reported one accident in Kuanza Sul when one deminer was injured due to a failure to follow procedures.32 None of these casualties were recorded in CNIDAH data. Landmine Monitor also identified one incident in the media when on 6 October 2008 two people were killed and two injured in an antivehicle mine incident when their car drove off the main road in Kibala, Kuanza Sul province.33 The US Department of State further reported landmine incidents involving “construction workers, mostly Chinese, while rebuilding roads and railroads.”34 None of the casualty data received included foreign nationals.

Due to the incompleteness of the data, comparisons with previous years are impossible. For 2007, casualty figures ranging between 48 and 127 were reported.35

24 “Poucos acidentes com artefactos” (“Few incidents with artifacts”), Jornal de Angola (Luanda), 1 September 2008. TEH EPORTED ON 16 MAY
26 Data provided by email from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17 June 2009.
27 CNIDAH, “Relatório Provincial” (“Provincial Report”), Luena, 16 December 2008; and CNIDAH data provided during Landmine Monitor field mission in Moçambico province, May 2009. For one casualty included in the national CNIDAH data, insufficient data was available to verify whether it was included in the data provided to Landmine Monitor.
28 Email from Danny Kavanagh, Country Programme Manager, MAG, 24 June 2009.
29 Email from Hendrix Chilongu, Mine RE/CL Supervisor, DCA, 22 June 2009.
32 Email from Anna Kudarewska, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 30 April 2009.
33 “Kwanza-Sul: Mina faz dois mortos e igual número de feridos” (“Kwanza-Sul: Mine kills two and injured the same number”), Jornal de Angola (Luanda), 8 October 2008.
Casualties continued to occur in 2009 with at least eight casualties (four killed and four injured) to the end of May. In Moxico, CNIDAH recorded five casualties and MAG recorded one additional person injured. CNIDAH in Luanda recorded two additional casualties in Lunda Sul.\(^3\) INAD recorded one woman killed and one man injured.\(^3\)

The cumulative number of mine/ERW casualties is not known. Angola has stated several times that there are an estimated 80,000 survivors.\(^3\) In 2006, however, the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS) stated that 70% of 89,170 registered persons with disabilities were mine/ERW survivors.\(^3\) This would amount to approximately 62,500 people. The media reported in 2008 that the UN estimates there are some 23,000 mine survivors.\(^4\)

The LIS data is considered to be the most reliable source of casualty information; it identified 341 recent casualties (168 killed, 159 injured, and 14 unknown) in 173 communities.\(^4\) The number of non-recent casualties is unknown. Most casualties were male (232 or 68%), which is also below the international average of about 80%. Some 75% of casualties were aged between 15 and 44 years. Of total casualties, 15% were military. The most common activity at the time of the incident was traveling (30%), followed by collecting wood/water (17%), and farming (11%). One-third of casualties occurred in Moxico province (111), followed by Bié (58).\(^4\) Most of those killed or injured while traveling were not from the communities where the incidents occurred, which resulted in a lack of detail about these casualties.\(^4\)

In addition to the LIS, fewer than 300 casualty records were entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database at CNIDAH in Luanda. The first casualties were entered at the start of the LIS and “almost no data before that.”\(^4\) Landmine Monitor identified at least 2,664 mine/ERW casualties between 2000 and 2008 (no data is available for 1999), including 877 people killed, 1,644 injured, and 143 of unknown status.\(^4\)

**Risk profile**

People are at most risk in Moxico, followed by the provinces in northern Angola.\(^4\) While there is a high level of awareness, people are at risk while conducting livelihood activities including collecting water and food, firewood, making charcoal, and hunting.\(^4\) Most mined areas are not marked.\(^4\)

**Socio-economic impact**

Landmines affect the daily lives of the people of Angola in many ways. The LIS identified access to drinking water, housing, and public services as problems related to mines and ERW. Lack of access to drinking water is a problem nationwide but is particularly acute in Kuanza Norte, Kuanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Malanje, and Moxico provinces. Water and electricity distribution for much of the country is also affected, due to the widespread practice of mining high-voltage electricity pylons, reservoirs, and dams during the years of conflict.\(^4\)

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\(^{36}\) Emails from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17 June 2009; Danny Kavanagh, MAG, 24 June 2009; and from Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, 22 June 2009.


\(^{39}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 182.

\(^{40}\) “Angola to stage ‘Miss Landmine Survivor’ pageant,” Agence France-Presse (Luanda), 26 March 2008.

\(^{41}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 143–144. Recent casualties are those occurring within the two year period preceding LIS fieldwork, which was conducted between April 2004 and April 2007.


\(^{43}\) Ibid, pp. 13, 35–39.

\(^{44}\) Emails from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17, 18, and 19 June 2009. Three cumulative sheets were sent to Landmine Monitor, only including 155 records for 1999–2009, one with 251 records for the same time period and one including 281 records (but no incident dates). The data did not match data provided separately for 2008 and 2009 or provided to Landmine Monitor in the past. LIS data was kept separately.

\(^{45}\) See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

\(^{46}\) Interview with Carlos Seixas, Mine Risk Education Officer, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

\(^{47}\) Interview with Graza Monteiro, Liaison Officer, NPA, Malanje, 13 May 2009; and email from Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, 22 June 2009.

\(^{48}\) Interview with Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 15 May 2009.

Two World Bank papers on Angola address the impact of landmines. The Environmental and Social Management Framework Final Report concludes that the presence of landmines throughout the country inhibits access to land and is an environmental limitation that undermines development.\(^{50}\) The areas cleared are being primarily used for housing and farming: sometimes construction and farming begins before formal handover tasks with local officials are completed.\(^{51}\) An unpublished World Bank study on the economic impact of landmines reports that although economic models show that mines have affected the overall economy, in Angola there is largely a lack of evidence and studies to back up general statements about that impact.\(^{52}\)

Landmines also have an environmental impact in Angola. Mine contamination in Kuando-Kubango province was cited as one of the obstacles to creating the new Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, the world’s largest game park on the borders of Angola, Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. *National Geographic* reported that “since the end of the war in 2002, elephants have begun to go back to the Luiana Partial Reserve in Angola’s sparsely populated Kuando-Kubango province that borders southwest Zambia and Namibia. When the initial migration began a number of elephants had their trunks and legs blown off by mines, condemning the animals to agonizing deaths. But the elephants that followed have since avoided those areas.” According to Elephants Without Borders, “in order to re-establish and sustain wildlife communities in Luiana Partial Reserve, it is critical that the area be declared a national park and that the land mines are cleared.” More than 130,000 elephants are waiting to be allowed to move from Botswana through the park. This process has been held up until the park is free of the threat of mines.\(^{53}\)

Mine action has created thousands of jobs in rural areas where in March 2009 unemployment was reported to be as high as 48\%.\(^{54}\) With dozens of international and national organizations and commercial demining companies\(^{55}\) operating in Angola, mine clearance projects provide “a good number of jobs” in the rural areas. This has created a dynamic and competitive labor market in which turnover among deminers, in particular with some NGOs, is high as a result of commercial demining companies offering higher salaries. NGOs reported the turnover causes disruptions in operations and lower outputs as more time is needed for recruiting and training.\(^{56}\)

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

The mine action structure in Angola has evolved into a complicated mix of government bodies that coordinate poorly, if at all, and which lack financial transparency. CNIDAH, created in 2001 by presidential decree 54/2001,\(^{57}\) is responsible for mine action policy development, planning, priority-setting, coordination, and management of the implementation of Angola’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, and reports directly to the Council of Ministers. CNIDAH is also


\(^{51}\) Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fatmire Uka, Operations Manager, DCA, 3 March 2009; and Aubrey Sutherland, Programme Manager, NPA, 9 March 2009.


\(^{57}\) Presidential Decree No. 54/2001.
responsible for the accreditation of commercial demining companies and, in principle, these companies send their clearance reports to CNIDAH.\textsuperscript{58} CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices (one in each province) determine annual priorities based on NGO priority tasks, the LIS, provincial plans, and requests from traditional leaders and other NGOs.\textsuperscript{59}

In order to separate coordination and operational responsibilities, in 2002 the government of Angola also created INAD as a public institute responsible for demining and training operations under the auspices of the Minister of Assistance and Social Reintegration.\textsuperscript{60} INAD takes directions from the government rather than CNIDAH. Araújo Kapapelo Nunda, the general assistant to the director of INAD’s Technical Department, declared in February 2008: “Our priorities are defined by the central Government. At the moment, we are demining the railways, enlarging the road sides and intervening on places where undertakings helping with the process of reconstruction and development of the country will be built or rehabilitated.”\textsuperscript{61} In May 2009, INAD stated that they were fully funded by the government and had “everything” they needed, but the director general would not provide any figures for the level of support it was receiving.\textsuperscript{62}

Coordination problems have seemingly been compounded since the establishment of the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) in December 2005 to coordinate and manage mine clearance by INAD, the Angolan Armed Forces (Forças Armadas Angolanas, FAA), and the National Reconstruction Office (Gabinete de Reconstrução Nacional, GRN).\textsuperscript{63} The CED is composed of representatives from the three operators, reports to the President of Angola, and is managed by the Minister of Assistance and Social Reintegration. It functions exclusively at the operational level and participates in the planning process with the same status as other mine action operators. The CED does not have a fixed budget for mine action.\textsuperscript{64}

Two reports suggest that the GRN has ample assets to carry out its mission and maintain some independence from CNIDAH. The Ministry of Finance reported the GRN reconstruction budget for 2007 was AOA8,693,107,667 (approximately US$118 million). It was also reported by Le Monde diplomatique in June 2008 that the GRN raised its own money, estimated to be in the billions of dollars, using future oil revenues as leverage.\textsuperscript{65}

According to CNIDAH, the work performed by certain commercial companies does not follow the priorities set out in CNIDAH’s annual workplan. Private contractors take orders from their client, the GRN, whose mandate is funding infrastructure projects such as roads, railways, bridges, dams, hospitals, schools, and other buildings under the national development plan.\textsuperscript{66}

In 2008, the Council of Ministers was scheduled to vote on legislation that would clarify the roles of the CED, INAD, FAA, and CNIDAH. Under the proposed legislation the CED and CNIDAH would remain separate entities. Under Angolan law, a commission has only a temporary life. The proposed legislation would change CNIDAH’s status from a commission to an agency, thereby granting CNIDAH a more permanent status.\textsuperscript{67} However, as of May 2009 the Council of Ministers had not voted on the legislation.\textsuperscript{68}
Risk education
CNIDAH is responsible for the management, coordination, and monitoring of RE. It was supported by UNICEF until the end of 2008. Three national coordination meetings were held in 2008.69 RE is also coordinated at the provincial level, through regular meetings run by the CNIDAH provincial offices. UNICEF reported that coordination is variable, and NPA reported that the frequency of meetings had decreased in Malanje province.70 Organizations are accredited to carry out RE activities by CNIDAH.71

National standards for RE exist, and it is conducted according to a methodology developed in 2006 with UNICEF and NGOs called the Solution Based Methodology (SBM). SBM involves the establishment of community focus groups, consisting of community leaders and members, with whom NGOs meet to discuss the mine/ERW problem and to come up with solutions. Participatory Rural Appraisal techniques such as community mapping and seasonal calendars are used. This is a shift from the previously used message-based methodology. A guidebook for SBM has been produced.72

RE activities are recorded in IMSMA,73 although data provided to Landmine Monitor does not include all RE activities.74

Victim assistance
CNIDAH is responsible for the planning, coordination, and monitoring of all victim assistance (VA) activities through its Sub-commission for Assistance and Reintegration. The Sub-commission is made up of relevant ministries, the UN, and NGOs.75 However, CNIDAH’s VA coordinator noted that coordination had been difficult due to internal reorganization and logistical challenges at CNIDAH. Coordination meetings had been irregular, partly because of the elections in 2008.76 Overall coordination within ministries and with civil society was weak.77

MINARS is responsible for disability issues in general and, in the context of VA, it is responsible for reintegration services. The Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for medical care for survivors and for one of the main programs coordinating assistance to survivors and persons with disabilities, the National Program for the Rehabilitation of People with Physical and Sensorial Disability (PNR).78

CNIDAH is responsible for producing an annual VA progress report to monitor assistance provided to survivors.79 In 2008, it produced two reports covering its own coordination efforts but not implementation achievements in the sector.80 CNIDAH stated that it needed technical support and increased cooperation from ministries and implementers to compile this kind of information.81

71 Email from Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, 26 June 2009.
72 Interview with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009.
74 Information from CNIDAH’s database provided by email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009. Luanda shows a lower number of recipients of RE in 2008 (38,382) than the totals provided to Landmine Monitor by individual operators.
76 Interview with Madalena Neto, VA Coordinator, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
79 Ibid.
81 Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
Due to the increased decentralization, the National VA Plan 2007–2011 (see Strategic mine action plan section below) needs to filter down to provincial authorities. The vice-governors are responsible for provincial coordination, and local authorities are responsible for allocating relevant budgets, but VA is often not seen as a priority and budget allocations vary accordingly.

**Data collection and management**

Data collection and management are also at the heart of problems with Angola’s mine action program. In Geneva in May 2009 at the Standing Committee meetings, CNIDAH stated it did not have all of the clearance data because of a rapid expansion of commercial companies and INAD’s increased capacity. CNIDAH requested assistance from other States Parties in information management, though it did not specify the type of assistance it was seeking. As a result of database problems, Angola decided not to submit an Article 7 report for 2008.

The data collection system begins in the provinces where mine clearance operators send their reports each month to the CNIDAH provincial office. The provincial offices do not enter the data into IMSMA, which Angola uses to record mine action information. Instead they forward it to CNIDAH in Luanda where it is entered into the database. Some NGOs also email duplicate copies of their data directly to CNIDAH in Luanda each month. However, all of the information does not seem to arrive in Luanda. The NGO operators reported that they are often requested to resend data weeks or months after having submitted it to the provincial CNIDAH office and sending it direct to Luanda. Based on the requests, the NGOs assume the previously sent data had been lost.

Luanda then sends each provincial office an updated “read-only” database. In turn, however, the provincial offices do not always receive the updated database. For example, according to Chile Manuel Chicanha, the Liaison Officer at CNIDAH in Luena, the “read-only” database in Moxico in May 2009 did not show any change from the LIS data—even though for more than three years MAG, DCA, and others have been clearing high and medium-impact communities. Luanda is still working on it,” Chicanha told Landmine Monitor.

Despite all these problems, on 31 March 2009 the UNDP capacity-building project ended, leaving CNIDAH without an international advisor for the database. In May 2009, however, it was reported that UNDP was restructuring its support for mine action in Angola within a broader framework that combined work on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, and small arms and light weapons. A key component of the new structure would be efforts to secure and disseminate mine action data between CNIDAH at the national level, its provincial offices, and all mine action operators.

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83 Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and email from Claude-Alain Amiet, Orthopedic Technical Advisor, MoH/GTZ, 18 June 2009.


86 Interviews with Johan P. Botha and Douglas Kilama, CL Manager, MAG; and with Fatmire Uka, DCA, Luena, 16–17 May 2009. UNDP confirmed in March 2009 to Landmine Monitor that not all reports from mine clearance operators had reached Luanda and a review of the CNIDAH provincial offices was ongoing. Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009.


90 Email from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.

As evidenced above, casualty data collection in Angola remains incomplete and inconsistent and has possibly deteriorated compared to previous years. It is believed that casualties remain under-reported.\textsuperscript{93} CNIDAH is responsible for storing casualty data in IMSMA, which was reportedly functioning properly. However, only casualties since 2004 that were received on IMSMA forms were entered. Data from some organizations was not included in IMSMA because it was incomplete or not submitted for inclusion in the IMSMA database.\textsuperscript{94} Analysis of national and regional CNIDAH IMSMA data shows many discrepancies. Landmine Monitor received, as in previous years, information submitted to CNIDAH, which did not appear to be included in the data provided by CNIDAH.\textsuperscript{95}

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<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>StiB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stiftung Menschen gegen Minen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Handicap International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Technische</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zusammenarbeit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angolan Association of Disabled Persons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for the Promotion and Development of Communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability and Development Partners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2008 and 2009, Landmine Monitor field visits noted that sources traditionally aware of incidents, such as the police and village chiefs, did not report incidents to CNIDAH.\textsuperscript{96} CNIDAH noted that challenges in collecting data included the fact that CNIDAH only played a coordinating role and depended on operators for information while not one operator was assigned to collect the information.\textsuperscript{97} INAD also records casualty data but it was not known if this was shared with CNIDAH in 2008.

\textsuperscript{93} Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009; and email from Mohammad Qasim, 28 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{94} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by and email from Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17 June 2009 and 19 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{95} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 140–144.

\textsuperscript{96} Observations and discussions with operators during Landmine Monitor field mission, Moxico province and Luanda, 9–14 March 2008 and 11–22 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{97} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Pedro Ribeiro Toka, UNDP/CNIDAH, 17 June 2009.
Analysis of the data provided to Landmine Monitor shows unsystematic information provision by data collectors as well as a lack of person, device type, and activity information. Database fields are often not filled, are completed unsystematically, and are contradictory. It was also noted that the incident date was not the actual date of the incident but the date the report was entered into IMSMA, sometimes years later. This would include all the information provided to Landmine Monitor previously, making the data’s reliability even more questionable.

In May 2009, CNIDAH reported that it had started a nationwide survivor survey, which would be completed in 2011.

**Plans**

*Strategic mine action plan*

LIS data (interim results from 12 provinces) served as the basis for developing Angola’s latest strategic mine action plan. On 6 September 2006, the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2006–2011 was approved by the Council of Ministers. Within the time period it aims to resolve the mine issues in all high-impact communities and half of the medium-impact communities.

CNIDAH planned to review the strategic plan in October 2009 with the help of an international consultant. In preparation for the strategy review, a second annual meeting on demining was held in Luanda on 14 May 2009 at the army’s General Headquarters to review the results of clearance operations from 2006–2008 and identify activities that would support the implementation of Angola’s development plan. According to Engineer Leonardo Sapalo, INAD’s director general, the meeting concluded that more time was needed to clear all mines and this would be reflected in the revised strategic plan.


Overall, the aim of the plan was to improve service provision for all components of VA for 80% of mine/ERW survivors and/or affected communities. Given that there could be up to 80,000 mine/ERW survivors, this is a challenging target. In addition, many of the objectives focused on capacity-building and institutional strengthening, awareness-raising, and information gathering, rather than service provision. In 2008, it was reported that full implementation of the plan was scheduled to start in 2009, but due to a lack of capacity and financial means, CNIDAH had...
not been able to operationalize the plan or monitor relevant activities as of May.\textsuperscript{112} CNIDAH has met with several ministries and operators to discuss how they envisioned implementing their responsibilities under the plan. It also had several fundraising meetings and visited projects to assess their needs.\textsuperscript{113} VA is also included in the Strategic Mine Action Plan 2006–2011 as one of its strategic goals.\textsuperscript{114}

**Priority-setting**

Provincial authorities are responsible for annual operational workplans.\textsuperscript{115} At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola stated its priorities as: clearing agricultural areas, schools, hospitals, and recreation areas, and demining and rebuilding roads and bridges.\textsuperscript{116} CNIDAH provincial offices provide a priority task list to demining NGOs from which the NGOs then select the tasks they will undertake during the year.\textsuperscript{117} According to NPA, many of the provincial priority tasks focus on roads, houses, and official buildings.\textsuperscript{118}

**Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development**

In its 2007 annual report on Angola, UNDP cited the incorporation of mine action operations into the government’s development plans at both the national and provincial levels as one of its main challenges in 2008.\textsuperscript{119} From 2008–2010, government priorities include making more land accessible to expand agricultural output in order to diversify national revenue that relies mostly on oil and minerals; developing an infrastructure for the 2010 African Cup of Nations football tournament, which will be hosted in Angola; and building one million houses and improving communication networks throughout Angola.\textsuperscript{120} In two positive developments towards achieving these targets, agricultural production increased 28% in 2007, and 2008 clearance results from INAD indicate they verified and cleared 160km\textsuperscript{2} to permit the laying of fiber-optic cables.\textsuperscript{121}

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Angola has demonstrated some commitment to mine action, in particular through its adoption of a five-year strategic plan and by providing funding to mine action (even though the exact amount is unknown). Nevertheless, as this report indicates, there are significant problems with issues such as financial transparency, information management, and technical capacity within the key national institutions, seemingly with no ready solutions.

At the ministerial level, there appears to be a lack of progress in creating national ownership on VA/disability issues. The government was said to have other priorities, and 2008 elections diverted attention elsewhere.\textsuperscript{122} Yet some awareness was raised to include disability in the national political agenda, to improve legislative frameworks, and to more actively involve

\[\text{References}\]

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{114} Statement of Angola, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 21 November 2007.


\textsuperscript{116} Statement of Angola, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 20 November 2007, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{117} Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 22 February 2008; and responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaires by Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 9 March 2009; Megan Latimer, HALO, 4 March 2009; and Danny Kavanagh, MAG, 22 February 2009.

\textsuperscript{118} Interview with Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, Malanje, 13 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{119} UNDP, “2007 Annual Report,” Luanda, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{120} Interview with Adriano Gonçales, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{122} Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
persons with disabilities. Even though service provision remained fragmented and was mainly carried out by non-governmental operators, the number of persons with disabilities visibly living in undignified conditions decreased and they were more able to assert their rights.\textsuperscript{123}

As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009, CNIDAH has worked on improving coordination on VA/disability issues. It organized broad stakeholder meetings and created thematic working groups in 2006–2007,\textsuperscript{124} with the help of a short-term international consultant who also stimulated the development of the VA plan.\textsuperscript{125} CNIDAH acknowledged that, without international technical support, these efforts had slowed in 2008 and that longer-term technical assistance was needed to improve its coordination efforts. CNIDAH continued to raise the importance of VA with the relevant ministries, but it does not have the mandate to direct ministries responsible for implementation of VA/disability activities.\textsuperscript{126}

\textit{National management}

Angola is fully in charge of its mine action program although its management of the program is plagued with persistent problems, with overlapping or unclear mandates between the different government institutions that have responsibilities for mine action. Moreover, Angola still relies heavily on international advisors and organizations for key parts of its mine action program. UNDP has supported mine action through three separate projects, of which one remained ongoing as of June 2009.\textsuperscript{127}

In May 2005, UNDP established the Rapid Response Fund (RRF) in order to have a mechanism to quickly access funding for mine action after the departure of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2004. The RRF provided funds to 23 projects in mine clearance, RE, and VA as well as for the LIS, with mixed results. The evaluation team granted “highly successful” status to only eight of the 23 projects. The RRF ended in 2008 after three extensions.\textsuperscript{128}

UNDP supported CNIDAH through an 18-month project that ended on 31 March 2009 to train the management, planning, quality control, and data processing departments, as well as the staff for 18 provincial offices and the funding of national technical advisors. At the end of the project CNIDAH was left without technical support for its national mine action database.\textsuperscript{129}

As of May 2009, the remaining UNDP mine action support project was the three-year direct execution project with funding from Japan. The aim of the project, which includes six technical advisors, was to enhance INAD’s role as the national mine clearance operator.\textsuperscript{130}

In 2008–2009, the PNR, one of main disability programs, was increasingly dysfunctional (see Victim assistance section below) due to a lack of involvement from the responsible ministry (MoH). Since its inception, the PNR has not been able to function without support from international technical advisors. Its main challenges are related to budgeting, management, staff training and retention, and ensuring quality.\textsuperscript{131} It was added that sufficient budget should be available for VA/disability issues, but that it was unclear if it was actually used.\textsuperscript{132}

\footnotesize

127 Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009.
129 Email from Mohammad Qasim, UNDP/CNIDAH, 12 March 2009.

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National budget
There is no centralized reporting for government of Angola allocations to mine action. Instead any knowledge of government funding to national mine action operators since 2002 has been sporadic, although funding appears substantial. The FAA received $7 million for mine action from the government in the period immediately following the signing of April 2002 peace accords.\(^{133}\) On 8 September 2004, the media reported a government announcement that it was investing $16 million in mine clearing equipment and the training of nine new demining brigades for INAD.\(^{134}\) In 2005, the government reportedly allocated $3 million for mine action to INAD.\(^{135}\) All mine clearance and verification for national development is now said to be funded by the government through the GRN, but the amount of this support is unknown.\(^{136}\)

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures
National mine action legislation to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of CNIDAH, the CED, INAD, FAA, and government ministries, and to provide the framework for funding policies and regulations was drafted in 2007.\(^{137}\) As of May 2009, the Council of Ministers had not approved it.\(^{138}\) Angola has not developed national mine action standards. Each demining operator uses its own standing operating procedures (SOPs).\(^{139}\) INAD, which also has its own SOPs, does not conduct clearance to international standards.\(^{140}\)

Program evaluation
No evaluation of Angola’s mine action program has yet been conducted. In 2008, UNDP commissioned an evaluation of the 2005–2008 RRF and found that the RRF provided positive but limited outcomes. Among its contributions was funding to complete the LIS, mine clearance of more than 500,000m\(^2\), and the marking of 92km of suspected roads. It also funded some RE and VA projects. The RRF was established as a means to rapidly respond to a need. However, the evaluation deemed the RRF ineffective, with limited impact when compared to its original aims, owing to disorganization, insufficient staff, and inadequate monitoring.\(^{141}\)

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
Demining in Angola began in 1994 in the midst of armed conflict. International NGOs were the predominant demining operators until 2007, when INAD greatly expanded its operational capacities and commercial companies were formed to benefit from significant government funding for mine action through its infrastructure reconstruction projects. The international NGOs largely concentrate on provincial priorities based on the LIS results while INAD, the FAA, and the commercial companies are tasked by the government to clear and verify areas tied to national development priorities. As of March 2009, 89% of the work reported to CNIDAH had been done by seven NGOs (DCA, HALO, MAG, MgM, NPA, StB, and INTERSOS, which closed its demining operations in 2007).\(^{142}\) INAD is the government’s operational arm for mine action. It conducts clearance in every province and, somewhat unusually, reports its results as well as the results of the police and army demining units to the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration.\(^{143}\) INAD also

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\(^{133}\) Interview with Rogério Neves e Castro, UNDP, Luanda, 3 March 2003.

\(^{134}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 131.


\(^{136}\) Interview with Brig. Jose Roqué de Oliveira, CNIDAH, Luanda, 21 May 2009.


\(^{138}\) Interview with Adriano Gonçales, CNIDAH, Luanda, 27 May 2009.

\(^{139}\) Email from Zlatko Vezilic, NPA, 30 June 2009.


\(^{142}\) Email from Mohammad Qassim, 7 April 2009.

operates a training center in Viana, a town outside Luanda, with technical support from UNDP. INAD certifies the graduates of the school as deminers. INAD reported they asked a number of NGOs to send their new deminers to the school for training.\textsuperscript{144} CNIDAH's list of demining operators in Angola in 2008 included INAD, the FAA, and 46 registered national commercial and NGO mine clearance companies, of which CNIDAH had accredited 21.\textsuperscript{145} The bulk of clearance has been conducted by international NGOs.

**Demining by NGOs in 2008**

In November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola reported clearance of 5.4km\textsuperscript{2} of SHAs, 423km of road, and 19.3km of railway between January and July 2008. During these operations, 91,311 antipersonnel mines, 74 antivehicle mines, and 915,177 items of UXO were said to have been destroyed.\textsuperscript{146} In comparison, NGO operators reported to Landmine Monitor 4.56km\textsuperscript{2} cleared and another 34.96km\textsuperscript{2} either cancelled or reduced for calendar year 2008 (see table below) and found many fewer mines and UXO than reported by Angola at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.\textsuperscript{147}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m\textsuperscript{2})</th>
<th>Battle area clearance (m\textsuperscript{2})</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>Area cancelled (km\textsuperscript{2})</th>
<th>Area reduced (km\textsuperscript{2})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>200,463</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>2,550,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,338</td>
<td>4,686</td>
<td>10,033</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1,239</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>28.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MgM</td>
<td>239,537</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>980,000</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5,707</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StB</td>
<td>91,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,561,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>270,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,093</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,781</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,551</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.60</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textit{N/R = not reported}

INAD reports clearance according to the type of task (e.g. whether it was clearance of a road, school, or powerline). In 2008, INAD conducted clearance or verification on nine different kinds of SHA. Landmines (or other ordnance) were found at only seven of the 29 work sites. The majority of INAD’s work was in clearing 1.4km\textsuperscript{2} of land and verifying another 159km\textsuperscript{2} in order to lay fiber-optic cables as part of Angola’s national development program. Although almost 250km\textsuperscript{2} of land was said to have been verified or cleared (see table below), INAD found just 102 mines and 336 items of UXO. INAD also conducted clearance at five airports, including in Benguela, where 76 mines were found. No mines were found at the other airports.\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{144} INAD reported it cleared 244km of road in 2008. Interview with Eng. Leonard Sapalo, INAD, Luanda, 21 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{145} “Situacao da Acreititacao dos Operadores de Desminagem em Angola” (“The status of accreditation of demining operators in Angola”), 19 March 2009. Table provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{146} In November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola reported clearance of 5.4km\textsuperscript{2} of SHAs, 423km of road, and 19.3km of railway between January and July 2008. During these operations, 91,311 antipersonnel mines, 74 antivehicle mines, and 915,177 items of UXO were said to have been destroyed.\textsuperscript{146} In comparison, NGO operators reported to Landmine Monitor 4.56km\textsuperscript{2} cleared and another 34.96km\textsuperscript{2} either cancelled or reduced for calendar year 2008 (see table below) and found many fewer mines and UXO than reported by Angola at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.\textsuperscript{147}
\textsuperscript{147} Emails from Ken O’Connell, Country Director, MgM, 12 May 2009; Thomas Roth, StB, 20 March 2009; Danny Kavanagh, MAG, 2 April 2009; Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 9 March 2009; Megan Latimer, HALO, 4 March 2009; and Fatmire Uka, DCA, 3 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{148} Landmine Monitor analysis based on the data table provided by INAD in May 2009.
### Demining in 2008 by INAD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Description</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>SHAs cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Roads released (km)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Road clearance</td>
<td>Cabinda, Kuando-Kubango</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>993,624</td>
<td>38.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minefields</td>
<td>Bié, Huila, Kuanza Sul, Lunda Sul, Malanje</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>48,455</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiber-optic cables</td>
<td>Bengo, Bié, Kunene, Lunda Sul, Malanje, Zaire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,403,651</td>
<td>158.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bridges</td>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>Moxico</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,694</td>
<td>46.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airports</td>
<td>Benguela, Huambo, Huila, Kunene, Kuando-Kubango, Ulige</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>83,288</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>Bié</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerlines</td>
<td>Lunda Norte</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,750</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Bengo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12,801</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>102</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>336</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,555,992</strong></td>
<td><strong>244.36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Demining by commercial companies

Commercial demining operators are contracted by other companies working on construction, communications, energy, and diamond projects. It is believed much of the work is verifying land as being free from mines, rather than conducting full clearance to remove mines. The little data available on the work of the commercial companies seems to indicate that the output does not contribute very much to clearing SHAs according to the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011.

CNIDAH conducts quality assurance on commercial demining projects and determines when the cleared land should be handed over to the community for use. INAD reported, however, that in agreement with CNIDAH they certify their own clearance work on electricity towers, railways, roads, and other infrastructure as it is difficult for CNIDAH to keep up with the work. If not, according to INAD, clearance would come to a stop. However, it is planned that CNIDAH will eventually certify all infrastructure projects.

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150 Email from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.
151 Interview with Balbina Malheiros Dias da Silva, Coordinator, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 4 June 2008.
Battle area clearance in 2008
In 2008, NPA reported battle area clearance (BAC) on 270,000m² of land. No other operator, including government and national NGOs and commercial companies, reported BAC in 2008.

Explosive ordnance disposal
In March 2009, CNIDAH for the first time provided data on the extent of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations conducted from 2004 to April 2009. During this period CNIDAH recorded 5,225 EOD tasks, in which 85,507 items of UXO and 287,954 items of abandoned explosive ordnance were found, most reportedly in Zaire province. MAG, in Moxico, is said to be responsible for more than 20% of completed EOD tasks. According to MAG’s technical operations manager, it conducts EOD tasks nearly every day. In 2008, HALO responded to 301 EOD callouts, and destroyed 7,843 items of UXO and 2,004 items of stray ammunition. Between 2004 and April 2009 HALO responded to 1,150 EOD callouts and destroyed a total of 18,553 items of UXO and 9,556 items of stray ammunition.

Road clearance
The LIS identified blocked roads as a nationwide problem with a particularly high impact in Bié, Huambo, and Moxico provinces. According to INAD, all major roads have been cleared and were being paved with asphalt as planned by the Ministry of Public Works and Road Institute of Angola, who are responsible for the road project. The clearance of secondary roads over the next four years is one of the current reconstruction priorities. At the end of 2008, NPA stopped clearing roads, because the government had declared that commercial companies and INAD would conduct these tasks, and began clearing only SHAs.

Angola reported 423km² of road had been cleared or verified in 2008. HALO reported that investment in rebuilding roads and bridges has vastly improved movement for its mine clearance teams and improved logistics in the Benguela, Bié, and Huambo provinces, a region known as Plano Alto.

Land release
Angola has been trying—so far without success—to adopt a land release policy since the completion of the LIS in 2007. Data from the LIS indicated that the Angolan landmine problem could take decades to resolve if clearance capacity was not increased and if the same methods of operation continued. Although CNIDAH did not adopt a land release policy in 2008 as it planned, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) assisted NPA in developing and implementing the Land Release Concept, a model for non-technical survey methods to release land. CNIDAH has endorsed NPA as a partner for developing the Land Release Concept in Angola.

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153 Email from Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, 9 March 2009.
154 Information provided by email from Mohammad Qasim, 7 April 2009.
155 Email from Johan P. Botha, MAG, 17 June 2009.
156 Email from Christian Richmond, Southern Africa Desk Officer, HALO, 21 August 2009.
157 The LIS as a community-based survey, however, did not completely capture the road and infrastructure mine contamination. Bridges, railways, and road systems were damaged as well as mined during the long conflict. SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey, Republic of Angola, Final Report,” Washington, DC, November 2007, p. 10.
159 Interview with Aubrey Sutherland, NPA, Luanda, 20 May 2009.
161 Email from Megan Latimer, HALO, 4 March 2009.
Using the Land Release Concept, NPA conducted 125 non-technical surveys on SHAs identified by the LIS, covering 24.3km², and cancelled 29 SHAs, measuring 4.8km² in total. Similarly, in Moxico province MAG cancelled 28km² in 27 communities using their own methodologies. In the process, 43 SHAs that originally measured 33km² in the LIS were reduced by 85% to 5km². Another 18 SHAs were cancelled because the land had been in use for more than two years for construction and three years for farming without a mine incident. All cancellation reports were submitted to CNIDAH.

HALO cancelled 88 SHAs from its database in 2008. Cancellation criteria for HALO includes: land that has been farmed for three years or more without any incidents, land that is being used for other purposes (housing and infrastructure) with no incidents reported for three years, and SHAs that have been cleared by another operator which follows the same safety practices and clearance standards. If a SHA meets the criteria, both the beneficiaries and the local authorities must sign a statement declaring the area is not mined and is safe to use. CNIDAH is provided with a copy of the statement. Periodically, HALO also uses technical survey and mechanical assets for area reduction.

INAD has not adopted a land release policy, although UNDP advisors have introduced the concept to them. In recognition of the importance of land release in meeting its Article 5 obligations, at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Angola requested assistance from other States Parties to adopt a land release policy.

Marking and fencing
A CNIDAH workshop on area reduction and marking, held in Benguela province in February 2008, decided that concrete pillars should be placed every 15m and linked with barbed wire. It was suggested that national institutions should buy and place the pillars, but this marking system was considered too expensive by the demining operators. In general, fencing and marking is not widely practiced in Angola. For example, HALO does not mark low-impact SHAs because marking materials are often taken by local residents and end up as roofing tiles or building materials. As tasks are surveyed, HALO marks the perimeter with red paint or stones in order to indicate that the area within is a SHA, especially in areas that are close to villages or areas of activity. This marking is explained to the local authorities and the community, who are often already avoiding the area.

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2013. It is difficult to measure the progress being made in Angola. The government, through the CED, FAA, and INAD, has substantially increased clearance assets since 2005, but data on their achievements is scarce and of poor quality. INAD, for example, believes the lack of a complete database of known mined areas will prevent Angola from meeting its Article 5 deadline for the clearance of mined areas.
### Demining from 2003–2008 (includes only international NGOs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Battle area clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Other land release (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4.56</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>34.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>16.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>12.25</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>38.89</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.72</strong></td>
<td><strong>43.53</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*N/A = not available*

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Angola stated that it had allocated human and financial resources to tackle the mine problem in the whole country, but the target set was achievable only if technical and operational demining capacity was doubled by the government and NGOs. The statement did not mention the likelihood of a need to request a deadline extension.\(^{172}\)

In the UN 2008 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, published in November 2007, Angola’s entry states, “The strategic plan is a basis for fulfilling the Government’s commitment to the anti-personnel mine-ban treaty. If it is achieved on time, the Government will have one more year to remove all marked SHAs, thus meeting the mine clearance deadline of 1 January 2013.”\(^{173}\) However, after a meeting in Luanda in May 2009 convened to review demining achievements in 2006–2008 and to prepare for a revision of the previous five-year strategy, participants from INAD and CNIDAH stated their belief that it would be difficult to meet the current Article 5 deadline.\(^{174}\)

### Risk Education

The level of mine/ERW RE activity had reduced significantly by the end of 2008, even though the need is high. RE was implemented by 14 national and international NGOs in 15 provinces. INAD also has an RE team in each of its 15 brigades operating throughout the country,\(^{175}\) although its activities are limited and the teams do not appear to be active everywhere.\(^{176}\) Some national NGOs were supported by UNICEF and Handicap International (HI) until December 2008. UNICEF phased out RE because it was no longer a national program priority, they had been working on it for 10 years, and casualties had been reduced.\(^{177}\)

Most national NGOs, including those supported by UNICEF and HI, use the SBM methodology, although some also conduct emergency message-based RE. International NGOs implementing clearance activities conduct community liaison, including non-technical survey.\(^{178}\)

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\(^{176}\) Interviews with Bernardo das Mercês, National Program Director, CVA, Luanda, 12 May 2009; and Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 15 May 2009.

\(^{177}\) Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.

\(^{178}\) Interview with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009.
Materials are used sparingly in Angola, and mainly as visual aids to support RE sessions. DCA does not give out leaflets or other materials to communities, as they are not found to be useful. RE is not integrated into the school curriculum because it was developed in 2002, and it was not possible to include RE at the time. RE is conducted in schools in high-impact areas, and training and resources are provided to teachers. UNICEF reported that more than 200,000 primary school students were reached in 2008.

In some provinces RE was conducted through radio but not in Mozico, because it was expensive and the radio frequency did not reach the areas required. RE is now closely integrated with mine action. Organizations carrying out RE liaise closely with CNIDAH provincial offices and provide information to communities on how to report contamination and casualties, generally to municipality offices, as the information will then go to the CNIDAH provincial office. RE teams gather information on contamination and casualties and record it on IMSMA forms to provide to CNIDAH provincial offices (see Data collection and management section above). They also liaise directly with clearance organizations and VA organizations in their locale. MAG, DCA, and HALO respond to reports of contamination. MAG’s community liaison (CL) teams are mainly engaged in survey and impact assessment. MAG acquired a geographic information system capacity in 2008, which is managed by the CL department. Community marking is included in the SBM, and NGOs supported by UNICEF and HI implement this, as well as Angola Red Cross (Cruz Vermelha de Angola, CVA) volunteers. CNIDAH provides paint to communities for this purpose. DCA does not encourage community marking, and Exame de Abelhas reported that they do not have the capacity to do it.

In 2008, UNICEF conducted regular monitoring visits to its partners, and was always accompanied by CNIDAH personnel, who also conducted their own separate monitoring visits. Both CNIDAH and UNICEF reported that they were happy with the way RE was being implemented according to the new methodology developed. HI monitored the work of its partners, and the international NGOs have their own internal monitoring system. As well as a shortage of funding, RE also faces logistical challenges. Although UNICEF lent its partners vehicles, they were often damaged by the poor road conditions.

Through the national coordination meetings, CNIDAH and UNICEF’s NGO partners discussed the achievements of RE, noting that implementation of the SBM had allowed more communities to be reached (allowing better identification of risk areas), that there was a decrease in casualties, but that the decrease in funding meant an uncertain future for RE, data collection, and reporting of casualties. No other evaluations have been conducted.

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179 Interview with Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 21 May 2009.
183 Interview with Hendrix Chilongu, DCA, Luena, 21 May 2009.
190 Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009; and email from Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, 26 June 2009.
### RE Activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVA</td>
<td>Working with focus groups in communities</td>
<td>15 out of 18 provinces</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palanca Negro</td>
<td>SBM</td>
<td>Malanje</td>
<td>6 municipalities, 19 comunas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPDC</td>
<td>SBM</td>
<td>Luanda Sol</td>
<td>3 municipalities, 11 comunas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club de Jovens</td>
<td>SBM</td>
<td>Huíla</td>
<td>6 municipalities, 23 comunas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secut Bagos</td>
<td>SBM</td>
<td>Uíge</td>
<td>5 municipalities, 7 comunas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exame de Abelhas</td>
<td>SBM</td>
<td>México</td>
<td>4 municipalities, 7 comunas, total 29,762 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalofulofu</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>México</td>
<td>3,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Humanitarian</strong></td>
<td><strong>Organisation (OHI)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bié</strong></td>
<td>100 communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines Victim Association (AVMI)</td>
<td>SBM</td>
<td>Benguela</td>
<td>36 communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Support Group (GAC)</td>
<td>SBM</td>
<td>Huambo</td>
<td>30 communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MAG</strong></td>
<td><strong>Community Liaison:</strong> survey, impact assessment, and RE</td>
<td><strong>Moxico</strong></td>
<td>11,302 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>CL and RE</td>
<td>Moxico</td>
<td>17,702 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HALO</strong></td>
<td><strong>RE/CL conducted by minefield and survey supervisors alongside</strong></td>
<td><strong>Demining</strong></td>
<td>15,930 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Limited CL and RE with clearance operations</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No figures available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INAD</td>
<td>Limited RE, message-based</td>
<td>Capacity, but not necessarily active, in all provinces</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = not available

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UNICEF has tried to help national NGOs with fundraising to continue their work into 2008, but only two received funding to continue work into 2009.\textsuperscript{194} CNIDAH and the CVA have a draft agreement in place to conduct RE in 2009, but in May 2009 they were waiting for approval to work.\textsuperscript{195} MAG was gathering knowledge, attitude, and practice data in mid-2009, planning to issue a report in August.\textsuperscript{196} RE has been conducted in Angola for more than 10 years by UNICEF, international and national NGOs working in partnership. ICRC worked with the CVA, INAD, and school teachers. Some 20 organizations have been involved, with RE reaching a peak of over 800,000 beneficiaries in 2003, after which it decreased in scale.\textsuperscript{197} The LIS reported that some areas were under-provided with RE.\textsuperscript{198}

UNICEF supported the national coordination body—the National Institute for Removal of Obstacles and Explosive Devices (Instituto Nacional de Remoção De Obstáculos E Engenhos Explosivos, INAROREE) until 2001, and then CNIDAH—in providing capacity-building to NGOs, supporting school-based RE programs, conducting mass media RE, and financial support. RE planning became decentralized to the provincial CNIDAH office level in 2004.\textsuperscript{199} In 2004, community mine action committees were introduced. The committees were reported to be challenging to maintain, however, as the members asked for incentives.\textsuperscript{200} In 2006, RE shifted to a development approach. New participatory methods were introduced in order to consider local threats and risk-taking behavior.\textsuperscript{201}

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but there are many thousands. In May 2009, CNIDAH said that the situation of mine/ERW survivors had improved in recent years, mainly due to better medical and socio-economic services.\textsuperscript{202} It was further noted that improvements to the road network enabled survivors to reach existing services.\textsuperscript{203} Nevertheless, most survivors and persons with disabilities had limited access to services, particularly in rural areas, due to insufficient transportation and financial means.\textsuperscript{204} Some of the main challenges noted were: providing comprehensive assistance to survivors/persons with disabilities, utilizing improved infrastructures/mechanisms to actually enhance service provision, and reinforcing coordination.\textsuperscript{205}

Despite fast economic growth, Angola’s health indicators remained among the worst in the world and social infrastructure, including health centers, schools and human resource capacity, remained “extremely poor.”\textsuperscript{206} The US Department of State reported that “in many areas, health care was limited or nonexistent.”\textsuperscript{207} In 2008, Angola reported that several provincial hospitals

\textsuperscript{194} Interview with Carlos Seixas, UNICEF, Luanda, 11 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{195} Interviews with Bernardo das Mercês, CVA, Luanda, 12 May 2009; and with Nelson Hiyonanye, CNIDAH, Luanda, 12 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{196} Interview with Douglas Kilama, MAG, Luena, 17 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{197} See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
\textsuperscript{198} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{199} See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{200} See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 171.
\textsuperscript{201} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{202} Interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, Geneva, 28 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{203} “Situação de vítimas de engenhos explosivos melhora em Angola” (“Situation of victims of explosive devices better in Angola”), Jornal de Angola (Luanda), 26 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{205} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Raul Feio, EC Delegation in Angola, 29 June 2009.
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had been upgraded and health centers had been constructed in several mine-affected areas, which also received ambulances.208 Angola also said in May 2009, that it “continued its efforts to guarantee the quality, sustainability and accessibility” of services by providing qualified staff and equipment.209 But it acknowledged that this was the area with the least progress.210 In reality, access to physical rehabilitation seems to have deteriorated compared to 2007 and definitely compared to 2005. As of August 2008, all international organizations had withdrawn support to the physical rehabilitation sector for which the MoH is responsible through the PNR. The program aimed to create a national sustainable physical rehabilitation capacity, and was increasingly dysfunctional as a result of a lack of involvement by the ministry.211 In 2009, the program was still functioning though with more logistical constraints and a reduced capacity to respond after the end of European Commission funding in 2007.212 None of the centers are fully operational, salaries are not paid, and materials are not available.213

Since the departure of the international supporting organizations, the rehabilitation centers have seen patient numbers decrease rapidly, as no one covers their transportation costs214 and the government does not buy materials or components. It was also noted that international organizations pulled out of Angola without ensuring that sustainable alternatives were in place.215 Services were said to be only available for those who could afford to receive treatment abroad.216 All this would appear to contradict the situation Angola portrayed in its VA plan covering 2007–2011, which stated, “almost always survivors have access to [rehabilitation] services.”217

For psychosocial support, the government mainly relied on the activities of national NGOs and disabled people’s organizations (DPO), and on the survivors’ family networks.218 The government also maintained that the “Miss Landmine Beauty Pageant” contributed to raising awareness about the issue.219 Services remained limited, due to the non-existence of formal counseling infrastructure and a lack of trained staff.220

Economic reintegration of mine/ERW survivors is a priority area for Angola and several government-sponsored and NGO initiatives exist, which are said to have more than 10,000 beneficiaries.221 Angola also reported this figure of 10,000 beneficiaries reached in 2007 and

211 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Raul Feio, EC Delegation in Angola, 29 June 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 150.
212 Email from Claude-Alain Amiet, MoH/GTZ, 18 June 2009; and interview with Madalena Neto, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
213 Ibid.
215 Email from Claude-Alain Amiet, MoH/GTZ, 18 June 2009.
June 2008.222 Despite more employment of young persons with disabilities in 2008, educational and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities remained limited.223 Survivors rarely had access to vocational training and employment schemes because they were not aware these services existed; the government rarely provided incentives to promote economic opportunities for persons with disabilities; and services were not accessible and limited in rural areas.224 In November 2008, Angola reported the development of a Strategy for Special Needs Education 2009–2015 and the construction of five accessible schools.225 Mine/ERW survivors do not appear to benefit from this plan, which was originally developed in 2006 (with a 2007–2015 timeframe).226

Angola has fragmented legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but the government did not effectively enforce it.227 Work on the compilation and unification of existing disability legislation has stalled due to election-related legislative work.228 In November 2008, the National Assembly reportedly started the approval procedure of the Protection Law for Disabled Persons created in 2000;229 no further progress was reported as of May 2009.230 As of 1 July 2009, Angola had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

An HI impact assessment showed that while people still feel “pity” for persons with disabilities, people are more aware of equal rights for persons with disabilities, increased community participation, employment, and education rather than just charity.231

An evaluation of the UNDP Angola RRF between 2005 and 2008 noted that the VA component of the RRF had been “relatively cost efficient provided that the intended target groups in remote rural areas with little access… actually were the main beneficiaries.”232 The evaluators were not able to visit beneficiaries and the evaluation had to be based on information provided by the implementers, which was sometimes missing and did not always include beneficiary statistics. It was also concluded that the support provided was not comprehensive.233

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

Angola is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.234 Angola presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005 and revised them in 2006 and 2007. The latest revision was to be used as the National VA Plan 2007–2011 (see Strategic

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231 Email from Julie Nuttens, HI, 29 June 2009.
233 Ibid, pp. 31–33, 37.
mine action plan section above). Most of the deadlines have been set for 2011 and objectives were not focused on service provision. Due to a lack of capacity impeding implementation and coordination of the plan, most of the objectives due for completion in 2009 do not appear to be on track:

- **Data collection**: No reliable data collection mechanism is functional, and comprehensive data is not available; despite a temporary improvement in 2007 there was no noticeable coordination and capacity improvement.
- **Medical care**: New health centers were constructed, but no progress was reported on improving first responder capacity and access to services.
- **Physical rehabilitation**: None of the objectives were achieved, notably improved national sustainability; increased training; increased repair/replacement capacity; and assumption of financial and technical responsibility for producing three-quarters of the mobility devices to assist 80% of survivors needing them.
- **Psychosocial support**: No progress was reported on expanding psychosocial services to rehabilitation centers and hospitals, strengthening capacity, the creation of a survivor network or projects at the regional level; the only area of progress might be in the inclusion of survivors in special education.
- **Economic reintegration**: Some cooperatives were created and small business projects started in cooperation with the private sector and multinational companies, and more young persons with disabilities were employed. But economic reintegration remained a weak point.
- **Laws and public policy**: Disability legislation had not been approved and strengthened as scheduled. Advocacy efforts did take place (including the Miss Landmine Beauty Pageant).


**Victim assistance activities**

CNIDAH was not able to provide reliable and complete statistics on the number of survivors assisted in 2008. Due to the PNR’s poor functioning, rehabilitation statistics were no longer available. MINARS stated that 21,350 persons with disabilities received socio-economic reintegration services in 2008. The ministry also claimed that it supported 89,170 out of an estimated 150,000 persons with disabilities in the country. CNIDAH in Moxico province reported that the Luena rehabilitation center had assisted 480 survivors in 2008.

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241 “Programas de apoio a deficientes criam empresas e cooperativas” (“Programs to support persons with disabilities starting businesses and cooperatives”), *Jornal de Angola*, 4 December 2008.
The Angolan Association of Disabled Persons (Associação dos Deficientes de Angola, ANDA) reported supporting 1,500 persons socio-economically through the “Come with me” project in 2008. ANDA also distributed 248 motor-taxis in partnership with the local NGO Causa Solidaria. The Center for the Promotion and Development of Communities (CAPDC) suffered financial challenges and had to lay off most of its staff.

In 2008, the German Society for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ), present in Angola since 1995, ended its collaboration agreement on physical rehabilitation with the MoH in August 2008, and also ended its support to the community-based rehabilitation (CBR) project of the NGO League for the Reintegration of Disabled Persons (Liga de Apoio à Integração dos Deficientes). It started a new collaboration with the Institute of Socio-Professional Reintegration of Former Combatants for vocational training in Gabela, Kuanza Sul province; two cooperatives for disabled persons were also created in Porto Amboim, Kuanza Sul province.

In 2008, HI continued its support for two disabled people’s organizations in Huambo in conducting socio-economic reintegration activities benefiting 102 persons with disabilities (30% mine survivors). It also supported 17 disabled people’s organizations or local NGOs in Benguela, Huila, and Huambo provinces with training and with raising awareness of disability in public and private institutions. HI also continued its CBR projects and conducted 4,263 peer support home visits for persons with disabilities in Benguela, Huila, and Namibe provinces; 309 people received medical care, 404 socio-economic support, 300 material support, and 853 were referred to other appropriate services (146 survivors). In 2008, HI conducted an impact assessment of its CBR activities and it was noted that perceptions of disability had improved in the target area after two years of implementation. Since HI started its activities in Angola in 1995, it has moved from direct implementation and support for physical rehabilitation (facing challenges similar to those explained above) to support of local associations, community-based and socio-economic activities.

In July 2008, the ICRC ended its support to the physical rehabilitation sector after nearly 30 years in Angola, “believing that the country has all the necessary means to provide effective physical rehabilitation services.” Over the years, it constructed the rehabilitation centers in Huambo and Kuito, renovated the main center in Luanda, donated materials and components, provided institutional support to CNIDAH and the PNR, trained staff, and covered transport costs for patients. In 2008 to the end of June, the three centers supported by the ICRC produced 420 prostheses (72% for mine/ERW survivors) and 80 orthoses (1% for mine/ERW survivors); in total 3,048 people were assisted. Since 1979, the ICRC has produced 33,041 prostheses (41% for mine/ERW survivors) and 962 orthoses (7% for mine/ERW survivors).

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and victim assistance) in Angola. The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011 includes among its five primary goals the establishment of a national mine action capacity “sustainable by national resources” after the end of major international assistance. The plan projects an overall decline in international mine action funding from 2006 to 2011.
CNIDAH distributes and manages some funds allocated by national and international donors; advises the Angolan government on national funding issues; and liaises with government and donors on the impact on mine action of national development projects, and inclusion of mine action costs in relevant project budgets.\(^\text{252}\) CNIDAH coordinates with the Council of Ministers on national development priorities, and acts as a strategic partner of the Ministry of Finance in coordinating the national budget for mine action.\(^\text{253}\)

**National support for mine action**

Angola did not report national funding to mine action in 2008. It did not report national funding in 2007, but stated that the national government had allocated “both human and financial resources” to fulfill its Article 5 obligations, without specifying funding amounts.\(^\text{254}\) The National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2006–2011 commits the Angolan government to providing substantial funds “from 2006 onwards” to resource, equip and train manual and mechanical demining brigades.\(^\text{255}\)

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, 12 countries reported providing $22,136,622 (€15,032,278) to mine action in Angola. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was 12% more than reported in 2007.

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Angola reported on the need for additional international assistance to support its VA programming.\(^\text{256}\) At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Angola reported increasing difficulties in gathering and reporting information on mine action results due to the large number of operators conducting programs in the country. It called for assistance in support of land release and Article 7 reporting, citing the obligations under Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^\text{257}\)

Without adequate reporting of cost estimates or national support to mine action programs, it is not possible to evaluate the sufficiency of funds in meeting Angola’s mine action needs. Nevertheless, 2008 funding levels were relatively strong, and funds committed by the European Commission (EC) in 2009 (see below) will further strengthen Angola’s capacity to fulfill its treaty obligations.

Norwegian funding to NPA in Angola is part of a NOK24 million (approximately $4.26 million) funding agreement signed in January 2008 and covering the period 2008 to 2010.\(^\text{258}\) HALO reported funding in 2008 from the United States, the European Commission (EC), the United Kingdom, Finland, Japan, Switzerland and Ireland.\(^\text{259}\) No funding to HALO was reported by Finland, Japan, or the US in 2008; the EC also did not report funding to Angola in 2008.

In addition to its specific monetary contributions in 2008 to national mine action initiatives, the EC announced in May 2009 that it had committed €39 million ($57 million) during 2008 to mine action in a number of states. Although states receiving aid were specified, the amounts and projects supported were not differentiated, and as of June 2009 were still to be determined. The EC stated simply that funds are “to support future action” in recipient states.\(^\text{260}\) Angola was among the states named as recipients within the overall commitment. However, in June 2009 the EC reported to Landmine Monitor that the commitment “can be subject to changes” before its final adoption by the EC.\(^\text{261}\)

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\(^\text{252}\) Ibid, p. 43.


\(^\text{259}\) Email from Christian Richmond, Desk Officer, HALO, 3 September 2009.


\(^\text{261}\) Email from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Directorate-General for External Relations, EC, 12 June 2009.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Angola: Monetary\(^{262}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Department of State, Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related programs appropriation, Centers for Disease Control</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$5,955,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>MAG, HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$3,407,698 (£1,837,529)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$2,102,550 (DKK10,700,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>MAG, NPA, HI</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$2,020,407 (€1,372,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,854,685 (NOK10,454,817)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>StB, GTZ</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$1,760,926 (£1,195,794)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Finn Church Aid, Finnish Red Cross/ICRC</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$1,178,080 (£800,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$1,067,635 (£725,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan International Goodwill Foundation, Japan Mine Action Services</td>
<td>Mine clearance, mine/ERW RE</td>
<td>$1,059,110 (¥109,186,608)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>NPA, HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$482,641 (CHF522,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Mine clearance, RE</td>
<td>$435,890 (£296,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$21,324,622 (€14,480,933)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2008 International Mine Action Support to Angola: In-Kind\(^{263}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Form of In-Kind Support</th>
<th>Monetary Value (where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Mine clearance expert in support of NPA</td>
<td>$184,920 (CHF200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Mine clearance training and equipment to INAD</td>
<td>$626,992 (£425,772)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$811,912 (£551,346)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{262}\) US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” Washington, DC, July 2009; emails from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; and Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; emails from Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2009; David Keating, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2009; Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Japanese Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation; Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; and Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.

\(^{263}\) Email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; and Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
In April 2009, the EC and the Angola Ministry of Planning signed an agreement securing €20 million ($29.5 million) in EC funding for mine clearance over a period of four years, starting in 2010.264 Although the agreement evidently fulfills part of the above general commitment, as of June 2009 no specific project details or annual funding amounts were available.

ARGENTINA

Ten-Year Summary

Argentina became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2000. It has not enacted domestic implementation legislation. Argentina completed destruction of its stockpile of more than 90,000 antipersonnel mines on 4 December 2003. Argentina originally indicated it would retain 13,025 mines for training, but decided to convert most to inert “exercise mines.” Since 2004, the number of retained mines has decreased from 1,772 to 1,268. In December 2005, States Parties agreed to a proposal by Argentina and Chile for expanded reporting on mines retained for training and development purposes. Argentina served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention from September 2006 to November 2007 and co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies from November 2008 to December 2009.

Argentina has asserted that the “illegal occupation” of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands has “effectively prevented [it] from having access to the anti-personnel mines…in order to fulfill the obligations undertaken in the Mine Ban Treaty.” On 27 April 2009, Argentina submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. The request was to be formally considered by the Second Review Conference in November–December 2009.

Scope of the Problem

Argentina reports that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim to sovereignty over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. On ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty, Argentina submitted a declaration reaffirming “its rights of sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Georgia and South Sandwich and the surrounding maritime areas which form an integral part of the territory.” There is a sovereignty dispute over the islands between Argentina and the United Kingdom.

The islands were mined, mostly by Argentina, during its armed conflict with the UK in 1982. A joint UK-Argentine feasibility study, the plan for which was first announced in 2001, was completed by Cranfield University in July 2007 and issued by a Joint Working Group of the two states in October 2007. It identified 117 mined areas covering 13.15 km², which represents approximately 0.1% of the area in the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. There is also UXO, including a number of areas containing cluster munition remnants resulting from the use of BL-755 bombs by the UK.

In interviews with the ICBL, Argentina has reiterated its claim that there are no known mined areas or suspected hazardous areas on the mainland. In March 2009, the Ministry of Defense acknowledged that a number of mineral mining companies had inquired about the presence of landmines in Salta province before starting operations; the companies were told that there were no mined or suspected hazardous areas.

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1 See, for example, Article 7 Report, Forms A and C, 30 May 2008.
4 For details of contamination, see report on Falkland Islands/Malvinas in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
5 Article 7 Report, Form C, 16 April 2007.
7 Cranfield University, “Field Survey to Examine the Feasibility of Clearing Landmines in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),” 9 July 2007, p. 12.
8 Interviews with Gustavo Ainchil, Director, Department of International Security, Nuclear and Space Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Buenos Aires, 23 March 2009; and Navy Capt. (ret.) Carlos Nielsen, Advisor, Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces, Buenos Aires, 25 March 2009.
In June 2007, forensic anthropologists began excavating a possible burial site at an army ammunition storage area in Tucumán province and found what they believed to be landmines on the site. The Tucumán Federal Court ordered an investigation to determine if the area contained explosive devices. In October 2008, the investigation was completed, and the burial site was determined to be free of mines. No other similar investigations have been requested or conducted according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Program Management and Coordination

Argentina has a Humanitarian Demining Office under the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Armed Forces. This office is in charge of dealing with relevant international treaties, including the Mine Ban Treaty.

In 2008, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining delivered two workshops for Argentina on the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) covering the latest advancements in the IMSMA software.

Demining

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Argentina is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2010. In its Article 7 reports and Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports, Argentina has asserted that the “illegal occupation” of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands has “effectively prevented [it] from having access to the anti-personnel mines…in order to fulfill the obligations undertaken in the Mine Ban Treaty.” On 27 April 2009, Argentina submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. The request was to be formally considered by the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Colombia in November–December 2009.

Support for Mine Action

In its Article 5 clearance deadline extension request, Argentina provided an overall budget of US$250 million for clearance operations in the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. The budget includes $15 million for capacity-building, $160 million for five years of full-scale clearance operations, $72 million for three subsequent years of reduced operations, and $3 million for redeployment of personnel. Argentina has not reported in detail on resource mobilization strategies to cover costs projected within the request, nor has it provided a detailed annual breakdown of operational and other expenses.
2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Scattered UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>3 (2007: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The People’s Republic of Bangladesh became the first South Asian country to ratify the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2000. It has yet to enact domestic legislation to implement the treaty. Bangladesh served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from September 2003 to December 2005. Bangladesh completed destruction of its stockpile of 204,227 antipersonnel mines in February 2005. It retained 12,500 mines for training, but has never reported consuming any of these mines in training activities. Bangladesh is not believed to be mine-affected, although it has a problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW). No mine casualties have been reported since 2001, although ERW and improvised explosive devices continued to cause casualties. No systematic mine/ERW risk education activities have been reported. Few mine/ERW survivors received prosthetic or rehabilitation assistance and socio-economic assistance was seriously lacking.

Mine Ban Policy

Bangladesh signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 May 1998 and ratified it on 6 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001. Bangladesh established a national committee to oversee implementation of the treaty in August 2001, but has not yet enacted domestic legislation to implement the treaty. In May 2009 Bangladesh reported, “Necessary implementation measures are in progress;” it has made similar claims since 2002 in all previous Article 7 transparency reports. Bangladesh submitted its eighth Article 7 report on 15 May 2009, covering the period from 1 March 2008 to 28 February 2009. Bangladesh attended the Ninth Meeting of State Parties in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, but made no statements. Bangladesh has not made known its views on key issues of interpretation and implementation of Articles 1 and 2 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling, transit of antipersonnel mines, and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices).


1 Article 7 Report, Form A, 15 May 2009. In its second Article 7 report, submitted in April 2003, Bangladesh reported that domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty was in its “final stage of preparation.”

Production, transfer, use, stockpile destruction, and retention
Bangladeshi officials have stated that the country has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines and never used antipersonnel mines within the country or along its border. Bangladesh completed destruction of 189,227 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in February 2005. Bangladesh had mines manufactured by China, India, Iran, Pakistan, the United States, and the former Yugoslavia. Islamists, Maoists, Marxists, and other armed groups associated with some political parties manufacture and use command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). None have been known to use victim-activated IEDs that function like antipersonnel mines.

Mines retained for research and training
Bangladesh has retained 12,500 antipersonnel mines for research and training under Article 3 of the treaty, which is the second highest number among State Parties. The number of antipersonnel mines retained since Bangladesh’s first Article 7 report in 2002 has remained essentially unchanged. This indicates that mines are not being consumed during training or research activities. In its Article 7 reports, Bangladesh has not used the expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines that State Parties agreed to in 2005. The form is intended to ensure that States Parties are transparent about the precise intended purposes, actual uses, and future plans for use of retained mines.

In the past, Bangladesh Army officials have stated that they require a large number of retained mines because deminer training requires live rather than dummy mines and because engineering units and training facilities are spread all over the country. They have also said that training with live mines is necessary to fulfill Bangladesh’s role in UN peacekeeping missions. Bangladesh has stated that its stockpile of Claymore mines can only be used in command-detonated mode, but has not described what specific measures were taken to ensure that its 2,499 Iranian M18A1 Claymore-type mines can only be used in command-detonated mode, as has been urged by other States Parties.

No new recoveries or seizures of antipersonnel mines have been reported in Bangladesh for the past two years. In previous years, Bangladesh has recovered antipersonnel mines in weapons caches in various parts of the country.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Bangladesh is affected by ERW, with both UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance, including arms caches from World War II and the independence war of 1971, still found in different parts of the country. Casualty data also indicates a threat from IEDs, though the extent is not known. Many IEDs, although believed to be command-detonated, result in unstable ERW.
There is no evidence of remaining mined areas. Bangladesh has reported no known or suspected mined areas in the country.\textsuperscript{13} In talks with Myanmar officials on border security issues in June 2008, however, Bangladesh proposed a survey of the border for mines, and the two sides agreed to jointly remove any that were found.\textsuperscript{14} No further progress had been reported as of 1 April 2009.

**Casualties**

In 2008 and to March 2009, no new mine casualties were reported in Bangladesh. The last reported mine casualties occurred in June 2001.\textsuperscript{15} At least two incidents involving ERW occurred in 2008: a farmer was injured by a bomb while digging, and a girl and a woman were killed when the girl tried to pull the pin out of an abandoned grenade.\textsuperscript{16} The number of IED casualties in 2008 is unknown but it was noted that while IED use had decreased following a state of emergency in 2007, it increased slowly through 2008. Between January and March 2009, one boy was killed and 22 people were injured by IEDs.\textsuperscript{17}

Bangladeshi casualties also continued to occur in Kuwait with at least three people injured in two mine/ERW incidents.\textsuperscript{18} The actual figure may be higher as there is no systematic data collection and casualties are often described as “Asian.” Since 2006, most reported casualties in Kuwait were Bangladeshi workers usually shepherding or collecting scrap metal.\textsuperscript{19} One Bangladeshi military deminer was injured in Juba, Sudan, in 2008.\textsuperscript{20}

The total number of mine/ERW/IED casualties in Bangladesh is not known. Between 1993 and June 2001, at least 64 people were killed and 131 injured in reported landmine incidents.\textsuperscript{21} The Bangladesh Freedom Fighters’ Welfare Trust identified 148 people who lost limbs in antipersonnel mine incidents during the 1971 independence war.\textsuperscript{22} Nonviolence International-Bangladesh (NVI-Bangladesh) identified 1,863 explosives casualties (192 killed and 1,671 injured) between March 1999 and December 2008.\textsuperscript{23}

**Program Management and Coordination**

Mine/ERW/IED survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Social Welfare, the Department of Social Services, and the National Foundation for Development of Disabled Persons are the main government bodies responsible for addressing the needs of persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{24} In 2008, the government appointed disability focal points in various ministries, divisions, and agencies.\textsuperscript{25} As there is no national mine/ERW/IED casualty data collection mechanism, incidents are likely unreported.

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\textsuperscript{14} M. Shajahan and Ramjan Uddin Patal, “BDR-Nasaka Sector Commander level meeting held,” \textit{The Daily Ajke Deshibidesh} (Cox’s Bazar), 30 June 2008; and “Bangladesh-Burma agree to remove landmines from border area,” \textit{BBC Monitoring Asia-Pacific}, 30 June 2008.


\textsuperscript{17} NVI-Bangladesh, “Survey of IED Casualties,” updated 31 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{18} See report on Kuwait in this edition of Landmine Monitor.


\textsuperscript{22} Interview with Abdullah Hasan Chowdury, Secretary, Bangladesh Freedom Fighters’ Welfare Trust, Dhaka, 22 March 2009. The number of veteran mine survivors remained the same between 2004 and March 2009. The Trust has records on 5,028 injured veterans.


Risk Education

In 2008–2009, no formal mine/ERW risk education activities were reported. In its most recent Article 7 report, Bangladesh noted that efforts to warn the population were not required due to the absence of suspected mined areas, although the army previously stated that awareness programs about ERW and IEDs would be helpful. Following a reported landmine explosion on the Bangladesh-Myanmar border in November 2008, border guards from both sides warned the local population against entering the area.

The only formal mine/ERW risk education reported between 1999 and 2009 consisted of brief training sessions in 2004.

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown, but at least 285 (excluding IED survivors). Assistance to civilian mine/ERW survivors remains inadequate. The only facility able to provide specialized treatment and prosthetic devices near affected areas is the Memorial Christian Hospital in Cox’s Bazar district, which distributes prostheses free of charge to people who are unable to pay. Access to quality devices was limited. Technicians lacked training opportunities and experience. Equipment was often not functioning or obsolete.

In early 2009, the Memorial Christian Hospital organized a medical “camp” to distribute prostheses free of charge in the southwestern Sidr region. Due to funding problems, it was the first camp since June 2007. However, since 1998 only two camps were held in areas that have been mine-affected and few mine/ERW survivors have received prostheses through these camps.

Annual Landmine Monitor field visits to Ukhiya and Naikongchari sub-districts since 2006 have shown that the economic situation of survivors and casualties’ families continued to deteriorate. By 2009, many survivors visited in past years had moved away from their villages for economic reasons.

Military mine casualties receive assistance at military hospitals and facilities. The government provides medical assistance and social assistance payments for people registered as disabled freedom-fighters and families of the martyred through the Bangladesh Freedom Fighters Welfare Trust. In 2009, the Trust requested a 20% increase to fund payments.

In 2008, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) continued to support the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), the Limb and Brace Center, and the Center for Rehabilitation of Paralyzed (CRP) and its satellite center. Following SFD advice to enhance

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26 Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2008.
31 “Rehabilitation services of Handicap International In Bangladesh,” undated, document provided by email from Kabir Hossain, Communications Officer, Handicap International, 23 April 2009.
32 Interviews with Simpson Tuhin Sardar, Physiotherapist, Memorial Christian Hospital, Malumghat, Cox’s Bazar, 15 March 2009 and 19 March 2009.
35 Landmine Monitor visited mine-affected villages in the eastern part of Ukhiya and the southern part of Naikongchari from 24 to 25 January and from 18 to 19 February 2009.
38 Email from Miguel Mateus Fernandes, Head of Project, ICRC SFD Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam) Regional Office, 16 April 2009. The ICRC SFD had no records of landmine survivors receiving services at either center between January 2007 and April 2009.
the long-term functioning of their centers, the CRP and BRAC’s prosthetic/orthotic services were moved to improved premises in 2008.39

On 30 November 2007, Bangladesh ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and on 12 May 2008 ratified its Optional Protocol. National legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities passed in 2001 was reportedly “fundamentally flawed,”40 and persons with disabilities continued to face discrimination.41 In 2009, the Ministry of Social Welfare together with disability NGOs started preparing new disability legislation.42

39 Ibid.
42 Interview with Dr. Nafeesur Rahman, Director, National Forum of Organizations Working With the Disabled, Dhaka, 23 March 2009.
Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Belarus became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2004. It has cited various articles of its criminal code as national implementation measures, as well as decrees specific to antipersonnel mines. Belarus failed to meet its 1 March 2008 stockpile destruction deadline and is therefore in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It finished destroying its 294,775 non-PFM type antipersonnel mines in 2006, but still possesses 3.37 million PFM-type mines. It is in the process of finalizing a new project with the European Commission to complete stockpile destruction. Belarus reports retaining 6,030 antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes, but no mines have been consumed in such activities.

Belarus has continued major clearance operations of World War II ordnance, particularly UXO. It has a significant residual mine threat, but no known mined areas. Since 1999, Landmine Monitor has reported 52 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Belarus. In the same period, the Ministry of Defense reported 62 ERW casualties (19 killed and 43 injured); it was not possible to determine where these two cumulative totals overlap. No mine casualties have been reported in Belarus since 2004, and ERW casualties have been decreasing.

Risk education has been implemented by the Ministry of Defense’s explosive ordnance disposal teams, and awareness messages have also been disseminated through the media. Belarus has never had a national victim assistance program. Survivors receive free basic healthcare, but services are inadequate. In general, benefits, services, and legal protection for persons with disabilities are minimal.

Mine Ban Policy

Belarus acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Belarus has cited various articles of its criminal code as national implementation measures, as well as decrees specific to antipersonnel mines.

Belarus submitted its sixth Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008.1

Belarus attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. At each of the meetings, Belarus provided updates on stockpile destruction (see Stockpiling and destruction section below).

Belarus has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Belarus has said it did not produce or export antipersonnel mines after independence in 1992, and never used antipersonnel mines for protection of its borders or for other purposes.2

Belarus is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.3 It submitted the annual report required by Article 13 in August 2008. Belarus ratified Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 29 September 2008.4

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2 Statement by Aleh Shloma, Representative of Belarus, First Committee of the UN General Assembly, New York, 21 October 2004.
3 When it joined Amended Protocol II on 2 March 2004, Belarus deferred for nine years compliance with the protocol’s requirements for self-destruction and self-deactivation of remotely delivered antipersonnel mines. This deferral will become irrelevant when Belarus completes destruction of its stocks of PFM antipersonnel mines to comply with Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty.
4 On 30 April 2008, the President signed a decree on accession; the instrument of ratification was submitted on 29 September 2008.
Belarus has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.5

Stockpiling and destruction
Belarus failed to meet its deadline of 1 March 2008 to destroy all stockpiles of antipersonnel mines it owns or possesses, or are under its jurisdiction or control.6 It is therefore in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty and will remain so until destruction of the stockpile is completed.

Belarus still possesses 3,371,984 PFM-type mines.7 This number is unchanged since the end of 2006, when Belarus completed destruction of its non-PFM antipersonnel mines.8 The stockpile includes: 1,790,064 PFM-1 blast mines in KSF-1 cassettes; 707,072 PFM-1S blast mines in KSF-1S cassettes; 413,712 PFM-1S blast mines in PFM-1S canisters; and 461,136 PFM-1S blast mines in Uragan (Hurricane) 220mm rocket warheads.9

Destruction of PFM mines
As of mid-2009, Belarus could not state when it would complete the destruction of its remaining stockpile and be compliant with its treaty obligation. In May 2009, Belarus told States Parties that it hoped to conclude the preparatory phase of the project in the first half of 2010.10

Belarus has stated that it requires international assistance in order to destroy its remaining PFM-type antipersonnel mines.11 A project funded by the European Commission (EC) to provide technical and financial resources to Belarus for destruction underwent competitive tendering in 2006, but the project was subsequently cancelled after an evaluation committee, with the participation of a representative from the government of Belarus, unanimously concluded that a


6 In informing States Parties that it would not meet the deadline, Belarus stated that it “is not capable to destroy over 3.3 million stockpiled PFM type mines in terms stipulated in the Convention… The international community has no experience so far in destruction of large quantity of the PFM mines with the environmentally appropriate technology. Open detonation of this type of mines may cause severe consequences for population and environment and is therefore unacceptable. There has always been an understanding that the issue of PFM type mines is unique from the point of view of the Convention…. We have repeatedly stated that the Republic of Belarus has no possibilities to accomplish the destruction of the stockpiled PFM mines without the assistance of the international community. In this regard we welcome and highly appreciate the contribution of the European Community in solving this issue. In the spirit of transparency the Republic of Belarus has always informed the States Parties to the Ottawa Convention on implementation of the arrangements reached with the European Commission on this issue.” Note Verbale and Non-Paper sent from the Permanent Mission of Belarus to the UN in Geneva to the Permanent Mission of Jordan to the UN in Geneva (as President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties), 18 February 2008.

7 Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2009. This total does not include 6,030 other types of mines retained for training purposes. Belarus’s original stockpile of antipersonnel mines inherited from the Soviet Union totaled approximately 4.5 million. Belarus destroyed approximately 300,000 antipersonnel mines between 1992 and 2003. In its first Article 7 report submitted in June 2004, Belarus declared a total of 3,988,057 antipersonnel mines, including 3.37 million of the PFM-type. It subsequently declared a stockpile of 3,676,389 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2004, with the difference primarily being the reclassification of 200,847 OZM-72 mines and 110,766 MON mines as command-detonated munitions. Belarus declared a stockpile of 3,672,789 antipersonnel mines as of the end of 2005.

8 Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2007. In cooperation with the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency and interested donor countries, Belarus completed the destruction of 294,775 stockpiled antipersonnel mines other than PFM-type mines in December 2006. This included 45,425 PMN, 114,384 PMN-2, 12,799 POMZ-2, 64,843 POMZ-2M, and 57,324 POM-2 antipersonnel mines. A total of 217,133 mines were destroyed by open detonation, and 12,799 POMZ-2 and 64,843 POMZ-2M mines were disassembled at Belarusian industrial plants. Also in 2006, Belarus destroyed the victim-activated components of its 5,536 MON-type and 200,826 OZM-72 mines.


technically compliant bidder could not be identified. The funds were therefore “decommitted,” and the process to secure new EC funds and initiate a new project had to begin all over again. Belarus concluded a €4 million (US$5,890,400) agreement with the EC for a new project to destroy PFM stockpiles on 22 January 2008. Belarus reported to States Parties in June 2008 that “given that the process within the new EC project remains sophisticated there is no warranty that the project will be implemented successfully in reasonable time. In this connection we are not in a position to indicate any timelines for the project being started and finalized.” Following the recommendation of the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, Belarus has provided reports on its progress toward meeting its stockpile destruction obligations. In May 2009, Belarus informed the treaty’s Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction that Belarus and the EC had been able to agree to a Terms of Reference document, as well as technical specifications and a timetable for the preparatory phase of the project. It said that after a location for destruction was agreed upon, Belarus and the EC would approve a final version of the project agreement, and the EC would begin a competitive tendering process to select a company to carry out destruction. Belarus told States Parties that it “is ready to exert maximum efforts for the successful completion of the joint project,” and that it has taken steps to avoid repetition of mistakes that led to cancellation of the previous project in 2006.

An EC assessment mission took place in Belarus from 8–11 June 2009 to determine a location for destruction. The EC published the tender notice, with a budget of €4 million ($5,890,400), on 18 July 2009. It states that the project is aimed at destruction of the mines “within 24 months from signature of the contract.” Mines retained for research and training

In May 2009, Belarus reported retaining 6,030 antipersonnel mines for research and training purposes. This number has remained constant since Belarus first declared it in June 2004, indicating no mines have been consumed (destroyed) in training activities. Belarus has said that it retains antipersonnel mines for training of mine detection dogs, testing of protective equipment and mine detectors, and training of personnel. Belarus has not used the reporting format for retained mines agreed by States Parties in 2005, and has not reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines as agreed by States Parties in 2004.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Belarus is primarily contaminated by large quantities of ERW, mainly UXO from World War II, World War I, and even from the Napoleonic Wars. There is also a significant residual mine problem from World War II, although there are no known or suspected mined areas. Government officials have claimed that 353 km² of the country is contaminated with explosive ordnance. Heavy contamination has been reported in Brest, Minsk, Mogilev, and Vitebsk regions. The majority of the contaminated areas are said to be agricultural land or forest. None of the areas are marked or fenced, and little information is available to indicate the potential density of contamination.

Casualties
No mine casualties have been reported in Belarus since 2004. In December 2008, one man was killed while tampering with UXO in Minsk region. This was a decrease from 2007 when three casualties occurred in two ERW incidents. In 2009, no new mine or ERW casualties were reported as of 30 May.

From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor reported 52 mine/ERW casualties in Belarus (19 killed and 33 injured), and at least 14 casualties were children. In the same period, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) reported 62 ERW casualties (19 killed and 43 injured); it was not possible to determine where these two cumulative totals overlap. Forty-five casualties were caused by ERW, five by mines, and two by an improvised explosive device (IED). Between 1944 and 31 March 2009, the MoD recorded 6,177 mine/ERW casualties: 2,667 people killed and 3,510 injured. Most mine/ERW survivors in Belarus were injured by World War II ordnance or during military service in Afghanistan in the 1980s. It has not been reported how many survivors are still alive, and the total number of mine/ERW survivors in Belarus is still not known. The Belarus Prosthetic Rehabilitation Center (BPRC) has officially registered 97,410 persons with disabilities with rehabilitation needs.

Program Management and Coordination
Belarus does not have a national mine action authority or mine action center. Mine action is managed by the MoD, which nominally holds clearance data. It does not use the Information Management System for Mine Action, but it does maintain and regularly update a mine/ERW casualty database. The Belarus Campaign to Ban Landmines (BCBL) also collects data through media monitoring and field visits.
Demining

Demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) is conducted by both MoD and Ministry of Interior personnel. Since the end of World War II, Belarus’s Engineer Forces have reportedly found and destroyed more than 27 million items, mostly UXO but also some landmines.35 In 2008, the MoD received 613 call-outs and destroyed 7,153 ERW, including 59 landmines.36 The Ministry of Interior received 3,500 call-outs37 and destroyed 16,419 ERW, including 74 landmines.38 No data exists on the size of area cleared or otherwise released.

Risk Education

Limited mine/ERW risk education (RE) has been conducted over the past few years, and there are no national standards for RE.39

In 2008, the ministries of defense, interior, and education informed the population about the ERW threat.40 The MoD continued its RE activities in areas where clearance operations were planned, using its EOD teams. The entire population was targeted for RE, as mines/UXO are said to be found throughout the country.41 In 2008, 1,058 RE meetings were conducted, approximately the same number as in 2007. Around 64,000 people were reached, including some 31,000 children. RE messages were also given through television, radio, and print media.42

The MoD has been delivering RE through its EOD teams alongside clearance operations since the mid-1990s. It launched a formal RE program in 2004, consisting of the dissemination of messages through the media—including the broadcast of documentary films—and presentations. This continued through to 2009. RE was reportedly provided to youth in grades 11–12 undergoing pre-conscription military training in 2005.

Plans to include RE in the school curriculum have been in place since 1999. Although material was developed,43 this has not been implemented, and in 2007 the Ministry of Education stated that the issue was not relevant.44 In the same year, however, a one paragraph section on the threat of mines and ERW was included in secondary school textbooks dealing with safety issues.

Belarus did not include information on RE in its latest Article 7 or CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 reports.45

Victim Assistance

The number of survivors in Belarus is unknown but there are at least 60.46 There have never been specific victim assistance (VA) programs in Belarus, but survivors have access to state-operated healthcare. Basic medical care is free of charge, although hospitals are reportedly

37 Interview with Col. Gennady Pozniak, Ministry of Interior, Minsk, 25 March 2009.
39 Email from Iouri Zagoumennov, Coordinator, BCBL, 8 June 2009.
41 Email from Iouri Zagoumennov, BCBL, 1 May 2009.
45 Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009; and Article 13 Report, 1 August 2008.
“undersupplied.”47 Most amputees receive prosthetic devices free of charge, purchased from the BPRC by local authorities. In 2008, the BPRC assisted 53,767 people, but disaggregated data on mine/ERW survivors was not recorded. The BPRC also continued vocational training programs for persons with disabilities in 2008.48

An assessment in 2008 revealed that the needs of most persons with disabilities in Belarus remain unmet.49 The Ministry of Labor and Social Security is the main government agency responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but government benefits for persons with disabilities were reportedly “minimal” and “ineffectual.”50

Belarus has national disability laws. Legislation mandates that transport and government buildings be accessible for persons with disabilities, but these provisions have rarely been enforced.51 On 2 February 2009, the Council of Ministers agreed on funding for vocational opportunities and workplace accessibility for persons with disabilities.52

As of 30 May 2009, Belarus had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. As in the past, Belarus did not include information on mine/ERW casualties or VA in its latest Article 7 report.53

Support for Mine Action

No national funding for mine action was reported by Belarus in 2008, as in 2007. Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action or RE needs in Belarus. Belarus has reported that no funding support for VA is necessary, as the national healthcare infrastructure meets the country’s VA needs.54 A tender for allocating EC funding of €4 million ($5,890,400) for destruction of Belarus’ stockpile of PFM-type mines was released in July 2009 (See Stockpiling and destruction section above.)

48 Interview with Nadezda Denisova, BPRC, Minsk, 26 March 2009.
51 Ibid.
53 Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
54 Interview with Valery Kolesnik, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minsk, 27 March 2007; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 197.
BHUTAN

Ten-Year Summary

After little involvement with the Ottawa Process and the Mine Ban Treaty, the Kingdom of Bhutan acceded to the treaty in August 2005. Prior to joining, it consistently voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for the treaty’s universalization. When Bhutan submitted its only Article 7 transparency report in May 2007, it revealed for the first time a stockpile of 4,491 antipersonnel mines, all of which it has retained for training. Bhutan also acknowledged for the first time its past use of antipersonnel mines. In 2007, Bhutan reported that it had cleared the 103 antipersonnel mines that it had laid on its territory, but it did not formally declare compliance with its Article 5 obligations at a meeting of States Parties.

Mine Ban Policy

Bhutan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 18 August 2005, and the treaty entered into force on 1 February 2006. Bhutan has not indicated if it has undertaken any new national measures to implement the treaty.1


Bhutan did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008 in Geneva or the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings. Bhutan has not made its views known regarding matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, mines with sensitive fuzes or anti-handling devices, and mines retained for training).

Bhutan is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.2

Use, stockpiling, production, and transfer

Bhutan’s initial Article 7 report, in contrast to earlier statements, revealed that it possesses antipersonnel mines and has used them in the past.3 Bhutan maintains a stockpile of 4,491 antipersonnel mines, all of which it has stated it will retain for training purposes.4

Bhutan has not provided any details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties. The number of mines it wishes to retain appears more than absolutely necessary for a small armed force that does not engage in mine clearance, domestically

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1 Article 7 Report, Form A, 29 May 2007, states, “In Bhutan’s case, the treaty would be ‘self-enacting’ under domestic law since Chapter IV, clause 29 of the Civil & Criminal Procedure Code of Bhutan 2001 states that ‘The Royal Court of Justice shall apply International Convention, Covenant, Treaty and Protocol that are duly acceded by the Royal Government of Bhutan and ratified by the National Assembly of Bhutan.’”

2 A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Bhutan would have participated in the Oslo conference and signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but was constrained by the lack of human and financial resources, including the availability of only one person in the legal section of the ministry in the capital. Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official requesting anonymity, Royal Embassy of Bhutan, New Delhi, 29 January 2009.

3 Article 7 Report, Forms C, D, E, F, and H, 29 May 2007. Bhutan previously stated several times that it had not produced, imported, exported, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel mines. The Article 7 report confirms Bhutan has no production facilities.

4 Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 May 2007. The stockpile consists of 1,740 M14 mines and 2,751 M16 mines. Bhutan did not provide any technical characteristics of the mines, as called for in Article 7, but their specific designations are typical of Indian-manufactured mines.
or internationally, on an ongoing basis. Bhutan’s treaty-mandated deadline for destroying any stockpiled antipersonnel mines that are not retained for training purposes is 1 February 2010. Bhutan has not indicated whether or not it has destroyed any stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.

Bhutan previously used antipersonnel mines on tracks to camps maintained by Indian insurgents in Gorbakunda and Nganglam on the Bhutanese side of the Manas Wildlife Sanctuary.5

During 2008, there appeared to be an increase in the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups operating in Bhutan.6 However, none of the reported incidents appear to have involved mine-like, victim-activated IEDs, and Landmine Monitor could find no evidence of insurgents using factory-made antipersonnel mines.

**Scope of the Problem**

Bhutan reported in 2007 that it had laid a total of 103 antipersonnel mines in two locations on its side of the Manas Wildlife Sanctuary, which straddles the border with India. These included 62 antipersonnel mines laid on tracks that Bhutan said led to an insurgent camp in the Gorbakunda area and 41 antipersonnel mines laid on tracks that it said led to camps of Indian insurgents in Nganglam sub-district.7 The date of emplacement was not given. Bhutan stated it had removed the mines after three attempts that proved difficult and hazardous because monsoon rain had dislodged the mines from recorded locations, and because of rough terrain.8 The Royal Bhutan Army lost two soldiers when a patrol was sent to check the mines in one of the areas. While trying to locate the mined track, some of the mines exploded, and two soldiers were killed.9

Bhutan remains on the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit’s (ISU) list of countries with Article 5 obligations,10 presumably as it has not formally declared compliance with Article 5 clearance obligations to a meeting of States Parties.

Police said Communist Party of Bhutan insurgents based in Nepal used what was reportedly a landmine in an ambush in which they killed four government rangers in the Sarpang district of southern Bhutan at the start of 2009.11

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8 Ibid, Form F.
9 Ibid.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 1999</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>1,683km² (31 December 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but estimated 3,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 March 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Mined area clearance: 3.16km²</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>24,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National: $16.2 million (2007: $13.7 million)</td>
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</tr>
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Ten-Year Summary

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999. It completed destruction of its stockpile of more than 460,000 antipersonnel mines in November 1999. In addition, from 1998 to 2006, BiH authorities and international troops collected and destroyed at least 38,500 mines from the populace. There have been several reports of use of antipersonnel mines in criminal activities, most recently in 2003. BiH passed national implementation legislation in 2004. The number of retained mines reported has fluctuated, including increases in 2007 and in 2008 to a total of 2,282.

Mine action in the aftermath of the 1992–1995 conflict was highly decentralized and engaged a wide spectrum of organizations but has changed dramatically in the past decade, particularly after the 2002 Demining Law created a Demining Commission and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center. These provided a national focus for assessing the extent of the problem and coordinating and regulating responses to it. A Landmine Impact Survey completed in 2003 found 1,366 communities, or nearly half those surveyed, to be mine-affected. Survey and clearance has resulted in release of almost 1,300km² in the past decade, but difficulties identifying the location and extent of BiH’s mostly small, nuisance minefields, poor planning, and shortfalls in funding slowed clearance and led BiH to apply in 2008 for a 10-year extension of its Article 5 deadline. The extension request was approved by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, but BiH is already behind schedule in implementing its plan for the extension period.

As of June 2009, BHMAC could provide data on a total of 459 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (214 killed and 245 injured) recorded between 1999 and 2008. The number of casualties reported annually declined from 1999 to 2004, but has increased slightly since then.

Extensive mine/ERW risk education (RE) has been conducted since 1999 by numerous organizations, through school- and community-based RE, and the media. Neither of two major evaluations of RE in 2007 identified a causal relationship between RE implementation and casualty rates in BiH.

Emergency services improved with international funding. General health and rehabilitation services for mine survivors improved gradually, bolstered by the ongoing presence of a government-funded community-based rehabilitation system throughout the country. Most
direct assistance continued to be provided by NGOs and, increasingly, by national NGOs. Psychological support and socio-economic reintegration opportunities increased but remained inadequate despite continued input by NGOs and international donors. Progress was made in the adoption of a national disability policy, but little progress was made towards the adoption of legislation to ensure the rights of persons with disabilities, including mine survivors.

**Background**

BiH is an independent state, but under international administration. The 1995 Dayton peace accord, which ended the 1992–1995 war, set up two separate entities: a Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and the Bosnian Serb Republic (Republika Srpska, RS), each with its own president, government, parliament, police, and other bodies. Overarching these entities is a central Bosnian government and rotating presidency. In addition, the district of Brčko is a self-governing administrative unit, established as a neutral area placed under joint Bosniak, Croat, and Serb authority.¹

**Mine Ban Policy**

BiH signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. On 29 December 2004, parliament approved a law amending the criminal code to apply penal sanctions for violations of the treaty.²

BiH participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made a statement on victim assistance (VA) and gave a presentation on its request for an extension of its Article 5 mine clearance deadline. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009 and made a statement on mine clearance.

BiH submitted its annual Article 7 report in 2009, covering calendar year 2008. It used voluntary Form J to provide additional information on casualties, mine clearance, and VA. BiH submitted nine previous Article 7 reports.³

In July 2008, the BiH Ministry of Defense responded to a Landmine Monitor inquiry about its views with respect to interpretation and implementation of Articles 1 and 2 of the treaty.⁴ On Article 1, it stated that if “engaged in joint military operations with its allies, Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina can not be engaged in the process of planning and preparing military action where will be used antipersonnel mines.”⁵

On Article 2 and the issue of antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes, BiH made specific reference to TMRP-6 antivehicle mines, which have tilt rods. It appears that the BiH Ministry of Defense does not believe that such mines are explicitly prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty but will consider ways to ensure that such mines cannot be victim-activated and function as antipersonnel mines.⁶

¹ “Country Profile of Bosnia-Hercegovina,” BBC Online, news.bbc.co.uk.
² “Law on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Official Gazette, No. 61/04. Article 193a forbids the development, production, storage, transportation, offer for sale or purchase of antipersonnel mines. The penalty for such offenses is between one and 10 years’ imprisonment. If death or injury occurs to people or animals, or if there is damage to the environment, the person or people involved shall be punished by imprisonment of no less than five years or by a long-term prison sentence.
⁴ Email from Denis Selimovic, Senior Expert, Ministry of Defense, 29 July 2008. This email stated it constituted “official opinion from [Ministry of Defence] MOD BiH.” BiH has not expressed its views on the permissible number of mines retained for training under Article 3.
⁵ BiH told Landmine Monitor in 2003 that it “will not participate in joint military operations with any forces planning, exercising or using antipersonnel mines.” It also said that BiH will not allow the storage or transit of antipersonnel mines belonging to other countries in or through its territory. Fax from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2003.
⁶ Specifically, it said that the BiH Ministry of Defense “does not mean that TMRP-6 antivehicle mine is not considered under definition of antipersonnel mines. This mine is intended for incapacitating and demolition of enemy armored and other combat and transport vehicles…. this mine could be activated by human touch, but this way is one of way activated. Further, the BiH Ministry of Defence will consider correct legal mechanism how to reduce use of this mine in order to remove possibility for the mine to be activated by the human being.”

BiH signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not yet ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^7\)

**Production, transfer, use, and illegal stores**

BiH has stated that production of antipersonnel mines ceased by 1995.\(^8\) It has reported on the conversion of production facilities.\(^9\) BiH is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. After BiH joined the treaty, Landmine Monitor noted several cases of use of mines in criminal activities,\(^10\) but no such incidents have been reported since 2003.

In past years, authorities on numerous occasions found illegal stores of mines, but none were discovered between 2006 and the first half of 2009. The Dayton peace accord allows international military forces to search for and collect illegally held weapons, including mines.\(^11\) The European Force (EUFOR), which took over from the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in December 2004, has not conducted any Operation Harvest arms collection activities since 2006, but retains the right to do so.\(^12\)

**Stockpile destruction and retention**

BiH declared completion of its antipersonnel mine stockpile destruction program in November 1999, with a total of 460,727 mines destroyed.\(^13\) This number has been amended annually since 2003 and was changed to 463,921 mines in the latest Article 7 report, covering calendar year 2008.\(^14\) No explanation has been given for the changes. Presumably these are newly discovered stocks, mines turned in by the population, or illegal mines seized from criminal elements.\(^15\)

In September 2006, BiH reported that it had discovered more than 15,000 MRUD (Claymore-type) directional fragmentation mines during inspections of weapon storage sites.\(^16\) It said that although the mines were not specifically prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, BiH had made a

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\(^8\) Interview with members of the Demining Commission, Sarajevo, 30 January 2003. BiH inherited the mine production facilities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Bugojno, Goražde, Konjic, and Vogošć.


\(^11\) Once seized or collected, mines and other weapons are held under international control until destroyed. Mines found by the police and EUFOR are destroyed by either the Civil Protection Agency or NPA under the supervision of EUFOR. A EUFOR spokesperson told Landmine Monitor, “Civil Protection is the organization which coordinates the destruction of all seized weapons and ammunition. In order to carry out this task they are assisted by other organizations such as military EOD teams (including EUFOR EOD teams), non-government organizations, etc.”

\(^12\) A demining official told Landmine Monitor that mines found or confiscated by the police and EUFOR are counted in the Civil Protection Agency numbers of destroyed mines. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 183.

\(^13\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 183. Operation Harvest began as an SFOR initiative in 1998 to collect unregistered weapons from private holdings under amnesty conditions. From 1998 to late 2006, about 38,500 landmines were collected.

\(^14\) Article 7 Report, Form G, 1 February 2000. Destruction was carried out at various locations by the two entity armies with SFOR assistance. The stockpile consisted of 19 types of mines.


\(^16\) In 2003, SFOR found very large additional quantities of antipersonnel mines among old munitions, after the entity armies requested assistance with downsizing military storage sites and dealing with old munitions in storage. An SFOR publication reported that several hundred thousand antipersonnel mines were awaiting destruction at these sites. By March 2004, 2,574 antipersonnel mines, 31,920 antivehicle mines, and 302,832 detonators had been destroyed. Landmine Monitor has been unable to obtain updated information on further destruction or new discoveries at storage sites of antipersonnel mines. The BiH government has not formally reported the existence of these newly discovered stocks of antipersonnel mines, has not provided details on numbers and types of mines, and has not made known the timetable for destruction of the mines. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 202.

\(^16\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 184, for more details.
decision to destroy the mines for humanitarian reasons as well as to show its commitment to the aims of the treaty. BiH reported that, as of April 2007, about 5,000 mines had been destroyed, with the intention to complete destruction in May 2007, but it has not provided information on completion. According to BiH, “Representatives of UNDP, NATO, and the OSCE [Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe] have controlled the whole process of destruction.”

Mines retained for research and training
At the end of 2008, BiH retained 2,274 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, as well as 116 MRUDs. This is an increase of 665 mines from the end of 2007, when BiH reported retaining 1,619 mines and 157 MRUDs, which again was an increase from the end of 2006, when it reported retaining 1,550 mines and 158 MRUDs. BiH has not explained these increases or the overall inconsistencies in its reporting on retained mines over the last few years.

BiH’s Article 7 reports submitted in 2008 and 2009 have indicated, however, that all of the retained antipersonnel mines are fuzeless. In its 2007 Article 7 report BiH did not state that any of the retained mines were fuzeless, while its 2006 report stated that 876 retained mines were fuzeless and 1,299 were active. BiH has not explained these changes.

Of the 2,274 antipersonnel mines (other than MRUDs) reported as retained at the end of 2008, 1,023 are held by demining agencies, 557 by the BiH Mine Detection Dog Center (MDDC), 351 by the BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 333 by the BiH Armed Forces, and 10 by the RS Civil Protection Agency. A comparison of the Article 7 reports for 2008 and 2007 indicates that antipersonnel mines, other than MRUDs, held by demining operators have increased by 207: mines held by MDDC increased by 276, mines held by BHMAC increased by 45, mines held by the BiH Armed Forces increased by 125, and mines held by the RS Civil Protection Agency increased by two.

BiH has stated that its retained mines are used for training mine detection dogs (MDDs). While providing more facts about its retained mines, BiH has still provided few details on the intended purposes and actual uses of the mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004. BiH has not used the expanded Form D on retained mines as agreed by States Parties in 2004.

17 It stated that the mines are “designed to be used with an electrical initiation system,” and therefore are not considered antipersonnel mines under the Mine Ban Treaty. However, it also noted that “since they are not adapted to ensure command-detonation, MRUD mines can be technically considered as anti-personnel mines.” Statement by Amira Arifovic-Harms, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 20 September 2006. Use of Claymore-type mines in command-detonated mode is permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty, but use in victim-activated mode (with a tripwire) is prohibited.

18 In April 2007, BiH indicated that of the 15,269 MRUD mines, 14,701 mines would be destroyed by mid-May 2007, 396 were transferred to EUFOR for training, 20 were donated to Germany, two were destroyed immediately and BiH intended to retain about 150 mines for training. The 14,701 mines were transported to a workshop in Doboj and by mid-April about 5,000 had been destroyed. Article 7 Report, Form J, April 2007.


20 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. The 2,274 antipersonnel mines include 61 ROB and 10 PMR RP mines—two mine types not previously listed by BiH—as well as 206 PMA-1, 735 PMA-2, 597 PMA-3, 291 PMR-2A, 4 PMR-3, 154 PROM-1, 8 PMR-Capljinka, and 208 PMR2A-vjezbovna.

21 Article 7 Report, (for calendar year 2007), Form D. The 1,619 antipersonnel mines included 127 PMA-1, 634 PMA-2, 319 PMA-3, 132 PMR-2A, 15 PMR-3, 92 PROM-1, 92 PMR-Capljinka, and 208 PMR2A-vjezbovna. Form D states a total of 1,920 mines, but the numbers in the form add up to 1,930 mines.


23 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form B; and Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form B.


25 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. Since the previous report, MDDC has seen an increase of 162 PMA-3, 98 PMR-2A, and 27 PROM-1. BHMAC has an increase of nine PMA-1, nine PMA-2, 18 PMA-3, and nine PROM-1. The RS has an increase of one PMA-2 and one PMR-2A. BiH Armed Forces have seen an increase of 14 PMA-1, 41 PMA-2, 35 PMA-3, 16 PMR-2A, and 19 PROM-1. Finally, the demining companies have seen a decrease of 84 PMR-Capljinka, and an increase of 56 PMA-1, 50 PMA-2, 63 PMA-3, 44 PMR-2A, seven PROM-1, 61 ROB, and 10 PMR RP.

States Parties  
Bosnia and Herzegovina

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
BiH is heavily contaminated with mines and ERW, primarily as a result of the 1992–1995 conflict related to the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The parties to the conflict placed mines extensively along confrontation lines to block troop movements and around strategic facilities but lines moved frequently, leaving contamination that is extensive and generally low density.

Most minefields are in the zone of separation between BiH’s two political entities—FBiH and RS—which is 1,100km long and up to 4km wide, but mines were placed throughout the country in all types of soil and vegetation. In southern and central BiH, mines were often used randomly, with few records kept. Some of the affected territory is mountainous or heavily forested, but the fertile agricultural belt in Brčko district is one of the most heavily contaminated areas. There is also a significant but unquantified problem with UXO, including a small residual threat from cluster munition remnants.

BiH lacks sufficient or reliable data to determine the number of remaining mines or their location. BHMAC’s database holds records of 19,000 minefields but it estimates that this represents only 50–60% of the real number. Most minefields have a relatively small number of mines, often laid individually or without any pattern. Even where minefield records exist, in many cases they do not show exact locations of minefields or individual mines. According to BHMAC, some 220,000 mines remained to be cleared. This is a far smaller estimate than earlier years, when it cited up to one million mines. As a result of a new general assessment conducted in preparation for the Article 5 deadline extension request and analysis of clearance records, BHMAC found there are an average of nine mines per affected hectare (10,000m²).

At the end of 2008, BHMAC reported 1,683km² of contaminated land (3.29% of BiH territory), down from 1,738km² a year earlier. BHMAC identified 12,167 micro-locations (with an average size of 0.14km²). In its Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2008, BiH projected that by the start of the requested extension in 2009 it would have 1,573km² of contaminated land implying clearance of 165km² in 2008, but results for the year showed it missed this target by 110km².

Casualties
In 2008, BHMAC reported 39 mine/ERW casualties (19 people killed and 20 injured) in 21 incidents/accidents; 37 were male and the gender of two was unknown, 38 were adult and the age of one was unknown. Of the total, nine deminer casualties occurred in six accidents (six deminers killed and three injured). Mines caused the majority of casualties (29) in 17 incidents/accidents; most mine types were not reported but antipersonnel mines caused at least four casualties. ERW caused eight casualties in three incidents and one unknown device incident caused two casualties. The activity most connected with civilian mine/ERW incidents was collecting wood (17 casualties). Another five casualties occurred in an incident at a scrap metal yard, but the nature of the activity at the time was not recorded by BHMAC. The number

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28 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 27 June 2008, p. 4; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 177.
30 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 27 June 2008, p. 4.
34 Interview with Tarik Serak, Mine Action Planning Manager, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 26 January 2009.
35 Ibid..
of casualties in 2008 increased from the 30 mine/ERW casualties (eight people killed and 22 injured, including seven deminers) recorded in 2007.39 The 2008 total was the highest annual total number of casualties in BiH since 2004.40

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, with five casualties (three killed and two injured) recorded in the BHMAC database as of June. Three of these casualties (two killed and one injured), in three incidents, were civilians. The other two casualties (one killed and one injured) in one accident, were deminers.41

As of June 2009, BHMAC could only provide data on a total of 459 mine/ERW casualties (214 killed and 245 injured) recorded between 1999 and 2008. BHMAC reporting indicated that there were at least 589 casualties from 1999–2008, of whom 229 people were killed, another 156 injured, and 204 unknown.42 Data provided to Landmine Monitor by BHMAC contained discrepancies which could not be resolved immediately due to data verification underway at BHMAC.43

As of June 2009, BHMAC was still using three dissimilar casualty data records and could not indicate which was the most correct or reliable.44 BHMAC estimated that the unified database, which was reportedly nearing completion, contained approximately 7,300 casualty entries, with some 100 to 200 more requiring revision or verification.

The total number of survivors, or people injured, was not available as of 16 June 2009.45 In April 2009, BHMAC reported 1,660 casualties from 1996–2008, including 488 people killed, another 535 injured, and 639 unknown,46 but detailed data provided by BHMAC to Landmine Monitor in June 2009 contained only 1,187 casualties from 1992–2008.47

Risk profile

Adult males form the largest casualty group.48 People enter contaminated areas for livelihood purposes including cutting firewood, herding, hunting, and collecting scrap metal and herbs. The majority of incidents have taken place in properly marked areas.49 The highest number of incidents occurs during spring and autumn, during the peak of agriculture activities and firewood collection.50

Socio-economic impact

A general assessment of the mine situation in BiH conducted by BHMAC in 2007 identified 1,631 mine/ERW impacted communities, up from 1,366 in the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in 2003. The assessment estimated that mines/ERW directly influence the lives of 921,513 people, including 154,538 in high-impacted communities, 342,550 in medium-impacted communities, and 424,425 in low-impacted communities. Of the total number of impacted communities, 122

41 Casualty data provided by email from Zoran Grujic, Chief of Information Technology, BHMAC, 18 June 2009.
43 Email from Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, 21 June 2009.
44 Telephone interview with Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, 25 June 2009.
45 Email from Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, 16 June 2009.
or 7.5% were high-impacted, 625 or 38.3% medium-impacted, and 884 or 54.2% low-impacted. On this basis, BiH remains one of the world’s most mine-affected countries.51

Most impacted communities are in rural areas where people depend economically on contaminated land. BHMAC reports that “inhabitants of major cities have a relatively safe economic and social life in comparison with population living in rural area, which depends economically on access to mine contaminated areas.” Two-thirds of the affected population are returnees, mostly living in villages.52

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
The Demining Commission under the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication supervises the state-wide BHMAC and represents BiH in its relations with the international community on mine-related issues. The Demining Commission’s three members, representing the three ethnic groups in BiH, propose the appointment of BHMAC senior staff for approval by the Council of Ministers, report to the Council on mine action, approve the accreditation of demining organizations, and facilitate cooperation between the two separate entities that together comprise BiH. The Demining Commission mobilizes funds for mine action in cooperation with the Board of Donors, which includes the embassies of donor governments, the European Commission (EC), the UN, and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF).53

BHMAC, established by the Decree of Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers in 2002,54 is responsible for regulating mine action and implementing BiH’s demining plan, including accreditation of all mine action organizations.55 By the end of 2008, BHMAC was supported by a part-time UNDP advisor and, until mid-2008, a UNICEF advisor for RE.56 BHMAC operates from its headquarters in Sarajevo through two mine action offices—formerly autonomous Entity Mine Action Centers (EMACs)—and eight regional offices. The two entity offices deal with regional offices on planning, survey, and quality control/assurance. Quality assurance (QA) inspectors are based in the regional offices.57 In 2008, BHMAC coordinated the work of 35 accredited demining organizations.58

Risk education
BHMAC is responsible for managing and coordinating RE. In 2008, it focused on monitoring the implementation of RE standards and standing operational procedures (SOPs), and on coordination, supervision and integration of RE with other mine action activities.59 UNICEF’s technical advisor left BHMAC in mid-2008, but UNICEF continued to provide some financial and capacity-building support. In addition, UNICEF continued to support school-based RE and development, and piloted mine action planning at the level of affected municipalities.60

Accreditation and additional accreditation processes for organizations engaged in RE activities continued.61

54 BiH, Official Gazette, Sarajevo, 17 March 2002.
56 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 26 January 2009.
60 Interview with Mario Tokic, Project Officer Mine Action, UNICEF, Sarajevo, 17 February 2009; and emails from Mario Tokic, UNICEF, 23 February and 4 September 2009.
The working group responsible for drafting a sub-strategy for RE for 2009–2019 held five meetings in 2008, organized by BHMAC with the support of UNICEF, but the sub-strategy developed was still pending approval as of May 2009. Organizations that developed the strategy consisted of government and non-governmental organizations: BHMAC; RS Civil Protection Agency; FBiH Civil Protection Agency; Brčko District Civil Protection Agency; Red Cross Society of BiH (RCSBiH); ICRC; INTERSOS; Posavina bez mina; Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA); STOP Mines; and UNICEF, which supported the process financially.

Victim assistance

BHMAC is responsible for VA coordination, which is implemented through working group meetings with service providers, including relevant ministries, NGOs, and international organizations. In 2008, committees were established at the entity level to transfer the Disability Policy in BiH into the appropriate local legislative (entity and cantonal) frameworks for implementation. VA planning will be linked to the policy’s implementation.

BHMAC’s Mine Action Strategy 2005–2009 contained a VA sub-strategy that aimed to create a standardized information system on mine casualties; improve coordination between organizations working on mine victim assistance by establishing working bodies; develop quality standards for orthopedic and medical rehabilitation; enhance professional development, vocational training, and employment of mine survivors; and amend existing legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities.

A VA sub-strategy for 2009–2019 drafted in 2008 focused on the provision of comprehensive assistance, development of sustainable systems, improved coordination and data collection, and adjustment of existing laws.

In addition, in May 2008, the BiH Council of Ministers reviewed and officially adopted a Disability Policy. The policy proposed the development of an institutional model for assessing the legal status and needs of all persons with disabilities; accessible social security for persons with disabilities; improved rights for working conditions; and inclusion of persons with disabilities in medical care, rehabilitation, education, training, and employment. Mine survivors and their representatives had input in the drafting of the document.

Due to the dual-entity and multi-cantonal governance systems of BiH, there can be no practical national ownership of VA, or of disability issues generally. BHMAC is responsible for VA coordination, but not its management.

Data collection and management

Casualty data management is the responsibility of BHMAC which enters data into the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Information System (BH MAIS) database. Monthly RE activity reports are also entered into the database.
In 2008, RCSBiH, together with the NGO HOPE’87 and BHMAC, worked on revising casualty records from seven databases that had been provided by partner organizations and compiled by BHMAC into a single database in 2006. The unified database project missed its planned completion date of November 2008 but was reportedly nearing completion in June 2009. Data is shared with ministries and NGOs who have signed a memorandum of understanding with BHMAC. The unified database was also due to be integrated into the health information system by 2009. Integration means that data shared with entity ministries will be used to improve planning of health services according to locations with the greatest needs.

From 1996 to 2005, the ICRC and the RCSBiH collected mine casualty data and provided up-to-date information on mine/UXO incidents nationwide. Several other databases on casualties or survivors were maintained by NGOs, and casualty data was collected during the 2003 LIS. In 2005, responsibility for the ICRC/RCSBiH casualty database was passed to BHMAC. In 2006, the RCSBiH continued to operate its database due to a lack of capacity at BHMAC and there were still four separate mine/ERW casualty or survivor databases, but planning for the current unification and verification of the data was underway. A system for recording VA services to individual survivors was established by BHMAC in 2007. Complete data from service providers for 2008 had not been received as of June 2009.

72 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J; and telephone interview with Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, 16 June 2009.
74 Interview with Dr. Goran Cerkez, Assistant Minister for International Cooperation, Development and Information Technology, FBiH MoH, in Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.
76 Telephone interview with Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, 16 June 2009.
### Mine action program operators in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
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Data provided during meetings with Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 6 March 2009; and Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 26 January 2009.
States Parties

International operators and activities

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<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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Plans

**Strategic mine action plan**

BHMAC conducted a general assessment of mine action at the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008 and used the results, together with financial, operations, and resources plans as the basis for a new BiH Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019, which was approved on 24 April 2008.78

The assessment calls for revision of national mine action legislation in order to:

- establish stable and continuous funding of mine action from government and local authority budgets;
- develop local government responsibility for mine action with a focus on planning and prioritizing, RE, and measures prohibiting movement of ERW;
- criminalize the destruction or removal of mine warning signs; and
- improve the social security of deminers.79

The new strategy sets BiH the target of becoming free of mines by 2019. To accomplish this, BiH has set seven strategic goals, including “elimination” of the threat of mines, increased funding for mine action, RE, VA, technical development and research, and advocacy. It also foresees three future revisions of the strategy in 2012, 2015, and 2017.80

BiH identifies three priority categories of suspected hazardous areas:

1. areas needed for movement of the local population and occasional users and locations with resources for economic development;
2. locations that are used occasionally or border first priority locations; and
3. remote areas along former confrontation lines, without known minefields but with possible ERW, and unused by the local population.81

The first and second categories are to be released through general and technical survey and clearance with continuing prevention measures, including urgent and permanent marking and RE. The third category will be dealt with through urgent and permanent marking, RE, and the introduction of a law imposing penalties for trespassing on marked and/or fenced mined areas.82

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79 Ibid, pp. 7–9.
80 Ibid, pp. 11–14.
81 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 27 June 2008, p. 10.
BiH Armed Forces and the Civil Protection Agencies submitted their strategies in February 2009 to BHMAC, which confirmed they are in compliance with the national mine action strategy. The strategies were also sent to the Demining Commission for approval but as of July 2009 had not been accepted. The VA sub-strategy had not yet been officially adopted as of 24 July 2009.

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

The involvement of BiH’s Council of Ministers in the oversight of mine action underscores the importance national leaders attach to a sector that is regarded as a key to recovery from the 1992–1995 conflict. Mine action has been essential to the rehabilitation of essential infrastructure, to facilitate the return of up to 2.2 million people displaced by fighting, and to open up land and other resources. Until 2008, however, BiH did not commit its own funding to mine action and depended entirely on international donor support, which left a big gap between the resources available and the sector’s financial needs. BiH was stepping up its financial commitment to mine action by seeking to pass a mine action law that would remedy this deficit and mobilize the necessary funding from national sources (see National mine action legislation section below).

The BHMAC staff responsible for VA coordination and casualty data management are nationals and no involvement of external advisers was reported. Budgeting for VA was to be linked to the VA sub-strategy of the BiH Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019.

National management

The BiH mine action program is fully nationally managed. Since December 2008, there have been no international advisors for mine action in BiH.

National budget

International donors provided almost all funding for mine action with only a small amount coming from local budgets and entity governments. BiH has repeatedly cited lack of financial support as one of the main reasons for slow progress in clearance over the past 10 years. The Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019 estimated the cost of completing clearance by 2019 at BAM790 million (US$594.3 million).

National mine action legislation

The 2002 Demining Law created the present framework for managing mine action in BiH, ending the previous autonomy of the EMACs. A new mine action law under consideration by parliament as of March 2009 provides for federal, state, and municipal governments to make up any shortfall in donor support in order to provide stable and continuous funding of mine action.

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

BHMAC has drawn up 15 chapters of national standards that it says are based on and in compliance with the International Mine Action Standards. All demining organizations have their own internal QA staff. Final quality control is undertaken by BHMAC inspectors.

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83 Telephone interview with Ahmed Orahovac, Deputy Director, BHMAC, 17 July 2009.
84 Telephone interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 17 July 2009.
85 Telephone interview with Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, 24 July 2009.
87 Interview with Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 17 February 2009; and interview with Zoran Grujic, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 4 April 2008.
89 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 26 January 2009.
90 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 27 June 2008, p. 7.
91 Ibid.
93 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 5 March 2009.
95 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 186; and interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 26 January 2009.
The general survey SOPs were revised in 2008 and include new chapters focusing on general assessment of the mine situation. The basis of the new SOPs is collection of more comprehensive data on impacted communities and mined areas. This approach will provide important information for RE implementation as well as improved community liaison, which will lead to better prioritization.96 No SOPs for VA were reported.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

BiH had 35 accredited demining organizations at the end of 2008, including six governmental bodies (BiH Armed Forces, FBiH Civil Protection Agency, RS Civil Protection Agency, Brčko District Civil Protection Agency, MDDC, and the RCSBiH), 14 NGOs (nine local and five international) and 15 commercial companies (13 local and two international). Accredited organizations operated a total of 37 machines, 1,336 detectors of different types, and a total of 45 accredited MDD teams.97

BHMAC had 58 surveyors, deployed in 29 survey teams. Eight senior planning officers were assigned to regional offices. BHMAC also had 36 inspectors in regional offices in Sarajevo and Banja Luka, and in the Department for Quality Assurance headquarters, which between them conduct 8,000 inspections a year.98

**Identification of hazardous areas**

BiH has continued general, systematic and technical survey since 1998, spurred by the low quality of minefield records in BiH.99 The Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019 calls for completing general survey activities by 2012 in order to provide a basis for revising the mine action strategy.100

In 2008, BHMAC survey teams surveyed a total of 142.97 km² (4% more than planned), resulting in preparation of 628 projects for technical survey and clearance.101 The teams surveyed 2,088 suspected areas, including 1,061 areas that were resurveyed, 862 newly surveyed, and 165 locations that were found to have no identified risk.102 Some 29km² of land was released as a result of general survey and 41km² was released after systematic survey involving desk analysis of suspected areas.103

NPA remains the only organization that supports BHMAC in general survey, land release, and preparing tasks for technical survey and clearance, working from BHMAC regional offices in Brčko, Pale, and Travnik.104 NPA surveyed a total of 34.7km², releasing 23.1km² and identifying 11.6km² as suspect.105

Regional BHMAC offices have permanently marked 88 areas covering 8.8km² (one-quarter of the 35km² which they plan to mark).106 A further 18 permanent marking tasks covering a total area of 1.3km² were being carried out as of January 2009, and tenders had been invited for 10 more projects on an area of 699,900m².107

As part of general survey operations, BHMAC’s survey teams placed 6,487 mine-warning signs in 2008, a little more than half the planned number. RE NGOs placed 155 signs for urgent marking.108

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96 Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 26 January 2009.
98 Ibid.
102 Ibid, p. 17.
104 Email from Amela Balic, Operations Manager, NPA, 4 March 2009.
105 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
Mine clearance

Demining operators manually cleared 3.16km² in 2008, up more than one-third compared with 2007 but as in previous years, BiH still cleared much less—barely half—of the amount planned.¹⁰⁹ BHMAC stated that planning was realistic in terms of available capacity but it did not receive sufficient funding to deploy all the available assets. A further 11.6km² was released through technical survey.¹¹⁰ Demining operations combined with all forms of survey resulted in release of a total of 84.8km², representing less than half (46.2%) of the amount planned.¹¹¹

In the bid to meet its Article 5 deadline extension request goals, BHMAC set a target of releasing 151.67km² in 2009, including 9.5km² through demining, 21.5km² through technical survey, and 115.75 km² through general and systematic survey. BHMAC projected the total cost for 2009 at around €40 million (approximately $58.9 million). It reported in May 2009 that it had secured 65% of the funding needed and expected to cover the shortfall through “rebalancing of local budgets.”¹¹²

The share of demining organizations in total clearance operations in 2008 remained almost unchanged from 2007.¹¹³ Eleven NGOs cleared nearly half (47.25%) of the total demined area, eight commercial companies cleared 32.38%, and state bodies, including three Civil Protection Agencies and the Armed Forces, cleared 20.4%.¹¹⁴

There were six demining accidents in which six deminers were killed and three injured during 2008.¹¹⁵ All accidents are recorded as the result of mistakes made while clearing mines. All six fatalities were caused by PROM-1 mines, five occurring during technical survey operations and one during demining. The fatalities included a deminer from the RS Civil Protection Agency killed in March, two deminers from Demira also killed in March, two Tehnoelektro deminers killed in July, and a UEM deminer killed in October. Deminers from Demira, N&N IVSA company, and the BiH Army suffered injuries.¹¹⁶

Quality assurance/Quality control

BHMAC conducted 5,479 technical inspections (68.48% of planned inspections) on 567 demining sites in 2008, an average of 9.67 inspections per demining site. These resulted in 32 decisions calling for re-clearance and 10 decisions temporarily suspending clearance operations.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁰ Interview with Tarik Serak, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 26 January 2009.
¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 11.
¹¹⁵ Ibid, p. 23.
¹¹⁶ Email from Dejan Babalj, Project Development Officer, BHMAC, 16 July 2009.
### Demining in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>Area cancelled (km²)</th>
<th>Area reduced (km²)</th>
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**Total** 3,163,958 2,567 229 3,117 70.07 11.57

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118 Ibid, pp. 8–11.
119 HI reported it cleared 51,473m² of mined area, 33 antipersonnel mines, two antivehicle mines and 11 UXO. Email from Emmanuel Sauvage, Regional Programme Director, South-East Europe, HI, 4 September 2009.
Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, BiH was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. BiH submitted the first draft of its request for a 10-year extension of its Article 5 deadline in March 2008 together with a new strategy for clearance. A revised version was submitted in June 2008 and presented at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, which approved the request but noted that BiH “still faces a significant remaining challenge in order to fulfill its obligations under Article 5.” It also observed that “success is contingent upon increased performance in technical survey, an ongoing, although decreasing, high level of donor funding and the initiation of and thereafter constantly increased funds provided by local governments.”


Demining from 1999–2008

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<td>2005</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>57.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6.55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>49.20</td>
<td>1,244.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BiH failed to meet the first target set by its extension request, whereby as of the start of the extension period in 2009 it was to have reduced the estimated area of contamination to 1,573 km². To achieve this, BiH should have completed clearance and area reduction or cancellation of 165 km² in 2008, but it achieved only a little over half of this amount (85 km²). Moreover, the extent of the residual task remains unclear and the assumptions on which completion within 10 years are based appear unrealistic when compared with past performance.

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122 Interview with Ahdin Orahovac, BHMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.
123 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
A lack of funding was responsible for BiH missing its targets in 2008 as it did in previous years. The extension request draws attention to past funding constraints on operations and notes “a big discrepancy between realistic needs for mine action in BiH and possibilities of the country and its supporters.” Yet the extension request still envisages a rise of more than half in projected mine action expenditure to more than BAM78 million ($58.7 million) a year from 2009–2019 without showing how this will be achieved. Close to half of the projected funding in 2009 and two-thirds of funding in 2019 was supposed to come from “new sources (local government budgets).”

**Risk Education**

In 2008, 16 organizations were accredited to conduct RE. RE was conducted through school-based RE, community integrated mine action plans (CIMAPs), and by clearance organizations. In 2008, 24,500 people were reached through RE, an increase from 9,176 in 2007 but lower than 2006, when 31,021 people were reached. RE management training was held by BHMAC with UNICEF support for the representatives of 10 organizations (governmental, NGO, and commercial). A national NGO, STOP Mines, provided training for 27 RE instructors from 13 organizations, with the financial support of UNICEF and Handicap International (HI).

In 2008, a new planning methodology was implemented to improve mine action planning at a municipal level and develop an interactive combination of different mine action components (clearance, technical survey, permanent marking, RE, and VA) within the municipality. This plan aims to give more responsibility to local government and involved the local community in the decision making process.

Community Integrated Mine Action Plans (CIMAPs) continued to be developed and implemented during 2008: 10 CIMAPs were prepared and seven of these were implemented. CIMAP’s are developed for every impacted community and integrate general survey data with RE data. They include a separate RE assessment within the CIMAP. Following two RE evaluations in 2007, meetings with the ministries of education were initiated and UNICEF supported BHMAC by employing a consultant to further develop the municipal mine action planning system.

In 2008, BHMAC met with the entity and cantonal ministries of education to discuss integration of RE into the education system. Although all 13 ministries of education were invited, only four attended. RE is integrated into the school curriculum as an extracurricular lesson, to be conducted six times a year in high-impacted communities, and four times a year in low-impacted communities. However, although all materials were developed and distributed to schools, the proper training was not conducted and the program was not functional as of July 2009.

NGOs engaged in RE activities conducted marking of hazardous areas. UNICEF provided 3,700 mine-warning signs to BHMAC for emergency marking.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FBiH Civil Protection Agency</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Training of trainers, community Liaison (CL), RE material distribution</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS Civil Protection Agency</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Training of trainers, CL, RE material distribution</td>
<td>Foča</td>
<td>25 people trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posavina bez mina</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>CL, stand-alone RE, material distribution, RE planning (CIMAPs)</td>
<td>Banovići (Seona) Brčko (Laništa)</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSBiH including Red Cross RS, and Red Cross FBiH</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Auxiliary to the government in humanitarian affairs</td>
<td>Planning (CIMAP), CIMAP implementation, RE quiz for school children</td>
<td>1,679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERSOS</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>CL, RE implementation, urgent marking; RE planning (CIMAP)</td>
<td>Kiseljak (Donji Azapići) Bugojno(Šumarstvo)</td>
<td>150 people at risk, and 49 forestry workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>CL and RE implementation (CIMAP), RE planning (CIMAP)</td>
<td>Brvnik, Boderiste communities, Sarajevo canton, Brčko district, Posavina canton, Tuzla canton and RS</td>
<td>430 adults and 46 children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDC</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Planning (CIMAP), CIMAP implementation</td>
<td>Drvar (Bastasi), Kiseljak (Kazagići) Foča (Vikoč)</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Genesis Project</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE through training of trainers for schools, and puppet shows</td>
<td>20 communities across BiH:</td>
<td>1,160 teacher trainers, teachers, and community representatives trained, 200 children trained in peer to peer RE, and 2,000 children reached through puppet shows</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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## Type of activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UXB Balkans</td>
<td>Commercial demining company</td>
<td>RE and urgent marking</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tehnoelektro</td>
<td>Commercial demining company</td>
<td>RE and urgent marking RE planning (CIMAP)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH Armed Forces</td>
<td>Governmental</td>
<td>RE and urgent marking RE planning (CIMAP)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOP Mines</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE, urgent marking, RE planning (CIMAP), training of trainers</td>
<td>Pale</td>
<td>27 instructors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro Vita</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE and urgent marking, RE planning (CIMAP)</td>
<td>Livno (Ceprazljije), Maglaj (Straiste)</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Community liaison, RE tools distribution (to Civil Protection Agencies)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>18 mine-impacted communities and neighbourhood communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH Demining</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE implementation, urgent marking, RE planning (CIMAP)</td>
<td>Zvornik (Baljkovica), Visoko (Kopa i)</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>Doesn't have accreditation but conducts RE according to its special status provided by Dayton Peace Accords</td>
<td>RE implementation</td>
<td>21 communities across BiH</td>
<td>6,928 children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extensive RE has been conducted since 1999, through BHMAC and the EMACs, UNICEF, UNDP, ICRC, and the RCSBiH, the ministries of education, Civil Protection Agencies, and numerous NGOs. Methods included school-based RE, community-based RE, media, and data
gathering. By 1999, all primary school teachers were trained in RE, and it has been conducted in secondary schools since 2000. RE has been conducted through theatrical productions of “Little Red Riding Hood” and through sport by the NGO Spirit of Soccer. In 2000 RE began to focus on returnees and refugees. RE has also been conducted by SFOR for its troops. HI ran a project in 2004–2007 to develop sustainable RE capacity in schools and communities. An evaluation in 2007 found that there was no uniform method of teaching, the level of participation by schools was unclear, and there was no monitoring by BHMAC. However, HI ended its support to RE in December 2006, so it was unclear how the recommendations of the evaluation could be implemented.

Coordination mechanisms, working groups and RE standards have existed for at least 10 years, but have been developed over the years. In 2002, UNICEF appointed an RE specialist to develop BHMAC’s capacity. In 2003, RE started to be more closely integrated with mine action and clearance organizations started to conduct RE. By March 2004, an RE strategy was developed that integrated RE into the overall mine action strategy. By the end of 2004, BHMAC had developed a system for RE planning at community level through the CIMAPs.

In 2006, BHMAC developed SOPs for RE. In 2007, 10 out of the 23 organizations that applied did not fulfill requirements for accreditation contributing to a sharp downturn in RE activity. An evaluation of the UNICEF program found that the SOP was unnecessarily restrictive and hindered community participation. It also concluded there was no longer a need for UNICEF support, based on low casualty rates, a limited risk-taking group, and the established capacity of BHMAC and Civil Protection Agencies.

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is unknown due to BHMAC’s continuing work to verify and unify data; a 2005 estimate put the number at approximately 3,919. The main improvement in services to mine/ERW survivors since 1999 has been increased emergency response capacity and faster response times since 2006. In 2008, emergency medical care and transportation was reportedly adequate and improving. Demining and Civil Protection Agency personnel are usually first on the scene of an incident and provide emergency transportation of mine/ERW survivors.

Healthcare systems overall are generally reported to be adequate. Health services are free of charge for people with life-threatening conditions or with insurance, but approximately 50% of persons with disabilities did not have health insurance. The Ministry of Health (MoH)
of the FBiH has noted that many people, including mine survivors, who do not register for unemployment benefits within the prescribed 30-day period, experience a lack of access to health insurance and health services. From 2008–2009, the cantons of the FBiH accepted an arrangement with the FBiH MoH to provide a basic package of healthcare services to all people, including mine survivors, who are not insured. As of May 2009, the arrangement was yet to be fully implemented.158

In the last decade, BiH has faced many challenges in providing rehabilitation and prosthetics services, including poor quality devices, lack of trained technicians, and few choices of services for survivors. However, the situation has improved and BiH now has a wide range of health and rehabilitation facilities available to mine/ERW survivors. The FBiH has rehabilitation centers, spas, and 38 community-based rehabilitation (CBR) centers for psychological and physical rehabilitation, which provide assistance to mine survivors. The RS has 23 CBR centers situated within other health institutions. BiH reported that CBR centers significantly improved access to the rehabilitation services by mine survivors.159 From 2008–2009, there was a nationwide survey of the centers, to assess the outputs of the CBR system, as well as its existing capacity and needs. As of May 2009, some 42 of the 60 CBR center questionnaires on accessibility, equipment, staff education levels and community connection had been returned and analyzed.160

New developments were reported in capacity-building of rehabilitation services. The Miracles Center for Prosthesis and Care in Mostar, completed in August 2008, was specifically built to provide for the needs of mine survivors. The center also offers short-term free accommodation for beneficiaries who have to travel to access care at the center.161 However, Miracles, a British NGO, reported a continuing lack of prosthetic technicians qualified to international standards in BiH.162

In 2008, the NGO Human Study, in cooperation with Don Bosco University of El Salvador, the International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics (ISPO), and HI, began implementation of a prosthetic and orthotic education program to address the lack of modern services and trained practitioners in the Balkans region. The course was providing distance education in prosthetics and orthotics to ISPO category II for 13 students in the region (one from BiH, six from Croatia, one from Macedonia, and five from Serbia).163 In 2008, the Center for International Rehabilitation (CIR) in Tuzla ran a project for prosthetic training of students from BiH for ISPO category II accreditation. In 2009, the FBiH MoH continued cooperation with the CIR to improve national prosthetics capacity.164 By October 2008, HOPE’87 established pain therapy departments linked to clinical centers and CBR centers. In 2008, HOPE’87 also worked on a project aimed at creating a pain management network throughout BiH, to be completed by early 2010.165

As in past years, in 2008, BiH stated that psychological support was available through CBR centers which were reported to be fully operational and open to all in need.166 According to recent research, however, there is a lack of political will to address psychological support needs and consequently, funding for services is minimal. There remained a high level of need for psychosocial assistance for people who have suffered war and postwar trauma, including mine survivors. Stigmatization of psychological support remained a problem, particularly among war veterans who are often referred to psychiatric institutions and centers for mental health, which

158 Interview with Dr. Goran Cerkez, FBiH MoH, in Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.
160 Interview with Dr. Goran Cerkez, FBiH MoH, in Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.
162 Ibid.
164 Interview with Mersiha Idrizovic, Regional Administrator, CIR, Tuzla, 5 March 2008; and interview with Dr. Goran Cerkez, FBiH MoH, in Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.
principally treat severe psychiatric disorders. Psychiatric clinics in Sarajevo and Tuzla have specific departments for the treatment of traumatic stress.\(^{167}\)

The great majority of persons with disabilities are unemployed.\(^{168}\) The Fund for Employment of Persons with Disabilities of the RS co-financed an NGO economic reintegration project for mine survivors that ended in October 2008.\(^{169}\) In 2007, engagement of the Fund in economic reintegration for mine survivors was announced as a plan for implementing BiH victim assistance objectives.\(^{170}\) All reported economic assistance activities for survivors are provided by NGOs.

The law in both entities prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities but discrimination persisted in employment, education, access to health care, and other state services. Laws requiring that buildings are accessible to persons with disabilities were not adequately enforced. Discrimination between civilian and military survivors persisted, the latter receiving a privileged status above civilian war injured.\(^{171}\) In 2008, access to education for students with disabilities improved. The Office of the Ombudsperson for Persons with Disabilities was set up and a National Implementation Plan on Social Inclusion 2007–2008 was produced.\(^{172}\) FBiH legislation for improving economic reintegration of persons with disabilities was still pending final approval in early 2009.\(^{173}\)

BiH signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 29 July 2009 but has not yet ratified either.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

BiH is one of the States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.\(^{174}\) BiH presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. The objectives were not revised and no plans to achieve them have been presented.\(^{175}\) Only three of the BiH’s 14 objectives were time-bound and no clear responsibilities were assigned for their implementation. Of the three time-bound objectives, only one—to increase efficiency of medical interventions by 2009—was completed by the deadline. The other two, to integrate mine casualty data collection into a nation-wide injury surveillance system by 2009, and to ensure every mine survivor has access to psychological support services, if needed, by 2009 were yet to be accomplished as of June 2009.\(^{176}\)

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173 Email from Amir Mujanovic, Operations Manager, LSN BiH, 18 June 2009.


In 2007, BiH convened two VA workshops to refine objectives and elaborate a VA plan. However, results from these workshops were only used to guide the 10-year sub-strategy and not the work for the period under review (2005–2009).

BiH included a VA expert on its delegation to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2007, and at the Meetings of States Parties in 2005, 2007, and 2008.177

Victim assistance activities

Landmine Survivors Network BiH (LSN BiH)178 continued the implementation of its program in BiH, while completing its transition to becoming a national NGO. In 2008, LSN BiH provided assistance to at least 635 survivors who received peer support services. LSN BiH made 5,258 home visits and 217 hospital visits to survivors and other amputees, 170 new survivors/amputees entered the program, 16 survivors/amputees were in groups for social integration, 39 in groups for economic integration, 90 survivors/amputees in groups for advocacy and rights of persons with disabilities, 157 received direct assistance packages, and 15 survivors were assisted in getting prosthetic orthotic devices. More than 200 survivors participated in LSN social, cultural, educational, and sporting events. LSN BiH provided 30 survivors with small business training, assisted in helping to get 37 small businesses started and extending another 50 small businesses, and helped four survivors/amputees find employment.179 LSN BiH reported that 92% of the survivors helped with their economic reintegration activities continued to run their own businesses, and 12% of the survivors it assisted employed additional workers.180

In 2008, Mercy Corps Scotland assisted 86 mine survivors (six more than began the project initially) with economic reintegration activities, in cooperation with LSN BiH. Of the total beneficiaries, some 80% were engaged in agriculture and 20% in craft, production, or services. The program continued in mid-2008 with a new group of 90 survivors receiving economic reintegration packages in an 18-month project due to finish in January 2010, and another 20 survivors receiving only education support.181

One mine survivor received assistance at the Institute for Rehabilitation Republic of Slovenia, with the support of LSN BiH.182 LSN BiH also organized the 10th Sitting Volleyball tournament in September 2008.183 The International Sitting Volleyball tournament was held in Sarajevo in May 2008 with support from the ITF. The NGO ECO Sport Group provided sports diving activities for mine survivors in 2008, as in past years. STOP Mines also continued their socio-economic reintegration support program, “Sustained Professional Rehabilitation of Mine Victims in BiH,” which was due for completion in June 2009.184

World Vision United States assisted 56 people (18 children), including mine survivors, with prosthetics and rehabilitation at the University Clinical Centre in Tuzla.185

From 2008–2009, the NGO Amputee Association (Udruženje Amputiraca, UDAS) based in Banja Luka provided information on healthcare for amputees, economic reintegration assistance in cooperation with LSN BiH, as well as sporting and art and cultural activities for mine survivors and other amputees.186

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178 In 2009 it registered as a local organization called Landmine Survivors Initiative.
180 Ibid.
183 Email from Tirza Leibowitz, Director of Advocacy, Survivor Corps, 8 September 2009.
186 UDAS, “Projekti” (“Projects”), www.udas.rs.ba; and UDAS, “Arhiva” (“Archive”), www.udas.rs.ba.
Support for Mine Action

In its revised Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in June 2008, BiH estimated funding needed to meet its mine clearance obligations at BAM790.4 million ($594.3 million) for the period 2009–2019. The budget consists of BAM742.4 million ($558.5 million) for survey, area reduction, clearance and QA; BAM13.9 million ($10.5 million) for RE; BAM32.4 million ($24.4 million) for VA; BAM850,000 ($639,000) for research and development; and BAM920,000 ($677,000) for advocacy. Annual cost estimates are roughly consistent across the extension period, averaging BAM79 million (roughly $59.5 million per year, with a low of BAM75.28 million ($56.6 million) in 2018 and a high of BAM80.14 million ($60.3 million) in 2012.

BiH’s revised Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019 acknowledges the need to continue transition from international to national and local responsibility for resource mobilization, but states that BiH still must rely on substantial international donor support for fulfillment of its current mine action strategy. Beginning in 2008, the strategy calls for annexes and amendments of national mine action law to “secure additional and continuous funding through national budgets.”

The revised Article 5 deadline extension request cites a lack of funding along with the scale of the mine problem as the main reasons for BiH’s failure to fulfill its mine clearance obligations in line with the original treaty deadline. The request states that the adoption of new mine action legislation (pending as of June 2009) would “create conditions for stable and continuous funding” from local budgets. The Mine Action Strategy 2009–2019 calls for annual reviews and adjustments of financial plans, and for funding from national sources to increase each year beginning in 2009.

National support for mine action

In 2008, overall spending on mine action was €31 million ($45.7 million). Of this amount, roughly €20 million ($29.5 million) or 65% was reported to have come via the ITF or bilateral funding from international donors. This would leave approximately €11 million ($16.2 million), or 35%, in funding from national sources (including federal and local sources). In its revised Article 5 deadline extension request, BiH projected national allocations totaling BAM20.1 ($15.1 million) in 2008. In comparison, in 2007 BHMAC reported national funding totaling BAM19,419,177 ($13,618,669), or 40.4% of total funds.

For the 2009–2019 extension period, of the approximately €400 million ($589 million) total estimated cost for mine clearance, BiH has projected that €325 million ($479 million), or 81%, will come from state budgets.

In December 2008, the director of BHMAC stated that national funds for mine clearance came mainly from the Armed Forces and Civil Protection Agencies budgets, with some additional funds coming from municipalities, cantons, the electrical utility, and forestry agencies. The director stated that overall allocation of funds is not regulated in BiH and, without more active involvement by the government in financing mine action, international donors may withdraw their support.

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187 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision) 27 June 2008, p. 32.
188 Ibid.
190 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 27 June 2008, p. 7.
193 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 27 June 2008, p. 23.
International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, 11 countries and the EC reported providing $24,550,453 (€16,671,501) to mine action in BiH, which is approximately 43% more than reported in 2007. According to BiH’s proposed mine clearance strategy, annual donor support for mine action during the period 2008–2012 is projected to be €10–15 million, decreasing gradually afterward to €2.5 million a year in the last years of the extension.\(^{196}\)

In May 2009, BiH stated that, with “regular funding,” it could achieve its mine clearance targets for 2009 as reported to the Standing Committee meetings. Total funds required for mine action in 2009 were estimated to be roughly €40 million, with 65% of funds being raised as of May 2009. BiH stated that the remaining funds would likely be covered by “rebalancing of local budgets.”\(^{197}\)

Funding at 2008 levels, with both national and international contributions totaling roughly $39.8 million, is not sufficient to meet BiH’s mine action needs according to its own plans described in the Article 5 deadline extension request. In both 2007 and 2008, reported international funds did not take into account the costs of VA, which only one donor reported funding directly in 2008, although the ITF reported contributions to VA during this period.

The ITF reported that 53% of BiH’s mine clearance program is funded via the ITF.\(^{198}\) In 2008, it allocated $18,232,963 (59%) to BiH.\(^{199}\) Funds for BiH were allocated to mine and UXO clearance, structural support, VA, RE, training, and other operational or program expenses.\(^{200}\)

In addition to the above funds, Sweden provided funds for UNDP through ITF and contributions to the ITF in 2008 were also reported from Belgium, Hungary and the United Kingdom, as well as from local and national sources and NGOs.\(^{201}\)

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\(^{197}\) Ibid, 27 May 2009.


\(^{199}\) Ibid, p. 29.

\(^{200}\) Ibid, p. 37. Structure support includes provision of equipment, operational support and training, and other areas of support not part of clearance operations. Email from Luka Bunin, Project Manager, ITF, 16 July 2008.

\(^{201}\) Email from Roman Turšič, Head, BiH Implementation Office, ITF, 7 September 2009.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Monetary\(^{202}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA,RE</td>
<td>$5,780,383 (€3,925,291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Demira, HI, ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$5,689,203 (€3,863,373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$4,005,472 (€2,720,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$2,687,610 (NOK15,150,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>HI, BHMAC, NPA</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,541,955 (CHF1,667,700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>International Rescue, International Management Group</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,438,515 (€976,854)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>BHMAC</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,063,300 (SEK7,000,000)</td>
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<td>Austria</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$957,190 (€650,000)</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$640,581 (€435,000)</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$368,150 (€250,000)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan International Cooperation Agency</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$253,203 (¥26,103,378)</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$124,891 (€84,810)</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$24,550,453 (€16,671,501)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**BURUNDI**

**2008 Key Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 April 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified; small residual mine and ERW threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>4 (2007: Unknown but eight reported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but estimated 523–1,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Clearance of 29,445m² of mined/battle areas  Release of 53,384m² of suspected mined/battle areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 April 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $1,094,632 (2007: $1 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ten-Year Summary**

The Republic of Burundi became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 April 2004. It enacted national implementation legislation in October 2008 and completed stockpile destruction in March 2008. There were credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both government and rebel forces in the past, but none involving government forces since the treaty entered into force in April 2004, and none involving rebels since peace negotiations started in May 2006.

Despite being slow to initiate a demining program, Burundi has made significant progress in addressing its mine problem since international NGOs initiated clearance operations in 2005. By May 2009, Burundi was close to fulfilling its Article 5 obligations for the clearance of mined areas well in advance of its 1 April 2014 deadline. Burundi’s antipersonnel mine problem has proved to be less than originally feared. It also has a residual threat from explosive remnants of war (ERW).

From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 826 mine/ERW casualties (218 killed, 523 injured, and 85 unknown), though there is a lack of effective data collection. Mine/ERW risk education activities continued to decrease in 2008, as a response to the reduced level of need resulting from previous risk education activities and the clearance of most hazardous areas. Burundian survivors, along with other persons with disabilities, have limited access to support or services.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Burundi signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 22 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004.

The Burundi National Assembly adopted a national implementation law on 25 September 2008, followed by the Burundi Senate on 28 September 2008. The law was promulgated by the President of Burundi on 10 October 2008. Although Burundi reported the enactment of the law at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, it did not provide further details on the law’s contents in its Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2009.

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Burundi submitted its fifth annual Article 7 report on 30 April 2009. The report covers the period from 30 April 2006 to 30 April 2009.2

Burundi participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made statements during the general exchange of views, as well as statements on mine clearance and victim assistance (VA). Burundi also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it also provided information on mine clearance and VA.

Burundi has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling or transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Burundi is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not yet ratified as of 1 July 2009.3

Production, transfer, use, and stockpiling

Burundi has stated that it has never produced antipersonnel mines.4 It is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. There have been credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both government and rebel forces in the past.5 Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Burundi on 1 April 2004, there have been no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by the army.

Burundi completed the destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines on 17 March 2008, ahead of its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 April 2008. It destroyed a total of 664 mines, including 591 POMZ-2M and 73 TS-50 mines.6 The 664 mines destroyed exceeded the 610 reported as stockpiled as of April 2007.7

Burundi has reported retaining two POMZ-2M and two TS-50 mines for training purposes.8 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Burundi reported that in April 2009 a cache of 41 TS-50 antipersonnel mines was discovered in the village of Mabayi, Cibitoke province. It said the mines were being held for the time being by Mines Advisory Group (MAG), which indicated that the mines were subsequently destroyed.9

After stockpile destruction in 2008 and 2009, Burundi stated that the total number of mines held by the National Forces of Liberation (Forces Nationales de Libération, FNL),10 the last remaining rebel group, remained to be confirmed.11 The FNL and the government signed a

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2 Previous reports were submitted on 1 July 2008 (covering the two-year period from 30 April 2006 to 30 April 2008), 30 April 2006, 9 August 2005, and 8 November 2004. The November 2004 report is not posted on the UN website, but Landmine Monitor has a copy.


4 Article 7 Reports, Form E, 8 November 2004 and 9 August 2005.


6 Twelve of the POMZ-2M mines were from former rebel National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Forces for the Defense of Democracy (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie, CNDD-FDD) stocks, and the rest were from army stocks. UNDP and MAG provided assistance with the destruction program. CNDD-FDD signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in 2003, Statement of Burundi, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008. See also Article 7 Reports, Forms F and G, 1 July 2008 and 30 April 2009.

7 Statement of Burundi, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 23 April 2007. In this statement, Burundi informed States Parties that, after reviewing its mine inventory, it concluded that it had 610 antipersonnel mines in stock, and not the 1,212 previously declared on several occasions.

8 Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2009.

9 Ibid, Forms B and D; and email from Julie Claveau, Country Programme Manager, MAG, 3 August 2009.

10 FNL was formerly known as Palipehutu-FNL. In January 2009 they formally dropped the first part of their name in order to become a political party.

11 Article 7 Reports, Form B, 1 July 2008 and 30 April 2009. In April 2007, Burundi stated that its reporting on stockpiles could not be considered complete until the FNL revealed its stockpile, which it had not done up to that time. Interview with Remy Bacumurwanko, Director, Mine Action Section, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, 26 April 2007.
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement on 26 May 2008.\textsuperscript{12} In April 2009, FNL combatants began demobilization and the surrender of weapons to the African Union Special Task Force.\textsuperscript{13} There have been no reports of antipersonnel mines being handed in. Landmine Monitor has not received any allegations of mine use since May 2006, when negotiations to end hostilities began. Prior to May 2006, the government had accused the FNL of sporadic mine use.\textsuperscript{14}

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

As of May 2009, Burundi had a small residual threat from mines and ERW, the legacy of 13 years of internal conflict.\textsuperscript{15} DanChurchAid (DCA) declared that more than 90\% of “known hazardous areas” were cleared before operations were disrupted by persistent threats from FNL non-state armed groups (NSAGs).\textsuperscript{16} The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) stated that despite the lack of any declaration of Article 5 compliance by the government, no “meaningful clearance work” was left to be done.\textsuperscript{17}

Burundi has declared that only two suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) remained from the more than 230 identified by an FSD general survey in 2005–2006 as well as subsequent survey by demining operators.\textsuperscript{18} The uncompleted areas are in Mpishi, Musigati commune, and Mwico, Kanyosha commune; these are located in Bujumbura Rural and Bubanza provinces, respectively.\textsuperscript{19} FSD cautioned, however, that a further 58 SHAs had been recorded in the first half of November 2008 on the hills facing the Kibira park area as a result of FNL activity.\textsuperscript{20} However, the information about the SHAs, which resulted from a new general survey by FSD, was quite general. FSD’s former program manager believed that the number of affected areas would prove to be considerably lower than initially reported.\textsuperscript{21}

The FSD general survey identified a widespread but low intensity ERW threat that included mortar rounds, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, artillery shells, and aircraft bombs.\textsuperscript{22} According to MAG, there is a particular problem with hand grenades: “Accidents also happen


\textsuperscript{13} “BURUNDI: Demobilisation of thousands of former rebels begins,” IRIN (Bujumbura), 20 April 2009.


\textsuperscript{16} Email from Adam Forbes, Program Manager, DCA, 24 February 2009.

\textsuperscript{17} Email from Alex Griffiths, Director of Operations, FSD, 24 February 2009.


\textsuperscript{21} Email from Zlatko Gegic, FSD, 11 May 2009.

when children play with grenades, unaware of the risks.” Burundi has also indicated that an ERW threat might exist within the Kibira and Rukoko parks, which had been impossible to access because of FNL presence.

Casualties

As in previous years, the Humanitarian Department for Mine/UXO Action (Direction de l’Action Humanitaire contre les Mines et Engins non explosés, DAHMI) was unable to provide reliable casualty data for Burundi; information is therefore incomplete. In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least four new mine/ERW casualties, including two killed and two injured in two incidents. Two of these casualties were recorded by DAHMI, and two were reported in the media. DAHMI identified one additional incident which could not be included in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database due to lack of information.

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with at least three people injured in three incidents as of May. In February, a female of unknown age was injured in a mine incident in a house compound in Kanyosha (Bujumbura Rural province). In March, a 12-year-old boy was injured by a mine while collecting wood in Musigati (Bubanza province). In a separate incident in March, another person was injured in a field in Buterere (Bujumbura Mairie province). There have also been reports of cows killed by mines around Kibira park, but the information has not been confirmed. DAHMI stated that casualties from the 2009 incidents had not yet been entered into IMSMA.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Burundi remains unknown and unverified. DAHMI reported at the end of 2008 that 1,561 casualties were registered (16% killed and 84% injured). In 2008, however, Burundi reported several different figures, including 1,549, 1,551, and 1,556, always repeating that 16% were killed and 84% injured. DAHMI stated that inconsistencies were due to double counting of IMSMA forms, but that the database has been “cleaned up” and verified.

From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 826 mine/ERW casualties, including 218 killed, 523 injured, and 85 of unknown status. Information on device type, activity, location, gender, and age was not systematically reported, and data provided by relevant authorities appeared to be conflicting. It appears that casualty rates started decreasing sharply in 2005 (14 casualties) and remained relatively low in the following years (2006: 15 casualties; 2007: eight casualties). However, during the same time period, mine action authorities were less capable of providing information.
In May 2009, Burundi reported that the majority of casualties were adults between 21 and 50 years (50%), followed by youth between one and 20 years of age (34%). The majority of casualties were farmers (75%), followed by students (11%), and military personnel (3%). Burundi reported that the decrease in casualty rates since 2004 is due to risk education (RE) activities.37

There is little data on persons with disabilities. In August 2008, a national census was completed in Burundi,38 which included one question on the type of disability and one on the cause of disability.39 As of August 2009, results of the census had not yet been released.40 A 2006–2007 disability survey by Handicap International (HI) found that one in four (680 out of 2,630) persons with disabilities had been injured by mines and ERW.41 In March 2009, HI launched an assessment of the status of persons with disabilities in six provinces, but the results were not ready as of 2 June 2009.42

Program Management and Coordination

Burundi’s oversight of mine action has been vested in the National Civil Protection Service, within the Ministry of Interior and Public Security.43 In April 2009, the service became the General Directorate for Civil Protection, and a new director was appointed.44 On 11 February 2008, Burundi officially inaugurated DAHMI.45

DAHMI is responsible for the coordination of mine action activities but does not coordinate or implement VA, which is the responsibility of several different ministries. The Ministry of National Solidarity reportedly has overall responsibility for VA.46 Following its assessment mission in November 2004, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) drafted a national VA strategy for Burundi, which has never been implemented.47

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Mine action program operators in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundian Demining Center</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining Center of Central Africa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAHMI</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA*</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD*</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


39 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Caroline Duconseille, Country Director, HI, 22 April 2009.
40 Ibid; and email from Tirza Leibowitz, Advocacy Director, Survivor Corps, 4 August 2009.
42 Telephone interview with Stephan Jooris, Desk Officer, HI, 2 June 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Caroline Duconseille, HI, 22 April 2009.
44 Telephone interview with Jean-Baptiste Hatungimana, DAHMI, 18 May 2009; and Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2009.
46 Email from Jean-Baptiste Hatungimana, DAHMI, 28 May 2009.
Data collection and management
Burundi uses IMSMA.\footnote{48} In 2008, casualty data collection in Burundi remained inadequate, and no progress was made in expanding the coverage, accuracy, and detail of the IMSMA database. Although it was announced that IMSMA would be fully operational by December 2006 and detailed, verified data would be available by September 2007,\footnote{49} this was not the case as of May 2009. DAHMI reported that, although data collection was ongoing, as of October 2008 it was not able to enter data into IMSMA for logistical reasons.\footnote{50}

In June 2008, Burundi announced that the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Interior and Public Security would undertake “a survey of victims in all the country,” starting in July 2008.\footnote{51} However, since then, no progress was reported.

Plans
\textit{Strategic mine action plans}

The main goal for the mine action program in 2009 was “strengthened national capacities for peaceful reintegration and socioeconomic community recovery, including for vulnerable people and mine survivors.”\footnote{52}

National ownership
\textit{Commitment to mine action and victim assistance}

Burundi’s commitment to mine action has been inconsistent since becoming a State Party. In 2005, Landmine Monitor noted that clearance operations had been slow to start. According to remarks by the head of the government’s National Civil Protection Service reported in December 2004, “Two years after the cease-fire, there is still no systematic mine clearance program.”\footnote{53} In 2008, however, the UN praised the swift implementation of the action plan “owned by national authorities,” and noted that it might make Burundi one of the first mine-affected countries in Africa to meet its Article 5 obligations before the deadline prescribed in the Mine Ban Treaty.\footnote{54}

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007, Burundi stated that its objective was to develop a VA strategy and create a national committee to coordinate assistance to persons with disabilities.\footnote{55} At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, it announced that two workshops on assistance to persons with disabilities were organized in 2008 (2–3 April and 20–21 November) to help prepare a national plan of action in 2009.\footnote{56} No further updates were reported as of May 2009.\footnote{57} Therefore, guidelines for Burundi’s VA implementation remain limited to the so-called coherent victim assistance program which it has been presenting at international meetings since 2006.

\footnote{49}See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 211.
\footnote{51}Statement by Burundi, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 3 June 2008.
\footnote{57}Statement of Burundi, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.
Persons with disabilities are not differentiated from other vulnerable people.\textsuperscript{58} Despite identifying a need for specific programs for persons with disabilities in its 2006 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Burundi did not report on progress achieved in its 2009 Annual Progress Report.\textsuperscript{59}

In November 2008, Burundi announced the creation of a national committee to monitor the African Decade of Persons with Disabilities, composed of government and civil society organizations.\textsuperscript{60} However, this committee has not yet been formed and the African decade ends in 2009.

National management
Management of Burundi’s mine action program has been fully nationalized. The Burundi Mine Action Coordination Centre (BURMACC) (previously called the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre, UNMACC) began work in June 2004 under the auspices of the UN Operation in Burundi, with support from the UN Office for Project Services and UNMAS. The UNMAS program was completed on 31 July 2006 and moved under the administration of the government of Burundi with UNDP support. The center was functionally operational in 2005.\textsuperscript{61} DAHMI replaced BURMACC in 2008.\textsuperscript{62} In 2004–2008, UNDP provided mine action capacity-building support to the government of Burundi. This support ended in 2008.\textsuperscript{63}

National mine action legislation and standards/Stand operating procedures
The mandate for DAHMI followed the signature of an official decree by General Evariste Ndayishimiye, Minister of Interior and Public Security, in October 2007.\textsuperscript{64}

No national mine action standards were adopted in Burundi. However, FSD noted that “DAHMI insisted that all sites were left ‘metal free’ (not just ‘mine free’) and consequently, many tasks required ‘full excavation’ clearance methods to be adopted. This required the full removal and checking of the top 15cm of soil, which hugely impacted on clearance productivity rates.”\textsuperscript{65} The two NGO operators used their own standing operating procedures for demining operations.\textsuperscript{66}

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
Demining and battle area clearance operations are now the sole responsibility of DAHMI, following the closure of the DCA and FSD programs in 2008. Demining in Burundi only uses manual methods.\textsuperscript{67} MAG has been assisting Burundi with its management of ammunition and weapons storage areas and the destruction of surplus weaponry, and it has also conducted destruction of several items of UXO.\textsuperscript{68} A joint MAG/Burundi National Police (Police Nationale Burundaise, PNB) team, created in July 2008 to support the civilian disarmament campaign launched by the government in 2006,\textsuperscript{69} includes disposal of any ERW encountered.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{58} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Eugène Nsabayezu, Permanent Secretary, Network of Associations of Persons with Disabilities in Burundi (Réseau des Associations de Personnes Handicapées du Burundi, RAPHB), 7 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{64} Official Decree No. 530/4040/CAB/2007, 29 October 2007.
\textsuperscript{66} Emails from Alex Griffiths, FSD, 17 April 2009; and from Adam Forbes, DCA, 20 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{68} Interview with Adam Komorowski, Regional Head of Operations, MAG, Manchester, 28 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{70} Interview with Rob White, Head of Operations, MAG, Manchester, 28 April 2009.
Mine and battle area clearance in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>ERW destroyed</th>
<th>Area released by survey (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>9,077</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>23,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>20,368</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,445</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td><strong>53,384</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Progress since becoming a State Party

Burundi is required by Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2014. Despite being slow to initiate a demining program, Burundi has made significant progress in addressing its mine problem since international NGOs initiated clearance operations in 2005 (see table below), although as of May 2009 a small residual threat remained to be dealt with before it could declare compliance with Article 5. Security concerns caused the intended completion date of April 2008 to be postponed.71 Burundi had subsequently aimed to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas as well as be free of ERW by the end of 2008.72

Demining in 1999–end 200873

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>ERW destroyed</th>
<th>Area released by survey (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>29,445</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>53,384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>12,834</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>35,647</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>205,027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>15,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>79,924</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,236</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,783,411</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk Education

RE activities continued to decrease in 2008, due to the reduced level of need resulting from previous RE activities and the clearance of most hazardous areas.74 The number of incidents has also reduced significantly. DCA believes that continuing to provide RE would simply create unnecessary fear.75 Burundi did not report on RE activities for 2008 in its Article 7 report submitted in 2009.76

HI ended its activities in March 2008 because it perceived the mine threat to be marginal.77 DCA also ended its RE project in early 2008 to focus its attention on small arms and light weapons awareness activities, a need identified from RE sessions. In January 2008, DCA handed over its RE project to its national partner, the National Council of Churches in Burundi (Conseil

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73 The figures are based on Landmine Monitor research. Figures provided by Burundi differ slightly. A higher total was reported for clearance in 2007—51,000m²—and at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties a lower total was given for the destruction of ERW in 1999–2008: 1,638.
74 Email from Adam Forbes, DCA, 12 May 2009.
75 Ibid.
76 Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009.
77 Email from Stephan Jooris, HI, 28 May 2008.
An external evaluation of DCA’s RE activities in 2007 found it effective to work through “an established, authoritative and active church network.” DCA also continued to provide limited safety messages through its explosive ordnance disposal and survey teams and through the distribution of materials, reaching 21,174 people. The population was informed on how to report contamination to DCA.

In its Article 7 report submitted in 2008, Burundi reported that DAHMI had developed and distributed new RE materials with support from UNICEF, although it was not specified when these activities had taken place. Two national demining organizations, the Demining Center in Central Africa (Le Centre de Démineur en Afrique Centrale, CDAC) and the Burundian Demining Center (Centre Burundais de Démineur, CBD), established in 2008 by former national staff of international NGOs, have reported including RE in their mandate and conducted some limited RE activities in 2008, including the distribution of materials.

Earlier RE was conducted by a variety of actors, including the Ministry of Defense, BURMACC, HI, and UNICEF. DCA implemented RE in 2004–2005 for Burundian refugees in Tanzania and a project with the church network in April 2006.

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is unknown but is estimated at between 523 and 1,311. In May 2009, Burundi recognized that its VA efforts were still weak and called for international assistance. The Ministry of Interior and Public Security acknowledged that not all persons with disabilities received assistance, due to a lack of financial resources. In November 2008, Burundi reported the following as its main VA challenges: the ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the approval of the national plan for community-based rehabilitation, the promulgation of the law on disability, and the creation of a training school for physiotherapists and orthopedic technicians.

A long period of civil war has damaged Burundi’s healthcare system. While there is little data available, war victims, including mine/ERW survivors, have put an additional strain on the healthcare system. While progress has been registered in the field of healthcare since 2007, access and overall performance remained problematic. In 2008, public health centers

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78 Email from Adam Forbes, DCA, 12 May 2009.
80 Email from Adam Forbes, DCA, 12 May 2009.
81 Article 7 Report, Form I, 1 July 2008.
82 Emails from Théophile Ninteretse, CDAC, 4 June 2009; and from Pontien Biyaka, CBD, 1 June 2009.
87 See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 239.
89 The lower estimate is based on Landmine Monitor media monitoring, and the higher estimate is based on DAHMI data cited above in the casualty section, i.e. 84% of 1,561.
90 Email from Jean-Baptiste Hatungimana, DAHMI, 28 May 2009.
continued to lack personnel and supplies.\textsuperscript{95} A strike by healthcare personnel from November 2008 to April 2009 to protest against low wages and poor working conditions adversely affected the delivery of services.\textsuperscript{96}

Services for persons with disabilities in Burundi continued to be delivered mostly by NGOs.\textsuperscript{97} NGOs are in charge of providing first-aid to mine/ERW survivors at the incident site and transfer to hospitals.\textsuperscript{98} About 10 to 20\% of patients requiring orthopedic surgery needed to be treated abroad.\textsuperscript{99} The government distributes cards for people displaced by the war, including persons with disabilities, which give access to free healthcare. However, the card is not accepted everywhere and does not cover all costs.\textsuperscript{100}

There are four rehabilitation centers and orthopedic workshops in Burundi, one run by the government and the other three by religious associations with support from HI.\textsuperscript{101} In 2008, nine physiotherapists were trained by the NGO African Medical Assistance, but in the absence of a training school for rehabilitation specialists and ortho-prosthetic technicians, the availability of qualified staff remained a problem.\textsuperscript{102} Waiting lists to obtain prosthetic and orthotic devices remain long and the cost for appliances variable.\textsuperscript{103}

Socio-economic reintegration opportunities for mine/ERW survivors remain largely non-existent, although there are some income-generating projects targeting vulnerable persons, including persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{104}

Burundi’s constitution prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities, but there is no specific disability law or action plan. The draft law on disability adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2007 had not been passed as of May 2009.\textsuperscript{105} Burundi signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 26 April 2007 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

Burundi is one of the 26 States Parties making up the VA26 group, with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.\textsuperscript{106} Burundi did not formally present its 2005–2009 objectives as part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan. However, it presented various versions of its “coherent victim assistance program” in April and November 2007, June 2008, and May

\textsuperscript{95} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Joseph Ndayisenga, Representative, General Direction of National Solidarity, Ministry of National Solidarity, 7 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{96} “BURUNDI: Government, health officials seek to resolve strike,” IRIN (Bujumbura), 2 December 2008, www.irinews.org; and “Burundi: accord entre le gouvernement et le personnel medical” (“Burundi: agreement between the government and the medical personnel”), Voice of America (Washington, DC), 8 April 2009.


\textsuperscript{98} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Joseph Ndaysenga, Representative, General Direction of National Solidarity, Ministry of National Solidarity, 7 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{100} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Caroline Duconseille, HI, 22 April 2009; and by Joseph Ndaysenga, Ministry of National Solidarity, 7 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{102} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Joseph Ndaysenga, Ministry of National Solidarity, 7 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{104} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Eugène Nsabayezu, RAPHB, 7 May 2009.

2009. The May 2009 version of Burundi’s “coherent victim assistance program” included six objectives and seven actions that remain incomplete and are not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound). The data collection action included in the June 2008 version was removed from the May 2009 version. Progress on any of the objectives and actions in this program appears to be unrelated to their VA program goals. Even though Burundi has announced since 2007 that the development of a VA strategy is one of its priorities, the plan had not been presented as of May 2009.

In 2008, a process support visit was undertaken by the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit on behalf of the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration.


**Victim assistance coverage**

It is not known how many mine/ERW survivors received assistance in 2008 or in the last 10 years as no specific VA programs were implemented and survivors have not been differentiated from war victims or other vulnerable people.

In 2008, HI continued to support five rehabilitation centers by providing equipment and materials, training technicians, and supporting the management of the centers. In June 2008, HI launched a community-based rehabilitation project in Ruyigi province. HI also supported local associations of persons with disabilities in conducting awareness on the rights of persons with disabilities.

In 2008, the ICRC continued to support one private hospital treating weapon-injured people. With ICRC support, 286 weapon-injured people were treated in referral hospitals. The ICRC also trained 702 volunteers in first-aid.

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113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.


116 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Caroline Duconseille, HI, 22 April 2009.

Other organizations providing services to war victims, including mine/ERW survivors, included HealthNet TPO, Oxfam-Quebec,118 the Network of Associations of Persons with Disabilities in Burundi (Réseau des Associations de Personnes Handicapées du Burundi), and Survivor Corps, which established an office in Burundi in 2009.119

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of a comprehensive long-term cost estimate for meeting mine action needs in Burundi. In 2008, UNDP continued to support mine action programming in Burundi, including facilitating “the effective coordination and monitoring of mine action activities at a national level.” In April 2007, Burundi reported that UNDP services were necessary only until the end of 2007.120 However, UNDP support continued in 2008 with a project budget of $997,629 (€677,461).121 One of Burundi’s three mine action “end goals” for 2007–2008 included the aim of incorporating mine action funding into the national budget.122 No progress on the development of a dedicated national mine action budget was reported for 2008.

Burundi’s “coherent victim assistance program,” presented at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in April 2007, included some goals for capacity development and noted some financial and material shortfalls in VA programs including “insufficient infrastructure,” insufficient financial support for micro-credit programs, and a lack of equipment for sport and cultural programs, but it did not include detailed resource mobilization strategies.123 No further strategies for raising funds for VA were reported in 2008.

National support for mine action

The government of Burundi did not report national funding for mine action in 2008, nor did it provide valuations of government contributions to VA programming and support services.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, two countries, Austria and Switzerland, reported providing $1,094,632 (€743,333) to mine action in Burundi. Reported international mine action funding in 2008 was 1% higher than the previous year. Welt Ohne Minen (World Without Mines) contributed $120,000 to FSD in 2008 for mine clearance.124 Pending determination of the extent of its landmine problem, Burundi’s overall mine action budget needs remain uncertain, and there is not enough information to measure the adequacy of international funding.

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Burundi: Monetary125

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$800,112 (CHF865,360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$1,094,632 (€743,333)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

124 Email from Zlatko Gegic, FSD, 29 July 2009.
125 Emails from Daniela Krejdj, Humanitarian Aid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2009; and from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009.
2008 Key Data

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Party since</td>
<td>1 January 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>649km² of mined areas was expected to require full clearance (August 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>269 (2007: 352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>43,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 January 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>63.26km² (2007: 55.31km²)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>380,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International: $28 million (2007: $30.8 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National: $1.8 million (2007: $1.15 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Kingdom of Cambodia became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 January 2000. In 1999, Cambodia adopted national ban legislation and declared completion of its destruction of 71,991 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Yet it continues to discover and destroy thousands of additional stockpiled mines each year, more than 133,000 from 2000 to 2008. Thailand made a serious allegation of new use of antipersonnel mines by Cambodia on their border in October 2008. Cambodia served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Technologies for Mine Action from 1999 to 2000, and as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies from 2002 to 2004, as well as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from 2006 to 2008. Cambodia hosted regional Mine Ban Treaty meetings in 2003 and 2007.

Cambodia remains one of the world’s most mine- and explosive remnants of war (ERW)-affected states—and is also affected by cluster munition remnants—but clearance of mined areas has increased sharply in recent years with the adoption of new methods and equipment while land reclamation by farmers and cancellation of suspected land through survey has drastically increased land release by the demining program. In April 2009, Cambodia submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its treaty deadline for clearance of 1 January 2010.

At least 7,300 mine/ERW casualties were recorded between 1999 and 2008 of a total of more than 60,000 casualties since 1979. Extensive risk education has been conducted in Cambodia for over 10 years, implemented by the Cambodian Mine Action Center and other NGOs, and the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports. Over the years the approach has shifted from awareness-raising to risk reduction, with stronger integration into mine action, and links with development. An evaluation in 2008 acknowledged the achievements of RE in Cambodia but concluded that a more targeted and cross-sectoral approach combined with improved communications will be needed to change behavior.

Throughout 1999 to 2008, even the basic needs of many mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities were not fulfilled; assistance was almost exclusively provided by NGOs that were facing increasing donor fatigue. As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action
Plan, Cambodia developed a national disability plan for 2009–2011 after a nearly two-year consultation process.

**Mine Ban Policy**


Cambodia participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where its year-long term as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration ended. Cambodia made statements during the general exchange of views and a session on compliance that mostly addressed Thailand’s allegation of new mine use (see Use section below). Cambodia also spoke on victim assistance, its 2010 mine clearance deadline, and the United Kingdom’s extension request.

Cambodia participated in the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia from 1–3 April 2009, the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the treaty’s Second Review Conference. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Cambodia made statements on victim assistance and its Article 5 mine clearance extension request (see Plans section below).

Cambodia has not made its views known on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Cambodia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It has not submitted an annual report under Article 13 of the protocol since April 2008. Cambodia is not a party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, Cambodia had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention**

The government has reported that it does not have any antipersonnel mine production facilities, and that it has not exported antipersonnel mines.

The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) destroyed its declared stockpile of 71,991 antipersonnel mines between 1994 and 1998, and in February 1999 the RCAF Deputy Commander in Chief formally stated that the RCAF no longer had stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. In 2000, Cambodia reported an additional stockpile of 2,035 antipersonnel mines held by the national police, which were subsequently destroyed. Cambodia regularly declares that there have been no antipersonnel mine stockpiles in the country since 2001. However, police and military units still frequently discover antipersonnel mines in various locations and from various sources around the country. Many are from previously unknown arms caches left from decades of war. Informal (“village”) demining and the scrap metal trade also account for some of the newly discovered stocks of mines.

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1 The law bans the production, use, possession, transfer, trade, sale, import, and export of antipersonnel mines. It provides for criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment for offenses committed by civilians or members of the police and the armed forces. It also provides for the destruction of mine stockpiles.


4 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Forms D and E. In the 1970s Cambodia manufactured one type of antipersonnel mine, the KN-10 Claymore-type mine, and various armed groups made improvised mines in the past.


6 Article 7 Report, Form B, 26 June 2000.

7 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form F. This has been repeated since 2004.
Discovered mines are supposed to be reported to the Cambodia Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), and handed over to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) for destruction. In February 2008, Cambodia stated that it destroys newly discovered stocks immediately. Cambodia has declared that a total of 133,478 antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed from 2000 to 2008, including 13,665 in 2008 (9,698 by CMAC; 2,713 by HALO Trust; and 1,254 by Mines Advisory Group). Cambodia stated these mines were “reported by local communities.”

Mines retained for research and training
As in previous years, in its Article 7 report covering 2008, Cambodia declared that it does not retain any antipersonnel mines for training or development purposes. However, Cambodia has reported transfer of mines for training and development purposes to the CMAC training center each year. It reported that in 2008 Cambodia transferred for training purposes 519 antipersonnel mines “from various sources and Demining Units/CMAC that were found in the Mined Areas.” This is the first time Cambodia has been explicit that these mines used for training were removed from the ground by deminers, and were not newly discovered caches.

Cambodia has not yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of mines kept for training—a step agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004. Cambodia has not utilized expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2005.

Use
Until 2008, there had not been any specific allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces since Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.

On 6 October 2008, a Thai paramilitary Ranger stepped on an antipersonnel landmine while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. A second soldier stepped on an antipersonnel mine while attempting to aid the first injured. Both lost their legs. This took place three days after an exchange of gunfire between Thai and Cambodian military units at the same location.

Thai authorities maintain that the area was previously clear of landmines. The Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) sent a team to investigate which found some PMN2-type antipersonnel mines. TMAC stated that the mines were newly placed. The sequence of discovery was detailed on the Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.

Cambodian authorities stated that the Thai investigation of the incident site was a unilateral incursion on Cambodian territory undertaken without their consent or participation, and denounced the action. The Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Thai Rangers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts.

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9 Ibid.
12 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form G.
13 Ibid, Form D1a.
14 Cambodia reported in 2007 that 594 mines were transferred for development and training. See Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form D2. Cambodia has reported a total of 3,450 mines transferred for training purposes from 1998–2007.
15 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D2.
The Coordinator of the Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines (TCBL) visited the site at the invitation of TMAC and Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She observed, “The mines which were displayed as recovered from the site showed no rust on their metal parts. Identification numbers on the mines were clearly visible, and did not appear to have been exposed to the elements very long. Local villagers informed me that they regularly used the path where the incidents took place.”

Thailand stated that the Royal Thai Army has never possessed PMN2 mines. Cambodia’s annual transparency reports indicate that PMN2 mines are commonly found during mine clearance operations. It has also reported stockpiling PMN2 mines in the past.

On 17 October 2008, representatives of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and TMAC met an ICBL/TCBL mission and presented information from Thailand’s investigations into the incident. Subsequently Thailand made this information available to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November.

Cambodia made several statements on the incident at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties. Cambodia said that “it was with great sadness that we learned of the allegations that Cambodia had contravened their obligations under the Ottawa Convention by laying new mines along the Thai Cambodian border. For a country that has suffered such heavy losses, the claim that we had contravened the most basic and fundamental tenet of the Convention came as a great surprise. In the clearest possible language, we deny the insinuations made to that effect. Cambodia has written two official letters through the Implementation Support Unit of the AP Mine Ban Convention to provide clarification, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia sent out an official bilateral response last week outlining its response to specific allegations.”

Cambodia also said, “Given the seriousness of the claims and the importance which Cambodia places on its international commitments, the Royal Government of Cambodia immediately ordered the formation of a Fact Finding Commission to thoroughly review the situation 3 days after receiving the request for clarification from Thailand...The Commission will complete its work in the near future, and we will share the findings of the report with Thailand and those concerned and other interested parties. To clarify to the meeting, I would like to confirm that the accident happened in a confirmed minefield on Cambodian territory.” Cambodia has not subsequently made a Fact Finding Commission’s report publicly available.

It would appear from available evidence that this incident involved new use of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor is not able to determine who was responsible for the use. To Landmine Monitor’s knowledge, other States Parties have not pursued a resolution to this issue between Cambodia and Thailand.

On 1 April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Nearly three decades of war left Cambodia as one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and ERW. After more than 15 years of humanitarian demining, the landmine threat is mainly concentrated in 21 districts in six provinces along Cambodia’s western and northern border with Thailand, including the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt. This was installed by the Vietnamese-backed government in the mid-1980s in an attempt to seal the border against infiltration by anti-regime guerrilla groups based on the Thai border. It represents Cambodia’s densest contamination, reportedly with up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer.\(^{26}\)

UXO, including cluster munition remnants, and abandoned explosive ordnance is found throughout the country. During the Vietnam War, the United States dropped more than a million tons (one billion kg) of general purpose bombs and at least 26 million submunitions on Cambodia, mainly BLU-24, BLU-26, and BLU-61 submunitions. This bombing is estimated to have left between 1.9 million and 5.8 million cluster munition remnants, mostly in the southeast and the sparsely populated northeast, along the border with Vietnam.\(^{27}\) However, a 2006 study of ERW in Cambodia found that more than 80% of the ordnance being cleared was ground artillery and munitions, and less than 20% was air ordnance.\(^{28}\)

By 2009, Cambodia had yet to fully determine the extent of contamination. In April 2009, Cambodia submitted an initial request for an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline for mine clearance, which put forward an estimate that 672km\(^2\) of mined areas remained for full clearance, 1,864km\(^2\) remained to be released through technical and non-technical survey, and 2,008km\(^2\) were to be released through cancellation of database entries.\(^{29}\) It also stated, however, that current data “presents a suspect area that all in the sector know is a massive, inaccurate and highly distorting snap-shot.”\(^{30}\) A revised request submitted in August 2009 put the area requiring clearance at 648.8km\(^2\) but said stakeholders believed a Baseline Survey started in August 2008 would reduce this figure.\(^{31}\)

A national ERW strategy published by the CMAA in January 2008 says a 2004 estimate that Cambodia had 427km\(^2\) of “priority minefields requiring formal clearance” had been “validated by recent trends, even if some of these areas remain to be further defined by current area reduction efforts.”\(^{32}\)

In the past three years, demining NGOs have identified more than 1,000km\(^2\) of land which the LIS identified as suspect that has been reclaimed by the population. Accordingly, the CMAA has removed this area from the database of land requiring clearance.\(^{33}\) A clearer estimate is expected from a baseline survey by demining NGOs of 21 districts with the most landmine casualties in recent years, which started in August 2008 and was due to be completed in a year.\(^{34}\)

Casualties\(^{35}\)

In 2008, the Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System (CMVIS) recorded 269 new mine/ERW casualties in Cambodia (47 people killed and 222 injured) in 154 incidents. This is a 24% decrease compared to 2007 (352) and confirms the downward casualty trend started in 2006.

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\(^{28}\) Interview with Dave McCracken, Consultant, NPA, Phnom Penh, 21 March 2006.

\(^{29}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, p. 48.

\(^{30}\) Ibid, p. 44.

\(^{31}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, p. 41.


\(^{34}\) Email from Pascal Rapillard, Policy and External Relations, GICHD, 4 September 2009.

\(^{35}\) Unless noted otherwise, casualty data 1979–May 2009 provided by Cheng Lo, Data Management Officer, CMVIS, 19 June 2009.
Reasons for the continued decrease were said to include continued community involvement in mine action and risk education (RE). \(^{36}\)

The vast majority of casualties were civilian (251), including 136 men, 75 boys, 22 girls, and 18 women. Seven casualties were deminers (all men); six were injured during antipersonnel mine clearance and one while off-duty. Nine casualties were soldiers, including three Thai soldiers injured in two incidents in Preah Vihear, and two were police. The nationality of one person was unknown and the remaining people were Cambodian. As has been the case since 2001, \(^{37}\) most casualties were caused by ERW (146 or 54%), including seven by unexploded submunitions. Antipersonnel mines caused 72 casualties, antivehicle mines 45, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) five, and one casualty was caused by an unknown device.

More than half of the ERW casualties were children: 65 boys (or 86% of total mine/ERW child casualties) and 11 girls. Three-quarters of child ERW casualties happened while handling ERW or standing-by when others were doing this (38 and 19 respectively). In total, there were 76 civilian casualties due to handling (64 ERW, seven mines, and five improvised explosive devices, IEDs) and 50 casualties because of standing near such activities (32 ERW and 18 mines). Motives for handling mines/ERW were: playing/curiosity, usually by hitting or throwing the device (51); fishing (10); selling scrap metal (seven); making the area safe (five), and using it as a weapon (three). CMVIS data shows that two IED casualties were caused by handling a device while fishing and three others while trying to re-use the IED as a weapon.

The other most common activities leading to incidents were traveling (33), clearing new land for use (23), or collecting wood (16). People were most at risk of becoming casualties in or near their livelihood areas: villages/built-up areas (77), agricultural land (62), orchards (39), and foraging areas (34). Eleven casualties happened on or near military bases; no civilian or military casualties happened on demining sites. No casualties were reported due to “informal demining,” probably because this activity decreased due to penalties or fewer reports because of the penalties.

Casualties occurred in 19 of 24 provinces, including two where there were no casualties in 2007 (Kampong Chhnang and Prey Veaeng). Mine casualties occurred in eight provinces. \(^{38}\) Four provinces with casualties in 2007 did not record casualties in 2008 (Kampot, Krong Preah Sihanouk, Phnom Penh, and Stueng Traeng). However, as in 2007, just two provinces accounted for 44% of all casualties—Battambang (32% or 87, up from 82 in 2007), followed by Banteay Meanchey (31, down from 55 in 2007). Other provinces with 20 or more casualties were, as in 2007, Oddar Meanchey (27), Krong Pailin (22), and Preah Vihear (22). The most significant decrease was noted in Siem Reap (14, down from 32).

In total, 63% of casualties reported receiving RE, compared with 83% in 2007.

The number of reported casualties continued to fall in 2009, with 128 (19 killed and 109 injured) by the end of May; casualties for the same period in 2008 were 152. Twelve casualties were soldiers, including two Thai soldiers and two deminers. ERW caused 60 casualties (23 handling and 12 by-standing), antipersonnel mines 48, antivehicle mines 17, and IEDs three.

Ten-year summary
As of 31 May 2009, the CMVIS database contained records on 63,402 mine/ERW casualties in Cambodia: 19,476 killed and 43,926 injured since 1979. Of these, 7,300 were recorded between 1999 and 2008, including 1,385 killed and 5,915 injured. \(^{39}\) Some 14% of casualties suffered amputations and of these, 84% were caused by mines. \(^{40}\) Between 2000 and 2005, casualties


\(^{38}\) Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Krong Pailin, Mondol Kiri, Otdar Meanchey, Preah Vihar, Pursat, and Svay Rieng.


\(^{40}\) Ibid.
remained relatively constant, but a sudden 50% drop occurred in 2006 and has continued since. The drop was then ascribed to favorably seasonal conditions, greater economic opportunities, and increased community involvement in mine action planning and prioritization. Additionally, policing of the scrap metal trade and informal demining in some provinces might have contributed. No follow-up study has been made, but it is assumed that demining and priority-setting contributed most to the decrease. The largest casualty group between 1999 and 2008 were men (4,544), followed by boys (1,823), women (520), and girls (413). The majority of casualties were civilian (3,973); 191 were security forces, 106 deminers, 28 informal deminers, and 62 other/unknown. For 2,940 people the military-civilian status was not recorded, but their activities showed that only 192 of these were engaged in military, demining or “other” activity, and 951 were children or women. It can, thus, be assumed that up to 6,721 casualties (92%) were civilian.

Half of the casualties were caused by ERW (3,676), including 159 submunition casualties. It is likely that submunitions casualties are under-reported as CMVIS only started differentiating these from other ERW casualties in September 2006. Antipersonnel mines caused 1,970 casualties (27%), antivehicle mines 690, unknown mines 822, IEDs 141, and an unknown device one. Most common activities at the time of the incident were: handling mines/ERW (2,565 including 1,075 boys); farming (1,045); traveling (943); and being a by-stander (823). Casualties occurred in all provinces in Cambodia, but most in Battambang (1,942), Banteay Meanchey (1,172), Oddar Meanchey (690), Krong Pailin (612), and Preah Vihear (457). Most casualties happened in villages or built-up areas (2,057) or in rice fields (1,082).

Accurate information about the number of persons with disabilities in Cambodia and their living circumstances is lacking. Limited information was included in the 2008 census but was not available as of July 2009. In early 2009, the National Institute of Statistics developed a test form for a pilot survey on disability. If suitable, this could become part of the national disability survey planned by the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY).

Risk profile
People are at risk from landmines in the northwest and northern provinces bordering Thailand, and from UXO in these areas and the northeastern provinces bordering Vietnam. The majority of areas have not been marked.

Incidents are caused by involuntary contact through routine livelihood activities, such as farming and forestry, and by the intentional handling of UXO, especially by adolescent males. People may move UXO to a perceived safe place. Scrap metal collection remains a significant problem, although a law against scrap metal collection and possibly a drop in metal prices has had a positive impact on trends. Out-of-school youth may be particularly vulnerable.

Increasing population and demand for agricultural land continues to prompt people to move into mine- and UXO-affected areas. The region east of the Mekong river may become a higher priority for RE as areas open up for development and people migrate there.
Socio-economic impact
Despite the sharp fall in casualties in recent years, Cambodia’s mine and ERW problem still represents a major obstacle to social and economic development. According to the CMAA, ERW “severely affect rural livelihoods by impeding access to productive resources, markets and basic social services, land for agriculture and resettlement, irrigation, roads, access to water, health centers, schools and other rural infrastructures. When located near archeological sites, landmines and ERW also severely affect economic activities and the development of tourism, which is a major source of revenues for Cambodia.”52

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
The CMAA, set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates mine action, responsibilities previously assigned to CMAC.53 The CMAA has six departments whose responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparing strategic plans, managing data, and quality control.54 Prime Minister Hun Sen is the CMAA President, and a senior government minister (Secretary of State of the Council of Ministers), Prak Sokhonn, brought in as second CMAA Vice President in June 2005, leads the dialogue with donors as the chair of a Government-Donor Technical Working Group for Mine Action.55

The CMAA’s day-to-day management is in the hands of the Secretary-General. In January 2008, the government appointed Secretary-General Sam Sotha additionally as Cambodia’s ambassador on mines and cluster bombs.56 In December 2008, however, Prime Minister Hun Sen replaced him in both jobs with Chum Bun Rong, a former General Director of the Social Fund without previous experience in mine action.57

Risk education
The CMAA also regulates and coordinates mine/ERW RE. An external evaluation was conducted by UNICEF in October 2008 to look at the capacity needed for the government to facilitate the transition to national implementation of programs and to inform the forthcoming revision of strategy.58

Coordination meetings of the Technical Working Group for Mine Risk Education (MRE TWG), consisting of stakeholders from government institutions, operators, and development partners occur at the national level, and operators meet regularly to refine messages.59 The CMAA/UNICEF evaluation reported that coordination is generally good, although it suggested that less formal CMAA coordination would also be useful.60

53 CMAC is the leading national demining operator, but does not exercise the wider responsibilities associated with the term “center.” Set up in 1992, CMAC was assigned the role of coordinator in the mid-1990s. It surrendered this function in a restructuring of mine action in 2000 that separated the roles of regulator and implementing agency and led to the creation of the CMAA.
55 See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 249–250. Prak Sokhonn is now the only vice-president of CMAA. Email from Pascal Rapillard, GICHD, 4 September 2009.
59 Interview with Oum Sang Omn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ruth Bottomley, MAG, 6 July 2009.
RE activities are monitored internally by individual operators and externally by the CMAA. However, the CMAA/UNICEF evaluation found that, “strategy and program indicators are mainly quantitative, without specific target groups being described, and focus primarily on program activities and outputs, rather than behavioral outcomes and impacts.”

**Victim assistance**

The CMAA delegated coordination of victim assistance (VA) to the MoSVY and Disability Action Council (DAC) by subdecreed in 2001.

In April 2009, the process started to transform the Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance into the National Disability Coordination Committee (NDCC). The committee’s work would be expanded from coordinating VA plans to a general coordination role for the disability sector. The NDCC will be chaired by the minister of MoSVY; DAC is the secretariat; and relevant ministries, service providers and disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) would be members. The NDCC was approved by the Prime Minister in early August although members had met regularly before approval was granted. However, practical coordination between ministries was limited and even more limited between the CMAA and MoSVY.

The MoSVY is responsible for disability issues in general, favoring a mainstreaming approach to VA in its general structures. The MoSVY delegates responsibilities to provincial and district offices. However, due to its initial focus on veterans only, its structure at all levels is insufficient to deal with the broader disability mandate. Its branches are “often under-resourced, inexperienced, or reluctant to implement MoSVY directives.” Commitment of local offices varies.

DAC and its various working groups, which include national and international operators and advisors, provide technical advice to the MoSVY, but since 2006 have had limited capacity to do so.

**Data collection and management**

In 2008, the CMAA gave priority to overhauling its database, with technical support from Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), as a critical requirement for preparing a new 10-year strategic plan. The plan was intended to accompany its request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline under the Mine Ban Treaty (see Summary of efforts to comply with Article 5 section below).

An assessment of the CMAA’s database needs by Australian Volunteers International in 2007 found that the CMAA had not set documentation or reporting standards, that these differed between operators, and that the CMAA had difficulty obtaining data in a useable format and on a regular basis. Individual data providers had some good data management procedures but worked in isolation. Moreover, the RCAF, police, and newly established commercial operators were “not reporting any clearance or EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] information to the

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61 Ibid, p. 11.
62 Interview with Thong Vinal, Executive Director, DAC, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.
63 NDCC Terms of Reference, distributed at the Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance meeting, MoSVY, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.
64 Email from Sheree Bailey, Victim Assistance Specialist, Implementation Support Unit, GICHD, 6 September 2009.
65 Email from Teresa Carney, Programme Coordinator, ARC, 3 July 2009; email from Ket Chanto, Education Program Manager, WVC, Phnom Penh, 14 July 2009; and interview with and email from Ngin Saorath, Executive Director, CDPO, Phnom Penh, 7 April and 13 July 2009.
66 Interview with Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and interview with Bruno Leclercq, Country Director, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.
68 Interview with Sok Sophorn, Manager Rehabilitation Center, HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009; email from Meas Vicheth, Project Manager, Operations Enfants du Cambodge (OEC), 10 July 2009.
70 Interview with Amb. Sam Sotha, CMAA, in Geneva, 2 June 2008; and interview with Steve Munroe, Mine Action Programme Manager, UNDP, Phnom Penh, 28 April 2008.
CMAA on a regular basis. In June 2008, operators started reporting clearance data to the CMAA using a standard format which underwent further revision in 2009.

Until 2007, the CMAA operated with a self-built database adapted from an old version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). In 2007, the CMAA installed the latest version of IMSMA and staff received training from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), but the system had difficulties accepting existing data. As a result, NPA prepared an updated dataset of contamination in 2008 using an alternative tool (Microsoft Access). By August 2008, NPA had reconciled existing data but the CMAA continued to have difficulties providing a coherent assessment of contamination, because of data losses and differences in operators’ survey procedures and classifications of demining interventions.

RE data is kept only in paper form, and the CMAA/UNICEF evaluation recommended the integration of RE data into a central CMAA database to facilitate a more integrated approach to implementation.

CMVIS has operated a casualty database since 1994. Casualties are reported through a network of Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) field staff and by CMVIS data gatherers deployed at the district and provincial levels, and then entered into the database. Throughout 1999–2008, CMVIS data collection has been adequate and continuous improvements were made to the system, most recently at the end of 2007. CMVIS data is used for planning and prioritization of VA, RE, clearance, and EOD tasks. It widely distributes monthly and annual reports.

Handicap International-Belgium (HI-B) ended its technical assistance to CMVIS at the end of June 2009 and planned to finish its financial support at the end of 2009, stating that CMVIS should progressively be taken over by national partners. HI-B noted that in 2007–2008 Cambodian counterparts were reluctant to proceed with this integration. In April 2009, the CRC and CMAA signed a memorandum of understanding to ensure the future sustainability and integration of CMVIS in mine action. But it was noted that it was “important that CRC gains the necessary skills to maintain the standards currently delivered by CMVIS.”

HI-B continued to state that the ongoing decrease in casualties indicated a diminished need for data collection; it added that CMVIS should concentrate on its core business of casualty data collection and not implement its VA services survey, or RE and VA activities. Therefore further decreases in CMVIS staff could be envisioned. CMVIS noted that while casualties decreased the territory to cover remained the same, resulting in challenges to continuing nationwide coverage and maintaining links with community focal points. The main issue was that data gatherers covering several provinces were not always familiar with the communities, which often resulted in certain communities providing less information. CMVIS also noted that increased dependence on volunteers could in the longer term affect the quality of collected data. But it did not think there was significant under-reporting.

72 Interview with Arleen Engeset, Advisor, IMSMA in Southeast Asia, NPA, Phnom Penh, 30 March 2009.
73 Interviews with Rune Engeset, Regional Program Manager, NPA, Phnom Penh, 28 April 2008; and Amb. Sam Sotha, CMAA, in Geneva, 2 June 2008.
74 Interview with Arleen Engeset, NPA, Phnom Penh, 30 March 2009.
78 Email from Chhiv Lim, CMVIS, 13 July 2009.
79 Interview with Hugo Hotte, Mine Action Project Coordinator, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.
80 Interview with Chan Rotha, Deputy Secretary-General, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.
82 Interview with Hugo Hotte, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.
83 Interview with Chhiv Lim, CMVIS, Kampong Thom, 9 April 2009.
### Mine action program operators

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<th>National operators and activities</th>
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In April 2007, as part of its agreement with HI-B, CMVIS began a survivor survey to collect data on assistance received and socio-economic indicators. HI-B found that this information existed elsewhere and that focusing on mine/ERW survivors was discriminatory and consequently withdrew technical support in August 2008. As of July 2009, the survey remained suspended pending improvements to the questionnaire. Nevertheless, other operators have repeatedly stated that this information is needed for more effective VA and that gathering “information to assess quality of life of survivors and victim assistance services received, on an ongoing basis” is one of the key objectives in Cambodia’s 2009–2011 VA plan. The MoSVY was also seeking CMVIS advice on management of disability data.

**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plans**

The CMAA, supported by other stakeholders, worked in 2009 on a new national mine action strategy (NMAS) in conjunction with its preparation of an Article 5 deadline extension request. The strategy was due to include: an agenda for transparent use of aid; “a basic mine action strategy” drafted with GICHD assistance; “a combination of strategies” for demining, ERW, and RE; and a national action plan for disabled people, as well as the extension request. The CMAA expected to present it to the Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference in November–December 2009.

The CMAA set up a task force to draft the strategy under its Deputy Secretary-General, Prum Sophamonkol, and included representatives of UNDP, NGO operators, the National Center for Peace Keeping, and six technical reference groups, which in the past had met only when required and which were reactivated to work on the NMAS in June 2009. The Task Force was to report to a Review Committee led by CMAA Secretary-General Chum Bun Rong.

Cambodia’s initial Article 5 extension request submitted in April 2009 acknowledged problems in drawing up a detailed workplan in the absence of precise data on the extent of the residual problem, but set out a range of initiatives to be pursued including:

- a Baseline Survey, starting in August 2009, focusing on the 21 most contaminated districts to be completed in 2010, and to be completed countrywide by 2012;
- development of a national standard for land release (CMAS 15), regarded as a “critical activity” that will contribute to increased productivity;
- release through clearance by operators who will commit the majority of their resources to the 21 most affected districts and concentrate “the overwhelming majority” of clearance on Classification A mined areas (the extension request states that some 470km² will be cleared by 2019 with a clearance rate of 40km² a year from 2011 and an annual productivity increase of 2% a year); and
- drafting a sector-wide NMAS and improving planning and prioritization processes.

The CMAA published a national ERW strategy in January 2008 which sets out a vision that “by 2015, Cambodia will be a country where ERW do not represent an immediate threat for the civilian population (work towards zero victims), and where national resources are available to deal with the remaining ERW contamination through an efficient reporting network and

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84 Interview with Hugo Hotte, HI-B, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; and emails from Hugo Hotte, 18 March and 7 September 2009.
85 Email from Chhiv Lim, CMVIS, 13 July 2009.
88 Statement by Chum Bun Rong, Secretary-General, CMAA, NMAS workshop, Phnom Penh, 6 July 2009.
89 CMAA, “Plan for the development of a National Mine Action Strategy,” Phnom Penh, undated but June 2009, p. 3; and telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, Mine Action Program Manager, UNDP, 13 July 2009. The six TRGs were for: Demining (survey, marking, and clearance); Information Management; Mine Risk Education; Victim Assistance; Gender; and Monitoring and Evaluation.
90 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, pp. 53–54.
appropriate intervention/disposal capacity, under Government coordination and regulation.”

The ERW strategy was not put into operation but was expected to feed into the provisions for ERW in the new NMAS. It recommended that Cambodia ratify CCW Protocol V, thus committing Cambodia to clearing all ERW.

The strategy identified the CMAA as the regulatory and policy-making authority for ERW action. Short-term goals included:

- develop the RCAF’s capacity as a “national ERW operator;”
- develop CMAC’s response capacity by increasing the number of EOD teams, strengthening skills, including multi-item demolition;
- pilot and expand a response system involving the police, community networks, and operators;
- safe storage of munitions; and
- reduce the number of annual ERW victims to 115 by 2010.

By 2015, the strategy called for:

- the creation of a “national ERW center” as a repository of expertise and as a training center, allowing the phasing out of international assistance;
- a national intervention capacity provided by RCAF, which is to be involved “as a matter of priority in ERW clearance related to major national infrastructures,” and by a reformed CMAC “focused mostly on ERW response, fully integrated in Government and with national budget;”
- a central database located in the CMAA; and
- quality assurance and monitoring by the CMAA.

**Risk education plans**

The RE strategy for 2006–2012 aims to reduce casualties by empowering affected communities to identify appropriate and effective risk education/reduction approaches, and integrate these efforts with broader humanitarian and development activities, including VA.

**Victim assistance plans**

The National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine/ERW Survivors 2009–2011, is Cambodia’s VA plan. It was developed as part of Cambodia’s commitment to the so-called VA26 process (see Victim Assistance section below). The drafting process started in July 2007 under the coordination of an international consultant and later a national coordinator in an AUSAID-funded project through the Australian Red Cross (ARC) and was finalized in February 2009. The plan was approved by the MoSVY and CMAA in April 2009, and by the Prime Minister in August 2009. The initial timeframe for the plan, which was also presented at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, was 2008–2011.

The plan was created in broad consultation with stakeholders and through focus group meetings. One of its main aims was to strengthen MoSVY capacity, while linking this to “direct actions and building a solid relationship…with the clients whether they be landmine/ERW survivors or other persons with disabilities, advocacy groups, or NGO implementing agencies.” The plan contains objectives and plans for data collection, medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support, economic reintegration and laws, and public policies, and it assigns responsibilities to relevant ministries. The future roles of DAC and the CMAA are unclear.

92 Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
97 Notes from Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance meeting, MoSVY, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.
100 Ibid.
Non-governmental stakeholders estimated that the plan was not conducive to real action and contained plans that were too broad, unclear and in some cases unrealistic, particularly because of the level of responsibility placed on the MoSVY with its limited capacity. Monitoring of the plan will be conducted through visits to relevant ministries and operators. This effort started in 2009 to complete the status report template developed by the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration for the purpose of the Second Review Conference.

In addition to the 2009–2011 VA plan, the MoSVY and the five international physical rehabilitation service providers signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2008 under which the ministry committed to gradually take over all financial responsibility for the management of physical rehabilitation services by 2011.

The CMAA expressed interest in increased involvement in VA, but noted that it did not have sufficient human and financial resources. The CMAA’s VA department is responsible for providing regular reports on VA. In 2007, DAC was delegated responsibility for compiling the annual VA report. While a report was prepared for 2007, it did not exist for any other years. The CMAA noted that this was due to a lack of data provided from the MoSVY and DAC.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

Cambodia’s “Rectangular Strategy,” setting out the government’s platform for national economic and social development in 2004–2008, identified agricultural development as the “first rectangle” and clearance of mines as a component of agricultural development. The National Social Development Plan 2006–2010, based on the Rectangular Strategy, gives priority to rural development as the quickest route to alleviating poverty and recognizes mine clearance as “very important for making arable land safe for cultivation and to prevent death and lifelong handicaps caused by severe injuries.” It also includes demining, UXO clearance, and VA among Cambodia’s Millennium Development Goals. Senior Minister Prak Sokhonn stated in July 2009 that the NMAS would be aligned with the second phase of the Rectangular Strategy and the update of the National Social Development Plan for 2009–2013.

A GICHD study reported “there is a consensus among government ministries that the mine action programme should begin ‘mainstreaming’ itself (i.e. using government systems established at the national, provincial, and commune levels for planning, priority-setting, etc., rather than ‘stand-alone’ mechanisms for mine action).”

The practical mechanism for integrating mine action and broader community needs are eight Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs), which are responsible for planning and prioritizing clearance under guidelines laid down by a subdecree issued in November 2004, and operational guidelines issued by the CMAA in February 2007. MAPUs work with local authorities to identify community priorities, and with operators to prepare annual task lists which are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Councils. Mine action in provinces without MAPUs is coordinated with provincial authorities.

102 Email from Teresa Carney, ARC, 3 July 2009.
104 Interview with Chum Bun Rong, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.
105 Interview with Chan Rotha, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.
Operators express support for the MAPU system, under which they also propose sites for clearance and make a selection of tasks for the coming year in negotiation with MAPUs; but they have also expressed concern that the units are under-resourced, raising questions about their long-term sustainability after training support from Australian Volunteers International stopped in mid-2008.111

HALO also noted a contradiction between the 2007 guidelines, which state that clearance should target “worst contaminated areas,” and the MAPU focus on task selection according to socio-economic impact. HALO noted that the K5 mine belt represents the heaviest concentration of mines, but sections of the belt that are not close to communities “are therefore being left off MAPU workplans (despite a persistence of incidents) in favor of land that can demonstrate post-clearance beneficiaries.”112

The Cambodian Millennium Development Goals, and the National Strategic Development Plan 2006–2010 have linked mine action to poverty reduction, and both plans support activities to reintegrate mine/ERW survivors. The NSDP also aimed to reduce mine/ERW casualties to zero by 2020. However, neither plan mentions activities or targets for persons with disabilities (including survivors).113

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Government commitment to mine action is reflected by Prime Minister Hun Sen’s position as President of the CMAA and reference to mine action in national development plans.114 A report by GICHD on the need for a new national mine action strategy found “strong support both among mine action stakeholders and government ministries/ agencies.”115

Government capacity to conduct VA/disability activities is “in its infancy,” according to an NGO assessment.116 The fulfillment of the 2009–2011 VA plan is largely dependent on the MoSVY’s capacity to take on a leadership role. Actors noted that the MoSVY was becoming more involved but were also concerned that disability was not a priority.117 It was also noted that the MoSVY lacked sufficient financial resources and that it was understaffed, but a national disability advisor, funded by USAID, started in the ministry on 1 July 2009.118 Involvement of other ministries was limited.119

DAC noted in May 2009 that the national budget allocation to disability was low, and that “structures lack human resources and technical and financial capacity to fully respond to the needs of the disability sector.”120

In 2007–2008, the ARC (funded by AusAID) provided extensive support to coordination of VA/disability efforts to re-engage and reactivate mechanisms that had been defunct under DAC.121 HI-F and HI-B continued to support DAC through various projects in 2008 in its efforts to remain the coordination body for the disability sector.122

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116 Email from Teresa Carney, ARC, 3 July 2009.
118 Email from Sheree Bailey, ISU, GICHD, 6 September 2009.
119 Interview with and email from Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April and 3 July 2009.
122 Email from Marie-Pierre Guicherd, South East Asia Desk Officer, HI-F, 4 September 2009.
All actors agreed that service provision was almost exclusively carried out by NGOs and DPOs and that this would remain unchanged. It was noted that even after the end of the VA plan in 2011, the MoSVY would not have the financial capacity to conduct VA/disability activities.123 Several operators also mentioned donor fatigue and increased funding challenges, which would make it difficult to maintain the same level of operations in Cambodia in the medium- to long-term.124 Equally, the viability and sustainability of DAC, which depended exclusively on external funding, was questioned, unless national contributions increase.125

**National management**

The CMAA, supported by UNDP and working closely with stakeholders, is the focal point for mine action and developing a national mine action strategy. A concept paper in June 2009 said the NMAS should incorporate “concrete measures to enhance Government ownership and capacity to deal with Cambodia’s landmine/ERW problem over the long term.”126

**National mine action legislation**

A royal decree dated 4 September 2000, and a subdecree dated 8 August 2001, define the CMAA’s roles and responsibilities; the 2001 subdecree also confirmed CMAC’s status as a service provider.127

**National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures**

The CMAA has drafted 29 chapters of Cambodian mine action standards, of which the first five came into effect in August 2006, covering accreditation and licensing; monitoring demining organizations; the storage, transportation, and handling of explosives; and the reporting of demining accidents. Another six chapters covering, among other issues, standards for mine and UXO clearance, were approved and came into effect in February 2007. As of April 2009, two chapters on marking and baseline survey had been provisionally approved, a chapter on mechanical clearance was awaiting approval, and the remaining 15 chapters were in draft form.128 In 2009, work started on drafting standards for land release.129 There are draft national standards for RE but as of April 2009 they had not been completed.130

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

Demining is conducted by three NGOs: CMAC, HALO, and MAG, which have operated in Cambodia since the 1990s. The CMAA began accrediting operators in 2006 and accredited all three NGOs in October 2006. In 2007, CMAC also started demining on behalf of Australian mining company BHP Billiton, which was exploring for bauxite in the northeastern province of Mondolkiri; in April 2009 CMAC reported it had completed its engagement and the site was mine-free.131

The CMAA has also accredited three international commercial companies and a Cambodian company: BACTEC, Milsearch (International), Phoenix PCL, and the Cambodian Demining Service.132 BACTEC mainly provides support to mineral exploration companies.133

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123 Interview with Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.
125 Interviews ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.
129 Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
130 Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.
132 CMAA, “Mine Action Achievements Report 2007 and Work Plan 2008,” p. 8, received by email from Tong Try, Project Officer, CMAA, 18 August 2008, p. 8. The CMAA reported that of the four companies only BACTEC was active.
133 Interview with Burt Kearney, General Manager, Asia, BACTEC, Phnom Penh, 30 April 2008.
The RCAF had not applied for accreditation as of July 2009, but with backing from the Prime Minister, it has conducted demining on behalf of government ministries, mainly in support of infrastructure projects.\textsuperscript{134} Discussions were underway with the CMAA on accrediting at least some of the RCAF engineers for demining. Cambodia’s initial Article 5 deadline extension request projected the RCAF would clear more than one-third of the remaining mined area but the revised submission dropped this projection. It stated, however, that RCAF accreditation would make a significant contribution to increased productivity and as such was “seen as a major priority for the CMAA.” It included RCAF’s accreditation as a milestone to be achieved in 2009.\textsuperscript{135}

RCAF engineers have also conducted demining for the UN Mission in Sudan since 2006, rotating a new unit every year.\textsuperscript{136} The third contingent, comprising 139 engineers, deployed in June 2008,\textsuperscript{137} and a fourth team of 52 deminers was due in Sudan in June 2009.\textsuperscript{138} Cambodia also announced in March 2009 that it would send soldiers to Chad and the Central African Republic, also to undertake demining in support of UN peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{139}

\textbf{Identification of hazardous areas}

As part of its Article 5 extension request preparations, the CMAA and operators recognized the need for a Baseline Survey to provide more reliable data on which to determine the extent of remaining mine and ERW contamination and to set priorities for clearance. The extension request outlined plans to conduct the survey in two phases. The first phase was to cover the 21 “focus” districts, which accounted for 93\% of mine casualties in the past five years. The survey’s first phase started in August 2009 and was due to take one year to complete.\textsuperscript{140} The second phase covering the remainder of the country was to be completed in 2012. Operators agreed the results of the survey will supersede the LIS.\textsuperscript{141} CMAC was due to conduct the survey with 13 survey teams for 13 districts, HALO with six teams for six districts, and MAG with two teams for two districts.\textsuperscript{142}

The Baseline Survey is seen as an important opportunity to get around flaws in available data on mine action contamination and operations, and to present the first coherent dataset since the start of mine action in Cambodia (see Data collection and management section above). The CMAA and operators paved the way for the survey by agreeing to standing operating procedures, a common survey report form, and a system of classifying affected or suspected land agreed by CMAA and operators.\textsuperscript{143} This provides a platform for strategic planning and prioritization and for a process of releasing or reclassifying land.\textsuperscript{144} Operators started a pilot survey to field test the survey methodology on 6 July 2009.\textsuperscript{145}

Under the land classification matrix, land will be categorized as either:

- \textit{Mined area}, including land with dense concentrations of antipersonnel mines (A1), a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines (A2), just antivehicle mines (A3), or land containing scattered or nuisance mines (A4);
- \textit{Residual threat}, land including ERW (B1), or land with no verifiable mine threat (B2); or

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{134} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 221.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009; Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, pp. 59–60; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision) 24 August 2009, p. 54.
\item \textsuperscript{136} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 211.
\item \textsuperscript{137} “2nd batch of Cambodian deminers return from UN peacekeeping missions in Sudan,” Xinhua (Phnom Penh), 10 June 2008, news.xinhuanet.com.
\item \textsuperscript{138} “Cambodia to send fresh soldiers for de-mining operation,” Sudan Tribune, 22 May 2009, www.sudantribune.com.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{141} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, pp. 55–56.
\item \textsuperscript{142} Email from Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 15 July 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{143} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, p. 46.
\item \textsuperscript{144} Ibid, pp. 55–56.
\item \textsuperscript{145} Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
• **End state**, including reclaimed land returned to productive use for three years or more without accident or evidence of mines (C1), land released by survey (C2), cleared land (C3), and “unmined land” (with no indication from local communities or previous survey) (C4).

The formula calls for concentrating clearance assets on land classified as A1 or A2 and for further investigation of A3 and A4 land before deploying clearance teams. It says clearance assets should only be deployed to B-classification land where there is a community need, and should not be deployed to C-classified land.\(^{146}\)

### Mine clearance

Demining operations continued in 2008 at about the same level as in previous years, increasing clearance of mined areas about 4% over 2007 although numbers of items cleared were lower. The amount of land area reduced or canceled also dropped, to 482km\(^2\) in 2008 from 557km\(^2\) the previous year.\(^{147}\)

Debate continued among operators, MAPUs, and other stakeholders on whether clearance should concentrate on densest concentrations of mines or tasks supporting community and development priorities.\(^{148}\) Tensions between Thailand and Cambodia led to interruptions in tackling some border tasks. In 2009, Senior Minster Prak Sokhonn stated that the CMAA and the Ministry of National Defense had agreed that no orders would be issued to halt border demining; that, in areas where the border is not clearly demarcated, demining operations required the approval of the two countries’ Joint Border Commission; and that demining should concentrate on other priorities rather than border areas that are disputed.\(^{149}\)

CMAC, with some 2,400 personnel, reported it had targeted clearance of nearly 30km\(^2\) in 2008 and fell short of that figure mainly as a result of cross-training 650 deminers on courses that included EOD and battle area clearance, mapping, and minefield management. CMAC expected the training to raise productivity, and in 2009 it targeted clearance of 35.1km\(^2\). CMAC also worked with NPA in developing technical survey and land release protocols intended both to meet international standards and increase the rate of land release. GICHD also provided assistance on technical survey and land release.\(^{150}\)

In 2009, it was preparing its own five-year strategic plan (for 2009–2013) in parallel with its involvement in discussions on the Article 5 extension request and a new NMAS.\(^{151}\)

CMAC set up eight battle area clearance teams in 2007 for its BHP Billiton contract. It also sees a long-term role in tackling ERW contamination as economic development and demand for land expand into areas mainly affected by ERW and in response to heightened international attention resulting from the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 2008, it moved demining teams from the western border with Thailand to eastern Cambodia, partly in response to US interest in funding clearance of ERW contamination resulting from US bombing in the 1970s.\(^{152}\)

HALO, with five international and some 1,200 national staff, operated about 100 eight-person manual clearance sections, two mechanical teams, three EOD teams, and eight survey teams. HALO concentrated operations on areas close to the Thai-Cambodian border with heavy concentrations of mines, including parts of the K5 mine belt,\(^{153}\) and accounted for more than half (54%) the total antipersonnel mines cleared in 2008 (see table below). Productivity has been helped by use of HSTAMID detectors, which reduce the number of signals for investigation and are now used by 20 of its clearance sections.\(^{154}\)

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\(^{146}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, Annex 4, p. 72.

\(^{147}\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 213.

\(^{148}\) Interviews with operators, Phnom Penh and Siem Reap, 30 March–1 April 2009.


\(^{150}\) Email from Pascal Rapillard, GICHD, 4 September 2009.


\(^{152}\) Ibid, pp. 5 and 9–13; and interview with Heng Rattana, Director General, CMAC, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.

\(^{153}\) Interview with Tim Porter, Program Manager, HALO, Siem Reap, 1 April 2009.

MAG continued to operate in northwestern Cambodia with around 500 staff, deploying 21 manual clearance teams, three mine detection dog teams, one technical survey team, seven community liaison teams, three brush-cutting teams, six mapping teams, and three research and development teams. It increased the number of EOD teams from five to seven, reflecting the demand for collecting ordnance from villagers. Operations benefited from wider use of brush-cutting trimmers and the use by two teams of dual sensor HSTAMIDS detectors. MAG also invested in new Minelab detectors after encountering difficulties with other equipment finding minimum-metal mines below depths of 7cm.155

Demining in 2008156

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed*</th>
<th>Area reduced or cancelled (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>27.65</td>
<td>25,543</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>114,101</td>
<td>201.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>6.97</td>
<td>37,542</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>8,308</td>
<td>90.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>4,538</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>19,813</td>
<td>190.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO total</td>
<td>37.86</td>
<td>67,623</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>142,222</td>
<td>482.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCAF**</td>
<td>27.50</td>
<td>1,878</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9,822</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>65.36</td>
<td>69,501</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>152,044</td>
<td>482.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Operators do not distinguish in their reporting between UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance. 
** It is not known how much of this total is area reduction or cancellation rather than physical clearance, but it is likely to be substantial.

Quality assurance/Quality control
The CMAA undertakes quality assurance (QA), supported by UNDP, which in 2007 contracted BACTEC to provide technical assistance. BACTEC’s contract ended in mid-July 2009 when UNDP recruited a technical adviser to support QA.157 In February 2008, the CMAA raised the number of QA teams from two to four, with two of them working from bases in the provinces (Battambang and Kampong Cham).158 Operators reported QA teams had become more effective as they gained experience.159 In a final report on its engagement, BACTEC observed “the entire CMAA organization is geared to react rather than to be proactive” and suffered from lack of funding, and weak administration and logistics.160

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Cambodia is required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2010.

In April 2009, Cambodia submitted a request for a 10-year extension “commencing January 2010 and concluding December 2019.” The request estimated the area requiring full manual clearance at 672km² necessitating annual clearance of about 80km² a year from 2011, more than double the annual clearance by NGOs in recent years, and costing a total of US$529

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155 Interview with Rupert Leighton, Country Programme Manager, MAG, Phnom Penh, 30 March 2009; and email from Rupert Leighton, MAG, 23 March 2009.
157 Telephone interview with Melissa Sabatier, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
159 Interviews with operators, Phnom Penh, 28–30 April 2008.
Million. Four months later in August 2009, Cambodia submitted a revised request that estimated 648.8km² of land required demining and projected the cost at $330 million. The revised request observed that the current capacity of demining organizations would clear some 470 km² and thus would be insufficient to complete clearance within 10 years. It added that “with a 38% increase of financial resources made available to the sector and a greater involvement of the RCAF in addressing the remaining challenge, productivity rates can be increased which may make completion of clearance of all known minefields within the extension period possible.” However, it warns that on current estimates “the problem for Cambodia will go beyond 2019 if funding levels do not increase” and acknowledges that competing demands for funding, locally and globally “will make it very challenging for Cambodia’s mine action sector to maintain the current capacities.”

The ICBL concluded that Cambodia would only be able to provide States Parties with a meaningful estimate of remaining mine contamination, workplan, and cost estimate after the results of the first phase of the Baseline Survey. ICBL recommended States Parties give Cambodia a two-year extension to allow for completion of the survey’s first phase and analysis of its findings.

**Risk Education**

There are four main approaches to RE in Cambodia: message-based approaches (awareness-raising, public information, and education); livelihood/integrated mine action approaches; law enforcement and monitoring of the scrap metal trade; and community participation in mine action processes. In 2008, RE was conducted by CMAC, Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports (MoEYS), National Police, CRC, clearance operators, and other NGOs. At the provincial level the Provincial Mine Action Committee prioritizes and coordinates messages. CMVIS data informs operator activities.

Although the RE strategy aims to empower affected communities to identify appropriate and effective risk education/reduction approaches, the CMAA/UNICEF evaluation found that, “direct RE activities are still essentially awareness raising however with a focus on risk avoidance. The main strategy is information dissemination, targeting a broad target population, although some specific risk behaviours have been incorporated into the messages.”

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)*</th>
<th>Area reduced or cancelled (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>37.86 (63.26)</td>
<td>482.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>36.34 (55.3)</td>
<td>557.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>35.4 (51.9)</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>30.8 (40.6)</td>
<td>85.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>18.9 (32.0)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>17.3 (41.7)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>17.6 (34.71)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15.4 (21.87)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12.18 (32.19)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>12.53 (N/R)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>234.31 (373.53)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,427.58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Brackets indicate clearance including RCAF’s reported results.

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161 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 April 2009, pp. 8, 54, 56–59.
162 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, pp. 6, 56.
165 Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.
One method of RE delivery is through CMAC’s program, “Community Based Mine UXO Risk Education and Reduction through national police and community resource mobilization.”\(^{168}\) Since late 2001, CMAC has operated networks that link communities to district authorities. Community-based Mine UXO Committees (MUCs), comprised of government employees and community volunteers, form a link with District Focal Points, which are members of the local authorities.\(^{169}\) In the northwest, the approach is called community-based mine risk reduction (CBMRR). In the southeast, it is called community-based UXO risk reduction (CBURR), but this is less well developed at the community level.\(^{170}\) The MUCs use Participatory Learning in Action to understand the problem and then work with development agencies and government authorities to incorporate mine action in the community development plan. Contamination reports are passed to the District Focal Points who request clearance from operators. An increase in CBURRs in 2008 resulted in an increase in spot UXO reports, which were usually met with a response.\(^{171}\) The MUCs also deliver RE messages through schools, and maintain minefield markings.\(^{172}\) Messages are cross-sectoral, along with HIV, gender issues, etc.\(^{173}\) CMAC intends that every district in the country will have the capacity for community-based risk reduction.\(^{174}\)

RE continued to be included in the school curriculum in a project implemented by the MoEYS, with support from RE operators.\(^{175}\) In 2008, directors and inspectors were trained and supported to observe teaching practices, interview children and parents to assess behavior change, and meet with teachers to provide advice and refresher training.\(^{176}\) RE campaigns also take place at the district level on television and radio.\(^{177}\) RE is well integrated into other components of mine action.\(^{178}\) Clearance organizations conduct community liaison. MAG undertakes CL as a core activity that ensures affected communities are consulted and involved at every stage of the mine action process. EOD teams routinely provide informal RE on practicalities such as how to report mines or UXO, as well as safety briefings during clearance operations.\(^{179}\) Challenges in 2008 included lack of resources and collecting reports from the MoEYS.\(^{180}\)

RE materials are shared among the implementing organizations, and are all in Khmer language. Informal evaluations of material are conducted at the MRE TWG meetings. The CMAA prepares materials for the army and police while other operators prepare their own.\(^{181}\)

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\(^{169}\) Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.

\(^{170}\) Ibid.

\(^{171}\) Ibid.

\(^{172}\) Ibid.

\(^{173}\) Ibid.

\(^{174}\) Ibid.


\(^{177}\) Interview with Oum Sang Onn, CMAC, in Geneva, 28 April 2009.

\(^{178}\) “Evaluation of Mine Risk Education in the Kingdom of Cambodia,” CMAA/UNICEF, October 2008, p. 34.

\(^{179}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ruth Bottomley, MAG, 6 July 2009.


\(^{181}\) Interview with Khuon Pheng, MRE Officer, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 2 July 2009.
### RE Activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>National organization</td>
<td>Five programs: Mine Risk Education and Reduction; Community-Based Mine Risk Reduction; Mass Media (television, radio); UXO Risk Reduction through Scrap Metal Dealers; and Community-Based UXO Risk Reduction</td>
<td>17 of the 24 affected provinces: Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Speu, Kampong Thom, Kandal, Kratie, Mondolkiri, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Preah Vihear, Prey Veng, Pursat, Ratanakiri, Siem Reap, Stueng Traeng, and Svay Rieng</td>
<td>434 CBMRR networks (total beneficiary numbers unavailable); CBURR network reached 89,908 beneficiaries including 397 scrap dealers/collectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>Volunteers working with fishermen, hunters, newcomers, wood collectors, veterans, scrap metal collectors, and in and out of school children; CMVIS project staff (employed by CRC); emergency RE where they collect data and where incidents have occurred, and on request from other operators in remote areas</td>
<td>All provinces</td>
<td>31,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE alongside clearance activities</td>
<td>Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, and Siem Reap</td>
<td>35,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE in cooperation with the National Police, and development operators; focus on scrap metal trade</td>
<td>Pailin, Rattanak Mondoul, Sala Krau, and Samlot</td>
<td>1,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Informal RE through community liaison staff, primarily during EOD tasks</td>
<td>Banteay, Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Pailin, and Preah Vihear</td>
<td>RE to 25,171, Community liaison to 27,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoEYS</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Trained members of the education system: school directors, district education officials, inspectors and staff of teacher training, planning and pedagogical departments</td>
<td>Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Speu, Kratie, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, Preah Vihear, and Pursat</td>
<td>2,195 teachers and 145,377 students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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182 Ibid, pp. 15, 17, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 36.
The CMAA/UNICEF external evaluation in October 2008 concluded: “the MRE sector in Cambodia has been remarkable in adapting its response to the different phases. Overall, coverage has been good with the most affected areas targeted. The program has also been effective in raising awareness and knowledge of risk avoidance strategies. Messages while relevant in the early stages of the program are less relevant in the current context and need some revision to ensure they are more contextually specific. Impact is harder to assess and it is difficult to gauge the extent to which MRE has resulted in changes to the reduction of mine/UXO risk taking behavior…A more targeted and cross-sectoral approach based on principles of Communication for Behavioural Impact (COMBI) will be needed to change behavior…MRE should also increasingly be integrated into wider development and clearance interventions with the ultimate aim of mine/UXO risk being perceived as a cross-cutting issue, integrated into overall safety strategies and managed by existing local government structures. This is a key strength of the CBMRR approach which could potentially be expanded to aid the transition to national ownership.”

Extensive mine awareness has been conducted in Cambodia for over 10 years. CMAC coordinated RE until 2000, when it became the role of the CMAA. RE has evolved with the recognition that awareness-raising alone was insufficient as people were driven to take risks through economic necessity. Traditional mine awareness needed to broaden its approach to develop the capacity of communities to fully participate in mine action and providing RE. In 2004, UNICEF began to fund a full-time RE coordinator for the CMAA. In 2005, a strategy was developed to improve integration of RE in mine action and community development, to strengthen national coordination, and to integrate RE in the school curriculum. Because of the continued high rate of incidents, a revised strategy for 2006–2012 was developed, which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Education RE laws pertaining to scrap metal and ERW RE by police UXO teams, gathering information about contamination</td>
<td>Seven target provinces: Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Speu, Kandal, Oddar Meanchey, Pailin, and Siem Reap</td>
<td>35,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCAF</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>RE alongside clearance activities, training of trainers</td>
<td>Provinces with ongoing demining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirit of Soccer</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE through soccer training in schools; Limited RE delivered indirectly through disabled volleyball league according to CMAC</td>
<td>Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, and Pailin provinces</td>
<td>12,726 students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision Cambodia</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>RE in communities through RE representatives; house-to-house visits; and RE during community meetings</td>
<td>Ratanak Mondoul, Samlot district of Battambang province, Rovieng district of Preah Vihear province</td>
<td>15 communities, 93 families through house-to-house visits</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

sought to empower affected communities to identify appropriate and effective RE/reduction approaches and integrate these efforts with broader humanitarian and development activities. In 2006, RE capacity increased, but beneficiary numbers decreased as RE increasingly targeted at-risk groups through integration with community development and small income-generation activities.\textsuperscript{187}

**Victim Assistance**

The national VA plan mentioned that households headed by a “person disabled by war or landmines live in poverty at levels almost three times higher than if the disability was due to other causes.”\textsuperscript{188}

Medical care is usually not free of charge and the cost of continuing care is especially prohibitive. Emergency transport is not widely available and the lack of roads in remote areas is also an obstacle. Emergency care to mine/ERW survivors is usually limited to government facilities. Complex trauma care is only provided by an Italian NGO, Emergency, in Battambang. Training of health staff is basic and coordination in the sector is limited. Under the Health Equity Funds, some medical costs can be covered, but this is not systematic for all persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{189}

Physical rehabilitation services, run with the support of, or by, five international operators, are well organized and good quality, particularly for amputees. Accommodation, transport, and meals may also be included.\textsuperscript{190} However, transport costs are often only reimbursed afterwards, which still poses problems for patients.\textsuperscript{191} Coordination among service providers is good.

The physical rehabilitation sector in Cambodia is under the authority of the MoSVY, which also provides limited assistance, including some government staff, minimal monetary contributions towards the operational costs, tax exemptions, land and buildings. However services are predominantly provided by international operators.\textsuperscript{192} The MoSVY started a process of taking over responsibility for the rehabilitation sector by the end of 2010 (see Plans section above) but the sector continued to operate almost exclusively on international funds.

A review in 2008 showed that the MoSVY on average completed 50\% or less of its management, financial, and technical responsibilities, whereas the operators scored much higher.\textsuperscript{193} Operators noted that the MoSVY had not started paying its small financial contribution (less than 5\%) to the running costs of the centers as of April 2009. But their main concern was keeping staff who would now be paid at government salary levels that are much lower than those they previously received and who might not meet civil service criteria for employment.\textsuperscript{194} The ICRC foresaw fewer challenges as it already worked with government staff on government salaries, although it did pay incentives.\textsuperscript{195}

As in previous years, there were 11 physical rehabilitation centers and orthopedic workshops covering 24 provinces. But operators noted that this number might decline after 2011 due to decreasing donor commitments. It was estimated the MoSVY would not have the financial


\textsuperscript{189} Ibid, p. 13.


\textsuperscript{191} Landmine Monitor interviews with survivors, Pursat, 5 April 2009; and Kampong Thom, 9 April 2009; and interview with Sok Sophorn, HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{192} Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 7 September 2009.

\textsuperscript{193} “The 3-Year Physical Rehabilitation Working Project (Review of responsibilities to be completed in 2008),” Phnom Penh, 26 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{194} Interviews with VI, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009; HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; and UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{195} Interview with Yann Drouet, ICRC, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.
capacity to completely manage the centers after 2011 and that further international contributions would be needed. Only HI-B envisioned exiting by 2011, and HI-F handed over the Spinal Cord Injury Centre to the MoSVY in December 2008. However, the MoSVY started its financial contributions only in April 2009, severely hampering the center’s operations. Operators also noted that there was an over-concentration of centers near Phnom Penh and improvements could be made in outreach and referral.

Community-based rehabilitation services under the MoSVY and with UNICEF financial and technical support expanded to 19 provinces by 2009. UNICEF was also finalizing guidelines for community-based organizations. The physical rehabilitation services also extended their services to include community-based rehabilitation activities such as on-the-spot repairs of assistive devices, patient follow-up and referral and home care.

As of 2008, there was no national mechanism to provide psychological or psychiatric support. Some limited services are offered through the Ministry of Health’s mental health units or referral hospitals, but they do not function well. There is only one facility providing training for health staff on basic psychological issues. After reviewing performance of province and district branches of the MoSVY, it was considered necessary to develop a psychosocial support policy. NGOs providing psychosocial support and activities were expanded through the community-based rehabilitation network and the development of self-help groups. The number of self-help groups continued to grow, providing psychosocial peer support, economic benefits and awareness-raising. Most self-help groups are supported by NGOs, but these did not coordinate sufficiently and exchanges of experiences were lacking.

Few persons with disabilities have access to education and survivors can often not afford education for their children. Efforts were made to improve this through the MoEYS. The Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training is responsible for vocational training centers, but services for persons with disabilities at these centers need strengthening. Vocational training and economic reintegration for survivors are carried out mostly by NGOs, but the success rate of job placements is low. Cambodia noted in its Article 7 report for 2008 that, “many [economic reintegration] projects have been postponed or ended due to the lack of funding.”

On 3 July 2009, the King of Cambodia signed the Law for the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of People with Disabilities. The law was first drafted in 2000, redrafted in 2004, and submitted to the government in 2006. All actors in Cambodia stated that having approved legislation was crucial to improved VA and disability implementation. The Cambodia Disabled People’s Organization (CDPO) acknowledged, however, that some amendments

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197 Email from Marie-Pierre Guicherd, HI-F, 4 September 2009.
198 Interview with Ung Sambath, Program Officer, DAC, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009.
199 Interviews with VI, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; HI-B, Siem Reap, 8 April 2009; and ICRC, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.
202 Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, ICRC, 7 September 2009.
207 Email from Thong Vinal, DAC, 8 July 2009.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**


As the 2009–2011 VA plan was only finalized in early 2009, some operators who had been consulted had not yet received the final plan.\footnote{Interview with Pheng Samnang, Director, DDSP, Pursat, 5 April 2009.} Others found it too early to comment on its implementation. However, they noted that their activities were in line with the plan.\footnote{Interviews with DDSP, Pursat, 5 April 2009; HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; AAR, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and Rudi Kohnert, then Country Representative, Austcare, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and email from Meas Vicheth, OEC, 10 July 2009.} Some noted that a further implementation plan was needed and that implementation of the plan would probably be limited to what is realistically feasible.\footnote{Interviews with UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; DAC, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; and CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.} Another main challenge would be to find funding for the plan.\footnote{Interview with Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.}

When looking at the 2005–2009 objectives, uneven progress was made:

- Data collection: CMVIS activities continued throughout, but the survey of assistance received by survivors was not conducted.
- Emergency and continuing medical care: no progress reported on specific health sector strategy development or on the plan to provide free hospital care for survivors.
- Physical rehabilitation: services functioned adequately, but long-term national sustainability remained questionable (see above).
- Psychological support and social reintegration: plans and guidelines for psychosocial support were not developed.
- Economic reintegration: self-help groups were established, but income generation, employment and educational opportunities did not increase.
- Laws and public policy: the draft disability law was adopted and the VA action plan was developed, but other legislation was not under revision and there was limited disability awareness.

\footnote{Interview with Ngin Saorath, CDPO, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009.}
\footnote{Statement by Thong Vinal, DAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.}
\footnote{Statement of Cambodia on Victim Assistance and National Objectives, Ottawa Convention Implementation and Universalization Workshop, Bali, Indonesia, 25–27 February 2008.}
\footnote{Statement of Cambodia, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2008.}
\footnote{Interview with Pheng Samnang, Director, DDSP, Pursat, 5 April 2009.}
\footnote{Interviews with DDSP, Pursat, 5 April 2009; HI-B, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; AAR, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and Rudi Kohnert, then Country Representative, Austcare, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009; and email from Meas Vicheth, OEC, 10 July 2009.}
\footnote{Interviews with UNICEF, Phnom Penh, 7 April 2009; DAC, Phnom Penh, 10 April 2009; and CMAA, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.}
\footnote{Interview with Teresa Carney, ARC, Phnom Penh, 6 April 2009.}
At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Cambodia mentioned progress on establishing the National Disability Coordination Committee, recruitment of the disability advisor, the memorandum of understanding between the CMAA and CMVIS, and legislative progress. Challenges were also mentioned, but there was no discussion of implementation.  


Victim assistance activities
Numerous organizations are active in the disability/VA sector. Only those that provided updated information for 2008 are included below. More detail on their activities and on other organizations is mentioned in previous Landmine Monitor reports and a listing is available from DAC.  

### 2008 VA activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Number of mine survivors assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARC</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Support to partners including the CRC, CMVIS, and Landmine Survivors Assistance Fund (small grants)</td>
<td>See partners CRC and CMVIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association for Aid and Relief (AAR)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Vocational training</td>
<td>649 persons with disabilities (289 survivors), living standard of 70% increased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austcare</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Referral, economic reintegration self-help groups (with CDPO), awareness</td>
<td>338 survivors (215 income generation and 123 referral); total beneficiaries: 385</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Number of mine survivors assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia Trust (CT)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Physical rehabilitation, training, economic reintegration</td>
<td>Mobility devices for 625 survivors; physical rehabilitation for 1,590; income generation for 185; vocational training for 149; educational support for 365 (all survivors); total beneficiaries: 6,432.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian Development Mission for Disability</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Comprehensive community-based rehabilitation</td>
<td>48 survivors; total beneficiaries: 5,948.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian War Amputees Rehabilitation Society</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Economic reintegration</td>
<td>Vocational training for 716 survivors and loans to 101; total beneficiaries: 991.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building of People with Disabilities in Community Orgs.</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Referral, awareness, educational support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian Disabled People's Organization</td>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>National coordination</td>
<td>Policy and representing persons with disabilities nationally and in 20 provinces through 34 DPOs; 9,603 members (1,267 survivors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMVIS</td>
<td>National organization</td>
<td>Referral, material aid, transport and medical costs and disability awareness</td>
<td>21 survivors received transport or medical costs, 9 house repairs, 80 referrals, 16 funeral aid, 41 emergency food kits, 412 awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>National society</td>
<td>Micro-finance loans and material aid</td>
<td>100 loan beneficiaries, 80 latrines and water filters, and 60 water tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disability Development Services Pursat (DDSP)</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Self-help groups, economic reintegration, referral, community-based rehabilitation</td>
<td>Multiple services for 98 survivors (various community-based rehabilitation for 20, social reintegration for 98, income-generating activities for 32); total beneficiaries: 1,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Social Relaunch of Northwest Provinces in Cambodia</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Agriculture training</td>
<td>31 survivors; total beneficiaries: unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Medical care</td>
<td>95 survivors; total beneficiaries: unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## States Parties

### Cambodia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Number of mine survivors assisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HI-B</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Physical rehabilitation, partner support, extensive community-based rehabilitation</td>
<td>1,263 mobility devices produced; 2,484 repaired (55% for survivors in Siem Reap); 71 survivors included in self-help groups. Total beneficiaries: 5,037.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI-F</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Physical rehabilitation, livelihood project</td>
<td>436 survivors assisted at rehabilitation center (170 protheses provided); 254 survivors part of livelihood project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International organization</td>
<td>Physical rehabilitation</td>
<td>1,675 prostheses (86% for survivors) and 1,394 orthoses (2.5% for survivors); total beneficiaries: 10,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesuit Service Cambodia</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Economic reintegration, rehabilitation, peer support, awareness, material support and referral</td>
<td>10 persons with disabilities received vocational training; 902 peer support; 85 access to education/accommodation; 1,012 wheelchairs; 63 tricycles; 1,512 referrals; total beneficiaries: unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Center for Disabled Persons</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Referral, education, awareness, self-help groups</td>
<td>Awareness for 1,832 and support to 30 self-help groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opération Enfants du Cambodge</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Home-based physical rehabilitation, education and economic reintegration</td>
<td>825 survivors received multiple services and 1,571 children of survivors were assisted; total beneficiaries: 2,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans International</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Physical rehabilitation, self-help, economic reintegration</td>
<td>3,686 mobility devices including 1,560 repairs (45% for survivors); total beneficiaries: 5,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision Cambodia</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Self-help groups</td>
<td>105 persons with disabilities; total beneficiaries: 1,059 households</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive cost estimates for all areas of mine action, including RE and VA, in Cambodia. Its revised Article 5 deadline extension request, estimated the cost of clearance of some 470km² up to 2019 at $329.4 million, climbing from $22 million in 2010 to $28.7 million in 2014, $35.2 million in 2017, and $40.3 million in 2019. The total cost of completing clearance of the estimated 648.8km² of remaining mine contaminated land was put at $455 million. Because the real extent and nature of contamination in Cambodia remains to be determined, cost estimates are expected to change as results of the Baseline Survey become known. The extension request does not include detailed resource mobilization strategies or plans.

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224 Article 5 deadline Extension request (Revision), 24 August 2009, p. 55.
National support for mine action
In its CCW Article 13 report submitted in April 2008, Cambodia reported national funding to mine action of $1,550,000 in 2007, which was the same amount as reported in 2006. 225 Cambodia’s revised Article 5 extension request reported national contributions had increased from an initial $200,000 in 2003 to $3.5 million in 2009 and totaled nearly $11 million for 2003–2009. The request adds that external funding will “continue to play a crucial role in supporting mine action.” 226

International cooperation and assistance
In 2008, 14 countries reported providing $28,072,304 (€19,063,088) to mine action in Cambodia, 8% less than reported in 2007. While the full extent of contamination and the total number of landmine survivors are unknown, funding at 2008 levels—combining reported international and national funding—is not sufficient to meet the financial requirements for 2010–2019 cited in Cambodia’s Article 5 extension request, or to address the country’s substantial victim assistance needs.

In addition to the above, New Zealand reported contributing to capacity development through the CMAC training center in 2008, but did not provide a value for its contribution. 227 HI-F reported funding to support VA programs from the European Commission (EC) ($439,589) and France ($64,412) in 2008. 228 Neither the EC nor France reported funding to Cambodia in 2008.

In March 2009, Japan reported ¥548 million (roughly $5.5 million) in new funding to support the purchase of clearance equipment in Cambodia. The funding comprises phase five of a support agreement between Japan and CMAC, and the equipment includes mine detectors, mine/UXO detectors, and spare parts. 229

International support by Cambodia for mine action
Cambodia has provided three contingents of demining personnel to UN Peacekeeping operations in Sudan since 2006 (see Demining section above). 230 In June 2009, a contingent of 52 demining personnel were sent to Sudan to replace returning personnel. 231 Cambodia receives funding from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) assessed budget (independent of donor contributions earmarked for mine action) in order to defray the costs of its mine action support in Sudan. 232 Cambodia receives funding from the UN DPKO assessed budget (independent of donor contributions earmarked for mine action) in order to defray the costs of its mine action support in Sudan. 233 Cambodia did not report the value of these contributions in 2008 or 2009.

226 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 24 August 2009, pp. 38, 56.
227 Email from Marie-Pierre Guicherd, HI France, 4 September 2009.
231 Email from Pascal Rapillard, GICHD, 4 September 2009.
232 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>CMAC, HALO, Japan Mine Action Service</td>
<td>Mine clearance, EOD, capacity-building</td>
<td>$5,936,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>CMAC/CMAA, HALO, MAG, Golden West, NPA, Spirit of Soccer</td>
<td>Mine/ERW clearance, capacity-building, RE, VA, advanced technology (HSTAMIDS and explosive harvesting)</td>
<td>$4,117,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>MAG, HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$3,510,359 (£1,892,887)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Geospatial International, UNDP</td>
<td>Clearance, agricultural development in mine-affected areas</td>
<td>$2,702,240 (C$2,880,546)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>FinnChurchAid, HALO, HI</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$1,568,319 (£1,065,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>CMAC</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,197,283 (£613,040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,104,450 (£750,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$736,300 (£500,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>$515,410 (£350,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$294,520 (£200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$154,605 (£104,988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Miss Landmine Cambodia</td>
<td>$70,960 (NOK400,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$28,072,304 (£19,063,088)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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234 Emails from Kathleen Bombell, Mine Action Unit, AUSAID, 21 July 2009; and Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” Washington, DC, July 2009; emails from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DFID, 17 March 2009; Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; and Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2009; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; emails from David Keating, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2009; and Daniel Gengler, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2009; Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; and emails from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; and Stacy Davis, Public Engagement, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 2 September 2009.
CHAD

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 November 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other UXO, AXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>No credible estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>131 (2007: 186)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 1,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Original deadline: 1 November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Clearance of 0.04km² of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearance of 2.85km² of battle areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Release of 131km² of suspected hazardous areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>34,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $2.1 million (2007: $0.7 million) National: $2.6 million (2007: $2.5 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Chad became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 November 1999. National implementation legislation was promulgated in August 2006. Chad completed destruction of its 4,490 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in January 2003. Since then, it has discovered and destroyed an additional 1,418 stockpiled mines. It retains no mines for training purposes.

Chad was unable to meet its 1 November 2009 Article 5 deadline for clearance of mined areas. The reasons were the extent of contamination, armed conflict, and poor management of the mine action program. Chad requested, and was granted, a 14 month extension to conduct a survey of suspected hazardous areas. The survey results will help Chad to determine how much additional time is needed to complete its clearance obligations. The extent to which Chad remains affected by cluster munition remnants is also unknown.

From 1999–2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 977 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties, including 287 killed, 666 injured, and 24 of unknown status although figures might be higher as data collection was inadequate. In total, at least 2,763 casualties were recorded in Chad, but this probably includes 1,686 casualties identified in the 1999–2001 Landmine Impact Survey. Mine/ERW risk education has been implemented directly by National Demining Center teams, in schools and through a network of community volunteers, focusing on refugees and communities in high-impact areas. In 2008, progress was made in integrating risk education in the primary school curriculum. Despite being part of the so-called VA26 group, with responsibility for significant numbers of survivors, mine/ERW survivors receive limited support. Service provision continued to be adversely affected by the armed conflict.
Mine Ban Policy

Chad signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 6 July 1998 and ratified it on 6 May 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 November 1999. National implementation legislation was promulgated on 26 August 2006.1 Chad submitted its annual updated Article 7 report for 2008 on 1 July 2009. It has submitted eight previous reports.2 Chad attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it presented its Article 5 deadline extension request and made a statement on victim assistance (VA). Chad participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it made statements on mine clearance and VA.

Chad was absent from the 2 December 2008 vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Chad has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3. However, in July 2006, Chad sent a letter to Landmine Monitor stating that, with regard to Article 1, “we will reject any rules of engagement permitting use of antipersonnel mines and will refuse to order them as well. We will also reject participation in any joint operation if our military forces derive any military benefit from use of antipersonnel mines and we will not provide security or transportation of antipersonnel mines.”3 Chad is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not yet ratified it as of 1 July 2009.4

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use

Chad is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It completed destruction of its stockpile of 4,490 antipersonnel mines in January 2003. It destroyed 1,365 newly discovered stockpiled mines from 2003 to early 2005, and reported later in 2005 the destruction of an additional 42 mines discovered in a container abandoned by the Libyan army.5 Chad reported destroying another 11 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in 2007, but did not report details of the locations or sources of the mines.6 In all of its Article 7 reports Chad has reported that it does not retain any antipersonnel mines for training purposes.

It is alleged that smugglers lift and sell landmines found in mined areas in Chad bordering Niger.7 In the past, there have been occasional allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Chadian forces, but no compelling evidence has been presented and the government has strongly denied the charges.8

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Chad is contaminated by mines and ERW resulting from the 1973 Libyan invasion and 30 years of internal conflict, which continues to this day, but the precise nature and extent of this contamination remains to be quantified. The UN has referred to “vast quantities of unexploded

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1 Article 7 Report, Forms A and J, 1 April 2007. For the text of the law, see www.icrc.org.
3 Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 273. Chad has still not made known its views on issues related to foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training.
6 Article 7 Report, Form G, 1 April 2008.
7 See report on Niger in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
ordnance and other explosive remnants of war” across eastern Chad. 9 Previous estimates of 670km² of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) outside the northern Tibesti department, identified as a result of a 1999–2001 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), are widely believed to overstate the true extent of the problem today. An upcoming survey of SHAs is expected to clarify the situation across most of the country, but it will not include the Tibesti department where most of the contamination is believed to be located.11 Clearance has been completed in two areas—Faya (Largeau) and Ounianga-Kébir—while partial clearance has been conducted of Fada, Gouro, and Wadi-Doum.12

In November 2007, the coordinator of the National Demining Center (Centre National de Démisnage, CND) claimed that ERW posed a greater humanitarian threat than mines but promised to “expand our minefield survey and clearance capacity, without abandoning our commitment to addressing the ERW contamination that is killing and injuring Chadians now.”13 Contamination likely comprises cluster munition remnants. Following the end of the conflict with Libya in 1987, unexploded submunitions and cluster munition containers were found in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti region, Biltine department in Wadi Fira region (northeastern Chad), and east of the capital, N’Djamena.14 On 3 December 2008, at the signing conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the representative of Chad spoke of “vast swathes of territory” contaminated with “mines and UXO (munitions and submunitions).”15 No submunitions were formally reported to have been found during demining operations in 2008; however, the CND recorded one dangerous area containing 10 unexploded submunitions in Biltine department in 2008.17

Casualties
In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 131 new mine/ERW casualties, including 24 killed, 99 injured, and eight of unknown status.18 Of these, 122 casualties were recorded by the CND and nine were reported in the media.19 The vast majority of casualties were civilians (120), three were military, and the status of eight remains unknown. Children were the biggest casualty group (65) including 47 boys, nine girls, and nine children of unknown gender; the age of 15 casualties was unknown. Among adult casualties (51), the majority were men (45). Nearly all casualties were caused by ERW (120). The majority of recorded casualties occurred in eastern Chad (49) and in N’Djamena (47). Activities at the time of the incident were not recorded systematically, but verification was ongoing as of May 2009.20
The 2008 casualty rate is a decrease compared to 2007 (188) and 2006 (139) but it is still higher than 2003–2005, due to ongoing conflict. The number of reported casualties is likely to increase as data collection improves. In May 2009, the CND reported that six additional casualties were identified for 2008, but no details were available and verification was ongoing so these casualties were not added to the above total. Casualties are believed to be under-reported because of rapid burial practices for religious reasons, but also due to the size of the country and the ongoing conflict.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, but at a lower rate with nine ERW casualties (seven killed and two injured) as of 31 May 2009. On 2 April 2009, one girl was killed and two others injured in Tître village, in Dar Sila region, eastern Chad. They were playing with an ERW they found while looking for water. In May 2009, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported an additional six child casualties, all killed, in eastern Chad. In May, the CND reported that no casualties from 2009 were entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) as verification of data was ongoing. It had received partial information on at least 10 incidents, but no further information was available.

The total number of casualties in Chad remains unknown. The CND could not provide data for the last 10 years due to ongoing problems with information management. From data made available to Landmine Monitor in previous years, the CND has registered at least 2,763 casualties (1,167 killed, 1,588 injured, and eight of unknown status) as of December 2008. Since 2000, at least 15 clearance staff have been killed and 11 injured. The LIS identified 1,688 mine/ERW casualties (825 killed and 863 injured) from January 1998 to May 2001. The

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21 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 234; and statement of Chad, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008. Chad reported 188 casualties for 2007 in its statements at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties and at the Standing Committee meetings in June 2008 as well as in its 2008 Article 7 report. However, it only provided detailed records for 186 casualties, CND, “Année 2007: Liste des victimes des mines et de UXOs recensées par le CND” (“Year 2007: list of mine/UXO victims recorded by the CND”), provided by Assane Ngueadoum, CND, N’Djamena, 15 April 2009.


27 Interview with Assane Ngueadoum, CND, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and interview with Fatimata Mohammad Hisseine, Director of Risk Education and Victim Assistance, CND, N’Djamena, 17 April 2009.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 In 2008, Chad reported that up to December 2007, 2,632 casualties were recorded (1,143 killed and 1,489 injured). In 2009, Chad reported that from January to December 2008, 131 casualties were recorded (24 killed, 99 injured, and 8 of unknown status). See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 235; Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008–31 December 2008; Landmine Monitor analysis of CND, “Liste générale des victimes des mines et autres engins non explosés/2008” (“General list of mine/ERW victims/2008”), provided by Assane Ngueadoum, CND, N’Djamena, 15 April 2009; and email from Assane Ngueadoum, CND, 22 May 2009.


LIS figures are probably included in the CND totals. From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 977 casualties, including 287 killed, 666 injured, and 24 of unknown status. There are no reliable statistics on the number of persons with disabilities in Chad. In 2004, the government estimated that 5.3% of the population was disabled. Limb loss due to mines or other weapons was specified as one of the categories of disability, and 1.9% of persons with disabilities were registered under this category.

**Risk profile**

The greatest risk from mines is in Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti region in the north of the country. People are at risk from ERW contamination throughout the country, which increased in January 2008 in and around N’Djamena as a result of combat. The majority of recorded casualties are boys and men living in areas contaminated by ERW, particularly in the capital and in eastern Chad. At-risk groups are herders, farmers and children playing.

**Socio-economic impact**

The current extent of socio-economic impact from mines and ERW is unknown. According to the UN, mine and ERW contamination affects the livelihoods and safety of more than 280,000 people. These figures, though, relate to the findings of the LIS, and are probably now out of date. Continued fighting in the east of the country has added to the problem and its impact. Thus, the UN Secretary-General reported to the Security Council in July 2009 that air attacks by the Chadian armed forces against non-state armed groups (NSAGs) had resulted in a new UXO threat, which subsequently "claimed the lives of at least six children in the Dar Sila region and resulted in school closures and restricted access to farmland."

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action and risk education**

Since a 2007 decree, mine action, including risk education, in Chad has been under the responsibility of a Steering Committee, which serves as the interministerial National Mine Action Authority. The Steering Committee, which is chaired by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Economy and Cooperation, is responsible for mine action regulation, policy, and resource mobilization.

All mine action operations are coordinated by the CND, whose work is overseen by the Steering Committee. Four CND regional centers coordinate activities within their respective zones in Abéché, Bardaï, Fada, and Faya. A “sub-center” was subsequently created by the CND in Am Timan.

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37 Interview with Assane Ngueadoum, CND, N’Djamena, 20 April 2009.


41 Ibid.

42 For further details see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 231.

43 The centers were established under Decree N° 498/PR/PM/MEP/07, issued by the Ministry of Economy and Cooperation on 28 June 2007.

At the end of 2008, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) set up a mine action center in Abéché within the context of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) and initiated an emergency survey and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity to ensure the safe deployment of the peacekeeping mission.\footnote{45} Under contract to MINURCAT, MineTech started to deploy its EOD teams in January 2009. MINURCAT planned to establish field offices in Farchana, Goz Beïda, and Iriba in July 2009, which were to have a mine action component.\footnote{46}

**Victim assistance**

The CND is also in charge of coordination, management, and monitoring of VA.\footnote{47} Risk education (RE) and VA fall specifically under the Directorate of Awareness and Victim Assistance (Directorate de la Sensibilisation et Assistance aux Victimes).\footnote{48} In November 2008, Chad reported that the Directorate of Awareness and Victim Assistance works in partnership with NGOs, associations, the ICRC, Ministry of Health, Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of Social Action and Family,\footnote{49} which is responsible for disability issues.\footnote{50}

**Data collection and management**

Following conflict in the capital in February 2008, all of the CND’s computers were stolen, but in August 2008 UNDP reported that new computers had been purchased.\footnote{51} Chad is using the latest version of IMSMA, which was installed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in December 2008.\footnote{52} The Mine Action unit of MINURCAT is also using IMSMA, and data is said to be regularly fed into the CND databases in Abéché and N’Djamena.\footnote{53}

While there have been improvements since 2007, casualty data collection in Chad remains inadequate.\footnote{54} CND field teams collect casualty data and transfer it to the CND’s four regional centers and the headquarters in N’Djamena.\footnote{55} Hospitals, local authorities, the ICRC, and NGOs including Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) also collect casualty data.\footnote{56}

Data collection and forms are not standardized among all actors.\footnote{57} The CND reported that data arrives from the field in N’Djamena “slowly” and that it is often incomplete as many actors do not use IMSMA forms, but transfer the information about incidents via radio.\footnote{58} In 2008, the ICRC organized two data collection trainings in Adré and N’Djamena for Red Cross of Chad

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\footnote{46} Ibid.
\footnote{48} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 239.
\footnote{51} Email from Eva Faye, Institutional Development Advisor, UNDP/CND, 18 August 2008; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 231.
\footnote{52} Interviews with Assane Ngueadoum, CND, N’Djamena, 20 April 2009; and with Jean-Paul Rychener, Deputy Head of Information Management, GICHD, Geneva, 25 March 2009.
\footnote{53} Interview with Michel Cipiere, Program Manager Mine Action Unit, MINURCAT, in Geneva, 25 March 2009.
\footnote{54} Interview with Assane Ngueadoum, CND, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
\footnote{55} Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 235; and interview with Fatimata Mohammad Hisseine, CND, N’Djamena, 17 April 2009.
\footnote{56} Ibid; and interview with Ronald-Paul Veilleux, Programme Manager, MAG, N’Djamena, 17 April 2009.
\footnote{57} Interview with Fatimata Mohammad Hisseine, CND, N’Djamena, 17 April 2009.
\footnote{58} Interview with Assane Ngueadoum, CND, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
(CRC) volunteers and staff from the Ministry of Health. While data is normally stored in IMSMA, in 2009 the CND reported that there was a problem with their database, which resulted in the loss of information. As of May 2009, the CND reported it was working with GICHD to restore the database and retrieve data.

In 2008, the ICRC revised the IMSMA forms for recording RE activities for use by the CND, although data entry did not start until January 2009, and there were no plans to record activities retroactively.

### Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International operators and activities</td>
<td>Demining</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Casualty data collection</td>
<td>VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MineTech</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Plans

#### Strategic mine action plans

The 2003–2015 National Strategic Plan to Fight Mines and UXO, drafted in 2002, remains the reference document for mine action, including RE, although its relevance has been superseded by subsequent events, and it was revised in 2005. The following priorities have been defined for 2009 to 2011:

- UXO clearance in the east and southeast of the country, and deployment of rapid response teams to urban centers;
- technical surveys on contaminated regions, particularly Kalait Fada, Wadi Doum, Kouba Olanga, Bahaï, and Gouro;
- demining in the zones of Kalait, Fada, Ounianga-Kébir, and Wadi Doum;
- improved management of IMSMA;
- systematized RE for risk prevention, and to support clearance and demining operations, along with continued development of the school curricula module;
- design of a VA strategy and enhanced national capacities;
- development of national mine action capacities; and
- leveraging of national, bilateral, and multilateral resources and contributions.

VA was included in Chad’s 2002 National Strategic Plan to Fight Landmines and UXO, revised in 2005 to include the aim of “zero victims” by 2009. The plan was integrated in Chad’s 2003 Poverty Reduction Strategy, which recognized that ERW exacerbates poverty by creating

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59 Email from Sitack Yombatina Béni, ICRC, 30 April 2009.
60 Interview with Assane Ngueadoum, CND, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
61 Interview with Sitack Yombatina Béni, ICRC, and Matthieu Laruelle, Weapon Contamination Advisor, Assistance Division, ICRC, N’Djamena, 16 April 2009; email from Sitack Yombatina Béni, ICRC, 30 April 2009; and interview with Ahaya Mallowa, Assistant Director for Sensitization, and Fadoul Ahmat, Chief of Production Section, CND, N’Djamena, 14 April 2009.
new burdens on families and communities. The target was not attained and the document is now obsolete. In May 2009, Chad stated that the development of a VA plan was ongoing and that funding was needed. Chad has raised the funding issue since 2005 and further noted in June 2008 that the plan would be completed by the end of 2008 with funding from Canada. In May 2009, the CND reported that one of the main objectives would be the launch of a disability census including questions on the cause of disability. The CND planned to present the plan to the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

To ensure that mine action is integrated into broader development, reconstruction, and humanitarian programs, the national mine action plan was aligned in 2003 with the government’s overall reconstruction plans, Chad’s Millennium Development Goals, and the National Poverty Reduction Strategy. According to the chair of the Steering Committee: “The Government is determined that the affected areas are cleared to become a vital part of the fight against poverty.”

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Chad’s support to mine action has been uneven since becoming a State Party. A 2005 UN assessment found serious management and financial problems with the program. A national audit in 2006–2007 led to the suspension of the then-coordinator of the National Demining Office (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), and resulted in the reorganization of the mine action program, particularly the coordination and management structures. A new coordinator was appointed on 11 September 2007, several months after the reform of the HCND into the Steering Committee and the CND.

National management

Chad’s mine action program is nationally managed with the assistance of UNDP and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as implementing agency. From July 2008 to April 2009, an institutional development advisor supported the CND’s coordinator in efforts to reform the mine action program in Chad.

National budget

Since the establishment of the HCND in 1998, Chad has financed the salaries of CND staff from the national budget. Since 2008, the amount of national funding is said to have significantly increased, showing a new political commitment to mine action.
National mine action legislation and standards

The HCND was established by a 1999 presidential decree that was superseded by a new decree in 2007 that reorganized the coordination and management of the mine action program. A separate ordinance appointed CND staff, including the coordinator. National mine action standards were supposed to be developed during 2008, but had not been adopted by May 2009.

There are no national standards for RE, but materials are developed with the support of the ICRC and UNICEF and informed by the needs in Chad, and are therefore considered by the CND to be to international standards.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Clearance operations are performed by CND teams, with the support of international NGOs and commercial companies. As of April 2009, the CND had an operational capacity of two demining units and three EOD teams.

Demining in 2008

In 2008, the mine action program focused on emergency battle area clearance (BAC) and EOD following conflict between government forces and NSAGs. On 29 July 2008, one of the CND’s two demining teams initiated operations in Ounianga-Kébir in the northeast of the country, with funding from the Libyan De-mining Society of the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation and the Chadian government. In September 2008, the second CND team started mine clearance in Fada, also in the northeast. After a quality control mission found technical deficiencies, clearance by both teams was suspended in March 2009. The teams were expected to resume operations in May 2009.

Battle area clearance in 2008

After NSAG attacks in February 2008, emergency missions were deployed in N’Djamena, Massakory, Massaguet, and Mongo. The CND has reported a total area cleared of 2.8km². In July 2008, BAC operations restarted in the eastern Abéché area with the support of MAG (see table below). In the first quarter of 2009, MAG cleared a further 22,000m² of battle areas, destroying 27,668 ERW and releasing 307km². During the same period, MINURCAT, through its contractor MineTech, verified 420km of main supply routes between Abéché, Farchana, and Goz Beïda and confirmed them free from contamination: they also visited 105 villages and communities, home to approximately 11,000 people, and collected and destroyed a total of 3,413 ERW.

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74 Presidential Decree No. 133/PR/98, 19 May 1999.
75 Ministry of Economy and Cooperation, Decree No. 498/PR/PM/MEP/07, 28 June 2007.
82 Interviews with Mahamat Abdallah Kari, CND, and with Assane Nguedoum, CND, N’Djamena, 14 April 2009.
83 Email from Assane Nguedoum, CND, 22 May 2009; and Article 7 Report, Form J, 1 July 2009.
85 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ronald-Paul Veilleux, MAG, 22 April 2009.
Demining and battle area clearance in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>Unexploded submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>Other UXO destroyed</th>
<th>Area released by survey (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>42,250</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57,258 items</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND (mine clearance)</td>
<td>12,572</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>0.376 tons (376kg)</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND (BAC)</td>
<td>2,828,451</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>55.394 tons (55.394kg)</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = not reported

From December 2008–July 2009, MineTech verified 1,012km of main supply roads in eastern Chad as free of mines and ERW and visited 214 villages in conjunction with road verification and decontamination activities. A total of 10,349 items, including 1,680 ERW and 8,669 pieces of small arms ammunition, were subsequently removed as part of the road verification/clearance process and EOD/BAC emergency clearance activities; 1,333 of the ERW and 7,161 of the small arms ammunition were destroyed. In May 2009, at Am Dam, following combat between the armed forces and NSAGs, a further 2.92km² area of battlefield was cleared, “providing local populations with access to social infrastructure, such as hospitals and schools, as well as agricultural land.” A total of 1,201 items of ERW and 10,379 items of small arms ammunition were removed and destroyed.

Progress since becoming a State Party

Chad was required by Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2009. Demining operations started in August 2000, but stopped at the end of December 2005 due to lack of funding. There has since been only intermittent clearance of mined areas.

On 28 July 2008, Chad submitted an extension request for an initial 14-month period (1 November 2009 to 1 January 2011). In the request, Chad attributed the impending failure to meet its Article 5 deadline to a number of factors, including lack of funds, the lack of reliable technical survey (and questionable impact survey data), and poor management within the former HCND. The ICBL stated that far greater progress should have been achieved by the mine action program in Chad after many years of significant UN and donor support. Moreover, as the Analysing Group’s review of the extension request states, “Chad is unable to provide an accounting of the areas now considered to be no longer dangerous relative to those areas originally suspected of being dangerous.”

87 MAG data in response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ronald-Paul Veilleux, MAG, 22 April 2009; and see Article 7 Report, Forms G and J, 1 July 2009.
88 The remainder of the items removed were put in temporary storage or handed over to the Chadian army. Email from Marie-Anne Menier, Mine Action Unit, MINURCAT, 28 August 2009.
90 Analysis of the Chad Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 19 November 2008, p. 2.
91 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 July 2008, pp. 5–6.
93 Analysis of the Chad Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 19 November 2008, p. 2.
According to the UNDP’s institutional development advisor, the first period of the extension was intended to allow the mine action program to:

• undertake a technical survey to clearly determine the residual contamination, and to develop an accurate and realistic action plan to address it;
• deploy demining sections in the north and east of the country, an effort requiring the composition of a new demining section; and
• revise Chad’s procedures for land release.94

A second extension request will be submitted on the basis of the planned survey and demining results.95 At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, the ICBL welcomed the request for a short amount of time to conduct the necessary surveys to clearly determine the remaining contaminated area.96 The ICBL cautioned, however, that the Tibesti department will need to be cleared before Chad can declare completion of Article 5 obligations.97

The CND coordinator hoped to present the request for a second extension at the 2010 Meeting of States Parties to avoid a gap between the two extension periods during which Chad would be technically in violation of the treaty. This means that the technical survey of SHAs must be completed by March 2010 in order to prepare a realistic operational plan and a new extension request in time.98 In May 2009, Chad declared that the survey would start in June 2009.99

**Risk Education**

RE provision continued to decrease in 2008, as 34,376 people were reached through CND teams, a reduction from 41,883 in 2007.100 Preparations for conducting RE in schools took place in 2008, resulting in a significant increase in RE in the first half of 2009.101 In February 2008, the highest priorities for RE became conflict-affected areas in western Chad, as well as in and around N’Djamena.102

There were three types of RE activities in 2008: direct awareness sessions, integration of RE into the school program, and training of trainers to create a sustainable community-based RE capacity.103 RE through street theater was conducted in N’Djamena.104 MAG conducted some limited community liaison.105

RE activities were planned based on information from the LIS, traditional community leaders, and casualty reports. The reduction in casualties was attributed to RE by the CND, which concludes that RE is still needed because of high levels of illiteracy and large geographic areas that are difficult to reach.106

The CND implements RE through its three three-person RE teams, based in regional centers. The team in Abéché center received training in 2008.107

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94 Email from Eva Faye, UNDP/CND, 18 August 2008.
95 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 July 2008, p. 7.
97 Ibid.
98 Interviews with Mahamat Abdallah Kari, CND, and Assane Ngueadoum, CND, N’Djamena, 14 April 2009.
101 Email from Jean-Francois Basse, former Section Chief Child Protection, UNICEF, 21 June 2009.
104 Article 7 Report, Form J, 1 July 2009.
105 Email from Ronald-Paul Veilleux, MAG, 30 April 2009.
In 2008, progress was made in putting RE into the primary school curriculum. The curriculum, teachers’ guidelines and classroom materials were developed by the Ministry of Education and the CND. The aim was to provide knowledge and teach children about safe and unsafe behavior. The target areas were locations with a high rate of child casualties, and N’Djamena and the surrounding affected areas. Teachers were trained in 2008 and 2009 to start work in schools in 2009.\textsuperscript{108}

The ICRC conducted a five-month-long needs assessment in 2008 in Mongo, Bitkine, Massaguet, Massakory, Adré, Goz Beïda, Biltine, Abou Goulem, Forchana, and Miele, to develop an RE program with the CRC.\textsuperscript{109}

### Activities in 2008\textsuperscript{110}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographical location</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>UXO emergency RE, direct RE, community-based RE, and training of trainers</td>
<td>Abéché, Am Zoer, Fada, Massaguet, Massakory, Mongo, N’Djamena, and Ounianga-Kébir</td>
<td>34,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CND, Ministry of Education, UNICEF</td>
<td>School-based RE</td>
<td>N’Djamena and surrounding areas</td>
<td>150 school inspectors trained, 2 staff each in 345 schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Limited community liaison prior to clearance</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC and CRC</td>
<td>Training of CRC volunteers</td>
<td>Adré, Biltine, Massakory, and Mongo</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The CND and UNICEF developed an “image box” teaching aid containing laminated posters. ICRC developed a user manual to accompany it, but it had not been printed as of April 2009.\textsuperscript{111}

Media was used for RE, including radio, television, and newspapers, although access and the cost of putting spots on television limits coverage.\textsuperscript{112} Some emergency messages were broadcast on radio in early 2008 after the conflict in N’Djamena.\textsuperscript{113}

Prior to 2004, RE was only provided alongside clearance operations, with the creation of volunteer focal points to exchange information with the CND (until 2007, the HCND). The ICRC also broadcast radio messages. The 1999–2001 LIS identified a need for a focused RE program to reduce tampering with munitions. In 2004, an RE director was appointed at the HCND and a UNICEF consultant was also appointed. UNICEF started a project to support RE in 2005, and since then RE has been mainly implemented by the HCND/CND with support from UNICEF, which trained a large network of community volunteers and distributed materials. RE was delivered in schools. Since 2005, MAG has also helped to spread RE messages. RE


\textsuperscript{109} Interview with Sitack Yombatina Béni and Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, N’Djamena, 16 April 2009; email from Sitack Yombatina Béni, CND, 30 April 2009; and email from Camilla Waszink, Policy Adviser, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 28 August 2009.


\textsuperscript{111} Interview with Sitack Yombatina Béni and Matthieu Laruelle, ICRC, N’Djamena, 16 April 2009; and email from Sitack Yombatina Béni, CND, 30 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Assane Ngueadoum, CND, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{113} Telephone interview with Fatimata Mahammad Hisseine, CND, 30 April 2009.
has focused on refugees and communities in high-impacted areas. In 2006, RE activities were increased in and around N’Djamena due to renewed conflict.\textsuperscript{114}

\textbf{Victim Assistance}

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be at least 1,588.\textsuperscript{115} In May 2009, Chad reiterated its commitment to VA and acknowledged that the progress made since the First Review Conference to improve the lives of survivors had not been sufficient due to lack of funding. It also stated that, despite government goodwill, it was difficult to address the needs of mine/ERW survivors, when basic needs of the population are not being met.\textsuperscript{116}

Chad is one of the poorest countries in the world,\textsuperscript{117} with a volatile security situation.\textsuperscript{118} Much of the population sees little benefit from oil revenues.\textsuperscript{119} The government of Chad has a limited capacity to provide medical and social services and many parts of the country are not served.\textsuperscript{120} It is estimated that less than 40% of the population has access to basic healthcare.\textsuperscript{121} According to the ICRC, in eastern Chad, healthcare services were “breaking down.”\textsuperscript{122} NGOs providing humanitarian relief in the conflict areas continued to be the target of attacks, further limiting assistance.\textsuperscript{123}

Emergency medical care is available at health posts, but the time required to reach the facilities varies from several hours to several days. The road network does not allow the quick transfer of patients.\textsuperscript{124} The most serious cases are transferred to N’Djamena,\textsuperscript{125} and when possible abroad.\textsuperscript{126} There is a lack of specialized staff and very few facilities can carry out complex surgery.\textsuperscript{127} In 2008, the CND trained medical personnel both among its staff and from other organizations.\textsuperscript{128} In May 2009, a project was launched in Abéché with United States Department of State financial support, to equip a burn center and finance the purchase of ambulances.\textsuperscript{129}

Reportedly, mine/ERW survivors can receive free medical care, if the patient receives a document from the CND.\textsuperscript{130} It is unclear how many survivors received free medical care.

\textsuperscript{114} See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
\textsuperscript{115} In 2008, Chad reported that up to December 2007, 2,632 casualties were recorded (1,143 killed and 1,489 injured). In 2009, Chad reported that from January to December 2008, 131 casualties were recorded (24 killed, 99 injured, and 8 of unknown status). See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 235; Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008–31 December 2008; Landmine Monitor analysis of CND, “Liste générale des victims des mines et autres engins non explosés/2008” (“General list of mine/ERW victims/2008”), provided by Assane Ngueadoum, CND, 15 April 2009; and email from Assane Ngueadoum, 22 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{116} Interview with Assane Ngueadoum, CND, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{120} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 237.
\textsuperscript{124} Statement of Chad, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} Landmine Monitor interviews with mine/ERW survivors in N’Djamena, 14–18 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{129} Interview with Assane Ngueadoum, CND, N’Djamena, 20 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid, 28 May 2009.
Physical rehabilitation services are limited to two centers: the Kabalaye Physical Rehabilitation Center (Centre d’Appareillage et de Rééducation de Kabalaye, CARK) in N’Djamena and the Our Lady of Peace Rehabilitation Center (Maison Notre Dame de la Paix, MNDP) in Moundou, both run by local NGOs with support from the ICRC. Access to psychological support, vocational training, and economic reintegration is limited, as are employment opportunities for persons with disabilities. Psychological support is provided by social workers, religious organizations, and organizations for persons with disabilities. Chad reported that the number of social workers continued to increase in 2008. Yet many survivors reported they never received psychological assistance.

The disability legislation approved in May 2007 stipulates access to health, education, socio-economic reintegration, sports, transport, housing, and social security for persons with disabilities. It is unclear to what extent the law was implemented. Knowledge and recognition of the law’s benefits needed to be strengthened. As of 1 July 2009, Chad has not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives
Chad is one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors. As of May 2009, Chad did not present its 2005–2009 objectives as part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan.

In May 2006, Chad announced its intention to launch a study to determine the number of survivors and their needs, followed by the development of SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) objectives and the implementation of an action plan. Implementation was conditional on funding. Informally, Chad also presented some objectives for its 2006 action plan, which were not achieved. In April 2007, Chad described plans for VA activities for 2007 and appealed for financial support to recruit a consultant to develop a national VA plan. In November 2007, Chad reported that the verification of casualty data, an analysis of the situation and the elaboration of an action plan had begun and appealed for international assistance. It repeated the same in June and November 2008. In May 2009, Chad restated that the development of a VA action plan was ongoing and that funding was needed.

Chad presented 10 VA projects in the 2009 UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, but, as of May 2009, none had been funded. According to the CND, none of Chad’s VA projects presented in previous UN Portfolio of Mine Action Projects had ever received funding.

134 Landmine Monitor interviews with mine/ERW survivors, N’Djamena, 14–18 April 2009.
138 Statement of Chad, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 8 May 2006; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 284.
141 Ibid.
In 2008, the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit undertook a process support visit on behalf of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration co-chairs. The outcome of this visit has not been made public.

Chad reported on its VA activities at the meetings of States Parties from 2005–2008, and at the Standing Committee meetings from 2006–2009. At most meetings, it gave similar statements on the VA situation and on the need for financial support. Chad used the voluntary Form J to its annual Article 7 reports to provide updates on VA activities from 2005–2008 and to provide an update on casualty data in 2009. Chad included a VA focal point on its delegation to the intersessional Standing Committees meetings in 2006, 2008 and 2009 and at the meetings of States Parties in 2006 and 2008.

Victim assistance activities

The ICRC continued to support the CARK and MNAP rehabilitation centers with raw materials, components, and on-the-job training. It financed the construction of a new physiotherapy department at CARK, which was expected to be completed by the end of 2009. It continued to support a referral system for patients from eastern Chad and covered patients’ transportation and accommodation costs. As services at CARK are not free, the ICRC also financed the treatment of 187 people. The two centers assisted 3,315 people and produced 325 prostheses (62% for survivors) and 473 orthoses (4% for survivors). Four Chadian technicians received refresher courses at the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) regional training center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In 2008, 228 weapon-injured were treated with ICRC support, including 10 mine/ERW survivors.

The CRC, with ICRC support, continued to train and equip personnel in emergency response and ran a horse-and-cart ambulance service in the Adré border region. MSF also provided emergency medical care to weapon-injured, including mine/ERW survivors, in Dogdoré, Goz Beida and Adré in eastern Chad and in N’Djamena.

The Association of Mutual Aid of Physically Disabled of Chad (Association d’Entraide aux Handicapés Physique du Tchad, AEHPT), a local organization based in N’Djamena, supports persons with physical disabilities. In 2008, with the financial support of a local mobile network operator, AEHPT set up a workshop of persons with disabilities that produced 30 tricycles. AEHPT has 1,518 registered members, but it is not known how many of them are mine/ERW survivors.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Chad. Chad has reported a cost estimate of US$15 million for completion of mine clearance between 2009 and 2011, with the government of Chad projected to cover $2 million per year, financial institutions covering $1.5 million, and

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147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.

149 Ibid.


152 Ibid, p. 93.


154 Interview with Mahamat Awada, Secretary General, AEHPT, N’Djamena, 15 April 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 243.

155 Interview with Mahamat Awada, AEHPT, 15 April 2009.

156 Ibid.
“other international actors” providing $1.5 million per year. The request covers survey, mine clearance, and land release.

**National support for mine action**
Chad reported XAF883,731,425 (≈$2.562,821) in annual government contributions to mine action as of July 2008. These included XAF4 million (≈$1.160,000) to support CND operations. Chad reported national funding of $2,512,000 to mine clearance and related operations in 2007.

**International cooperation and assistance**
In 2008, three countries reported providing a total of $2,145,486 (€1,456,937) to mine action in Chad. Reported international funding in 2008 was roughly double that reported in 2007. Funding at 2008 levels is not on target to meet Chad’s mine clearance budget of $5 million per year. In March 2009, however, Japan made a contribution of ¥762 million (≈$7,391,400) to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) for mine action in the DRC and Chad. In May 2009, Chad reported that $5,586,000 of that amount would be allocated to technical survey and clearance in Wadi Doum. Chad also reported a contribution of $380,000 from Canada to support CND capacity. These contributions appear to make up much of the shortfall in Chad’s reported budget for mine clearance, but they do not address Chad’s ongoing VA needs.

### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Chad: Monetary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>UN Voluntary Trust Fund, ICRC</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$1,398,970 (€950,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$451,996 (C$481,821)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$2,145,486 (€1,456,937)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above, Chad reported funding for mine RE training workshops during 2008 from the US via UNICEF. According to Chad’s Article 7 report, the US did not provide funding to Chad in 2008. Chad reported assistance for clearance operations in Ounianga-Kébir from the Libyan De-mining Society of the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation, but it did not report the value of this assistance.

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160 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 July 2008, p. 36.
162 Statement of Chad, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 27 May 2009.
163 Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 and 19 June 2009; and Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
164 Article 7 Report, Form I, 1 July 2009.
165 Ibid.
CHILE

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, scattered UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>25km² of mined areas (as of May 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>0 (2007: 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines: 0 (2007: 1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown, but at least 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 March 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>44,120m² of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow, but improving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National: Not specified (2007: $1,340,578)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Chile became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2002. Since 2005, Chile has stated that legislation is in preparation to more fully and specifically implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Chile completed destruction of a stockpile of 300,039 antipersonnel mines in August 2003. Also in 2003, it revised downward the number of antipersonnel mines to be retained for training from 28,647 to 6,245 mines. In 2006, it destroyed an additional 1,292 mines no longer needed for training. It has consumed mines each year during training, leaving a total of 4,083 at the end of 2008. In December 2005, States Parties agreed to a proposal by Chile and Argentina for expanded reporting on mines retained for training and development purposes. Chile served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies from September 2006 to November 2007, and as co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention from November 2008 to December 2009.

In 2002, Chile identified 198 minefields covering 26km² and containing 107,398 mines. This included 15 minefields cleared prior to Chile becoming a state party, but in which clearance was not conducted to international mine action standards. Chile has cleared only a little more than 1km² since 2003, with 75% of this total cleared in just one year, 2006. It is not on course to meet its Article 5 deadline for mine clearance of 1 March 2012.

Between 1999 and 2008, there was no national risk education program in Chile, nor was risk education included in the national mine action plan. Limited activities have been carried out, but these were said to have been insufficient in 2008. In 2002, the President acknowledged the state’s responsibility towards mine and explosive remnants of war survivors, and a casualty survey was completed in early 2009. However, little has been done to ensure the availability of victim assistance.

Mine Ban Policy

Chile has not adopted comprehensive national legislation, but it has stated on several occasions that legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty is being prepared. In May 2009, Chile stated that its existing laws sufficiently cover the various issues required for implementation, citing the Arms Control Act No. 17.798, which addresses all weapons and explosives, including landmines. Chile nonetheless reiterated its intent to adopt specific legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty. The draft legislation in preparation by various ministries would also serve to implement aspects of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II and Protocol V, as well as the conventions on the rights of persons with disabilities and cluster munitions.

Chile submitted its eighth Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008. Chile attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 where it became co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, having served as co-rapporteur the previous year. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Chile made statements on national implementation measures, victim assistance, and mine clearance.

While Chile has led States Parties’ discussions on mines retained for training (Article 3), it has not engaged in States Parties’ discussions on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2. Thus, Chile has not made known its views on issues related to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes, or antihandling devices.


**Production, transfer, use, and stockpile destruction and retention**

Chile is a former producer, exporter, importer, and user of antipersonnel mines. It has reported that it ended production and export in 1985. Chile used mines in the 1970s and 1980s along its borders with Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. In August 2003, Chile completed destruction of its stockpile of 300,039 antipersonnel mines.

According to its latest Article 7 report, Chile had a total of 4,083 antipersonnel mines retained for training at the end of 2008. It consumed 70 antipersonnel mines in 2008 in humanitarian demining training activities. Chile used the expanded Form D in its reporting, but did not project the number of mines to be consumed in 2009.

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1 See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007* for a comprehensive review of previous statements on this matter.
4 A proposal by Chile and Argentina for a new Form D for expanded reporting on mines retained for training and development purposes was agreed to at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2005. It is aimed at generating more information on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines.
5 During the June 2004 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Chile reacted favorably to a Non-Paper circulated by the co-chairs, aimed at facilitating conclusions on these issues by the First Review Conference. It said the paper was a good basis for discussion and possible consensus.
6 Chile’s most recent Article 13 report was submitted on 2 October 2007 for the period September 2006 to September 2007.
9 Chile initially reported destruction of a stockpile of 299,219 antipersonnel mines. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, pp. 300–302. However, Chile’s Article 7 reports submitted since 2005 each cited destruction of 300,039 mines from 4 December 1999 to 25 August 2003. See for example, Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2009.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Chile is affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and, to a very limited extent, by abandoned or unexploded ordnance, which may include cluster munition remnants.\(^{11}\) As of 31 December 2008, 167 minefields remained to be cleared, down from the original 198 reported in 2002 in 17 municipalities (comunas), approximately 5% of the country’s total number of municipalities. This includes 15 suspected hazardous areas demined prior to Chile becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but which were not cleared to international mine action standards.\(^{12}\)

As of 2009, some 25km\(^2\) of mined areas remained to be cleared, although Chile has cautioned that until clearance is completed all data is “relative.”\(^{13}\)

The mines were all laid on Chile’s borders with Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru during the Pinochet regime in the 1970s, when Chile’s relations with its neighbors were strained. Contaminated areas are difficult to access and mostly unpopulated. Some minefields in the north are located as high as 5,000m above sea level.\(^{14}\) However, the vast majority of the mines are located in two of the six mine-affected regions. Of the 198 original mined areas, three-quarters are located in Region XV/Arica and Parinacota (on the border with Peru) and Region II/Antofagasta (desert). These two regions contain 92% of the mines.\(^{15}\) Seventeen minefields have been identified on five islands in Region XII/Magallanes and Chilean Antarctic, including Hornos Island, on the edge of the Beagle Channel near the entrance to the Drake Passage, which leads to the Antarctic. The climatic conditions on these islands are severe all year round and limit mine clearance to only a few weeks a year.\(^{16}\) Hornos Island, which has one minefield and is uninhabited, was visited by 6,000 tourists in 2007.\(^{17}\)

All mined areas are said to be marked and fenced, with warning signs in at least three languages.\(^{18}\)

Casualties

No new mine/UXO casualties were reported in 2008 or in 2009 through 23 March.\(^{19}\) Landmine Monitor has identified 30 casualties (four deaths and 26 injuries) since 1999. Casualties included 25 civilians, four military personnel, and one deminer. Reportedly, immigrants entering the country at illegal crossings along the Peruvian border are at high risk.\(^{20}\) Five of the civilian casualties have been Peruvian nationals (two killed and three injured) who were crossing the Peruvian-Chilean border.\(^{21}\)

As of February 2009, Chile had confirmed 181 casualties (60% military and 40% civilian) since 1970. Sixty-eight were caused by antipersonnel mines, 57 by antivehicle mines, 20 by UXO, and 36 by an unknown explosive device.\(^{22}\) In comparison, the Chilean NGO the Center for

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\(^{11}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 257.

\(^{12}\) Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by CNAD, 8 May 2009.

\(^{13}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by CNAD, 8 May 2009.

\(^{14}\) “Chile ha desactivado el 13 por ciento de terrenos minados” (“Chile has cleared 13% of mined land”), AP Spanish Worldstream, 24 March 2008, noticias.terra.com.

\(^{15}\) Presentation by Chile, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009.

\(^{16}\) “Chile to spend millions removing borders’ landmines,” Mercopress (Montevideo), 26 March 2008, cn.mercopress.com.


\(^{19}\) Email from Col. Álvaro Romero, Executive Secretary, CNAD, 23 March 2009.


Information and Humanitarian Assistance in Mined Zones (Centro de Información y Asistencia Humanitaria en Zonas Minadas, Zona Minada) registered 571 military mine/UXO casualties between 1973 and 2005.\textsuperscript{23}

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Data collection and management**
In February 2009, Chile’s National Humanitarian Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado Humanitario, CNAD) completed the first phase of a casualty survey begun in 2006, which located and contacted all known landmine survivors since 1970.\textsuperscript{24} This first phase identified survivors, their location, and their injuries, and was being used to develop an assistance plan for victims. The data was collected by the National Police and provided to CNAD, which managed the data using the Information Management System for Mine Action.\textsuperscript{25} In 2008, CNAD requested further information from the public, to be submitted via their website.\textsuperscript{26} The Ministry of Planning is using the survey results to determine the “socio-economic situation” of survivors, before identifying appropriate social services and pensions.\textsuperscript{27} NGOs were initially involved in the casualty survey but expressed serious concerns about its accuracy and methodology, particularly the use of police to implement the project. They withdrew from the project in May 2007 and questioned its results.\textsuperscript{28}

**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plans**
In 2007, Chile restructured its national mine action plan to take into account the experiences gained after four years of demining in 2002–2006.\textsuperscript{29} Each year, an activity plan is produced that allocates specific responsibilities to the institutions that will participate in mine action during the year.\textsuperscript{30}

**Disability action plan**
CNAD, established on 19 August 2002, is responsible for national implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including “humanitarian assistance of victims of antipersonnel landmines, their families and their communities.”\textsuperscript{31} The National Fund for the Disabled (Fondo Nacional de Discapacitados, FONADIS), within the Ministry of Planning, is responsible for protecting the rights and social inclusion of persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{32} Chile’s Action Plan for the Social Integration of Persons with Disabilities (Plan de Acción para la Integración Social de las Personas con Discapacidad) outlines the role of various government ministries in implementing Chile’s National Policy for Persons with Disabilities.\textsuperscript{33}

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**
Chile has demonstrated a clear commitment to mine action through the formation of a national mine action authority and allocating annual funding through its national budget for mine action.
**National management**

CNAD is responsible for mine action in Chile. Its main functions are to advise the president and “propose policies, legal norms and plans for complying with the Ottawa Convention.” CNAD is chaired by the Minister of National Defense and includes the undersecretaries of foreign affairs, health, treasury, plus the armed forces’ chief of staff and the heads of the general staff of the armed forces, and CNAD’s executive secretary. The Chilean mine action program is nationally executed under the Ministry of National Defense.

**National mine action legislation**

On 9–10 April 2008, CNAD and the Chilean Campaign to Ban Landmines convened a workshop in Santiago with technical assistance from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining to discuss national legislation that would comply with the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty. Chile has not yet adopted comprehensive national implementation legislation, despite the decrees establishing CNAD and regulating its operations as well as administrative regulations governing demining. In May 2009, Chile reported that adopting a national mine action law was not a priority for its parliament.

**Demining**

The Chilean army and navy conduct clearance, quality assurance, and survey while CNAD funds operations and purchases equipment. In May 2009, CNAD stated that national demining standards had been developed.

Demining in Chile has proceeded slowly. It has been under-resourced, given the difficult terrain and the size of the country. The high altitude of some mined areas combined with severe seasonal weather changes limit demining to only a few months of the year. Chile has its own quality management system, which is said to comply with the International Mine Action Standards.

In 2008, Chile completed clearance of six mined areas in Antofagasta covering an area of 44,119m² and destroyed 5,214 antipersonnel and 1,093 antivehicle mines.

### Demining in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining Regions</th>
<th>No. of mined areas cleared in 2008</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region XV/Arica and Parinacota</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,041</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region I/Tarapacá</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22,933</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region II/Antofagasta</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9,432</td>
<td>2,875</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region XII/Magallanes and Chilean Antarctic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,714</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>44,120</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,214</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,093</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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36 See Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2009.
41 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by CNAD, 8 May 2009.
42 Chile does not report on land released other than by clearance, because they know “exactly where the mines are located and how many there are.” Email from Col. Martin Borck, CNAD, 6 May 2008.
In 2008, Chile purchased US$10.6 million worth of demining equipment, including two Minewolfs, three Bozenas, a number of support vehicles, and equipment for the deminers. Chile planned to increase its personnel from 97 to 205 in 2009 and to form five mechanical demining teams.\(^{43}\) It is therefore expected that productivity will increase significantly. In December 2008, Chile completed the construction of an operational demining base on Hornos Island.\(^{44}\)

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Chile must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2012. Chile has cleared a little more than 1km\(^2\) in six years, with 75% of the total cleared in just one year—2006\(^{45}\)—leaving almost 25 times that area to be cleared in less than three years. Although Chile purchased significant demining equipment in 2008 and planned to increase the number of demining teams in 2009,\(^{46}\) it is not on course to meet its Article 5 deadline.

### Demining in 2003–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m(^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>44,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>131,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>731,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>24,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>96,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,029,739</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Risk Education

While CNAD reported that it is “constantly concerned with carrying out prevention activities and mine risk education,”\(^{47}\) Chile has no national mine/UXO risk education (RE) strategy; RE was not included in the national mine action plan, and there was a decrease in RE activities in 2008. The mine action budget has not included dedicated funds for RE since 2007.\(^{48}\) In 2008, civil society and government representatives recognized that RE activities were insufficient.\(^{49}\)

Since 2001, however, disparate RE activities were carried out by the Chilean military, CNAD, and some national NGOs. In 2008, Zona Minada continued to implement a limited number of RE activities focused on the province of El Tamarugal and the municipality of Iquique (both in Region I/Tarapacá), despite the end of European Union funding. The total number of beneficiaries is unknown.\(^{50}\) CNAD distributed an RE video to organizations and communities.

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\(^{43}\) Presentation by Chile, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by CNAD, 8 May 2009.

\(^{44}\) Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2008, p. 18.

\(^{45}\) Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2008, p. 247.


\(^{47}\) Email from Col. Álvaro Romero, CNAD, 23 March 2009.

\(^{48}\) See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

\(^{49}\) Email from Col. Álvaro Romero, CNAD, 23 March 2009; and email from Elir Rojas Calderon, Zona Minada, 24 March 2009.

\(^{50}\) Email from Elir Rojas Calderon, Zona Minada, 24 March 2009.
in mine-affected areas, and demining units informed affected communities of demining plans in Arica, near Chile’s border with Peru. It also worked with tour operators, park rangers, and the Ministry of Education to carry out workshops for tourists and schoolchildren.\(^{51}\)

**Victim Assistance**

The estimated number of survivors is unknown, but at least 26. Although CNAD is mandated to coordinate victim assistance (VA), as of February 2009 survivors had not seen any tangible benefits.\(^{52}\) The government recognized in 2009 that its VA activities were “relatively delayed in relation to other countries in the region.”\(^{53}\) In 2008, Chile did not have a VA plan, though CNAD reported in February 2009 that it was using the data from the casualty survey to formulate one.\(^{54}\) It also identified progress in VA as a priority for 2009.\(^{55}\) The “Law of Victims Reparations,” intended to provide a legal framework for rehabilitation and services to survivors, was still in draft form in February 2009, pending review of the financial implications by the ministries of work, planning, and health.\(^{56}\)

Military survivors receive medical and social care from the army. Most civilians with disabilities, including civilian landmine survivors, qualify for free healthcare through the National Health Fund and social support through the Ministry of Planning. However, the government recognized that “many civilian cases” have problems accessing services because of their poverty or remote location.\(^{57}\) In March 2009, an NGO representative met with seven survivors from the municipality of San Pedro de Atacama who all said they had not received government benefits.\(^{58}\) As of April 2009, only one survivor had successfully claimed compensation from the government.\(^{59}\)

FONADIS provides grants, funded by the Chilean government, to national disability organizations and covers the cost of mobility devices for individuals who can demonstrate economic need. It does not maintain records on the number of mine/UXO survivors that have benefited.\(^{60}\) There are no international organizations providing disability services in Chile.

Chilean law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities, but de facto discrimination continued in 2008.\(^{61}\) In 2008, FONADIS found that Chile lacked public policies to improve the quality of life for persons with disabilities, who faced inadequate access to healthcare, rehabilitation, education, employment opportunities, and transportation.\(^{62}\) On 29 July 2008, Chile ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol. On 1 April 2009, the Chilean Senate’s Health Commission approved reform of Chile’s disability policy, encouraging a move from a needs-based to a rights-based perspective, but this awaited approval from the House of Representatives.\(^{63}\)

\(^{51}\) Email from Col. Álvaro Romero, CNAD, 23 March 2009.

\(^{52}\) Email from Elir Rojas Calderon, Zona Minada, 12 March 2009; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 247.


\(^{54}\) Interview with Felipe Illanes, Ministry of National Defense, Managua, 25 February 2009.


\(^{56}\) Ibid.

\(^{57}\) Ibid.

\(^{58}\) Email from Elir Rojas Calderon, Zona Minada, 24 March 2009.


\(^{60}\) Ibid.


Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Chile. CNAD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly set mine action strategy, including for resource mobilization. Costs are set for each fiscal year based on projected needs. Resource mobilization strategies are reported by CNAD to be adequate for raising needed funds.64 Specific strategies, however, have not been reported.

National support for mine action

In its May 2009 presentation to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Chile reported two separate items of national funding in its statements on national and international funding for the period 2004–2009. Chile reported national contributions of $4,186,696 and $10,600,000, for a total of $14,786,696.65 This included the $10.6 million paid for demining machines, a purchase first announced by CNAD in March 2008, while the remaining funds paid for operational and other expenses.66 Chile reported national funding totaling $1,340,578 in 2007.67

International cooperation and assistance

Spain reported providing training for 23 mine clearance personnel in Chile in 2008, with a reported valuation of €78,157 ($115,094).68 Spain was the sole reported donor to Chile in 2008. International funding for Chile in 2008 was 72% less than funds received in 2007.

Spain also reported, as a separate funding item for 2008, providing training to 23 mine clearance personnel from Chile, Ecuador, and Peru at the International Demining Center, with a valuation of €133,736 ($196,940). Spain did not differentiate funding for each recipient state.69

64 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Col. Martin Borck, CNAD, 8 May 2008.
66 News coverage stated that Chile would invest $9.6 million, but CNAD confirmed that it was $10.6 million. “Chile ha desactivado el 13 por ciento de terrenos minados” (“Chile has cleared 13% of mined land”), AP Spanish Worldstream, 24 March 2008, noticias.terra.com; telephone interview with Col. Martin Borck, CNAD, 25 March 2008; and email, 6 May 2008.
68 Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
69 Ibid.
COLOMBIA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, IEDs, UXO, AXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Approximately 150,000m² on 18 military bases; the contamination in civilian areas is unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 6,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>28,000m² around 10 military bases and 136,547m² of hazardous areas in three communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
National: $942,000 (July 2007–June 2008: $1.3 million) |

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Colombia became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2001. National implementation legislation took effect on 25 July 2002. Colombia dismantled its antipersonnel mine production facilities in November 1999 and completed destruction of its stockpile on 24 October 2004. Colombia served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from 2001 to 2003. During the past decade, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have increased use and production of antipersonnel mines in many parts of the country. Other armed groups have also used mines, including the National Liberation Army (ELN), and in the past the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC).

Colombia is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of 40 years of internal conflict. Incidents involving landmines or improvised explosive devices have been reported in 31 of the 32 departments, with approximately half of these recorded in Antioquia, Bolívar, Caquetá, Meta, and Santander. The precise extent of the problem remains unclear, although an impact survey was planned to begin in September 2009. Despite starting clearance only in 2005, Colombia has since made steady progress in clearing its 35 mined military bases. Lack of control of certain areas of the country means that clearance of mined areas laid by non-state armed groups will probably not occur in time to meet Colombia’s Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011. Mine action is overseen by the Presidential Program for Mine Action.

Between 1999 and 2008, at least 6,696 casualties of explosive devices occurred in Colombia. Casualties have increased rapidly due to intensified conflict since 2002, making Colombia one of the countries with the most annual casualties in the world. The vast majority of casualties were military, but under-reporting of civilian casualties was certain.
As of 2009, mine/ERW risk education had improved yet it remained insufficient to cover all affected communities. Although capacity and the number of activities increased every year since 1999, no systematic program exists to develop a sustainable risk education capacity. Activities were hampered by ongoing conflict and a lack of demining.

Most civilian survivors in Colombia live in rural areas where services are spread unevenly and of variable quality. In urban centers, sufficient capacity exists to provide the necessary assistance, but distances are long and further hampered by complicated bureaucratic procedures. In principle, a legal framework for comprehensive assistance to survivors (and other victims of conflict) exists, but most survivors are not aware of their rights, not all services are covered, and application procedures are difficult. Services for military survivors are far more comprehensive.

Mine Ban Policy


Colombia submitted its ninth Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering the period from 1 January 2008 to 31 March 2009.2

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, Colombia made statements during the general exchange of views, as well as during the sessions on mine clearance and victim assistance.

At the meeting, States Parties agreed to hold the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Cartagena, Colombia, from 30 November to 4 December 2009 and named Norwegian Ambassador Susan Eckey as President-Designate of the “Cartagena Summit.” Colombia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Jaime Bermúdez Merizalde made a statement welcoming the decision to hold the Second Review Conference in Colombia. Colombian Ambassador Clara Inés Vargas was named as Secretary-General-Designate of the Second Review Conference.

In early March 2009, coinciding with the tenth anniversary of entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombian officials helped launch the “Road to Cartagena” during events held in Bogotá, Geneva, New York, and elsewhere.3 An ICBL delegation visited Colombia in March 2009, where it met with government officials, NGO representatives, and mine survivors to plan for the Second Review Conference.

Several meetings were held in 2009 to prepare for the Second Review Conference. On 2 March, Colombia’s Vice President Francisco Santos Calderón addressed an informal preparatory meeting in Geneva. A formal preparatory meeting was held in Geneva on 29 May 2009, and another was scheduled for 3–4 September 2009.

Colombian officials attended regional meetings scheduled in 2009 in the lead-up to the Second Review Conference. Colombian officials, including Ambassador Vargas, attended the Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas from 24–26 February 2009, where they made a presentation on mine clearance (Article 5) and a statement on the preparations for the Second Review Conference. Colombia also made a statement on victim assistance and participated in the parallel program for victim assistance experts. Colombian officials also attended the Bangkok Workshop on 1–3 April 2009.

During the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Colombia made statements on mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.

1 See Article 7 Report, Form A, 6 May 2005; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 255, for details on penal sanctions and other aspects of the law.
3 Colombia’s Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, Amb. Claudia Blum, spoke at the event held in New York on 2 March 2009, while Colombian Vice President Francisco Santos Calderón addressed the Geneva event on 2 March 2009. See ICBL Newsletter, May 2009; and the Second Review Conference website, www.cartagenasummit.org.
With respect to key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty, Colombia stated in 2004 that any mine that is victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine and is banned. It has not stated its views on the prohibition on “assistance” during joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, on foreign transit or stockpiling, or on mines retained for training.

Colombia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Colombia has never submitted an annual Article 13 national measures report. Colombia is not party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

Colombia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.

The Colombian Campaign against Mines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) has a network of local coordinators in 22 departments. The CCCM works in cooperation with other national initiatives and organizations aimed at banning mines, helping affected communities, and ending the internal armed conflict. The CCCM continues to promote the end of the use of landmines by Colombian non-state armed groups (NSAGs). At its 2009 national meeting, the CCCM decided to be involved in a new project on humanitarian demining.

**Production and transfer**

Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998, and destroyed its production equipment on 18 November 1999. As of 2001, INDUMIL was still producing Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines. Colombia has stated that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode, as permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty. However, Colombia has not reported on steps it has taken to ensure that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode.

The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. There have been past reports of mines transferred as part of illegal weapons shipments destined for NSAGs in Colombia, but Landmine Monitor knows of no reports since 2003.

NSAGs in Colombia are expert in the production of explosive devices. Colombia’s Article 7 reports contain information on mines produced by NSAGs by type, dimensions, fuzing, explosive type and content, and metallic content, and include photographs and additional information. Twelve different design types are manufactured, which include antipersonnel, antivehicle, and Claymore mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The military states that the mines are sometimes fitted with antihandling devices.

**Stockpile destruction and retention**

Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its 18,531 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004.

Colombia’s latest Article 7 report indicates that it retained 586 MAP-1 mines for training purposes as of March 2009, the same number as reported in 2007 and 2008. In March 2007, the coordinator of the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory (Observatorio de las Minas Antipersonal) told Landmine Monitor that Colombia had made a decision in 2006 to destroy all of its

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6 Email from Camilo Serna Villegas, Operations Coordinator, CCCM, and Alvaro Jiménez Millán, National Coordinator, CCCM, 6 August 2009.
8 Presentation by the Colombian Armed Forces, “Desarrollo Compromiso con la Convención de Ottawa” (“Development commitment with the Ottawa Convention”), Bogotá, 6 March 2006.
9 In addition to the 18,531 mines destroyed, the government has reported three other destructions of a total of 3,404 antipersonnel mines. Over the years, there have been many inconsistencies and discrepancies in Colombia’s count of stockpiled mines and their destruction. The Ministry of Defense sent a letter to Landmine Monitor in September 2005 to clarify many of the problems. For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 302.
10 Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2009. See also, Article 7 reports submitted April 2008 and April 2007.
antipersonnel mines previously retained for training. It destroyed 300 mines in three separate events in 2006, but has not destroyed any, or consumed any in training activities, since that time. Colombia has never reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004.

Use
In this reporting period, since May 2008, there has been one allegation of possible use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, in Valle del Cauca’s municipality of La Florida on 9 June 2008. The Ombudsperson’s office (Defensoría del Pueblo) made a formal complaint to the military, but had not received a response as of June 2009. On 27 August 2009, the Presidential Program for Mine Action (Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, PAICMA) informed Landmine Monitor that according to data from the Governor’s Office of El Valle and El País (Cali newspaper), the incident involved a mine planted by the FARC and not the Colombian Armed Forces.

Use by Non-State Armed Groups
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) possess and manufacture antipersonnel mines and IEDs, and use them on a regular basis. In the past decade, paramilitary forces have also used antipersonnel mines, most notably the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) until its disbandment in 2006.

In 2008 and 2009, conflict escalated between the army and armed groups, especially in the southwest and east of the country, with an apparent increase in NSAG use of mines. The Colombian army has frequently reported on the use of antipersonnel mines by and the recovery of antipersonnel mines from FARC and ELN, as well as the destruction of explosives factories. Studies have claimed 50,000–100,000 mines have been laid by NSAGs but the precise number is not known.

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11 The coordinator said the decision was made primarily because the majority of mines laid in the country are of NSAG design and do not correspond to the MAP-1 mines used for demining instruction. Interview with Luz Piedad Herrera, Coordinator, Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, Bogotá, 16 March 2007. Colombia destroyed 300 retained mines in 2006. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 267–268.

12 In 2003 and 2004, Colombia reported it retained 986 mines for training. It reduced that number to 886 in 2005 when it decided the larger number was not necessary. It destroyed 300 more mines in 2006 (100 each in March, September, and December), but the number has not changed since December 2006. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 267–268; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 302–303.

13 On 11 and 18 June 2008, the Permanent Committee for Defense of Human Rights in Valle del Cauca issued two documents detailing possible use of mines by government forces in Valle del Cauca’s municipality of La Florida, where FARC has proposed to create a demilitarized zone. According to the documents, at 9:00 on 9 June 2008, local inhabitants heard a gunshot and then an explosion. The next morning, a 68-year-old local man was found dead, allegedly from a mine explosion. According to the documents, the army had been active for several days before the incident and the site had been considered safe until that point. Documents by the Permanent Committee for Defense of Human Rights in Valle del Cauca (Comité Permanente Por la Defensa de Los Derechos Humanos del Valle del Cauca), 11 June 2008 and 18 June 2008.

14 Letter OF109-00090099 / AUV 33500 to Landmine Monitor from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, Director, PAICMA, 27 August 2009. The letter was in response to an inquiry sent by Landmine Monitor on 7 August 2009. The letter said, “These facts allow the PAICMA to conclude that the accident in question was not the result of a mine planted by the Military Forces, but an artifact planted by the illegal Armed Groups that operate in the area and who use them to protect their logistical corridors.” The letter also noted that Colombia had destroyed the last of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines in 2004.


In September 2008, the army reported that three FARC members and five ELN members turned in 106 antipersonnel mines along with other weapons when they surrendered to the army for demobilization. The report did not indicate which armed group possessed the mines.

**FARC**

FARC is probably the most prolific current user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world.

In late 2008, FARC Commander Alfonso Cano is reported to have stated in an email to his secretariat intercepted by the Colombian military and made public:

“Minefields are the best way to stop the advance of military operations. We know that they are the only thing that stops and intimidates them, for this reason it is requested to increase the training of ‘explosivistas’ [experts in explosives] and to execute as soon as possible plans to instill terror that will avoid an environment of the progressive defeat of the FARC.”

FARC has been increasing its recruitment of child soldiers, who are known to carry and deploy antipersonnel mines. Many civilians are injured by these mines, including many children.

Since May 2008, the army reported encountering mines in military operations against FARC forces in Antioquia, Bolivar, Caldas, Caquetá, Cundinamarca, Guaviare, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo. The date of placement is often not known.

In November 2008, the army encountered newly laid FARC mines near La Florida in the municipality of San Carlos, near El Porvenir in the municipality of San Francisco, and in La Selva and La Quebrada in the municipality of Argelia, all in Antioquia department. Also in January 2009, it was reported that the army discovered and destroyed a FARC landmine production facility in La Holanda, in the municipality and department of Arauca, and that the facility contained 124 IEDs, 450kg of explosives, and 150kg of shrapnel.

In March 2009, FARC’s 36th Front was accused by the government of laying mines near Highway 25 in the municipality of Yarumal, in the north of Antioquia. Five members of the Colombian military died trying to clear the mines. It is not known when the minefield was laid.

In April 2009, the army encountered three explosive booby-traps near the municipality of San Pablo, Bolivar department.

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17 “Se desmovilizan 8 integrantes de las Farc y el Eln” (“8 members of the Farc and Eln demobilized”), Emisora del Ejército de Colombia (army radio), 14 September 2008, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co. In July 2008, the army reported that two members of FARC and three of ELN turned in two antipersonnel mines when surrendering for demobilization. “Aumenta el número de desmovilizados de las Farc y el ELN” (“It increases the number of Farc and ELN demobilized”), Emisora del Ejército de Colombia (army radio), 9 July 2008, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co.


ELN
In May 2008, the army reported discovering an ELN weapons cache containing 12 antipersonnel mines among other weapons near Sopagá in the municipality of Paya, Boyacá department.25 In June 2008, the army reported discovering another ELN weapons cache containing 12 antipersonnel mines near Guacal in the municipality of Paya, Boyacá department.26 Also in June 2008, the army discovered and destroyed a mine production facility belonging to the ELN near Barranco Ceiba in the municipality of San José del Guaviare, Guaviare department.27

In April 2009, the army encountered an antipersonnel mine and explosive booby-traps while raiding and destroying a clandestine radio station and ELN explosive weapons factory near the municipality of Támara, Casanare department.28 In June 2009, the army blamed the ELN for a civilian mine casualty in the municipality of Samaniego, Nariño department, near the border with Ecuador.29

Scope of the Problem
Contamination
The precise extent of Colombia’s mine and ERW problem remains unclear. According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), since at least 1990 mines, IEDs, and other explosive ordnance have been used in Colombia during the conflict involving the armed forces, NSAGs, and paramilitary forces.30 It is reported that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines laid by NSAGs are found along routes used by government forces and around NSAG bases, in rural areas, around schools, houses, national parks, indigenous communities’ land, and coca production sites.31

Analysis of mined areas by the Organization of American States (OAS) shows that NSAGs place activation devices in separate locations approximately five meters apart and connected by wires that cannot be detected by conventional mine detection equipment.32 PAICMA has claimed that NSAGs have made mines and IEDs from cans and plastic bottles and “hung” mines in trees to avoid detection as well as covering them in feces to cause wounds to become infected.33

Although Colombia maintains a database that includes information from as far back as 1990, the database is more of a conflict monitoring system than an accurate appraisal of Colombia’s mine problem.34 So-called “events”—a generic term specific to mine action in Colombia that encompasses “incidents,” “accidents,” “suspected hazardous areas,” “UXO,” “deactivation” of

34 Email from Basile Corbaz, Assistant to the Director, GICHD, 5 September 2008.
devices, and “military demining”—have occurred in 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments, the only exception being the Caribbean archipelago department of Providencia, San Andrés, and Santa Catalina.35

According to PAICMA, most mined areas are only identified after an incident occurs. There are no records, or even reliable estimates, of the number and exact location of mined areas laid by NSAGs. Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) are generally in isolated locations scattered across the affected departments, and the security situation is so precarious that there is no guarantee that cleared areas can be released as safe areas.36 As of 31 March 2009, Colombia had recorded 13,822 events involving mines, UXO, and IEDs, of which 9,668 were considered danger areas and 4,154 where incidents occurred. Since 2006, however, the number of reports has decreased each year. Of all the events, 57% have occurred in six of the 32 departments: Antioquia, Bolívar, Caquetá, Meta, Norte de Santander, and Santander,37 and 70% of events are in just 90 of the 1,098 municipalities.38

In 2008, the number of “events” was down by one-third compared to 2007.39 A possible reason for the sharp decline is military setbacks suffered by the two main NSAGs—the FARC and the ELN—since the beginning of 2008.40

In addition, 34 military bases are affected by mines laid by the government, of which 18 had been cleared by December 2008. Of the 10 released in 2008, four were cancelled after the technical surveys were completed and no mines were found, and full clearance operations in two other mined areas found no mines either. As of 31 March 2009, therefore, a total of 14 military bases were suspected to be mined.41 In May 2009, the Monitoring and Evaluation Office of the Government Planning Office reported 22 of the 34 mined military bases had been cleared.42 According to the OAS, one previously unknown minefield was identified at the military base at Cerro Curva in 2009 and Colombia planned to include in its next Article 7 report.33

According to PAICMA, no civilians are impacted by the mines protecting military bases as the mined areas are inside the perimeters of the bases.44 However, it was reported on 5 July 2009 that one child was killed and another was injured in a mine incident in the municipality of Granada, Meta, in an unmarked area the military uses for training for explosives and munitions.45

In December 2008, the European Commission (EC) awarded a contract to an international consortium led by the University of Brussels and the National University of Colombia to conduct a landmine impact survey (LIS) in Colombia.46 As of May 2009, however, the areas the survey would cover had not been decided (see Identification of hazardous areas section below).47

37 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009.
41 Article 7, Form C, 30 April 2009.
43 Email from Carl Case, Director, Office of Humanitarian Mine Action, OAS, 4 September 2009.
45 CCCM, Press release, Bogotá, 7 July 2009; and email from Carl Case, OAS, 4 September 2009.
46 “Anuncio de Licitación de Contrato de Servicios, Estudio de Impacto Socioeconómico de las Minas Antipersonal y Munición sin Explotar en Colombia—EISEC Colombia—América del Sur” (“Announcement of Tender, Landmine and UXO Socio-economic Impact Survey—EISEC Colombia—South America”), EC, ec.europa.eu.
Military bases suspected to be mined as of 30 April 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Name of base</th>
<th>Estimated no. of antipersonnel mines</th>
<th>Estimated contaminated area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>Pedrera</td>
<td>La Pedrera</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>1,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonas</td>
<td>Puerto Nariño</td>
<td>Puerto Nariño</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivar</td>
<td>Santa Rosa</td>
<td>Santa Rosa</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caldas</td>
<td>Villamaria</td>
<td>Guay</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cauca</td>
<td>El Tambo</td>
<td>Munchique</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choco</td>
<td>Bahia Sola</td>
<td>C. Mecana</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cundinamarca</td>
<td>San Juaquín</td>
<td>Mochuelo</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meta</td>
<td>San Juanito</td>
<td>El Tigre</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>119,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putumayo</td>
<td>Tagua</td>
<td>La Tagua</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>2,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risaralda</td>
<td>Pueblo Rico</td>
<td>Montezuma</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle</td>
<td>V. Cerrito</td>
<td>Pan Azucar</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle</td>
<td>Dagua</td>
<td>C. Tokio</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,407</strong></td>
<td><strong>139,440</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the British Royal Engineers, the main problem in Colombia is nuisance mining and IEDs planted by NSAGs. In an interview with Landmine Monitor, Colonel Alexander Carmona, the Commander of the Colombian Engineers School, said army troops are the primary target of mines and IEDs, and incidents occur during military engagements as well as during military clearance, when mines are detonated by remote control, “The intent and effect of the mines is massive with multiple casualties for each incident.” For example, on 17 July 2009 the Colombian army reported that during military operations in the village of Gualanday, in municipality of San José del Guaviare, Guaviare department, they found four IEDs and a gas cylinder bomb, and in the same village while conducting “search and control” operations they found five gas cylinder bombs in what the army called a minefield. In similar operations in the municipality of Sabana de Torres, Santander, in a place known as Las Delicias, the army reported finding and destroying two antipersonnel mines laid by the FARC’s 20th squad. The army also reported finding mines in Santa Rosa, Cauca, and in the village of Alto Cartagena, in the municipality of Samaniego, Nariño department.

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48 Article 7 Report, Forms C and I, 30 April 2009; and email from Guillermo Leal, South America Regional Coordinator, OAS, 5 August 2009.
50 Interview with Col. Alexander Carmona, Colombian Engineers School, in Geneva, 3 June 2008.
Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor recorded at least 777 new casualties due to explosive devices in Colombia, including 160 killed and 617 injured. Although there was a 15% reduction in the total number of victims (civilian and military) between 2007 and 2008, the proportion of civilian casualties actually increased during this period from 24% to 35%. PAICMA recorded at least 904 casualties for 2007, which was significantly lower than the 1,172 recorded in 2006. The main reason for this decrease would appear to be due to increased government territorial control, but PAICMA also noted that risk education and demining could have played a role. The CCCM noted that no systematic examination into reasons for decreased casualties has taken place.

PAICMA recorded 763 of the 777 casualties, and Landmine Monitor identified at least 14 additional casualties. Of these casualties, 266 were civilian, 507 were security forces, and the status of the remaining four was unknown. No NSAG casualties were recorded in 2008 by PAICMA. In the data provided to Landmine Monitor, PAICMA recorded 264 civilian casualties.

However, the ICRC noted that there was substantial under-reporting of civilian casualties, adding that, “the officially quoted figures should be viewed as a minimum number, rather than an exact figure…” When examining PAICMA data for 2008, the ICRC found that it had registered 103 civilian casualties that were not included in the PAICMA statistics. PAICMA recorded 181 civilian casualties at the time of ICRC examination, which means that there would be at least 284 civilian casualties, and under-reporting “of approximately 56%.” In May 2009, the ICRC provided PAICMA with details of 842 civilians injured between 1998 and 2009 for inclusion in their database.

While PAICMA appears to have included some of these casualties identified by the ICRC in the data it provided to Landmine Monitor, under-reporting of civilian casualties remains certain. In previous years, Landmine Monitor frequently reported that many civilians do not report incidents for fear of being suspected of belonging to NSAGs or of being threatened by NSAGs, and that the majority of mine/ERW casualties are only recorded once they seek government assistance. Additionally, most casualties occur in remote rural areas or areas where conflict is ongoing, and there is a lack of data collection capacity. In 2008, Handicap International (HI) provided casualty data for 1982–2009 by email from Marían Monroy Torres, Data Management Advisor, PAICMA, 5 June 2009; and from Ulrich Tietze, Chief Technical Advisor for Mine Action, PAICMA, 17 June 2009.

It is impossible to report accurately on the device types causing casualties in Colombia. The vast majority of casualties are caused by IEDs, which can be victim-activated, command-detonated, or have multiple detonation mechanisms. However, PAICMA's data collection forms only specify two categories: “MAP” (minas antipersonal—antipersonnel mines) and “MUSE” (municiones sin explotar—UXO). The type of device used varies from region to region, based on the NSAG manufacturing the device and on the situation in which they are used. Most actors involved in data collection state that the majority of IEDs used are victim-activated. For more information see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 264–265.

These figures differ from those reported in previous editions of Landmine Monitor because PAICMA continuously updates its casualty data as information comes in from other sources or as it identifies additional casualties through its activities. In Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 261–262, PAICMA recorded 887 casualties for 2007 and 1,167 for 2006.

Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, 13 May 2009.

Information from Magda Portilla, VA Coordinator, CCCM and Camilo Serna Villegas, CCCM, 15 March 2009.

PAICMA also recorded five additional military casualties which were clearly the result of a targeted ambush and, through the media, Landmine Monitor identified 10 soldiers injured in the same incident, which were not included in PAICMA data for 2008, nor have they been included in casualty totals above. For more information see: “Rebel landmines kill five Colombian soldiers,” Xinhua (Bogotá), 4 May 2008, news.xinhuanet.com.


Email from Leila Blacking, Communications Officer, UNDP, UNDP, 6 September 2009.

Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 6 September 2009.

noted that 80% of survivors interviewed for its victim assistance study were not recorded by PAICMA.63

Of the civilian casualties in 2008, 54 were killed and 212 injured, including 202 men, 37 boys, 18 women, and nine girls. The majority of casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines (263) and three by ERW. For 115 casualties, the activity at the time of the incident was unknown or “other.” When recorded, by far the most common activity was coca eradication (68, or 45% of known activities), followed by travel (39, or 26%). All but five casualties occurred in rural areas. Casualties occurred in 20 departments, mostly in Nariño (54), Putumayo (44), Antioquia (38), and Meta (34). In Nariño, most casualties happened in conflict-ridden Samaniego (19), and in Meta, most casualties occurred in Vista Hermosa (20), the site of large-scale coca eradication.

The remaining 507 casualties were security forces (105 killed and 402 injured), including one woman, all involved in antipersonnel mine incidents. Casualties occurred in 22 departments, particularly in Meta (96), Antioquia (95), and Caquetá (50). As in previous years, there were more civilian casualties in Nariño among security forces (26); civilians also outnumbered military casualties in Putumayo (14 military). Reportedly, five military casualties occurred during demining in 2008,64 but this was not recorded as such in the PAICMA database as for 306 casualties the activity was unknown and for 199 it was “security.”65

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, albeit at an apparently decreased rate, with 240 casualties to 10 June 2009 (36 killed and 204 injured). Of these, PAICMA recorded 214 to 30 April 2009 and Landmine Monitor identified the remaining 26 casualties. Civilians accounted for 67 casualties (28%). The remaining 173 were security forces. All casualties were due to antipersonnel mines, and all but one occurred in rural areas. Most casualties occurred in the departments of Antioquia (47) and Meta (34). For January–April 2008, PAICMA recorded 327 casualties.

Since 2002, PAICMA has recorded 7,945 casualties (1,782 killed and 6,163 injured) between 1990 and July 2009. At least 6,696 casualties (1,483 killed and 5,213 injured) occurred between 1999 and 2008, with the vast majority of casualties starting from 2002 (6,218 or 93%) when the conflict escalated. Between 1999 and 2008, 35% of casualties were civilian (2,323), including 1,507 men, 475 boys, 177 women, and 127 girls (28 adults and nine children of unknown gender). The military accounted for 4,373 casualties, including 1,025 killed and 3,348 injured; all but one were men. NSAG casualties reported previously were not included in this data. For example, PAICMA data provided in June 2008 contained information on 42 NSAG members (including four children).66 Nearly all casualties (6,566) occurred in rural areas. Some 96% of casualties (6,397) were caused by antipersonnel mines and 299 were caused by ERW. PAICMA did not provide activity information for the vast majority of casualties (6,165 or 92%). The most common activities recorded for civilians were coca eradication (102) and travel (79). Casualties happened in 31 departments with most casualties recorded in Antioquia (1,473), Meta (754), Caquetá (519), and Norte de Santander (504).

Of all casualties with detailed information (7,715), 696 (both civilian and military) received assistance under the ruta de atención (“route of assistance,” see Plans section below) including 484 civilians who received social security coverage. However, this data was still under revision as of mid-June 2009,67 and figures were incomplete.68
The ICRC reported that it had recorded at least 2,420 civilian casualties between January 2002 and 31 December 2008, and that the statistics from PAICMA it had at its disposal at the time only included 1,960 casualties for the same time period. ICRC analysis showed that the ICRC had assisted an additional 458 casualties who were not in the PAICMA database. The ICRC added that “This indicates that there is a substantial under reporting of civilian victims, of approximately 23%. It is also highly probable that there are other civilian victims not known either to the ICRC or to PAICMA.”69 Some of these casualties have been included in the meantime, as data obtained by Landmine Monitor contained information on 2,075 civilians between January 2002 and the end of 2008.

**Risk profile**

The casualty rate from landmines, UXO, and IEDs in Colombia is one of the highest in the world. The extent of the problem is unknown, and there is a lack of clearance activities, all of which make risk education an important activity. The most affected department is Antioquia and secondly Nariño. Of Colombia’s 32 departments, 31 have a problem with landmines.

Military personnel make up the largest number of casualties, followed by civilians working in forests and traveling.70 An ICRC knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) survey in the departments of Antioquia, Meta, and Nariño in 2007 revealed a disappointing level of awareness.71

**Socio-economic impact**

Due to the inaccessibility of the rural areas where mine and IED incidents are reported, evidence of the socio-economic impact from mines is scant.72 In July 2009, the World Food Program reported violence and conflict in several departments and, in response, were implementing the “Food Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Other Highly Food-Insecure Groups Affected by Violence” program, which included food aid to families and communities impacted by mines in Samaniego municipality in Nariño department.73

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

The National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Nacional Intersectorial para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonnel, CINAMA), established on 8 October 2001, is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance.

The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, established in 2002, operated as the technical secretariat of CINAMA until June 2007, when Presidential Decree 2150 created PAICMA. The decree transferred all functions previously held by the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory to PAICMA.74

**Risk education**

PAICMA is responsible for coordinating and monitoring risk education (RE) activities and accrediting organizations, and has four RE staff members.75 In 2008, it moved towards a greater coordination role, and away from direct implementation of RE. However, PAICMA had to complete some obligations to deliver RE activities for some local government authorities in 2008. RE coordination meetings are held every two months in Bogotá, and NGOs from

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70 From CCCM–IMSMA database, analysis by Magda Portilla, CCCM, July 2009.
71 The ICRC survey is being used in the planning of a KAP survey under development by UNICEF, PAICMA, and the US Centers for Disease Control. Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, ICRC, 6 September 2009.
74 Article 7 Report, Annex 1, April 2008.
75 Email from Verónica Rios, Mine Risk Education Coordinator, PAICMA, 27 March 2009.
States Parties

Colombia

the regions travel there for the meeting. UNICEF and the ICRC participate in the meetings. National standards based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) were developed and there is an accreditation process.76

Victim assistance
Victim assistance (VA) is coordinated by PAICMA, which until July 2008 was in the process of reorganizing its VA department. Throughout 2008, PAICMA focused on liaising with government bodies, NGOs, and the private sector involved in VA to improve data collection, to strengthen links between VA service providers, and to examine remaining gaps in VA service provision, as well as awareness-raising.77 PAICMA also coordinated the Sub-committee for Integral Assistance to Victims.

Significant responsibility is delegated to departmental authorities, some of which included mine action in their development plans or created mine action committees. The level of attention dedicated to VA was variable.78

The Presidential Program for Human Rights is responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Social Protection has a disability unit, which develops and coordinates disability strategies, pays disability pensions, and funds activities. The ministry also runs the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía, FOSYGA), one of the main assistance funds reimbursing services for conflict victims, through which survivors are most often assisted. The other main assistance fund for victims of violence, including survivors, is operated by the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation (Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional, Acción Social).79

Data collection and management
Colombia has used the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to store its mine action data since 2002. Collecting this information and assessing its accuracy has been difficult. The sources of information in the IMSMA database in Bogota are the Armed Forces, Department of Security Administration (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, DAS) and other police and military sources.80 Estimates of the number of SHAs are based on incidents involving landmines, IEDs, and UXO, clearance operations by the military, and SHAs registered in the national database.81

The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory and PAICMA have registered casualty data in IMSMA since 2002. Information is obtained from departmental and municipal authorities, the civil defense, national park guards, daily secret service bulletins, military sources, occasional meetings with survivors, civilians, and the media.82 In 2009, PAICMA was reviewing existing data and comparing it with that of service and compensation providers to obtain more information about assistance provided to survivors. This effort is hampered by the fact that operators all use their own databases, which have gaps but also overlap.83 Also, it was reported that some service providers do not record the cause of disability/incident in their registries.84

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76 Email from Verónica Rios, PAICMA, 27 March 2009.
78 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, 13 May 2009; and information from Magda Portilla, CCCM, 15 March 2009.
80 Email from Pascal Rapillard, Policy and External Relations, GICHD, 7 September 2009.
82 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, 13 May 2009.
83 Email from Ulrich Tietze, PAICMA, 20 May 2009.
84 Information received from Magda Portilla, CCCM, 15 March 2009; and CONPES, “Política Nacional de Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (MAP), Municiones sin Explotar (MUSE) y Artefactos Explosivos Improvisados (AEI)” (“National Strategy for Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AP), Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)”), Bogotá, 16 February 2009, p. 38.
In 2008, PAICMA reported improving its data collection and follow-up of information on casualties for whom little information is available. PAICMA focused on areas it did not prioritize for other VA activities (Caldas and Quindío departments) and identified 45 survivors, some of whom were not previously recorded. PAICMA also organized meetings with survivors to obtain more information. Although casualty data collection has improved, verification is hindered by conflict and military sources only provide the strict minimum of information.

The ICRC collects casualty and other weapon-contamination data for its own operational purposes and, as of mid-2008, was sharing this data regularly with PAICMA. ICRC data was included in PAICMA information. PAICMA exchanges information with other organizations such as the OAS, CCCM, Handicap International (HI), and Pastoral Social. Information exchange between the Integral Center for Rehabilitation of Colombia (Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia, CIREC) and Mi Sangre Foundation has also improved.

Preparations for the LIS started in 2009, but it is unclear what kind of information will be collected on casualties. The CCCM and other organizations give reports of their activities to PAICMA; PAICMA intended to start entering the data into IMSMA in 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombian army</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIREC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mi Sangre Foundation</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoral Social</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian Red Cross</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International operators and activities</td>
<td>Demining</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Casualty data collection</td>
<td>VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


86 Email from Andy Wheatley, Mine Action Advisor, ICRC, 22 July 2009.


Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Colombia’s National Strategic Plan for 2004–2009, approved by the government on 10 August 2004, included four goals:

1. capacity-building and implementing state policy against landmines;
2. reducing casualties and providing assistance;
3. meeting treaty obligations by demining military bases, destroying stockpiles, and “universalizing the fulfillment of the Treaty;” and
4. promoting changes in perception and practice of the population towards mines.

The strategy did not set timelines for each goal.90

In February 2009, the National Economic and Social Policy Council (Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social, CONPES), which is responsible for all government planning, approved the “National policy for comprehensive action against antipersonnel mines, unexploded ordnance and improvised explosive devices 2009–2019” (Aprobación de la Política de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal 2009–2019).91 The plan has four main elements, namely to:

1. coordinate mine action at the national and regional level with appropriate and sustainable interventions;
2. contain contamination from antipersonnel mines and reduce their impact on communities;
3. reduce the level of risk from mines; and
4. ensure mine victims access rehabilitation and social and economic activities.92

The purpose of the 10-year plan, according to PAICMA’s director, is to assist communities and people who live in mine-affected areas. He has stated that it is not a plan to meet Colombia’s Article 5 obligations, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.93 The overall strategy of the policy is to minimize the socio-economic impact of mines, IEDs, and UXO, and to implement sustainable development programs in mine-affected communities.94

In addition to conducting the LIS, priorities for 2009 were the clearance of 10 military bases and of other mined areas in Antioquia, Meta, and Nariño departments. It was also planned to conduct technical surveys in San Carlos in Antioquia, El Dorado in Meta, and Samaniego in Nariño department.95 Colombia planned to clear all its military bases before 1 March 2011, its Article 5 deadline.96

VA is included in the 10-year plan with the same aim as the National Development Plan 2006–2010, namely to ensure “integral and retroactive attention” to survivors.

The main goals of the 2009–2019 strategy are: providing opportune and complete access to comprehensive rehabilitation and socio-economic inclusion; integrated service provision by government and non-governmental service providers; and complete development and implementation of the VA scheme. Activities, timeframes, and indicators were also included, but PAICMA’s role remained largely limited to improving data collection, establishing information exchange conventions, information dissemination and awareness-raising, liaison and facilitation.

93 Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, in Managua, 27 February 2009.
96 Ibid.
among service providers, stimulating capacity-building, and developing plans. Implementation of actual assistance activities is embedded in existing state programs for vulnerable groups or conflict victims.

The main program benefiting mine/ERW/IED survivors as part of a larger group of conflict victims is the ruta de atención (“route of assistance”), a legal framework specifying assistance, ranging from first-aid to socio-economic reintegration, which has been in place since 1997. In principle, assistance under the framework is free of charge for civilian mine/ERW/IED survivors once they are recognized as victims of conflict, violence, or “terrorism” victims; they have one year to complete the administrative procedure. But services are not complete, coordination between sectors fragmented, awareness lacking among service providers and survivors, and bureaucracy complex. One of the main gaps in the ruta de atención is the lack of transport and accommodation for survivors seeking treatment. PAICMA acknowledged this, but in its 2009–2019 plan, PAICMA limited its role to lobbying for the inclusion of transport and accommodation.

PAICMA had a VA workplan for 2008, which focused on capacity-building, awareness-raising, and better follow-up of VA activities and data collection, socio-economic reintegration, and channeling resources to RE implementers. The measurable objectives for 2008 were 100% of civilian casualties to be reported in 2006–2007, and 50% of older casualties to receive information about their rights and about their progress in the ruta de atención. These objectives have not been reached; in total, PAICMA reached 105 survivors (recent and not recent) and for 86 people administrative procedures for their compensation were started.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development


National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Colombia has demonstrated an uneven commitment to mine action. It began demining the army bases only in 2005, while criticizing NSAGs for their continued use of mines. It has committed significant funding to the mine action program (see Support for mine action section below).

Through the ruta de atención, Colombia manages a large part of assistance to survivors with national resources. It has largely sufficient infrastructure and technical capacities to deal with VA, although its assistance network is mostly centralized in urban areas and access can

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98 PAICMA, “Ruta de Atención Integral a las Víctimas de Minas Antipersonal (MAP) y Municiones sin Explotar (MUSE)” (“Integral Assistance Route for Victims of Antipersonnel Mines (AP) and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)”), www.accioncontraminas.gov.co; and HI, “Minas Antipersonal en Colombia: El Camino Hacia la Rehabilitación e Inclusión Social” (“Antipersonnel Mines in Colombia: The Road to Rehabilitation and Social Inclusion”), Medellín, October 2007, pp. 128–139.
101 PAICMA, “Plan estratégico y operativo del programa presidencial para la acción integral contra las minas antipersonal (PAICMA) en el año 2008” (“Strategic and operational plan of the presidencial program for the action against antipersonnel mines (PAICMA) for the year 2008”), Bogotá, February 2008, pp. 3–5.
depend on territorial control. While the assistance framework was, in principle, comprehensive, NGOs still had to cover significant gaps and were crucial in facilitating access to services for survivors.103 In 2008, PAICMA acknowledged that VA was its weakest component and that several gaps, particularly in coordination and monitoring, needed to be addressed.104 NGOs noted that the government’s commitment to disability issues was low and that PAICMA did not make any “visible interventions” on the broader issue of disability to advance the situation of survivors.105

From 2007–2009, Colombia attracted an increasing number of international operators and funding for VA. Some NGO operators saw an improvement in coordination with PAICMA, but also stated that this improvement was mainly due to efforts of NGOs influencing authorities and making more concerted efforts in accompanying survivors to access assistance.106 While PAICMA noted that it worked on improving coordination with the Ministry of Social Protection,107 NGOs noted that coordination between PAICMA and relevant ministries was unclear and that coordination between NGOs, ministries, and Acción Social was limited.108

The CCCM found that the main progress in VA since 1999 was increased awareness, better geographic coverage, and increased survivor participation; the latter two, however, remained insufficient. HI added that significant improvements had been made in the framework and organization of VA, and that more socio-economic reintegration projects were emerging. However, continued revision according to the emerging needs and improved field implementation was required. HI added that there was no real involvement of survivors in the implementation and monitoring of assistance.109

National management
Colombia’s mine action program has been nationally managed since its inception, with some international support, as detailed below.

External advisors
The role of the OAS is bound by the March 2003 Agreement of Cooperation and Technical Assistance between the General Secretariat of the OAS and the government of Colombia. Under this agreement, the OAS, with the Inter-American Defense Board, has assisted the Colombian army in strengthening its capacity for humanitarian demining. In 2008, the OAS used five international monitors as part of the quality management process for mine clearance at the military sites.110

Colombia has a UN Mine Action Portfolio Country Team that includes representation from the government, UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and the International Organization for Migration. Each year, through a series of multilateral consultations with stakeholders, priorities are determined and a list of projects requiring funding are identified.111

103 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, 13 May 2009.
104 Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrones de Guevara, and Zoraida Delgado Sierra, Advisor for Integral Attention to the Population, PAICMA, Bogotá, 24 April 2008.
105 Information received from Stéphane Petiaux, Country Director, HI, Medellín, 30 March 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Magda Portilla, CCCM, 13 July 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Pastoral Social, 13 July 2009.
106 Information received from Stéphane Petiaux, HI, 30 March 2009; information received from Magda Portilla, CCCM, 13 March 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Pastoral Social, 13 July 2009.
108 Information received from Stéphane Petiaux, HI, 30 March 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Magda Portilla, CCCM, 13 July 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Pastoral Social, 13 July 2009.
109 Information received from Stéphane Petiaux, HI, 30 March 2009.
110 Interview with Guillermo Leal, OAS, Bogotá, 19 April 2008; and email from Carl Case, OAS, 4 September 2009.
Between 2003 and 2005, UNDP provided two technical advisors to the Antipersonnel Landmines Observatory, but neither held the post for more than a few months.\(^{112}\) In May 2009, the European Commission (EC) hired a technical advisor based at PAICMA. The main tasks of the advisor are to organize three seminars on RE, VA, and humanitarian demining and to monitor the EC-funded LIS.\(^{113}\)

**National mine action legislation**

In 2002, Law 751 created CINAMA, and Decree No. 3787 in 2003 established the Antipersonnel Landmine Observatory and authorized funding for it. In June 2007, Presidential Decree 2150 created PAICMA to replace the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory.\(^{114}\)

**National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures**

To meet its responsibilities under the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia developed two National Protocols on Humanitarian Demining: one for military bases and one for mines laid by NSAGs. Both are based on IMAS. The two protocols, akin to standing operating procedures, cover safety, procedures for impact and technical survey, marking, the destruction of UXO, and internal quality assurance, and were updated in 2007 based on lessons learned from demining activities.

**Program evaluations**

In January 2008, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an evaluation of the 2005–2007 EC Mine Action Strategy in Latin America, including a case study on Colombia. The focus of the case study was assessing the value of EC funding in contributing to mine action in Colombia. The evaluation concluded that mine clearance in Colombia is heavily politicized and under the control of the Colombian army. One indication of the politicization, the evaluation observed, was the lack of distinction between civilian casualties and casualties among the armed forces engaged in combat, a practice the evaluation considered as a “departure from standard practice which is not justified.” The evaluation recommended that Colombia disaggregate the casualty data. The evaluation concluded the real impact of mines on the civilian population was difficult to assess and would remain so until a systematic survey was conducted. Nevertheless, it concluded that “By any measure, Colombia has a very severe mine problem.”\(^{115}\)

The Canadian Landmine Fund, as part of a global evaluation of the mine action programs it has funded, conducted field work for the evaluation in Colombia in March 2008.\(^{116}\) The findings of the evaluation were not available as of August 2009.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

The Colombian Armed Forces is the sole demining operator. The army conducts military counter mine operations to protect government troops and to facilitate the mobility of tactical units. As of September 2009, three platoons were clearing minefields under military jurisdiction and three platoons were conducting “emergency humanitarian demining.”\(^{117}\)

Two of the platoons have been assigned to clear mined areas around military bases and the remaining two teams were conducting “emergency humanitarian demining” in areas where NSAGs operate.\(^{118}\) Criteria for determining emergency demining for any given site include: the absence of conflict for one year; the army is in control of the area to ensure security; mines

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\(^{113}\) Email from Ulrich Tietze, PAICMA, 27 April 2009.

\(^{114}\) Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009; and Article 7 Report, Annex 1, April 2008.

\(^{115}\) Email from Ted Paterson, Head of Evaluation and Policy Research, GICHD, 5 May 2008.

\(^{116}\) Interview with James Freedman, Consultant, Canadian Landmine Fund, in Geneva, 4 June 2008.

\(^{117}\) Email from Carl Case, OAS, 4 September 2009. In June 2009 PAICMA changed “emergency humanitarian demining to “humanitarian demining in communities.”

\(^{118}\) PAICMA defines military mine clearance as “the destruction of IED that are used illegally in Colombia as antipersonnel mines, which takes place within the military operations in order to provide mobility to the troops.” PAICMA, “Monthly Newsletter, Special Edition,” Bogotá, April 2008, p. 19.
are impacting the population; there is a known landmine problem; and part of the population is displaced.\(^{119}\) PAICMA admits, however, that sometimes political considerations are the primary basis for clearing a village in order to show the government is in control of the area.\(^{120}\)

At the beginning of 2009, Colombia began assessing how international NGOs could operate in the country to clear mines. HALO Trust had been conducting a mines assessment since September 2008 and has assessed six priority departments (of Colombia’s 32 departments) and made detailed field missions to municipalities and villages in Bolivar and eastern Antioquia from June–August 2009. The Colombian government asked HALO to initiate a large-scale civilian demining program as a pilot project for international NGO assistance. Subsequently, HALO recruited and trained senior Colombian staff, and planned to start clearance operations in Antioquia in late 2009.\(^{121}\) However, new legislation and revised coordination structures were needed before they could be allowed to operate.\(^{122}\)

In June 2009, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted exploratory missions to Colombia, and the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement within the US Department of State conducted a workshop in Bogotá on planning and humanitarian demining.\(^{123}\) In July, MAG was in the process of recruiting a community liaison manager to work with the CCCM to strengthen the capacity of their field teams and local partners, and to implement community liaison and risk reduction education activities, as well as assess other mine action opportunities in Colombia.\(^{124}\)

**Identification of hazardous areas**

The EC issued a call for tender on 24 April 2008 to conduct an LIS in Colombia over a 15-month period beginning in September 2008.\(^{125}\) In December 2008, a consortium led by the University of Brussels and the National University of Colombia, including Sistemas de Información S.A. (Spain), Humanitarian Technology Consulting (UK), and RK Consulting Ltd. (UK), was awarded the contract for the survey, which officially began in March 2009.\(^{126}\)

The protocols that guided the global LIS process will be adapted to the situation in Colombia, where there is still active combat in some regions. The consortium will use both paper and electronic means to collect and store data. In July 2009, PAICMA identified Antioquia department, Catatumbo in Norte de Santander department close to the Venezuelan border, Montes de María (a mountainous region on the Caribbean coast), and Nariño department as the four areas where the survey would begin in September 2009.\(^{127}\)

The survey will be conducted in locations based on safe working conditions, the number of casualties, and the level of suspected contamination.\(^{128}\) Affected communities are fearful of reprisals from NSAGs, which impedes the flow of information about dangerous areas and SHAs. If this fear is pervasive in mine-affected communities, it could affect the comprehensiveness of the planned LIS.

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\(^{119}\) Interview with Guillermo Leal, OAS, Bogotá, 19 April 2008.

\(^{120}\) Interview with Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, in Managua, 27 February 2009.

\(^{121}\) Email from Guy Willoughby, Director, HALO, 8 September 2009.


\(^{123}\) Email from Álvaro Jiménez Millán, CCCM, 12 June 2009; and email from Ed Trimakas, Program Manager, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 9 June 2009.


\(^{127}\) Email from Andrés Dávila Ladrón de Guevara, PAICMA, 12 August 2009.

It was planned to begin the LIS in September 2009 in Antioquia, Catatumbo, Nariño, and the Montes de María region. The project was scheduled to take one year, but PAICMA believed an extension might be required.

Mine clearance in 2008

In 2008, the army’s humanitarian demining teams cleared 10 military bases bringing the number of cleared bases to 18 of the 34 believed to be mined. As noted above, on six of the bases (Cerro Luna, El Hobo, Fortaleza, La Argelia, and La Riqueza, and Yatacue) no mines were found during technical surveys and clearance operations. According to Guillermo Leal, South America Regional Coordinator for the OAS mine action program, it is likely the mines were never laid in these locations and indicated it was possible that during future technical surveys in the remaining mined military bases no landmines will be found. Pablo Parra, PAICMA’s Mine Action Advisor, thought no landmines were found in these six locations because years ago the base commanders had ordered that the mines be removed but never reported it.

In 2008, a total of 28,423 m² of SHA was cleared around military bases, resulting in the destruction of 316 antipersonnel mines and 13 items of UXO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Name of base</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valle del Cauca</td>
<td>Toro</td>
<td>La Argelia</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle del Cauca</td>
<td>Roldanillo</td>
<td>El Hobo</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Santander</td>
<td>Pamplona</td>
<td>Base de Oriente</td>
<td>10,997</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arauca</td>
<td>Tame</td>
<td>Biran</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Valle del Cauca</td>
<td>Dagua</td>
<td>Yatacue</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle del Cauca</td>
<td>Dagua</td>
<td>Fortaleza</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle del Cauca</td>
<td>Dagua</td>
<td>La Riqueza</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valle del Cauca</td>
<td>Dagua</td>
<td>Cero Luna</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quindío</td>
<td>Calarcá</td>
<td>Campanario</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norte de Santander</td>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>Toledo</td>
<td>11,013</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>28,423</strong></td>
<td><strong>316</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Technical surveys, or impact surveys as they are called in Colombia, have been conducted on nine SHAs mined by NSAGs in five departments. The nine SHAs range in size from an estimated 5,000 m² to 360,000 m², with all nine calculated to cover 457,900 m². The army’s humanitarian demining teams have cleared three of the nine areas. Two were located in San Francisco municipality in Antioquia and one in San Jacinto municipality in Bolivar.

129 Email from Russell Gasser, Colombia LIS Consortium, 24 August 2009.
132 Email from Guillermo Leal, OAS, 30 June 2009.
Bajo Grande is an abandoned village in the municipality of San Jacinto in the department of Bolívar, 200km from the city of Cartagena in northern Colombia. Manual clearance of the 360,000m² SHA began in December 2007 with one army platoon of 40 deminers. Houses, yards, roads, and agricultural land were targeted for clearance. As of August 2009, however, eight months after clearance was completed, and despite promises of development projects such as roads, agricultural land, and new housing, little more than ground breaking for a road had been achieved, according to La Silla Vacia, an online news service in Colombia.

There is reportedly no electricity, drinking water, or other public services in the village. During a visit in June 2009, US Department of State official Ed Trimakas said it would be difficult for people to live in the village in these conditions. Apart from 50 men who have occasionally farmed in Bajo Grande since 2007, only five families have returned to the village. With no public services available, the poor condition of the cleared land, and debt among displaced families, some of the cleared land has been sold to a company for 300,000 pesos per hectare (US$150) for agricultural production and cattle-raising. The local government in San Jacinto municipality has received 128 requests to sell land owned by internally displaced persons (IDPs). The government was said to be investigating whether the IDPs were pressured into selling their land or were threatened by potential buyers.

Elsewhere, in San Francisco department, at San Isidro and Alto El Aguacate, mined areas blocking farmland and a frequently used trail were cleared. During the clearance operations, 100 improvised mines and six items of UXO were destroyed. Clearance of the SHAs in Antioquia, Meta, and Nariño departments continued into 2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Non-technical land release</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines IEDs destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Antioquia</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>San Isidro</td>
<td>8,707</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antioquia</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>Alto El Aguacate</td>
<td>24,194</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolívar</td>
<td>San Jacinto</td>
<td>Bajo Grande</td>
<td>51,120</td>
<td>52,526</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>84,021</strong></td>
<td><strong>52,526</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the responsibility of the General Inspector of the Armed Forces, a National Demining School at the Colombian Engineers School is responsible for training army deminers. The OAS, Inter-American Defense Board, British Royal Engineers, and Salamandra Foundation (Fundación Salamandra) provide technical assistance to the training. Demining capacity in January 2009 was 240 deminers.

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136 Email from Carl Case OAS, 5 September 2008.
138 Email from Carl Case, OAS, 4 September 2009.
139 Ibid.
It was planned to add three humanitarian demining teams (120 people) in 2009 and by the end of 2011 to have 14 demining teams including mine detection dog and mechanical clearance teams deployed.\textsuperscript{142} Mine clearance operations in areas mined by NSAGs are said to be hindered by poor roads, inclement weather, and vegetation.\textsuperscript{143}

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2011. The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory in 2005 said that the government plans to meet the Article 5 deadline in terms of clearance of the minefields under the jurisdiction of the armed forces, but “there is no guarantee that Colombia will be able to declare itself mine-free in 2011, especially if non-State actors do not embrace the principles in the Convention. However, the Government will not ask for any extension until evaluating the possibility to completely fulfill what is established in the Treaty.”\textsuperscript{144}

In June 2007, the Chief of the Joint Command told Landmine Monitor that Colombia would clear “all mined areas under its control.”\textsuperscript{145} At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007, Colombia said it would probably request an extension of its Article 5 deadline to address the types of mines manufactured by NSAGs. In the same statement, Colombia reiterated it would clear all mines from its military bases by 1 March 2011.\textsuperscript{146}

Colombia is making steady progress in clearing the 34 mined military bases. As of May 2009, 14 remained to be cleared. Nevertheless, true progress towards meeting its Article 5 obligations cannot be measured until the full extent of the problem is known. While it was planned to commence an LIS in a limited number of departments in 2009, ongoing security concerns in the rural areas where thousands of events have been recorded will severely limit its coverage. A nationwide survey is needed to ensure that Colombia has made every effort to identify all mined areas, as required by the treaty.

**Risk Education**

RE in Colombia aims to provide information to enable communities to manage risk themselves. Local government staff, health workers, and teachers are trained in RE, but no systematic program exists to develop a sustainable RE capacity. Some operators deliver RE directly to households, as community gatherings are not possible in remote areas. There are also community liaison clearance activities led by the OAS.\textsuperscript{147}

RE is insufficient as operators are unable to cover all affected communities. Nariño department has the greatest number of operators but, as it is a large department, the level of activity is inadequate. According to the CCCM, the most important issue is promoting and sustaining the RE program because there are many regions and areas where it is impossible to start demining, hence the focus on RE.\textsuperscript{148}

A needs assessment was conducted in 2005, and each year the information is updated, based on casualty data, indigenous communities in priority areas, IDPs and returnees, coca eradication activities, and recent conflict.\textsuperscript{149} The ICRC conducted a KAP survey in three departments (Antioquia, Meta, and Nariño) in 2007.

\textsuperscript{142} Email from Stacy Davis, Public Engagement, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 2 September 2009.

\textsuperscript{143} Presentation by Colombia, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009.

\textsuperscript{144} Interview with Luz Piedad Herrera, Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, Bogotá, 2 March 2006.

\textsuperscript{145} Interview with Gen. Eduardo Behar, Colombian Armed Forces, Bogotá, 28 June 2007.

\textsuperscript{146} Statement of Colombia, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 19 November 2007.

\textsuperscript{147} Telephone interview with Camilo Serna Villegas, CCCM, 3 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{148} Interview with Alvaro Jiménez Millán, CCCM, in Geneva, 29 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{149} Email from Verónica Rios, PAICMA, March 27, 2009.
The CCCM is funded by Spain and receives technical support from UNICEF. The EC funded RE projects by Pastoral Social and the Gobernación de Antioquia (Antioquia departmental government). The National Learning Institute (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA) implemented a training course based on its curriculum for “community mine action agents,” which was developed in 2007. However, these were vocational training courses for people who wanted to gain qualifications to increase employment opportunities, and who would not necessarily use the training provided to deliver RE. The department of Antioquia government is the only department that has taken an active role in RE: it has contributed funding to RE projects and has produced materials, including a comic book for children.

The ICRC and Colombian Red Cross (CRC) work together to conduct risk reduction activities and RE. According to the ICRC, “Risk reduction seeks to ensure that weapon contamination-affected communities have safe access to important resources such as water points, schools and agricultural land or undertake other interventions to mitigate the impact of weapon contamination.” In 2008, risk reduction activities included agricultural projects, the provision of accommodation near hospitals to reduce excessive movements on roads, and liaison on prioritization of clearance activities. The ICRC and CRC provide basic safety messages, reaching rural areas that are inaccessible to most other operators, and “while the ICRC seeks to negotiate and facilitate CRC access to affected areas, the ICRC has developed a capacity to undertake risk education in areas where this is not possible, or where CRC capacity does not exist.”

A four-day international seminar on RE funded by the EC to build the capacity of Colombian mine action was held in May 2009. Almost 20 organizations and more than 100 people participated.

### Risk education activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographic areas</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCCM and Paz y Democracia</td>
<td>House-to-house visits in remote communities</td>
<td>17 municipalities, 34 villages in Nariño, Chocó, and Cauca departments and the Mojana region</td>
<td>60,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM with Camaguarí</td>
<td>Emergency NGO with indigenous communities (finished December 2008)</td>
<td>Nariño</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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151 Telephone interview with Camilo Serna, CCCM, 3 August 2009.
155 Ibid, pp. 7–8.
156 Ibid, pp. 8–9.
## Risk Education Activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographic areas</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>House-to-house visits and mass presentation</td>
<td>Six communities in two municipalities of Bolivar and Antioquia departments</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAICMA</td>
<td>Training on standards for RE; training of RE agents—community leaders, teachers, health, and social workers in indigenous communities</td>
<td>16 departments—Antioquia, Arauca, Bolivar, Caquetá, Cauca, Cesar, Cúcuta, Cundinamarca, Guaviare, Guajira, Huila, Magdalena, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, and Putumayo</td>
<td>1,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENA</td>
<td>Training local authority staff in mine action issues, including RE</td>
<td></td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC and CRC</td>
<td>Risk reduction activities; provision of basic safety messages combined with information on first-aid, victim’s rights, etc.</td>
<td>In all 31 departments from CRC centers</td>
<td>11,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diakonie/Tierra de Paz</td>
<td>RE in schools</td>
<td>Cauca</td>
<td>250 teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental government of Antioquia (with support from the EC)</td>
<td>End of 2007 received EC funding for project to enhance institutionalization and sustainability of RE through inclusion in municipal education plans in 59 municipalities; implementation started in February 2008, resulting in production of comic book</td>
<td>Antioquia</td>
<td>35,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIREC Seeds of Hope program</td>
<td>Activities to promote safe behavior and create communication links between affected communities in each region</td>
<td>9 departments, 42 municipalities</td>
<td>168 workshops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pastoral Social</td>
<td>House-to-house RE</td>
<td>5 departments: Caquetá, Cauca, Meta, Nariño, and Putumayo</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundación Restrepo Barco</td>
<td>RE for children and youth</td>
<td>Santander, Nariño, and the Montes de María region</td>
<td>1,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Ad hoc awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In 2008, materials were developed by a committee consisting of UNICEF, PAICMA, CCCM, and other organizations. In the initial stages, there was coordination with NGOs, but not through to the completion of the materials.\(^{159}\)

UNICEF conducted an evaluation in 2008 of the CCCM RE and VA project in the departments of Cauca, Chocó, and Nariño, and La Mojana region. It found that the messages and methods of delivery were appropriate and, although it was difficult to measure the impact in a short period of time, it concluded that the project had resulted in behavior change. UNICEF identified a need to improve sustainability, and recommended linking with municipal development plans, implementing RE through schools, and linking with public institutions.\(^{160}\)

RE has been conducted over the last 10 years with the support of UNICEF by department governments, national NGOs, the CRC with the support of ICRC, the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory (from 2001 to 2007), and then PAICMA from 2007. Although the level of activity has increased each year, geographic coverage has remained inadequate. A desk needs assessment in 2005 prioritized 100 municipalities in 12 departments, but as of July 2006, most of these had not received RE. Methods have included: seminars, presentations, mass media campaigns, field projects, training of community leaders, RE to children, and in 2005 a project was launched to include RE in the school curriculum. Emergency RE was conducted in 2005 following heavy fighting in Cauca. Lack of coordination was reported to be a problem. The ongoing conflict also hampered RE.

In March 2003, the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory published an RE handbook. In March 2005, a workshop was held to develop best practices, which brought all RE actors together for the first time. In May 2005, a second workshop with GICHD was held to develop an action plan. A national strategic plan for 2005–2009 was developed with technical and financial support from GICHD and Switzerland. In 2005, UNICEF produced two new tools: a fieldwork manual for facilitators and an interactive game for community members. In 2006, the IMAS for RE was translated into Spanish.

### Victim Assistance

The number of mine/ERW survivors in Colombia is not known, but is estimated to be at least 6,163. In its 2009–2019 strategy, PAICMA noted that “despite the achievements in providing assistance to victims, there is no certainty that survivors of APs [antipersonnel mines], IEDs and UXO effectively receive integral rehabilitation and social and economic inclusion…” because of a lack of management capacity by service providers, inflexible systems, and the lack of a clear framework for certain types of services.\(^{161}\)

The ICRC noted that government and NGOs often have “extremely limited” access in most conflict-affected parts of the country, resulting in a limited capacity to respond and restricted access for civilians to services. It was added that the government has the capacity to manage health and other services, but not in all parts of the country, and capacity varies over time and location due to conflict.\(^{162}\)

Colombia possesses an extensive, but unequally distributed, network of hospitals with well-trained staff. Mine/ERW survivors usually receive emergency care, which is free of charge. However, the timeliness and quality remained variable due to a lack of capacity at the community health level.\(^{163}\) Departmental capitals have the capacity to carry out comprehensive surgical and

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\(^{159}\) Interview with Alvaro Jiménez Millán, CCCM, in Geneva, 29 May 2009.

\(^{160}\) UNICEF evaluation conducted by Ana Luz Rodríguez Puentes and Juan Fernando Pachecho Duarte, September 2008.


\(^{163}\) CONPES, “Política Nacional de Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (MAP), Municiones sin Explotar (MUSE) y Artefactos Explosivos Improvisados (AEI)” (“National Strategy for Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AP), Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)”), Bogotá, 16 February 2009, p. 39.
rehabilitation assistance. The Colombian Association for Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation was cited as stating that only some 15% of persons with disabilities received medical care adequate to their condition.164 According to the ICRC, follow-up assistance is more difficult, as “a significant minority are often refused treatment by hospitals, who are either unaware of their obligations or are worried about the financial implications.”165 Referral is not systematic and a lack of financial means, long distances, and ongoing conflict hamper civilian access to these follow-up services. Service providers are strained by the decreased budget allocated by the government for those without private insurance, and reimbursement delays occasionally disrupted service provision.

Rehabilitation centers are usually of good quality, but only available in major cities and few outreach services are available. Services are provided by the government, private centers, and NGOs. In 2008, the Ministry of Social Protection worked on draft standards for prosthetic-orthotic services and on establishing a training program with support from the ICRC,166 and within the framework of the 2008–2012 program to strengthen the integral rehabilitation system, supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency and PAICMA. This program—working with departmental health secretaries in Valle del Cauca and Antioquia, two university hospitals, service providers, and rural health promoters—was in the planning stage in 2008, and implementation and study visits started in February 2009.167

Mine/ERW survivors are entitled to psychosocial assistance for one year after the incident, but services are virtually non-existent. According to PAICMA, however, psychosocial services were not fully developed or implemented.168 Psychosocial services do not exist at community-level hospitals.169 Survivors can access free vocational training at SENA, but these courses are not adapted to the needs or education levels of the mostly rural survivors. Reportedly, only 7,000 of Bogotá’s 100,000 persons with disabilities had access to public education.170 Economic reintegration opportunities for mine/ERW survivors are limited, even though these are, in principle, included in the ruta de atención. It was said in 2009 that “only a negligible percentage of weapon contamination victims are currently benefiting from government or other projects to help them become economically self-sufficient.”171 This is partly because of a lack of expertise and partly because of a lack of awareness.172 PAICMA noted the lack of any systematic income-generating activities, and stated that although the local authorities are crucial in these activities, they do not know what role they are expected to play.173

Mine/ERW survivors and the families of those killed by these devices can claim one-time government compensation and reimbursement of treatment costs within one year of the incident under various legislative frameworks. The most recent decree is Decree 3990 of October 2007, which meant to streamline procedures.174 However, the complexity of procedures “often

169 Information from Magda Portilla, CCCM, 15 March 2009.
174 For more detailed information see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 271.
hinder[s], rather than improve[s], access to services.” Both PAICMA and operators noted that Decree 3990 encountered problems since its implementation started in 2008. The most common problems were: the stricter definition of who is eligible; more documentary proof needed; shorter timeframes in which documents need to be furnished by authorities; and a reduction of time for rehabilitation. In addition, the same awareness problems remained, as did gaps for transport and accommodation. Service provision was extended to cover more medical services and to make the provision of mobility devices to children less time-bound, but gaps remained, particularly for psychosocial support and economic reintegration.

The military provides health and rehabilitation services to its personnel, but the level of services differs between professional soldiers and those performing military service. The military is not able to provide sufficient socio-economic reintegration or pensions to professional soldiers who then often need to turn to charities and civilian services.

Colombia has specific legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but its implementation is limited due to a lack of capacity, coordination, and leadership. On 30 March 2007, Colombia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol. As of 1 July 2009, Colombia had not ratified the convention.

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives
Colombia is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors. Colombia presented its four 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. The objectives have not been updated since; four equally broad objectives have been elaborated in the 2009–2019 strategy. PAICMA stated in 2009 that the objectives reflect the actions taken under the ruta de atención and PAICMA’s activities.

Most of Colombia’s objectives related to data collection and the development of strategies. Progress was made on all objectives, but the actual benefits for survivors remain to be seen. In 2008, PAICMA acknowledged that the objectives were not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound), but also said VA was incorporated into larger programs for conflict victims or poor people, such as the ruta de atención.

A VA expert from Colombia was present at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings from 2006–2009 and at meetings of States Parties from 2006–2008. VA experts also participated in workshops held in Managua, Nicaragua in February 2009 and April 2005. Colombia included detailed information on plans in the statements it made at all intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties between 2005 and 2009 and in Form J of its Article 7 reports from 2005–2009.

Victim assistance activities
There are many assistance providers in Colombia; only those providing updated information have been included below.

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177 HI, Analysis of Decree 3990 of 2007, Medellín, 2008; and information from Magda Portilla, CCCM, 15 March 2009.
181 Ibid.
182 Interview with Zoraida Delgado Sierra, PAICMA, Bogotá, 24 April 2008.
183 A detailed list of VA operators in Colombia is available from PAICMA. CONPES, “Política Nacional de Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (MAP), Municiones sin Explotar (MUSE) y Artefactos Explosivos Improvisados (AEI)” (“National Strategy for Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AP), Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)”), Bogotá, 16 February 2009, p. 13.
In 2008, PAICMA worked on increasing awareness about VA services for service providers, authorities, and survivors through workshops and meetings; some 105 survivors in Santander and 150 local authority service providers in Huila and Caquetá were reached. PAICMA also stimulated training on the ruta de atención through other channels and supported some survivors identified during meetings or through data collection in accessing assistance (see above).\(^{184}\)

Of the 139 survivors monitored by PAICMA in the first half of 2008, only 86 received medical assistance covered by FOSYGA and 62 received compensation through Acción Social.\(^{185}\)

Within the framework of EC funding for RE and VA in 2008, the departmental government of Antioquia monitored assistance and referral of 247 survivors, cooperated on psychosocial support in five municipalities with the University of Antioquia, visited 15 municipalities to promote the establishment of survivor organizations, and organized awareness-raising workshops in 59 municipalities.\(^{186}\)

No formal prosthetic-orthotic curriculum exists in Colombia, and in 2008–2009 work was undertaken to establish a course by the Ministry of Social Protection, SENA, and the ICRC. Additionally in 2009, three technicians started courses at the Don Bosco University in El Salvador, and several others started distant learning courses.\(^{187}\)

In 2008, the CCCM ended its cooperation with the Spanish NGO Moviment Per la Pau (Movement for Peace) and in 2009 entered a partnership with Mercy Corps (with funding from the US Agency for International Development, USAID) for a three-year VA project. In 2008, the CCCM opened a farm in Girón (Santander department) where survivors can live and work during their rehabilitation.\(^{188}\) After winning a USAID tender, Mercy Corps started VA activities in 2009. The work includes construction of a rehabilitation facility in the departmental hospital of Nariño.\(^{189}\)

In 2008 and 2009, US Department of State funded the CCCM RE projects in Antioquia.\(^{190}\)

CIREC continued to provide physical rehabilitation (center-based and through “rehabilitation brigades”), socio-economic assistance to survivors, as well as capacity-building and peer support through its Seeds of Hope groups. Some 513 prostheses and 3,478 orthoses were produced; the rehabilitation brigades assisted 624 people; and peer support groups operated in 42 municipalities. CIREC also organized awareness-raising workshops on disability and the ruta de atención. In 2008, CIREC organized a patient evaluation of its services: some 81% were satisfied with the treatment they had received, 92% with the staff competencies, and 71% with the quality of mobility devices provided.\(^{191}\) The US Department of State has partnered with CIREC’s Seeds of Hope project since 2006 supporting medical brigades and association development in 10 municipalities.\(^{192}\)

In 2008, the national secretariat of Pastoral Social provided individual psychosocial support for survivors and their families in five southern departments and organized workshops for the affected communities. It assisted 93 survivors and another 171 family or community members.

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\(^{185}\) CONPES, “Política Nacional de Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (MAP), Municiones sin Explotar (MUSE) y Artefactos Explosivos Improvisados (AEI)” (“National Strategy for Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AP), Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)”), Bogotá, 16 February 2009, p. 37.


\(^{187}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by PAICMA, 13 May 2009.


\(^{190}\) Email from Stacy Davis, US Department of State, 2 September 2009.

\(^{191}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by CIREC, 2 July 2009.

\(^{192}\) Email from Stacy Davis, US Department of State, 2 September 2009.
Pastoral Social also assisted 97 survivors and 64 family members with the administrative process to apply for assistance.193

In 2009, the ICRC reported that of the 2,420 civilian casualties recorded between 2000 and 2008, the ICRC had provided economic support and/or medical support to 936 (39%).194

In 2008, the ICRC continued its awareness training on the ruta de atención for community leaders, teachers, and local and departmental authorities, combined with RE messages, in some 32 municipalities. First-aid refreshers and trauma care training were provided to more than 400 health staff. The ICRC paid for transport and accommodation during medical or physical rehabilitation for some 331 weapon-injured people.195 In 2008, the ICRC supported five physical rehabilitation centers, assisting 14,370 persons with disabilities, including assisting 152 mine/ERW/IED survivors with prostheses and 18 with orthoses. It covered the full cost of treatment for 103 of these survivors. Training and facility upgrades were also supported.196

In 2008, HI continued to expand and diversify its VA activities to provide more comprehensive assistance. It developed quality guidelines for integral assistance, facilitated access to services, and raised awareness among service providers. HI also built the capacity of survivors and persons with disabilities to participate in community coordination/representation and increased their involvement in the management of assistance provision. It also continued its community-based rehabilitation for persons with disabilities and technical advice to the Fundación REI rehabilitation center. In 2008, 124 survivors, including 14 injured in 2008, received multiple services: all received psychosocial support, 90 received physical rehabilitation, 40 peer support, and three economic reintegration assistance; 217 medical care services and 96 mobility devices were covered. An additional 480 persons with disabilities received physical rehabilitation (and 150 of these also received psychosocial support).197

During 2008, the OAS facilitated the assistance of and covered the treatment, accommodation, and transport costs for 77 mine/ERW survivors at CIREC. In coordination with PAICMA, the OAS also supported vocational training for 35 survivors at SENA. Of those 35, five had found employment by July 2009 and 11 had received financial assistance to start their business.198

**Support for Mine Action**

In April 2009, Colombia reported that it would cost an estimated $78 million to cover mine action needs for the period 2009–2012, with $66.3 million projected to come from national funding sources—42% of the total requirement from the Ministry of Defense, and 23% from the Ministry of Welfare—and $11.7 million from other sources, including international assistance.199

**National support for mine action**

In official budget reporting, Colombia reported contributing COP1.884 billion ($942,000) to national mine action programs in 2008, as reported by the National System for Evaluation of Public Sector Performance (Sistema Nacional de Evaluación de Resultados de la Gestión Pública), the Department of Planning’s monitoring and evaluation division.200 PAICMA reported contributions of COP2.771 billion ($1,385,500) in national funds for mine action in 2008, but did not provide details to compare to Department of Planning figures.201 National funds are allocated under the project entitled “Implantación del Programa Nacional de Prevención de Accidentes por Minas Antipersonales y Atención a Víctimas” (“Implementation of the National...
Program for the Prevention of Antipersonnel Mine Accidents and for the Care of Victims”). In its Article 7 report covering 1 January 2007 to 31 March 2008, Colombia reported a government commitment of COP2.665 billion (about $1,327,500) for the national mine action program for July 2007–June 2008.\(^{202}\) As of August 2009, the Department of Planning reported a national commitment of COP2.937 billion ($1,468,500) for 2009.\(^{203}\)

For the implementation of VA between 2009 and 2012, some COP63.991 million ($31,996) in national resources was budgeted, mostly coming from the Ministry of Social Protection.\(^{204}\) In its 2009–2019 strategy, PAICMA mentioned that from 2008 to 2019, Colombia would spend COP155.110 million ($77,555) on 1,682 civilian survivors (this equals less than $50 per person). Additionally, COP258.194 million ($129,097) was allocated to psychosocial and economic support for 2,799 military and civilian survivors during the same period.\(^{205}\)

National funding as reported by the Department of Planning evidently does not include funds directed through other budget sources such as the ministries of defense and foreign affairs. As a result, it is not possible to assess national funding levels against the levels called for in Colombia’s Article 7 report for 2008. These average $16.6 million per year based on a total requirement of $66.3 million for the four-year period. In its Article 7 report for 2007, Colombia reported a commitment of $41 million in national funding over four years. It has not since reported on further contributions to make up shortfalls in reported national funding.\(^{206}\)

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, nine countries and the EC reported providing $9,139,472 (€6,206,351) to mine action in Colombia. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was 4% more than reported in 2007.\(^{207}\) Past statements by Colombia have suggested that the lack of effective control of mine-affected areas, rather than international funding levels, is the main hindrance to meeting its Article 5 deadline.

Funding to Colombia at 2008 levels appears adequate for supporting clearance of areas under military control. No estimates have been provided on what is needed to clear the other mined areas where incidents occur. Funding to RE and VA appear insufficient to meet needs in these areas.

**2008 International Mine Action Support to Colombia: In-Kind\(^{208}\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Form of In-Kind Support</th>
<th>Monetary Value (where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Training of 25 mine clearance personnel at</td>
<td>$202,232 (€137,330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong> $202,232 (€137,330)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{202}\) Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2008.

\(^{203}\) SINERGIA, “Programas de prevención de accidentes por minas antipersonal y atención a víctimas” (“Program for the prevention of antipersonnel mine accidents and victim assistance”), www.sigob.gov.co.

\(^{204}\) CONPES, “Política Nacional de Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal (MAP), Municiones sin Explotar (MUSE) y Artesufrs Explosivos Improvisados (AEI)” (“National Strategy for Integral Action against Antipersonnel Mines (AP), Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)”), Bogotá, 16 February 2009, p. 65.


\(^{206}\) Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2008.

\(^{207}\) Of EC funds committed in 2007 and reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2008, €700,000 ($959,770) was allocated in April 2008 to a tender issued for the LIS.

\(^{208}\) Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Colombia: Monetary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>ICRC, Mi Sangre Foundation, Moviment Per la Pau, UNICEF</td>
<td>RE, VA</td>
<td>$1,885,153 (€1,280,153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>OAS, CIREC, CCCM, iMMAP, POLUS Center</td>
<td>Mine clearance, RE, VA</td>
<td>$1,503,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>CCCM, Norwegian Red Cross</td>
<td>Advocacy, integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,419,200 (NOK8,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Oxfam, Spanish Red Cross</td>
<td>RE, VA</td>
<td>$1,323,963 (€689,065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Santander University Hospital, PAICMA</td>
<td>VA, mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,142,034 (¥117,735,476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>CIREC, Mi Sangre Foundation</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$698,354 (€474,232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$324,582 (C$345,999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>CINAMA, HI</td>
<td>RE, VA</td>
<td>$249,642 (CHF270,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$121,210 (€82,310)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** $8,937,240 (€6,069,021)

In addition to the above, HALO reported $200,000 in funding from the Reid Lawlor Foundation in 2008 to support impact assessment projects.

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209 Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; emails from Stacy Davis, US Department of State, 2 September 2009; Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Policy Assistant, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009; and Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; emails from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; and Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.

210 Email from Guy Willoughby, HALO, 8 September 2009.
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 November 2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 1,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 November 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Mined and battle area clearance: 0.55km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>575,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $12.4 million (2007: $5.9 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 November 2002. National implementation legislation is under consideration in the Parliament. In May 2006, the DRC reported that it had completed its stockpile destruction. It continues to find and destroy additional stockpiled mines each year. There were credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC by non-state armed groups at least until 2004, and by Ugandan and Rwandan government forces in 2000.

The DRC has made limited progress in identifying and clearing mined areas from its territory since becoming a State Party. The extent of contamination remains unclear, and the UN has noted the lack of significant progress in treaty implementation.

The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre recorded 1,696 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (705 killed and 991 injured) in the DRC between 1999 and 2008, although data collection remained limited and many more casualties are thought to exist. Risk education has been conducted by international and national NGOs working in partnership since 2002, and has increased each year.

Despite having developed objectives to increase victim assistance by 2009, as part of its commitment to achieve the aims of the Nairobi Action Plan, mine/ERW survivors have received little assistance since 2004. Due to ongoing conflict, poor healthcare services, an under-resourced rehabilitation sector, and few opportunities for psychological assistance or economic reintegration, survivors received limited or no support services.

Mine Ban Policy

The DRC acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 2 May 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 November 2002. The National Commission to Fight Antipersonnel Mines was created in 2002.¹

The DRC submitted its latest Article 7 transparency report on 22 May 2009, covering calendar year 2008. It has submitted six previous reports.²

¹ Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2003; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 325.
The DRC has not enacted domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. In its May 2009 Article 7 report, it stated that the process of developing legislation had been “paralyzed” by internal political problems, which have had “grave repercussions” on the functioning of national institutions. However, it also said the legislation was still under consideration by the Lower House of Parliament, before being sent to the Senate and then the President for promulgation, noting that it hoped to complete the process in 2009.

The DRC attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made statements on stockpile destruction, mine clearance, and victim assistance. It did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

The DRC has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

The DRC is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 18 March 2009 during a special event at the UN in New York. It had not ratified the convention as of 1 July 2009.

Production, use, stockpiling, destruction, and retention
The DRC is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. While government forces used antipersonnel mines in the past, Landmine Monitor has not received any allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces since the DRC acceded to the treaty. There were credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC by non-state armed groups at least until 2004, and by Ugandan and Rwandan government forces in 2000.

In May 2006, at the Standing Committee meetings, the DRC informed States Parties that it had completed the destruction of all 2,864 stockpiled antipersonnel mines it had been able to identify, thus fulfilling its treaty obligation to destroy stocks by 1 November 2006. It stated that if more stockpiled mines were discovered later they would be destroyed in a timely fashion.

Since May 2006, the DRC has destroyed newly discovered or seized antipersonnel mines on many occasions. In its May 2009 Article 7 report, the DRC listed 631 additional mines destroyed during 2008, all of them reportedly turned over by national armed forces (Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC) personnel at Kabinda, Lubao, and Lufalanga, as well as the Kamina military base. The report does not explain whether the mines were discovered among FARDC arsenals or were discovered or seized from other sources. The stockpiles consisted of the following mines: 267 M35, 110 NR413, 100 TM-500, 78 Z1, 72 No. 4, one M18, one AUPS, one No. 2, and one TS-50. The DRC also reported destruction of more than 1,000 additional mines in 2007 and 2006.

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3 Article 7 Report, Form J, 22 May 2009. In its May 2008 Article 7 report, the DRC had reported “new momentum” in development of national implementation laws, and stated that in 2007 a bill on the prohibition of mines was presented to parliament for “assessment.” Article 7 Report, Forms A and J, 20 May 2008. In its April 2007 Article 7 report, the DRC stated that the government had restarted the process of adopting the basic texts relevant to application of the treaty. Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2007.
6 See Uganda and Rwanda chapters in this edition of Landmine Monitor. In earlier years, there were also credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC by the armed forces of Burundi and Zimbabwe.
7 See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 326–327. The DRC representative in May 2006 did not indicate the date on which the DRC considered the program completed. The 2,864 mines destroyed included mines held in the military regions, mines recovered from non-state armed groups, and mines abandoned across the country. Apparently, it only included seven mines (Claymore type) held by the armed forces. The DRC’s Article 7 reports seem to indicate that 2,662 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed from 2002 until the end of 2005. The mines were destroyed by HI, Mechem, and MAG.
8 Article 7 Report, Form G, 22 May 2009.
In its May 2009 Article 7 report, as in its previous report, the DRC stated that information on retained mines was “not yet available.”\(^{10}\) It is still not clear if this indicates the DRC is considering retaining or has already retained an unspecified number of mines for training and research purposes.

**Non-State Armed Groups**

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs), both Congolese and foreign, remain active in the country.\(^{11}\) Landmine Monitor found no allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by any group in 2008 or the first half of 2009. Disarmament and demobilization of former NSAG combatants continued.\(^{12}\) As noted above, the DRC reported additional mines destroyed during 2008, but did not report specifically on mines surrendered by or seized from NSAGs.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

The DRC is affected by mines—both antivehicle and antipersonnel—and ERW. Contamination is from UXO, possibly still including unexploded submunitions,\(^{13}\) as well as from significant quantities of abandoned explosive ordnance. The precise extent of contamination is unknown due to the lack of a nationwide general survey\(^{14}\) although, as of November 2008, a total of 2,004 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) had been identified.\(^{15}\)

Contamination is said by the government to exist across the territory, but is predominantly found in the east, north, and part of the south of the country.\(^{16}\) In November 2008, the UN declared that the provinces of Equateur, Katanga, North Kivu, Province Orientale, and South Kivu were the most affected. The DRC’s latest Article 7 report also includes Maniema in a list of the most affected provinces.\(^{17}\) The UN also stated that, “more and more dangerous areas are being reported in Kasai Oriental and Occidental.”\(^{18}\)

**Casualties**

In 2008, the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMacc) reported 14 mine/ERW casualties (three killed and 11 injured). The casualties were seven men, one woman, five children (four boys and one girl), and no details were provided for one casualty. At least six were civilian casualties and details for the others were not recorded. At least three incidents were caused by ERW; for the others the device was unknown. Three incidents occurred in South Kivu province and one incident each in the provinces of Kasai Occidental, Katanga, North Kivu, and Oriental. This was a decrease compared to 2007 when 28 new mine/ERW casualties (four killed and 24 injured) were reported in 11 incidents in the DRC.\(^{19}\)

Due to delays in data collection, however, it is possible that the 2008 casualty figure will increase in future reporting, as in previous years, including 2007, for which UNMacc had reported 22 casualties.\(^{20}\) Casualty reporting remained inconsistent. In 2008, UNMacc informed Landmine Monitor of three people killed in April while tampering with a hand grenade, but

\(^{10}\) Article 7 Report, Form D, 22 May 2009.

\(^{11}\) Foreign armed groups reported to be active or present in DRC as of June 2009 included the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), the Interahamwe (Rwanda), and the Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda). For details of the disarmament process, see *Landmine Monitor Report* 2006, pp. 328–330.

\(^{12}\) See, for example, “MONUC hands over weapons to the FARDC,” MONUC, 15 May 2009, monuc.unmissions.org.

\(^{13}\) DCA deminers have documented the presence of cluster munition remnants in the villages of Kasu, Katelwa, and Est Agrico in Kabalo territory. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “Africa and the Oslo Process to Ban Cluster Munitions,” Cluster Munitions Coalition Fact Sheet, September 2008, p. 2. In 2008, HI cleared unexploded submunitions in the east of the DRC.

\(^{14}\) See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form C, 22 May 2009.


\(^{16}\) Ibid.

\(^{17}\) Article 7 Report, Form C, 22 May 2009.


\(^{19}\) UNMacc IMSMA database query in email from Madieng Ndiaye, Roving Operation Officer, UNMacc, 22 April 2009; and IMSMA analysis in email from Salim Raad, Deputy Program Manager, UNMacc, 15 June 2009.

\(^{20}\) Landmine Monitor identified 28 casualties in 2007, 22 of which were recorded by UNMacc. See *Landmine Monitor Report* 2008, p. 285.
these casualties were not included in the UNMACC total for 2008. No further explanation was provided.\textsuperscript{21} UNICEF reported that there were 10 mine incidents during October 2008 to January 2009: this does not correspond with UNMACC records.\textsuperscript{22}

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009: at least one boy was injured while playing with ERW in North Kivu, as of 15 June.\textsuperscript{23}

As of June 2009, the total number of casualties recorded by UNMACC in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) from 1964 to the end of 2008, was 2,184 (931 killed and 1,247 injured; six people who were neither killed nor physically injured were also included in the database).\textsuperscript{24} Reflecting the inconsistencies in data and reporting for the DRC, it was also reported that the 2,184 UNMACC-recorded casualties occurred between 1996 and 2008.\textsuperscript{25} The UN reported that the current records underestimate the extent of the problem. Total casualty figures for the DRC are expected to “rise dramatically” when information can be collected in areas currently inaccessible due to ongoing conflict.\textsuperscript{26}

From 1999 to 2008, UNMACC recorded 1,696 casualties (705 killed and 991 injured).\textsuperscript{27} The majority of casualties were men (782 including four deminers), followed by women (311), boys (205), and girls (88), while the age and/or gender of 315 casualties was unknown. Most casualties were civilian (1,213), while 67 were military and another 421 unknown. ERW caused most casualties (571) followed by antipersonnel mines (554), antivehicle mines (66), cluster submunitions (142), other victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—booby traps—(10), and unknown devices (358).

The main activities at the time of the incident were farming (319), passing by/standing near (245), collecting food/wood/water (221), and hunting and fishing (108). Deliberate tampering caused 68 casualties, traveling (60), household work (31), and tending animals (19). One civilian casualty occurred during a demining accident and 175 casualty activities were recorded as “other” and 322 as unknown. Four deminer casualties and 57 military casualties were reported. The casualty peak occurred between 2000 and 2003 when at least 1,316 casualties were recorded. Most casualties occurred in the provinces of Equateur (381), South Kivu (359), Katanga (170), and North Kivu (168).\textsuperscript{28}

**Risk profile**

People are mainly at risk from UXO, although mines also pose a threat. The highest level of contamination is found from the north of Equateur province to the south of Katanga province, via the two Kasai provinces. Most incidents reported were caused through farming, herding, attempting to transform hazardous items into agricultural, hunting, or fishing tools, collecting water and firewood, and children playing with suspected items.\textsuperscript{29} The state of ammunition stockpiles also poses a significant risk to civilians and explosions have occurred in a number of ammunition storage areas.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, p. 286; and email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 15 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{23} Email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 15 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} An additional five people not physically injured are included in the analysis, bringing the total to 1,701.
\textsuperscript{28} There were many data entry discrepancies in the data provided by UNMACC. Therefore, Landmine Monitor asked UNMACC to provide the summary demographic data reported in this paragraph. Email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 15 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{29} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Rei, Program Manager, MAG, 6 May 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by King Ngoma Kilema, Senior Survey Coordinator, DCA, 23 April 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ramazani Malwilo, Head of RE and Data Collection Section, HI, 14 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Marrion Ngavho Kambale, Coordinator, SYLAM, 21 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{30} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Rei, MAG, 6 May 2009.
Conflict in the Eastern provinces (North Kivu, Maniema, Oriental, and South Kivu) has increased the level of UXO contamination, as well as creating large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). In other areas relative stability is an incentive for refugees based in Zambia, Tanzania, and the Republic of the Congo to return to Katanga and Equateur, two of the most contaminated provinces.\(^{31}\) According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 39,543 refugees returned to the DRC in 2008.\(^ {32}\)

**Socio-economic impact**

According to the UN, the growing number of victims and dangerous areas being reported suggests that the impact of contamination is considerable.\(^ {33}\) The DRC has stated that contamination impedes access to water points, renders agricultural land unusable, endangers the return of refugees and IDPs, and blocks the reconstruction of roads. The existence of antivehicle mines has, for example, prevented Médecins sans Frontières Suisse from accessing the health point at Dungu; the health center at Ikela in Equator province is said to be similarly blocked.\(^ {34}\)

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

In March 2008, the government created two new structures: an interministerial National Mine Action Commission to serve as the national mine action authority and a “Focal Point” in the Ministry of Interior and Security. Both will lead to the establishment of the Congolese Centre for Mine Action, a “technical, operational, and permanent” structure charged with implementing the policies and decisions of the Commission.\(^ {35}\) In the absence of a formal governmental regulatory body, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) manages UNMACC, established in 2002, which is part of the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) peacekeeping mission. UNMACC maintains de facto responsibility for planning, managing and monitoring all mine action activities on behalf of the government.\(^ {36}\)

**Risk education**

Risk Education (RE) is managed by UNMACC. UNICEF funded a position for a Congolese national on UNMACC’s staff to coordinate RE issues beginning in August 2007. From August to December 2008, there was a gap in the contract and no one was responsible for managing RE. As of January 2009, the post was filled again.\(^ {37}\) The RE officer receives training from the deputy program manager.\(^ {38}\)

An accreditation process exists for international NGOs and is to be extended to national NGOs, but this had not happened as of May 2009.\(^ {39}\) The RE officer is in charge of quality assurance of the operators.\(^ {40}\) The national standards for mine action that are being developed by UNMACC include RE, but had not been approved as of June 2009.\(^ {41}\)

RE is included in the monthly mine action coordination meeting organized by UNMACC.\(^ {42}\)

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31 Telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, Community Liaison Technical Advisor, MAG, 23 June 2009.
35 Ibid.
41 Ibid; and telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.
UNMACC’s operational plan includes RE and was developed through consultation with key stakeholders. The goal is a reduction by 50% of new mine/UXO incidents by 2012. The specific RE objectives are: to coordinate RE activities, build capacity, monitor and evaluate RE programs, and the financial management of RE projects. An evaluation is planned for September 2009.

Victim assistance
A focal point for victim assistance (VA) at the Ministry of Health (MoH) was appointed in late 2007. UNMACC’s VA role has been limited, other than data collection. There was some limited collaboration between UNMACC and the MoH on logistics and data management issues. In early 2009, UNMACC was preparing to fill a position for a VA coordinator which would include roles of casualty data management, VA planning and coordination, and liaison on VA issues with the ministries of health and social affairs. Funding for the position was secured by April 2009. As of 17 June 2009, the position had not been filled.

Data collection and management
An evaluation of the UNMAS program in 2008 found that “greater efforts” were needed to ensure reliable data is available to assist mid- to long-term planning. UNMACC has been administering the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database for the DRC. RE activities are entered into IMSMA.

There is no complete nationwide data collection mechanism in the DRC and casualties are believed to be under-reported. Some areas remain inaccessible because of the lack of infrastructure or security constraints.

UNMACC began collecting data on mine/ERW casualties in the DRC in 2002. It collects casualty information through partner organizations, mostly local NGOs and international organizations. The capacity of the organizations involved is variable, and quality assurance from UNMACC is inadequate. No changes were reported in data collection organizations. However, the detail in reporting forms was reduced to match the level of information that could be entered into IMSMA. The 2008 UNMAS evaluation recommended that UNMACC improve distribution of casualty data to VA providers. Health system data does not differentiate mine/ERW casualties from other injured people, although the distinction may sometimes take place in the records of local services.

From January to May 2008, Handicap International (HI) carried out a Preliminary Opinion Collection and Community Impact Survey in Equateur, Maniema, North Kivu, and Orientale provinces. The survey identified previously unrecorded casualties; 54 in North Kivu and six
in Maniema. Data was shared with UNMACC for IMSMA use. UNMACC reported that it received 62 casualty reports provided by HI but that many of the records contained incorrect or incomplete data and required further verification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Synergie pour la lutte antimine (Synergy for Mine Action, SYLAM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Tosalisana</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Action for the Complete Development of Communities (ADIC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureau des Actions de Développement et des Urgences (BADU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Humanitas Ubangi</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eglise du Christ au Congo (ECC-Meru)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handicap International</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial companies</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>The Development Initiative Limited (TDI)</td>
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**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plans**

No strategic mine action plan exists for the DRC. In May 2008, the evaluation of the UN mine action program recommended that UNMACC develop a four- to five-year mine action operational strategy concentrating on the following areas:

- identification of contaminated areas;
- establishment of an action plan for effective prioritization of clearance operations;
- definition of the needs for RE and development of an action plan; and
- development of a meaningful VA policy.

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The UN reported that in 2009, mine action would “emphasize surveying, due to the continuous lack of information, and pay more attention to the overlooked provinces of Kasai Oriental and Kasai Occidental.” As of April 2009, an operational action plan was reportedly being drafted, due to be ready by June. No further progress was reported as of late July 2009.

The DRC has not presented a national VA strategy. In its 2009 Article 7 report the DRC stated that drafting of a VA strategy was ongoing. Yet, in 2007, it was reported that “a plan of action based on the Nairobi Action Plan has been developed.” In 2008, the VA focal point in the MoH declined to provide a copy of the draft plan, and explained that further developments were pending. The UNMACC position for a VA coordinator includes the task of preparing a VA strategy. A recommendation of the 2008 evaluation was for the program to develop “a meaningful victim assistance policy.”

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
The national strategy for growth and poverty reduction was published in July 2006, but it does not refer specifically to the problem of mines or ERW. According to the poverty reduction strategy, the government’s priority activities take account of persons with disabilities. Possible activities include the establishment of a national program for persons with disabilities, improving economic and social circumstances, promotion of education and training, and improving health and mobility of persons with disabilities.

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
In November 2007, the UN stated that although the government “continues to demonstrate commitment to the treaty, there has been no significant progress on implementation. The adoption of national legislation and the establishment of a national mine action authority are still pending.” It repeated this statement in 2008. In November 2008, the DRC declared its firm commitment to implementing the Mine Ban Treaty and claimed that its recent progress had been far more significant, notably through its efforts to set up national mine action structures.

VA, to the extent that it has been included in broader health and disability services in the DRC, has been primarily the responsibility of the MoH, which coordinates the rehabilitation sector through the National Community-Based Rehabilitation Program (Programme National de Réadaptation à Base Communautaire, PNRBC). However, the centers which provide rehabilitation services to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, are managed by NGOs, religious organizations, or private companies and receive support from the ICRC.
National mine action legislation
Two ministerial decrees were issued in 2008, establishing a National Mine Action Authority and a focal point for mine action. A national law, including a legal basis for the mine action program, was planned to be adopted before the end of 2008.73 This had not occurred as of March 2009.74

National management
The demining program in the DRC continues to be managed by the UN, although in 2008 the government appeared to be taking a greater interest in asserting its responsibilities for the program. The focal point system is seen as a positive step but is still at an early stage of development.75

National budget
In 2008, a budget of US$2.9 million was proposed by the Ministry of Interior and Security to support the Focal Point for Mine Action, but this was not approved by the National Assembly. It was planned to reintroduce the budget for the 2010 fiscal year.76

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
National mine action standards (NMAS) were drafted in 2008 with the assistance of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.77 In November 2008, the DRC stated that the standards would be adopted by February 2009.78 As of March 2009, 21 of the 27 planned NMAS had been drafted and a review had started within technical working groups.79 The NMAS were expected to be adopted by the end of 2009.80

Program evaluations
In 2008, UNMAS commissioned an external evaluation of the UN mine action program in the DRC. The purpose of the evaluation, conducted in March–April, was to help define the future course of the program.81 The evaluation concluded that there was a need to “reactivate and reorient the program,” on the one hand, by continuing to encourage the government to establish the necessary capacity to deal with the mine/ERW problem, and, on the other hand, to improve the efficiency of mine action. This implied gaining a better understanding of the extent of contamination as well as being more responsive to the needs of the NGOs and proactively supporting their operations.82

The evaluation report included only a brief review of data collection and VA issues, highlighting the need for increased data collection and sharing of information as well as a severe lack of VA services. The evaluation concluded that establishing specific VA projects for mine/ERW survivors in the DRC was not warranted and that mine action actors should help to ensure that mine/ERW survivors’ needs are met through appropriate programs in the existing health, education, social, and employment sectors.83

75 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salim Raad, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.
77 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salim Raad, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.
80 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Salim Raad, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.
Demining and Battle Area Clearance

In 2008, demining and battle area clearance continued to be carried out by three international NGOs: DanChurchAid (DCA), Handicap International (HI), and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). A new international demining operator, TDI (The Development Initiative Ltd.), a commercial company, arrived in the DRC in December 2008. As of May 2009, it was deploying to Katanga province to carry out general survey and spot explosive ordnance disposal tasks.84 Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) joined DCA in a partnership in February 2009, using a Mini MineWolf machine in Kabalo on DCA tasks.85

Demining and battle area clearance in 200886

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>Unexploded submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>Other ERW destroyed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>323,125</td>
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<td>9,796</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mechem</td>
<td>16,492</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>554,162</td>
<td>23*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49,143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The DRC reported the destruction of only 19 antipersonnel mines during 2008.87

The 2008 UNMAS evaluation identified UNMACC’s quality management as a serious weakness of the demining program. Only the subcontracting agency Mechem seemed to be correctly monitored, 88 although UNMACC conducted six quality management missions in 2008 and a further three in the first quarter of 2009 on DCA projects.89 Neither HI nor MAG had a quality assurance or quality control visit during 2008,90 although in 2009, HI received one visit per month in the first four months of the year.91 HI noted that the lack of quality management capacity impeded the appropriate handover of cleared land.92 In April 2009, UNMACC stated that a new concept of operations would include a “total quality management process.”93

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the treaty, the DRC is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2012.

Demining and battle area clearance: 2004–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>2004</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.20</td>
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</table>

84 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Russell Friend, Program Manager, TDI, 22 April 2009.
85 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Signe Noermose, Desk Officer, Humanitarian Mine Action Unit, DCA, 29 April 2009.
86 Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Signe Noermose, DCA, 29 April 2009; Philippe Houliat, HI, 26 April 2009; and Matthew Willner-Reid, MAG, 6 May 2009. Mechem data is from response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Madieng Ndiaye, UNMACC, 20 April 2009.
87 Article 7 Report, Form G, 22 May 2009.
89 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Signe Noermose, DCA, 29 April 2009.
90 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Reid, MAG, 6 May 2009.
91 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Philippe Houliat, HI, 26 April 2009.
92 Ibid.
In five years of clearance, DRC has cleared only 2.2km² of suspected hazardous areas and has no credible estimate for the extent of contamination. On 27 November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, the DRC declared that it was “superfluous” to consider the need for an extension at this stage but noted the “major obstacles” facing the country in its efforts to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.94

**Risk Education**

In 2008, mine/ERW RE was implemented by national NGOs and accredited international NGOs working in partnership.95 Other national NGOs expanded their spheres of activity to include RE and survey.96 In 2008, the number of beneficiaries recorded in IMSMA was 549,457,97 but the total reported to Landmine Monitor by operators was 575,723. This continues a trend of increasing RE activity over the last five years.98

RE activities include emergency RE, direct RE, training of trainers, and community liaison (CL). Reaching remote and isolated communities has continued to be a major challenge for RE.99

MAG and Humanitas Hubangui, a national NGO, have a network of community volunteers in most of the affected areas, which they provide with notebooks and T-shirts to gather information. When MAG passes through communities, their CL officers collect the information and where necessary, produce dangerous area reports.100 MAG conducts organizational capacity-building for Humanitas Hubangui on both implementing and managing RE with a view to the organization being able to access funding on its own.101 They also conduct RE through the community volunteers, including refugees in transit camps, in Katanga, North Equateur, and South Equateur provinces to a total of 170,600 beneficiaries.102

HI worked in partnership with the national NGOs SYLAM and Tosalisana in Kisangani and Goma to deliver emergency RE, training of trainers to mine committees, local authorities, child-to-child training, and community liaison to a total of 31,462 beneficiaries.103

DCA worked in partnership with ECC-Meru, the national church umbrella organization, Badu and ADIC to conduct RE and community liaison in Katanga, South Kivu and Manjema to a total of 373,661 beneficiaries.104

An RE workshop was held in Bukavu with all operators (except HI, as a fatal accident prevented their participation) in September 2008 to develop a common set of RE materials, including school booklets, leaflets for use in communities during RE sessions and at refugee transit camps, and training aids. They were produced in Swahili, Lingala, and French.105 They were printed and distributed by UNICEF in early 2009.106

The international NGOs report monitoring the activities of their national partners.107

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98 Ibid.
99 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Reid, MAG, 6 May 2009.
100 Telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.
101 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Reid, MAG, 6 May 2009; and telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.
102 Telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.
103 Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Marrion Ngavho Kambale, SYLAM, 21 April 2009; and Ramazani Malwilo, HI, 14 April 2009.
104 Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Matthew Willner-Rei, MAG, 6 May 2009.
105 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by King Ngoma Kilema, DCA, 23 April 2009; and Matthew Willner-Rei, MAG, 6 May 2009.
106 Telephone interview with Raphael Debotte, MAG, 23 June 2009.
107 Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by King Ngoma Kilema, DCA, 23 April 2009; Matthew Willner-Rei, MAG, 6 May 2009; and Ramazani Malwilo, HI, 14 April 2009.

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The 2008 external evaluation of the UN mine action program recommended defining the needs for RE, developing an action plan, revising and harmonizing messages, setting up an accreditation procedure for national organizations, and developing national coordination capacity.\(^{108}\)

There was little RE in the DRC until July 2002. Since then international and national NGOs have conducted RE through a mix of emergency and community-based activities (including setting up community committees, and child-to-child RE), mass media, and CL. Target groups have included at-risk communities, IDPs, and refugees. RE has been conducted in Kisangani and the surrounding areas, north Katanga, North and South Kivu, Equateur, and Orientale provinces.\(^{109}\)

HI started to conduct RE in the DRC in 2002, and was joined by UNICEF, DCA, and Mines Awareness Trust in 2003 and MAG in 2005.\(^{110}\) National NGOs called for capacity-building to create a sustainable RE capacity, and UNICEF and international NGOs responded by providing several training courses and working in partnership with national NGOs.\(^{111}\) In 2006, the number of RE beneficiaries doubled from the previous year, as a result of the doubling number of national NGOs and training by international operators.\(^{112}\) It continued to increase in 2007 with international NGOs increasing the scope of the programs and more national NGOs becoming involved. Yet geographic coverage remained inadequate.\(^{113}\)

In 2004, Mines Awareness Trust seconded an RE advisor to UNICEF who designed a national RE curriculum and materials.\(^{114}\) From 1999–2008, UNMACC recorded 1,423,862 beneficiaries.\(^{115}\)

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be at least 1,247.\(^{117}\) In 2008, VA efforts were stalled by political discord and the consequences of internal conflict on the operation of relevant institutions.\(^{118}\) No specific VA programs exist in the DRC. All assistance has been provided through broader programs for health and persons with disabilities. Accessing rehabilitation services remained challenging. Few other services have been reported by international organizations or local authorities.\(^{119}\)

A lack of resources, combined with looting of medical equipment, has eroded the healthcare system.\(^{120}\) Emergency healthcare in the DRC remained inadequate in mine-affected areas in 2008, and in many places public health services had collapsed. International organizations continued to supplement healthcare, but faced funding shortages. Ongoing conflict hampered


\(^{109}\) See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.


\(^{112}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 299.


\(^{115}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Micheline Magwamboa, UNICEF/UNMACC, 7 May 2009. Data from IMSMA.

\(^{116}\) Ibid.

\(^{117}\) Email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 15 June 2009.

\(^{118}\) Article 7 Report, Form J, 22 May 2009.


relief efforts and simultaneously increased demand for services. The government reportedly provided limited assistance through healthcare facilities and some surgical assistance in coordination with the national community-based rehabilitation program. Government services in areas with mine casualties faced limited finances and lacked technical capacity.

Improvement of physical rehabilitation services remained a serious challenge. PNRBC services remained weak and lacked funding. No expansion of the program, as had been planned, was reported for 2008. PNRBC has struggled to implement activities since its launch in 2002. The PNRBC community-based rehabilitation (CBR) network attempted to integrate data on persons with disabilities in 2008. It faced challenges in equipping and standardizing services at centers.

Limited psychological support services exist in the DRC, despite the needs of people suffering trauma from conflict, particularly sexual violence. Psychological care within the health system is only provided by physiotherapists and social workers with some basic training. Persons with disabilities often found it difficult to obtain economic reintegration assistance including through employment, education, and government services. Limited private and public funds were allocated to schools providing specialized or vocational training for persons with disabilities. No specific economic reintegration services were reported for survivors.

The DRC has no specific legislation for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors. The 2006 constitution contains a general provision protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. But the government has not effectively enforced existing legal provisions. Accessibility of buildings or government services is not mandated by law. Supported by HI, in 2008, local associations for persons with disabilities in Kinshasa worked to develop draft legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, based on the provision in the constitution.

As of 1 July 2009, the DRC had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The DRC stated it had started the accession process in late 2007. In 2008, the treaty text was reportedly translated and distributed nationally to provincial parliaments. Workshops on the convention were held in provinces including Kisangani, and North and South Kivu, with a view to adoption by the national parliament in 2009.


123 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Violaine Fourile, HI, 23 April 2009.


129 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Violaine Fourile, HI, 23 April 2009.


132 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Violaine Fourile, HI, 23 April 2009.


Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

The DRC is one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.135 As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, the DRC presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005; they were subsequently revised in 2006, but no plans to fulfill the objectives were added. Objectives remained largely non-specific.136 As noted above, the creation of a strategic plan to implement the objectives was announced twice in 2007, but was being revised and had not been formally presented as of May 2009.

Landmine Monitor was unable to identify significant progress on any of the DRC’s VA objectives since 2004, other than partial improvement in data collection, the deadline for which elapsed in 2007. In 2008 and 2009, no notable developments were reported on objectives, which were scheduled to be realized by 2009. Challenges appeared to be a lack of coordination, capacity, technical support, and funding. No progress in implementing objectives was reported in 2008, and the only concrete activities reported by the DRC were consultations regarding a VA strategy.137

In 2008, a process support visit was undertaken by the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit on the behalf of the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. The DRC participated in the Nairobi workshop on advancing VA in Africa in 2005. The DRC included a VA or disability expert on its delegation to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2006 and 2007, and at each meeting of States Parties from 2006 to 2009. The DRC used the voluntary Form J attachment to its annual Article 7 report to provide some information on the state of VA in all years from 2005 to 2009.138

Victim assistance activities

ICRC-supported hospitals reported admitting 502 weapon-wounded patients, among them one mine/ERW casualty (0.02% of the total in 2008).139 During the year, ICRC-supported physical rehabilitation centers provided 93 prostheses for mine/ERW survivors (16% of the total) and 11 orthoses for mine survivors (9% of the total).140 The ICRC increased its support from one rehabilitation center in 1999 to five in 2009: Kasai Occidental, North Kivu, South Kivu, and two centers in the capital, Kinshasa.141

HI continued to support the reintegration of persons with disabilities in Kinshasa through its CBR project in cooperation with the urban division of social affairs. The HI CBR project did not operate in coordination with the national CBR program run by the MoH. The HI program identifies persons with disabilities and provides referrals to appropriate medical, rehabilitation, and educational services. Based on its recent data collection activities, HI intends to work with local NGOs to build VA capacity as part of an exit strategy from VA in the DRC by 2011. Through the HI program, one mine/ERW survivor received a referral for prosthetics assistance in 2008.142

No data from the MoH on beneficiaries of the PNRBC was available due to a lack of adequate data collection.143

140 Ibid.
142 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Violaine Fourile, HI, 23 April 2009.
143 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Masuga Musafiri, MoH, 22 April 2009.
Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in the DRC. There is no long-term strategic plan for mine action, including resource mobilization strategies. In November 2007, the DRC stated that development of a strategic plan through to 2012 was one of two national priorities for mine action. UNMAS reported that such a strategy was planned for 2008, along with capacity development for a transition away from UNMACC management. No such plan was reported complete as of July 2009.

National support for mine action
The DRC did not report national funding to mine action in 2008, as in 2007.

International cooperation and assistance
In 2008, six countries reported providing $12,407,357 (€8,425,476) to mine action in the DRC. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was roughly 110% more than reported in 2007. In US dollar terms, funding to the DRC has risen every year since 2003. However, as in previous years, given that the full extent of the landmine problem is not known, it is not possible to assess the adequacy of overall funding for mine action.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing agencies/organizations</th>
<th>Project details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>MAG, UNMAS</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$4,196,640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>MAG, SRSA</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$3,569,346 (SEK23,497,996)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,719,375 (DKK8,750,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,193,142 (€810,228)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Data collection, RE, mine action coordination</td>
<td>$911,561 (£491,540)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$817,293 (€555,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$12,407,357 (€8,425,476)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In March 2009, Japan made a contribution of ¥762 million ($7,391,400) to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action for mine action in the DRC and Chad. It did not differentiate the amounts dedicated to Chad and the DRC, but in May 2009, Chad reported that at least $5,586,000 of Japan’s contribution would be allocated to technical survey and clearance programs in Chad. This would leave not more than about $1.9 million in funding to the DRC, to be applied to survey, rapid response capacity, and VA programs.

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146 Email from Salim Raad, UNMACC, 17 June 2008.
147 Emails from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; Amb. Lars-Erik Wingren, Department for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009; Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; and Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of the Congo (Congo) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 November 2001. It has not enacted national legal measures to implement the treaty. Congo reported completion of destruction of its stockpile of 5,136 antipersonnel mines in September 2003, but 4,000 additional mines were found in 2009 and destroyed.

Congo is contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants, but the presence of emplaced mines has not been confirmed. In May 2009, Congo announced that it was seeking international assistance to conduct technical survey of its mine-suspected region, close to its border with Angola, in order to meet its Article 5 deadline of November 2011.

Landmine Monitor has identified 25 ERW casualties (14 killed, one injured, and 10 unknown) and no mine casualties between 1999 and 2008, though under-reporting is likely. There are no specific victim assistance programs and limited services for persons with disabilities.

Mine Ban Policy

Congo acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 May 2001, becoming a State Party on 1 November 2001. It indicated as early as September 2002 that legislation had been drafted to implement the treaty domestically, but this still had not occurred as of mid-2009.\(^1\)

Congo submitted an undated Article 7 report in 2009 covering calendar year 2008. It submitted four previous reports, the most recent in April 2007.\(^2\)

Congo attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but did not make any statements. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it intervened on mine clearance. It has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

No mine use has been reported in Congo since 1997, when mines were used during its civil war.\(^3\) Congo is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In September 2003, Congo reported the destruction of its stockpile of 5,136 antipersonnel mines.\(^4\)

In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Congo reported that it had discovered 4,000 antipersonnel mines (2,500 PPM-2 and 1,500 PMN) in an abandoned warehouse and destroyed them on 3 April 2009 in Mongo-Tandou. Congo reported that an additional 508 POMZ-2 mines were awaiting destruction.\(^5\)

\(^{1}\) Article 7 Report, Form A, 12 September 2002. In November 2007, Congo stated that it required assistance from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in order to draft national legislation. In August 2008, the GICHD reported that support had been provided. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 294. No further progress on national legislation has been reported, including in Congo’s Article 7 report submitted in 2009.


Mines Advisory Group (MAG) oversaw the destruction of the 4,000 mines along with a local explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team. It said that the mines came from the Pointe-Noire regional stockpile and that the destruction was witnessed by the Minister of Defense, 100 international representatives, and members of the press. MAG stated that a further 509 POMZ mines would be destroyed in the coming days at the Pointe-Noire Foundry. Previously, in June 2008, MAG told Landmine Monitor that between December 2007 and the end of May 2008 its teams destroyed 83 antipersonnel mines among other items of ordnance and ammunition from storage areas in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire.

In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Congo stated that it retained 322 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, after it used 50 mines (30 PPM-2 and 20 POMZ-2) in the April 2009 destruction of the newly discovered stockpile. Previously, in November 2007, Congo had cited a figure of 372 mines retained. It has not provided details on the intended purposes of its remaining retained mines.

Congo is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Congo signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo on 3 December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Congo is significantly contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), both abandoned explosive ordnance and UXO. The problem results from civil conflict in 1993–1999. There are many areas of ERW contamination, and even the capital, Brazzaville, is reported to have an area of 260,000 m² still contaminated with UXO. The threat includes cluster munition remnants. Unsafe explosive ordnance storage conditions also increase the likelihood of fires or explosions at ammunition storage areas; these have already occurred several times.

MAG, the only international demining operator in Congo, has conducted surveys in Brazzaville and Dolisie, on sites where civilian incidents have occurred as a result of ERW. Preliminary findings indicated that incidents continued to occur due to the encroachment of communities onto contaminated land for housing, agriculture, and other livelihood activities. At one of the sites, items of UXO, including unexploded submunitions, were scattered on open ground being cultivated. MAG expects that battle area clearance (BAC), and possibly demining, will be required.

Yet the exact extent to which Congo is affected by antipersonnel mines remains unknown. According to its Article 7 report covering April 2003 to April 2004, “the border zone with Angola in the southwest of the country is mine suspected.” Its latest Article 7 report, covering calendar year 2008, indicated “no change” in the situation on the cover page. As previously reported by Landmine Monitor, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) believes that the mine problem—to

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6 Mines Advisory Group, “4,000 anti-personnel landmines destroyed,” 6 April 2009, www.alertnet.org. MAG said the explosive charges from the POMZ mines were used as priming charges to destroy the 4,000 mines, and that the bodies of the POMZs would be melted at the foundry.
7 Email from Anna Kilkenny, Programme Manager, MAG, 27 June 2008.
8 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. The mines are: 66 German PPM-2, 50 Soviet PMN-58, 156 Soviet POMZ-2, and 50 Soviet PMD-6.
14 Ibid.
16 Article 7 Report, Form C, 4 May 2004; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 357.
17 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form C.
the extent one exists—is limited to an area 60km in diameter between the unclearly marked
borders of the Cabinda enclave (Angola), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Congo.18

In February 2008, MAG carried out a survey in Kimongo district suspected to be contaminated,
along the border with Cabinda. The findings of the survey “did not confirm a current mine threat
on the Republic of Congo side of the border,” but MAG hoped to carry out additional spot
verification to validate the results.19 This did not subsequently occur.20 In May 2009, Congo
informed the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action
Technologies that surveys had not identified any new victims since the 1970s, although the
indigenous populations had claimed “without much evidence” that mines were present.21 In
2006, it was reported that civilians in the suspected areas were reluctant to return to their
communities to carry out forestry and farming as “they have not received any guarantees for
their security from the authorities.”22

Casualties
A representative of the Ministry of National Defense told Landmine Monitor that there had not
been any mine or ERW casualties in Congo in 2008 or 2009, as of 27 May.23

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Congo is not known. Landmine Monitor has
identified 25 ERW casualties (14 killed, one injured, and 10 unknown) between 1999 and 2008.
No mine casualties were identified. The last incident was in May 2006, when a person was killed
by ERW.24 In 2003, approximately 10 UXO casualties were reported; all were treated at the
ICRC-supported military hospital in Bangui.25 In 2001, a man and boy were killed and a woman
injured in an ERW explosion. In 2000, 11 children were killed while playing with a shell in a
school playground.26 However, it is possible that there is significant under-reporting, given the
lack of an effective data collection system.

In October 2008, MAG stated that it was conducting surveys in Brazzaville and Dolisie, in
areas where ERW incidents have occurred. However, no further details were available regarding
what information they had gathered.27

Program Management and Coordination

There is no national mine action authority or mine action center, although a colonel serves as the
mine action focal point within the Ministry of National Defense.

National ownership
Congo has demonstrated some commitment to mine action, but so far progress in meeting its
Article 5 obligations has been slow. Some surveys of the suspected region have been conducted
by the Ministry of Defense at its own cost. Otherwise, clearance operations have been conducted
through MAG with international funding.

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures
National mine action legislation has not been adopted.28 MAG has its own standing operating
procedures for BAC and EOD.29

19 Email from Anna Kilkenny, MAG, 7 April 2008.
20 Ibid.
21 Statement of Congo, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action
26 Ibid.
29 Interview with Adam Komorowski, Regional Head of Operations, MAG, Manchester, 28 April 2009.
Demining and Battle Area Clearance

MAG is the only operator conducting BAC and EOD in Congo. In the capital, Brazzaville, and in the country’s second largest city, Pointe-Noire, MAG trained and supervised two teams of technicians from the armed forces in the use of techniques to destroy small arms and light weapons, including man-portable air-defense systems, air-to-air missiles, rockets, and landmines.30 Between December 2007 and May 2008, MAG destroyed 18 cluster munitions, containing submunitions, during stockpile destruction activities.31

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Congo is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2011. In May 2009, at the Standing Committee meetings, Congo stated that it had “not even considered the possibility” of seeking an extension, but noted that its deadline was fast approaching.32 It has requested the assistance of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining in applying land release principles to the suspected region, therefore seeking to avoid the conduct of expensive clearance operations in areas which are not actually contaminated.33

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown. There are no specific victim assistance (VA) policies or activities in Congo. Survivors receive the same limited services as other persons with disabilities. However, the Ministry of Health is responsible for mine/ERW survivors,34 and the Ministry of Social Affairs is the lead agency for disability issues.35 The Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security and the National Social Security Fund are responsible for disability pensions.36

Emergency and continuing medical care is poor, with only two doctors and nine nurses per 10,000 people in 2004.37 The ICRC continued to provide medicines, supplies, supervision, and training to eight health centers in Pool, which are gradually transferring to government responsibility.38

There is a National Prosthesis Center in Brazzaville, but this is difficult to access for persons outside of the capital.39

In 2009, the National Union of Congolese Disabled (Union Nationale des Handicapés congolais, UNHACO), which works with persons with disabilities in Congo, said that “the situation of disabled people in Congo has made significant advances,” citing increased recruitment of persons with disabilities in the public sector and greater public funds.40 However,
they called on government to improve its rehabilitation and accessibility policies. In May 2009, the Chinese Ambassador donated equipment to UNHACO as a gesture to facilitate friendship between the organization and the Federation of the Disabled in China. Other organizations that have assisted persons with disabilities include the Congolese Federation of People with Disabilities (Fédération Congolaise des Personnes Handicapées) and the Federation of Disabled Women (Fédération des Femmes handicapées).

There are few socio-economic reintegration services for persons with disabilities. With 50% unemployment among the active population, economic prospects for persons with disabilities are difficult. There is a limited disability pension for those with “a loss of at least 2/3 of capacity for work.”

Congolese law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities, but these provisions were rarely enforced. There were no laws requiring accessibility. Congo signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol in 2007, but neither had been ratified as of 1 July 2009.

Support for Mine Action

International cooperation and assistance

No international funding was reported for Congo in 2008. In 2007 and 2008, the United States funded MAG technical survey and destruction of disused military stockpiles, consisting of obsolete and surplus weapons and munitions. The US contributed US$675,000 to the program in 2008 and US$445,000 in 2007. As the MAG survey and destruction program focuses on small arms and light weapons other than antipersonnel mine stockpiles, US support in 2007 and 2008 is not included in reported mine action funding for Congo. As of December 2008, MAG listed the US and the United Kingdom (via the Conflict Prevention Pool) as “current donors” to its program in Congo.

France reported contributing mine clearance training for Congolese personnel in 2007, valued at $12,829 (€9,357).
CÔTE D’IVOIRE

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Côte d’Ivoire became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 December 2000. It submitted its initial Article 7 report in May 2004, three years late. It has not enacted national legal measures to implement the treaty. Côte d’Ivoire has stated that it has never used, produced, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, even for training purposes. Côte d’Ivoire is not believed to be affected by mines but may have a residual problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW). From 1999–March 2009, 23 ERW casualties were identified (nine killed and 14 injured) in five incidents. No formal risk education activities have been recorded since 1999. Access to health and disability services is problematic and has deteriorated since the 2002 coup.

Mine Ban Policy


Côte d’Ivoire has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training). Côte d’Ivoire has reported that it has never used, produced, or exported antipersonnel mines and has no stockpile, even for training purposes.3 In 2006, a commander with the former non-state armed group, New Forces, stated they had not used mines either.4 Côte d’Ivoire is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Côte d’Ivoire signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.5

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1 In its Article 7 reports submitted in 2005 and 2006, Côte d’Ivoire stated, “Legislation for domestication of Land Mine Ban Treaty to follow.” An official stated in March 2006 that a draft bill was being reviewed by the office of the Prime Minister and was expected to be submitted to the National Assembly. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2007, Côte d’Ivoire stated that the status of national implementation legislation had remained unchanged since 2006.
2 Côte d’Ivoire has submitted five previous reports: in 2008 (for the period 1 May 2007 to 30 April 2008); in 2007 (an undated cover page, for the period 9 August 2006 to 30 April 2007, indicating that all areas of reporting were unchanged); 25 April 2006; 27 April 2005; and 27 May 2004. Its initial report was three years late.
4 Interview with Cmr. Koffi Ferdinand, Communications Director, Armed Forces of the New Forces, Bouaké, 28 March 2006.
5 For further details on its cluster munitions policy, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice, Mines Action Canada, May 2009, p. 64.
Scope of the Problem

There is no evidence that Côte d’Ivoire is affected by landmines. In its Article 7 reports, Côte d’Ivoire has reported no areas in which antipersonnel mines were confirmed or suspected. There is, however, a sporadic threat from ERW, as evidenced by several incidents in 2008 involving civilians, particularly children.

In 2008, at least 18 new ERW casualties were reported in two incidents, including seven people killed and 11 injured, in Bondoukau town (eastern Côte d’Ivoire) and in Yamoussoukro city (central Côte d’Ivoire). All casualties were civilians, mostly children (15) tampering with the devices. Compared to 2007, when two military personnel were injured, the increase is due to one incident causing 14 casualties.

Two other ERW incidents have been recorded since 1999: one in 2005 when two children were killed by ERW and one in 2003 when a soldier was injured. No new ERW casualties were reported from January–March 2009.

In addition, on 29 September 2008, an ammunition storage area belonging to the Armed Forces of the New Forces exploded near the commercial center in Bouaké, injuring seven soldiers. It is not known whether this created a UXO problem in the vicinity.

Program Management and Coordination

The situation in Côte d’Ivoire does not warrant a specific mine action strategy or authority. Disability issues are under the responsibility of the Ministry of Family, Women and Social Affairs and the Federation of the Disabled. Casualty data is reported by national media, Handicap International (HI), and the police (gendarmerie), with HI noting that data collection is not a priority for the health sector.

Risk Education

As of 2009, mine/ERW risk education was not considered needed in Côte d’Ivoire because officially there was no contamination. In all Article 7 reports submitted by Côte d’Ivoire from 2004–2009, Form I was marked as “not applicable.” Landmine Monitor reported some informal risk education activities provided by the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and Force Licorne in Bouaflé (in 2005), by the Club Union Africaine, the ICRC, and the Canadian Embassy (in 2002), and general awareness campaigns from 1999–2001.

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7 See, for example, Article 7 Report (for the period 9 August 2006 to 30 April 2007), Form C; and Article 7 Report (for the period 1 May 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form C.
12 Landmine Monitor media monitoring from January to March 2009; and email from Sylvain Ricard, Program Director, HI, 18 February 2009.
16 Email from Sylvain Ricard, HI, 18 February 2009; and telephone interview with Michel Broux, Program Coordinator, Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit, UNDP, 13 March 2009.
17 Article 7 Reports, Form I: (for the period 1 May 2003 to 31 March 2004); 25 April 2005; 25 April 2006; (for the period 9 August 2006 to 30 April 2007); (for the period 1 May 2007 to 30 April 2008); and (for the period 1 May 2008 to 30 April 2009).
Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is 21. ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities, but the overall health and humanitarian situation is fragile and access to services continued to be limited in 2008. Existing disability legislation was not enforced. In September 2008, the governmental National Institute for the Training of Health Workers (Institut National de Formation des Agents de la Santé) launched a four-year program to train specialized rehabilitation personnel—the first program of this kind. After nine years of presence, HI phased out its operations in Côte d’Ivoire in February 2009 because of lack of funding. As a result, no international organizations working on disability remain present in the country.

As of 1 July 2009, Côte d’Ivoire had not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, which it signed on 7 June 2007.

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21 Telephone interview with Dominique Delvigne, Operational Coordinator, HI, 27 March 2009.
CROATIA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Landmines and ERW, including submunitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>954.5km² (1 January 2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Original deadline: 1 March 2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area released by survey: 29.78km²</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>Approximately 14,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National: $45.3 million (2007: $45.6 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Croatia became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999. It completed destruction of its stockpile of 199,003 antipersonnel mines in October 2002. It initially indicated it would retain 17,500 mines for training and research purposes, but reduced this number to 7,000 in 2000, and has since consumed more than 900 mines. Antipersonnel mines were occasionally used in criminal activities in Croatia up to 2003. National implementation legislation, including penal sanctions, was enacted in October 2004. Croatia served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from 2000–2002, and co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from 2002–2004. Croatia hosted regional mine action conferences in 1999 and 2002 and served as President of the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2005.

Croatia is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Contamination includes a significant problem of cluster munition remnants. Croatia has made steady progress in demining 239km² in the decade to 2008 and releasing another 613km² through technical survey and other methods of land release. Croatia was unable to meet its Article 5 clearance deadline, however, and in 2008 requested and was granted a 10-year extension through March 2019.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 214 mine/ERW casualties (75 killed, 137 injured, and two unknown). The main provider of risk education over the last 10 years has been the Croatian Red Cross, but there has also been strong input from local communities with numerous NGOs, associations and theaters involved. The Croatian Mine Action Centre has been responsible for coordinating risk education since 2003.

Over the last decade there has been an improvement in emergency medical care, an increase in psychosocial counseling services, and the adoption of the National Strategy of Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities 2007–2015. In May 2009, however, despite being one of the VA26 countries with significant numbers of mine survivors, Croatia admitted that victim assistance progress since 2005 had been largely “cosmetic,” lacked follow-up and, so far, had not made any “real changes” in the lives of survivors.
Mine Ban Policy


Croatia attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and made several statements on mine clearance. It also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it made a statement on mine clearance and another detailing how it has used its retained mines.

Croatia submitted its annual Article 7 transparency report on 10 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008. It included voluntary Form J, reporting on casualties, victim assistance, and risk education. Croatia has submitted 10 previous Article 7 reports.

With respect to interpretation and implementation of the treaty, Croatia has said that the transit of antipersonnel mines across Croatian territory by other states will not be tolerated. With respect to antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes, Croatia informed States Parties in May 2006 that it had removed the tilt rods from its TMRP-6 antivehicle mines. It said that it “fully subscribes” to the statement in a Landmine Monitor Fact Sheet that “a mine that relies on a tripwire, breakwire, or tilt rod as its sole firing mechanism should be considered an antipersonnel mine.” Croatia has not yet made known its view on the issue of joint military operations with states not party.

Croatia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It submitted an annual report as required by Article 13 on 30 September 2008. Croatia is party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.


Production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Croatia has regularly stated that it has never produced antipersonnel mines. It inherited stocks from the former Yugoslavia. There have been no reports of Croatia ever importing or exporting antipersonnel mines.

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1 The Law on Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction was approved by parliament on 1 October 2004 and by the president on 6 October 2004. Article 9, Section IV of the law provides penal sanctions. Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 June 2005.

2 Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 June 2005. It consists of representatives from the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, interior, and justice, as well as CROMAC.


6 Statement of Croatia, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 12 May 2006. It said, “Moreover, in order to make the agreement on this issue even stronger, we would like to point out that, although TMRP-6 mines do not rely on tilt rod as its sole firing mechanism, and in that sense do not constitute antipersonnel mines, we decided to take a step further and remove tilt rods from these mines so as to exclude every possibility for these mines to be activated by persons. This means that now all TMRP-6 mines in Croatia can be used exclusively as anti-vehicle mines which can only be detonated by pressure force of 250–300 kilos.” In addition, in February 2006, a Ministry of Defense official stated that the Croatian company Agencija Alan had removed TMRP-6 mines from its website and all of their sales catalogues. The ICBL had expressed the view that the sale of TMRP-6 mines with tilt rods would constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. For more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 354.


8 See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form E, 10 April 2009.
Croatia completed the destruction of its stockpile of 199,003 antipersonnel mines on 23 October 2002, in advance of its treaty deadline of 1 March 2003. Six types of mines were destroyed in three phases. An additional 45,579 mine fuzes were destroyed during the stockpile destruction program.

Croatia also possesses 19,076 MRUD Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, which it does not classify as antipersonnel mines. It has repeatedly said these mines cannot be activated by accidental contact, but has not reported on what steps it has taken to ensure that these mines can only be used in command-detonated mode.

Mines retained for research and training
Initially, Croatia announced that it would retain 17,500 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, but in December 2000 decided to reduce this number to 7,000. Croatia reported that it retained 6,038 antipersonnel mines at the end of 2008. The mines are stored at the Croatian Armed Forces storage site, Jamadol, near Karlovac, and “are used or going to be used by the Croatian Mine Action Centre.” In 2008, a total of 65 mines were destroyed in the testing of demining machines by the Croatian Centre for Testing, Development and Training.

In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2008, Croatia used expanded Form D on retained mines to state that, “Based on the current needs for testing of demining machines in year 2008, we estimate that the following amount [175] of anti-personnel mines will be used (and consequently destroyed) in year 2009.” This was the same amount estimated for 2006, 2007, and 2008.

Scope of the Problem
Contamination
Croatia is affected by landmines and— to a much lesser extent—ERW, a legacy of four years of armed conflict associated with the breakup of the former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. Mines were laid mainly to protect defensive positions on lines of confrontation, which changed frequently, but also in areas of strategic importance such as railway lines, power stations, and pipelines.

At the end of 2008, the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) estimated the total suspected hazardous area (SHA) at 954.5km², affecting 111 towns and municipalities. Mined areas are still present in 12 of Croatia’s 21 counties, including the agriculturally fertile region of Slavonia.

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9 Article 7 Report, Form F, 28 April 2006. The mines destroyed included: PMA-1 (14,280); PMA-2 (44,876); PMA-3 (59,701); PMR-2A/2AS (74,040); PMR-3 (4); and PROM-1 (6,102).
10 Article 7 Report, Form F, 28 April 2006.
11 Email from Capt. Vlado Funaric, Ministry of Defense, 22 February 2006; and Statement of Croatia, “Claymore-Type Mines,” Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 16 May 2003. Claymore-type mines used in command-detonated mode are permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty, but are prohibited if used with tripwires.
13 Statement of Croatia, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 25 May 2009; and Article 7 Report, Form D, 10 April 2009. The mines included: 763 PMA-1; 1,238 PMA-2; 1,255 PMA-3; 893 PMR-2A; 70 PMR-3; and 1,819 PROM-1.
14 Article 7 Report, Form D, 10 April 2009.
15 Ibid. The mines destroyed included: 30 PMA-1A; 15 PMA-2; 10 PMA-3; 4 PMR-2A; and 6 PROM-1. Croatia provided details on how many of which types of mines were used for each of the four demining machines tested (Casper SMT-01, Mini MineWolf, MV-4, and MV-10) and for training exercises in detection and removal of UXO.
16 See annual Article 7 reports, Form D.
17 Article 7 Report, Form D, 10 April 2009.
19 Interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, Head of Department for Planning and Analysis, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009.
which also has oil and natural gas reserves. CROMAC included in its overall estimate some 4.6km² contaminated with KB-1, MK-1, and BL-755 unexploded submunitions left from the conflict in 1991–1995 and affecting 16 towns and municipalities in eight counties.

In 2008, Croatia reported that 82 military facilities covering 2.8km² are contaminated with a further 65,521 antipersonnel mines and 1,697 antivehicle mines. There is also a problem with UXO found around military storage facilities and the public occasionally reports items of abandoned explosive ordnance.

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified nine landmine casualties (three killed and six injured); all were adult men, including three deminers. CROMAC reported seven of these casualties, in six incidents resulting in the death of one civilian and one deminer and causing injuries to three civilians and two deminers. From media reports Landmine Monitor identified two additional landmine casualties, one death and one injury, both men. Both incidents happened while the men were grazing their animals. This is a slight increase from the eight casualties identified in 2007, but a decrease compared to 2006 (13) and 2005 (20).

Landmine casualties continued in 2009 with two reported (one death, one injury) as of 14 July. On 31 January, a man was killed in Sisak-Moslavina county while hunting. On 17 February, a man was injured in Osijek-Baranja county while collecting wood.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 214 mine/ERW casualties (75 killed, 137 injured, and two unknown), including a Dutch tourist injured in 2005 and an Italian tourist killed in 2007. During the same period, CROMAC reported 201 casualties (71 killed, 128 injured, and two unknown). Information on an additional 17 casualties (two killed, four injured, and 11 unknown) was gathered from the Croatian Mine Victim Association (CMVA) and media reports.

Recent casualty figures have been consistently lower than the 59 casualties reported in 1999. CROMAC stated the fewer casualties were reported in 2008 than any previous year.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Croatia is not known. CROMAC recorded 1,908 casualties between 1991 and July 2009, a decrease from the 1,951 registered casualties held by CROMAC for the period from 1991 to 2007, as reported in 2008. The discrepancy is probably the result of a review in 2008 of casualty data for incidents prior to 1998. CMVA, prior to ceasing operations in 2007, had collected data on 2,244 mine/ERW casualties between 1990 and January 2007.

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21 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, Assistant Director, CROMAC, 18 August 2009.
22 Article 7 Report, Form C, 10 April 2008; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 317.
23 Email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 5 June 2008.
27 CROMAC casualty data received by email from Goran Gros, Adviser for Planning and Analysis, CROMAC, 14 July 2009.
28 Based on updated CROMAC casualty data received by email from Goran Gros, CROMAC, 14 July 2009. Updated information reflects CROMAC’s efforts to verify or complete data on casualties in previous years. The Landmine Monitor figures use CROMAC data for all years, except for 2004, 2005, and 2006, when Landmine Monitor reported additional casualties not identified by CROMAC.
29 Article 7 Report, Form J, 29 April 2009.
31 CROMAC casualty data provided by email from Goran Gros, CROMAC, 14 July 2009.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid, p. 309.
Risk profile
Men are most at risk, accounting for the majority of casualties. Recent casualties have occurred while grazing, hunting, and collecting wood. Refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) are also at risk. The PROM-1 mine caused 42.8% of incidents. All recent incidents occurred in clearly marked areas. All SHAs are marked.

Socio-economic impact
Around 800,000 people—18% of the population—live in 111 towns and municipalities (out of a total of 556) that are affected by mines and ERW. Up to 22,000 people remain refugees or internally displaced and the return of many of these individuals to their homes is hampered by the presence or suspected presence of mines.

Of the total SHA, forest accounts for 566km² (57%), arable land for 140.7km² (14%), meadows and pastures 108.2km² (11%), and underbrush and karst (limestone areas characteristic of a certain region of the former Yugoslavia) 108.7km² (11%). Mine-affected agricultural and forest areas are a major economic problem. The total loss to agriculture is estimated at €44 million a year (approximately US$65 million) and Croatian Forest Ltd. assesses the value of wood resources that cannot be used because of mines at €178 million ($262 million). Additional losses flow from the inability to maintain and renew forests. Croatia has made safety for tourism a priority, but some subsectors continue to be affected, particularly “hunting tourism.” Suspected mined areas account for more than 100km² of national park land or nature reserves.

Program Management and Coordination
Mine action
CROMAC was established by the Croatian government on 19 February 1998 as the umbrella organization for mine action, responsible directly to the government for coordinating mine action. The CROMAC council, appointed by the government, is the governing and advisory body for CROMAC. The council consists of a president, appointed by the prime minister, and 10 members, appointed from the concerned ministries. The council meets at least quarterly.

Risk education

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35 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, pp. 61–72.
37 Interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009.
38 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, p. 21.
39 Email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 20 August 2009.
40 Ibid; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, p. 6.
41 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, pp. 7 and 33.
42 Ibid, p. 6.
46 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 14 August 2009.
CROMAC holds coordination meetings with representatives of institutions and associations performing RE where they present their plans and reports. However, stakeholders have identified a need for improved coordination between government organizations and NGOs to facilitate planning, monitoring, and mobilization of resources.

Victim assistance
Since 2006, CROMAC has been responsible for coordinating victim assistance (VA), in cooperation with other government ministries and NGOs. This role mainly consisted of semi-annual coordination meetings to exchange information, which few stakeholders attended. The CROMAC staff person responsible for VA had limited expertise in VA or disability-related matters.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a Special Advisor for Mine Action who provided updates on VA implementation at international meetings.

The Commission for Persons with Disabilities, located in the Ministry of Family, Veteran’s Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity, is the focal point for monitoring implementation of the National Strategy of Equalization of Possibilities for Persons with Disabilities 2007–2015. An Ombudsperson for Persons with Disabilities was appointed on 9 June 2008, although the office did not start functioning until October 2008.

Data collection and management
CROMAC plays a leading role in collecting data on contaminated areas and manages the database on suspected mined areas, which includes the results of general and technical surveys. CROMAC sends updated maps of suspected mined areas to more than 50 local government departments and to organizations that require them. In 2008, CROMAC sent 877 maps of mine-affected counties and towns, 533 mine situation maps in response to specific requests, and 1,808 maps with data on newly identified and released SHAs. CROMAC has also developed maps marking the location of areas affected by cluster munition remnants.

Despite plans to “completely update the CROMAC database, incorporating information from other databases as required by the end of 2006,” in May 2009 Croatia stated that it still lacked a consolidated disability database and that data spread among “7–8” databases was only partially complete and “only partially useful.”

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47 Ibid.
48 Statements by Dijana Pleština, Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration; Marija Breber, Director, MineAid; and Milena Horvat, Assistant Minister, Ministry of Health and Social Protection, “Minutes from the 19 March 2009 MRE/VA coordination meeting,” Zagreb, provided by email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009.
51 Interview with Dijana Pleština, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
54 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, p. 8.
55 Statement by Mirko Ivanusic, CROMAC, “Minutes from the 19 March 2009 MRE/VA coordination meeting,” provided by email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009; and email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009.
In 2008 and 2009, CROMAC was the main entity collecting data on new mine/ERW casualties although its mandate was restricted to those incidents that occurred within the boundaries of suspected mined areas. CROMAC reported that casualty data was collected primarily to define mined areas as well as for VA purposes, although no further information was provided about these purposes, and a representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration was unable to identify them. In March 2009, the lack of a clear definition of a mine casualty was raised as an obstacle preventing the consolidation of casualty data, and plans were made to approve a definition at CROMAC’s next VA coordination meeting.

As of May 2009, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare had information on 343 civilian mine casualties, as part of its efforts to register trauma casualties in the Croatian Trauma Register. It was reported that the information for registered casualties was complete, but that information on past casualties not already in the database was not actively being sought.

CMVA recorded casualties in every part of the country, including outside the CROMAC monitoring areas, until it ceased to operate in early 2007. In 2008, Landmine Monitor reported that most of the CMVA data had been lost and that existing data was incomplete.

In October 2007, the local NGO MineAid requested funding support to undertake a survivor needs assessment as part of a larger VA program, but no funding was provided in 2008.

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### Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>Croatian Red Cross</td>
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<thead>
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<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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60 Statement by Mirko Ivanusic, CROMAC, “Minutes from the 19 March 2009 MRE/VA coordination meeting,” provided by email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009; and email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009. No date was available for the next coordination meeting.
Plans

Strategic mine action plan
Croatia has conducted mine action in accordance with a 10-year National Mine Action Strategy approved by Parliament in 2000. CROMAC prepared a new strategy for 2009–2019 as part of Croatia’s request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline, which was submitted in June 2008 and approved by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.64

In July 2009, the government approved a three-year plan for 2009–2011 that aims to reduce the SHA by 219.5km² through demining and general survey. Nearly one-quarter of the area will consist of tasks that are safety priorities and more than one-half will be linked to socio-economic development plans. The plan projects that demining costs will amount to about HRK1 billion ($207 million) and will be financed by the state budget, World Bank loans, public companies, and donations.65

CROMAC planned in 2007 to create a new VA strategy, but as of May 2009 had made no progress.66 In June 2007, Croatia passed the National Strategy of Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities 2007–2015, which coordinates all programs that relate to persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, and seeks to raise standards to an international level.67 In May 2009, Croatia reported that there was a lack of political will to implement the strategy.68

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
Planning and prioritization of mine action is undertaken at the municipal and county levels, based on maps and data of confirmed and suspected mined areas sent by CROMAC twice a year. Municipalities submit their demining priorities to county authorities who take account of development plans in setting regional demining priorities. From these, CROMAC drafts annual plans for approval by ministries and then by the government. Public companies with projects in suspected mined areas are obliged to include mine action in their budgets.69

CROMAC gives priority to tasks that promote public safety, contribute to socio-economic development, as well as “ecological priorities,” notably protection and preservation of forests and natural parks where the presence of mines can prevent effective firefighting. With this system, Croatia has almost completely removed the danger to transport infrastructure and major tourist destinations, as well as removing the threat to housing and areas immediately surrounding communities.70

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Croatia’s national budget has been the most important source of financing for its demining. Together with national investors, Croatia provides more than 80% of funds for clearance operations from national sources.71 Yet the pace of demining has been slower than planned and in 2008 Croatia requested the maximum extension period allowed by the treaty.

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64 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, p. 34; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 303.
65 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 18 August 2009; interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009; and email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, 20 August 2009.
71 Interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009.
VA has been coordinated through CROMAC without international technical or financial support. Most VA services, especially medical care and physical rehabilitation, were carried out using national technical capacity and funds. However, there was no national educational capacity to train prosthetic technicians to internationally recognized standards.

**National mine action legislation**

The Law on Humanitarian Demining was adopted in 2005 and entered into force on 5 January 2006. It has been amended twice: a 2007 amendment more clearly defined mine action staff roles and responsibilities and a second amendment in 2008 clarified responsibilities for quality control (QC). According to the law, the Croatian army is responsible for clearance of all military areas.

**National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures**

Croatia does not have national mine action standards, but under the auspices of its national legislation Croatia has adopted Rules and Regulations on Methods of Demining to guide the demining program. CROMAC’s standing operating procedures (SOPs) are said to be in line with the International Mine Action Standards, and cover: survey and marking of mined areas and/or buildings; project planning; eligibility assessment for demining operators; and quality assurance (QA) and QC of demining.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

In 2008, 27 commercial companies and one international NGO, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), carried out demining. These organizations used a total of 617 deminers (46 more than in 2007) and 70 support staff, 50 demining machines, and 44 mine detection dogs (MDDs). The Croatian army cleared 152,956m² of contaminated land on some of the 82 affected military sites, which include military bases, training and storage sites, radar stations, and an airport.

Throughout 2008, an average of 257 deminers, 13 demining machines, and four MDD teams were involved in demining operations. The cost of demining in 2008 (i.e. clearance and survey) averaged HRK7.78 per m² ($1.59), without value-added tax. This represented a cost reduction of 8.1% compared with 2007, a result of working on bigger tasks in agricultural areas where demining machines could be used.

**Identification of hazardous areas**

CROMAC survey teams continued in 2008 with the project started in 2006 to resurvey the entire suspected mined area in Croatia. General survey by CROMAC in 2008 reduced the suspected mined area by 9.4km².

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72 Article 7 Report, Form J, 29 April 2009.


79 Article 7 Report, Form C, 10 April 2009.

80 Interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009.

81 Ibid.


with international standards. Demining operators conduct technical survey in a procedure called “mine search.” CROMAC still issues clearance certificates for those tasks.\(^{85}\)

CROMAC plans to use technical survey to reduce the SHA in protected forest areas such as national parks and nature reserves. These are the areas for which there are no records of minefields or mine emplacement but which were identified as suspect as a result of general survey. CROMAC expects to start in 2010, after amending legislation to make technical survey of these areas possible and after preparing specific SOPs. CROMAC expects technical survey will reduce the total suspected mined area by a further 377km\(^2\).\(^{86}\)

CROMAC is responsible for marking and fencing mined areas. Croatia’s Article 5 deadline extension request states that it has marked all SHAs,\(^{87}\) making it one of the few countries in the world to have done so. CROMAC reported that as of December 2008, it had placed a total of 14,986 mine signs around SHAs, having added 461 mine signs during the year.\(^{88}\)

**Mine clearance in 2008**

In 2008, operators released a total of 33.11km\(^2\), including 20.88km\(^2\) that was released by technical survey, up from 12.75km\(^2\) in 2007, and 12.23km\(^2\) that was manually demined. In the process they destroyed 1,808 antipersonnel mines, 2,627 antivehicle mines, and 3,617 items of UXO.\(^{89}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km(^2))</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>Area reduced by technical survey (km(^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 Commercial companies</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>1,787</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>20.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,263*</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian army</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.23</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,808</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,627</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,617</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.88</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* NPA’s UXO clearance results included 25 unexploded submunitions.\(^{91}\)

**Quality Assurance/Quality Control**

Under the 2006 Law on Humanitarian Demining (as amended), CROMAC was obliged from 5 January 2008 to ensure the presence of a demining monitor at all worksites on a daily basis. CROMAC had a problem allocating sufficient staff, but eventually managed to organize daily visits by the monitor, and weekly visits by the QA inspector to every open task.\(^{92}\)


\(^{86}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, p. 36.

\(^{87}\) Ibid, p. 21.

\(^{88}\) Interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009.


\(^{90}\) Email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009. Results reported by NPA differ from those reported by CROMAC. NPA reported to Landmine Monitor that during 2008 it released 101,835m\(^2\) of suspected mined areas through mine and battle area clearance and a further 531,754m\(^2\) through technical survey. Email from Vanja Sikirica, Deputy Program Manager, NPA, 22 May 2009; and email from Kristina Ikić Banicek, Advisor for International Cooperation and Donations, CROMAC, 24 August 2009.

\(^{91}\) Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 22 May 2009.

\(^{92}\) Interview with Zeljko Piscenec, Deputy Manager for Quality Control, CROMAC, Sisak, 29 February 2008; and interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009.
Quality assurance of demining operations in 2008 was conducted by 12 QC officers, who checked 338 completed tasks, and by 23 QA monitors, who made 3,778 sample checks on 587,939m² during 918 QA visits.93

**Progress since becoming a State Party**
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Croatia was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. On 2 June 2008, however, Croatia submitted a request for a 10-year extension.94

The request estimated that at the beginning of the extension period, in March 2009, Croatia would have 944km² of suspect land, meaning that it would reduce its total SHA through clearance and technical survey by 53km² in 2008.95 Croatia missed the target by 10.5km² as CROMAC and operators released a total of 42.5km² in 2008 and bringing the total SHA area down to 954.5km².96

The request projects that Croatia will release 410km² of land through clearance and the rest through general (210km²) and technical (377km²) survey. This calls for clearance that peaks at 56km² in 2010, and will average 41km² a year for the coming decade, levels well in excess of anything achieved so far.97

The request also foresees a substantial rise in mine action demands on national financial resources. Croatia projects total costs for completion at €740 million ($1 billion), of which €490 million ($722 million) or 66% of the total is to come from the state budget.98 The request envisaged a rise in the state’s annual contribution from €22.5 million in 2008 to an amount variously reported as €33 million and €53 million in 2010.99

The Ninth Meeting of States Parties approved the request but the Analyzing Group noted that, while the plan presented is workable and ambitious, its success was contingent on Croatia doubling its average annual financial contribution to demining and on the development of a methodology to address forested areas suspected to contain mines. The Analyzing Group considered the plans contained in the request to be comprehensive and complete, but said additional clarity could result from defining some key terms, using them consistently, and incorporating (into the goals for the extension period) clearance of the 3.24km² around military barracks100, training grounds, technical warehouses, radar stations, and airfields.101 An ICBL critique of the application noted Croatia in the past has set realistic targets and largely achieved them but found the extension request “optimistic.”102

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95 Ibid.
96 Interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009.
98 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, pp. 7, 37. However, the request also presents figures (Table 5, p. 53) which project total costs at €683 million and the contribution from the state budget at €458 million.
100 This is the area requiring clearance at the time the Extension Request was drafted. Clearance operations in 2007 and 2008 reduced it to 2.81km².
101 Analysis of Croatia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 22 October 2008, p. 4.
### Demining from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)*</th>
<th>Area released by survey (km²)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>12.23</td>
<td>30.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>27.12</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>24.77</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>27.18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>33.68</td>
<td>142.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>31.83</td>
<td>252.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>30.85</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12.69</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9.81</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>14.33</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>224.49</td>
<td>613.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures prior to 2008 are taken from Croatia’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request and differ significantly from figures previously provided to Landmine Monitor.*

Demining operations in the last 10 years resulted in the destruction of 46,430 mines, including 26,570 antipersonnel mines and 19,860 antivehicle mines, as well as 202,166 ERW. In addition, the Croatian army destroyed 1,826 antipersonnel mines, 2,473 antivehicle mines, and 44,406 ERW in areas around military barracks, training grounds, and facilities.

### Risk Education

In 2008, RE was mainly conducted by the Croatian Red Cross (CRC), but also by NGOs, theater groups, the police, and CROMAC.

Information on mine casualties and previous RE activities is used to prioritize RE activities and to ensure even coverage.

A joint initiative by the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs and UNDP called “Less weapons-fewer tragedies,” which combined gathering “war materials” from homes and delivering RE messages through lectures and the media, was reported to have achieved good results.

In August 2008, CROMAC piloted a unique web-based system called the Mine-Information System portal (MISportal), that provides information on suspected mined areas and detailed maps showing the location of mine warning signs. This enables CROMAC to provide updated information and distribute searchable maps widely to the general public. Information from MISportal is available to all Internet users and mine-suspected areas can be searched by county.

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103 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, pp. 15, 17; and interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009.
105 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, p. 16.
106 Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 14 August 2009.
107 Article 7 Report, Form J, 10 April 2009; and email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 14 August 2009.
108 Article 7 Report, Form C, 10 April 2009.
municipality, town, or community.\textsuperscript{109} It is intended that this would be used to inform people planning tourism.\textsuperscript{110} The site has received a high number of hits, particularly during the tourist season.\textsuperscript{111}

### Risk Education Activities in 2008\textsuperscript{112}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographical area</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CRC</td>
<td>Lectures, public events and school-based RE to high risk groups (forest workers, hunters, fishermen, and returnees); 12 safe-play areas in Darla, Solin, and Vinkovci; RE provided along side other community events</td>
<td>12 counties: Brod-Pozavina, Dubrovnik-Neretva, Karlovac, Lika-Senj, Osijek-Baranja, Pozega-Slavonija, Split-Dalmacija, Sisak-Moslavina, Šibenik-Knin, Virovitica-Podravina, Vukovar-Srijem, and Zadar; 49 municipal areas</td>
<td>42 instructors; 688 lectures for 8,775 attendants (1,052 men, 747 women, and 6,976 children)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Civil Victims of Homeland War, CRC, CROMAC, and County Police Administration anti-explosive units</td>
<td>Six “Children in a mine environment” lectures in elementary schools</td>
<td>Osijek-Baranja, Sisak-Moslavina, and Vukovar-Srijem</td>
<td>1,000 estimated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROMAC with police, and the Association of Civil Victims of Homeland War</td>
<td>Lectures in elementary schools, distribution of books, plays, and display of panel “Children in a mine environment”</td>
<td>Osijek-Baranja, Karlovac, and Zadar</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Bembo, Theatre Daska, Scena MM Puppet Theatre, and Pinokio Theater</td>
<td>“Bembo and Friends” project: July 2007–July 2008; six short films, 10,000 picture books, and DVD to elementary schools; 22 theater shows</td>
<td>Osijek-Baranja, Karlovac, and Zadar</td>
<td>4,700 audience for the theater shows</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Neohumanist Studies</td>
<td>Distribution of books</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mine awareness activities were regularly promoted and broadcast through the media.\textsuperscript{113} A new poster was designed, and 2,000 copies were printed and distributed through the CRC. A total of 10,000 “Beware of mines!” picture books were distributed to elementary school students by the Centre for Neohumanist Studies from Karlovac.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{110} Interview with Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, Sisak, 9 February 2009.

\textsuperscript{111} Email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 14 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{112} Article 7 Report, Forms I and J, 10 April 2009; statement by Slavica Marinovic, Vice President, Association of Croatian Civilian Victims of Homeland War; “Minutes from the 19 March 2009 MRE/VA coordination meeting,” provided by email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009; email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009; ITF “Annual Report 2008,” Ljubljana, April 2009, p. 46; and email from Miljenko Vahtarić, CROMAC, 14 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{113} Article 7 Report, Forms I and J, 10 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
The main RE provider over the last 10 years has been the CRC with ICRC support. The Ministry of Education also provided RE with UNICEF support until 2000, when it was integrated into the school curriculum, although it was not implemented systematically. RE has had strong input from local communities, and, by 2006, more than 15 national NGOs, associations and theaters were involved, and four state institutions. By 2003, CROMAC was responsible for coordinating RE. Since 1999, RE has been conducted in all affected counties through training of instructors, presentations, plays, in schools and through mass media and the distribution of materials. By 2007, 54 safe-play areas had been built. From 2006, however, activities had reduced significantly due to decreased donor support.

RE initially focused on children, but by 2003 adults were increasingly targeted as the highest casualty group before swinging back to children by 2007, when they were again the largest number of beneficiaries. Adult target groups included male workers, particularly railway and forestry workers, hunters, farmers, and returning refugees and IDPs.

The CRC reported that traditional presentations were of limited value, and that it was difficult to change behavior. RE activities were combined with efforts to raise funds for demining. RE was also combined with marking during the general survey. Although CROMAC stated that RE should be integrated with clearance operations, NPA was the only organization to do this, through its community liaison activities. In 2007, the continued decrease in mine casualties annually since 2005 was attributed in part to sustained RE efforts, although there was no evaluation to confirm this.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is at least 1,421. In 2008, Croatia stated that survivors were “entitled to health care and orthopedic prosthesis” up to the amount covered by the Croatian Institute for Health Insurance but psychosocial rehabilitation programs and employment opportunities were limited.

By law, healthcare for survivors (as for all Croatian citizens) was free through the country’s well-developed healthcare system. But quality and coverage varied around the country with less access in rural areas and reports of corruption. There was a need to strengthen health...
workforce monitoring and management, improve emergency response, and reform health financing to reduce chronic deficits. A 2008 study by Health Consumer Powerhouse found Croatia’s healthcare system to be “among the worst in Europe,” although the study lacked information for several indicators. Aside from the development of SOPs in 2007 for the evacuation of clearance casualties, as of May 2009 no progress had been made in providing emergency response training to doctors or increasing the number of emergency response medical teams.

The Institute for Rehabilitation and Orthopedic Devices and specialized hospitals provide physical rehabilitation services, which by law are free to survivors. In May 2009, Croatia reported that bureaucratic obstacles to services had been reduced, but were not fully removed. Survivors’ ability to access services thus depended on “where one goes for rehabilitation, connections and sheer luck.” As with healthcare generally, quality and access of rehabilitation remained inconsistent, with fewer services available in rural areas. Croatia lacked the capacity to train prosthetic technicians to internationally recognized standards, although plans were underway to open a government-hosted prosthetics and orthotics school that would seek certification from the International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics by 2011.

The Ministry of Family, Veterans Affairs and Intergenerational Solidarity operates psychosocial counseling centers that survivors can access in every county. The government acknowledged, however, that there were “problems detected in the programs of psycho-social rehabilitation of victims.” Few survivors visited centers, because they were not aware they existed and there were stigmas associated with visiting a mental health center. No progress was announced on the national strategy on mental health for vulnerable groups, including landmine survivors, which was proposed in 2007. The CMVA, prior to its closure in 2007, was the main psychosocial support network for mine/ERW survivors.

While Croatia stated that, in 2008, “various projects of financial assistance and education were enforced with the aim to help mine victims,” it also recognized that there were “problems” in employment for survivors. In 2008, a separate department for persons with disabilities was established within the national employment agency, but just 22% of registered persons with disabilities found employment, a slight decrease from previous years. There was a lack of progress in employing persons with disabilities outside Zagreb. Despite special training for employment agency staff members in 2007, Croatia stated that these staff members lacked

137 Interview with Dijana Pleština, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
141 Interview with Dijana Plešćina, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
143 Article 7 Report, Form I, 29 April 2009.
training to properly match survivors with jobs, causing some survivors to lose their jobs after government incentives ended.146

Registered mine/ERW survivors are entitled to a pension according to their level of disability. In some cases, however, this disability status must be verified annually, a serious challenge to survivors for whom travel is difficult.147 Mine/ERW survivors with a “100% physical impairment” are entitled to a disability pension, a monthly orthopedic allowance, and a pension for a person who cares for the survivor which averaged HRK8,714 ($1,776) a month in 2008. A family disability allowance of 2,694 HRK ($549) a month is provided to survivors’ family members following fatal mine/ERW incidents, although just 74 people were collecting this allowance. Children of people killed in mine/ERW incidents, of landmine/ERW survivors with 100% physical impairment, and child survivors with 100% physical impairment receive affirmative action when applying to educational institutions, student housing, and for scholarships, and are entitled to a grant while enrolled in primary and secondary school.148

Croatia has a highly-developed legal framework related to persons with disabilities, including survivors, with some 200 different laws designed to promote their rights and prevent discrimination.149 Because of a lack of implementation,150 however, discrimination occurred and access to public facilities remained limited.151 Croatia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 15 August 2007.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

As one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate attention to survivors,152 Croatia presented its 2005–2009 VA objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005 and presented revised objectives in April 2007.153 In May 2009, Croatia acknowledged that there had been little progress towards achieving its VA objectives, blaming a lack of political will,154 a sentiment echoed by the leader of a VA organization, who stated that, by the end of 2008, there had been “no fulfilment of Croatia’s 17 objectives.”155

Some limited progress has been seen towards three of the 17 objectives, although none was noted in 2008: develop a strategy for better and stronger cooperation between all interested parties in mine victim assistance by mid-2007; develop SOPs, by 2008, for the evacuation of mine casualties from mined areas; and fully implement the National Strategy of Unique Policy for the Disabled 2003–2006, and develop a new strategy for the period after. Lack of progress in establishing a comprehensive database made it impossible to determine whether or not specific

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146 Statement of Croatia, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 May 2009. Government incentives are provided for the first six months of employment for persons with disabilities.

147 Interview with Dijana Pleština, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.


149 Ibid.


155 Statement by Marija Breber, MineAid, “Minutes from the 19 March 2009 MRE/VA coordination meeting,” provided by email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009.
targets had been reached in providing psychosocial support, vocational training, and income-generation opportunities.\textsuperscript{156}

Croatia included a disability expert on its delegation to the Meeting of States Parties in 2007 and included a mine survivor in its delegation to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings from 2006–2007 and meetings of States Parties from 2005–2008. It reported on progress in achieving VA aims at intersessional meetings in 2005 and 2006 and meetings of States Parties from 2005–2007. Croatia used the voluntary Form J attachment in every Article 7 report since 2005 to provide details on VA activities.

**Victim assistance activities**

In 2008, MineAid implemented two projects to improve access to education for more than 27 landmine survivors and their children.\textsuperscript{157} A regional psychosocial support and rehabilitation center for survivors in Rovinj, originally planned to open by mid-2006, was not yet operational by May 2009. The center, previously referred to as the Duga Center, had been renamed to Model of Active Rehabilitation and Education, and planned to expand its target population to include a broader category of traumatized and vulnerable population, along with mine/ERW survivors.\textsuperscript{158} No other survivor-specific activities were identified.

**Support for Mine Action**

Croatia’s Article 5 deadline extension request includes a cost estimate for completion of mine clearance between 2009–2018 totaling €740 million ($1 billion) but it identified sources of funding for only €715 million. Of the total required, the state budget is projected to cover €490 million or 66%, with national investors covering 18%, European Union funds covering approximately 5%, and national and other donors and financial intitutions (including the World Bank) covering the remaining 7%.\textsuperscript{159}

**National support for mine action**

In its Article 7 report for 2008, Croatia reported that the state budget accounted for 56% of overall mine action funding in 2008, compared to 56.5% in 2007.\textsuperscript{160} As reported by CROMAC, however, total annual funding for 2008 was HRK320,137,524 ($65,276,041/€44,327,069), of which HRK158,086,839 ($32,233,906) was provided from the state budget, with state administered bodies such as forestry, highway, utility and water authorities covering a further HRK64,230,612 ($13,096,622). National sources of funding thus totaled HRK222,317,451 ($45,330,528), or 70% of overall funding.\textsuperscript{161} National funding from the state budget and legal entities totaled HRK245,655,863 in 2007.\textsuperscript{162}

The 2009 mine action plan reported that funds totaling HRK289,666,001 ($59,062,898) had been allocated from the Croatian state budget for mine action in 2009. National funds included loans of HRK42,100,000 ($8,604,580) taken by Croatia to support socio-economic recovery of mine-affected areas. Funds were allocated to management and administration, clearance, medical services, salaries, training and equipment, facilities, and socio-economic recovery.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{156} Statement of Croatia, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 May 2009; and statement by Marija Breber, MineAid, “Minutes from the 19 March 2009 MRE/VA coordination meeting,” provided by email from Natasa Matesa-Matekovic, CROMAC, 18 February 2009.


\textsuperscript{158} Interview with Dijana Pleština, Zagreb, 25 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{159} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 June 2008, p. 37. The request also presents figures (Table 5, p. 53) which project total costs at €683 million and the contribution from the state budget at €458 million.

\textsuperscript{160} Article 7 Reports, Form C, 10 April 2009; and Form C, 30 April 2008.


According to the 2009 plan, HRK318,157,000 ($64,872,212) was secured for mine clearance operations in 2009, of which the state budget accounted for 55.3% (HRK175,977,000/$35,881,710), compared to 50.1% in 2008. State administrative bodies accounted for 17.7% of funds, donations for 13.7%, and loans for 13.2%.164

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, seven countries reported providing $6,574,631 (€4,464,641) to mine action in Croatia, approximately 11% more than international funding reported in 2007. CROMAC reported international donations in 2008 totaling HRK51,910,070 ($10,584,463) against a projection of HRK63,800,000 ($13,008,820). Thus, in US dollar terms, donations were roughly 19% less than projected.165 In May 2009, Croatia reported that “in order to fulfill the plan to remove the mine threat” by 2019, it was necessary for Croatia to access more funding via EU pre-accession and structural funding mechanisms.166

2008 International Mine Action Funding to Croatia: Monetary167

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$2,490,519 (NOK 14,039,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance, survey, RE, VA</td>
<td>$2,027,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Arbeiter Samritter Bund</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,178,080 (€800,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>CROMAC</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$517,749 (¥53,376,202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$147,260 (€100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$108,972 (€74,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$104,555 (€71,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** $6,574,631 (€4,464,641)

In 2008, the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance (ITF) allocated $5,627,109 (18%) of its funds to Croatia.168 In 2007, the ITF allocated $3,189,527 (13.81%) of its funds to Croatia.169

In February 2009, Croatia signed a cooperative agreement with Yemen, under which Croatia will provide equipment to support clearance operations in Yemen, and the two countries will exchange technical expertise in areas related to treaty implementation. The types of equipment and value of in-kind support were not reported.170

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164 Ibid.
167 Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” Washington, DC, July 2009; email from Stacy Bernard Davis, US Department of State, 11 September 2009; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; email from Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation; Czech Republic Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J; emails from Daniel Gengler, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2009; and Gregor Kaplan, Security Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 June 2009.
2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 July 2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Up to 5km² (November 2008 UN estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>Six (2007: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least seven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>1 July 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Twenty SHAs in buffer zone; two National Guard minefields in government-controlled areas; no demining in Turkish-controlled areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>1,645</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Cyprus became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 July 2003. It completed destruction of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines on its deadline of 1 July 2007. It retained 1,000 mines for training and research purposes but has yet to consume any of them. Cyprus has stated that domestic implementation of the treaty is achieved through the ratification legislation and other law non-specific to antipersonnel mines.

Cyprus has made steady progress in clearing mined areas since becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The UN has continued to conduct clearance of contamination in the buffer zone between the government-controlled areas and territory controlled by Turkish Forces, although funding shortfalls in early 2009 have restricted progress. There has been no evidence of clearance on territory controlled by Turkish Forces.

From 1999 to 2009, Landmine Monitor identified at least eight landmine casualties (one killed and seven injured) in Cyprus. Risk education has been provided to civilians since 2006. Mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors, including non-Cypriot nationals, receive adequate assistance.

Mine Ban Policy

Cyprus signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 January 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 July 2003. Cyprus states that domestic implementation of the treaty is achieved through the legislation adopted for ratification. In addition, the “Law Concerning Explosive Materials of 2005” makes it a crime to use, produce, stockpile, or transfer any explosive material without the necessary authority. The National Committee for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention and the Cyprus Mine Action Centre (CYMAC) are responsible for implementation of treaty obligations.

Cyprus attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, making statements on mine clearance at both meetings.

Cyprus submitted its updated annual Article 7 report covering calendar year 2008. It had previously submitted five Article 7 reports.  

With respect to matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Cyprus has stated its view that the treaty prohibits foreign stockpiling and transshipment of antipersonnel mines, and, in the case of Article 1(c) of the treaty, "prohibits common military exercises of states parties to the Convention with the armed forces of states that have not ratified the Convention."  

Cyprus is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. As of July 2009, it had not yet submitted its national annual report for 2007 or 2008 in accordance with Article 13. Cyprus is not yet party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

As of 1 July 2009, Cyprus had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, stockpiling, and retention

Cyprus maintains that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In its initial Article 7 report, Cyprus declared a total of 48,475 stockpiled antipersonnel mines before the destruction program started in December 2003. Cyprus completed stockpile destruction on its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 July 2007.

Cyprus retained 1,000 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes under Article 3 of the treaty. This number has not changed since 2003, indicating that none of the mines are being consumed in training activities. An official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor in April 2009 that a limited number of these mines would be consumed during training in May 2009. Previously, in June 2008, officials told Landmine Monitor that Cyprus has no plans to destroy any of its retained mines. Cyprus has yet to provide details of the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines. Cyprus has not used the expanded Form D on retained mines agreed by States Parties in December 2005.

3 Previous reports were submitted for calendar year 2007, in April 2007, 28 April 2006, 24 April 2005, for the period 1 July–31 December 2003, and on 28 September 2005 (non-standard form).
4 Fax PD-MA/24.11.12.142 from Panayiotis Papadopoulos, Counselor, on behalf of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 May 2006. For additional details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 374.
5 The United States government identified Cyprus as a past producer, but Cyprus denied it. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 704.
6 Article 7 Report (for the period 1 July–31 December 2003), Form B. Cyprus has at times reported other numbers, but officials have stated this is the correct total. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 374–375 for details. The stockpile initially declared consisted of eight types or variants of mines from China, Singapore, Taiwan, and the US: M2A1 (474), M2A3 (179), M16 (4,086), M16A1 (16,440), M16A2 (20,146), M16E3 (278), VS-50 (4,450), and GLD-112 (2,422).
7 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form G. The destroyed mines were M2A1/A4, M16A1/A2, M16E3, VS-50, and GLD-112. The report does not provide the number of each type.
8 Article 7 Report, (for calendar year 2008) Form D. The form states “Unchanged from last reporting.” The mines are stored at the National Guard warehouse at Palodia village near Limassol and are used by CYMAC. The total retained is made up of 100 each of types M2A1, M2A3, M16A1, and M16A2, as well as 200 each of M16, VS-50, and GLD-112 types. While the 1,000 figure has remained the same since 2003, Cyprus changed the composition in the 2006 report to 200 M16 mines and zero M16E3 instead of 100 M16 and 100 M16E3.
9 Email from Panayiotis Papadopoulos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2009.
10 Interview with delegation of Cyprus, intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 5 June 2008. The delegation also noted Cyprus can retrieve mines from its minefields and use these for training purposes.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Cyprus is contaminated by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and ERW. The island has been divided geographically and politically by a heavily mined, 180km-long buffer zone since 1974 when Turkish Armed Forces took control of the north. Minefields were laid within and outside the buffer zone by both the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Turkish Armed Forces. The UN has estimated that up to 5km² of land on the island may be contaminated with mines and UXO.11 By early 2009, 10 mined areas containing 3,224 antipersonnel mines remained to be cleared outside the buffer zone in territory controlled by the Republic of Cyprus;12 confirmed minefields remained in or around the villages of Dali, Geri, Potamia, and Trouloi.13 As of May 2009, a military firing range near Paphos was close to being completely cleared. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, there are no other areas affected with ERW in the territories under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus.14 A further 18 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) remained to be cleared within the buffer zone.15 The extent of contamination in areas controlled by the Turkish Armed Forces was not known.

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least six new landmine casualties (all injured) in four incidents.16 Four casualties were civilians and two were deminers. On 28 March 2008, a Mozambican demining team leader was injured by an antipersonnel mine in the buffer zone.17 On 5 December 2008, three members of the same Iraqi family (one man, one woman, and one child) were injured by an antipersonnel mine in the buffer zone while seeking asylum.18 On 20 December 2008, in a similar incident another Iraqi man was injured by an antipersonnel mine in the buffer zone while seeking asylum.19 On 10 December 2008, a deminer was injured by an antipersonnel mine during clearance activities.20 Prior to 2008, the last identified mine casualty in Cyprus occurred in 2003.21 No new landmine casualties were reported in 2009, as of 31 May.22 The total number of mine casualties in Cyprus is not known. From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least eight mine casualties (one killed and seven injured).23 Five casualties were civilians (three men, one woman, and one child) and the remaining three casualties were deminers. Among the civilian casualties, four were Iraqi immigrants trying to cross the North-
South border illegally and one was a farmer. Antipersonnel mines caused six casualties and antivehicle mines caused two casualties. In addition, in August 2003, a Cypriot refugee from the Turkish-occupied north committed suicide by walking into a clearly signposted minefield.\(^{24}\) Before 1999, at least four casualties were identified: three peacekeepers of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) were killed by mines between 1974 and 1998, and a 37-year-old man was killed by a mine when he followed his dog into a minefield in the buffer zone in 1997.\(^{25}\)

**Risk profile**  
In 2008, the increase in casualty numbers was a result of asylum seekers trying to cross the North-South border illegally. People living along the buffer zone, particularly farmers, are also believed to be at risk.

**Socio-economic impact**  
The impact of contamination across the island appears to be primarily a blockage to agricultural activities.\(^{26}\) Farmers are said to be using the land adjacent to the mined areas and in most cases have cultivated land to within two meters of minefield perimeter fences.\(^{27}\) Demining in the buffer zone is said, however, to have a significant economic impact: by enabling the opening of new crossing points, clearance has facilitated increased trade and population movement.\(^{28}\)

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**  
An interministerial National Committee, established in May 2003, serves nominally as the National Mine Action Authority for Cyprus, but since adopting a National Plan for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention (see below) it has not met.\(^{29}\) Cyprus has two mine action centers. The Cyprus Mine Action Centre (CYMAC), under the command of the Engineers Corps Command of the National Guard, is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and CCW Amended Protocol II. The UN Mine Action Centre in Cyprus (MAC-C), established in 2004, supports coordination between UNFICYP, the Republic of Cyprus, Turkish Armed Forces, and the European Union. MAC-C is responsible for supervising demining operations in the buffer zone.\(^{30}\)

**Victim assistance**  
The situation in Cyprus does not warrant specific victim assistance (VA) programs. There is no legislation concerning the coverage for mine incidents, but survivors and families of casualties receive assistance through the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance.\(^{31}\) Cyprus included information on VA activities in voluntary Form J to its Article 7 report only once.\(^{32}\)

Disability issues fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance.\(^{33}\) The Pancyprian Council for Persons with Disabilities, chaired by the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, monitors disability issues and allows persons with disabilities to contribute

\(^{24}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 383. As this was a suicide, it does not fit within the Landmine Monitor definition of a mine/ERW casualty, and was thus not counted in the 1999–2008 total.  
\(^{32}\) Article 7 Report (for the period 1 July to 31 December 2003), Form J.  
to public policy. Government representatives, organizations of persons with disabilities, employers, and employee organizations participate in the Council.34

Data collection and management
MAC-C uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) for operations in the buffer zone, and makes data available on request. The latest version of IMSMA was installed in 2006 but, due to technical problems relating to the migration of data, has not become fully operational.35 MAC-C has reported that recent casualty data is inserted into the IMSMA database.36 In 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that data is collected by the National Guard and police forces, and that data collection has become faster and more efficient.37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine action program operators</th>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Engineers Corps Command</td>
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International operators and activities

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<th>Demining</th>
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<td>ArmorGroup</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN Police in Cyprus (UNPOL)</td>
<td>x</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Plans

Strategic mine action plan
Cyprus’s strategic plan for fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations remains based on the National Plan, which was first issued in September 2004. The plan included an annual timetable for the clearance of the 18 minefields in Cyprus-controlled areas. No plan for clearance of areas controlled by Turkish Armed Forces has been made public. Clearance of the 18 remaining SHAs in the buffer zone was planned to be completed by 2011, although funding constraints in early 2009 had temporarily threatened that deadline.38 UNFICYP was seeking access to 12 SHAs from the relevant parties; access to six had already been granted. For 2009, MAC-C planned to clear four large minefields containing a substantial number of mines.39

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
There is no evidence that Cyprus has formally integrated mine action into development efforts.

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Cyprus has made steady progress in removing emplaced antipersonnel mines from mined areas. According to the UN, the major constraint to demining operations is the country’s sensitive political climate. Mine clearance operations face delays and changing priorities due to political considerations.40

36 Email from Michael Raine, MAC-C, 31 March 2009.
37 Email from Panayiotis Papadopoulos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2009.
39 Email from Michael Raine, MAC-C, 3 April 2009.
**National management**

Cyprus has conducted and managed demining of its National Guard minefields outside the buffer zone and in territory under its control. All demining inside the buffer zone has been coordinated and implemented by the UN.

**National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures**

No national mine action legislation has been adopted in Cyprus. National Guard operations are only to remove antipersonnel mines—antivehicle mines are left in the areas cleared. Demining in the buffer zone is said to be carried out according to the International Mine Action Standards, which were developed into safety guidelines by the UN, creating a basis for standing operating procedures for contractors. 41

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

The Engineers Corps Command of the National Guard is tasked with clearing emplaced minefields in government-controlled areas. 42 In the buffer zone, MAC-C manages demining with two demining operators: ArmorGroup Services carries out clearance and Mines Advisory Group carries out quality management. Mine detection dogs are no longer used in the buffer zone and MAC-C had planned to hire a mini-flail for a short period in late 2008 to speed up clearance but this did not happen. 43

Within the buffer zone, 20 minefields were cleared in 2008, with the destruction of 5,090 antipersonnel mines, 2,497 antivehicle mines, and five ERW. 44 The National Guard cleared two minefields of antipersonnel mines only, with the destruction of 392 mines. 45 In addition, clearance of a military firing range in the vicinity of Paphos was due to be completed by the end of May 2009. Clearance activities as of 22 May 2009 had led to the destruction of 16 items of UXO. The land that was cleared as of that date amounted to 64,564m², with 5,850m² remaining to be cleared. No decision had been taken on the future ownership or use of the land. 46

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Cyprus is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 July 2013. The clearance of National Guard minefields in areas controlled by Cyprus outside the buffer zone began in 2005 with a demining team from the National Guard.

Demining of minefields within the buffer zone started in November 2004, and by late 2008 demining operations had released more than 6km², with the destruction of more than 9,000 landmines. 47 Clearance of the buffer zone was due to be completed by 2011, although funding constraints in early 2009 had temporarily called into question that deadline.

There has been no progress in clearance of mined areas under the control of the Turkish Armed Forces. This involves the legal responsibility of Turkey under the Mine Ban Treaty as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, should Turkey fail to fulfill its legal obligations, in accordance with Article 5 of the treaty, Cyprus will be obliged to seek an extension to its deadline by virtue of its assertion of jurisdiction over the areas occupied by the Turkish Armed Forces. 48 This is not the understanding of Cyprus “simply because the Ottawa Convention

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44 Email from Michael Raine, MAC-C, 3 April 2009.
45 Email from Panayiotis Papadopoulos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 May 2009.
46 Ibid.
makes the occupying power solely responsible for mine clearance in the occupied part of the Republic, Ankara’s disagreements notwithstanding.49

**Risk Education**

In 2008, risk education (RE) activities increased, reaching some 1,645 civilians working in the buffer zone, particularly farmers.50 The number of mine incidents also increased.

The UN Police in Cyprus (UNPOL) continued providing mine/ERW risk education to 1,145 farmers working in the buffer zone (500 in 2007).51 RE briefings were organized in coffee shops.52 Farmers in Cyprus must receive RE each year as a condition for renewing their farming licenses.53 UNPOL staff continued to be trained by MAC-C.54 The National Guard Demining Unit (Engineer Corps Command) carried out four RE seminars for some 500 people, including local families, farmers, and workers in the buffer zone.55 MAC-C also provided safety briefings for some 1,600 UNFICYP personnel.56 Cyprus reported that “All National Guard minefields under the Republic of Cyprus jurisdiction and control are fenced, marked with warning signs and monitored by troops in full compliance with the Convention.”57

It is unknown whether, in 2008, Turkish forces organized RE. Cyprus’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs has reported that “the government of the Republic does not conduct risk education within occupied areas.”58

Cyprus’ national mine action plan does not include RE59 but UNPOL has been providing RE to civilians, with no interruption, since 2006.60 Previously, a UN Mine Action Service mission saw no need for RE as the mine threat to the civilian population in Cyprus is minimal.61 In its Article 7 reports for 2007 and 2008, Cyprus noted in Form I that the situation remained “Unchanged from last reporting.”62 In the previous Article 7 report for 2006, it did not report RE activities, but stated that mined areas are fenced and marked.63

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is at least seven. The health sector in Cyprus has adequate means to treat new mine casualties,64 and survivors receive free medical assistance, rehabilitation, *ex gratia* monetary compensation, and a monthly disability allowance.65

Civilian survivors and families are entitled to free medical services at government hospitals and institutions, as well as to compensation and allowances. Military personnel dealing with demining activities receive the same benefits but, in case of fatal accident, the relatives are

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49 Email from Panayiotis Papadopoulos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 May 2009.
50 Email from Michael Raine, MAC-C, 31 March 2009; and email from Panayiotis Papadopoulos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2009.
51 Email from Michael Raine, MAC-C, 31 March 2009.
52 Ibid.
54 Email from Michael Raine, MAC-C, 31 March 2009.
55 Email from Panayiotis Papadopoulos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2009.
56 Email from Michael Raine, MAC-C, 31 March 2009.
57 Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2007; Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2006; Article 7 Report, Form I, 22 April 2005; and Article 7 Report (for the period 1 July to 31 December 2003), Form I.
58 Email from Panayiotis Papadopoulos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2009.
60 Ibid, p.323.
62 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form I; and Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form I.
eligible for a compensation payment. In addition, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of
Finance can recommend *ex gratia* allowances for mine survivors and families of mine casualties,
subject to approval by the Council of Ministers.66

Non-Cypriot mine survivors, including illegal immigrants, receive free medical care at the
same standards as Cypriot citizens.67 Post-treatment issues for illegal immigrants are, however,
examined by the government on a case-by-case basis.68

The two deminers injured in 2008 received initial medical care in Cyprus and were then
transferred abroad; both were covered by their employer’s insurance.69 Civilian survivors
injured in 2008 received free medical treatment and were granted permission to remain legally
in Cyprus.70 In 2008, in the Turkish-controlled areas, authorities reportedly employed 423
persons with disabilities and provided financial aid to another 3,155 of the approximately 3,928
known persons with disabilities.71

Cyprus has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, in employment,
education, access to healthcare, and other forms of social assistance.72 These provisions are
enforced, although physical accessibility of buildings continues to be a problem.73 On 30 March
2007, Cyprus signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its
Optional Protocol, but it had not ratified them as of 1 July 2009.

### Support for Mine Action

In April 2006, the UN Secretary-General’s representative provided a cost estimate of €11
million (US$16.2 million) to achieve a “mine-free Cyprus.” Mine clearance in the buffer zone
was estimated to cost €6 million, with an additional €5 million required for unspecified mine
action to achieve “mine free” status.74 In December 2008, MAC-C reported that it would cost $7
million to complete mine clearance operations in the buffer zone.75

According to the National Plan for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention for 2005–
2013, the total estimated cost for the “destruction of antipersonnel mines” outside the buffer zone,
including emplaced mines under Cyprus’s control, was CYP475,350 ($1.2 million/€811,510).76
Landmine Monitor is not aware of cost estimates since 2005 for completion of mine action
programs outside the buffer zone.

#### National support for mine action

In June 2008, the Defence Policy Directorate reported that the annual budget of the Cyprus
National Guard included a budget item for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The
Directorate reported allocations for mine action in 2008 totaling €100,000 ($147,260) and
planned allocations in 2009 totaling €50,000 ($73,630).77

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66 Ibid.
67 Email from Panayiotis Papadopoulos, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2009.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid; and email from Michael Raine, MAC-C, 31 March 2009.
70 Ibid.
25 February 2009.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 “UN official optimistic Cyprus to be mine-free in a few years,” *Financial Mirror* (Nicosia), 7 April 2006,
76 Republic of Cyprus, “Contribution of Cyprus to a Mine-Free World – National Plan for the Implementation of
77 Email from Lt. Gennaris Andreas, Defence Policy Directorate, 24 June 2009.
The National Plan states that the required costs for destruction of antipersonnel mines outside the buffer zone will be met from the national budget. In November 2008, Cyprus reported that “the destruction process of AP mines laid in minefields” was “not impeded by any circumstances,” and that demining teams were supported “technically and financially.” In May 2009 Cyprus reported that it did not require “external assistance” for either mine clearance or destruction activities.

**International cooperation and assistance**

No international funding was reported for mine action in Cyprus in 2008. In 2007, the European Commission (EC) reported providing €4 million ($5,484,400), via the Partnership for the Future program to UNDP, to support clearance of mined areas under Turkish control in the north of the buffer zone. The duration of the funding was originally reported as from September 2007 to September 2009. However, as of December 2008, MAC-C reported that EC funding would end in January 2009, and that mine clearance in the buffer zone could shut down in the absence of additional funds. In January 2009, the United Kingdom provided £46,700 ($86,605) to cover MAC-C clearance costs through February and March 2009. Cyprus did not report continuing funding shortfalls in its statements to the May 2009 Standing Committee meetings, nor did it report having secured additional funding to cover costs for the remainder of 2009.

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81 Email from Laura Liguori, Desk Officer, Directorate-General for External Relations, EC, 19 March 2008; and EC, “Instrument of financial support to encourage the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community: Summary Project Fiche – 2006,” p. 12.
82 Ibid.
DENMARK

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>1.246km² of mined areas as of May 2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Article 5 (clearance of mined areas) | Deadline: 1 January 2011  
Original deadline: 1 March 2009 |
| Demining in 2008 | Clearance of 0.47km² of mined areas  
(May 2007–April 2008) |

Ten-Year Summary

The Kingdom of Denmark became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999. No additional legal or administrative measures were deemed necessary for national implementation of the treaty beyond ratification. Stockpile destruction of 266,517 mines was completed in December 1999, well in advance of the treaty deadline of 1 March 2003. Denmark initially retained 4,991 mines for training and research, but this number was reduced to 2,091 in August 2000. By the end of 2008, Denmark retained 2,009 mines, which was one more than it had reported the previous two years.

Denmark was slow to begin clearance of its only mined area on the Jutland peninsula after becoming a State Party. In November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Denmark requested, and was granted, an initial 22-month extension to its Article 5 deadline in order to determine the period needed to complete demining operations.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

In 1944, the whole area of the Skallingen Peninsula in Jutland on the Danish west coast was mined with antipersonnel and antitank mines. One minefield remains on the peninsula. In 1946, large parts of the minefield were cleared, but due to significant difficulties with the clearance and quality control of mainly dune and salt marsh areas, a part of the mined area was fenced and left uncleared.

The affected area of the Skallingen Peninsula, as of entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty for Denmark, comprised a total of 1.86km², initially identified from German mine records as well as markings established by mine clearance teams in 1947. For operational purposes the suspected mined area was divided into three sub-areas: 1, 2, and 3. Area 1 was cleared by a British contractor, European Landmine Solutions, in 2006, releasing 0.19km² of beach and dunes. Area 2 was cleared by the Danish consortium Minegruppen between May 2007 and April 2008. Area 3 remains to be demined.

As a result of these demining operations, the suspected hazardous area of Area 3 was 1.2km² as of November 2008. Subsequent “terrain analysis” resulted in the size of the suspected area rising slightly to 1.246km² as of May 2009. However, it is not known to what extent the area

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3 Ibid, p. 2.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
still contains functioning mines. Based on findings in Areas 1 and 2, Denmark’s original Article 5 deadline extension request asserts that, “Most or all remaining mines are ineffective because of the salty, wet environment in the area.”

Casualties
No incidents from mines on Skallingen have been reported since 1946. No casualties were reported in the clearance operations in 2006–2008. The entire area—almost 3km²—was surrounded by a new fence in 2005.

Socio-economic impact
The socio-economic impact of the remaining minefield on Skallingen is said to be insignificant. “Although tourists can not walk to the south end of Skallingen, small boats from Esbjerg cannot land there and hunters cannot hunt in the area concerned, none of this has any economic implication on the local community.” According to Denmark, the environmental impact of the minefield is mainly positive due to restricted human access, while it expects mine clearance to have significant detrimental impacts, especially for the rare birds that have colonized the peninsula. The salt meadows are said to still show signs and scars of the mine clearance carried out in the 1940s.

Program Management and Coordination
The Ministry of Transport is responsible for clearance activities on Skallingen. The project is organized under the Danish Coastal Authority, which has the power to task and coordinate civil contractors and manage projects.

Plans
In May 2009, Denmark announced that the next steps in the demining of Area 3 were the conduct of an Environmental Impact Assessment, the specification of clearance standards and methods, and the development of a clearance plan. Also, as the area “is designated as a specially protected nature and wildlife area under both the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and the EU’s Birds and Habitats Directives,” Denmark stated that, “… a public consultation process of relevant interested parties has to be carried out.” Previously, Denmark had noted that the release of Area 3 would be based on technical survey of the area, the condition of the mines, and the environmental implications. It has claimed that it may be impossible to demine the salt meadows without causing serious deterioration, which “is probably not compatible with the rules of the Habitats Directive and RAMSAR Convention.”

National Ownership
Denmark has asserted full national ownership of its demining program, including responsibility for all its costs. It developed standards for clearance on Skallingen based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). Denmark has stated that, prior to the clearance of Area 3, these standards will be “reviewed and reformulated so they address the situation in the new

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1. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
2. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
3. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
4. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
5. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
6. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
7. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
8. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
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11. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
12. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
13. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
14. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
15. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
16. Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008, Form A.
area of operation while remaining IMAS compliant.”17 Clearance operations are subject to an “extensive quality management system,” which includes samples of cleared areas as a final quality control.18

Demining

Demining on Skallingen has been carried out by commercial contractors selected from a process of internationally competitive bidding. In 2008, all demining was carried out by the Danish consortium Minegruppen. Area 2 was cleared between May 2007 and April 2008, releasing 0.47km² of “sensitive and highly protected nature,” destroying in the process 13 antipersonnel mines, five antivehicle mines, and 131 other items (detonators, explosives, or UXO).19 In May 2009, Denmark stated that “should any States Parties have an interest in the experiences Denmark has gained in terms of mine clearance in dynamic beach and dune areas as well as marsh areas, we will be happy to share information.”20

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Denmark was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. On 27 March 2008, Denmark presented a first request for an extension to its Article 5 deadline but did not specify the period it was seeking, a treaty requirement.21 On 28 August 2008, Denmark presented a revised request seeking an initial extension of 22 months until 1 January 2011.22 This period will primarily be used to determine the period needed to complete clearance operations.23 Thus, Denmark will probably need a second extension period to fulfill its Article 5 obligations.

The Analysing Group of States Parties, chaired by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, noted that, “presumably the delay in proceeding with implementation as soon as possible after entry into force hampered Denmark in fulfilling its obligations under Article 5 of the Convention by its deadline.”24 At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Denmark stated it had “taken note of this assessment, which we do not wish to challenge.”25

In granting Denmark’s extension request, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted that, “while it may be unfortunate that after almost ten years since entry into force a State Party is unable to specify how remaining work will be carried out, it is positive that Denmark will, within the extension period of 22 months, garner an understanding of the true remaining extent of the challenge and develop plans accordingly that precisely project the amount of time that will be required to complete Article 5 implementation.”26 In October 2008, Denmark declared its plan to submit an additional request in mid-2010 for consideration at the Tenth Meeting of States Parties.27 In May 2009, Denmark stated that a “final time schedule and a complete

17 Ibid, p. 2.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
21 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2008.
22 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 28 August 2008.
23 See, for example, Analysis of Denmark’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 21 October 2008, p. 1.
24 Ibid, p. 2; see also Decision on Denmark’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of the States Parties, 28 November 2008; and “Critique of Denmark’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request,” ICBL, November 2008, www.icbl.org.
26 Decision on Denmark’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.
27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 21 October 2008, p. 3.
release plan shall be prepared, and presented, before the deadline of January 1, 2011.” Denmark remained “fully committed to fulfill our obligations in accordance with Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention.”

Support for Mine Action

National support for mine action
In 2005, the government of Denmark committed DKK86 million (US$14,344,569), and in 2006 it allocated an additional DKK32 million ($5,385,211) for completion of mine clearance operations on the Skallingen peninsula, to support clearance activities under its Article 5 deadline extension. In referring to these allocations in its update on mine clearance activities at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Denmark did not report any new funding since 2006, implying that clearance during 2008 had been paid for via funds contributed in 2005 and 2006, and that no new funds were needed to cover costs.

International support for mine action
Denmark reported making donations for mine action totaling DKK74,630,000 ($14,664,795) in 2008, an increase of approximately 14% compared to 2007. In US dollar terms, Denmark’s 2008 contributions represent the highest annual funding reported by Denmark since at least 1999. (In DKK terms, Denmark’s funding surpassed 2008 levels throughout the period 2000–2004 and in 2006).

In 2008, Denmark ceased funding to Chechnya, Jordan, and Nepal, all of which received funds in 2007. In 2007, Denmark contributed DKK6,798,000 ($1,249,333) to Nepal. Funding to Afghanistan increased from DKK8 million ($1,470,236) in 2007 to DKK18 million ($3,537,388) in 2008.

31 Email from Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group, UN Mine Action Service</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$3,537,000 (DKK18,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$2,102,550 (DKK10,700,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global or Other</td>
<td>Geneva Call, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, UN Mine Action Service, UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, ICRC, Nordic Demining Research Forum, Mine Ban Treaty Sponsorship Program</td>
<td>General contributions, ICRC Special Appeal</td>
<td>$2,082,900 (DKK10,600,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,965,000 (DKK10,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,719,375 (DKK8,750,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,420,695 (DKK7,230,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>UN Mine Action Service</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$982,500 (DKK5,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$461,775 (DKK2,350,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$196,500 (DKK1,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$196,500 (DKK1,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$14,664,795 (€9,958,438)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 Email from Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.
States Parties

Djibouti

**Ten-Year Summary**

The Republic of Djibouti completed destruction of its stockpile of 1,188 mines on 2 March 2003, one day after its treaty-mandated deadline, but has retained 2,996 mines for training purposes. It enacted national implementation legislation in March 2006. It has not submitted an Article 7 report since January 2005.

It is not known whether Djibouti is still affected by landmines, but it has a small residual problem from explosive remnants of war (ERW). Its Article 5 deadline for clearance of emplaced antipersonnel mines expired on 1 March 2009, and clearance by France of its ammunition storage area at La Doudah in May 2008 ostensibly removed the last known mined areas from the territory of Djibouti. All other known mined areas were cleared during the demining program that formally ended in 2003.

Between 1999 and May 2009, at least 84 casualties were recorded (23 killed, 54 injured, and seven whose status is unknown), but there may have been up to 160 casualties in Djibouti. No formal mine/ERW risk education activities have been recorded since 2002. Healthcare, disability services, and disability legislation remain inadequate.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Djibouti signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 May 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. The president signed national implementation legislation on 11 March 2006.\(^1\) The law also created a national commission responsible for application of the law.

As of July 2009, Djibouti had not submitted its annual updated Article 7 report, due 30 April 2009. Djibouti has not submitted an Article 7 report since January 2005.\(^2\)

Djibouti did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. Djibouti has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Djibouti has reported that it has not produced antipersonnel mines. It is not known to have ever exported mines.\(^3\) Both the government and the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy used landmines around military positions and on access roads during the 1991–1994 civil war.\(^4\)

On 2 March 2003, one day after its treaty-mandated deadline, the country destroyed its stockpile of 1,188 antipersonnel mines.\(^5\) In 2005, Djibouti reported that it retained 2,996 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, the same number it first declared in January 2003.\(^6\) It has not provided an update since that time and has never reported in any detail on the intended

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\(^{3}\) Article 7 Report, Form E, 16 January 2003.


\(^{6}\) Mines retained include: 650 M12; 307 M412; 621 PPM2; 665 T72; 521 MB; 16 DV; 30 M961; 10 AV; 128 PPMISR; 12 MLE421; 18 M59; and 18 of unknown type and origin. Article 7 Reports, Form D, 25 January 2005; and Form D, 16 January 2003.

Djibouti is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but not Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 1 July 2009.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Djibouti has a small residual problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily UXO, and possibly mines. With the completion of mine clearance by France in May 2008 around its ammunition storage area at La Doudah, there were no known mined areas. Indeed, at a regional seminar for French-speaking countries in October 2008, Djibouti reported that it was “mine free since the completion of demining at La Doudah.” In June 2008, however, a border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea at Ras Doumeira raised fears of new contamination.

Casualties

There were no reports of new mine/ERW casualties in Djibouti 2008 or in 2009 to 31 May. The last confirmed mine casualties occurred in September 2004 when three girls were injured.

In June 2008, France declared that there have never been casualties at its base at La Doudah.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Djibouti is not known as there is no systematic casualty data collection mechanism. In 2003, Djibouti reported that there had been more than 160 casualties, including some 40 people killed. In October 2008, at the Seminar of African Francophone Actors of Mine and ERW Action in Benin, it was reported that from 1997 to 2000 there were 30 people killed and 89 injured in Djibouti.

Between 1999 and May 2009, Landmine Monitor identified 84 mine casualties, including 23 people killed and 54 injured, with the status of seven unknown. The majority of casualties (81) were registered between 1999 and 2001.

According to military sources, between 1997 and 2000, 31 people were killed and 90 injured in mine incidents: most casualties were military personnel. In May 2003, Djibouti declared that “no casualties were registered since 2001.” However, media reported one mine incident occurred in September 2004. The incident was confirmed by the Djibouti Mine Action Center.

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Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Progress in implementing Article 5
Under Article 5 of the treaty, Djibouti was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. Mine clearance operations ended in 2003, and Djibouti has been listed by the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit as having indicated that it fulfilled its Article 5 obligations; but Landmine Monitor knows of no formal declaration of completion to date. In November 2005, Djibouti acknowledged that even though it had declared itself “mine-safe” in January 2004, “nevertheless, we should continue our efforts especially with France to clear completely La Doudah…and only once those demining operations are completed, we will be able to declare Djibouti ‘mine-free’.”21 Djibouti did not request an extension to its Article 5 deadline at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008.

Risk Education
The level of the threat does not warrant a formal mine/ERW risk education (RE) program in the country, and no RE activities have been recorded in Djibouti since 2002.

In 2001 and 2002, activities included school-based RE and public information dissemination by the ICRC, the Red Crescent Society of Djibouti, the Association of Support to Mine Victims (Association de Soutien aux Victimes de Mines), and the Djibouti Mine Action Center.22 Djibouti made use of Article 7 Form I only once to report on RE activities, stating that awareness and information campaigns were organized up to October 2002, but it did not state when they started.23

Victim Assistance
The total number of survivors is unknown but is estimated to be at least 54. In 2004, when Djibouti declared itself “mine-safe,” government officials stressed the need to assist mine survivors.24 However, there is no specific victim assistance plan for Djibouti, and mine/ERW survivors receive the same inadequate services as other persons with disabilities.25 The capacity to provide adequate healthcare continued to be hampered by a lack of qualified medical staff and limited infrastructure and supplies.26 The Peltier Hospital, in the capital, is the only structure able to treat trauma injuries.27

There is no specific agency responsible for disability issues in Djibouti.28 Djibouti does not have specific legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but the Labor Code prohibits discrimination in employment. In 2008, NGOs continued to advocate for improved legal protection and employment conditions for persons with disabilities.29 Nonetheless, persons with disabilities still reportedly faced discrimination.30

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29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
Djibouti has not made official statements on victim assistance, either in meetings of States Parties or in its annual Article 7 reports, since 2003. As of 1 July 2009, Djibouti had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

**Support for Mine Action**

**International cooperation and assistance**

No international funding was reported for Djibouti in 2008. In 2007, France reported contributing US$3,300 (€2,407) of in-kind funding to Djibouti, in the form of mine clearance training.\(^{31}\) France also reported funding mine clearance at La Doudah, but did not report a value for the contribution.

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\(^{31}\) Email from Anne Villeneuve, Advocacy Officer, Handicap International, 6 June 2008; with information from Béatrice Ravanel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Henry Zipper de Fabiani, National Commission for the Elimination of the Antipersonnel Mines (Commission nationale pour l’élimination des mines antipersonnel).
ECUADOR

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 October 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mines, a few antivehicle mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>517,312m² of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>0 (2007: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 October 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original deadline: 1 October 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>6,215m² of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>1,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National: Unknown (2007: $500,000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary


The mine problem in Ecuador originates from the 1995 border conflict with Peru. During the conflict, six provinces were mined, particularly in the Condor Mountain Range (Cordillera del Cóndor). Ecuador has since made slow progress in clearance, with average annual output since 1999 only slightly more than 12,000m². At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Ecuador requested, and was granted, an eight-year extension of its Article 5 deadline to 1 October 2017; remaining suspected mined areas totaled about 500,000m² as of mid-2009.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 13 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (five killed and eight injured) in Ecuador. Limited risk education (RE) has been conducted since 2002 by the Organization of American States (OAS), the Ecuadorian Red Cross and the army in El Oro, Loja, and Morona Santiago provinces. Between 2005 and 2008, two RE campaigns were conducted, training members of Shuar communities to deliver RE messages.

Prior to 2003, there was no mine/ERW casualty data collection or any specific services provided to mine/ERW survivors. Civilian survivors received inadequate services and there was a general lack of government attention to persons with disabilities. Starting in 2003, the Ecuadorian National Demining Center and the OAS worked together to provide comprehensive services to the 14 registered, living civilian mine survivors. Military survivors receive comprehensive care through the government, though many veterans find it difficult to find work because of their advanced age and limited education.
Mine Ban Policy

Ecuador signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 29 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999. Ecuador initiated a process in 2008 to adopt national implementation measures, including penal sanctions as required by Article 9.1 The Ecuadorian National Demining Center expected progress after the April 2009 elections.2

Ecuador submitted its eleventh Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008.3 At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008, Ecuador made statements on its Article 5 deadline extension request and refuted a media report cited in Landmine Monitor Report 2008 that Colombian rebel leader Raúl Reyes was killed by a landmine laid around a FARC camp in Ecuador (see below). At this meeting, Ecuador became co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.

In February 2009, Ecuador participated in a regional Mine Ban Treaty meeting held in Managua, Nicaragua, to prepare for the treaty’s Second Review Conference. Ecuador also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it gave an update on its mine clearance program.

With respect to matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3, Ecuador has stated that it has never participated in a joint military operation with states not party to the treaty and that its foreign policy does not allow it to participate in joint military operations with other states. Ecuador has also stated that it has never received a request for the transit of antipersonnel mines, it has not produced antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and it views 1,000 as the acceptable limit for the number of mines retained for training.4


Ecuador signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not yet ratified it as of 1 July 2009.5

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, retention, and use

Ecuador has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines in the past. Ecuador completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in January 2002, destroying a total of 260,302 mines.6

According to its April 2009 Article 7 report, Ecuador has a total of 1,000 mines retained for training, a number that is unchanged from the previous year’s report.7 Since completing its stockpile destruction, Ecuador has destroyed a total of 2,971 mines previously retained for training.8 Yet it still has not yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, a step agreed to by States Parties at the First Review Conference in December 2004.

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2 Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2009.
7 Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2009. This includes 800 TAB-1, 158 VS-50, 25 P-4B, 11 PRB-M35, and six PMD-6M mines.
8 Ecuador said in 2000 it would retain 16,000 mines, then said in 2001 it would only keep 4,000, a number later revised to 3,970. It then destroyed 1,970 retained mines on 11 August 2004 and another 1,001 on 4 August 2007. Article 7 Report, Form G, 30 April 2009; Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 333; and Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 402–403.
Landmine Monitor knows of no government use of antipersonnel mines in Ecuador since the Cenepa border war with Peru concluded in 1998. A March 2008 media report cited by Landmine Monitor Report 2008 claimed that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) had emplaced landmines around a camp in Ecuadorian territory and that FARC deputy leader Raúl Reyes was killed by one of these mines. Ecuador strongly denied that the area surrounding the FARC camp was mined and cited “sufficient documentation by media and global public opinion” that Reyes was killed as a result of bombardment by the Colombian Armed Forces in Ecuadorian territory. Landmine Monitor acknowledges that it appears that the media report regarding the death of Reyes by a landmine was not correct. In a March 2009 letter to Ecuador, Landmine Monitor said the inclusion of the information in the 2008 report was “in no way intended to imply any wrongdoing on the part of the government of Ecuador” or “indicate that the government was in any respect failing to live up to its obligations.”

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Five provinces in southern Ecuador remain contaminated with antipersonnel mines and, to a much smaller extent, antivehicle mines and UXO, resulting from the 1995 conflict with Peru. The most heavily mined section of the border is the Condor Mountain Range, which was at the center of the conflict.

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Ecuador provided a detailed history of its mine problem and progress in clearance. It reported that the original number of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) was 128, covering an estimated 0.6km². A total of 10,910 mines were said to have been laid between 1995 and 1998, of which 10,843 were antipersonnel mines and the remaining 67 were antivehicle mines, in the provinces of El Oro, Loja, Morona Santiago, Orellana, Pastaza, and Zamora Chinchipe. Orellana province has since been declared free from mines. Morona Santiago is the most mine-affected province, in terms both of the numbers of SHAs and the number of mines.

As of end April 2009, Ecuador reported that its mine problem was more extensive than that described in its Article 5 deadline extension request. Between April 2008 and April 2009, Ecuador identified nine new SHAs covering 21,200m² in Morona Santiago although the number of mines reported to be in the ground did not change. As of 31 December 2008, 61 SHAs remained containing 6,113 mines over an area of 517,312m² (see table below). The demining teams have found 69 antivehicle mines in comparison to the 67 Ecuador reported had been used

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13 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 17.
15 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 20. The number of mines quoted in the extension request does not add up to the original estimated number and the actual number found. The number of remaining mines is estimated to be 5,953, but it is likely to prove different once clearance is completed.
and needed to be removed. Ongoing surveys may determine that much of the suspected area is in fact free of contamination.\(^\text{18}\) Ecuador reported no SHAs along the border with Colombia.\(^\text{19}\)

### Summary of the mine problem in Ecuador as of 31 December 2008\(^\text{20}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>No. of SHAs</th>
<th>Mined area (m(^2))</th>
<th>No. of antipersonnel mines</th>
<th>No. of antivehicle mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>El Oro, Loja, Morona Santiago, Pastaza, Zamora Chinchipe</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>642,234</td>
<td>10,910</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completed</td>
<td>El Oro, Loja, Morona Santiago, Pastaza, Zamora Chinchipe</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>124,922</td>
<td>4,797</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining</td>
<td>El Oro, Loja, Morona Santiago, Pastaza, Zamora Chinchipe</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>517,312</td>
<td>6,113</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>274</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,284,468</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,820</strong></td>
<td><strong>136</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Casualties

No new mine/ERW casualties were recorded in Ecuador in 2008 or in 2009 as of 26 February. There were no demining accidents in the same period.\(^\text{21}\)

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Ecuador is not known. Prior to mid-2001, there was no systematic data collection mechanism for mine incidents. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 13 mine/ERW casualties (five killed and eight injured) in Ecuador. The last recorded incident was reported in 2004, when a mine incident caused seven casualties (two killed and five injured); the incident occurred when an adult male was handling an antipersonnel mine.\(^\text{22}\) By the end of 2008, the OAS Program for Integrated Action against Antipersonnel Mines (Programa de Asistencia a la Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal, AICMA) database had information on 69 landmine casualties in Ecuador, of which 19 were civilian and 50 were military.\(^\text{23}\)

### Socio-economic impact

According to Ecuador, although the socio-economic impact of mines on a national basis impacts less than 5% of the population, mine/ERW contamination restricts and endangers subsistence livelihoods and access to water. Particularly affected are the indigenous Shuar and Achuar tribes, who are prevented from accessing large tracts of their traditional farming and hunting land.\(^\text{24}\)

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\(^\text{19}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Bolívar Torres Cevallos, CENDESMI, 7 May 2008.

\(^\text{20}\) The Article 7 reports in 2008 and 2009, Ecuador’s Statement to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009 and the presentation by Ecuador at the Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25–27 February 2009 are inconsistent. They do not match or calculate correctly. The baseline figures in the table are taken from the Article 7 report of 30 April 2009 and the Article 5 deadline Extension Request, and the “remaining” figures are the difference between the “baseline” and the “completed” numbers.


\(^\text{23}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sergio Ugarte Argüello, National Coordinator, OAS AICMA, 29 April 2009.

\(^\text{24}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, pp. 21–25.
Perhaps the major benefit of the mine action program has been the impetus it has created to improve relations between Ecuador and Peru. Since May 2007, Ecuador and Peru have met three times to discuss progress towards meeting Mine Ban Treaty obligations within the extension periods approved in November 2008. These meetings have taken place within the “2+2” framework, which entails formal cooperation between the Foreign and Defense Ministers of both countries. At their meeting in October 2008, the presidents of Peru and Ecuador agreed to use the Andean Development Corporation as a funding mechanism for mine action and each country committed US$2 million as seed money. Other issues raised in the meetings included the role of the OAS, the medical evacuation of Peruvian deminers to Ecuador, and an agreement on mine clearance operations from July 2009 to June 2010.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
The Ecuadorian National Demining Center (Centro Nacional de Desminado Humanitario, CENDESMI), under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in collaboration with the Ministry of Defense, is responsible for coordinating mine action operations, mine/ERW RE (which is conducted by OAS AICMA and CGD), and the victim assistance (VA) program (implemented by OAS AICMA). CENDESMI is chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is composed of the Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Public Health, the Ecuadorian Institute for International Cooperation, and the Demining General Command (Comando General de Desminado, CGD) of the Army Engineering Corps.

Data collection and management
Ecuadorian army mine action survey teams conduct surveys and the data is entered into the database at the OAS using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software. Casualty data is collected through impact studies, during landmine/ERW RE campaigns, and from the Association of Former Military Combatants (Asociación de Excombatientes del Ejército). As of April 2009, impact studies, through which most civilian casualties have been identified in the past, were ongoing and expected to be completed in 2010. OAS AICMA maintains a registry of casualties and the services received by survivors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine action program operators</th>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuadorian army</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International operators and activities</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Plans

Strategic mine action plans
CENDESMI’s board of directors, in coordination with the CGD and the OAS AICMA office in Quito, establish annual clearance priorities. Ecuador’s Article 5 deadline extension request contains a workplan for each year of the extension period and, according to CENDESMI, the order in which the mined areas will be cleared each year will be reviewed and revised if needed.

The National Mine Action Plan, approved in 2000, includes RE and VA. There is no separate VA plan nor is one needed, given Ecuador’s relatively small number of survivors. CENDESMI is a national body and military survivors are assisted with national funds. Services for civilian survivors are paid for with international funds channeled through the OAS. As of April 2009, there were no plans in place to transfer responsibility for the VA program from the OAS to a national body.

The National Council on Disabilities (Consejo Nacional de Discapacidades, CONADIS) is responsible for the development and monitoring of disability policy. Ecuador has a national disability plan; implementation is monitored by CONADIS. In June 2008, Ecuador developed a plan for implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
Ecuador has never reported any strong links between mine clearance and development, although agricultural production, mining, and tourism are affected, and each sector could expand if the areas were free from landmines. Demining in the provinces of El Oro, Loja, and Morona Santiago and in Amazonas department in Peru, is said to contribute to the development of border areas, including the construction of three major roads and an international bridge between the two countries, expected to directly benefit 500,000 inhabitants.

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Despite its slow progress in clearing mined areas, Ecuador has stated that it is committed to mine action. In an interview with Landmine Monitor in Quito, Bolivar Torres, CENDESMI’s president, said that demining is considered one of the most successful confidence-building measures with Peru, after almost two centuries of hostilities and mistrust. It has provided significant in-kind support to the program since 1999 (see Support to Mine Action section below).

National management
CENDESMI is responsible for coordinating mine action operations. As a coordinating body CENDESMI does not manage any of the national or international funds received for mine action. The OAS has this responsibility.

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33 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Bolivar Torres Cevallos, CENDESMI, 7 May 2008.
36 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sergio Ugarte Argüello, OAS AICMA, 29 April 2009.
38 Letter from Julio Hinojose, Executive Director, CONADIS to Augusto Saá, Director General of Human Rights and Social Welfare, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 August 2008, www2.ohchr.org.
40 Interview with Bolivar Torres Cevallos, CENDESMI, Quito, 12 September 2008.
41 Ibid.
Since 2001, OAS AICMA has assisted Ecuador in executing and managing its national demining plan. The Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South America (Misión de Asistencia a la Remoción de Minas en Suramérica, MARMINAS), established by the Inter-American Defense Board in May 2003 to support mine clearance in Ecuador and Peru, provides technical advice to the OAS and monitors demining operations. CENDESMI reported that in 2007 seven international monitors from MARMINAS supported demining operations.

**National mine action legislation and standards**

CENDESMI and the National Demining School were established by Executive Decree 1297 on 22 September 1999. Ecuador uses national standards and procedures, based on the International Mine Action Standards and established with OAS technical assistance.

**Program evaluations**

In January 2008, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an evaluation of the European Commission (EC) 2002–2007 mine action strategy in Latin America. The objective was to generate lessons for the EC that could be applied to improve planning and management of existing and future mine action projects, programs, and policies. The evaluation concluded that the Ecuador border had only minor contamination and was located in a mostly remote border region which had some impact on cross-border transit and trade. The most important consequence of the demining to date has been to reinforce and consolidate the peace process between the two countries. The analysis conducted during the evaluation concluded that in terms of mine clearance the best approach would have been rapid clearance with limited long-term capacity development. The evaluation also noted that because, in earlier years, consolidation of the peace process was the primary strategic goal, limitations in effectiveness and efficiency in mine clearance were more acceptable. With the political situation now more stable, the report recommended that future efforts insist on greater efficiency and effectiveness.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

The CGD of the Ecuadorian army, CENDESMI’s operational unit, is responsible for carrying out demining operations through its Army Engineering Corps.

CENDESMI operates two regional commands. One is the Tarqui regional command covering El Oro and Loja provinces and the other is the Amazonas regional command in Morona Santiago province. The missions assigned to these units include mine clearance, technical survey, minefield marking, RE, and VA. In 2008, the Army Engineering Corps consisted of 60 deminers with plans to increase the number of deminers to 100 in October 2009.

In 2008, the Army Engineering Corps cleared 6,215 m² (approximately the size of one football field) in two mined areas in Morona Santiago, destroying 176 antipersonnel mines and four antivehicle mines. In the first four months of 2009, mine clearance continued at a reduced pace as the survey teams were able to conduct clearance on only 34 of 80 working days because of rain.

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45 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009.
49 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 17.
52 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009; and statement of Ecuador, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009. The 2008 clearance figure is derived from subtracting the cumulative area cleared at the end of 2007 as reported in the Article 5 deadline extension request from the cumulative area cleared at the end of 2008 as stated in the 30 April 2009 Article 7 report. Ecuador did not report a clearance figure for only 2008.
In July 2007, the US Department of Defense provided Ecuador with a piece of remote controlled vegetation clearing equipment called the Tempest system, which has been used since September 2007 to clear vegetation for paths to mined areas in Morona Santiago, where approximately one-half of the total remaining mined areas is located. In July 2008, the Department of Defense agreed that Ecuador could use the Tempest for an additional year.

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ecuador was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2009. Since 2005, Ecuador has declared its commitment to meeting its Article 5 obligations on a number of occasions. In 2005, the OAS-EC agreement for the joint Ecuador-Peru project stated the funded activities should enable Ecuador to “achieve the objective of declaring its national territory free from antipersonnel mines in 2010.” In 2006, CENDESMI indicated that Ecuador “would make all the necessary efforts to conclude operations in 2009, and therefore achieve the deadline mandated by the Treaty.” A 2006 planning document for the OAS mine action project in Ecuador stated that the goals of the national mine action authorities were to meet its Article 5 obligations. A key goal was to achieve “mine-safe” status by 2010. On 31 March 2008, however, Ecuador submitted a formal request for an extension of eight years to its Article 5 deadline, to 30 September 2017. A revised “Executive Summary,” submitted in August 2008, did not change the requested extension period.

Since the beginning of the program, progress in clearing mined areas in Ecuador has been slow, with a rainy climate in the mined areas said to be the major hindrance to not meeting its original 10-year treaty deadline. In granting Ecuador an extension to 2017, the States Parties noted that technical surveys still needed to be carried out to know the full extent of the problem and raised the concern that the 333,390m² (the remaining 80% planned to be cleared in the last two years of the extension period) far exceeded any previous outputs. States Parties requested that Ecuador provide a detailed accounting of the remaining mined areas at the Second Review Conference.

States Parties also noted the request indicated a more than 100% increase in future funding as well as a significant increase in demining capacity, which suggests that Ecuador could clear all remaining mined areas in less time than requested. Ecuador has pointed out that technical surveys are likely to reduce the contaminated area to a size that matches the personnel and proposed budget and that the amount of land to clear will not greatly exceed what has been achieved on an annual basis since 1999. The ICBL has recommended on a number of occasions that Ecuador should carry out the technical surveys as soon as possible rather than wait six more years until 2015, as planned under the extension request.

According to CENDESMI’s president, the extension request sets out a realistic plan based on the limitations in financial and human resources and the logistical problems posed by transporting personnel, equipment, and supplies to the area of operations. He also said that
Ecuador was committed to meeting its Mine Ban Treaty obligations and was “not going to cross its arms and wait for the deadline to expire.”

The Article 5 deadline extension request did not include a timeframe to clear nine mined areas in El Oro and Loja provinces in which manual clearance was said to be not applicable because there was a need to first secure mechanical equipment with the capability to act like a sieve.

Ecuador reported in May 2009 that the OAS has been in discussion with the US Department of State to obtain the necessary equipment.

### Demining from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>12,219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>12,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>24,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>11,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2000</td>
<td>43,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>124,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per year</td>
<td>12,492</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Risk Education

During 2008 mine/ERW RE was conducted by OAS AICMA and the CGD. They reached 1,820 people in three of the five mine-affected provinces: 43 people in El Oro, 658 in Loja, and 1,119 in Morona Santiago provinces. The number is similar to 2007 when 1,875 received RE. In 2008, two teachers and two community leaders were trained to spread RE messages in their communities.

RE was provided through multi-day participatory campaigns and follow-up visits were made to at-risk communities. Campaigns targeted adults (mainly farmers or hunters) and children, as well as teachers and local leaders. Activities aimed to provide alternatives to risk-

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62 Interview with Bolívar Torres Cevallos, CENDESMI, Quito, 12 September 2008.
63 Analysis of Ecuador’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of the States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 10 November 2008, p. 1; and presentation by Ecuador, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009.
65 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009.
67 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sergio Ugarte Argüello, OAS AICMA, 29 April 2009; and Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009.
68 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sergio Ugarte Argüello, OAS AICMA, 29 April 2009.
taking behaviors in affected communities. Methods used included house-to-house visits and distribution of materials including posters. The key message disseminated was “Mines Kill.”

The RE campaign focusing on Shuar communities in Tiwinza canton, Morona Santiago province, which began in 2007 and continued into 2008. Mayors and teachers were trained to deliver RE messages in their communities and were provided with materials in Spanish and the Shuar language. This appeared to resolve the language barrier previously reported to reduce the effectiveness of RE in Shuar communities. In 2008, monitoring of the beneficiaries’ knowledge about mine risk took place while continuing to spread RE messages. It was found that 100% of beneficiaries surveyed were able to correctly answer the question, “What is an antipersonnel mine?” while 76% indicated that they knew what to do if they encountered a mine.

Quarterly monitoring visits to marked sites are carried out by OAS AICMA in conjunction with RE activities. In May 2008, two new warning signs were placed in Loja province and subsequently, inspection carried out in nine areas in Loja province and one in El Oro province showed that marking/fences were in good condition, although one sign in Loja province was dislodged by a river.

OAS AICMA maintains a telephone line which allows the public to access information about mines and report mine contamination. In the first quarter of 2008, OAS AICMA received two reports of antivehicle mines in Loja province which were followed up on by CENDESME and the CDG.

According to OAS AICMA, the achievements of RE programs are reflected in the fact that there have been zero mine accidents and that members of the population of three provinces knew about safe behavior in the presence of mines.

Since 1999, RE has been provided in El Oro, Loja, and Morona Santiago provinces. Until 2002, only very limited RE was provided by the military with help from the US military, and in 2002 a Landmine Monitor field visit found there was little awareness of mine risk in El Oro. From 2002, RE also began to be conducted by the OAS and the Ecuadorian Red Cross (ERC), as well as the army, in El Oro, Loja, and Morona Santiago. A toll-free number was provided to report mine/ERW contamination and listen to RE messages. RE was reportedly limited by poor means of communication, long distances, and poor weather. At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Ecuador stated that some 37,000 people had benefitted from RE, including 21,060 people reached by radio in El Oro province.

**Victim Assistance**

The estimated number of casualties is 69; there are 14 civilian survivors in Ecuador and the number of military survivors is unknown.

Mine survivors in Ecuador receive comprehensive VA services on an ongoing basis. However, care for civilian survivors is dependent on international assistance channeled through the OAS. Of the 15 registered civilian survivors, as of the end of 2008, 12 had received comprehensive assistance, including physical rehabilitation, psychological support, and economic reintegration, with support from the OAS. Of the remaining three, one was no longer living and the other two did not need assistance.
Military survivors who were injured during the 1995 war are entitled to free medical, psychological, and physical rehabilitative care, including mobility devices, housing support, and scholarships for their children. The armed forces provide transportation to assist military survivors in accessing services. Active military survivors are given administrative assignments and inactive military survivors can receive job placement assistance through the National Disabled Federation’s Labor Insertion project.\(^{80}\)

In 2008, no improvements had been made to the poor road conditions in some mine-affected provinces, necessitating evacuation of casualties by helicopter.\(^{81}\) The Center for Comprehensive Disability Assistance (Centro de Atención Integral al Discapacitado, CAID), one of the main rehabilitation centers in Ecuador, is well equipped, with six staff who work to international standards. Because of the expensive materials used, the cost of devices limits access for persons with disabilities.\(^{82}\)

While survivors have access to economic reintegration services, military survivors have problems finding jobs because of their age (the average age of survivors is 43) and their limited levels of education.\(^{83}\)

In 2006, a law established benefits for a select group of disabled veterans from the 1995 conflict. The law was later reformed to include deminers injured in post-war demining activities. As of February 2009, 272 people had benefited from the law.\(^{84}\) In addition, Ecuador has enacted various laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. This legal framework was strengthened in September 2008 with the approval of a new article to the constitution, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability.\(^{85}\) However, some aspects of laws protecting persons with disabilities were not enforced.\(^{86}\) On 3 April 2008, Ecuador ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol.

**Victim assistance activities**

In 2008, three landmine survivors received medical and physical rehabilitative care through the OAS program. Two survivors had existing prostheses maintained and one received a replacement prosthetic.\(^{87}\) No other services were provided specifically to mine survivors, although various government institutions provided medical, physical rehabilitation, and economic integration services to persons with disabilities.\(^{88}\)

In 2008, the Ministry of Defense provided 383 scholarships to children of persons with disabilities from the military.\(^{89}\) An initiative of the Office of the Vice President, “Ecuador without Barriers,” helped create approximately 2,800 jobs for persons with disabilities by 17 December 2008.\(^{90}\)

In 2008, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) donated to CAID equipment and materials to fit 50 people with prostheses and provided training in the production of lower-limb prostheses.\(^{91}\)

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\(^{80}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 23 May 2009.

\(^{81}\) Ibid.


\(^{83}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 23 May 2009.

\(^{84}\) José Olmos, “Héroes de guerra ‘combaten’ ahora por una ley prometida” (“War heroes now ‘fighting’ for a promised law”), *El Universo* (Guayaquil), 8 February 2009.

\(^{85}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 23 May 2009.


\(^{87}\) Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009.

\(^{88}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of Ecuador to the UN in Geneva, 23 May 2009.

\(^{89}\) Ibid.


**Support for Mine Action**

In March 2008, Ecuador provided a cost estimate totaling $10,560,040 (€7,701,874) for fulfilling its Article 5 obligations during the period from 2010 to 2017.\(^{92}\) In July 2008, Ecuador revised downward its total cost estimate for meeting its Article 5 obligations to $9,321,940 (€6,798,877) for the same period.\(^{93}\) Then, in September 2008, Ecuador submitted another revised budget for its extension request, but this time totaling $16,671,040 (€11,320,820). The substantial increase in overall costs is accounted for by both increases to existing budget items and the addition of new budget items not included in the July 2008 estimate. Annual costs within the latest budget are roughly $2.33 million in 2010, $2.15 million in 2011 and 2012, $2 million in 2013, and $2.01 million annually from 2014 to 2017. The government of Ecuador is projected to provide $1,080,000 annually during the extension period, totaling $8.64 million or 52% of the total projected costs.\(^{94}\) Ecuador has not provided a total cost estimate for fulfilling VA or RE obligations.

International support for Ecuador’s mine action programming to date has occurred mainly through the framework cooperation agreement signed between Ecuador and OAS AICMA in 2001. OAS AICMA is responsible for the management of funds allocated to Ecuador through the agreement.\(^{95}\) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs mobilizes international resources from sources outside the OAS.\(^{96}\) In 2008, Ecuador and Peru continued to coordinate resource mobilization as part of their overall cooperative efforts in mine action. Ecuador and Peru held a joint meeting in Quito in September 2008 with mine action NGOs and representatives from diplomatic missions of donor countries to develop coordinated funding for clearance operations in both countries.\(^{97}\) Ecuador has not reported on the results of this meeting or subsequent resource mobilization efforts.

**National support for mine action**

Ecuador did not report national funding to mine action in 2008. In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Ecuador reported on annual national funding during the period 1999–2007, with national support in 2007 roughly $500,000 (€364,671), as well as $326,836 (€238,375) in additional funding from national agencies.\(^{98}\) In its extension budget revised in September 2008, Ecuador reported on national funding for the period 2010–2017, but did not confirm whether the amounts committed had been obligated.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, the OAS reported funding to Ecuador/Peru mine action projects via OAS AICMA totaling $1,285,195 (€872,739), with contributors consisting of Canada ($318,773), Norway ($300,000), the EC ($280,259), Spain ($280,092), and Italy ($106,071). The OAS did not specify how much was allocated to each country. Reporting to Landmine Monitor by Spain and Italy for 2008 included contributions to OAS AICMA for projects in the Americas, including mine action in Ecuador and Peru, but the donors did not specify the amounts directed to projects in each country.\(^{99}\) In 2007, Spain reported providing $109,688 (€80,000) through OAS AICMA for unspecified mine action in Ecuador.\(^{100}\)

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\(^{92}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 70.

\(^{93}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary (Revision), 3 July 2008, p. 5.

\(^{94}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Timelines Revision), 13 September 2008.

\(^{95}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 50.


\(^{97}\) Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.

\(^{98}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 52.


Based on the budget revised as of September 2008, the amount of international funding needed to fulfill Ecuador’s Article 5 obligations ranges from roughly $915,000 to $1.2 million per year.\textsuperscript{101} It is uncertain, given that OAS funds for Ecuador and Peru are undifferentiated, whether international funds directed in 2008 to Ecuador’s national mine action efforts meet the financial targets in its extension plan. National funding as last reported is less than the annual amount required in the plan. International funding does not appear to fully address Ecuador’s VA needs.

\textsuperscript{101} Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Budget Revision), 13 September 2008.
EL SALVADOR

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 July 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Residual antipersonnel mines and ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>14 (2007: four)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but estimated 3,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>4,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>$195,000 (2007: $195,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary


El Salvador was mine-affected but major clearance operations were completed in 1993. There is a residual problem with explosive remnants of war. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 63 casualties (12 killed, 26 injured, and 25 unknown). During the same period, risk education activities were carried out by the National Civilian Police’s Division of Arms and Explosives, as part of a permanent education program on the risks of mines, explosives, and guns.

While some progress was made in decentralizing access to healthcare and community-based rehabilitation and raising awareness about the rights of persons with disabilities, limited progress has been observed in the implementation of El Salvador’s victim assistance objectives that were established in 2005. In 2009, El Salvador called on the international community to assist with physical rehabilitation and economic reintegration.

Mine Ban Policy

El Salvador signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, ratified on 27 January 1999, and became a State Party on 1 July 1999. The treaty is enforced domestically through Article 346-C of Decree 471 (Reform of the Penal Code), which entered into force on 30 November 2004.1


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1 The law includes penal sanctions of five to 10 years imprisonment for using, developing, producing, purchasing, stockpiling, or transferring one or more antipersonnel mines. Any individual that in any way assists with these activities can be prosecuted with a two to four year prison sentence. Diario Oficial, Vol. 365, No. 217, 22 November 2004. The text of the decree, which amends the Penal Code, is included in Article 7 Report, Section II.B, 29 April 2005.
As of 1 July 2009, El Salvador had not yet provided its annual Article 7 report covering calendar year 2008, due 30 April 2009. It also failed to submit a report covering calendar year 2007. El Salvador has prepared a total of seven Article 7 reports, the most recent dated 31 December 2006, covering calendar year 2006.

El Salvador has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

El Salvador is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It has never submitted an annual Article 13 report. El Salvador is also party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, but has not yet submitted an annual Article 10 report. El Salvador signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not yet ratified as of 1 July 2009.

**Production, transfer, use, stockpile destruction, and retention**

El Salvador has reported that it has not produced antipersonnel mines. It is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines in the past. There have been no reports or allegations of landmine use since the early 1990s.

El Salvador completed destruction of its stockpile of 7,549 antipersonnel mines on 20 February 2003. In its initial Article 7 report submitted in 2001, El Salvador stated that it would not retain any mines for training. However, in subsequent reporting, El Salvador stated that the armed forces retained a total of 96 antipersonnel mines (50 M14 and 46 M26) for the purposes of training and development. In its most recent Article 7 report, it indicated that 24 mines had been consumed in training activities, leaving a total of 72. In March 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor that El Salvador was considering destroying all of the mines retained for training.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

El Salvador has a problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW), and may have a small residual mine threat, although no mined areas have been identified in recent years.

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2 In March 2008, a government official told Landmine Monitor that reports had not been submitted because there had been no change, but the Article 7 reporting template allows for the submission of a cover sheet “no change” report. Telephone interview with José Francisco Cortez González, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, San Salvador, 25 March 2008.

3 Other Article 7 reports were submitted on: 3 August 2006, 29 April 2005, 25 March 2004, 4 March 2003 (received by Landmine Monitor; not recorded by the UN), 29 April 2002, and 31 August 2001. The last four reports do not use the standard forms.


5 Article 7 Report, Forms E and H, 4 March 2003.


8 Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 August 2001.

9 Article 7 Report, Forms B and D, 29 April 2002, and subsequent reports. As El Salvador has not submitted an Article 7 report since 31 December 2006, it has not reported on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, and has not used the expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines agreed by States Parties.

10 Article 7 Report, Section 2.c, 31 December 2006.

11 Telephone interview with José Francisco Cortez González, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 March 2008. He also indicated that he believed that the retained mines were inert and contained no explosives.
Casualties
El Salvador reported 14 ERW casualties (two killed and 12 injured) in four incidents in 2008. No landmine casualties were reported in 2008. Four of the casualties were boys, followed by men (three), girls (three), and women (two); the gender of two children was unknown. This represents a significant increase from the four ERW casualties (all injured) recorded in 2007. Government representatives offered no explanation for the increase except to say that there was an increase of explosive incidents involving ERW during the year, particularly in June, July, and August, including incidents with no casualties. The increase is likely due to better reporting through increased awareness of the issue.

Incidents occurred in the departments of Chalatenango, Cuscatlán, and La Libertad, and in San Miguel, a large city in the eastern part of the country. Three of the four incidents occurred when children were playing with abandoned explosives. The fourth incident occurred when two adult men attempted to extract metal from an explosive. In all four cases, the Division of Arms and Explosives (DAE) within the National Civilian Police determined that the explosives were from the civil war in the 1980s.

In 2009, four ERW casualties (all injured) were identified, as of 31 May. On 26 January, in the department of La Unión, three men and one boy were injured when they detonated an explosive device they found in the yard of their home.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 63 mine/ERW casualties (12 killed, 26 injured and 25 unknown). Because there is no detailed mechanism to collect information about mine/ERW casualties, it is likely that there were other casualties; in 2004, for example, there were “several” casualties, but the precise figure is not known. Between 1999 and 2008, casualties were identified through media reports, the National Civilian Police and the Council for Integrated Attention for Persons with Disabilities (Consejo Nacional de Atención Integral a las Personas con Discapacidad National, CONAIPD). The last officially confirmed report of a mine casualty was in 1994. At the end of 2007, El Salvador reported that “at least 3,142” casualties were in the database of the Protection Fund for the Disabled and Injured as a Result of the Armed Conflict (Fondo de Protección de Lisiados y Discapacitados a Consecuencia del Conflicto Armado). By 28 November 2008, a total of 14,068 war-injured individuals had been registered, which included mine/ERW survivors.

Risk profile
In 2008 and 2009, incidents happened in rural areas in five different departments. In two cases, the activity at the time of the incident seems to have been intentional risk taking behavior. However, in the other three cases, young children (aged 5, 7, and 9) found explosives and began to play with them in the company of other children.

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13 Interview with Lourdes Barrera de Morales, Executive Director, CONAIPD, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
14 Email from Sheree Bailey, Victim Assistance Specialist, ISU, GICHD, 30 July 2009.
16 Telephone interview with Walter Alvarado, Data Manager, DAE, 25 June 2009.
17 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
21 Ibid; and interview with Lourdes Barrera de Morales, CONAIPD, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
There is no national mine action program. The Ministry of Defense and the DAE are the authorized national institutions responsible for clearance of mines and ERW. Since 1994, El Salvador has managed, implemented, and funded national risk education (RE) activities with 100% national funds from the DAE’s general budget.22

Victim assistance
CONAIPD coordinates victim assistance (VA) through its Sub-Committee on Victim Assistance. The Sub-Committee includes representatives from various government ministries, survivors’ organizations, organizations for persons with disabilities, and other civil society actors.23 It met in November 2008 to review progress in achieving the country’s VA objectives.24 According to a representative of a survivors’ network, the Sub-Committee was unbalanced, with many more government representatives than survivors or other persons with disabilities, and government delegates to the Sub-Committee lacked the authority to make decisions.25

El Salvador coordinates VA through CONAIPD without international technical or financial assistance. Despite being a developing country, it has significant national capacity, especially in healthcare and physical rehabilitation, and most VA services are provided by national public and private entities.26 In 2005, the government estimated that 98% of VA services were provided with national funds.27 In 2009, El Salvador reported that all VA services were supported by national funds.28 However, at nearly every meeting of States Parties and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings,29 El Salvador has called on the international community to support economic reintegration services and the cost of materials for prosthetics and other mobility devices, to “extend its reach.”30 El Salvador has national legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, including landmine/ERW survivors, but it is poorly enforced.31

RE activities are included as part of an ongoing, permanent safety campaign.32 In September 2007, El Salvador developed a VA action plan for the implementation of its revised “VA26” objectives (see Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives section below).

El Salvador has an action plan for the implementation of the 2001 National Policy for the Regulation of the Equality of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities.33 In 2008, El Salvador developed a plan of action for the implementation of and compliance with the Convention

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25 Telephone interview with Jesus Martinez, Executive Director, RSPD, 25 June 2009.
26 Interview with Lourdes Barrera de Morales, CONAIPD, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The National Development Plan “Safe Country: Government Plan 2004–2009” includes the aim of social inclusion for all persons with disabilities within the objective of combating extreme poverty in the poorest regions of the country. Funds dedicated to the implementation of this plan have supported the development of a community-based rehabilitation network in rural communities, for the benefit of all persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.

Data collection and management
Data on all mine/ERW casualties occurring since the end of the war is collected by the DAE, where it is recorded in a database for casualties caused by all “industrial and homemade explosive artifacts.” The Protection Fund collects data on war-injured individuals, including some mine/ERW survivors injured after the war, who were determined to have been “injured by war in times of peace.” CONAIPD tracks the number of survivors from both databases.

As there is no single consolidated database, it is possible that some survivors are in both the DAE and the Protection Fund databases, since casualties occurring after the end of the war can apply to be included in the Protection Fund. Data managed by the Protection Fund does not differentiate between survivors injured by mines and those injured by ERW. Data held by the DAE lacks details, only noting the type of explosive that caused the casualty. While Protection Fund data was said to be under revision in April 2008, no further details of this revision were available as of 31 May 2009.

A 2007 national census, which included a question on disability for the first time in El Salvador’s history, identified 235,302 persons with disabilities, making up 4.1% of the population. However, these results have been disputed by CONAIPD, the Permanent Table of the Office of the Ombudsperson for Human Rights, and many individual NGOs for having significantly undercounted this population. In 2008, CONAIPD received technical assistance from Spain to design plans for a national disability census and, as of May 2009, was seeking funding to carry out the census.

Risk Education
Mine/ERW RE in El Salvador is part of a broader, permanent education campaign carried out in schools by the National Civilian Police to explain the dangers of weapons, including explosives, arms, and landmines. The target population for this program is schools with high rates of juvenile delinquency. Previously, the police targeted areas where the conflict had been most intense.

In 2008, the DAE held 153 sessions in 10 different schools, reaching 4,792 people, including 4,653 students and 139 teachers. This was a decrease from the 6,819 beneficiaries in 2007. Schools were based in the departments of Chalatenango, La Paz, La Libertad, and San Salvador. The DAE has two staff members who carry out all RE sessions. Included in the presentations is information about the criminal penalties for being found in possession of illegal weapons.

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34 Plan provided by email from Lourdes Barrera de Morales, CONAIPD, 27 May 2009.
37 Data from the DAE for 2008, provided by Lourdes Barrera de Morales, CONAIPD, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
38 Statement by Jesus Martinez, RSPD, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, Victim Assistance Parallel Session, 24 February 2009.
41 Interview with Lourdes Barrera de Morales, CONAIPD, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
42 Email from Walter Alvarado, DAE, 25 June 2009.
43 Ibid.
44 Email from Tirza Leibowitz, Director of Advocacy, Survivor Corps, 5 August 2009.
45 Email from Walter Alvarado, DAE, 25 June 2009.
In July 2008, following an ERW incident involving four children in Chalatenango, a police officer stated that there were not enough RE programs in the department. He had participated in an RE program in the area that ended in 1999 and believed that the adult population was aware of the risks but children lacked awareness, causing them to become “the new victims.”

The DAE has provided education to schools regarding the risks of mines, explosives, and arms since at least 1999. In 2003, a government representative acknowledged that the local population was not informed or qualified to take action when coming into contact with UXO. In 2005, the DAE program targeted schools in areas that had previously been impacted by conflict. By 2008, RE activities were focused on eliminating the use of arms and explosives by youth involved in criminal activity.

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be 3,158. While some progress was made in decentralizing access to healthcare and community-based rehabilitation and raising awareness about the rights of persons with disabilities, limited progress has been observed in the implementation of El Salvador’s victim assistance objectives that were established in 2005. In February 2009, in reviewing overall progress in VA, El Salvador described mobility devices, professional training, and income-generating projects for survivors as ongoing needs and underscored the importance of international assistance to continue providing “effective attention” for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities.

Landmine/ERW survivors are treated within the general healthcare system and services directly related to their disability are free of charge. Most specialized health services are located in the capital, however, they are out of reach for most civilian survivors, due to lack of transportation. In 2008, military survivors could receive free transportation to the Central Military Hospital in San Salvador and the Regional Military Hospital in San Miguel; mobile health services were organized to benefit people living in rural communities, including survivors, but their reach was limited by a shortage of fuel for vehicles.

In 2008, CONAIPD reported that the national healthcare system could handle any kind of emergency. However, following an ERW incident in June 2008, the evacuation of four wounded children to an appropriate medical facility took more than five hours because of a lack of emergency vehicles, impassable roads, and the lack of necessary equipment and materials in the nearest health center.

While there is a range of public, private, and NGO providers of rehabilitation services in El Salvador, survivors complained that their mobility devices were not of good quality and that waiting periods for repairs and replacements were long. In November 2008, a multi-stakeholder review of VA noted that there were just two institutions to provide physical rehabilitation services

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48 Email from Walter Alvarado, DAE, 25 June 2009.


52 Ibid.


to survivors, one of which was restricted to military survivors. These were a rehabilitation center run by the Protection Fund in San Salvador (serving both former combatants and civilians) and the Centro de Rehabilitación Profesional de la Fuerza Armada de El Salvador (Center for the Professional Rehabilitation of the Armed Forces of El Salvador) in San Salvador (serving former and active military personnel). The review recommended that rehabilitation services be decentralized. The cost of materials for the production of prosthetics was another challenge. In 2008, the government began a project to establish standards for prosthetic/orthotic production.55

By May 2009, community-based rehabilitation (CBR) networks had been established in 64 municipalities “in extreme poverty,” to improve social integration of persons with disabilities. Through a joint government-NGO project, local authorities were trained to help persons with disabilities become involved in developing themselves and their communities.56 However, the 2008 national VA review found that the country lacked a national policy for psychological support and social integration.57

Despite a 4% employment quota for persons with disabilities, and NGO projects to increase economic opportunities for survivors, unemployment remained a problem for survivors in 2008. The 2008 VA review cited challenges such as the age of survivors (most are in their 40s while employers prefer to hire younger candidates) and the high unemployment rate.58 Pensions for all survivors classified as “war victims,” both civilian and military, were raised by 20% in January 2009.59

El Salvador has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities but, despite government awareness campaigns to prevent discrimination and promote compliance with employment quotas, implementation remained ineffective.60 El Salvador ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 14 December 2007. In 2008, El Salvador developed an action plan and established a commission to monitor implementation of this convention.61

El Salvador’s VA situation has improved over the last 10 years. In 1999, only NGOs were providing survivor-specific services, although the government had requested international assistance to develop a comprehensive landmine victim assistance program.62 In that same year, El Salvador began receiving assistance from the Pan American Health Organization through a five-year project for the rehabilitation of mine victims in Central America. By 2003, the project had provided CBR training for socio-economic reintegration, as well as training for physiotherapists and prosthetic technicians. In 2004, several factors limited effective socio-economic reintegration initiatives, including: the lack of access to basic education; lack of appropriate transportation to facilities; lack of financial support; discrimination; lack of awareness of the needs of persons with disabilities; lack of access due to centralization of services; and limited support for income-generating activities for persons with disabilities. In 2005, El Salvador presented objectives for improving victim assistance but, as of May 2009, limited progress had been identified.

56 Statement by Jesus Martinez, RSPD; and statement by Lourdes Barrera de Morales, CONAIPD, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, Victim Assistance Parallel Session, 24 February 2009.
58 Ibid.
61 Interview with Lourdes Barrera de Morales, CONAIPD, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

As one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate attention to survivors, El Salvador presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. It then presented revised objectives and a plan to implement them in 2007 at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties. The revised objectives were developed by the CONAIPD Sub-Committee on Victim Assistance (see Program Management and Coordination section above). The Sub-Committee met in November 2008 to review progress made towards achieving the revised objectives.

El Salvador’s revised objectives lack specific targets for the number of beneficiaries or deadlines. There has been some progress towards some objectives: such as the implementation of CBR networks in targeted communities; an increase in pensions for mine/ERW survivors; awareness raised about the rights of survivors; and the implementation of projects to increase healthcare access in rural communities. But there is no data available on the number of survivors receiving services as a result of these advances. One critical objective that has not been achieved is the verification and consolidation of survivor data; without this, it is not possible to monitor progress. A government official explained that they were still monitoring the implementation of the program developed as part of the Nairobi Action Plan, but that the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities action plan had, in part, taken its place since available data includes services provided to all persons with disabilities.

El Salvador has provided information on advances and challenges in VA at all meetings of States Parties since 2005 and at all intersessional Standing Committee meetings except in 2006. A VA expert from CONAIPD has attended all international meetings since 2005 (except in 2006). El Salvador has never used voluntary Form J in its Article 7 report to provide information on VA.

Victim assistance activities

In 2008, 1,759 of the 14,068 war-injured individuals (approximately 25% of which are mine/ERW survivors) registered with the Protection Fund benefited from the socio-economic reintegration program; 5,216 received assistance through the continuing health program. Through the Salvadoran armed forces, 15,031 veterans received physical and mental health benefits; 3,097 received economic assistance. It is not known how many of these beneficiaries were mine/ERW survivors as data is not collected on the cause of disability for beneficiaries with disabilities.

In 2008, Survivor Corps (formerly Landmine Survivors Network) in El Salvador completed the nationalization process and, by the start of 2009, was officially registered in El Salvador as the Fundación Red de Sobrevivientes y Personas con Discapacidades (Foundation Network of Survivors and Persons with Disabilities, RSPD). In 2008, it continued to receive funding support from Survivor Corps in Washington, DC, but began to cover 25% of its operating expenses through direct donations. The RSPD expanded its mandate of working with landmine/ERW survivors to include all those wounded by war and other persons with disabilities. This change was designed to make the organization more inclusive and, as the only organization in Central America dedicated to providing peer support, to allow a larger group of persons with disabilities.

to benefit from this methodology. In 2008, the RSPD provided a range of services, including peer support, physical rehabilitation and small business support to 267 persons with disabilities, of which 139 were mine/ERW survivors. Some survivors received multiple services. Through a special project funded by Canada, a further 700 persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, participated in a course in business administration and human rights. In 2009, the RSPD had begun to diversify its peer support outreach workers to include persons with a range of disabilities.

In 2008, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) continued to collaborate with the Universidad Don Bosco (UDB) School of Prosthetics and Orthotics, an International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics Level II regional school based in San Salvador. The SFD provided equipment and materials for training purposes, material and components to fit 60 people, and supported the participation of two UDB teachers in a one-month tutorial on the use of polypropylene technology for lower-limb prostheses, held at the SFD training center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The SFD also assessed a rehabilitation center in Santa Ana, the second largest city in El Salvador.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs, including RE and VA.

National support for mine action

The Ministry of Health is in charge of coordinating and allocating funds for rehabilitation programs, including those allocated through the Protection Fund, as well as other services for persons with disabilities, including war-injured. The government of El Salvador has not reported to Landmine Monitor whether the Protection Fund receives any international monetary assistance, nor has it reported the amount of funds directed from the Protection Fund to landmine survivors.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, the United States reported providing US$195,000 from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for VA in El Salvador. The US was the sole reported contributor to El Salvador in 2007, providing the same amount via the CDC.

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69 Telephone interview with Jesus Martinez, RSPD, 25 June 2009.
70 Email from Jesus Martinez, RSPD, 29 June 2009.
71 Ibid, 30 June 2009.
72 Telephone interview with Jesus Martinez, RSPD, 25 June 2009.
74 Interview with Dr. Eva María Mateu, Director, Unit of Public Health, Ministry of Health, San Salvador, 31 March 2008.
75 USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2008, from US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining,” provided by email from Timothy Groen, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Department of State, 18 June 2009.
ERITREA

2008 Key Data

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<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 February 2002</th>
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<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Clearance of 0.06km² of mined areas</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearance of 1.5m² of battle areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk Education Recipients in 2008</td>
<td>Approximately 106,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

Ten-Year Summary

Eritrea became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 February 2002. Eritrea has not enacted national implementation legislation. Since becoming a State Party, Eritrea has consistently reported that it has no stockpile of antipersonnel mines, other than 100 live and nine inert mines retained for training purposes. Both Eritrea and Ethiopia used antipersonnel mines in their 1998–2000 border war. Eritrea strongly denied a report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia that Eritrea provided antipersonnel mines to “militant fundamentalists” in Somalia in 2006.

Conflicts dating back to World War II have left Eritrea with a severe mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem. Following the signing of a peace agreement with Ethiopia in December 2000, the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) was deployed and established a Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC). The Eritrean Demining Authority (EDA) was created as the national mine action authority, with clearance entrusted to the Eritrean Demining Operations (EDO). The EDO was subsequently absorbed into the EDA.

A Landmine Impact Survey completed in 2004 is the basis for describing the landmine problem and the National Mine Action Strategic Plan. Eritrea ordered all international mine action organizations to cease operations and leave the country in July 2002 and then again in 2005, when the government impounded vehicles and clearance operations were suspended. A lack of funds since 2007 has further reduced the EDA’s capacity to conduct clearance and the amount of land cleared in 2008 was the lowest since 2000. On 30 July 2008, the UN Security Council terminated UNMEE and all mine action activities ceased in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) separating Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 653 mine/ERW casualties (159 killed, 445 injured, and 49 unknown), which, due to limited and overlapping data collection mechanisms, is likely to be less than the actual total for the period. Data collection by the EDA has improved over the past decade, but data remained incomplete and lacked detail.

Risk education (RE) has primarily been conducted by the EDA, working with the ministries of education and information, and increasingly integrated with demining, with the support of UNICEF. A 2008 knowledge, attitudes, and practice survey recommended significant changes to the RE program, including the development of a more targeted approach and more of a focus on behavior change as opposed to conventional information dissemination.
Healthcare improved but serious shortages in staff and supplies remained. Rehabilitation and prosthetics services were available through state-run centers, supported by the ICRC until mid-2009. The community-based rehabilitation (CBR) program expanded to all areas of the country by 2009, providing rehabilitation, prosthetic and counseling services and access to inclusive education for persons with disabilities, yet it lacked sufficient coordination and monitoring capacity. Economic reintegration activities were mostly provided by the government and a disabled war veterans’ NGO. Although opportunities for vocational training and income-generation were limited, the government committed significant resources to the training war-injured persons with disabilities. Psychological support services lacked qualified staff. Eritrea lacked adequate legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities. Government restrictions have significantly reduced the number of international operators providing victim assistance in Eritrea.

Mine Ban Policy

Eritrea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 August 2001, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2002. Eritrea has not enacted domestic legislation or reported any new national measures to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, as required by Article 9.1

Eritrea submitted its sixth annual Article 7 report on 25 March 2009, covering the period from 30 December 2007 to 30 December 2008.2

Eritrea did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. It attended both meetings the previous year.

Eritrea has not made known its views on key issues of interpretation and implementation of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit, mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Eritrea is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.3

Transfer of antipersonnel mines

In its May 2006 and November 2006 reports, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia alleged the transfer of antipersonnel mines from Eritrea to non-state actors in Somalia in March and July 2006.4 In July 2007, the Monitoring Group provided clarification and further details on the alleged July 2006 transfers, including details of the air transport and background information on the plane used.5

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1 At a March 2004 regional landmine workshop, Eritrea said it planned to “take all the necessary measures to adopt implementing legislation.” However, in May 2005, the deputy general manager of the EDA told Landmine Monitor that he did not know if national legislation was being pursued. No progress on national legislation has been reported in Eritrea’s recent Article 7 reports.

2 Previous reports were submitted on 10 March 2008, 3 January 2007, 15 September 2005, 4 December 2004 (report received by Landmine Monitor), and 3 September 2003.


Eritrea has stated that the information in the Monitoring Group reports is “groundless” and “fictitious.” In July 2007, Eritrea stated that allegations by the Monitoring Group of antipersonnel mine transfers were “baseless and unfounded…Eritrea has never provided landmines or any other military support to any of the factions in Somalia.”

Attempts by two Presidents of meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty to clarify and seek further information from the Monitoring Group about its reports of mine transfers had not received a reply as of August 2009.

**Production, stockpiling, and use**

Eritrea has stated that it never produced antipersonnel mines, and that all the mines used in past conflicts were obtained from Ethiopian forces (either from minefields or storage facilities) during the 1962–1991 war of independence.

In each of its Article 7 reports, Eritrea has indicated that it no longer has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Eritrea’s treaty-mandated deadline for destroying any stocks of antipersonnel mines was 1 February 2006.

According to its most recent Article 7 report, as in previous reports, Eritrea retains 100 live and nine inert antipersonnel Mines for training purposes. The number has not changed, indicating no mines have been consumed during training activities. Eritrea has not reported on the precise intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004, and has not used the expanded reporting form for retained mines agreed by States Parties in 2005.

There have been no reports of new use of antipersonnel mines since the end of the 1998–2000 border war with Ethiopia. Between 2003 and 2008 there were incidents caused by newly laid antivehicle mines in the TSZ, according to news reports and UNMEE MACC. In October 2008 an antivehicle mine killed three civilians traveling by car on the road connecting the contested town of Badme with Ethiopia. Reportedly the road is checked by the Ethiopian army regularly for new mine use.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Eritrea is affected by mines and ERW dating back to World War II, but largely as the result of the country’s struggle for independence from 1962–1991 and its border war with Ethiopia in 1998–2000.

The remaining extent of contamination is not known with any precision. A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), conducted from 2002–2004, indicated that 481 of 4,176 communities in Eritrea (11.5%) were seriously affected by mines and/or ERW. The LIS also found that more

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8 For details of statements and actions by the two Presidents relating to the Monitoring Group reports, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 356.
9 Article 7 Report, Form B, 10 March 2008.
10 See Form B of each Article 7 report. Eritrea maintains that all of the approximately 450,000 mines it obtained from Ethiopia during the 1962–1991 war were subsequently laid during the 1998–2000 border conflict, except for those that were unusable, which were disposed of or destroyed. In 2002, Eritrea claimed that 40,000 mines had been destroyed by the Eritrean Defense Force following the end of the liberation war. UNMEE MACC could not confirm this. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2002*, p. 249. UNMEE MACC estimated that Eritrea laid about 240,000 mines during the 1998–2000 conflict. Interview with Phil Lewis, Programme Manager, UNMEE MACC, Asmara, 18 January 2002.
11 Article 7 Report, Form D, 25 March 2009. It retains 40 PMN, 40 POMZ-2, and 20 PMD6 live mines, as well as one inert mine of each of the following types: PMN, PMD-6, POMZ-2, M16, PPM-2, MON 100, M14, PRB M35 and MON 50.
than 650,000 people lived in the impacted communities across all six regions of the country. Contamination in 914 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) was estimated to cover a total of 129 km² of land, including the surveyed areas in the TSZ. An additional 113 UXO-contaminated sites required spot clearance.14

The LIS was not granted access to some 30 communities in the TSZ, as well as to a further 140 communities across Eritrea.15 In its last report on its operations in Eritrea issued January 2008, UNMEE MACC stated that while the LIS data and RE teams contributed to the knowledge of the mine problem, the full extent of contamination in the TSZ cannot be known without a thorough survey.16 UNMEE has estimated that mined areas cover 78 km² in the TSZ and that SHAs cover a further 21.8 km². Some of these areas were identified as potentially contaminated during the LIS.17 In May 2009, the EDA estimated that 702 SHAs remained from the 914 SHAs identified by the LIS, covering approximately 100 km².18

The Eritrean Armed Forces have reported laying more than 200,000 mines in the TSZ.19 In January 2008, they claimed only 10,472 antipersonnel mines and 34 antivehicle mines remained in the ground20 and Eritrea’s most recent Article 7 report stated that 10,619 mines had been found and destroyed during clearance operations from 2000–2008.21 Based on the reported figures, UNMEE concluded that, although there are many minefields, the quantity of mines emplaced may, in fact, be significantly lower than expected.22

The majority of the UXO contamination is in the TSZ, where UNMEE found munitions primarily along the trench lines.23 UNMEE reported in 2007 that PTAB 2.5 and BL755 unexploded submunitions have been encountered in Eritrea; ERW have also been found in artillery and mortar ammunition storage areas used in the 1998–2000 war. ERW have been located at Tio and Iidi, in Sub-Sector East, and more recently, outside Massawa.24 ERW in Eritrea may also include items left over from the Italian invasion prior to World War II.25

Casualties
In 2008, the EDA identified 64 new mine/ERW casualties, including 22 killed and 42 injured. Almost half of all casualties (30) were children (11 boys, two girls, and 17 unknown gender), four were adults (two men and two of unknown gender), and another 30 casualties were of unknown age and gender. Three casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 28 by antivehicle mines, 29 by ERW, and four by an unknown device. Most casualties occurred in Gash Barka region (29), followed by Anseba (16), Debub (15), Semenawi Keyih Bahri/Northern Red Sea (three), and Maekel (one). In three incidents, which caused 28 casualties, buses reportedly activated newly laid mines. Another 16 casualties occurred while herding, 15 while playing; the activities of five casualties at the time of the incident were unknown.26

This was a slight decrease from 2007, when the EDA identified at least 70 new mine/ERW casualties (17 killed and 53 injured).27 It was, however, an increase from 2006, when 32 casualties were identified (nine killed and 23 injured).28

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23 Ibid, p. 12.
26 Email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 13 March 2009.
Casualties continued to be reported in 2009: the EDA reported 14 casualties (four killed and 10 injured) as of June, including five men, six boys, and three girls.29

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 653 casualties (159 killed, 445 injured, and 49 unknown).30 Landmine Monitor data was gathered from reporting by the EDA, UNMEE MACC, Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare (MoLHW), and the Ministry of Health (MoH).31 The EDA recorded 677 casualties between 2000 and 2008, including 184 killed and 493 injured.32 It is unknown if all these casualties actually occurred in this timeframe. The LIS remains the most reliable source of cumulative casualty data, identifying 4,934 reported mine casualties (2,436 killed and 2,498 injured) through June 2004.33

A MoLHW national survey on disability completed in 2005 reportedly identified approximately 84,000 landmine survivors in Eritrea, of a total 150,000 persons with disabilities.34 However, this figure was not issued again and does not appear to correlate with other reporting on the numbers of persons with disabilities or war-injured persons in Eritrea, including reporting by the MoLHW.35 According to UNICEF the exact number of mine survivors was not determined by this study,36 which runs contrary to earlier information received by Landmine Monitor.37

Risk profile

According to UNICEF, “The suspension of the UN Mine Action Coordination Center’s demining and explosive ordnance disposal [EOD] activities, in April 2008, and lack of donor and technical support to the EDA is increasing the risk of mine and UXO accidents.”38 People are at risk from mines, UXO and IEDs.39

The proportion of incidents attributed to mines is decreasing, while those involving ERW have remained relatively static. Since 2006, just under half of recorded incidents were attributed to intentional handling of UXO, and two of every three of these incidents involved young males under 18 years of age.40

According to the EDA/UNICEF knowledge, attitudes, and practice (KAP) survey in 2008, “[a]lthough the findings of the survey describe considerable residual contamination, overall respondent ratings for threat were generally low, suggesting the perceptions of threat have moderated as people have adapted to living in contaminated environments. Despite this, perception of risk remains high, and for a majority of respondents, well above reported levels of knowledge and practice.”41

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29 Email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 26 June 2009.
31 The LIS identified 295 casualties from incidents in 2001–2003, compared to the 340 casualties identified by the UNMEE MACC in the TSZ only, in the same years. While there is likely significant overlap between UNMEE MACC and LIS data, inadequate details on casualties prevent comparisons from being made.
32 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 365; and email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 13 March 2009. In 2008, the EDA reported 613 casualties (162 killed and 451 injured) between 2000 and 2007, to which the casualties reported by EDA for 2008 have been added. Email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 13 March 2009.
35 For example, in 2008 the MoHLW reported a total of 80,000 persons with disabilities in Eritrea and the ICRC reported 58,000. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 365.
41 Ibid.
Socio-economic impact
Those most affected by mines in Eritrea are the rural population in all regions, nomadic people, internally displaced persons (IDP), and refugees. Key humanitarian challenges were to make land safe for the return and resettlement of IDPs in Debub and Gash Barka, and freeing land for agricultural use. The government reported that in 2007 all Eritrean IDPs successfully returned home. According to UNMEE, mines and ERW remain a major threat to people living and working in the TSZ.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
The Eritrean Demining Authority was established in July 2002, reporting directly to the Office of the President and responsible for coordinating mine action in Eritrea, and ensuring that mine action would support rehabilitation and development projects and be integrated into the national development strategy. It was not responsible for mine action in direct support of the UNMEE peacekeeping mission and the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Commission.

UNMEE MACC was established in August 2000, following the cessation of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with a mandate to provide demining support to the UNMEE peacekeeping mission within the 25km-wide TSZ and for 15km on either side. It was responsible for all mine action activities within the TSZ. In July 2008, its mandate was not renewed and UNMEE left Eritrea.

Risk education
The EDA is responsible for managing and implementing RE, but coordination meetings did not take place in 2008. In March 2009, with UNICEF support, a Technical Working Group on the Mine Action Program was established, and is open to UN agencies, government ministries, the ICRC, and the Red Cross Society of Eritrea (RCSE), and all other mine action actors remaining in the country.

UNICEF supported capacity-building of the EDA, including a study visit to Kenya, and advocated on gender mainstreaming in the mine action program, in particular in demining and EOD operations.

Victim assistance
The MoLHW, through its Department of Social Affairs, is responsible for issues regarding persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors. MoLHW victim assistance (VA) activities are conducted in cooperation with the EDA. UNDP is designated to support capacity development for both the EDA and the MoLHW. In late 2008, however, the UN reported that communication between mine action stakeholders was “in limbo.”

Data collection and management
There is no comprehensive casualty data collection mechanism in Eritrea. The EDA collects casualty data through mine/ERW RE field teams and community volunteers and provides monthly mine/ERW casualty reports to UNICEF. The EDA also said that the MoLHW is

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43 Article 7 Report, Form I, 10 March 2008; and email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 19 March 2009.
51 Email from Gbemi Akinboyo, UNICEF, 14 August 2009
ultimately responsible for nationwide reporting on mine/ERW survivors.\(^\text{53}\) In 2008, UNMEE noted a lack of effort in data collection by national authorities and the need for a standard reporting format.\(^\text{54}\) The UNMEE MACC stopped collecting mine/ERW casualty data in early 2008, before the formal end of its mandate in July 2008.

In 2008, UNMEE MACC entered into discussions with the EDA and the Ethiopian Mine Action Office to develop plans to transfer segregated national data from its Information Management System for Mine Action database to other organizations. The final outcome of the discussions was not reported.\(^\text{55}\) According to UN reporting on the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2009, the EDA and MoLHW are responsible for coordinating management of mine/ERW casualty and relevant disability survey data.\(^\text{56}\)

### Mine action program operators

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
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<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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### Plans

#### Strategic mine action plans

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2005–2010 aims to support poverty reduction initiatives and achieve zero victims from mines and UXO.\(^\text{57}\) The plan calls for technical surveys, clearance and marking, reactivation of demining teams, and RE refresher courses as well as RE to assist the return of IDPs.\(^\text{58}\) The UNDP 2007–2011 country plan set a target of clearing half of all mined areas by 2011.\(^\text{59}\)

There is no specific VA plan. However, the National Mine Action Strategic Plan includes provisions for the implementation of VA. According to the plan, the MoLHW had developed a “directions paper” for VA. No further details were available.\(^\text{60}\) In 2008, the MoLHW reported that a National Policy on Disability, developed in 2000 to ensure that persons with disabilities had access to services and assistance, was being implemented.\(^\text{61}\)

\(^{53}\) Email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 26 June 2009; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 365.

\(^{54}\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 364.


\(^{57}\) Ibid, p. 179.

\(^{58}\) See *Landmine Monitor 2008*, pp. 359–360.


National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

In June 2008, Eritrea declared that, “to enable our objectives and achieve our vision by completing landmine clearance within the initially planned time frame our demand for financial and logistical support is crucial.” However, actions by Eritrea, such as expelling international demining NGOs and confiscating mine action program vehicles, has made the international provision of funds and logistical support almost impossible. As a result, Eritrea is managing the mine action program on its own with no external advisors since UNDP support ended in 2006.

VA is primarily provided through government structures, particularly those of the MoLHW. At the beginning of 2008, nine international humanitarian organizations were operational in Eritrea. International NGOs faced considerable restrictions from the government. The ICRC was given the most room to operate, but even its field of operations was strictly limited by the government. Restricted access to fuel supplies led the ICRC to suspend a series of programs in 2008. The number of international NGOs working in Eritrea (on other issues, not merely VA) was reduced to five in 2009, down from 37 in early 2005. International NGOs operating in Eritrea are reportedly not allowed to be implementing partners of UN agencies.

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

The EDA was established in July 2002 through Proclamation 123/2002 to coordinate mine action in Eritrea, and to ensure that mine action would support rehabilitation and development within the national development strategy. The EDA has developed standing operating procedures for demining operations, said to be in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards.

Program evaluations

In July 2004, UNDP commissioned a technical appraisal of its 2002–2006 Mine Action Capacity Building Programme (MACBP) that recommended the programme monitor not only the short-term outputs (such as the results of mine clearance), but also the lasting impact of the program for people living in mine-affected communities. The review also recommended that a mechanism be incorporated to measure the contribution of mine action to Eritrea in achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

In 2008, the EDA had six 60-person and two 30-person manual clearance teams, one technical survey team of seven people, two quality assurance teams of three persons each, and two EOD teams of five persons each. Four of the demining teams were deployed on an emergency response basis to facilitate the return of IDPs. According to Eritrea’s Article 7 reports no technical surveys to reduce the overall estimate of contamination have been conducted since 2005 due to a shortage of funds.

67 Ibid.
68 Interview with Habtom Seghid and Arafayne Fessehaie, Administration/Logistics Officer, EDA, Asmara, 23 January 2008; and email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 19 March 2009.
UNMEE MACC closed its mine clearance operations in February 2008 and did not conduct any clearance in 2008.\(^{71}\) Over the course of its 2001–2008 mission, which operated under restrictions imposed by the government, UNMEE and cleared and handed over 350,000m\(^2\) of agricultural land, cleared 950km of roads and assessed and verified another 2,485km, and released 35km\(^2\) of land through surveys. During the clearance operations, 473 items of UXO, two antivehicle mines, and 379 antipersonnel mines were destroyed.\(^{72}\)

As a result of the closure of UNMACC and the limited resources of the EDA a total of only 57,014m\(^2\) of mined areas and another 1.5km\(^2\) of battle areas were cleared in 2008, compared to 1.31km\(^2\) of mined areas and 6.08km\(^2\) of battle areas cleared in 2007.\(^{73}\) Clearance operations in 2008 resulted in the destruction of 35 antipersonnel mines, nine antivehicle mines, and 611 items of UXO.\(^{74}\) EDA teams also conducted road verification in Gash Barka and Debub regions, approved demining projects to assist the government and the private sector in development projects, and carried out EOD.\(^{75}\)

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Eritrea is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2012. The EDA has stated that it remains committed to this goal, although limited funding presents a major challenge.\(^{76}\) As the table below indicates, output from clearance operations has decreased significantly in the last years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km(^2))</th>
<th>Area released by survey (km(^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>35.91*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>7.21</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.16</strong></td>
<td><strong>35.91</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Reflects cumulative total, not annual figure.

Since the LIS was completed in 2004, Eritrea has released more than 25km\(^2\) of land, leaving approximately 100km\(^2\) remaining. The EDA considers the 100km\(^2\) only an estimate.\(^{78}\) Until the EDA conducts technical surveys on the remaining SHA, the actual remaining area to clear will

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\(^{71}\) Email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 15 April 2009.


\(^{73}\) UNMEE MACC, “Annual Report 2008,” undated draft, provided by email from Anthony Blythen, UNMAS, 7 April 2009, p. 3.

\(^{74}\) Email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, 15 April 2009.

\(^{75}\) Ibid; and Article 7 Report, Form F, 25 March 2009.

\(^{76}\) Interview with Habtom Seghid and Arafayne Fessehaie, EDA, Asmara, 23 January 2008.

\(^{77}\) Interview with Yohannes Embaye, EDA, 17 July 2008; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 373.

\(^{78}\) Email from Habtom Seghid, EDA, Asmara, 15 April 2009.
be unknown. With a low annual clearance rate and insufficient funds to conduct surveys to release land by means other than clearance Eritrea is unlikely to meet its 2012 Article 5 deadline and will have to request an extension from a Meeting of States Parties.

**Risk Education**

In 2008, the EDA implemented RE with UNICEF financial and technical support through 10 RE teams in five of the country’s six regions (Anseba, Debub, Gash Barka, Maekel, and Semenawi Keyih Bahri/Northern Red Sea). The teams developed a network of more than 100 community volunteers to deliver RE. Approximately 106,500 people, including 75,500 children in 225 villages, were reached through the EDA teams in 2008 and through community-based RE outreach to all IDP resettlement villages. The RE teams became more closely integrated with EOD teams, on the recommendation of the EDA/UNICEF KAP survey.

RE activities in schools, in collaboration with the Ministry of Education, increased in 2008, and training was conducted for curriculum developers and school teachers. As of September 2008, it was estimated that the RE program had established coverage in 334 elementary and middle schools serving a population of some 226,000 students.

RE kits were provided to IDP families. Activities took place on 4 April 2009 in support of the International Day for Mine Awareness and Mine Action Assistance. RE messages were disseminated through radio, newspaper and television by UNICEF and the Ministry of Information. UNMEE MACC also conducted community-based RE in the TSZ for communities and IDPs until March 2008.

The 2008 KAP survey was used for RE planning, and improved targeting so that highest priority was given to children and young people. The report noted that RE programming remained mine-focused although casualties were increasingly from intentional handling of ERW, and that interventions were still largely “whole of community” focused and relied on conventional dissemination approaches. The report concluded, “…there is a need to modify current approaches, focusing more on behaviour change and less on conventional information dissemination. This will require re-thinking how MRE can best engage vulnerable populations and involve targeted groups in the design of behaviour change communication (BCC) interventions and materials.”

UNICEF conducted monitoring and evaluation, but noted that the system needed strengthening, that materials specifically targeting boys needed to be developed, and that outreach was needed to both school-children in remote areas and the nomadic population.

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81 Email from Gbemi Akinboyo, UNICEF, 14 August 2009.
84 Email from Gbemi Akinboyo, UNICEF, 14 August 2009.
86 Email from Gbemi Akinboyo, UNICEF, 14 August 2009.
88 Email from Gbemi Akinboyo, UNICEF, 14 August 2009.
90 Email from Gbemi Akinboyo, UNICEF, 14 August 2009.
UNICEF reported that a lack of continuity of funding remained a major threat to sustaining gains made in RE.91

RE has been conducted over the last 10 years with the involvement of the EDA (and until 2005 the EDO), UNMEE MACC, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Information, the RCSE (with support from the ICRC), and NGOs, with technical and financial support from UNICEF. RE has primarily consisted of presentations in communities, school-based RE, training of trainers (including school teachers and community volunteers), radio broadcasts, distribution of materials, and displaying of billboards.92

By 2002, most school teachers in highly affected areas had been trained through a program by UNMEE/UNICEF.93 RE was integrated into the primary school curriculum in 2006.94

The RCSE started an RE program in 2006, but this was suspended in 2007 due to a court case.95 RE resumed in mid-2008 and was ongoing as of September 2009 with the financial support of the ICRC.96

Victim Assistance

The number of mine/ERW survivors in Eritrea remains unknown. The 2004 LIS identified 2,498 people injured by mines/ERW in Eritrea while other estimates have indicated there may be from 40,000 to more than 84,000 mine/ERW survivors.97

Eritrea continued to face a shortage of qualified medical personnel, leaving the country short of surgical and physical rehabilitation services. Outside of the capital Asmara, general practitioners rather than specialist surgeons reportedly performed surgery in hospitals. In 2008, the Ministry of Health chose the Barentu Referral Hospital in the heavily mine-affected Gash Barka region as a training center for graduate medical staff. Although hospitals in the Gash Barka region continued to lack necessary resources in 2008, the range and quality of surgery, and pre- and post-operative care had reportedly improved.98

The MoLHW Division of Orthopedics is responsible for rehabilitation services and runs three centers: the main Adi Guadad center in Asmara and two satellite centers in Assab and Keren. There is also a small prosthetics and device workshop at the Denden Camp for IDPs in Asmara serving the camp and its surrounds.99 Rehabilitation services are also provided through the CBR program, under the MoLHW Division of Rehabilitation.100 In January 2009, the MoLHW reported that the CBR program had been introduced in all the administrative regions of Eritrea, covering more than 68,000 beneficiaries.101 This was accomplished in advance of the plan to establish nationwide coverage by 2012.102 However, in 2008, there continued to be shortages of qualified physical rehabilitation staff in Eritrea.103

Following the closure of UNMEE activities in 2008, UNDP re-established support to VA.104 In January 2009, UNDP began modest support to the MoLHW, including assistance in developing nationwide rehabilitation services for persons with disabilities through both the CBR

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91 Ibid.
92 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
95 Ibid; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 365.
96 Email from Camilla Waszink, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 15 September 2009.
program and institution-based rehabilitation, with emphasis on enabling the MoLHW to plan, coordinate and monitor its activities. Increased coordination and monitoring were reportedly much needed in existing CBR facilities, as these mechanisms had not kept pace with the rapid expansion of the CBR program.

The CBR network provides psychosocial support through some 5,000 volunteers throughout Eritrea. Due to widespread conflict trauma, there is a significant and increasing need for mental health services. The number of mental health professionals is reportedly extremely limited. The NGOs HealthNet TPO and Dutch Interchurch Aid, operating from January 2005–January 2009, assisted the Ministry of Health in establishing psychosocial support services and community-based mental health structures in the mine-affected Gash Barka and Debub regions. From 2005–2008, the project trained community counselors, psychiatric nurses, and primary care workers in mental health. In October 2008, UNICEF provided training on psychosocial support to teachers and community workers in Debub region.

The government, particularly through the MoLHW, continued to provide programs and funding to increase economic opportunities for persons with disabilities, including veterans, as well as running schemes for broadening access to vocational training, loans, and allotments of farming land. The government reportedly committed “substantial resources” to support and train persons with physical disabilities caused by armed conflict. The Ministry of Education has an inclusive education policy to integrate children with disabilities and other vulnerable children into public schools. The CBR program has reportedly also assisted children with disabilities access mainstream education.

Eritrea has no specific legislation to protect the rights of people with disabilities. However, Eritrea’s draft constitution prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities, in employment, education, or other state service provision. There is no legislation prescribing access to public thoroughfares or public or private buildings. Discrimination against persons with disabilities remained problematic. Women with disabilities faced particular discrimination in accessing social and economic rights.

As of 1 August 2009, Eritrea had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

As a member of the so-called VA26, a group of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate attention to survivors, Eritrea presented its 2005–2009

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105 Email from Techeste Ahderom, Senior Technical Advisor on Transition and Early Recovery, UNDP, 2 June 2009.
VA objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. The objectives were not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) and had no set time-frames for completion. Eritrea did not report on progress against its objectives and has not revised the objectives or presented plans on how they were to be achieved, or by which institutions.

Eritrea participated in the workshop on advancing landmine VA in Africa, in Nairobi in May–June 2005. Eritrea did not send a VA expert to participate in the meetings of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration or to meetings of States Parties. However, Eritrea reported on its VA activities at the Standing Committee meetings in 2008. Eritrea has not included the voluntary Form J in its annual Article 7 report to provide information on VA.

From 2005–2008, progress was reported on several of Eritrea’s 2005–2009 non-specific VA objectives including: increased data collection by the EDA; training of health workers; increased employment through access to land and seed money loans; and improved accessibility of buildings and disability awareness. No progress was reported against the few more measurable objectives, such as providing rehabilitation services for 80% of known recent landmine survivors. Eritrea’s restricted collaboration with international organizations appears to have hampered progress in reaching its VA objectives. These include training surgeons in saving limbs and amputation surgery; procuring sufficient raw materials for prostheses production; and formulating and implementing national disability legislation in line with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Victim assistance activities

As noted above, the most significant VA provider is the MoLHW, through the CBR program and Division of Orthopedics rehabilitation centers. The Norwegian Association for the Disabled (NAD) disability program, which had provided support to the disability sector, including the MoLHW CBR program, was phased out in 2008.

The ICRC planned cooperation with the MoLHW to support physical rehabilitation services, including physiotherapy, did not proceed as planned during 2008, since the project proposal and Memorandum of Understanding were not signed until late October. ICRC activities included refresher courses for physiotherapists and support to the Ministry of Health for developing and implementing a national, diploma-level training course for physiotherapists. The ICRC provided technical support to a training course in wheelchair production, in collaboration with NAD and the Association for the Physically Disabled of Kenya. ICRC technicians and physiotherapists also provided ongoing support to the main Adi Guadad center in Asmara. The ICRC provided training at the Barentu Referral Hospital and Agordat and Tesenay hospitals in Gash Barka region; these hospitals received supplies on an ad hoc basis, as well as equipment and logistics support. Barentu Referral Hospital had a four-person ICRC surgical team, which assisted the other two hospitals. Due to fuel supply restrictions, the ICRC’s surgical training program was suspended in August 2008; the problem was not resolved at the end of 2008. The ICRC supported three hospitals in Gash Barka region, which treated five people injured by mines.
ERW in 2008. With relevant ministries, the ICRC co-organized courses on trauma management, war surgery and physiotherapy for 220 civilian and military medical personnel.\(^{124}\)

The Eritrean National War-Disabled Veterans Association (ENWDVA) provides support to war veterans with disabilities through services including mobility devices, loans and small business opportunities, counseling and workshops. ENWDVA also sent some members abroad for appropriate medical treatment. Specific ENWDVA programs provide economic reintegration support for female veterans with disabilities. ENWDVA receives considerable financial contributions from Eritrean communities in Europe.\(^{125}\)

**Support for Mine Action**

Eritrea’s original National Plan to Implement Article 5, published in 2004 for the period 2005–2009, included a budget estimate totaling $63,350,000 (€43,019,149) to fulfill strategic objectives in survey, clearance, RE, and VA, and to support the return of IDPs.\(^{126}\) In March 2007, Eritrea reported a revised plan, with updated strategic objectives and a revised budget of $38.2 million for the period 2006–2009.\(^{127}\) In March 2008, EDA further revised the budget downward to $19.7 million for remaining work.\(^{128}\)

**National support for mine action**

No national mine action funding was reported for Eritrea in 2008 or 2007. In June 2008, Eritrea reported that the government paid for costs associated with EDA mine clearance teams, including operational and logistical costs, aside from two teams funded by UNDP.\(^{129}\) It did not report the value of these contributions.

The original National Mine Action Strategic Plan projected that the government of Eritrea would contribute $800,000 (€543,257) annually to mine action in 2008 and 2009. The plan also stated that the government paid the salaries of national mine action staff, excluding RE teams.\(^{130}\)

In updating its mine action cost estimates in 2008, Eritrea did not report if funds required from national sources had been revised downward along with the overall budget, or whether the government of Eritrea had fulfilled its financial obligations to the plan to date.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, Italy reported contributing €230,000 ($338,698) through UNICEF to RE activities in Eritrea.\(^{131}\) In addition, the United Kingdom reported contributing £50,000 ($92,725) through the UN Mine Action Service to support capacity-building, mine clearance and emergency response in Eritrea and Ethiopia, but did not differentiate funds to Eritrea.\(^{132}\) No international monetary or in-kind support was reported for Eritrea in 2007. Technical surveys originally planned for 2006 had not begun as of March 2009, due to a lack of financial support, and were postponed until the second (post-2009) phase of Eritrea’s strategic plan.\(^{133}\)

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\(^{127}\) Article 7 Report, Form I, 3 January 2007.

\(^{128}\) Ibid, 10 March 2008.


\(^{131}\) Email from Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.

\(^{132}\) Email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, DfID, 17 March 2009.

\(^{133}\) Article 7 Report, Form C, 25 March 2009.
ETHIOPIA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 June 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>18 (2007: 84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>At least 7,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 June 2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Not formally reported, but believed to be 4.46km² of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk Education Recipients in 2008</td>
<td>88,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $18.9 million (2007: $5.8 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary


Ethiopia’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem is the result of armed conflicts dating back 60 years. The Landmine Impact Survey, completed in 2004, significantly overstated the extent of contamination. The Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) was established in February 2001 to formulate policy, allocate resources, and approve mine action strategies and workplans. With support from Norwegian People’s Aid, EMAO has been using land release principles to identify the remaining threat.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 1,947 mine/ERW casualties in Ethiopia (786 killed, 1,129 injured, and 32 unknown). Ethiopia lacks a national casualty data collection mechanism and accurate casualty data was not available so it was not possible to analyze trends effectively or accurately represent the total numbers of casualties. Since 1999, risk education (RE) in Ethiopia has been provided by EMAO, NGOs, and local government, mainly in the regions of Tigray, Afar, and Somali, with UNICEF financial and technical support. By 2008, the provision of RE was limited.

Ethiopia lacks sufficient emergency medical care. Despite some improvements in healthcare coverage by 2009, some mine-affected regions had made the least progress in healthcare development. Physical rehabilitation services increased significantly since 1999, but remained inadequate to meet the needs of persons with disabilities—including mine survivors—despite significant international support, particularly from the ICRC. Psychosocial support and economic reintegration were inadequate throughout the past decade. Surveys indicated that only about half of mine/ERW survivors received emergency medical care, very few received rehabilitation, and almost none accessed psychological or economic assistance. Limited progress was made in introducing public policies to address the needs of persons with disabilities: existing laws were not adequately implemented, which perpetuated discrimination.
**Mine Ban Policy**

Ethiopia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 December 2004, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2005. Ethiopia has not reported the enactment of national implementation legislation. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, however, Ethiopia included reference to several items of legislation that it stated were “consistent with Article 9” of the Mine Ban Treaty. These included: certain sub-articles of the Ethiopian constitution; the Council of Ministers’ Regulation No. 70/2001 establishing the EMAO; and articles 500, 499, 497, and 481 of Ethiopia’s penal code.1


Ethiopia has not engaged in States Parties’ discussions on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 and thus has not made known its views on issues related to joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit, mines with sensitive fuzez or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training. Ethiopia’s silence is particularly notable in light of its military support for, and joint military operations with, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, known as the Government of National Unity after February 2009, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ethiopia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.3

**Transfer of antipersonnel mines**

The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia has alleged transfer of antipersonnel mines from Ethiopia to Somalia. In November 2006, the Monitoring Group reported that in September 2006 the Ethiopian military transferred 180 antipersonnel mines and other unspecified mines to Puntland and Qeybdiid militias.4 The Monitoring Group had alleged earlier transfers of mines from Ethiopia to Somalia, but did not specify whether the mines were antipersonnel or antivehicle.5 In response to Landmine Monitor’s inquiries about the alleged November 2006 transfer of antipersonnel mines, Ethiopia described the allegations as “without foundation… unsubstantiated…[and] false.” It stated that “Ethiopia is in full compliance of its obligations under the Convention…[T]here has never been any transfer of antipersonnel mines to any third party including in Somalia.”6

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1  Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2009. No further details of the penal code articles were reported.
2  The initial report did not include Form A (national implementation measures) or Form B (stockpiled antipersonnel mines), and did not note what period it covered. The date ranges of several forms were left blank. Form C referred to locations of mined areas as of June 2007; Form G stated the period from 2004 to 2007.
6  Letter from Amb. Samuel Assefa, Embassy of Ethiopia to the US, to Stephen Goose, HRW, Landmine Monitor Ban Policy Coordinator, 11 July 2007. He also wrote, “Terrorists and extremist groups, however, have routinely used antipersonnel landmines. These mines are channeled to these by, among others, the Government of Eritrea and its collaborators.”
No new allegations of antipersonnel mine transfers have been made by the Monitoring Group since 2006. Attempts by two Presidents of Meetings of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty to clarify and seek further information from the Monitoring Group about its reports of mine transfers have not received a reply as of August 2009.\footnote{For details of statements and actions by the two Presidents relating to the Monitoring Group reports, see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 373.}

**Production, stockpiling, and use**

Ethiopia has stated that it does not produce antipersonnel mines, and has not imported antipersonnel mines since the overthrow of the Mengistu regime in 1991.\footnote{Ethiopia first made this statement in 1997. Statement by Amb. Dr. Fecadu Gadarmu, Embassy of Ethiopia to Canada, Mine Ban Treaty Signing Ceremony, Ottawa, 3 December 1997, p. 2.}

The Mine Ban Treaty required that Ethiopia destroy all of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines by 1 June 2009. In its June 2007 Article 7 report, Ethiopia reported that 39,759 items described as stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed between 2004 and 2007. Of the declared items, only 5,867 appear to be antipersonnel mines.\footnote{Article 7 Report, Form G, June 2007. Antipersonnel mines declared destroyed are as follows: PMD-6M (111), PMN (4,227), TS-50 (1), M2A3B (2), M3 (620), M14 (306), M16 (21), POMZ-2M (361), V-5 (2), M69 (151), M35 (10), M21 (14), GOYYATA (29), “Egypt antipersonnel mine” (2), and antipersonnel mines of unknown type (10). The remaining items included detonators, blocks of explosives, practice mines, fuzes, and booby-traps.}

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Ethiopia reported that, as a result of inventories carried out by the Ministry of Defense during 2008, it concluded its original stockpile to be 55,569 antipersonnel mines, of which 40,189 had already been destroyed. Ethiopia stated its intention of destroying a further 14,266 mines (54,455 in total) before its June 2009 deadline, with the remaining 1,114 mines to be retained for training purposes.\footnote{Statement of Ethiopia, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.}

In its April 2009 Article 7 report, Ethiopia stated that 54,455 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed, fulfilling the Article 4 stockpile destruction obligation on 2 April 2009. It said the mines were destroyed at various locations by “electrical method” according to Ministry of Defense safety and environmental procedures. It indicated that 40,189 mines had been destroyed in 2008 and another 14,266 mines in 2009—again providing a list which included many items that do not appear to be antipersonnel mines. Of the 54,455 items, it appears that 32,650 were antipersonnel mines.\footnote{Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2009. The 32,650 mines include: PMN (14,318), M16 (7,023), PMD-6M (6,178), POMZ-2M (3,471), M3 (503), M14 (390), M69 (318), MD-9 (182), GOYYATA (132), MK-1 (30), PPMI (29), V5 (23), M2A3 (17), GOYTA (13), M-35 (9), unknown (8), NR490 (3), and MON-50 (3). The other items include detonators, fuzes, strikers, detonating cord, blasting caps, TNT, and plastic explosives.}

In one part of the April 2009 Article 7 report, Ethiopia stated it retained 303 mines for training purposes, the same number as reported in the initial Article 7 report in 2008. It said the mines were used for mine detection dog (MDD) training at Entoto, Gembhalo, and Tegochale.\footnote{Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2009. This included PMD (76), PMN (60), M14 (58), POMZ (43), M16 (43), M3 (13), and Type 69 (10).}

However, in another part of the report, Ethiopia indicated 1,114 mines are retained, the same number cited at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.\footnote{Article 7 Report, Form G, 30 April 2009. This included PMD (76), PMN (60), M14 (58), POMZ (43), M16 (43), M3 (13), and Type 69 (10).}

There have been no reports of new use of antipersonnel mines since the end of the 1998–2000 war with Eritrea.\footnote{While not openly acknowledging the use of antipersonnel mines during the border conflict with Eritrea from 1998–2000, in April 2002 Ethiopia provided the UN with detailed maps of mines laid by Ethiopian forces in Eritrea during the conflict. Email from Phil Lewis, Chief Technical Advisor, UNMEE MACC, 23 April 2002.} Between 2003 and 2008 there were incidents caused by newly laid antivehicle mines in the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) separating Eritrea and Ethiopia, according to news reports and the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) Mine Action
Coordination Center (MACC). UNMEE has had no access to the TSZ since March 2008. In October 2008 an antivehicle mine killed three civilians traveling by car on the road connecting the contested town of Badme with the rest of Ethiopia. Reportedly the road is checked by the Ethiopian army regularly for new mine use.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Ethiopia is contaminated by mines and ERW, primarily UXO, resulting from internal and international armed conflicts dating back to 1935. It is not known if this includes a residual threat from cluster munition remnants. The 2004 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 1,492 communities as impacted by mines and UXO in 1,916 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Afar, Tigray, and Somali regions accounted for more than 80% of the impacted communities in the country.

EMAO, however, considered the results of the LIS unreliable, and in 2007 began to conduct general and/or technical surveys in all of the communities deemed affected by the LIS. In its initial Article 7 report submitted in 2007, Ethiopia declared 4,097 suspected mined areas; the date of emplacement of the mines ranges from 1935 to 2000. EMAO, however, believed the actual number was much lower than even the 1,916 SHAs identified by the LIS and did not know the source of the Article 7 data on SHAs.

In August 2009, EMAO reported it had re-surveyed 1,047 communities and had confirmed 164 mined areas and SHAs in nine regions covering approximately 36km² (see table in Identification of hazardous areas section below). A total of 925 SHAs had been cancelled totaling more than 597km² of estimated area, and 738 communities of the 1,047 communities visited were declared unaffected.

**Casualties**

Landmine Monitor identified 18 mine/ERW casualties in Ethiopia in 2008 (three killed and 15 injured). Casualties included eight men, one woman, one girl, and two people of unknown gender. Due to a lack of consistent information and limited casualty data collection, not all casualties could be cross-referenced and current casualty data probably under-represents the extent of the problem in Ethiopia. The available casualty figures for 2008 are inadequate for meaningful comparison to the 84 mine/ERW casualties (31 people killed, 49 injured, and four unknown) identified by Landmine Monitor in 2007. No confirmed mine/ERW incidents were recorded in 2009 as of June.

In 2008, Ethiopian troops in Somalia were frequently involved in explosive device incidents, although most appear to have been caused by remote-detonated devices as opposed to victim-activated devices.
Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 1,947 mine/ERW casualties in Ethiopia (786 killed, 1,129 injured, and 32 unknown). Landmine Monitor data in the period was gathered from various sources, including UNMEE MACC, EMAO, the national NGO Rehabilitation and Development Organization (RaDO), and the LIS. Due to the lack of comprehensive or systematic data collection, these cumulative casualty figures should not be considered comprehensive or representative of trends or the actual numbers of casualties.\(^{26}\)

### Casualties from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>426</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>786</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,129</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,947</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most complete data source remains the LIS completed in 2004, which recorded 16,616 mine/ERW casualties (9,341 people killed and 7,275 injured).\(^{27}\)

**Risk profile**

A high proportion of recent casualties were children, and many incidents were caused by antivehicle or antipersonnel mines. Common activities at the time of incident include traveling and tampering, followed by shepherding.\(^{28}\)

There is no permanent marking of mine/UXO contaminated areas, although a Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)/UNICEF RE needs assessment report of May 2008 for Somali region found that communities there used tree branches to fence off some minefields.\(^{29}\)

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\(^{27}\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 895.

\(^{28}\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 375.

\(^{29}\) Ibid, p. 378.
**Socio-economic impact**

An RE assessment conducted by GICHD/UNICEF in Somali region in December 2007 and January 2008 found that while the mine/ERW problem was considerable, most of the people interviewed stated that clearance was not their first priority. Drought, food and water shortages, as well as health, were considered more serious problems.\(^{30}\)

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

EMAO was created as an autonomous statutory body by the Council of Ministers in February 2001.\(^{31}\) Initially, EMAO reported to the Office of the Prime Minister but, following public-sector reorganization in 2005, responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of Federal Affairs.\(^{32}\) EMAO formulates policy, allocates resources, and approves mine action strategies and workplans.\(^{33}\) EMAO also conducts mine surveys, marking, clearance, and RE activities based on priorities determined by regional and local authorities.\(^{34}\)

In 2007, following a recommendation by a 2006 UNDP evaluation, the Ethiopian mine action program changed from being directly executed by UNDP to a nationally executed program with one international mine action project officer based at EMAO.\(^{35}\)

**Victim assistance**

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA) is responsible for disability issues and coordinating rehabilitation. The Head of MoLSA’s Rehabilitation Affairs Department represented Ethiopia internationally as the victim assistance (VA) focal point. The Ministry of Health (MoH) has also claimed to have responsibility for VA coordination. EMAO does not coordinate VA activities.\(^{36}\)

**Data collection and management**

The LIS conducted in 2002–2004 was not certified by the UN until July 2006. EMAO believes that if the survey teams had included one person with a demining background for the community interviews, the results would have been more accurate.\(^{37}\) In 2007, at EMAO’s request, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) trained their survey teams to conduct technical and general survey in the SHAs identified by the LIS.\(^{38}\) As of April 2009, these surveys were continuing.\(^{39}\)

There is no nationwide or systematic mine/ERW casualty data collection for Ethiopia and data is not readily shared between mine action actors. The extent to which EMAO collects casualty data was not clear.\(^{40}\) There was no standard format or mechanism for collecting or storing data. Limited mine/ERW casualty or survivor data was collected separately by the Ministry of Health, Landmine Survivors Network Ethiopia (LSN Ethiopia), and RaDO. The Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia collects data on persons with disabilities. There is only limited sharing of data between stakeholders in the disability sector.\(^{41}\)

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37 Interview with Gebriel Lager, EMAO, in Geneva, 4 June 2008.
38 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Per Håkon Breivik, Programme Manager, NPA, 11 April 2008.
39 Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009.
The MoH, in cooperation with the World Health Organization (WHO), has operated an injury surveillance system in six hospitals in Addis Ababa since 2004. The project was expanded to Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, and Somali regions and Dire Dawa city by 2009 and was planned to be implemented nationwide by 2010. MoLSA and LSN Ethiopia were involved in designing a census questionnaire component on disability for the Third National Population and Housing Census 2007: the census included questions on cause of disability, including war injury. As of August 2009, MoLSA had not reported the results. In early 2008, a RaDO survey of 135 mine-affected villages in the Tigray region found 343 mine/ERW casualties, including 14 recorded in the past year. As of June 2009, LSN Ethiopia had registered 2,084 amputees, including some who were not mine survivors. LSN Ethiopia did not collect recent mine/ERW casualty data for 2008–2009.

The GICHD/UNICEF needs assessment for the Somali region reported that only half of all survivors interviewed had received medical care and just 1% had received physical rehabilitation. The assessment was not endorsed by the government and thus could not be used subsequently for program implementation purposes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bureaus for Labor and Social Affairs</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheshire Services Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMAO</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSN Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoLSA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RaDO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigray Disabled Veterans Association</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handicap International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

43 Email from Bekele Gonfa, Director, LSN Ethiopia, 6 August 2009.
Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Even though the decree that established EMAO did not explicitly require a strategic plan, in August 2005 EMAO completed a strategic plan for 2006–2011. The draft strategy reportedly sets the following goals:46

• elimination of the socio-economic impact of mines and UXO in affected communities;
• provision of RE to affected communities to reduce the number of victims;
• building of a competent mine action program; and
• creation of a mine information system capacity to assist planning of demining and RE, and to provide full information to other developmental actors.

EMAO stated that it would revise its strategic plan after completion of the technical surveys, scheduled for before the end of 2009.47

UNDP mine action project objectives include: to return and promote long-term reintegration of internally displaced people; to stabilize peace in war-affected areas of Afar and Tigray; and to improve food security through creating access to land for affected communities.48

Disability action plan

A National Program of Action for Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities (1996–ongoing) was under revision in 2008. Reportedly, VA will be addressed in the revised plan to be created by 2010.49 Ethiopia has not presented a strategic VA plan. It did report, however, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MoLSA, Ministry of Education, MoH, EMAO, LSN Ethiopia, and other relevant partners “exert coordinated efforts to implement the plan of action.”50

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

Cleared land in Afar and Tigray regions is said to be made available for common use by community farmers and herders, and in most cases plowing and grazing begins immediately after the handover of cleared land to the community.51 According to UNDP, the released land was used for farming and grazing and contributed to improved food security in the regions. As a result, UNDP believes mine clearance contributed directly to one of the Millennium Development Goals: the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger.52

Ethiopia’s Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP) includes provisions for food security for people in highly vulnerable situations, specifically including persons with disabilities. Ethiopia also reportedly adheres to the Continental Plan of Action for the African Decade of Persons with Disabilities (1999–2009).53

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Ethiopia has demonstrated commitment to mine action through the establishment of a mine action center and the use of national resources to address contamination. A UNDP evaluation of mine action in 2006 found that “a high degree of national management, planning and operational

47 Interview with Gebriel Lager, EMAO, in Geneva, 4 June 2008; and email from Rune Andresen, NPA, 20 April 2009.
49 Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
50 Ibid.
52 UNDP, “7.5 million meters square of suspected hazardous areas were cleared of mines and handed over to the community for immediate productive use,” www.et.undp.org.
capacity had been developed,” and recommended that the national mine action program should transition to national execution in early 2007,54 which occurred the same year.55

Ethiopia has stated it is committed to its “obligations to meet the aims of the Nairobi Action Plan and to assist landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities” by giving special consideration to survivors and other persons with disabilities living in mine-affected areas.56 However, disability is not considered a priority issue in Ethiopia. Disability organizations have stated that MoLSA was not capable of planning and coordinating VA due to a lack of government commitment.57 Ethiopia has acknowledged that the disability sector is uncoordinated and lacks direction, funding, and capacity at the regional level.58 In 2009, the work of civil society organizations was hampered by a new law setting categories of activities that can be undertaken by NGOs in accordance with their funding sources (national or international).59

National efforts in VA for landmine survivors, and assistance for people with disabilities more generally, focus on revision of existing laws and policy frameworks.60 MoLSA has a mandate to address issues relating to persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors. Other relevant ministries reportedly also have disability departments. Each region of the country and the two separate city administrations have a Bureau for Labor and Social Affairs (BoLSA) responsible for employment and social issues in addition to coordinating both public and private services for persons with disabilities. Many VA services were supported by international organizations or provided by NGOs or the ICRC.61

National management

Many EMAO personnel are former Ethiopian army personnel and constitute the core group of technical experts at EMAO.62 NPA initiated a project in 2005 with EMAO to enhance EMAO’s MDD and technical survey/task impact assessment capacities.53 In 2008, the project was extended until 201164 and its office relocated to EMAO’s headquarters.65 In May 2009, UNDP reported that it continued to provide support for technical capacity development, project quality assurance, program advice, strategic partnering, and resource mobilization.66

During a workshop in 2008, MoLSA, the disability and VA coordination focal point, proposed the creation of an interministerial Disability Council under the Office of the Prime Minister to implement the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the Developmental Social Welfare Policy.67 In 2009, this policy, issued in 1996, was being reviewed in order to more adequately address disability and rehabilitation issues, including mine/ERW VA provisions. An ad hoc national committee was established to coordinate community-based rehabilitation (CBR) programs.68

55 Interview with Keita Sugimoto, UNDP, in Ljubljana, 14 April 2008.
60 Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
64 Email from Rune Andresen, NPA, 19 April 2009.
65 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Rune Andersen, NPA, 4 April 2009.
66 Email from Lydia Good, UNDP, 26 August 2008.
National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures
As noted above, EMAO was established through a Council of Ministers’ decision in 2001. EMAO National standards for mine clearance operations were adopted in 2001 and revised in 2006. NPA drafted standing operating procedures (SOPs) for technical survey, which EMAO accepted in October 2006. The SOPs foresee two phases: first, information gathering and analysis through general survey without entering the SHA; and then technical survey to further reduce the polygons by defining the perimeters of the SHA.

Program evaluations
A GICHD evaluation published in 2007 concluded that EMAO “has performed increasingly well since its establishment. Its demining operations have made a substantial contribution to resettlement and rehabilitation efforts in the war-affected districts (“woredas”) of Tigray and Afar regions, delivering significant socio-economic benefits for those regions and promoting Ethiopia’s post-war recovery.”

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
EMAO and NPA are the only demining operators in Ethiopia. As of November 2008, the demining capacity was comprised of six manual demining companies, 12 MDD teams, five technical survey teams, and six mechanical demining teams.

In 2006, NPA completed a MDD training facility at Entoto Mountain in Oromia region near Addis Ababa as part of a larger EMAO training center that was under construction. The full training center was scheduled to officially open in late 2009. From 2007–2008, NPA trained and accredited 38 MDD teams with a capacity of approximately 1,000m² of clearance or verification per day per dog. Three teams have been “retired” leaving 35 active MDD teams.

Identification of hazardous areas
In 2007, five technical survey teams were deployed to the regions of Amhara, Dire Dawa, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray to re-survey SHAs identified by the LIS. As of August 2009, EMAO had surveyed 1,047 SHAs from the LIS and confirmed 164 as mined areas. They also identified 40 new SHAs. The technical surveys applied NPA/EMAO land release concepts which break SHAs into smaller demining tasks and polygon sets. As of August 2009, 925 SHAs had been cancelled totaling more than 597km² of estimated area.
Preliminary survey results as of August 200980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No. of SHAs surveyed</th>
<th>Land released (m²)</th>
<th>Confirmed mined area (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>511,197,341</td>
<td>29,983,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigray</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>40,750,015</td>
<td>5,461,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afar</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>38,226,465</td>
<td>355,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oromia</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>5,242,661</td>
<td>209,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amhara</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>1,933,202</td>
<td>13,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benishangul-Gumuz</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>223,994</td>
<td>13,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dire Dawa</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30,043</td>
<td>413,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambela</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,089</strong></td>
<td><strong>597,603,721</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,679,937</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demining and battle area clearance in 2007 and 2008

Ethiopia did not formally report clearance results for 2008, although Landmine Monitor extrapolation from available data suggests clearance of 4.46km². According to NPA, in 2008 MDD teams cleared 1,630,342m² and found 13 antipersonnel mines, four antivehicle mines, and 129 items of UXO in Gemhalo, Tigray region, and Togochale, Somali region.81 In the first quarter of 2009, NPA MDD teams cleared a further 500,000m², during which 19 items of UXO were found.82

In 2007, Ethiopia reported it cleared 7.54km² of mined areas and that the total SHA for the country had been reduced by 122.11km².83 In June 2008, Ethiopia reported it had released 375km² through technical surveys and rapid response teams since 2002.84 During clearance operations since 2003, 5,713 antipersonnel mines, 722 antivehicle mines, and 97,148 items of ERW have been destroyed.85

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ethiopia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2015. In April 2007, Ethiopia informed States Parties that high-priority mined areas would be cleared by 2010 and the remaining areas by its Article 5 deadline.86 In June 2008, Ethiopia reiterated that it “firmly hopes to fulfill its Article 5 obligations by 1 June 2015.”87

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80 Email from Rune Andresen, NPA, 19 August 2009.
81 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Rune Andresen, NPA, 3 April 2009; and email from Rune Andresen, NPA, 19 April 2009.
85 Email from Rune Andresen, NPA, 20 August 2009.
2008, however, Ethiopia cited security problems in the regions as a possible impediment to mine clearance operations and meeting its Article 5 obligations by the June 2015 deadline.88

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Battle area clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Area released by survey (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4.46</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>475.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.54</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>122.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>7.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2003</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.42</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>606.36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Risk Education**

RE remained very limited in 2008. RE was delivered by EMAO, alongside clearance, and by RaDO. UNICEF support to the Tigray BoLSA ended in 2007.90

RaDO conducted RE for Sudanese refugees in four camps in collaboration with the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). RE was delivered through community meetings, house-to-house visits, and the media. Training of trainers was conducted through existing community networks: women’s associations, youth associations, schools, clubs, churches, social workers. A total of 1,227 trainers were trained, and 87,958 beneficiaries reached.91

RaDO’s RE materials were developed to be language appropriate and culturally sensitive to southern Sudanese communities. The materials were cloth banners, posters, leaflets, carry bags, and wall murals. They were distributed to the trainers for use as aids, and to community leaders during repatriation for use in education sessions at screening points, assembly points, and way stations by already-trained members of repatriation teams.92 Monitoring was conducted regularly by RaDO and partners.93

The GICHD/UNICEF needs assessment concluded that RE was needed in Somali region due to the high number of casualties and ongoing conflict. The communities surveyed had little knowledge of the danger posed by mines/ERW, particularly to children and herdsmen. The assessment recommended the adoption of a participatory community-based approach using local resources, supported by external actors, and taking into consideration lessons learned from RE in Tigray and Afar regions. RE should also support data collection efforts.94

Since 1999, RE in Ethiopia has been provided by EMAO, NGOs, and local governments, mainly in Tigray, Afar, and Somali regions, with UNICEF financial and technical support.95

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88 Ibid.
90 Telephone interview with Helena Ruud, UNICEF, 10 August 2009.
91 Email from Ambachew Negus, RaDO, 17 June 2009.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
95 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Ethiopia is unknown, but is at least 7,275, according to the LIS.96 Little concrete progress in providing services to mine/ERW survivors was reported for 2008. Challenges in providing adequate services for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, in Ethiopia included a lack of resources, a lack of trained personnel, and inadequate enforcement of existing legislation. Communication between national and international organizations was also poor.97

The emergency medical care system in Ethiopia remained inadequate to meet the needs of people with traumatic injuries, including mine/ERW survivors. There was insufficient medical staff, including a lack of doctors trained in emergency care. Some progress in national emergency response coordination was reported with the establishment of an emergency unit at the MoH and the completion of new blood banks in all regions of the country.98

Ethiopia continued to improve coverage in the health sector and build the capacity of health services through the Health Sector Development Program (Phase III 2005–2010).99 Yet shortages in medicine, supplies, and staff persisted. In part, this was due to a focus on quantity rather than quality in the program. The MoH was reportedly aware of these challenges and constraints, including an acute lack of adequate funding to fulfill plans. Reporting in mid-2008 indicated that overall national use of the health system had decreased slightly since 2004. Although no conclusive data was available, explanations for this decrease included the introduction of user fees deterring poor people from accessing the system and a lack of understanding or implementation of the fee waiver, as well as an increased number of private sector health providers.100 Healthcare coverage in some areas was hampered by the volatile security situation. This prevented expansion, upgrades, and maintenance of health services in the Somali region, which fell behind national targets. In Oromia, the most densely inhabited region, healthcare services fell behind other large regions, leaving serious gaps in coverage.101

Access to physical rehabilitation services remained difficult due to the limited number of centers. Many persons with disabilities could not afford transportation or accommodation during treatment.102 Particularly in eastern Ethiopia, including in Dire Dawa and Somali regions, there was a lack of physical rehabilitation services, combined with inadequate awareness about physiotherapy and rehabilitation in general.103 The Social Welfare Development Directorate of MoLSA is responsible for coordinating rehabilitation services for persons with disabilities. Ethiopia had 13 centers run by the government and NGOs providing physical rehabilitation and prosthetic-orthopedic devices. Regional BoLSAs supervised six centers in different parts of the country. Some NGO-run outreach programs existed to assist people without access to centers. A sustainability study in early 2007 recommended the development of a national physical rehabilitation strategy, which MoLSA planned to complete by 2010, for distribution to relevant government offices, including BoLSAs, in 2011. The strategy is being drafted in collaboration with the ICRC.104 Throughout 2008, the ICRC provided support to MoLSA in developing the strategy.105 WHO was working with relevant disability and rehabilitation stakeholders to expand CBR implementation in Ethiopia.106

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98 Ibid.
103 Email from Thierry Hergault, Program Director, HI, 21 May 2009.
Psychological support services are limited in Ethiopia and are mostly provided by NGOs, including peer support services. Some psychiatric services are provided by the MoH, but these were largely confined to Addis Ababa. There are no clinical psychologists in Ethiopia. Reportedly psychiatric nurses are distributed throughout the country and other health workers receive some mental health support training.\textsuperscript{107}

No concrete improvement was reported in economic reintegration for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors. Limited economic reintegration activities have been exacerbated by extreme poverty, conflict, and geographic obstacles. Access to vocational training and micro-credit institutions is limited by strict eligibility criteria and interest rates.\textsuperscript{108}

Government-run centers under BoLSAs provide some vocational training to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors. Vocational training and income-generation opportunities were also provided by NGOs and the Ethiopian Red Cross. Some economic reintegration opportunities for persons with disabilities were supported by the International Labor Organization and international donors. Employment quotas reportedly existed, but were not implemented. The government reportedly tried to raise awareness among employers and civil service institutes for the increased employment of persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{109}

Ethiopian law does not mandate equal rights for persons with disabilities. Reportedly the government devoted few resources to rehabilitate or assist persons with disabilities or provide services for them. Persons with disabilities sometimes reported discrimination in work and wages. Women with disabilities were more disadvantaged than men in education and employment.\textsuperscript{110}

Furthermore, inadequate enforcement of existing legislation sustained negative attitudes to persons with disabilities. In 2008, a proclamation was passed to provide equal employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, prohibit discrimination, and require employers to adapt to the needs of employees with disabilities, with recourse to legal action and penalties.\textsuperscript{111}

Ethiopia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 30 March 2007, but as of 1 July 2009 had not ratified it, nor had it signed the Optional Protocol.

### Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Ethiopia is one of the 26 States Parties which are members of the VA26 group of States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors. As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Ethiopia developed 2005–2009 VA objectives which were presented at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005.\textsuperscript{112} Objectives for 2005–2009 have not been formally revised and failed to meet the SMART criteria (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound). No plans to achieve the objectives were reported and Ethiopia did not formally report on progress related to the objectives in 2008–2009.\textsuperscript{113} A revised draft status report provided to Landmine Monitor indicated that although progress in VA has been noted by Ethiopia, it did not correlate with the objectives presented in 2005. Ethiopia was developing new or revised objectives for the period 2009–2010.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{109} “Draft Victim Assistance Status Report,” provided by email from Assefa Ashengo, MoLSA, 15 August 2009.


\textsuperscript{111} “Draft Victim Assistance Status Report,” provided by email from Assefa Ashengo, MoLSA, 15 August 2009.


\textsuperscript{113} Statement of Ethiopia, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, 3 June 2008; and “Mid-Term Review of the Status of Victim Assistance in the 24 Relevant States Parties,” Dead Sea, 21 November 2007, pp. 31–32.

\textsuperscript{114} “Draft Victim Assistance Status Report,” provided by email from Assefa Ashengo, MoLSA, 15 August 2009.
Ethiopia did not make statements regarding VA progress and challenges at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in 2008 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. Ethiopia participated in the workshop on advancing landmine VA in Africa, held in Nairobi from May–June 2005. In November 2006, MoLSA co-hosted a workshop to discuss mine VA in Ethiopia. In August 2007, a VA-focused roundtable was convened by MoLSA to discuss future measures.

Ethiopia included a VA/disability expert on its delegation to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2008 and the Seventh Meeting of States Parties. Ethiopia reported on challenges in achieving the aims of the Nairobi Action Plan, and on its VA activities more generally, at the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in 2008 and at the meetings of States Parties in 2007 and 2008.

In June 2008, Ethiopia presented a report on the Status of Victim Assistance to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. In 2007, Ethiopia used Form J in its initial Article 7 report and in its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, to provide details on VA.

**Victim assistance activities**

The National Orthopedic Center (NOC) at the Black Lion Hospital in Addis Ababa, inaugurated in October 2007, was not fully operational as of July 2009, although the physiotherapy unit was operational. The Prosthetic Orthotic Center (POC) of Addis Ababa remains the largest prosthetic center and the national referral center, pending the NOC becoming fully operational. In 2009, the organizational structure of the POC was being revised and would probably result in its merger with the NOC, under coordination of the Medical Faculty of Addis Ababa University. ICRC support to the POC had been phased out and by 2008 the center was using local products for manufacture. In 2008, the POC assisted 130 mine/ERW survivors, of whom 116 received prostheses (among the 528 prostheses produced).\(^\text{115}\)

The ICRC and regional authorities held a seminar for health professionals on treating weapon-wounded patients in Tigray. The ICRC faced restrictions in carrying out its mandate in Ethiopia and reduced its set-up and program, concentrating activities in Tigray. In 2008, the ICRC was not granted permission to resume work in the Somali region after having been expelled in July 2007.\(^\text{116}\) In 2008, the ICRC supported six rehabilitation centers (Assela, Arabaminch, Bahirdar, Cheshire Services Ethiopia, Dessie, and Mekelle) with materials and components, technical support, and on-the-job training. In 2006–2007 it supported eight centers. The ICRC covered transportation, accommodation, and other costs for mine/ERW survivors and other war amputees. ICRC support to the Harar center ended in October 2007 and the center has not been operational since. The ICRC-supported centers delivered 520 prostheses to mine/ERW survivors (of 1,959 total prostheses delivered) and 65 orthoses to survivors (of 2,874 in total). This total was a decrease from 2007, due to the termination of support to the POC and Harar centers. Yet the six ICRC-assisted centers increased service provision by about 25%.\(^\text{117}\)

Ethiopia views the peer support services by LSN Ethiopia through trained peer counselors as an integral part of national capacity for providing psychological support to mine/ERW survivors.\(^\text{118}\) LSN Ethiopia assisted a total of 644 mine/ERW survivors in 2008. It supported 339 people through its peer-to-peer support program, 139 through social reintegration, 66 through loans/micro-credit, 15 through income-generating activities and eight received educational support. In addition, five survivors were referred for emergency medical care and eight received continuing

\(^\text{115}\) Data from interview with Yohanes Berhanu, Manager, POC, Addis Ababa, March 2009, provided by email from Ambachew Negus, RaDO, 17 June 2009; and telephone interview with Yohanes Berhanu, POC, 5 August 2009.


\(^\text{118}\) “Draft Victim Assistance Status Report,” provided by email from Assefa Ashengo, MoLSA, 15 August 2009.
medical care, 35 received prosthetics, and 20 survivors received other services. In 2008, LSN Ethiopia held a workshop for health experts on including psychological support in hospitals and workplaces to raise awareness of employing mine/ERW survivors; this lead to some beneficiaries gaining employment.

In 2008, RaDO provided physical and social rehabilitation services in six refugee camps in west and east Ethiopia for Sudanese and Somali refugees and the surrounding local population, in collaboration with the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. RaDO provided various mobility devices and offered vocational training and income-generating activities.

Cheshire Services Ethiopia provided rehabilitation services and orthopedic appliances to persons with disabilities, mainly children, in 2008. It provided rehabilitation services through its center just outside Addis Ababa as well as outreach and CBR programs in Dire Dawa and Addis Ababa. The appliances it provided were included in ICRC reporting. Outreach by Cheshire Services Ethiopia reaches eight regions of Ethiopia, in collaboration with MoLSA and MoH.

The Tigray Disabled Veterans Association (TDVA) continued to support the service capacity of the Mekelle Orthopedics and Physiotherapy Center, which provided vocational training and access to credit, self-employment, and income-generation opportunities. TDVA carried out several projects specifically supporting war veterans with disabilities and their families in 2008, including developing cooperatives in rural and semi-urban areas of Tigray region, supporting entrepreneurship for women with disabilities and sponsoring education for persons with disabilities and their children.

In October 2008, Handicap International (HI) began a two-year project to increase and improve physical rehabilitation services in Dire Dawa and Somali regions. Physiotherapy units of public hospitals in Dire Dawa and Jijiga receive equipment and HI provides technical support and training to four graduate physiotherapists. The project did not have data on the number of mine/ERW survivors among beneficiaries for 2008, but intended to collect such data for 2009.

**Support for Mine Action**

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Ethiopia. The national mine action program was established using a combination of national funds and a World Bank loan. Authority for mine action strategy and implementation, aside from VA activities, rests with EMAO.

**National support for mine action**

Ethiopia did not report national mine action funding in 2008. In 2007, the GICHD evaluation of Ethiopia’s mine action program reported an annual contingency budget of ETB17 million to 20 million ($1,941,400–$2,284,000) for mine action, most of which had not been spent.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, 10 countries and the EC reported providing $18,942,638 (€12,863,397) to mine action in Ethiopia. This represents more than double what was reported in 2007. The EC continued its ongoing support to UNDP in Ethiopia with a €9,750,000 ($14,357,850) contribution in 2008. Funding at 2008 levels appears sufficient to meet Ethiopia’s mine action needs.

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119 Data from interview with Bekele Gonfa, LSN Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, March 2009, provided by email from Ambachew Negus, RaDO, 17 June 2009.
121 Data from interview with Alemayoh Mitiku, Coordinator, Refugee Rehabilitation Program, RaDO, Addis Ababa, April 2009; and interview with Teshome Zewdie, Project Manager, Somalia Refugee Camps, Jijiga, Ethiopia, April 2009, both provided by email from Ambachew Negus, RaDO, 17 June 2009.
124 Email from Thierry Hergault, HI, 21 May 2009.
126 Ibid.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Ethiopia: Monetary\(^\text{127}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>UNDP, TRANSTEC, ICRC</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$15,940,415 (€10,824,674)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,405,008 (NOK7,920,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), NPA</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$576,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Survey, mine clearance</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Fund for Barrier-free Mobility</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$232,956 (¥24,016,060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Via the Centers for Disease Control</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$173,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Capacity-building, mine clearance</td>
<td>$83,453 (£45,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>LSN</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$4,374 (£2,970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$18,710,505 (€12,705,762)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2008 International Mine Action Support to Ethiopia: In-Kind\(^\text{128}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Form of In-Kind Support</th>
<th>Monetary Value (where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Mine clearance equipment</td>
<td>$232,133 (€157,635)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$232,133 (€157,635)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above, the UK reported contributing £50,000 ($92,725) via the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to support capacity-building, mine clearance, and emergency response in Eritrea and Ethiopia, but did not differentiate funds to Ethiopia.\(^\text{129}\)

\(^{127}\) Emails from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Policy Assistant, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009; Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2009; and Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” Washington, DC, July 2009; email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, DFID, 17 March 2009; and email from Daniela Krejdl, Humanitarian Aid, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2009.

\(^{128}\) Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; and Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.

\(^{129}\) Email from Amy White, DFID, 17 March 2009.
Ten-Year Summary


It is not known to what extent the Gambia is contaminated with landmines. It has not formally reported a problem, although a mine blast was reported by the media in December 2007 close to the border with the mine-affected Casamance region of Senegal. Its Article 5 deadline for clearance of antipersonnel mines in mined areas is 1 March 2013.

Landmine Monitor has identified three mine casualties (two killed and one injured) occurring in the Gambia between 1999 and 2008. In response to the influx of refugees crossing from Senegal, risk education was provided in 2007 and 2008 to border communities in the Gambia. Services for persons with disabilities remain limited. Access to healthcare in some rural areas is difficult.

Mine Ban Policy

The Gambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997. While it completed domestic ratification of the treaty on 2 November 1999, the instrument of ratification was not deposited until 23 September 2002. The Gambia became a State Party on 1 March 2003. In 2002, the Gambia reported its intent to incorporate the Mine Ban Treaty into its domestic laws, but no progress on national implementation legislation has since been reported.1

The Gambia did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. The Gambia has not made known its views on key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

As of 1 July 2009, the Gambia had not submitted its initial treaty-mandated Article 7 transparency report, due 27 August 2003. It is one of only three of the 156 States Parties that have not submitted an official Article 7 report. Prior to ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty, the Gambia submitted a voluntary report on 28 August 2002, in which it declared that it has never possessed antipersonnel mines.2

The Gambia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.3

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

The Gambia has seemingly been contaminated by mines as a result of spillover from ongoing violence in the Casamance region of Senegal,4 as evidenced by the 2007 mine blast in the Gambia’s Western division (see Casualties section below).5 Villagers subsequently claimed

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1 Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form A, 28 August 2002.
2 Ibid, Forms B and C.
that it was no longer safe to graze cattle in the area and that the incident had sent “a wave of fear” through their communities. No explosions have since been reported, however, and the government has not formally declared the area contaminated.

Casualties
There were no reports of new mine or explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in the Gambia in 2008 or to 31 May 2009.7 The only mine incident ever reported in the Gambia occurred in December 2007, when two children were killed and one injured in Gilanfari, a village on the border with Senegal’s Casamance region. Also in December 2007, there was an unconfirmed media report of another incident in which a mine killed one man and injured another. Landmine Monitor could not verify this information and did not include the incident in casualty figures.

In May 2008, at least one Gambian was injured in Casamance when a Gambian-registered bus drove over a mine; in total there were 21 casualties in this incident.9 In March 2002, one Gambian was killed in a mine explosion in Casamance.10

In February 2009, at least 10 Gambian mine casualties (seven killed and three seriously injured) occurred in Libya when the vehicle in which they were traveling detonated a landmine in a remote area near the Niger-Libya border. The group of illegal migrants was trying to reach Europe.11

Results of a Voluntary Services Overseas report published in June 2009 estimated there were approximately 33,000 persons with disabilities in the Gambia (or 1.8% of the population).12

Program Management and Coordination
There is no formal mine action structure in the Gambia. The army has responsibility for demining. The situation in the Gambia does not warrant specific victim assistance programs. Disability issues do not fall under any government agency, although the Department of State for Health and Social Welfare is responsible for supplying wheelchairs received from donors.13

Demining
There is no formal mine action program in the Gambia. In late December 2007, the Gambian Armed Forces (GAF) Public Relations Officer, Lieutenant Alagie Sanneh, noted that sufficient time was needed to study the patterns of mines laid. While noting that the army had enough trained personnel, Lt. Sanneh said that landmine incidents were uncommon in the Gambia and that the army was not readily equipped to deal promptly with them. In 2007, 30 deminers from the Gambia received training in mine clearance at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Nairobi, Kenya.15

6 Ibid.
7 Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008 to 31 May 2009; telephone interview with Lt. Omar Saidykhan, GAF, 30 April 2009; and email from Lamin Gibba, Senior Project Manager, NSGA, 23 February 2009.
8 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 393; and telephone interview with Lt. Omar Saidykhan, GAF, 30 April 2009. The GAF were not able to confirm the second incident and stated that the only incident recorded was the one in Gilanfari.
11 “Gambia: 7 Gambians Die in Sahara Desert...as Vehicle Hits Landmine,” The Daily Observer (Banjul), 19 February 2009, allafria.com. For more information, see the report on Libya in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
15 Email from Ben Remfrey, Global Operations Director, Mines Awareness Trust, 23 June 2008.
Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Gambia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2013. As a first step, the Gambia should report formally on the extent of the problem to other States Parties and, if necessary, request assistance to initiate a demining program.

Risk Education

In 2008, the Nova Scotia Gambia Association (NSGA) continued the mine/ERW risk education (RE) program started in 2007 in Foni, Western division. They worked in cooperation with village committees, showing educational films and giving interactive presentations. Some 13,950 people in 34 border communities were reached in 2008. Target groups included Senegalese refugees and border communities, mainly children and women, farmers, and traders.

NSGA and UNICEF installed 43 mine/ERW RE billboards warning members of local communities as well as people crossing the border; 1,280 RE posters and 2,000 leaflets were also distributed.

NSGA received technical and financial support from UNICEF and worked in close cooperation with the GAF. While no evaluation of the effort has been conducted, NSGA believes that RE played a crucial role in preventing casualties in 2008–2009.

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown but is at least five (one injured inside Gambia, four outside Gambia). Mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities, but services are limited. Persons with disabilities mostly have to rely on the support of their families, some disability organizations or charity. The National Rehabilitation Center is not able to cope with the demand, and disabled people’s organizations often have resource challenges. Additionally, there is a lack of disability awareness and knowledge about service providers.

Begging is said to be one of the main sources of income for most persons with disabilities. Some social discrimination was reported against severely disabled persons, but “persons with less severe disabilities were accepted fully in society and they encountered very little discrimination in employment for which they were physically capable,” according to the United States Department of State.

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17 Email from Lamin Gibba, NSGA, 8 June 2009.
20 Email from Lamin Gibba, NSGA, 23 February 2009.
22 Ibid.
Access to basic health services remained problematic in some rural areas, and a lack of adequate human resources was a concern.\footnote{See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2008}, p. 394.} The government reported that every year, 50% of the trained Gambian medical personnel left the public sector for the private sector or to work abroad. This trend particularly impacted rural health posts.\footnote{“Gambia: Health worker flight,” \textit{IRIN} (Banjul), 11 December 2008, www.irinnews.org.}

Media reported that two casualties occurring in Libya were treated in the hospital of Sabha, Libya; the third received first-aid in Niger and was then transported to Dakar, Senegal.\footnote{“Gambia: 7 Gambians Die in Sahara Desert...as Vehicle Hits Landmine,” \textit{The Daily Observer} (Banjul), 19 February 2009, allafrica.com.}

Greece

Ten-Year Summary

The Hellenic Republic (Greece) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2004. It relies on existing legal measures to implement the treaty. Greece failed to destroy its stockpile of 1.58 million antipersonnel mines by its deadline of 1 March 2008. It did not begin the destruction process until November 2008; had destroyed only 225,962 mines as of May 2009; and hoped to complete stockpile destruction by the end of 2009. Greece retains 7,224 mines for training purposes, but has yet to consume any of them.

Greece has made significant progress in clearing antipersonnel mines from its border with Turkey and expected to complete operations before the end of 2009, well in advance of its 2014 Article 5 deadline for clearance of mined areas.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 108 landmine casualties (66 killed and 42 injured); the majority of casualties were non-Greek citizens. There has been no formal risk education program in Greece but minefields are marked and fenced.

Mine survivors received some services, particularly in terms of emergency medical care, but assistance in rehabilitation, psychological support, and socio-economic reintegration are limited. Greece has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, and in the provision of other government services. Accessibility legislation was poorly enforced.

Mine Ban Policy

Greece signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Ratification makes the Mine Ban Treaty part of Greek domestic law.1 In 2006, Greece for the first time provided details about its national implementation measures, and specified which parts of existing criminal codes provide penal sanctions for treaty violations.2

Greece attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. On each occasion it made statements on its missed stockpile destruction deadline (see Production, trade, stockpiling, and destruction section below) and mine clearance. At the Ninth Meeting, it was named co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education, and Mine Action Technologies.

Greece submitted its sixth Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008.3 Greece has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling or transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).


Greece had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 1 July 2009.4

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Production, trade, stockpiling, and destruction

Greece is a former producer of antipersonnel mines, and also imported them from Germany and the United States.\(^5\) Prior to becoming a State Party, Greece had a moratorium on the production and export of antipersonnel mines for a number of years.

In its Article 7 reports, Greece has declared a stockpile of 1,566,532 antipersonnel mines composed of five types: M2 (214,374), DM31 (794,400), M16 (553,359), M14 (3,895), and Area Denial Antipersonnel Mine (ADAM) artillery shells (504).\(^6\) Each ADAM 155mm projectile contains 36 antipersonnel mines thus the 504 shells reported by Greece contain 18,144 mines, bringing the stockpile total to 1,584,172. An army official told Landmine Monitor that ADAM mines, which contain traces of depleted uranium, pose a problem because they must be frozen before destruction.\(^7\)

Greece did not meet its 1 March 2008 deadline for destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines, and remains in violation of the treaty. It gave repeated assurances throughout 2007 that it would meet the deadline.\(^8\) In November 2007, Greece informed States Parties that it had “contracted a specialized private company” to destroy the mines, and said, “Our goal is to complete the destruction within the set deadline. You will be kept informed on the progress.”\(^9\) The deadline came and went without further communication to States Parties from the government.

In its 30 April 2008 Article 7 report, Greece stated: “The stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines (APM) have already been gathered and transferred in 26 final sites, from which they will be collected by the tendered private company, in order to be destructed.”\(^10\)

In June 2008, at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Greece informed States Parties that it had missed the deadline, but did not provide an explanation, citing only “complex and time consuming procedures, which were further delayed by changes intervened [sic].” Greece stated that the contract with Hellenic Defense Systems SA had still not been finalized, but was undergoing an audit and legal review.\(^11\)

In June 2008, officials told Landmine Monitor that the delays had been caused by “legal parameters,” as well as environmental concerns that required special destruction facilities. They said that the facilities and legislation needed for the destruction were in place and that no further delays were expected.\(^12\) The official military order for the destruction of the mines had been signed earlier in June,\(^13\) and the contract was finally signed on 25 June 2008.\(^14\)

On 1 August 2008, Landmine Monitor was informed that preparations were underway to initiate the transfer of the mines to Bulgaria, where the Videx company would destroy the mines.\(^15\) Greece also wrote to the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, stating that it would complete the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines no later than 28 May 2009.\(^16\)

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5 Greece has stated, “Upon ratification of the Ottawa Convention, there were not any anti-personnel mine production facilities whatsoever in Greece.” Article 7 Report, Form E, 30 April 2007.

6 Most recently, Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2009. The report submitted in July 2004 listed a stockpile total of 1,565,532.

7 Interview with Lt.-Col. Vassilis Makris, MoD, Athens, 29 March 2006.


9 Statement of Greece, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 19 November 2007. In June 2007, Greece confirmed to Landmine Monitor that the tender still was open.

10 Article 7 Report, Form F, 30 April 2008.


15 Telephone interview with Lt.-Col. Pericles Diamantides, Division of Defense Policy, Department of International Organizations, MoD, 1 August 2008.

On 26 November 2008, Greece informed States Parties that 7,488 mines had been transferred to the destruction facility in Bulgaria, and that it believed all mines would be transferred and destroyed by the summer of 2009. In its April 2009 Article 7 report, Greece stated that during 2008, a total of 24,868 stockpiled antipersonnel mines (all DM31) were destroyed, while a total of 107,510 had been transferred to Bulgaria for destruction.

On 25 May 2009, Greece told States Parties, “The operation on transfer and destruction... has begun [on 24 November 2008] and will be completed by the end of 2009.” When asked by the ICBL to clarify if both transfer and destruction would be done by the end of 2009, or just transfer, Greece replied that it hoped to be able to announce the completion of destruction by the Second Review Conference in November 2009.

It went on to say that a total of 1,568,159 mines would be destroyed. That number is 1,627 more mines than Greece has reported as stockpiling. Greece further said a total of 225,962 mines had already been transferred and destroyed and that another 50,000 would be transferred by the end of that week.

Mines retained for research and training
In its April 2009 Article 7 report, as well as previous reports, Greece indicated that it will retain 7,224 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes: M14 (3,780), M2 (1,512), DM31 (1,512), and M16 (420). Greece did not use the expanded Form D for reporting on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines agreed at the First Review Conference in 2004. However, Greek officials in 2005 and 2006 provided a detailed rationale to Landmine Monitor of how Greece determined its requirement to retain 7,224 antipersonnel mines. It claimed that the mines are needed for the army to retain its ability to conduct counter-mine operations; the army must have “the operational ability to lay or to clear a typical minefield of 100 meter width by 60 meters depth, of the minimum possible density as this technical operation is prescribed by NATO field manuals.” Any emplacement of antipersonnel mines outside of the specific exceptions in Article 3 is outlawed under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Scope of the Problem
Contamination
Greece is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The mine contamination consists primarily of 57 minefields laid by Greece in 1974 along the Evros river on the heavily militarized northeastern part of its border with Turkey, and has been maintained since then. A total of 24,751 antipersonnel mines were originally emplaced, as well as an unknown number of antivehicle mines; Greece has been removing only the antipersonnel mines since becoming
a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The extent of residual contamination along the border with Turkey has not been reported, but in May 2009 Greece reported that 23,836 emplaced antipersonnel mines had been destroyed across 55 of 57 minefields.

Contamination elsewhere in the country consists not only of mines, but also of booby-traps and ERW remaining from World War II and the 1946–1949 civil conflict in the Western Macedonia and Epirus regions in the north of the country. The total size of contaminated areas in the north is not known. Greece has reported suspected areas covering 40,000 hectares (400km²). A survey in Western Macedonia in 2007, however, found a total of 786 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), including some mined areas, of which 13 SHAs covering 310,000m² were subsequently cleared, leaving 773 areas to be demined.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) also reported in 2004 that there are other suspected mine/ERW-affected areas on the mainland and various islands. No further information has been provided on these areas and this information was contradicted by defense officials in June 2008.

Greece’s Article 13 report under CCW Amended Protocol II refers to areas contaminated by mines in Western Macedonia and Epirus, although it notes that there are “no properly defined minefields in this area and no maps.” Greece has reported as “void” the section covering “areas suspected to contain mines” in its annual Article 7 reports.

Casualties

In 2008, there were at least four mine casualties in Greece. The four were Georgians who were killed in September while trying to cross a minefield near the village of Kastanies, Evros prefecture, at the border with Turkey. Greece reported that there were “no mine victims among the Hellenic population.” The last recorded mine casualties occurred in 2006 when four people were killed and five injured (all non-Greek citizens) while attempting to cross the Evros minefields. A Greek deminer was killed in 2005.

No new mine casualties were reported in 2009, as of 31 May. The total number of mine casualties in Greece remains unknown. Between 1999 and 2008, the MoD reported 98 mine casualties, including 52 killed and 46 injured. All casualties were non-Greek migrants attempting to cross the Evros minefields. However, numbers might be higher: in 2007, the head of the Minefield Clearance Battalion, TENX, was reported saying that “104 illegal immigrants have been killed in Greek minefields since 1995 and another 187 have

37 See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009.
43 Ibid.
been severely injured.44 The total number of Greek military personnel, including deminers, that were landmine casualties is unknown. However, between 1954 and 2007, at least 31 deminers were killed. From 1954 to 2002, 17 military personnel were injured in clearance operations.45

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 108 landmine casualties, including 66 killed and 42 injured.46 The vast majority (105) of casualties were non-Greek, including at least 22 Iraqi nationals, 13 Turks, seven Pakistanis, six Georgian, three Burundian, two Moldovan, two Somali, two Iranian, one Mauritanian, one Palestinian, and one Tunisian. The nationality of 45 reported non-Greek casualties remains unknown. The majority of casualties occurred at the border between Greece and Turkey (102), two at the border with Bulgaria, and the location of four remains unknown. All casualties were caused by landmines.47

Risk profile
According to Landmine Monitor data, at-risk groups are illegal immigrants or asylum seekers trying to cross the Evros minefields and, to a lesser extent, military personnel. Greece reported that illegal migrants become casualties “because they are led to the border along the river Evros at night and then instructed to ignore any mine fences and markings and walk into the Hellenic territory. Sometimes they are even aided in cutting the wire and led into minefields.”48

Socio-economic impact
In 2007, the ERW-affected areas were said by a defense general staff official to have “no socio-economic impact” on the local population. However, it has also been noted previously that areas cleared in the Grammos and Vitsi mountains are used for pasture and leisure. In a June 2008, meeting with the ICBL, defense officials noted that the mountains were “very beautiful areas for recreation.”49 In 2007, forest fires in the mountains resulted in explosions, which impeded fire-fighting efforts.50

Program Management and Coordination
There is no national mine action authority or mine action center in Greece.51 All clearance operations and their management fall under the responsibility of the MoD.52 The MoD and the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity are responsible for ensuring the rights of mine survivors.53 An interministerial committee in February 2007, hosted by the MoD, proposed establishing a survivor assistance committee54 but no progress has been reported since.55

45 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid, p. 399.
52 Ibid.
55 Email from Louisa O’Brien, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 1 April 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 401
Data collection and management
Information on mine action is stored in a database accessible only to the Army General Staff and Defense General Staff.\textsuperscript{56} Civilian and military casualty data is collected by the army.\textsuperscript{57} In 2009, for the first time, the MoD provided details of migrant casualties to Landmine Monitor.\textsuperscript{58} It is possible that casualties have been under-reported.\textsuperscript{59}

Plans
Strategic mine action plans
In June 2008, the MoD provided Landmine Monitor with a document in which it revealed plans to clear seven of the remaining 17 minefields in 2008, four in 2009, and six in 2010.\textsuperscript{60} In May 2009, however, Greece reported to the Standing Committee meetings that it would complete its demining obligations by the end of year, five years in advance of its Article 5 clearance deadline.\textsuperscript{61}

National ownership
Greece has been efficient in clearing antipersonnel mines along its border with Turkey in accordance with the strict requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty. National mine action legislation has not been adopted.

Greece has reported that the MoD complies with NATO standards for demining\textsuperscript{62} and that it takes into account international mine action standards.\textsuperscript{63}

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
Most clearance in Greece has been carried out by the military.\textsuperscript{64} In September 2007 to September 2008, Greek military engineering forces cleared 3,350 antipersonnel mines along Greece’s border with Turkey (the area cleared was not reported) as well as 926,575m² in the regions of Western Macedonia and Epirus in the northwest of the country.\textsuperscript{65} In 2007, a Greek commercial company, P.A.S.S. Defence, was contracted by the Western Macedonia regional authority to survey suspected land in that region and to clear 310,127m² of land confirmed to be contaminated.\textsuperscript{66}

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Greece is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2014. Progress in meeting this obligation has been efficient, with clearance of antipersonnel mines along its border with Turkey reported to be almost completed as of May 2009, well in advance of its Article 5 deadline.

Questions remain, however, about the extent of Greece’s obligation to clear containing scattered Civil War-era mines elsewhere in the country. Greece’s Article 13 report under CCW Amended Protocol II refers to areas contaminated by mines in Western Macedonia and Epirus, though it notes that there are “no properly defined minefields in this area and no maps.”\textsuperscript{67}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{56} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 402.
\textsuperscript{57} See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 368.
\textsuperscript{60} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 399.
\textsuperscript{62} Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{63} Article 13 Report, Form G, 3 November 2008.
\textsuperscript{64} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 399.
\textsuperscript{65} Article 13 Report, Form B, 3 November 2008.
\textsuperscript{67} Article 13 Report, Form B, 3 November 2008.
\end{footnotesize}
Greece has reported as “void” the section covering “areas suspected to contain mines” in its annual Article 7 reports.68

**Risk Education**

There is no formal risk education (RE) program in Greece. Greece reported that “all minefields along the border with Turkey in the Evros province are clearly defined and marked, well above any standard established by Amended Protocol II and the relevant NATO STANAGs [Standardization Agreements].”69 It also stated that “all minefields have a double fence and that “barbed wire was added to almost all the minefields of Evros.”70 The minefields are signposted in English and Greek”71but are not always clearly visible.72 The Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council of Europe expressed concern that “no action has been taken to avert other deaths.”73 One survivor reported that some parts of Evros minefields are not clearly signposted.74

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Greece is unknown. The vast majority of casualties are people trying to enter Greece illegally. The head of the clearance battalion reported that some 187 non-Greek citizens had been injured between 1995 and early 2007.75 There are no recent or reliable figures concerning Greek mine/ERW survivors. As of July 2009, there were four known landmine amputees residing in Greece. All were foreign nationals.76 It is not known how many other mine survivors have left the country.77

In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Greece stated that it “offers, free of charge, health treatment through its National Health System to any person injured by landmines, irrespective of their legal status.”78 Some support has been provided to survivors, particularly in terms of emergency medical care, but Landmine Monitor found no evidence of full rehabilitative assistance made available to all known survivors.79 In 2008, during a visit to Evros prefecture, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe reminded Greece that “the authorities must provide a prompt and generous assistance [sic] to all mine victims, especially migrants.”80

Mine casualties at the Evros border are evacuated and receive first-aid delivered by military personnel.81 They are treated at the hospital of Alexandroupolis or “other major hospitals” in northern Greece free of charge.82

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68 See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009.
70 Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009.
73 Ibid.
74 Telephone interview with Redouane Kharbouche, Representative, Mine Survivors Greece, 27 July 2009.
75 Based on a declaration made by the head of the Minefield Clearance battalion, TENX. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 401.
Continuing medical care for mine/ERW survivors remains problematic. In 2009, Greece maintained that rehabilitation of survivors, including provision of prosthetics, is undertaken by the military hospitals following the consent of the Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity. However, survivors reported that, in practice, they have to cover the costs of their healthcare and medicines or rely on the assistance of private citizens. Negotiations for an agreement between ministries to cover the cost of prosthetic devices for mine survivors began in 2006, but no significant progress was reported as of July 2009.

There were no psychological support or socio-economic reintegration opportunities for survivors. One survivor received a Greek language course organized for migrants and a computer class paid for by a private citizen. Special education for persons with disabilities remains limited. Unemployment remains a major social problem for persons with disabilities, with estimated 80% of disabled being unemployed. In 2008, the deputy ombudsperson for social welfare handled complaints related to persons with disability on employment, social security, and transportation.

Survivors with “humanitarian refugee” status may be eligible for a small disability benefit. As of July 2009, two survivors with refugee status received financial support of about €270 (US$398) every two months. Survivors without clear residency status rely on sporadic contributions from state institutions or public donations.

The Ministry of Interior reported that asylum applications by mine survivors are generally a top priority and deportation is excluded in such cases. However, human rights activists feared in the past they might have been deported. In 2008, the Council of Europe found “grave and systemic deficiencies in the Greek asylum practice” and stressed the need to improve refugee protection and access to the asylum procedure, especially in border areas, such as Evros.

In 2008, the Medical Center for the Rehabilitation of Torture Victims did not provide any support for mine survivors. In 2007, it had channeled Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity funds for rent payments of survivors.
In 2009, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs allocated €17,000 ($25,034) to landmine survivors in Greece through the ICBL; the funds arrived in Greece on 28 August 2009. Consequently, survivors did not receive any state support in the first eight months of 2009.

Greece has legislation that protects the rights of persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to health care, access to buildings, and in the provision of other government services; the legislation is enforced, but access to buildings for persons with disabilities is poorly enforced. There is a general lack of physical accessibility in Greece: only 5% of public buildings are accessible.

On 30 March 2007, Greece signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol. As of 1 July 2009, Greece had not ratified the convention.

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103 Ibid.
GUINEA-BISSAU

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
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<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified; partial survey in 2007–2008 identified almost 3.2km² of mined and battle areas</td>
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<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
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<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Clearance of 0.49m² of mined areas</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Clearance of 0.76m² of battle areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk Education Recipients in 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary


Guinea-Bissau continues to make slow progress in clearance of mined areas; it is struggling to meet its Article 5 deadline of November 2011. A 2007–2008 “selective” impact survey identified 80 mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW)-affected communities, but it did not capture the full extent of contamination.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 151 mine/ERW casualties in Guinea-Bissau, (60 killed, 82 injured, and nine unknown). Risk education has been implemented since 2001 but only expanded to cover areas outside the capital in 2006. A lack of funds has restricted efforts to improve and expand the program.

Over the last 10 years, capacity for the care and rehabilitation of survivors has been limited due to extreme poverty and lack of basic services in the country. Between 2004 and 2006, improvements were made to the emergency care facilities in some regional hospitals. In 2004, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled began assisting the only physical rehabilitation center in the country.

Mine Ban Policy

Guinea-Bissau signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified it on 22 May 2001, and became a State Party on 1 November 2001. In December 2004, the Minister of Foreign Affairs said Guinea-Bissau was planning to enact domestic legislation to implement the treaty. Yet, in July 2007 the director of the National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenção da Accão Anti-Minas, CAAMI) told Landmine Monitor that the government no

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longer plans to adopt a new law as it believes that it is sufficient that the treaty automatically became national law under the constitution, making mine-related crimes subject to existing penal sanctions.4

Guinea-Bissau submitted an undated Article 7 report in 2009, covering the period from 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009. Guinea-Bissau previously provided six reports.5

Guinea-Bissau attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance. It attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it made a statement on mine clearance.

Guinea-Bissau has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Guinea-Bissau is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 4 December 2008, but, as of 1 July 2009, had not ratified it.6

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use

Guinea-Bissau has reported that it never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. On 17 October 2005, Guinea-Bissau destroyed the last of its 10,654 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, just ahead of its 1 November 2005 deadline.7

In its Article 7 report submitted in 2008, Guinea-Bissau reported retaining 109 mines for training purposes.8 However, 100 of these—50 POMZ-2 and 50 PMD-6—were listed as disarmed.9 In its report submitted in 2009, Guinea-Bissau listed only nine armed mines as retained for training: six PMN, one M409, and two M969 mines. It reported that the 50 POMZ-2 mines had been recycled for metal use, and the 50 PMD-6 mines had also been destroyed.10 The Article 7 report submitted in 2009 also stated that no training was currently underway.11

There have been no reports of use of antipersonnel mines in Guinea-Bissau since March and April 2006, when a faction of the Senegal-based Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, MFDC), having fled Senegal into Guinea-Bissau, laid both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in northern Guinea-Bissau.12

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4 Email from César de Carvalho, General Director, CAAMI, 19 July 2007. This point has been stated in Guinea-Bissau’s Article 7 reports. See, for example, Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2005 to 30 April 2006), Form A. The report cites Articles 85.1(h), and 68(e) of the Constitution as making the treaty national law, and Article 206 of the Penal Code, which allows sentencing of crimes. Penal Code Article 206(1) prohibits the use of explosives.

5 The report submitted in 2008 was also not dated, but covered the period from 30 April 2007 to 30 April 2008. Guinea-Bissau did not submit a report in 2007. The report submitted in 2006 was also not dated, but covered the period from 30 April 2005 to 30 April 2006. Other reports were submitted on 14 June 2005, 13 May 2004, 13 May 2003, and 19 June 2002.


9 Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2005 to 30 April 2006), Form D. At the time of the final destruction in October 2005, Guinea-Bissau said that it would retain 67 mines. This included 58 disarmed mines (50 POMZ-2 and eight PMD-6) and nine active. Letter to Kerry Brinkert, Director, Implementation Support Unit, GICHD, from César de Carvalho, CAAMI, 20 October 2005.

10 Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form D.

11 Ibid. As in previous years, the report notes that mines retained for training purposes were to be used for “on-going training of military deminers,” and stated that the retained mines are used to “[t]rain military deminers regarding how mines work and in recognition training since these mines are likely to be found around the country.”

12 For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 463–464. In April 2006, Guinea-Bissau declared that it had ousted rebel forces from its territory. The ICBL condemned the antipersonnel mine use in northern Guinea-Bissau and noted that the MFDC in 1999 signed the Banjul Declaration, which among other things, committed the group to cease using landmines.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination

As a result of armed conflicts dating back to 1963, Guinea-Bissau is contaminated by landmines (both antipersonnel and antivehicle) and ERW. The last known cluster munition remnants were reportedly destroyed by Cleared Ground Demining (CGD) in August 2008, though Guinea-Bissau’s latest Article 7 report refers to “some clusters” at the Paiol da Bra ammunition storage area.

An impact survey initiated in October 2007 and completed in May 2008 confirmed 80 affected communities in seven of the country’s eight regions: Bafata, Biombo, Cacheu, Gabu, Oio, Quinara, and Tombali. The survey estimated that 12 mined areas covered almost 2.24 km² while five battle areas (not including Paiol da Bra) covered 0.93 km². According to the survey findings, the most affected regions are Cacheu and Oio in the north, mostly as a result of mine contamination resulting from the Casamance conflict. The survey report states that these regions, “together with Buruntuma in Gabu region, constitute the highest priorities for clearance.” By June 2009, however, it was reported by the United States that with its financial support, the local demining NGO Humanitarian Aid (HUMAID) had, “managed to clear the area of Buruntuma (in the northeast of Guinea Bissau on the border with Guinea Conakry) of all land mines.”

The LIS survey was not able to visit all suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) because of security or access problems: “Some communities were not surveyed due to impassable roads or pathways or due to the existence of potentially dangerous MFDC rebels in the northern region of Oio/Cacheu. Other communities were not found due to the limited information recorded on the original list and the lack of national maps of Guinea-Bissau, [sic] detailed questioning of local people could not locate these communities…In addition to these localities other places have been found which were not visited during the LIS…” These included a new minefield at Gadamel Porto.

A workshop convened to discuss the findings in 2008 concluded that the LIS “did not reflect the complete reality of the country’s contamination by mines and UXO.” The survey itself acknowledged that it is “not fully comprehensive” and that “further localized survey work in areas of high contamination may reveal other, as yet unsurveyed but ERW/landmine affected communities,” but noted that the communities covered by the survey were preselected by national government counterparts.

The capital, Bissau, is believed to be clear of mines, but remains contaminated by large quantities of ERW around Paiol de Bra, an ammunition storage area that was bombed during the internal armed conflict. Clearance by CGD was expected to be completed by the end of 2009.

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13 Email from Cassandra McKeown, Finance Director, CGD, 22 April 2009.
14 See Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form C.
16 See Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form C.
20 Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form C.
21 See Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form C.
25 See Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form C.
Casualties

One ERW casualty (injured) was identified in 2008: on 26 April, in Paiol da Bra, the former ammunition storage site in the capital of Bissau, a 14-year-old boy was injured while “illegally tampering” with an abandoned explosive. He had received mine/ERW risk education. The 2008 casualty rate represents a significant decrease from the eight ERW casualties (one killed, six injured, and one unknown) recorded in 2007. As in 2007, no landmine casualties were identified in 2008.

The LIS attempted to collect recent casualty data but there was no evidence of deaths or injuries within the prior 24 months in communities surveyed.

Casualties increased in 2009, with 12 casualties (four killed and eight injured) in two incidents, as of 31 May. On 25 March, in the Bafata region, two boys died when a grenade they were playing with exploded. On 29 April, an incident with ERW in the Oio region killed two girls and injured five girls, one boy, and two women. One girl died on the spot and another died after being evacuated to Bissau hospital. Two other survivors were also evacuated to Bissau and were treated for serious injuries. The remaining six survivors were treated for minor injuries at the local hospital. Neither of the communities where the 2009 incidents occurred had been included in the recent LIS.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 151 mine/ERW casualties in Guinea-Bissau: 60 killed, 82 injured, and nine unknown. It is likely that the number is higher, given the under-reporting of incidents and the complete lack of data from the years immediately following the conflict in 1998–1999. In 2000, for example, Landmine Monitor was unable to report the number of casualties in 1999, stating that “though the number is uncertain, there continue to be mine casualties.” Once some figures became available, starting in 2002, reported casualties ranged from 12 to 43 per year until 2007 when there was a decline to eight casualties. The unreliability of data and the 12 reported casualties in the first six months of 2009 make it impossible to determine a downward trend in annual casualty rates.

As of December 2008, the CAAMI casualty database had registered 1,140 casualties. There was no breakdown of people killed and injured. Some 42% of casualties occurred in the south, 38% in the north, and 20% in the east. It is believed that these casualties include people hurt by weapons other than mines and ERW, but at least 847 of the recorded casualties are due to mines/ERW. It is believed that military and demining casualties are not included in this total as the two non-civilian casualties (one military and one deminer) identified in 2007 were not included.

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26 Casualty data provided by Irene Laval, Mine Risk Education Officer, CAAMI, 11 June 2009.
27 Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009.
31 Casualty data provided to Landmine Monitor by Irene Laval, CAAMI, 11 June 2009.
32 Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
34 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
36 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
37 Casualty data provided by Irene Laval, CAAMI, 11 June 2009.
38 Casualty data provided by email from César de Carvalho, CAAMI, 9 June 2009.
39 Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009.
Risk profile
As in previous years, livelihood activities, including farming and scrap metal collection, have remained the main reason for risk-taking behavior. Men and adolescent boys are believed to be most at risk, as they traditionally work the land.\(^\text{42}\) In addition, the impact survey found that informal village demining had been conducted by civilians in 23% of communities surveyed.\(^\text{43}\) HUMAID, cites examples of people entering battle areas when HUMAID personnel were not present and using hammers and chisels to remove the copper bands on unexploded artillery shells.\(^\text{44}\)

Socio-economic impact
The survey pinpointed 11 communities that were “high-priority for clearance,” 13 of which were “medium-priority,” and 56 “low-priority.”\(^\text{45}\) More than four-fifths of the affected communities are “compact villages, relying on small-scale agriculture for survival.” Although the overall scale of contamination and impact is “limited,” the impact survey results suggest that clearance will “ameliorate currently blocked or compromised access to agricultural and pasture land for almost half of these communities.”\(^\text{46}\)

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
Guinea-Bissau’s national mine action authority is the National Commission for Humanitarian Demining (Comissão Nacional para Desminagem Humanitária, CNDH), set up in 2001.\(^\text{47}\) CAAMI was also established in 2001 and coordinates mine action operations.\(^\text{48}\)

Risk education
CAAMI is responsible for coordinating and monitoring the Education Program to Prevent Mine Accidents (Programa de Educação para a Prevencção de Acidentes com Minas, PEPAM), with support from UNICEF.\(^\text{49}\) In 2008, CAAMI held 20 coordination meetings.\(^\text{50}\)

Victim assistance
Guinea Bissau’s victim assistance (VA) program is coordinated by CAAMI, but all activities are supported through international assistance. In 2008, CAAMI’s role in VA was mainly to secure international funding. Because no international funding was secured and no national funds were available or committed, none of CAAMI’s 2008 VA goals were achieved and there were no VA activities in 2008.\(^\text{51}\) In 2008, efforts to strengthen national VA capacity consisted of steps to renovate the national rehabilitation center.\(^\text{52}\) The Ministry of Social Solidarity and Poverty Reduction is the main government body addressing disability issues, with responsibilities to provide pensions, specialized education, promote employment, and mobilize international assistance.\(^\text{53}\)

Guinea-Bissau’s National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper specifically names mine/ERW survivors as a vulnerable group that must be assisted through operational strategies and actions to reduce poverty.\(^\text{54}\) While VA is included with the mine action plan, there is no specific VA plan.

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\(^{42}\) Ibid, p. 415; and interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.


\(^{44}\) Email from John Blacken, HUMAID, 17 April 2009.


\(^{46}\) Ibid.


\(^{48}\) Ibid.

\(^{49}\) Ibid, p. 415.

\(^{50}\) Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009.

\(^{51}\) Ibid.

\(^{52}\) Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.


and no progress was made towards developing one in 2008. Guinea-Bissau does not have a general national disability plan.

Data collection and management

The Portuguese edition of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) has been installed in CAAMI. It is not known if data from the impact survey has been entered into the database. CAAMI stores casualty data in IMSMA. Prior to 2008, IMSMA was mainly populated using retroactive survey data and information collected by risk education (RE) promoters during community RE sessions. In 2008, for the first time, details of a casualty were entered into IMSMA at or close to the time of the incident, demonstrating an improvement in the ongoing maintenance of casualty data.

CAAMI receives casualty data from RE promoters, the national Red Cross society, NGOs, hospitals, and through community radio. It is suspected, however, that not all cases are reported because data collectors (RE promoters) only work where there is ongoing clearance, people do not report to local authorities for fear of punishment, and there is a very limited presence of healthcare systems to report casualties.

In 2006, with support from the World Health Organization (WHO), CAAMI verified and completed information for all registered casualties using an updated IMSMA form. It is believed that registered casualties do not cover all existing casualties, since there is no national coverage by data collectors or other reporting mechanisms. It was expected that the LIS would increase knowledge of recent casualties that may have been previously unreported but it did not identify any casualties in the surveyed communities, nor did it cover the entire country.

Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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</tr>
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</table>

*Landmine Action left Guinea-Bissau following the completion of the LIS and had not returned as of July 2009.

55 Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009.
57 Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009.
58 Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
59 Interview with Irene Laval, CAAMI, in Geneva, 4 June 2008; and email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 7 April 2009.


**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plan**

A workshop in 2008 to discuss the LIS findings concluded that although the survey had not captured all the country’s contamination, it “can be accepted as a basis for future plans during 2009–2011.”

The UN reported in November 2008 that, with the impact survey data, Guinea-Bissau “is well placed to prepare a revised and focused national mine action strategy and a national mine action operational plan to ensure it addresses its Article V obligations on time.”

In November 2008, CAAMI’s director stated that an action plan for that period would be developed “later in the year.”

UNDP informed Landmine Monitor in early August 2009 that priorities for the program were the effective integration of mine action in the reconstruction of Guinea-Bissau, government involvement in support of mine action to mobilize resources and interaction with other institutions, establishing CAAMI liaison and coordination with the armed forces, gathering reliable information on remaining contamination in the absence of technical survey, and meeting Guinea-Bissau’s 2011 Article 5 deadline for mine clearance.

UNDP’s aims for the program for 2009 were to: support institutional capacity-building of CAAMI to plan, coordinate, and monitor mine action; a revision of the program and preparation for the completion initiative (including a reduced structure of CAAMI capable of dealing with the residual ERW threat after 2011); and the preparation of a national strategic mine action plan. In July 2009, a consultant for the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit visited Guinea-Bissau to assist them in developing a clearance completion plan.

The goals for RE are: “educating vulnerable communities regarding ways to avoid risk of injury from mines/UXO” and “strengthening the education system to provide MRE to youth and children,” along with supporting national capacity and sustainability, ensuring consistency and quality of RE messages, and providing effective coordination of activities.

**Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development**

There is no evidence of any integration of demining with reconstruction and development in Guinea-Bissau. Guinea-Bissau’s National Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper specifically names mine/ERW survivors as a vulnerable group that must be assisted through operational strategies and actions to reduce poverty.

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Government support to the mine action program has remained minimal. In November 2008, CAAMI’s director declared that the program suffered from a lack of government leadership and support prior to the November elections.” Guinea-Bissau continues to benefit from considerable international support, although a new UNDP chief technical advisor only started work in May 2009 after a gap of more than one year.

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66 Email from Tomas Lourenço, Mine Action Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP/CAAMI, 6 August 2009.
67 Ibid.
68 Email from Tim Lardner, Mine Action Consultant, 13 July 2009.
69 Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form I.
72 Emails from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 22 April 2009; and Tomas Lourenço, UNDP/CAAMI, 6 August 2009.
National mine action legislation and standards
Apart from the 2001 decree that created the CNDH,73 no national legislation governing the mine action program has been adopted. In early 2007, it was reported that new national mine action standards were being drafted. No progress has since been reported.74 CAAMI has stated that it ensures quality control based on the International Mine Action Standards.75

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
There were a variety of national and international demining operators in Guinea-Bissau in 2008. Their main task was to help develop the capacity of the two local NGOs that implement clearance operations. International NGO Landmine Action was partnered with HUMAID, and CGD with LUTCAM, although this situation changed as CGD ended its collaboration with LUTCAM and funded HUMAID’s demining activities in Buruntuma in the second half of 2008.76 In addition, CGD has a battle area clearance (BAC) team in Bissau and a female Roving Small Arms and Light Weapons Collection Team that works countrywide.77 Landmine Action left Guinea-Bissau after completing the impact survey and, as of early July 2009, had not returned, although it was seeking funding for clearance, further survey, and monitoring of armed violence.78 The US Department of Defense has contributed trainers and materials to build national explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacities.79

HUMAID’s demining priority in 2008 was to clear mines surrounding the town of Buruntuma. EOD priorities were to complete clearance of the ammunition storage areas at Prabis and Ilonde. Work at Prabis was completed during 2008, but some work at Ilonde remained to be completed in 2009.80

Identification of hazardous areas
According to CAAMI, technical survey will supplement the impact survey results during demining/EOD operations.81 A working technical survey capacity did not formally exist as of early August 2009.82

Mine clearance in 2008
Demining is primarily manual in Guinea-Bissau.83 Clearance in 2008 focused on the Buruntuma minefield through HUMAID, and on the São Domingo sector of the northern border with Senegal through LUTCAM, but operations stopped in June 2008 due to lack of funding.84

75 Article 7 report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009) Form I.
76 Emails from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 6 March and 22 April 2009.
77 Ibid, 22 April 2009.
78 Email from Melissa Fueth, Operations Officer, Landmine Action, 6 July 2009.
80 Email from John Blacken, HUMAID, 17 April 2009.
82 Email from Tomas Lourenço, UNDP/CAAMI, 6 August 2009.
Release of mined areas in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed during mine clearance</th>
<th>Land released by survey (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUMAID</td>
<td>481,247</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUTCAM</td>
<td>11,317</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Battle area clearance in 2008
Clearance of the Paiol da Bra ammunition storage area was initiated in July 2008, with financial support from the European Commission.

Release of battle areas in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>BAC (m²)</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>Abandoned explosive destroyed</th>
<th>Area released by survey (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMAID</td>
<td>131,382</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUTCAM</td>
<td>303,855</td>
<td>4,574</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGD</td>
<td>325,750</td>
<td>4,567*</td>
<td>214,175</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = not reported
* In addition, CGD's Roving EOD Team removed 1,489 explosive items in 174 tasks in 2008.

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Guinea-Bissau is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2011. In 2007, Landmine Action affirmed that “with the correct investment and sensible tasking and cooperation from CAAMI, the job could feasibly be done in 2–3 years and Guinea-Bissau could become one of the few mined countries to achieve its Ottawa treaty target dates.” In November 2008, however, CAAMI’s director declared that: “Due to inconsistency of funding we face a challenge in meeting the objective of having Guinea-Bissau free of mine and UXO contamination by the end of 2011.” He hoped that the newly elected government would provide greater support for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

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85 Data from email from John Blacken, HUMAID, 17 April 2009. LUTCAM did not respond to requests for information on its clearance and Guinea-Bissau has not disaggregated clearance data in its formal reporting. The information on LUTCAM was provided by UNDP in an email from Reuben McCarthy, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Specialist, Sub-Regional Office for Eastern and Southern Africa, UNDP, 26 August 2009.
87 Data from emails from John Blacken, HUMAID, 17 April 2009; Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 22 April 2009; and Reuben McCarthy, UNDP, 5 August 2009.
88 Email from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 22 April 2009.
91 Ibid.
In May 2009, Guinea-Bissau reported to the Standing Committee meetings that from January 2000 to April 2009, a total of 3.54 km² of SHAs had been released, with the destruction of 3,039 antipersonnel mines, 157 antivehicle mines, 149 antiboat mines, and 49,009 items of UXO. This did not appear consistent with figures provided in its latest Article 7 report, which reported a total of 2.88 km² of clearance in 2002–2009.

### Demining from 2002–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Risk Education

In 2008, most RE activities took place just outside Bissau (where most clearance activities have been completed), and in Bafata, Gabu, and Oio on the northern border at São Domingo, Cacheu region. They were implemented by the national mine clearance NGOs, HUMAID and LUTCAM, who conducted community liaison and delivered RE. A free telephone ERW hotline was launched by LUTCAM on 7 November 2008, which resulted in daily reports of contamination.

Guinea-Bissau reported that the number of beneficiaries from April 2008 to April 2009 was 1,159 individuals (478 men, 275 women, and 406 children), reached through 26 training sessions covering 46 communities or villages. This was a slight increase from 908 people reached by RE in the previous reporting period. LUTCAM reported that in 2008 they delivered RE to approximately 5,000 people. In addition, 360 activists, representatives of youth and women’s associations or religious and traditional leaders, were trained by CAAMI’s 38 trainers. It was believed that CAAMI RE activists also carried out RE in their communities but, because of a lack of financial resources, it was not possible to monitor these activities, and the number of beneficiaries was not recorded.

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93 See Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form G.
94 The figures are taken from previous Landmine Monitor reports. Guinea-Bissau has reported different figures for clearance in recent years in its latest Article 7 report: 2008: 0.76 km² of combined clearance; 2007: 0.61 km²; 2006: 0.28 km²; 2005: 0.12 km²; 2004: 0.22 km²; 2003: 0.28 km²; and 2002: 0.13 km². See Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form G.
95 Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009, HUMAID; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by John Blacken, HUMAID, 17 April 2009; and email from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 22 April 2009.
96 Email from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 22 April 2009.
97 Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and Article 7 Report (for the period April 2008 to April 2009), Form I.
98 In *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 415, it was reported that there were 908 RE beneficiaries in 2007. However, it seems that this number of beneficiaries was for the period from April 2007 to April 2008. Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
99 Email from Cassandra McKeown, CGD, 22 April 2009.
101 Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
CAAMI and the Senegal Mine Action Center (SMAC) met to exchange experiences and promote collaboration on delivering RE on the northern border at São Domingo.\footnote{Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009.}

Activities included in CAAMI’s 2008 action plan to expand within the affected regions of Biombo, Buruntuma, Bigene (Cacheu region), and Sambuia (Gabu region) and to increase community participation were not realized because of a lack of funding.\footnote{Ibid; and interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.}

All operators used standard materials and messages, which they adapted to the local context.\footnote{Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009.} UNICEF produced RE materials such as books, notebooks, games, and T-shirts for use for all RE activities, targeting schoolchildren and CAAMI activists.\footnote{Email from Sónia Polónio, Child Protection Specialist, UNICEF, 24 February 2009.}

The impact survey noted that only 18% of surveyed communities had received RE and that the RE received by mine-affected communities was “minimal at best.”\footnote{Landmine Action, “Impact survey: Guinea Bissau, A selective nationwide survey of communities affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war,” London, 2008, pp. 12–13.} CAAMI disputes this finding on the basis that LIS researchers did not contact local authorities or CAAMI focal points in these communities.\footnote{Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009.} As of June 2008, UNICEF was carrying out an assessment of the “process and impact” of the RE program, working closely with CAAMI.\footnote{Email from Sónia Polónio, UNICEF, 24 February 2009.} Results were not available as of July 2009. They are to be used, along with the results of the LIS, to plan RE activities for 2010 and 2011.\footnote{CAAMI has scheduled the closure of its RE program for 2011 when demining is due to be concluded. Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.}

In 2008, UNICEF provided US$31,400 in funding and $14,000 in-kind contributions for the RE program.

Although a need for RE was identified in 1999, outbreaks of violence prevented an RE program from being implemented until 2001.\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 158.} In 2006, RE activities began to move outside Bissau to other affected areas of the country, as recommended by a 2002 UNICEF evaluation.\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 416.}

The evaluation also recommended an increased coordinating role for CAAMI; carrying out impact studies; linking RE closer to other mine action activities and performing community liaison; and expanding coverage and creating a sustainable community-based network of RE activists.\footnote{Ibid.} An increase in armed violence in the north of the country from March–April 2006 resulted in emergency RE for the region for the rest of 2006 and 2007.\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 418.}

### Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown; there are at least 1,140 total casualties, of whom some 70% (or 798) were estimated to be survivors.\footnote{Casualty data provided in email from César de Carvalho, CAAMI, 9 June 2009; and see previous editions of Landmine Monitor.} In 2008, as in 2007, Guinea-Bissau made little progress in providing assistance to survivors, due to lack of funds and government support.\footnote{Interview with Irene Laval, CAAMI, in Geneva, 4 June 2008; responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Irene Laval, CAAMI, 23 May 2008 and 30 March 2009.}

In its statement to the Ninth Meeting of State Parties, Guinea-Bissau did not mention any ongoing VA activities and referred only to the progress made with WHO support that ended in 2006.\footnote{Statement by Amália Luis Mendes, Ministry of Economy, Finance and Regional Integration, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.} During the WHO project, a needs assessment for survivors was carried out, casualty data...
was verified, and an unspecified number of survivors received clinical assessments, prostheses, and physiotherapy.117 CAAMI reported that there were no VA activities in 2008, none of the year’s VA goals had been achieved, and the WHO project was the only project that had really helped mine survivors.118

Over the last decade, capacity for the care and rehabilitation of survivors has been extremely limited. Following years of civil war and internal political instability, Guinea-Bissau remains one of the poorest countries in the world, ranked 171 out of 179 countries on the Human Development Index in 2008.119 Access to basic services remains severely limited for the vast majority of the population, making VA provision difficult. Political instability continued in 2009, with the assassinations of the country’s president and chief of the general staff in March, leading the UN to call on the international community to “intensify its support” to the country.120

As in previous years, in November 2008, Guinea-Bissau called on donor states to provide support for comprehensive VA.121 UNICEF cited the lack of a fundraising strategy on the part of the government and competing priorities to explain, in part, the lack of external support for both VA and RE activities.122

As of May 2009, only the Bissau hospital had the capacity to attend to serious injuries resulting from mine/ERW incidents.123 In its latest Article 7 report, Guinea-Bissau stated that the capacity to provide care and rehabilitation to survivors “is severely limited” as a result of the 1998–1999 conflicts that “seriously affected” the healthcare system.124 The impact survey also found that the “healthcare systems available to treat and report casualties are extremely limited.”125

According to the government, survivors “have difficulties accessing physical rehabilitation services.”126 The only operating physical rehabilitation center in the country, the privately-run Friendly House for the Disabled (Casa Amiga do Deficiente, CAD) lacked adequate prosthetic and orthotic personnel for most of the year and saw its production decrease by nearly 50% from 2007 levels, despite increased support from the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD). The price of prosthetic and orthotic services at the center and access to transport are an obstacle for survivors.127 In 2008, the government began renovations on a public rehabilitation center that closed during the conflict in 1998, with the intention of rehiring previous staff and re-opening, with SFD support, in 2009. As of May 2009, the center had not yet opened.128

Even greater challenges lie in accessing socio-economic reintegration services. There is a lack of support for professional training, small business start-up costs, or for persons with disabilities to participate in regional sporting events as they had in the past. One advancement noted in this area was the formation of an association of mine/ERW survivors, called the National Union of Physically Disabled and Mine/UXO Victims (Unión Nacional de Deficientes Motoras y Víctimas de Minas y UXOs, UNDEMOV). No further information about the organization was available.129

118 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009; and interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
120 UN Peacebuilding Commission, “Statement by the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission’s configuration on Guinea-Bissau,” (New York: UN Peacebuilding Commission, 4 March 2009), PBC/3/GNB/5.
122 Email from Sónia Polónio, UNICEF, 24 February 2009.
123 Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
124 Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009), Form J.
128 Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
Guinea-Bissau’s constitution prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities but no progress was made in its implementation.\(^{130}\) Some military veterans with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, received pensions but these did not adequately address health, housing, or food needs.\(^{131}\) Constitutional reform to include mine/ERW survivors as “war victims” was underway as of May 2009, to give them the same rights to compensation and assistance as disabled military veterans. This reform depends, however, on the Ministry of Social Affairs securing the funds to pay the pensions.\(^{132}\)

As of 1 July 2009, Guinea-Bissau had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.\(^{133}\)

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

As one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate attention to survivors,\(^ {132}\) Guinea-Bissau presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005 and has not revised them since.\(^ {135}\)

In 2008, no progress was identified in achieving any of the 11 objectives presented. The main reasons for this lack of progress continued to be a lack of funds and national capacity. Other obstacles identified were a lack of awareness among governments (both the national government and other members of the international community) and the number of competing priorities for assistance in the country.\(^ {136}\)

Guinea-Bissau included a VA expert on its delegation to the intersessional meetings of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in 2008 and meetings of States Parties from 2006–2008. In 2007 and 2008 the expert was a survivor, who was unable to attend the meetings in 2009 due to visa problems and poor health.\(^ {137}\) Guinea-Bissau reported on progress and challenges in implementing VA activities at the intersessional meetings in 2005, 2006, and 2008 and at every meeting of States Parties since 2006. Because of the lack of progress achieved, much of the information provided in updates has related to the WHO project implemented from 2004–2006. Guinea-Bissau used voluntary Form J in its annual Article 7 report to provide details on VA activities in 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009 although the annual objectives for VA included in the report have been the same since 2006.\(^ {138}\)

**Victim assistance activities**

In 2008, the CAD, run by the national NGO ANDES, provided prosthetics to two landmine survivors.\(^ {139}\) Production overall at CAD in 2008 was 50% lower than in 2007.\(^ {140}\) The ICRC SFD, which has supported CAD since 2004, agreed in 2008 to cover the entire treatment cost for 144 war-disabled people, including the cost of prosthetics, transportation, and accommodation.

\(^{130}\) Ibid.


\(^{132}\) Interview with César de Carvalho, CAAMI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

\(^{133}\) Ibid.


\(^{138}\) Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009) Form J; Article 7 Report (for the period April 2007 to April 2008), Form J; and Article 7 Report (for the period 30 April 2005 to 30 April 2006), Form J.

\(^{139}\) Email from Irene Laval, CAAMI, 30 March 2009.

It is unknown how many of these were landmine/ERW survivors. Because of “disappointing implementation rate of mutually agreed upon recommendations,” the ICRC decided to terminate its support to CAD at the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{141}

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Guinea-Bissau.

National support for mine action

No national funding for mine action was reported by Guinea-Bissau in 2008, nor was any national funding reported in 2007.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, four countries reported providing $1,694,882 (€1,150,945) to mine action in Guinea-Bissau. Reported mine action funding in 2007 included allocations totaling €1.4 million ($1,919,540 at 2007 exchange rates) for which actual disbursements took place in 2008. As a result, comparisons of 2007 and 2008 funding levels are not valid.

\textbf{2008 International Mine Action Funding to Guinea-Bissau: Monetary}\textsuperscript{142}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$189,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Cleared Ground</td>
<td>Roving EOD team</td>
<td>$345,930 (NOK1,950,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Mine clearance, capacity-building</td>
<td>$280,957 (£151,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>HUMAID, Cleared Ground</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance, small arms and light weapons and EOD destruction and mechanical equipment field testing</td>
<td>$878,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,694,882 (€1,150,945)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{142} Emails from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DFID, 17 March 2009; Stacy Bernard Davis, Public Engagement, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 26 August 2009; and Reuben McCarthy, UNDP, 26 August 2009.
INDONESIA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 August 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 4 (stockpile destruction)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 August 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Completed: 13 November 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Occasional ERW or IEDs; no mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>Seven (2007: eight)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Indonesia signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997, but did not ratify it until February 2007, citing difficult national circumstances. It participated in Mine Ban Treaty meetings throughout the period and supported the annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution. Indonesia completed destruction of its stockpile of 11,603 antipersonnel mines in November 2008, far in advance of its deadline. There have been a small number of reports of the use of homemade mines and booby-traps by non-state armed groups. Indonesia has declared no known or suspected mined areas since becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor identified at least 52 casualties due to mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) since 2001. No mine/ERW risk education has taken place in Indonesia despite ERW and IED incidents in Aceh province. Access to disability services was limited due to the centralization of services in major cities.

Mine Ban Policy

Indonesia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 20 February 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 August 2007. Indonesia submitted its second Article 7 report on 17 April 2009.²

Indonesia states that its Emergency Law No. 12/1951 on Fire Arms and Explosives provides for the imposition of penal sanctions as required by the treaty.³ In March 2009, a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that the ministry has raised the possibility of new implementation legislation specifically for the Mine Ban Treaty in inter-agency meetings, but there is no progress yet in that direction.⁴ Other officials said they did not expect the need for such legislation to be considered until after parliamentary and presidential elections in April and June 2009.

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¹ On the UN website, the Article 7 report is marked as submitted on 17 April 2009. The report itself has a date of January 2008 on its cover. The report covers calendar year 2008. Indonesia’s initial Article 7 report was submitted 21 January 2008.
² Article 7 Report, Form A, 17 April 2009. The law was appended to Indonesia’s initial Article 7 report and provides either the death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a maximum of 20 years for the import, transfer, receiving, acquiring, possession, ownership, transportation, hiding, bringing, use or export of firearms, munitions, or explosives, including mines.
³ Email from Andy Rachmianto, Deputy Director, Directorate for International Security and Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 2009.
⁴ Interview with Luna Amanda Fahmi, Desk Officer for Disarmament Affairs, and Riando Sembiring, Assistant to the Deputy Director, Directorate for International Security and Disarmament, Department of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 12 March 2009.
Indonesia participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it was named co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction for the next year. During the session on stockpile destruction, Indonesia made a surprise announcement that it had completed the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, nearly three years ahead of its deadline. Indonesia also made a general statement regarding mine clearance extension requests, a statement in support of Thailand’s extension request, and a statement during the session on Mine Ban Treaty universalization.

Indonesia participated in the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, from 1–3 April 2009, the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the treaty’s Second Review Conference.

In response to questions from Landmine Monitor regarding issues of implementation and interpretation related to Articles 1 and 2 that have been under discussion by other States Parties, a senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated, “Since the APL [antipersonnel landmines] Convention is banning all types of APL (total ban), transit is also an activity that is prohibited under the Convention.”

Indonesia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Indonesia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not ratified as of 1 July 2009.

Production, use, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

Indonesia’s Article 7 report confirmed that it did not have any production facilities for antipersonnel mines. Indonesia stated in the past that it has never used antipersonnel mines.

On 26 November 2008, Indonesia announced to States Parties that it had finished its stockpile destruction obligation on 13 November when it destroyed the last of 11,603 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. It also stated that it was retaining 4,978 mines for training purposes.

Indonesia reported destroying 709 PMRS, Honckin, and K-440 mines on 12 February 2008 in Garut, West Java; 758 PMA-1 and PMRS mines on 7 August 2008 in Lumajang, East Java; 539 PMA-1 mines in Madura, East Java on 7 August 2008; 80 PMA-1 and Armadila mines on 11 November 2008 in Medan, North Sumatra; 18 K-440 and MK-1 mines on 12 November 2008 in Ketawang, Central Java; and a final destruction of 9,499 PMA-1 and PMRS mines in Batujajar, West Java, on 13 November 2008.

The 4,978 mines retained for training purposes are under the control of the Directorate General of Defense Strength in the Department of Defense. Indonesia reported retaining 2,531 PMA-1 mines, 1,500 PMRS mines, and 947 K-440 directional fragmentation mines.

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6 Email from Andy Rachmianto, Department of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 2009. Other comments did not illuminate Indonesia’s views on the interpretive issues under discussion. It simply stated that Indonesia “has been and will continue to conduct joint military exercises with some friendly countries not party” to the Mine Ban Treaty, and that the treaty “only covers anti-personnel mines not any other mines.”
8 Article 7 Report, Form E, 17 April 2009.
9 Statement of Indonesia, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 18 November 2007. There have been conflicting reports about mine use by Indonesian forces in West Papua in 1961–1962 and in East Timor in the 1970s. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 452–453.
11 Article 7 Report, Form F, 17 April 2009. In Form G, Indonesia reports that the 11,603 destroyed mines also included 78 Kayu mines and nine BG M35 mines. In total, Indonesia reports destroying 9,828 Yugoslav PMA-1; 1,612 Yugoslav PMRS; 78 Russian Kayu; 32 Korean K-440; 26 Yugoslav Armadila; 10 Yugoslav Honckin; 9 Belgian BG M35; and 8 Indian MK I. The nomenclature for several of the mines in Indonesia’s Article 7 report, such as the Kayu, Armadila, and Honckin, are not standard.
13 Article 7 Report, Form D, 17 April 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 430. The K-440s are “Claymore” type mines that are permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty when used in command-detonated mode (usually electric detonation), but are prohibited when used in victim-activated mode (usually with tripwires). The ICBL has asked States Parties to report on steps taken to ensure Claymore-type mines cannot be used in command-detonated mode.
Indonesia did not provide specific details on how the mines will be used, but stated that they will be used as “instruction/teaching materials” to enhance the identification, detection and destruction of landmines “in general, particularly for the purpose of preparing Indonesia’s participation for UN peacekeeping operations.”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials indicated that the training program was still in the planning phase.

Scope of the Problem

Indonesia is not believed to be mine-affected but has a limited problem with ERW and victim-activated IEDs. It declared it had no mined areas in its initial Article 7 report.

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified seven new casualties due to two ERW incidents in Aceh province, including one caused by an unexploded victim-activated IED. In February, a 10-year-old boy was injured while playing with ERW. On 22 April, six men were injured in Lueng village, North-Aceh district when they mistook an IED for scrap metal. In 2007, eight casualties were reported. No casualties were reported in 2009 as of 31 March.

Between 2001 and 2008 Landmine Monitor identified 52 mine/ERW/IED casualties (12 killed and 40 injured) through media reports. Due to the lack of a casualty data collection mechanism and ongoing conflict, it is likely that the actual number of casualties is higher.

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown but at least 40. There are no specific services for mine/ERW/IED survivors. The Ministry of Social Welfare is responsible for social and economic reintegration services for persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Health is responsible for medical treatment and physical rehabilitation.

Between 1999 and 2008, access to medical care, physical rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration services for mine/ERW/IED survivors was limited due to the centralization of services in major cities and the remote locations of survivors. In 2005 and 2006, there was a small improvement in Aceh because of increased international disaster relief following the tsunami. There was no evidence of government efforts to improve services during this period.

In Ambon regency (Maluku province) and Aceh province, medical care for casualties is available in government centers, but decades of conflict have degraded the quality of services. Indonesia lacks adequately trained orthotic and prosthetic technicians. Basic psychosocial services are available through primary healthcare centers and specialized centers.

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14 Article 7 Report, Form D (1)(b), 17 April 2009.
15 Email from Andy Rachmianto, Department of Foreign Affairs, 23 March 2009; and interview with Luna Amanda Fahmi and Riando Sembiring, Department of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 12 March 2009.
24 Ibid.
Although Indonesian law prohibits discrimination and mandates accessibility, laws are not enforced and persons with disabilities face considerable discrimination.\textsuperscript{26} As of 8 May 2009, Indonesia had not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which it signed on 30 March 2007, nor had it signed the Optional Protocol.

**Support for Mine Action**

**International cooperation and assistance**

No international funding to Indonesia for mine action was reported to Landmine Monitor for 2008.

The Department of Foreign Affairs disclosed in 2008 that it planned to request foreign financial assistance for building a center in Jakarta to train troops for peacekeeping and in mine detection and clearance.\textsuperscript{27} Indonesia did not report on progress in mobilizing funds for the center in 2008.


\textsuperscript{27} Interview with Andy Rachmianto, Department of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta, 6 March 2008.
States Parties

IRAQ

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 February 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW including cluster munition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>No credible estimate for entire country; 1,730km² in 13 governorates (2006 Iraq Landmine Impact Survey results)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>15.74km² of battle areas 9.4km² of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>At least 134,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The government of Saddam Hussein did not engage in the global effort to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It used antipersonnel mines prior to the 2003 Coalition invasion, and also continued to produce mines until 2003 when its capacity was destroyed. Coalition forces did not use antipersonnel mines, but did use large numbers of cluster munitions. The Iraqi government that was subsequently formed became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 February 2008. Since 2003, there has been a dramatic increase in the use and sophistication of command-detonated improvised explosive devices by Iraqi insurgents, as well as some sporadic use of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

Since 2003, mine action in the north has continued steadily and attracted growing interest from commercial companies, but in the rest of Iraq efforts to configure an effective mine action response to extensive mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination have faltered as a result of the lack of security and a complex political environment. According to the UN, mine action activities in Iraq have not received the necessary attention and priority of the government.

Iraq has a significant number of mine/ERW casualties, but due to continuous conflict and a lack of data collection, the figures are unknown. Landmine Monitor identified more than 5,000 casualties occurring between 1999 and 2008.

Mine/ERW risk education (RE) has been conducted in the north since before 1999, and limited RE was conducted in the south by the ICRC and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society from 2001. In 2008, RE was adequate in the north, but remained inadequate in the center and south, and was implemented by NGOs and regional mine action centers with support from UNICEF.

Through its initial Article 7 report in 2008, Iraq declared being responsible for significant numbers of survivors, and therefore also having the greatest needs and expectations for assistance. It thus became the 26th State Party in the VA26 group, whose members have significant numbers of mine survivors and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors. Services for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities were limited in Iraq and varied regionally, with significantly more services and capacity in northern Iraq than elsewhere. Assistance to survivors was hampered
by years of conflict and sanctions, and deteriorated since 2003. No national victim assistance (VA) or disability strategies or coordination capacity existed, further exacerbating the situation.

**Mine Ban Policy**

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2008. Since 2004, government representatives indicated on many occasions that Iraq was favorably inclined toward the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^1\)

Iraq has not reported any national legal measures or implementation legislation for mine action. It is not known if new national implementation legislation is being pursued or if existing laws are considered adequate.\(^2\)


Iraq attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008 in Geneva where it made a statement on mine clearance. Iraq also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it made a statement on the status of implementation of Article 5 on mine clearance, highlighting its need for international cooperation and assistance to fulfill its obligations.

Iraq has not yet made its views known on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty that have been widely discussed by other States Parties. These issues include joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training.

Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It attended as an observer the Oslo Signing Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but has not yet signed the convention.\(^3\)

**Production, transfer, and stockpiling**

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 Coalition invasion. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign.\(^4\) In its initial transparency report in 2008, Iraq reported that the Al Qaqa Factory that “produced anti-personnel mines and anti-tank mines before the 2003 war…has been completely destroyed during the 2003 war and there is no intention from the side of the Iraqi Government to reconstruct this facility.”\(^5\) Landmine Monitor is not aware of any mine transfers from Iraq since the 1990s.

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2. In the report submitted in 2009, Article 7 report, Form A on national implementation measures is blank. In the report submitted in 2008, Form A only refers to the legal framework for mine action.


4. Landmine Monitor (HRW) interview with Mowafak Ayoub, Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 10 February 2004. Iraqi and US sources requesting anonymity indicated that the Alao’oa’a and Hutten factories in Alexandria and the Aloudisie factory in Al Youssfiz were destroyed. See *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 886–887, for details on previous production. In 2005, Landmine Monitor removed Iraq from its list of countries producing antipersonnel mines or reserving the right to produce them, following the destruction of Iraq’s production facilities and the government’s statements in support of banning antipersonnel mines.

5. Article 7 Report, Form E, 31 July 2008. The report also states: “The PMN Anti-Personnel mine was produced in this factory. Shortly before the war of 2003 however, a defect in these mines resulted in restricting the use of these mines. As far as can be determined, the stocks of these mines in military ammunition dumps have been dealt with by the US Corps of Military Engineering Conventional Munitions Destruction Project. Iraq also developed the capacity to produce Valmara 69 mines but apparently this capacity was never used to physically produce Valmara mines.”
Iraq’s treaty deadline for destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 February 2012. Iraq did not include any information on stockpiles or destruction in its Article 7 report submitted in May 2009. In its initial Article 7 report, Iraq stated that it did not hold stockpiles of antipersonnel mines and that “this matter will be further investigated and if required, corrected in the next report.” It also said, “If such stockpiled [antipersonnel mines] APMs are identified during further investigation of the matter, appropriate plans will be developed for the destruction of such and it will be reported in the next Article 7 Report.” Landmine Monitor has previously noted that Iraq was believed to stockpile, at some point, mines manufactured by Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union, and the United States, in addition to Iraqi-manufactured mines.

From May 2008 to July 2009, according to Coalition press releases and local media reports, Iraqi forces recovered at least 41 antipersonnel mines in weapons caches. More than 1,800 “landmines” and “mines,” type unknown, were also reported to have been recovered by Iraqi forces, as well as more than 300 antivehicle and Claymore-type mines. The Central, Northern, and Baghdad Multi-National Divisions were also reported to have recovered antipersonnel, antivehicle, Claymore, and unidentified mines. The jurisdiction over and arrangements for antipersonnel mines collected by multinational forces is not clear. The Iraqi government has not reported on these recovered mines or their destruction in its Article 7 reports.

In November 2008, the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program ended after destroying more than 822,980 kg of munitions from more than 100 weapons storage facilities of the Saddam Hussein regime and 10,000 smaller caches reportedly created shortly before the 2003 invasion. An unknown number of landmines were among the weapons destroyed. According to a November 2005 American Forces Press Service (AFPS) news article, a total of 410,000 mines captured in Iraq and another 100,000 mines shipped to Iraq from the US were used to help blow up other weapons. The type of mine (antipersonnel or antivehicle) was not specified.

**Mines retained for research and training**

In its initial Article 7 report, Iraq indicated it was retaining 1,234 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, it appears to indicate that 297 mines are retained. The change in number is not explained.

Iraq reported that for the period from 1 August to 31 December 2008, the NGO Mines Advisory Group (MAG) retained 288 antipersonnel mines for “training and as targets during clearance operations and possible use as donor charges.” Of these, the report noted that 36 PMN mines were retained.

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8 Iraq’s Article 7 report contains a blank form on stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Article 7 Report, Form B, 8 May 2009.
9 Ibid, Form F. Landmine Monitor had previously noted that the size of Iraq’s mine stockpile will be difficult to determine, given the dispersal of ammunition storage areas around the country. Mines and a full range of ammunition were dispersed to storage locations across the country and subsequently abandoned as the Iraq army disintegrated after the March 2003 invasion.
10 Ibid.
retained by MAG were “buried in the MDD [mine detection dog] training and accreditation area at Chamchamal.” UNDP also retained nine mines for training. The Ministry of the Environment/Regional Mine Action Center was reported to have transferred and destroyed 153 retained antipersonnel mines. Iraq did not report on any mines retained by the Ministry of Interior or the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), which it had previously listed as retaining antipersonnel mines in its initial Article 7 report.

Use

In the ongoing armed conflict, there have been no reports of new mine-laying by Iraqi government military forces. There have never been confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by Coalition forces.

Non-state armed groups

Despite documented cases of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines between May 2008 and 1 July 2009, Landmine Monitor found no confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by the insurgency. In April 2009, a US soldier died when reportedly a mine detonated near him during combat operations near Baghdad. The type of mine was not known nor whether it was recently placed. Civilians continue to be killed by mines laid in previous years (see Casualties section below).

Insurgent forces have used command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in large numbers. An IED that is victim-activated—one that explodes on contact by a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated—where the user decides when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been frequently referred to in media reports as “landmines.”

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Iraq is massively affected by landmines and ERW, the result of internal conflicts, the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War (first Gulf War), and the conflict that has continued since the 2003 invasion by the US-led Coalition. Since then, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other IEDs on civilians, the military, and the police indicate the huge amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. Much of this AXO has subsequently been plundered and is assisting ongoing insurgencies. A joint report by UNICEF and UNDP issued in 2009 observed that the task of clearance “might take decades to complete.”

The first phase of the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented in 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in 2004–2006 and published in August 2007, found 1,622 communities affected by 3,673 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 1,730km² of land. Five governorates could not be surveyed because of insecurity. Moreover, there is substantial contamination in uninhabited areas or areas that were depopulated in the course of recent wars: this is not reported in the ILIS which was based on community interviews.

15 Ibid, 8 May 2009. MAG holds 12 types (40 PMN; 2 SB 33; 2 M14; 12 V69; 1 VST; 121 VS-50; 61 Type 72; 40 TS 50; 4 PSM 1; 1 PRBM 413; 1 VAR 40; and 3 POMZ.)
16 Article 7 Report, Form D, 8 May 2009.
17 Ibid. The Ministry of Environment/Regional Center of the South transferred and destroyed 149 VS-50 and 4 M14 mines.
18 As of July 2009, only the US maintained foreign armed forces in Iraq. US forces will remain in Iraq until 2011 under a status of forces agreement between the US and Iraq. The agreement contains no references to Iraq’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, for example, reporting on antipersonnel mines stockpiled or seized by the US forces, and disposition of seized mines. “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq,” ratified version, 17 November 2008.
Preliminary results of a second phase of the ILIS covering the remaining five governorates, which started in 2008 and was still continuing in September 2009, indicate that of nearly 3,000 communities visited, only 86 remain contaminated (see Identification of hazardous areas below). More than 1,000 communities were previously affected, but contamination has been cleared by local actors, military forces, and/or humanitarian mine action implementers.22

Border minefields alone have been estimated by one source to total an area of 6,370km².23 Iraq’s initial Article 7 report states that Iraqi forces emplaced more than 18 million mines on the border with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war and another one million mines ahead of both the first Gulf War and the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq.24

Types of contamination and impact vary significantly between regions. The northern Kurdish governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah comprise one of the world’s most heavily mine-contaminated areas, particularly along borders with Iran and Turkey and along the Green Line—the former frontline between Kurdish forces and former President Saddam Hussein’s army. All three governorates also suffer from UXO contamination.

South-central Iraq is particularly affected by cluster munition remnants and unexploded air and ground ordnance. In the First Gulf War alone, US-led forces dropped 15 million submunitions and the failure rate of the cluster munitions used is unknown.25 The 2003 invasion resulted in extensive further contamination along the routes followed in the advance on Baghdad.

Other governorates bordering Iran also have minefields dating from the 1980–1988 war and some newer mines were laid by Saddam Hussein’s army on the border with Saudi Arabia before the 2003 invasion in Muthanna governorate. However, many villages in these areas are abandoned.26

**Casualties**27

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 263 new casualties due to mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs in Iraq, including 81 people killed, 159 injured, and 23 of unknown status.28 Of these casualties, 39 were recorded by the General Directorate of Mine Action (GDMA), 42 by IKMAA, and 46 by the Kurdish Organization for Rehabilitation of the Disabled (KORD) in northern Iraq, and the rest (136) were identified through media monitoring, including by the NGO Iraq Body Count. Under-reporting is certain, as there is no systematic casualty data collection, particularly in southern and central Iraq.

At least 139 of the casualties were civilian, seven deminers, 47 security forces, and 70 unknown. Men were the largest casualty group (147, 84 civilians), 41 casualties were children (10 boys, remainder unknown), and nine were women. For the remainder, age and gender information was unknown. Some 45% of casualties were caused by ERW (118, including four cluster submunitions casualties), mines caused 106 casualties (including five due to antipersonnel mines), and victim-activated IEDs caused 39 casualties. Incidents were recorded in 12 governorates. Since there is no data collection mechanism in southern or central Iraq, most casualties were recorded in northern Iraq: 59 in Sulaymaniyah, and 42 in Erbil and Dahuk. KORD also recorded 19 casualties from

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22 Email from Joe Donahue, Chief Executive Officer, iMMAP, 9 September 2009.
28 Due to the lack of detail and standard terminology in media articles, many incidents were excluded. Unspecified landmines were only included when sufficient detail was available to exclude remote-detoned attacks; IEDs were only considered victim-activated when a person triggered the explosion, for example by stepping on it or by touching it. A common and gruesome tactic is to attach IEDs to corpses or emplace IEDs in houses which explode when a person enters the house.
Diyala and 19 additional casualties were recorded in booby-trapped houses in Diyala. When known, the most common activities at the time of the incident were security/military (46), traveling (38) handling devices (31), and tending animals (20).

Almost all casualties of victim-activated devices identified in 2008 were Iraqi (261), while one was a US soldier and one an Israeli volunteer in the US Army. IEDs caused numerous casualties among foreign troops but most IED incidents were caused by remote-detonated devices. For example, 124 US military were killed by IEDs as reported on the US Department of Defense website in 2008.

The 2008 casualty rate is an increase compared to 2007 when 216 casualties were recorded (101 killed, 114 injured, and one unknown). This increase is partly due to improved casualty data collection in northern Iraq and the increased level of detail in records compiled by Iraq Body Count.

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009 with at least 45 casualties to 16 June 2009 (17 killed, 24 injured, and four unknown). Of these, the GDMA recorded seven, IKMAA 11, and KORD five; the others were identified through Landmine Monitor media monitoring. At least 42 of the casualties were civilian, including 23 children. Two casualties were deminers and one was a US soldier. All were Iraqis except the US soldier. ERW caused 23 casualties, mines 21, and one casualty was caused by a victim-activated IED. At least 16 casualties were caused while playing (all children). Additionally, three Iraqis were injured by an antipersonnel mine while trying to cross the buffer zone in Cyprus.

Ten-year summary

According to the 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report, there are “no reliable nation-wide figures” for the number of mine/ERW casualties in Iraq. Landmine Monitor analysis of the five National Mine Action Authority (NMMAA) databases in August 2007 showed there were approximately 21,492 records entered since 2001 (including casualties occurring before this time). These figures are incomplete, particularly since 2003, as only one database was kept updated in 2004–2005 after which data entry stopped. Most casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah governorate (12,573).

In its Article 7 report, Iraq noted that between 1991 and March 2008, 5,348 casualties were recorded in Sulaymaniyah (2,427 killed and 2,921 injured); 2,403 in Erbil (855 killed, 1,528 injured, and the status of the remainder is unknown); and 443 in Dahuk (209 killed and 234 injured). Nearly 60% of casualties (4,801) were caused by mines. However, the UN noted that, “These figures are only indicative… and there is a rather large number of victims that remain uncounted.” A UNICEF knowledge, attitudes, and practices study (KAP) in 2008, recorded 656 casualties since 2003 in the three northern governorates (46 killed and 610 injured).

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 5,184 casualties in Iraq, including 789 killed, 2,798 injured, and 1,597 unknown. A significant percentage of these were foreign troops, but the vast majority were probably Iraqi civilians. Most casualties occurred in 2003, as a result of conflict (2,192). The ILIS estimated that there were on average some 300 casualties per year.
Risk profile
People are at mainly at risk from landmines and UXO in the north, and mainly from cluster submunitions and UXO in the center and south. Most minefields in the north are marked, but those on the border, in areas where there is a security risk, and newly discovered minefields are not marked. Few areas in the rest of the country are marked. In urban areas people are at risk from AXO.

The ILIS found that the typical casualty was a male of productive age, killed or injured while tending animals or farming. The low incidence of tampering may be due to under-reporting. People are also at risk foraging for wood and plants, and fishing. Children help their families in this work. Shepherds traveling north to graze sheep are also at risk.

According to Danish Demining Group (DDG), in the south the risk has decreased due to behavior change, RE activities, and demining. In the south, common activities at the time of the incident are transferring explosives to cultivate the ground, grazing cattle, and scrap metal collection.

Socio-economic impact
Mines and UXO represent “an issue of national importance” that “endanger the overall state of Iraq’s national economy,” according to the 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report. The report states that: “With large areas of agricultural land, numerous oil and gas fields, and hundreds of infrastructure and public facilities sown with mines, riddled with cluster bomblets or unexploded mortar and bomb shells, these would first need to be cleared before sustainable economic development and diversification could take place on a large nation-wide scale.”

A specific example of economic activity and development blocked by mine/UXO contamination cited by Iraq includes exploration of the Rumailah oil fields, one of Iraq’s biggest oil reserves. In addition to oil and gas sector blockages, the 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report cites delays in construction of a water treatment plant in Basra which would permit the return of local communities to cultivate land as well as fishing by communities near the port of Fao. The report observes that mines and UXO prevent the return of internally displaced people (IDPs) and refugees to their communities, and “prevent the use of roads, water resources and residential areas.”

Affected communities are mostly rural, agricultural, and small. According to the ILIS, “The type of resource to which landmines and UXO block access are chiefly pasture and crop land, as well as in the north, scrubland used for firewood collection. In the south, irrigated farmland is an important asset type impacted by the contamination.” High-impacted communities make up 4% of those affected.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
Efforts to establish a new structure for mine action management and regulation continued in 2009. The NMAA, created in 2003 under the Ministry of Planning, had become inactive by 2007 and the government shut it down in June 2007. After discussion of whether a military or a
civilian ministry should take the lead in mine action, the government decided at the end of 2007 to place mine action under the Ministry of Environment, which took over in April 2008 and set up the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in place of the NMAA. The DMA is responsible for planning, accreditation, project coordination, prioritizing tasks, setting standards, quality assurance (QA), and managing a database. The DMA is supported by a Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) in Basra, which is intended to coordinate mine action in the south. However, the DMA’s development has been hampered by the lack of any regulatory framework establishing its mandate. A regulatory structure proposed by UNDP would provide for the creation of an Iraqi Higher Committee for Mine Action consisting of 20 deputy ministers from concerned ministries to act as a policy-making body, with the DMA functioning as the implementing body coordinating mine action.

In the meantime, Iraq’s security ministries, including the ministries of defense, interior, and state security affairs have also asserted the need for security screening of organizations and personnel engaging in mine action as part of the accreditation process. As of August 2009, the DMA had forwarded documents submitted by demining organizations to the Ministry of Defense but had received no feedback.

Mine action in the northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah continues to function semi-autonomously under the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority and the General Directorate of Mine Action. Both organizations accredit operators in their area of responsibility. The KRG passed a law merging IKMAA and the GDMA in April 2007 but the merger had not taken place as of August 2009, although there is said to be ongoing coordination and cooperation.

Risk education

The DMA is responsible for the management of RE, and has an RE officer. However, UNICEF remained the de facto coordinating body in 2008, and also worked on capacity-building of the DMA with the aim of gradually handing over RE to the government by the end of 2010. There is no coordination between the DMA and the two mine action centers in the north.

The RMAC in the south has one RE officer and covers Basra, Muthanna, Maysan, and Thi Qar governorates. It held coordination meetings in 2008 with agriculture and civil defense directorates, DDG, the national NGO Rafidain Demining Organisation (RDO), and the Iraqi Red Crescent Societies. IKMAA and the GDMA organize quarterly coordination meetings attended by representatives of the KRG’s Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, GDMA, MAG, ICRC, UNDP, and UNICEF. In addition there are weekly mine action meetings of all sectors in the north.

52 Email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 8 April 2008.
53 Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.
54 Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.
55 Email from Jilan al-Qurainy, RMAC, 12 May 2009.
56 Ibid.
57 Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.
58 Email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.
59 Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009 and email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.
60 Ibid.
61 Email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.
The DMA developed an RE plan for 2008 that it shared during a UNICEF and government annual workplan meeting for 2008. However, in practice it was not implemented and all organizations worked separately, with the result that some areas were over-resourced while other areas were not covered.

UNICEF provides technical support to the DMA and partners. An RE/VA study tour to Cambodia took place in September 2008, with the participation of 12 staff from the national authorities and NGOs, to learn about the roles and responsibilities of a national coordination body, working with communities, prioritization of activities, and coordination.

RE operators use national RE standards and curriculum (2005 version) and modify them to meet their needs. The planned review of national standards did not happen in 2008, but was to take place in 2009.

Victim assistance
In principle, the DMA is in charge of coordinating VA at the national level and has had a VA director since 2006 but very few VA activities have originated from the national level. Coordination between the DMA and relevant government bodies was limited and unsatisfactory. There was also limited coordination between regional and national levels.

In northern Iraq, both the GDMA and IKMAA were actively involved in coordinating and monitoring VA activities. Although they have not yet merged, they coordinate regularly. VA activities are carried out in coordination with the regional Ministry of Health. Coordination and information-sharing between the KRG, GDMA, IKMAA, and NGOs was sufficient. At IKMAA, the VA officer position was open from October 2008 to the end of June 2009, slowing down activities. In southern Iraq, a new VA manager was recruited for the RMAC in 2009. There was coordination with DMA and with the local health authorities, but not with other regional mine action centers or NGOs.

At the national level, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs are responsible for disability issues. The Ministry of Health’s Higher Committee for Physical Rehabilitation is responsible for the health and physical rehabilitation sectors, but this committee does not meet regularly. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for socio-economic reintegration issues.

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62 Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.
63 Email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009; email from Nige Rees and Hussam Falah, DDG, 16 March 2009; and email from Ahmed Zubeidi, Director, IHSCO, 20 April 2009.
64 Email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009; email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.
65 Email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009; email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.
66 Email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009; email from Nige Rees and Hussam Falah, DDG, 16 March 2009; email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009; email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009; and email from Ahmed Zubeidi, IHSCO, 20 April 2009.
67 Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.
72 Email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 24 June 2009.
73 Email from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 27 May 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Faiq A. Jumaa, RMAC, 19 August 2009.
74 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Faiq A. Jumaa, RMAC, 19 August 2009.
Data collection and management

The DMA operates a database using an older version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which is due to be upgraded to the latest version (V.5) in 2010. The database includes all data from the ILIS and records of mine action. Clearance results in southern Iraq are recorded by RMAC and then passed to the DMA. Data from operations in the north is entered into IKMAA and GDMA databases. A Technical Advisor (TA) from Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP) has supported the DMA and IKMAA since 2007. The TA, among other activities, supervised a clean-up of DMA and IKMAA data. As of 2009, no systematic data collection or unified casualty database existed in Iraq. Particularly in southern and central Iraq, casualty information was lacking. The DMA collects casualty information in an ad hoc manner, by attempting to verify incidents when reported in the media. There is no systematic cooperation on data collection with relevant ministries, although cooperation between the DMA and the Ministry of Health reportedly improved in 2009. Some information was contained in the EpilInfo database at the DMA, but it was not updated and needed more involvement from the DMA’s VA department, which lacked capacity.

RMAC started coordinating with the health directorates in Basra and Muthanna, the general hospitals in Basra and Maysan, and the Basra Prosthetics Center to collect casualty information. No NGOs in the south collected casualty information. In northern Iraq, the regional mine action authorities and operators continued to collect reliable data and share it. The casualty surveillance project started in 2006 in cooperation between UNDP, UNICEF, and the World Health Organization (WHO), with the Ministry of Health as implementing partner, was not fully functional as of 2009. A pilot project was completed in three areas, but the results and the project needed evaluation before continuing. Verification and unification of five defunct databases handed over to the DMA was completed for clearance and contamination and mostly entered into IMSMA as of June 2009, but the casualty records remained untouched. RE activities are not yet recorded in IMSMA at the DMA or RMAC as they do not have the capacity. UNICEF maintains reports of activities implemented by its partners. IKMAA teams and MAG enter their activity records into the IKMAA IMSMA database, while the GDMA and its partners enter data into their own database.

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78 Telephone interview with Joe Donahue, iMMAP, 19 August 2009; and email from Joe Donahue, 9 September 2009.
79 Article 7 Report, Form J, 8 May 2009.
80 Interview with Essa Rahim al-Fayadh, Director-General, DMA, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
81 Email from Richard Shdeed, Information Management and GIS Officer, iMMAP, 5 June 2009.
82 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fa’iq A. Jumaa, RMAC, 19 August 2009.
83 Email from Soran Majeed, GDMA, 15 June 2009; and email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 24 June 2009.
85 Email from Richard Shdeed, iMMAP, 10 June 2009.
86 Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009; and email from Jilan al-Qurainy, RMAC, 12 May 2009.
87 Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.
88 Email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.
### Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basra Prosthetics Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diana Prosthetic Limbs Center Erbil</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDMA</td>
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<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKMMA</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Iraq armed forces</td>
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<td>Iraq Mine and UXO Clearance Organization</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>KORD</td>
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<td>Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center Dahuk</td>
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<td>RDO</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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<tr>
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<td>ICRC</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>RONCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Plans

**Strategic mine action plan**

In June 2009, the DMA started drafting a plan for mine action in consultation with the ministries of defense and interior. The DMA expected to submit the draft to government ministries to review data and then provide input on their priorities. The plan was intended to provide the basis for mine action over the next two to three years, allowing time for the preparation of a comprehensive strategic plan in 2011.89

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A draft plan for 2010–2012 prepared by UNDP sets out a vision of “an Iraqi society free from the fear and impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war” and identifies clearance priorities as agricultural land, oil fields, power lines, roads and railway lines.\(^90\)

**Victim assistance**

In 2009, the DMA with support from UNDP was in the process of developing a mine action strategy. It was said that this strategy would be a general framework document, which would contain some objectives for VA but subsequent specific action plans would need developing.\(^91\)

The DMA noted in May 2009 that a high-level meeting on VA involving experts, ministries, and NGOs would be held “in the near future” to discuss VA requirements under the Mine Ban Treaty, the current status of services, ways to solve gaps, and roles and responsibilities.\(^92\) No date or agenda for the meeting was set, and it appeared that not all stakeholders were aware of these efforts.\(^93\) One main challenge was said to be that the government does not have “a strategizing culture.”\(^94\)

**Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development**

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report noted that the National Development Strategy mentioned mine action only once, and then only with the phrase “accelerating demining actions.”\(^95\) The report also noted that mine action was not mentioned at all in the International Compact with Iraq launched in May 2007 to provide a partnership with international donors and development agencies, despite UNDP urging attention to the sector. The report concluded, “It is not surprising, therefore, that some international donors overlooked Mine Action activities altogether when making their decisions on how to best support the development of Iraq.”\(^96\)

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report stated that, despite the size of the challenge posed by mines and ERW to Iraq’s recovery, “little attention has been given to unexploded ordnance and mines within and outside the country. Consequently, a very limited national capacity exists to tackle the issue and the large number of injuries caused by it.”\(^97\) The report expressed concern that mine action in Iraq had not received the necessary attention and priority of the government: “Consequently, the issue of landmines and unexploded ordnance is not fully integrated into and supported by key government strategic documents and policies. This lack of attention has resulted in limited support for a long-term and comprehensive approach to the issue.”\(^98\)

In northern Iraq, the mine action centers have sufficient capacity and have benefited from the continuous support provided by the UNDP program specialist and UNICEF.\(^99\) The KRG has gradually increased its interest and involvement in VA since 2006 and was said to have adequate capacity to address VA/disability issues.\(^100\) The KRG provided some funding to VA but this needed to be supplemented by international funding so as not to endanger service provision, which was adequate overall.\(^101\) The main obstacle was the lack of a strategy and disability

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\(^91\) Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

\(^92\) Interview with Essa Rahim al-Fayadh, DMA, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and email from Richard Shdeed, iMMAP, 5 June 2009.

\(^93\) Email from Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 9 July 2009.

\(^94\) Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.


\(^96\) Ibid, p. 9.

\(^97\) Ibid, p. 4.

\(^98\) Ibid, p. 18.

\(^99\) HI, Voices from the Ground: Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War Survivors Speak Out on Victim Assistance, Brussels, 2 September 2009, p. 131; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 453.

\(^100\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009.

\(^101\) Ibid; and interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
legislation to guide the KRG in properly assessing the resources needed. For RMAC, the new VA manager appeared to be active, but was dependent on guidance from the national level, which was lacking.

In early 2008, a component to reform Iraq’s physical rehabilitation sector was added to the World Bank-funded Emergency Disability Project (EDP). The reform was to include policy development and the establishment of a multi-sectoral disability working group headed by the Ministry of Health, but the reform was shelved in November 2008 due to a lack of institutional capacity at the ministry. The EDP project is financed by a US$16.8 million ($11.4 million) World Bank grant. VA/mine action operators were not involved in or aware of activities under this project.

Few NGOs were active on VA/disability, particularly in southern and central Iraq, and their capacities were weak. NGOs working on VA in the north since the 1990s have sufficient capacity to carry out VA/disability activities, but depend on fluctuating funding. Disabled people’s organizations were often linked to political factions, had insufficient knowledge to implement activities, and did not coordinate with each other.

National management

Iraq is creating national structures for management of mine action but lacks the human resources and a regulatory framework in which to operate. The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report concluded the DMA and the regional centers, “were unable to coordinate, plan and strategize Mine Action at the national level. They could not advocate for a prioritisation of Mine Action in the development strategies and plans of the country.”

External advisors

UNDP provides technical advice and capacity-building support through an advisor based in Amman, Jordan, supported by four national technical advisors in Iraq. RONCO has two expatriate technical advisors with the DMA assisting accreditation and planning and any other issues by request. iMMAP provides data management support to the DMA and other government offices as requested, working with five expatriate staff (and around 50 nationals).

National mine action legislation

There is no national mine action legislation in place. The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report noted that development and implementation of mine action standards had been hindered by the absence of a legal framework for mine action. According to the report, the lack of government attention to mine action has “caused a situation where a number of critical reconstruction projects are on hold due to the fact that available resources are only a fraction of what is needed. At the same time there is no regulatory framework for the possible contracting of commercial demining operators.”

102 Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009; and Soran Majeed, GDMA, 21 July 2009.
111 Telephone interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 21 August 2009.
112 Email from Lance Height, Program Manager, RONCO, 12 August 2009.
113 Telephone interview with Joe Donahue, iMMAP, 19 August 2009.
115 Ibid.
National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

The NMAA drafted 29 national standards based on the International Mine Action Standards in 2006, but these never received government approval. Iraq’s first Article 7 report said that with the formation of a new national mine action authority the process for approving these standards would be reactivated.  

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

In addition to the Iraqi army and Coalition forces, demining was conducted in 2008 by three international and two Iraqi NGOs, commercial demining operators, and IKMAA. Among NGO operators, MAG and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) were working in the north, the Iraqi Mine and UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO) worked mainly in central Iraq, and DDG and RDO worked in the south.  

Kurdish commercial companies coordinated by the GDMA included Ararat, Araz Mahmood Maroof, Asa, Chamy Rezan, Khabat, and the Arabian Gulf Mine Clearance Organization reportedly undertook tasks in south central Iraq.  

The Iraqi army had 10 divisions, each with one company that conducted mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). The Iraqi army and police are mainly engaged in spot EOD and IED clearance tasks. Coalition forces also conduct EOD and IED clearance for force protection purposes.  

Identification of hazardous areas

The ILIS, implemented by iMMAP with US Department of State funding, provided the first comprehensive national survey of mine/ERW contamination but lack of security limited its completion to only 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates. Even within the 13 governorates completed, two districts and 346 other communities were omitted. In 2008, survey teams started survey of the other five governorates and as of mid-2009 had completed three. iMMAP expected to finish remaining areas, including areas on the border with Iran, by the end of 2009.  

In the first 13 governorates, the ILIS found contamination covering an estimated 1,730km² of land (776km² in the northern region, 12km² around Kirkuk, 87.6km² in the partially surveyed south-central region, and 854.5km² in the southern region). Although the survey found mine contamination was densest in the north, which had 3,024 SHAs (82% of the total), casualties were heaviest in the southern four governorates where most of the contamination was more recent and communities were less aware of the dangers of mines and ERW.  

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report commented that many hazardous areas and victims remained uncounted and called for “an urgent increased effort to gather information regarding the extent of land mine and explosive remnants of war contamination, as well as its implications and impact on the daily lives of the Iraqis and the country’s development.” According to the report, this “should include both the location of the contaminated areas and surveying the victims and their needs.”  

117 Iraq also reports “limited” and “erratic” clearance by contractors working on infrastructure projects, including work conducted by South Oil Company and Al Safsafa Company in Rumailah oil fields and by Al Khalij Al Arabi on the Basra-Al Shalamja railway line. Article 7 Report, Form F, 31 July 2008.
119 Email from Daniel Eriksson, E-Governance Advisor, UNDP, 14 April 2008.
120 Ibid.
121 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 444; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 442–443. Governorates surveyed were Babylon, Basrah, Duhok, Erbil, Kirkuk (Tameem), Maysan, Muthanna, Najaf, Qadisiya, Sulaymaniya, Dhi Qar, and Wasit.
122 Telephone interview with Joe Donahue, iMMAP, 19 August 2009; and email from Joe Donahue, 9 September 2009.
Demining and battle area clearance in 2008

Operators achieved higher productivity in 2008, with the amount of battle area cleared continuing at close to the same levels as in 2007 but nearly tripling the amount of mined area cleared to 9.4km² (from 3.7km² in 2007) while more than tripling the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed (to 22,000) and the number of UXO destroyed (to nearly 73,000).

Clearance rates will plunge in 2009, however, as a result of the suspension of clearance in all parts of Iraq—except the north—imposed by the Ministry of Defense with effect from 23 December 2008. The ministry halted operations on grounds of security and the need to vet personnel engaged by demining operators who would therefore have access to mines and/or explosive ordnance. The suspension remained in force as of August 2009. The ban halted work on 25 projects around Basra alone, according to media reports citing a UNDP technical advisor.

In northern Iraq, IKMAA had a total staff of 360 (58 permanent and 302 on contract) operating in 13 demining teams, two EOD teams, two general survey teams, six preliminary technical survey (PTS) teams, eight external QA teams, and two RE teams. The PTS teams were tasked with updating and refining data on known minefields with a view to defining resource needs for full clearance. The GDMA also coordinated and issued contracts for clearance to Kurdish commercial companies and similarly coordinated the work of international organizations in its area of operations.

MAG operated with a total of 11 expatriate and 850 national staff working in 19 mine action teams, eight small arms and light weapons teams, and 14 community liaison teams, backed by mechanical and mechanical support teams. MAG also acquired a mine detection dog (MDD) team of three dogs, which were accredited with the GDMA and assigned to work in Kirkuk governorate. It expected to expand its MDD capacity in 2009. In 2007, MAG operated in Duhuk, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninawa (Mosul), Salah ad Din, and Sulaymaniya governorates, and in 2008 expanded operations into areas of Diyala governorate. The teams handed over 33 former mined areas and 17 battle area clearance (BAC) tasks to local communities.

NPA had 80 staff working in 2008 with five multi-skilled teams conducting manual demining, BAC, EOD, and survey for land release. In addition to items cleared by its own teams, NPA destroyed 2,315 antipersonnel mines, 19 antivehicle mines, and 106 submunitions found by commercial companies. NPA reported that decisions on whether land could be cancelled, required sampling, or full clearance were taken in cooperation with a QA team from the GDMA and handover documents were signed by NPA, the GDMA, local authorities and the landowner. NPA decided to phase out its mine clearance program in 2009 and as of July had cut staff to 23.

IMCO was set up in 2003 with support from RONCO until it became financially independent from RONCO in August 2008 and started to receive funding direct from the US Department of State. By 2008, IMCO had 203 staff, including 88 conducting BAC and 20 for EOD. It also had seven MDDs and seven handlers. Major tasks undertaken in 2008 included clearing agricultural land in the Mukaseb and Hay Al Furat areas near Baghdad airport, the Wassit entry point on the border with Iran, and the Al Qanat nursery, also in the Baghdad area. IMCO planned to add another 40–50 staff by the end of 2009 and to use them for BAC, survey, and marking.

127 Email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 29 June 2009.
128 Email from Diyar Sadiq, Information Officer, GDMA, 23 August 2009.
129 Email from Meredith Wotten, Iraq Projects Manager, MAG, 9 June 2009.
130 Email from Sherko Rashid, Program Manager, NPA, 20 July 2009.
131 Email from John Lytle, RONCO, 25 July 2009.
RONCO continued to provide technical support to the DMA, with two technical advisors assisting planning and accreditation and on other issues as requested. It also continued to advise IMCO on all aspects of its operation. RONCO was also working in the north undertaking survey, clearance, and infrastructure support tasks for commercial companies.

DDG, based in Basra governorate, added 63 personnel in 2008 bringing its total to 115, who worked in five BAC and five EOD teams, three RE teams, and two teams each for survey and QA. With its new staff, DDG opened a new forward operating base on the outskirts of Nasiriyah to take on clearance operations in Dhi Qar governorate. In 2009, with the ban on clearance operations, teams were active conducting survey.

RDO, with a total of 82 staff, operated two BAC and two EOD teams in 2008 and in 2009 added two RE/community liaison teams that were expected to undertake post-clearance land use assessments. RDO had relied initially on DDG survey capacity but in 2009 also planned to reconfigure its resources to make up two survey teams.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>AXO destroyed</th>
<th>Area released by survey (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IKMAA</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>1,372</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>4,234</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>15,630</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,411</td>
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<td>2.00</td>
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<td>60</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>311</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>30,996</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>9.35</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,001</strong></td>
<td><strong>318</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.74</strong></td>
<td><strong>72,984</strong></td>
<td><strong>632</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.35</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Quality assurance/Quality control**
The DMA’s QA capacity is limited to desk evaluation of operators applying for accreditation. QA and quality control in field operations were undertaken internally by operators.

**Progress since becoming a State Party**
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018. Progress in mine clearance stalled, however, after the December 2008 ban by the Ministry of Defense on all clearance activities except those in the north.

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report expressed concern that mine action had not received enough attention and stated “at the current slow pace of demining operations, it is clear the goal of an ‘Iraq free of the impact of mines and unexploded ordnance’ will not be reached by the 2018 Mine

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132 Email from Lance Height, RONCO, 12 August 2009.
133 Email from Andrew Twigg, Program Manager, DDG, 19 July 2009.
135 Email from Andrew Twigg, DDG, 19 July 2009.
Ban Convention deadline.”138 UNICEF and UNDP emphasized that “it is clear that the current
demining capacities in Iraq are far from meeting the requirements of the Mine Ban Convention”
and called for “the urgent development of a nation-wide Mine Action Programme. This much-
needed capacity increase can only be met by inviting international de-mining organizations to
work in Iraq, as well as developing national Iraqi organizations and/or allocating and training
more military resources for this purpose.”139

Risk Education

RE in 2008 was conducted by national and international NGOs, IKMAA, and the GMDA. RE
coverage was fairly adequate in the north, and in Basra and Thi Qar. It was inadequate
in Maysan, Muthanna, Wasit, Karbala, and Qadisiyah governorates, as very few communities
were reached.140 In the remaining governorates no RE was reported. According to UNICEF,
community engagement remained very poor, which was not realized at the national level, hence
the few RE efforts in only a few areas.141

Risk reduction messages concentrated on informing people about the risk, threats, and safe
behavior in general. Both general and tailored messages were provided in 2008.142 In IKMAA’s
area of operations, activities were prioritized based on the size of the mine and ERW problem,
type of behavior and number of casualties.143 RE was also provided on request to oil and
construction companies.144

In the north, Handicap International (HI) conducted a KAP survey in 2008.145 It found that
general knowledge was good, with most people having participated in at least one RE session.
As a result of the school program, children were generally found to be more knowledgeable
about mine/ERW risks than adults. However, general attitude and practice was limited.146 It
recommended more evaluations of the impact of RE interventions, which it found had not
taken into account economic and cultural factors. It also recommended targeting high-impact
communities in Dahuk and Sulaymaniyyah, more community-based interventions, the use of risk
reduction activities (for example, the construction of wells), use of participatory rural appraisal
techniques and more innovative approaches, house-to-house RE to reach women, and peer-to-
peer education for children.147

In central Iraq, the Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO) conducted a second
needs assessment in an additional four governorates in central Iraq (Anbar, Baghdad, Salah ad
Din, and Babil).148 Bustan Association for Children’s Media and Culture (BACMA, formerly
Darastan Group for Child and Media) collected information in Baghdad for its project, mainly
case studies, and entered data into its own database. It found that children in Baghdad lack
correct knowledge about mine/ERW risks.149 With its mobile teams in the field, DDG gathered
information through RE sessions on dangerous areas, livestock, and cash crops, and used this to
prioritize teams’ deployment.150

139 Ibid.
140 Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.
144 Email from Mohammad Tahir, GDMA, 27 March 2009.
145 Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.
146 HI/UNICEF “Mine Risk Education Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) survey in Northern Iraq, impact
147 Ibid, pp. 79–80.
148 Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.
149 Email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009.
150 Email from Nige Rees and Hussam Falah, DDG, 16 March 2009.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDMA</td>
<td>Direct RE in communities, training forest police, commemorating awareness day, posting of billboards, summer programs for children, TV broadcasts, educational materials, and sending reports to clearance teams.</td>
<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
<td>112 villages, 900 forest police trained, summer school to 500 children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IKMAA</td>
<td>Mass media, direct RE, training of community members—religious leaders and teachers—and community liaison. RE teams reported discovered to EOD teams for destruction.</td>
<td>Dahuk and Erbil governorates</td>
<td>463 teachers. Direct RE 6,245 people in 196 communities. RE to 654 government and NGO staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Direct RE to nomads, shepherds, IDPs, and children. Training of teachers (in coordination with the Ministry of Education) and religious leaders, posting of billboards, distribution of leaflets at checkpoints, contamination data collection and community assessments.</td>
<td>Dahuk, Diyala, Erbil, Kirkuk, Ninawa, and Sulaymaniyah.</td>
<td>56,947 people; 2,352 teachers trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACMA</td>
<td>School awareness sessions and distribution of RE materials</td>
<td>Baghdad and Basra governorates</td>
<td>4,300 students in 21 primary schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense</td>
<td>RE in areas near fire stations</td>
<td>Southern governorates</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Direct RE and community liaison</td>
<td>Basra governorate</td>
<td>12,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Emergency RE in April 2008 — distribution of materials</td>
<td>Baghdad and Basra governorates</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHSCO/MAG</td>
<td>Training and emergency RE</td>
<td>5 governorates in the center and south</td>
<td>5,314 teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Red Crescent Society</td>
<td>Presentations, group discussions, distribution of materials.</td>
<td>15 governorates</td>
<td>39,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF in partnership with INTERSOS, Darstan, and IHSCO</td>
<td>School-based and community-based RE</td>
<td>Baghdad, Basra, Karbala, Maysan, Muthanna, Thi Qar, Wasit, and Qadisiya.</td>
<td>1,500 schools, 1,000 communities, 850 teachers, 150 community volunteers, 100 local NGOs and government officials, 800 child peer trainers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Both print and media materials were used. Some 60,000 copies of various information, education, and communication materials on RE have been distributed to key target groups throughout Iraq. An RE guidebook for schoolteachers was produced by IKMAA. Special materials were produced for shepherds travelling to the north.

UNICEF produced two TV spots for children in 2008, which were aired three times a week for six months on Spacetoons Arabic channel and provided to other partners.

The DMA does no RE monitoring, while RMAC, IKMAA, and the GDMA monitor their own activities. UNICEF monitors its projects with partners through regular progress reports, monitoring questionnaires, and through field visits by contracted facilitators. DDG has an internal monitoring system. IKMAA’s RE director monitored training of teachers and the work of IKMAA teams. MAG monitored the work of the teachers and religious leaders they trained to deliver RE.

RE has been conducted in Iraq for more than 10 years by several government bodies and international and national NGOs, with the support of UNICEF, but it has been severely affected by ongoing security problems, and has been inadequate. In the north, RE has been mainly conducted by MAG since before 1999, by the Kurdish Organization for Mines Awareness from 2000 to 2005, and then by IKMAA and the GDMA. It was conducted through direct presentations, training of teachers and religious leaders and community liaison. In the south, the ICRC and the Iraqi Red Crescent Society started conducting RE in 2001, reaching all 15 governorates in the center and south by the end of 2003, and RE activities are still carried out.

In 2003, emergency RE was implemented by several organizations, including HI with UNICEF in Baghdad, MAG in the north and south, INTERSOS in Basra, and UNICEF conducting mass media campaigns. But the security situation forced most international organizations to leave the center and south. IHSCO received support from MAG and HI to deliver direct RE and train trainers. In 2007, UNICEF started working with the ministries of education, and youth and sports to deliver RE.

The ILIS noted, “the significant number of communities whose key informants had a clear recollection of past [mine risk education] MRE and clearance events... suggests that this response has been active in many of those communities.”

The DMA (until 2008 the NMAA) has been responsible for coordinating RE since 2003, with technical support from UNICEF, MAG, and RONCO. However, by 2007 the status of the NMAA was unclear, and UNICEF became the de facto RE coordinator. Several national RE stakeholder workshops to develop needs assessments and strategies were held. Regular coordination meetings were also held in the north and Basra, but the security situation prevented coordination meetings in Baghdad. In 2006, UNICEF conducted a review of materials, which led to some revisions.

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Iraq is unknown, but is at least several thousand. Although conflict decreased in 2008, the number of war-disabled continued to grow as it was reported that 60% of hospital admissions were due to war-related injuries. The improved security situation resulted in little improvement in access to basic services, and the quality

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152 Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.
153 Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.
154 Email from Shanti Kaphle, UNICEF, 21 April 2009.
155 Ibid; and email from Ayoub Allain, BACMA, 31 March 2009.
156 Email from Nige Rees and Hussam Falah, DDG, 16 March 2009.
157 Email from Ako Aziz Hamad, IKMAA, 31 March 2009.
158 Email from Meredith Wotten, MAG, 11 August 2009.
159 MAG has conducted RE in the north since 1993; and email from Rob White, Director of Operations, MAG, 11 September 2009.
of services continued to erode.\textsuperscript{161} Assistance providers continued to be the target of attacks. Government bodies were only able to provide basic services.\textsuperscript{162}

The 2009 UNICEF/UNDP report noted that, “there is little doubt that a considerable number of victims of landmines and explosive remnants of war suffer from severe disabilities, poverty, unemployment, discrimination and stigmatization, negligence and deprivation of their basic rights across Iraq.”\textsuperscript{163} The UNICEF KAP study in three northern governorates in 2008 found that only 12% of survivors identified had received any form of assistance.\textsuperscript{164} The IHSCO found that in central and southern Iraq only 4% of survivors had received assistance and that services had been in continuous decline since 2003.\textsuperscript{165} Most persons with disabilities were cared for within the family network and 90% of them lived below the local poverty line.\textsuperscript{166}

In 2008, hospitals still often lacked medicines, equipment, suitable infrastructure, and experienced staff.\textsuperscript{167} It was estimated that some 75% of medical staff have left Iraq while demand increased, particularly in rural areas where most mine/ERW casualties occur and health professionals “are almost completely absent.”\textsuperscript{168}

Government or NGO-operated physical rehabilitation centers are available in major cities, but in 2008, the ICRC reported that a low level of services was provided not because “the national capacity is overwhelmed” but rather because “patients are not coming to existing structures.”\textsuperscript{169} This was due to the risk and cost of traveling, ethnic tensions, and a lack of information about services. In 2008, 17 centers were operating, including a newly-built center in Fallujah.\textsuperscript{170} Many centers needed international support (mostly from the ICRC) and services remained more accessible in northern Iraq, where many services are operated by local NGOs with government and international funding.\textsuperscript{171}

War and insecurity have had a major impact on mental health, but psychosocial care is stigmatized and only provided in hospitals in the main cities and by some NGOs, particularly in northern Iraq.\textsuperscript{172} Unemployment remained high in Iraq, and economic reintegration opportunities for persons with disabilities were limited and they faced discrimination. In northern Iraq, more constant support for NGOs providing economic reintegration opportunities has helped improve the living standard of program beneficiaries, resulting in a “dramatic decrease” of disabled beggars on the streets. The programs remained limited, however, and the GDMA estimated that only some 20% of those needing urgent assistance had received it during 2005–2009.\textsuperscript{173}

The Ministry of Health managed six rehabilitation centers and facilitated the procurement of equipment to eight centers in 2008. It also operated three “disability centers,” which facilitated capacity-building of rehabilitation staff (all under a World Bank Project) and provided 38,000 medical services to persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{174}

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs operates the Social Safety Net program for vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities, with $8 million from the World Bank. This support contained funding for a pension survey and a beneficiary assessment, which were delayed as of

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{165} Email from Ahmed al-Zubaidi, IHSCO, 3 August 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 451.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{174} Email from Essam Namk, Ministry of Health, 1 September 2009.
May 2009. The government provides benefits to disabled war veterans, but many supplement it with employment. The KRG also paid small monthly pensions.

Iraq has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but this is reportedly only enforced in the public sector and not in the private sector. Discrimination remained common, and reforms to the disability sector were halted in late 2008. As of May 2009, a draft disability law remained pending in the parliament of the KRG. Disabled people’s organizations and NGOs held a two-day conference in May 2009 to lobby political parties and members of parliament to approve the law after the elections in July. As of 1 July 2009, Iraq had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

In 2008, Iraq “clarified through its initial Article 7 transparency report that it also has a responsibility for significant numbers of mine survivors.” This made Iraq the 26th State Party to join the VA26, one of the States Parties with the “greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.” However, as of July 2009, many stakeholders were not aware of the implications and possible benefits of Iraq’s declaration.

A process was underway to identify “an appropriate in-country victim assistance/disability expert.” As of August 2009, this expert had not been identified. It was anticipated to have an expert present at the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November–December 2009. In 2008–2009, Iraq did not make statements on VA, but UNDP issued a message in July 2009 asking relevant stakeholders to start compiling information for a report to the Second Review Conference. Additionally, the UNDP started assisting the government in mapping existing VA capacity and projecting required VA capacity, and to bring together stakeholders. It was scheduled to complete these activities by mid-2010.

Iraq reported on VA in its Article 7 reports submitted in 2008 and 2009.

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177 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Soran Majeed, GDMA, 21 July 2009.
180 Email from Soran Majeed, GDMA, 31 May 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, KORD, 27 July 2009.
186 Ibid.
Victim assistance activities
Various organizations work on VA-related issues and only those providing updated information for the reporting period have been included in this report. Information about other organizations can be found in previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

VA activities in northern Iraq were advanced by the joint UNDP/WHO project started in August 2007, channeling international funding to the main local service providers to supplement KRG funding. For the activities supported by UNDP, the first phase was concluded in February 2009.\(^{189}\) WHO-funded projects faced some challenges and were not executed as planned. One NGO noted that the WHO did not have a clear vision and that the delays caused confusion among service providers, unlike the UNDP-supported component.\(^{190}\) UNDP secured additional funding from Australia to continue its part of the project to the end of 2010. It was anticipated that the KRG would increase its contribution, but the government was facing budget difficulties in 2008–2009 due to the economic slowdown.\(^{191}\) The project’s main challenges remained the long-term sustainability of the three implementing NGOs and securing direct bilateral funding to the KRG and NGOs.\(^{192}\)

Under the UNDP component, the Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center in Dahuk, the Diana Prosthetic Limbs Center in Erbil, and KORD in Sulaymaniyah provided physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration services. As of 31 December 2008, 7,784 physiotherapy sessions, 3,289 mobility aids, and 3,130 prosthetic and orthotic devices were provided. An additional 27 people completed vocational training and 110 started income-generating projects; 26 home adaptations were also made.\(^{193}\)

Under the WHO component, a needs assessment of the rehabilitation centers in Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk was conducted and two physiotherapists and two psychotherapists recruited as a result. Twelve medical staff received a four-week emergency trauma training and 18 received a multi-disciplinary training in Jordan focusing on mental health. Mental health materials were translated for use.\(^{194}\)

KORD operates two physical rehabilitation centers and three outreach posts in northern Iraq. Its strategic plan for 2009–2013 focuses on continued capacity-building and increasing its socio-economic reintegration activities. Its main challenges were: a lack of sustained financial support from the KRG; skilled staff preferring to work for the government rather than NGOs or the private sector; and a lack of coordination mechanisms with the broader disability sector. In 2008, KORD provided services to mine/ERW survivors, including 3,016 physical therapy sessions, 1,218 prosthetic-orthotic services, and economic reintegration assistance to 80 people; 28 of the survivors assisted were injured in 2008. It also provided 3,647 services to other persons with disabilities.\(^{195}\)

In 2008–2009, the GDMA provided $800,000 support to VA/disability service implementers. Its main challenges were a lack of a nationally regulated funding mechanism and delays in funding from the KRG. The GDMA had records of 10,081 services provided to survivors in 2008, mostly physical rehabilitation, and 9,156 other persons with disabilities were also assisted (these figures include beneficiaries under the UNDP-support project and KORD beneficiaries).\(^{196}\)

The Iraqi Association of the Disabled conducted awareness raising and lobbying of the government, NGOs and other stakeholders on VA/disability issues and provided material support to persons with disabilities. It also participated in the EDP World Bank project until policy reform work was halted.\(^{197}\)

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\(^{191}\) Interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.
\(^{194}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahim Baba-Ali, UNDP, 17 August 2009.
\(^{195}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Sardar Sidiq Abdulkarim, KORD, 27 July 2009. Some of the statistics are already included in those of the UNDP-supported VA program.
In 2008, the ICRC increased its support to the physical rehabilitation sector by adding support to the center in Fallujah which it completed in October. The center started operating in December 2008. The ICRC also supported the Prosthetics and Orthotics Training School and the al-Salam crutches production unit. The ICRC’s aim was to ensure assistance to a network of centers covering most of the country so that patients would not have to travel long distances for treatment. An information leaflet on the location of the centers was produced. The centers received raw materials and components, training, and (for the Erbil center only) transport costs. The centers assisted 29,422 people, and produced 2,863 prostheses (450 for mine/ERW survivors) and 9,864 orthoses (76 for mine/ERW survivors). The ICRC also supported 77 hospitals in all 18 governorates with supplies, equipment, and training. Some 5,438 weapon-injured people were assisted in 22 ICRC-supported hospitals and 83 medical staff attended seminars on war surgery, trauma management, and advanced first-aid. In 2008, the ICRC started a micro-economic initiatives program for conflict-disabled heads of households in northern Iraq, benefiting some 324 persons with disabilities.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Iraq. The DMA, within the Ministry of Environment, has official responsibility for mine action throughout Iraq, including strategic planning, budgeting, and donor relations. The KRG exercises responsibility for mine action in the three northern governorates of Dahuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah, including budget support to IKMAA and the GDMA, which plan mine action programming independently from the DMA.

National support for mine action

Iraq did not report national funding for mine action in 2008. UNDP estimated Iraq’s national mine action budget in 2007 to be $15 million (€10,186,065). In addition, the KRG Ministry of Finance allocated funds totaling IQD4 billion ($3.2 million) to IKMAA in 2007.

In April 2008, the Iraqi government announced the creation of 2,000 new mine clearance jobs to support mine and UXO clearance throughout Iraq, with annual salaries totaling an estimated IQD4.8 billion (approximately $4.32 million). As of May 2009, Iraq reported that fewer than 2,000 deminers were active overall, compared to an estimated need for more than 19,000 in order to complete clearance by its 2018 Article 5 clearance deadline. It did not report whether national or international funds were used to cover salaries for deminers.

The government provided a budget of $15 million–$20 million for the management of mine action in 2009. In addition, Iraqi ministries were expected to provide funding for mine clearance operations in 2009, but many did not have a budget for such activities.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, nine countries reported providing $35,886,215 (€24,369,289) to mine action in Iraq. This was approximately 4% less than reported in 2007. Reported annual international funding has decreased from a high of $58.7 million in 2004. There is not sufficient data on the full extent

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203 Email from Niazi Argoshi, IKMAA, 8 April 2008.
204 “Two thousand demining jobs up for grabs,” IRIN (Baghdad), 4 April 2008.
206 Telephone interview with Kent Paulusson, UNDP, 21 August 2009.
of the landmine problem or the needs of landmine survivors to assess whether funding at 2008 levels is adequate.

As of April 2008, the UN Mine Action Team reported that its activities in Iraq were funded for the duration of the year, with contributions from the US, Australia, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the UNDP Iraq Trust Fund.208

### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Iraq: Monetary209

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Via the US Department of State</td>
<td>Mine/ERW clearance, stockpile destruction, RE, VA</td>
<td>$21,550,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$3,265,850 (SEK21,500,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>ERW clearance, VA</td>
<td>$2,902,580 (A3,400,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>MAG, HI</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$2,323,763 (€1,578,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,965,000 (DKK10,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NPA, Norwegian Red Cross</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$1,964,642 (NOK11,074,643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,251,710 (€850,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$368,150 (€250,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$35,886,215 (€24,369,289)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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States Parties

JORDAN

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State party since</th>
<th>1 May 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>9.64km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>18 (2007: 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>654</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Article 5 (clearance of mined areas) | Deadline: 1 May 2012  
Original deadline: 1 May 2009 |
| Demining in 2008 | Clearance of 1.098km² of mined areas  
Release of 6.1km² |
| Risk education recipients in 2008 | 21,600 |
| Progress towards victim assistance aims | Good |

Ten-Year Summary


Mine action was conducted exclusively by the army’s Royal Engineering Corps until 2006 when the National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) signed an agreement with Norwegian People’s Aid to undertake clearance of minefields on its borders with Israel and Syria in a bid to accelerate clearance and fulfillment of Jordan’s Article 5 obligations. In November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Jordan requested, and was granted, a three-year extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline. Also in 2008, the NCDR embarked on a nationwide survey and clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW) to tackle what has emerged as the main source of casualties.

From 2000 to 2008, the NCDR recorded 88 mine/ERW casualties (13 killed and 75 injured) in Jordan; in total at least 778 casualties have occurred since 1949. From 1999 to 2008, risk education was conducted in Jordan primarily through public information dissemination and community liaison. After several years of reducing casualty rates, in 2008 the number increased, seemingly due to more scrap metal collection. In May 2009, Jordan completed the verification and consolidation of casualty data recorded in the National Victim Database. Since 2008, Jordan has been a focus of attention of the States Parties after reporting its responsibility for significant numbers of mine/ERW survivors. It has generally been active in providing services to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.
Mine Ban Policy

Jordan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 August 1998 and ratified it on 13 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. On 1 April 2008, Jordan enacted the National Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Law, which incorporates the treaty into Jordan’s domestic law.1

Jordan submitted its twelfth Article 7 report, dated 30 March 2009, covering the period from 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009.2

Jordan served as host of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007. Jordan’s Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein, chair of NCNR’s board, was President of the meeting. As President, he continued to play an important leadership role in promoting effective operation and implementation of the treaty, as well as its universalization, until the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008. His duties also included chairing the treaty’s Coordinating Committee, which consists of all the Standing Committee co-chairs and co-rapporteurs, and chairing the Analyzing Group of states tasked with reviewing Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension requests.

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, Jordan commented on several of the States Parties’ Article 5 deadline extension requests, in addition to making a statement on victim assistance. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Jordan made statements on victim assistance, risk education, and mine clearance.

Jordan has only rarely engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2, regarding the issues of joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices.

Jordan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It has not submitted its annual report as required under Article 13.3 Jordan is not party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, it had not yet signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.4

Production, use, stockpile destruction, and retention

Jordan never produced or exported antipersonnel mines and last used them in 1978. It completed the destruction of its stockpile of 92,342 antipersonnel mines in April 2003. It included Claymore mines in its stockpile destruction.

Until 2007, Jordan consistently reported that it retained 1,000 mines for training and research purposes; it had not consumed any of these retained mines since it first reported in August 1999.5 In its 20 March 2008 Article 7 report, Jordan reported retaining 950 mines and noted that 50

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1 NCDR, “The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Law: Law Number 10 for the year 2008,” Amman, April 2008, www.ncdr.org.jo. The law bans the use, import, export, transfer, trade, production, development, possession, sale, purchase, or acquisition of antipersonnel mines, and also bans assisting, encouraging, or inducing these prohibited activities. It includes penal sanctions that apply equally to violators of the law and anyone assisting activity prohibited by the law. The law also endorses the NCDR as the lead mine action coordinating and supervising agency in Jordan. The law was passed by the Cabinet of Ministers in November 2007, approved by the parliament on 17 January 2008 and the Senate on 12 February 2008, then “following the endorsement of His Majesty King Abdullah, [the law] was passed by parliament and came into effect on April 1, 2008.” Statement of Jordan, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 6 June 2008. For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 459.


3 Jordan’s latest CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report was submitted on 26 September 2006, covering the period 25 September 2005 to 19 July 2006.


5 Jordan had listed the same number and types of mines retained in each of its Article 7 reports: 800 M14, 100 M35, and 100 M18A1. In June 2004, Jordan stated that live antipersonnel mines were unnecessary for training purposes. Jordan also said States Parties should set a limit of 1,000 retained mines. Statement of Jordan, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, 25 June 2004.
States Parties

mines (40 M14 and 10 M35) had been consumed during mine detection training. In June 2009, the NCDR’s national director informed Landmine Monitor that Jordan plans to use some of the remaining 950 mines for further training of mine detection dogs (MDD), as well as more deminers, but did not provide any detailed plans.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Jordan is contaminated by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines as well as ERW, including grenades, artillery shells, and aircraft bombs. Contamination results from the 1948 partition of Palestine, the 1967–1969 Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1970 civil war, and the 1975 confrontation with Syria. There are also believed to be cluster munition remnants in remote areas, the result of the armed forces testing cluster munitions on firing ranges. The NCDR has no data on the extent of contamination, but believes that it is not extensive. A NATO-funded ERW survey initiated in September 2008 had recorded no cluster munition remnants as of end June 2009.

A Landmine Retrofit Survey (LRS) completed in September 2007 concluded that 10.5km² of suspected mined areas remained, concentrated in well-defined and mapped military minefields along the border between Jordan and Syria. The LRS also identified six affected communities in the Jordan Valley, which have since been cleared of mines. However, a sampling and verification project in the Jordan Valley in August 2008 (see below) has identified 108 suspected hazardous areas. These areas will need to be surveyed and, if mines are confirmed, cleared as part of Jordan’s fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations.

ERW contamination, mostly from the 1970 civil war, is concentrated around Ajloun and North Shunah in the Jordan Valley, particularly near former Palestine Liberation Organization bases, where munitions were hidden in caves and buried underground. ERW are said to pose a greater risk than mines, causing a higher number of incidents. The NATO-funded ERW survey found more contamination than expected and by May 2009 had identified 264 affected communities. Jordan has also had to deal with ERW that entered from Iraq through the scrap metal trade. Under a plan drawn up by the NCDR and various government ministries and departments, army engineers have been positioned at the border to check scrap metal entering the country for UXO, and ex-military personnel have been contracted to work at factories inspecting the scrap metal. The Jordanian government has a plan to establish a central market for all scrap metal, which can then be regulated.

6 Article 7 Report, Form D, 20 March 2008. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 460–461. In June 2008, Jordan reported that NPA used the mines to train four new MDD teams in the south for the Wadi Araba project and in the north for the Northern Border Clearance Project. Statement of Jordan, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 2 June 2008. NPA reported that 150 of Jordan’s retained mines were used in 2007 for MDD training in Wadi Araba; all were destroyed. Email from Henrik Mathiesen, Desk Officer for Mine Action in the Middle East, NPA, 22 August 2008.

7 Email from Mohammed Breikat, National Director, NCDR, 17 June 2009.

8 See, for example, Dalya Dajani, “Mine action authority to tackle unexploded ordnance,” Jordan Times, 22 January 2009, www.jordantimes.com; and email from Stephen Bryant, former Program Manager, NPA, 2 February 2009.

9 Email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 2 July 2009.

10 Email from Mohammed Breikat, NCDR, 24 April 2008.


14 Interview with Mohammed Breikat, NCDR, Amman, 9 March 2008.


16 Interview with Mohammed Breikat, NCDR, Amman, 9 March 2008.
Casualties
In 2008, the NCDR recorded at least 18 new mine/ERW casualties, including six killed and 12 injured, in 11 incidents. The majority of casualties were civilians (16), and two were military on a routine patrol. All were Jordanian nationals. Children were the biggest casualty group (nine boys and one girl). The remaining casualties were men. ERW caused 10 casualties and landmines eight. The most common activity at the time of the incident was collecting scrap metal (10). Casualties were recorded mainly in Mafraq (nine), followed by Al Karak (four), Irbid and Zarqa (two each), and Balqa (one).

The NCDR revised its 2007 mine/ERW casualty figure downwards from 10 to seven (two killed and five injured in six incidents) after verification home visits. The increased casualty rate in 2008 compared to 2007 and 2006 (nine) may be due to increased scrap metal collection activities (three incidents alone during scrap metal collection caused nine casualties in 2008).

In 2009, the NCDR recorded just one new casualty to 21 June 2009: a 22 year-old shepherd was injured by ERW in Balqa.

The NCDR identified at least 779 mine/ERW casualties (125 killed and 654 injured) between 1949 and 22 June 2009. Of these, 673 verified mine/ERW casualties (19 killed and 654 injured) had been entered in the National Victim Database. The remaining 106 fatalities occurring prior to 2005 were not entered, as verification was not possible. The large majority of verified casualties occurred before 2000 (584). Of all verified casualties entered in the database, 294 were civilians, 279 military, 21 deminers, and the status of 79 was unknown. Only 45 casualties were women, 18 were boys, one was a girl, and the rest were men. Information on activity at the time of incident, device type, and location was not made available.

From 2000 to December 2008, 88 verified mine/ERW casualties were recorded by the NCDR (13 killed and 75 injured); 60 were civilians, 23 military, three deminers, and two of unknown status. Most casualties were men, and only 18 boys, five women, and one girl became casualties. At least 13 Jordanian peacekeepers were hurt abroad, including eight peacekeepers injured in Eritrea in 2001. It is unclear if they are included in NCDR data.

The Higher Council for the Affairs of Persons with Disabilities reported that some 180,000 people (3% of the population) are disabled.

Risk profile
The main casualty groups are men of working age and boys. Livelihood activities are the most common cause of casualties, and in 2008 the most common activity was scrap metal collection. In May 2009, the NCDR reported that scrap metal imported from Iraq has become an issue of concern.

Socio-economic impact
Mine clearance in the Jordan Valley and around Aqaba has opened up land to development of infrastructure, including dams, pipelines, airfield expansion, and housing, as well as for commercial farming and large-scale tourist developments. The LRS found that 34 communities

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17 Unless noted otherwise, information and casualty data covering 1999–2009 provided by email from Adnan Telfah, Head Mine Risk Education/Victim Assistance Department, NCDR, 31 May, 4, 21, 22, and 25 June 2009.
19 The NCDR does not have separate calendar year information prior to 2000. In 2000, Landmine Monitor reported four casualties two killed and two injured), but NCDR could not confirm whether it had been able to verify these for its database. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 981–982.
with a total population of 69,000 claimed to be affected by mines, 17 of them in northern Mafraq governorate.\(^{27}\) Mined areas exacerbate already acute shortages of land and deny access to agricultural land and pasture and to scarce supplies of water, particularly in the northeast.\(^{28}\) Northern border clearance was expected to open access to at least 33 wells, assisting 7,000 people, and interviews with local residents found they expected household incomes to rise by a quarter as a result of the clearance.\(^{29}\)

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

Jordan established the NCDR under Law No. 34, passed in 2000, and an April 2002 royal decree, which appointed its board of directors. It includes representatives of the Jordanian Armed Forces, the government, NGOs, landmine survivors, and the media. It became fully operational in 2004 when Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein, a cousin of King Abdullah, became the NCDR’s chair, and after a UNDP technical advisor had joined the staff.\(^{30}\) UNDP will fund the position until July 2009.\(^{31}\)

The NCDR was established as “the primary national mine action authority” responsible for preparing and overseeing implementation of a national mine action plan, including mine clearance, mine/ERW risk education (RE), and victim assistance (VA), and ensuring that mine action is integrated into the country’s wider development strategies. It is also responsible for coordinating, accrediting, and regulating all organizations involved in mine action as well as for fundraising.\(^{32}\)

The NCDR also conducts quality management of demining operations and in 2007 increased its staff to 18 to cope with the increased level of clearance.\(^{33}\) The NCDR, with funding from Sweden, recruited a technical advisor for RE in September for four months and another technical advisor to strengthen NCDR’s quality management, who started in January 2009.\(^{34}\)

**Risk education**

The NCDR is responsible for coordination and monitoring of RE activities.\(^{35}\) In November 2008, an RE steering committee and working group were established among RE operators, and they met at least quarterly.\(^{36}\)

**Victim assistance**

The NCDR has a VA steering committee, including governmental and non-governmental stakeholders, to ensure mainstreaming of victim assistance into other relevant strategies. However, in November 2008 it delegated actual coordination of VA and appointed the Higher Council on the Affairs of Persons with Disabilities (HCAPD) as Jordan’s VA focal point.\(^{37}\) The HCAPD was established in 2007 and monitors the implementation of the National Strategy on Disabilities, ensures quality standards for services, provides training, advocacy, and networking.

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\(^{27}\) Email from Mohammed Breikat, NCDR, 28 April 2008.

\(^{28}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 4; and emails from Mohammed Breikat, NCDR, 24 April and 27 July 2008.

\(^{29}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 33.


\(^{31}\) Email from Mohammed Breikat, NCDR, 23 July 2008.


\(^{33}\) Email from Mohammed Breikat, NCDR, 23 July 2008.

\(^{34}\) Telephone interview with Muna Alalul, NCDR, 2 July 2009.


services, and supports the cost of rehabilitation and education services for poor persons with disabilities as well as the development of disability programs in rural areas.38

Data collection and management

The NCDR manages data using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Version 5. Data from the LRS was entered into the IMSMA database in 2008.39 In May 2009, Jordan announced that the NCDR had completed the verification and consolidation of casualty data registered in the National Victim Database.40 However, some gaps remained in information provided to Landmine Monitor, such as conflicting sets of data and a lack of detailed device type information (the only categories are landmines and UXO). The NCDR reported that discrepancies were due to “translation problems” and that information in IMSMA would be translated from Arabic to English.41

The verified information comes from the LRS conducted by the NCDR and Survivor Corps (SC) who organized home visits.42 Prior to the LRS and until 2007, casualty data was maintained in separate databases and information collected remained incomplete.43

The NCDR believes that the updated data is now accurate, but expressed concerns that incidents involving scrap metal collectors and dealers44 or occurring at the border may not always be reported.45 SC believes NCDR reporting structures have improved significantly. Local authorities report more directly and efficiently to NCDR.46

The NCDR reported plans to develop a Mine/ERW Victims Surveillance Mechanism to be used by all VA operators under the coordination of the NCDR. The mechanism will include collection, assembly, and dissemination of relevant data using the Epi Info system.47

In 2008, the NCDR VA officer participated in a Field Epidemiology for Mine Action course organized by UNICEF.48 In 2008, the NCDR, in coordination with SC, carried out a needs assessment survey in Maftaq and Irbid through home visits to mine survivors. The results were not available as of 31 May 2009.49

IMSMA is used to record RE activities.50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordanian Red Crescent Society</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCDR</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REC</td>
<td>x</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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39 Email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 1 July 2009.
41 Telephone interview with Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009.
46 Email from Shireen Hanna Dabbas, SC, 25 May 2009.
Plans

**Strategic mine action plan**

The 2008–2012 workplan set out by Jordan’s Article 5 deadline extension request provided for completing clearance of the 104km-long northern border with Syria by October 2011. The workplan breaks down clearance of minefields along the border into three main tasks:

- the east sector, comprising 54km of border, with 39 mined areas covering 5.5km²;
- the northeast sector, along 31km of border, comprising 26 mined areas covering 2.96km²; and
- the northwest sector, along 19km of border, with 28 mined areas covering 1.85 km².

As foreseen in the plan, technical surveys began in the east sector in November 2007 and were planned to continue in the other sectors ahead of clearance operations. Detailed timelines indicated that clearance of the east sector would continue until January 2010; clearance of the northeast sector from November 2009 until September 2010; and clearance of the northwest sector from September 2010 until July 2011. The northwest sector includes border areas disputed by Syria and was left to the end in the hope that a joint border committee set up to resolve the dispute would complete its work in time for the start of clearance operations.

The Jordan National Mine Action Plan 2005–2009 published in 2005 was still under revision by the NCDR as of July 2009 to take into account data gathered in the LRS. The NCDR expected to complete a draft of a new plan by the end of 2009 that would cover the period through the end of its Article 5 extension period in 2012.

Jordan’s national mine action plan did not include clearance of ERW but, with funding from NATO, the NCDR started an ERW survey in September 2008. The first phase was due for completion in February 2010 (see Demining and Battle Area Clearance section below).

RE was included in Jordan’s National Mine Action Plan 2005–2009. The plan was to design and coordinate an RE program based on assessment of current RE efforts, undertake a train-the-trainers program, and deliver the new RE program to all high-risk communities. Previous RE action plans were not implemented due to a lack of funds, and so a new two-part action plan (April 2007–July 2008 and August 2008–December 2009) was developed in line with the 2006 LRS findings and a 2005 RE needs assessment (see Risk Education section below).

Following the changes in the risk profile, and in line with the new timeframe of the Article 5 deadline extension request, in December 2008, the NCDR organized a meeting with all relevant RE actors to develop a Strategic Framework for Mine Risk Education 2009–2012, and a new action plan covering calendar year 2009. The new objectives include: carrying out an RE needs assessment in all mine/ERW-affected communities in the governorates of Ajloun, Irbid, Jerash, Ma’afraq, and Zarqa; providing RE through public dissemination of RE messages through the mass media, material distribution, etc., in all identified affected communities, targeting in particular out-of-school children, scrap metal collectors and dealers, shepherds, farmers, and women; and providing school-based RE in Ajloun, Irbid, Jerash, Ma’afraq, and

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51 Telephone interview with Muna Alalul, NCDR, 2 July 2009.
53 Ibid.
54 Email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 1 July 2009.
60 Telephone interview with Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009.
Zarqa governorates. With UNICEF support, the UNICEF technical advisor who had supported the NCDR in 2007 returned in September 2008.

VA was included in Jordan’s National Mine Action Plan 2005–2009, with the following objectives: developing and implementing comprehensive activities; strengthening national rehabilitation capacity; supporting socio-economic reintegration; and supporting the construction of a National Rehabilitation Center for Amputees (NRCA). In 2007, the NCDR developed a draft action plan, with six strategic outputs: developing and mainstreaing VA capacity for long-term sustainability; unifying and verifying casualty data accessible to all implementers; improving geographic coverage of services and information; monitoring of VA implementers; issuing “victim cards” and recording assistance provided; and ensuring assistance to all survivors under NCDR coordination. The plan was never finalized.

In May 2009, Jordan reported that the National Strategy on Disabilities (2007–2015) was under review, and the HCAPD intended to integrate mine/ERW victim assistance into the national strategy and other national policies/strategies.

National ownership
Mine action is nationally managed through the NCDR with support from one expatriate UNDP technical advisor (see Program Management and Coordination section above).

National mine action legislation
Jordan established the NCDR under Law No. 34, passed in 2000, and an April 2002 royal decree.

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
Jordan has national standards based on the International Mine Action Standards which were drawn up for the NCDR in 2006 by an international advisor.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

The Armed Forces’ Royal Engineering Corps (REC) had exclusive responsibility for demining until 2006. It continues to undertake clearance in the Jordan Valley and to conduct explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in support of the NATO-funded ERW survey, and in response to public reports. In 2006, the NCDR signed an agreement with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) to clear minefields on Jordan’s borders with Israel and Syria. NPA completed clearance of minefields in Wadi Araba and Aqaba on the border with Israel in 2007 and in 2008 started clearing the northern border.

Demining and battle area clearance in 2008
Jordan started the ERW survey in September 2008 with four staff in headquarters and three four-person survey teams and expected to finish the first phase in February 2010 (see Strategic mine action plan section above). The survey includes a desk assessment of data available from

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69 Email from Mohammed Breikat, NCDR, 23 July 2008.
72 Email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 1 July 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 464.
government agencies as well as field visits and community mapping of suspected hazardous areas. By June 2009, it had completed visits to Balqa, Mabada, and Zarqa governorates. The NCDR had expected to find about 100 affected communities, but by May 2009 reported it had identified 264. NCDR survey teams can call for clearance of surface UXO by the REC but are short of capacity for deep search.74

A Belgian Navy reconnaissance team inspected the banks of the Jordan River, accompanied by members of the Jordan Valley sampling and verification project, in January 2009 to ensure that no mines had been deposited in the course of flooding, particularly close to tourist areas. No mines have been found, but the Belgian team recommended the installation of several wire mesh traps in the river as a precautionary measure.75

The REC cleared 15 mined areas covering a total of 1.7km² under the European Union-funded North Shunah project over two years, completing work in December 2007. The REC then took on another 18 mined areas in the Jordan Valley and Mount Nebo area. The project ended with completion of clearance of these areas covering 0.62km² in June 2008.76

The NCDR, supported by the REC, implemented a sampling and verification project in areas previously cleared by the REC in the Jordan Valley after NCDR quality management teams had found a number of mines in these areas. The NCDR felt compelled to check the area because the REC had cleared it before NCDR had been set up and mine action standards had been adopted.77 Under the first phase of the sampling and verification project, conducted from August to October 2008, NCDR reviewed records provided by REC of 267 mined areas cleared between 1993 and 2007. In the second phase, which lasted until 31 March 2009, NCDR conducted field visits and community interviews. In November 2008, the NCDR started a third phase of sampling and verification involving clearance of UXO, supported by three 12-person REC teams. By April 2009, sampling had been conducted in 22 areas leading to clearance of 51 items, including 31 antipersonnel mines, two antivehicle mines, and 18 live fuzes.78

NPA started clearance of the northern border in April 2008 with 150 staff making up six demining teams, two mechanical teams, and one mine detection dog team of 10 dogs and five handlers.79 Work had been due to start a year earlier, but NPA only received authorization to conduct limited technical survey in November 2007. NPA eventually received authorization to commence clearance operations to start on 1 April 2008, and full-scale operations only started in July 2008, after delays in delivery by UNDP of European Union funding held back recruitment and training.80

Once underway, NPA also encountered technical difficulties as the rakes used by deminers for clearance operations in Wadi Araba did not work well with the different, much harder ground encountered on the northern border. Detectors bought for the project were not yet accredited by the NCDR and also initially encountered technical difficulties with the ground conditions until the manufacturers modified the software in 2009. To accelerate clearance, NPA recruited an additional 66 deminers in May 2009 and at the same time added a second demining shift.81

74 Interview with Deemah Farouq Naser, NCDR, in Geneva, 29 May 2009; and email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 1 July 2009.
75 Email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 1 July 2009.
78 Email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 1 July 2009; NCDR, Jordan Mine Action Quarterly, April 2009, p. 4, www.ncdr.org.jo; and email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 4 June 2009.
79 Email from Reuben McCarthy, UNDP, 5 August 2009.
80 Telephone interview with Stephen Bryant, Program Manager, NPA, 8 June 2009; and email from Lina Ghazi, Coordination and Communication Manager, NPA, 23 June 2009.
81 Telephone interview with Stephen Bryant, NPA, 8 June 2009; and email from Lina Ghazi, NPA, 23 June 2009.
Demining statistics for calendar year 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining project</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Anti-personnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>Battle area clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Abandoned explosive ordnance destroyed</th>
<th>Area cancelled (km²)</th>
<th>Area reduced (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REC North Shunah Project</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC DR Sampling and Verification Project</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA Northern Border Clearance Project</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>10,474</td>
<td>4,703</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.098</td>
<td>10,481</td>
<td>4,730</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Quality management
The NCDR undertakes daily quality management of NPA clearance on the northern border. The NCDR brought in a technical advisor from Mines Advisory Group for four months from January–April 2009 to help develop the management and operational capacity for quality management. The assignment was extended for two months to develop standing operating procedures for UXO clearance and the Jordan Valley sampling and verification project.

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Jordan is required to clear all antipersonnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2009. In March 2008, however, Jordan acknowledged it would not be able to meet the deadline and submitted a request for an extension until 1 May 2012. In its critique of Jordan’s extension request, the ICBL stated that, “Earlier action to mobilize additional demining capacity and international financial support could have avoided the need for an extension. However, Jordan’s request shows clear determination to fulfill its obligations; comprehensive and detailed planning for clearance of the remaining mine hazard; and mobilization of the necessary demining and financial resources needed to implement these plans in the time stipulated.”

In November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Jordan was granted a three-year extension. States Parties found the plan “workable and fully-funded although complete implementation was contingent upon resolving border demarcation issues.” At the

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82 Email from Muna Alalul, NCDR, 14 June 2009; and email from Reuben McCarthy, UNDP, 5 August 2009.
84 Ibid.
85 Interview with Mohammed Breikat, NCDR, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Jordan stated that although border demarcation involving a 45km stretch of the border had yet to be fully resolved, the government had approved clearance in disputed areas “without reservation.” Jordan added that, “therefore complete implementation of the 104km-long mine belt of the Northern Border Project is not contingent on border demarcation issues.”

Jordan’s March 2008 extension request had included a workplan that planned completion of clearance by November 2011. Despite delays in starting northern border clearance, in June 2009 NPA stated that increases in capacity and productivity would enable it to complete border clearance by the end of 2010.

### Risk Education

In 2008, RE activities continued to increase, reaching an estimated 21,600 direct beneficiaries including 16,200 children and 5,400 adults. Indirectly, a further 75,000 people were reached. This represents an increase compared to 2007, when 14,700 people received RE, and results from the NCDR’s increased RE capacity and improved funding situation. The NCDR believes that RE had an overall positive impact in reducing incidents in target areas and in teaching communities to report hazardous objects, although there was an increase in ERW casualties in 2008. RE continues to be necessary in Jordan due to the increase in scrap metal collection activities and ERW contamination.

In 2008, RE activities were carried out by the NCDR’s RE department which is composed of four NCDR staff working with a joint team of eight RE field officers from the REC, the Jordanian Red Crescent Society (JRCS), the Hashemite Commission for Disabled Soldiers (HCDS), and SC. It was also conducted through a JRCS program, with assistance from the ICRC. RE messages were disseminated through public education activities and community liaison. The NCDR reported that activities targeted all at-risk groups including herders, farmers, children, housewives, scrap metal collectors, and community leaders. Activities were organized in Ajloun, Irbid,

### Demining from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Area released (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2003</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = not reported

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92 Telephone interview with Stephen Bryant, NPA, 8 June 2009.
93 Telephone Interview with Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 26 May 2009.
95 In 2009, the NCDR clarified that 14,700 people were reached in 2007. Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 26 May 2009. Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 466, reported that there were 16,000 direct beneficiaries.
96 Telephone interview with Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 466.
98 Telephone interview with Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009.
100 Telephone interview with Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009; and NCDR, “MRE/VA Department update,” June 2009, provided by email from Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009.
Mafraq, and the Jordan Valley. In 2008, new RE material was produced including an animated cartoon, a coloring book, and an RE song for children in affected communities. RE messages were standardized based on RE national standards, standard operating procedures, and a manual that was developed by the NCDR according to international standards. The NCDR has an RE quality management officer who monitors RE activities. A refresher course for volunteer RE providers was organized in August and September 2008.

Awareness messages have been delivered without interruption from 1999 to 2008 by several operators, including the NCDR, the REC, Civil Defense, the Ministry of Education, the JRCS in cooperation with the ICRC, the UNRWA, and SC. In 2005, the NCDR, UNICEF, and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an RE needs assessment which concluded that there was no need for a major RE program in Jordan, although there would be a merit in conducting specific RE sessions among communities living close to mined areas. In April 2007, the NCDR launched its comprehensive RE program with funding from the United States Department of State and technical support from UNICEF, and became the main RE provider in Jordan. Jordan used Form I of its annual Article 7 report to provide generic information on RE activities in 1999–2009.

**Victim Assistance**

The estimated number of mine/ERW survivors in Jordan is 654. In May 2009, Jordan stated that it considered victim assistance “a major pillar in mine action.” In 2008, as in previous years, Jordan continued to be active in providing services to mine/ERW survivors and to persons with disabilities. Persons with disabilities remained among the most disadvantaged groups in Jordanian society and suffer from stereotyping by the general population. Access to services in rural areas for persons with disabilities was said to be problematic.

Since 1999, services have been provided by a large number of organizations. Mine/ERW survivors are treated within the general health system, which is reasonably well developed. Emergency medical care is free of charge, but continuing medical care is not free for those who

103 Telephone interview with Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009.
108 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
110 Telephone interview with Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009; and NCDR, “MRE/VA Department update,” June 2009, provided by email from Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 22 June 2009.
112 Emails from Adnan Telfah, NCDR, 31 May and 4 June 2009.
116 These organizations include the NCDR, RMS, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Development, HCDS, JRCS, Civil Defense, Al-Hussein Society for the Physically Challenged, SC, UNRWA, and the private sector.
are not insured. On a case-by-case basis, the NCDR ensures that the government pays the costs of treatment for uninsured survivors. It is unknown how many landmine survivors are insured, but the NRCA reported that in 2008 the costs of treatment for all its non-insured patients were covered by the government. The quality of healthcare for the military is said to be better than for civilians.

The main institutions for prosthetic and rehabilitation services are al-Bashir Hospital, the King Hussein Medical Center, and the NRCA—all located in Amman. The NRCA reported a lack of machinery, equipment, and raw materials. In 2009, Jordan’s rehabilitation capacity was expanded as the Queen Rania Center for Military Personnel with Special Needs, under the HCDS, started functioning. Lack of supplies and long waiting lists remained a challenge. In 2008, Canada launched a project in cooperation with the Ministry of Health and the Royal Medical Services to enhance the standards of rehabilitation services and to train doctors and technicians. The first batch of 10 students graduated in 2008.

Jordan acknowledged that more effort is needed for socio-economic reintegration, which remained limited to vocational training and financial assistance by some NGOs.

The law mandates that 4% of jobs must be reserved for persons with disabilities, but there were reports of discrimination. High unemployment rates further hampered job opportunities for persons with disabilities. Financial assistance is granted to persons with severe disabilities whose families earn less than JOD250 (US$350) per month.


Jordan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 31 March 2008, but as of 1 July 2009 it had not ratified its Optional Protocol.

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Jordan is one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors. Jordan declared its responsibility for significant numbers of survivors for the first time at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007 and clarified its status through its Article 5 deadline.
extension request in March 2008.\textsuperscript{133} Jordan stated that, although the total number of casualties “may not compare highly on a global scale, it is significant when measured against the size of the population.”\textsuperscript{134} It also added that Jordan’s priority is to develop an action plan with SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) objectives.\textsuperscript{135} A national review conference on the rights of persons with disabilities is scheduled for November 2009.\textsuperscript{136}

In May 2009, Jordan reported on its victim assistance (VA) activities against the actions set in the Nairobi Action Plan. The HCAPD reported that Jordan’s efforts to mainstream VA into disability policies are to be seen as a major success.\textsuperscript{137} As of May 2009, Jordan identified some specific gaps and weaknesses in service provision in the health, rehabilitation, and psychosocial and socio-economic reintegration areas.\textsuperscript{138}

In 2008, a process support visit was undertaken by the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU).\textsuperscript{139} During the visit, the NCDR organized a roundtable discussion with governmental and non-governmental actors working in the field of disability.\textsuperscript{140} Jordan reported on its VA activities at the Meeting of States Parties in 2008, and at the Standing Committee meetings in 2008 and 2009.\textsuperscript{141} Jordan did not use the voluntary Form J to its annual Article 7 report to provide an update on victim assistance activities in 2008 and 2009.\textsuperscript{142} However, in Form I of its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, it noted that a list of mine/ERW casualties had been completed and that the list will be used to provide rehabilitation services to survivors.\textsuperscript{143} Jordan included a VA expert on its delegation to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in 2008 and at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.\textsuperscript{144}

**Victim assistance activities**

The number of mine/ERW survivors that received assistance in the last 10 years is unknown, but Jordan reported that all known mine/ERW survivors received some form of physical rehabilitation and psychological support; services were provided by both governmental bodies and NGOs.\textsuperscript{145}

\begin{itemize}
  \item See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 468.
  \item Interview with Mona Abdeljawad, HCAPD, in Geneva, 29 May 2009.
  \item Article 7 Report, Form I, 20 March 2008; and Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009.
  \item Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009.
\end{itemize}
In 2008, the NRCA, with funds from the Royal Medical Services and support from the NCDR, assisted 17 new patients (four civilians, two military, and 11 persons from Yemen and Iraq), including an unknown number of mine/ERW survivors with prosthetics, rehabilitation, and psychological support.\textsuperscript{146}

In 2008, SC provided 6,193 services for persons with disabilities, including 1,394 services to mine/ERW survivors: 20 socio-economic activities, 77 direct health assistance services, 92 referrals, and 1,205 peer support home visits.\textsuperscript{147}

**Support for Mine Action**

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates for fulfilling mine action obligations in Jordan. Jordan has reported a required budget of $13 million to carry out the Northern Border Clearance Project for the period 1 April 2008–1 May 2012.\textsuperscript{148} In November 2008, Jordan reported that all finances had been raised to support clearance in the Northern Border Clearance Project during its Article 5 extension period. However, it reported that raising funds for review and verification efforts in the Jordan Valley remained an outstanding task.\textsuperscript{149} Jordan has not reported on comprehensive estimates or the status of resource mobilization for long-term VA.

**National support for mine action**

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Jordan reported total funding for mine action of $84.5 million since 1993, with government contributions accounting for some $52.5 million or 62% of total funds. Jordan reported that annual national funding has remained roughly stable at $3.5 million annually during the past 15 years.\textsuperscript{150} Annual funding in 2007 was reported in the extension request to be $3.5 million.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, seven countries, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, and the US, reported providing $6,800,877 to mine action in Jordan. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was roughly 43% less than reported in 2007, but covers a substantial portion of overall funds required according to Jordan’s national mine action plan. As noted above, Jordan has stated that all required funds for the Northern Border Clearance Project have been raised. As of March 2008, contributions to the Northern Border Clearance Project consisted of $787,287 from Australia, $1,276,675 from Canada, $6,880,289 from the European Commission, $382,238 from Germany, $185,006 from Japan, and $3,576,281 from Norway.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{146} Email from Dr. Abdel-Fattah Al-Worikat, NRCA, 17 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{147} Email from Shireen Hanna Dabbas, SC, 25 May 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 470.

\textsuperscript{148} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 31.


\textsuperscript{150} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, p. 52.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Jordan: Monetary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NPA, UNDP, NCDR</td>
<td>Mine clearance, capacity development</td>
<td>$1,878,393 (NOK10,588,460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Emergency mine action</td>
<td>$1,325,340 (€900,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>NATO Partnership for Peace</td>
<td>Mine clearance, EOD</td>
<td>$1,251,710 (€650,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>UN Mine Action Service</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$938,100.00 (C$1,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Department of State (NADR), Centers for Disease Control</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$748,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$370,306 (€251,464)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>NCDR</td>
<td>Sampling and verification</td>
<td>$80,993 (€55,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** $6,592,842 (€4,477,008)

### 2007 International Mine Action Support to Jordan: In-Kind

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Form of In-Kind Support</th>
<th>Monetary Value (where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Provision of 1 demining expert</td>
<td>$208,035 (CHF225,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** $208,035 (€141,271)

In May 2009, Jordan reported that Canada was supporting capacity development of the Royal Medical Services and the Ministry of Health, to train doctors and improve rehabilitation services.

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153 Email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009.


Kenya has not had an antipersonnel mine problem since becoming a State Party, but it continues to be affected by UXO at military training ranges. In February 2005, the International Mine Action Training Centre opened in Embakasi, near Nairobi’s international airport, with the support of the United Kingdom; it has since become an important regional mine action training center.

As Kenya is only slightly contaminated by UXO, most risk education has been targeted at refugees and, sporadically, at Kenyans in the north. Discrimination and poor access to services remained problematic for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.

**Mine Ban Policy**


Kenya served as the co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention from 2006–2008. At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, it made a statement during the general exchange of views noting the “background of unprecedented challenges pertaining to the implementation of the convention and the coordination of the gains already achieved.” It expressed concern about the lack of progress on universalization of the treaty and about the large number of requests for extensions of Article 5 clearance deadlines. It commented on the requests by Senegal, the UK, and Zimbabwe. Kenya also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009 but did not make any statements.

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2. Kenya’s latest Article 7 report, covering 31 March 2007 to 31 March 2008, was dated 31 July 2008 but was not received by the UN until 17 October 2008. Kenya has submitted five previous Article 7 reports: in February 2008 (covering 1 April 2006 to 31 March 2007); 1 April 2005; 31 March 2004; 4 June 2002; and 27 December 2001. Kenya did not submit reports covering 1 April 2005 to 1 April 2006, or 1 May 2002 to 30 April 2003.

With respect to issues of treaty interpretation under discussion by States Parties, Kenya has said, on Article 1, that its military may not participate in joint operations or drills where antipersonnel mines are being used. On Article 2, it has said that “any mine that functions or has the capacity to function as an antipersonnel mine…should be considered as an antipersonnel mine and is therefore banned.”

Kenya has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In August 2003, Kenya’s military destroyed its stockpile of 35,774 antipersonnel mines, far ahead of its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 July 2005.

In its Article 7 report submitted in July 2008, Kenya cited a total of 1,020 antipersonnel mines retained for training purposes. This is a reduction of 1,980 mines since its Article 7 report submitted in February 2008; however the report submitted on 31 July 2008 does not give details of the actual uses of the mines consumed. At the April 2007 Standing Committee meetings, Kenya reported that the number of retained mines stood at 2,460 “after using 540 APMs [antipersonnel mines] for the provided purposes.” It is not known if the total of 3,000 retained mines in the February 2008 report indicates an unexplained increase back to 3,000, or if it is an error.

Kenya is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Kenya signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008 but had not ratified as of 1 July 2009.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Kenya is not believed to be mine-affected, although it has had a problem with UXO on training ranges at Archer’s Post. Kenya’s latest Article 7 report listed no known or suspected mined areas, as did its previous report. In 2008, the British Army carried out its annual Exercise Pineapple, in which explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel spend up to a month clearing UXO that may have been left in Kenya. Media reports claimed that an incident which killed a

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5 It continued, “We therefore consider mines with sensitive fuzes and all anti-vehicle mines with antihandling devices to be covered under Article 2 and therefore prohibited under the Convention.” Statement of Kenya, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 12 May 2006.

6 Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 April 2005; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 323, for details on the types of mines, which were obtained from Belgium, Israel, and the UK.

7 Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 July 2008. The 1,020 mines include: 176 No. 4 mines, 42 No. 409 mines, 475 No. 6 mines, and 327 NR PRB mines.

8 Statement of Kenya, “Kenya’s Progress on Aspects of Articles 3 and 5,” Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 27 April 2007. It stated that the mines were used for training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques at training institutions, and were consumed during “humanitarian demining and EODs; demolition/destruction practical exercises; mine awareness training to peacekeeping contingents deployed to various missions.”

9 Prior to the 2007 statement, Kenya had, since its initial declaration in 2001, consistently reported a total of 3,000 mines retained, suggesting that no mines had been consumed (destroyed) during training activities. However, in June 2006, an IMATC official told Landmine Monitor that it was using antipersonnel mines provided by the Kenyan Army for its training activities, and that the mines were being consumed during the training courses. Interview with Lt. Col. Tim Wildish, Commandant, IMATC, Nairobi, 6 June 2006.


13 Email from Col. John Steed, Defence Advisor, Kenya and Tanzania, and Defence Attaché, Eritrea and the Seychelles, British High Commission, 26 June 2008.
child in Samburu district in June 2009 was caused by a cluster munition remnant.\textsuperscript{14} Landmine Monitor was unable to verify the details of the reports. Kenya has not previously been considered affected by cluster munition remnants and had even made a declaration to that effect at the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions in February 2008.\textsuperscript{15}

**Casualties**

The British High Commission in Kenya reported five new UXO casualties occurring in 2008, including one person killed and four injured. Further detail was not provided.\textsuperscript{16} In 2007, one man was killed by ERW.\textsuperscript{17} In 2009 through July, in the incident referred to above, a 12-year old boy was killed in June, reportedly by a cluster munition remnant.

Landmine Monitor has identified 79 mine/ERW casualties between 1999 and the end of 2008 (24 people killed and 55 injured).\textsuperscript{18} The last recorded landmine casualties occurred in 2005, when a bus drove over a mine near the border with Somalia, killing six people and injuring 10.\textsuperscript{19} In 2002, media reported that at least 500 people had been killed by UXO since the start of military drills in 1945 and that many more had been injured.\textsuperscript{20} In 2002, the British Ministry of Defence paid compensation to 1,046 people reportedly injured by UXO from training areas used by the British Army.\textsuperscript{21} Figures are likely incomplete, as there is no systematic casualty data collection mechanism in Kenya.

Preliminary results of the 2007–2008 National Disability Survey found that 4.6% of the population was disabled.\textsuperscript{22}

**Program Management and Coordination**

There is no mine action program in Kenya. The situation does not warrant specific victim assistance programs. The Ministry of Health is the lead ministry responsible for the care of persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{23}

**Risk Education**

Due to limited contamination, there were no mine/ERW risk education (RE) programs in Kenya, and in its most recent Article 7 report, Kenya left blank Form I regarding measures to provide warnings to the population.\textsuperscript{24}

Since 1999, the majority of RE activities have been targeted at refugees from neighboring countries, mostly Sudan. However, activities decreased significantly in early 2008 when Handicap International (HI)—present since 2005—ended its program for southern Sudanese in the Kakuma Refugee Camp. A December 2007 evaluation of the HI RE program indicated that it had a positive impact on the behavior of its recipients and that it had a good potential


\textsuperscript{16} Telephone interview with Col. John Steed, British High Commission, 25 March 2009.


\textsuperscript{19} See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 496.

\textsuperscript{20} See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 529.

\textsuperscript{21} Telephone interview with Col. John Steed, British High Commission, 25 March 2009.


\textsuperscript{24} Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 July 2008.
for sustainability.\textsuperscript{25} As an exit strategy, HI established RE clubs in schools and provided an RE video to its partners.\textsuperscript{26} In March 2009, HI could not confirm whether these activities continued after its departure.\textsuperscript{27} HI provided RE to some 129,577 people between 2005 and January 2008.\textsuperscript{28}

Before 2005, other organizations providing RE included Jesuit Refugee Service Eastern Africa, the Kenyan military, the Organisation for the Survival of Il-Laikipiak Indigenous Maasai Group Initiative, and the Nairobi Rotary Club.\textsuperscript{29}

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is unknown but is at least 1,068 (1,046 from the British claims and the 2003–2008 survivors). Mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities, but access to services remained limited.\textsuperscript{30} Public health facilities are considered to provide adequate treatment.\textsuperscript{31} Physical rehabilitation is available at national, provincial, and district levels.\textsuperscript{32}

The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) continued to support two physical rehabilitation centers in Kenya: the Kangemi Rehabilitation Centre (Kangemi, mainly serving refugees) and the Kikuyu Orthopaedic Rehabilitation Centre (Nairobi). Due to budgetary constraints at the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the ICRC had to provide one-off financial support to the Kangemi center in 2008, and in Nairobi production decreased due to a lack of funding, subsequent lower staff motivation, and access difficulties.\textsuperscript{33}

The British Ministry of Defence has paid compensation to alleged UXO casualties, the last time in 2002. Although the 2007 casualty was allegedly due to UXO found at a British Army training field,\textsuperscript{34} no additional claims were made to the British High Commission in 2008.\textsuperscript{35}

The Persons with Disability Act 2003 prohibits discrimination and calls for the creation of a National Development Fund for the Disabled. As of March 2009, this fund had not been established and the Act was not implemented effectively.\textsuperscript{36} Students with disabilities were often denied access to regular schools and less than 10\% of children with disabilities were enrolled.\textsuperscript{37} Kenya ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 19 May 2008, though it had not signed its Optional Protocol as of 1 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{25} Email from Sylvie Bouko, Regional Technical Advisor in Risk Education, HI, 29 May 2008.
\textsuperscript{26} Telephone interview with Sylvie Bouko, HI, 25 March 2009; and see \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2008}, pp. 474–475.
\textsuperscript{27} Telephone interview with Sylvie Bouko, HI, 25 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{28} See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2008}, p. 474.
\textsuperscript{29} See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2004}, p. 529.
\textsuperscript{33} ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, May 2009, p. 20. Support to the Kangemi center was provided to bridge the gap from July to December; UNHCR assistance was expected to resume in 2009. Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 29 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{34} See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2008}, p. 474.
\textsuperscript{35} Telephone interview with Col. John Steed, British High Commission, 25 March 2009.
Support for Mine Action

International Mine Action Training Centre
The International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) is jointly funded by the UK and Kenyan governments. Kenya has not reported in detail to Landmine Monitor on the financial structures or national contributions to the center, but IMATC has in the past reported Germany, the European Commission, the UK, and the US among its funding partners. It has also reported receiving funds from the UN Mine Action Service and UNDP, and staff support from the UK and the US.\(^3\) In July 2007, the UK House of Commons Defence Committee reported that Ministry of Defence budget estimates including support to IMATC totaled £987,000 (US$1.8 million) for 2007–2008.\(^4\) The UK did not report specific funding to Kenya or IMATC for the 2007–2008 or 2008–2009 fiscal years to Landmine Monitor.

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\(^3\) Presentation by Lt.-Col. Boniface Ngulutu, Deputy Commandant, IMATC, Humanitarian Development Program Summit, 3–5 October 2006, Nairobi.

KUWAIT

Ten-Year Summary


Kuwait has a residual mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem, mostly unexploded submunitions. The number of mine/ERW casualties in Kuwait is unknown. Between 1999 and 2008, no formal mine/ERW risk education activities targeting at-risk groups were organized. Kuwait has the capacity to deliver disability services. However, foreign mine/ERW survivors encountered problems in accessing services in Kuwait.

Mine Ban Policy

Kuwait acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 30 July 2007, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2008. In its second Article 7 report, submitted on 24 May 2009, Kuwait stated that it was “in progress to enact the required legislation to meet the elements of this convention” as required by Article 9. It also indicated that the “recent” penal code was being applied, which prohibits “such acts mentioned in the convention.” In July 2009, Kuwait stated that “The Government of Kuwait has submitted a draft Military Law to the Parliament in Kuwait to prohibit the possession of conventional weapons for those not authorized…”

Kuwait attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, but did not make any statements.

Kuwait has not yet made known its views on key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Kuwait is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Stockpiling, destruction, production, transfer, and use

In its initial Article 7 report, Kuwait declared a stockpile of 91,432 antipersonnel mines, composed of six types. In July 2009, Kuwait informed States Parties that it had destroyed its stockpile. This was accomplished far in advance of its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 January

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4 This total quantity of mines was inconsistent with the quantity listed next to each of the six mine types, which added up to 87,582. These included: 12,151 P-40 bounding fragmentation mines (apparently with fuze assemblies, produced by Italy); 6,848 TS-50 blast mines (apparently without fuzes, provided by Egypt); 2,765 NR-409 blast mines (produced by Belgium); 64,033 C3A1 Elsie blast mines (produced by Canada); 446 M14 blast mines (origin not specified); and 1,339 of an unknown type of high explosive mine with, presumably, a tripwire. Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 May 2008.
5 The letter states that Kuwait “would like to communicate that the Competent Authorities in the State of Kuwait (Ministry of Defense) have destroyed the stockpile of Anti-Personnel Mines as mentioned in the State of Kuwait’s report on transparency measures (7.1b) reporting period 1st June 2008 – 30 March 2009.” Letter M 134/2009 from the Permanent Mission of Kuwait to the UN in Geneva to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit, 9 July 2009. The reference to the Article 7 report presumably applies to Kuwait’s initial report, dated 28 May 2008, which erroneously lists the reporting period as 1 June 2008 to 30 March 2009.
States Parties

Kuwait

2012. Kuwait did not provide any details on the destruction process, such as the location and method of destruction, the numbers or types of mines destroyed, or the dates of initiation and completion.

Kuwait’s May 2009 Article 7 report lists no stockpiled mines, yet it does not report specifically on the destruction of the mines, nor does it report any mines transferred for the purpose of destruction. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Kuwait did not inform States Parties that it had completed stockpile destruction.

Kuwait’s Article 7 reports indicate that it is not retaining any mines for training purposes. Previously, in 2004, the Minister of Defense told the UN Mine Action Service that Kuwait did not have any stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.

Kuwait is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It did not declare any production facilities in its Article 7 reports. Officials from the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor in 2002 that Kuwaiti forces have never used mines.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Wide desert and coastal areas of Kuwait were contaminated with mines and ERW, including unexploded submunitions, as a result of the 1990–1991 Gulf War. Despite massive demining operations that employed foreign contractors following the war, mines remain in some areas, particularly along the natural sand corridors, although the precise extent of residual contamination is not known. In its initial Article 7 report, submitted in May 2008, Kuwait declared no known or suspected mined areas, noting that there are “no mined areas left in Kuwait recently and formally [sic].” However, according to a 2009 United States Overseas Security Advisory Council report, “[u]nexploded bombs, mines, and other ordnance from the 1991 Gulf War remain present in some desert areas in Kuwait.” The US embassy in Kuwait urges caution if traveling off paved surfaces outside of Kuwait City. Unexploded ordnance has also been discovered in piles of sand used at construction sites, including at Camp Arifjan, the largest U.S. military base in the country.

In addition, in the west, southeast, and north of the country, it is believed that mines (and UXO) can still be found under oil lakes as a consequence of the destruction of Kuwaiti oil wells by Iraqi forces in 1991. There are also said to be mines in parts of the desert and on Bubiyan Island off the northeast coast of Kuwait, which have both been used for military exercises.

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least three new mine casualties injured in two incidents. In July, two Bangladeshi shepherds were injured in Kabad while tampering with a landmine. Reportedly, the men were not aware of the risks. In September, a 50-year-old Bangladeshi man was injured by a mine in the Amghara scrapyard area, west of Kuwait City. The 2008 casualty rate is a sharp decrease compared to 2007 (20 casualties) and the lowest since 2003.

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10 Information provided by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, 10 April 2002.
15 “Mine hurts expat,” Arab Times (Kuwait City); and “Mine explosion in Amghara area,” Al Qabas (Kuwait), 25 September 2008.
Casualties continued to be reported in 2009. In March, a 13-year-old boy was injured while playing with a mine. In February 2009, it was reported that a foreign worker had been “recently” killed while attempting to remove wiring from an item of ERW near a border checkpoint with Iraq.

The Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) holds the most comprehensive information on mine/ERW casualties covering the period from August 1990 to 2002. Its records show that mines killed 85 people and injured 1,026, and ERW killed 119 and injured 175 during this period. A nationwide government casualty survey between 1991 and 1993 found 20 people killed and 429 injured by mines and ERW. Additionally, at least 191 demining casualties occurred. Between March 2000 and December 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 85 casualties (24 injured and 61 killed).

Program Management and Coordination

There is no formal mine action program in Kuwait. The Ministry of Defense is responsible for coordinating all demining operations. The Engineering Corps of the Land Forces deals with mines and ERW in desert areas, while the Ministry of Interior deals with ordnance in populated areas. Both bodies respond to calls from public and private organizations.

The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor coordinates disability issues, and the Higher Council for Handicapped Affairs is responsible for disability policy as well as financial and socio-economic reintegration issues. There is no mine/ERW casualty data collection mechanism in Kuwait and the main source of information remains media.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Both mines and unexploded submunitions continue to be disposed of across the country. In August 2008, explosive ordnance disposal specialists detonated a submunition found in a desert along the al-Salmi highway. On 3 October, a mine was found by a member of the public in the Um al-Aish area in the north of the country; the mine was cleared by army engineers. On 19 November, a submunition was found by a member of the public in al-Wafra Farms, in the southwest of Kuwait, and again it was disposed of by army engineers.

Risk Education

In 2008–2009, no mine/ERW risk education (RE) activities were identified, even though Kuwait listed some RE activities planned between 1 June 2008 and 30 March 2009 in its initial Article 7 report. No formal RE has been reported since 1999, but some basic public information dissemination and lectures for students were provided by the government, the Kuwait Red Crescent Society, the Center for Research and Studies on Kuwait, and KISR in 2000–2001 and 2007–2008.

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16 “Mine,” Al Qabas (Kuwait), 28 March 2009.
24 Telephone interview with Rafaat Misak, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 2 April 2009; and see Article 7 Report, Form I, 28 May 2008.
Victim Assistance

The estimated number of mine/ERW survivors in Kuwait is unknown but at least between 62 (Landmine Monitor data) and 1,201 (KISR data). In its initial Article 7 report, Kuwait did not make use of Form J to report on victim assistance activities.\(^\text{25}\) While the Kuwaiti health system is said to be one of the best in the Gulf region, problems such as staff shortages and inadequate service provision are increasingly reported. Some believe the system might not be able to cope with the increasing (foreign) population.\(^\text{26}\) In early 2009, there were reports of poor treatment of foreign workers, who make up the majority of recent mine/ERW casualties.\(^\text{27}\) Access to disability services was also problematic for foreign nationals in Kuwait. Kuwaiti citizens and non-citizens are entitled to financial compensation for disabilities caused by work. Military mine/ERW casualties are treated in separate military facilities. As of 1 July 2009, Kuwait had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

\(^{26}\) Dana Khraiche, “Patients: There’s a problem,” Kuwait Times (Kuwait City), 9 January 2009.
\(^{27}\) Ibid.
Landmine Monitor Report 2009

LATVIA

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Latvia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 July 2005. Before adhering to the treaty, Latvia submitted three voluntary Article 7 reports and voted for every annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution. Latvia inherited a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines and completed their destruction in August 2006. It has retained mines for training purposes. The total number of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties since 1999 in Latvia is unknown, but at least eight civilian ERW casualties have been reported. Some limited mine/ERW risk education has taken place in Latvia since 2000, but by 2006 this was limited to warnings in media reports about ERW discoveries. No specific victim assistance activities were reported for Latvia from 1999 to 2008.

Mine Ban Policy

Latvia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 July 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2006. Latvia has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, but has detailed a number of national implementation measures.\(^1\)

Latvia submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 29 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008.\(^2\) The report included voluntary Form J with information on Latvian involvement in international mine clearance operations and a regional landmine meeting. Before adhering to the treaty, Latvia submitted three voluntary reports.\(^3\)

Latvia attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, but made no statements. Latvia has not made its views known on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3, including the issues of joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training.

Latvia did not produce or export antipersonnel mines in the past, but inherited a small stockpile of Soviet antipersonnel mines. Latvia completed destruction of its stockpile of 2,490 PMN-2 mines on 2 August 2006.\(^4\) In its latest Article 7 report, Latvia reported that, as of the end

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\(^1\) In its Article 7 report for 2007, Latvia for the first time included details about national implementation measures in accordance with Article 9 of the treaty. The report listed four measures, which were: (1) Law on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, which is the law authorizing accession to the treaty; (2) Cabinet of Ministers Regulations No. 645 of 25 September 2007 on the List of National Strategic Goods and Services, which prohibits export and transit of antipersonnel mines; (3) The Code for Administrative Violations, which lays down liability for violations of circulation, manufacturing, storage, and use of strategic goods and arms and explosive devices as well as their export, import, and transfer; and (4) The Criminal Law, which provides for liability in case of smuggling explosive devices. Section XX of the Criminal Law stipulates punishment for unauthorized manufacture, acquisition, storage, and sale, as well as transportation and conveyance of weapons and explosives. In the past, Latvia had only reported its Law on the Circulation of Arms prohibiting the export and transit of antipersonnel mines. Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form A.

\(^2\) Previous Article 7 reports were submitted in 2008 (for calendar year 2007), 2007 (for calendar year 2006), and on 28 April 2006.

\(^3\) It submitted voluntary reports on 16 June 2005, 14 May 2004, and 1 May 2003.

\(^4\) Statement of Latvia, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 20 September 2006. Latvia’s reporting on its stockpile has been inconsistent. Over the years, it has declared its stockpile to consist of between 0 and 4,666 antipersonnel mines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 403. Also, in its four Article 7 reports, Latvia did not include in its stockpile the MON-50, MON-100, MON-200, and “Defense Charge-21” Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines listed in its previous voluntary reports. It has stated that “they are defence charge and not observed by the Ottawa Convention. Latvia is committed not to use them as APM [antipersonnel mines].” Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 April 2006. Use of Claymore-type mines in command-detonated mode is permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty, but use in victim-activated mode (with tripwires) is prohibited. The ICBL has urged States Parties to report on steps taken to ensure that these types of mines can only be used in command-detonated mode.
of 2008, it retained a total of 899 antipersonnel mines (881 OZM-4 and 18 PMN-2) for training purposes. It did not consume any mines for training in 2008. It used the expanded Form D on retained mines to state, “There are no reasons for retaining mines other than for training EOD (explosive ordnance disposal) experts for participation in international operations.” In 2007, Latvia consumed three PMN-2 mines during training activities and in 2006 it consumed 399 PMN-2 mines. Latvia originally declared that it was retaining 1,301 mines for training purposes, including 420 PMN-2 and 881 OZM-4 mines.

Latvia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It submitted its annual report for 2008 required by Article 13 of the protocol, although this appears to be identical to its report for 2007. Latvia is not party to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, Latvia had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Scope of the Problem

Latvia is contaminated by ERW from World War II and military bases from the Soviet era. There is also a small residual problem with mines, but no known mined areas.

Casualties

Landmine Monitor did not record any mine/ERW casualties in Latvia from 2008 to 1 April 2009. There is no casualty data collection mechanism in Latvia. Landmine Monitor information has been collected from media reports and provided by Latvian Armed Forces personnel. There were at least nine ERW casualties in Latvia from 1999 to the end of 2007 (five killed and four injured); no active duty EOD personnel casualties were reported.

Risk Education

In the context of the small number of ERW casualties reported, the level of mine/ERW risk education (RE) available seems adequate. There may be some risk from scrap metal collection: for example, in 2006 companies complained that sometimes people bring in UXO as scrap. Between 2006 and 2008, Latvian newspaper reports on discoveries of ERW included phone numbers for the public to call when suspicious objects were found. Previously, the Latvian EOD center reported conducting RE for visiting groups and in some schools.

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is at least three. Due to the small number of known ERW survivors, there is no need for specialized mine/ERW victim assistance in Latvia. Emergency medical attention is available through the public health system. Reform of the healthcare system in 2008 included major structural changes to the emergency system to increase its effectiveness before and during hospitalization.

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5 Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 April 2009.
6 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form D.
8 Latvia's CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report as recorded by the UN is available at www.unog.ch.
The Ministry of Welfare was responsible for coordination of disability issues between relevant ministries, and the National Council of Disability Affairs (NCDA) facilitated the engagement of NGOs. NCDA has both advisory and implementation functions. Latvia has had a disability action plan since 2006, but limited progress has been made due to a lack of financial resources. Legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities was generally enforced. As of 1 July 2009, Latvia had not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which it signed on 18 July 2008.

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The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999. FYR Macedonia completed clearance of all emplaced antipersonnel mines in mined areas on 15 September 2006, in advance of its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2009. Demining activities had searched and cleared a total of nearly 7 km² of land, particularly on the country’s northwestern border with Kosovo and Albania, and destroyed 558 antipersonnel mines. FYR Macedonia provided the Seventh Meeting of States Parties with a Declaration of Completion, pledging to report and clear any previously unknown mined areas that may be subsequently discovered “as a matter of urgent priority.” FYR Macedonia completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in February 2003. Ethnic Albanian insurgents reportedly used mines in 2001 in a conflict in the region bordering Kosovo. FYR Macedonia continues to have a problem with explosive remnants of war, mostly from World Wars I and II, for which the Protection and Rescue Directorate is the responsible government body. During clearance activities in 2007 and 2008, it did not report the destruction of any antipersonnel mines. No new mine/ERW casualties have been reported in FYR Macedonia between 2006 and 1 July 2009. The last reported casualty occurred in 2005. There are no dedicated victim assistance programs in FYR Macedonia.

**Mine Ban Policy**

FYR Macedonia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 9 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. While it has not enacted new national implementation legislation, it has reported that prohibited activities are covered by existing criminal law. FYR Macedonia attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but made no statements. It did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

FYR Macedonia submitted its ninth Article 7 transparency report in April 2009, covering calendar year 2008. The report consists of a cover page which states that all items are either “unchanged” or “non applicable.”

With respect to matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3, FYR Macedonia has strong positions consistent with those articulated by the ICBL and many States Parties regarding the prohibition on antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes, the prohibition on transit or foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, and the requirement during joint operations with states not party to the treaty to reject any rules of engagement permitting use of antipersonnel mines.

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FYR Macedonia has stated that it never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{5} It completed destruction of its stockpile of 38,921 antipersonnel mines on 20 February 2003, just ahead of the treaty-mandated deadline. It decided initially to retain 4,000 mines for training and research, but on 10 July 2006 destroyed them.\textsuperscript{6}

FYR Macedonia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. For the third straight year, it has not submitted its annual Amended Protocol II Article 13 report. FYR Macedonia gave its consent to be bound by Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 19 March 2007. FYR Macedonia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not yet ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{5} Some of the former Yugoslavia's mine production facilities were located in FYR Macedonia, but the government states that production had ceased. Fax from Ministry of Defense, 20 April 2004.
\textsuperscript{6} For additional details, see \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2006}, p. 508.
Ten-Year Summary


Mali is believed to be affected by antivehicle mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). It is not known if it has an antipersonnel mine problem. Its Article 5 deadline for clearance of antipersonnel mines in mined areas expired on 1 March 2009. Mali did not request an extension to the deadline at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.

Following antivehicle mine incidents in 2007–2008 causing 19 casualties, some limited mine/ERW risk education was provided in Mali; none had been recorded prior to 2008. Access to disability services is difficult outside of urban areas.

Mine Ban Policy

Mali signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 2 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. National implementation measures were adopted in 2000 which include penal sanctions and fines.1

As of 1 July 2009, Mali had not submitted its annual updated Article 7 report, due 30 April 2009. Mali has not submitted an annual report since July 2005.2

Mali attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but did not make any statements, and did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009. Mali has not made known its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Mali has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In 1998, prior to becoming a State Party, Mali destroyed its stockpile of 7,127 antipersonnel mines, together with 5,131 antivehicle mines.3 Mali reported in 2003 that it retained 600 antipersonnel and 300 antivehicle mines for training purposes.4 It has not since reported on the number of retained mines, or on the use of mines retained.

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1 Two legal texts, an ordinance and a decree, prohibit the development, manufacturing, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, offer, import, export, transfer, and use of antipersonnel mines. Breach of the legislation is punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment and a fine of between CFA500,000 and CFA3 million (approximately US$1,150 to $6,900). Ordinance No. 049/P-RM on the Implementation of the Convention, adopted on 27 September 2000; and Decree No. 569/P-RM on the Application of the Ordinance, adopted on 15 November 2000. An interministerial National Commission for a Total Ban on Landmines was established in June 2002 to take responsibility for the mine issue. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 341.


4 Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 July 2003. Mali initially reported in 2001 that it retained 2,000 antipersonnel and 1,000 antivehicle mines for training purposes. In 2003 it reported having consumed 1,400 antipersonnel mines and 700 antivehicle mines during training activities.
Mali stated in 2001 that it had never used antipersonnel mines and that there had been no reports of use by government forces or rebels during the Touareg rebellion. The resurgence of the Touareg rebellion in 2007 brought reports of mine use by the rebels. Some reports in 2007 cited the possible use of antipersonnel mines, but none were substantiated. Sporadic conflict in northern Mali with the Alliance Touareg Nord-Mali continued in 2008 and 2009, with no credible reports of the use of antipersonnel mines.


**Scope of the Problem**

Mali appears to have a problem with antivehicle mines, as well as with ERW. The precise extent of the threat is not known. At a regional seminar in October 2008 (see below), Mali suggested, implausibly, that the extent of contamination was approximately 2,000km².

As of March 2009, there was no evidence of a problem with antipersonnel mines. Mali has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2005, in which it declared that there were no mined areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory.

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least eight people killed in two landmine incidents in the region of Kidal in northern Mali. Five casualties were civilian (one child) and three were military. Media reported an additional incident in February involving a military convoy. The exact number of casualties resulting from this incident is unconfirmed and therefore not included in the total.

In 2007, 11 people were killed in landmine incidents and an unknown number were injured (at least three). Casualties included one soldier and 11 civilians. Prior to 2007, no landmine casualties were recorded in Mali.

No new landmine casualties were reported in 2009, but Landmine Monitor identified at least six ERW casualties (two killed and four injured) in two separate grenade incidents in northern Mali in January. All casualties were civilian (five children and one woman).

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2. In all cases of mine use known to Landmine Monitor, the mines used appear to have been antivehicle mines, which caused both civilian and military casualties in 2008. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 500.
4. Email from Seidina Dicko, Deputy Director, Army Engineer Corps, 30 March 2009; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 500.
Program Management and Coordination

An interministerial decision establishing a national mine action authority and mine action center was adopted in 2002, and a further decree was adopted on 16 March 2006. It is not known whether either of these bodies is functioning.

Assistance to mine survivors appears to be addressed by existing services with no need for a separate victim assistance program. The Ministry of Social Affairs is responsible for disability issues.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Clearance in Mali is the responsibility of the armed forces. In January 2008, Mali was among the countries whose armed forces received training in demining at the West African Center for Humanitarian Mine Action Training (CPADD) in Benin.

In October 2008, at the first regional Francophone seminar organized by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining at CPADD, demining was said to be ongoing, with progress said to be “satisfactory given the means available and conditions of work.” During the build-up of government armed forces in northern Mali following the retreat of rebels in October 2007, government troops had reportedly demined areas previously occupied by rebels.

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the treaty, Mali was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. As of that date, there was no firm evidence of any antipersonnel mine contamination, and Mali has not submitted a request for an extension. Should areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines be confirmed, Mali will be required to submit a report on the location of mined areas under Article 7 of the treaty and request an extension in accordance with Article 5(3).

Risk Education

In 2008, following mine incidents in northern Mali, limited risk education was provided by the Network of Journalists for the Security and Development of West Africa (Réseau des Journalistes pour la Sécurité et le Développement de l’Afrique de l’Ouest, RJSDAO). RJSDAO organized two conferences in Gao and Bamako delivering basic awareness messages to the general public and the media on the danger of mines. In 1999–2007, no formal risk education was conducted in Mali.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is at least seven. At the First Meeting of States Parties in 1999, Mali stated that it sought to share its experience and expertise in the area of prosthetics and orthopedics and the special reintegration of survivors. Since then, it has not made statements on victim assistance or made reference to it in its annual Article 7 reports.

15 Interministerial Decision No. 021370/MAEME-MFAAC-MSPC of 7 June 2002; and Decree No. 06-117/P-RM of 16 March 2006.
17 West African Center for Humanitarian Mine Action Training, “16è stage de Formateur aux techniques de base de déminage et de dépollution” (“Sixteenth trainer’s course in basic demining and explosive ordnance disposal techniques”), www.cpadd.org.
20 Emails from Amadou Maiga, RJSDAO, 7 and 14 March 2009.
21 Article 7 Reports, Form I, 17 May 2001; 31 July 2003; 15 September 2004; and 8 July 2005.
Healthcare in Mali is not free of charge, and lacks qualified staff, medication, and adequate medical standards.\textsuperscript{23} Persons with disabilities have little to no access to services.\textsuperscript{24} The six grenade casualties identified in 2009 were treated at the Gao Regional Hospital;\textsuperscript{25} they had to cover the cost themselves.\textsuperscript{26} The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) has continued to support physical rehabilitation in Mali.\textsuperscript{27}

There is no specific legislation for persons with disabilities in Mali,\textsuperscript{28} although it ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 7 April 2008.

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{24} Handicap International, “Mali: Renforcer la solidarité malgré la pauvreté” (“Mali: Reinforcing solidarity despite poverty”), www.handicap-international.fr.
\item\textsuperscript{25} “Escalade de violence sur fond de tension ethnique à Gao: Les grenades continuent de pétiller dans les rues” (“Escalation of violence in the background of ethnic tension in Gao: grenades continue to explode on the streets”), Maliweb, 8 January 2009, www.maliweb.net.
\item\textsuperscript{26} Email from Amadou Maiga, RJSDAO, 7 March 2009.
\end{itemize}
Mauritania

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 January 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, cluster munition remnants, other UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>51km² as of May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>0 (2007: three)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>1 January 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Demining in 2008 | Clearance of mined areas: 2km²  
                            Clearance of battle areas: 2km²  
                            Release of suspected hazardous areas by survey: 10km² |
| Risk education recipients in 2008 | 32,200 (2007: 64,200) |
| Progress towards victim assistance aims | Limited, but increasing |
                                      National: $800,000 (2007: $750,000) |

Ten-Year Summary


Despite being slow to initiate a mine action program after becoming a State Party, Mauritania has made steady progress in clearing mined areas since completing a Landmine Impact Survey in 2006, having subsequently released 25km² of suspected hazardous areas. As of May 2009, however, Mauritania was not on course to meet its Article 5 deadline for clearance of all emplaced antipersonnel mines by 1 January 2011. The country is also affected by cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).

The National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development recorded at least 42 mine/ERW casualties (20 killed, 20 injured, and two of unknown status) between 2001 (the earliest date for reliable data) and 2008. Since 1978, at least 618 casualties might have occurred. Risk education activities focused on nomads and children but were hampered by lack of funds. Services for mine/ERW survivors remain limited, but some activities started in 2008.

Mine Ban Policy

Mauritania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 21 July 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2001. A national commission was set up to be responsible for the mine issue and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty in July 2002.¹ On 2 January 2008, Mauritania adopted national legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty.²

² Law No. 2008-06 Relative to the Prohibition of Antipersonnel Mines in Mauritania, 2 January 2008. The legislation bans the acquisition, manufacture, stockpiling, transfer, import, export, and use of antipersonnel mines. It provides penalties of one to three years' imprisonment and fines of MRO100,000 to 1 million ($442 to 4,417) for violations. The law permits retention of mines for training and development, and sets conditions for implementing Article 8 of the Mine Ban Treaty on compliance.
Mauritania submitted its ninth annual Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering the period from 30 April 2008 to 30 April 2009. Mauritania attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it commented on the Article 5 extension request put forward by Senegal and made a statement on mine clearance. Mauritania also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it made statements on mines retained for training and mine clearance.

Mauritania has not stated its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices). With respect to Article 3, in April 2007 Mauritania said that it agreed with the ICBL and others that the number of mines retained for training and development purposes should at most be in the hundreds or thousands.

Mauritania has not stated its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices). With respect to Article 3, in April 2007 Mauritania said that it agreed with the ICBL and others that the number of mines retained for training and development purposes should at most be in the hundreds or thousands.

Mauritania is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 1 July 2009.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention
Mauritania has reported that it has never manufactured antipersonnel mines. It is not known to have exported mines. Mauritania completed the destruction of its stockpile of 21,168 antipersonnel mines on 5 December 2004, ahead of its deadline of 1 January 2005.

Mauritania initially intended to retain 5,728 mines for training purposes, but decided in 2004 to reduce the number to 728. Mauritania reported in April 2009 that it still retained 728 antipersonnel mines: 100 PMN mines, 161 Model 51 mines, and 467 MP mines. Thus, no mines were consumed (destroyed) in training activities from 2005 to 2008.

In its Article 7 report submitted in April 2009, Mauritania reported that its retained mines were used to train military academy personnel in mine identification. It stated that it was looking at the possibility of gradually destroying the retained mines starting in 2010. At the May 2009 Standing Committee meetings, Mauritania said that it hoped that all its retained mines would be destroyed by 2011.

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5 Article 7 Report, Forms E and H, 30 April 2009. This has been stated in previous Article 7 reports.

6 It destroyed 16,168 French-made APID 51 mines in 2001 and 2002, and destroyed the final 5,000 antipersonnel mines on 5 December 2004, including 1,738 Soviet PMN mines, 1,728 French Model 51 mines, and 1,533 “MP” mines, which are most likely Yugoslav PMA-3 mines. The quantities provided for each type of mine total 4,999, not 5,000. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 422–423.

7 Article 7 Report, Forms B and D, 30 April 2009.

8 The Article 7 reports submitted in 2008 and 2009 contain no information on mines transferred for training purposes; the reports submitted in 2006 and 2007 indicated that Mauritania had transferred 85 retained antipersonnel mines for training purposes (30 PMN mines, 30 Model 51 mines, and 25 MP mines), but the mines were apparently not consumed, and no details about the transfers were provided. See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form D, 20 April 2007.

9 Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2009.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Northern Mauritania is contaminated by mines and ERW, mostly UXO, the result of the conflict over Western Sahara from 1975–1978. Contamination includes cluster munition remnants. A 2006 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) found a total of 65 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), covering 76km² and affecting 60 communities. Subsequent release of land by clearance and technical survey reduced the total SHA to 51km² as of May 2009. Of this total, 15km² of SHA were believed to contain both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines as well as ERW, while the remaining 36km² of SHA were believed to contain antivehicle mines and ERW only.

The National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) has told Landmine Monitor that it has found cluster munition remnants around the town of Bir Mogrein in the extreme north of Mauritania, close to the border with Western Sahara. Unexploded submunitions found are reported to be the Mk-118, BLU-63, and M42. The contaminated areas already identified cover some 6km², but more survey is planned in these areas, depending on the availability of funding.

Casualties
There were no reports of new mine/ERW casualties in Mauritania in 2008 or to 31 May 2009. In 2007, the PNDHD reported three civilian mine casualties (one killed and two injured) in three incidents.

In 2008, two Mauritanian nomads were involved in a mine incident in Western Sahara; their status remained unverified. More Mauritanian casualties were reported in Western Sahara in 2009 when two nomads were killed by antipersonnel mines in two separate incidents in January. Although these casualties occurred outside Mauritania, the PNDHD entered them into its database.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Mauritania remains unknown. However, the PNDHD has information on 618 casualties (358 killed, 258 injured, and two of unknown status) between 1978 and the end of 2008. The PNDHD was not confident about the accuracy of data prior to 2001.

The PNDHD recorded 42 mine/ERW casualties (20 killed, 20 injured, and two of unknown status) between January 2001 and December 2008. All casualties were civilians. The majority of casualties were men (24), followed by boys (nine), women (two), girls (two), and five of unknown age/gender. Antipersonnel mines caused 22 casualties, antivehicle mines 11, ERW
three, unknown mines two, and for four casualties, the type of device was unknown.\textsuperscript{22} All casual
ties were recorded in Adrar, Dakhlet Nouadhibou, and Tiris Zemmour regions, and the most common activities at the
time of the incidents were nomadic herding, playing, and driving.\textsuperscript{23} From data previously transmitted by the PNDHD, it appears that at least four casual
ties were foreigners (two Qatari, one French, and one Portuguese).\textsuperscript{24} In 2005, a Mauritanian man
was killed in a border minefield between Greece and Turkey, but he was not recorded in the database.\textsuperscript{25}

The LIS recorded 14 “recent” landmine casualties (eight people killed and six injured).\textsuperscript{26} One casual
ty was female, 12 were male, and the gender of the other person was unknown. Most casual
ties (nine) were between 30 and 44 years old, and all casualties were older than 14 years. Eight of the casualties were herders. All the survivors were from Dakhlet Nouadhibou and suffered amputations.\textsuperscript{27} An estimated 7\% of Mauritania’s population is disabled.\textsuperscript{28}

\textbf{Risk profile}

According to the PNDHD, the groups most at risk of being injured or killed by mines/ERW are nomads and children. The LIS identified nomads to be more at risk to the dangers of landmines because they travel throughout the impacted areas. The PNDHD reported that nomadic herders engage in risk-taking behavior for economic reasons. Other at-risk groups include tourists, miners, and fishermen.\textsuperscript{29}

\textbf{Program Management and Coordination}

\textbf{Mine action}

The PNDHD is mandated by decree to coordinate mine action operations in Mauritania.\textsuperscript{30} Since August 2007, the PNDHD has been the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior and Decentralization.\textsuperscript{31} The PNDHD is overseen by an interministerial Steering Committee, set up by decree on 3 September 2007.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{Risk education and victim assistance}

The PNDHD is responsible for overall coordination and monitoring of risk education (RE) and victim assistance (VA) activities.\textsuperscript{33} The Steering Committee is responsible for establishing national priorities and approving the PNDHD’s workplan.\textsuperscript{34} VA providers include the Ministry of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Telephone interview with Lt.-Col. Alioune O. Mohamed El Hacen, PNDHD, 24 June 2009.
\item “Recent” means they occurred within 24 months prior to the survey team’s visit to the relevant community.
\item See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2008}, p. 506.
\item Ibid.
\item See Article 7 Report, Form A, 24 April 2008.
\item See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2008}, p. 507.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Health, UNICEF, the National Orthopedic Center for Physical Rehabilitation (Centre National d’Orthopédie et de Réadaptation Fonctionelle, CNORF), and several disability organizations.35

Data collection and management
The PNDHD has installed the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).36 In 2009, the PNDHD reported that casualty data collection in Mauritania had improved in recent years due to the mobilization of all actors working in affected areas. However, due to the size of the country and the nomadic lifestyle of many people, some older incidents remain unreported.37 Since 2004, the PNDHD has been collecting casualty data within the framework of the mine action program, in cooperation with UNICEF and operators.38 All the information is stored in the IMSMA database, including RE and VA activities.39

Plans
Strategic mine action plan
A revised National Mine Action Strategy was drafted in 2008 to cover the period from 2009 to 2011.40 The focus of demining for the coming years will be the 15km² of SHA that was believed to contain antipersonnel mines.41

Both RE and VA were included in the revised National Mine Action Strategy, which aims at “reducing mine incidents to arrive to zero victims” through awareness activities.42 Two strategic objectives for RE were presented for 2008–2011: marking and fencing all antivehicle minefields not covered by the Mine Ban Treaty; and providing RE in affected areas through local NGO networks. The implementation plan lists RE activities and allocates tasks. Awareness messages are to be delivered by the PNDHD and local NGO networks to all affected areas, specifically targeting children and women. It is also planned to mainstream RE in the school curriculum, to conduct public information dissemination for nomads, and to continue marking of areas in affected communities.43

For VA, the aims are to strengthen CNORF’s capacity and to involve partner organizations in the rehabilitation of survivors, and to provide survivors with vocational training to further their socio-economic reintegration.44 The goals reflect a 2007 needs assessment, which recommended: development of a specific VA project; strengthening CNORF; creating a survivor database; developing a vocational training program; providing micro-credit opportunities; creating a survivor network; and encouraging access to education for young survivors.45 Progress on making a specific five-year VA strategy had not been made as of May 2009 due to lack of funds.46 Implementation of VA under earlier mine action plans was equally hampered by lack of funds.47

43 Ibid, pp. 17, 23.
44 Ibid, p. 17.
Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

Efforts have been made to integrate mine action into both development policy and practice at the national and local levels.\(^{48}\) Mine action is said to have been included in the country’s poverty reduction strategy, as illustrated by the presentation of demining projects by Mauritania at a donor meeting in Paris in December 2007.\(^{49}\) Mine action is not, however, mentioned in Mauritania’s 2006–2010 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.\(^{50}\) At the local level, mine action is integrated into a number of community development plans “as an important action for good governance and enabling their full socio-economic development.” Examples include the annual development plan for the villages of Bou Lenoir, Inal, and Tmeimichatt, as well as the town of Zoueratt.\(^{51}\)

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Mauritania has been providing the bulk of the resources for its mine action program. According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “small-scale demining and mine awareness activities have fallen short of the need for more systematic operations and wider campaigns.”\(^{52}\)

National management

The demining program in Mauritania is managed by the PNDHD with “full” technical support from UNDP.\(^{53}\)

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

Legislation supporting the managing institutions for mine action was adopted in 2007.\(^{54}\) National mine action standards and standing operating procedures (SOPs) have been developed and adopted.\(^{55}\) A national standard on land release was developed at the end of 2007,\(^{56}\) finalized at the end of 2008, and was due to be implemented in 2009.\(^{57}\)

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

All demining in Mauritania has been conducted by the Army Engineers Corps.\(^{58}\) In 2008, mine clearance was conducted in Boulenoir, Hank Labbara, Mbalket Choumad, Sweiciya 1, and Sweiciya 2, while battle area clearance was conducted in Bir Mariam, Etoijil, and Rich Enajem.\(^{59}\) For 2009, Mauritania was seeking funds to support a mechanical demining capacity with “a medium machine with combined tiller and flail systems.”\(^{60}\) It was also planned that UNMAS would fund the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), which includes the former Swedish Rescue Services Agency, to train Mauritania’s explosive ordnance disposal
(EOD) team in cluster munition clearance.\(^{61}\) No cluster munition remnants were cleared in 2008 or 2007, although marking was installed around the contaminated areas.\(^{62}\)

### Land release in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHA (km(^2)) at 1 January</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km(^2))</th>
<th>Battle area cleared (km(^2))</th>
<th>Area released by survey (km(^2))</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>Unexploded submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>Other UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Mauritania is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2011. In November 2008, UNMAS noted that Mauritania “has firmly stated it expects to meet its treaty obligations by 2011.”\(^{63}\) In May 2009, however, PNDHD’s coordinator said that Mauritania was unlikely to meet its 2011 deadline as the program was facing a major funding shortfall. As a consequence, Mauritania will likely ask for a short extension that would imply a change to its National Mine Action Strategy.\(^{64}\)

### Demining and Battle Area Clearance: 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Area released (km(^2))</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>Unexploded submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>Other UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–end 2005</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>5,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.45</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,027</strong></td>
<td><strong>151</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,845</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(N/R = \text{not reported}\)

According to UNMAS, “While Mauritania’s armed forces have 120 deminers who should be able to respond to the mine and UXO problem, the Government does not have the resources for the maintenance and fuel to deploy these troops. Government capacity and resources should be assessed annually to determine if the armed forces can fill gaps or if development cooperation resources should go towards deploying commercial companies or non-governmental organizations to clear mined areas.”\(^{65}\)

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\(^{62}\) Ibid.


\(^{64}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Alioune O. Mohamed El Hacen, PNDHD, 23 April 2009.

Risk Education

In 2008, RE activities were provided to some 32,200 people through public information dissemination and school-based activities. The PNDHD estimates that at least double this number were reached indirectly, as RE recipients were given extra materials so they could pass messages to their families and friends. The PNDHD believes that RE played a crucial role in decreasing casualty rates in 2008 and deems it necessary to continue providing awareness messages until the dispute over Western Sahara is settled. However, activities decreased compared to 2007, when 64,200 people were reached, partly due to funding shortfalls, but also because recipients of indirect RE were not counted then.

In 2008, RE continued to be provided by two networks of national NGOs, NEJDA and the Nouadhibou Network, and by community facilitators (“relais communautaires”). Among nomads, women are traditionally in charge of educating children, so they were included more systematically in RE activities. Some 70% of the members of the two NGO networks were women.

RE targeted 17,200 nomads in 60 communities in the three regions identified by the LIS as being affected by mines/ERW: Adrar, Dakhlet Nouadhibou, and Tiris Zemmour. Awareness messages were provided through interactive presentations, “tea debates,” and a radio station for nomads. To maximize the number of beneficiaries reached, RE sessions were organized in transit areas, including water points. Posters were also distributed and additional materials left with the communities.

RE is part of the school curriculum in Dakhlet Nouadhibou and Tiris Zemmour (Adrar has no schools); 15,000 primary and secondary school students were reached. RE sessions were given by trained teachers one day each month.

The PNDHD continued marking mined areas: 30 new signs were added in Boulenouar, in Dakhlet Nouadhibou region, together with the maintenance of previously laid warning signs.

Between 2001 and 2008, awareness messages have been provided to affected populations, mainly nomads and children, by the PNDHD, UNICEF, local NGOs, and community facilitators, with one major interruption (November 2005 to November 2006) due to lack of funds. The PNDHD trained RE trainers in 2007. Mauritania used Form I of its annual Article 7 reports submitted in 2001–2009 to provide information on RE activities. The LIS recorded that RE had been conducted in 32 of the 60 mine/ERW-affected communities (53%), mostly in Nouadhibou, where 72% of affected communities had received RE, followed by Tiris Zemmour (42%) and Adrar (36%). RE occurred in six of the nine communities where recent casualties had been recorded by the LIS.
Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown but at least 258. Mauritania’s vision is to “promote the rehabilitation of survivors and their social integration.”\(^{80}\) However, mine/ERW survivors have received little attention due to lack of funds.\(^{81}\) Mauritania’s VA project in the 2009 Portfolio of Mine Action had not received funding as of June 2009.\(^ {82}\)

Mauritania has a network of basic health centers, and 67% of the population lives within 5km of healthcare services, but in remote rural areas access to, and quality of, services is very limited.\(^ {83}\) Even when casualties can access medical care, the long distances to reach medical facilities are a “major challenge,” and mine incidents usually occur in remote locations. Medication, transport, and accommodation have to be covered by the patients, which is problematic for the majority of survivors.\(^ {84}\)

Regional rehabilitation centers in affected areas are not operational, and CNORF in Nouakchott remains the only physical rehabilitation facility capable of providing adequate assistance to mine/ERW survivors. The center has limited means.\(^ {85}\) The quality of services and productivity needs to be improved. The social security system covers 90% of services delivered by CNORF. Patients cover the remaining costs,\(^ {86}\) unless their fees are covered by the PNDHD.\(^ {87}\)

Reportedly, the Ministry of Health is in charge of providing psychological support to all persons with disabilities, and it has supported some survivors.\(^ {88}\) In 2008, the PNDHD provided some funds to survivors to start income-generation projects.\(^ {89}\) Mauritania has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, and there have been no reports of discrimination.\(^ {90}\) As of 1 July 2009, Mauritania had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

Victim assistance activities

CNORF, with PNDHD and UNICEF support, assisted 20 mine/ERW survivors with physiotherapy services and orthopedic appliances. Transport, food, and accommodation were also covered. Each survivor also received funds for income-generation projects.\(^ {91}\)

In 2008, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) continued to support CNORF with material assistance, monitoring visits, and training. Two CNORF technicians received training at the regional SFD training center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. CNORF prosthetic and orthotic production increased by 19% in 2008 (192 patients) compared to 2007 (162 patients).\(^ {92}\)

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\(^{83}\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 508.


\(^{89}\) Interview with Lt.-Col. Alioune O. Mohamed El Hacen, PNDHD, in Geneva, 27 May 2009; and Article 7 Report, 30 April 2009, Form J.


Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Mauritania. In December 2007, UNDP reported that all mined areas in Mauritania could be cleared by 2011 at a cost of US$14 million (€10,210,780), which would cover survey, clearance, clearance training, and RE.93

UNDP reported the creation in 2007 of a dedicated mine action line in Mauritania’s national budget to support PNDHD staff and operations. As of June 2009, no specific allocations for mine action within the budget had been reported by Mauritania.

National support for mine action

The PHDHD reported Mauritania’s contributions in 2008 as $800,000 composed of $725,000 in-kind and $75,000 for clearance operations.94 In 2007 Mauritania reported contributing MRO200 million ($747,214), with the government reportedly allocating the same annual amount since 2002.95

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, Spain reported contributing $427,631 (€290,392) for mine action in Mauritania: $220,890 (€150,000) for integrated mine action and $206,741 (€140,392) in-kind for mine clearance personnel training. Reported funding in 2008 was approximately 7% less than in 2007.

The United States, a contributor to mine action in Mauritania in 2007, cut mine action funding after the coup in Mauritania in August 2008, applying a 2006 act of Congress calling for “non-humanitarian” US assistance to be cut off to countries in which governments are overthrown by the military.96

Funding at 2008 levels appears adequate to meet Mauritania’s RE needs but does not address the country’s demining and VA needs.

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94 Email from Lt.-Col. Alioune O. Mohamed El Hacen, PNDHD, 29 July 2009.
**MOLDOVA**

### 2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Possibly UXO from World War II; mines and UXO (unconfirmed) in breakaway Transnistria region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>0 (2007: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Article 5 (clearance of mined areas) | Deadline: 1 March 2011  
Completed: 2000 (government-controlled areas) |
| Demining in 2008 | Spot clearance of ERW |
| Progress towards victim assistance aims | Slow |

### Ten-Year Summary

The Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for the Republic of Moldova on 1 March 2001. It has not enacted domestic legislation to implement the treaty, but has cited its Criminal Code which includes penal sanctions. In November 2002, Moldova completed destruction of its stockpile of 13,194 antipersonnel mines, far ahead of its March 2005 deadline. Moldova initially declared 849 mines retained for training, but destroyed the last of these in 2006.

Moldova is affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW), particularly UXO. It remains unclear whether territory within the breakaway Transnistria region is mine-affected. Moldova completed mine clearance operations on territory under its control in 2000, prior to becoming a State Party. Many details on issues relating to antipersonnel mines in the Transnistria region, not under the control of Moldova, remain unknown.

The number of mine and ERW casualties occurring in Moldova between 1999 and 2009, including in Transnistria, is unknown. There were no systematic mine/ERW risk education (RE) activities in Moldova and no known RE activities in the Transnistria region. Services to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, were not adequate to meet the level of need.

### Mine Ban Policy

Moldova signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001. Moldova has not enacted any legal measures to implement the treaty domestically. It believes that the Criminal Code passed on 18 April 2002 covers all aspects necessary for adequate implementation of the treaty.¹

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¹ Interview with Dorin Panfil, Head, Division for Political-Military Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Chisinau, 31 March 2009; and interview with Emil Druc, Deputy Head, General Department for Multilateral Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Chisinau, 13 March 2007. See also Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2006, which states “The Criminal Code of the Republic of Moldova envisages penal sanctions for the storage, purchase, selling and use of weapons and ammunitions that also includes anti-personnel mines. Although there is not national legislation specifically related to the Convention, the existing one is sufficient to give effect to the Convention.”
Moldova has submitted its ninth Article 7 transparency report, covering calendar year 2008. It cited no changes from the previous year. It did the same in its report covering calendar year 2007, reporting no changes since 2006.

Moldova attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but did not make any statements. It participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it made a statement highlighting issues related to Moldova’s implementation of the treaty and stating that, because of lack of access, “it was not possible to collect and report accurate information concerning the issue of antipersonnel mines in the Transnistria region.” Moldova said that it had invited the NGO Geneva Call to engage representatives of the region and that it had held discussions with Moldovan NGOs and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) office in Chisinau on obtaining better information on the antipersonnel mine situation in the region, with a view toward pursuing implementation of the treaty.

In 2006, Moldova expressed its views on key issues of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, when it made strong statements in agreement with the positions of the ICBL and many States Parties.


Production, transfer, stockpiling, and mines retained
Moldova has stated that it has never produced, imported, or exported antipersonnel mines. It destroyed its stockpile of 13,194 antipersonnel mines inherited from the Soviet Union in 2002, as part of a destruction program managed by the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency. In 2002, Moldova declared it would retain 849 antipersonnel mines for training. It reported destroying a number of these during 2004, indicating that 249 remained retained for training. In 2006, Moldova destroyed the remaining 249 antipersonnel mines.

Scope of the Problem
Contamination
Moldova is affected by UXO, but the precise extent to which territory under its jurisdiction or control is mine-affected remains unclear.

Moldova reported previously that it had completed the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its control by August 2000. In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2005, Moldova claimed that there were no mined areas containing antipersonnel mines on

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5 Types destroyed under this program included PMN, PMN-2 (Soviet origin), and MAI-75 (Romanian origin). Moldova’s reporting on its stockpiled mines, mines destroyed, and mines retained was inconsistent. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 430–431.
8 See, for example, Article 7 Report, para. 3, 6 May 2005; and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 517.
States Parties

Moldova

territory under its control, while acknowledging that it had no information on the situation in Transnistria. Subsequent Article 7 reports have been marked “unchanged.”

Transnistria region
The Transnistrian region of Moldova declared independence in September 1990 as the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic (Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika, PMR), but has not been recognized internationally. PMR forces maintain control of the region. In 2007, a top military official from Transnistria’s military forces told Landmine Monitor that the PMR will not recognize the obligations of any international agreement such as the Mine Ban Treaty until Transnistria is internationally recognized.

Both sides used landmines when fighting broke out between Moldovan and PMR forces in 1992. Transnistria military forces are believed to still have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but have not reported on numbers or types.

In its CCW Article 13 reports, however, Moldova has stated that there is a “high probability” of mined areas in some regions on the side of the Nistru river where the Transnistrian conflict took place in 1992. Subsequent reports have marked this information as “unchanged.” In the 1992 conflict, landmines were reportedly laid in Dubasari region, Cosnita-Pogrebea, and Varnita-Bender. In addition, on 2 August 2008 following the flooding of the Nistru river, 510 antipersonnel mines left from World War II were reportedly discovered in Bender by inhabitants, and were subsequently destroyed by Transnistrian military forces.

Casualties
No new mine/ERW casualties were reported in 2008 and to June 2009 on territory controlled by the Moldovan government. Three new ERW casualties (two killed and one injured) were reported in three incidents in the ceasefire “security zone.” All incidents were believed to have involved hand grenades or grenade components.

Moldova’s 2006 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report stated in relation to mine casualties, “There are no such victims on the territory controlled by the constitutional authorities of the Republic of Moldova.” Subsequent Article 13 reports stated that the situation was unchanged. Landmine Monitor has identified at least 14 civilian ERW casualties in Moldova (10 killed and four injured) since 1999.

In Transnistria, 47 civilian landmine casualties (21 killed and 26 injured) were recorded in eight villages in the Dubasari region between 1992 and 2005. Ten military casualties (two killed and eight injured) occurred during the same period. In 2006, a boy was injured, and a man

10 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form C.
11 See, for example, Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form C.
12 Telephone interview with Gen. Vladimir Atamaniuk, Chief of General Staff, Transnistria military forces, 6 April 2007.
13 A July 1992 cease-fire agreement established a “security zone” and a tripartite peacekeeping force comprised of Moldovan, Russian, and PMR units. The “security zone” separating Transnistria from the rest of Moldova is 10 to 20km wide and 140km long on both sides of the Nistru river. From 1992 to 31 May 2006, 5,207 antipersonnel mines and 2,850 antivehicle mines were cleared from the security zone.
16 Article 13 Reports, Form B, 10 August 2007; and 20 October 2008.
19 Letter from Ion Coropcean, Chief of General Staff, Moldovan National Army, 18 March 2009.
21 Article 13 Reports, 10 August 2007; and 20 October 2008.
and a girl were killed in separate incidents in Transnistria involving hand grenades; it was not specified whether the grenades were ERW.\(^{24}\)

In 2004, a Moldovan citizen was killed and another injured after they entered a minefield while trying to cross the border between Greece and Turkey.\(^{25}\)

**Program Management and Coordination**

There is no ongoing mine action program and no ongoing mine clearance in Moldova. The Moldovan Ministry of Social Protection, Family and Child is responsible for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.\(^{26}\)

**Data collection and management**

Moldova does not have a comprehensive casualty data collection or reporting system and information in the local media was incomplete. Information on casualties in Transnistria is not publicly available.\(^{27}\)

**Demining**

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Moldova is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2011. It cleared mined areas under its control prior to becoming a State Party. In its Article 7 report for 2001, Moldova reported that there were “no mined areas available.”\(^{28}\) It reported the destruction of the “minefield Northern Pohrebea” by the Ministry of Defense from 3 May to 12 August 2000 using “electrical method.”\(^{29}\) In a subsequent Article 7 report, Moldova stated that, “As a result of this operation, 85 ha [hectares] of terrain mined during the military conflict of 1992 have been cleared. A total of 345 explosive objects have been extracted and eliminated. Presently, the Republic of Moldova does not have any mined terrain.”\(^{30}\) During the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Moldova stated that in “carrying out in good faith the obligations which it assumed by the Ottawa Convention, the Republic of Moldova completed, inter alia, the destruction of all anti-personnel mines far ahead of the established deadlines under Articles 4 and 5.”\(^{31}\)

According to one Moldovan official, it is already in compliance with Article 5 since it already destroyed all antipersonnel mines in mined areas in the territory under its control. With regard to the Transnistria region, which is not controlled currently by the central authorities, an obligation will arise as soon as de facto control by the central government is restored.\(^{32}\) In 2008, however, Geneva Call was invited by the Moldovan government to assess the landmine situation in Transnistria and to contribute to confidence-building efforts in the region.\(^{33}\)


\(^{28}\) Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2001), Form C.

\(^{29}\) Ibid, Form G.


\(^{32}\) Email from Victor Moraru, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of Moldova to the UN in Geneva, 17 June 2008.

\(^{33}\) Interview with Markus Haake, Programme Officer for the Caucasus, and Mehmet Balci, Programme Director and Permanent Representative of Geneva Call to the European Union, Geneva Call, Chisinau, 3 October 2008.
Further, in contrast to the position it has expressed previously, at the regional seminar Towards Global Coherence in Addressing the Problems caused by Landmines, Cluster Munitions, and Explosive Remnants of War, organized by Lithuania on 26–27 June 2008, Iurie Tabunicic, an official from the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, declared that Moldova would need to request an extension to its Article 5 deadline.\(^{34}\) In March 2009, however, an official from the same ministry contradicted this statement, stating that until the Moldovan government had restored its control over the territory of Transnistria all discussions on this issue “would be irrelevant.”\(^{35}\)

The ICBL believes that should any mined areas under Moldova’s jurisdiction but not its control remain upon expiry of its Mine Ban Treaty deadline, in accordance with Article 5, Moldova will need to seek an extension to that deadline.\(^{36}\)

**Risk Education**

No mine/ERW RE activities were reported in Moldova from 2008–2009 and no systematic RE activities were carried out from 1999–2009. From 1999 to August 2000, during clearance operations, deminers told the local population what to do if they found landmines, except in the Transnistria region.\(^{37}\) During the 2007–2008 school year, the only RE activity reported by the Red Cross Society of Moldova was a module in its optional human rights school course.\(^{38}\)

**Victim Assistance**

The estimated number of survivors is unknown. There are no specific mine/ERW victim assistance activities in Moldova.\(^{39}\) In June 2008, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Social Protection, Family and Child noted that government assistance to persons with disabilities did not meet their needs. In 2000 and 2007, veterans and pensioners protested against the irregular payment or non-payment of benefits.\(^{40}\) Legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities was not enforced and few resources were allocated.\(^{41}\) Moldova had not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or signed its Optional Protocol as of 1 July 2009.

In Transnistria, the level of support provided to mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities also remained below what is stipulated in public policy.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{35}\) Interview with Dorin Panfil, Head, NATO and Political-Military Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chisinau, 31 March 2009.

\(^{36}\) See, for example, Statement of the ICBL, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 28 May 2009.

\(^{37}\) Email from Iurie Pintea, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 25 April 2007; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 742.

\(^{38}\) Interview with Vasile Cernenchi, Executive Director, RCSM, Chisinau, 30 March 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 514.

\(^{39}\) Moldova’s Article 13 report for calendar year 2006 stated that, “no rehabilitation programmes for persons injured by antipersonnel mines explosions are conducted,” and in its subsequent Article 13 reports Moldova stated that the situation remained unchanged. Article 13 Reports, 10 August 2007; and 20 October 2008.


Support for Mine Action

From September 2003 to December 2008, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units of the Moldovan National Army were deployed to Iraq for the clearance and disposal of mines, UXO, and improvised explosive devices. The final contingent of 20 military personnel, including 16 mine engineers and four staff officers, was deployed on 19 August 2008. An EOD team was attached to the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Mosul and the four staff officers were attached to the Multi-national Force–Iraq headquarters in Baghdad. Moldova withdrew its contingent of personnel from Iraq in December 2008, citing Iraq’s “stability... and the transfer of de-mining operations to (Iraqi) armed forces.” Moldova did not report the in-kind value of deployment of demining personnel in Iraq in 2008.

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45 “Moldova to pull troops out of Iraq early,” Agence France-Presse (Chisinau), 15 October 2008.
MONTENEGRO

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 April 2007</th>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Cluster munition remnants: 250,000m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>0 (2007: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Disposal of underwater UXO: 104,000m²</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>1 April 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>No progress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Montenegro gained independence in June 2006 and became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 April 2007. On 16 May 2007, the last of Montenegro’s stockpiled mines were destroyed in Serbia. Montenegro decided not to retain any mines for training purposes. Following its independence from Serbia, in November 2007 Montenegro was reported in the media as having completed mine clearance operations, but had still to survey an area bordering Croatia for possible contamination as of April 2009. No formal declaration of compliance with Article 5 had been made. In addition, Montenegro still faces contamination from unexploded submunitions and underwater explosive remnants of war (ERW) located offshore.

The number of mine and ERW casualties is unknown, but at least 260 survivors were said to be residing in Montenegro. No formal mine/ERW risk education has been provided in Montenegro as officially there is no mine problem. The capacity and quality of the Montenegrin healthcare system deteriorated during the war in the 1990s, and little progress has been noted since. Progress was made in the field of disability law, although the level of implementation remains unclear.

Mine Ban Policy

Montenegro deposited its instrument of succession to the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 October 2006, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2007. Montenegro has not enacted new legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, but instead relies on existing laws. The head of the Regional Center for Divers’ Training and Underwater Demining (RCUD) told Landmine Monitor in February 2009 that existing laws and regulations are sufficient and that due to the small scale of the landmine problem there is no need for further adjustments. Montenegro’s Article 7 reports have all declared that the requirements of Article 9 (national implementation measures) have been fully implemented.

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1 On 3 June 2006, Montenegro ended its union with Serbia and became independent. It was accepted as a member of the UN on 28 June 2006. The former state of Serbia and Montenegro had acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2003.

2 Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, Director, RCUD, Podgorica, 18 February 2009.

3 Article 7 Reports, Form A, October 2007, 2008 (for calendar year 2007), and 2009 (for calendar year 2008). The 2008 and 2009 reports include excerpts from the Criminal Code of Montenegro (2003 and 2004) on “use of forbidden means of combat” and the “manufacture of forbidden weapons,” citing relevant penal sanctions. The 2009 report also refers to Article 25 of the “Law on Army of Montenegro,” which states that the military must function in the framework of international law and that military personnel must be equipped in accordance with international conventions.
Montenegro submitted its third Article 7 report in 2009, covering calendar year 2008. It includes voluntary Form J with an explanation of Montenegro’s view of MRUD (Claymore-type) mines.

Montenegro attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Montenegro has not participated in States Parties’ discussions on issues of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty, including what acts are prohibited by the ban on joint military acts with states not party, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes, and mines retained for training.

Montenegro is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but has not yet joined Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Montenegro signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had yet to ratify it as of 1 July 2009.

Use, production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

In October 2008, a Montenegrin border guard was injured when his vehicle hit what was initially reported as an antipersonnel mine on the border with Albania and Kosovo. It was reported that the mine could have been newly laid as the road is frequently used and in an area previously declared free of mines, or that it might be a remnant from the Kosovo war. In March 2009, the police stated that it was a criminal act and that the investigation was ongoing.

In March 2007, Montenegro reaffirmed earlier reports that the former state of Serbia and Montenegro did not produce any type of landmine after 1990. Montenegro has also confirmed that there are no facilities for mine production on its territory. In the past, the former Serbia and Montenegro stated several times that mine exports halted in 1990.

On 16 May 2007, Montenegro and Serbia destroyed the last of their stockpiled antipersonnel mines in advance of their respective deadlines of 1 April 2011 and 1 March 2008. In total, Montenegro transferred 199,387 mines to Serbia for destruction, including approximately 40,000 after independence. However, in its Article 7 report submitted in 2008, Montenegro stated, “All mines had been destroyed before Montenegro gained independence.”
Montenegro has not retained any mines for training purposes.\textsuperscript{17} In its initial Article 7 report, Montenegro stated that it had 23,826 MRUD (Claymore-type) directional fragmentation mines in stock.\textsuperscript{18} However, its Article 7 report submitted in 2008 did not list any MRUD mines.\textsuperscript{19} Montenegro did not initially explain this change.\textsuperscript{20} In March 2009, a Ministry of Defense official informed Landmine Monitor that Montenegro does not consider its MRUD mines covered by the Mine Ban Treaty, since these, according to the official, are command-detonated and not victim-activated.\textsuperscript{21} Montenegro’s Article 7 report submitted in 2009 similarly states that the MRUD mines “are permissible under Mine Ban Treaty, it does not classify as antipersonnel mines and can not be activated by accidental contact.”\textsuperscript{22}

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Montenegro became contaminated with mines and ERW, mainly UXO, as a result of conflicts during the break-up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Contamination included cluster munition remnants left after NATO air strikes on Serbian and Montenegrin military positions in 1999.\textsuperscript{23} Montenegro reported in the press in November 2007 that it had become the first country in the Balkan region to be cleared of mines.\textsuperscript{24} By April 2009, Montenegro had not officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations although its Article 7 report submitted in 2009 did not report any mined areas.\textsuperscript{25} However, Montenegro still had to survey a mountainous area on the border with Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to clarify if the contamination that affects the Croatian side of the border also affects Montenegro. A technical survey of the area was planned to be conducted (see Demining and battle area clearance section below).\textsuperscript{26} Montenegro has a problem with cluster munition remnants, consisting of unexploded BLU-97 submunitions, mainly located on and around Golubovci airfield, near the capital Podgorica. Contamination, which is estimated to cover 250,000m²,\textsuperscript{27} directly affects four villages around the airfield.\textsuperscript{28} A technical survey of the area that was planned to start in 2007\textsuperscript{29} was postponed to 2009, and was still dependent on securing the necessary funding.\textsuperscript{30} Officials say cultivated land in the area has been cleared and is safe for use, but edges of the land have not been cleared and may still pose a threat to the population.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{17} Article 7 Report, Form D, October 2007; and Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form D.
\textsuperscript{18} Article 7 Report, Forms B and H, October 2007. It states that the “detonator is electrical capsule.”
\textsuperscript{19} Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form B.
\textsuperscript{20} Claymore-type mines that are used in victim-activated mode, with tripwires, are banned by the treaty. Those used in command-detonated mode are not. States Parties have been urged to report on what steps they have taken to ensure that any such mines that are retained cannot be used in victim-activated mode.
\textsuperscript{22} Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
\textsuperscript{23} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 523.
\textsuperscript{24} “Montenegro is the only one without mines in Balkans,” Pobjeda (Montenegrin daily newspaper), 8 November 2007; “Montenegro cleared,” Dan (Montenegrin daily newspaper), 9 November 2007; interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, Podgorica, 16 March 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 518.
\textsuperscript{25} Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Forms C and I.
\textsuperscript{26} Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, Podgorica, 18 February 2009.
\textsuperscript{29} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 519.
\textsuperscript{30} Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, Podgorica, 18 February 2009.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid; and telephone interview with Borislav Miskovic, Montenegro Police Force, 18 February 2009.
Another area of approximately 30,000m² around Golubovci airfield is suspected to be contaminated by UXO from munitions fired during Yugoslav military aviation drills. The area is mostly used by the local population, who are said to be aware of the possible threat.32

The Bojana river, which represents the natural border between Montenegro and Albania, is suspected to be contaminated by UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) from earlier conflicts. The river is used by small boats and its banks by border police.33 Montenegro’s Adriatic coast is also contaminated with underwater UXO left after World Wars I and II and the 1991–1995 conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The precise location of all residual underwater contamination remains unknown, although two bays are confirmed to be affected.34

Casualties
In 2008, no new landmine casualties were identified in Montenegro, but the Montenegro Police Force reported that one child was injured by an M35 Italian hand grenade he found in a wall in Podgorica.35 The RCUD added that the device dated back to World War II.36

In October 2008, the media reported that a member of the border police had been injured when his car drove over a mine in Bjelaje.37 The police stated in March 2009 that the incident was a criminal act and an investigation was ongoing.38

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Montenegro remains unknown. From 1999 to 2008, at least 10 ERW casualties, including five children, were recorded in four incidents (four killed and six injured). Submunitions caused four casualties, grenades three, and unknown ERW the remaining three. In 2009, the Montenegro Police Force and RCUD provided information on three previously unreported casualties: two people injured by an M35 grenade in 2006 and one Bosnian killed in 2002 (the two other casualties of this incident had been reported before).39 In 2004, 260 mine/ERW survivors were recorded as living in Montenegro.40

Socio-economic impact
In the past, the main socio-economic impact of ERW was said to be preventing people from using forests to collect firewood and lumber, which for some inhabitants were the main sources of income.41 In addition, businesses investing in areas that may be affected by World War II-era bombs or unexploded submunitions may require survey and possibly clearance to be conducted.42

Program Management and Coordination

The Ministry of Interior Affairs and Public Administration established a Department for Emergency Situations and Civilian Safety in 2007, and set up an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team within it, but due to a lack of human resources, responsibility for EOD remained with the police in 2008.43 Officials said in 2008 that Montenegro was in the process of clarifying roles and responsibilities for mine action but, as of March 2009, had yet to issue any clarification.44

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32 Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, Podgorica, 18 February 2009.
33 Ibid.
35 Email from Borislav Miskovic, Montenegro Police Force, 9 March 2009.
36 Email from Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, 26 March 2009.
38 Email from Borislav Miskovic, Montenegro Police Force, 26 March 2009.
42 Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, Podgorica, 16 March 2008.
The RCUD continued its role as the national mine action center.\textsuperscript{45} The RCUD was set up in 2002 by the government, which assigned the Ministry of Interior Affairs and Public Administration to “develop [the center’s] organization and its specification.” It describes itself as a “public institution and has status of a legal entity realizing independently its functions assigned by the [government].”\textsuperscript{46}

There is no need for a specific victim assistance framework in Montenegro; mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Education and Science are responsible for disability issues.\textsuperscript{47} A Commission for Anti-Personnel Mine Victims was reportedly established by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Welfare in 2004. In 2009, however, the ministry stated that it had no knowledge of the commission’s existence.\textsuperscript{48} In November 2007, Montenegro adopted a Strategy for the Integration of Persons with Disabilities 2008–2016,\textsuperscript{49} and in June 2008 a two-year action plan with specific objectives and timeframes was launched.\textsuperscript{50}

**Data collection and management**

Montenegro and Serbia shared a joint database on contamination and victims during their union, but since their separation, Montenegro has not established its own mine action database. RCUD staff have received training in the use of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA),\textsuperscript{51} but the RCUD stated in 2009 that it will not use IMSMA because of the limited extent of ERW contamination and the absence of recent victims.\textsuperscript{52}

There is no systematic collection of mine action data in Montenegro. The RCUD has general information on previously mined areas and suspected hazardous areas, and it has recorded the number of mines found and destroyed during demining.\textsuperscript{53} The Ministry of Interior Affairs and Public Administration also has some information on the progress of mine action and some victim data.\textsuperscript{54}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCUD</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| None                                   |          |    |                          |    |

\textsuperscript{45} Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, Podgorica, 16 March 2008.
\textsuperscript{46} See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 524; and *Sluzbeni list RCG* (Official Gazette of Montenegro), No. 66, pp. 28–32.
\textsuperscript{47} Email from Senka Klikovac, Office of Mileva Todorić, Deputy Minister, Department of Pension and Disability Insurance and Protection of War Veterans, 25 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{48} Email from Mileva Todorić, Department of Pension and Disability Insurance and Protection of War Veterans, 4 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{52} Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, Podgorica, 18 February 2009.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid; and email from Borislav Miskovic, Montenegro Police Force, 9 March 2009.
Plans

Strategic mine action plans
Montenegro did not draw up a strategic mine action plan due to the relatively small extent of its mine problem.\(^5\) For 2009, the RCUD was planning to give priority to general and technical surveys of suspect land around the military airfield at Golubovci and the Bojana river, as well as the mountainous area on the border with Croatia and BiH, which may still be contaminated with antipersonnel mines. Where surveys confirmed contamination, clearance operations would then be planned.\(^5\)

National ownership
Landmine Monitor is not aware of any legislation establishing the RCUD. However, it functions under rules published in the Official Gazette for regulating as well as implementing underwater mine/UXO clearance.\(^5\)

National mine action legislation and standards
The RCUD says that it disposes of mines/UXO in accordance with international standards and has developed its own standard operating procedures (SOPs) for clearance operations. The RCUD also says its SOPs for underwater demining are “unique.”\(^\)\(^5\)

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
In February 2009, in cooperation with the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC), the RCUD planned to survey difficult-to-access areas in the mountains along the border with Croatia and BiH that might be mine-affected.\(^5\) CROMAC had agreed to send mine situation maps covering the border areas between BiH, Croatia, and Montenegro.\(^5\) As of 1 April 2009, no further progress had been reported with respect to the survey, and it was not known when it would be carried out.

Demining

The RCUD said no mine clearance took place in 2008.\(^\)\(^5\)

Identification of hazardous areas
The RCUD had planned to conduct a technical survey in 2008 of the area around Golubovci airfield, which is believed to be contaminated with unexploded submunitions.\(^5\) It postponed the project due to lack of funding and expected to carry it out in 2009.\(^5\) As of March 2009, however, the RCUD had not received authorization from the airfield’s management to operate in the airfield zone.\(^5\)

The RCUD and the police EOD team surveyed the area around a former Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) ammunition storage area.\(^5\) In response to requests by a commercial company investing in the area, the RCUD undertook a general underwater survey of 600,000m² in Tivat bay (a bay within Boka Kotorska bay in the Adriatic sea). The survey defined 104,000m² of area for clearance. The area will be used for construction of a marine complex.\(^5\)

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\(^5\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 524; and Sluzbeni list RCG (Official Gazette of Montenegro), No. 66, pp. 28–32.

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Battle area clearance

As a result of the underwater survey, RCUD conducted clearance on 104,000m² in 2008, finding and destroying 13 tons (13,000kg) of UXO. The RCUD also undertook 11 underwater clearance tasks, acting on information provided by the local population, and reported clearing approximately 500kg of ammunition and UXO. RCUD interventions included clearance of explosive ordnance to a depth of 40m; the ordnance had been inadvertently dragged up by fishermen who threw it back, marked the location, and then informed the police or RCUD.

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Montenegro is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2017. Officials stated publicly in November 2007 that Montenegro was free of mines, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not made a formal declaration of compliance with Article 5 as of April 2009, nor had it said when it planned to do so.

Demining: 1999–200870

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m²)</th>
<th>Area released by survey (m²)</th>
<th>Battle area clearance (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>78,028</td>
<td>76,179</td>
<td>394,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004–2006</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>241,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>319,028</td>
<td>76,179</td>
<td>394,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 2002 and 2008, the police EOD team removed and destroyed a total of 58 air bombs of 100–500kg, 176 rocket projectiles, 986 cannon and howitzer grenades, 794 mortar shells, 565 rocket-propelled grenades, 560 rifle grenades, 140 antipersonnel mines, 18 antivehicle mines, 32 unexploded submunitions, 5,587 hand grenades, three antiship/antisubmarine mines, and several thousand other munitions.

Risk Education

In 2008, as in previous years, no formal mine/ERW risk education (RE) was provided in Montenegro. According to the police, the local residents around Golubovci airfield are aware of the danger from cluster munition remnants, having lived there during the NATO air strikes and having knowledge of where the cluster munitions were dropped and their impact. Therefore, warning signs have not been installed, although marking costs are included in the expenditures.
document of the technical survey of the airfield.\textsuperscript{74} The RCUD believes that submunitions still pose a threat to the local population.\textsuperscript{75}

Montenegrin authorities reported that over the years some sporadic RE was provided during survey and clearance activities.\textsuperscript{76} Since the creation of the EOD team within the Montenegro Police Force, communities have been informed on how to reach the police if ERW are found. The media has also been used on several occasions to inform the public about the dangers of ERW.\textsuperscript{77}

**Victim Assistance**

The estimated number of survivors is unknown but at least 260; this is presumed to be the result of conflicts in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.

Montenegro did not retain the former Serbia and Montenegro’s status as one of the 26 States Parties with the greatest numbers of survivors and the greatest needs.\textsuperscript{78} Support is limited to state benefits and services, and in 2007–2008 healthcare services did not meet the needs of the population.\textsuperscript{79} Economic reintegration of persons with disabilities was problematic with only 2% of them employed in 2008. It was hoped that the August 2008 Law on Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of Persons with Disabilities would generate positive changes. Disability allowances are low.\textsuperscript{80} Civilian victims of war, including mine/ERW survivors, are organized in local associations with units in each community.\textsuperscript{81}

**Support for Mine Action**

No international contributions were reported for mine action in Montenegro in 2008.

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\textsuperscript{75} Interview with Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, Podgorica, 16 March 2008.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77} Email from Borislav Miskovic, Montenegro Police Force, 26 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{78} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 526.


\textsuperscript{81} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 526; and email from Mileva Todorić, Department of Pension and Disability Insurance and Protection of War Veterans, 4 March 2009.
2008 Key Data

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Party since</strong></td>
<td>1 March 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contamination</strong></td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO, AXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated area of contamination</strong></td>
<td>10.49km² of mined areas (end 2008) and additional SHAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Casualties in 2008</strong></td>
<td>Nine (2007: 47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</strong></td>
<td>Unknown but at least 185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</strong></td>
<td>Deadline: 1 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Original deadline: 1 March 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demining in 2008</strong></td>
<td>1.75km² of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.5km² of land surveyed for development projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk education recipients in 2008</strong></td>
<td>At least 52,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Progress towards victim assistance aims</strong></td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for mine action in 2008</strong></td>
<td>National: $1.6 million (2007:$1.3 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International: $3.2 million (2007: $3.5 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary


Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in Mozambique are a legacy of nearly 30 years of conflict that ended in 1992. Inaccurate surveys and poor data led to poor targeting of clearance and unnecessarily large expenditure for many years of the mine action program. In 2007 and 2008, a Baseline Assessment and the completion of clearance in the four northern provinces reduced the remaining problem to an estimated 12km². In November 2008, Mozambique received a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline for clearance to 1 March 2014. Since 1993, national, nongovernmental, and commercial entities have carried out demining in Mozambique. By 2008, three NGOs remained and commercial demining companies were contracted to verify the safety of land related to construction and development projects.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 447 casualties (86 killed, 183 injured, and 178 unknown). During the same period, the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, IND) identified 285 casualties (100 killed and 185 injured). While there is probably significant overlap between Landmine Monitor and IND data, inadequate details on casualties from IND and from media reports make comparisons unreliable.

Mozambique credits its risk education (RE) program for helping to reduce the number of mine/ERW casualties. In 2005, UNICEF determined that there was no longer a need for RE in the country, although an assessment by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining suggested there was still a need for RE to be integrated with mine clearance activities.
Overall, victim assistance improved little, although some investments were made to infrastructure and staff training for physical rehabilitation services. Progress made towards the achievement of VA26 objectives was limited, especially in psychological support and social and economic reintegration. Mozambique has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but few resources were available to enforce existing laws and discrimination was prevalent.

Mine Ban Policy

Mozambique signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 August 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. No implementing legislation is in place. Mozambique has reported that a draft law was submitted to Parliament for analysis, that it is on the government’s agenda, and “it’s likely to be approved in July [2009] by the Council of Ministers.”


Mozambique participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made a statement on its Article 5 clearance deadline extension request, and commented on Zimbabwe’s extension request. It attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance.

Mozambique has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training). In June 2004, however, a government legal advisor told Landmine Monitor that Mozambique believes any mine that is capable of exploding from the contact of a person is prohibited by the treaty.

Mozambique is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not yet ratified it as of 1 July 2009.

Production, transfer, use, stockpile destruction, and retention

Mozambique has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Throughout the civil war, antipersonnel mines were imported from many countries and used by different parties to the conflict. Mozambique completed destruction of its stockpile of 37,318 antipersonnel mines on 28 February 2003, a few days before its treaty-mandated deadline.

In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Mozambique reported that it retains a total of 2,088 mines for training purposes, including mines retained by NGOs operating in the country. Mozambique’s first three Article 7 reports stated that no antipersonnel mines would be retained for training or development purposes. The 2003 report indicates 1,427 mines would be kept; the 2004 and 2005 reports both cite a figure of 1,470 antipersonnel mines; the report for 2006 cites 1,319. The reduction of 151 mines from 2005 to 2006 was the result of the Accelerated Demining Program destroying its mines when the program ended in June 2005.

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3 According to IND’s records, this Article 7 report was submitted “through the normal channels”—the Mozambican Embassy. Email from Hanoch Barlevi, CTA, UNDP/IND, 5 September 2008.


6 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2006), Form E, and earlier Article 7 reports.

7 For more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 580; and Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form B. Mozambique initially reported that it destroyed 37,818 mines, but later changed the figure to 37,318.

8 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. Mozambique cites a total figure of 1,963 mines in the Form D table, but the actual total of the mines listed within the table adds up to 2,088.

9 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2006), Form D. For details see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 530. Mozambique’s first three Article 7 reports stated that no antipersonnel mines would be retained for training or development purposes. The 2003 report indicates 1,427 mines would be kept; the 2004 and 2005 reports both cite a figure of 1,470 antipersonnel mines; the report for 2006 cites 1,319. The reduction of 151 mines from 2005 to 2006 was the result of the Accelerated Demining Program destroying its mines when the program ended in June 2005.
States Parties

Mozambique

MN, PMN-2, POMZ-2M, POMZ-2, OZM-72, MON-50, and OZM) held by the Mozambique Armed Forces; 520 mines of unspecified types held by IND; 343 mines held by APOPO, a Belgian research organization that uses rats to detect mines; 42 mines held by Handicap International (HI); 10 138 by HALO Trust; and six by Integra. Mozambique’s reporting of 1,265 mines retained in 2006 did not include the 520 mines in the possession of IND, which accounts for much of the overall discrepancy in numbers reported at the end of 2006 and the end of 2008.

Mozambique did not report on mines actually consumed during 2008 for training purposes. It reported that the 520 mines retained by IND, after being turned over by Norwegian People’s Aid in 2005, would be destroyed by June 2009 as IND has no mandate to carry out training operations.

Mozambique did not explain why the number of retained mines increased from 2006, and it has yet to provide details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in December 2004.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Mozambique is affected by landmines and ERW, a legacy of nearly 30 years of conflict that ended in 1992. The results from the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) from 2001 have been updated by three major surveys of the problem—two by HALO and one by HI—that reduced the total estimated mined area in Mozambique to approximately 12km².

Between March 2005 and 8 December 2006, HALO conducted a Mine Impact Free District survey in the four northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa, and Zambézia, where it had been operating since 1994. On completion of the survey, HALO stated it had identified and cleared every known mined area in the four provinces. In April 2009, HALO’s Executive Director Guy Willoughby said every village in the four provinces in northern Mozambique was free of landmines. In its Article 5 deadline extension request revision, Mozambique stated that it had met its treaty obligations in the northern provinces and accepted the findings of the survey, despite the fact that after the survey local authorities had received police reports from the provincial authorities of 146 sites containing a residual threat from UXO or mines. IND planned to send quality assurance (QA) teams to the four provinces in 2009 to make a technical assessment of the reported problem.

In the 2007 Baseline Assessment, HALO surveyed Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Sofala, and Tete provinces for contamination. Further surveys by HALO and HI in 2008 added 57 contaminated areas for a new total of 541 mined areas amounting to 12.16km² across six

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10 Email from Camille Gosselin, Advocacy Project Officer on Landmines and Cluster Munitions, HI, 21 August 2009.
11 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. The report contains a detailed breakdown of mines retained by NGOs.
12 Ibid. As of July 2009, Mozambique had not reported completing or beginning destruction of the mines possessed by the IND.
14 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 26 August 2008, p. 4.
15 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 May 2008, p. 2.
17 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 25 August 2008, pp. 2–3.
18 Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Head of Operations and Mila Massango, Head of International Affairs, IND, in Geneva, 2 June 2008; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fernando Mulima, Head of Planning and Information Department, IND and Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, 24 April 2009.
provinces. The Baseline Assessment also identified contaminated areas that include the following:

- six battle areas comprising 81,000m² in Manica, Sofala, and Tete provinces;
- roads on the border with Zimbabwe;
- infrastructure, such as dams at Cahora Bassa and Chicamba in Tete province;
- the Beira-Machipanda railway in Manica province and the Limpopo railway in Gaza province;
- 170 electricity pylons between Maputo city and the border with South Africa; and
- 75 UXO spot clearance tasks.

Mozambique has yet to provide official clearance estimates for minefields along its border with Zimbabwe and IND has categorized one SHA in Cheringoma district in Sofala province and one SHA in Mabalane district in Gaza province for further survey. IND did not expect the areas to be resurveyed in 2009.

Between May and September 2009, HALO surveyed the border areas with Zimbabwe, estimated to be 7km long with an estimated contaminated area of 210,000m². Initial funding came from the United States Department of State.

### Mined areas and UXO sites in Mozambique, December 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No. of mined areas in Baseline Assessment</th>
<th>No. of SHAs remaining</th>
<th>Estimated area (m²)</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Area remaining (m²)</th>
<th>Mined roads</th>
<th>UXO sites remaining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1,931,793</td>
<td>73,066</td>
<td>1,858,727</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhambane</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3,720,474</td>
<td>246,501</td>
<td>3,473,973</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manica</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2,438,511</td>
<td>20,141</td>
<td>2,418,370</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maputo</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>622,188</td>
<td>592,899</td>
<td>29,289</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sofala</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2,532,486</td>
<td>350,066</td>
<td>2,182,420</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tete</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>918,589</td>
<td>598,016</td>
<td>320,573</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>12,164,041</td>
<td>1,880,689</td>
<td>10,283,352</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form C.
23 Analysis of Mozambique’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 17 October 2008, p. 2; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 May 2008, p. 24.
24 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fernando Mulima, IND and Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, 24 April 2009.
26 Interview with Helen Gray, Representative for Mozambique and Christian Richmond, HALO, Maputo, 19 April 2009.
Casualties
IND recorded nine mine/ERW casualties (three killed and six injured) in four incidents in 2008. Four casualties were caused by mines, and five by ERW. The majority of casualties were girls (four), followed by men (two, including a deminer), boys (two), and women (one deminer).28

This represents a significant decrease from the 24 mine/ERW casualties (14 killed and 10 injured) recorded by IND or the 47 mine/ERW casualties (22 killed and 25 injured) identified by Landmine Monitor in 2007.29 IND believed that the reduced number of casualties was the result of reduced mine contamination and successful RE, including RE activities particularly targeting scrap metal collection, which has reduced risk-taking behavior.30 Mine clearance operators agreed that there was a general perception that the number of casualties had reduced and that SHAs were well known by the population.31 However, it is also suspected that some casualties go unreported.

In April 2008, two girls were injured by ERW while playing near a former military training site in Chicualacuala, Gaza. In a separate incident, on 18 April 2008, an adult male and a four-year-old girl were killed, and a girl injured in Mutarara, Tete, when the adult attempted to take apart an ERW that he had found near his home. RE was provided in that district in 2007, but it was unknown if the casualties themselves had received RE.32 In September 2008, two boys were injured when one stepped on a landmine in Tete province. The boys live near a known minefield but given their young age, it was unlikely either had received RE, since it was last provided in that area in 2004.33

On 7 July 2008, a male deminer was killed and a female deminer was injured when the male deminer (the team supervisor) set off a landmine in the Mafuiane minefield in Namaacha district, Maputo province. An investigation into the accident determined that the supervisor had violated standing operating procedures but that all others involved, including the injured deminer and medical staff, followed instructions and responded adequately.34

In 2009, one mine casualty (killed) was identified up to 31 May. On 1 March, in Mabalane, Gaza, a woman was killed when she set off a landmine while preparing an oven to make charcoal on the outskirts of her village.35

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 447 casualties (86 killed, 183 injured, and 178 unknown).36 Landmine Monitor data was gathered from IND, Mozambique’s Article 7 reports, the Article 5 deadline extension request, and from media reports. During the same period, IND identified 310 casualties (100 killed, 185 injured, and 25 unknown).37 While there is probably significant overlap between Landmine Monitor and IND data, inadequate details on casualties from IND and from media reports make comparisons unreliable. The most comprehensive collection of casualty data remains the nationwide LIS, completed in August 2001, which recorded 2,145 mine/ERW casualties (but did not provide a breakdown of those killed and injured).38
In August 2008, Mozambique reported that annual casualty rates had decreased since 2001. In both IND and Landmine Monitor data, however, the number of casualties has not consistently decreased each year. That, and the general unreliability of data, makes it difficult to determine trends with any certainty.

**Risk profile**

IND believed that people were now aware of the dangers of mines and ERW and that scrap metal collection was no longer a cause of mine/ERW incidents in 2008. Representatives of mine-affected communities believed that children were at greater risk because, while adults were familiar with and avoided mined areas, children were more likely to enter restricted areas. In 2008, six of the nine casualties were children who were playing in known mine/ERW contaminated areas. The second highest risk group were people cutting wood (minefields tend to be densely vegetated as people have not been using the land) or expanding their fields into the margins of suspected areas. The second highest risk group were people cutting wood (minefields tend to be densely vegetated as people have not been using the land) or expanding their fields into the margins of suspected areas. The second highest risk group were people cutting wood (minefields tend to be densely vegetated as people have not been using the land) or expanding their fields into the margins of suspected areas.

**Socio-economic impact**

With the problem largely confined to 386 small mined areas in six provinces at the beginning of 2009, the socio-economic impact and level of risk has been greatly reduced over the past decade. The remaining mined areas impact farming and access to water, and present a risk to certain hospitals and schools.

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40 Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.
41 Interview with Helen Gray and Christian Richmond, HALO, Maputo, 19 April 2009.
42 Casualty incident reports provided by Fernando Mulima, IND, 21 April 2009.
43 Email from Helen Gray, HALO, 26 March 2009.
44 Article 5 Extension Request (Revision), 25 August 2008, p. 3.
45 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fernando Mulima, IND and Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, 24 April 2009.
States Parties

Mozambique

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
IND serves as the mine action center in Mozambique under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It coordinates demining, including QA and data management, at both the national and provincial levels. 46

Risk education
IND is also responsible for coordinating RE. In 2008, there were no coordinating meetings specific to RE, but RE was included in all mine clearance coordination meetings. 47 INDe monitored the work of demining operators to ensure that they included community liaison activities, as needed. 48

Victim assistance
While the National Mine Action Plan 2008–2012 (Plano Nacional de Acção contra Minas 2008–2012, NMAP) (see Strategic mine action plans section below) reaffirms the role of IND in coordinating victim assistance (VA), 49 IND itself says it does not coordinate VA. Its role is limited to mobilizing resources, encouraging other government agencies to act, ensuring that the national disability plan includes mine/ERW survivors, and preventing further casualties through clearance and RE activities. 50 In its Article 7 report for 2008, as in previous years, Mozambique reported that responsibility for VA was shared by the Ministry of Health (Ministério de Saúde, MISAU) and Ministry of Women and Social Action (Ministério da Mulher e da Acção Social, MMAS) in coordination with IND. 51

MISAU coordinates all healthcare and physical rehabilitation activities and directly manages the country’s 10 orthopedic centers. 52 MMAS coordinates social and economic reintegration services for persons with disabilities, such as pensions, income-generating projects, transportation to help access physical rehabilitation services, inclusive education, and disability rights and awareness activities. 53

Data collection and management
The national mine action database, which uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software, is located at IND. 54 It is updated, but numbers provided to Landmine Monitor on contaminated areas did not add up correctly.

IND also collects RE and casualty data. In theory, RE activity reports are received from the mine clearance operators—IND QA staff who also serve as RE promoters and volunteers or “agents.” In practice, IND only received RE data from one mine clearance operator in 2008 and from IND QA staff. 55 IND RE agents are expected to give their activity reports to the local government to pass them to IND, but no reports were received in 2008. 56 In 2008, RE information was not entered into IMSMA. While it was expected that this would happen by

48 Ibid; interviews with Helen Gray and Christian Richmond, HALO, Maputo, 19 April 2009; and with Aderto Ismael, HI, Maputo, 24 April 2009.
50 Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.
51 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
52 Interview with Edma Sulemane, Coordinator for Physical Rehabilitation, MISAU, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
53 Interview with Macario Dubalelane, Coordinator for Disability, MMAS, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
54 Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin and Mila Massango, IND, Maputo, 4–5 March 2008.
56 Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.
the end of 2009, it was thought unlikely that data would be entered retroactively.\(^{57}\) RE data is believed to be incomplete since some mine clearance operators who carry out community liaison activities do not provide IND with information about these activities.\(^{58}\)

There is no comprehensive database of mine/ERW casualties in Mozambique.\(^{59}\) In August 2008, Mozambique stated that some of its casualty data was “subject to confirmation” and that the data did not represent “the real situation of surviving people of accidents with mines/ERW in Mozambique.”\(^{60}\)

IND receives casualty data from local authorities, hospitals, the media, mine clearance operators, QA staff, and RE agents. IND provides local authorities and mine clearance operators with casualty data collection forms. In 2008, however, only one incident was reported using the designated form.\(^{61}\) The PNAM and IND annual plan for 2009 include an objective to update and complete the database on mine survivors by 2010.\(^{62}\) Little progress was observed and, as of March 2009, casualty data had not yet been included in IMSMA,\(^{63}\) although it was expected that it would start being included by end-2009. As in the case of RE data, there were no plans to input data retroactively.\(^{64}\)

Casualties are believed to be under-reported for a variety of reasons. First, in cases where the casualty dies, the family has no expectation of receiving any benefit or service. Second, people are afraid to report incidents for fear they may be punished for doing something wrong. Third, incidents occur in remote locations where there is little contact with any government officials. Fourth, government staff turnover at the district or provincial level, and/or unclear reporting instructions, prevent local authorities from reporting casualties to IND. Finally, mine clearance operators (who are often the first to learn of incidents) do not systematically report incidents to IND.\(^{65}\) In 2007, Landmine Monitor identified 32 casualties through media monitoring, of which 23 were not included in IND records.\(^{66}\) In most cases, when casualties are reported, only partial data is received and more complete information is difficult to collect because of a lack of roads and telephones in some remote locations where incidents occur.\(^{67}\)

Efforts by MISAU and MMAS to develop a casualty database, first reported in the IND 2006 Annual Report,\(^{68}\) had not been completed as of March 2009 and data collected up to that point had not yet been shared with IND.\(^{69}\) The 2007 national census included four questions on disability, but as of April 2009, disability data had not been made available to IND or MMAS.\(^{70}\)

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\(^{57}\) Interview with Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.

\(^{58}\) Interview with Helen Gray and Christian Richmond, HALO, Maputo, 19 April 2009; and with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.


\(^{60}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 25 August 2008, p. 14.

\(^{61}\) Interview with and casualty incident reports provided by Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 21 April 2009.


\(^{63}\) While Mozambique’s Article 5 deadline extension request of 6 May 2008 stated that casualty data and assistance to registered survivors was recorded in IMSMA, on 20 April 2009, IND staff informed Landmine Monitor that this was not the case. See Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 May 2008, p. 25.

\(^{64}\) Interview with Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.

\(^{65}\) Interviews with Aderito Ismael, HI, Maputo, 24 April 2009; and with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.


\(^{67}\) Interview with Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 21 April 2009.


\(^{69}\) Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.

\(^{70}\) Ibid; Interview with Macario Dubalelane, MMAS, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
States Parties

Mozambique

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

The Council of Ministers approved the NMAP in April 2008. The NMAP aims to establish sustainable mine action planning, coordination, and operational capacities and to fulfill international obligations, including clearing all known minefields. It is based on the results of the Baseline Assessment, lessons learned from the implementation of the 2002–2006 strategic plan, and results of other surveys conducted by HALO and HI.

IND also developed detailed annual plans and targets based on a district-by-district approach to clearance as part of its Article 5 deadline extension request. For 2009, with APOPO, HALO, and HI, and a number of commercial companies as operational partners, IND planned to:

• clear 82 areas and 1.997km² of area in Gaza, Inhambane, Manica, Maputo, Sofala, and Tete provinces;
• conduct a three-month survey of the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border;
• clear 170 electrical pylons; and
• begin clearance around the Cahora Bassa dam.

In May 2009, IND announced the clearance of the 170 electrical pylons would begin as soon as funding was available. António Belchior, the head of operations at IND, said, “After 17 years of peace … we have to remove them [the mines] as we have also received appeals from communities who want to open up fields along the power lines.”

Mozambique does not have separate RE or VA national plans. The NMAP includes the following RE objectives: targeting RE at affected communities as identified by surveys; analyzing incident data to determine the most at-risk groups; and establishing community-based RE by 2010. The plan’s VA objectives included supporting mine survivors’ socio-economic reintegration by providing information and directing them to appropriate service providers and continued advocacy to ensure that the needs of survivors are addressed by relevant government ministries. Annual plans with more specific objectives are developed for RE and VA based on the NMAP four-year cycle.

The National Disability Plan 2006–2010 (Plano Nacional de Acção da Arena da Deficiência, PNAD) includes all persons with disabilities. In 2009, IND requested that VA objectives be included in the PNAD and that IND be included in the committee monitoring the implementation of the plan. MMAS said that this request will be considered when they review the plan in 2010. MMAS had no objection to IND being on the committee.

The African Union Plan for the Decade of Persons with Disabilities 1999–2009 includes a component that will touch on plans for improving disability rights in Mozambique. As of April 2009, Mozambique was revising its objectives for an updated version of the African Union Plan, which would begin in 2010. It is not known how this plan relates to the PNAD.

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71 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fernando Mulima, IND and Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, 24 April 2009.
72 Ibid.
73 Article 5 Extension Request (Revision), 25 August 2008, Table 8, p. 28.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Interview with Macario Dubalelane, MMAS, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
80 Ibid.
81 Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.
The National Health Plan 2009–2016 includes plans for improving physical rehabilitation services for persons with disabilities.83

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

The 2008–2012 NMAP seeks to contribute to Mozambique’s poverty reduction strategy for 2006–2009 in areas where demining is considered “a strategically crucial activity… [and by] making sure that mines are cleared in the affected regions in order to (i) prevent and reduce the loss of human life and (ii) allow the implementation of economic projects, resettlement, and greater mobility of population groups.”84 The remaining SHAs are in agricultural areas and in areas where economic development is planned. IND believes the demining of these areas would contribute to achieving the objectives of the government’s poverty reduction strategy.85

Mozambican law requires that all land designated for infrastructure and construction of new buildings be verified free of landmines. The appropriate government ministry contracts an international or national demining company to carry out this verification.86

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

For many years the Mozambique mine action program was plagued with management problems and a general indifference to mine action, despite significant support with international funds, the UN, international NGOs, and technical advisors. Mozambique’s drafting of the 2008–2012 NMAP and its Strategic Plan for Resource Mobilization (see Support for mine action section below), as well as larger financial contributions to the program from the national budget, has demonstrated a greater commitment to meeting its Mine Ban Treaty obligations.

While IND officially coordinates VA, IND staff asserted that the government committed to assisting mine/ERW survivors without assigning this responsibility to any particular agency or ministry.87 While Mozambique has reported that responsibility for VA is shared by MISAU and MMAS, representatives of IND said that, aside from MMAS, other government agencies feel “no responsibility for the Mine Ban Treaty and have no special concern for mine victims.”88 In IND’s projected budget for 2009–2013, no funds were included for VA coordination or activities.89 Mozambique lacked funding for implementing PNAD and few resources were dedicated to enforce anti-discrimination laws.90

National management

Mine action is managed nationally and at the provincial level by IND. As of December 2008, IND had 45 staff members: 35 based in Maputo and 10 in the regional office in Beira. This represents a decrease of 12 staff from 2007. IND planned to maintain the same staffing levels in 2009.91 Since 1993 when the Mozambique mine action program began, UNDP has supported IND and its predecessors through a chief technical advisor (CTA), an operations manager, and an IMSMA officer. In January 2008, UNDP reduced its technical support to a CTA. When the need arises, short-term consultants will be hired.92

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83 Interview with Edma Sulemane, MISAU, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
86 Interview with Fernando Mulima, IND and Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, Maputo, 21 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fernando Mulima, IND and Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, 24 April 2009.
87 Interview with António Belchior Váz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.
88 Ibid.
89 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 25 August 2008, p. 27.
91 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Fernando Mulima, IND and Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, 24 April 2009.
**National budget**

Over the 2009–2014 Article 5 extension period, Mozambique has committed to contributing US$10.5 million, or about 38% of the total demining funding requirements, including $1.8 million in 2009.93

**National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures**

IND was established by decree in 1999 under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.94 The National Demining Commission, the predecessor to IND, issued national standards in 1998. They were revised in 2001 with technical assistance from the international NGOs operating at the time in Mozambique, to reflect procedures and principles found in the International Mine Action Standards.95 Mozambique does not have separate RE national standards, but mine clearance standards include a requirement that all mine clearance operators include RE alongside clearance.96

**Program evaluations**

The Canadian Landmine Fund, as part of a global evaluation of the mine action programs it has funded, conducted field work for the evaluation in Mozambique in March 2008.97 The findings of the evaluation were not available as of July 2009.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

Demining operations are conducted in all the remaining six mine-affected provinces by APOPO, HALO, and HI. IND tasks them with annual targets according to the operational plan in the Article 5 deadline extension request. Private international and national demining companies are contracted by various ministries involved in investment and development projects to verify that the land for each project is free from mines. In 2009, IND planned to contract local commercial companies to clear some suspected mined areas in Tete province contained in the national database.98

**Mine clearance in 2008**

IND reports that the NGOs cleared almost 1.75km² of land in 2008.99 The results of clearance in 2008 by NGOs are summarized in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO Operator</th>
<th>No. of SHAs cleared</th>
<th>SHA cleared (m²)</th>
<th>UXO sites cleared</th>
<th>Mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APOPO</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>130,272</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>540,178</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1,076,696</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>228</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,747,146</strong></td>
<td><strong>63</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,122</strong></td>
<td><strong>843</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

93 Analysis of Mozambique’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 17 October 2008, p. 3.
96 Interview with António Belchior V az Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.
98 Interview with Fernando Mulima, IND and Hanoch Barlevi, UNDP/IND, Maputo, 21 April 2009.
100 Ibid.
Commercial companies
Commercial companies in 2008 were tasked, according to the law, with verifying that land for new buildings or infrastructure was free from mines and that construction could commence. In 2008 they cleared 495,000m² and found 22 mines and five items of UXO. They conducted mine clearance to assist in investment and development projects such as building schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure. The companies, which are accredited by IND, were contracted by the Ministry of Housing and Public Works, the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Ministry of Mineral Resources, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Tourism. In early 2009, IND issued tenders for commercial companies to clear some of the remaining 386 SHAs in the baseline data. The extent of the commercial companies’ participation is dependent on the availability of funds.

### Demining for Development Projects in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operators</th>
<th>Land released (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed during mine clearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADDC</td>
<td>161,353</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACTEC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JVD</td>
<td>110,730</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>223,500</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>495,583</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Land release**
Mozambique considers the adoption of land release principles and policies to be integral to meeting its Article 5 obligations. IND invited the Survey Action Center to Maputo in March 2009 to facilitate a workshop on land release for IND operations staff and QA teams. The aim was to develop operational procedures for land release (particularly through non-technical means and technical surveys), for QA of the process, and for documentation of the results. IND had not adopted a land release policy as of April 2009. According to Aderito Ismael, HI’s Mine Action Programme Manager in Mozambique, neither land release concepts in general nor the specific methodologies to release land by means other than clearance were well understood at the village level.

**Battle area clearance in 2008**
The Baseline Assessment identified six battle area clearance (BAC) tasks: three in Manica, two in Tete, and one in Sofala. No BAC took place in 2008. There is no special priority to clear these areas. Instead, they will be included in the district-by-district planning and will be cleared when each district is cleared.
Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Mozambique was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. On 6 May 2008, Mozambique submitted a request to extend its deadline to 1 March 2014 (although the operational plan to clear the remaining mined areas was due to be completed by 31 December 2013). 110

Controversial large estimates of the number and size of SHAs have plagued the mine action program since 2001 when the LIS estimated there were 561km² of contaminated area in the country. In 2005–2007, the estimated contaminated area had decreased to some 12km² as well as several road and infrastructure clearance projects as presented in its Article 5 deadline extension request in May 2008. 111 By the end of 2008, the total SHA had been reduced to 10.28km². 112

The ICBL stated in June 2008 at the Standing Committee meetings that Mozambique’s extension request was well conceived and realistic. Clearance of the remaining mined areas may even require less than six years, given sufficient resources. 113

Risk Education
In 2008, RE was increasingly integrated alongside mine clearance activities and QA, and included within the Ministry of Education’s curriculum: it was rarely a stand-alone activity. This was in accordance with a recommendation made by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in 2005. 114 Mozambique stated that “mine risk education continued to be a priority for the government in 2008.” 115

RE was provided by IND, the Ministry of Education, and NGOs to at least 52,911 beneficiaries. This represents a sharp decrease compared to the 503,100 beneficiaries identified by Landmine Monitor in 2007. However, 349,100 of the 2007 beneficiaries had received emergency RE following the ammunition storage area (ASA) explosion in Maputo and flooding in mine-affected provinces. 116 In addition, RE beneficiary figures are not collected systematically by IND and it is possible that, in both years, some beneficiaries were counted twice or not at all. 117 Government representatives and mine clearance operators felt that 2008 activities were sufficient to address potential risks, given the reduced levels of mine/ERW contamination in the country and the decrease in the number of new incidents in recent years. 118

In 2008, there was an increased focus on reducing risks associated with scrap metal collection through a radio and television campaign and messages provided by IND QA teams. 119 While there was one incident in 2008 (the 18 April incident, see Casualties section above) that was believed to have been related to scrap metal collection, government representatives and

110 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 May 2008.
111 Ibid, p. 4.
119 Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.
practitioners in Mozambique felt that risks had been successfully reduced.120 In 2007, there were at least two incidents related to scrap metal collection.121

Mine clearance operators (APOPO, HALO, and HI) were required by the national standards to carry out RE activities alongside clearance activities. IND QA teams also spread RE messages when conducting surveys or QA for sites during and post clearance.122 RE activities carried out by mine clearance operators are funded by international donors.123 HALO reported that community reports collected during community liaison resulted in the identification and destruction of 20 mines and 651 ERW.124

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographic location</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APOPO</td>
<td>RE through community meetings</td>
<td>Gaza province</td>
<td>No figures available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CinemArena</td>
<td>Community presentations through theater, production of film based on theater performances</td>
<td>Inhambane province</td>
<td>Film to 30,000 people, additional beneficiaries but no figures available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>RE through community meetings</td>
<td>Maputo province</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>RE through community meetings, training of RE agents, facilitation of CinemArena RE</td>
<td>Inhambane province</td>
<td>140 RE agents trained, but no figures available for community liaison beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IND</td>
<td>RE through QA teams survey and community liaison, and through IND volunteers</td>
<td>All six mine affected provinces; follow-up on 2007 ASA weapons depot explosion in Maputo</td>
<td>109 RE sessions by QA teams; 24 RE agents trained; 6,911 beneficiaries; no figures available for volunteer activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>RE messages in the school curriculum</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>No figures available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique Christian Council (MCC)</td>
<td>Emergency RE following 2007 ASA explosion</td>
<td>Maputo city</td>
<td>5 MCC staff trained as RE agents, but no figures available on RE beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1999, RE in Mozambique was implemented jointly by HI, the Ministry of Education, and the Mozambique Red Cross (MRC). In 2000, this program was handed over to IND to coordinate and manage. Mozambique’s 2002–2006 NMAP called for “aggressive and sustained” RE, but by 2004, because of a lack of funding, few activities were implemented. In 2005, UNICEF

120 Ibid; interview with Helen Gray and Christian Richmond, HALO, Maputo, 19 April 2009; and Aderito Ismael, HI, Maputo, 24 April 2009.
122 Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
determined that there was no longer a need for RE in the country, although an assessment by the GICHD felt that there was still a need for RE integrated with mine clearance activities. Emergency RE was provided in 2000 and 2007 in response to flooding in mine-affected areas and, in 2007, in response to the ASA explosion in Maputo. In its Article 7 report for 2008, Mozambique stated that “Due to effectiveness of MRE activities, we have registered a reduction of number of accidents and casualties among civil population compared to previous years.”

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is at least 185. Since 2005, Mozambique has repeatedly recognized that VA is the “weakest component” of its program and, in 2008, there were few programs specifically dedicated to mine/ERW survivors. Some progress was noted in the provision of services to all persons with disabilities, however, which could benefit mine/ERW survivors. Mozambique’s healthcare structure is weak and heavily dependent on international assistance (representing 73% of the national health budget in 2008), a result of long years of armed conflict and repeated natural disasters. About one-third of the population cannot access health services and only half have access to an acceptable level of healthcare. There are not enough trained healthcare professionals and insufficient funds dedicated to basic healthcare delivery. District level hospitals have poor capacities to provide emergency and continuing care to mine/ERW survivors and there is no referral service to help people access this care elsewhere.

Rehabilitation services are provided in 10 centers in provincial capitals, all operated by the government. In 2008, the last remaining privately operated center, the MRC Society’s Jaipur Orthopedic Center in Gaza province, began a transition to government operation, which was completed in January 2009. But services were out of reach for those survivors based in rural areas because of a lack of assistance for transportation and accommodation costs. While services are supposed to be free for war-disabled people, survivors were often unaware of this or did not know how to process the paperwork necessary to access them. Four centers were renovated in 2008, bringing the number of renovated centers to six; four remaining centers still required renovation to have “appropriate conditions” to provide services.

The most highly equipped orthopedic center, based in Maputo, had “long waiting lists that keep getting longer” because of a lack of trained staff. A national prosthetics and orthotics course, which began in 2008 and was the first of its kind since 1990, expected to increase the number of staff by 2010. Practitioners and survivors complained about a lack of adequate equipment and the poor quality of prosthetics because of inferior materials and the repeated recycling of materials.

128 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form I.
131 Interview with Manuel Amise, Program Director and Luis Wamusse, President, RAVIM, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
132 Interview with Ivete Dengo, Head, Social Department, MRC, Maputo, 20 April 2009; and interview with Sérgio Nhantumbo, Director, Orthopedic Center, MISAU, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
133 Interview with Manuel Amise and Luis Wamusse, RAVIM, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
135 Interview with Sérgio Nhantumbo, MISAU, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
136 Interview with Carlos Passe, Director of Prosthetics and Orthotics, MISAU, Maputo, 22 April 2009.
137 Interviews with Sérgio Nhantumbo, MISAU, Maputo, 22 April 2009; Adelia Macie, Orthopedic Technologist, Orthopedic Center, MISAU, Maputo, 23 April 2009; Mario Maute, Technician and Landmine Survivor, Orthopedic Center, MISAU, Maputo, 23 April 2009; and Eufémia Amelia, President, Mozambican Association of Disabled Women, 21 April 2009.
Psychosocial support and economic integration activities remained limited. Many persons with disabilities were isolated in their homes, education remained physically inaccessible and there were insufficient employment opportunities, especially in the formal sector. Existing programs were mainly run by NGOs with limited resources. Government officials expressed interest in implementing inclusive education, but called on NGOs for support because of a lack of resources. From 2006–2007, the Network for Mine Victims (Rede para Assistência às Vítimas de Minas, RAVIM) carried out a needs assessment of mine/ERW survivors in one district in Maputo province. Of the 98 survivors they identified, none had received vocational training and the vast majority were unemployed since they were unable to farm, the main occupation in the area.

Although Mozambique has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, few resources were available to enforce existing laws and discrimination was prevalent. As of 1 July 2009, Mozambique had signed but not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, although the government was doing preparatory work for ratification.

In 1999, the Ministry of Health received technical assistance in physical rehabilitation from HI and POWER, a disability organization focused on advocacy and social reintegration, and was dependent on international assistance to provide basic healthcare services. Few to no services were available for psychological support or socio-economic reintegration. In 2004, Mozambique acknowledged that few mine survivors had benefited from assistance programs and that there was a need for a stronger government commitment in this area. Since 2004, Mozambique has repeatedly identified VA as the weakest component in its mine action program. By 2009, mine/ERW survivors still had extremely limited access to all VA services, especially survivors living outside provincial capitals. The Ministry of Health still depended on significant external support for healthcare, but had assumed responsibility for the management of all orthopedic centers and was investing in staff training and the renovation of buildings housing orthopedic centers.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

As one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate attention to survivors, Mozambique presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. Revisions to these objectives had not been presented by May 2009 and thus they remained largely non-SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound). In 2009, IND reported that the PNAD had taken the place of Mozambique’s Nairobi VA objectives and that IND was working with MMAS to ensure that all VA objectives were integrated within the PNAD.

Progress made from 2008–2009 towards the achievement of VA objectives was limited, especially in psychological support and socio-economic reintegration. More progress was observed in physical rehabilitation. Achievements included: the renovation of four orthopedic centers; increased equipment for physical rehabilitation services; the launching of a two-and-a-half year national course in prosthetics and orthotics with 21 students, operated by MISAU;
advances in promoting inclusive education; and the creation of a department within MMAS to address the needs of former combatants, including those with a disability, such as pensions, healthcare and increased awareness of the rights of persons with disabilities.\(^\text{147}\)

The creation of a National Disability Council, originally expected by the end of 2008, thus fulfilling Mozambique’s objective within the area of “laws and public policy,”\(^\text{148}\) had not been formed as of April 2009, but MMAS was developing a proposal for its formation.\(^\text{149}\) Mozambique has no VA objectives related to data collection, although this is included as an objective in their 2008–2012 NMAP; no progress was noted in this area in 2008, but RA VIM began a needs assessment of mine/ERW survivors in two districts in Maputo province.\(^\text{150}\) No progress could be observed in developing a national VA action plan (an objective included in IND’s 2007 Annual Report).

Mozambique included a VA/disability expert on its delegation to the meetings of States Parties from 2005–2008, and to the Standing Committee meetings in 2005 and 2009.\(^\text{151}\) The person acting as Mozambique’s VA expert has changed at nearly every meeting, preventing continuity from one meeting to the next. Mozambique has reported on progress and challenges in VA at the Standing Committee meetings in 2005 and 2009 and at all meetings of States Parties since 2006. Mozambique used voluntary Form J in its annual Article 7 reports to provide details on VA activities in 2005, 2006, and 2008.\(^\text{152}\)

**Victim assistance activities**

In 2008, 1,150 people, including 57 mine/ERW survivors, received physical rehabilitation services for the first time from MISAU.\(^\text{153}\) MMAS provided vocational training in areas such as tailoring, metalworking, electrical work, bicycle repair, refrigeration, small business management, craftsmanship, mechanics, shoemaking, carpentry, and brick making, for 441 youths with disabilities. Another 86 persons with disabilities (38 men and 48 women) received vocational training or support in securing employment.\(^\text{154}\) It was not known if this included mine/ERW survivors. IND assisted 84 mine survivors from Inhambane province with vocational training, scholarships and/or mobility devices, with funds from Italy.\(^\text{155}\) RA VIM also facilitated access to physical rehabilitation services for an unspecified number of mine/ERW survivors.\(^\text{156}\)

In 2007 and 2008, HI and RA VIM identified 50 persons with disabilities that were direct (those injured in the explosion) or indirect (those already disabled but unable to access services because of the explosion) survivors of the ASA explosion in Maputo in 2007.\(^\text{157}\) Based on the needs of the beneficiary, HI and RA VIM facilitated access to physical education, provided support to start a new business, or provided school scholarships for survivors or their family members.\(^\text{158}\)

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\(^{147}\) Statement by Mozambique, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009; interview with Manuel Amise and Luis Wamusse, RA VIM, Maputo, 22 April 2009; and interview with Carlos Passe, MISAU, Maputo, 22 April 2009.


\(^{149}\) Interview with Macario Dubalelane, MMAS, Maputo, 22 April 2009.

\(^{150}\) Interview with Manuel Amise and Luis Wamusse, RA VIM, Maputo, 22 April 2009.


\(^{152}\) Ibid.


\(^{155}\) Interview with António Belchior Vaz Martin, Mila Massango, and Fernando Mulima, IND, Maputo, 20 April 2009.

\(^{156}\) Interview with Manuel Amise and Luis Wamusse, RA VIM, Maputo 22 April 2009.

\(^{157}\) For more information on the 2007 ASA explosion, see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 526.

\(^{158}\) Email from Audrey Relandeau, HI, 19 May 2009.
Support for Mine Action

Mozambique has reported a cost estimate of $28 million (approximately €19 million) for completion of its Article 5 obligations—including the costs of survey, mine clearance, land release, coordination, and maintenance of IND—during the period from March 2009 to March 2013.\(^{159}\) Costs under the plan are roughly $5.4 million in 2009, $6 million in 2010, $6.9 million in 2011, $6.7 million in 2012, and $3.4 million in 2013.\(^{160}\) Mozambique has committed to cover “more than a third” of costs with international donors contributing an estimated $3.6 million per year.\(^{161}\) Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for fulfilling VA obligations in Mozambique.

National support for mine action

In 2008, Mozambique contributed $1,563,270 to mine action.\(^{162}\) It reported contributing $1.3 million from national funds to mine action in 2007. In its revised Article 5 deadline extension request, Mozambique committed to providing $1.8 million in national funds in 2009, $2 million in 2010, $2.5 million in 2011 and 2012, and $1.7 million in 2013.\(^{163}\)

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, eight countries reported providing a total of $3,184,248 (€2,162,331) to mine action in Mozambique. Reported international mine action funding in 2008 was 9% less than reported in 2007, and falls short of the international funds required during the first four years of Mozambique’s Article 5 extension period (ranging from approximately $3.6 million to $4.4 million). This does not take into account the fact that some international funding in 2008 was directed to VA programs, without which the total international funding would be less than $3.2 million. Mozambique reported $2.7 million in international contributions in 2007, down from $6.2 million in 2006 and $15 million in 2005. This decline coincided with the departure of Norwegian People’s Aid and the focus on surveying rather than clearance in 2007.\(^{164}\)

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\(^{159}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 25 August 2008, p. 5.

\(^{160}\) Ibid, p. 27.

\(^{161}\) Ibid, p. 5.


\(^{163}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 25 August 2008, p. 27.

\(^{164}\) Ibid, p. 5.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Mozambique: Monetary\(^{165}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/ Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>HI, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action</td>
<td>VA, capacity-building</td>
<td>$349,006 (€237,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>APOPO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$736,300 (€500,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$699,485 (€475,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$261,387 (€177,500)</td>
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<td>Norway</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Mainstreaming mine action</td>
<td>$709,600 (NOK4,000,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>$36,984 (CHF40,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$366,486 (£197,620)</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Via the Centers for Disease Control</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$3,184,248 (€2,162,331)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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NAMIBIA

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Namibia became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999. It has not enacted national implementation legislation. Angolan rebels and Angolan government forces used antipersonnel mines inside Namibia prior to the peace accords in 2002. Namibia submitted its initial Article 7 report nearly five years late in July 2004. It reported having destroyed its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in May 1998. It has not submitted an updated report since April 2006, when it reported retaining 3,899 mines for training purposes, down from an initial 9,999.

By the expiry of its Article 5 deadline on 1 March 2009 Namibia had still to clarify the extent of its residual mine problem. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2006, Namibia declared that demining had been completed in 2001 and ongoing surveys in 2005 had not identified new mined areas. The survey results have not been released. Namibia did not request an extension to its Article 5 deadline at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008.

At least 618 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties have been recorded since 1999; the last mine casualty occurred in 2005. No mine/ERW risk education has taken place in Namibia since 2006, with UNICEF noting in 2008 that it was not necessary. Disabled people’s organizations and the government recognized that access to health and rehabilitation services was unequal and insufficient.

Mine Ban Policy


Namibia did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009 or the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008. It has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Namibia maintains that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines and that it obtained mines as “leftovers during the liberation struggle.” There have been no serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Namibian forces since the April 2002 peace agreement in Angola.
In 2004, Namibia reported that by May 1998 it had destroyed 21,857 stockpiled antipersonnel mines and was retaining 9,999 mines. By the end of 2005, it had reduced the number of retained mines to 3,899. Namibia has not provided any update since that time and has never reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties. Namibia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008 but had not yet ratified it as of 1 July 2009.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Namibia is affected by ERW, particularly UXO, but the extent of its residual mine problem remains unclear. According to its Article 7 reports, Namibia has no known mined areas containing antipersonnel mines. In November 2007, the United States Department of State declared Namibia had achieved “impact free” status. There are, however, indications that landmines may still pose a problem for Namibia. Media reports in 2008 stated bilateral development projects with Angola required mine clearance to ensure all landmines and explosive devices in the area were found. On 25 June 2008, when Namibia announced an agreement with the Kunene Consortium to build a power station on the Kunene river basin bordering Angola, Namibia’s Deputy Minister of Mines and Energy, Bernard Esau, said that Angola and Namibia would have to ensure all landmines and explosive devices still in the area were cleared first.

Since November 2007, Canada has warned its citizens they should be aware of the presence of landmines in the border area from Katwitwi (a village on the Okavango river in western Kavango region) to Kongola town (Caprivi region). In a May 2009 travel advisory, Australia warned travelers in Caprivi and Kavango regions to stay on well-travelled routes because: “Unexploded landmines and munitions remain in these regions.” Although the US does not mention landmines in its travel advisory for Namibia, the US Embassy in Windhoek website lists “Remove landmines leftover from the struggle for independence” under special US government programs in the country.

The origins of the landmine problem in Namibia lie with the 23-year struggle for independence between the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) and South Africa that ended in 1990 and the decision by the government of Namibia in 1999 to allow the government of Angola to use Namibian territory as a base to attack the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, UNITA) forces in southeastern Angola during its internal conflict.

An assessment mission by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in 1999 concluded the landmine situation in Namibia was neither a humanitarian emergency nor a major obstacle for development. Prior to 1999, support from the US resulted in 135 deminers and 20 explosive ordnance disposal specialists in the Namibian Defence Forces being trained, but the clearance...
operations after the training were eventually suspended due to the high incident rates in “cleared” areas.\textsuperscript{16} The US government stated that the US commercial demining firm RONCO had cleared 10 minefields by January 2001 comprising 1 km\textsuperscript{2} of land and 410 electrical pylons, destroying 5,000 mines and 1,300 items of UXO in the process.\textsuperscript{17}

South African Defence Force (SADF) and Namibian security force bases, as well as villages, were mined in the densely populated Caprivi, Kavango, Kunene, Ohangwena, Omusati, Oshana, and Oshikoto regions of northern Namibia. Some demining by the SADF, the UN Transition Group forces, and a Namibian demining company occurred during the transition period leading up to Namibian independence from South Africa in 1990.\textsuperscript{18}

In 2002, Namibia requested international assistance for mine action.\textsuperscript{19} Although the mined areas were reportedly cleared by 2001\textsuperscript{20} and declarations were made that Namibia was “mine safe,”\textsuperscript{21} other media reports and statements by the government of Namibia at international meetings seemed to indicate Namibia still had a landmine problem.\textsuperscript{22} Despite a claim by the US Department of State in 2002 that Namibia’s only mined area was in Kavango region, an area near the border with Angola, local residents in the northern areas of Onamunama and Utomba continued to report the presence of landmines.\textsuperscript{23} Farmers also reported that they could not plant crops in Caprivi region because of landmines.\textsuperscript{24}

Most UXO has been found around former shooting ranges and consisted of grenades either from the SADF or from three South African ammunition storage areas in the north that exploded.\textsuperscript{25} Namibian police reported clearing many more items of UXO (8,415 items) than mines in 2006 (10 antipersonnel mines and five antivehicle mines). In 2006–2007, Namibian police reported finding more than 11,000 UXO while finding 17 landmines during the same period.\textsuperscript{26}

**Casualties**

Landmine Monitor did not identify new mine/ERW casualties from 2008 to March 2009. However, since Namibian police did not provide casualty data for 2008, under-reporting is likely. In 2007, 12 ERW casualties were reported.\textsuperscript{27} The last known mine casualty was in March 2005 involving one man who lost his leg.\textsuperscript{28}

Since 1999, the number of new mine/ERW casualties per year in Namibia has declined rapidly. In 2000, official statistics reported 14 people killed and 126 injured by mines/ERW. By 2002, this number had decreased to two people killed and 17 injured.\textsuperscript{29} Between 1999 and December 2008, at least 145 civilians have been killed and 473 injured by mines/ERW.\textsuperscript{30}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 70.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} “Government accused of ‘ambivalence’ on key issue,” The Namibian, 16 October 1997, pp. 1–2.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} UNMAS, “Namibia: Overall Environment,” 30 November 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} See report on Namibia in previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Chrispin Inambao, “Cotton Farmers Miss Out on Reaping Harvest Pay,” The Namibian, 26 February 2003.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Interview with Chief Inspector John N. Alweendo, Explosives Unit, Namibian Police Force, Windhoek, 17 March 2008.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Fax from Maj.-Gen. M’Lukeni and Chief Inspector John N. Alweendo, Namibian Police Force, 10 May 2006.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 542.
  \item \textsuperscript{28} Fax from Chief Inspector John N. Alweendo, Namibian Police Force, 18 June 2007.
  \item \textsuperscript{29} See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 601.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 542.
\end{itemize}
Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
There is no national mine action authority or mine action center in Namibia. The Namibian Defence Force maintains ownership through the landmine focal point who reports to the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence. The Namibian Defence Force is nominally responsible for mine clearance, and the Police Explosives Unit is responsible for clearing ERW (although it also reports on mine clearance).31

Victim assistance
Namibia has no specialized mine/ERW victim assistance program or coordinating agency. On 10 July 2008, the National Disability Council was launched to coordinate and monitor implementation of disability policy in cooperation with disabled people’s organizations (DPOs), service providers, and government agencies.32

There is no nationwide casualty data collection mechanism in Namibia. The police and media are the main sources of information. In November 2008, the National Federation of People with Disabilities in Namibia (NFPDN) began a living conditions survey to include information on gender, income, education, and access to health services in its database on persons with disabilities. The survey is due for completion at the end of 2009.33

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

There are no reports of any demining or battle area clearance in 2008 or 2009 through July.

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Namibia was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. In March 2006, Namibia stated that it was “mine-safe,” but that it was not ready to declare itself mine-free until the completion of ongoing surveys.34 Since then, no further information has been reported. Namibia did not intervene during the Standing Committee meetings in April 2007 to provide an update on its mine-affected status or on progress in achieving its mine action “strategic objectives” for 2005–2009.35

Namibia did not apply for an extension of its Article 5 deadline, and as of 1 March 2009, Namibia had not declared whether it was in compliance with the provisions of the article.

Risk Education

There were no risk education (RE) activities in 2008. In 2008, UNICEF said it did not conduct mine/ERW RE in Namibia because mines were not a major problem. The Police Explosives Unit requested assistance for RE but has not received support since 2004.36 The unit carried out an RE campaign from 1990 to 2004. From 2003 to 2006, the Namibian Red Cross, with support from the ICRC, provided RE to Angolan refugees in Namibia.37

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Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is estimated to be at least 473. On 10 June 2008, the NFPDN stated, “We, the majority of people with disabilities in Namibia, have lost hope in the top government especially those whom we thought could make a difference for the people with disabilities in Namibia.”38 However, the US Department of State noted that disability issues received “greater public attention than in previous years” and that the Prime Minister recruited a disability advisor.39

There are no specialized services for mine/ERW survivors in Namibia, but persons with disabilities are referred to services, including psychological support and pensions, through the government or NGOs.40 However, DPOs and the government acknowledged that access to health and rehabilitation services was unequal and insufficient, especially outside the capital.41

In 2002, the ICRC assisted the Ministry of Health to set up a physical rehabilitation workshop in Rundu, near the border with Angola. In 2007, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) reduced its support partly because the workshop was somewhat under-used.42 In 2008, the SFD ended its support as the government increased its responsibility in accordance with a 2005 agreement between the government and the SFD.43

In Oshana region, an economic reintegration project for persons with disabilities was shut down in 2008 because of a lack of skilled staff to run it.44 The law prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities was not enforced effectively, and discrimination persisted.45

The NFPDN reported cases of physical abuse and neglect of persons with disabilities within families and by institutions.46 Namibia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 4 December 2007.

41 Ibid; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 602.
NICARAGUA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 May 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Total area not quantified, but 10 mined areas remained as of May 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>Three (2007: 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>1,145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Article 5 (clearance of mined areas) | Deadline: 1 May 2010  
Original deadline: 1 May 2009 |
| Demining in 2008 | 29 mined areas were cleared, but the size of the areas was not reported |
| Risk education recipients in 2008 | 34,541 |
| Progress towards victim assistance aims | Slow, but some improvements |
| Support for mine action in 2008 | International: $3.3 million (2007: $4.5 million)  
National: $1 million (2007: $1 million) |

Ten-Year Summary


Nicaragua is contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of armed conflict between 1979 and 1990. More than 1,000 mined areas have been recorded or identified. Mines were mostly located in the border areas in the north and south of the country, the majority along the Honduran border, and by 2009 the remaining mined areas were only on the border with Honduras. Nicaragua requested, and was granted, a one-year extension to its Article 5 deadline of 1 May 2009.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 117 mine/ERW casualties in Nicaragua: 27 killed and 90 injured. Nicaragua has reported 1,236 casualties since 1980. It has consistently carried out mine/ERW risk education since 1999, which has been evaluated and assessed regularly. Starting in 2006, the coverage of risk education activities and the number of beneficiaries began to decrease to just two departments of the country, corresponding to the reduction in contamination.

As of March 2009, 1,107 of Nicaragua’s 1,145 registered survivors had received regular rehabilitation services and 450 had also received socio-economic reintegration services with support from the Organization of American States. Efforts to improve national capacity were limited throughout much of the 10-year period, though some improvements in quality and access to emergency and continuing medical care and physical rehabilitation services were noted in 2008.
Mine Ban Policy

Nicaragua signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 30 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically, Law 321, was enacted on 7 December 1999 and includes penal sanctions.1

Nicaragua participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made a statement regarding its Article 5 extension request and announced its intent to host a regional meeting to prepare for the Second Review Conference. Government representatives from 18 countries across the region attended the Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas from 24–26 February 2009, in addition to campaigners and mine survivors from 12 countries.2

On 13 April 2009, Nicaragua submitted its tenth Article 7 report, covering the period to 31 December 2008.3

Nicaragua attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it reported on mine clearance and risk education efforts.

Nicaragua has not expressed clear views with respect to key issues of interpretation of Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty, including what acts are prohibited by the ban on “assistance,” whether antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes are banned, and the acceptable number of mines retained for training.4

Nicaragua is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Nicaragua has never submitted an annual report as required by the protocol’s Article 13. Nicaragua is also party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Nicaragua signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not yet ratified it as of 1 July 2009.5

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

Nicaragua has stated that it has never produced antipersonnel mines.6 It is not known to have ever exported mines. Nicaragua destroyed its stockpile of 133,435 antipersonnel mines between 12 April 1999 and 28 August 2002.

According to its most recent Article 7 report, the Nicaraguan army retained a total of 1,004 antipersonnel mines for training as of April 2009, the same number as reported in 2008 and 2007.7 In previous years, Nicaragua reported consuming some of its retained mines.8 The report stated that the army transferred 26 PMN mines to the Engineer Corps for detector calibration and 46 mines to the mine detection dog training unit.9


4 See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 565. Nicaragua has said it “supports all elements of Article 1” and the prohibition on assisting banned acts, but it has not elaborated on what acts it considers permissible and prohibited. Nicaragua reiterated in May 2006 that it has not taken a position on whether antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive antihandling devices are banned under Article 2 of the treaty.


6 This is stated in all of Nicaragua’s Article 7 reports.

7 The 1,004 mines retained are: 300 PMN-2, 274 PMN, 240 POMZ-2M, 90 PPMI-SR11, 50 POMZ-2, 25 OZM-4, and 25 PMFH. Article 7 Report, Form D, 13 April 2009; Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 February 2008; and Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 February 2007.

8 It consumed 19 and 17 retained mines in 2005 and 2006, respectively. Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 February 2007; and Article 7 Report, Form D, 8 February 2006.

9 Article 7 Report, Form D, 13 April 2009. The 46 mines included 20 PMN, 15 PPMISR-11, and 11 POM-Z. The same numbers and types of mines were transferred to the same entities in Article 7 reports submitted in 2008 and 2007. See Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 February 2008; and Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 February 2007.
In March 2009, Nicaragua informed Landmine Monitor that following the completion of its demining program it would present a plan for reducing the number of mines retained for training.\(^{10}\)

Nicaragua has previously reported that it possesses 121 MON-series (Claymore-type) directional fragmentation mines.\(^{11}\)

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Nicaragua is contaminated by mines and ERW as a result of armed conflict between 1979 and 1990. Most of the mines used were antipersonnel, but antivehicle mines were also laid along the northern border with Honduras. Mined areas have been reported in 105 communities,\(^{12}\) in 74 municipalities, in 14 of the 15 departments, and in the two autonomous regions. In addition, almost 1.9 million ERW have been destroyed in the course of demining operations.\(^{13}\)

Based on records from the Nicaraguan Army, which Nicaragua considered to be 80% complete,\(^{14}\) the total number of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines emplaced was initially said to be 135,643 in 991 minefields.\(^{15}\) This estimate had risen to more than 179,195 mines (32% more than the original estimate) in 1,019 mined areas, covering 11km\(^2\), by May 2009 as a result of clearance operations and reports from communities of new suspected hazardous areas (SHAs).\(^{16}\)

In May 2009, it was reported that at least 5,471 mines remained in 10 mined areas\(^{17}\) across four municipalities: three in the department of Nueva Segovia (Mozonte, San Fernando, and Wiwilí) and one in the department of Jinotega (Wiwilí de Jinotega), all of which are on the border with Honduras.\(^{18}\)

**Casualties**

In 2008, there were three new mine/ERW casualties (all three injured) in two incidents and one demining accident. The casualties were registered by the Organization of American States (OAS) Assistance Program for Demining in Central America (Programa de Apoyo al Desminado en Centroamérica, PADCA) and confirmed by the Nicaraguan Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado, CND). All three were men injured by antipersonnel mines.\(^{19}\) Two civilian incidents occurred in Jalapa municipality in the department of Nueva Segovia. The first, on 18 September, occurred while a farmer, who had received RE, was transporting the mine to

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\(^{10}\) Interview with Dr. Juan Umaña, Technical Secretary, CND, San Fernando, 4 March 2009.

\(^{11}\) Nicaragua has stated these mines are “not included in the restrictions established by the Ottawa Convention.” Article 7 Report, Form D, 19 May 2005. This total of 121 appears to include 100 MON-50 mines, 11 MON-100 mines, and 10 MON-200 mines, based on previous Article 7 reports. ICBL has urged States Parties to report on the steps they have taken to ensure that Claymore mines can be used in command-detonated mode only (and not with tripwires), so that the mines conform to the treaty.


\(^{13}\) Article 7 Report, 13 April 2009, p. 3.


\(^{15}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, pp. 6, 16.


\(^{17}\) Ibid.


\(^{19}\) Email from Carlos J. Orozco, Regional Coordinator, OAS PADCA, 17 March 2009; and interview with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, Managua, 19 March 2009.
a “safe place” before reporting it.20 The other, on 14 October, occurred when a farmer lost his foot to a mine 21m from a minefield cleared in 2006; following this, clearance within 100m² of the incident was conducted and no mines were found.21 The third injury came in a demining accident on 9 December 2008 in the “Las Nubes” minefield in San Fernando, Nueva Segovia. The mine was one meter outside a suspected mined area and exploded when the squadron chief entered the area to carry out an inspection.22

The three casualties in 2008 were a significant decrease from 2007 (one killed and 14 injured in six incidents) and the lowest number of casualties identified by Landmine Monitor since 1999. This may be the result of an intensified risk education campaign to respond to ERW casualties in 2008, military clearance, and police efforts to halt transportation of explosives.23 So far in 2009, a man was injured in Tipitapa, Managua department, when he struck an ERW while digging a latrine for his home.24

As of 13 May 2009, the OAS PADCA database had information on 1,236 casualties in Nicaragua since 1980 (91 deaths and 1,145 injuries), including 43 demining accidents.25 Of these, 117 casualties occurred between 1999 and 2008 (27 killed and 90 injured).26 Ninety percent of Nicaraguan mine/ERW survivors are men between 20 and 40 years old at the time of their injury, the majority being farmers injured while working on the land.27

Socio-economic impact
No more than 15,000 people were believed to be living near the remaining mined areas.28 This represents a 95% reduction in the number of people potentially impacted since the start of the mine action program in 1991.29 All the remaining mined areas are, however, in impoverished areas.30 The demand for land is so great that at times farmers are said to begin to use the newly demined areas before they are officially handed over to the local government.31

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
The CND, created in 1998, is responsible for formulating national mine action policy, assisting and coordinating implementation of the National Humanitarian Demining Program (Programa Nacional de Desminado Humanitario, PNDH), managing international funds, and conducting risk education.32

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Interview with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, Managua, 19 March 2009.
24 Email from Cecilia Bustamante, Victim Assistance Program Coordinator, OAS PADCA, 2 June 2009.
26 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
28 Population figures found at population.mongabay.com and www.gichd.ch.
29 Based on a population of 2.5 million. Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 5 March 2008; and see Article 7 Report, Annex 2, 13 April 2009, p. 25.
31 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009.
32 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 12.
States Parties Nicargua

Risk education
Mine/ERW risk education (RE) is nominally coordinated by the CND and its Sub-Commission on Education and Prevention, which includes representatives from government ministries, NGOs, the Nicaraguan Red Cross, UNICEF, and OAS PADCA. However, the sub-commission did not meet in 2007 or 2008.33

Victim assistance
Victim assistance (VA) is nominally coordinated by the CND and its Sub-Commission for Medical Assistance and Rehabilitation of Mine Survivors. However, the sub-commission did not meet in 2008.34 On 5 February 2009, the Director General of Health Services within the Ministry of Health was named the VA focal point, a position that had been vacant since the closure of the ministry’s Rehabilitation Office in 2007.35 The National Rehabilitation Council (Consejo Nacional de Rehabilitación, CONARE) coordinates the national plan for physical rehabilitation.36 OAS PADCA’s VA program coordinates and provides financial support for the provision of physical rehabilitation and economic reintegration services to mine survivors.37

In 2008, the Nicaraguan Commission for Verification, Reconciliation, Peace, and Justice established a plan to respond to the needs of victims of war, including those disabled during the war as a result of landmines and other causes, based on the commitments of Nicaragua’s peace process.38

Data collection and management
The identification of the location of mined areas is based on records from the Nicaraguan Army, new mined areas discovered during clearance operations, RE sessions, and reports from local officials and communities. The OAS manages the mine action database including the victim database, using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software, at its offices in Managua.39 Casualty data is collected by the Nicaraguan Army and OAS PADCA risk educators, using a joint form that asks for details of the incident, personal details, and assistance received.40 Data is stored in IMSMA and managed by OAS PADCA. While this database has been described as “very complete,”41 an official within the demining program estimated that the number of survivors could be significantly higher.42

When the OAS first began collecting casualty data, it required hospital records for confirmation. Many survivors did not have this record so they were not counted. In addition, civilians who were involved in mine incidents during the war are counted as “victims of war” rather than mine survivors.43 However, in 2008, OAS PADCA reported that the victim assistance database

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33 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009; and with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, Managua, 19 March 2009; and email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 24 July 2009.
34 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009; and with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, Managua, 19 March 2009.
35 Interview with Dr. Juan Umaña, CND, Managua, 18 February 2009.
38 Presentation by Dr. Carlos Jarquín González, Ministry of Health, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009. As of 13 March 2009, the details of this plan were not publicly available. See also interview with Nelson Artola Escobar, Executive President, Fondo de Inversión Social de Emergencia, Managua, 13 March 2009.
39 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009.
41 Ibid.
42 Interview with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, San Fernando, 4 March 2009.
43 Interviews with Dr. Juan Umaña, CND, San Fernando, 4 March 2009; and with Dr. Carlos Jarquín González and Guillermo Gosebruch, Ministry of Health, Managua, 25 March 2009.
was much more complete than in the past, as a result of ongoing data collection efforts through RE campaigns.\textsuperscript{44} In 2008, the Ministry of Health began collecting information about the cause of amputations from children receiving medical and physical rehabilitation services.\textsuperscript{45} In 2009, OAS PADCA and the Nicaraguan government started discussing plans to transfer responsibility for the database to the government, anticipating the future closure of the OAS PADCA office.\textsuperscript{46}

**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plan**

Due to the “high number” of unrecorded mines discovered during clearance, in every year since 2004, operations have been delayed and the projected completion of the mine action program put back. In March 2008, Nicaragua declared that it would not be able to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 May 2009 and requested a one-year extension of its deadline.\textsuperscript{47} Clearance priorities for 2008 and 2009 included all known mined areas.\textsuperscript{48} An unspecified part of the US$5 million sought for demining operations in 2009 was needed to replace boots, metal detectors, and communications equipment.\textsuperscript{49}

**Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development**

A study conducted on behalf of the OAS by the National Institute of Statistics and Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, INEC) from August 2006 through April 2007 found a direct relationship between mine clearance in previously affected areas and subsequent improvements in various development indicators, such as health, access to education, and access to water and electricity.\textsuperscript{50} Some of the improvements in development indicators may be due to improved access to formerly affected communities as a result of the repair or construction of roads for mine clearance operations.\textsuperscript{51} By the end of 2008, 138.5km of roadwork had been completed to facilitate mine action.\textsuperscript{52} The roads were built by the National Institute for Rural Development and the Nicaraguan Army Corps of Engineers and will be maintained by the local government and farmers.\textsuperscript{53} One example of successfully using demined land is a farmer and his family who returned to reclaim land that was suitable for planting coffee. In 2008, they won the honor of “best cup” in an annual coffee contest, and his crop subsequently fetched more than $41,000 on the international market.\textsuperscript{54}

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Nicaragua has been clearing mines on its territory since the end of the decade-long conflict in the 1980s. Since joining the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999, it has established a national mine action coordination body, engaged the army in demining, and provided considerable funding for mine action, while actively seeking international assistance.

**National management**

CND employees are paid by the Ministry of Defense, but the CND has no operational budget and works with resources from donor countries channeled through the OAS or bilaterally. Since 1993 (except in 1995–1996) the OAS, through its Program for Integrated Action against Handmines in the Americas (PAMIA), has coordinated the efforts of the national authorities to clear mines and has supported the CND in its operations.

\textsuperscript{44} Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 5 March 2008.
\textsuperscript{45} Interview with Dr. Carlos Jarquín González and Guillermo Gosebruch, Ministry of Health, Managua, 25 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{46} Interview with Dr. Juan Umaña, CND, in Geneva, 29 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{47} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 1; and interview with Dr. Juan Umaña, CND, Managua, 13 March 2008.
\textsuperscript{48} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, Annexes 8–11; and presentation by Nicaragua, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009.
\textsuperscript{49} Interview with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, San Fernando, 4 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{50} INEC, on behalf of the OAS, “Estudio sobre el Impacto del Desminado en Nicaragua” (“Impact Study of Demining in Nicaragua”), 7 May 2007.
\textsuperscript{51} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{52} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 550; and Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, Annex 27.
\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{54} Tim Rodgers, “Nicaragua gains land by removing Contra war mines,” Miami Herald, 3 January 2009.
Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral Contra las Minas Antipersonal, AICMA), has provided support to mine action activities in Nicaragua through PADCA, with technical support from the Inter-American Defense Board.\(^{55}\)

The Mine Clearance Assistance Mission in Central America (Misión de Asistencia para la Remoción de Minas en Centro América, MARMINCA), which is part of the Inter-American Defense Board based in Washington, DC, monitors demining operations to ensure that they meet humanitarian demining standards. It is planned that MARMINCA will retain up to three people in-country during the six months after Nicaragua clears its last known mined area in case any new suspected mined areas are identified.\(^{56}\)

**National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures**

National mine action legislation was enacted with Presidential decree 84–98 published on 5 December 1998, which created the civilian CND as the interagency coordination body responsible for the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty and the development of the National Humanitarian Demining Program. It authorized the CND to conduct surveys, establish and manage a database, assess the socio-economic impact, support the special demining unit of the Nicaraguan Army in its work, raise funds, receive reports from the Ministry of Defense on demining activities, and negotiate with the proper officials to ensure mine survivors are included in social and rehabilitation programs.\(^{57}\)

Nicaragua reports that it respects the International Mine Action Standards and national standing operating procedures.\(^{58}\)

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

Clearance operations in Nicaragua are the responsibility of the Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps. From 1999–2008, more than 600 Nicaraguans worked in the national mine action program (both civilians and army personnel), but in early 2009, the total number was reduced to 450 as a result of a decline in funding.\(^{59}\) Clearance operations are organized on five “fronts” consisting of between 70 and 100 personnel each. A group of 29 deminers referred to as the Marking Platoon (Pelotón de Señalización), which responded to new reports of mines and UXO and marked mined areas, was disbanded in December 2008 due to a lack of funding.\(^{60}\)

In 2008, all mine clearance in Nicaragua was done manually. The conditions and remoteness of minefields along the Honduran border do not make mechanical clearance feasible, according to MARMINCA.\(^{61}\) In 2008, Nicaragua cleared 29 mined areas in Boca de Paiwas, Jalapa, La Dalia, and Murra municipalities, destroying 7,123 antipersonnel mines.\(^{62}\)


\(^{56}\) Interview with Col. Francisco Elias Henriques Coelho Nascimento, Director, MARMINCA, Brazilian Army, Managua, 2 March 2009.

\(^{57}\) See Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 12; and Arnoldo Alemán Lacayo, President of Nicaragua, “Creación de la Comisión Nacional de Desminado” (“Creation of the National Demining Commission”), Decree No. 84–98, approved 27 November 1998 and promulgated on 5 December 1998, legislacion.asamblea.gob.ni.

\(^{58}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 17.


\(^{60}\) Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009.

\(^{61}\) Interviews with Normando Bona do Nascimento and other staff, MARMINCA, Managua, 11 March 2008; and with Dr. Juan Umaña, CND, Managua, 13 March 2008.

\(^{62}\) Presentation by Nicaragua, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009. Nicaragua accounts for mines in three ways: 1) mines that have been found by deminers and are exploded where they are found; 2) evidence of the presence of a mine that had exploded during clearance activities; and 3) mines that are listed in the registry but that are no longer there based on the pattern of other mines found around it. The sum of these three figures is the total number of mines cleared reported by Nicaragua in its Article 7 transparency report and other reports. Interview with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, San Fernando, 4 March 2009.
Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Nicaragua was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2009. Between 1990 and 28 February 2008, Nicaragua’s mine clearance program released 53.03 km² of SHAs and destroyed 158,661 mines in 958 minefields. Each year since 2004, Nicaragua has declared it needed one more year to meet its treaty obligations. Each year, however, completion was pushed back for another year, and in March 2008, Nicaragua declared that it would not meet its 1 May 2009 deadline and applied for a one-year extension. The extension request cited the discovery of new minefields and the decline in international funding as justifications for the need for an extension.

States Parties granted Nicaragua the extension on 28 November 2008. As of late May 2009, Nicaragua reported that 10 mined areas remained to be cleared.

Risk Education

In 2008, mine/ERW RE activities continued to decrease in line with the reduced area of contamination in the country. Mine/ERW casualties decreased compared to 2007 and the number of public reports of mines or ERW received by RE personnel continued to be high (130), providing two indicators of an effective program.

As in past years, the number of RE beneficiaries continued to decline, with 34,541 people receiving RE in 2008 compared to 42,327 in 2007. The RE program in 2008 focused on ERW risk prevention, given the increase in ERW incidents in 2007.

In 2008, all RE activities were carried out by OAS PADCA in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and local authorities. Geographic targets for RE activities were reassessed every three months based on remaining known mined areas, public reports of mines or ERW that had been found, and mine/ERW casualties. In the departments of Boaco, Jinotega, León, Matagalpa, and Nueva Segovia, a total of 28,658 adults and children received RE messages. Four methodologies were used: community presentations (2,466 beneficiaries), door-to-door or peer-to-peer messages (18,930), classroom presentations (2,789), and community festivals (4,473). In order to include adult men, sessions were held when men would be home and arrangements were made with farm owners to provide sessions to their employees.

A further 5,883 people in León and Matagalpa received ERW RE alongside the destruction of obsolete munitions. RE messages for scrap metal collectors were also aired on television warning scrap metal collectors.

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65 Email from Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, 17 March 2009.
67 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009; and with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, Managua, 19 March 2009.
68 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009.
69 “Actividades de Educación Preventiva: Año 2008 Audiencia Sensibilizada por Departamento/Grupo de Edad y Tipo de Actividad” (“Risk Education Activities: 2008 Beneficiaries Reached by Department, Age Group and Type of Activity”), provided by email from Erika Estrada, OAS PADCA, 1 June 2009.
72 Interview with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, Managua, 19 March 2009.
In 1999, RE activities had been underway for three years, but it was assessed that more community-based organizations needed to be involved. In 2002, the CND became responsible for the implementation of the national RE plan, and worked to harmonize the activities of the operators by providing supervision and developing a National Guide for the Development of Educational Materials. In June 2004, UNICEF reported that RE activities had become more organized and effective in terms of coverage, coordination, and the methodologies used. An OAS/CND evaluation of RE materials in 2005 resulted in an increased focus on ERW and more information about the physical and economic impact of mines/ERW. Starting in 2006, the coverage of RE activities and number of beneficiaries began to decrease, corresponding to the reduction of mine contamination to just two departments of the country.

**Victim Assistance**

The estimated number of survivors is 1,145. As of March 2009, a total of 1,107 survivors had received regular rehabilitation services and of these, 450 had also received socio-economic reintegration services with support from the OAS. Some advances were noted in data collection, government coordination and planning, the provision of emergency medical care, and physical rehabilitation services. However, despite the large number of survivors receiving individual attention, NGO representatives still expressed concern over the national sustainability of physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration programs, the centralization of these services, and the lack of trained staff.

In 2008, the Nicaraguan government committed to address the needs of war victims, including mine survivors, in recognition of their sacrifice during Nicaragua’s revolution and civil war. However, as of March 2009, this commitment had not yet resulted in tangible action. Nicaragua’s urban hospitals have sufficient surgical capacity for emergency care and specialized services. Some regional hospitals close to demining operations, such as the Ocotal Hospital in Nueva Segovia, have sufficient capacity to provide care to deminers as well as civilian casualties. However, hospitals in more remote regions of the country, such as the mine-affected department of Jinotega, lack such capacity, requiring expensive evacuations to Managua, beyond the reach of most civilian casualties. In 2008, the Ocotal Hospital provided emergency care to all three new survivors before referring cases to Managua. The military provided free evacuation services to one of the civilian casualties in 2008.

In 2008, the government restructured the management of physical rehabilitation and increased national funding, though services remained limited to three workshops (one public and two private). Two of these were based in the capital and all were distant for most survivors. One physical therapy center reopened in 2008 in Ocotal, in a region with a large number of mine survivors. Increased government funding for the National Center for the Production of Technical Assistance and Orthoprosthetic Devices (Centro Nacional de Producción de Ayudas

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73 Email from Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, 17 March 2009.
74 See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 554; and presentation by the ICRC SFD, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 26 February 2009.
75 Interview with Dr. Carlos Jarquín González and Guillermo Gosebruch, Ministry of Health, Managua, 25 March 2009.
76 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009.
77 Interview with Lt.-Col. Jorge Castro, Nicaraguan Army Engineer Corps, San Fernando, 4 March 2009.
81 Ibid.
Técnicas y Elementos Ortoprotésicos, CENAPRORTO) resulted in a 25% increase in production of orthopedic devices.\(^{83}\)

In June 2008, Nicaragua began developing a national plan for physical rehabilitation. Initially convened by the ICRC-Special Fund for the Disabled, CONARE assumed responsibility for the planning process and convened additional planning meetings in October 2008, and January and June 2009.\(^{84}\) As of March 2009, the plan was not finalized, delaying the implementation of a revised rehabilitation program within the Ministry of Health.\(^{85}\)

Psychosocial support is available to survivors who are accessing other services, through the three physical rehabilitation workshops and the National Technological Institute (Instituto Nacional Tecnológico, INATEC).\(^{86}\) Economic reintegration and educational opportunities remain inadequate to meet the demand, but INATEC’s capacity to provide vocational training to persons with disabilities improved in 2008.\(^{87}\) As of March 2009, 450 mine survivors had received socio-economic reintegration assistance through the OAS; 50 individuals remained on a waiting list.\(^{88}\) But a “large majority” of mine survivors remain unemployed.\(^{89}\) Only some survivors receive a disability pension ranging from $7 to $26.60 per month, depending on the severity of their disability.\(^{90}\)

Nicaragua has various laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.\(^{91}\) However, these laws are not effectively enforced and discrimination is “widespread.”\(^{92}\) Nicaragua ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 7 December 2007, and signed its Optional Protocol on 21 October 2008. As of 25 March 2009, Nicaragua was in the process of reviewing and updating its national legislation to comply with the convention.\(^{93}\) Nicaragua has also ratified the Plan of Action for the Decade of the Americas for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006–2016).\(^{94}\)

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

As one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate attention to survivors, Nicaragua presented its 2005–2009 objectives to implement the Nairobi Action Plan at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. However, neither revisions to the objectives nor plans to achieve them had been presented formally as of March 2009. Nicaragua’s victim assistance focal point reported that Nicaragua did not compare progress in victim assistance with its Nairobi Action Plan objectives but said “they could.”\(^{95}\)

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85 Ibid.
87 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009.
88 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
Nicaragua provided updates on its victim assistance activities at the Seventh and Eighth Meetings of States Parties and at intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2005, 2006, and 2007. Nicaragua included a victim assistance/disability expert on its delegation to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2007 and the Sixth and Eighth Meetings of States Parties. In 2005, 2006, and 2007 Nicaragua did not use voluntary form J in its Article 7 report to provide information on victim assistance. In 2008 and 2009, it did use Form I to provide information on casualty data collection (the same information both years). In February 2009, Nicaragua hosted a regional preparatory meeting for the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, where it provided an update on its victim assistance activities.

Victim assistance activities

In 2008, the Foundation for Rehabilitation “Walking Unidos” (Fundación para la rehabilitación “Walking Unidos”), through its two rehabilitation centers—Walking Unidos in León and Different Abilities (Capacidades Diferentes, CAPADIFE) in Managua—and CENAPRORTO in Managua assisted more than 1,000 persons with disabilities, including fitting 513 prostheses, 432 orthoses, and the delivery of 36 wheelchairs and 87 pairs of crutches. Approximately 25% of those assisted were mine survivors.

The OAS supported physical rehabilitation services at CENAPRORTO and CAPADIFE for 394 survivors in 2008, with either new mobility devices or, more typically, maintenance of existing devices. It also supported comprehensive socio-economic reintegration for 88 survivors, including counseling, vocational training and, when appropriate, small business seed support at INATEC.

Support for Mine Action

Nicaragua has reported a cost estimate of $8.3 million for fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations during the period 2008–2010, with annual costs estimated at $1.8 million in 2008, $6 million in 2009, and $500,000 in 2010. National funds were projected to account for $1.7 million or roughly 20% of total required funds, with the remaining $6.6 million provided by international donors.

As of March 2008, Nicaragua reported a deficit of $1.2 million in funding towards meeting its 2008 mine clearance obligations. In April 2009, it reported that during the second half of 2008 its programs were fully funded, but funds were lacking for all of 2009, with the exception of its mechanized minesweeper detachment, and for the first quarter of 2010. For 2009, $5 million was outstanding; for 2010, $400,000 was needed. Lack of funding was listed first among problems in carrying out mine clearance operations.

In August 2009, Russia announced approximately $6 million in bilateral funding to the government of Nicaragua to cover mine clearance operations until May 2010. Of the total contribution approximately $3 million is reportedly a combination of in-kind contributions of

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97 Article 7 Reports, Form I, 28 February 2008 and 13 April 2009.
100 Email from Carl Case, Director, Office of Humanitarian Mine Action, Department of Public Security, OAS, 17 July 2009.
101 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, 2 March 2009, and email, 17 March 2009.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 The mechanical demining battalion has been reassigned to build roads to support demining.
equipment and monetary contributions to purchase equipment, including mine detectors and road-building machinery to improve accessibility to mine-affected areas; roughly $3 million will cover the costs of clearing the remaining mined areas. Nicaragua planned to set aside a small portion of the contribution to fund a rapid response clearance team until the end of 2010.\textsuperscript{107} In December 2008 the rapid response teams had ceased operations due to a funding shortage.\textsuperscript{108}

### National support for mine action

Nicaragua has reported contributing about $1 million annually to its mine action program since 1999. In total, Nicaragua has contributed approximately one-sixth of the funds needed for demining.\textsuperscript{109} Nicaragua did not report any contributions to its mine action program in 2008. Nicaragua reported covering CND staffing costs, while international donors covered operational costs.\textsuperscript{110}

### International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, three countries reported providing $1,524,756 (€1,035,418) to mine action in Nicaragua. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was approximately 66% less than in 2007. As noted by Nicaragua in April 2009, funding in 2008 was insufficient to meet mine action needs.

#### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Nicaragua: Monetary\textsuperscript{111}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Government of Nicaragua</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,005,790 (¥103,689,704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$876,658 (C$900,842)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>RE, mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$381,770 (€258,282)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>RE, mine clearance</td>
<td>$316,550 (NOK1,612,880)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>RE, mine clearance</td>
<td>$600,230 (€428,595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$3,320,998 (€4,890,502)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As noted above, the OAS supports Nicaragua’s national demining plan by providing training, technical advice, supervision, equipment, and logistical and administrative support, including fundraising for humanitarian demining operations.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{107} Telephone interview with Dr. Juan Umaña, CND, 18 August 2009 and email from Carl Case, Director, Office of Humanitarian Mine Action, OAS, 18 August 2009. The OAS reported slightly different figures, citing $6.5 million overall funding with $3.5 million to support clearance operations and at least $1.9 million earmarked for equipment purchases.

\textsuperscript{108} Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, OAS PADCA, Managua, 2 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{109} Analysis of Nicaragua’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 3 October 2008, p. 3.


\textsuperscript{111} Emails from Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department; Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Senior Regional Program Coordinator, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; Manfredo Capozza, Humanitarian Demining Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009; and email from Carl Case, OAS, 17 July 2009.

**2008 Key Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 September 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antivehicle mines and possibly antipersonnel mines and ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>89 (2007: 96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but estimated 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (Clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 September 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Only spot clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ten-Year Summary**

The Republic of Niger became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 September 1999. National implementation legislation entered into force in September 2004. Niger completed its stockpile destruction in April 2003, and did not retain antipersonnel mines for training purposes. An additional 1,772 mines were discovered and destroyed in 2008. Niger carried out a program to buy mines from traffickers to prevent them from falling into the hands of rebels.

Niger is contaminated with antivehicle mines as a result of insurgency in the north of the country, but the extent of any contamination from antipersonnel mines or explosive remnants of war (ERW) remains unknown. Niger announced the adoption of a four-year strategic mine action plan in April 2009.

From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 205 landmine casualties, including 48 killed and 157 injured. The majority of casualties occurred in 2007 and 2008. There has never been a formal risk education program, but basic awareness messages were provided in 2007–2008.

No specialized assistance for mine/ERW survivors is in place. Emergency and continuing medical care is insufficient, as are rehabilitation services. There are no known psychological support or socio-economic reintegration programs for survivors. Niger has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but discrimination against them is reported to have continued.

**Mine Ban Policy**


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1 Article 7 Report, Form A, 26 May 2005. According to Article 13 of Law 2004–044, use, production, stockpiling, or transfer of antipersonnel mines can be punished with a prison term of between 10 and 20 years, as well as a fine of CFA1 million–3 million. Article 16 of the law directs that the CNCCAI is responsible for ensuring the law’s application.

2 Niger submitted Article 7 reports on 26 May 2009, 29 June 2006, 26 May 2005, 30 April 2004, 4 April 2003, and 12 September 2002. In addition, Landmine Monitor received a copy of an Article 7 report dated 9 August 2001, which apparently was never received by the UN.

Niger has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling or transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).


Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and use
Niger has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In April 2003, Niger reported that it had destroyed its stock of 48 antipersonnel mines, fulfilling its Article 4 obligation. In its earlier Article 7 reports, Niger indicated that it was retaining for training purposes 949 antivehicle mines and 146 French “éclairant” (flare) mines. It appears that none of these are considered antipersonnel mines under the Mine Ban Treaty. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Niger reported only the 146 flare mines as retained, and reported that none of the flares contained explosives.

In 2008, Niger destroyed an additional 1,772 antipersonnel mines. These consisted of: 251 NR 409, four PMA-3, 1,447 BMP1, 22 BMP, and 48 mines of unspecified type. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Niger provided additional details, indicating that the NR 409 and PMA-3 mines, as well as 12 unspecified mines and 1,487 detonators, were destroyed at Dirkou on 26 August 2008, followed by destruction of the BMP1 and BMP mines at Dirkou between 13 and 22 October 2008. The other 36 unspecified antipersonnel mines detonated accidentally while being prepared for destruction during a ceremony in Gouré on 24 August 2008 when a non-state armed group was reportedly surrendering the mines to government control. The incident reportedly killed one person and injured approximately 40 others.

The mines apparently came from two sources, some discovered on the border with Chad and some purchased from traffickers. It was reported in the media that in July 2008 Niger had discovered more than 1,000 abandoned mines on the Niger-Chad border. The mines were believed to have been lifted from minefields by smugglers for resale.

The government initiated a program to buy mines and other weapons from traffickers to prevent them from falling into the hands of rebels. Niger said in May 2009 that the program had recovered many mines, all of which had been destroyed, but the program was halted as it

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5 Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 June 2006. This was also declared in the May 2005 and April 2003 reports.
6 Article 7 Report, Form D, 26 May 2009.
7 Ibid, Form B; statement of and presentation by Niger, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 25 May 2009. The NR 409 mine is Belgian-made. The PMA-3 is typically designated as Serbian, but Niger has cited it as Chinese-made. Landmine Monitor is not familiar with the BMP designation, but Niger cited it as a Belgian bounding mine, which likely refers to the NR442.
actually increased the flow of arms into the country. The head of the CNCCAI told Landmine Monitor in May 2009 that the mines acquired were old mines that had been removed from the ground, and were believed to have come from Chad.

In 2007, an armed insurgency reignited in the north of the country with the Touareg non-state armed group, the Niger Justice Movement (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice, MNJ) and some splinter factions. In November 2008, Niger told other States Parties that insurgents have not used antipersonnel mines, but have used antivehicle mines, causing both military and civilian casualties. It noted that while its Article 7 report had listed some suspected areas, on investigation no antipersonnel mines had been found. Niger confirmed again in May 2009 that no antipersonnel mines had been used by the rebels, but said it cannot guarantee that they will not be used as the conflict has not ended.

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Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Niger is contaminated with antivehicle mines, especially in the north of the country, where the army has been fighting the MNJ. Other antivehicle mine explosions have occurred elsewhere in the country, including in the capital, Niamey. An incident in February 2009 that cost the lives of six Gambians occurred on the border between Niger and Libya (see Casualties section below). Whether Niger is also contaminated by antipersonnel mines remains unclear. In its Article 7 report for 2008, Niger reported no areas in which antipersonnel mines were known or suspected to be emplaced. It further stated that antipersonnel mines had never been used in Niger. In its previous Article 7 report, covering April 2005 to March 2006, Niger declared eight suspected areas: the plateaus of Djado, Karama, Mangueni, and Tchigai; the Afafi and Air mountain ranges; the Talak plain; and the Emi Fezzan region.

In November 2007, a UNDP rapid assessment of the situation concluded that most of the numerous incidents in 2007 had occurred as a result of antivehicle mines in the Agadez region on the main and secondary roads east of the Air mountain range, and there was no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines in the current situation. However, analysis by Landmine Monitor of

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12 Ibid.
13 Interview with Col. Maï Moctar Kassouma, President, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009. A northern Niger newspaper printed an article alleging that state agencies were paying between CFA250,000 and CFA500,000 (approximately US$500–$1,000) per mine to smugglers who gathered the mines in Kourouzo in the western Tibesti region of Chad. “Comment lutter contre ces engins de la mort” (“How to fight against these devices of death”), Air Info, No. 90–91, 15 December 2008–15 January 2009, p. 2.
21 Ibid, Form I.
22 Article 7 Report, Form C, 29 June 2006.
24 Ibid.
the casualty data included in the report indicated that a number of the incidents—some of which did not inflict any injuries—did not seem consistent with the explosion of an antivehicle mine.26 The extent of ERW contamination is not known.

Casualties

In 2008, at least 89 new landmine casualties were identified in Niger, including 14 killed and 75 injured.27 The CNCCAI recorded 85 casualties, including 10 killed and 75 injured from January to September 2008.28 Landmine Monitor identified four additional casualties reported in the media (four military killed between Elmiki and Dabaga in the Agadez region) in November 2008 that are not in CNCCAI data.29

The large majority of casualties were men (77). The remaining casualties were woman (seven), boys (three), and girls (two). Detailed information on the date, location, civilian status, device type, and activity was not available, but the CNCCAI reported that military were the biggest casualty group and that the most common activity at the time of the incident was driving/traveling.30 All casualties were caused by antivehicle mines, except for one incident in which one person was killed and 40 injured in Gouré, Zinder province by the explosion of a number of antipersonnel mines during a weapon handover ceremony between the government and the rebels.31

The CNCCAI revised its 2007 mine casualty data upwards from 90 to 104, including 28 killed and 76 injured. Men were the biggest casualty group (98); four were women; and two were children, one boy and one girl.32 Detailed information was not available, but the majority of casualties were military personnel who were driving/traveling. All casualties were caused by antivehicle mines.33 The 2008 casualty rate is lower than 2007. Almost half of 2008 casualties occurred in the single incident in Gouré. With slow data collection and ongoing verification of information, however, these figures might well under-represent the problem.

No new mine/ERW casualties had been identified in 2009 as of May.34 The CNCCAI’s mine action consultant reported that “some casualties have been found in 2009,” but details were not available as of June.35

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Niger remains unknown, and the CNCCAI reported that data was being verified as of June 2009.36 From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 205 landmine casualties, including 48 killed and 157 injured.37 The majority

35 Telephone interviews with Allassan Fousseini, CNCCAI/UNDP, 15 June and 26 June 2009.
of casualties were identified in 2007 and 2008, linked to the Touareg rebellion. Some 80,035 persons with disabilities have been registered in Niger, but numbers could be 10 times higher.

**Risk profile**

The main at-risk group is military personnel traveling on the roads in northern Niger, while civilian travelers, including humanitarian aid workers, are also at risk.

**Program Management and Coordination**

The CNCCAI serves as the national mine action authority for Niger. In accordance with the 1994 decree that established it, the commission reports directly to the President and one of its functions is to monitor Law 2004–044 on the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The CNCCAI is also responsible for coordinating risk education (RE) and victim assistance (VA) activities. Its role in VA remained limited in 2008, due to lack of funds. The Ministry of Population and Social Welfare is responsible for disability issues.

There is no separate mine action center, given the lack of formal demining operations, as access to the north is restricted because of the ongoing conflict. In February 2008, however, a working group on mine action, including RE, was jointly established by the CNCCAI and UNDP. The working group has since been meeting several times each month.

**Data collection and management**

Casualty data collection remains incomplete in Niger. In 2008, the CNCCAI, with the support of a UNDP consultant, established a casualty database. As of June 2009, detailed information remained limited and data was being verified.

Casualty data is collected by the “gendarmerie” (police), the National Forces for Intervention and Security (Forces Nationales d’Intervention et de Sécurité), health personnel, and local organizations. A standard data collection form was developed in 2008 and shared with data collectors. In May 2009, the CNCCAI reported that verification of data and collection of further details was slowed down by the volatile security situation in the north. Casualties also continued to be reported in the media, but the information provided was limited.
Plans

Strategic mine action plans

The Anti-Mine Action Plan 2009–2013 was presented at an RE workshop organized on the International Day of Mine Action in 2009. Under the plan, Niger will seek to develop the CNCCAI’s capacity to coordinate mine action, set up a mine action database, conduct demining, promote international humanitarian law relating to mines and ERW, carry out RE, and support health structures to ensure assistance is provided to survivors. Demining objectives include the following:

• procure demining equipment;
• conduct training in mine clearance;
• begin identifying, marking, and, where possible, clearing suspected areas while the conflict is ongoing; and
• complete clearance operations once the conflict is over.

Niger will also destroy all mines that are handed in to the authorities.

Both RE and VA were also included in the plan. The RE objective is to reduce the risk of incidents through information dissemination, awareness-raising, and education of the population. A communication plan (to develop awareness messages, define communication networks and materials, and train trainers) will be implemented and evaluated.

The VA objective is to support health structures and ensure monitoring of the assistance provided to mine survivors. Three activities are planned to:

• develop a strategy and a mechanism to provide assistance to victims;
• recruit and train doctors and military and civilian personnel; and
• create a rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration center.

The 2007 UNDP rapid assessment recommended developing a mine action plan, including VA, based on the Nairobi Action Plan. UNDP planned to finance a national strategic plan for VA in 2009. In 2008, Niger reported that a VA consultant was to be hired, but no progress was reported as of late April 2009.

Niger’s Poverty Reduction Strategy for 2008–2012 contains some priority actions targeting vulnerable people, including persons with disabilities. The actions are to promote sports for persons with disabilities, and ensure their legal protection and social reintegration.

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Niger has set up mechanisms to address mine action and VA, but its overall response has been slow. Following preliminary talks between the Niger government, the MNJ, and two splinter factions, the NGO Geneva Call lobbied the government and the MNJ to address mine action, particularly demining, in possible future peace negotiations.
States Parties

Niger

National management
Niger’s nascent mine action program is nationally managed, under the responsibility of the CNCCAI. The program has been receiving technical assistance from UNDP. No national mine action legislation or standards have yet been drafted.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
The Niger Armed Forces are responsible for demining and to date have marked a number of suspected mined areas and carried out some spot demining. There was, however, no humanitarian demining carried out in 2008. Twice during the year, Niger sent members of its armed forces for professional training in basic demining and clearance techniques at the West African Center for Humanitarian Mine Action Training (Centre de Formation au Déminage Humanitaire–Afrique de l’Ouest) in Benin.

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Niger was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 September 2009. Given the uncertainty surrounding the possibility of antipersonnel mine contamination, in March 2008, Colonel Maï Moctar Kassouma, the head of the CNCCAI, wrote to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit noting that since the conflict was still ongoing, it was not possible to confirm that there had been no use of antipersonnel mines. In June 2008, however, at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Colonel Kassouma, representing Niger, stated, “In the current context, and based on the accidents recorded to date, Niger can today confirm that the presence of antipersonnel mines is no longer suspected on its territory and that the problem that confronts it currently is linked to the presence of antivehicle mines.” Niger also noted, however, that rebels had used “antivehicle mines intended for use against people.” It is not known which type of mines are referred to.

Niger further declared, “If previously unknown mined areas [containing antipersonnel mines] are found, Niger promises to report to the other States Parties in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 and to take the appropriate measures to destroy all antipersonnel mines in these areas with respect to the obligations of Article 5 of the Convention.”

Risk Education
In 2008, RE continued to be provided on an ad hoc basis. The number of people reached is unknown. In Form I of its Article 7 report for 2008, Niger stated that “antipersonnel mines have never been used in Niger. However, because of traffickers, awareness campaigns are done to invite the population to be cautious and to denounce and/or voluntarily hand over [mines].” The 2007 UNDP rapid assessment recommended starting emergency RE activities.

References:
70 See www.cpadd.org. The center was formerly known in French as the Centre de Perfectionnement aux Actions Post-conflictuelles de Déminage et de Dépollution.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Article 7 Report, Form I, 26 May 2009.
In January and February 2008, UNICEF broadcast awareness messages in French and in three local languages on the national radio and on seven regional radio stations.\(^{78}\) It is estimated that 80% of the population was reached.\(^{79}\) In August and September 2008, the CNCCAI, with UNDP support, organized three training courses in Agadez, Niamey, and Zinder for RE focal points among local authorities and civil society.\(^{80}\) An awareness campaign was organized countrywide from 26 November to 3 December 2008.\(^{81}\) Basic RE messages were provided to the population.\(^{82}\) There has never been any formal RE program.\(^{83}\) At the Standing Committee meetings in February 2004, Niger presented a draft action plan, which included RE,\(^{84}\) but the plan was not implemented. In Form I of its Article 7 reports, Niger has stated that awareness messages were provided to the population and that the army informed people who were traveling about the safety of their itinerary.\(^{85}\) In 2007, transport and other unions, as well as some local NGOs, alerted their drivers about the threat posed by mines.\(^{86}\)

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be at least 157. With more than 70% of the population living below the poverty line,\(^{87}\) Niger remains one of the poorest countries in the world.\(^{88}\) Despite efforts to improve it, healthcare remains inadequate due to poor quality of services, lack of personnel, and a shortage of medicines and equipment, particularly in rural areas.\(^{89}\) In 2008, service provision was further strained by the volatile security situation and by the threat of landmines in the north of the country.\(^{90}\) The healthcare system was challenged by an increased influx of weapon-injured people, both civilian and military.\(^{91}\)

National law mandates that the state provide for persons with disabilities,\(^{92}\) but in practice the social security system assists less than one citizen out of ten.\(^{93}\) Persons with disabilities receive limited services and their survival and reintegration are issues of concern.\(^{94}\) Military mine survivors received some support from the government and are said to be better off than civilians.\(^{95}\)

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\(^{78}\) Email from Djanabou Mahonde, UNICEF, 2 May 2009; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 563.

\(^{79}\) Email from Djanabou Mahonde, UNICEF, 2 May 2009.

\(^{80}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Allassan Fousseini, CNCCAI/UNDP, 29 April 2009.

\(^{81}\) Ibid.

\(^{82}\) Interview with Col. Maï Moctar Kassouma, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.

\(^{83}\) Ibid.

\(^{84}\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 581.

\(^{85}\) Article 7 Report, Form I, 4 April 2003; Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2004; Article 7 Report, Form I, 26 May 2005; and Article 7 Report, Form I, 29 June 2006.


\(^{94}\) Ibid, p. 60.

\(^{95}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Allassan Fousseini, CNCCAI/UNDP, 29 April 2009.
Emergency and continuing medical care are insufficient, due to limited resources.96 Mine casualties were transported by ambulance or air to one of the three hospitals in Arlit, some 300km from Agadez, when means were available.97 As the lack of medical personnel, especially surgeons, remains a problem,98 Niger’s mine action plan envisages recruiting and training new doctors.99 Rehabilitation and orthopedic services are also insufficient and there are no rehabilitation centers in Agadez.100 Orthopedic workshops are located in Dosso, Niamey, and Zinder.101 No psychological support or socio-economic reintegration programs are known to exist for survivors. There are no regulations to mandate special education for persons with disabilities.102 Niger has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities: the law was generally enforced, but discrimination continued to be reported.103 Niger ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 24 June 2008.

Victim assistance activities
In 2008, there was no specialized VA program.104 The total number of mine/ERW survivors assisted in 2008 remains unknown and Niger did not provide information on its VA activities in Form J of its Article 7 report submitted in 2009.105 The ICRC covered the medical and orthopedic expenses of one mine survivor.106 It provided medicines and materials to health facilities in the north and the Agadez hospital.107 In addition, it organized three war-surgery seminars to improve the treatment of weapon-injured, including mine-injured, in Agadez, Arlit, and Niamey.108 The seminar was attended by 35 civilians and 27 military health professionals.109 UNICEF trained 80 social workers on psychological support for children affected by the ongoing insecurity in Agadez and Tahoua.110 Handicap International works with children with disabilities in Niamey and conducts disability advocacy activities.111 One Gambian civilian injured in a mine incident in Libya received medical assistance in Niger in 2009.112

Support for Mine Action
No international funding was reported for Niger in 2008. In 2007, France reported contributing US$108,313 (€78,997) in-kind funding to Niger.113 On 23 January 2008, UNDP approved $100,000 for emergency activities, following several landmine incidents in urban areas.114

101 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
106 Email from Nicolai Panke, Head of Mission Niger-Mali, ICRC, 27 April 2009.
108 Email from Nicolai Panke, ICRC, 27 April 2009.
109 Ibid.
110 Email from Djanabou Mahonde, UNICEF, 2 May 2009.
111 Telephone interview with Xavier Joubert, Program Director Niger-Burkina Faso, HI, 28 April 2009.
114 Email from Simon Handy, CTP Crises, UNDP, 12 August 2009.
Ten-Year Summary

The Federal Republic of Nigeria acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 September 2001, and the treaty entered into force on 1 March 2002. Nigeria has stated since 2004 that it is in the process of enacting national legislation to implement the treaty. Nigeria stated in 2001 that it no longer possessed antipersonnel mines, but in 2004 declared that it had a stockpile of 3,364 mines, and indicated that it would retain the entire stock for research and training purposes. However, Nigeria reported that it destroyed all of these mines in 2005. Yet, in its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Nigeria again listed 3,364 mines as retained for training and stated that it had destroyed 9,786 stockpiled mines in 2005.

It is not known to what extent Nigeria is contaminated with landmines, although contamination from explosive remnants of war (ERW) has been reported across nine states. In May 2009, Nigeria reported a possible mine threat left over from the Biafra conflict in the 1960s to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings. Its Article 5 deadline for clearance of antipersonnel mines in mined areas is 1 March 2012.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Nigeria is not known. Landmine Monitor identified at least two casualties from 1999 to 2008, but these figures do not represent the real scope of the problem, as the number of casualties from the Biafran conflict has never been established. In 2009, the government announced the beginning of data collection on survivors. There is no risk education program in Nigeria. Services for persons with disabilities are limited and there is no legislation prohibiting discrimination.

Mine Ban Policy


Nigeria has stated since 2004 that it is in the process of enacting national legislation to implement the treaty. Its latest Article 7 report stated, “Domestication of MBT is in progress.” It further stated that an inter-ministerial committee had been formed to prepare a draft bill and that once drafted, the bill would be presented to the National Assembly for consideration. In a July 2007 letter to the ICBL, Nigeria indicated that the draft legislation would criminalize any activity prohibited under the convention and “as far as the application of Article 9 of the treaty is concerned, Nigeria’s efforts have reached an advanced stage.” Nigeria previously reported that as of December 2005, the implementation bill was undergoing its first reading in the National Assembly.


Nigeria attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but did not make any statements. At the meeting, it was named co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies. It attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it made a statement...
outlining how it planned to investigate recent reports that there may be mined areas in Nigeria. In the past, Nigeria has reported that there are no mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.

With respect to matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty, Nigeria has indicated that its draft implementation legislation “prohibits transfer of anti-personnel mines through any part of the Nigerian territory.” Nigeria stated in 2005, after reporting that it had destroyed all mines it had previously retained under Article 3, “If you are really convinced about a mine free world, what would you need mines to train for?” Nigeria has not made known its views on issues related to joint military operations with states not party and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or anti-handling devices.

In March 2009, the IANSA Women Network (Nigeria) organized a roundtable discussion to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty’s entry into force and to review Nigeria’s progress towards full implementation of the treaty. The event was attended by representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the Nigerian Police, and the Ministry of Environment, as well as by foreign diplomats, the ICRC, NGOs, and the media. A main focus of the meeting was on how Nigeria had not yet adopted national implementation measures.

Nigeria has signed but not ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 12 June 2009, but had not ratified as of 1 July 2009.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use
Nigeria is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In the past, Nigeria has stated that it has not acquired or used antipersonnel mines since the 1967–1970 Biafra Civil War. Nigeria has denied allegations that its Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) troops used mines in the 1990s in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In February 2001, the Chief of Operations of the Nigerian army reported to Landmine Monitor that Nigeria had destroyed its antipersonnel mines remaining after the war, and had retained none for training or development purposes. In May 2002, however, Nigeria presented photographs to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction showing that antipersonnel mines were among munitions involved in a January 2002 fire and explosion at the Ammunition Transit Depot in Ikeja Cantoment, Lagos.

In its initial Article 7 report in 2004, Nigeria declared a stockpile of 3,364 so-called ‘Dimbat’ mines and reported that it would retain the entire stockpile for research and training. Following the Mine Ban Treaty’s First Review Conference in 2004, Nigeria reversed this position and issued a presidential directive to destroy the mines. In April 2005, Nigeria reported that all of its retained mines had been destroyed. Nigeria stated, “With the completion of these destruction
exercises, we are able to report that there are no more anti-personnel mines on Nigeria soil.” 15 However, in its 2009 Article 7 report, Nigeria again listed 3,364 “British made AP mines” as retained for training. 16 Moreover, it reported that it had destroyed 9,786 stockpiled “British made AP landmines” in 2005 under the supervision of the then President.17

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Nigeria is contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a legacy of the Biafra conflict that ended in 1970.18 Contamination was reported across nine states: Abia, Anambra, Akwa Ibom, Benue, Cross River, Delta, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo; as of end-June 2009, according to the Minister of Defence, a total of at least 649 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) had been identified.19 The extent of any landmine problem is not yet known, although media reports in 2009 suggested that landmines formed part of the residual threat.20 Nigeria’s Article 7 report submitted in 2009 stated that there were suspected mined areas in the “war-affected areas in the Eastern part of Nigeria” that might be contaminated with “Biafran ‘locally fabricated’ explosive device (OGBUNIGWE), which was used as AP Landmine.”21

**Casualties**

There were no reports of new mine/ERW casualties in Nigeria in 2008 or in 2009, as of May 2009.22 In 2004, Nigeria reported that “we have not had mine-related incidents for a very long time.”23 However, in January 2009, the Ministry of Defence reported that “cases of explosions of unexploded mines have continued to be a threat to our people’s lives [sic] causing loss of lives and property.”24

The only two mine incidents ever identified in Nigeria occurred in 2002 and were reported by the media. In January 2002, after an explosion occurred at the Lagos Ammunition Transit Depot, a young man was reportedly injured after stepping on a landmine at the scene.25 In its 2005 and 2004 Article 7 reports, however, Nigeria stated that “no casualty was reported.”26 In December 2002, a person of unknown gender and age was injured by an ERW.27

In September 1997, 11 Nigerian soldiers from the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were killed in a mine explosion in Sierra Leone.28 It is not known if any Nigerian soldiers involved in peacekeeping operations since have been killed or injured by landmines.29

16 Article 7 Report (for the period 2006–2009), Form D.
17Ibid, Form G.
21 Article 7 Report (for the period 2006–2009), Form C.
The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Nigeria is unknown. The Biafran conflict claimed a number of landmine victims, although their number has never been established.\(^{30}\) In 2009, the government announced plans to count mine survivors in 10 states: Abia, Anambra, Bayelsa, Benue, Cross River, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo, Lagos, and River.\(^{31}\) In January 2009, an interministerial Committee was set up to deal with mine issues; one of its tasks was collecting mine survivor data.\(^{32}\) In April 2009, the chair of the committee reported that a team had been sent to the Ebonyi state, in southeastern Nigeria, to count mine survivors.\(^{33}\) Nigeria did not report on progress made in collecting casualty data at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.\(^{34}\) In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Nigeria stated that 147 survivors had been identified in a resettlement center in Anambra state and additional 41 outside of this the resettlement center.\(^{35}\)

**Program Management and Coordination**

There is not yet a formal mine action program in Nigeria, although there are plans to establish one. In April 2009, the chair of the Committee on Landmine Clearance and Unexploded Ordnance from the Ministry of Defence visited Ebonyi state in accordance with President Yar’Adua’s approval for the clearance of landmines and UXO arising from the Biafra conflict.\(^{36}\)

It is unknown which governmental body has the final responsibility for mine/ERW survivors. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs is in charge of disability issues.\(^{37}\) The interministerial Committee on Landmine Clearance and Unexploded Ordnance reported that, upon identification of mine victims in Nigeria, a request for assistance will be submitted to the UN.\(^{38}\)

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

As of May 2009, a demining program was not yet underway. In May 2009, at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Nigeria declared that it was discussing with the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit the possibility of technical assistance in demining. An initial assessment mission was said to be planned for July 2009.\(^{39}\)

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Nigeria is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2012. Nigeria has reported to States Parties on the possibility of mine contamination through the Standing Committees and in August 2009 submitted an Article 7 report in which it declared suspected mined areas. Should mine contamination be confirmed, Nigeria declared its commitment to addressing it as quickly as possible.\(^{40}\)

\(^{32}\) Article 7 Report (for the period 2006–2009), Form C.
\(^{35}\) Article 7 Report (for the period 2006–2009), Form J.
\(^{40}\) Ibid.
Risk Education

From 1999 to 2009, there was no formal risk education program in Nigeria. The government declared in earlier Article 7 reports that Form I was not applicable to Nigeria. However, in its latest Article 7 report, Nigeria reported that, from 2006 to 2009, basic awareness messages were disseminated through posters, media, and sign posts; churches and mosques also provided some basic awareness.

In May 2009, at the Standing Committee meetings, Nigeria stated that if the technical assessment planned was to confirm the presence of mined areas, Nigeria “will do what is required to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians until all AP mines contained therein have been destroyed.”

Victim Assistance

The number of survivors is unknown, but at least 188. The number of persons with disabilities in Nigeria is also unknown, although the World Health Organization has estimated that some 19 million people are disabled (20% of the population).

Nigeria is classified among the 25 poorest countries in the world, and its health system is said to be in poor condition. Services for persons with disabilities are limited; medical care and rehabilitation are inadequate. Prosthetics remain unaffordable for the majority of the disabled population. There are government-run vocational training centers in Abuja and Lagos for persons with disabilities. There are several international and national NGOs working within the disability sector including Leonard Cheshire Disability, the Leprosy Mission, and Christianblinden Mission.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for fulfilling Nigeria’s mine action needs, including risk education and victim assistance. No international mine action funding was reported for Nigeria in 2008, nor was any reported in 2007. Nigeria did not report national funding in 2008, but its 2009 Ministry of Defence budget includes an item for “Enumeration of Landmines Victims and Removal of Anti-Personnel Mines,” with appropriations in 2009 amounting to N100 million (US$680,000). In its 2009 Article 7 report Nigeria reported contracting a consultant to carry out “pre-enumeration of landmine victims and removal of mines and explosive remnants of war”, starting in January 2009, but did not specify the contract amount or the consulting party involved. There is not enough data on landmine contamination or casualty statistics to assess the adequacy of national funding in meeting Nigeria’s mine action needs.

41 Article 7 Report, Form J, 22 August 2006; and Article 7 Report, Form J, 15 April 2005.
42 Article 7 Report (for the period 2006–2009), Form I.
44 Article 7 Report (for the period 2006–2009), Form J.
49 Ibid.
52 Nigeria Federal Ministry of Finance, “2009 Appropriations: Ministry of Defence,” undated, p. 96, www.fmf.gov.ng. Budget appropriations are presumed to be reported in Nigerian Naira (NGN) although amounts are reported under the denomination “N”.
53 Article 7 Report (for the period 2006–2009), Form C.
The Republic of Palau became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 May 2008. In August 2008, draft national implementation legislation was introduced into the Senate, and Palau hosted a sub-regional workshop to promote the Mine Ban Treaty.

Min Ban Policy


According to Palau’s initial Article 7 report, Senator Caleb Otto introduced draft legislation—the Anti-Personnel Mine Prohibition Act of 2008 (SB No. 7-270)—into the Senate on 20 August 2008. The legislation passed its first reading and was referred to the Senate Committee on Judiciary and Governmental Affairs. Its progress was delayed by national elections held on 4 November 2008, but according to the Article 7 report, legislative action was anticipated in the next Senate session in February 2009. No update on the legislation was available as of August 2009.

Palau attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. At the Meeting of States Parties, Palau said it would host a regional nuclear disarmament meeting in May 2009, where it would press states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty from the Pacific to join.2 At the opening of the regional meeting, Palau’s Minister of State, Sandra Pierantozzi said, “Like the AP Mine Ban Treaty, we in the Pacific may not possess nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, but our joining this Treaty would strengthen the universalization of this Treaty, thus isolating the users and wanna-be users of these weapons to their own regions.”

In August 2008, Palau hosted a sub-regional workshop to promote Mine Ban Treaty accession by Micronesia and ratification by the Marshall Islands.4

In November 2007, at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan, Palau’s Minister of State, Temmy L. Shmull, announced Palau’s accession to the treaty and said Palau had “worked diligently” on the accession process since it first attended a Mine Ban Treaty annual meeting in 2005. He also said Palau “sees a moral obligation and responsibility to do its part” to promote universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.5

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1 Article 7 Report (for the period 1 May 2008 to 15 September 2008), Form A.
In its initial Article 7 report, Palau confirmed that it does not possess antipersonnel mine stockpiles, has never produced the weapon, and has no mined areas. Palau had previously said on several occasions that it did not produce or stockpile antipersonnel mines, and that it was not mine-affected.

Palau told States Parties in November 2005 that there is UXO still to be found in many of Palau’s 200 islands left over from World War II.

Palau signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009. Palau is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

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6 Article 7 Report (for the period 1 May 2008 to 15 September 2008), Forms B, C, and E.
8 Statement of Palau, Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 29 November 2005.
## Peru

### 2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>State Party since</strong></th>
<th>1 March 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contamination</strong></td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated area of contamination</strong></td>
<td>192,000m² covering 35 mined areas in the Condor Mountain Range, three prisons (11,167m²), and two police bases (area not reported)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Casualties in 2008</strong></td>
<td>Eight (2007: 48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</strong></td>
<td>Unknown but at least 372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</strong></td>
<td>Deadline: 1 March 2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Original deadline: 1 March 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demining in 2008</strong></td>
<td>1,155m² of mined areas on the border with Ecuador and 324,800m² of national infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk education recipients in 2008</strong></td>
<td>At least 10,896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Progress towards victim assistance aims</strong></td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support for mine action in 2008</strong></td>
<td>National: $960,911 (2007: $1.3 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International: $447,257 (2007: $200,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Ten-Year Summary


Peru’s mine problem is the result of the conflict with Ecuador in 1995 and from internal conflict with non-state armed groups that ended in 1992. In December 2002, Peru created the Peruvian Center for Mine Action (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonales, Contraminas), which, under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is responsible for mine action planning and policy-making. Peru has developed its mine clearance capacity under the supervision and monitoring of the Organization of American States, but clearance on the border with Ecuador has been generally slow. Unable to meet its March 2009 treaty deadline for clearance, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Peru requested, and was granted, an extension until March 2017.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 141 casualties (29 killed and 112 injured) caused by mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim-activated improvised explosive devices. During the same period, Contraminas reported 84 casualties (five killed, 69 injured, and 10 unknown), mostly from mines. In 2008, Contraminas reported that it had identified 318 mine casualties (49 killed, 265 injured, and four unknown), and 107 ERW survivors in Peru since 1991. Limited risk education has been conducted in Ica, Junin, and Lima departments, and along the border with Ecuador through direct presentations and training of teachers and community leaders.
Victim assistance initiatives started relatively late in Peru, with the formation of Contraminas in 2002 and the Association of Mine Victims in 2003. Previously, data collection on casualties was irregular and few services were available specifically for survivors. Peru is one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors (VA26). As of May 2009, limited progress had been made in achieving its VA26 objectives. Most advances were part of broader efforts to improve healthcare services.

Mine Ban Policy


On 29 April 2009, Peru submitted its tenth Article 7 report, covering the period from March 2008 to March 2009.2

Peru participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, speaking on both occasions about mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. At the Ninth Meeting of State Parties, States Parties approved Peru’s mine clearance deadline extension request to 1 March 2017 (see below). Peru also became co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration.

In February 2009, Peru participated in a regional Mine Ban Treaty meeting held in Managua, Nicaragua, to prepare for the Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference.

Peru has made few formal statements on key issues of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3, concerning joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes and antihandling devices, and mines retained for training purposes.


Peru signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not yet ratified as of 1 July 2009.3

Production, transfer, use, stockpiling, and retention

Peru is a former producer of antipersonnel mines.4 The Ministry of Defense has stated that Peru has never exported antipersonnel mines.5 Peru used antipersonnel mines around its electricity towers and public infrastructure during and after the internal conflict of 1980–1992.6

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4 The police produced the DEXA mine until production facilities were closed in 1994, while the navy produced the CICITEC MG-MAP-304 and the CICITEC MGP-30 mines until production facilities were closed in 1997. Article 7 Report, Form H, 2 May 2005; Article 7 Report, Forms E and H, April 2003; and ICRC, “Programa de Sensibilización de los Peligros de las Minas Antipersonal” (Mine Risk Education Program), Lima, 2002, p. 7.
6 Peru has denied mine-laying during the 1995 border conflict with Ecuador. Article 7 Report, Form C, 6 May 2004.
From 1999 to December 2001, Peru destroyed its stockpile of 338,356 antipersonnel mines. In April 2009, Peru reported a stockpile of 4,047 antipersonnel mines retained for training. This is 47 more mines than reported in 2008 as, according to its Article 7 report, Peru’s National Penitentiary Institute informed the government on 3 April 2009 about 47 antipersonnel mines stored in the inventory of a regional office.

Peru reported the destruction of 12 mines during training activities in 2007, but it still has not reported in any detail on the intended purpose and actual use of its retained mines. In 2005, a military official told Landmine Monitor that mines are held by different army Combat Engineer Units for use in instruction on the safe storage and transportation of mines, meaning the mines are not usually destroyed during training.

Since early 2007, remnants of the non-state armed group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, referred to as “explosive traps,” to protect illegal coca fields in the Alto Huallaga sector of Huánuco department, and in San Martín department. In October 2008, the Peruvian media agency InfoRegion reported that since 2004 Shining Path had carried out 84 attacks against coca field eradicators in the Alto Huallaga sector, using “explosive traps” in 24 of the attacks.

In August 2008, Peru launched an offensive in Vizcayan province against Shining Path in which 24 members of the army, air force, and navy were injured, reportedly mainly by “explosive traps.” A March 2009 media report indicated that since moving into Vizcayan, troops had “detonated landmines” in their campaign against the guerrillas. Also in March 2009, a journalist told Landmine Monitor that the Ministry of Defense had warned him of explosive devices on dirt roads inside and outside the region.

In the past decade, the only other reports of use of antipersonnel mines or antipersonnel mine-like devices by Shining Path came in June and July 2003. Victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

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7 Two destructions of a total of 11,784 antipersonnel mines between March 2000 and March 2001 are sometimes not included in Peru’s destruction totals. Peru destroyed the bulk of its stockpile, 321,730 mines, between 30 May and 13 September 2001. Peru declared stockpile destruction complete in September 2001, but then destroyed a further 926 mines in December 2001 that it had intended to retain for training. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 658.

8 Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 April 2009. The 4,047 mines include 775 CICITEC (MGP), 600 M18-A1 Claymore, 525 M409, 500 PMA-3, 500 PMB-6N (possibly PMD-6M), 500 PDM-6, 500 POMZ-2M, 100 M35 C/ESP M5, and 47 CICITEC mines. All are held by the army, except the 47 CICITEC mines which are held by the National Penitentiary Institute.

9 Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 April 2009.

10 Peru stated in its Article 7 report that 12 MAP-CICITEC mines held by the national police were destroyed in 2007, but did not provide details. Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2008. In April 2008, Contraminas told Landmine Monitor that 12 retained mines were used by DIVSECOM in training operations. Telephone interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, General Coordinator, Contraminas, 4 April 2008.


13 María Elena Hidalgo, “Quitamos la mamadera a terroristas pero todavía tenemos para largo” (“We have taken the pacifier from the terrorists but we still have a long way to go”), La República (Lima), 28 September 2008, www.larepublica.com.pe.


According to a January 2009 media report, municipal workers in Lima found three grenades and a Claymore mine in a garbage container.\(^\text{17}\) Contraminas has sought more information.\(^\text{18}\)

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Landmines and ERW in Peru are the result of internal and international armed conflicts. Peru has two distinct mine problems. One is the Condor Mountain Range in the sparsely populated Amazon basin, where in 1995 during an armed conflict with Ecuador, antipersonnel mines were emplaced along the border in Amazonas, Cajamarca, Piura, and Tumbes departments.\(^\text{19}\) In November 2008, Peru reported that 35 mined areas remained covering a total of 192,700m\(^2\) in the sectors of Achuime, Cenepa, and Santiago in Amazonas department, containing approximately 29,200 mines.\(^\text{20}\)

The other mine problem is in the center of the country where, in the 1980s, mines were planted to protect infrastructure against attacks from non-state armed groups.\(^\text{21}\) In response to the destruction of 10 high-tension electricity pylons in one day in 1986, resulting in a nationwide blackout, the government of Peru decided to mine the pylons to protect them.\(^\text{22}\) Mines were also planted around three maximum security prisons in 1993–1996 to prevent prisoners escaping and around police anti-narcotics bases as a defensive measure.\(^\text{23}\) In total, 837 electricity pylons, three antenna transmitters, one electricity substation, three high-security prisons, and two police bases were mined.\(^\text{24}\) By the end of 2008, all of the mined pylons, transmission antennas, and substations had been cleared, leaving the three prisons and two police bases to be demined.\(^\text{25}\) In February 2009, Peru reported that technical surveys of the prisons had begun.\(^\text{26}\)

An unknown number of ERW, mainly UXO, remain to be cleared from both internal armed conflicts as well as the war with Ecuador. There may also be another, more recent, explosive hazard. As noted above, since 2007 Shining Path rebels have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, mainly to protect cocoa crops.

**Casualties**

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified eight ERW and victim-activated IED casualties (five killed and three injured) in two separate incidents. On 15 March 2008, in the province of La Convención, two children brought an abandoned explosive, found near an army base, into their home. It exploded, killing both children and an adult male family member and injured two women and one boy.\(^\text{27}\) On 5 May 2008, two civilian community guards (“ronderos”) were killed

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18 Telephone interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, 29 April 2009.

19 Article 7 report, Form C, 29 April 2009, pp. 6–7.


23 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 5; and email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, 7 August 2008.


by a victim-activated IED while guiding an army patrol looking for members of Shining Path in Chungui district in La Mar province.28

The eight casualties identified in 2008 is a decrease from the 48 casualties (five killed and 43 injured) reported in 2007. The high number of casualties reported in 2007 was mostly due to increased media attention to incidents occurring during coca eradication activities; 34 of the casualties in 2007 were caused by victim-activated IEDs planted in coca growing areas. It is also likely that there were additional casualties from victim-activated IEDs during 2008. Because media reports are the only source of information on these casualties, it is difficult to get precise data. One 2008 media report included information on 24 casualties between 30 August and 28 September (21 security guards and 3 civilians, all injured) that were “primarily” caused by victim-activated IEDs.29

In its 2009 Article 7 report, Form J, Peru stated that it was not aware of any antipersonnel mine casualties between March 2008 and March 2009.30 Contraminas also reported no mine/ERW/IED casualties in 2008 or 2009, as of 31 March.31

In 2009, one casualty was identified as of 31 May. On 23 April, a 23-year-old male farmer was injured when he stepped on an explosive in Huanta province, Huancavelica department in the VRAE (River Apurímac and River Ene valley) region, an area with significant coca cultivation. Media reports identified the explosive as an antipersonnel landmine, believed to have been planted by Shining Path to prevent coca eradication.32 As of 6 July 2009, Contraminas was not yet able to confirm or deny the type of explosive involved in the incident.33

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 141 casualties (29 killed and 112 injured) caused by mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs. Casualty data provided by Contraminas had a significantly lower casualty total of 84 for the same period (five killed, 69 injured, and 10 unknown). This can primarily be explained by the fact that Contraminas only has a mandate to collect data on mine casualties, although there are also some ERW casualties included in their total. Landmine Monitor data includes information provided by Contraminas on landmine casualties as well as ERW and victim-activated IED casualties reported in the media or identified by the Association of Victims and Survivors of Minefields (Asociación de Victimas y Sobrevivientes de Campos Minados, AVISCAM).

Annual fluctuations in casualty figures and incomplete data make it impossible to establish any clear trends between 1999 and 2008.

The total number of casualties in Peru is not known. In April 2008, Contraminas reported it had registered 318 mine casualties (49 killed, 265 injured, and four unknown) since 1991, and in June 2008 it reported 107 ERW survivors. In 2007, AVISCAM estimated that more than 500 mine/ERW casualties had occurred in Peru.34

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29 María Elena Hidalgo, “Quitamos la mamadera a terroristas, pero todavía tenemos para largo” (“We have taken the pacifier from the terrorists but we still have a long way to go”), La Republica (Ayacucho), 28 September 2008, www.larepublica.com.pe.

30 Article 7 Report, Form J, 29 April 2009.

31 Casualty data provided via email by Juan Miguel Grau, Victim Assistance Consultant, Contraminas, 10 June 2009.


33 Interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, in Geneva, 26 May 2009; and email from Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, 6 July 2009.

Risk profile
Casualties result from ERW and, to a limited extent, antipersonnel mines located mainly in the center of the country and the Condor Mountain Range near the border with Ecuador. Additionally, Peruvians crossing illegally into Chile are at risk from mines on the Chilean side of the border. Victim-activated IEDs planted to prevent coca eradication are a significant cause of incidents.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
The National Mine Action Authority is the Executive Council, comprised of representatives of the ministries of defense, education, health, interior, and the National Council for the Integration of Disabled Persons (Consejo Nacional Para la Integracion de la Persona con Discapacidad, CONADIS) and chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Executive Council sets strategy and priorities and approves plans and budgets. Under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Contraminas coordinates planning and operations to meet Peru’s Mine Ban Treaty obligations, including for clearance.

Risk education
Contraminas is responsible for the coordination of mine risk education activities, and held six meetings in 2008, with the participation of the Ministry of Education. There is no body responsible for ERW education.

Victim assistance
Contraminas coordinates all mine action activities, including victim assistance (VA). In 2006, Contraminas formed an inter-ministerial permanent committee made up of representatives from the ministries of health, women, and education, and the armed forces, to facilitate coordination. As in 2007, it met irregularly in 2008. In 2009, the VA committee was expanded to include representatives from civil society and, as of 29 April, it had held three formal meetings. CONADIS is responsible for disability policy. The Office of the Public Advocate for Persons with Disabilities, within the Office of the Ombudsperson (Defensoria del Pueblo), receives complaints regarding discrimination. On February 2009, the Office of the Ombudsperson created the Program of Defense and Promotion of the Rights of the Persons with Disabilities.

Data collection and management
Contraminas manages the national mine action database at its offices in Lima using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software. Risk education activities are recorded in IMSMA. Contraminas receives information on both landmine and ERW casualties from the army, police, AVISCAM, and the Office of the Ombudsperson, and until 2006, also received information from the ICRC. However, only mine casualties are recorded in IMSMA, because...
Contraminas’ mandate does not include ERW casualty data collection. As of 25 May 2009, legal procedures were underway to expand this mandate to include ERW casualties.45 Impact studies carried out by the Peruvian Armed Forces General Directorate of Humanitarian Demining (Director Ejecutivo de la Dirección General de Desminado Humanitario del Ejército de Perú, DIGEDEHUME), in preparation for demining in border areas near Ecuador, included questions about mine casualties but, as of February 2009, none had been identified.46

In 2007, Contraminas recognized that casualty data was not complete and launched a pilot project, originally planned to start in 2004, to verify data and undertake a needs assessment of 20 survivors based in Lima with support from the Organization of American States (OAS). Contraminas’ 2008–2019 Mine Action Plan includes the objective of identifying and registering all mine victims by March 2009.47 As of 26 May 2009, the original pilot needs assessment was completed, but not all mine survivors had been identified.48 Reasons given for the delay in data collection included the remote location of many survivors, the long time that had passed since incidents occurred, and the unwillingness of some survivors to be identified (because of possible connections with, or fear of, being connected with a non-state armed group).49 In 2009, the expanded VA committee met to discuss plans for data collection; survivor identification and registration was expected to be completed by August. Data was to be used in the development of a VA strategy to be completed by November 2009.50

Contraminas, AVISCAM, and the ICRC have all asserted that casualties are under-reported,51 in part because of the reluctance of survivors to be identified and also because, prior to the creation of Contraminas in December 2002, there was no focal point to collect reports of incidents from the police, nor was there a procedure to determine the type of explosive involved.52 Recent casualties are better recorded, since it is believed that the police now report all casualties to Contraminas.53 Contraminas has also improved data collection procedures with military and police health units.54 As a result of these recent improvements, the total number of registered casualties in the Contraminas database increased from 318 in April 2008 to 332 as of 10 June 2009, with all added casualties having occurred prior to 2008.55 The ICRC still believes, however, that a comprehensive, national casualty survey is needed.56

**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plans**

On 1 April 2008, the Executive Council approved the “National Action Plan Against Antipersonnel Mines,” for 2008–2017. This action plan mirrors the plan described in Peru’s Article 5 deadline extension request.57 The overall strategic goal of the project is to reinforce the peace process between Peru and Ecuador.58

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44 Interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, in Managua, 26 February 2009.
45 Statement of Peru, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 3 June 2008.
47 Interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, in Managua, 26 February 2009; and interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, Lima, 12 March 2009.
50 Email from Fanny Diaz, Protection Officer, and Dafne Martos, Communication and Press Officer, ICRC, 16 March 2009.
51 Ibid.
52 Telephone interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, 29 April 2009.
53 Casualty data provided via email from Juan Miguel Grau, Contraminas, 10 June 2009. See also Landmine Monitor 2008, p. 575.
The national police planned to complete clearing the prisons and police stations in 2010. In anticipation the police demining teams being available after the infrastructure is cleared, Contraminas and the army began discussions about sending some police demining units to clear mines along the border. With technical advice from the commercial clearance company RONCO, Peru plans to establish a training center in Bagua, Amazonas department, where police and army deminers and other personnel would train together.

Peru’s 2008–2017 Mine Action Plan includes risk education activities on the borders with Ecuador and Chile, and around the penal institutes and police stations. Although it was not approved as of 1 July 2009, implementation has started. The Ministry of Education plan has been approved.

The Action Plan also covers VA with the overall objective of “providing assistance to all mine victims in Peru, promoting their self-sufficiency.” The plan includes a specific objective to “implement a Victim Assistance plan,” although as of May 2009, a national VA plan had not yet been developed. In 2009, the United States-based NGO the Polus Center was awarded a grant to bring together local governments, organizations involved in VA, and landmine survivors and their families to develop a VA plan. As of 6 July 2009, activities had not yet started.

On 23 December 2008, Peru approved the “Plan of Equality of Opportunity for Persons with Disability 2009–2018” which includes “goals, objectives and precise indicators to allow for the efficient monitoring of progress in its implementation.” As called for by the plan, a permanent, multisectoral commission was created on 2 March 2009, to ensure that all relevant sectors are involved in its implementation. CONADIS is the technical secretary for this commission. The plan was developed with participation from civil society, including persons with disabilities. However, a government representative noted that the Plan of Equality of Opportunity lacked sufficient funds to be implemented.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

The peace agreement that ended the territorial dispute between Peru and Ecuador included the creation of jointly managed contiguous national parks called the Condor Mountain Range Transboundary Protected Area. The government of Peru has also reported the possibility of extracting minerals from the Condor Mountain Range area after all the mines have been removed. Mine action was the impetus for creating the Coordination and Political Consultation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense for Peru and Ecuador Forum (the “2+2” Framework) in which representatives from the armies of each country and the presidents meet to discuss and resolve issues related to clearing mines on their shared border.

Since October 2007, Peru and Ecuador have met three times within the “2+2” framework to discuss progress towards meeting Mine Ban Treaty obligations within the extension periods granted by States Parties to the two nations in November 2008. At the meeting in October 2008

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60 Interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, in Managua, 25 February 2009; and email from Sandy Powell, Program Manager, RONCO, 9 June 2009.
62 Presentation by Dr. Juan Daniel Guillen Cabrejos, General Director, INR, Managua Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009.
63 Ibid.
64 Interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
65 Email from Michael Lundquist, Executive Director, Polus Center, 6 July 2009.
the presidents of Peru and Ecuador agreed to use the Andean Development Corporation as a funding mechanism for mine action and each country committed US$2 million as seed money. It was also agreed that Peru be allowed to evacuate injured deminers to Quito, Ecuador, thus halving the travel time for evacuations.

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Peru has demonstrated a commitment to mine action through its earlier engagement with the OAS in establishing a program to clear mines on the border with Ecuador and the creation of Contraminas. In February 2009, a government representative recognized the need for greater focus on VA, stating that, “The government knows that it must emphasize its efforts in improving the planning and implementation of victim assistance.” In April 2009, Contraminas added a dedicated staff position for VA.

**National management**

Contraminas is responsible for overall management and day-to-day coordination of mine action activities and the OAS has assisted Peru in mine clearance since May 2001. The Assistance Mission for Mine Clearance in South America (Misión de Asistencia a la Remoción de Minas en Suramérica, MARMINAS), established by the Inter-American Defense Board in May 2003 to support mine clearance in both Ecuador and Peru, provides technical advice to the OAS and monitors demining operations. OAS monitors from Brazil and Chile are based in Ecuador to support the Peruvian army’s clearance operations.

**National mine action legislation**

Contraminas was established in December 2002 by government decree. A further decree of 2 July 2005 clarified its roles and responsibilities.

**National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures**

The Peruvian Armed Forces follow procedures drafted by Contraminas in 2004 and the army’s technical manual drafted in 2002, which are both said to be based on international standards. Demining by the police also follows the army manual, which has a chapter dedicated to procedures for demining high-tension electricity pylons. In July 2008, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted a workshop in Lima on the development of national standards based on the International Mine Action Standards for representatives of the Peruvian government, the army and police, and the OAS. GICHD reviewed Contraminas’ revised national mine action standards and provided comments in November 2008, and a second workshop in support of national standards was held in Lima in March 2009. There are no national standards for risk education.

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72 Interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, in Managua, 26 February 2009.


75 Interview with Guillermo Leal, South America Regional Coordinator, OAS, Bogota, 19 April 2008; and email from Adriana C. Frenchiea, Mine Action Program, OAS, 26 August 2008.

76 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008.


79 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Jorge Liza, Coordinator, DIVSECOM, 3 April 2007.


81 Email from Pascal Rapillard, Advisor to the Director, GICHD, 24 August 2009.
Program evaluations
In January 2008, GICHD conducted an evaluation of the 2005–2007 European Commission (EC) Mine Action Strategy in Latin America. In the case study of Peru the evaluation concluded that even though mine clearance at the border was very slow and Peru was not a heavily mine-affected country, it has been a success in terms of peace-building with Ecuador. The evaluation was critical of the isolation of the national police demining unit whereby the same technical assistance provided to the army was not provided to the police. It recommended that, unless the EC improves its technical capacity in Peru to monitor any project it funds, the EC should otherwise stop funding mine action.82

The evaluation also concluded that the initial work of the OAS in establishing contact between the Peruvian and Ecuadoran armies after the conflict ended had been a significant contribution to starting mine action in Peru, but that more recently it seemed the Peruvian army did not clearly understand the technical contribution offered by the OAS to the clearance work on the border with Ecuador. The evaluation was critical of the achievements at the border (197 mines cleared when the target was 1,500 out of about 30,000 to be cleared) and questioned the OAS’s effectiveness based on such modest outputs.83

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
The Armed Forces Demining Directorate, DIGEDEHUME, is responsible for clearance of the border with Ecuador. A specialized unit of the national police, the Security Division (División de Seguridad, DIVSECOM), is responsible for clearing mines around the high-tension electricity pylons and other infrastructure. The police units demining infrastructure planned to finish clearing the three prisons and two police bases in 2010. It is anticipated that the completion of infrastructure clearance may make available 70 to 80 trained and equipped deminers who could be integrated with the army units working along the border. The decision on this will have to be taken at the ministerial level.84

As a result of fewer resources, in 2008 Peru reduced the number of personnel in each demining team and trained the deminers to perform multiple functions, which was expected to increase efficiency, if not productivity. In addition, each paramedic would support two teams.85

In 2008, the police demining teams cleared the remaining 324,800m² of land near 393 electrical pylons, three antennas, and one substation. During the clearing of the pylons, antennas, and substations since 1999 the police demining teams cleared 2,040,925m² and found and destroyed 82,125 mines.86

The Peruvian army destroyed 767 antipersonnel mines in the Chiqueiza area of Río Santiago district (Amazonas department) in the Condor Mountain Range.87 Peru did not report that any mined areas were completely cleared or that any suspected areas were reduced. The mountainous terrain and rainy weather are cited as the main reasons for the slow progress in clearing mines at the border. The frequent wet weather also limits the availability of the sole helicopter assigned by the Peruvian army to the demining teams.88

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**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Peru was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. In previous years, Peru had made several statements that it would meet its Article 5 deadline. In November 2005, an OAS-EC agreement for joint demining in Peru and Ecuador stated that the activities being funded should enable Peru to “achieve the objective of declaring its national territory free from antipersonnel mines in 2010.” In September 2006, Peru informed other States Parties that it would develop a national plan for mine action, in order to complete clearance by 2009. Peru stated that all minefields associated with 1,711 high-tension electricity towers would be cleared by 1 July 2007, all police stations would be cleared by 1 July 2008, and the remainder of the electricity towers would be cleared by March 2009.

In January 2007, however, Peru announced it would not be able to meet its deadline. It presented a draft request for a 10-year deadline extension at the April 2007 intersessional Standing Committee meetings. In March 2008, Peru formally submitted a request for a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, until 1 March 2019. Peru cited a number of factors, such as troop rotations, logistics, weather, and lack of helicopter support, for not meeting its deadline. In its extension request, Peru did not include plans to increase clearance capacity despite the poor level of progress so far. After two productive years in 1999 and 2000 when 34 mined areas covering 298,954m² were cleared, its mine clearance program on the border in the subsequent eight years cleared only 33,000m². Peru also submitted an operational plan to clear all mined areas around high-tension electricity pylons, antenna transmitters, penitentiaries, and police substations by 2010.

### Demining from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No. of mined areas in 1999</th>
<th>No. of mined areas at end-2008</th>
<th>Size of mined area in 1999 (m²)</th>
<th>Size of mined area at end-2008 (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>512,329</td>
<td>192,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11,167</td>
<td>11,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Stations</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical Towers</td>
<td>2,518</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,040,945</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission Antennas</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = not reported

In response to the request, the ICBL noted that “even allowing for the difficult terrain, granting a blanket 10-year extension is not recommended to a country that has not adequately addressed contamination on its border with a former adversary. An extension of no more than six years is recommended, and Peru should re-submit an operational plan that includes addressing the number of deminers, logistics and communications and new arrangements with Ecuador.”

In August 2008, Peru submitted a revised request seeking an eight-year extension. In November 2008, States Parties granted Peru the requested extension. States Parties noted that if Peru used all its resources and techniques available, it could clear all the remaining mined areas

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92 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008.
sooner than eight years and this would benefit both the Mine Ban Treaty and Peru, given the indication by Peru of the socio-economic benefits that will flow from demining. 93

**Risk Education**

In 2008, risk education (RE) reached at least 10,896 people, and consisted mainly of mass media and *ad hoc* activities in communities alongside clearance and some training of teachers. 94 It was implemented by the police, ministries of interior and education, Contraminas, AVISCAM, EDEGEL, and the OAS.

In 2008, most direct RE was conducted on the outskirts of Lima for communities leaving near the mine contaminated high-tension electricity pylons to deliver messages about mines, as well as improvised mines and grenades. Training of teachers was conducted for communities living near the border with Ecuador, which are at risk from 35 hazardous areas, and communities near the high-tension electricity towers. During an assessment of the mine problem around the penal institutions in mid-2008, a one day presentation on RE was given to the authorities and police in preparation for future RE activities. Security problems around the contaminated police stations prevented RE from taking place there. 95

RE has been limited for the last 10 years, and has focused on communities around the high-tension electricity towers in the departments of Ica, Junín, and Lima, and along the border with Ecuador. Since 2000 it has been implemented by the national police and the army. The ICRC started RE in 2002 with the support of the Unit of Peasant Communities of the Central Andes (Unidad de Comunidades Campesinas de la Sierra Central del Peru, UCSICP), and Contraminas ran an RE training program for teachers and community leaders in Junín and Huancavelica in 2003. However, plans to extend this project to other regions were not realized until 2007. In 2005, AVISCAM started to conduct RE. In late 2007 the Ministry of Interior launched its “Fields that Kill” campaign about victim-activated IEDs during coca eradication.

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95 Ibid.
### Risk education activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contraminas, national police, and AVISCAM</td>
<td>NGO and Government</td>
<td>Basic RE in a three week program, through one day workshops for community members</td>
<td>Lima (Naña and Huinco sectors) near the high-tension electricity towers</td>
<td>6,996, including 6,251 students and 745 adults in 18 schools and 9 communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS and Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Training of teachers</td>
<td>Near the border with Ecuador, and in Huancavelica and Junín departments, near the high-tension electricity towers</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIVSECOM</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>In schools and communities alongside clearance activities</td>
<td>Lima (Barranca, Lima, and Huarochiri provinces), Junín (Yauli, Jauja, Concepción, Chupaca, and Huancayo provinces) and Huancavelica (Castrovirrenya province)</td>
<td>3850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contraminas</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Workshop on international humanitarian law included awareness of landmines on the Chilean side of the border with Peru</td>
<td>El Escudero and Papayacu, around Santiago river, Condor Mountain Range Puno, Tacna department</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>“Fields that kill” mass media campaign about IEDs during coca eradication</td>
<td>Pucallpa city Coronel Portillo province, Ucayali department; Tingo Maria city (Leoncio Prado province, Huanuco department); and Tocache province (San Martín department)</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is at least 372. Most persons with disabilities in Peru do not receive adequate services. The “scattered and rural nature” of landmine/ERW incidents made it challenging to identify and provide services to landmine survivors, since the limited services available remained centralized in the capital, Lima. Military and police mine/

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ERW survivors are entitled to adequate services, but bureaucratic procedures have prevented some from accessing this care.

In 2008, the government found that 62% of persons with disabilities lacked health insurance and only 13% were receiving some kind of therapy or rehabilitation. While specialized services for emergency care and physical rehabilitation existed in Lima, not all services were accessible to civilian mine/ERW survivors and services in rural areas were limited. Ninety percent of Ministry of Health staff were based in Lima. Emergency medical care for mine/ERW casualties depended on the incident location, the availability of emergency transport, and climatic and road conditions. The evacuation of the 23 April 2009 casualty to an appropriate medical facility took nearly 23 hours because of the remote location, rain which prevented a helicopter evacuation, and lack of sufficient medical facilities nearby. Regional and local health centers continued to lack funding and trained personnel.

In November 2008, Peru stated that 20 regional health centers had the equipment and trained staff to provide rehabilitation services, as did the health facilities of the national police and the armed forces. In the same statement, however, Peru reported that amputations and other complicated procedures were only done at the National Institute of Rehabilitation (Instituto Especializado de Rehabilitación, INR) near Lima, which is difficult to reach for most survivors. The INR has no technicians with internationally recognized credentials and some of its equipment was antiquated and in need of replacement. The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) found that the INR faced challenges in the quality and quantity of its services. In 2008, the Saint John Clinic and Home (Hogar Clínica San Juan de Dios, HCSJD), a rehabilitation center based in Lima offering prosthetics and orthotics to children with disabilities, closed its prosthetics department.

Comprehensive care is available at the INR and physiotherapy and psychosocial support services are free of charge for survivors. In 2008, the OAS began covering the costs for the prostheses, transport and accommodation for landmine survivors referred to the INR by Contraminas. In 2008, AVISCAM went to the INR to request prosthetic devices for two landmine survivors but were told there were no materials available. They found services at a private rehabilitation center to be cheaper and more efficient.
States Parties Peru

Community-based rehabilitation (CBR) services exist in poor neighborhoods in Lima, and there were plans to expand the program to other parts of the country. As of March 2009, however, this had not happened, due to a lack of funding.115 Economic reintegration opportunities for survivors were limited and employment rates for persons with disabilities were low.116 Centro de Formación Técnica para Personas con Discapacidades (Center for Technical Training for Persons with Disabilities), managed by CONADIS, is the only training center in the country focused on persons with disabilities. The center faced budgetary shortfalls in 2008 and access was limited to students from one section of Lima, because of a lack of public transportation.117

 Civilians who have demonstrated that their disability makes them unable to work receive a pension of PEN415–800 ($144–278), depending on the degree of the disability.118 An NGO representative believed that few survivors received a pension.119 In November 2007, Peru stated that the National Council for Reparations for Political Violence (Consejo Nacional de Reparaciones por la Violencia Política) had amended its regulations so that mine casualties and their families who could demonstrate that their incident was caused by “terrorism” could apply for compensation.120 In 2009, Contraminas began notifying survivors to let them know how to apply to the fund.121

Discrimination against persons with disabilities is prohibited by law, but the government provided limited funding to enforce the law and many persons with physical disabilities remained economically and socially marginalized. Despite a law requiring physical accessibility to public spaces for persons with disability, the government made little effort to ensure access to public buildings.122 On 7 February 2009, Peru passed a law establishing penalties for failing to comply with the General Law of Persons with Disability.123 On 30 January 2008, Peru ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

As one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate attention to survivors,124 Peru presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. As of July 2009, it had not updated its objectives nor had it developed formal plans to achieve them. All but two of Peru’s objectives had timeframes of “by end 2006” and all of these had lapsed without significant progress having been observed.125 Some limited progress occurred in data collection and coordination in the first half of 2009. A lack of funding has been cited to explain delays in implementing VA objectives.126

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115 Interview with Dr. Juan Daniel Guillen Cabrejos, INR, Lima, 1 April 2009.
117 Interview with Gaby Valcázar, Director, Center for Technical Training for Persons with Disabilities, and Jorge Llerena, Specialist, Registers and Supervision, CONADIS, Lima, 16 September 2008.
118 Telephone interview with Jorge Llerena, CONADIS, 13 May 2008; and interview with Guillermo Vega Espejo, CONADIS, Lima, 19 March 2009.
Peru’s 2008–2019 Mine Action Plan elaborated four VA objectives similar to Peru’s 2005–2009 objectives, three of which had more specific (and delayed) timeframes. These were: to identify medical, physical rehabilitation, and economic integration services for survivors by July 2008; to identify and register all mine victims in Peru by March 2009; and to develop a pilot project to provide services to landmine survivors before 2008. The first two objectives had not been achieved by the deadline and the third objective was mostly completed only by the end of 2008. As of July 2009, no progress had been observed in identifying services for survivors and Peru had not yet identified all survivors or assessed their needs, an obstacle that prevented the development of a strategy to assist survivors. Progress had been made in verifying data of survivors living in Lima and there had been improvements in collecting casualty data from the military and the police. By the end of 2008, the pilot project to assist survivors, originally planned for 2004, had provided comprehensive care to 14 survivors, a reduction from the goal of 23 that it sought to assist.

As of May 2009, a national VA strategy had not yet been developed (an objective to be completed by 2009). The Polus Center project activities to develop a VA plan had not started as of 6 July 2009. Progress towards Peru’s one objective in psychological support and social reintegration, “to facilitate accessibility to services offering psychosocial support, if requested, for all registered mine survivors by 2006” had completely stalled in 2008. The only functioning survivor group in the country, reported that there had been no cooperation with the authorities on any survivor services in 2008.

Peru has provided updates on progress and challenges in VA at all intersessional meetings and meetings of States Parties since 2005 and has also used the Article 7 Form J to provide similar information for all years since 2005. The statements have mainly provided general information on government bodies and policies dealing with disability and activities conducted by the INR. Statements in 2008 and 2009 repeated the objectives outlined in the mine action plan (including the objectives that had expired at the time of the May statement but had not been revised) without reporting specifically on progress towards the 2005–2009 objectives. Statements from 2007, 2008, and 2009 repeated information on general health advances without noting the year in which the progress occurred. Peru’s delegation included an INR representative as its VA expert to the intersessional meetings in 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, and meetings of States Parties in 2005, 2007, and 2008. Peru had two VA/disability experts attend the VA parallel session at the Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas in February 2009.
Victim assistance activities
In 2008, through the Victim Assistance Pilot Project, with support from the OAS, the INR provided psychological support and rehabilitation services to nine landmine survivors, referred by Contraminas, bringing the total number of beneficiaries to 14 for 2007 and 2008. The project originally aimed to provide comprehensive services to 23 people but four recipients refused help and another five could not be located.

Peru’s latest Article 7 report listed 10 beneficiaries assisted by the INR between 1 March 2008 and 1 March 2009. Social Security, the armed forces and police rehabilitation services assisted 40 military landmine survivors.

The INR offers training courses in starting small businesses to persons with disabilities, supported by private funding, and in 2008, the Ministry of Health launched an initiative to open convenience stores in all health centers to employ persons with disabilities.

In 2008 and 2009, CONADIS’ Center for Technical Training for Persons with Disabilities provided eight three-month employment training courses. Some 120 to 150 students attend courses at the center each quarter; it is unknown if students have included any mine/ERW survivors.

In 2008, AVISCAM provided prostheses and support for transportation, accommodation, and costs of medicine for 18 landmine survivors. While in 2007 Contraminas and AVISCAM worked on a project to include mine survivors in RE and VA planning and as “observers” during humanitarian demining operations, in 2008, AVISCAM was excluded by the national authorities from all of these activities, including VA planning.

The ICRC SFD carried out support visits to the INR and the HCSJD in Lima in August 2008. According to the INR, “the materials delivered in 2008 by the ICRC SFD were used to assist one landmine survivor and the rest were used to assist persons with disabilities living in poverty.” An INR technician attended a three-week SFD course at the Universidad Don Bosco School of Prosthetics and Orthotics in El Salvador on polypropylene technology for lower-limb prostheses.

Support for Mine Action
In March 2008, Peru reported a projected total estimated cost of $17,944,207 (€13,087,453) for fulfilling its mine clearance obligations during a requested extension period of 2009–2019. Of this amount, $16,236,207 (€11,841,738) was required for mine action operations by the armed forces and $1,708,000 (€1,245,715) for operations by the national police. In August 2008, Peru issued a revised Article 5 extension request for the period 2008–2017, including a new budget totaling PEN87,196,123. Peru reported the US dollar equivalent as $25,889,106; however, at the average 2008 exchange rate, the amount is closer to $30,335,531. The budget does not break down costs by year, but provides totals for each budget item for the entire extension period.

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140 Article 7 Report, Form J, 29 April 2009.
142 Statement by Dr. Juan Daniel Guillen Cabrejos, INR, Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, 25 February 2009.
143 Interview with Dr. Juan Daniel Guillen Cabrejos, INR, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
144 Interview with Guillermo Vega, CONADIS, Lima, 19 March 2009.
147 Email from Carlos Estrada, AVISCAM, 10 March 2009.
149 Interview with Dr. Juan Daniel Guillen Cabrejos, INR, Lima, 1 April 2009.
151 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 42.
152 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 18 August 2008, p. 147.
Ecuador and Peru continued in 2008 to coordinate resource mobilization as part of their overall cooperative efforts in mine action. Ecuador and Peru held a joint meeting in Quito in September 2008 with mine action NGOs and representatives from diplomatic missions of donor countries to develop coordinated funding for clearance operations in both countries.\(^{153}\) Peru has not reported on the results of this meeting or subsequent resource mobilization efforts.

**National support for mine action**

Peru re-established mine action as a specific item in the national budget in 2006, after suspending it in 1999.\(^{154}\) In its August 2008 Article 5 deadline extension request, Peru stated its intention to provide $17,807,906 in national funds during the extension period, or 69% of the total reported cost of $25,889,106. Peru reported contributing $960,911 from national funds to mine action in 2008, consisting of $768,463 to the armed forces and $192,448 to the national police.\(^{155}\)

**National budget**

Between 1999 and 2008, Peru’s own contributions to all funds for mine action in the country totalled more than $7 million (approximately 60%). Peru’s Article 5 deadline extension request indicates it intends to cover a greater proportion of costs during the extension period by doubling its annual state contributions, beginning with approximately $2 million in 2009. For the complete eight-year extension period Peru has committed to contributing more than $17.8 million, of which $16.56 million is for clearing areas along Peru’s border with Ecuador and $1.25 million for clearing national infrastructure.\(^{156}\) The private electricity companies, ETECEN, EDEGEL, and CAHUA, which have concessions for the power lines, have contributed to the clearance/quality control of the electricity pylons.\(^{157}\)

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, two countries reported providing a total of $447,257 (€235,812) directly to mine action in Peru. The United States contributed $300,000 via the Department of State for unspecified mine action, while Germany contributed $147,257 (€99,998) worth of equipment to support mine clearance operations. In 2007, Spain reported providing $207,232 (€151,143) to mine action in Peru.

In 2008, the OAS reported funding to Ecuador/Peru mine action projects via the OAS totaling $1,285,195 (€872,739), from Canada ($318,773), Norway ($300,000), the EC ($280,259), Spain ($280,092), and Italy ($106,071). The OAS did not specify how much was allocated to each country. Reporting to Landmine Monitor by Spain and Italy for 2008 included contributions to the OAS for projects in Latin America, including mine action in Ecuador and Peru, but Spain did not specify the amount directed to projects in those countries.\(^{158}\)

In June 2009, RONCO, under contract with the US Department of State, opened an office in Lima and began providing technical assistance to Contraminas to expand its capacity, including developing a centralized training capacity for police and army deminers. The contract also includes providing Peru with $150,000 in new demining equipment, out of an assessed need for $600,000.\(^{159}\) As of May 2009, the Polus Center had received a grant of $120,000 to increase national VA capacity through training.\(^{160}\)

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\(^{153}\) Article 7 report, Form J, 30 April 2009.

\(^{154}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 18 August 2008, p. 48.

\(^{155}\) Ibid, p. 45.

\(^{156}\) Decision on Peru’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, 28 November 2008.

\(^{157}\) Interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, Lima, 15 September 2008.


\(^{159}\) US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” Washington, DC, July 2009, p. 37; email from Sandy Powell, RONCO, 9 June 2009; and email from Ed Trimakas, Program Officer, US Department of State, 9 June 2009.

\(^{160}\) Interview with Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
PHILIPPINES

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of the Philippines became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 August 2000. It had already destroyed its stockpile of Claymore-type antipersonnel mines in 1998. Implementation legislation has been repeatedly introduced in Congress since 2000, but has never been passed. At least three rebel groups have used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs): New People’s Army (NPA), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayyaf Group. The NPA’s use violated a 1998 agreement with the government that included a commitment not to use landmines. Five other rebel groups, including the MILF, have formally pledged in writing not to use antipersonnel mines.

The Philippines denies the existence of any mined areas, but has reported and continues to face use of landmines and IEDs in continuing low-level insurgencies by the NPA and Muslim groups. Since 1999, Landmine Monitor has identified 457 casualties from landmines, explosive remnants of war, and IEDs. Landmine Monitor reported risk education activities for the first time in 2006, but activities appear to be insufficient. Access to emergency medical care and physical rehabilitation for persons with disabilities was limited because of the centralization of services. Disability regulations were weak and unimplemented.

Mine Ban Policy

The Philippines signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 15 February 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 August 2000.

On 4 March 2009, the Philippine Congress took an important step toward passing national implementation legislation by holding the first hearing on the Philippine Landmine Bill.1 Previous bills introduced in the Congress since 2000 were never called for public hearing, as they were given low priority.2 As of July 2009, the bill was still at the Technical Working Group level.3 In May 2009, the Philippines stated, “it is hoped that our law will pass before the next round of national elections to be held in May 2010.”4

As of 1 July 2009, the Philippines had not submitted its annual Article 7 report due 30 April 2009. It also never submitted a report in 2008.5 In March 2009, a Department of Foreign Affairs official said that it was working on the report.6 The Philippines has submitted eight previous reports, the most recent of which is dated 31 March 2007.7

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1 The Philippine Landmine Bill refers to House Bill No. 1054 and Senate Bill No. 1595. The bill would comprehensively prohibit victim-activated antipersonnel mines and implement both the Mine Ban Treaty and CCW Amended Protocol II.
5 At the June 2008 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, the Philippines informed States Parties that it would “in due course update” its reporting. Statement of the Philippines, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 6 June 2008.
6 Telephone interview with Leah B. Ruiz, Director, Political and Security Issues Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, 6 March 2009.
The Philippines attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008 in Geneva, where it made a statement in support of Thailand’s request for an extension of its mine clearance deadline. It also attended the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, where it made a statement outlining its progress on national implementation legislation and other matters.

The Philippines has not made known its views on key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).


Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use
The Philippines has previously stated that it did not produce or export antipersonnel mines. It destroyed its entire stockpile of antipersonnel mines—all Claymore-type mines—in 1998. It did not retain any live mines for training purposes. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has stated that it has never used antipersonnel mines to combat insurgency within the country.

Non-state armed groups
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) on 21 October 2008 became the fourth armed group in the country to sign the “Rebel Group Declaration of Adherence to International Humanitarian Law on Landmines” produced by the Philippine Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL).9 The MILF previously signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment, thereby committing to no use of antipersonnel mines, as did two other rebel groups.10

There have been reports of use of improvised antipersonnel mines by rebel groups in this reporting period (since May 2008). Non-state armed groups (NSAG) in the Philippines have produced and used both command-detonated and victim-activated IEDs, but are not known to possess or use factory-made landmines, other than Claymore-type directional fragmentation devices.11

The government has accused both the NPA and the MILF of using “banned” landmines. In January 2009, Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro condemned what he described as the increasing use of landmines, while Interior Secretary Ronaldo Puno said that the Philippine National Police (PNP) has basis to file a case of human rights violation against the NPA for its continued use of landmines.12

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9 PCBL, “Moro Islamic Liberation Front Signs New Declaration For Rebel Group Adherence To IHL On Landmines,” Press release, 15 November 2008, www.nonviolenceinternational.net. This declaration unilaterally commits the signatory to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II and Protocol V (Explosive Remnants of War), as well as customary international humanitarian law rules regarding use of landmines and explosive devices. The other signatories are: the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Mindanao/ Revolutionary People’s Army (RPMM/RPA) in February 2008; the Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Pilipinas/Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayoa Brigade (RPMP/RPA-ABB) faction of Nilo de la Cruz, in May 2008; and the Marxista-Leninistang Partido ng Pilipinas/Rebolusyonaryong Hukbong Bayan (MLPP/RHB) in July 2008.
10 The Revolutionary Workers Party of the Philippines/Revolutionary Proletarian Army-Alex Boncayoa Brigade and the Revolutionary Workers Party of Mindanao/Revolutionary People’s Army.
11 In October 2008, a factory-made M18A1 Claymore mine was recovered from a house in General Santos City. “11 injured in grenade, rocket attacks in Mindanao,” GMA News and Public Affairs, 4 October 2008, www.gmanews.tv. When command-detonated, use of these devices is permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty. When victim-activated, usually by a tripwire, they are banned.
The AFP and the PNP annually provide the PCBL with data on landmine incidents, including information on the type of mines, seizures and recoveries, and number and names of casualties, whether killed or injured.\(^\text{13}\) The data may indicate some use by both the MILF and the NPA of victim-activated improvised explosive devices, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, but nearly all instances appear to involve the use of command-detonated devices, which are permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty.

**New People's Army**

The NPA, the armed wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, signed a Comprehensive Agreement to Respect Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) with the Philippine government in The Hague, Netherlands, in 1998.\(^\text{14}\) Government and AFP officials have accused the NPA of violating CARHRIHL by repeatedly using landmines in 2008 and 2009. In December 2008, a military spokesperson said, “The Philippines Army strongly condemns the NPA’s continued and growing use of landmines in their attacks on government troops and calls out to the international community to make appropriate action or sanction on this.”\(^\text{15}\)

The NPA again acknowledged, in 2008, that it manufactures and uses command-detonated antivehicle and antipersonnel weapons, but denied any use of victim-activated mines, insisting that it will continue to use only command-detonated explosives not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. It stated that it does not permanently plant its command-detonated devices, but rather “they are immediately taken when no enemy pass these routes.”\(^\text{16}\)

AFP and media accounts indicate the NPA on some occasions may have used victim-activated devices. In July 2008, two soldiers on patrol were reportedly injured when a “pressure released” landmine exploded in Maco, Compostela Valley.\(^\text{17}\) In September 2008, three soldiers were killed and 14 injured after they “tripped” landmines used as booby-traps near an NPA camp in Surigao del Sur province.\(^\text{18}\) In November 2008, six soldiers were killed and four injured after “they stepped on landmines planted by NPA rebels” in Baganga, Davao Oriental, and Maco, Compostela Valley.\(^\text{19}\) All other reported incidents appear to have been command-detonated antipersonnel mines and IEDs used in ambushes, or antivehicle mines and IEDs (some of which may have been vehicle-activated).

**Moro Islamic Liberation Front**

Following the collapse of negotiations between the government and the MILF, renewed hostilities in Mindanao resulted in increased armed conflict. The AFP launched air and ground attacks in suspected MILF areas for three days in August 2008, during which the AFP accused MILF rebels of planting landmines in North Cotabato and Maguindanao, and preventing more than 130,000 people from returning to their homes.\(^\text{20}\) The AFP said that it had to clear landmines...

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\(^\text{13}\) The latest were “Matrix of Landmine Incidents and Recoveries,” provided by Maj.-Gen. Carlos B. Holganza, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3, AFP, 18 March 2009; and “Landmine Explosion Incidents, Matrix,” provided by email from Ferdinand Garay, Superintendent, PNP, 11 March 2009.

\(^\text{14}\) CARHRIHL, Part III: Respect for Human Rights, Article 2 (15), 16 March 1998, hdcentre.org. The government considers use of command-detonated devices as well as any type of landmine as banned by CARHRIHL, while the NPA considers only use of victim-activated devices banned.


\(^\text{19}\) “Landmine Explosion Incidents, Matrix,” provided by PNP, 11 March 2009. The same incident was reported in the “Matrix of Landmine Incidents and Recoveries,” provided by AFP, 18 March 2009.

from areas vacated by MILF rebels in North Cotabato and Maguindanao.\(^{21}\) The MILF, however, denied the AFP’s allegations that it planted landmines.\(^{22}\)

On 27 April 2009, Landmine Monitor met four AFP officers at the 36th Infantry Battalion Headquarters, Barangay San Roque, Bislig City, Surigao del Sur and was shown recovered mines, all of which were command-detonated Claymore antipersonnel mines or command-detonated antivehicle mines. No victim-activated mines were recovered, according to the AFP officers.\(^{23}\)

There have been reports of explosive incidents in which the weapons may have been victim-activated. In August 2008, a Scout Ranger soldier reportedly “tripped” a landmine during a clearance operation in Aleosan town in central Cotabato province.\(^{24}\) On 14 October, in Tukanalipao village, Maguindanao, a soldier reportedly “stepped on a landmine, causing it to explode.”\(^{25}\) On 17 October, a landmine allegedly planted by MILF rebels was detonated by a farmer’s water buffalo, injuring both the farmer and his animal, in Datu Piang, Maguindanao.\(^{26}\)

Based on the available information, Landmine Monitor cannot conclude definitively that the MILF used victim-activated antipersonnel mines or IEDs during this reporting period. In addition to the lack of clarity about victim-activated versus command-detonated devices, it is not clear in some incidents if the MILF was responsible, or another armed group such as Abu Sayyaf. In April 2009, the armed forces approved a mission by Geneva Call to verify allegations of violations of the Deed of Commitment.\(^{27}\)

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

The Philippines is affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially UXO. The extent to which it is also affected by mines is unclear. The Philippines has consistently denied in its Article 7 reports that it has any mined areas containing antipersonnel mines and says that whenever mines or IEDs are found they are immediately removed.\(^{28}\) However, a low level insurgency continues in which NSAGs have used mines and IEDs, and UXO continues to accumulate in areas of continued insurgency in the south.

The AFP claims that the NPA and MILF continued to use antipersonnel mines in 2008 and 2009. It reported 38 landmine incidents or retrieval of landmines involving the two non-state armed groups in Mindanao, the Visayas, and Luzon provinces (see Non-state armed groups section above).\(^{29}\) In July 2008, the AFP reported that the NPA may have placed landmines in residential areas.\(^{30}\) Police Superintendent George Gaddi also reported nine landmine incidents in 2008, most involving the NPA.\(^{31}\)

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27 Email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Program Officer Africa, Geneva Call, 3 August 2009.

28 See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form C, 31 March 2007; and see also *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 491.

29 “Matrix of Landmine Incidents and Recoveries,” provided by AFP, 18 March 2009.


31 Statement by George Gaddi, Superintendent, PNP, Congressional Hearing on Landmines Bill, Philippine Congress, 4 March 2009.
The NPA denies using landmines, but acknowledges that it continues to use command-detonated IEDs in attacks on government security forces, asserting that these are legitimate weapons of war (See New People’s Army section above).32

Mindanao is affected mainly by UXO resulting from conflict between the government and Muslim rebels dating back more than 30 years. UXO contamination reportedly increased in 2007 and 2008 because of continuing hostilities between the MILF and the AFP involving use of air strikes and ground artillery.33 However, the AFP also reported 14 landmine incidents involving the MILF in 2008.34

A preliminary assessment of contamination in areas of conflict in central Mindanao conducted by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) in 2005 showed the presence of hand grenades, mortar rounds, artillery shells, and aerial bombs remaining from armed hostilities over the years. These explosive hazards pose a threat to evacuees returning to their homes and farms, and could hinder rehabilitation and development projects in their communities.35

Casualties

In 2008, 69 new mine/ERW/IED casualties were reported in 12 incidents, including 25 people killed, 43 injured, and one unknown. All casualties were adult men: two civilians and 67 security personnel, including three police. Mines caused 36 casualties, victim-activated IEDs nine, and unknown devices 24. Incidents occurred in seven provinces, mostly on Mindanao island, which is most affected by ongoing conflict. The greatest number of casualties (17) happened in Surigao del Sur province.36

The 2008 casualty rate was nearly triple the 25 casualties in 2007, though fewer than the 145 casualties reported in 2005 at the height of the counterinsurgency campaign.37 The increase in 2008 was due to intensified NPA activity and hostilities erupting between the MILF and the government.38

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with at least four people killed and eight injured in two mine/ERW incidents through to 31 March. On 3 March, three children were killed and five others injured when an ERW exploded while they were playing in Buldon, Maguindanao. The adult casualties were from the security forces.39

34 “Matrix of Landmine Incidents and Recoveries,” provided by AFP, 18 March 2009.
38 Email from Paz Verdades Santos, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, and PCBL, 1 April 2009.
From 1999 to 2009 through 31 March, Landmine Monitor has identified 457 casualties from landmines, ERW, and IEDs (176 killed, 280 injured, and one unknown). The number of casualties per year has varied significantly over this period making it difficult to identify a trend. Additionally, the lack of detail about device types and detonation mechanisms in data provided by the AFP, PNP, and in media reports has made it difficult to accurately count the number of casualties of victim-activated devices. Most explosive devices are used to target the military and are planted in regions where there is ongoing armed conflict. However, victim-activated devices and ERW posed a limited danger to the population in general in conflict areas.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
The Philippines has no formal program for dealing with landmines, IEDs, or ERW. The AFP’s Office of Civil Defense reported in August 2008 that it conducted mine clearance operations in Aleosan, North Cotabato, and Mindanao before allowing people displaced by war to return home.

United States forces provide some demining training and technical advice to the AFP, but they do not engage in demining, and training appears to be on a limited scale.

In 2007, the government and the MILF accepted in principle a joint proposal submitted by FSD and the PCBL to conduct survey, marking, and destruction of mines and UXO in MILF territory. Discussions on implementing guidelines continued in 2008, but final agreement was held up by a resumption of hostilities between the government and the MILF following the collapse of negotiations over a Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains.

In 2007, the PNP increased the total number of its explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians deployed in Mindanao from eight to 55—five in each of Mindanao’s 11 provinces. The main purpose of the training was to prepare EOD teams to respond to terrorist bomb attacks. In addition, the army, navy, air force, and the PNP each have EOD units deployed in a defensive role to areas of armed conflict such as Jolo and Cotabato. These include the army’s EOD battalion and the air force’s 710 Wing. These units dispose of IEDs and UXO in accordance with standing operating procedures after armed hostilities occur.

Victim assistance
Recognizing the need to strengthen governmental disability programs, the National Council on Disability Affairs (NCDA, previously the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons) was transferred from the Department of Social Welfare and Development to the Office of the President in early 2008. The NCDA formulates policies, coordinates activities by government agencies, and monitors the implementation of legislation.

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40 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
46 Telephone interview with Warlito Tubon, Police Senior Superintendent, EOD Logistics Support Services, PNP, 2 April 2008.
47 Interview with Maj. Jesus Jeffrey Grapa, AFP, Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City, 10 May 2007.
Data collection and management
There is no comprehensive government database of mine/ERW/IED casualties. The PCBL receives data from the AFP, PNP, and the Department of Foreign Affairs. This information is supplemented by nongovernmental sources such as the Philippine National Red Cross, NGOs, media, and private citizens.51

Risk Education
The AFP have implemented mine/ERW risk education (RE) activities in conflict-affected areas since 2005. The Philippines’ latest Article 7 report, dated 31 March 2007, states that the AFP conducts EOD “Training and Bomb Threat Prevention Seminars to Military and Civilians as part of [its] sustainable Mine Awareness Education Program.”52 The MINSED Foundation, which provided RE in Mindanao in 2006 and 2007, reported no further activities.53 The Philippine National Red Cross have disseminated visual material in displacement camps, highlighting the risks posed by UXO.54

The plans of PCBL and FSD to conduct RE activities were put on hold in August 2008 when hostilities broke out between the AFP and MILF.55 In 2009, they stated that RE to the internally displaced persons in Mindanao was “their first priority” and were looking for funding.56

Given the relatively high number of mine/ERW/IED casualties, the amount of RE activities in the Philippines has been very limited over the last 10 years.

Victim Assistance
The estimated number of survivors is at least 275. No improvements in services for persons with disabilities were observed during 2008. As in previous years, services remained centralized in urban areas while armed clashes and most mine/ERW/IED casualties occurred in remote areas with limited healthcare.57 Rehabilitation services were mainly provided by national NGOs. In 2008, the ICRC provided assistance to the Davao Jubilee Center.58 In 2007, the Ministry of Health estimated that only 20% of persons with disabilities had access to rehabilitation services because of high transportation costs.59

In 2008, increased hostilities in Mindanao caused the suspension of some planned disability activities.60 In the second half of 2008, the ICRC increased support for emergency medical services, doubling personnel and distributing emergency medical supplies.61

Military mine/ERW/IED survivors receive some financial assistance from the government for their everyday needs. While there is no pension for civilian landmine survivors, some have been able to receive limited government support.62 The Alay sa Kawal (ASK) Foundation’s Saludo sa

51 Email from Paz Verdades Santos, PCBL, 23 March 2009.  
54 Email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Geneva Call, 3 August 2009.  
56 Interview with Valeria Fabbroni, FSD, Geneva, 19 March 2009.  
Kawal (Salute to Soldiers) program, which previously assisted soldiers and their families, was unable to continue this support in 2008 because of a lack of funding.63 Republic Act No. 9442, also known as the Magna Carta for Persons with Disabilities, outlines the rights of persons with disabilities, including employment quotas and health benefits.64 But implementation remained ineffective because of weak regulations, insufficient funding, and an inadequate focus on integration of persons with disabilities.65 The Philippines ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 15 April 2008, but not its Optional Protocol. The 30th National Disability Prevention and Rehabilitation Week was celebrated from 17 to 23 July 2008, to raise awareness.66

Support for Mine Action

The US reported contributing US$800,000 to the Philippines through the USAID Leahy Fund in 2008.67 USAID reported contributing at least $626,750 to Handicap International for socio-economic reintegration of persons with disabilities in the Philippines, covering the period from October 2008 to September 2010.68 These funds are presumably part of the overall $800,000 contribution. No funding was reported for the Philippines for 2007.

63 Telephone interview with Ramon Pedrosa, President, ASK Foundation, 24 March 2009.
RWANDA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 December 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>18,000m² of mined areas (May 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>Six (2007: 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but possibly 403–1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>520,192m² of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $441,780 (2007: None)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Rwanda became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 December 2000. It has not enacted national implementation legislation. Rwanda reported that prior to joining the treaty it destroyed all stockpiled antipersonnel mines inherited from the previous government. There were serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Rwandan forces in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 2000, and of transfer of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups in the DRC as late as 2004. Rwandan officials have strongly denied all allegations.

The landmine problem in Rwanda originates from the 1994 genocide and its aftermath, affecting four of the country’s 12 provinces. Rwanda established the National Demining Office under the Ministry of Defense in 1995 with army personnel conducting clearance. Progress slowed until 2006 when Mines Awareness Trust began supporting operations. In 2008, Norwegian People’s Aid brought in mechanical assets to help clear the last major minefield. As of 1 July 2009, Rwanda was close to fulfilling its Article 5 obligations in advance of its deadline.

The number of casualties occurring between 1999 and 2008 is unknown as no reliable and complete data exists. From 1995 to 2001, Rwanda had a formal mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) risk education program which, combined with clearance, resulted in decreased casualties. Since 2001, however, only basic awareness was provided due to lack of funds. There is no specific victim assistance strategy and mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities in Rwanda. Despite post-conflict efforts, the majority of persons with disabilities cannot afford the cost of services, including medical care.

Mine Ban Policy

Rwanda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 8 June 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 December 2000. The treaty was incorporated into domestic law with the presidential order of 24 December 1998. Rwanda has not enacted further domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^1\)\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Order of the President, No. 38/01, 24 December 1998. Rwanda has also stated that an existing law, Decree-Law 12/79, which prohibits illegal import, use, transfer, and possession of arms and ammunition, covers mines, although mines are not explicitly mentioned. Article 7 Report, Form A. 1 June 2006.

\(^2\) It reported in 2004 and 2005 that efforts were underway. It then reported that a bill was before cabinet for approval as of April 2006. A Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor in May 2006 that the draft law had been submitted to parliament. No further progress has been reported. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 594.
As of 1 July 2009, Rwanda had not submitted its annual Article 7 report, due 30 April 2009. It submitted six previous reports, including in April 2008.3 Rwanda participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, but made no statements. Rwanda has not taken part in discussions among States Parties on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty (“assisting” acts prohibited by the treaty, joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign transit and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use
There have been no reports of use of antipersonnel mines in Rwanda since 1998.4 Rwanda has stated that it has never produced and has no stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.5 In its Article 7 report submitted in April 2008, it stated, “Rwanda government has never imported antipersonnel mines since 1994 and has destroyed all that were imported by the former government forces.”6 This was the first time Rwanda indicated that it destroyed stockpiles inherited by the previous government.7 After initially indicating that it retained no antipersonnel mines for training or development purposes, Rwanda reported in April 2003 that it possessed 101 antipersonnel mines “uprooted from minefields and retained for training purposes.”8 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2008, Rwanda reported 65 mines retained for training purposes, a reduction of 36 mines.9 While it did not explicitly explain the reduction, it did report, “So far 25 EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] personnel have been trained.”10 Rwanda used the expanded Form D to report more generally that retained mines would be used to train deminers according to International Mine Action Standards, to train EOD personnel, and to train mine detection dogs.11 Rwanda is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not yet ratified as of 1 July 2009.12

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Rwanda has a small residual problem with landmines and ERW, the legacy of the 1990–1994 war against the government that committed the 1994 genocide, from the retreat of the army and Interahamwe militias to neighboring countries, and their subsequent attacks launched from the DRC in 1996–1998 in the northwest of the country.13

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3 Previous reports were submitted in April 2008, and on 1 June 2006, 15 June 2005, 1 April 2004, 22 April 2003, and 4 September 2001.
4 However, there were allegations of mine use by Rwandan forces in the DRC in 2000, and of transfer of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups in the DRC as late as 2004. Rwandan officials have repeatedly denied all allegations of involvement in mine use in the DRC. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 612.
5 Article 7 Report, Form E, April 2008.
6 Ibid, Form B.
7 No details are provided about when or how many mines were destroyed. Previously, Rwanda said that in 1994, the former government “fled into neighboring Congo with all arms and ammunitions including antipersonnel mines,” and that the current government “has never imported antipersonnel mines, and therefore no stockpiled antipersonnel mines [are] in Rwanda.” Article 7 Report, Form E, 1 June 2006. The same language is used in earlier reports.
8 Article 7 Report, Form D, 22 April 2003. The mines included 32 PMD-6, 26 TS-50, and 43 M-35 mines.
9 Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2008. The mines included 22 PMD-6, 26 TS-50, and 17 M-35, which would indicate that 10 PMD-6 and 26 M-35 mines had been consumed in training.
10 Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2008. The 25 personnel included five EOD technicians, 10 operators, and 10 “Recce” agents. The report did not provide details on the number or types of mines used in each instance of training.
11 Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2008.
In a 2002–2003 assessment, four of the 12 former provinces (since 2006, Rwanda has only five provinces) reported a mine threat: Byumba, Gisenyi, Kigali (including in the capital itself), and Ruhengeri. Two additional minefields were discovered in Ruhengeri after the assessment; both have since been cleared. As of June 2009, the Muhororo minefield in Northern province was the sole remaining minefield, which the National Demining Office (NDO) began clearing in May. The main battle area site is in Gabiro district of Eastern province, although there are also spot items of UXO found across the country.

Casualties
In 2008, the NDO recorded six new mine casualties (two killed and four injured), all caused by TS-50 antipersonnel mines. Four casualties were girls between five and nine years old, plus a seven-year-old boy and a 28-year-old man. The NDO did not provide information on the activity at the time of the incident or the exact incident dates. Four casualties occurred in Kigali and two in Gicumbi, North province.

The NGO Survivor Corps “had heard” of two mine/ERW casualties occurring in the south in 2008, which were not included in the NDO database and Landmine Monitor was unable to verify this information. In 2007, 10 casualties were recorded, compared to 15 in 2006, but in 2008 casualty data was incomplete.

In 2009, no new mine/ERW casualties were reported as of 10 May.

The number of mine/ERW casualties in Rwanda is unknown and estimates vary. In 2009, the NDO was unable to provide detailed information on cumulative casualties between 1999 and 2008. However, from data made available from the NDO previously, it appears that between 1991 and 2008 the NDO recorded at least 702 casualties, including 299 killed and 403 injured.

In 2009, the NDO reported that casualty rates have been declining over the years from an average of two casualties per week reported prior to 1995.

Risk profile
Casualties have declined, indicating a reduced level of risk. The majority of recorded casualties are men, but since 2006, child casualties have made up an increasing proportion of the total. School-age children are considered to be the most at-risk group as they never received any formal mine/ERW risk education. Other at-risk groups were said to include farmers and returning refugees. In the past, the NDO reported that out of “the need of survival” people intentionally took risks.

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Program Management and Coordination

Mine action and risk education
Rwanda does not have a civilian mine action authority. The NDO, created in 1995 and located near Kigali, manages and implements demining operations across the country, under the Ministry of Defense, with assistance from Mines Awareness Trust (MAT) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). The NDO coordinates mine/ERW risk education and developed a summary plan for 2008, but it had not been implemented as of May 2009 due to lack of funds.

Victim assistance
The NDO reported that it is not involved in victim assistance due to a lack of funds, and its mandate does not seem to include victim assistance. The Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs as well as the Ministry of Health are responsible for issues relating to persons with disabilities.

Data collection and management
In 2009, the NDO reported that “data is collected countrywide,” verified, and stored in the NDO’s Information Management System for Mine Action database. However, information made available to Landmine Monitor was incomplete. In 2008, the NDO stated that casualties in remote areas go unreported.

Plans
Strategic mine action plan
A strategic plan to complete clearance of all known mined areas was drafted in 2006 with the assistance of MAT. Rwanda sought to concentrate on developing the NDO’s capacity through training, hiring more staff and deminers, and by procuring new equipment. Rwanda’s operational priority has been to clear all known mined areas by its 2010 Article 5 deadline, which it was on course to meet.

In April 2008, the Ministry of Health finalized a National Plan for Rehabilitation of Physical Disabilities for 2009–2013. As of March 2009, however, the policy had yet to be implemented.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
As food security is a government priority, Rwanda’s post-clearance plan is to give the cleared areas to landless families who can then use them for subsistence farming.

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Rwanda has demonstrated a firm commitment to mine action through the establishment of the NDO under the Ministry of Defense, its secondment of army personnel to the clearance effort, and its positive collaboration with international NGOs to meet its Article 5 obligations in time.

Footnotes:
30 Email from Maj. Wilson Ukwishaka, NDO, 10 May 2009.
31 Ibid.
34 Email from Maj. Wilson Ukwishaka, NDO, 10 May 2009.
36 Email from Ben Remfrey, MAT, 6 February 2007.
38 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 601; and email from Mark Vaemneyck, Program Director, HI, 23 March 2009.
**National management**

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Rwanda stated they “were proud that our mine action program was locally managed.”\(^{40}\) A major program asset is said to have been the quality of the deminers and NDO personnel and leadership.\(^{41}\) The government of Rwanda has also contributed a small amount to the overall mine action program (see Support to Mine Action section below).

Support for mine action implementation and management has come from MAT, which has been training and mentoring 230 NDO personnel, including 146 deminers, since April 2006. MAT has provided technical assistance for survey and clearance through two technical advisors, and has also been conducting post-clearance evaluation of clearance operations using three mine detection dog teams trained at the International Mine Action Training Centre (IMATC) in Nairobi, Kenya.

**National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures**

There is no national mine action legislation or standards in force. Since 2006, standing operating procedures have been based on those provided by IMATC.\(^{42}\)

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

As of July 2008, the NDO had 230 Rwanda Defense Forces (RDF) personnel consisting of three demining teams, three EOD teams, and two reserve demining teams.\(^{43}\) From May 2006, when it began operations in Rwanda, MAT has helped the NDO to conduct technical survey on 16 mined areas.\(^{44}\) Surveys identified six more hazardous areas totaling 93,145m\(^2\), which have since been cleared.\(^{45}\)

In 2008, the mine problem was significantly reduced with the help of machines and technical assistance from NPA.\(^{46}\) In August 2008, NPA redeployed a MineWolf machine from its Sudan program to prepare approximately 525,400m\(^2\) of land in Kanombe minefield in Eastern province for manual clearance by NDO demining teams. At the end of the project in December 2008, NPA had released 520,192m\(^2\), of which only 15,303m\(^2\) (3% of the contaminated land) needed to be physically cleared. The rest of the area was released through cancellation and area reduction. Forty percent of the area was cancelled based on farmers having used the area for three farming seasons without incident or because the land had been in use by the Rwandan army or had been used as a cemetery.\(^{47}\)

In May 2008, MAT deployed three mine detection dog teams to Rwanda for quality management.\(^{48}\) MAT used them with the NDO’s battle area clearance team to quality control (QC) the Kanombe minefield after clearance. Through April 2009, MAT had conducted QC on all cleared areas with the exception of Rubaya and Nyabihu in Western province. During the QC project, two landmines, four hand grenades, and one item of UXO were found.\(^{49}\) MAT planned to complete QC in all cleared mined areas by October 2009.\(^{50}\)

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\(^{42}\) Interview with Dennis Felah, MAT, Kigali, 8 March 2007.


\(^{44}\) Email from Ben Remfrey, MAT, 21 April 2008.


\(^{50}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by MAT, 14 April 2009; and “Rwanda MDD,” www.minesawareness.org.
In February 2009, Mines Advisory Group signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Rwanda to provide technical assistance and training to the RDF in basic stockpile management and the destruction of surplus small arms and light weapons and munitions.\(^{51}\)

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Rwanda is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 December 2010. In April 2008, Rwanda reiterated its commitment to meeting the deadline: “The government of Rwanda is continuing to contact her partners to continue support in the fulfillment of Article 5...We look forward to declare Rwanda mine free by December 2010.”\(^{52}\)

As of June 2009, the Muhororo minefield in Northern province, measuring approximately 18,000m\(^2\), was the sole remaining minefield, which the NDO had begun demining.\(^{53}\)

### Demining from 2003–2008\(^{54}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m(^2))</th>
<th>BAC (m(^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>520,192</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>101,240</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>4,265</td>
<td>344,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>19,687</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>26,752</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>673,431</strong></td>
<td><strong>344,909</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though Rwanda may have fulfilled its Article 5 obligations by 2010, NPA believes there will remain a need for emergency/quick reaction teams to respond to discoveries of UXO and other spot tasks. In 2008, the NDO reported conducting two spot tasks per day.\(^{55}\)

**Risk Education**

In 2008, as in previous years, no formal mine/ERW risk education (RE) was provided in Rwanda. The NDO and MAT continued to provide basic community liaison in their area of operations in Eastern province and Kigali, in coordination with local leaders.\(^{56}\)

NDO staff delivered messages in Kinyarwanda and French using visual aids such as mine warning signs and free-from-explosive mines and ordnance. Awareness messages targeted children, farmers, and returning refugees; the total number of recipients is not known.\(^{57}\)

Formal RE was provided in Rwanda by the NDO from 1995 to 2001.\(^{58}\) In cooperation with Rwanda’s Information Office (Office Rwandais d’Information, ORINFOR), UNESCO, and UNICEF, it conducted school-based RE and public dissemination activities. The total number

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\(^{52}\) Article 7 Report, Form 1, April 2008.

\(^{53}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by MAT, 14 April 2009; and email from Ben Remfrey, MAT, 9 June 2009.


\(^{56}\) Emails from Dennis Felah, MAT, 3 March 2009; and from Maj. Wilson Ukwishaka, NDO, 10 May 2009.

\(^{57}\) Email from Dennis Felah, MAT, 3 March 2009.

of recipients is not known. Since 2002, no formal RE has been conducted due to lack of funds.\textsuperscript{59} However, some activities were organized by the Mulindi Japan One Love Project in 2005, and community liaison has been provided since 2002 alongside demining operations. Rwanda used Form I of its annual Article 7 report to provide an update on RE activities in 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006, and reported in Form J in 2008 that assistance was needed to continue RE.\textsuperscript{60} It is believed that RE, combined with clearance activities, has contributed to casualty reduction and in teaching communities to report on suspected dangerous areas.\textsuperscript{61}

**Victim Assistance**

The estimated number of survivors is unknown, but there could be at least 403 and up to 1,000.\textsuperscript{62} In 2004, Rwanda declared its commitment to support persons with disabilities, including mine survivors.\textsuperscript{63} However, it has not made statements on victim assistance or reported on it in its annual Article 7 reports.\textsuperscript{64} After suffering extensive damage and strain during the 1994 conflict, progress has been made in strengthening the health sector.\textsuperscript{65} The number of health posts and hospitals increased, and Rwanda’s improved road network ensured relatively quick transfer of patients.\textsuperscript{66} A lack of health professionals remained an issue of concern.\textsuperscript{67} By the end of 2008, 91% of the population was reported to have joined a medical insurance scheme (mutuelle).\textsuperscript{68} Those who are in extreme poverty, including survivors, are said to be exempted from paying the insurance and receive free care.\textsuperscript{69} However, Handicap International (HI) reported that most persons with disabilities cannot afford the high costs of continuing medical care, including surgery, physical rehabilitation, and prosthetic and orthotic devices.\textsuperscript{70} A draft ministerial decree, stating that the government will cover rehabilitation expenditures for destitute persons with disabilities, was under discussion at the beginning of 2009.\textsuperscript{71} In the public sector, there are approximately 20 district hospitals that offer physiotherapy services and five hospitals that offer both physiotherapy and orthopedic services (in Butare, Cyangugu, Gahini, Kigali, and Ruhengeri).\textsuperscript{72} In 2008, support to the rehabilitation sector

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid; Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 693; Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 501; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 616. Rwanda reported in its annual Article 7 reports that awareness campaigns were organized through media, but the NDO did not confirm this information.


\textsuperscript{61} Email from Dennis Felah, MAT, 3 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{62} In July 2008, the NDO reported 696 total casualties (297 killed and 399 injured) recorded between 1991 and December 2008. It also reported that six mine casualties (two killed and four injured) were registered in 2008. In May 2009, the NDO reported that since the last reporting to Landmine Monitor there have been no new casualties in Rwanda. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 599; and email from Maj. Wilson Ukwishaka, NDO, 10 May 2009. ALSAR noted that it has 1,000 members. Email from Francis K. Karangwa, ALSAR, 7 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{63} Statement of Rwanda, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 10 February 2004.


\textsuperscript{65} Email from Francis K. Karangwa, ALSAR, 7 March 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 600.

\textsuperscript{66} Email from Francis K. Karangwa, ALSAR, 7 March 2009.


\textsuperscript{70} Email from Mark Vaernewyck, HI, 23 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{72} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 601; and email from Mark Vaernewyck, HI, 23 March 2009.
continued to be provided by HI and Christoffel-Blindenmission (CBM). Rehabilitation services are also provided by religious organizations. The Association of Landmine Survivors and Amputees of Rwanda (ALSAR) reported that the quality and quantity of orthopedic services need to be improved and that it is difficult for survivors to obtain new orthopedic devices.

Since 2007, discrimination against persons with disabilities is prohibited by law (Loi de Protection des Personnes Handicapées). Provisions of the law were generally implemented in 2008. A first step toward implementation was the creation of the National Federation for People with Disabilities. On 15 December 2008, Rwanda ratified the UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol.

Victim assistance activities
In 2008, HI continued to support five orthopedic centers in the public hospital system. The centers provided 1,282 and repaired 120 orthopedic appliances and held 20,194 physiotherapy sessions. No distinction is made between mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities. HI also supported local associations of persons with disabilities and conducted advocacy work.

In 2008, CBM supported two local institutions that provided community and center-based rehabilitation and produced orthopedic appliances: the Association of Inkuru Nziza Churches in Kigali (which fitted four mine survivors with prostheses) and the Gahini Hospital in northeastern Rwanda (which fitted five mine survivors with prostheses). CBM also supported the countrywide orthopedic and rehabilitative surgery project run by the Ministry of Health.

ALSAR is the only mine survivors’ organization in Rwanda and has some 1,000 members. With limited funds, ALSAR carried out home visits, provided medical and material assistance, and conducted advocacy work.

In 2009, Survivor Corps, formerly known as Landmine Survivors Network, launched a new peer support program for survivors of genocide and former perpetrators. It estimated that 50% of genocide survivors are disabled.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any estimates for meeting future mine action needs, including victim assistance needs, in Rwanda.

National support for mine action
Rwanda did not report national funding in 2008. In June 2008, Rwanda reported contributing FRW30 million ($56,400) to NDO salaries, clothing, food, and equipment, but did not specify the period covered by its contribution. The NDO’s expenses are covered by the Ministry of Defense.

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73 Email from Mark Vaernewyck, HI, 23 March 2009; and telephone interview with Sheila Chimwani-Mukoto, Acting Chief Operations Officer, CBM, 9 June 2009.
74 Email from Mark Vaernewyck, HI, 23 March 2009.
75 Email from Francis K. Karangwa, ALSAR, 7 March 2009.
77 Email from Mark Vaernewyck, HI, 23 March 2009.
78 Telephone interview with and email from Sheila Chimwani-Mukoto, CBM, 9 and 10 June 2009.
79 Email from Francis K. Karangwa, ALSAR, 7 March 2009. Landmine Monitor was unable to determine how many survivors were assisted in 2008 alone.
80 Email from Albert Nzamukwereka, Survivor Corps, 7 May 2009.
82 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of Rwanda to the UN in Geneva, 4 April 2006, p. 3; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 502.
International cooperation and assistance

Germany reported contributing €300,000 ($441,780) for mine action in Rwanda in 2008. The funding went to NPA for clearance of the Kanombe minefield. No international funding for Rwanda was reported in 2007.

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>No credible estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>24 (2007: one)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>At least 570</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Article 5 (clearance of mined areas) | Deadline: 1 March 2016  
Original deadline: 1 March 2009 |
| Demining in 2008 | Not reported |
| Risk education recipients in 2008 | Unquantified |
| Progress towards victim assistance aims | Slow |
National: $337,000 (2007: $960,000) |

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Senegal became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999. It enacted national implementation legislation in August 2005. In March and April 2006, the Salif Sadio faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC), having fled Senegal, laid both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in northern Guinea-Bissau. There were also credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by MFDC rebels in Senegal in 1999 and 2000.

Senegal has made limited progress in clearing mined and battle areas from the Casamance region since becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Humanitarian demining operations only started in 2008, with one Handicap International clearance team working under the auspices of the Senegalese National Mine Action Center (CNAMS). In November 2008, at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Senegal requested, and was granted, a seven-year extension to its Article 5 deadline to clear mined areas on its territory.

CNAMS and Landmine Monitor identified a total of 332 mine/explosive remnants of war casualties (47 killed and 285 injured) from 1999–2008 in Senegal. Risk education has been conducted in Casamance since 2000, initially through Handicap International and since 2008 through the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims. UNICEF was the de facto coordinator of risk education until CNAMS assumed this role in 2007, after which UNICEF continued to provide support.

Despite being one of 26 States Parties reporting significant numbers of survivors, Senegal’s progress towards victim assistance aims was limited. Civil society reported a lack of government commitment. Victim assistance service provision decreased in 2008–2009.

Mine Ban Policy

Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. On 3 August 2005, the president signed a law on the prohibition of antipersonnel mines. The law makes production, purchase, sale,
States Parties

Senegal

stockpiling, transfer, and use of antipersonnel mines a criminal offense.² The president signed two implementation decrees on 18 August 2006, establishing a national mine action authority and a mine action center.

Senegal submitted its latest Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008. It has submitted nine previous reports.³

Senegal attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it provided an overview of its request for an Article 5 clearance deadline extension and made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance. Senegal participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance.

Senegal has rarely engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training). It has stated that it would not allow transit or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines on its territory.⁴

Senegal is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Senegal did not submit an annual transparency report as required under Article 13. Senegal is also party to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

Senegal signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.⁵

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use

Government authorities claim that Senegal has never used antipersonnel mines inside or outside the country.⁶ With one exception, Senegal has consistently stated in its Article 7 reports that it has never produced, possessed, or stockpiled mines, even for training purposes.⁷

Sporadic armed conflict in the Casamance region of Senegal continued between government forces and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC).⁸ There have continued to be civilian casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor has not seen any direct allegations of new use of antipersonnel or antivehicle mines by the MFDC in this reporting period.

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² Articles 5 and 6 of the law include penal sanctions of a prison term of five to 10 years, a fine of one to three million Senegalese francs for individuals, and a fine of 30 to 50 million Senegalese francs for legal entities. The law was submitted as an attachment to the Article 7 report submitted in 2006.
⁶ However, it appears certain that Senegalese forces used antipersonnel mines in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, to support government troops against a self-proclaimed military junta. Such use would have occurred after Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty, but before its entry into force for the government. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 76–79.
⁷ In April 2007, Senegal reported that 24 antipersonnel mines were used for training purposes before their destruction in August and September 2006. It stated that the mines were either taken from demining operations or discovered among rebel stockpiles, and that the defuzed mines were used to instruct deminers. The mines were 10 Mi AP DV, 10 Mi AP ID, two PMN, one M 969, and one PRB M35. It has not since reported the use or retention of mines for training purposes. Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2007.
⁸ The MFDC has had at least three factions, with shifting leaders and some infighting. Some MFDC leaders signed a peace accord with the government in December 2004, but further negotiations on its implementation have not taken place. The agreement acknowledged the scourge of antipersonnel mines and called for humanitarian demining in Casamance. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 505.
An MFDC representative who claimed to speak on behalf of all factions told Landmine Monitor in March 2009, “For the time being we don’t need mines, but [possible future use] will entirely depend on the government. Mines are a defensive tool for us. The state has obliged us to use mines and to go to war.”

In August 2008, the NGO Geneva Call and the Association pour la Promotion Rurale de l’Arrondissement de Nyassia–Solidarité, Développement, Paix (Association for the Promotion of the Rural Borough of Nyassia–Solidarity, Development, Peace, APRAN-SDP) met with senior commanders of two factions of the MFDC in São Domingos, Guinea-Bissau. Geneva Call reports that the MFDC military commanders declared themselves open to progressive humanitarian demining of the region of Casamance, undertaken by neutral NGOs, provided that there were consultations on targeted areas before demining began. Geneva Call said these MFDC factions claimed that they no longer use antipersonnel mines, but that they cannot fully renounce the weapon, or allow comprehensive demining of the region, particularly in areas close to their camps, until final settlement of the conflict. On 2 April 2009, Geneva Call and APRAN-SDP held a mine ban advocacy workshop with a “Contact Group,” comprised of representatives of several political wings of the MFDC.

In March and April 2006, the Salif Sadio faction of the MFDC, having fled Senegal, laid both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in northern Guinea-Bissau. There were also credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by MFDC rebels in Senegal in 1999 and 2000.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Senegal is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), the result of fighting between the Senegalese army and the MFDC in Casamance, an area in the south of the country between the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. The districts of Diattacounda, Niaguiss, and Nyassia, situated between the Senegal river and the border with Guinea-Bissau, have been identified as the most contaminated.

The precise extent of contamination remains unclear. An emergency landmine impact survey (ELIS) in 2005–2006 estimated that approximately 11km² of land and 63km of tracks and/or paths were suspected of being contaminated by mines, affecting more than 90,000 people. Senegal’s Article 5 deadline extension request, however, states that sizes of areas identified are indicative only and that the true nature of the challenge would only be known after technical survey of each area. In 2008, demining operations covered seven areas, of which three proved to have no explosive threat. The army also demined 11km of routes in March 2008, only some of which had been identified as hazardous by the survey.

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9 Interview with Daniel Diatta, Representative of the Secretary-General, MDFC, Ziguinchor, 20 March 2009. He further stated that they attacked Moroccan deminers in 2006 as a defensive measure. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 607.
10 Email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 5 June 2009.
12 For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 463–464. In April 2006, Guinea-Bissau declared that it had ousted rebel forces from its territory. The ICBL condemned the antipersonnel mine use in northern Guinea-Bissau and noted that the MFDC in 1999 signed the Banjul Declaration, which among other things, committed the group to cease using landmines.
14 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 22 October 2008, p. 2.
15 Email from Camille Gosselin, Advocacy Project Officer on Landmines and Cluster Munitions, HI, 3 September 2009.
16 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April 2008, p. 9.
Senegal acknowledged in September 2008 that the ELIS “might have overestimated the number of affected areas.” At the same time, it was not possible to visit certain suspected areas during the ELIS (said to amount to 263 areas in November 2008), thus other areas may also require demining. This number had “reduced” as of May 2009, thanks to general survey in Diouloulou district in 2008. A better idea of the total number of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) across the Casamance was expected from general surveys being conducted during 2009.

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 24 mine casualties (one killed and 23 injured) in four incidents. One casualty was military and the other 23 were all civilians, of whom at least two were adult males and four were males of unknown age. The gender and age of 17 was not recorded. Activities at the time of the incident included travel (21), farming (one), security (one), and building a well (one). Most casualties (21) were caused by a bus driving over an antivehicle mine on the way to the Gambia on 1 May 2008. It appears that the incident was caused by a newly laid mine, although the Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines du Sénégal, CNAMS) was not able to confirm this. The three other casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines. Two casualties were recorded in Ziguinchor region, 21 at the border with the Gambia, and another at the border with Guinea-Bissau.

The 2008 casualty rate is a sharp increase compared with 2007 (one injured casualty).

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with two mine casualties (both injured) as of July 2009. On 8 June 2009, a 36-year-old woman and a 60-year-old man were injured by an antipersonnel mine while looking for wood around the village of Kourin, in Ziguinchor region.

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Senegal is unknown, and data verification is ongoing. As of 1 July 2009, CNAMS had data on 702 mine/ERW casualties (152 killed and 550 injured) from 1988–2009. From 1999 to 2008, CNAMS recorded 311 casualties (46 killed and 265 injured) in Casamance. These do not include the 21 additional casualties identified by Landmine Monitor in 2008. Of the 332 total mine/ERW casualties (47 killed and 285 injured) identified by Landmine Monitor and CNAMS from 1999–2008, the majority (208) were civilians; 124 were military. Among civilian casualties, the largest casualty group was men (91), followed by women (42), boys (21), and girls (three). The age of 26 male and eight female casualties remains unknown; the gender and age of additional 17 casualties is also unknown.

Antivehicle mines caused 177 casualties, antipersonnel mines caused 143, ERW 11, and the device type for one casualty is unknown. The most common activities at the time of the incident were conducting military operations (114), collecting food/water/wood (96), and traveling (71), followed by agricultural activities (15), other everyday activities (10), tampering (seven), construction (four), herding (two), and fishing (one); the activity of 12 casualties is unknown.

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20 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 22 October 2008, p. 2.
22 For the 1 May 2008 incident, CNAMS recorded four casualties (one killed and three injured), but reported that 15 casualties occurred (1 killed and 14 injured). However, from media reports it appears that there were 21 casualties (one killed and 20 injured). See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 609.
23 Interview with Col. Paul Ndyaye, Commander, Military Zone N. 5, Ziguinchor, 19 March 2009.
24 Interview with Seyni Diop, Head of Victim Assistance and Mine Risk Education, and Diogoye Sene, Victim Assistance Officer, CNAMS, Ziguinchor, 18 March 2009.
25 Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008; and Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by email from Papa Omar Ndiaye, Director, CNAMS, 1 July 2009.
26 Email from Mamady Gassama, Secretary-General, ASVM, 8 June 2009; Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by email from Papa Omar Ndiaye, CNAMS, 1 July 2009; and “Senegal: Fresh violence in Casamance,” IRIN (Dakar), 12 June 2009, www.irinnews.org.
27 Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by email from Papa Omar Ndiaye, CNAMS, 1 July 2009.
28 Ibid.
29 Landmine Monitor media monitoring for calendar year 2008.
The highest casualty rates were recorded from 1997–1999; constant casualty decreases were recorded from 1999–2007, although the trend was broken in 2008. The downward trend is mainly due to the positive impact of risk education (RE) and the improved security situation since 2004.30

The MFDC declined to provide casualty data, but acknowledged that there have been mine casualties among their combatants.31

The ELIS found 400 casualties of whom 17 had occurred in the two years prior to the community surveys.32 The number of persons with disabilities in Senegal is unknown,33 but it is estimated that some 10% of the population is disabled.34

Risk profile
At-risk groups include the military, people collecting food, water and wood, farmers, travelers, and schoolchildren.35 With the improved security situation, movements of populations have been registered, increasing the risk to internally displaced persons and refugees.36

Socio-economic impact
According to Senegal’s Article 5 deadline extension request, the presence or suspected presence of mines impedes the provision of international assistance, affects economic development and trade, and serves as an obstacle to the application of Senegal’s poverty reduction strategy and the attainment of its Millennium Development Goals.37 As of June 2009, there was particular concern about the threat to returnees displaced by the fighting: many villages were completely abandoned, meaning that there is little or no local knowledge about the location and extent of any mine or ERW threat.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
On 18 August 2006, the National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention was designated as the national mine action authority for Senegal by presidential decree.38 The same day, a separate decree established CNAMS.39 The CNAMS director was appointed in January 2007 and its center in Ziguinchor became operational in August 2007.40 According to the director, the main difficulties encountered were “essentially difficulties of interpretation of the role of each actor; the responsibilities of each agency for implementation.” He claimed that “Today, everything is clear and the process is well underway.”41

References
30 Interviews with Camille Aubourg, Programme Manager, Mine Department, HI, Ziguinchor, 20 March 2009; and Benoît Toupane, President, Senegal Committee to Ban Landmines (SCBL), Ziguinchor, 18 March 2009.
31 Interview with Daniel Diatta, MFDC, Ziguinchor, 20 March 2009.
33 Interview with Colis El Hadji, Director, Social Action Department, Ministry of Family, Food Security, Women Entrepreneurship, Micro Finance and Early Childhood, Dakar, 24 March 2009.
37 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 8 July 2008, p. 34; and see also Analysis of Senegal’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 21 October 2008, p. 3.
40 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 22 October 2008, p. 2.

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Risk education
CNAMS is responsible for managing, coordinating, and monitoring RE through its RE department. As CNAMS is new to this role, they reported that 2008 was a setting-up phase and they expected to become more operational in 2009. Organizations have reported that coordination is poor and irregular, and that meetings are generally unproductive, as suggestions are not taken up by CNAMS. Information sharing was also said to be poor. Previously, UNICEF was the de facto RE coordinator, however when CNAMS was established in 2007, this role was then assumed by CNAMS. UNICEF provided funds to CNAMS in 2008 to support the coordination and harmonization of RE activities.

Victim assistance
CNAMS is responsible for overall coordination, monitoring, and reporting of victim assistance (VA) activities. CNAMS does not implement programs directly, but works through local and international partners. In 2008, CNAMS’ role in VA remained limited due to a lack of funds. The VA sub-commission within the National Commission is responsible for defining a VA strategy.

VA is included in Senegal’s mine action strategy of November 2007. The strategy was reviewed and approved by the National Commission in May 2009. Reportedly, the revision did not modify CNAMS’ VA responsibilities. CNAMS claimed that coordination with VA partners “works well” and noted that regular bilateral and sectoral meetings were held in 2008. However, associations working with mine/ERW survivors reported that coordination is poor and that civil society involvement in VA planning was limited.

The Ministry of Family, Food Security, Women Entrepreneurship, Micro Finance and Early Childhood is responsible for disability issues. It is unclear if the ministry coordinates with CNAMS.

Data collection and management
Casualty data collection remains incomplete in Senegal, but in 2009 CNAMS reported it started verifying existing data and gathering additional information on survivors’ needs. In 2007, CNAMS unified casualty databases held by different organizations and the information...
was entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 609.} IMSMA is operational and information is said to be shared with partner organizations.\footnote{Interview with Seyni Diop and Diogoye Sene, CNAMS, Ziguinchor, 18 March 2009.}

Information is collected through the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association Sénégalaise des Victimes de Mines, ASVM), Handicap International (HI), the National Agency for the Revival of Economic Activities in Casamance (Agence Nationale pour la Relance des Activités Économiques en Casamance, ANRAC), hospitals, army, local authorities, and RE committees.\footnote{Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by email from Papa Omar Ndiaye, CNAMS, 1 July 2009.} Data collection has improved,\footnote{Interview with Daniel Diatta, MFDC, Ziguinchor, 20 March 2009; and interview with Col. Paul Ndyaye, Military Zone N. 5, Ziguinchor, 19 March 2009.} but the data provided to Landmine Monitor has remained incomplete.\footnote{ASVM, “Base de Données (victimes des mines)” (“Database (mine victims”)”), undated, provided by Mamady Gassama, ASVM, 21 March 2009.} MFDC casualties go unreported.\footnote{Observations during Landmine Monitor field mission, Senegal, 17–25 March 2009.}

As of March 2009, ASVM had gathered information on the needs of 177 mine survivors. ASVM stated it wished to continue collecting data but was hampered by lack of funds.\footnote{Interview with Seyni Diop and Diogoye Sene, CNAMS, Ziguinchor, 18 March 2009.} In general, information collected by local organizations on recipients of VA services needs to be strengthened.\footnote{Interview with Seyni Diop, CNAMS, in Geneva, 25 May 2009.}

There is no systematic national collection of data on RE activities. Some national NGOs record the number of activities, but not the number of recipients. UNICEF passes its partners’ data to CNAMS. In 2008, CNAMS gave RE IMSMA activity forms to implementing organizations. Nothing was entered into IMSMA in 2008, but data entry started in early 2009.\footnote{National Commission, “Stratégie de lutte antimines du Sénégal” (“Senegal Mine Action Strategy”), Dakar, November 2007, p. 11.}

### Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
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<th>Casualty data collection</th>
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### Plans

**Strategic Mine Action Plan**

In November 2007, the National Commission and CNAMS initiated a review of its mine action strategy. The resulting strategic plan, which covers 2007–2015, reaffirms the “civilian, neutral, and humanitarian character” of the program.\footnote{Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 22 October 2008, p. 2.} The plan provides that the areas with the highest priority include the abandoned areas in which the population is resettling and the areas where the socio-economic impact of the presence of mines is considered to be high.\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 610.} The plan also provides for direct RE sessions in communities, community liaison in conjunction with clearance activities, and radio broadcasting.\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 610.}
The plan was revised in a process that involved all stakeholders. Thereafter, the document was the subject of a forum for exchange between members of the National Commission. A national workshop to confirm the plan took place in Ziguinchor in May 2009.  

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
Senegal’s Poverty Reduction Strategy includes priority actions for 2006–2010 that target persons with disabilities, including improving sanitation and mobility, promotion of education and training, and improved socio-economic reintegration.

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Senegal’s commitment to mine action has been uneven since becoming a State Party. In granting Senegal’s Article 5 deadline extension request, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted that it was “unfortunate” that after almost 10 years since becoming a State Party, Senegal was only “beginning to obtain clarity regarding the challenge it faces and has demined very little.” It further noted, however, “some compelling circumstance [sic] that impeded any work from progressing until 2005.”

National management
Senegal’s demining program is managed by CNAMS, with UNDP support since 2007 under the Project for Assistance in Mine Action in Casamance (PALAC Project). The former UNDP chief technical advisor left in June 2008 and had not been replaced by mid-2009. UNDP had, however, hired a technical advisor for operations and quality control who took up the position on 30 June 2009.

National budget
Senegal has reported that it has committed a total of US$1 million for CNAMS’ work for 2007–2009. This amount covers all CNAMS operating costs and the salaries of staff implementing the PALAC Project.

National mine action legislation and standards
As noted above, decrees mandating the national mine action authority and setting up the national mine action center were adopted in August 2006. The Senegalese Mine Action Standards (Normes Sénégalaises d’Action antimines, NOSAM), including RE standards, were developed in 2008 and 2009 with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the participation of all stakeholders. A workshop to confirm the content of the standards was held in mid-May 2009 with GICHD support. As of July 2009 they were in draft form and awaiting approval from the National Commission. Organizations need to be accredited by CNAMS to conduct RE.
Program evaluations
The first program evaluation was planned for the end of 2009.82

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

HI was the only international demining operator in Senegal during 2008. Its single demining team was composed of eight deminers with basic training in mine clearance, one team leader, two medics, and two community liaison officers. An operations/quality control (QC) manager and an assistant supervised the local demining team. Additional training to Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Level 2 was provided to the team by the West African Center for Humanitarian Mine Action Training (CPADD) in Ziguinchor from September–October 2008.83

Funding has proved an impediment to demining operations. In May 2008, HI had to suspend demining operations for one month as they were waiting for the task order from CNAMS.84 HI again stopped demining in August 2008 as a result of lack of funding, only restarting in October 2008.85 By then, the only humanitarian demining activities in Casamance had taken place in the area of Kandialang, near the town of Ziguinchor, and in Boutoute, Mandina Macagne, and Soucouta, all of which are within 6km of Ziguinchor.86 HI started demining in Kandialang using standard mine clearance drills. After a few days and with the help of a technical survey, it was determined that the area was not mined but contaminated with UXO; the deminers then employed battle area clearance techniques.87

Comprehensive results for demining in Casamance during 2008 were not available as of July 2009. Through 21 April 2009, Senegal reported that 63,252m² had been released in the districts of Bacounoum, Boutoute, Boutoute-St-Louis, Darsalam, Kandialang, Mandina Mancagne, and Mandina Manjack; 96 mines were found (95 antipersonnel mines and one antivehicle mine).88

In parallel, from 10–15 March 2008 the army demined certain routes, releasing 11.4km of suspected track and roads. The routes were between Diagonon and Mbissane bainounk, between Mbissane bainounk and Singuere, and between Mbissane bainounk and Mbissane Abondi-Nadiou.89

Internal quality management of demining operations is carried out by the HI operations manager in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards. External quality management is a task that falls to CNAMS.90 In April 2008, CNAMS visited the Kandialang site, and in June, personnel visited Boutoute, but without a formal QC process or trained personnel. Without a final QC procedure, the demined area cannot be officially handed over to the population. Therefore, the site at Kandialang, which had been cleared since November 2008, had still not been formally handed over as of May 2009, although a quality management process was being developed.91

85 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 22 October 2008, p. 4.
86 Ibid, p. 3.
88 Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009. The Article 7 report gives a total of 96 antipersonnel mines but one of the mines cited is an antivehicle mine.
89 Ibid.
Senegal hopes to have at least two demining operators and approximately 200 deminers supported by various mechanical means. As of June 2009, a tender process for the selection of demining operators with funding from the European Commission was still waiting to be initiated by UNDP. This and QC were the top priorities for the UNDP technical advisor for operations, to be followed by setting up a quality management system.

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the treaty, Senegal was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. On 2 April 2008, Senegal submitted a request for a seven-year extension to its Article 5 deadline (until 1 March 2016) to the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties. A revised request (dated 18 June) was submitted on 8 July 2008, but Senegal did not alter the extension period sought, which the ICBL criticized as excessive. The extension request was granted by the Ninth Meeting of States Parties on 28 November 2008.

The Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted that Senegal “does not yet have a clear knowledge of size and location of areas that will actually warrant mine clearance, its estimates for time and money required appear to be based solely on clearance assumptions, and the commitment made by Senegal to undertake technical survey activities and to develop a cancellation procedure may result in implementation that proceeds much faster than that suggested by the amount of time requested and in a more cost-effective manner.” Senegal pledged to land release techniques in the 41 localities suspected of being “lightly contaminated” in order to confirm contamination or to delete them from the list of SHAs.

In October 2008, Senegal stated that since its demining program was “in its initial stages, it is not yet possible to make precise projections concerning the potential viability of the operations being conducted. It should also be pointed out that the objective can be achieved only if the peace process continues favorably and if security conditions improve in all the areas affected by the conflict, which are, of course, those most affected by the existence of mines.” In November 2008, Senegal stated its intention not to seek a second extension period, except for “truly exceptional circumstances.”

As of mid-2009, the security situation in Casamance was generally improving. Geneva Call has reported positive talks with the MFDC on demining in the region. On 24 August 2008, Geneva Call and its local partner, APRAN-SDP, met with senior commanders of the Kassolol and Diakaye armed factions of the MFDC in São Domingos, Guinea-Bissau. At this meeting, the MFDC military commanders for the first time declared themselves open to progressive humanitarian demining of Casamance, undertaken by neutral NGOs and provided that consultations on targeted areas occurred prior to demining efforts. Previously, the MFDC had categorically refused demining.

On 2 April 2009, responding to a request by the MFDC’s armed wing (Kassolol faction), Geneva Call and APRAN-SDP held a mine ban advocacy workshop with the MFDC’s Contact Group. The Contact Group committed to discussing the issue of mine action in detail with the...
movement’s military wings. The following day, Geneva Call facilitated a first exchange between the Contact Group and CNAMS on perspectives on mine action in the region.102

Following the Geneva Call/APRAN-SDP workshop, CNAMS invited the MFDC Contact Group and Geneva Call to participate in a meeting from 29–30 April 2009 in Kabrousse to identify criteria to prioritize areas eligible for humanitarian demining. The workshop gathered more than 40 participants representing the government, security forces, the MFDC Contact Group, and NGOs. Security conditions and conflict parties’ commitment to collaborate in mine action (and not re-mine) were among the eight criteria identified to prioritize areas that will be demined.103

Risk Education

RE was implemented by national NGOs, with support from UNICEF from July to December 2008. ASVM was the only organization which had RE as a primary function. Other organizations implemented RE as part of wider programs, such as child protection, conflict prevention, and stress management. Radio programs were also delivered in several local languages.104 RE was conducted in schools in Casamance in 2008 by teachers trained in 2007, but no monitoring took place by CNAMS.105 Monitoring was done by Ministry of Education school inspectors and through the local UNICEF field office.106 Funding for RE was provided by the UNICEF National Committee in Spain and United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID).107

CNAMS organized two workshops in 2008 on the coordination of RE messages, with funding from UNICEF.108 Fifteen NGOs and government RE stakeholders participated. The first workshop, held 14–15 July 2008, resulted in the development of unified RE messages. The second, held 16–17 December 2008, focused on sharing experiences109 and also discussed target groups and geographic areas of work in order to avoid duplication.110 In June 2009, a workshop on RE planning was convened by CNAMS in Ziguinchor with GICHD support.111

As RE has been conducted for several years there is a good level of awareness.112 However, CNAMS considers RE important because clearance is at an early stage and data has shown a decrease in casualties which they attribute to RE campaigns.113 All the actors interviewed expressed the view that there was still a need of RE and some thought that it should continue until the last mine is cleared.114 Messages focused on avoiding unknown areas (for example, children taking short cuts to school) and not picking up unknown objects.115

103 Email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Geneva Call, 5 June 2009.
104 Interview with Christina de Bruin, UNICEF, Ziguinchor, 19 March 2009.
106 Email from Christina de Bruin, UNICEF, Ziguinchor, 2 September 2009.
112 Interview with Camille Aubourg, HI, Ziguinchor, 20 March 2009.
114 Interviews with Benoît Toupane, SCBL, Ziguinchor, 18 March 2009; Camille Aubourg, HI, Ziguinchor, 20 March 2009; Christina de Bruin, UNICEF, Ziguinchor, 19 March 2009; Mamady Gassama, ASVM, Ziguinchor, 21 March 2009; and Maria Sagna Le Caer Nee Ndeye, Project Manager, Kabonketoor, Zinguinchor, 1 April 2009.
115 Interview with Seyni Diop, CNAMS, in Geneva, 25 May 2009. Specific themes included: What are mines/UXOs; In what places are you likely to find mines/UXOs; How to identify mines/UXOs; What can mines/UXOs do to you and others; and, What should you do when you are in a minefield. Email from Christina de Bruin, UNICEF, 2 September 2009.
In May 2008, CNAMS, RE NGOs, and UNICEF held a mine action awareness day. CNAMS also conducted landmine safety training for local NGO staff traveling to remote areas.116

### Risk education activities in 2008117

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographical area</th>
<th>No. of recipients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASVM</td>
<td>80 village mass awareness sessions; 119 radio programs with ASAPAD and CROSP; refresher courses; training of trainers; RE for refugees and internally displaced persons planning to return home</td>
<td>Ziguinchor region (departments of Niaguiss and Niassy); Sédhiou region (Diattacounda department); and radio messages in Ziguinchor and Kolda regions</td>
<td>80 communities, totaling 45,288 people; estimated 100,000 people reached through radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASAPAD</td>
<td>Training of trainers for community peace unit members; community RE presentations; 30 radio programs in partnership with AVSM (see above), covering both Ziguinchor and Kolda regions</td>
<td>Ziguinchor and Kolda regions</td>
<td>4,275 people through direct presentations; 180 peace unit members trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CROSP</td>
<td>35 mine awareness panels with AVMS; 30 radio programs (see above); community presentations—RE with conflict prevention</td>
<td>Ziguinchor region</td>
<td>5,000 people through direct presentations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabonkétoor with UNICEF support</td>
<td>Limited RE activities integrated with conflict management program</td>
<td>Ziguinchor region</td>
<td>300 community-level women leaders trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspection d’Academie (regional level of the Ministry of Education)</td>
<td>RE in schools</td>
<td>Ziguinchor region</td>
<td>262 principals and teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Community liaison with demining activities</td>
<td>Ziguinchor region</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CNAMS has a budget for RE materials, and has designed RE materials, which organizations are required to use.118

CNAMS monitors the work of the implementing organizations.119 Yet local organizations reported that CNAMS’s monitoring role remained limited in 2008.120 ASVM and the Association of the Artisans of Peace and Development (Association des Artisans de la Paix et

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118 Interview with Seyni Diop, CNAMS, in Geneva, 25 May 2009. According to UNICEF, its partner organizations have not yet received these materials. Email from Christina de Bruin, UNICEF, UNICEF, 2 September 2009.
du Développement, ASAPAD) monitor RE conducted by their trainers; in addition, UNICEF, through its local field office in Ziguinchor, monitors the activities. ASVM reported that although they have a good network of contacts in communities to deliver RE, they suffer from a lack of funding to follow up and meet them.

UNICEF had not released funds for RE activities in 2009 as of July 2009, except for funding to CNAMS for the production of school exercise books containing RE messages. HI conducted an exploratory mission in January 2009 to determine if there was a need to restart its RE program. It concluded that there was a need, focusing on the returning population to provide in-school and community-based RE.

The main RE provider in Senegal from 2000 to 2007 was HI, working with NGOs and hundreds of community volunteers, establishing community committees to conduct RE and marking, training school teachers to deliver RE through the school curriculum, and through regular radio broadcasts. By 2002, HI reported that RE had covered all of Casamance and each year the number of reported beneficiaries increased. In 2002, UNICEF developed an awareness campaign using songs, murals, and notebooks. An HI evaluation of RE in July 2002 found a lack of awareness and misinformation but HI also reported that the large reduction in casualties from 1998 to 2004, when no humanitarian clearance was undertaken, was mainly due to effective RE. HI stopped RE in Senegal in August 2007 reportedly because of a lack of commitment from the authorities. Prior to 2000, limited RE had been conducted by the Senegalese Red Cross and the army.

A UNICEF RE evaluation in 2005 recommended that communication strategies be better adapted to the context and need of the communities. In 2008, UNICEF reported that it had acted on these recommendations. In 2006, community liaison projects were included as a part of peacebuilding and development programs. Additional efforts were also made to reach internally displaced persons (IDPs) after renewed fighting in north Casamance in August 2006.

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is unknown and under revision by CNAMS, who identified at least 550. Landmine Monitor has identified at least 570 survivors. In March 2009, the National Commission acknowledged that VA activities remain insufficient. ASVM and survivors reported that VA is not high on the government’s agenda. In 2008–2009, projects aimed at assisting survivors were “winding down” (particularly since the HI VA project ended in

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121 Emails from Christina de Bruin, UNICEF, 22 July and 2 September 2009.
123 Emails from Christina de Bruin, UNICEF, 22 July and 2 September 2009.
125 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
129 Interview with Laurène Leclercq, HI, Ziguinchor, 20 March 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 609.
133 Interview with Oumar Thiaw and Abdoulaye Bathily, National Commission, Dakar, 24 March 2009.
August 2008) and there were difficulties in mobilizing resources. In May 2009, a new wave of insecurity was reported in Casamance, further hampering service provision and access to services for survivors.

There are two regional hospital centers capable of providing emergency and continuing medical care services in Casamance, one in Ziguinchor, and one in Kolda. The majority of survivors are treated in Ziguinchor, as the hospital is better equipped and more incidents occur nearby. There are two surgeons at the Ziguinchor hospital, of whom one is military, but who also treat civilian casualties. Emergency medical care is free in principle, but medicine and surgical kits need to be paid for by survivors or their families. Amputations can cost up to €500 ($736), which the majority of survivors find difficult to pay. Military casualties are treated in military medical camps and then evacuated by plane to the Military Hospital in Dakar. While military survivors are entitled to free medication, in reality, the only pharmacies accepting military prescriptions are in Dakar, while the majority of military survivors live in Casamance and cannot afford to travel to the capital.

At least 80% of survivors live in rural areas in the regions of Ziguinchor and Kolda, where services are more limited than elsewhere in Senegal. The healthcare situation is “precarious” and poverty is widespread. Access to healthcare, particularly emergency services, in rural areas remains problematic. Ambulances and the road network are in poor condition. Casualties are usually evacuated by the army, which has military posts spread all over Casamance. Yet many survivors reported that they had to be transported by their family or neighbors by cart or taxi. First-aid can be administered by the army or by volunteers from the Senegalese Red Cross. It usually takes about two hours to reach the first health post or hospital, or more if the incident is in a remote area. Casualties among the MFDC are not transported to the health posts/regional hospitals due to “security reasons”—they fear arrest if they show up in a health facility.
Physical rehabilitation services, including physiotherapy and mobility devices, are available in Dakar, Kolda, and Ziguinchor. Prosthetics can be repaired by mobile units in Bignona and Ouissouye departments (Ziguinchor region). Rehabilitation and orthopedic services are not sufficient and there is a lack of material and equipment. At the Ziguinchor hospital, it takes an average of 45 days to get prosthetic devices, which are given at a “humanitarian cost.” The orthopedic center at the Kolda hospital is in a poor state and lacks materials. Military survivors receive free rehabilitation and prosthetic devices in Dakar.

Psychosocial support services are provided by the government and NGOs, mainly in the framework of stress management and conflict resolution activities. Services are provided through peer-to-peer support and professional psychologists. In November 2008, the Kenia Psychiatric Center (Centre Psychiatrique de Kénia) in Ziguinchor became operational, with support from ANRAC, the National Agency for the Revival of Economic Activities in Casamance, but no survivors had been assisted as of April 2009. With HI support, a psychiatrist from Dakar was paid to visit Casamance in 2007–2008 and mine/ERW survivors received free counseling, psychotherapy, and debriefing sessions. Most mine survivors are unemployed or self-employed but socio-economic reintegration services remain largely inadequate. Analysis of ASVM data shows that many survivors need vocational training and funds to start income generation projects. Special education is limited. Military survivors receive a modest pension.

The rights of persons with disabilities are protected in the constitution, but discrimination remains a problem. Legislation reserved 15% of new civil service positions for persons with disabilities, but an additional bill is needed to make the law operational. Specific disability legislation (Loi d’orientation sociale relative aux droits des personnes handicapées) has been drafted, but was pending approval as of June 2009. On 25 April 2007, Senegal signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol; neither had been ratified as of 1 July 2009.
Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Senegal is one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.\(^{175}\)

Senegal presented its 2005–2009 objectives as part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005,\(^{176}\) including: improving the effectiveness and analysis of data collection while amalgamating databases; reducing time to reach emergency care and enhancing capacities of medical staff and supplies; improving services, capacities, and coordination of rehabilitation centers; developing two public cells for psychological support and reinforcing social service capacity and teacher training; restarting economic activities in Casamance and reinforcing national development programs to increase access to credit and training for people with disabilities; and implementing legislation relative to disability and ensuring accessibility of schools and public buildings.\(^{177}\) The objectives are not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) and Senegal has not formally presented revised objectives or plans.\(^{178}\)

In April 2007, Senegal reported that a VA strategy had been developed, which included strengthening medical infrastructure and socio-economic reintegration in close cooperation with ASVM.\(^{179}\) In June 2008, Senegal outlined planned VA activities under the national mine action strategy.\(^{180}\) These included: updating the casualty database; technical support to AVSM; finding ways to produce and repair mobility devices; lobbying for healthcare cost coverage and education for mine/ERW survivors; and identifying means and partners to support income-generating activities. No clear timeframes or responsibilities were assigned.\(^{181}\) The objectives do not seem to provide for comprehensive VA, as issues are addressed very broadly (economic reintegration, education, and physical rehabilitation) or not addressed at all (psychosocial support, emergency medical care, and laws/public policies).\(^{182}\) In November 2008, Senegal announced its intention to develop a VA action plan.\(^{183}\) The same statement was repeated in May 2009.\(^{184}\) In May 2009, CNAMS reported that it will develop a 2009–2014 VA plan with SMART objectives based on the Nairobi Action Plan by the end of 2009.\(^{185}\) On 9 May 2009, as part of the work of the VA focal point of the ICBL, a “VA reflection day” was organized to stimulate discussions around the development of a VA action plan.\(^{186}\)

Some achievements have been recorded in the fields of data collection, medical care, and psychological support. However, significant progress has been hampered by ongoing conflict, time needed to set up a mine action framework, and limited resources.\(^{187}\) In May 2009,

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181 Ibid.

182 Ibid.


187 Interview with Seyni Diop and Diogoye Sene, CNAMS, Ziguinchor, 18 March 2009.
Senegal identified seven key VA challenges, including identifying survivors and their needs; setting up an incident surveillance system; simplifying replacement of prosthetic devices; making raw materials accessible to orthopedic workshops; equipping the psychiatric center in Kenya; facilitating access to employment for survivors and other persons with disabilities; and elaborating a VA national action plan. In addition, Senegal reported two priorities for 2010–2014: setting up an inter-ministerial council on VA and establishing a fund for survivors to ensure free services, orthopedic devices, scholarships, and socio-economic reintegration.

In 2008, a process support visit was undertaken by the GICHD Implementation Support Unit on behalf of the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration.

Senegal participated in the workshop on advancing assistance to mine victims in Africa, in Nairobi in 2005. Senegal reported on its VA activities at meetings of States Parties from 2005–2008, and at the Standing Committee meetings from 2007–2009. It used the voluntary Form J to its annual Article 7 report to provide an update on VA activities for 2006–2008 and to report on casualty data in 2009. It also included a VA expert on its delegation to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings from 2007–2009 and at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.

Victim assistance activities

It is unknown exactly how many mine/ERW survivors received assistance in 2008, but at least 318 received some services. At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, CNAMS reported that from 2005–2009 some 29,972 persons with disabilities, including an unknown number of mine survivors, received assistance in Casamance (223 persons received medical care, 506 physical rehabilitation, 1,332 received walking appliances, 116 peer-to-peer support, 3,281 support to access education, and 24,514 food aid).

In 2008, ASVM, in cooperation with UNICEF, provided a wide range of services, including: psychological support and stress management to 183 mine survivors (86 men, 62 women, and 35 children) and 427 members of affected communities (157 men, 137 women, and 133 children) in 20 villages in Nyassia and Niaguiss, Ziguinchor region; physical rehabilitation assistance through obtaining prosthetic devices for 28 survivors (of which one was a new survivor and seven were survivors never previously fitted with a prosthesis) and in repairing old devices for 70 survivors; and support to child survivors through the delivery of 10 new bicycles and repair

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189 Ibid.
192 Ibid; and statement of Senegal, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.
194 Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
199 Ibid; and interview with Sarani Diatta and Mamady Gassama, ASVM, Ziguinchor, 18 March 2009.
of 12 bicycles in order to increase their participation, reintegration and mobility within the community, and the coverage of school fees and material to 19 children. 200 ASVM also signed an agreement with one pharmacy to cover the costs of medicines for emergency treatment of mine/ERW survivors. 201 ASVM distributed rice and meat, received through private donations, among their most vulnerable members. 202

In March 2008, the Senegalese Association for the Support of the Creation of Socio-Economic Activities (Association Sénégalaise pour l’Appui à la Création d’Activités Socio-économiques, ASAPAD) organized a fundraising event for mine/ERW survivors, reportedly collecting CFA35 million ($85,750). 203 Part of the money was used to build a new office for ASVM. 204 The building was not completed as of March 2009. 205

ASAPAD, with UNICEF support, provided psychological support/stress management to two new mine survivors in 2008 and organized 145 sessions to provide psychological support to victims of conflict and their families at the Ziguinchor hospital. 206

The Regional Center for Educational and Professional Orientation (Centre Régional d’Orientation Scolaire et Professionnelle, CROSP) provided psychological support to one mine survivor and organized four refresher trainings in psychological support for ASVM members. 207

The Ziguinchor hospital provided medical and physical rehabilitation assistance to 10 new mine survivors in 2008. 208 The Kolda hospital did not assist any mine/ERW survivors in 2008. 209

The ICRC covered the medical and transportation expenses of two new mine survivors in 2008. 210 It also supported three health centers in Casamance and the hospitalization of 34 weapon-injured people. 211

From January to August 2008, HI provided direct and indirect assistance to conflict victims and persons with disabilities in Ziguinchor and Kolda regions through psychological assistance, promoting sport for persons with disabilities, and capacity-building for local organizations. The project started in 2006 and ended in 2008 due to lack of funding. 212

The Canadian university College Montmorency continued to receive support from Canada to provide VA in Senegal. In August 2008, they reported that since the project’s beginning in 2004, 400 patients had received psychological and rehabilitation services. Moreover, Canadian specialists had trained more than 100 medical professionals involved in treating survivors. 213 CNAMS employed three mine survivors in 2008. 214

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201 Ibid.

202 Interview with Mamady Gassama, ASVM, Ziguinchor, 20 March 2009.


204 Interview with Boubou Bathily, Regional Director, ASACASE, Ziguinchor, 23 March 2009.


206 Interview with Edouard Ndecky, ASAPAD, Ziguinchor, 19 March 2009.

207 Interview with Guorgy Kebé, CROSP, Ziguinchor, 19 March 2009.

208 Interview with Dr. Jacques Senghor, Ziguinchor Regional Hospital, Ziguinchor, 23 March 2009.

209 Interview with Guorgy Kebé, CROSP, Ziguinchor, 19 March 2009.

210 Interview with Maurice Grundbacher, ICRC, Ziguinchor, 19 March 2009.


214 Interview with Seyni Diop and Diogoye Sene, CNAMS, Ziguinchor, 18 March 2009.
Support for Mine Action

Senegal has provided a cost estimate for completion of mine clearance obligations totaling $32,070,000 (€21,777,808) for the period 2009–2015. The estimate, reported in Senegal’s June 2008 revised Article 5 deadline extension request, is provisional and based in part on a projection of clearing 20km² at a cost of roughly $1.50 per meter. The cost estimate includes $3,350,000 for core costs, $2,020,000 for mechanical demining, and $26,700,000 for manual demining during the seven-year period. Total annual estimated costs are $2.5 million in 2009, over $5 million in 2010, $6.1 million in 2011, and $4.6 million annually from 2012 to 2015. The National Commission has responsibility for allocating and managing resources to ensure the effective use of mine action funds.

In May 2009, Senegal reported among its mine action priorities for the period 2010–2014 the establishment of a fund to support mine victims with free healthcare, mobility assistance, scholarships, and support for rehabilitation.

National support for mine action

Senegal reported CFA150 million (roughly $337,000) in national funding for mine action in 2008. Senegal reported providing $960,000 in 2007. In its Article 5 deadline extension request, it reported that a contribution had been made of $1 million to cover the period 2007–2009. In May 2008, Senegal stated that, although its Article 5 deadline extension request does not refer to an increase in national funding, such an increase may take place, and the level of national funding for the period 2009–2015 had not yet been determined. Senegal stated that during this period, national funding would “certainly not decrease but will most probably increase with the development and progress of the [demining] programme.”

In September 2008, it reported that a submission had been made by CNAMS to the government to increase annual national funding to CFA250 million (roughly $567,000).

International cooperation and assistance

Canada was the sole reported donor to mine action in Senegal in 2008, contributing C$50,698 ($47,560) to College Montmorency to support rehabilitation services. Five countries and the European Commission (EC) reported contributing $7,305,406 (€5,328,135) in 2007. Much of funding committed or allocated in 2007 was either applied to programming in 2008 or is intended for disbursement in support of future programs. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Senegal reported conducting a pilot demining phase in 2008 based on funding from Belgium, and continued demining in 2008–2009 based on funding from France and Germany. Yet none of these donors reported funding allocations in 2008. In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Senegal reported EC funds committed in 2007 (€3.35 million) among “potential” or

215 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 8 July 2008, Annex II.
216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
220 Additional information provided by Senegal to the Article 5 deadline extension request analysis group, 12 September 2008. The conversion is as provided by Senegal; the average exchange rate for 2008 was not available to Landmine Monitor.
222 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 8 July 2008, p. 7.
225 Emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 and 19 June 2009.
226 Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009.
“expected” funds. Although it seems the funds have been applied in multiyear timeframes, funding at 2008 levels appears to fall short of the amount required to meet the estimated annual costs of the 2009–2015 mine action plan of about $4.6 million per year.227

In May 2008, Senegal reported that Spain had announced €4 million in new funding, but had not yet officially confirmed the contribution. In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Senegal again referred to expected funding by Spain, this time roughly €3 million.228 No such funding had been reported as of August 2009 by either Spain or Senegal. As of August 2008, HI also reported receiving €300,000 from Spain for VA in 2006–2008.229 Spain has not reported funding since 2006, to HI programs in Senegal.

227 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2 April 2008, p. 12.
228 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 8 July 2008, p. 7.
229 Email from Laurène Leclercq, HI, 12 August 2008.
2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>1.7km² of mined areas (April 2009) 30km² of cluster munition remnants (November 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>Three (2007: two)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Up to 3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (Clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Mined area clearance: 0.95km²  Battle area clearance: 1.07km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $2,831,668 (2007: $2,713,610)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Serbia assumed the treaty commitments of the former state union of Serbia and Montenegro, which became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2004. Serbia’s 2006 Criminal Code makes possession of antipersonnel mines a crime. Serbia destroyed its stock of 1.2 million mines in May 2007. It initially retained 5,565 mines for training purposes, but reduced that to 3,589 mines in 2008. Serbia served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from 2006–2008. Until 2006, there were instances of discoveries of mines, and occasional mine incidents, but it was not clear if these represented new use of mines by irregular anti-Serbian forces.

Serbia has made slow but steady progress in clearing its mine contamination. A general survey of cluster munition remnants completed by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in November 2008 estimated that the residual threat from unexploded submunitions, including subsurface hazards, covered up to 30km².

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 113 mine/ explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (21 killed, 64 injured, and 28 unknown) from media reports and data provided by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ICRC. During the same period, the Department of Civil Protection, within the Ministry of Defense, identified 643 casualties (203 killed and 440 injured), 637 of which occurred in 1999. NPA collected data on 191 cluster munition casualties (31 killed and 160 injured) from 1999–2008. Lack of effective data collection prevents comparison between these different totals, or a consolidation of them.

No risk education (RE) has been conducted since 2006. Emergency RE was conducted in 1999, primarily by the army, the Ministry of Interior, and the ICRC.

Overall, little progress was noted in improving victim assistance (VA). Serbia had comprehensive medical and physical rehabilitation services for survivors prior to the conflict in the 1990s, but the quality of these services has declined as a result of the armed conflict, sanctions, and economic difficulties. While there had been a government social and economic

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reintegration program available during the 1999 war, there were few programs after it, although the national organization Dobra Volja worked with survivors to provide psychosocial support. Progress toward the achievement of VA objectives was limited in all areas except for some in the creation of laws and policy for all persons with disabilities. Serbia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in May 2009 and the harmonization of national disability legislation was underway.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Serbia assumed the treaty commitments of the former state union of Serbia and Montenegro following the Republic of Montenegro’s declaration of independence in June 2006. The former Serbia and Montenegro acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 18 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. Serbian President Boris Tadic has declared the declaration illegal and stated that “Serbia considers Kosovo as its southern territory.”

A new Criminal Code of the Republic of Serbia entered into force on 1 January 2006. Articles 376 and 377 make the use, production, stockpiling, trade, and transfer of antipersonnel mines a criminal offense. These two provisions also specify penal sanctions.

Serbia submitted its third Article 7 report in 2009, covering calendar year 2008. Serbia attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made statements on VA and mine clearance. As the outgoing co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Serbia was one of eight vice-presidents of the meeting. Serbia also participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, making statements on its experience with stockpile destruction, VA, and mine clearance.

Serbia has reconfirmed the view of the former state union of Serbia and Montenegro that “mere participation” in military activities with states not party to the treaty, which engage in activities prohibited by the treaty, is not a treaty violation. Serbia has not made other statements on issues of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the treaty, including on acts prohibited by the ban on “assistance,” antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes, and the acceptable number of mines retained for training.

Serbia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but not Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

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3 Following a referendum on independence on 21 May 2006, the Parliament of Montenegro declared independence on 3 June, and Montenegro was accepted as a member of the UN on 28 June. Montenegro deposited its instrument of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 October 2006.
4 William J. Kole and Nebi Qena, “Kosovo Declares Independence From Serbia,” *Associated Press*, 17 February 2008; and see also report on Kosovo in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
6 During the State Union before Montenegro’s independence, each Republic had separate legislative authority to implement the treaty. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 633, for details on the penal code, articles 376 and 377, and the sanctions.
7 The previous two reports were submitted: covering calendar year 2007, and on 27 December 2006 (due 30 April 2006), covering the period 1 July to 1 December 2006.
8 In a 30 June 2006 letter to the UN Secretary-General, Serbia stated that “all declarations, reservations and notifications made by Serbia and Montenegro will be maintained by the Republic of Serbia until the Secretary-General, as depositary, is duly notified otherwise.” Upon acceding to the treaty, Serbia and Montenegro made a Declaration that “it is the understanding of Serbia and Montenegro that the mere participation in the planning or conduct of operations, exercises or any other military activities by the armed forces of Serbia and Montenegro, or by any of its nationals, if carried out in conjunction with armed forces of the non-State Parties (to the Convention), which engage in activities prohibited under the Convention, does not in any way imply an assistance, encouragement or inducement as referred to in subparagraph 1 (c) of the Convention.”
Production, transfer, and stockpile destruction
In March 2007, Serbian officials reaffirmed that the former Serbia and Montenegro did not produce any type of landmine after 1990. Serbia has stated that old facilities for landmine production have been successfully transformed for production of resources for civilian purposes. In the past, the former Serbia and Montenegro stated several times that mine exports halted in 1990.

After Montenegro’s declaration of independence, the two countries continued the stockpile destruction process initiated by the former Serbia and Montenegro in 2005 as a project of the Ministry of Defense and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA).

On 7 May 2007, Serbia completed the destruction of 1,404,819 antipersonnel mines stockpiled by both Serbia and Montenegro. An additional 10 mines were found and destroyed shortly thereafter. Of the 1,404,829 mines destroyed, a total of 1,205,442 were held in the Republic of Serbia and 199,387 in the Republic of Montenegro. Destruction was completed well in advance of the treaty deadlines of 1 March 2008 for Serbia and 1 April 2011 for Montenegro.

Mines retained for training
When it completed stockpile destruction in May 2007, Serbia stated that it was retaining 5,565 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2007, according to NAMSA, 1,839 of these 5,565 mines did not have fuzes. At the Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Serbia informed States Parties that it still retained 5,565 mines, with 5,104 held by the Ministry of Defense and 461 by the Ministry of Interior.

In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Serbia stated that it retained 3,589 mines, with 3,194 held by the Ministry of Defense and 395 held by the Ministry of Interior. This is a decrease of 1,976 mines from the end of 2007. Serbia further reported that it consumed five of these mines.

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10 Interview with Col. Dr. Vlado Radic, Department for Defense Technology, Ministry of Defense, Belgrade, 21 March 2006; and interview with Mladen Mijovic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 16 March 2007.
13 Interview with Zoran Dimitrijevic, Local Representative, NAMSA, Belgrade, 5 March 2007; and “Last Balkan mine stockpiles destroyed under NATO-supported project,” NATO News, 16 May 2007.
14 The mines destroyed included: 294,823 PMA-1; 169,400 PMA-2; 307,969 PMA-3; 580,411 PMR-2A; 4,787 PMR-3; 44,083 PROM-1; and 3,356 VS-50. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 608.
15 A Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor in March 2006 that the General Staff “would probably” order all retained mines to be destroyed at the end of the stockpile destruction program. In its December 2006 Article 7 report, Serbia reported that only 5,307 mines would be retained for training, all by the Ministry of Interior. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2008, Serbia reported that same number and types of mines as being transferred for training by the Ministry of Interior (presumably to the Ministry of Defense). See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 618–619.
16 This includes all 629 PMA-1 mines and all 1,210 PMA-3 mines. Email from Zoran Dimitrijevic, NAMSA, 25 May 2007; and email from Graham Goodrum, Technical Officer, NAMSA, 25 June 2007.
17 Presentation by Serbia, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 2 June 2008. It stated the mines are stored at three locations, two belonging to the Ministry of Defense and one to the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Defense retained: 500 PMA-1; 1,050 PMA-2; 1,050 PMA-3; 504 PMR-2A; 1,000 PMR-3; and 1,000 PROM-1 (PROM-1: 800 and PROM-1P: 200). The Ministry of Interior retained: 129 PMA-1; 80 PMA-2; 160 PMA-3; 40 PMR-2A; 12 PMR-3; and 40 PROM-1. Email from Zoran Dimitrijevic, NAMSA, 25 May 2007; email from Graham Goodrum, NAMSA, 25 June 2007; and statement by Col. Dr. Jugoslav Radulovic, Ministry of Defense, Ceremony on the Occasion of Closing the Project for Destruction of Antipersonnel Landmines in Serbia, Belgrade, 16 May 2007.
in training activities, and destroyed another 1,940 mines.\textsuperscript{19} The difference of 31 mines (1,976 versus 1,945) is not explained, apart from a remark in the report stating “Differences of APMs due to the administrative mistake.”\textsuperscript{20} The report notes that a total of 1,070 mines are without fuzes (510 PMA-1 and 560 PMA-3).\textsuperscript{21}

In May 2009, Serbia told States Parties that 1,389 of the mines held by the army were without fuzes. It also specified that the 1,940 mines were sent to the Technical Repair Facility (Kragujevac) in April 2008, and were disassembled and disposed of during November 2008. It said that the retained mines “are foreseen for personnel training for possible engagement in UN peace operations, protection equipment testing and mine detectors.”\textsuperscript{22}

In June 2008, Serbia similarly told States Parties that the retained mines would be used for those same purposes, but it also informed delegates, “Currently, there are no plans or projects for the use of retained APM for this purpose.” It also said, “Retained mines have not been used or are not being used for the mine detection, clearance or destruction techniques…. They have not been used for any training [or] for any other reason.”\textsuperscript{23}

The former Serbia and Montenegro acknowledged that it possessed an unspecified number of MRUD (Claymore-type) directional fragmentation mines, but stated that the mines were only used in command-detonated mode, and therefore were not covered by the Mine Ban Treaty.\textsuperscript{24} It is not known how many, if any, of these now belong to Serbia.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{Scope of the Problem}

\textbf{Contamination}

Serbia is contaminated with mines and also has extensive areas affected by ERW, particularly UXO, including unexploded submunitions. The extent of mine contamination is relatively small, a legacy of the armed conflict associated with the break-up of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{26} Minefields with a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines are located on the border with Croatia, in Jamena and Morovic villages in Sid municipality.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{19} Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. Five PMA-3 mines were used for testing deminers’ boots in February 2009. A total of 450 PMA-2, 490 PMA-3, 500 PMR-3, and 500 PROM-1 were transferred for destruction in April 2008 and destroyed in November 2008.

\textsuperscript{20} Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Statement of Serbia, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 25 May 2009. In a letter to the ICBL Australian Network, Serbia elaborated that a plan is in place to test the protective characteristics of landmine boots, and mines will also be used for training “in detecting and destroying and demonstrating the effects of certain types of mines. Testing will also be conducted on the protective properties of the equipment for defusing” mines. Letter No. 882-I/08, from Lepsa Stulic, Charges d’Affaires, Embassy of Serbia, Canberra, to Mark Zirnsak, ICBL Australian Network, 18 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{23} Presentation by Serbia, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 2 June 2008. The statement notes that some training has been carried out, including a Basic Demining and Battle Area Clearance Course for 35 participants, “using different types of exercise mines and ammunition,” but apparently not the retained mines. Similar information was conveyed to Landmine Monitor in an interview with Capt. Marko Mojsavevic, Arms Control Inspector, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, 4 June 2008.

\textsuperscript{24} See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 714. Claymore-type mines that are used in victim-activated mode, with tripwires, are banned by the treaty. Those used in command-detonated mode are not. States Parties have been urged to report on what steps they have taken to ensure that any such mines that are retained cannot be used in victim-activated mode.

\textsuperscript{25} In its initial Article 7 report, Montenegro stated that it had 23,826 MRUD directional fragmentation mines in stock. Montenegro Article 7 Report, Forms B and H, October 2007. It states that the “detonator is electrical capsule.”


\textsuperscript{27} Email from Sladana Košutić, International Cooperation Advisor, SMAC, 28 April 2009; and for more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 609.
Serbia reported 6km² of mine-affected areas in its Article 7 report submitted in 2004 but demining operations since reduced the figure to 2.5 km² by the end of 2007, and during the first five months of 2008 it fell further to 1.8km². By November 2008, the Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) reported a mine-affected area of 1.3km² but new minefield discoveries since then pushed the estimate back up to 1.7km² as of April 2009.

In addition, UXO from previous wars, mainly unexploded submunitions from NATO air strikes in 1999, remain a significant problem. SMAC estimated the total area affected by cluster munition remnants at 30km² based on the database developed as a result of a general survey by NPA which completed field activities in November 2008. Serbia reports that 28 communities in 16 municipalities (excluding Kosovo) are affected. SMAC expects additional (non-technical) survey will reduce the suspected area to about 16km².

NATO air strikes in 1999 also scattered unexploded bombs across Serbia. At the June 2008 Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, Serbia stated that some 60,930kg of air-dropped bombs and other large items of UXO are present in 43 locations at depths of up to 20m, as well as in the Danube and Sava rivers.

An explosion at the Ministry of Defense ammunition storage area in Paracin on 19 October 2006 resulted in contamination of surrounding areas with UXO and led to classification of Paracin and Cuprija as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) estimated to total 8km². Landmine Monitor was informed that at the time of explosion approximately 700 PROM-1 antipersonnel mines were stored in the facility, which may now be scattered around the area.

Serbia also has to deal with large quantities of naval mines and other items of UXO that were aboard German World War II-era vessels which sank in the Danube river, in the vicinity of Prahovo, in 1944. The position of the sunken vessels and UXO was pinpointed in a general survey of the area in 2006. The survey identified 22 war vessels and on four it found naval mines and other items of UXO.

Casualties
In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified three ERW casualties, one killed and two injured, through Serbian media reports. On 30 June, an adult and a child were injured in Belgrade by a victim-activated booby-trap made from a grenade. On 5 July, one man was killed by an unidentified explosive fragmentation device while burning rubbish. This is a slight increase from the two ERW casualties identified in 2007. There is no comprehensive data collection mechanism, and it is likely that casualties are unreported.

31 Email from Petar Mihajlović, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
34 Email from Petar Mihajlović, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
36 Email from Petar Mihajlović, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
39 Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 28 April 2009.
The Ministry of Defense’s Department of Civil Protection and SMAC did not report mine/ERW or submunition casualties in 2008 or in 2009 through 13 July.\textsuperscript{43}

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 113 casualties (21 killed, 64 injured, and 28 unknown), including nine Albanians (four killed and five injured) in 2001.\textsuperscript{44} Landmine Monitor data was gathered from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, ICRC, and media reports. Between 1999 and 2008, the Department of Civil Protection identified 643 casualties (203 killed and 440 injured), 637 of which occurred in 1999.\textsuperscript{45} Due to incomplete data collected by the Ministry of Defense, it is suspected that incidents were caused by both victim-activated devices and bombing strikes or other attacks. As part of its general survey on the impact of submunitions, NPA collected data on 191 casualties caused by the weapons, 31 killed and 160 injured, between 1999 and 2008.\textsuperscript{46}

The lack of data also makes comparisons between these casualties and those reported by other sources unreliable. Therefore, neither the casualties recorded by NPA or the Ministry of Defense have been included in the total casualty figure.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Serbia is unknown.\textsuperscript{47} Estimates of the total number of survivors range from 1,110 to more than 3,000.\textsuperscript{48}

While the lack of a comprehensive data collection mechanism makes it difficult to confirm trends since 1999, available data and perceptions of those working in mine action indicate that casualties peaked in 1999 and 2000, during and immediately after the deployment of NATO air forces, and have declined since, with very few casualties in the last six years.\textsuperscript{49} The last confirmed mine and submunition casualties were reported in 2005.\textsuperscript{50}

**Risk profile**

NPA found that risky behavior occurred in more than 90% of surveyed contamination areas. Over half of the cases involved adults and children entering dangerous areas.\textsuperscript{51}

NPA’s analysis indicates that people in affected communities assume that surface-level removal of unexploded submunitions has been undertaken. When entering suspected areas, adults take children with them or go in groups rather than individually.\textsuperscript{52}

NPA concluded that clearance operations had reduced but not eliminated the hazard: “The likelihood of fatalities has been reduced but the number and frequency of incidents is such that the probability of activating unexploded submunitions will rise with the growing needs of the population to use the blocked land.”\textsuperscript{53}

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\textsuperscript{43} Email from Petar Mihajlovic, SMAC, 29 April 2009; and email from Srecko Gavrilovic, Assistant to the Director, Department for Civil Protection, Ministry of Defense, 13 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{44} Due to improvements in data collections, some casualties reported by both the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the ICRC in 1999, 2000, and 2001 were later consolidated to avoid duplicates. *Landmine Monitor Report 2002* reported 32 casualties (11 killed and 21 injured) in 2001, but *Landmine Monitor Report 2004* reported 33 casualties total. Therefore, for this report, Landmine Monitor has counted 33 casualties (11 killed, 21 injured, and one unknown) for 2001. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* reported 27 casualties (five killed and 22 injured) in 2000, but *Landmine Monitor Report 2004* reported 48 casualties total. Therefore, for this report, Landmine Monitor has counted 48 casualties (five killed, 22 injured, and 21 unknown) for 2000. Likewise, *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* reported eight casualties (three killed and five injured) in 1999, but *Landmine Monitor Report 2004* reported 14 casualties total. Therefore, for this report Landmine Monitor has counted 14 casualties (three killed, five injured, and six unknown) in 1999.

\textsuperscript{45} Casualty data provided by Srecko Gavrilovic, Ministry of Defense, 13 July 2009.


\textsuperscript{47} Statement of Serbia, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, p. 45.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, pp. 28, 48.
Socio-economic impact
Mine/ERW contamination in Serbia still affects agricultural land and forested areas, but the principal contamination is found on roads through forests and in rivers and canals.\textsuperscript{54} Affected areas include the country’s ski resorts and national parks, which affects tourism, wildlife, and the environment.\textsuperscript{55}

According to the 2009 survey by NPA, a total of 162,000 people \textsuperscript{28} local communities are affected by cluster munition remnants and 88,000 people living near suspected areas are exposed to daily risk. Of these, two-thirds live in Dušaniste, a suburb of the city of Niš.\textsuperscript{56} NPA found that unexploded submunitions mostly block access to agricultural land (one-third of the total suspect area), inhibit reconstruction of infrastructure and utilities (19.9%), and prevent renovating or restoring housing (14.2%).\textsuperscript{57}

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
SMAC was established on 7 March 2002.\textsuperscript{58} The Law of Alterations and Supplementations of the Law of Ministries passed in August 2004 identified the center as a legal independent entity (not part of a ministry), with responsibility for humanitarian demining, collection and management of mine/UXO-related information (including casualty data), and surveying of suspected areas. SMAC also has the mandate to plan demining projects, conduct quality control and monitor operations, ensure implementation of international standards, issue licenses to demining organizations, and warn the population about mine/UXO dangers.\textsuperscript{59}

SMAC does not conduct demining directly or employ deminers, but undertakes quality management of demining operations carried out by others. Demining is conducted in accordance with international standards by commercial companies and NGOs, after being selected through public tender procedures, which are executed by the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF).\textsuperscript{60}

Due to the global financial crisis and cost-saving measures implemented by Serbia’s government, SMAC deferred plans to increase its staff in 2008.\textsuperscript{61}

Risk education
There is no RE program in Serbia, although SMAC is responsible for warning the population about mine/UXO dangers.\textsuperscript{62}

Victim assistance
SMAC is not involved in VA.\textsuperscript{63} The Special Hospital of Rehabilitation reports on VA at international meetings, but has no other coordinating functions. Responsibility for the provision of services to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, is shared among several government agencies, primarily the Ministry of Health (MoH), Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW), and the Republic Health Insurance Institute (RHI).\textsuperscript{64}


\textsuperscript{58} See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 716.


\textsuperscript{60} Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 28 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{61} Email from Petar Mihajlovic, SMAC, 29 April 2009.


\textsuperscript{63} Interview with Dr. Zvezdana Markovic Mihajlovic, Chief of Prosthetic Ward, SHROP, and Sladana Košutić, SMAC, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 627.
Data collection and management
SMAC has responsibility for the collection and management of mine/UXO-related information (including casualty data). Although SMAC installed the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) in December 2004 and partially used it, SMAC reported in 2008 that it was not using IMSMA to support its operations.65

Since 2004, Landmine Monitor has reported on Serbia’s plans to establish a casualty database as part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan.66 As of May 2009, no such database existed. In 2008, Serbia proposed the establishment of a team of government experts to manage casualty data to facilitate the preparation of a VA strategy,67 but no progress was reported as of May 2009. As in past years, in 2009, Serbia again reported that the lack of casualty data was a “large obstacle for [a] holistic model of development and monitoring of policy” related to VA.68

Both the Department of Civil Protection and the Ministry of Internal Affairs collect information on mine/ERW incidents, but information is not shared between ministries. Casualties are believed to go unregistered and the Department of Civil Protection has acknowledged that it lacks the capacity to identify all incidents or to verify data on registered casualties.69

The MoH, MSW, and RHII collect incident information when treating survivors. As of May 2009, information collection was ongoing, but data was not consolidated in one place, nor was it available to be shared across government agencies or with NGOs.70

Data from NPA’s survey in Serbia was provided to SMAC in January 2009.71

As of May 2009, plans announced by Serbia in September 2006 to engage the NGO Dobra Volja (Goodwill) to collect casualty data and undertake a survivor needs assessment had not progressed.72 Dobra Volja ceased operations in 2009 due to insufficient funding and lack of “support from the state.”73

Mine action program operators

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<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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<td>UXB Balkans</td>
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65 Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 28 April 2009.
67 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Zvezdana Markovic Mihailovic, SHROP, 8 April 2008; and email, 1 June 2008.
69 Email from Srecko Gavrilovic, Ministry of Defense, 13 July 2009.
73 Telephone interview with Dusan Vukojevic-Mars, President, Dobra Volja, 21 May 2009.
Plans

Strategic mine action plan
SMAC has not drawn up a long-term demining plan or strategy, but bases its work on annual demining programs adopted by the government that are implemented if funding is available.74

Serbia has no VA plan, but mine/ERW survivors are included in the National Strategy for Enhancement of Status of Persons with Disabilities 2007–2015, which was drafted with input from disabled people’s organizations.75 As of May 2009, the government had not yet formed a council as planned to monitor the implementation and achievements of the National Strategy.76

National ownership
SMAC is fully nationalized. As it does not have its own demining teams, SMAC engages Serbian and regional specialized companies and organizations.77 The government’s contribution to mine action and VA is mainly through the provision of office space, operating costs, and the salaries of government employees working in mine action.78

VA for mine/ERW survivors, mostly medical care and physical rehabilitation services, is provided through the state health system, supported through national funds. Socio-economic reintegration needs have not been addressed with national funds.79 Since 2004, Serbia has called on the international community to support psychological support and socio-economic reintegration services for survivors, estimated in 2004 to cost €900,000 (US$1,325,340) over three years.80 As of May 2009, the only international support specifically for VA was the training of one prosthetics and orthotics technician.81

National mine action legislation and standards
Serbia does not have national mine action legislation, but SMAC reports that mine action is implemented in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards.82

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Mine and battle area clearance (BAC) in Serbia is carried out by specialized companies and other organizations accredited by SMAC. For donor-funded clearance, the ITF calls for tenders and issues contracts to selected demining organizations. For commercial clearance, investors select the demining organization.83

Five commercial companies and one international NGO were actively demining in Serbia in 2008 using manual and mechanical assets. They included PMC Inženjering, DOK-ING Demining, and DETEKTOR and UXB Balkans from Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Russian state demining agency EMERCOM; and NPA.84 The armed forces continue to undertake clearance of contaminated areas of military facilities but these operations are not monitored or recorded by SMAC.85

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74 Email from Petar Mihajlovic, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
77 Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 28 April 2009.
78 Email from Petar Mihajlovic, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
82 Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 28 April 2009.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
NPA completed its mine clearance project on 31 May 2008, but continued its survey of cluster munition remnants with four teams of two surveyors and a community liaison officer until November 2008. NPA seconded four surveyors to SMAC until the end of 2009.86

**Identification of hazardous areas**

NPA's general survey of submunition contamination, conducted between 9 November 2007 and 30 November 2008, identified 105 “deployment zones” where cluster munitions were used and 390 polygons or suspect areas covering a total of 30.7km². These affected 28 communities in 16 municipalities. The survey found that 67 polygons classified as “higher hazard” (including six “extremely high,” 17 “very high,” and 44 “high” hazards) covering 6.6km², 186 “middle hazard” polygons covering 11.77km², and 137 “low hazard” polygons covering 12.77km². The classification depended on the distance from the drop zone and the number of bombs used.87

The survey found that four of the 16 affected municipalities in central Serbia (Krveni Crst, Kraljevo, Medijana, and Sjenica) accounted for nearly 60% of the SHA. According to the survey, police and civil defense conducted surface clearance of UXO in the past but no records of this clearance exist and subsurface contamination remains.88

NPA survey teams marked strike impact zones as part of the survey and for that purpose developed a warning sign in both Serbian and Albanian.89

In May 2008, Sogelma of Italy, working under the supervision of Mull and Partner Ingenieurgesellschaft of Germany started to implement the “Survey and Search for UXO removal in the Inland Waterway Transport System in Serbia,” to locate large UXO from by 1999 NATO bombing along the Sava and Danube rivers.90 The survey covered 3.9km² and resulted in SMAC finding and destroying seven aircraft bombs of between 250 and 930kg.91 On the basis of the survey, SMAC prepared project documents for clearance of UXO, including bombs and missiles, and expected to invite tenders later in 2009. SMAC planned to survey 12 more locations along the two rivers covering a total area of 6.6km², also starting later in 2009.92

**Mine clearance in 2008**

Serbia reported mine clearance and BAC in 2008 on a total of 2.15km², an increase of 45% compared to 2007 (1.48km²) made possible by increased donor support that resulted in part from NPA’s survey. The clearance resulted in destroying a total of 289 antipersonnel mines, 74 antivehicle mines, 450 items of UXO, and 25 unexploded submunitions.93

NPA cleared two projects on the border with Croatia. It started work on the Blata 1 project in 2007 and cleared 132,100m² of land in 2007. The remaining 38,600m² was completed in early 2008. NPA’s Neprečava 1 project, lasting from February to May 2008, resulted in clearance of 176,200m².94

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86 Interview with Emil Jeremic, Regional Director, NPA, Regional Office South East Europe, Belgrade, 26 February 2009.
90 Email from Sladjana Kosutic, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
91 Email from Petar Mihajlovic, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
92 Telephone interviews with Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 19 August 2009; and email from Petar Mihajlovic, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
93 Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 28 April 2009; and telephone interview, 19 August 2009.
94 Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 28 April 2009.
Mine clearance and BAC in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Mine clearance (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>BAC (m²)</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DETEKTOR</td>
<td>439,000</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOK-ING</td>
<td>227,400</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMERCOM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>737,000</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA*</td>
<td>214,600</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMC Inženjering</td>
<td>71,980</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXB BALKANS</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>331,990</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>952,980</strong></td>
<td><strong>289</strong></td>
<td><strong>74</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,068,990</strong></td>
<td><strong>475</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NPA’s results as reported by SMAC equaled 346,700m², but included tasks completed in 2008, which it had started in 2007. NPA’s clearance in 2008 amounted to 214,600m.

Battle area clearance in 2008

In 2008, EMERCOM cleared unexploded submunitions at Niš airport funded by the Russian government. From August to the end of December, it cleared an area of 737,000m² and found and destroyed 450 items of UXO, mostly unexploded submunitions. EMERCOM continued operations in 2009 supporting construction of a gas pipeline. Since 2003, five operators have cleared 4km² to a depth of 50cm, destroying 745 submunitions and other items of UXO.

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Serbia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2014. Serbia stated in 2007 that it intended to complete clearance by the end of 2008 but at the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009 and the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, Serbia postponed completion until the end of 2009. It said “this can be impeded only by the lack of funds.”

Mine and Battle Area Clearance from 2003–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>Area released by survey (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.66</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.78</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Email from Petar Mihajlovic, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
98 Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 28 April 2009; and email from Petar Mihajlovic, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
100 Email from Sladana Košutić, SMAC, 28 April 2009.
Risk Education

No mine/ERW risk education has been reported in Serbia since 2006. However, SMAC reported that during 2008, all areas suspected of submunition contamination were marked with 600 new warning signs placed by NPA survey teams as part of its general survey. RE activities have been confined to southern Serbia. In 1999, emergency RE was provided in response to thousands of refugees flooding into Macedonia. The NGO CARE conducted RE, UNICEF trained teachers, and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees handed out pamphlets to refugees returning to Kosovo. From 2002, RE was conducted by the army and Ministry of Interior coordination body. The ICRC operated an RE program from late 2000 to 2005, training a network of volunteers and delivering RE through lectures and theater in Presevo and Bujanovic. It stopped its activities due to the low number of casualties. RE was also delivered through mass media and billboards. In 2006, emergency RE was delivered by the Serbian Red Cross Society in response to the ammunition depot explosion in Paracin.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but estimates range from 1,110 to 3,000. In May 2009, Serbia stated that “the situation for landmine survivors is much better now than before” although there was little evidence of concrete improvements in 2008, apart from the strengthening of Serbia’s legal framework for persons with disabilities. Many survivors are refugees who would not be entitled to free services if their status was not regularized. It was not known how many survivors are in this situation. Government representatives acknowledged that, while emergency care was available, it was more difficult to address survivors’ ongoing medical needs. Serbia has rehabilitation centers and prosthetic and orthotic workshops where survivors can receive basic prosthetic and orthotic services. However, Serbia recognized the need to improve the quality of services through licensed education and ongoing training. Government officials also recognized that the quality of prosthetics had declined since the wars of the 1990s because of reduced government resources. Many survivors are treated at the Special Hospital of Rehabilitation (SHROP) in Belgrade, where there were long waiting lists for services and no technicians with internationally recognized credentials. From 2008–2009, one technician

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101 Email from Petar Mihajlovic, SMAC, 29 April 2009.
111 Ibid.
from SHROP was enrolled in a distance training program to receive International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics level II accreditation.\textsuperscript{115}

Despite recognizing that many survivors suffer from post-traumatic stress as a result of their injury,\textsuperscript{116} psychotherapeutic assistance was not covered by health insurance and the overall quality of care was inadequate.\textsuperscript{117} In 2009, Dobra Volja, the only association of mine survivors that provided peer psychosocial support, ceased operations due to a lack of funding.\textsuperscript{118}

Government officials called high unemployment the “biggest problem” for mine/ERW survivors, but acknowledged that no was funding available.\textsuperscript{119} Seventy percent of persons with disabilities live in poverty.\textsuperscript{120} In November 2008, the National Employment Service, which has responsibility for training and job placement, found that just 21,000 out of 700,000 persons with disabilities were employed.\textsuperscript{121} A lack of workplace accommodation combined with high unemployment makes economic reintegration difficult for persons with disabilities. In May 2009, the Law on Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of Persons with Disabilities was passed, specifying employment quotas for persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{122}

Serbia has several laws protecting the rights of persons with disabilities that were generally enforced. Yet public transportation and older buildings were not physically accessible.\textsuperscript{123} Serbia stated that disability laws were not harmonized with relevant international laws and regulations but that, as of May 2009, a harmonization process was ongoing.\textsuperscript{124} On 29 May 2009, Serbia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol.\textsuperscript{125}

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

As one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate attention to survivors,\textsuperscript{126} Serbia presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. It then presented revised objectives in 2006 and 2007,\textsuperscript{127} although, as of May 2009, a plan to achieve these objectives had not been made available. As of May 2009, while Serbia stated that the situation for survivors had improved since 2004, little progress could be identified towards achieving VA objectives. According to Dobra Volja’s president, “there is no evidence on any progress in achieving any of the VA 24 [VA26] objectives.”\textsuperscript{128}

No progress had been made towards the establishment of a survivor database, which is a prerequisite for planning and measuring progress in other areas. Four of Serbia’s eight objectives refer to actions that would be carried out “based on” information gathered for the

\textsuperscript{115} Email from Christian Schlierf, Regional Director, Human Study, 14 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{116} Interview with Zvezdana Markovic Mihailovic, SHROP, and Slada Košutić, SMAC, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{118} Telephone interview with Dusan Vukojevic-Mars, Dobra Volja, 21 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{120} UNDP, “Persons with Disabilities Fact Sheet–Serbia,” Belgrade, 2 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{122} UNDP, “Persons with Disabilities Fact Sheet–Serbia,” Belgrade, 2 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{124} Statement of Serbia, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{128} Telephone interview with Dusan Vukojevic-Mars, Dobra Volja, 21 May 2009.
survivor database or the VA plan to be established using the same information. While Serbia noted that all survivors received basic medical and rehabilitation services, no progress was made toward objectives to improve training and education of the prosthetic/orthotic team. In 2008, no progress was identified in achieving Serbia’s two economic reintegration objectives. A national strategy for improving the quality of life of persons with disabilities and their families was developed, but not based on the needs of survivors, as planned, again due to the lack of progress on a survivor database.

Serbia included a disability expert on its delegation to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2006, 2007, and 2009, and meetings of States Parties held from 2005–2008, who reported on progress in achieving VA aims at all of these meetings. Statements mostly repeated similar information, stating the goals of the National Strategy for persons with disabilities and the ongoing obstacles preventing progress in data collection, physical rehabilitation, and socio-economic reintegration and calling on the international community to support efforts to improve the quality of life of survivors. Economic hardship and increasing poverty levels, caused by the “transition period,” along with the global financial crisis, were cited as reasons for needing international assistance. Serbia has not used the voluntary Form J attachment to its Article 7 report since 2005 to provide details on VA activities.

Victim assistance activities
In 2008, before it closed, the national survivors’ organization Dobra Volja provided school supplies and clothing to an unspecified number of children of landmine/ERW survivors. No other programs providing services specifically to mine/ERW survivors were identified in 2008.

Support for Mine Action
Serbia has not published comprehensive long-term cost estimates for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) but has projected the cost of mine and submunition clearance and explosive ordnance disposal at $51,541,000 (€35 million) based on projected clearance of mined areas by 2009. Serbia has not developed a mine action or resource mobilization strategy.

National support for mine action
Serbia did not report national funding to mine action in 2008. SMAC reported RSD13,193,000 ($232,197) in national funding in 2007.

International cooperation and assistance
In 2008, five countries and the European Commission (EC) reported providing $2,831,668 (€1,922,904) to mine action in Serbia, 3% more than reported funding for 2007. Most mine action funding prior to 2006 did not distinguish between Serbia and Kosovo. Funding at 2008 levels is inadequate to meet the budget requirements reported by Serbia to complete mine clearance by the planned 2009 deadline, and as in 2007, does not directly address RE or VA needs.

135 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire provided by email from Sladjana Košutić, SMAC, 8 May 2008.
In 2008, the ITF reported allocating $1,780,518 (6%) to Serbia, compared to $1,478,280 (6.4%) in 2007.

### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Serbia: Monetary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance and battle area clearance</td>
<td>$1,050,000 (€713,024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$883,560 (€600,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$441,780 (€300,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>Mull und Partner Ingenieurgesellschaft</td>
<td>Survey and mine clearance</td>
<td>$300,234 (€230,880)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$73,630 (€50,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$42,705 (€29,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$2,831,668 (€1,922,904)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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137 Ibid, p. 25.
SUDAN

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 April 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>556 confirmed minefields and SHAs covering 107km² (September 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>At least 65 (2007: 91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 April 2014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Demining in 2008 | Mined area clearance: 4.07km²  
Battle area clearance: 5.74km² |
| Risk education recipients in 2008 | 691,464 |
| Progress towards victim assistance aims | Slow |
National: $4.9 million (2007: $7.5 million) |

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of the Sudan ratified the Mine Ban Treaty in October 2003 and became a State Party on 1 April 2004. Sudan has drafted but not enacted national implementation legislation. Sudan served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from 2005–2007. Sudan completed destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines in March 2008. Additional mines were later discovered and destroyed. From 1999–2004, there were serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and other rebel groups; the government denied any use.

Sudan is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of more than 20 years of armed struggle between the government of Sudan and non-state armed groups in the south, mainly the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army. A Landmine Impact Survey was completed in 16 Sudanese states in June 2009, with the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAS) estimating that total residual contamination covered 107km². UNMAS began mine action operations in 2002 in the Nuba Mountains with international and local NGOs carrying out demining and risk education. More than 44km² of land have since been released and a further 29,000km of road verified. Mine action centers have been set up in Khartoum in the north and in Juba in the south.

There have been at least 4,213 mine/ERW casualties in Sudan, including 1,748 casualties between 1999 and 2008, but data collection has been incomplete and not nationwide. Mine/ERW risk education was undertaken from 1999–2008 by an increasing number of operators and with increasing effectiveness, but some areas remained uncovered. Activities were also organized for refugees from other countries as well as Sudanese refugees in countries such as Kenya.

Despite an increase in activities due to long-term funding for victim assistance (VA) since 2007, service provision has remained limited both in terms of geographic coverage and the types of services provided. The situation of survivors and persons with disabilities was hampered by a general lack of capacity, infrastructure, ongoing conflict, and poverty. Government interest in VA/disability action has increased since 2007, but this has not yet been matched with increased financial commitments or better implementation by government ministries.
Background

Following a three-year peace process, the government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. An interim implementation period of six years will last until July 2011, when a referendum on self-determination for the south will be held. Sudan is now ruled by the Government of National Unity (GONU)—an entity containing the former ruling party, the National Congress, SPLM/A, and others—and a semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS).

Mine Ban Policy

Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004. The CPA incorporates previous agreements between the government and SPLM/A that explicitly prohibit use of all landmines. An agreement reached on 31 December 2004 states that the “laying of mines, explosive devices or booby traps of whatever type shall be prohibited.”

Sudan submitted its annual Article 7 report on 13 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008. It has submitted five previous Article 7 reports. In its Article 7 report covering 2008, Sudan reported that draft national implementation legislation had been cleared by the GONU Ministry of Justice and “endorsed by the concerned committee of the National Assembly responsible for the validations of humanitarian laws.” The legislation is expected to pass into law during 2009.

Sudan participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made a statement during the general exchange of views, as well as statements on mine clearance, VA, and cooperation and assistance. Sudan participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, where it made statements on stockpile destruction, mine clearance, risk education (RE), and VA.

Sudan has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 10 April 1981, but has never ratified it. Sudan has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

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1 See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 652. Under a previous memorandum of understanding on cessation of hostilities reached in October 2002, both parties agreed to “cease laying of landmines.” The government and SPLM/A also agreed to stop using mines in the January 2002 Nuba Mountains cease-fire agreement. Prior to these agreements, the SPLM/A signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in October 2001.

2 Sudan prepared an initial Article 7 report, dated 1 October 2004; the period covered was not stated. The Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit received this initial report, but Sudan apparently never officially submitted it to the UN. Sudan submitted a second Article 7 report dated 30 April 2005, but the date of submission is listed by the UN as 17 February 2006, covering the period from 1 October 2004 to 30 April 2005. Sudan submitted a third, undated, Article 7 report, listed by the UN as submitted on 20 May 2006, covering 1 May 2005 to 31 December 2005. Sudan submitted a fourth Article 7 report, dated 30 April 2007, after August 2007, covering calendar year 2006, and a fifth report in August 2008, covering calendar year 2007. Prior to the submission deadline of 30 April 2008, Sudan submitted an interim letter to the treaty’s Implementation Support Unit regarding completion of its stockpile destruction obligations. Letter to GICHD from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the UN, Geneva, 4 April 2008.

3 Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

Production, transfer, and use
Sudan has repeatedly stated that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.⁵ Landmine Monitor has not received any serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the government, the SPLA, or other forces anywhere in Sudan since early 2004.⁶

The UN has reported one suspected mined area in Darfur region. It is not known when the mines may have been laid.⁷ Many groups remain outside the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, which prohibits mine use.⁸

Stockpiling and destruction
Sudan completed destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines on 31 March 2008, ahead of its 1 April 2008 treaty-mandated deadline. The reported size and composition of Sudan’s stockpile, as well as the number of mines to be retained for training purposes, have varied in accounts by Sudan leading up to and following stockpile destruction events in 2007 and 2008.

In its Article 7 report submitted in February 2006, Sudan declared a total of 14,485 antipersonnel mines of eight types held in army and SPLA stockpiles, and stated that 5,000 mines of various types would be retained for training purposes by the Engineer Corps of the Sudan Armed Forces.⁹ In its Article 7 reports submitted in May 2006 and April 2007, Sudan declared a total of 4,485 stockpiled antipersonnel mines of 18 types, all under the control of GONU, and an additional 10,000 mines of unspecified types to be retained for training purposes, with GONU and GOSS each retaining 5,000 mines.¹⁰

Sudan carried out an initial stockpile destruction event on 30 April 2007 in northern Sudan, during which 4,488 mines were destroyed. On 31 March 2008, a second destruction event took place in Southern Sudan, during which an additional 6,078 mines were destroyed, bringing the total number of mines destroyed to 10,566.¹¹ In an April 2008 letter to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Sudan stated that, of a total stockpile of 15,566 antipersonnel mines, it had destroyed 10,566 and retained 5,000. Sudan stated that the adjusted figure of 15,566 mines (rather than the 14,485 mines previously reported) was the result of additional mines stockpiled by SPLA forces not being previously included in inventories.¹²

In its Article 7 report covering 2008, Sudan revised its number of mines retained for training purposes, this time reporting a total of 1,938 mines of six types (see Mines retained for training purposes section below).¹³ In a presentation during the May 2009 intersessional Standing

⁵ Previous editions of Landmine Monitor have noted no evidence of production of antipersonnel mines by Sudan, but have cited allegations of transfer to militant groups in neighboring countries prior to Sudan becoming a State Party. See, for example, Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 223.

⁶ Landmine Monitor received allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government-supported militias in Upper Nile state as late as April 2004. A Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) commander in Northern Darfur state said the SLA had captured a Sudanese government cache of landmines when it overran a government army position in early 2004. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 753–755. For descriptions of past use and denials of use, see previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

⁷ UNMAO information sheet on Darfur, provided by Christina Greene, Program Officer, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.

⁸ Darfur Peace Agreement, Abuja, 5 May 2006, www.unmis.org. Other factions and non-state armed groups have rejected the Abuja agreement. Previously, the SLA and the Justice and Equality Movement signed a humanitarian cease-fire for Darfur with the Government of Sudan in April 2004. This agreement required a halt in mine use and required the marking of any mined areas. “Agreement on Humanitarian Ceasefire on the Conflict in Darfur;” (N’Djamena Agreement), Articles 2, 4, and 6, N’Djamena, Chad, 8 April 2004. The UN has identified 30 armed parties, classified into different groups. Email from Ida Margarita Hyllested, Assistant Project Officer, UNICEF, 30 March 2008.

⁹ Article 7 Report, Form D, 17 February 2006.


¹² Letter to GICHD from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the UN in Geneva, 4 April 2008.

¹³ Article 7 Report, Form D, 13 April 2009.
Committee meetings, Sudan revised its total number of stockpiled mines, reporting that in spite of its original declaration of 14,485 stockpiled mines, only 12,513 were “accounted for” during physical stock-taking. It is likely that number is supposed to be 12,504 (the 10,566 destroyed mines plus the 1,938 retained mines). Sudan noted, “As no proper records have been maintained, determining the exact number and types of APMs [antipersonnel mines] was a challenge.”

In its Article 7 report for 2008, Sudan stated, “In addition to the destruction of known stockpiles of APMs, caches of APM were discovered in various locations of Southern Sudan which contained 523 APM. All these mines were destroyed in 2008. The destruction took place in various parts of Blue Nile State, Southern Sudan during October–December 2008.”

**Mines retained for training purposes**

As noted above, in recent years Sudan has reported differing numbers of mines retained for training purposes, based on varying estimates of overall stockpiles. In April 2008, shortly after the completion of stockpile destruction, Sudan reported retaining 5,000 mines of unspecified types “for the purposes of research and [the] demining training process.” In June 2008, it reported retaining 4,979 mines, again without specifying types. In August 2008, Sudan reported retaining 4,997 mines of 18 types, without specifying numbers retained for each type. The list provided was evidently provisional, as Sudan stated that “Details of each type of mine and the quantities are being sorted out and will be reported in the next report.” The same number of mines retained was repeated in a statement by Sudan at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008. However, in its Article 7 report covering 2008, Sudan reported retaining only 1,938 mines, consisting of PMN (178), Type 14 (130), “Desert plastic” (85), Type 35 (1,194), Valmara (46), and PPM mines (307). This number was confirmed in a presentation by Sudan at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Sudan has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004.

In June 2008, the head of the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA) stated that all mines retained by Sudan for training and research purposes are held under the authority of GONU and are not accessible to mine action authorities or operators in Southern Sudan. Mines required for training purposes in Southern Sudan must be obtained from sources other than GONU stocks, at least until the 2011 referendum on the status of Southern Sudan, at which time common access to stocks may result from the establishment of a joint government.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Sudan is contaminated with mines and ERW, primarily as a result of more than 20 years of armed struggle between the Government of Sudan and non-state armed groups in the south, mainly the SPLA. The struggle ended with the signing of the CPA on 9 January 2005, although continued violence raised fears of a return to conflict.24

Of Sudan’s 25 states, 19 have previously been suspected to be mine-affected,25 although survey has discounted Sennar in central Sudan. (See Identification of hazardous areas section below). To better determine the scope of contamination in Sudan, in 2005 the UN launched the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) with the Survey Action Center (SAC). In the 16 states where the LIS was conducted, of an estimated 5,445 villages the survey identified 296 as impacted by landmines—a prevalence rate of 5.4%. As a comparison, the prevalence rate across Angola and Afghanistan was 8%.26

With little evidence of a mine problem in Darfur region, it was planned to survey the region for UXO sites but the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) decided not to proceed after 13 international NGOs were expelled from Darfur in March 2009. As of August 2009, the survey had not started.27

Prior to the LIS, the Sudanese government considered the five states of Gezira, Khartoum, Northern, Northern Kordofan, and White Nile as not being affected, and they were not surveyed as a result, although the borders with Libya and Egypt in Northern and Nile states may be contaminated with mines laid during World War II.28

A more complete view of the mine/ERW problem in Sudan may be contained in UNMAO records, which covered 5,511 “hazardous areas” across 18 states in 2002 through June 2009. Hazardous areas are classified in three ways: a dangerous area (DA), a (confirmed) mined area, or a suspected hazardous area (SHA). DAs represent 85% of all hazardous areas, of which more than half are designated as UXO spot-clearance tasks. Almost half of the DAs are associated with roads and open land while approximately one in five are located inside buildings, including military installations. As of June 2009, DAs in buildings represented approximately 12% of the DAs awaiting clearance.29 In Darfur region, 148 hazardous areas—all classified as DAs—had been identified, but as of June 2009 only 37 sites with a residual UXO threat remained to be released.30

Of the 5,511 identified hazardous areas, 3,467 have been “closed” (i.e. released by clearance, cancelled, or changed to a SHA or minefield31), mainly through the retrofit of DAs found by the LIS, leaving 2,044 for release. Of these 2,044 areas, 192 were confirmed mined areas and 364 were SHAs (see table below).32 The confirmed mined areas were estimated to cover 26km² of land and as of June 2009 the SHAs remaining from the LIS cover an estimated 94km² for a total estimated area of contamination of 119km².33

25 Interview with Al Awad Al-Bashir, Director, NMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 623.
31 Email from Mohammad Kabir, Chief Information Officer, UNMAO, 11 August 2009.
33 Ibid; and email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 3 August 2009.
Hazardous areas as of June 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>No. of hazardous areas</th>
<th>No. of DAs</th>
<th>No. of mined areas</th>
<th>No. of SHAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Equatoria</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kordofan</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Bahr el Ghazal</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Equatoria</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,653</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,165</strong></td>
<td><strong>173</strong></td>
<td><strong>315</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage</strong></td>
<td><strong>80.87%</strong></td>
<td><strong>70.48%</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.47%</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.06%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other 11 affected states</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,044</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,488</strong></td>
<td><strong>192</strong></td>
<td><strong>364</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data on the type of munitions found indicates more of a UXO/ERW problem than a landmine problem. As of September 2009, UNMAO reported that 15,217 antipersonnel mines and 3,050 antivehicle mines had been found compared to 834,112 ERW and 1,098,828 pieces of small arms ammunition.

**Casualties**

In 2008, there were at least 65 new mine/ERW casualties, including 19 people killed and 46 injured. Of these, UNMAO recorded 61 casualties and Landmine Monitor identified four additional casualties. Three casualties were military and one was a Bangladeshi deminer. At least 29 casualties were children (25 boys and four girls), 17 were adults (13 men and four women), and for the remainder the age was unknown. Antipersonnel mines caused seven casualties, antivehicle mines 12, cluster munitions eight, and other ERW 15. One casualty was caused by a fuze and for 22 casualties the device type was unknown. For 17 casualties the activity at the time of the incident was unknown.

Tending animals was the main cause of casualties where the activity was known (13), followed by tampering (12). Casualties occurred in 12 states, mostly in Kassala (18), followed by Unity (10), and Northern Darfur and Western Bahr el Ghazal (seven each). Just two of the casualties in 2008 reported receiving mine/ERW RE (39 said no and the remainder was unknown), and seven reported knowing the area they entered was dangerous.

The casualties recorded in 2008 decreased in comparison to 2007, when 91 casualties (28 killed and 63 injured) were recorded. Ultimately, the 2008 casualty figures are likely to be higher due to slow data collection and the lack of a universal data collection system. Further reasons noted were the varying presence and absence of mine action operators in certain areas, decreased survey activity, and the impact of RE activities.

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36 Unless noted otherwise, casualty data (1964–June 2009) provided by Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 4 June 2009; and Landmine Monitor media analysis from 1 January 2008 and 2 June 2009.
37 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 July 2009.
Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with at least 41 casualties as of 14 July 2009, including six people killed and 35 injured. UNMAO recorded 40 casualties until the end of May and Landmine Monitor identified one boy injured on 14 July 2009.\textsuperscript{38} At least 22 casualties were civilian, one was a Pakistani military deminer, and four were military. The status of the others was unknown. For 30 casualties the device causing the incident was not known, cluster munitions caused six casualties, other ERW three, and a fuze two. Incidents occurred in 11 states, mostly in Lakes (10) and Northern Darfur (seven).

Ten-year summary
To July 2009, UNMAO recorded 4,213 mine/ERW casualties, including 1,402 people killed and 2,811 injured.\textsuperscript{39} Of these, 1,748 occurred between 1999 and the end of 2008 (553 killed and 1,195 injured). Most casualties from 1999–2008 were male (1,441) and 234 were female (70 unknown). For 631 casualties, their status was unknown; 503 were civilians, 257 military, 5 mine action personnel (four demining casualties), and 352 “others.” Casualties occurred in 18 states, mostly in Western Bahr el Ghazal (564) followed by Southern Kordofan (328), Kassala (239), and Central Equatoria (183). When known, the most common activity at the time of incident was traveling (422), followed by military activity (198), and playing/recreation (117).

By July 2009, the LIS identified 104 casualties in 16 states within the two years preceding the survey (37 killed and 67 injured), including 92 civilians. Most casualties (86) were male.\textsuperscript{40} At least 1,158 less recent casualties (664 killed and 494 injured) were also recorded. Most recent casualties occurred in Kassala (32), Eastern Equatoria (28), and Central Equatoria (20) states. Most of the less recent casualties were recorded in Eastern Equatoria (498), Central Equatoria (320), and Kassala (227) states.\textsuperscript{41}

Landmine Monitor also identified at least seven casualties from 1999–2008 not included in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, including five deminers and two Eritrean children (one killed and six injured).\textsuperscript{42}

Risk profile
The majority of casualties are male and a significant proportion are children. The most common activities by civilians at the time of incident are traveling, collecting food, water, and wood, playing and recreation, and farming.\textsuperscript{43} Where information was available, a significant proportion of casualties (850) reported that they had not received RE, and only 22 casualties had received RE. However, for the majority of casualties (1,188) this information was not available.\textsuperscript{44}

Socio-economic impact
In addition to causing casualties, mines and ERW contaminate agricultural land, livestock-grazing areas, land used for collecting firewood and producing charcoal, access routes, and roads.\textsuperscript{45} A GICHID evaluation in 2007 concluded that mine contamination in Sudan was modest but the fear of landmines constrained recovery and development efforts.\textsuperscript{46} Fear of mines and ERW has resulted in extensive road closures including key logistical/supply routes that hamper

\textsuperscript{40} SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey Status in Sudan as of July 2009,” provided to Landmine Monitor, 4 July 2009; and email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 4 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{41} Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 18 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{43} Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 26 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Interview with Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008; and SAC, “Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) Status in Sudan as of July 2009,” provided to Landmine Monitor, 4 July 2009.
movement, the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, trade, and humanitarian interventions.47

According to a study conducted by the World Food Program (WFP), its combined demining and road rehabilitation program has yielded significant socio-economic benefits. Based on interviews with local residents, verifying and clearing roads has reduced travel time by 50% and the cost of transportation by 40%. In one location, the WFP noted a 65% increase in the number of businesses following the opening of a road. It has also greatly reduced the WFP’s costs for moving food. According to the study, opening up the major roads to traffic, commerce, and the return of refugees is mine action’s signal achievement in Sudan, an achievement the WFP said should be given more credence. The study also concluded that the benefits of demining outweighed the costs: although it was quite expensive to open the roads, perhaps it could have been done for less money.48

A research paper by Professor Dawood H. Sultan of Indiana University on the impact of landmines in the Nuba Mountains in Sudan’s Kordofan region found that mines limited access to water and land-based resources, causing socio-economic, psychological, public-health, and ecological problems. The author argued that mines have disrupted ancient tribal land patterns, thereby affecting agriculture and food security, and he questioned whether targeting high- and medium-impacted communities for clearance is the correct strategy unless clearance includes also farmland, pasture, and water.49

The LIS identified 48 communities with 98 SHAs in South Kordofan. Of the 98 SHAs, 62 were reported to cause agricultural blockages. However, with only 11 of the communities classified as high- or medium-impacted, just 32 SHAs are scheduled for clearance before 2011,50 leaving 66 SHAs for clearance afterwards.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is the institution responsible for coordination and management of mine action in Sudan. The NMAA51 includes a National Mine Action Committee; a General Secretariat; the National Mine Action Center (NMAC), based in Khartoum; and the Southern Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA), based in Juba. With support from UNDP, the authorities in the north and the south of the country have also established field offices in Kassala, Malakal, and Wau, with plans to set up new offices in Kadugli and Ed Damazin in 2009.52

UNDP and UNMAS provide technical assistance through UNMAO,53 which is mandated by UN Security Council Resolution 1590 and the CPA to coordinate, facilitate, accredit, and conduct quality assurance of all mine action activities in Sudan. Following the 1 January 2008 establishment of the UN-African Union Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to support the effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, UNMAO opened offices in Al Fasher, Nyala, and El-Geneina in Darfur region.54

51 The NMAA was established by Presidential Decree No. 299 of 24 December 2005 in accordance with Article 58(1) of the Interim Constitution for the year 2005, and Chapter VI (8.6.6) of the CPA.
53 Ibid.
UNMAO operations consist of three regional offices and 9 suboffices and its headquarters in Khartoum. The North Regional Mine Action Office is in Kadugli, South Kordofan state, supported by three suboffices in Kadugli, Ed Damazin in Blue Nile state, and Kassala in eastern Sudan. The South Regional Mine Action Office in Juba has suboffices in Juba, Malakal in Upper Nile state and Wau in Western Bahr el Ghazal state. The suboffice in Rumbek was closed in 2008. The Western Regional Mine Action Office in Al Fasher, in Northern Darfur state, coordinates its work with suboffices in Al Fasher for Northern Darfur state, in Nyala for Southern Darfur state, and in El-Geneina for Western Darfur.56

Risk education
Within the UNMAO framework, UNICEF is responsible for the management and coordination of RE. However, a transition process for mine action is working towards responsibility for RE passing to the respective authorities in the north (NMAC) and south (SSDA, also called the South Sudan Demining Commission, SSDC). The transition process should be completed in 2011, prior to the referendum on independence for South Sudan.57 In the north, the NMAC is more involved in coordination than in the south, and their RE staff chair the coordination meetings.58

UNICEF supported the planning, implementation, and management of RE activities at the national and regional levels through advisory and coordination groups. Sudan reported that in 2008 there was enhanced and broadened coordination and collaboration between the UN, government officials, and NGOs at the national and local levels.59

Victim assistance
Under the NMAA, NMAC coordinates VA activities in the northern part of the country. For Southern Sudan, a July 2008 workshop decided that the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs would be the VA focal point. Both these “VA coordination platforms” hold monthly meetings with all stakeholders60 and were considered effective.61 But meetings between the two platforms are infrequent, in part due to logistical challenges, and information-sharing between government bodies responsible for north and south was not satisfactory; however, it was noted that a number of communications were exchanged between NMAA and SSDC.62

UNMAO provides technical assistance to both coordination platforms.63 The National Council for Disability is in charge of implementing and monitoring disability legislation.64

Data collection and management
UNMAO manages mine action data using IMSMA software. Data is entered in the UNMAO regional offices and sent to Khartoum each month for quality assurance purposes. The updated database is then sent back to the regional offices. UNMAO provides the NMAC and the SSDA

62 Emails from Davide Naggi, Victim Assistance Specialist, UNMAO, 24 July and 7 September 2009.
with monthly read-only copies of the database. The database in Khartoum includes maps and is a major source of information for most stakeholders. The number of actors collecting data increased, there was no nationwide casualty data collection mechanism in Sudan as of July 2009. Data was collected by operators and authorities present in a specific area. The speed at which data is collected was considered to be satisfactory and all VA partners used the standard IMSMA form. The quality was said to be adequate. UNMAO also provided refresher training for data collectors. LIS data was integrated into IMSMA and checked for duplicates.

However, some other bodies (e.g. ICRC, local authorities) also collected data in their own formats, which were not always compatible with IMSMA, and could not be integrated with the IMSMA database. This was reported to be "a serious challenge in terms of optimization of resources, geographical coverage and creation of a common understanding about data collection for mine action and disability." Casualty data was used for RE and VA planning, but was not the only source of information, partly because many survivors move to areas with more opportunities or better services. RE activity data is collected by implementing organizations and entered into IMSMA. All VA operators and UNMAO partners had a contractual agreement to collect and share information on mine/ERW casualties and persons with disabilities. Survivor information was also collected through needs assessments and surveys by NGOs and authorities in Southern Sudan. UNMAO maintains casualty data in the central IMSMA database: three regional modules and seven read-only versions have been installed. The Khartoum office provides detailed casualty data analysis on request.

A UNICEF assessment of data collection in Southern Sudan in 2008 recommended: more analytical use of IMSMA data in designing, developing and implementing RE/VA; wider circulation of IMSMA reports; establishment of a comprehensive injury surveillance mechanism of which mine/ERW injuries are a part; and making existing data collection efforts more systematic and including the Ministry of Health and Police in the process.

### Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Charity Organization for Rehabilitation and Development (CORD)</td>
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66 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 July 2009; and statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva 26 May 2009.
67 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 July 2009.
68 Ibid.
70 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 July 2009.
72 Email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.
74 Email from Insaf Nizam, UNICEF, 5 July 2009.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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<tr>
<td>International Sisterhood Charity Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Plans

Strategic mine action plan

The National Mine Action Strategic Framework for 2006–2011, adopted in 2006, serves as the key strategic planning document for mine action in Sudan. Strategic goals for mine action include:

- continued emergency mine/ERW clearance and survey in high-priority areas;
- mapping of SHAs;
- strengthening national mine action institutions;
- expanding national mine action operational capacities;
- national mine action planning and budgeting;
- mobilizing national and international funding;
- planning and implementing the transition of mine action management from the UN to national authorities;
- integration of mine action into national recovery and development plans; and
- ensuring that Sudan honors its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty and other relevant treaties.\(^{76}\)

By 2011 Sudan plans to clear 80% of the high- and medium-impacted communities identified by the LIS.\(^ {77}\) This represents 88 of the 110 high- and medium-impacted communities.\(^ {78}\)

In 2008, UNMAO developed a plan in consultation with the authorities to transfer ownership of the mine action program to the government in 2011.\(^ {79}\) The plan involves the transferring of 10 core management responsibilities to the NMAC and SSDA. They are to:

1. coordinate all aspects of mine action;
2. prioritize, task, and authorize all mine action activities;
3. accredit mine action organizations in accordance with National Technical Standards and Guidelines;
4. ensure quality management of all mine action activities;
5. revise the national standards according to in-country needs and conditions;
6. maintain the integrity of the national mine action database;
7. mobilize necessary funds from national and international sources;
8. coordinate and manage the implementation of RE;
9. coordinate and manage assistance to survivors; and
10. ensure that Sudan meets its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^ {80}\)

The Mine Action Multi-Year Plan covering the period 2009–2011 is the implementation plan of the National Strategic Framework and the transition to national ownership. It is reviewed quarterly with adjustments made as necessary. The plan calls for annual revisions and the first is scheduled for release in late 2009.\(^ {81}\) Transition implementation began in January 2009.\(^ {82}\) UNMAO, in turn, will implement an exit strategy while placing key national and international staff among national authorities’ technical advisors.\(^ {83}\)

The National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework 2007–2011 was approved in July 2007.\(^ {84}\) It has six main lines of action: improving information management; ensuring medical and physical rehabilitation assistance; developing programs for social reintegration and

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\(^{79}\) Interview with Nigel Forrestal and Severine Flores, UNMAO, Khartoum, 18 March 2009.


\(^{81}\) Ibid, p. 8, www.sudan-map.org

\(^{82}\) Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2009; and see also Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.


economic empowerment; strengthening advocacy and policy programs; mobilizing resources; 
and streamlining coordination mechanisms at various levels.\textsuperscript{85}

The subsequent Victim Assistance Work Plan September 2007–August 2009 was finalized in 
September 2007. It set clear objectives, targets, responsible agencies, timeframes, and budget. 
Several objectives were drawn from earlier workplans and have been postponed continuously 
since early 2005, and had not been completed as of May 2009,\textsuperscript{86} such as the establishment of a 
nationwide data collection mechanism by December 2005.\textsuperscript{87} Progress under the 2007–August 
2009 plan had been reviewed, but results were not scheduled for release until August 2009.\textsuperscript{88}

The strategic framework and the workplan are integrated into the Transitional Plan towards 
National Ownership for Mine Action. After a national workshop on 4–5 February 2009, a 
workplan for the second phase of implementation was integrated into the Multi Year Plan for 
the mine action sector (2009–2011) at an estimated cost of US$4.3 million. As with the previous 
workplan, the 2009–2011 plan also contains targets, timeframes, and responsible agencies.\textsuperscript{89} 
Both the VA workplan and the Multi Year Plan were due to be finalized by August 2009.\textsuperscript{90} 
Some NGO representatives complained that the delay in obtaining the plan was hampering their 
activities.\textsuperscript{91}

\textit{Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development} 
The UN and national authorities are trying to integrate mine action with relief, reconstruction, 
and development efforts through a joint priority-setting process with GONU and GOSS.\textsuperscript{92} 
Previously, it was reported that “slow progress” had been made towards integration with 
development efforts\textsuperscript{93} but, according to UNMAO, support for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance has occurred through the opening of primary and secondary transportation routes.\textsuperscript{94} 

Verification and clearance of roads linking remote regions in the south, and linking the south 
and north, as well as roads leading to international borders has been a major achievement of 
the mine action program in Sudan. Several examples illustrate the impact of clearing the roads. 
Roads have opened linking Wau to its surrounding areas and creating links to the west, towards 
Southern Darfur and to the southwest.\textsuperscript{95} The opening of routes linking Kenya, Uganda, and 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo with major towns in the south has reportedly enabled 
commerce to flourish. The opening of the road from Kassala to Hameshokreib in eastern Sudan 
has provided critical access to a community cut off for several years due to fear of mines.\textsuperscript{96} At 
the request of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNMAO 
verified the Maban–Chali route, from Ethiopia to facilitate refugee returns, while the Malakal– 
Kodok–Malut–Kosti route has created a valuable link between the north and south.

UNMAO also receives a growing number of requests to widen roads, particularly in the 
south, in order to enable pedestrians to better cope with the increased traffic as a result of 
growing economic demand.\textsuperscript{97} The extensive road verification and assessment has also resulted

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{85} Republic of Sudan, “National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, March 2007, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{86} Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic 
\item \textsuperscript{87} NMAA, “Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework,” Khartoum, 27 August 2004, pp. 6–7; and see 
\item \textsuperscript{88} Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{89} UNMAO, “Sudan Mine Action Sector, Multi Year Plan,” p. 18, www.sudan-map.org.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Abu Osama Abdallah, JASMAR, 23 July 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{92} Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{93} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 223.
\item \textsuperscript{94} UNMAO information sheets, provided by Christina Greene, UNMAO, 26 March 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{95} UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2008,” provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, 
UNMAO, 17 March 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{96} UNMAO, “UNMAO in brief,” brochure provided during interview with Severine Flores, UNMAO, Khartoum, 
17 March 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{97} UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2008,” p. 2, provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, 
UNMAO, 17 March 2009.
\end{itemize}
in more internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees returning home, safer travel, faster and less costly travel, and a significant decrease of the costs of delivering humanitarian aid.98

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Sudan has demonstrated a growing commitment to mine action through the establishment of mine action centers in the north and south and the adoption of national mine action legislation. Sudan included mine action in its national budget for the first time in 2006, but operations remain heavily dependent on foreign support.

In May 2009, Sudan stated that “The main priorities of the VA program in Sudan are to progressively transition the VA Program to the Government and to ensure that all relevant ministries will include the support to mine survivors in their annual financial and work plans and that [they] will use the available resources accordingly.”99 VA coordination capacity was deemed to be stronger in northern Sudan, where NMAC proactively organized coordination meetings and project monitoring visits. In Southern Sudan continuous UNMAO support for coordination was needed and a staff member of the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs was seconded to UNMAO for capacity-building in 2009. Coordination between ministries remained sporadic.100

Government involvement in VA coordination meetings and planning, which was boosted in 2007 and early 2008, continued to develop, though at a slower pace, in the second half of 2008 and in 2009. In several states, awareness was raised with the local authorities due to the increased number of small-scale VA projects that were being carried out. Yet the government still largely depended on NGOs and international organizations for VA implementation and further capacity building was needed.101 In 2008, national NGOs continued to be more involved in VA/disability issues and strengthened their capacities, partly sustained by the availability of multi-year funding through to 2011. Nevertheless, they were in need of constant technical guidance (see below).102 One NGO also noted that NGO coverage remained limited and variable depending on the sector, adding that associations of persons with disabilities were increasingly active, particularly on income-generating activities.103

National management
Mine action remains under UN management in Sudan, while the NMAA, NMAC, and the SSDA continue to develop their capacities to take over management of mine action.104 Five UN agencies have been involved in mine action activities within the unified framework of UNMAO, namely: the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), in cooperation with UNMAS, which conducts demining and provides coordination and technical advice in support of the UNMIS mandate and the CPA; UNDP, which provides support to national authorities in building national mine action capacities and which is coordinating the transition of the mine action program to national ownership; UNICEF, which coordinates and undertakes RE; the WFP, which conducts clearance of key supply and access routes as part of the road reconstruction process; and UNHCR, which provides RE to returning refugees and IDPs.105

100 Information received in email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Hiba Mustafa Abdallah, FDPO, 16 July 2009.
102 Information received in email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.
104 Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.
In 2008, UNDP provided two technical advisors and three consultants to work with the two national mine action centers for the transition to national ownership in 2011.\textsuperscript{106} It was scheduled to completely nationalize the mine action program by 2011 and a transition plan was prepared in 2008. According to UNMAO, the transition plan became fully operational during 2009, with “ongoing work placements” since April.\textsuperscript{107} However, it had been decided that VA will be transitioned to NMAC in the north and to the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Religious Affairs in the south by 2011. The transition will be the main focus and challenge for 2010, but had started in the north in 2009. In the south “no significant activities” were undertaken due to the slow response from the government, the recent reshuffle of ministers, and financial difficulties.\textsuperscript{108}

**National budget**

During 2007 and the first half of 2008, GONU reported contributing $5.5 million to mine action, while GOSS contributed $1.5 million. Funds covered the cost of local personnel in the national mine action centers and the field operations of the national demining teams (Joint Integrated Demining Units, JIDUs, see Demining and Battle Area Clearance section below).\textsuperscript{109} VA projects were to be included in the budgets of relevant ministries, but no funding was allocated by any in 2008–2009.\textsuperscript{110} It was estimated that GOSS spent some 8% of its annual budget on healthcare.\textsuperscript{111}

**National mine action legislation**

Mine action in Sudan operates within a variety of legal frameworks. The CPA, signed in January 2005, provides the overall legal framework for mine action in Sudan including the NMAC and the SSDA. It is supplemented by the May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, presidential decrees in December 2005 which set up the NMAA, and the 1 January 2008 mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission which authorizes peacekeepers to conduct humanitarian demining.\textsuperscript{112} Sudan has not passed specific national legislation regulating mine action in Sudan. In April 2009, Sudan reported that a draft national mine action law had been cleared by the GONU Ministry of Justice and endorsed by the relevant committee of the National Assembly, and was expected to be formally adopted in 2009.\textsuperscript{113} A mine action framework specific to Southern Sudan has been drafted with support from UNDP and the GOSS Ministry of Legal Affairs, which was to be finalized in 2009 and then presented to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly for approval.\textsuperscript{114} As of April 2009 the legislation had not been approved.\textsuperscript{115}

**National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures**

National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) were originally developed in 2003 by the UN in English and as of August 2009 had been translated into Arabic in full collaboration with the national authorities.\textsuperscript{116} Additionally, UNMAO had not received feedback on the NTSGs from

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\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{107} Email from David McMahon, Chief of Operations and Planning, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.

\textsuperscript{108} Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{109} Statement of Sudan, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2008

\textsuperscript{110} Information received in email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.


\textsuperscript{112} See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 625. The Darfur Peace Agreement includes demining in its definition of disarmament; however, while it makes detailed reference to securing and decommissioning other types of weaponry it makes no such references to antipersonnel mines, does not make clear how demining relates to broader disarmament provisions, nor how long-term demining programs might be implemented or under what authority. UNMIS, “Darfur Peace Agreement,” www.unmis.org.

\textsuperscript{113} Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2009; and see Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{114} Interviews with Jurkuc Barac Jurkuc, SSDA, Juba, 3 April 2009; and Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2009; and see Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{115} Interview with Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, Khartoum, 18 March 2009. Presidential Decree No. 45/2006 issued by GOSS, which appoints the chairperson and members of the SSDA, states: “The Authority shall collaborate with the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitution Development in the formulation of its Draft Act and determination of the terms and conditions of service and the regulations that shall govern its work.”

\textsuperscript{116} Email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.
the NMAC and the SSDA.\textsuperscript{117} Organizations operating in Sudan are reported to be accredited according to the International Mine Action Standards and national standards.\textsuperscript{118}

**Program evaluations**

In 2007, an evaluation of the UNDP mine action program’s development and capacity-building project, conducted by GICHD, emphasized the important contribution of mine action to broader processes and programs in Sudan. It found that mine action was one of the fields in which GONU and GOSS cooperated most effectively with one another as well as with the international community. At the time of the evaluation, however, GICHD found no clear vision of the future composition and functions of the mine action program in Sudan post-2011. Sudan lacked a long-term plan that clarified the mine action capacities that would be required following the departure of UNMIS, and how to build those capacities.\textsuperscript{119} Since the evaluation, UNDP has developed a detailed plan to transition from the UN-led mine action program to national ownership in 2011.\textsuperscript{120}

VA projects are monitored regularly through the VA focal point in the north or through UNMAO: GOSS and SSDC were involved less frequently. Evaluation visits were intended to guide organizations in the implementation of their projects or to provide technical support, as it was noted that the national implementers needed continuous technical capacity reinforcement. Another aim was to carry out semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries. Some of the findings from these missions were that:

- data collection conducted only in rural areas missed a large target group as many survivors relocate to trading centers looking for economic opportunities;
- the needs of survivors remained poorly addressed and documented, partly because they were not organized into associations;
- local authorities were interested in VA/disability issues, but lacked knowledge and resources;
- economic reintegration activities were usually understood to mean just training opportunities, not assistance in finding employment or setting up a business;
- the programs did not discriminate against persons with disabilities due to causes other than mines/ERW; and
- a concerted effort was put in place to address the identified gaps.\textsuperscript{121}

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

As of June 2009, Sudan had 16 national and international mine clearance operators. These included a network of JIDUs (see below), operating under the NMAC, three international NGOs (DanChurchAid, Norwegian People’s Aid, and Mines Advisory Group); five UN peacekeeping battalions (from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Egypt, Kenya, and Pakistan); the local NGO Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service (SIMAS); and six commercial demining companies (ArmorGroup, Mechem, MineTech International, RONCO, Mine Wolf, and The Development Initiative). Through 31 December 2008, eight of the 16 mine action operators were responsible for three-quarters of the total area cleared. In the first six months of 2009 the distribution of available assets for clearance narrowed further as ArmorGroup and MineTech International alone cleared 76.5% of the 9.5km\(^2\) reported as having been cleared.\textsuperscript{122}


\textsuperscript{118} Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.


\textsuperscript{120} Article 7, Form A, 13 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{121} Emails from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July and 7 September 2009.

Sudan has posed several challenges to effective demining. Although the implementation of the CPA is proceeding, security issues have hampered clearance in some locations. For example, in May 2008, fighting erupted between the Sudan Armed Forces and the SPLA in Abyei, an oil-rich area at the heart of a longstanding dispute between north and south. The fighting forced up to 50,000 people to flee the area, and there was new ERW contamination. In the south, activity by the Lords’ Resistance Army along the Ugandan border delayed clearance, while in Darfur all movements had to be accompanied by armed escorts. Other impediments to demining operations in 2008 included a longer than usual rainy season in most regions of the south, and difficulties in importing equipment. Complicated logistics and local labor law can also affect operations. Another constraint is that contractors are responsible for securing their own explosives for demolition, which is time consuming and difficult.

There remains concern about the effectiveness of the national demining assets, the JIDUs. Although they continue to make significant progress in releasing SHAs, they are still not accredited for mine action operations. A GICHD evaluation of mine action stated that allowing the JIDUs to engage in demining in support of infrastructure reconstruction without being accredited in accordance with the IMAS could have “serious repercussions.” Nonetheless, the JIDUs, which have mechanical clearance assets as well as manual deminers, represent the bulk of the local demining capacity in Sudan. In 2008, a further 120 deminers, to add to the 110 already employed, were trained at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Nairobi, Kenya. The main responsibilities of the JIDUs are assessment, land release, and quality assurance.

Identification of hazardous areas
The three-year-long LIS, managed by SAC with Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Handicap International (HI), and JASMAR as implementing partners was completed in June 2009. It covered 16 states, of which only Sennar in central Sudan, was found not to be affected (although Red Sea had a very limited problem). During the Preliminary Opinion Collection stage of the survey 1,727 communities had been identified as possibly impacted by mines or UXO. Community visits confirmed 296 were impacted. In total, 605 SHAs were identified covering an area of 106km². The results show that the mine problem is heavily concentrated in Central Equatoria, South Kordofan, Eastern Equatoria, Blue Nile, Kassala, and Jonglei states where 77% of the impacted communities and 84% of the SHAs identified are in these five states. Of the 605 SHAs, incidents involving victims occurred in 58. In addition, 423 UXO spot clearance tasks had been identified. Sennar had no impacted communities and three others had only one each.

124 Ibid.
126 Interview with Paul Eldred, Regional Operations Coordinator, UNMAO, Juba, 2 April 2008; and email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.
127 Article 7 Report, Form A, 13 April 2009.
130 Interview with Al Awad Al-Bashir, NMAC, in Šibenik, 17 April 2008.
131 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 2 August 2009.
Preliminary LIS Results\textsuperscript{134}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>No. of impacted communities</th>
<th>No. of SHAs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Equatoria</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Kordofan</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Equatoria</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Nile</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kassala</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonglei</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Equatoria</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Nile</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Bahr el Ghazal</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Bahr el Ghazal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gedaref</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrab</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Red Sea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sennar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Total**            | **296**                    | **605**     

Mine clearance in 2008

In 2008, international commercial companies, and national and international NGOs cleared 4.07\textit{km}^2 of mined areas. Approximately three-quarters of all clearance since 2002 has been conducted in only three states: Central Equatoria, Kassala, and South Kordofan.\textsuperscript{135} During clearance in 2008, 4,400 antipersonnel mines and 258 antivehicle mines were destroyed.\textsuperscript{136}

Mine and battle area clearance in 2008\textsuperscript{137}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Clearance (\textit{km}^2)\textsuperscript{*}</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>ERW destroyed**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ArmorGroup</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh demining company</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>7,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia demining company</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,925</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid, Table 2.4.
### Mine and battle area clearance in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Clearance (km²)*</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>ERW destroyed**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt demining company</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenyan demining company</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12,502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECHEM</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Tech International</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Wolf</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan demining company</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RONCO</td>
<td>1.42</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Rescue Services Agency</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Integrated Mine Action System</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDI</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.81</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,400</strong></td>
<td><strong>258</strong></td>
<td><strong>120,833</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* UNMAO does not disaggregate between mine clearance and BAC in detailed reporting.

** No distinction is made between AXO and UXO in demining reporting by UNMAO.

NR = not reported

#### Battle area clearance in 2008

For 2008, UNMAO reported battle area clearance (BAC) over almost 5.74km² of land in nine states, of which 80% occurred in Upper Nile and Central Equatoria. Through June 2009, of the 54km² of all clearance in Sudan, more than 40km² was from BAC. Unexploded submunitions were reported to have been found in Blue Nile state and Kadugli in South Kordofan, but UNMAO does not distinguish between different types of UXO in their reporting.

#### Progress since becoming a State Party

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2014.

The precise extent of the problem remains unknown as new hazardous areas were still being identified each month according to UNMAO reports from 2007–2009. Nevertheless, it is clear that the known mine problem is much smaller than originally believed and operations have

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138 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 3 August 2009. NMAC claims 18.26km² of BAC, which is not included in these statistics as it has not been possible to verify the figures.

139 Email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 3 August 2009.

greatly reduced the threat and the level of risk in the last six years. As of the end of 2008, more than 44km² of land had been cleared (see table below).141

### Demining from 2003–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>9.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>24.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>7.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.79</strong></td>
<td><strong>31.31</strong></td>
<td><strong>44.10</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of an annual budget for mine clearance, Sudan was second only to Afghanistan in 2008. While much has been achieved, particularly in opening roads and allowing for more movement of people, a key development in achieving its Article 5 obligations will be the success of the planned transition to national ownership in 2011 and whether significant international support will continue for several more years.

### Risk Education

In 2008, extensive RE was provided to at least 691,464 people. In Southern Sudan the plan to reach 250,000 people was exceeded, with 396,772 people reached.143 RE focused on IDPs, returnees, and local communities.144 It was conducted through the training of community volunteers, direct presentations, training of teachers for school-based RE, and mass media. Community liaison (CL) was conducted by MAG, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL).145

Twelve local and international organizations, as well as UN agencies, were engaged in RE activities, through the deployment of a total of 47 RE teams.146 The number of teams in the south fluctuated throughout 2008, while 18 teams were active in the north including three teams in Darfur.147 In the south only international NGOs were operational until June 2008, when three local NGOs, OSIL, Sudan Landmine Response (SLR) and South Sudan Development and Relief Agency (SSDRA), were funded by the European Commission (EC) through UNMAO.148 DDG’s RE and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams collected information on RE activities undertaken by the community volunteers in subsequent visits to these communities.149

142 UNMAO, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” June 2009, p. 4, www.sudan-map.org; and email from Mohammad Kabir, UNMAO, 3 August 2009. Subsequently, UNMAO reported that for year 2007 the clearance figure should be reduced to 2.9km² and BAC increased to 21.45km². Email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.
143 Email from Bojan Vukovic, RE/VA Coordinator, UNMAO, 20 April 2009; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.
144 Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.
145 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 17 July 2009.
148 Interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 24 March 2009.
149 Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.
To support the building of local capacity and UNMAO’s plans for transition to government ownership of mine action, 18 participants, including government, NGO, and UNMAO staff, were provided with advanced RE training in December 2008 in Nairobi organized by UNMAO and conducted by Cranfield University.\footnote{UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2008,” p. 3 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.}

National prioritization of RE activities was based on UNMAO’s analysis of secondary data sources (IMSMA data, LIS, etc). Needs assessments were also undertaken by implementing organizations in RE which collected primary data in the field. Once deployed, RE organizations conducted field-level needs assessments to target exact locations and audience, and to develop RE strategies.\footnote{NMAA, “Sudan Mine Action Programme Transition Plan, Empowering National Ownership of the Sudan Mine Action Programme,” undated but 2009, p. 58; email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 20 April 2009; interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 24 March 2009; and Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.} MAG started household surveys at the end of 2008 and developed an impact assessment tool kit to measure the baseline situation before the RE session to monitor the impact of RE. The analysis of the results was due to be released in late 2009.\footnote{Interview with Hannah Bryce, Program Officer, MAG, Juba, 25 March 2009}

Efforts to include RE in the school curriculum by UNMAO and UNICEF through the Ministry of Education, with the NMAC taking the lead in coordination, increased in 2008 with the training of 862 teachers.\footnote{Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009. Note these figures differ from those provided in the Article 7 Report.} These activities took place in the Nuba Mountains, Western and Southern Darfur, and Southern Sudan. A monitoring system was set up in each state.\footnote{Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.}

A total of 535 teachers were trained in the north.\footnote{UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2008,” p. 3 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.} UNMAO conducted the training in the south where three training courses were organized for 327 teachers in Arapi-Nimule (Eastern Equatoria state), Rumbek (Lakes state), and Juba (Central Equatoria state). The training will continue throughout 2009, for teachers and for inspectors to monitor the work of teachers.\footnote{Email from Ahmed Gangari, Senior RE Associate, UNMAO, 22 July 2009.}

Other RE organizations also conducted RE in schools, at the request of individual schools and communities.\footnote{Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009.}

Public information campaigns were conducted in collaboration with UNMIS in the north and south, consisting of the distribution of posters and other materials, open air presentations, and radio interviews. In the south two sets of RE radio messages were broadcast, on Radio Miraya, a UN radio station, and local radio station Liberty, and were ongoing since June 2008.\footnote{UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2008,” p. 3 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009; and email from David McMahon, UNMAO, 6 September 2009.}

In the north, three public information campaigns were organized in White Nile state at Kosti town, a transitional point for refugees, in Kadugli, capital of South Kordofan, and in Kassala.\footnote{Email from Ahmed Gangari, Senior RE Associate, UNMAO, 22 July 2009.}

More than 400,000 copies of various RE materials (including “Safe Way Home” materials) were distributed in 2008.\footnote{Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009.} A review of RE materials was conducted in two workshops organized in 2008, in Juba in March and in Khartoum in May. As a result of the workshop, an additional 150,000 copies of “Safe Way Home” leaflets were reprinted for refugees both in the south and north.\footnote{EMERGANCY INTERNATIONAL, “Mines and landmines in Sudan, 2008,” p. 3 provided to Landmine Monitor by email from Severine Flores, UNMAO, 17 March 2009.} Further discussion was focused on design and production of materials for teachers, peer education, IDPs, and general and direct presentations for people at risk.\footnote{Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009; and email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009.}
## Risk education activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographical area</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>North</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association for Aid and Relief Japan</td>
<td>Designing and printing various RE materials; training of trainers for primary school students; distribution of posters for public information campaign; and provision of direct RE to people at risk</td>
<td>South Kordofan state</td>
<td>17,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends of Peace and Development Organization</td>
<td>Direct RE, public campaigns on RE six projects; information days on mine awareness; targeting IDPs in Khartoum returning to center and south</td>
<td>Khartoum, Kassala state, Hamishkorieb, and El Fasher in Northern Darfur state</td>
<td>78,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JASMAR</td>
<td>Provision of direct RE and CL; targeting IDPs in Khartoum returning to center and south</td>
<td>Khartoum, Kosti, South Darfur, Eddaien, and El Geneina in Western Darfur</td>
<td>106,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Association of Volunteers in International Service</td>
<td>Training of trainers for teachers, community, youth and women leaders and health workers; sensitization of people at risk; production of RE materials; and training drama groups to carry out RE in communities.</td>
<td>Imotong, Imhehejeh, and Kiyala in Eastern Equatoria</td>
<td>14,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Direct RE presentations; CL; training of community leaders; targeting local population and recently returned IDPs and refugees; distribution of materials</td>
<td>Magwi and Loa in Southern Sudan</td>
<td>23,742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Direct RE presentations through teams attached to EOD teams to respond to reports</td>
<td>Northern and southern areas of Nuba Mountains; Duk county, and Jongley state</td>
<td>87,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Direct RE to IDPs</td>
<td>Bor Way Station in Jongley state</td>
<td>32,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Direct RE presentations; CL; training of community leaders; peer-to-peer education; and focus on work with IDPs and returning refugees in way-stations and IDP camps</td>
<td>Southern Sudan and Blue Nile state</td>
<td>251,466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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163 Email from Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 20 April 2009; interview with Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, Juba, 24 March 2009; Article 7 Report, Form I, 13 April 2009; and IMSMA monthly report generated July 2009, provided by email by Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009. Note that the total number only approximately equals the total number of beneficiaries provided, due to very small differences in IMSMA data.
RE has been conducted in Sudan for more than 10 years by international and national NGOs, UN agencies, and the government.\textsuperscript{164} By 2007, the number of NGOs involved had reached 19.\textsuperscript{165} The number of beneficiaries has also risen each year, and the total recorded in IMSMA prior to 2009 was 2,673,870.\textsuperscript{166} RE has been conducted through public awareness campaigns, direct presentations, in schools, through child-to-child methodology, radio, and the distribution of materials.\textsuperscript{167} In 2003, Landmine Monitor reported that RE in Southern Sudan was at a standstill.\textsuperscript{168} Yet by 2006 only Wau was considered to be underserved, and this was addressed by MAG in 2007.\textsuperscript{169}

Needs assessments conducted in 2003 and 2004 by DanChurchAid (DCA), the Sudanese Red Crescent Society, and Save the Children USA showed that the most at-risk groups were adult men and children, and the most dangerous activity was farming.\textsuperscript{170} From 2005, the RE focus was IDPs and returnees.\textsuperscript{171} Since late 2007, the RE sector has also dispatched teams to Darfur region to deliver emergency RE sessions to IDPs and civilians in impacted communities.\textsuperscript{172} In 2007, LIS results were used to inform the RE program, but a lack of adequate casualty data affected the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSIL</td>
<td>Direct RE presentations; CL; training of community leaders; and RE at IDP way stations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLR</td>
<td>Media project with RE messages and radio clips broadcast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSDRA</td>
<td>Direct RE presentations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Both North and South</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAO/SSDC/UNHCR</td>
<td>Teacher training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTI</td>
<td>Direct RE and CL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Child Holland</td>
<td>Direct RE presentations and use of youth groups for different activities within the communities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{164} See previous Landmine Monitor reports.
\textsuperscript{166} See previous Landmine Monitor reports; and IMSMA monthly report generated July 2009, provided by email by Bojan Vukovic, UNMAO, 16 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{167} See previous Landmine Monitor reports.
ability to target appropriately. In 2007, the program started to evolve from emergency RE by NGOs to a more sustained approach through existing structures such as schools and community centers. Implementation is gradually being nationalized with the number of national NGOs growing over the last few years.

Since January 2005, coordination was done by UNICEF through UNMAO, while it also provided technical and financial support. International RE experts have been provided by UNMAO and UNICEF since 2002, when provisional guidelines and standards were developed.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is not known. Sudan’s health and social services have been severely damaged by years of conflict, particularly in Southern Sudan. Increased conflict in Southern Sudan in 2008–2009, and the expulsion of 13 international NGOs and the closure of three national NGOs in March 2009, further decreased the availability of services. Services are spread unevenly, with most service providers located in Khartoum and, to a lesser extent, in Juba. The main challenges were a lack of skilled organizations working on VA/disability, a lack of decentralized services, and a lack of financial commitments from the government. These were further compounded by poverty, long distances between clients and services, and an unstable security situation. Service provision and capacity in the south were generally weaker than in the north.

Health services were lacking throughout the country and often lacked skilled staff. In Southern Sudan, general health coverage was estimated at 40%, and 86% of basic health services were carried out by NGOs, usually with international funding. Patients often need to travel long distances, resulting in many mine/ERW casualties dying on the way. Follow-up care and referral systems were virtually non-existent. Fear of crossing frontlines and the lack of surgical resources to treat people severely injured by weapons exacerbated the situation.

In northern Sudan, the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics (NAPO) is the main actor in physical rehabilitation, a state body linked to the Ministry of Social Welfare. Its main rehabilitation center is in Khartoum and satellites exist in some state capitals. To improve services in 2008, NAPO signed agreements with state authorities to share responsibilities and better coordinate service provision. NAPO also started operating mobile workshops in late 2008. In Southern Sudan, physical rehabilitation was mainly provided by GOSS in Juba where the ICRC finished construction of the referral center for Southern Sudan in December 2008. Small-scale NGO services existed in some other states, but they lacked qualified staff, materials, and good-quality assistive devices.

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177 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
180 Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.
185 Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 7 September 2009.
States Parties

Sudan

Psychosocial support activities were virtually non-existent. In 2008, Sudan noted that the ministries of social welfare in the north and south were responsible for psychosocial support, but stated, “this area of VA is still to be empowered and needs more technical and financial support.”\(^{190}\) In 2008–2009 psychosocial support was increasingly incorporated into projects carried out by national NGOs.\(^{191}\) In November 2008, the Federal Ministry of Health acknowledged that mental health problems due to war-related causes were a priority issue and announced its decision to establish a National Mental Health Council and a National Center for Mental Health.\(^{192}\)

In May 2009, Sudan reiterated that three survivor associations had been established,\(^{193}\) in Ed Damazin, Kadugli, and Kassala with the support of the Sudan Campaign to Ban Landmines. However, these organizations were not well organized or active. In the south, there were no survivor initiatives.\(^{194}\) Economic reintegration was also included more systematically in NGO VA projects, but these projects remained small and often limited to pilot projects.\(^{195}\) Broader economic and employment programs were often not adjusted to the needs of survivors or not accessible to them. Awareness was lacking among employers.\(^{196}\)

Sudan has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but this is not consistently implemented or monitored. In late 2008, new disability legislation was approved by the government of Sudan; it includes mine/ERW survivors as a specific target group.\(^{197}\) Sudan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 24 April 2009.\(^{198}\) In Southern Sudan, GOSS was still in the process of developing a disability policy which would better fit into the context of the southern states as of July 2009;\(^{199}\) this process started in 2007.\(^{200}\)

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

Sudan is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors.\(^{201}\) Sudan presented its 2005–2009 objectives in November 2005,\(^{202}\) and revised them considerably in 2007, in extensive coordination with relevant stakeholders. While the objectives for economic reintegration remained weak, additional objectives on increased survivor inclusion, resource mobilization, and strengthening coordination mechanisms were added. Responsibilities were clearly defined, and involvement of governmental bodies was increased.\(^{203}\)

This resulted in progress, especially in establishing coordination mechanisms, information provision, monitoring of activities, and advocacy. Broadly, implementation was on track and a review was to be completed by the end of August 2009. Even though UNMAO noted that

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194 Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.
195 Ibid.
199 Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.
stakeholders used the objectives and the 2007–2009 plan less than expected, NMAC and a few NGOs used the objectives/plan for coordination and, mainly, resource mobilization purposes.\textsuperscript{204} One NGO noted that a lot of work had been done but that more efforts were needed to achieve the objectives, as well as better monitoring, not of project implementation per se but of the long-term impact of the activities.\textsuperscript{205}

In 2006–2007, Sudan co-chaired the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. At least one VA/disability expert attended the intersessional Standing Committee Meetings in 2006–2009 and all meetings of States Parties, making statements at every meeting. Sudan also reported on VA in its annual Article 7 reports submitted from 2006–2009.\textsuperscript{206}

**Victim assistance activities**

Many organizations provide VA/disability services in Sudan, including an increasing number of national organizations. Only those providing updated information for 2008 have been included below.

Under the Human Security Trust Fund (HSTF) project, Sudan received $1.7 million from Japan for RE and VA to be implemented over 18 months to the end of June 2008. Some $680,000 was dedicated to the implementation of five VA projects in the south and five in the north: eight economic reintegration projects, one psychosocial support project, one health project, and one awareness-raising project. In total, 669 of the targeted 719 survivors (267 women) were reached.\textsuperscript{207}

The overall evaluation of the 11 projects was positive, although several organizations faced challenges working in difficult to access or insecure areas and under tough security restrictions (particularly in eastern Sudan). Three projects were not successful due to a lack of management capacity and staff turnover. An evaluation noted that in some areas the projects were the first of their kind and thus provided much-needed information about the needs of survivors (for example in Kadugli) or tested new approaches (such as the radio awareness raising and a project designed by beneficiaries in Yei county).\textsuperscript{208}

Some organizations were able to secure international funding under a 2008–2011 $3 million Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) grant. Under this framework 15 VA/disability projects (six in the north and nine in the south) started in the second half of 2008 and were scheduled to run until the end of 2009.\textsuperscript{209} The program aimed to reach some 2,400 direct beneficiaries (survivors and other persons with disabilities).\textsuperscript{210}

UNMAO noted that the sustained international funding, together with improved coordination had resulted in the involvement of a larger number of national organizations, many of whom had not been involved in VA/disability before.\textsuperscript{211}

Elsewhere, ABRAR provided health insurance coverage, economic reintegration, and awareness-raising for 170 survivors. It also conducted workshops and information dissemination through the media.\textsuperscript{212} Rufaida provided income-generating activities to 55 military survivors and war disabled soldiers in cooperation with the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission.\textsuperscript{213}

\textsuperscript{204} Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{205} Email from Nagat Salih, ABRAR, 16 July 2009.


\textsuperscript{207} Article 7 Report, Form J, 13 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{208} Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{209} Article 7 Report, Form J, 13 April 2009 (mentioning 12 projects); and email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, 24 July 2009 (mentioning 15 projects ongoing in 2008–2009).

\textsuperscript{210} Statement by Dr. Ahmed el-Badawi, NMAC, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{211} Email from Davide Naggi, UNMAO, Juba, 24 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{212} Email from Nagat Salih, ABRAR, 16 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{213} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by RUFAIDA staff, 15 July 2009.
With funding provided by Switzerland, the NMAC revised and distributed 18,000 copies of a leaflet on first-aid and trauma care among community health workers and NGOs in 2008.\textsuperscript{214} In 2009, the United Arab Emirates started a mobile hospital providing assistance to underprivileged people in Southern Sudan.\textsuperscript{215}

In Southern Sudan, the GOSS Ministry of Health took over management of the Juba Teaching Hospital from the ICRC in 2008.\textsuperscript{216} An ICRC evaluation conducted one year after the handover concluded that, “the hospital was providing acceptable and appropriate care” and noted that the hospital “is able to stand on its own and function properly.”\textsuperscript{217}

NAPO mobile workshops assisted some 425 persons with disabilities in 2008 (and 888 to May 2009) and NAPO also completed construction of a new workshop in its Khartoum complex with ICRC support.\textsuperscript{218} Physiotherapy departments were established in Kadugli (with HI support) and in Kassala.\textsuperscript{219}

Construction of the ICRC rehabilitation center in Juba was completed in December 2008 and the center became fully operational in 2009. In 2008, the ICRC also continued its support to NAPO, including resuming its support to three NAPO satellite centers and renovating two satellite centers. A second group of 15 prosthetic and orthotic technicians started their ICRC-supported diploma course in 2008, and 17 others were sponsored for training abroad. In 2008, ICRC-supported centers assisted 3,158 people (slightly fewer than the 3,945 in 2007) and produced 1,172 prostheses (171 for survivors) and 1,227 orthoses (112 for survivors).\textsuperscript{220} An ICRC mobile surgical team also provided assistance to 128 weapon-injured people in Darfur region, south and central Sudan, and three war surgery seminars were organized.\textsuperscript{221}

Medical Care Development International (MCDI) provided physical and socio-economic rehabilitation for disabled war victims in Rumbek and extended its outreach activities to all of Bahr el Ghazal state in 2008. MCDI works with the state Ministry of Social Development on transitioning its rehabilitation center to the authorities. In 2008, it directly assisted 111 persons with disabilities with rehabilitation services (14 survivors) and two with educational support.\textsuperscript{222}

HI provided basic physiotherapy training to nurses and other healthcare providers in Southern Sudan and assisted NAPO in developing a physical therapy curriculum in 2008.\textsuperscript{223}

### Support for Mine Action

The Sudan mine action sector multi-year plan for 2009–2011 provides a cost estimate totaling roughly $245 million for mine action programs in all sectors from 2009 to 2011, including $122.5 million for clearance and survey in Southern Sudan; $41 million for impact survey; $37.6 million for RE; $20.6 million for clearance and survey in Darfur; $10.8 million for coordination and technical assistance; $8.3 million for capacity development of the NMAA; and $4.3 million for VA.\textsuperscript{224} The plan includes broad resource mobilization strategies to anticipate and respond to

risk factors impacting international funding. The National VA Strategic Framework 2007–2011 also includes resource mobilization goals among its strategic objectives.

The NMMA and NMAC, along with the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, are responsible for reviewing and updating resource mobilization strategies on behalf of GONU. GONU and GOSS coordinate with each other and with UNDP to develop the resource mobilization strategy and raise funds for mine action, as well as to allocate resources for mine action from the national budget. UNMAO conducts donor liaison and resource mobilization activities in support of mine action program implementation. In June 2008, NMAC reported a resource mobilization strategy based on lobbying efforts to include mine action within the government’s budget, seeking provision of funds for mine action programs, operational support to NMAC, and capacity-building.

National support for mine action

Combined reported national funding by GONU and GOSS in 2008 totaled $4,927,019. NMAC reported GONU funding to mine action in 2008 totaling $3,345,000, including contributions to personnel salaries, operational costs of the mine action center and field offices, equipment purchase and rental, and staff expenses for mine clearance operations in the field. The largest contribution was reportedly $1,737,000 to make partial payments on two flails and two water tankers for clearance operations. Sudan reported GONU contributions totaling roughly $6.8 million in 2007.

The SSDA reported national funding totaling SDG3,233,890 ($1,582,019) in 2008, including funding for SSDA personnel, equipment and running costs, insurance, and logistical and other operational costs. The projected budget for mine action in Southern Sudan during 2008 was SDG3,551,000 ($1,737,149), including a supplemental budget request made in June to cover various operating expenses. The SSDA reported that not all 2008 disbursements were spent during the year. GOSS was reported by UNDP to have contributed roughly $700,000 to mine action in 2007.

During 2007 and the first half of 2008, GONU reported it contributed $5.5 million to mine action, while GOSS contributed $1.5 million. Funds covered the cost of local personnel in the national mine action centers and field operations of the national demining teams.

In June 2009, UNDP reported that while 2009 national funding by GONU roughly matched 2008 funding levels, national funding by GOSS might decline in 2009 because of fluctuating oil prices. UNDP and UNMAO were reportedly working jointly with GONU and GOSS to secure as much funding as possible from state budgets. The SSDA reported that “this issue is likely to continue as long as the economy of Southern Sudan is reliant on oil revenues.”

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, 13 countries and the EC reported providing $39,077,807 (€26,536,607) to mine action in Sudan. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was 37% higher than reported in 2007.

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228 Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.
231 NMAC response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, 24 June 2009.
234 Email from Christina Greene, UNMAO, 10 April 2008.
236 Email from Qadeem Khan Tariq, UNDP, 24 June 2009.
As of October 2008, UNMAO reported receiving $23,934,225 in donor funding for mine action compared to a requirement of $70,400,407. Assessed mine action budgets for UNMIS and UNAMID totaled $49,403,610. As of May 2009, it was reported that international funding for 2009 had reached $31,045,632. Combined assessed and donor funds totaled $68,813,582, compared to a requirement for 2009 of $91,510,634.

**2008 International Mine Action Funding to Sudan: Monetary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$12,677,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada UNMAS, UNDP, MAG, UNICEF</td>
<td>Mine clearance, capacity-building, mine RE, VA</td>
<td>$4,024,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>DDG, MAG, NPA, UNMAS</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$6,030,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>MAG, DCA, UNDP, Cranfield University, SIMAS, NPA</td>
<td>Capacity-building, mine clearance, RE, other mine action</td>
<td>$3,643,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$3,548,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Swedish Rescue Services Agency, DDG</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$2,157,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>MAG, UNMAS, UNDP</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,919,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$1,420,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,243,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>UN Voluntary Trust Fund</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$736,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>HI</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$736,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$485,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Swiss Federation for Mine Action (FSD)</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$375,388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>FSD, Danish Refugee Council</td>
<td>Capacity-building, RE</td>
<td>$78,563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong> $39,077,807 <strong>(€26,536,607)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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TAJIKISTAN

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 April 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mines, submunitions, other UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Full extent not determined, but at least 8.42km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>13 (2007: 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas) Deadline:</td>
<td>1 April 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Mined area clearance: 0.7km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battle area clearance: 0.2km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area cancellation/reduction: 24.83km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Improved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National: $574,000 (2007: $565,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Tajikistan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 April 2000. It has not enacted national implementation legislation. Tajikistan declared a stockpile of 3,084 mines inherited from the former Soviet Union, and finished destroying these in March 2004. In 2005, Tajikistan took control of more than 49,000 additional stockpiled mines, which were destroyed in 2006 by Russia. It initially retained 255 mines for training purposes, but consumed the last of these in 2007. Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare antipersonnel mines stockpiled on its territory by a state not party by declaring approximately 18,200 antipersonnel mines of various types are stockpiled with Russian forces there. Tajikistan hosted a regional workshop on the Mine Ban Treaty in July 2009.

Tajikistan is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of civil war from 1992–1997 and mine-laying along its borders by Soviet and Uzbek forces. Contamination includes a problem of unexploded submunitions. In March 2009, limited funding, climate, and slow progress in demining led Tajikistan to request a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline for clearance of 1 April 2010.


Tajikistan is one of the group of 26 States Parties reporting responsibility for a significant number of survivors and has shown dedication towards implementing the Nairobi Action Plan. Progress in victim assistance (VA) has been recorded, with the majority of the objectives achieved or in progress. Yet challenges remained, including improving medical personnel training, ensuring national ownership, provision of psychological and economic reintegration services, and raising awareness of the rights of persons with disabilities. Funding for VA remained inadequate.
Mine Ban Policy

Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2000. In 2007, TMAC coordinated a project with the Tajik NGO Harmony of the World to make recommendations for amendments to harmonize national laws with the requirements of the Mine Ban Treaty. In late 2007, TMAC submitted three draft amendments to the national parliament for consideration. Tajikistan has not reported any progress in 2008 or 2009. In the past, the government said that new legislation to implement the treaty domestically was unnecessary, as it relied on its criminal code to punish violations of the treaty.


In the past, the government said that new legislation to implement the treaty domestically was unnecessary, as it relied on its criminal code to punish violations of the treaty.

Tajikistan has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Tajikistan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Tajikistan is also party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It has never submitted annual national reports as required under Article 13 and Article 10.

Tajikistan had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 1 July 2009.

Production, transfer, use, stockpiling, and destruction

Tajikistan has reported that it never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The most recent use of mines in Tajik territory occurred in 2000 and 2001, when Russian and Uzbek forces placed mines at various border locations inside Tajikistan.

1 Interview with Jonmahmad Rajabov, Director, TMAC, Dushanbe, 5 February 2008. The amendments are to the following laws: “On State Armaments Order,” “On Circulation of Explosive Materials for Civil Purposes,” and “On Arms.” The ICRC provided funding for the project, but did not review the recommendations. Email from Eve La Haye, Legal Adviser, Arms Unit, ICRC, 29 July 2008. The project was initiated in 2006. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 691.
7 Ibid, Form C.
Tajikistan destroyed its stockpile of 3,084 antipersonnel mines inherited from the Soviet Union between 5 May 2002 and 31 March 2004, finishing just ahead of its treaty-mandated deadline.8
Tajikistan is the only State Party to declare antipersonnel mines stockpiled on its territory by a state not party to the treaty. In 2003, it reported that approximately 18,200 antipersonnel mines of various types are stockpiled with Russian Ministry of Defense units deployed in Tajikistan.9 These stockpiles are not under the jurisdiction or control of Tajikistan.10 In its Article 7 reports submitted since 2003, Tajikistan has reported that intergovernmental talks are “currently underway” to clarify and complete data collection regarding these Russian mines.11

Newly discovered stockpiled mines
In its Article 7 report submitted in 2008, Tajikistan provided information on antipersonnel mines discovered and destroyed after completion of its stockpile destruction program.12 Sometime in 2006, a total of 49,152 PFM-1S remotely-delivered blast mines13 and 100 “blocks” of POM remotely-delivered fragmentation mines14 were transferred by Tajik border protection forces to Russian forces in Tajikistan for destruction. These stocks were destroyed in October 2006 by the order of the Russian Federal Border Service.15

In response to questions about where these mines came from, TMAC told Landmine Monitor that in 2005 the State Border Protection Committee of Tajikistan took control of Tajikistan’s international border with Afghanistan and received all border facilities and equipment—including the mines—from the border guards of the Federal Security Service of Russia. According to TMAC, the Tajik border authorities did not provide the information in time to include it in Tajikistan’s earlier Article 7 reports.16
In addition to reporting on the large stocks of remotely-delivered mines, the Article 7 report submitted in 2008 provided information about two other cases where mines were “confiscated or detected” by Tajik armed forces.17

Mines retained for training
Tajikistan retains no mines for training or development purposes, as it used the last of these in 2007. Tajikistan initially retained 255 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, and had indicated it would use these until 2010 when their shelf life expired.18

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8 Article 7 Report, Form G, 14 March 2005. The text in Forms A, D, and F cite a total of 3,029 mines destroyed, but the detailed listing in Form G adds up to 3,084. This includes: 1,591 POMZ-2; 633 PMN; 436 OZM-72; and 424 MON-100 mines.
10 Interview with Jonmahmad Rajabov, then-Deputy Head of the Board of Constitutional Guarantees of Citizens Rights, Executive Board of the President, in Geneva, 5 February 2003. In another interview in Geneva on 13 May 2003, Rajabov stated that Tajik forces are under a separate command-and-control structure and would refuse orders by Russian forces to lay mines.
13 TMAC has confirmed that this is the number of individual mines. It likely represents 768 canisters each containing 64 individual mines.
14 According to the form “each block [of POM mines] has several clusters [canisters] and each cluster has several mines. We have not determined the number of clusters that each block includes. This means, that each block has several mines.” Typically, a KPOM-2 canister has four mines, but it is unclear how many canisters are in a block.
16 Telephone interview with Jonmahmad Rajabov, TMAC, 18 July 2008. TMAC said that the border authorities did not provide information on the locations where the mines were discovered.
17 Article 7 Report, Form B2, 3 February 2008. In the first case, a total of two MON-100, 17 POMZ-2, and one OZM-72 mine were “confiscated or detected…as a result of counter-terrorism activity.” The date of discovery or detection is not provided nor is the ultimate disposal of these 20 antipersonnel mines. The second reported case noted that in 2007, two YM-1 and 13 M18A1 Claymore mines, and one MON-50 mine were “transferred from the stocks from the force structures of the Republic of Tajikistan to TMAC for destruction.” The mines were confiscated or found by security forces as a result of counter-terrorism activities.
18 The numbers and types of mines initially retained were: POMZ-2M (100); PMN (50); OZM-72 (50); MON-100 (50); and MON-200 (5). Tajikistan consumed 30 mines in 2005, 120 mines in 2006 and 105 mines in 2007. The mines were used for refresher training of survey and demining personnel. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 662.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Tajikistan is contaminated with mines and ERW, including a residual problem of unexploded submunitions. Tajikistan has not reported a problem with other ERW, although items of UXO continue to be found.

Tajikistan’s central region was contaminated by mines, unexploded submunitions, and other ERW in the 1992–1997 civil war.19 Russian forces emplaced landmines on the Tajik-Afghan border in 1992–1998 to protect the border and their border posts from armed groups attempting to enter Tajikistan from Afghanistan. In 2000–2001, Uzbek forces laid mines on the Tajik-Uzbek border (Tajikistan’s western and northern borders, primarily in Sughd province), seeking to prevent non-state armed groups from entering Uzbekistan from Tajikistan. Uzbekistan has claimed that 95% of its minefields along the border with Tajikistan have been demined, but Tajikistan has stated that mine records were not provided by its neighbor. Some 3% of the border remains to be defined between the two countries.20 Mines have also been found on Tajikistan’s border with Kyrgyzstan.21

In 2006, Russian border forces handed over responsibility for the protection of Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan to Tajikistan, but TMAC has stated that it did not receive all minefield records until February 2008. The records were for 384 minefields, identifying 607 mined areas with an approximate total size of 8.57 km² and containing more than 260,000 PFM-1, PFM-1S, POM, and POM-2S antipersonnel mines. An ongoing resurvey of the areas (see Identification of hazardous areas section below) has found that most of the mined areas have since been “destroyed” due to flooding of the Panj river and activation of the mines’ self-destruct mechanisms.22

An earlier impact survey carried out in 2003–2005 by TMAC’s main demining partner, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), identified 146 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering almost 50 km² across the country. Subsequent requests for clearance and technical survey from the government, local authorities, and ministries added 13 SHAs covering an estimated 0.86 km² of land while during clearance operations an additional 0.17 km² of hazardous areas were identified. Thus, the original total of 159 SHAs in Tajikistan covered an estimated 50.67 km².23 During re-survey operations through the end of 2008, 18 SHAs were cancelled while 92 additional mined areas with an approximate size of 2.93 km² were identified.24 As of the end of July 2009, TMAC estimated the extent of the residual problem at 8.42 km² along the border with Afghanistan and in the Central Region, with survey still being conducted along an additional 6 km², and had still to assess contamination along the border with Uzbekistan.25

The FSD survey and TMAC found evidence that cluster munitions had dispersed PFM-1 and PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and ShOAB-0.5, AO-2.5 RT, AO-0.5, and AO-1SCb submunitions, but as of August 2009, and as a result of clearance operations, the residual submunition threat was considered to be mainly in the central region.26

22 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 2.
25 Email and SMS from, and telephone interview with, Parviz Mavlonkulov, Operations Manager, TMAC, 22 August 2009; and telephone interview with Varka Okhoniyozov, Program Analyst, TMAC, 12 September 2009.
26 Telephone interview with Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 18 August 2009.
Casualties

In 2008, TMAC identified 13 mine/ERW casualties (four killed and nine injured) in eight incidents.27 There were eight civilian casualties; three military and two deminers. Adult males were the biggest casualty group (eight), followed by boys (four), and one girl. Activities at the time of the incident included tampering (five), demining (three), conducting military activities (two), grazing cattle (two), and collecting wood (one). Antipersonnel mines caused the majority of casualties (eight) and ERW caused five. Casualties were recorded in Khatlon province (five in Vose district and two Shahrtuz district), followed by Sugd province (one in Isfara district and one in Panjakent district), Gorniy Badakshan Autonomous Province (two in Vanj district and one in Darvoz district) and the Region of Republican Subordination (one in Tavildara district). All casualties were Tajik, except one deminer who was reported to be a resident of Kabul, Afghanistan.

The 2008 casualty rate is a decrease compared to 2007, when there were 20 recorded casualties, and is the lowest recorded since 1999.28 The decrease is attributed to the positive impact of RE.29 Casualties continued to occur in 2009 at a decreased rate, with six mine/ERW casualties (one killed and five injured) in four incidents, as of 17 June 2009.30 Three casualties were civilians, and three military. On 2 March, two military personnel were injured by ERW while on duty in Dushanbe. On 30 March, a man was killed by an antipersonnel mine while grazing cattle in Isfara district, in Sugd province. On 27 April, a man and a woman, both aged 18, were injured while playing with an ERW in Rasht district, in the Region of Republican Subordination. On 17 June, a military deminer was injured by an antipersonnel mine during clearance activities in Darvoz district, Gorniy Badakshan Autonomous Province.

On 1 April 2009, TMAC reported that a Tajik man was killed by an antipersonnel mine while in Uzbek territory, looking for his missing cows.31 The casualty was not added to TMAC’s database or to the above total, as it occurred in Uzbekistan.

Despite significant TMAC efforts, the total number of mine/ERW casualties in Tajikistan remains unknown, but TMAC has information on 802 casualties (354 killed and 448 injured) between 1992 and 2009.32 From 1999 to 2008, TMAC identified 318 mine/ERW casualties (132 killed and 186 injured).33 Of the 315 casualties with detailed records, the vast majority were civilians (285), but 24 were military and six deminers (it is unknown if these were civilians or military, but one was a French national). Most of these casualties were men (200), followed by boys (75), women (19), girls (nine), males of unknown age (11), and females of unknown age (one). Antipersonnel mines caused 226 casualties, ERW caused 34 (of which, at least five were submunitions), and unknown devices caused 55. The activities at the time of the incident of 135 casualties remain unknown, but 67 were herding, 37 collecting wood/food/water, 22 conducting military activities, 17 traveling, 13 playing, eight engaging in clearance activities, seven handling/tampering with devices, six fishing/hunting, and three conducting agricultural activities. While historic data remains incomplete, information collected shows that casualty rates have decreased or remained at similar levels since 2000.

27 TMAC, “List of the Victims of Landmine and ERW in 2008,” provided by email from Reykhan Muminova, Victim Assistance Officer, TMAC, 8 June 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008–31 December 2008. TMAC does not distinguish simply between military and civilian casualties; it separates them into deminers, military, and civilians. In the raw data, one of the three military casualties was reportedly a deminer. It is unknown if the other two deminers were civilian or military, so they are reported here in a separate category.
28 TMAC has revised its 2007 casualty rate from 19 (nine killed, 10 injured) to 20 (nine killed, 11 injured). Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 13 July 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 667.
29 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
32 Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 13 July 2009.
33 Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 13 July 2009; and email from Abdulmain Karimov, IMSMA Database Management Officer, TMAC, 21 June 2008.
States Parties  Tajikistan

Risk profile
Inhabitants of 24 districts are at risk from landmines, cluster munition remnants, and other ERW. Typical high-risk activities include collecting firewood, tending livestock, and using unfamiliar paths.

Socio-economic impact
Almost half a million people are believed to live in mine-affected areas, largely in hills or mountains where most villages are located. Contamination blocks the reconstruction of roads, power lines, and access to agriculture pasture and potable water. It is also reported that contamination denies access to land needed for geological research in the mountains.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action and risk education
The interministerial Commission on the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL) is Tajikistan’s national mine action authority. The CIIHL is chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister for Security.

TMAC was established on 20 June 2003 and functions as an executive body of the CIIHL in accordance with an agreement between Tajikistan and UNDP. TMAC is responsible for the coordination and monitoring of all mine action activities in Tajikistan including mine clearance, RE, and VA. TMAC also develops the national mine action plan and standards, tasks operations, and presents certificates of cleared sites to local authorities.

Two RE coordination meetings were held in 2008 with the TjRCS and ICRC. Technical and financial support was provided by UNDP from August 2008.

Victim assistance
The mine action strategy for 2004–2008 acknowledged TMAC’s role in VA, as does the amended strategy for 2006–2010. TMAC’s role includes coordinating with the Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Population (MLSPP), which is responsible for disability issues, and other stakeholders. TMAC’s VA department has been operational since 2006. It is staffed by a VA officer (who is both a medical doctor and psychologist) and an assistant (a survivor) and is responsible for assisting the government in developing a VA strategy, coordinating meetings and activities among VA operators, updating casualty data and mobilizing donor support.

The national Victim Assistance Working Group, created in 2006, coordinates VA and is composed of TMAC, the Ministry of Health, MLSPP, National Orthopedic Center, National Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Disabled People, National Union of Disabled People, TjRCS, Harmony of the World, and mine/ERW survivors. It met regularly in 2008 to discuss VA challenges, coordinate activities, and integrate VA in broader governmental projects.

The MLSPP has primary responsibility for persons with disabilities in Tajikistan and works with the relevant government bodies in charge of protecting their rights.

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35 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 4.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
41 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminoiva, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
42 Ibid.
Data collection and management

The latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) software was installed at TMAC in June 2008. The program was updated in May 2009 but, due to technical problems, TMAC decided in July 2009 to move back to an earlier version.43 TMAC acknowledged that nationwide data collection in Tajikistan had not fully been achieved,44 but geographic coverage was expanded in 2008 to seven additional districts, mainly in the south, near the border with Afghanistan.45 As a result of this expansion, it is believed that recent casualties are adequately reported, although some casualties that occurred during and immediately after the civil war may not have been recorded.46 Progress in data collection continued to be reported in 2008, with information on demographics, geography, activity at time of incident, and device type available for recent casualties.47

TMAC is responsible for casualty data collection and works in cooperation with the TjRCS, MLSPP, Ministry of Health, and local authorities. In 2008, the ICRC continued to support the TjRCS. Data is collected by requesting information from official sources and interviewing people in mine-affected communities.48 TMAC has maintained casualty data in IMSMA since 2003.49 Casualty information is shared with relevant actors on request.50

In March 2008, TMAC, the Ministry of Health, the MLSPP, and TjRCS completed a VA needs assessment, begun in 2006. The assessment covered Tajikistan’s five regions and collected data in 30 districts (including 24 mine-affected districts). Thirty previously unreported casualties were identified.51 The data was compared with the IMSMA database to fill gaps and remove duplicates.52 Information gathered is used to plan, prioritize, and monitor VA activities.53

The Ministry of Health collects service provision data from all healthcare facilities, but the information was not centralized or used for planning.54 In 2007, TMAC and the Ministry of Health reached an agreement to use the IMSMA form at hospitals and health centers. In 2008, TMAC continued to work in close cooperation with the ministry to continue collecting and verifying data from local hospitals.55

RE data is entered into IMSMA but this does not include information from the Ministry of Education.56

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43 Telephone interview with Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 5 August 2009.
45 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
46 Ibid.
47 Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
51 Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
52 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 668; and email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
56 Telephone interview with Shahrinisso Davlyatova, National MRE Coordinator, TMAC/UNDP, 13 August 2009.
States Parties

Tajikistan

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

In 2006, a national mine action strategy was formulated for 2006–2010 and approved by the government. The goal is to eliminate the economic impact of mines and ERW in Tajikistan, with a primary objective being to strengthen TMAC’s capacity “to create a sustainable national institution to plan, coordinate and implement comprehensive mine action.” A new strategic plan was expected to be developed in accordance with Tajikistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request, which will cover 2010–2020, probably broken down into two five-year phases.\footnote{Telephone interview with Jonmahmad Rajabov, TMAC, 18 August 2009.}

For RE, the strategy seeks to broaden geographical coverage, and improve links between RE and other mine action pillars, such as casualty/injury surveillance.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

According to a June 2006 directive from the Deputy Prime Minister, relevant ministries must share reconstruction and development project budgets with TMAC and allocate funds, where necessary, for mine clearance within these budgets.

Tajikistan’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper stated that mainstreaming VA into existing infrastructure is crucial in achieving the UN Millennium Development Goal of poverty reduction. The strategy aims to improve health, rehabilitation, vocational training employment, and pension services for persons with disabilities.\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 674; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.} The RE strategy also aims to integrate RE activities into “broader humanitarian, human rights and development activities.”

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

A 2008 UNDP evaluation (see Program evaluation section below) found limited government ownership of the mine action program, little or no government funding, and insufficient discussion with donors.\footnote{Robert Keeley, “Outcome Evaluation for Mine Action Program UNDP Tajikistan November–December 2008,” UNDP, January 2009, pp. 25–26.} For its part, TMAC believes that over the past three years it has promoted greater national ownership of mine action and supported its integration into the government’s development plan. Tajikistan has supported the program with in-kind contributions. With UNDP support, TMAC believes it has also been able to increase the effectiveness of the national mine action program, but acknowledges that the process of full nationalization of TMAC will need more time and further external support.\footnote{Email from Jonmahmad Rajabov, TMAC, 23 June 2009.}

TMAC has reported that “the government of Tajikistan tries to do its best within the framework of the Tajik legislation to provide assistance for victims’ families and survivors.”\footnote{TMAC, “Report of Victim Assistance Officer, Period January 1–December 31 2008,” undated, provided by email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.}

National management

Since its creation, TMAC has operated with UNDP support, including chief technical advisors (CTA) from 2003 to 2007. At the end of 2007, the CTA position was eliminated and, since March 2008, a local project analyst has been employed to support TMAC’s director with planning, resource mobilization, and treaty reporting obligations. However, in order to train the project analyst, an institutional capacity development consultant was hired for six months (April–September 2008). TMAC is gradually taking over full responsibility as the sole mine action entity in Tajikistan. UNDP has also been playing an important role mobilizing donor resources for mine action.\footnote{Email from Jonmahmad Rajabov, TMAC, 23 June 2009.}
National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

Mine clearance in Tajikistan is managed in accordance with its National Mine Action Standards, adopted in March 2008 based on the International Mine Action Standards. FSD’s standing operating procedures are approved by TMAC.63 In February 2009, a National Mine Action Standard on land release was approved by TMAC.64

Program evaluation

From November–December 2008, TMAC hosted a UNDP evaluation mission. The mission concluded that “the TMAC project is going well and has achieved much of the goals that might be expected of a mine action coordinating body.” The evaluation criticized a lack of government ownership (see Commitment to mine action and victim assistance section above), as well as the lack of a long-term explosive ordnance disposal capacity, poor access to external technical assistance, and deteriorating relations with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).65

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

In 2008, the mine action program had 126 national operational staff with two demining teams, two technical survey teams, two battle area clearance (BAC) teams, and six mine detection dog teams.66 In early 2009, the OSCE provided support for the creation of a third technical survey team under the Ministry of Defense. This team operates only in the area along the border with Afghanistan.67

In 2008, FSD reportedly cleared 0.74km\(^2\) of mined areas, with the destruction of 5,366 antipersonnel mines and 375 items of UXO.68 A further 24.83km\(^2\) of SHAs were released by TMAC through survey. FSD also cleared 158,258m\(^2\) of battle areas in 2008, with the destruction of 66 unexploded submunitions, 32 other items of UXO, and five antivehicle mines. No BAC operations were carried out in 2009 to May.69

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Tajikistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2010. Progress in meeting this obligation has been slow and Tajikistan has still to determine the extent of its mine contamination. Since the program started in 2004, Tajikistan has cleared only 1.83km\(^2\) of mined areas (see table below).

On 31 March 2009, Tajikistan submitted a request for a 10-year extension of its Article 5 deadline. Tajikistan cited a series of factors that explain its failure to meet its 2010 deadline, including limited funding as well as its own delays in initiating a demining program. Many of its SHAs are located in the mountains, which makes operations difficult. Also, severe weather conditions in some areas restrict operations to only three or four months a year.70 In 2009, for example, mine clearance operations started only in April.71

63 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 2.
64 Telephone interview with Parviz Mavljunkulov, TMAC, 5 August 2009.
66 Email from Parviz Mavljunkulov, TMAC, 23 June 2009.
67 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 5.
68 Email from Parviz Mavljunkulov, TMAC, 17 August 2009.
69 Ibid, and 5 August 2009.
70 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 3.
71 Email from Parviz Mavljunkulov, TMAC, 5 August 2009.
Mine and battle area clearance from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>Area released by survey (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0.74</td>
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<td>24.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>17.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2003</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.83</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.34</strong></td>
<td><strong>42.41</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In May 2009, during the presentation of Tajikistan’s extension request to the Standing Committee meetings, the ICBL called the duration of the request excessive and suggested that Tajikistan request a five-year extension to its clearance deadline.

Risk Education

RE was conducted in 22 mine-affected districts in the north, northwest, south, and southeast of the country. Communities were actively involved in RE through district officials, district emergency situation committees, district and village women’s councils, teachers, community members, and branches of the TjRCS. Activities consisted of roundtable meetings, workshops, community meetings, and RE in schools. Billboards were displayed for shepherds, while local government buildings and schools also displayed information, and materials were distributed. The national media also broadcast RE messages through television advertisements and interviews with RE practitioners in Tajik and Russian languages. Additionally, RE materials are produced and disseminated in the Uzbek language, as a significant number of ethnic Uzbek people live in the contaminated areas. Representatives from the two contaminated districts not covered in the RE program participated in events in neighboring districts. A lack of funding limited RE activities.

Contamination and casualty data are used to define the target group for RE, and to prioritize activities, but there were no formal needs assessments in 2008.

Although UNICEF support to the schools program ended in August 2007, TMAC continued to support RE in 290 schools in all contaminated districts, training teachers and using materials left over from the program.

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72 Ibid, 23 June 2009. The information in this table differs from previous Landmine Monitor reporting. Landmine Monitor reported 0.54km² for mine clearance in 2007; 0.31km² for mine clearance in 2006; 0.06 for BAC in 2006; and 17.7km² for area released by survey in 2007.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Email from Zanjirbek Karamov, Mine Risk Education Program Coordinator, TjRCS, 7 September 2009.
78 Telephone interview with Shahrinisso Davlyatova, TMAC/UNDP, 13 August 2009.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
The TjRCS continued its program based on a participatory community-based approach developed by the ICRC. They trained 66 volunteers from remote communities in 22 districts to deliver RE in 331 villages. Training included courses on “Development communication in [mine risk education] MRE” and “Gender Equity in MRE”. It has nine safe play areas, the first established in 2005.

Harmony of the World has included RE in its annual summer camps since 2006, training landmine survivors to deliver RE.

Since 2001, the TjRCS has been the main RE provider, using a community-based approach, with ICRC support, following a needs assessment conducted by the TjRCS, ICRC, and Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense. Prior to this, ICRC conducted some awareness activities and distributed materials.

In September 2005, UNICEF conducted a knowledge, attitudes and practice (KAP) survey that found children “had a relatively good knowledge of safety behavior, but needed encouragement and reminders to follow safety roles.” UNICEF also broadcast some children’s advertisements in 2005. It ran a pilot project from May 2005 to August 2007, training teachers and other educators to become RE focal points, and producing teaching guides. Despite an overall positive evaluation, the project was not continued, and the activities were incorporated into the TMAC program.

TMAC started to coordinate RE in 2005, and hired an RE officer in late 2006. RE expanded significantly in 2006 and in 2007 to reach areas that had previously been underserved. In 2007 a new program was launched, building on the participatory approach implemented by the TjRCS, and the Ministry of Education increased its involvement. Casualty and contamination data were used increasingly to prioritize RE and target groups.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Tajikistan is unknown, but at least 448. In 2009, TMAC reported progress in VA but acknowledged that challenges remained, including resource mobilization, long-term sustainability, capacity development, and adopting a holistic approach to survivor rehabilitation.

The 2006–2008 VA needs assessment showed that 90% of survivors were in need of economic assistance or income-generating projects; 85.5% needed long-term medical care and rehabilitation; 81% psychological support; 60% social support; and 57% training and education. TMAC’s priorities for 2010–2014 are physical and economic rehabilitation, accessibility to services, training rehabilitation specialists, capacity development, psychosocial support, data collection, resource mobilization, and long-term sustainability.

All Tajik nationals have the right to free emergency medical services and all casualties resulting from incidents in 2008 received emergency medical assistance. Casualties can be transported to hospitals and community health clinics by ambulance or other vehicles;

82 Ibid.
85 Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 13 July 2009.
86 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
87 Email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009; response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 671.
on average this journey takes between 30 minutes and three hours. While basic first-aid is available at clinics, they lack sufficient equipment and medicine. Overall, there is a lack of personnel trained in first-aid and emergency pre-hospital response in mine-affected areas. The specialized facilities nearest to the mine-affected areas are the Central District Hospitals (CDH), which have surgical and trauma departments, and an average of four or five surgeons. Local specialists are in need of training. There are no trauma specialists in the CDH in the mine-affected Tavildara district, although there are general surgeons. The cost of medicines in Tajikistan remains high. In 2008, the Ministry of Health received six mobile hospitals from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, which were distributed to the main hospitals in Sugd, Khatlon, Rasht, Gorniy Badakshan Autonomous Province and the National Medical Center in Dushanbe. A three-day training course on mobile hospitals for medical personnel was organized in August 2008.

Most mine/ERW survivors have access to physical rehabilitation services and orthopedic appliances. Services are available at the National Orthopedic Center (NOC) in Dushanbe or its three satellite workshops in Khujand (in the north), Kulob (in the center) and Khorugh (in the southeast). The satellite workshops are in poor condition, however, and lack capacity. Transportation, accommodation and meals for survivors receiving treatment at the workshops are provided free of charge. Physical rehabilitation is also available at the 60-bed National Research Institute for Rehabilitation of Disabled People (NRIRDP). After a gradual transition, the ICRC handed over the NOC to the MLSPP on 31 December 2008. The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) started supporting the NOC as of January 2009. In 2008, the NOC had a waiting list, due to the lack of technicians. Training for prosthetic technicians is not available in Tajikistan. In May 2008, TMAC, the Ministry of Health, and the International Trust Fund For Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) organized a six-day training on “Rehabilitation of Patients with Upper Limb Amputation” for 20 doctors from mine-affected districts and Dushanbe in May 2008.

91 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009; and “Fulfilling the aims of the Ottawa Convention’s Nairobi Action Plan,” undated but 2008, provided by email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
93 Ibid.
94 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
97 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
100 Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 8 September 2009.
Psychological support and socio-economic reintegration programs need to be expanded. Psychological support at the CDH level is limited. Assistance can be obtained at the NRIRDP and through the National Union of Disabled People. TMAC annual summer camps provide psychological support for a limited number of survivors. Socio-economic opportunities for survivors remain limited, although some income-generation activities were organized in 2008. Unemployment is a problem for the whole population and particularly for survivors. In 2008, the government increased pensions for persons with disabilities, including survivors and families of those killed by mines/ERW, raising the minimum pension to US$17 per month. Some 24% of survivors received the pension in 2008. Other benefits (including reduction of electricity and telephone bills) are granted to certain categories of persons with disabilities.

Tajikistan has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but implementation was not adequate because of lack of resources. Progress toward a new Law on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities was reported in 2009. As of 29 June 2009, Tajikistan had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. The convention was discussed at a roundtable organized by TMAC and the MLSPP on 30 May 2008. The International Forum of Organizations of the Disabled of Central Asian countries and Islamic Republic of Iran appealed to governments of the region to join the convention in August 2008. In June 2009, TMAC reported that the convention was under consideration by the government.

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives

Tajikistan is one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors. Tajikistan presented its 2005–2009 objectives as part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. It revised its objectives, and presented plans to achieve them, in 2006 and 2008.

Tajikistan’s revised VA action plan for 2006–2009 was discussed at the Second National Victim Assistance Workshop held in Dushanbe in April 2008. It was approved by the government in October 2008 and presented at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008. The plan

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109 Ibid.
111 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
112 Ibid.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
120 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
aims to achieve “the best possible quality of life for landmine survivors and for all persons with disabilities”\textsuperscript{125} and includes 21 revised SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) objectives and specific plans to achieve them.\textsuperscript{126}

Tajikistan has made progress towards its VA aims. Most of Tajikistan’s objectives (as revised in 2006) were achieved or in progress. Progress was noted on objectives under all components of VA.\textsuperscript{127} The least amount of progress was made on training of healthcare workers to improve pre-hospital emergency response capacity, disseminating the directory of economic reintegration services, providing psychological support, and raising awareness of the rights and capacities of persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{128} Funding for VA was overall inadequate, and in 2009 Tajikistan reported that it still needs international support.\textsuperscript{129}

Tajikistan reported on its VA activities at all meetings of States Parties and intersessional Standing Committee meetings from 2005–2009. Tajikistan used the voluntary Form J in its annual Article 7 report to provide an update on VA activities in 2006–2009. Tajikistan included a VA expert on its delegation to the meetings of States Parties from 2005–2008 and to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings from 2007–2009.\textsuperscript{130}

**Victim assistance activities**

In 2008, at least 157 mine/ERW survivors received assistance in Tajikistan (compared with 160 in 2007). The total number of survivors that received assistance between 1999 and 2008 is unknown, but at least 367 survivors received prosthetics, 110 survivors received psychological assistance, and 177 survivors received economic assistance.\textsuperscript{131} All new nine survivors in 2008 were provided with free treatment in national medical facilities.

In 2008, the NOC, with support from the ICRC, assisted 1,068 persons with physical rehabilitation and delivered 320 prostheses, 137 orthoses, 238 crutches, and two wheelchairs.\textsuperscript{132} Twenty-four mine/ERW survivors received prosthetics, including nine survivors injured in 2008.\textsuperscript{133} NOC staff received physiotherapy training from the ICRC and new manufacturing guidelines for trans-tibia and trans-femoral prostheses were translated into Tajik.\textsuperscript{134} The ITF reported among its training initiatives in 2008 a five-day workshop in Tajikistan on rehabilitation of patients with upper or low limb amputations. The workshop took place in May 2008, run by Slovenia’s Institute for Rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{135}

The NRIRDIP provided physical rehabilitation to 22 mine survivors.\textsuperscript{136} TMAC provided psychosocial support through summer camps to 34 survivors and support for educational activities for four survivors. Income-generating activities were organized for 56 survivors in the framework of a bee-keeping project in Tavildara and Sagirdasht districts implemented by

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{126} “Fulfilling the aims of the Ottawa Convention’s Nairobi Action Plan,” undated but 2008, provided by email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{128} “Fulfilling the aims of the Ottawa Convention’s Nairobi Action Plan,” undated but 2008, provided by email from Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{129} Statement of Tajikistan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{131} Statement of Tajikistan, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{133} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009; and statement of Tajikistan, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.
\textsuperscript{136} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reykhan Muminova, TMAC, 8 June 2009.
local authorities with funding provided by Canada. Eight family members of mine/ERW survivors received income generation support as part of a TjRCS project in Isfara and Panjakent districts.137

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for fulfilling mine action needs including RE and VA in Tajikistan. Tajikistan submitted an Article 5 clearance deadline extension request in March 2009 including a cost estimate of $36,270,000 (€24,629,906) for resurvey, manual demining, mechanical demining, mine detection dogs, and capacity-building from 2009 to 2019, averaging $3.8 million per year for completion of mine clearance, of which $550,000 is to be provided by Tajikistan. Annual international funding required for the plan ranges from a high of $3.7 million in 2009 to a low of $3.1 million from 2017 to 2019.138 The plan states that Tajikistan will hold donor consultative meetings at least twice per year to support resource mobilization.139

National support for mine action
Tajikistan reported providing $574,000 in national funding to mine action in 2008.140 Tajikistan reported to Landmine Monitor that it provided in-kind support valued at $565,000 in 2007.141 It did not report whether the funding was monetary or in-kind; in June 2008, however, TMAC reported that “there was no commitment for providing the [mine action] program with actual funds from the Government of Tajikistan.”142

International cooperation and assistance
In 2008, five countries reported providing $1,863,366 (€1,265,358) to mine action in Tajikistan. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was approximately 49% more than reported in 2007. Funding at 2008 levels is not sufficient to the meet mine clearance funding requirements reported in Tajikistan’s Article 5 deadline extension request, nor does it cover Tajikistan’s VA needs.

As of June 2008, TMAC reported an overall funding target for 2008 of $4,059,330.143

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,079,444 (€733,019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Mine clearance, capacity-building</td>
<td>$435,392 (C$464,121)</td>
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<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Mine clearance, capacity-building</td>
<td>$200,416 (£108,070)</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>UNDP, FSD</td>
<td>VA, survey, capacity-building</td>
<td>$122,226 (€83,000)</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>TjRCS, UNDP</td>
<td>RE, VA</td>
<td>$25,889 (CHF28,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$1,863,367 (€1,265,358)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

138 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, pp. 4, 13 and 14.
140 Article 5 extension request, 31 March 2009, p. 16.
142 Ibid.
144 Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; Belgium Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; and email from Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009.
### THAILAND

#### 2008 Key Data

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Party since</strong></td>
<td>1 May 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contamination</strong></td>
<td>Antipersonnel mines, ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated area of contamination</strong></td>
<td>562km² (July 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Casualties in 2008</strong></td>
<td>26 (2007: 19)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</strong></td>
<td>Unknown but estimated 1,252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</strong></td>
<td>Deadline: 1 November 2018 (Original deadline: 1 May 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demining in 2008</strong></td>
<td>Mined areas: 1.56km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk education recipients in 2008</strong></td>
<td>At least 37,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Progress towards victim assistance aims</strong></td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Support for mine action in 2008** | International: $0 (2007: $1.6 million)  
National: Unspecified (2007: $2.7 million) |

#### Ten-Year Summary


Thailand put in place a mine action structure supported mostly by its own financial resources in 1999 but the sector attracted little interest from political or military leaders: without adequate financial support it made little progress in either accurately defining or clearing mine contamination. Thailand set ambitious targets in its 2008 request for an extension to its Article 5 deadline but in 2009 neither the financing nor human resources needed to achieve them materialized, and clearance continued at a slow pace.

From June 1998 to 2008 Landmine Monitor recorded 555 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Thailand (26 killed, 169 injured, and 360 of unknown status). This total includes some casualties injured in Myanmar and recorded in Thailand which could not be separated from the data. Since 2001, mine/ERW risk education activities reached at least 1,018,632 beneficiaries, mostly conducted by personnel from the Thailand Mine Action Center Humanitarian Mine Action Units.

Data collection on survivors and their needs improved with a national survey in 2008–2009, despite the lack of a comprehensive national surveillance system. Thailand’s progress in victim assistance was slow in 2005–2007, after which significant advances were made in increasing the level of emergency and continuing medical care. Despite improvements in psychological support and economic reintegration, these services have not adequately addressed the specific needs of survivors, most of whom live in rural communities. Improved public policy enforcing the rights of persons with disabilities has been supported by Thailand’s ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Mine Ban Policy

Thailand signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 27 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. Thailand has not enacted domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. In April 2009, the Director General of the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) said that Thailand was in the process of passing an executive measure, the Office of the Prime Minister Regulations Governing the Implementation of the Convention, to ensure that the military, the police and other domestic agencies do not violate the treaty. The Sub-committee on Administration and Evaluation is responsible for this, and in early 2009 was in the process of submitting the draft regulation to the National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action for consideration.1

Thailand submitted its 11th Article 7 report on 30 April 2009, covering calendar year 2008.2

Thailand participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it formally requested an extension of its Article 5 mine clearance deadline. It also delivered a statement as the incoming co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration after serving as co-rapporteur the previous year. In addition, it made interventions during the general exchange of views, and during sessions dealing with mine clearance deadline extension requests, victim assistance (VA), and compliance (for the latter, see Use section below).

At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, in addition to its role as co-chair on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Thailand made statements during the sessions on universalization, VA, clearance deadline extensions, risk education (RE), and the Second Review Conference.

Thailand hosted the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine Free South-East Asia from 1–3 April 2009. This was the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the Second Review Conference. Eighteen countries, including all non-signatory states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), participated. Thailand also hosted a parallel Chiang Mai/Bangkok workshop on VA.

Thailand has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Thailand is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Thailand had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 1 July 2009.3

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

Thailand states that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Thailand formerly imported antipersonnel mines from China, Italy, the United States, and the former Yugoslavia. It completed destruction of 337,725 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 24 April 2003.

The Royal Thai Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Thailand National Police Department initially retained a total of 4,970 antipersonnel mines for training. The number of retained mines did not change from 2001 to 2004. In 2005–2006, Thailand reduced the number of mines retained by

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1 Oral intervention by Lt.-Gen. Tumrongsak Deemongkol, Director-General, TMAC, Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free Southeast Asia, Bangkok, 3 April 2009; and interview with Lt.-Gen. Tumrongsak Deemongkol, TMAC, in Bangkok, 19 March 2009. TMAC also told Landmine Monitor in February 2008 that this draft measure, which would amend existing laws, was in the process of being submitted to NMAC. The draft was first developed by TMAC in 2002. Thailand’s Article 7 reports submitted in 2007, 2008, and 2009 all stated, “The issuing is still in progress.” Thailand has reported that the draft regulation has been pending approval of various entities each year, including the Armed Forces Supreme Command, the Ministry of Defense, and the Cabinet. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it would be in place by the Review Conference in 2004. See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.


In 2007, it reduced the number by another 1,063 mines. It appears that 63 of the mines retained by the National Police Department were consumed during training activities, and all of the 1,000 mines retained by the navy were simply destroyed, presumably because they were no longer deemed necessary. 

In its latest Article 7 report covering 2008, Thailand reported that at the end of 2008, it retained 3,638 antipersonnel mines, a reduction of 12 from the previous year. It reported that 12 mines retained by the National Police Department (nine M14 and three M16) were destroyed for unknown reasons. No mines were reported as transferred for use in training. At the end of 2008, the army retained 3,000 mines, the Royal Thai Air Force retained 581 mines, and the National Police Department retained 57 mines. The total of 3,000 mines under the control of the army has not changed since 2001. Thailand has not provided details on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004.

While Thailand has not undertaken physical modifications of its Claymore mine stockpile to ensure use only in command-detonated mode, officials have stated that all units have received orders that Claymore mines are to be used only in command-detonated mode. The Director General of TMAC told Landmine Monitor in March 2009 that Thai forces have not used the Claymore mines.

**Use**

The insurgency in southern Thailand has seen extensive use of command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). There have apparently also been isolated instances of use of homemade landmines or victim-activated IEDs. In February 2009, a police officer was seriously wounded in Yala province by what was reported to be an explosive booby-trap.

On 6 October 2008, a Thai paramilitary ranger stepped on an antipersonnel landmine while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. A second ranger stepped on an antipersonnel mine while attempting to aid the first injured. Both lost their legs. This took place three days after an exchange of gunfire between Thai and Cambodian military units at the same location.

Thai authorities maintain that the area was previously clear of landmines. TMAC sent a team to investigate which found some PMN2-type antipersonnel mines. TMAC stated that the mines were newly placed. The sequence of the discovery was detailed on the Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs website.

Cambodian authorities stated that the Thai investigation of the incident site was a unilateral incursion on Cambodian territory undertaken without their consent or participation, and denounced the action. The Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Thai
paramilitary rangers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts.\(^\text{15}\)

The Coordinator of the Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines (TCBL) visited the site at the invitation of TMAC and Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and observed, “The mines which were displayed as recovered from the site showed no rust on their metal parts. Identification numbers on the mines were clearly visible, and did not appear to have been exposed to the elements very long. Local villagers informed me that they regularly used the path where the incidents took place.”\(^\text{16}\)

Thailand stated that the Royal Thai Army has never possessed PMN2 mines.\(^\text{17}\) Cambodia’s annual transparency reports indicate that PMN2 mines are commonly found during mine clearance operations.\(^\text{18}\) It has also reported stockpiling PMN2 mines in the past.\(^\text{19}\)

On 17 October 2008, representatives of the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and TMAC met with an ICBL/TCBL mission and presented information from Thailand’s investigations into the incident. Subsequently Thailand made this information available to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November.\(^\text{20}\)

Both Thailand and Cambodia made statements on the incident at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties. Thailand said it was “compelled to bring to the attention of States Parties the facts relating to an incident which, in our view, constitutes a clear violation of the Convention…[A] process of clarification must be set up and conducted in a constructive way within the framework of the Convention…Thailand has no intention of accusing any state party or politicizing this matter. Thailand has exercised utmost restraint to avoid jumping to conclusion. Rather, we have taken the appropriate step to request clarification from Cambodia via bilateral channel in accordance with Article 8(1) of the Convention. At this stage, Thailand is still ready to consider any options within the framework of Article 8(1) that would allow us to shed light on the 6 October incident, including the setting up of an international fact finding mission…”\(^\text{21}\)

It would appear from available evidence that this incident involved new use of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor is not able to determine who was responsible for the use. To Landmine Monitor’s knowledge, other States Parties have not pursued a resolution to this issue with Cambodia and Thailand.

On 1 April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries.\(^\text{22}\)


\(^{16}\) Interview with Emilie Ketudat, Coordinator, Thailand Campaign to Ban Landmines (TCBL), Bangkok, 18 October 2008.

\(^{17}\) Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Diplomatic Corps briefed on Thailand-Cambodia Border Incidents,” Press Release, 17 October 2008, www.mfa.go.th. Thailand’s Article 7 report submitted in April 2008 stated that the Royal Thai Army retained 10 “PMN2” mines. However, its April 2009 report records that the Royal Thai Army retained ten “PMN” mines; reports from 2004–2006 also cite “PMN.”

\(^{18}\) See Cambodia Article 7 Report, Form F, 28 April 2009, and see also previous Cambodia Article 7 reports.

\(^{19}\) See Cambodia Article 7 Report, Form D, 15 April 2003.


\(^{21}\) Statement by Dr. Virachai Plasai, Director-General, Department of Treaties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

\(^{22}\) “Cambodia, Thai border clash leaves two dead,” *Agence France-Presse* (Phnom Penh), 2 April 2009.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Thailand is affected by landmines and ERW, both abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and UXO, the result of conflicts on its borders with Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Myanmar, and Malaysia. The 2001 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 530 communities in 27 of 76 provinces and more than 500,000 people as mine-affected.

The LIS estimated the total area of mine/ERW contamination at 2,557km².23 Thailand’s revised Article 5 deadline extension request claimed Thailand had released 1,354.75km² leaving a total of 1,202.25km² of suspected area to be tackled, including an estimated 528.2km² of “real minefield” requiring manual demining.24 TMAC revised those estimates in 2009 and as of July had increased the estimated area of mined areas to 562km² (see Identification of hazardous areas section below).25

Thailand’s 700km border with Cambodia, used as a base by Cambodian guerrilla factions in the 1980s and 1990s, is worst affected, accounting for three-quarters of the LIS estimate and 51 of 69 high-impacted communities.26 More than half of the mine incidents in Thailand have occurred on this border.27 The Cambodian border is also contaminated by artillery and mortar shells fired by Vietnamese and Cambodian government forces and caches of abandoned mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and ammunition left by Cambodian guerrilla groups.28

On the border with Myanmar, the LIS identified 139 affected communities and 240 contaminated areas.29 Periodic spillover into Thailand of fighting between Myanmar government forces and Burmese non-state armed groups has deterred efforts either to survey or clear affected areas on the border.30 Contamination on the border with Lao PDR is limited and on the border with Malaysia it is negligible.31

Casualties

Landmine Monitor identified 26 mine/ERW casualties in Thailand in 2008; three people were killed and 23 injured.32 TMAC’s Humanitarian Mine Action Units (HMAU) recorded some 18 of these casualties (two killed and 16 injured). This was supplemented with data from hospitals (six injured) and the Epidemiology Office of the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) (one killed and one injured). Of the total, 25 casualties were male and one was female (adult). At least four casualties were boys and the age of another three male casualties was unknown. Eighteen casualties were civilian, five casualties were military or security personnel and three were deminers (injured in two incidents).

24 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 7 August 2008, pp. 15, 19.
32 Email from Lt. Pongpol Sutthibenjakul, Database Office, TMAC, 5 May 2009; fax from Duangrudee Chanchareon, Nurse, Mae Sot Hospital, 28 April 2009; fax from Supanit Dhammawong, Nurse, Si Sang Wal Hospital, 28 April 2009; data from the Epidemiology Office of the MoPH provided by fax from the Division of Operation Coordination, TMAC, 29 April 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring from January–December 2008.
Activities of civilians at the time of the incident, when known, included collecting wood or food (five), herding (four), and agriculture (three). Casualties mostly occurred on the Thai-Cambodian border, in the provinces of Si Sa Ket (eight), Trat (six), Surin (two), Ubon Ratchathani (two), Buriram (one), and Chanthaburi (one). Another six casualties occurred in Tak province on the Thai-Myanmar border. This represents an increase from 19 new mine/ERW casualties identified for 2007 (all injured). Three casualties were citizens of Myanmar.\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 683.}

In 2008, at least two Thai citizens were injured by mines/ERW in Myanmar, close to the Thai border. Both received treatment in Thailand.\footnote{Information provided by fax from Duangrudee Chanchareon, Mae Sot Hospital, 28 April 2009.} In addition, in February 2008, 14 Myanmar nationals were injured when an unidentified device exploded at a garbage dump while they searched for scrap metal. The device was variously reported in the media as a mine, an item of UXO, a homemade bomb, or a Molotov cocktail. Due to uncertainty about the device type, these casualties have not been included in the total for 2008.\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 683; “Police illegally detain and forcibly repatriate victims of bomb blast,” Asian Human Rights Commission, 27 February 2008, www.ahrchk.net; “Injured by blast? Where’s your ID?,” Rule of Lords (Online), 27 February 2008, ratchasima.net; and “NGOs Demand Halt to Refoulement of Injured Migrant Workers,” Prachatai (Bangkok), 27 February 2008, www.prachatai.com.}

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009 with at least four casualties (all injured) resulting from three incidents, as of 28 July. Two soldiers were injured on the Thai side of the disputed border area around Preah Vihear Temple. In Trat province, a husband and wife were both injured while collecting forest products: the man had previously stepped on a mine in 1993.\footnote{Landmine Monitor media monitoring from January–July 2009.}

In March 2009, a Thai farmer was injured in Israel by a mine while looking for mushrooms.\footnote{Eilian Kidman, “Went to pick up mushrooms and stepped on a landmine,” Local, 1 March 2009, www.local.co.il.}

From June 1998 to 2008 Landmine Monitor recorded 555 casualties in Thailand: 26 killed, 169 injured, and 360 of unknown status. This total includes some casualties injured in Myanmar and recorded in Thailand, which could not be separated from the data. It was not possible to separate out individual years for the data from June 1998 to May 2001. There has been no discernable decrease in the annual number of casualties since 2002.\footnote{See previous editions of Landmine Monitor. Landmine Monitor Report 2006 reported 51 casualties for 2005, however, details were provided for only 43. The others included may be erroneous or may have occurred in Myanmar and have not been included in the cumulative total. The LIS recorded 346 new casualties between June 1998 and May 2001, in addition, Landmine Monitor recorded two killed in December 2001. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 492.}

The most comprehensive casualty data collection for Thailand, including casualties both killed and injured, remains the LIS, which identified at least 3,468 casualties to May 2001 (1,497 people killed and 1,971 injured).\footnote{See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 672.} In 2008–2009, a retrospective data collection survey recorded a total of 1,252 mine/ERW survivors in 22 provinces of Thailand. Some three-quarters of all mine/ERW survivors were registered as physically disabled. Of the total 1,252 survivors identified, 1,246 provided detailed information: 1,157 (93%) were male and 89 (7%) female. The highest numbers of survivors were in the provinces of Sa Kaeo, 256 people (20% of total); Nan, 139 people (11%); and Si Sa Ket, 109 people (9%).\footnote{Although the retrospective survivor survey identified fewer than the total number of injured identified by the LIS, the difference may be attributed to different methodologies used: the survey targeted only Thai survivors and excluded non-Thai survivors, including those from neighboring countries injured in their country receiving medical care and rehabilitation in Thailand or survivors living in temporary shelters inside Thailand’s borders. Furthermore, landmine survivors who had died since the incident were not included in the data. Email from Shushira Chonhenchob, Disability and Development Manager, HI, 13 April 2009; and HI, “Mine Victim Survey and Situation Analysis: Findings, Analyses and Recommendations,” Bangkok, June 2009, p. 3.}
Risk profile
Casualty data indicates that livelihood activities are the main activities at the time of the incident: tending animals, agriculture, farming, hunting, fishing, and collecting wood, water, or food.41 Most incidents are caused by mines along the border with Cambodia, and most of the casualties are male. People are prohibited from entering land within 3km of the border by law. However, in the surrounding villages some people do enter mined areas to get food from the forest.42 People also have incidents crossing the border between Myanmar and Thailand.

Socio-economic impact
The main impact of mines and ERW has been to deny border communities the use of forest resources and, to a lesser extent, cropland, pasture, and water resources. Residential areas, roads, and other major infrastructure are rarely affected. Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request noted that economic growth since the LIS had lessened communities’ dependence on forest resources but mine and UXO contamination continued to cause casualties and pose barriers to local socio-economic development.43

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
Responsibility for overseeing mine action lies with the National Committee for Humanitarian Mine Action (NMAC), set up in 2000. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and includes representatives of all major ministries and government departments. Its duties include coordinating national and international support for demining, monitoring Thailand’s progress towards meeting its Mine Ban Treaty obligations, and monitoring implementation of the law banning landmines. NMAC’s mandate expired in January 2005 but was renewed in November 2006 after a military coup d’état.44 Abhisit Vejjajiva took office on 17 December 2008, as Thailand’s third prime minister since the 2006 coup, but as of July 2009 had not chaired a meeting of NMAC.

TMAC was established in 1999 under the Armed Forces Supreme Command to coordinate and implement mine action, including survey, clearance, RE, and VA. Since 2005, TMAC has pressed for a change in its status to a civilian organization, prompted by the slow progress of demining and the armed forces’ limited budget for operations.45 NMAC accepted the restructuring in principle in February 2007 but as of April 2009 had not decided on the new structure. The proposal that TMAC becomes a foundation but remains under the Armed Forces is still pending.46 The February 2007 meeting also decided to set up five sub-committees for VA, coordination with foreign organizations, demining, RE, and monitoring and evaluation. Each sub-committee met at least once in 2007 and 2008.47

Risk education
TMAC is responsible for coordinating RE and supporting training, and it also implements RE through the HMAUs. All RE activities along the borders have to be coordinated with TMAC because they are a military body and the army controls the border areas.48 TMAC monitors its own activities, but not those of other organizations. RE activity data is entered into the TMAC database.49

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46 Ibid, 8 April 2009.
49 Information provided by Shushira Chonhenchob, Landmine Monitor, 28 July 2009.
Victim assistance
The National Sub-Committee on Victim Assistance (VA sub-committee), established under NMAC, is the coordinating body for VA. The VA sub-committee, chaired by the MoPH, meets at least twice a year and includes the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security (MoSDHS), Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Labor, TMAC, and relevant NGOs.\(^{50}\)

Data collection and management
TMAC upgraded the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database to Version 5 in November 2007 but has experienced difficulties storing and accessing some data. TMAC signed a memorandum of understanding with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in February 2009 to provide technical assistance to develop its information management capacity as well as its technical survey and land release procedures.\(^{51}\)

An NPA assessment of the database in February 2009 noted that “lack of consistency in available data and TMAC’s current status as an ad hoc unit within the [Ministry of Defense] greatly hampers its functioning as staff rotate annually.” The assessment observed that the database unit’s five staff had no terms of reference or guidelines, clearance data was recorded in the Geographic Information System but undated, land release data was incomplete, and incident data existed in paper format only.\(^{52}\)

Thailand does not have a complete national data collection mechanism. The total number of mine/ERW casualties, both killed and injured remains unknown and, for 2008, Landmine Monitor continued to identify a few casualties not recorded in the existing data collection system. TMAC HMAUs collect new incident reports in areas of operation in mine-affected provinces, mainly along the Thai-Cambodian border. Details of the casualty and incident are entered into local log books. In 2008, TMAC continued to receive data directly from 16 mine-affected provinces through four HMAUs. In 2008, TMAC also received casualty data collected by the Epidemiology Office of the MoPH from all 76 provinces in Thailand. TMAC compiled data from both sources, concentrating on the 27 mine-affected provinces. TMAC shares information with the VA sub-committee, the MoPH, and relevant NGOs.\(^{53}\)

The most significant improvement in data collection and management from 2008–2009 was the completion of Thailand’s retrospective survivor data collection survey from June 2008 to April 2009. The project was the first comprehensive survey of mine/ERW survivors and established a database for future use in planning and implementation of services. The survey was conducted by Handicap International (HI) in Thailand in cooperation with Peace Road Organization Foundation (PRO), the Catholic Office for Emergency Relief and Refugees (COERR), and Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) with the financial support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the cooperation of the VA sub-committee including the MoPH, MoSDHS, and the Ministry of Labor.\(^{54}\) An online database containing information from the survey will be maintained by the MoPH and TMAC.\(^{55}\)


\(^{51}\) Interviews with Rune Engeset, Regional Program Manager, NPA, Bangkok, 3 April 2009; and with Lt.-Gen. Tumrongsk Deemongkol, TMAC, Bangkok, 22 July 2009.


\(^{54}\) Statement of Thailand, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva 26 May 2009; and email from Shushira Chonhenchob, HI, 13 April 2009.

Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COERR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mekong Organization for Mankind</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Plans

**Strategic mine action plans**

Thailand’s Master Plan on Humanitarian Mine Action No. 2 (2005–2009), drawn up by TMAC, set out general objectives of mine action in the country, emphasizing the integration of mine action into the National Socio-economic Development Plan. In view of the large estimate of contaminated area produced by the LIS and the slow progress of clearance operations, TMAC has increasingly focused on area reduction.56

TMAC’s current strategy is set out in Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request. The request identifies “Area Reduction Survey” as the “primary method of land release,” focusing particularly on its “Locating Minefield Procedure” (LMP). However, the request also “assumes” 528.2km² remains to be manually cleared, calling for annual clearance rising from 43km² in 2009 to 64.7km² in 2016 before dropping back to 63.5km² in 2019.57

The request envisaged total expenditure of THB17.4 billion (US$527.2 million). To achieve this target, TMAC also planned administrative reorganization and a major expansion in personnel, including a rise in the number of deminers from 546 in 2007 to around 900, making up 90 ten-person teams, and the acquisition of new equipment, including vehicles and detectors.58

Thailand has a Master Plan for Mine Risk Education 2007–2011, approved in February 2007. The plan notes which government agencies share responsibilities for RE, and mentions the role of NGOs, but lacks detailed planning and timeframes.59

The Master Plan for Mine Victim Assistance 2007–2011, allocates responsibility for VA services to various ministries in conjunction with the work of NGOs and other relevant bodies.60

National ownership

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Thailand’s institutional framework for managing mine action provides for engagement of the Prime Minister and senior ministers as well as the Armed Forces Supreme Command, directly responsible for TMAC. In practice, Thai political and military leaders have paid little attention to mine action which, as a result, remained severely under-funded in the past decade. Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request acknowledged TMAC had experienced “some organizational disadvantages” as an organization under military control and that it had been seeking to become a civilian organization to increase its flexibility and “administrative effectiveness.”61

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57 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 7 August 2008, pp. 22–23.
58 Ibid.
61 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 7 August 2008, p. 25.
In 2009, Thailand reported that “Thailand has always been committed to assisting victims of landmines.” Management of VA is carried out through national bodies and coordinated by NMAC’s VA sub-committee. Thailand has no specific VA legislation, but uses existing disability legislation for its VA planning. Except for the assistance to Myanmar refugees by HI, ICRC, and Clear Path International (CPI), all funding for VA was national (see Services for non-Thai nationals section below).

**National management**

TMAC has operated with an entirely national management and staff, mostly on two to three year rotation from regular service with the armed forces. A UNDP project officer started work in TMAC in mid-2009 to provide support for strategic planning and identifying provincial mine action priorities, to provide support for VA and enhance cooperation with NGOs. UNDP also agreed to provide an international technical advisor to lead the project but as of August 2009 had not finalized the appointment.

**National budget**

TMAC has been financed exclusively from the national budget since it was set up in 1999, although it has received some in-kind support from foreign governments, notably army surplus vehicles from the US. National funding has accounted for nearly 60% of total mine action expenditure between 1999 and 2008, the balance coming in the form of donor support to NGOs.

**National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures**

Thailand has no national legislation on mine action, other than government orders setting up NMAC and TMAC. TMAC’s humanitarian mine action units operate according to Thai national standards which TMAC says are based on the International Mine Action Standards. There are no national RE standards.

No standing operating procedures are known to exist for data management. TMAC reached an agreement with NPA in February 2009 to provide technical support, including development of land release procedures and ensuring they met international standards.

**Program evaluations**

The reporting of the retrospective survivor survey completed in 2009 included assessment of existing services and structures, together with general recommendations for improving VA.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

TMAC operates four HMAUs: three army units reporting to army task forces and one unit of marines reporting to the navy. Three of the units work on the border with Cambodia while the fourth works on the border with Lao PDR. In fiscal year 2009 (October 2008 to September 2009), the units had 426 staff out of TMAC’s total staff of 498, which was down from a total of 546 in fiscal 2008.

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63 Email from Reuben McCarthy, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Specialist, UNDP, 4 September 2009.
65 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 7 August 2008, p. 20.
67 Ibid.
68 Information provided by Shushira Chonhenchob, Landmine Monitor, Bangkok, 28 July 2009.
69 Interview with Rune Engeset, NPA, in Bangkok, 3 April 2009.
In 2008, demining was also conducted by two NGOs: the Peace Road Organization Foundation (PRO) with 35 field staff and the Mekong Organization for Mankind (MOM), which had about 50 staff, including 40 deminers, operating with some of its own equipment and some provided on loan by TMAC.

Identification of hazardous areas
In 2008 and early 2009, TMAC continued the LMP that began in October 2007. TMAC’s reporting, however, left considerable uncertainty about the dimensions of Thailand’s residual mine threat.

The LIS had identified a total of 2,557 km² as suspected hazardous area (SHA). In its revised Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2008, Thailand reported it had released a total of 1,611.2 km² of land through the LMP and clearance. The extension request further estimated Thailand still had 528.2 km² of “real minefield.” In March 2009, TMAC said that out of a total SHA of 2,417.6 km², it had identified 531.5 km² of minefields through LMP and 1,886.1 km² as safe. It also reported 55.9 km² as demined land and 77.6 km² as “dangerous land” needing to be checked by LMP. In July 2009, TMAC estimated the area of minefield at 562 km².

MOM started a two-year Integrated Area Reduction Survey (IARS) project in November 2007 as part of TMAC’s LMP initiative. TMAC assigned MOM to survey 219.5 km² in the provinces of Buriram, Chanthaburi, Sa Kao, Si Sa Ket, Surin, Trat, and Ubon Ratchathani on the border with Cambodia. The project covered four main activities: LMP; posting warning signs around SHAs; informing the community about the location of minefields; and spot demining. MOM deployed about 40 staff in the field for the project and received $1.28 million from Japan through the Japan-ASEAN Integrated Fund. MOM completed fieldwork in April 2009 leaving a further six months to check data and undertake spot clearance tasks.

Demining in 2008
TMAC nearly tripled the area it demined in 2008 to 1.3 km² from the previous year, when its four units cleared less than 0.5 km² and a total of 51 mines. The main focus of its efforts was implementing its LMP, which resulted in area reducing 805 km² of land identified by the LIS as suspect. But the 2008 and initial 2009 results underlined the highly, perhaps unrealistically, ambitious targets Thailand set in its Article 5 deadline extension request. This proposed that Thailand would clear 43 km² of mined area in 2009. In the first half of 2009, TMAC reported provisionally that it cleared 1.3 km². PRO continued mine clearance in the Pra Wiharn Sanctuary area in Si Sa Ket province and completed the project at the end of December 2008. As of April 2009, PRO no longer had funding and was not conducting any demining. MOM conducted spot demining as part of its IARS project.

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72 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 7 August 2008, pp. 4–5.
73 Presentation by TMAC, Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, 2 April 2009.
74 Interview with Lt.-Gen. Tumrongsak Deemongkol, TMAC, Bangkok, 22 July 2009.
75 Interview with Amornchai Sirisai, Project Manager, MOM, Bangkok, 3 April 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 681.
76 Interview with Amornchai Sirisai, MOM, Bangkok, 3 April 2009.
78 TMAC, “Increasing capacity on demining in order to achieve missions in the extended time frame,” Information document produced for TMAC Annual Seminar, Chanthaburi province, 7–9 April 2009.
79 Interview with Ruangrit Leunthaisong, Project Manager, PRO, in Chanthaburi province, 7 April 2009.
80 Interview with Amornchai Sirisai, MOM, Bangkok, 3 April 2009.
### Demining in 2008\(^{81}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Mine clearance ((\text{km}^2))</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed*</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>Area released by survey ((\text{km}^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOM</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMAC</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>804.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.56</strong></td>
<td><strong>208</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>815.31</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Unconfirmed clearance data indicates that TMAC also cleared 579 items of UXO in 2008.

### Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Thailand was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2009. Thailand’s limited progress in clearance since 2003 is reflected in the table below.

### Demining from 2003–2008\(^{82}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance ((\text{km}^2))</th>
<th>Area released by survey ((\text{km}^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>815.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>10.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.01</strong></td>
<td><strong>907.24</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In April 2008, Thailand applied to extend its Article 5 deadline, and submitted a revised request in August 2008. It asked for an extension to its deadline of 9.5 years, to 1 November 2018.\(^{83}\) The request estimated Thailand had 528.2\(\text{km}^2\) of “real minefield” requiring clearance by “traditional landmine clearance method [sic].” Although Thailand has cleared on average less than 1\(\text{km}^2\) a year, the request suggests annual clearance will climb from 43.07\(\text{km}^2\) in 2009 to 64.71\(\text{km}^2\) in 2016 before falling back to 63.51\(\text{km}^2\) in 2018.\(^{84}\)

The Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva granted the requested extension but called the 9.5 year timeframe “ambitious” and noted that achieving it was “contingent upon maintaining a sizeable increase in State funds dedicated to implementation and obtaining external support at a level that is at least 10 times greater than Thailand’s recent experience in acquiring such support.” The Meeting of States Parties further noted that significant progress was expected, through Thailand’s LMP, to overcome impeding circumstances such as the manner in which it said the LIS “had hindered implementation efforts” by its overestimate of contamination.\(^{85}\)

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\(^{81}\) Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2009. Destruction of antivehicle mines in 2008 was not reported in Thailand’s Article 7 report, but was recorded in TMAC’s monthly report, October 2008.

\(^{82}\) Results from 2003–2007 are taken from Landmine Monitor reports based on TMAC reporting, and the results for 2008 come from Thailand’s latest Article 7 report, submitted 30 April 2009.

\(^{83}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 7 August 2008, p. 7.

\(^{84}\) Ibid, pp. 18–23.

\(^{85}\) Decision on Thailand’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.
By mid-2009, Thailand was already having difficulty meeting the goals set in its extension request. The rate of demining by TMAC in the first half of 2009 (1.3km$^2$) was well behind what was needed to achieve the projected annual rate (43km$^2$) while the estimated area of contamination had actually increased (from 528km$^2$ to 562km$^2$).

To achieve its clearance targets, TMAC had envisaged increasing the number of deminers to 800 by the end of April 2009. As of June, however, TMAC’s HMAUs had 426 deminers. TMAC’s expansion was also dependent on receiving a big increase in its budget. In fiscal year 2008 (October 2007 to September 2008) TMAC’s budget rose to THB107.4 million ($3.3 million), 20% more than the previous year and more than double the annual budget received through much of the last decade. In August 2008, the government pledged THB1.4 billion ($42.4 million) for mine action for fiscal 2009 in line with the budget need set out in Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request. However, a new government took office in December 2008. As of July 2009, TMAC had not received the budget and was still uncertain of what funding was available for the year.

Risk Education

In 2008, RE was carried out by the HMAUs, HI’s Burmese Border Program, and COERR. HI’s Disability and Development Program, which included RE, ceased activities in February 2008 due to changes in its internal strategy and a lack of funding. At least 37,180 people received direct RE in 2008, in 11 of 27 the mine-affected provinces, all near the borders with Cambodia and Myanmar. This is a significant decrease from 2007, when some 63,911 people received RE. RE implemented by NGOs has decreased due to lack of funding, although TMAC activities continued at the same level. There are female RE staff in HI, but not in the HMAUs.

Casualty data is used to plan activities. TMAC RE teams go to villages and gather information about the locations of mines, then deliver RE. Messages delivered depended on the target group and geographical areas, and mainly consist of “do not touch, do not get close,” “do not go to the forest in mine-affected areas,” “do not go to unknown places.”

On completion of HI’s Disability and Development Program, HI handed the materials and curriculum over to the RE sub-committee members, so that it could be used by schools, landmine survivors, HMAUs, border patrol police, and other NGOs. The supervisors at the educational area offices monitor school activities but, without follow-up, activities are decreasing.

Each organization developed their materials for their specific uses and needs, but also collaborated to produce and share materials.

In the first two months of 2008, there were some radio broadcasts (i.e. provincial radio, community) by HI in Chanthaburi and Trat, which continued from 2007.

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87 TMAC, “Increasing capacity of demining to achieve extended deadline objectives,” Information document produced for TMAC Annual Seminar, Chanthaburi province, 7–9 April 2009; Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 7 August 2008, p. 20; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 713.
89 Email from Shushira Chonhenchob, HI, 13 April 2009.
90 Ibid.
92 Information provided by Shushira Chonhenchob, HI, 13 April 2009.
94 Information provided by Shushira Chonhenchob, HI, 13 April 2009.
96 Information provided by Shushira Chonhenchob, HI, 13 April 2009.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
### Activities in 2008<sup>100</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographical area (provinces)</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COERR</td>
<td>RE for schoolchildren</td>
<td>Sa Kaeo and Surin</td>
<td>No beneficiaries in 2008. Since the project started in October 2008, COERR has not trained any students. The total target is 2,500 students in 12 schools, to be covered by the end of September 2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMAC HMAUs</td>
<td>RE for communities and schoolchildren, displaying exhibitions at important events, posters, dissemination of information leaflets</td>
<td>HMAU1: Sa Kaeo HMAU2: Chanthaburi, Trat HMAU3: Buriram, Si Sa Ket, HMAU4: Chiang Rai</td>
<td>At least 12,131 in 42 villages (no beneficiaries recorded in at least two villages by HMAU3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Mine awareness—showing exhibitions in Si Sa Ket and Bangkok at relevant events</td>
<td>Kantharalak district, Si Sa Ket province, Thai-Cambodian border</td>
<td>Two phases in 2007–2008, reaching a total of approximately 3,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RE in Thailand has been mainly conducted by HMAUs and up to five NGOs in any one year. The NGOs were: the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC), HI, COERR, the General Chatichi Choonhavan Foundation (GCCF), and JRS. A training center for mine awareness was established in 1999 by TMAC and ADPC. The HMAUs mainly worked near the borders with Cambodia and Lao PDR. RE was conducted by military officers, who spent up to two weeks in a community conducting marking, giving RE sessions, and sessions on other subjects including agriculture and drugs. The NGOs mainly worked along the borders with Cambodia and Myanmar with affected communities, and in refugee and displaced persons

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<sup>100</sup> TMAC, Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2009; interview with Siwa Boonlert, Field Manager, COERR, in Bangkok, 18 May 2009; PRO, "Annual Report 2008; Peace Road Project Phase II, 2007–2008," p. 13; information provided by Shushira Chonhenchob, HI, 13 April 2009; TMAC monthly activity reports of January to December 2008; and email from Kiriti Ray, Program Manager, BBP, HI, Mae Sot, Tak province, 10 March 2009.

<sup>101</sup> See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.


States Parties

Thailand

camps. The ADPC conducted training for government officials and teachers, and provided RE to schoolchildren, including child-to-child training. HI conducted RE integrated with other programs, including emergency RE in refugee camps and training of teachers. COERR focused on training of school teachers and children. In 2005 a local RE curriculum was developed and integrated into schools near the border areas. GCCF posted mine warning signs and disseminated RE messages through its deminers. Since 2001, RE activities have reached at least 1,018,632 beneficiaries, the majority reached by HMAUs.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be 1,252. In 2009, Thailand reported significant improvements in VA, specifically regarding healthcare services, but also noted that challenges remain. In 2008, Thailand expanded its emergency medical service system to cover local communities in every province, supplemented by local health volunteers. A network of emergency response teams had access to most areas, while service times for emergency care, transport to primary health centers and referrals to hospital were significantly reduced. However, no system was in place for securing safe access of emergency personnel to casualties in mined areas. In 2008 and 2009, local healthcare centers and hospitals in many mine-affected regions were being upgraded and made accessible for persons with disabilities.

Physical rehabilitation services are provided by military hospitals, public hospitals, and private institutions. Persons with disabilities registered with the government are entitled to free medical examinations and mobility devices. Provincial general hospitals in Thailand offer prosthetic and rehabilitation services, but not all services are available locally at community hospitals. Prosthetics are provided to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, through public hospitals, with the support of the Sirindhorn National Medical Rehabilitation Center or through the national health insurance reimbursement system.

The recent retrospective survivor survey indicated that overall coverage for mobility devices was efficient, as 96% of respondents reported receiving services. But 43% of respondents cited repair or replacement of devices as key problems, due to the distance to centers and transportation costs. The national NGO, Prostheses Foundation in Chiang Mai, continued to establish workshops linked to medical centers in hospitals; some 11 workshops were in operation in 2008, as well as a mobile unit. The Sirindhorn Center and the Prostheses Foundation provide services in prosthetics and orthopedics free of charge to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, in remote areas throughout the country.

105 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
106 Ibid.
109 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
112 Ibid; and interview with Dr. Prachaksvich Lebnak, Emergency Medical Institute of Thailand, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.
113 Interview with Tripop Trimanka, Field Operations Manager, PRO, Sa Kaeo province, 7 April 2009; and interview with Dr. Prachaksvich Lebnak, Emergency Medical Institute of Thailand, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.
114 Observation and interviews with mine/ERW survivors during Landmine Monitor field mission in Sa Kaeo and Sa Si Ket provinces, 6–9 April 2009.
117 Interview with Dr. Therdchai Jivacate, Secretary-General, Prostheses Foundation, Chiang Mai, 31 March 2009.
The MoSDHS ran a volunteer-implemented, community-based rehabilitation (CBR) program providing social support for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, primarily by assisting them to register for disability benefits, but including other support services. By 2008, the CBR network covered all 75 provinces of Thailand, including provinces heavily affected by landmines. Social workers in hospitals also assisted patients who were disabled by their injuries, including mine/ERW survivors, to register for official disability status and benefits. But little psychological support outside the family is available to most survivors, although in rare cases, institutional psychiatric assistance may be available for particular issues.

According to the recent retrospective national survivor survey, almost three-quarters (72%) of mine/ERW survivors reported having employment; just over half worked on farms and another 30% in the home. Seven out of ten survivors have very low incomes and live in poverty. In 2008, many persons with disabilities reportedly faced wage discrimination and some state enterprises had discriminatory hiring policies. An employment quota system of 0.5% persons with disabilities in the workplace for private businesses was not adequately enforced. In 2009, the Ministry of Labor was in the process of taking over responsibility of the quota system from the MoSDHS.

Thailand’s Master Plan for Victim Assistance states that the Ministry of Education should ensure 12 years of education for mine survivors and access to vocational training. The survivor survey indicated, however, that almost three-quarters of survivors have not completed primary school education. Government, private, and NGO training centers for persons with disabilities exist. In 2009, Thailand reported that less than 30% of survivors have received vocational training and that training was seen as incompatible with the needs of agricultural occupations. In 2008, the Ministry of Education provided specialized materials to students with disabilities. The government provides a monthly allowance of THB500 (approximately $15) to persons with severe disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors and other amputees. The amount is insufficient to cover living costs, but survivors report it is vital for supplementing their meager incomes.

Thailand has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities and its 2007 constitution prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities and provides for access to services. Other laws continued to allow discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment. Some amputee landmine survivors reported that they were denied driving
licenses because of their disabilities. In December 2008, a policy on the eradication of all forms of discrimination against persons with disabilities and promotion of employment, education and suitable social welfare was announced in parliament by the Prime Minister. Strategic plan documents include specific projects for implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

On 29 July 2008, Thailand ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but as of 1 August 2009 had not signed its Optional Protocol.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

Thailand is one of the 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors. Thailand presented its 2005–2009 VA objectives to the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in November–December 2005. The objectives have not been revised since and they did not meet SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound) criteria. No plans to implement the objectives were reported. Thailand adopted the Master Plan for Mine Victim Assistance 2007–2011 on 26 February 2007, which assigned responsibility for implementation to relevant ministries and bodies. It set few specific targets and left the setting of individual plans and objectives to each actor. The Master Plan was used in place of Thailand’s 2005–2009 VA objectives.

Thailand reported progress towards the achievement of VA objectives in 2008–2009. There was improvement in mine/ERW survivor data collection with the completion of the retrospective survivor survey, needs analysis, and database on survivors. Emergency and continuing medical care capacity improved due to a nationwide emergency response network with increased coordination and enhancement of infrastructure in rural areas. Progress was also made in developing physical rehabilitation capacity. Some progress was reported in providing psychological support to mine/ERW survivors, particularly through the CBR program. More vocational training centers were reportedly established in some mine-affected areas. More persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, received monthly disability pensions and benefits, including free medical care and rehabilitation. Thailand ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and made improvements in long-term disability policies.

Thailand included a VA or disability expert on its delegations to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2007 and 2009, and to the Eighth Meetings of States Parties; three VA experts attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties. Thailand reported on VA at all the intersessional Standing Committee meetings since 2005 and at all meetings of States Parties since 2006 and used the voluntary Form J attachment to its annual Article 7 report to provide details on VA activities in all years since 2005. In its Article 7 report covering 2008, Thailand reported on the results of the retrospective national survivor survey and the activities of HI for refugees on the Thai-Myanmar border.

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131 Interviews with mine/ERW survivors during Landmine Monitor field mission in Sa Kaeo and Sa Si Ket provinces, 6–9 April 2009.


Victim assistance activities

Services for Thai nationals

The Sirindhorn Center provided prostheses, assistive devices, wheelchairs and other aids for persons with disabilities to 97 hospitals in 19 of 22 mine-affected provinces with survivors. The center also provided training in prosthetics and rehabilitation. In 2008, the center’s mobile units provided services to patients with mobility disabilities.139

In 2008, the Prostheses Foundation provided prostheses to beneficiaries, including mine/ERW survivors, through its centers and mobile services.140 In cooperation with HI, the Prostheses Foundation also provided free foot components to a group in Kantharalak sub-district, Si Sa Ket, for future repairs for 30 landmine survivors.141 The volunteer group, Single Drop of Sea Water, provided THB3,000 ($91) to the group for coordination expenses.142

JRS and COERR both continued to provide assistance to mine/ERW survivors as part of their broader programs in 2008. Five mine survivors in Aranyaprapathet district received support packages from COERR in 2008. 143

Services for non-Thai nationals

Landmine survivors from Myanmar seeking assistance in Thailand received medical care at hospitals in refugee camps and public district hospitals in the Thai-Myanmar border provinces. Physical rehabilitation is available at the Mae Sot General Hospital, Mae Tao Clinic Prosthetic Center, and within refugee camps at prosthetic workshops run by HI.144

Thai hospitals reported at least 60 mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar (58 injured in Myanmar and two in Thailand) receiving medical care in 2008.145 The ICRC continued its War Wounded program and covered the costs of 71 mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar receiving medical care in Thailand in 2008 (63% of 111 weapon-wounded patients from Myanmar in Thai hospitals assisted through the program in 2008).146 The ICRC also supported repairs to the surgical ward of the Mae Tao Clinic in Mae Sot, which assists injured refugees from Myanmar. ICRC, with the Thai Red Cross, held seminars on treating weapon wounds in Bangkok and southern Thailand for some 300 civilian and military medical staff in 2008.147

CPI continued to assist mine/ERW survivors along the Thai-Myanmar border. In 2008, CPI built a new prosthetics workshop for survivors in Pang Mapha, Mae Hong Son province; in 2008, it produced 22 prosthetics. The Peng Lo workshop near the Khung Jor refugee camp, in cooperation with the Shan Health Committee, produced 16 prosthetics in 2008. In 2008 and 2009, CPI expanded the development of farm projects providing income generation for amputee residents. CPI supported the Mae La Care Villa residence for some 20 blind amputee mine/ERW survivors. It also coordinated with the Mae Tao Clinic in Mae Sot to provide support and training to medics and counselors in physical therapy and psychosocial support.148 In 2008, 188 landmine survivors from Myanmar received prostheses from the Mae Tao Clinic Prosthetic Center.149

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139 Letter from the office of Dr. Piyavit Sorachaimetha, Sirindhorn National Medical Rehabilitation Center, 27 April 2009.
140 Interview with Dr. Therdchai Jivacate, Prostheses Foundation, Chiang Mai, 31 March 2009.
141 Email from Shushira Chonhenchob, HI, 19 May 2009.
142 Information provided by Shushira Chonhenchob, HI, 19 May 2009.
143 Telephone interview with Siwa Boonlert, COERR, 10 April 2009; and interview with Emilie Ketudat, TCBL, Bangkok, 10 April 2009.
145 Email from Lt. Pongpol Sutthibenjakul, TMAC, 5 May 2009; fax from Duangrudee Chanchareon, Mae Sot Hospital, 28 April 2009; and fax from Supanit Dhammawong, Si Sang Wal Hospital, 28 April 2009. This figure does not include the 14 people from Myanmar injured by an unknown device in 2008.
149 Email from Eh Thwa Bor, Administrative Officer, Mae Tao Clinic, 18 March 2009. See report on Myanmar in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
HI’s Burmese Border Program assisted non-Thai citizens with physiotherapy through refugee camp workers under the guidance of trained physiotherapists. The program also provided prosthetic, orthotic, and other assistive devices and accessibility to buildings and camp structures (the number of mine/ERW survivors assisted was unknown).150

In 2008, at least 11 Cambodian mine/ERW survivors received free emergency treatment, continuing medical care, and physical rehabilitation in Thai government-run hospitals along the border with Cambodia.151

**Support for Mine Action**

Thailand has estimated the total cost for completion of its Article 5 obligations by 2018 at THB17.4 billion ($527.2 million). Thailand’s Article 5 deadline extension request includes annual cost estimates for clearance activities and specifies annual funding amounts projected for the government of Thailand and international donors.152 From 2009 to 2013 Thailand has committed to contributing THB1 billion ($30.3 million) for mine clearance, and THB1.5 billion ($45.5 million) from 2014 to 2018, for a total contribution of THB12.5 billion ($378.8 million) or approximately 72% of its total Article 5 extension budget. Unspecified donors are projected to cover the remaining costs, totaling about THB 4.9 billion (about $149 million) and ranging from THB421.3 million ($12.8 million) in 2009 to THB635.4 million ($19.3 million) in 2016 before falling back to THB595.8 million ($18.1 million) in 2018.153 Thailand has not given a cost estimate for fulfilling RE or VA obligations during this period.

The request does not provide detailed resource mobilization strategies but calls for mobilization of funds from all levels of government, as well as state enterprises, European Union pre-accession funds, the World Bank, and national and international donors.154

**National support for mine action**

In its revised Article 5 deadline extension request, Thailand reported a national commitment to TMAC of THB106 million ($3.2 million) for 2008.155 Thailand reported THB88.3 million ($2.75 million) in funds contributed to TMAC from the national budget in 2007. In August 2008, the Prime Minister approved a budget of THB1.4 billion ($42.4 million) for the first year of the requested extension period (April 2009 to March 2010), which covers 2009 budget estimates under the Article 5 extension plan but as of July 2009 TMAC was unsure what funding would be available (see Progress since becoming a State Party section above).156

The Ministry of Defense allocates funds for mine action from its own budget, and must compete for its own funding with budget demands from other ministries. Thailand has reported that mine action has received less national funding in recent years as a result of other national humanitarian emergencies and priorities.157

The government did not report the cost of the monthly subsistence allowance provided for persons with “severe disabilities,” the cost of vocational training for disabled persons158 or the number of landmine victims receiving these benefits.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, no international donors reported assistance for mine action in Thailand. In 2007, reported funding totaled $1,611,071 (£1,175,021). In October 2008, within its Article 5 extension plan, Thailand reported THB50 million ($1.5 million) in international funding to mine action NGOs

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150 Email from Kiriti Ray, HI, 10 March 2009.
151 Email from Chhiv Lim, Project Manager, Cambodia Mine/UXO Victim Information System, 25 April 2009.
152 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 2 October 2008, p. 23.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
157 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 2 October 2008, p. 5.
in Thailand in 2008, but did not specify when allocations had been made or which donors had provided the money.\footnote{Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 2 October 2008, p. 20.} The lack of international funding in 2008 calls into question Thailand’s ability to meet the long-term costs of mine clearance or VA under its Article 5 extension plan.\footnote{Ibid, p. 23.}
TUNISIA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 January 2000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Residual antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>0 (2007: 0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Tunisia became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 January 2000 and regards existing legislation as sufficient to implement the treaty domestically. Tunisia has actively participated in the Mine Ban Treaty process, and hosted regional seminars on the treaty in January 2002 and September 2007. In September 2003, Tunisia completed destruction of its stockpile of 18,259 antipersonnel mines. In 2009, it reported a total of 4,980 mines retained for training.

In May 2009, Tunisia announced that it had successfully completed its Article 5 obligations on the clearance of antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control in advance of its 1 January 2010 deadline. Tunisia has shown significant commitment to mine action by this feat and using its own resources. Explosive remnants of war (ERW) and a residual mine threat from World War II remain.

Between 1999 and 2008 Landmine Monitor identified at least 16 mine/ERW casualties (one killed and 15 injured). There has been no formal risk education program, but the National Guard and police provided awareness to the local population. Services for persons with disabilities including mine/ERW survivors are in place and the government supports the disability sector.

Mine Ban Policy

Tunisia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 9 July 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2000. Tunisia has in previous years stated that existing laws, which include penal sanctions, are sufficient to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, citing three laws dated 1969, 1970, and 1996.1 In 2008, Tunisia cited an additional three laws, dated 1986, 2000, and 2003.2

Tunisia attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and made a statement regarding fulfilling its Article 5 obligation. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, Tunisia made a statement on mine clearance.

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2 Article 7 Report (for the period April 2007 to April 2008), Form A. The same information was provided in the Article 7 report submitted in 2009. Form A cites three previously unreported measures: “Law No. 1986-69 dated 19-07-1986 relating to the accord of Republic of Tunisia retraction [sic] to the convention on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects and the annexed protocols notified in Geneva at 10 October 1980; Law No. 2000-1443 dated 07-06-2000 fixing the conditions and the procedures of granting to the legal entity or individual of the authorization to carry out the whole or part of the operations of manufacture, importing, exporting, transporting, stocking, use and marketing of the explosives products used at civil purposes; and Law No. 2003-1266 dated 09-06-2003 relating to the creation of a national committee for the follow-up and implementation of the convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction.” In addition, Form A reports on laws on the approval of adherence to CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.
In 2009, Tunisia submitted its tenth Article 7 report covering April 2008 to April 2009.3 Tunisia has not participated in the discussions States Parties have had on interpretation and implementation of Articles 1, 2, and 3, with respect to the issues of joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training.4 Tunisia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It has never submitted an annual report as required under Article 13. On 7 March 2008, Tunisia adhered to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, but has not provided a national report. Tunisia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 12 January 2009 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.5

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention
Tunisia has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but imported them in the past.6 Tunisia completed the destruction of 18,259 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in September 2003.7 In its initial declaration in July 2000, Tunisia reported retaining 5,000 antipersonnel mines (4,000 PMA-3 and 1,000 PROM-1) for purposes permitted under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty.8 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Tunisia reported consuming 20 antipersonnel mines for training and reported a total of 4,980 mines retained for training.9 However, the number remaining may be 4,975, as in its previous Article 7 report (for the period from April 2007 to April 2008), Tunisia for the first time officially reported that it had consumed five mines for training purposes, leaving 4,995 mines.10 In its 2008 and 2009 reports, Tunisia did not specify the type of mines destroyed. Tunisia has not reported on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
As of May 2009, Tunisia had only a small residual threat from antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines following a successful clearance operation, but it remains contaminated with significant quantities of ERW, primarily UXO, as a legacy of World War II.11 Tunisia laid nine minefields in 1976 and 1980 in the south and southeast of the country, along the border with Libya (at Bir Zar, M’chiguig, M’guisem, and Ras Jedir,) and at Borj El-Khadhra where the borders of Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya meet. The minefields, which initially contained 5,750 antipersonnel mines and 1,958 antivehicle mines, were in sandy ground where wind

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4 A Tunisian official told Landmine Monitor that Tunisia had not participated in the discussions on Article 1 because it was not engaged in joint operations, or foreign stockpiling and transit. Interview with Maj. Beji Salah, Ministry of Defense, at the Dead Sea, 21 November 2007.
8 Article 7 Report, Form D, 9 July 2000.
9 Article 7 Report (for the period April 2008 to April 2009), Form D.
10 Article 7 Report (for the period April 2007 to April 2008), Form D. During an interview on 21 November 2007 during the Eighth Meeting of States Parties at the Dead Sea, Maj. Beji Salah of the Ministry of Defense told Landmine Monitor that mines had been consumed during 2007. In 2005, a Tunisian official told Landmine Monitor that some retained mines were used to train troops that cleared mines on the border with Libya. Interview with Col. Salem Ridiefi, Ministry of Defense, in Zagreb, 30 November 2005.
causes sand dunes to form and disappear. By April 2009, however, Tunisia reported that all the minefields it had laid had been “totally cleared and all the mines were removed and destroyed.”  

There are also other regions suspected to contain ERW (mostly UXO) and some mines as a result of combat in World War II: in the south (El Hamma, Mareth, and Mattmata regions); the center (Faïedh and Kasserine regions); the north (Cap-Bon); and the northwest (Medjez El Bab). According to Tunisia, all casualties reported in recent years are a result of ordnance from these areas, and the army is called upon to deal with items of UXO “on an almost daily basis.”

### Casualties

There were no reports of new mine/ERW casualties in Tunisia in 2008 or 2009, as of 31 May. The last reported mine incident occurred in January 2002, when two shepherds were injured by an antipersonnel mine that exploded in a fire in the Kairouan area. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, and in its statement at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, Tunisia reiterated that the rare incidents reported in recent years were due to ERW.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Tunisia is unknown. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 16 mine/ERW casualties (one killed and 15 injured). Fourteen of these casualties were the result of ERW, two of a mine. Six of these casualties occurred in Kairouan, two around Tunis, two in Sfax, two in Kasserine, one in Bizerte, and one in al-Kef. Landmine Monitor was only able to obtain more details on six of the casualties (all injured, all civilians) in four incidents. Three of these casualties were children of unknown gender, one was a man, and the gender/age of the remaining two casualties is unknown. Three casualties occurred while herding, two when a mine exploded in a fire, and one while farming. In total since 1991, Landmine Monitor was able to identify 21 casualties (one killed, 15 injured, and five unknown); seven the result of mines and 14 the result of ERW. The Tunisian delegation to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies reported that no accidents occurred during clearance operations. An unknown number of livestock losses due to mines/ERW have been reported over the years. On 4 April 2004, a Tunisian man was killed in a minefield while attempting to cross the border between Turkey and Greece.

### Program Management and Coordination

There is no national body in charge of management, coordination, and planning of mine action in Tunisia. The army is the only body authorized to undertake activities related to landmines or ERW.

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12 Article 7 Report (for the period April 2008 to April 2009), Form C.
13 See, for example, Article 7 Report (for the period April 2008 to April 2009), Form C.
The limited number of casualties in Tunisia does not warrant specific victim assistance (VA) programs.22 The Ministry of Social Affairs, Solidarity, and Tunisians Abroad is responsible for disability issues. It cooperates with the ministries of public health, education and youth, sports, and physical education.

**Data collection and management**

The results of clearance activities are stored in an information database managed by the army. Casualty data, which is collected by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, is also stored in the database and includes civilian as well as military casualties. The ministry declined to provide a copy of the database to Landmine Monitor.23

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Tunisia has shown significant commitment to mine action by clearing all known mined areas of all ordnance in advance of its Article 5 deadline and by using its own resources. In May 2009, Tunisia noted that the only international assistance it had received was the gift of 60 mine detectors, some personal protective equipment, and a number of GPS units.24

**National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures**

No national mine action legislation was adopted in Tunisia. The army is said to follow operational procedures that meet international standards.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

All demining in Tunisia has been carried out by its army. Tunisia has reported that of 5,750 antipersonnel mines it had recorded as having been laid in 1976 and 1980 along the border with Libya, by April 2009 and the closure of operations it had removed and destroyed 5,606 from a total area of 0.5km².25 It had also cleared all 1,943 antivehicle mines recovered from the minefields out of a total of 1,958 recorded. It believes that the remaining mines were destroyed by animals.26 In 2008, army explosive ordnance disposal teams were called out 346 times, resulting in the destruction of 950 items.27

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Tunisia was required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2010. As noted above, on 27 May 2009, Tunisia declared to the Standing Committee on mine clearance that it had fulfilled its Article 5 obligations.

Between 1991 and March 2001, 6,997 mines and items of UXO were reported cleared. In November 2004, Tunisia started to clear the Ras Jedir minefield, which represented 70% of known mined areas on its territory. A UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) assessment mission, undertaken in January 2003, had concluded that clearing the nine minefields would take approximately six months and cost around US$1 million.28 Demining operations were completed at the end of March 2009.29

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27 Ibid.


Risk Education

In 2008, as in previous years, there was no formal risk education program. Tunisian authorities reported that before clearance of all known mined areas was completed, suspected areas were fenced, marked, and regularly maintained by the army. They do so if an incident occurs, or when unidentified objects, including ERW, are discovered by civilians. A 2003 UNMAS assessment suggested there should be a national risk education campaign conducted “delicately,” to avoid civilian panic; it suggested the Tunisian Red Crescent could be in charge of this. The recommendation remained unimplemented.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown but there are at least 15. Tunisia has a reasonably well-developed health system, although there are regional disparities in the distribution of resources, with the west and southern parts of the country being the worst-affected. Almost the whole population—90%—lives less than 5km from the nearest healthcare center. Specialized care is available at regional hospitals, usually located in the main city of each governorate. Lack of specialized health personnel is a problem.

Persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, are entitled to free public services. Disability grants provide several benefits including priority medical services and consumer discounts. There are 269 centers specialized in different types of disability services in Tunisia. Survivors are entitled to socio-economic reintegration activities and some have received financial compensation.

NGOs working with persons with disabilities received strong governmental support. In 2008, they received financial support of approximately TND15 million ($12,373,500).

Tunisia has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but in 2008 some discrimination was reported. At least 1% of public and private sector jobs must be reserved by law for persons with disabilities, though in practice not all employers were aware of this provision. On 2 April 2008, Tunisia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol. On 29 May 2009, Tunisia celebrated the National Day of Persons with Disabilities, which focused on the reintegration of persons with disabilities and human rights.

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30 Article 7 Report (for the period April 2008 to April 2009), Form I.
40 Ibid.
In 2008, Handicap International (HI) continued to support local organizations working with persons with disabilities and organized awareness-raising events across the country. It launched a new project aiming to promote access to physical and sporting activities for persons with disabilities. HI worked with the Tunisian Federation of Sports for Persons with Disabilities and its member clubs, and targeted sports trainers, disability organization managers, and medical professionals.\footnote{Email from James Buchanan, Project Development Coordinator Morocco-Tunisia, HI, 4 August 2009.}
TURKEY

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO, IEDs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>21 killed (2007: 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79 injured (2007: 73)</td>
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<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
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<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Area cleared not reported, 999 mines reported destroyed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Turkey became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2004. It has not enacted domestic legislation, but has indicated that existing measures give effect to the treaty obligations. Turkey failed to destroy its stockpile of nearly three million antipersonnel mines by its 1 March 2008 deadline, and as of April 2009 still had more than 1.3 million mines in stock. Turkey decided to retain 16,000 mines for training and research purposes and at the end of 2008 still had 15,125 left. Turkey has regularly accused the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) of using landmines.

Turkey is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). It has started clearance of mines along its border with Syria, but at a slow pace and without sufficient transparency. Turkey still needs to set out concrete plans for clearance of all affected areas under its jurisdiction or control to meet the requirements of Article 5. This includes its responsibilities for areas under its control in northern Cyprus.

Landmine Monitor has reported 831 victim-activated mine/ERW casualties in Turkey between 1999 and 2008, including 250 killed and 581 injured. Little progress has been made on developing a sustainable risk education (RE) program in Turkey over the past 10 years, despite the government reaffirming its commitment to building awareness of the risks. NGOs have conducted only limited RE, predominantly due to lack of funds.

Services to assist mine/ERW survivors in Turkey remained inadequate. In October 2008, the parliament established a new social insurance system that should enable some persons with disabilities to access more services, although it would not cover total costs. There is no government coordination of victim assistance in Turkey, nor a national strategic plan. Physical rehabilitation is available to military personnel injured by mines/ERW and a limited number of civilian survivors through military and government rehabilitation centers.

Mine Ban Policy

Turkey acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 September 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2004. Turkey has not enacted domestic implementation legislation, but has indicated that its constitution and criminal code, and directives from the army general staff, give legal effect to the treaty’s provisions.1

1 Article 7 Reports, Form A and Annexes A, B and C, 1 October 2004 and 10 May 2005. Article 174 of the criminal code includes penal sanctions regarding explosives.
Turkey submitted its sixth Article 7 report in 2009, covering calendar year 2008.2 The report includes voluntary Form J with information on casualties and victim assistance (VA).

Turkey attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made remarks during the general exchange of views and also made statements on universalization, stockpile destruction, mine clearance, and VA. At the meeting, Turkey was named co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, it made statements on mines retained for training, stockpile destruction, mine clearance, and VA.

With respect to key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2, Turkey has stated, “Turkey does not use mines with sensitive fuses and/or anti-handling devices.”3 It has also stated that Turkey considers the stockpiling or transit of foreign antipersonnel mines on its territory as a breach of the Mine Ban Treaty, and that it will not permit the use of antipersonnel mines in Turkey by other states during joint military operations.4

With respect to Article 3, in May 2009 Turkey said that, “We agree with the rationale of Article III which recognises specific and different needs of States Parties by not fixing numbers or ceilings for training purposes.”5 In a similar statement on the issue in 2006, Turkey stated that “countries with varying geographies, incongruous terrain, different sizes of armed forces, more mines emplaced than others and countries that are simply in parts of the world where there are more anti-personnel mines, which would require more training, should not have artificial numbers or ceilings imposed on them for the number of mines to be retained under Article 3.”6

Turkey is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Turkey submitted its annual report required by Article 13 on 12 November 2008. Turkey is not party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

Turkey has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.7

At Turkey’s invitation, the ICBL and Landmine Monitor undertook a mission to Turkey from 22–23 May 2008, following Turkey’s failure to meet its stockpile destruction deadline on 1 March 2008 (see Stockpiling and destruction section below).8

In July 2006, the NGO Geneva Call reported that the Kurdistan People’s Congress (Kongra Gel) and its armed wing, People’s Defense Forces (Hezen Parastina Gel, HPG), also known as the Kurdistan Workers Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) and formerly as the Kurdish

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3 Letter No. 649.13/2005/BMCO DT/8805 from Vehbi Esgel Etensel, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 3 October 2005. It went on to say that “bearing in mind that some of Turkey’s neighbours have anti-vehicle mines placed on their border with Turkey, Turkey in principle, is in favour of a prohibition also of anti-vehicle mines, provided that these neighbours also share the same view.”
4 Turkey’s additional response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, 30 May 2004. The response said Turkey “will never permit stockpiling or transfer of any type of antipersonnel landmine on its territory,” and denied that, as previously reported, the US has a stockpile of 1,100 Air Force Gator antipersonnel mines in Turkey. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 848. In 2005, Turkey said, “With respect to joint military [operations], Turkey has committed herself to act in conformity with the spirit of the Ottawa Treaty, under all circumstances.” Letter No. 649.13/2005/BMCO DT/8805 from Vehbi Esgel Etensel, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 3 October 2005.
8 Representatives of the ICRC and the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit also participated in the mission. The group visited the new disposal facility and held discussions with officials from the ministries of defense and foreign affairs and General Staff officers, as well as the Prime Minister’s office, regarding the missed deadline and mine action issues. They also visited a rehabilitation center. Email from Tamar Gabelnick, Treaty Implementation Director, ICBL, 25 May 2008; and ICBL, “Internal Mission Report,” provided by email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008.
Freedom and Democracy Congress (Kongreya Azad z Demokrasiya Kurdista, KADEK), had unilaterally halted antipersonnel mine use by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. Turkey stated that the “signing took place without the prior information and consent of the State Party concerned, the Republic of Turkey. Consequently, it contradicts the understanding of a number of States Parties, including Turkey…and, therefore, is inappropriate and unacceptable.”

**Production and transfer**

Turkey halted production of antipersonnel mines concurrently with a moratorium on the sale and transfer of antipersonnel mines in January 1996. Turkey’s production facilities for antipersonnel mines were then gradually phased out of service. Turkey is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Turkey appears to have imported mines from Germany and the United States.

**Use**

The Chief of General Staff issued a directive banning the use of antipersonnel mines by the Turkish armed forces on 26 January 1998. There have been no confirmed instances of use of antipersonnel mines by Turkish forces since that time.

According to Turkey’s latest Article 7 report covering calendar year 2008, 37 military personnel and civilians were killed and 121 were injured in 2008 by landmines used by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel. The report does not differentiate between casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), nor between victim-activated and command-detonated mines/IEDs. In its Article 7 report covering calendar year 2007, Turkey reported that 53 military personnel and civilians were killed and 204 injured by landmines used by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel.

The Turkish General Staff reported that in 2008 it recovered 55 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine, and 85 other explosive devices from separatist groups in 2008. It also reported 27 incidents in 2008 where separatist groups set off munitions or mines. The General Staff reported that between January and July 2009, it seized 30 mines (the type was not identified).
and that there had been 44 incidents involving IEDs.\(^\text{18}\) During the ICBL’s May 2008 mission to Turkey, army officials showed photos of VS-50 antipersonnel mines they said were seized by the army as recently as March 2008.\(^\text{19}\)

Landmine Monitor has not been able to obtain from Turkey specific dates and locations, or other concrete details, of PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel use of antipersonnel mines, or of incidents that led to casualties from antipersonnel mines. The PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel has admitted to use of command-detonated mines, but denied any use of mines or other explosive devices which can be activated by a person or a vehicle.\(^\text{20}\) In 2008, Geneva Call submitted to the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel a list of reported mine incidents in areas where it operates, and requested a response. In late 2008, the HPG, the armed wing of the PKK, repeated that it uses only command-detonated explosive weapons in attacks on security personnel. It admitted that this has resulted in some civilian casualties. The HPG invited Geneva Call to send a verification mission. Geneva Call said this did not occur as the Turkish government in July 2008 refused Geneva Call’s request for such a mission.\(^\text{21}\)

In this reporting period, there were at least three incidents reported in the media that appear to have involved use of antipersonnel mines, all attributed to the PKK. Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify who laid the mines or when. In July 2008, it was reported that two Turkish soldiers died when they stepped on landmines while patrolling a mountainous rural area in Tunceli province.\(^\text{22}\) In August 2008, a Turkish soldier reportedly died when he stepped on a landmine near the town of Semdinli in Hakkari province.\(^\text{23}\) In September 2008, a Turkish soldier reportedly died when he stepped on a mine in the Beytussebap district of Sirnak province.\(^\text{24}\)

**Stockpiling and destruction**

Turkey did not meet its 1 March 2008 treaty-mandated deadline to complete destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile. Turkey is therefore in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty and will remain so until stockpile destruction is completed. Turkey’s latest Article 7 report stated that it had 1,702,982 antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles at the end of 2008.\(^\text{25}\)

In early 2006, Turkey indicated it had a stock of 2,866,818 antipersonnel mines to destroy.\(^\text{26}\) It subsequently destroyed 94,111 mines in 2006, 250,048 mines in 2007, 913,788 mines in 2008, and 377,573 mines in January–April 2009, for a total of 1,635,520 destroyed. At the end of April 2009, Turkey said it had 1,325,409 mines left to destroy.\(^\text{27}\) In September 2009, Turkey informed Landmine Monitor that as of 26 August 2009, it had destroyed 1,765,779 mines and had 1,195,069 left to destroy.\(^\text{28}\)


\(^{19}\) Meeting with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, General Staff, and the Prime Minister’s Office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, 22 May 2008. Internal notes by the ICBL.


\(^{25}\) Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form B. At the end of 2008, the stockpile consisted of the following mines: 584,742 DM-11; 974,040 M14; 96,173 M2; 25,239 M16; and 22,788 ADAM.

\(^{26}\) Turkey reported different numbers and types in its stockpile, prior to the start of destruction, at different times. See **Landmine Monitor Report 2006**, p. 733, and **Landmine Monitor Report 2007**, p. 688.


\(^{28}\) Email from Malike Selçuk Sancar, Counselor (Disarmament), Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN in Geneva, 9 September 2009.
As of April 2009, it had still not destroyed any of its ADAM mines.29 Throughout 2007 Turkey had assured States Parties that it would meet its deadline. As late as 19 November 2007, Turkey said that “unless unforeseen technical difficulties occur due to the operation of the Turkish Armed Forces Munitions Disposal Facility, we hope to be able to fulfill our obligation under Article 4, using if necessary other available methods.”30 In April 2007, Turkey told States Parties that “we are confident that we will be able to fulfill our obligation by destroying stockpiled APMs by 2008.”31 It also reported in April 2007 that the disposal facility would become operational on 4 July 2007, and run at full capacity as of that date.32 Turkey first announced its plans for the disposal facility in 2005.33 In mid-July 2007, Turkey informed Landmine Monitor that the facility was “finished as planned,” and that “qualification/certification activities are continuing.”34 It was not officially inaugurated until 8 November 2007.35

In a note verbale dated 28 February 2008 (two days before its deadline), and addressed to the “Presidency” of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Turkey stated, “At present it is difficult to make an estimate on when the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines could be accomplished. However, this process will be pursued with the utmost care.” It noted that the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility was inaugurated on 8 November 2007, and that the “certification and qualification process took longer than foreseen.” The other explanation offered for missing the deadline was the following: “With a view to meet the deadline, other ways and means to destroy the stockpiled anti-personnel mines have also been considered. However, bearing in mind their negative impact on the environment, as well as the risks they pose for human life, these methods were disregarded.” The note requested that the Presidency circulate the information to States Parties and interested organizations.36

Turkey began destroying its stocks at the Turkish Munitions Disposal Facility in Yahsihan in Kirikkale province in November 2007, and by its 1 March 2008 deadline had destroyed 35,488 mines there, in addition to 319,276 mines destroyed by open detonation in 2006 and 2007.37 In June 2008, Turkey told States Parties that it had removed and destroyed the fuzes of all remaining mines.38 It said, “Those remnant parts of the anti-personnel mines cannot be used. This is an important and irreversible step accomplished within the destruction process, the

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29 During the ICBL visit in May 2008, officials at the destruction facility said they were still working with engineers to see if it would be possible to destroy the ADAM mines there. Email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008; and ICBL, “Internal mission report,” provided by email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008.
30 Statement of Turkey, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 19 November 2007.
34 Email from Malike Selçuk Sancar, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 July 2007.
38 Email from Malike Selçuk Sancar, Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 July 2007.
39 Statement of Turkey, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008. Turkish officials also told the ICBL delegation in May that all of the fuzes for stockpiled mines had been destroyed “a few months ago.” Email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008; and ICBL “Internal mission report,” provided by email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 May 2008.
stockpiled landmines are not useable.” 39 It went on to note, “However, the whole destruction process has not yet been completed.” It was unable to give a timetable for completion, saying, “At this stage, I will refrain from making any predictions for the completion of the destruction of the remaining parts... When we have an accurate estimate of our daily average destruction capacity, we will be able to give you an accurate time-frame for the completion of the process.” 40

Turkey told the ICBL in August 2008 that it could not estimate a completion date because the munitions disposal facility was still not operating at full capacity, since procedures were still being perfected. Further, a new static furnace to destroy DM11 and M14 mines to address a capacity shortfall had been added, but was not yet operational. 41

In November 2008, Turkey told States Parties that it hoped to finish the destruction by early 2010. It also said it was working on increasing the productivity of its disposal facility, but that safety and environmental considerations were constraining elements. 42

In the past Turkey also reported possession of 18,236 M18 Claymore mines, but in its Article 7 report submitted in April 2007 Turkey stated that “M18 Series APM were removed from destruction list, due to their specific technical features. Turkey has already declared that M18 series APMs will not be used as victim activated.” 43 In May 2008, officials told the ICBL that the tripwires for M18s had been destroyed and the mines were only used in command-detonated mode. 44

Mines retained for research and training

In 2004, Turkey initially retained 16,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes. 45 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Turkey indicated it was retaining 15,125 mines. 46 This constituted the highest total of retained mines among States Parties. The total includes DM-11, M2, M14, and M16 mines. Turkey for the first time specified the exact number of each type of mine. 47

Turkey consumed 25 of its retained mines in 2008, although it did not identify the types. 48 In the previous two years the number of retained mines was unchanged at 15,150 mines.

In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Turkey also for the first time used the expanded Form D on retained mines agreed by States Parties in 2004. It indicated that the mines had been used in training 1,834 people in four different courses, as well as for research (a modification project for mine-proof boots). 49

39 Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 2 June 2008.
40 Ibid.
41 Email from Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 25 August 2008.
43 Article 7 Report, Form B, 23 April 2007. Use of victim-activated Claymore mines is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, but use of command-detonated Claymore mines is permitted. In May 2006, Turkey stated that “the victim activation components of M18 Claymore mines have recently been added to the list of mines to be destroyed and the necessary steps have been taken to stock only command detonated M18 Claymore mines.” Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006.
45 Article 7 Report, Form D, 1 October 2004. This included 4,700 each of DM-11 and M14, and 2,200 each of M16, M18, and M2 mines. In 2006, Turkey reported the number of mines retained for training had decreased to 15,150 “because 850 mines have been used for mine detection, mine clearance and mine destruction programmes carried out to train military personnel involved in mine action, as well as for related training at various military training institutions.” Statement of Turkey, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 11 May 2006. This information was also indicated in Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2006. However, neither document specified how many of each type of mine were destroyed, and how many remained.
46 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form D.
47 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. The retained mines consist of 3,897 DM11; 5,815 M2; 3,697 M14; and 1,716 M16.
49 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D. It provided this information during the May 2009 intersessional meetings as well. This included 867 people in the Mines and Booby-Traps Course, 603 people in the Mines and IED Course, 322 people in the Engineer Corps Basic Course, and 42 people from 21 countries in the Mines and EOD Course.
Turkey stated in May 2009, “The large size, as well as the different types of mine action units necessitate the Turkish Armed Forces to retain a certain number of APLMs [antipersonnel landmines] for training purposes…. Besides Turkey has been facing a terrorist threat which includes the use of APLMs. Mines laid by terrorists have to be seized and secured as they are detected.”

In May 2006, Turkey stated that “after covering some more ground in mine clearance, Turkey may review the number of mines retained for training purposes.” In June 2005, Turkey said, “This figure [16,000 mines] may be reassessed as the process of downsizing the armed forces progresses.”

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, and ERW, primarily UXO, as well as IEDs. Mines were laid from 1956–1959 along 510km of the border with Syria, and on some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq to prevent illegal border crossings, and around security installations. It has been stated that all the mines laid on the Turkish side of Turkey’s borders with Greece, Bulgaria, and Georgia have been cleared.

Landmines were also employed by government forces during the 1984–1999 conflict with the PKK in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998. New contamination may result from use of mines and IEDs by the PKK from 2007–2008 (see Use section above).

Turkey reported in 2009 that a total of 981,778 mines remained emplaced on its territory as of the end of 2008, of which 817,312 were antipersonnel mines, and 164,466 were antivehicle mines. This represents a small reduction on the figures given in the report covering calendar year 2007 (818,280 antipersonnel mines and 164,497 antivehicle mines). Turkey did not report on the locations of these mines or mined areas.

Casualties
Landmine Monitor analysis of 2008 media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) identified at least 100 new casualties due to mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs, including 29 people killed and 71 injured. Of these, 72 were members of security forces.

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57 Ibid.
58 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form C.
59 Ibid.
61 See report on Cyprus in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
62 Unless otherwise stated, data supplied by Muteber Öğreten, Coordinator, IMFT, 29 June 2009. IMFT also reported 63 casualties (25 killed and 38 injured) by command-detonated devices. These are not included in Landmine Monitor’s totals.
and 28 were civilians. Of the civilians, there was one female adult, four boys, six children of unknown gender, 12 males of unknown age, one female of unknown age, and four of unknown gender and age. Of the civilian casualties, five were traveling, five were bystanders, three were herding, one was farming, and one collecting firewood, water, or food. The activities of the 13 remaining civilian casualties at the time of the incident were unknown.

The number of casualties in 2008 was very similar to that collected by the IMFT in 2007 (101 casualties; 28 people killed and 73 injured).\(^63\) The media did not consistently identify the device type, often incorrectly identifying command-detonated IEDs as landmines. News reports also focused more on military casualties than civilians, resulting in possible under-reporting of civilian casualties.\(^64\)

Turkey reported 158 antipersonnel mine casualties in 2008 (37 killed and 121 injured). It was not specified how many of the casualties were civilian, or if any civilians were “village guards” or members of other security forces.\(^65\) This total represented a significant decrease from 257 casualties (53 killed and 204 injured) reported for 2007. It was a return to similar casualty numbers reported in 2006 (155 casualties; 24 killed and 131 injured).\(^66\)

Casualties continued to occur in 2009 with at least 48 new casualties of victim-activated devices (27 killed and 21 injured), as of 29 June 2009. All but one of the casualties were male (the gender of one casualty was unknown). The 47 male casualties included 42 men, one boy, and four casualties of unknown age.

The total number of mine casualties in Turkey is unknown. Landmine Monitor has reported 831 victim-activated mine/ERW casualties in Turkey between 1999 and 2008, including 250 killed and 581 injured.\(^67\)

Turkey has reported that between 1993 and 2003 landmines caused 2,905 casualties, including 588 people killed and 2,317 injured. It was reported that more than 3,000 people (mostly civilians) have been killed and another 7,000 injured by mines along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s. There are no recent or comprehensive statistics on persons with disabilities and questions on disability were not included in the most recent national census in 2007.\(^68\)

**Risk profile**

Turkey reports that all mined areas are fenced and clearly marked according to international standards.\(^69\) However local authorities and civil society groups have reported unmarked areas with no fencing, particularly in mountainous areas. They report that children regularly enter these areas to tend to animals.\(^70\)

Casualty data collected by the IMFT indicate that rural populations living near the mined border areas are most at-risk and in urgent need of risk education.\(^71\)

**Socio-economic impact**

Most land near the Turkish-Syrian border falls under legal category of “Forbidden Military Zone in the First and Second Degrees” (i.e. public land administered by the Turkish military). Some of it is formerly privately owned farmland which was nationalized during the 1956 border


\(^{64}\) Email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 21 July 2009.

\(^{65}\) Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.


\(^{68}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 705.

\(^{69}\) Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Cover page; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 692.


\(^{71}\) Data supplied by Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 29 June 2009.
demarcation. The Syrian military has reportedly cleared mines on the Turkish side of the border and in the buffer zone totaling 250 km², where they have planted cotton and olive trees.72

Program Management and Coordination

As of July 2009, there was no national mine action authority or mine action center in Turkey,73 despite earlier pronouncements that steps were underway to create mine action management structures.74

While the government of Turkey stated in 2008 that it “remains determined to end the suffering” of mine/ERW casualties,75 there was no coordination of VA or RE activities. The Administration for Disabled People, under the Prime Minister, is responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but lacks resources.76

Data collection and management

There is no comprehensive casualty data collection system in Turkey, though the government has provided annual casualty figures in its in Article 7 reports.77

The IMFT maintains a database of casualties identified in national media reports and by volunteers and partner institutions in affected areas.78 Since 2006, the IMFT has differentiated casualties from mines, ERW, and victim-activated and command-detonated devices more systematically. This remains difficult, however, as the media often do not provide sufficient detail on the devices causing the incidents or incorrectly identify command-detonated devices as landmines.79 Due to a lack of funding, the IMFT did not expand its casualty data and needs assessment pilot project from 2007–2008, so figures might be under-reported.80

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Turkey and Syria reportedly agreed in 2003 to demine their common borders.81 According to Turkey’s mine action plan,82 the 510 km-long minefield on the Syrian border will be cleared under the supervision of the Directorate General for National Real Estate Affairs of the Ministry of Finance.83 According to information provided to Landmine Monitor in 2005, Turkey’s mine action plan also includes clearing the minefield along 42 km of the border with Iraq (containing 75,115 mines), the minefield along 109 km of the border with Iran (containing 191,428 mines) and the minefield along 17 km of the border with Armenia (containing 21,984 mines).84

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73 Telephone interview with Elif Comoglu Ulgen, Head, Disarmament and Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 July 2009.
78 Email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 16 June 2009.
80 Email from Muteber Öğreten, IMFT, 21 July 2009.
82 It was not possible to obtain a copy of the plan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Telephone interview with Elif Comoglu Ulgen, 5 August 2009.
National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Turkey has been slow to implement its obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty and is currently not on course to meet its 2014 deadline for clearance of all antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Turkey reaffirmed its commitment to victim assistance at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties but it has made minimal progress in providing assistance to survivors of mine/UXO over the past 10 years and there are few resources and opportunities available.

National mine action legislation and standards
On 16 June 2009, the President of Turkey ratified Law No. 5903 on demining of minefields along the Syrian border. The law stipulates that initially the Ministry of National Defense will invite tenders for demining, and if this process does not work the Ministry of Finance will have the minefields cleared through the “service procurement method” (the meaning of this is not clear). If this method also fails, according to the law, the government will invite companies to tender for demining, in exchange for the right to cultivate lands suitable for agriculture for up to 44 years.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
In the past, demining in Turkey has been conducted by the Specialized Mine Clearance Unit of the Turkish army. In addition to its manual demining teams, the unit has mine detection dogs and machines available. In 2008, a commercial company was awarded a demining contract by tender. A Turkish company, Tusun Corporation, together with its German partner Tauber, initiated demining operations in June 2008 in an area near Nusaybin, where a new border crossing into Syria will be built. The estimated area of contamination was 200,000m².

Turkey’s latest Article 7 report stated that 999 mines were cleared in 2008. The locations and area cleared were not specified. Turkey has not included in its Article 7 reports the destruction of antipersonnel mines emplaced by the PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel, but the Turkish General Staff website has reported clearance of IEDs. In 2008, the Turkish General Staff reportedly destroyed 55 antipersonnel mines and in 2009 it reportedly destroyed a further 27 antipersonnel mines.

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2014. At the June 2008 Standing Committee meetings, Turkey stated that, “The mine clearance obligation of Article 5 is one of the central provisions of the Convention and Turkey will spare no effort in order to meet her 2014 deadline.” In May 2009, Turkey stated that it continued its efforts to comply with the obligation under Article 5. Yet Turkey still needs to set out concrete plans for clearance of all affected areas under its jurisdiction or control to meet the requirements of Article 5. This includes its responsibilities for areas under its control in northern Cyprus.

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87 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form F.
91 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form G.
92 Turkish General Staff, “The number of IED incidents perpetrated by the members of the terror organizations in 2008,” www.tsk.tr; and Turkish General Staff, “The number of IED incidents perpetrated by the members of the terror organizations in 2008 (for the period 1 January–17 July 2009),” www.tsk.tr.
Risk Education

RE in Turkey was reported to be very limited and inadequate in 2008, as in previous years. The government reported that their efforts to increase the awareness of the population regarding the dangers of mines and ERW remained “unchanged” since 2007. When asked in a parliamentary question in December 2007 what was being done in the mine/ERW affected region of Iğdır to protect civilians, the Minister of Internal Affairs responded that “the citizens in the region are being warned periodically that they should inform the security forces when they encounter suspicious things”. This is the extent of the information Landmine Monitor was able to source regarding government RE activities in Turkey.

In 2008, the IMFT hosted meetings in Batman, Gaziantep, Mardin, and Urfa with the participation of NGOs, parliamentary representatives, and mine survivors on the problems of mines and dangers to civilians. The IMFT also organized an educational workshop in January 2009 in Diyarbakir with the assistance of the Diyarbakir Branch of the Human Rights Association that was attended by some 15 people.

In 2008, Landmine Monitor reported that the Turkish Grand National Assembly had announced RE messages were to be screened on national television in 2008 but general elections in 2008 led to personnel changes in government and it is unclear if the messages were aired.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Turkey is unknown, but is at least 2,317. Despite the government reaffirming its commitment to the principles of VA at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, the government made little progress in the provision of services for mine/ERW survivors in 2008. There were few facilities and opportunities available to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors. Available services were inadequate to address the needs of persons with disabilities. There was also a lack of awareness of available services among survivors. Access was limited due to physical and financial barriers. The government does not distinguish between mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities in the provision of services or in laws. The European Commission criticized the government of Turkey for its lack of research and data on the situation of persons with disability which had reportedly resulted in uninformed government policymaking.

There was some progress in government provision of healthcare, through the creation of a new social security system in Turkey under the Social Insurance and General Health Insurance Law which entered into force in October 2008. The new law provides basic healthcare services to those who pay the insurance premium. Persons with disabilities and those who cannot afford the premium remain eligible for a “green card,” qualifying them for government coverage of the cost of their insurance premium. People under the age of 18 receive free healthcare under the new law. However, the Law of Central and Local Administrations Budget, passed by the National Assembly in 2009, stated that those eligible for the green card should pay for part of...
their medical expenses.\textsuperscript{107} Thus survivors who are unable to afford any financial contribution to their medical care cannot access the services.\textsuperscript{108}

Through the new social insurance law, all have the right to access free first-aid services at public and private healthcare centers. However, the number of healthcare centers equipped with the trained staff and material supplies required to provide emergency care in the case of severe injuries, such as those caused by mines and ERW, was very limited.\textsuperscript{109} Adequate emergency transport only exists in the cities, not in rural areas where the majority of incidents occur.\textsuperscript{110}

Disability groups in Turkey reported no progress in 2008 in the improvement of rehabilitation services.\textsuperscript{111} Services remain insufficient and inadequate medical treatment continues in rehabilitation centers. Community-based rehabilitation continued to receive much fewer financial and human resources than institutional care for persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{112}

The Gulhane Military Medical Academy and the Turkish Armed Forces Rehabilitation and Care Center (TAF-RCC) in Ankara have specialized facilities to assist mine/ERW survivors. In its Article 7 report, Turkey noted that rehabilitation was ongoing at military centers for 121 antipersonnel mine survivors throughout 2008. The number of civilians among those receiving treatment was not specified.\textsuperscript{113} Turkey reported that TAF-RCC reserves 30\% of its quota for civilian patients (including police) and accepts applications for additional civilian casualties if regional hospitals have insufficient capacity to address the patients’ needs. The service is free but the cost of travel is not covered and is beyond the means of some survivors.\textsuperscript{114}

The Orthopedics and Traumatology Center and the Prosthetic Center of the Dicle University Research Hospital in Diyarbakir both provided prosthetics (below-knee only) to survivors in 2008 free of charge. Eight civilian landmine survivors were fitted with prosthetics at the Dicle Prosthetic Center in 2008.\textsuperscript{115} Many mine survivors are not aware that prosthetics are provided at the Dicle University Research Hospital. Only survivors with a green card were eligible for services.\textsuperscript{116}

Only limited psychological support was available to people affected by mines and ERW, and no psychosocial programs were run for mine/ERW survivors or families of victims of mines/ERW.\textsuperscript{117}

Turkey noted in its Article 7 report that 152 military personnel had received indemnities, 15 had received salaries, and 48 had been assisted in finding employment in 2008.\textsuperscript{118}

Healthcare reform includes a policy that exempts employers from paying insurance premiums for persons with disabilities as the government will pay the premiums.\textsuperscript{119} It is too early to determine if this has increased employment with people with disabilities.\textsuperscript{120} Previous government quotas remained in effect, with employment quotas stipulating that 3\% of employees in the public sector and 4\% in the private sector should be persons with disabilities. Neither of these quotas was met in 2008. In the public sector, less than 20\% of the employment quota for persons with disabilities was filled in 2008.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{107} Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{113} Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
\textsuperscript{115} Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
\textsuperscript{117} Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{118} Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
\textsuperscript{120} Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.
From 7 July 2004 until it expired on 30 July 2008, 341,429 people applied for financial compensation under Law 5233 (on the Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts and the Measures Taken Against Terrorism). At the end of the program, one-third of the applications had been processed. Data on the number of mine/ERW survivors who applied for or obtained compensation was not provided.\(^{122}\) Mine/ERW survivors were also able to apply for compensation through the Damage Detection Commissions. However, the financial compensation the law prescribes does not cover the full financial cost of permanent injury. The amount of compensation is determined by the degree to which the survivor lost the ability to work. The maximum compensation payment is €5,000 (US$7,363).\(^{123}\)

The new social security system provides a monthly payment to persons with disabilities who are unable to work or who have not been able to find employment. The payment given in 2009 has been TRY250 ($155.40) a month. According to Turkish disability groups, the required monthly income for a family of four for food and basic goods was TRY953 ($592.38) at the beginning of 2009.\(^{124}\)

As of July 2009, the Disability Act, which came into force in 2005\(^{125}\) and related regulation on the rights of persons with disabilities have not been fully implemented. Disabled people’s organizations have criticized the Act as weak, and inadequate in the provision of social reintegration and healthcare services.\(^{126}\) Discrimination against persons with disabilities is illegal in Turkey, with regards to employment, education, access to health care, and the provision of other state services. The government reportedly enforced the law relatively effectively. The law does not mandate disability access to public transport and public buildings.\(^{127}\)

The Turkish Grand National Assembly ratified the UN Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 3 December 2008. It had not signed the convention’s Optional Protocol as of 1 July 2009.

**Victim assistance activities**

In 2008, the IMFT worked with limited funding to raise awareness of the needs of mine/ERW/IED victims.\(^{128}\) In 2008, the IMFT organized prosthetic services for four survivors at the Prosthetic Center of the Dicle University Research Hospital.\(^{129}\) The Disabled People’s Association of Turkey supported awareness-raising activities on VA.\(^{130}\)

**Support for Mine Action**

Turkey did not report national funds allocated to mine action in 2008.

During 2008 and 2009, Turkey has remained the lead nation in the NATO Partnership for Peace project to clear mines and ERW from a former military base at Saloglu village in Agstafa district in Azerbaijan.\(^{131}\) The total budget for the project from 2005 to 2011 is estimated to be €3.1 million ($4.6 million).\(^^{132}\) Turkey contributed to the first phase of the project in 2006, budgeted at €1.16 million ($1,708,216), and was reported by Azerbaijan to have provided an

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\(^{122}\) Parliamentary question from Gultan Kisank, Diyarbakir Representative of DTP to Beşir Atalay, Minister of Interior Affairs, Ankara, 1 December 2008.

\(^{123}\) Email from Tahir Elci, Attorney, Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, 27 March 2008.

\(^{124}\) Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.


\(^{126}\) Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.


\(^{128}\) Email from Mutebar Ogreten, IMFT, 16 June 2009.


\(^{130}\) Email from Ergun Işeri, Disabled People’s Foundation, 26 March 2009.


additional €50,000 ($73,630) for the second phase of the project starting in April 2007. In 2008, Turkey assigned a technical advisor to the Saloglu project but did not report other contributions. In addition to Azerbaijan, Turkey has provided personnel, training, and financial support to mine clearance activities in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Lebanon. It did not report the value of this in-kind support during 2008.

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2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 August 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Scattered antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>16 (2007: 23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but approximately 1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>171,497</td>
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<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 August 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>No mine clearance; 434 EOD tasks</td>
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<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National: Unknown (2007: $300,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Ten-Year Summary


Uganda’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem is the result of decades of armed conflict and civil strife. Evidence from re-survey and clearance records has indicated that the mine problem was far smaller than previously thought, but Uganda did not complete clearance by its Article 5 deadline of 1 August 2009. This put it in violation of the treaty until it either completes clearance or is granted an extension to the deadline by the other States Parties, whichever occurs sooner. A mine action program was established only in 2005, with the support of UNDP.

Between 1999 and 2008, the International Service Volunteers Association recorded 354 mine/ERW casualties in Uganda; more than 1,400 casualties have been recorded since 1986. Since 1999, risk education has been delivered by government bodies and international and national NGOs. The level of risk education provided has increased over the years, although it has remained inadequate, in part due to conflict and lack of funding. In 2008, national standards for risk education were approved.

Services for survivors and persons with disabilities remained largely inadequate. As a result of the so-called VA26 process, the government took more ownership over victim assistance service provision, and survivor groups became increasingly involved. Implementation of Uganda’s victim assistance plan for 2008–2012, as part of its commitment to the 2005–2009 Nairobi Action Plan, only started in mid-2009, reportedly due to a lack of resources.
Mine Ban Policy

Uganda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 February 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 August 1999. National implementation legislation has reportedly been under development for six years, but as of July 2009 had still not been enacted.1

Uganda submitted an undated Article 7 report covering the period from 2 April 2008 to 2 April 2009. Uganda has provided six previous reports.2

Uganda participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. At both meetings, Uganda made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance.

Uganda has not expressed its views on key issues of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, and antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices).

Uganda is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines, but not Amended Protocol II or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Uganda signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not yet ratified as of 1 July 2009.3

Production, transfer, use, stockpile destruction, and retention

Uganda produced antipersonnel mines until 1995 when the state-run facility was decommissioned. Uganda has stated that it has never exported antipersonnel mines.4

In 2000 and 2001, there were serious and credible allegations indicating the strong possibility of Ugandan use of antipersonnel mines in the DRC, particularly in the June 2000 battle for Kisangani. The government denied any use, but pledged to investigate; the results were never made known.5

The government consistently accused Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) rebels of using antipersonnel mines in Uganda until 2004, and regularly reported the seizure or recovery of stockpiled antipersonnel mines from the LRA until 2005.

In July 2003, Uganda completed destruction of its stockpile of 6,383 antipersonnel mines. This figure was considerably higher than Uganda initially indicated would be destroyed, apparently because of additional mines captured from rebel forces and a decrease in the number of mines kept for training purposes.6

Uganda has discovered or seized and destroyed additional antipersonnel mines in recent years.7 In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Uganda reported destroying 120 Type 72 mines. It did not note where the mines came from or who had possession of them before their destruction.

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1 The draft law is titled “1997 Mine Ban Implementation Bill 2002.” In May 2002, Uganda reported the act was before parliament. In May 2004, officials told Landmine Monitor that a revised draft was due to be presented to the cabinet for approval before going to parliament. In May 2005, Uganda reported, “An implementation act is ready to be presented before Parliament.” In December 2005, Uganda reported that national implementation legislation was “ready for parliamentary debate.” In May 2007, an official told Landmine Monitor that the bill still had to be approved by the cabinet before being sent to parliament. No further update has been provided.


4 In January 2005, a UN report said that landmines had been supplied from a UPDF camp to a rebel group in the DRC in violation of a UN embargo. The report did not specify if the mines were antipersonnel or antivehicle. Uganda strongly denied the allegation as “patently false and inflammatory.” See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 596.


In August 2008, a Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) spokesperson said that during a month-long exercise many tons of obsolete ordnance collected from armories around the country, or captured from rebels, were to be destroyed, including “landmines, which have been banned internationally.” Also in August 2008, the UPDF stated that 75 landmines (type unspecified) and other weapons had been recovered from the Acholi, Lango, and West Nile sub-regions, indicating the arms had been abandoned by the LRA. In December 2008, the UPDF reportedly recovered four antipersonnel mines, among other weapons, during a raid on an LRA camp in the DRC.

In its Article 7 report covering 2008, Uganda reported retaining 1,764 Type 72 mines for training purposes. This is the same number Uganda has been reporting since it completed stockpile destruction. Uganda has not yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines—a step agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004. In 2004, Uganda declared that it “supports the position already taken by African states which have called for a minimum number of retained mines to be of a bare minimum and not in thousands.”

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Landmines and ERW in Uganda are the result of armed conflict and civil strife over the past four decades. The main problem is in the north of the country, following many years of conflict with the non-state armed group, the LRA, and includes mines, UXO, and abandoned explosive ordnance. However, based on evidence from re-survey and clearance records, the mine threat appears to have been far smaller than previously thought. The UPDF reportedly laid mines in 2000 and 2002 to seal the border from intrusions by the LRA. But much of the area it fenced and marked as minefields was later determined to be dummy minefields designed to fool the LRA.

In July 2009, the director of the Uganda Mine Action Center (UMAC) stated that Uganda had two mined areas remaining, containing a total of six suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). The mined areas are all in Kitgum along the border with Sudan: five SHAs are at Lomwaka in Agoro sub-county, and the sixth is at Ngomoromo in Lokung sub-county. In Agoro, the last known casualty was in 1999, and the last mine incident occurred on 24 November 2008, when an animal strayed into the mined area on Mica hill. At Ngomoromo, the mined area is reportedly 4km long. The last known mine casualties in this area were two members of the UPDF during training.
clearance operations in 2007. Both mined areas were under technical survey as of May 2009.

Danish Demining Group (DDG) has reported that all of the SHAs are partially fenced.

Even after clearance of these two mined areas is completed, Uganda faces a potential residual threat as small numbers of mines were laid over a large area, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations in 2008 continued to find mines. In 2008, EOD teams found 13 antipersonnel and six antivehicle mines in 18 different locations in Gulu, Pader, Kitgum, and Amuru districts.

Additionally, Uganda reported that as of May 2009 they had cleared 244 SHAs containing UXO, with clearance ongoing in 40, while 35 had been discredited, and 107 remained to be cleared. Deminers in Gulu found RBK-250/275 cluster bombs and AO-1SCh submunitions, although Uganda could not provide the year they were found. It is uncertain who used the cluster munitions, but the Minister of Defence claimed it was non-state armed groups such as the LRA and the Allied Democratic Forces and not the Ugandan army. A 2006 survey of landmine and UXO casualties in Gulu district determined that 3% of casualties were caused by submunitions. UMAC cleared 121 AO-1SCh submunitions and two M42 series submunitions in 2008.

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 16 new mine/ERW casualties (six killed and 10 injured) in five incidents in Uganda. This data is incomplete as it only contains information from the media and from the International Service Volunteers Association (AVSI), which only collects data in Gulu and Amuru districts. UNDP, UMAC, and the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD) confirmed they were incapable of collecting casualty data. No data was collected by the Ministry of Health (MoH), due to a lack of resources, despite it being in charge of the National Surveillance Network.

AVSI recorded three of the casualties and Landmine Monitor the rest. All casualties were civilians, including at least nine children (two girls and seven of unknown gender) and two men. The age of four males and one female was unknown. ERW caused 15 casualties and an unknown device the sixteenth. The children became casualties while playing with ERW, including two girls while playing near an army site in Amuru. Five casualties occurred during scrap metal processing, and two men were digging in their fields. Three casualties occurred in Amuru, eight in Gulu, and the scrap metal incident occurred in Kampala. The decrease in casualties was

27 Article 7 Report (for the period 2 April 2008 to 2 April 2009), Form J.
30 Unless noted otherwise, analysis based on AVSI casualty data 1986–2009, provided by email from Femke Bannink, Project Coordinator, AVSI, 5, 18, and 26 June 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008 to 25 June 2009.
31 “Official Common Country Response” to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 15 June 2009, provided by email from Jose Neil A.C. Manzano, Programme Specialist, UNDP, 17 June 2009. This response combines information from UMAC, UNDP, DDG, and the MoGLSD. Separately, DDG confirmed that no casualty data was collected at the government level. Email from Elina Dibirova, RE/VA Specialist, DDG, 22 June 2009.
33 Martin Ssebuyira and Andrew Bagala, “Two killed, three injured in city blast,” New Vision (Kampala), 8 November 2008. The article mentions a second scrap metal incident in Kampala, but insufficient detail about the device causing the incident and the number of casualties was available to include it.

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ascribed to limited movement by internally displaced persons (IDPs), increased risk education, and successful clearance. In 2007, AVSI recorded 23 casualties (10 killed and 13 injured); 14 of those occurred in one ERW transportation incident. In 2007, Landmine Monitor was unable to identify casualties in the west of the country. UMAC was not able to provide data in 2007 either.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009 with at least four fatal casualties to 25 June. AVSI recorded one man killed while collecting building materials in the forest in Gulu. Landmine Monitor identified three children killed while playing with ERW in Pader. It is possible that three more boys were killed in neighboring Adjumani district, but insufficient information was available to include them.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties is not known, and figures between 900 and 3,000 have been cited. Uganda confirmed that these figures are incomplete and unreliable. It is expected that the actual figure will be closer to the low estimate.

AVSI remains the most complete source for northern Uganda. AVSI recorded 1,414 casualties between 1986 and June 2009 (538 killed, 864 injured, and 12 unknown). This includes survey results for 1986–2006, when 1,387 casualties were recorded, and subsequent annual updates; 1,278 of the casualties occurred in Gulu and Amuru. The remaining casualties included nine in Sudan. Most casualties occurred between 1995 and 1997 (39% or 542), with 302 casualties in 1996 (21%). At least 357 casualties occurred between 1999 and 2008 (138 killed, 216 injured, and three unknown), with rapid decreases starting in 2002.

Almost all casualties in Uganda were civilian (1,287 or 92%), 47 were security forces, and 71 were of unknown status. Some 68% of casualties were male: 538 men, 190 boys, and 230 of unknown age. Women accounted for 232 casualties, girls 79, and 107 females of unknown age. For 29 people, gender and/or age were unknown. More than half of the casualties occurred while traveling on foot (38%), in a vehicle (12%), and by bicycle (4%).

Mines caused 70% (977) of casualties, ERW 315 casualties, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 11, and unknown devices 102. AVSI attributed this high percentage of mine casualties to the fact that, at the height of the northern insurgency, people came in contact with mines more regularly than ERW despite significant ERW contamination; 427 mine casualties (44%) occurred between 1995 and 1997. AVSI added that interviewees might wrongly call all explosive devices mines and confirmed that ERW are now the main cause of casualties and an obstacle to the return of IDPs.

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

Uganda’s national mine action authority is its National Mine Action Steering Committee (NMASC), which is located at the Office of the Prime Minister in Kampala. A mine action policy drafted in early 2006 was formally adopted in October 2006 by the committee, but was still pending cabinet approval in April 2009. The policy laid down the aims of the program and clarified the responsibilities of the program’s main institutions and other actors.
Mine action is integrated in the government of Uganda’s Peace, Recovery, and Development Plan (PRDP). The plan is the main framework for peace, recovery, and development in northern Uganda, and mine action is indicated as one of the activities to facilitate the protected return and resettlement of former IDPs. The Office of the Prime Minister, through UMAC, is responsible for the management and coordination of mine action in the country, with the exception of victim assistance, which falls under the MoGLSD and the MoH. UMAC, which was set up in Kampala in 2006, is responsible for quality management of demining operations, risk education (RE), and accreditation of operators. A regional mine action center was established in Gulu in 2008.

**Risk education**

UMAC is responsible for managing and coordinating RE, although there was no RE coordinator in place in 2008. However, regular coordination meetings were held at the regional mine action centers. In January 2009, a DDG advisor joined UMAC, and UMAC planned to recruit an RE coordinator in early 2009. There was no RE strategy in 2008.

**Victim assistance**

Under Uganda’s Comprehensive Plan of Action on Victim Assistance 2008–2012, it was stated that the Office of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordination and that reporting is to the NMASC. In 2009, UMAC noted that it is responsible for all parts of mine action with the exception of victim assistance (VA).

The lead ministry for VA coordination is the MoGLSD. The other main ministry is the MoH, but coordination between the two ministries is not optimal. Responsibilities are delegated to district and local offices of both ministries.

The Uganda Landmine Survivors’ Association (ULSA) was planned to be an umbrella organization for survivor groups, but could not fulfill this role as the legal process was stalled in late 2007. As of 2009, ULSA was *de facto* playing its coordinating role, but this was not formalized and required support was lacking.

**Data collection and management**

UMAC uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) for its mine action data. After facing numerous problems, including a lack of reliable data, the mine action database at UMAC was completely reconstructed in 2008 to include only remaining SHA reports and clearance data. An IMSMA database is also located at the regional mine action center in Gulu.

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
49 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elina Dibirova, DDG, 27 February 2009.
54 Interview with Herbert Baryayebwa, MoGLSD, in Geneva, 29 May 2009.
56 Email from Muhamud Mudaki, Founder, KLSA, 17 June 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Stephen Okello, President, GALMSG, 17 June 2009.

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In 2008, DDG worked with UMAC to develop its capacity to enter RE activity data into IMSMA, and submission of activity data is a requirement for accredited organizations under the new standards.\(^58\)

In 2008, the MoH was mandated to establish the National Surveillance Network. But due to staff challenges and a lack of resources, no progress was made,\(^59\) and it was noted that the lack of data hampered victim assistance progress.\(^60\) At a mine action meeting at the MoGLSD in May 2009, it was confirmed that neither government nor non-governmental agencies had comprehensive casualty data. Additionally, there is no formal procedure for reporting new casualties.\(^61\) Regional data collection is not proactive or complete.\(^62\) In 2009, community development officers and other actors were given questionnaires developed by the MoGLSD in an attempt to create baseline information in four affected districts in northern Uganda. The data was considered to be insufficient, as it lacked sufficient quantitative information,\(^63\) probably because the community development officers were not well-prepared to collect this information.\(^64\)

As of June 2009, no casualty information had been entered into IMSMA, due to a lack of up-to-date information on older casualties, no standard reporting mechanism for new casualties, delays at UMAC due to staffing issues, and the departure of trained staff at other organizations.\(^65\) Additional reasons mentioned were incomplete data collection and duplication of previously collected data (due to population movements), and the inclusion of casualties not caused by mines/ERW. In October 2008, with DDG assistance, a database officer was recruited and trained at UMAC and a standard form developed.\(^66\)

In May 2009, Uganda said that it had insufficient resources to generate comprehensive data on mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities.\(^67\)

### Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti Mine Network-Rivenzori</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPAR</td>
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<td>GALMSG</td>
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<tr>
<td>UMAC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVSI</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WVI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{58}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elina Dibirova, DDG, 27 February 2009.


\(^{61}\) Ibid; and email from Femke Bannink, AVSI, 5 June 2009.

\(^{62}\) See casualty section above; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p.717.

\(^{63}\) Email from Femke Bannink, AVSI, 5 June 2009.

\(^{64}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Femke Bannink, AVSI, 18 June 2009. The main challenge appears to be that the MoH is in charge of data collection without considerable input from MoGLSD and its community officers.


\(^{67}\) Statement by and interview with Herbert Baryayebwa, MoGLSD, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, in Geneva, 26 and 29 May 2009.
Plans
In 2008, Uganda set strategic objectives to reduce mine and ERW incidents by 80% in 2009 and prepare for a residual mine action response capacity, while integrating mine action needs into national humanitarian, development, and reconstruction plans and budgets. In coordination with UNDP, it planned in 2009 to incorporate the national mine action program into the National Emergency Coordination and Operations Center. This would allow the Office of the Prime Minister to coordinate all disaster risk reduction efforts.

The Comprehensive Plan of Action on Victim Assistance 2008–2012 is the basis of VA implementation and contains a situational analysis, detailed objectives and plans, clear responsibilities, and funding requirements (US$2.95 million). The National Mine Action Policy also contains provisions for VA, and the draft national mine action standards were said to include VA provisions.

The National Council for Disability (NCD) is to monitor the extent to which government, the private sector, and NGOs “include and meet the needs of [persons with disabilities] in their planning and service delivery.” Mine/ERW survivors are included in this council. The NCD was appointed to monitor the VA plan, but only receives UGX2 million (less than $1,000) per year for this.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
Mine action in Uganda is implemented within the policy framework of broader government planning, which includes the Internally Displaced Persons’ Policy 2004, the National Policy on Rights of People with Disabilities 2006, and the 2008 draft Policy for Disaster Preparedness and Management.

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Uganda has demonstrated a commitment to mine action through its establishment of a mine action coordination and management structure, though it missed its Article 5 deadline and failed to submit an extension request to the relevant meeting of States Parties.

Through the appointment of the MoGLSD as the focal point for VA and the involvement of relevant ministries, Uganda is increasingly showing national ownership of VA, which has since 1999 evolved from being a “mere NGO program” to a government responsibility supplemented by partner activities. However, the MoGLSD continues to lack sufficient funding or capacity to undertake or support planned activities.

National management
The mine action program was established as a UNDP direct execution project supported by international funding and technical advisors. In April 2007, Uganda had announced that it would move to a nationally executed program during the course of the year, but as of March 2009 the transition had not been finalized.

UMAC and DDG have had a Memorandum of Understanding since July 2007 whereby DDG undertakes to operate within UMAC, establish a base in Gulu.
The 2008–2012 VA plan aims to integrate VA into the larger disability sector and is linked to existing strategies in the health and social sectors as well as the poverty eradication strategy. But, as of May 2009, it is unclear how implementation of activities is divided between the different strategies. One operator expressed concerns that a program similar to the VA plan was under development for victims of war in general without taking the VA one into account.

Uganda is heavily dependent on external funding for VA. The departure of the VA technical advisor to UMAC and a blockage of UNDP funding were, as of June 2009, major setbacks to implementation of the 2008–2012 plan. Uganda acknowledged that “different NGOs have played a big role in victim assistance” and continued to do so. A VA/RE officer was deployed again in late 2008 (by DDG with UNDP funding), and UNDP funds for implementation of the VA plan in 2007–2008 were released at the end of March 2009. It is unclear how much national funding was dedicated to VA/disability, but it was noted by one operator that the government was “reluctant” to spend money on disability.

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

The Uganda National Mine Action Standards were approved by the NMASC in November 2007. The document was published on 1 December 2008. UMAC uses standing operating procedures developed with the technical assistance of DDG. A land release model and standard is explained in Chapter 10 of the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS).

Program evaluations

An external evaluation of Uganda’s mine action program took place in March–April 2007. The results have never been made public, but, according to UMAC, one of the recommendations was to ensure the transition to a nationally executed program.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

UMAC is in charge of personnel from the Ugandan army and police who were trained in demining and EOD and seconded to it. As of 2008, there were 12 national demining teams, with a total of 60 demining personnel.

To date, the vast majority of clearance operations have been spot-task EOD. Indeed, Uganda did not conduct any formal mine clearance operations in 2008. Clearance teams completed 434 EOD tasks in 442 villages in Amuru, Bundibugyo, Gulu, Kasese, Kitgum, and Pader districts. During operations in 2008, 13 antipersonnel mines, six antivehicle mines, and 2,635 items of UXO were found, as well as 18,471 pieces of small arms ammunition.
Identification of hazardous areas

In 2007–2008, UMAC, with technical assistance from DDG, re-surveyed the country after UNDP and UMAC questioned the results of a baseline survey conducted by Mines Awareness Trust in 2005–2006. The re-survey found a total of only 24 landmines located over a wide area.92

In late 2008, the national demining teams with assistance from DDG conducted a general survey in Kitgum and found the two mined areas referred to above. In March 2009, a base camp had been built in preparation for the technical survey and clearance had begun. These followed a delay of several months as a result of the difficult logistics involved in supplying the remote base camp, which was four hours walk from Gulu.93 UMAC planned to apply land release principles on the remaining suspected areas.94

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Uganda was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2009. Uganda was slow to initiate a mine action program—clearance operations did not start until 2006—and it failed to clear all known remaining mined areas by the expiry of its Article 5 deadline.

In November 2007, at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, UMAC’s director had asserted Uganda’s intention “to clear all identified mined areas in Uganda... by August 2009. There is strong will and support by Government of Uganda to ensure this is achieved.”95 As recently as May 2009, at the Standing Committee meetings, Uganda reiterated it would meet its Article 5 clearance obligation by the deadline while at the same time stating only that it would be “mine impact free,” which is not equivalent to full compliance with treaty obligations.96

In July 2009, however, Uganda declared that it had underestimated the complexity of clearing its known remaining mined areas and the time required to clear them. As a result, it would not meet the 1 August deadline and would seek an extension at the Second Review Conference.97 Missing the deadline placed Uganda in violation of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty until it either completed clearance or was formally granted an extension by the other States Parties, whichever occurred sooner.

Risk Education

In 2008, RE was conducted by NGOs through training focal points in communities to conduct peer education, especially teachers and members of local drama clubs, and through conducting some direct presentations in schools and communities. They made efforts to ensure women and youth were represented. IDP camps were a focus for RE because of their inhabitants’ anticipated return to their communities that might be mine/ERW-affected. RE was also conducted through radio and the media.98 At least 171,497 people were reported to have received direct RE in 2008 (not including those who received RE through the mass media). This is a reduction from 2007, when at least 241,919 people were reported to be reached with some form of RE, which was double that of 2006.99

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92 Data and analysis provided to Landmine Monitor by DDG, 7 April 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 713, 715.
97 Email from Vicent Woboya, UMAC, 9 July 2009; and letter to Jurg Streuli, President of the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, from Pius Bigirimana, Permanent Secretary, OPM, , 2 July 2009.
RE was implemented by international NGOs and several community-based organizations.\textsuperscript{100} DDG started activities in June 2008.\textsuperscript{101} Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief (CPAR) reduced their activities in 2008 due to insufficient funding.\textsuperscript{102}

NMAS were passed and approved in December 2008. They include a chapter on RE, and all organizations are required to be accredited by UMAC. The standards provide for the RE/VA coordinator, once appointed, to monitor implementation of activities against the standards.\textsuperscript{103}

UMAC organized training courses for NGOs in 2008, with the support of DDG. It also organized meetings to synchronize messages, shifting focus from landmines to UXO.\textsuperscript{104} Communities were provided with a hotline number to report contamination. Requests for clearance were responded to by UMAC.\textsuperscript{105}

UMAC and UNDP conducted several monitoring visits in 2008. The main issues they found were that NGOs were slow to adopt the new UXO-focused messages, and they did not always report their activities to UMAC to be entered into IMSMA, usually because RE was only one part of their activities and they did not have time to do so.\textsuperscript{106}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographic area</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AVSI</td>
<td>Drama sensitizations, training of trainers, and community awareness training sessions</td>
<td>Gulu, Amuru, Kitgum, and Lira</td>
<td>30,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPAR</td>
<td>RE integrated with youth peace-building project through Youth Coalition for Peace</td>
<td>Gulu, Amuru, Pader</td>
<td>Approximately 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision International (WVI)</td>
<td>School-based RE, RE through drama groups, radio broadcasts</td>
<td>Kitgum, Pader, Gulu, and Amuru</td>
<td>All population of northern Uganda through broadcasts, 100,460 through direct presentations, and all schools in area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>RE training to national staff and other NGOs, development of materials, RE school clubs, provision of RE to communities at risk</td>
<td>Gulu</td>
<td>19,689 (18,639 children and 1,058 adults)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti Mine Network–Rwenzori</td>
<td>RE on scrap metal collection to school children in four schools</td>
<td>Around Kasese town</td>
<td>672 primary school children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{100} Interview with Jose Neil A.C. Manzano, UNDP, in Geneva, 25 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{101} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elina Dibirova, DDG, 27 February 2009.
\textsuperscript{103} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elina Dibirova, DDG, 27 February 2009.
\textsuperscript{104} Interview with Jose Neil A.C. Manzano, UNDP, in Geneva, 25 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{107} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elina Dibirova, DDG, 27 February 2009; email from Walter Mwaka, Project Coordinator, World Vision International, 26 June 2009; interview with Komakech Henry Banya, Team Leader (Gulu/Amuru), CPAR, 26 June 2009; and emails from Wilson Bwambale, Coordinator, Anti-Mines Network–Rwenzori, 25 June 2009; Michael Ocan, Mine Risk Education Program Officer, AVSI, 25 June 2009; and from Anne Miller, Director of Programs, CPAR, 22 July 2009.
Since 1999, RE has been delivered by government bodies and international and national NGOs. Methods have consisted of training of trainers (NGO staff, school teachers, health workers, and community leaders), community awareness activities including the use of dance and drama, mass media, and distribution of materials. The level of RE has increased over the years, though it has remained inadequate, in part due to conflict and lack of funding. It has mainly been focused on the north and to a lesser extent, the west of the country. From 2005, there was a focus on IDPs, with an increase in RE activities in 2007 in response to IDP resettlement in the north.

A mine action assessment in 1999 in Gulu district found a low level of mine awareness. Later evaluations found that RE had resulted in improved knowledge and behavior related to mines and UXO, and it was noted that reporting of contamination has increased. However, in 2006 it was reported that some RE was substandard and messages were not coordinated. From 1999, RE was coordinated by the Ministry of Health, although in 2004 it was reported that RE was not centrally coordinated. Monthly RE meetings were started in 2005, and UMAC became responsible for coordination. In 2006, UMAC planned to recruit a national coordinator, although this still had not happened by mid-2009. National standards started to be developed in 2006.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown but is estimated at around 1,000. In November 2008, Uganda reported, as in previous years, that it was still facing “many challenges” in implementing VA due to competing priorities, inadequate technical support for capacity-building in ministries, local authorities, and local survivors groups, and lack of funding. In May 2009, Uganda repeated that resources were lacking to provide assistance to survivors in all mine/ERW affected districts. This seems to be affecting survivors in Kasese in particular. The NCD noted that the “situation remained appalling.”

One improvement noted in the lives of survivors since 1999 was their increased participation in decision-making processes and their organization into survivors’ associations, as well as these associations’ increased competence and resource mobilization skills. One representative of a survivors’ group in Gulu noted some improvements in physical rehabilitation, attitudes, and grassroots survivor initiatives compared to 1999.

Most hospitals in Uganda are in bad condition and services inadequate, due to rapid population growth, increasing fuel/medication prices not accompanied by increased government budgets, and a brain drain. Most existing facilities lacked the capacity to effectively handle trauma, first-aid responders needed training, and post-emergency care was considered “quite weak” in government hospitals.

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108 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
117 Email from Muhamud Mudaki, KLSA, 16 June 2009.
118 Email from Julius Kamya, NCD, 29 June 2009.
119 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Femke Bannink, AVSI, 18 June 2009.
121 “Health facilities stretched to breaking point,” IRIN (Kayunga), 25 June 2009.
Uganda has a network of 14 physical rehabilitation centers under the responsibility of the MoH and one training center which is not recognized by the International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics. Survivors often needed to cover the cost of transport and accommodation. Centers lacked staff, raw materials, and capacity to follow up after fitting.

Psychosocial support was considered the weakest component and in need of strengthening and expansion into remote areas. The MoGLSD carried out psychosocial support through its community development officers, but for NGOs it was difficult to obtain funding for this type of activity. Stigma prevented survivors from accessing services, but survivors’ groups were being trained in peer support.

Since 1999, the economic status of survivors has not improved significantly, reportedly in part because many survivors have low education levels. Even when people receive training, very few employment opportunities existed, and there was no system to track employment after training. Representatives of disabled persons’ organizations noted that survivors were not included in program design and that implementers showed little “positive discrimination” for survivors. The government’s vocational training centers lack resources and are essentially defunct. Economic reintegration activities are mostly carried out by NGOs.

Uganda has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, who have representatives at various government levels. Nevertheless, discrimination remained, and the Uganda Human Rights Commission received complaints of discrimination in employment and access to transport and public services. On 28 September 2008, Uganda ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol.

**Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives**

Uganda is one of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and therefore “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors. As part of its commitment to the implementation of the Nairobi Action Plan, Uganda presented its 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. Revised objectives and plans to achieve the objectives were presented in November 2007 under the form of the Comprehensive Plan of Action on Victim Assistance 2008–2012 (see above). All actors saw the development of this plan as a key achievement between 2005 and 2009, even if actual implementation only started in June 2009. Additionally, many of the objectives with the earliest deadlines pertained to needs assessment, capacity building, and strengthening of structures, rather than actual activity implementation.

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131 MoGLSD in collaboration with the OPM and the MoH, “Comprehensive Plan Landmine Victim Assistance,” Kampala, undated but 2007, pp. 18–44.
AVSI noted that the 2008–2012 plan helped to guide its actions and avoid duplication. It reported progress under several objectives, including addressing inequality and exclusion through awareness-raising, support to survivor groups, skills training, and income-generating activities to decrease social vulnerability; continued support to the physical rehabilitation center in Gulu; and the development of psychosocial services.\(^{136}\)

Overall, objectives to be achieved in 2008–2009 have been delayed due to funding and capacity challenges, even though work has been carried out.

- **Data collection:** Reliable data on casualties and services was not expected before the end of 2009, data collection mechanisms were not functioning adequately, and newly collected information was deemed insufficient (see Data collection and management section above).
- **Medical care:** No progress was made on improving emergency care mechanisms.
- **Physical rehabilitation:** No progress was reported on integrating physiotherapy services and developing outreach services. Most objectives have deadlines for 2012.
- **Psychosocial support:** The objectives related to awareness-raising campaigns and activities were only reported by AVSI. NGOs also provided support to survivor groups and peer support training.
- **Economic reintegration:** There are no major improvements to the actual situation of survivors, but preparatory steps were taken in accordance with some objectives, such as the development of accessibility guidelines, strengthening of community/family support networks through the adoption of the community-based rehabilitation strategy, and a needs assessment (albeit inadequate).
- **Laws and public policies:** Ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, capacity-building for VA implementers, and work to operationalize the national disability policy were reported. No progress was reported on monitoring the 2008–2012 plan, activities under the African Decade for the Disabled (2000–2009), or decreasing stigma.

In May 2009, Uganda did not provide a detailed progress update on its achievements for 2008 because it was preparing its report “on the status of victim assistance for presentation at the Second Review Conference.”\(^{137}\) Some achievements and challenges detailed in past statements were listed. Uganda participated in a regional VA workshop in 2005, held a national planning workshop in August 2007, and included a VA expert on its delegation for each intersessional Standing Committee Meeting and each meeting of States Parties between 2005 and 2009. Three times this expert was the Minister of State for Elderly and Disability Affairs (2006–2007). Uganda reported on VA at each of these meetings, but did not use voluntary Form J of its annual Article 7 report.\(^{138}\)

### Victim assistance activities

MoGLSD activities largely related to coordination, policy, and guideline development and, to a lesser extent, data collection and psychological support, as explained above.

The Gulu Amuru Landmine Survivors Group (GALMSG) had 286 members as of 2009, and its main activities were capacity-building, psychosocial support, socio-economic reintegration, and rights advocacy. In 2008, 35 survivors received small business management training and loans, 20 were trained in solar panel assembly and provided with solar panels for income-generating purposes, 100 received counseling, 11 were trained to provide peer support, and five received material support. GALMSG’s main challenge was obtaining funding to support

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\(^{136}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Femke Bannink, AVSI, 18 June 2009.

\(^{137}\) Statement by Herbert Baryayebwa, MoGLSD, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 26 May 2009.

the return and reintegration of IDP survivors in their home villages. GALMSG is supported by AVSI and Humanist Action for Human Rights.139

In 2008, the Kasese Landmine Survivors Association was still facing difficulties after UNDP funding earmarked to support its activities in 2007 was blocked.140 With individual donations it was able to complete its registration as a national NGO as advised by the MoGLSD, to cover some costs for its banana rope-making project and to provide a sewing machine to one survivor in 2008. In April 2009, it received some of the blocked UNDP funding for the rope-making project and office materials.141

In 2008, AVSI continued its physical rehabilitation activities and expanded socio-economic reintegration and capacity-building. It provided support to several survivors’ groups in northern Uganda. AVSI’s main challenges were the cost of sustaining the Gulu rehabilitation center and working towards its sustainability. Other challenges were the increased demand for services at the center and the inability of the local government to provide transport for clients as agreed. AVSI provided physical rehabilitation to 308 persons with disabilities (53 survivors), psychosocial support to 589 (43 survivors), and socio-economic reintegration and business training to 610 (582 survivors); 38 survivors also received material support. Since 1999, AVSI’s support has evolved from direct physical rehabilitation provision into socio-economic reintegration and capacity-building activities for survivors’ groups (leadership, accountability, transparency, and monitoring).142

CPAR faced challenges to continue its VA and RE programs after funding ended in March 2008. Some activities were still conducted through an integrated youth peace-building program.143

After an assessment in March 2008, the ICRC resumed its technical and financial assistance to physical rehabilitation in Uganda in October 2008.144 Support provided to the Fort Portal Rehabilitation Center in West Uganda focused on structural and organizational improvements and orthopedic supplies. The ICRC also supported Mbale Rehabilitation Center in eastern Uganda and assisted the MoH in developing a standard list and logistics chain for prosthetic/orthotic supplies.145 Between 1998 and 2002, the ICRC had already provided assistance to three physical rehabilitation centers (Fort Portal, Gulu, and Mbarara). The Mbarara center ceased operations in 2006 due to a lack of partners supporting the center in supplies and managerial issues.146

Support for Mine Action

The NMASC is responsible for development and coordination of budgets, resource mobilization, and donor relations for all areas of mine action in Uganda.147 The Uganda Comprehensive Plan of Action on Victim Assistance 2008–2012 includes a cost estimate for the period from 2008–2012 totaling $2,954,684 (€2,154,973), including $212,404 for research and monitoring, $378,320 for medical care, $787,000 for physical rehabilitation, $323,000 for psychological support and social reintegration, $686,460 for economic reintegration, and $567,500 to support laws and public policies.148

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141 Emails from Muhamud Mudaki, KLSA, 16, 17, and 21 June 2009.
142 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Femke Bannink, AVSI, 18 June 2009.
143 Email from Anna Miller, CPAR, 25 June 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 723.
148 Ibid, p. 15.
National support for mine action
In a submission to the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Uganda stated that negotiations had begun to initiate a new national budget line for mine action.\footnote{Summary of Information Provided by States Parties on the Implementation Of Article 5 in the Context of Questions Posed by the co-chairs at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 21 November 2007, APLC/MSP.8/2007/MISC.3/Rev.1, p. 16. According to UNDP, there was a UGX50 million (€26,000) budget line item for 2006–2007, but it was not fully used by the OPM/UMAC. Email from Lydia Good, Mine Action Programme Specialist, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 11 August 2008.} UNDP reported that the budget line had been opened and funds allocated from it.\footnote{UN, “Country Profile: Uganda,” www.mineaction.org.} In May 2009, Uganda stated that an increase of funds from the mine action budget line was being sought, but did not report on the amount contributed from national funds in 2008 or 2009.\footnote{Statement of Uganda, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 27 November 2009.}

International cooperation and assistance
In 2008, Canada and Denmark reported providing $783,506 (€532,056) to mine action in Uganda. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was approximately 57% less than that reported for 2007. In spite of the steep decline after several years of stable funding, funding levels appear sufficient for Uganda to complete its mine clearance obligations. However, Uganda has stated a need for continued international assistance to address ERW, including cluster munition remnants, and to continue RE and VA programming.\footnote{Emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009; and from Mads Hove, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/ Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
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<td>DDG</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>RE, VA</td>
<td>$321,731 (C$342,960)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$783,506 (€532,056)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, Uganda reported its donors as Austria, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.\footnote{Statement of Uganda, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 27 May 2009.} It did not specify in which years each donor provided funds.
States Parties

Ukraine

UKRAINE

Ten-Year Summary

Ukraine became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 June 2006. Ukraine informed States Parties in May 2009 that it was unlikely that it would be able to meet its 1 June 2010 stockpile destruction deadline. It still possesses 5.95 million PFM-type mines and 149,096 POM-2 mines. It destroyed 101,088 PFM-1 mines in 1999 and 404,903 PMN-type mines in 2002 and 2003, as well as more than 254,000 other antipersonnel mines.

Ukraine has stated that it has no known mined areas on its territory although mines from World War II continue to be found, albeit in small numbers. A much greater problem comes from explosive remnants of war (ERW) left from WWII and from former Soviet bases and military training areas.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 115 mine/ERW casualties (55 killed, 57 injured, and three unknown) in Ukraine. Due to lack of comprehensive data collection, these figures may not represent the full scope of the problem. Risk education was provided on an ad hoc basis to emergency personnel and civilians in affected areas. There are no specific victim assistance programs, but war veterans are provided with financial support for medical, rehabilitation, and social services. Access to services remains difficult.

Mine Ban Policy

Ukraine signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 February 1999 and ratified on 27 December 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2006. Ukraine has not reported any steps taken to implement the treaty domestically, as required by Article 9.

Ukraine submitted its fourth Article 7 report on 20 April 2009, for the period 20 April 2008 to 20 April 2009.1

Ukraine participated in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in May 2009. At both meetings, Ukraine made statements on stockpile destruction.

Ukraine has not made known its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Ukraine is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.2 It submitted a national annual report as required by the protocol’s Article 13 on 12 April 2009. Ukraine is also party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War; it submitted a national report as required by the protocol’s Article 10 on 24 April 2009. Ukraine has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.3

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1 Ukraine submitted previous Article 7 reports on 12 December 2006, 11 April 2007, and 20 April 2008.
2 At the time of adherence on 15 December 1999, Ukraine deferred compliance with Amended Protocol II’s requirements for self-destruction and self-deactivation of remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines for nine years. The deferral became irrelevant when Ukraine became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, which prohibited it from using antipersonnel mines and obligated complete destruction of stocks by June 2010.
Production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Ukraine has repeatedly stated that it has not produced antipersonnel mines since its independence.4 Ukraine is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Its 1999 moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines was formally in place through 2003, and in practice stayed in effect until the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Ukraine.5

Ukraine’s treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 June 2010. Ukraine informed States Parties in May 2009 that it was unlikely that it would be able to meet the deadline.

Ukraine’s Article 7 reports have presented different information on the quantities and types of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, which in turn are different from previously revealed information, as detailed in the following table.6

<table>
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<td>5,947,596</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,664,342</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,405,800</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,304,907</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,454,003</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,453,859</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,099,468</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = not reported

Even prior to ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine destroyed 101,088 PFM-1 mines in 1999 and more than 400,000 PMN-type mines in 2002 and 2003.8

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4 Most recently, in May 2009, Ukraine said it “did not produce APL in the past, doesn’t produce at present, and will not produce them in the future.” Presentation by Ukraine, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 25 May 2009.


6 Landmine Monitor has previously reported that it appears that Ukraine inherited a stockpile of 7.17 million antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union, including 716,746 of various types of hand-emplaced mines, 404,903 PMN-type mines, and 6,048,684 PFM-type mines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 764. However, those totals did not include 8,060 PMD-6 mines Ukraine has more recently reported as destroyed.

7 With respect to the numbers cited in the Landmine Monitor Report 2006 column, the PFM number was provided by Ukraine in November 2000 to a stockpile assessment mission funded by Canada. The other numbers are from an August 2005 EC tender for destruction of non-PFM mines in Ukraine.

In June 2008, Ukraine reported that between 2005 and 2007, an experimental program to partially dismantle and destroy 8,000 POM-2 mines was carried out at the Donetsk Chemical Plant, and a further 48 POM-2 mines were destroyed at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant.9 In a November 2008 presentation, Ukraine indicated it has also destroyed its entire stock of 238,010 POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M mines, as well as all 8,060 PMD-6 mines.10 It subsequently informed Landmine Monitor that the destruction took place in 2006.11

In its Article 7 reports submitted in 2007, 2008, and 2009, Ukraine noted that while its MON-type and OZM-type antipersonnel mines can be used in command-detonated mode in compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty, these stockpiled mines are excessive and not suitable for use, and it has plans to destroy them.12 The Article 7 report covering 2008 continued to list 296,288 OZM mines and 57,935 MON mines as in the stockpile.13

**Destruction of PFM-type mines**

The Ministry of Defense destroyed a total of 101,088 PFM-1 mines between March and April 1999 at the Desna Training Center at a cost of €120,000 (US$176,712).14 These mines contain a liquid explosive filling (VS6-D) that makes them dangerous and difficult to destroy.

In 2002, the European Commission (EC) launched a project to prepare the destruction of Ukraine’s remaining PFM mines.15 However, a contract awarded in December 2005 to a consortium led by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit was terminated on 18 April 2007 at the request of the consortium “on the grounds of non-fulfillment by the [government of Ukraine] of their obligations.”16 No mines were destroyed before the end of the contract.

In April 2008, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction convened an informal closed consultation on destruction of PFM-type mines—including Ukraine, interested donors, and experts on stockpile destruction—which concluded that Ukraine should pursue more diversified sources of funding to pay for its stockpile destruction programs.17

Ukraine confirmed its determination to comply with its stockpile destruction obligation in a presentation to the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction in June 2008. Ukraine said it had decided to make a national contribution toward the destruction of a portion (about 1.6

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11 Telephone interview with Oleksandr Schebetuk, Head of Engineering, Munitions Department, MoD, 17 August 2009. Ukraine’s initial Article 7 report in 2006 did not list these as stockpiled mines.

12 Article 7 Reports, Form B, 11 April 2007, 20 April 2008, and 20 April 2009. The report submitted in 2009 stated that these mines “are considered to be used in their controlled model. They do not fall under the provisions of the Ottawa convention. However, we have an excessive amount of them and they are planned to be destroyed.” The report submitted in 2008 said the mines “are unsuitable for use” and will be destroyed. The report submitted in 2007 said these mines “are approved for usage in controllable variant, and are not covered by MBT, but they are not usable and planned for destruction.” Presumably this means that the mines are in unsafe condition or beyond their shelf-life and will be destroyed.

13 Article 7 Report, Form B, 20 April 2009.

14 After analyzing the consequences of this destruction, Ukraine decided it was necessary to destroy the rest of the PFM mines in a safer and more environmentally-friendly manner. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 654.

15 In mid-2003, an EC technical study determined that the condition of the PFM stockpiles was good, and the mines were consolidated into two sites, from a previous total of 13 storage locations. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 765.


million mines) of its PFM stockpile. Ukraine assigned existing facilities and a rotary kiln at the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for this purpose.18

In August 2008, Ukraine’s Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko requested a renewal of EC assistance, and the EC responded in October by proposing that European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) funds be used.19

In November 2008, Ukraine confirmed that it had provided funds from its state budget to commence the destruction process, and informed States Parties that a 13 November 2008 Presidential Decree set the starting date of 1 December 2008. It said the mines were already being transported to Pavlograd, and it expected to destroy “the first thousands” of PFM mines in February–March 2009.20

However, it stressed that “by its own resources Ukraine is capable to eliminate only the half of its PFM stockpiles in time [by the June 2010 deadline]. Acquisition of additional rotary kiln will make it possible to speed up the destruction process, with the aim of timely fulfilment [sic] of Ukraine’s obligations....Ukraine urges the States Parties to contribute to the provision of financial and technical assistance in order to complete the PFM destruction in Ukraine.”21

Ukraine agreed in January 2009 to an EC assessment mission to visit the existing stockpile destruction facilities, and the expert visit took place in May 2009.22

In May 2009, Ukraine told States Parties that it is unlikely it will be able to meet its June 2010 deadline. It said that its plans call for the destruction of 1.5 million PFM mines in 2009 and 600,000 more in 2010, but that the plan was being undermined by a lack of financial resources. It appealed to States Parties to find a “joint solution” to the problem and to come up with an option that would “prevent Ukraine from violating the Article 4 deadline.”23

According to Ukraine’s Article 7 report for 2008, a total of 144 PFM mines were destroyed in the reporting period, leaving a total of 5,950,540.24 In the May 2009 presentation, Ukraine provided a different number for the stockpiled PFM mines—5,950,372—presumably indicating the destruction of an additional 168 mines.25

**Mines retained for training**

Ukraine originally indicated it would retain 1,950 mines (950 PMN and 1,000 PMN-2) for training and research purposes.26 In its April 2008 Article 7 report, this number was reduced to 223 mines (103 PMN and 120 PMN-2),27 with 847 PMN and 880 PMN-2 mines destroyed.28 In its Article 7 report submitted in April 2009, Ukraine lists a total of 211 mines retained for training, with 12 PMN mines destroyed.29

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21 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Article 7 Report, Forms A and G, 20 April 2009. The Article 7 report said the mines were destroyed “carrying out experimental works disassembling and reusing the mine cassettes.” In March 2009, a government official told Landmine Monitor that the 144 PFM mines were destroyed by burning in the kiln. Interview with Oleksandr Schebetuk, MoD, Kiev, 20 March 2009. In November 2008, Ukraine was still citing the higher figure of 5,950,684 PFM mines. Presentation by Ukraine, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.
26 Article 7 Report, Form D, 11 April 2007. It is unclear what stockpiles these mines came from because Ukraine had reported the destruction of all its PMN-type mines in 2002 and 2003.
27 Article 7 Report, Form D, 20 April 2008.
28 Ibid, Form G. It appears the mines were not consumed during training activities, but simply destroyed as unnecessary for retention.
29 Article 7 Report, Form D, 20 April 2009.
Ukraine has not reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of retained mines, as agreed by States Parties in 2004.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Ukraine is affected by landmines and ERW, both UXO and abandoned ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in World War II, but also from World War I, the 1917–1921 civil war, and the Cold War. Ministry of Defense (MoD) engineering forces completed partial clearance of affected areas in the mid-1970s, but demining operations continue to this day. The precise scope of any residual mine problem is not known, but the ERW contamination is extensive. On 21 May 2009, one person died and another was seriously injured as a result of explosion of an item of UXO in Lozovoy district.30

In its Article 7 reports, Ukraine has declared no known or suspected areas containing antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control.31 On 28 April 2009, two teenagers died and one was injured as a result of a mine blast in Topolskoe village, Izjumska district, Kharkov province.32

The ERW problem includes World War II ammunition storage areas (ASAs), particularly around the towns of Kerch and Sevastopol where munitions were stored in a horizontal passageway driven into a hill or mountainside known as an “adit.” On 27 August 2008, an ASA belonging to the army’s 61st southern operational command in Lozovoy district, Kharkov province exploded, injuring two men.33

There was also a problem from a former Soviet ASA at Novobohdanovka that exploded in 2004 (now cleared), as well as military training areas used by the Soviet Army, said to affect 1km² of land in Ukraine. Underwater munitions have been found in the Black Sea near Kerch, Odessa, and Sevastopol, including naval mines from World War II.

There are also said to be 34 former Soviet military training areas with residual contamination, which reportedly cover more than 150km² of land.34 In 1991–2007, these areas were handed over to the local population and local municipalities, but reportedly without full survey and clearance. There have since been civilian deaths and injuries due to handling of items of UXO.35

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least six mine/ERW casualties (one killed, two injured, and three unknown) in four incidents.36 The civilian status, gender, and age of three casualties remain unknown, but the other three were male Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) clearance personnel. ERW caused at least three casualties. Activities at the time of the incident include tampering and working on munitions disposal. Casualties were recorded in Novobohdanovka in Zaporizhia province, in Krivyi Rih city in Dnipropetrovsk province, in Kremenchuk City in Poltava province, and in Odessa, Odessa province.

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31 See Article 7 Reports, Form C, 20 April 2009 and 20 April 2008.
35 CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, Form B, 1 April 2009.
The 2008 casualty rate is a decrease compared to 2007 (14 ERW casualties; five killed and nine injured),\textsuperscript{37} and 2006 (10 casualties; seven killed and three injured),\textsuperscript{38} but with incomplete data collection, casualties may have been unreported.

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with at least two casualties (one injured and one killed) as of 31 May 2009.\textsuperscript{39} On 21 May 2009, one person was killed and one injured while tampering with an unknown device in the village of Katerynivka in Kharkov province.\textsuperscript{40}

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Ukraine is unknown. The MES reported that between 1996 and 2008 there were 229 ERW casualties (100 killed and 129 injured), including 59 children, due to “handling of devices.” No further information was available.\textsuperscript{31} Between 2000 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 115 casualties (55 killed, 57 injured, and three unknown). There was no reliable data for 1999. While it is difficult to obtain detailed information on incidents in Ukraine, it appears that the majority of civilian casualties are due to ERW, and activities at the time of the incident include collecting scrap metal and tampering.

According to UN data, between 1945 and 1995, more than 1,500 civilians were killed by mines in Ukraine, and 130 deminers have been killed during clearance operations. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), 3,360 Ukrainians were killed and reportedly every sixth death was the result of a mine explosion.

The total number of Ukrainian mine/ERW casualties that have occurred abroad remains unknown. In 2005, eight Ukrainian military personnel were killed in a command-detonated mine blast in Iraq and seven other Ukrainians were injured. In July 2006, two Ukrainian peacekeepers were injured by a mine or similar device in Iraq. In October 2006, one Ukrainian citizen was killed and one injured in Iraq. In 2006, in Senegal, one Ukrainian taking part in a humanitarian mission was injured by an antivehicle mine. In March 2007, two Ukrainian employees working for a gas company in Algeria were injured when the company bus hit a mine.

The government of Ukraine estimates there are 2.4 to 2.7 million persons with disabilities in Ukraine.\textsuperscript{42}

**Risk profile**

People are at risk from abandoned unexploded ordnance. Children, particularly teenagers, regularly find and tamper with UXO in Artemovsk, Kerch, Kharkov, Kiev, Novobohdanovka, Sevastopol, and Vinnytsya.\textsuperscript{43}

**Program Management and Coordination**

An interministerial working group was set up by the Cabinet of Ministers in February 2006. There is no specific victim assistance (VA) strategy, and mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities in Ukraine. The State Department for Veterans Affairs coordinates policy on war veterans and victims. The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, the Ministry of Family, Youth, and Sports, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Science and Education are responsible for disability issues.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{38} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 718.
\textsuperscript{40} MES, “Unclassified Emergencies: Kharkiv Oblast,” old.mns.gov.ua.
\textsuperscript{43} See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 768.
Data collection and management

In 2001, the armed forces set up a demining center at the Military Engineering Institute of Podolsk Agrar Technical University. Since 2007, the center has been collecting and analyzing data on explosive hazards and demining.45

There is no comprehensive casualty data collection in Ukraine. The main source of information remains media reports and MES daily reports, which report information on a variety of emergency situations, including mine/ERW incidents.46 From 2004 to July 2007, the NGO Ukrainian Mine Action Coordination Center collected casualty data from media reports, but it is unknown if data is still collected.

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

On 31 January 2007, the Cabinet of Ministers issued Decree No. 75, “Program for the period of 2007–2010 for destruction of explosive devices on the territory of Kerch and Sevastopol since World War II.”47 On 18 February 2009, the Cabinet of Ministers issued Decree 131, “State Target Social Program for Anti-mine Activity in 2009–2014,” which seeks to address the problems of affected territories.48 The decree sets out requirements and allocates responsibilities for survey and clearance of affected areas. It calls for the civilian population to be given training on how to respond to explosive devices they may encounter.49 It also provides the basis for reconstruction of affected regions.50

National mine action legislation

A series of decrees and orders have been adopted to regulate mine action in Ukraine. In accordance with a December 1997 Decree from the Cabinet of Ministers and a Joint Order of the ministries of defense, emergency situations, and transport and communications, and the Border Guard Service of 27 May 2008, mine action responsibilities have been allocated among the various state structures concerned (see Demining and battle area clearance section below).

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures

The state company Ukroboronservice has its own standing operating procedures, which it claims meet the requirements of the International Mine Action Standards. They were first concluded in 2003, updated in 2005, and again in 2008, when new chapters on battle area clearance and mine/ERW risk education were added.51

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

In accordance with Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 2294 of 11 December 1999 and a Joint Order of 27 May 2008,52 the MES is generally responsible for clearance of affected territories, with the exception of those allocated to the other ministries and bodies. The MoD is responsible for all areas where military units, educational institutions, companies, or organizations belonging to the armed forces are permanently located. Ukroboronservice acts as a subcontractor for the MoD and MES in survey and disposal of ERW in Ukraine. The company also conducts survey and clearance of construction sites.53

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45 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for the period 15 May 2008 to 15 May 2009), Form B.
47 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for the period 15 May 2008 to 15 May 2009), Form B.
48 Ibid; and see also “Cabinet of Ministers, Decree No. 131, 18 February 2009, Kiev,” Zakonodatelstvo Ukraini, www.zakon1.rada.gov.ua.
49 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for the period 15 May 2008 to 15 May 2009), Form B.
50 Interview with Iurii Kolisnyk, Chief, Humanitarian Demining Center, Ukroboronservice, in Šibenik, Croatia, 28 April 2009.
51 Telephone interview with Iurii Kolisnyk, Ukroboronservice, 9 July 2009.
52 Joint Order No. 405/223/625/455 of 27 May 2008, issued by the MES, MoD, the Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) and the National Border Guard Service.
53 Telephone interview with Iurii Kolisnyk, Ukroboronservice, 1 April 2009.
The Ministry of Transport and Communications (MTC) is responsible for the transport system, with the help of the MoD and MES. The national Border Guard Service conducts demining (disclosure, destruction, and disposal) in areas under its control on land and in the sea.54

In 2007, the MES created a demining center within its Central Rescue Unit, which trains deminers in Explosive Ordnance Disposal Levels 1 and 2. A similar center was created in 2001 by the MoD in Kamenez-Podolskiy in the west of the country, which includes training in the use of mine detection dogs.55

Demining and battle area clearance results for 2008 are set out in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Mines destroyed</th>
<th>ERW destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MES</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>116,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>491</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukroboronservice</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>274*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Transferred to MES for destruction.

Following the 27 August 2008 explosion at the ASA close to the town of Lozovaya in Lozovoy district, almost 14,000 people were evacuated.57 On 29 August, clearance teams from the MoD began clearing in a 5km zone around the ASA. Twelve demining teams were said to be engaged in clearance.58 Clearance was completed on 28 November 2008, with a total area clearance of 6.65km² and the destruction of 45,573 items of UXO.59

Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2016. In Form I of its annual Article 7 reports, Ukraine stated that “There are no antipersonnel landmines (not even potentially) in the regions under the jurisdiction or the control of Ukraine.”60

Risk Education

In 2008, risk education (RE) continued to be provided on an ad hoc basis. The MES provided limited awareness messages for emergency personnel and civilians in ERW-affected areas as a part of its role in “[sic] preventive measures, minimization of other emergency consequences, [sic] and cleaning areas from the old munitions.”61 The number of people reached is unknown.

From 1999 to 2008 there was no systematic RE, but limited awareness messages were provided by deminers from the MoD and the MES, and by the Ukrainian Mine Action Information Center. In 2007, it was reported that the Ukrainian Red Cross Society trained some instructors.

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54 Email from Vitaliy Baranov, Deputy Chief, Mine Action Service, MoD, 22 April 2009.
58 Interview with Vitaliy Baranov, MoD, 20 July 2009.
Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but there are at least 130. Ukraine provides war veterans with financial support for medical, rehabilitation, and social services. However, veterans reported that pensions are meager and medical care poor. Rehabilitation centers provide prosthetics, orthotics, and other assistive devices to war veterans and other persons with disabilities. The main institutions for assistance of mine/ERW survivors are the Social Rehabilitation Center in Kiev and the “Ukrprotez” State Corporation. The Ukrainian Rehabilitation Center of Afghanistan Veterans, a private center in Kiev, also serves war veterans and other persons with disabilities.

As the majority of public buildings remain inaccessible, access to healthcare, transportation, education, and employment remains difficult. In 2008, a government audit reported that “the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy failed to implement the State policy as regards development of new types of orthopaedic products for the disabled, and their timely manufacture.” In 2009, the Rehabilitation Center of Afghanistan Veterans denounced the lack of rehabilitation and psychological care centers in Ukraine. Since December 2008, persons with disabilities have been entitled to free travel on the underground railway in Kiev. Special education is limited and a large number of children with disabilities do not go to school.

From January to October 2008, 7,571 persons with disabilities found jobs through government employment placement services, and in the academic year 2007–2008, 12,262 students with disabilities were enrolled in vocational and academic institutions of higher learning.

In September 2008, the Public Employment Service of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, with assistance from UNDP and the International Labor Organization, launched a program on “Social Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities through Access to Employment.” The program, which will run until September 2009, aims to “facilitate a proactive inclusion of people with disabilities in the open labour market.”

The ICRC did not report progress in the establishment of a rapid response trauma unit in 2007, as recommended by the evaluation it conducted together with the Ukrainian Red Cross Society in 2006. The unit was to address the psychological needs of children affected by explosions at ASAs in southern Ukraine.

Ukraine has not reported on victim assistance in any of its Article 7 reports. Ukraine has legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to healthcare, and other state services, but enforcement of provisions was hampered by lack of resources. On 24 September 2008, Ukraine signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol; neither had been ratified as of 1 July 2009.

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71 Ibid.
Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Ukraine. In 2005, the EC awarded a contract valued at €5,910,000 ($8.7 million) to cover costs for destruction of all PFM-type and non-PFM-type stockpiled mines. The contract was cancelled prior to completion in 2007. As no cost estimate has since been reported, the original contract value remains the closest known estimate for stockpile destruction in Ukraine.

National support for mine action

No specific national funding for mine action was reported by Ukraine in 2008, nor was national funding reported in 2007. In April 2008, Ukraine stated its commitment to cover a portion of the costs associated with destruction of half its PFM-type mines, but did not commit a specific amount or report timelines for its allocation of funds. In November 2008, Ukraine reported that it had provided funds from the state budget for the start of destruction of its stock of PFM mines but did not specify when or what amount of funds were allocated.

International cooperation and assistance

No international funding was reported for mine action in Ukraine in 2005 or 2007. In April 2008, the EC stated its willingness to continue supporting Ukraine’s stockpile destruction efforts, but with an emphasis on capacity-building. Between August 2008 and May 2009, Ukraine and the EC continued to assess the possibility of EC assistance for Ukraine’s stockpile destruction program.
**UNited kingdom**

**2008 Key Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, booby-traps, other UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>13km² of mined and battle areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Article 5 (clearance of mined areas) | Deadline: 1 March 2019  
Original deadline: 1 March 2009 |
| Demining in 2008 | Clearance of one antipersonnel mine |

**Ten-Year Summary**

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999, and national legislation implementing the treaty entered into force the same day. The UK completed destruction of its stockpile of more than two million antipersonnel mines on 19 October 1999. Initially, the UK retained close to 5,000 mines for training purposes, but decided the number was excessive in 2003 and reduced it to less than 2,000. At the end of 2008, it retained 903 mines, an increase from the previous year: after entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, there were allegations of attempted transfers of antipersonnel mines in the UK by Pakistani, Romanian, and UK companies. The UK served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies from 1999–2000, and as coordinator of the Sponsorship Programme for many years.

The UK has not initiated clearance operations despite being a State Party since 1 March 1999. In November 2008 at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, the UK requested, and was granted, a 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline to clear mined areas from the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, and pledged to begin clearance of three mined areas close to urban areas. As of May 2009, the UK had begun soliciting tenders from companies to conduct the demining and to run a mine action center on the islands.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have led to an increase of British casualties since 2001 due to mines, explosive remnants of war, and victim-activated improvised explosive devices.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

The United Kingdom is affected by mines and UXO, including cluster munition remnants, by virtue of its control and assertion of full sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which were contaminated during the armed conflict between the UK and Argentina in 1982. In addition, UK troops continue to be confronted with the threat of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The 1982 armed conflict between Argentina and the UK resulted in many thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines being laid on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, most by Argentina. The UK has reported that 117 mined areas remain, covering a total area of some 13km² and containing “just over” 20,000 mines. Of these areas, 113 are minefields totaling 7.35km² and the other four (5.78km²) are only suspected of containing mines.

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1. UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, p. 2. The estimate of the number of mines remaining to be cleared was higher than the 16,000 reported by Argentina in 2006. See Argentina Article 7 Report, Form C, 4 May 2006.
There is also UXO, including an unknown number of areas believed to contain cluster munition remnants as a result of use of BL755 cluster bombs by the UK against Argentine positions. The size of the affected areas is not known.

In February 2009, in a letter to Landmine Action, the Ministry of Defence stated the following: “According to historical records either 106 or 107 Cluster Bomb Units (CBU) were dropped by British Harriers and Sea Harriers during the conflict. Each CBU contains 147 BL755 sub-munitions and using the higher CBU figure (107), a total of 15,729 sub-munitions were dropped. Using a 6.4% failure rate assessed during in-service surveillance over 15 years, we would estimate that 1,006 would not explode. Given that 1,378 BL 755s were cleared in the first year after the conflict and that a further 120 have been found and disposed of since (totalling 1,498), clearly there was a slightly higher failure rate. Even if the rate had been closer to 10% and 1,573 had failed, we can only estimate that some 70 remain but that due to the very soft nature of the peat found on the islands, many of these will have been buried well below the surface. We believe that the majority of those remaining are now contained within existing minefields and these will be cleared in due course.”

The precise extent of other ERW contamination on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas is not known. The UK has also noted the presence of booby-traps on the islands.

Casualties

No human casualties from mines or UXO have been reported in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas since 1984. The UK has reported that six military personnel were injured in 1982 and a further two injured in 1983. Most military accidents took place while clearing/lifting the minefields in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 conflict or in the process of trying to establish the extent of the minefield perimeters, particularly where no detailed records existed.

No civilian mine casualties have ever occurred on the islands. Over the years, however, there have been numerous instances where civilians have deliberately or inadvertently entered a minefield. The Ministry of Defence has reported “infringement” of minefields by a total of six locals and 15 foreign fishermen or tourists between March 2000 and December 2008.

In the latest incident, three crew members of a Belgian yacht inadvertently entered a minefield at Kidney Cove on East Falklands on 6 December 2008 but left without incident. In October 2002, a Falkland Islander was fined £1,000 (then US$1,503) for entering a minefield on Goose Green. It is a criminal offense on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas to enter a minefield.

This record of infringements indicates that people are occasionally entering the minefields either deliberately or unwittingly and livestock deaths (see Socio-economic impact section below), indicate that mines in these minefields are still functioning. Such evidence should warn against complacency in efforts to tackle this contamination as soon as possible.

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 30 new British military casualties in Afghanistan (15 killed and 15 injured) from mines, ERW, or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). At least 11 casualties (one woman and 10 men) were reported to be due to antipersonnel mines. These figures are incomplete, as, for example, another 24 casualties in Afghanistan could not be confirmed and no new casualties were identified in Iraq.

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1 Letter from Lt.-Col. Scott Malina-Derben, Ministry of Defence, 6 February 2009.
2 See, for example, Article 7 Report, Form C, 2 April 2007.
7 Ibid.
8 Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008–30 April 2009.
British mine and UXO casualties abroad between 1999 and 2008 were mostly military and occurred mostly in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there were also several humanitarian demining casualties. For example, in 2001, a British deminer was injured when a grenade detonated during demining training in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In 2002, a British deminer was injured in a demining accident in southern Lebanon. In 2007, another British deminer was killed in Lebanon. However, total figures are incomplete and Landmine Monitor does not have a total number of casualties from 1999 to 2008. Non-governmental sources tracking casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq have criticized the Ministry of Defence for the lack of transparency and accuracy in reporting British casualties.

Socio-economic impact
The impact of contamination in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas is said to be minimal. All 117 areas are reported to have been “perimeter-marked and are regularly monitored and protected by quality stock proof fencing, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.” According to the UK, the 13km² of suspected hazardous area represent “only 0.1% of land used for farming. The mined areas cover a wide range of terrain including sandy beaches and dunes, mountains, rock screes, dry peat, wet swampy peat, and pasture land.” A number of instances of cattle, sheep, or horses entering the minefields have been recorded since 2000, some of which resulted in the animal’s deaths.

In a statement on 9 May 2008, the Falkland Islands government stated that the mined areas “present no long term social or economic difficulties for the Falklands.” Indeed, Falkland Islanders are reported to have expressed concern about the negative socio-economic impact that a demining operation would have—with disruption and strain on the infrastructure of their small community caused by an influx of a large number of deminers and heavy machinery for an extended period of time, and interference to their growing tourism industry (one of three major industries on the islands).

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
In November 2008, the UK pledged to begin work on establishing a “mine action coordinating committee.” Subsequently, a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) composed of both the UK and the Falkland Islands governments was established to oversee clearance of mined areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. As of May 2009, the NMAA was reviewing national mine action standards for the clearance operations.

In May 2009, the UK issued a request to tender for the Falkland Islands Demining Programme Office (DPO). The role of the DPO will be to execute the policies of the NMAA and to coordinate mine action activities on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The Ninth Meeting of States Parties
noted the UK’s undertaking to provide regular reports on the establishment of a NMAA “and other implementation bodies.”

**Data collection and management**

The UK’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment for the Islands and other staff completed training in the Information Management System for Mine Action in April 2008. Subsequently, personnel were engaged in digitizing all information about the mines and their location.

**Plans**

On 26 November 2008, the UK announced to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties its intention to begin demining of three mined areas: Fox Bay 8 (West), Goose Green 11, and Stanley Area 3 (M25). Fox Bay 8 is estimated to measure 24,500m²; Goose Green 11, 20,600m²; and Stanley Area 3 (M25), 5,400m². A BL755 cluster munition strike reported to the south of the minefield in Stanley was slated for clearance. Thus, the total area of this intended clearance is less than 0.5% of the total mined area on the islands. The UK stated that the areas had been chosen because of their proximity to urban areas and because the variety of terrain would serve as a test of the environmental and ecological impact of demining. A Statement of Requirement was being drafted and it was planned to put the work out to tender “in the next few months.” As of May 2009, the UK planned to issue invitations to tender to up to six companies with the aim that work would start before the end of 2009.

In a May 2008 statement, the Falkland Island government made clear that it would “have to pay close attention to the environmental implications of complete clearance.” The UK has stated that the clearance of all mined areas will be subject to an environmental impact assessment in the planning process under forthcoming Falkland Islands domestic law.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

No clearance operations had been initiated as of 1 March 2009, the expiry of the UK’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline for clearance. In 2008, one antipersonnel mine was destroyed when it came to the surface in a known minefield. In May 2009, the UK announced its intention to invite around four to six companies to tender for demining three mined areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.

According to information provided by the Ministry of Defence in 2009, no unexploded submunitions were cleared in 2008, but a BL755 submunition was destroyed in November 2007.

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27 Ibid.
29 UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 14 November 2008, p. 3.
30 Ibid.
31 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form G.
Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the treaty, the UK is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. On 31 May 2008, the UK submitted to the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties a request for an extension of its deadline of 10 years (until 1 March 2019). The UK’s extension request stated that the following circumstances had impeded the fulfillment of its Article 5 deadline:

- mined areas have a variety of terrain types and thus a single clearance method cannot be used;
- distance from the UK makes strategic logistics very challenging;
- almost 40% of mined areas are in very isolated locations that can be accessed only with specialized vehicles;
- a wide range of environmental issues affect the flora and fauna, requiring an environmental impact assessment prior to clearance;
- there are a number of environmental remediation protocols associated with every different terrain; and
- climatic conditions restrict work to 10 months of each year and make the use of dogs unlikely.34

The Analysing Group of States Parties, chaired by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, noted that the UK had made no clear commitment through its extension request to start mine clearance operations and ultimately comply with its obligations. The group noted that the Mine Ban Treaty as a whole would benefit if the UK provided an unequivocal commitment to implement Article 5 as soon as possible. It further noted that “it is unfortunate that after almost ten years since entry into force a State Party is unable to specify how remaining work will be carried out and that a two year trial is still required to obtain all necessary information and to confirm the timescale of the overall project.”35

Following opposition from a number of States Parties,36 as well as the ICBL and ICRC, to the UK’s blanket 10-year extension request at its initial presentation, the UK revised its request to make it explicit that Scenario 5 of the Field Survey (part of the Feasibility Study conducted by Cranfield University) was its clearance plan for fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations.37 Scenario 5 proposed clearance of all mined areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas within a 10-year period, beginning with the establishment of a project office on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas; the development of mine action standards, procedures for environmental impact assessments and remediation, and for external quality assurance and quality control; a trial of the effectiveness of clearance methods; and ending with the handover of all cleared land to a fully fledged mine action center.38 The UK decided to disregard the Field Survey’s recommendation for trials of clearance methods and to proceed directly to full clearance.39

While “a number of substantive concerns were raised,” the Ninth Meeting of States Parties decided to grant the request for an extension until 1 March 2019, taking into account a number of considerations.40 These included taking note of the UK’s confirmation that Scenario 5 of the Field Survey served as the UK government’s “indicative Clearance Plan, containing clear priorities, timeframes for action and projected milestones for clearance over the period of the

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34 Analysis of the UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 14 November 2008, pp. 1–2.
36 These countries were: Cambodia, Canada, France, Norway, and Switzerland.
38 Cranfield University, “Field Survey to Examine the Feasibility of Clearing Landmines in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),” 9 July 2007, Executive Summary.
extension and as such formed a basis for future work.” The meeting also took note of the UK’s agreement to provide as soon as possible, but not later than 30 June 2010, a detailed explanation of how demining is proceeding and the implications for future demining in order to meet the UK’s obligations under Article 5.41

The meeting also took note that the UK will keep under annual review the possibility of reducing the time necessary to fulfill its obligations. A number of States Parties expressed the wish that the UK proceed with the implementation of Article 5 much faster than suggested by the amount of time requested.42

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors since 1999 is unknown. The Ministry of Defence provides compensation to soldiers injured overseas or to the families of deceased soldiers, including mine/ERW casualties, through the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme (AFCS). On 15 December 2008, the ministry announced the doubling of the maximum payment available through the AFCS to £570,000 ($1,057,065). This would apply retroactively to soldiers who had received compensation since the creation of the scheme in 2005. The ministry stated that more than £10 million ($18.5 million) in additional compensation would be paid to approximately 2,700 injured service personnel.43 While many veterans welcomed the change, some continued to call for broader reforms so that the AFSC would “take into account the cumulative impact of a soldier’s injuries, their care needs and loss of earnings.”44

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for completion of mine clearance in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas. The UK has not reported on cost estimates associated with the joint UK/Argentina “Field Survey to Examine the Feasibility of Clearing Landmines in the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas),” or with its calls for tenders issued in 2009 for the DPO and for clearance operations. In March 2009, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) reported that funding for demining in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas would come from the FCO.45

International support to mine action

The UK reported providing mine action funding totaling £13,451,597 ($24,945,987/€16,940,097) in 2008–2009, an increase of approximately 7% compared to 2007–2008.46 This represents the highest level of funding by the UK since 2000–2001.

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, the UK stated that it had decided to maintain “current levels of funding” for mine, cluster munitions and ERW clearance until 2013.47

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41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
46 Email from Amy White, Deputy Programme Manager, DFID, 17 March 2009.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
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<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>MAG, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), UNDP</td>
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48 Email from Amy White, DfID, 17 March 2009.
The UK added Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Nepal, and Sri Lanka as mine action funding recipients in 2008 and discontinued funding to Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Uganda.
VENEZUELA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 October 1999</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel mines</td>
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<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>180,000m² of mined areas</td>
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</table>
| Article 5 (clearance of mined areas) | Deadline: 1 October 2014  
|                      | Original deadline: 1 October 2009 |
| Demining in 2008   | None |

Ten-Year Summary

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 October 1999. It submitted its initial Article 7 report in September 2002, two and a half years late. Venezuela reported that it completed destruction of its stockpile of 47,189 antipersonnel mines on 24 September 2003, just ahead of its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 October 2003. Venezuela has retained 4,960 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, but has not consumed any mines for training. In 2007, Venezuela made statements indicating that it was still making active use of its emplaced antipersonnel mines, which the ICBL decried as inconsistent with the Article 1 ban on use.

Venezuela disclosed that it laid antipersonnel mines around six naval bases in 1995–1997. Despite becoming party to the Mine Ban Treaty in October 1999, Venezuela had not started clearance of any of these bases by June 2009. In November 2008, Venezuela was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline for clearance of all mined areas.

Landmine Monitor has identified eight mine and explosive remnants of war casualties in Venezuela (four killed and four injured) between 1999 and 2008.

Mine Ban Policy

Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 14 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999. Venezuela has not adopted national implementation legislation stipulating penal sanctions for treaty violations, maintaining that domestic legislation to implement the Mine Ban Treaty is not necessary because international treaties ratified by the government automatically become national law. Venezuela restated this view forcefully during the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, in response to an ICRC presentation on Article 9 (national implementation measures).

On 6 July 2009, Venezuela submitted its annual updated Article 7 transparency report for the period from April 2008 to April 2009. Venezuela has provided six previous reports, most recently in April 2008.

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2 Oral Remarks by Venezuela, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 6 June 2008. Notes by Landmine Monitor. Venezuela said that all ratified international treaties are of the highest domestic legal standing—that of the constitution. The ICRC replied that a specific law was still desirable for various Mine Ban Treaty provisions, such as the Article 3 exception for retained mines and Article 8 provisions on fact-finding missions.

3 Venezuela submitted previous reports in April 2007, on 26 April 2006, 4 July 2005, 1 May 2003, and 10 September 2002. It also submitted a one-page letter to the UN on 25 November 2003, confirming completion of stockpile destruction. Venezuela did not provide an update in 2004. The initial report, due 1 March 2000, was two and a half years late.

Venezuela has not engaged in the discussions that States Parties have had on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3 (joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices, and mines retained for training).

Venezuela is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Venezuela has never submitted an annual report as required by the protocol’s Article 13. Venezuela is not party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Venezuela has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Use**

Venezuela has reported that it laid 1,074 antipersonnel mines around six naval bases between April 1995 and March 1997, one of which was subsequently accidentally detonated. In 2007, Venezuela made statements indicating that it was still making active use of these emplaced antipersonnel mines, which is inconsistent with the Article 1 ban on use. During 2007 and 2008, the ICBL repeatedly stated its concern that Venezuela was purposefully keeping its antipersonnel mines in place in order to derive military benefit from them, and was not, as required by the treaty, clearing them as soon as possible.

In 2008 and 2009, Venezuela stressed other factors—such as dense vegetation, rough weather, and safety concerns—to explain why it has not yet cleared its antipersonnel mines (see program coordination and management section below). In June 2008, Venezuela stated that it was not using mines for defensive purposes, even though there are still “anti-state actors” across its border with Colombia.

**Production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction**

Venezuela has stated that it has not produced antipersonnel mines. It is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Venezuela previously obtained antipersonnel landmines manufactured by Belgium, Italy, Spain, the United States, and the former Yugoslavia.

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4 Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2008; and email from Yaneth Arocha, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 June 2005. The 1,073 number (1,074 minus the accidental detonation) is the number used in the Article 7 reports submitted in 2008, 2007, 2006, and 2005, which was a revised total from the figure of 1,036 used in the 2003 report. Venezuela has reported different dates of emplacement in Article 7 reports. Most notably, Venezuela reported mines were last laid in March 1997 in its Article 7 report submitted on 26 April 2006 while the Article 7 report submitted on 1 May 2003 reports that mines were last laid in May 1998, the latter date being five months after Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty.


9 Article 7 Report, Form H, April 2008; and previous Article 7 reports.

10 Article 7 Report, Form B, 1 May 2003.
Venezuela completed destruction of its stockpile of 47,189 antipersonnel mines on 24 September 2003.\textsuperscript{11} It has never specified the types of antipersonnel mines that were destroyed.\textsuperscript{12}

In its most recent Article 7 report, submitted in July 2009, Venezuela stated that it is retaining 4,960 PMA-3 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, held by the Ministry of Defense.\textsuperscript{13} The number is unchanged from the previous four reports.\textsuperscript{14} At the June 2008 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Venezuela emphasized that States Parties retaining mines under Article 3 have no obligation to use these immediately, and noted that not all states can or need to use them with the same frequency.\textsuperscript{15}

Venezuela has not used the expanded Form D for reporting on retained mines adopted by States Parties in 2005. Venezuela has not yet reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines—a step agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference in 2004.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Venezuela’s mine contamination is the result of mine emplacement by its armed forces at six naval bases near Río Arauca in the Amazon region along its border with Colombia in 1995–1997. After a 25 February 1995 attack on the naval post in Cararabo, Apure state, by suspected non-state armed groups operating across the border with Colombia, Venezuela laid 1,074 mines in 13 minefields around six naval posts in Cararabo, Guauhtas, Isla Vapor, Puerto Páez, Río Arauca, and San Fernando de Atabapo.\textsuperscript{16} The total mined area is reported to be 180,000m\textsuperscript{2}. The maps and photographs in Venezuela’s Article 5 deadline extension request clearly show the locations and terrain of the mined areas.\textsuperscript{17} The minefields are located on a flood plain in dense vegetation and in an isolated part of Venezuela.\textsuperscript{18} The minefields are said to be marked and periodically controlled by technical teams.\textsuperscript{19}

**Casualties**

Landmine Monitor identified no mine or explosive remnants of war (ERW) incidents in Venezuela in 2008 or 2009, as of 30 May.

\textsuperscript{11} Letter from the Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the UN in Geneva, to the UN Disarmament Conference Secretariat, 25 November 2003. The 47,189 mines were more than previously reported as held in stock. In September 2002, Venezuela reported a stockpile of 22,136 antipersonnel mines, but in May 2003 reported a revised total of 46,136 antipersonnel mines. See Article 7 Reports, Form B, 1 May 2003; and Form B, 10 September 2002.

\textsuperscript{12} Venezuela’s 1 May 2003 Article 7 report, Form B, listed the types and quantities for 46,136 mines still held in stock.

\textsuperscript{13} Article 7 Report, Form D, July 2009. In 2005, Venezuela indicated that 4,950 of the mines were held by the National Armed Forces Armament Directorate, and another 10 were located at the Attorney’s Office in Puerto Cabello, Carabobo state. Article 7 Report, 4 July 2005.

\textsuperscript{14} In its September 2002 Article 7 report, Venezuela indicated it would retain 2,214 mines; in its May 2003 report it listed 4,614 mines; and in its November 2003 letter it indicated 5,000 mines.

\textsuperscript{15} Statement of Venezuela, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 6 June 2008.

\textsuperscript{16} According to earlier Article 7 reports, three minefields were laid at Guauhtas in May 1998, which is five months after Venezuela signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997. The May 2003 Article 7 report indicates Venezuela laid 20 SB-33 antipersonnel mines in Guauhtas in May 1998. The September 2002 Article 7 report indicates the number was 58 SB-33 antipersonnel mines. See Article 7 Reports, Form C, 1 May 2003; and Form C, 10 September 2002. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 861.

\textsuperscript{17} See Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, Annexes 5 and 6.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, p. 27; and statement of Venezuela, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 4 June 2008.

\textsuperscript{19} Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 14.
In November 2007, Venezuela reported that no fatal mine incidents had ever occurred in Venezuela.20 Landmine Monitor identified eight mine/ERW casualties in Venezuela (four killed and four injured) between 1999 and 2008, as well as one military casualty in 1996. The last casualties identified by Landmine Monitor occurred in 2004.21 The Venezuelan government has only acknowledged the existence of the two military mine casualties, both injured, in 2004 and in 1996.22

Program Management and Coordination

Plans

**Strategic mine action plans**

Venezuela’s demining plan is described in its Article 5 deadline extension request. The first year of the operational plan would be devoted to training deminers and purchasing equipment. In February 2009, at the Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, Venezuela reported that, in accordance with its plan, the procurement of demining equipment had begun and that training of deminers would begin in October 2009.23 In April 2009, Venezuela attended a technology conference in Šibenik, Croatia, to assess the latest demining equipment, as planned in its extension request, and to make contacts with manufacturers, particularly of advanced demining detectors.24 The four-year clearance operations at the six naval bases are planned to begin in October 2010 and be completed by October 2014 (see table below).25 With only a five-month clearance period each year because of the wet climate, clearance is planned to take 20 months over the four years.

National ownership

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Venezuela has not made concerted efforts to meet its Mine Ban Treaty obligations to clear all emplaced antipersonnel mines from mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible or by its deadline. As of June 2009 it had not cleared a single mined area since 1999 although the four-year plan for 2010–2014 indicates its improved intention to implement the treaty. It will finance all clearance operations from the national budget.26

National management

The mine action program is under the control of the Ministry of Defense with no civilian input or guidance from the legislature.27 Rear Admiral Alcibiades Jesús Paz, from the Department of Defense, is responsible for coordination, a post to which he was first appointed in 2004.28 There are no external technical advisors.

According to its Article 5 deadline extension request, Venezuela has not yet adopted national standards or confirmed standing operating procedures, although the process was reported to be underway.29

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26 Ibid.
27 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 5.
794
## Timeline from 2010–2014 for clearing 13 mined areas in Venezuela

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Mined Area</th>
<th>No. of mined areas</th>
<th>No. of Mines</th>
<th>Reported size of contaminated area (m²)</th>
<th>Date Scheduled for Clearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puesto Naval Fronterizo, Puerto Paez, Estado Apure</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>February–May 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puesto Naval Fronterizo, Guafitas, Estado Apure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>November–December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF. Clemente Maldonado, San Fernando de Atabapo, Estado Amazona</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puesto Naval Fronterizo, Río Arauca International, Estado Apure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF Manuel Echeveria, Cararabo, Estado Apure</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puesto Naval Fronterizo, Isla Vapor, Estado Apure</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,073</strong></td>
<td><strong>180,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Demining

### Progress since becoming a State Party

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Venezuela is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2009. In November 2008, States Parties granted Venezuela a five-year extension of its deadline to 1 October 2014. In granting the extension, States Parties noted that “with speedy establishment of a demining program and acquisition of mechanical demining assets, Venezuela may find itself in a situation wherein it could complete implementation before October 2014 and that this could benefit the Convention.”

At the Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Venezuela stated that, although it was not using mines for defense purposes, “We still have anti-state actors across the river.” As of June 2009, it had still to initiate clearance operations, despite becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999. In March 2008, Venezuela said difficult geographical, environmental, climatic, and technical factors had prevented mine clearance and noted that clearance personnel were at risk from attack by Colombian non-state armed groups. It further stated that “the transportation of personnel and equipment must take place under maximum safety in order to prevent placing the deminers in a vulnerable and insecure position. The mined areas are difficult to access and are in areas where civilians are not allowed.”

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30 Analysis of Venezuela’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 October 2008, p. 3.
33 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 5.
Venezuela has cited wet weather as the main reason for not being able to conduct mine clearance. The annual rains in Apure state are estimated to be 100 days and 1,500mm per year, although the number of rainy days is quite low for seven months of the year.\(^{34}\) As the mined areas are located on a flood plain, Venezuela has claimed that the rains would quickly end any ongoing clearance activities.\(^{35}\) In February 2009, at the Managua Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Americas, Rear Admiral Alcibiades Jesús Paz said Venezuela was using all means to comply with its treaty obligations and it would not violate the treaty for 1,073 mines. He noted, however, that the weather was unpredictable and as a result it was “not possible” to say when all the mines will be cleared.\(^{36}\)

In May 2009, at the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, the ICBL stated again its view that the failure to initiate clearance does not serve the interests of the Mine Ban Treaty as a whole, and that whatever the merits of granting Venezuela a five-year extension, Venezuela should begin clearance as soon as possible.\(^{37}\) Venezuela said it wishes to comply with all of the details in the extension request and is on schedule to do so.\(^{38}\)

**Victim Assistance**

There are an estimated four mine/ERW survivors in Venezuela. The situation in Venezuela does not warrant specific victim assistance policies. Specialized services, including rehabilitation services, are centralized in urban areas.\(^{39}\)

The Venezuelan government asserted that it has provided medical, psychological, and economic assistance to the military survivor injured in 2004.\(^{40}\) However, the survivor was reportedly dissatisfied with the level of assistance he received.\(^{41}\)

The Venezuelan constitution prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities.\(^{42}\) Yet implementation remains problematic; the US Department of State reported that the “government did not make a significant effort to implement the law, inform the public of it, or combat societal prejudice against persons with disabilities.”\(^{43}\) As of 1 July 2009, Venezuela had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

**Support for Mine Action**

Venezuela’s Article 5 deadline extension request includes a budget of VEF 30 million (US$14,019,000) for completion of demining activities during the five years of the extension. Venezuela stated in the request that it will assume the full costs of mine clearance, and funds will be allocated in Venezuela’s annual budget. Venezuela did not report on actual costs or government allocations during 2008 or 2009.

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\(^{34}\) Hong Kong Observatory, “Climatological Information for San Fernando de Apure, Venezuela,” www.weather.gov.hk.

\(^{35}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 8.


\(^{40}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2008, p. 17; and telephone interview with Diego Ibarra Martinez, Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the UN in Geneva, 24 June 2008.


\(^{43}\) Ibid.
Yemen

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Remaining suspect hazardous areas total more than 520km² as of the end of 2008. However it is thought that only some 12km² would require full clearance; the rest would be cancelled or reduced by technical survey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>At least 5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Article 5 (clearance of mined areas) | Deadline: 1 March 2015  
Original deadline: 1 April 2009 |
| Demining in 2008          | Mine clearance: 5.23km² |
| Risk education recipients in 2008 | 210,559 |
| Progress towards victim assistance aims | Slow |
| Support for mine action in 2008 | International: $1 million (2007: $1.1 million)  
National: $3.6 million (2007: $3.5 million) |

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Yemen became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 1999. It enacted national implementation legislation in 2005. Yemen destroyed the last of its known stockpile of 74,000 to 78,000 antipersonnel mines in April 2002. An additional 30,000 mines were found in November 2006 and destroyed in December 2007. Yemen initially retained 4,000 mines for training purposes, of which it has 3,760 left. In recent years, the government and rebel forces have occasionally traded accusations of new use of antipersonnel mines, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm such use.

Yemen is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of armed conflicts since 1962. Limited funding and the presence of mines in shifting sands as well as their depth (some may lie up to six meters below the surface of sand dunes) led Yemen to request a six-year extension to its Article 5 deadline for clearance of mined areas from April 2009 to March 2015.

There were some 5,000 mine/ERW casualties in Yemen, including at least 138 recorded by the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) from 1999 to 2008. Mine/ERW risk education (RE) has been conducted since 1999 by YEMAC and the NGO Yemen Mine Awareness Association, working together to conduct community liaison, deliver community-based RE, train community leaders and teachers, and give direct presentations.

Assistance to mine/ERW survivors was limited to the YEMAC program which was predominantly medically oriented and limited in scope. From 2008–2009, the program’s functioning was hampered by a lack of funding and a lack of partnerships. As one of the 26 States Parties with a responsibility for significant numbers of survivors, Yemen set objectives for victim assistance from 2005–2009 but did not reach its target of assisting 2,000 survivors. Services for persons with disabilities in general were limited and highly centralized.
Mine Ban Policy


Yemen elaborated its views on key matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2 of the Mine Ban Treaty in a letter to Landmine Monitor in April 2006, and again during the intersessional meetings in May 2006. It articulated strong positions mirroring those of the ICBL and many other States Parties.

Yemen is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and retention

Yemen has stated that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In October 2005, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia reported that the government of Yemen had transferred landmines to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in July 2005; the report did not specify if the mines were antipersonnel or antivehicle. In a July 2006 letter to Landmine Monitor, Yemen strongly denied transferring mines.

Landmine Monitor has reported that Yemen completed destruction of about 74,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 27 April 2002. In 2008, however, Yemen indicated that the number destroyed was actually 78,000. Further clarification is needed. On 16 December 2007, Yemen destroyed an additional 30,000 POMZ-2 antipersonnel mines that were found in November 2006 in an old military warehouse undergoing transformation into a tourist site.

1 Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 March 2007. On 16 December 2004, the Yemeni Parliament endorsed national implementation legislation and on 20 April 2005, Presidential Law No. 25 was issued to bring the legislation into force.


3 For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 782. Yemen supported the view that any mine (even if it is called an antivehicle mine) equipped with a sensitive fuze or sensitive antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and therefore prohibited. It supported the view that the Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the transit and foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. Regarding the issue of joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, Yemen stated the view that it is prohibited to participate in any activity related to the use of antipersonnel mines.


5 For more details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 783. In addition, a May 2006 report by the UN Monitoring Group said that in August 2005, traders at the Bakaraaha arms market in Somalia reportedly purchased mines and other arms from a Yemen arms trading network, and a 2003 report said that mines had been shipped from Yemen to Somalia.


7 See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 522, and subsequent editions. In its 2001 and 2002 Article 7 reports, Yemen reported a stockpile of 78,000 mines, including 4,000 to be retained for training. Its reporting on the destruction of the mines has contained discrepancies, but appeared to total about 74,000. Yet its Article 7 reports have usually cited the figure of 78,000 destroyed.

8 Email from Mansour al-Azi, Director, YEMAC, 31 August 2008; Article 7 Report, Form G, 31 March 2008, which reports total destruction of 108,000 mines, including the 30,000 mines destroyed in December 2007. The Article 7 report submitted in 2009 also contains this information.

9 Article 7 Report, Form G, 31 March 2008; Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 March 2007. Yemen also informed States Parties during the meeting of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction on 23 April 2007 about the discovery of the 30,000 mines, and indicated they had been handed over for destruction by the end of 2007. Notes by Landmine Monitor/HRW.
In May 2007, it was reported that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were among weapons purchased from the public in various parts of the country as part of a government arms reduction and arms collection program. The different types of weapons were in the hands of “regular civilians, tribal sheikhs and clans from around the country.”

**Mines retained for research and training**

Yemen reported that, as of March 2009, it retained 3,760 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes. This is the same number of retained mines reported the year before. As it has in the past, Yemen reported using 240 mines to train mine detection dogs, but did not subtract this number from the total retained. YEMAC told Landmine Monitor that the mines were not consumed (exploded) during the training.

Yemen has not reported in any detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines as agreed by States Parties in 2004. It has not used the expanded Article 7 report Form D for reporting on retained mines agreed by States Parties in 2005.

**Use**

Since an insurgency started in June 2004, there have been a small number of reports and allegations of the use of antipersonnel landmines during conflict between government troops and rebel forces led by Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi in the northern mountainous Sa’daa governorate. In this reporting period, the government and the rebels have accused each other of using antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Monitor has not been in a position to assess the veracity of the claims of antipersonnel mine use by either side. Since early 2007, the government has imposed a ban on media travel in the north of the country and has severely limited access by humanitarian agencies. It has not published information regarding war casualties.

Since 2004, the government has stated that Al-Houthi rebels possess large stockpiles of antipersonnel mines and have used them on occasion. In November 2008, the official state news agency quoted police in Sa’daa saying that there are frequent civilian casualties caused by landmines laid by the rebels. In September 2008, the army published a letter from rebel leader Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh stating his agreement to the conditions of a peace agreement, one of which was the removal of landmines.

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11 Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 March 2009. The retained mines consist of 940 PPMISR-2, 940 PMD-6, 940 POMZ-2, and 940 PMN.

12 Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 March 2009. Yemen reported the use of 240 mines for training every year from 2003 to 2007, without changing the total number retained. Only in its March 2008 Article 7 report did Yemen subtract the mines used for training, indicating they were consumed, and lowering the number from 4,000 to 3,760 mines.

13 Email from Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 31 August 2008. He stated that the 240 mines used for MDD training annually will only be subtracted when they are destroyed.


15 In 2008 and 2009, armed clashes intensified despite a peace deal brokered by Qatar in February 2008. An agreement was reached in Doha on 1 February 2008 aimed at implementing an earlier cease-fire agreement, also mediated by Qatar, signed by the two sides in June 2007.


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In August 2008, Al-Houthi representative Sheikh Saleh Habra claimed in an interview, “We often suffer from anti-personnel mines planted in our areas by the Yemeni army, but military officials have made no effort to remove these mines. We defused more than 400 mines, but thousands more still are planted in the ground.” He also stated that landmines have killed 100 women and injured more than 100 more as they grazed their sheep and goats near villages and refugee camps.20

It was reported in September 2008 that a member of the “Mine Clearing Committee” was injured by a mine in Haidan district in Sa’daa while removing antipersonnel mines allegedly placed by the army during conflict with the Al-Houthis.21 In April 2009, the website of the Al-Houthi rebels claimed that the 105th Division of the Yemen Army laid antipersonnel mines between Maran and Malahit districts.22

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Yemen is contaminated with mines and ERW, as a result of armed conflicts since 1962 (from 1962–1969, 1970–1983, and in 1994). Most of the mines were laid prior to unification in border areas between northern and southern Yemen. A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) completed in July 2000 identified 592 mine-affected villages across 18 of Yemen’s 21 governorates. Of those, 14 communities were deemed high-impact.23 As of the end of 2008, 10 of these communities had been cleared of contamination; in three clearance tasks had been suspended and the contaminated areas “permanently marked”; and the suspected hazardous area (SHA) affecting the final community had been cancelled.24 The LIS estimated that SHAs covered 922km², and subsequent demining identified a further 10 mined areas estimated to cover a total of some 600,000m².

As of April 2009, Aden and Al Hodaida governorates had been cleared and handed over, with operations completed in Dhamar, Hajjah, Raymah, and Sana’a governorates,25 but land was still to be handed over.26 In Abyan, Hadramout, and Lahij governorates there are only four mined areas, but these include mines buried up to six meters deep in sand dunes over a total estimated area of 41.4 km².27

Yemen reported that its total remaining SHA was more than 520km² as of the end of 2008.28 Based on YEMAC’s reports of land released since 2000 (almost 750km²), a more accurate estimate of remaining SHA comes to less than one-third of that figure (see Progress since becoming a State Party section below). Moreover, much of the remaining SHA is expected to be released without the need for clearance: Yemen’s Article 5 deadline extension request foresaw that, as of the end of 2008, only some 12km² would require full clearance; the rest would be cancelled or reduced by technical survey.29

Casualties30

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 20 new mine/ERW casualties in Yemen, including seven people killed and 13 injured. Of these, YEMAC recorded nine new casualties (one killed and eight injured), but did not have access to the restive Sa’daa governorate and could not record casualty data (1999–15 July 2009) provided by email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 15 July 2009.

22 “The media office of Mr. Houthy denies any relation with Mahazer accident and condemns the Government’s violation to the detainees and their families,” Al Menpar, 14 April 2009, almenpar.net.
23 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 2.
25 Ibid, Form F.
26 Email from Ahmed Alawi, Information Management System Officer, Operations Department, YEMAC, 20 August 2009.
29 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 12.
casualties there. Landmine Monitor identified the remaining 11 casualties, nine in Sa’da and two in Al-Dhale. In 2007, 26 casualties were reported, including one antivehicle mine incident that caused 10 casualties.

Fifteen of the casualties in 2008 were civilians, one was a deminer, and the status of the remaining four was unknown. At least 13 of the casualties were children (10 boys and three girls), and nine of these occurred while tending animals. Two casualties were women. Seven casualties were caused by ERW, five by antipersonnel mines, two by antivehicle mines, and six by unspecified mines.

The United States Department of State reported that, “At least 60 people, including military personnel, were reportedly admitted to hospital with injuries resulting from mine explosions in Saada [Sa’daa].” It added that at least four people were killed in mine/improvised explosive device (IED) incidents in the Sa’daa region in 2008. YEMAC said, however, that while landmines were used in the governorate, most of the military casualties were caused by remote-detonated IEDs and antivehicle mines. Landmine Monitor media analysis confirmed that a significant number of casualties in Sa’daa and neighboring Amran governorate were caused by remote-detonated IEDs or deliberate ambushes of security forces. Landmine Monitor identified at least 11 military casualties due to remote-detonated devices in 2008. None of these casualties were included in the totals above.

Médecins sans Frontières reported that it had not treated landmine injuries in Al-Talh and Razah hospitals in Sa’daa. The ICRC reported treating one mine/ERW injured person in Sa’daa in 2008.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009 with at least one person killed and eight injured to mid-July. YEMAC reported seven of these casualties (all injured) including five demining casualties. In one incident in May 2009, the ambulance accompanying demining teams in Hadramout governorate hit an antivehicle mine on the edge of a road used by the teams every day. The area had not been surveyed and was unmarked. The driver lost a foot and two of the other six passengers were slightly injured. The other two casualties were a civilian man and woman. Landmine Monitor identified two boys injured while fishing.

The Yemen Mine Awareness Association (YMAA) noted that one casualty in 2009 occurred when a shepherd walked into an uncleared area marked with white stones, which he thought meant the area was safe.

**Ten-year summary**
The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Yemen is unknown. According to the LIS, by 2000 there were 4,904 mine/ERW casualties (2,560 people killed and 2,344 injured). In May 2006, YEMAC estimated there were approximately 2,900 mine/ERW survivors. Between 1999 and the end of 2008, YEMAC recorded 138 mine/ERW casualties, including 49 people killed and 89 injured. It is unknown if LIS casualties occurring in 2000 are included in these totals. Almost all casualties recorded by YEMAC from 1999–2008 were civilians (127) and 11 were deminers.

31 Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 6 March 2009.
33 Interviews with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Geneva, 26 May 2009 and Sana’a, 6 March 2009.
34 “Two soldiers were martyred and five injured in a landmine,” Saba Net (Mareb), 16 April 2008; “Bomb attack kills three police in Yemen,” Agence France-Presse (Sana’a), 16 April 2008; and Hammoud Mounassar, “Yemen says fighting over but reveals seize village,” Agence France-Presse, 17 July 2008.
35 Interview with Médecins Sans Frontières personnel, Al-Talh Hospital, Sa’daa, 19 March 2009.
36 ICRC, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, 27 May 2009, p. 367. No further information was available and the casualty was not included in the total mentioned above.
At least 58 civilian casualties were children (35 boys, 22 girls, and one of unknown gender). Another 49 were civilian adults (38 men and 11 women), and for 20 people age information was unknown. Antipersonnel mines caused 50 casualties, antivehicle mines 29, ERW 56, and unknown devices caused three casualties.

In the past, YEMAC reported varying casualty figures. In March 2006, YEMAC reported 264 mine/ERW casualties between 2000 and 2005. Data provided by YEMAC to Landmine Monitor between 1999 and 2008 totals 159 casualties (63 killed and 96 injured). In July 2009, YEMAC stated that the casualty database had been verified and erroneous recording removed.

Landmine Monitor identified at least 26 additional casualties (nine killed and 17 injured) that occurred from 1999–2008, but were not included in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database held by YEMAC. Some were foreign nationals, such as three United Kingdom citizens in incidents in 2005. In recent years casualties were recorded in Sa’da where YEMAC does not have access.

**Risk profile**

Most casualties are farmers and herders and incidents are mainly caused by mines. In all years except 2005, children made up a significant percentage of the casualties, and women were a significant proportion. Many contaminated areas are not marked, as marking is only conducted along with clearance. The rainy season is the most dangerous because flooding can shift mines. Economic reasons are the primary cause of ERW incidents such as scrap metal trade and entering contaminated areas to tend animals.

### Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aden Association for the Physically Disabled</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aden Association of People with Special Needs</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>YEMAC</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen Association for Landmine and UXO Survivors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YMAA</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Save the Children</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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42 Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 15 July 2009.
45 Ibid.
Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
The National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) was established in June 1998 by Prime Ministerial decree to formulate policy, allocate resources, and develop a national mine action strategy.\(^{46}\) NMAC, chaired by the Minister of State (a member of the cabinet), brings together representatives of seven concerned ministries.

YEMAC was established in Sana’a in January 1999 as NMAC’s implementing body. YEMAC is responsible for coordination of all mine action activities in the country.\(^{47}\) A Regional Executive Mine Action Branch (REMAB) and a National Training Center in Aden were also set up. Another REMAB was added in March 2004 in al-Mukalla (Hadramout governorate). REMABs are responsible for field implementation of the national mine action plan.

In May 1999, UNDP started a program to support YEMAC. In October 2003, the program moved from direct (UN) execution to national execution. Since the beginning of 2007, UNDP has provided support for resource mobilization (including procurements and recruitment services), and project quality assurance (QA). Support from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) enabled the construction of a mine detection dog (MDD) center in Sana’a and training of MDD handlers.

Risk education
YEMAC’s RE department is responsible for planning and implementing RE, monitoring against national standards, and integrating RE into mine action. It has an office in Sana’a and a regional office in Aden. Its RE activities are recorded in IMSMA.\(^{48}\) RE was discussed at NMAC meetings, and YMAA representatives attended three of these.\(^{49}\) According to YMAA, however, the lack of coordination continued to result in poor RE progress in 2008.\(^{50}\)

Victim assistance
YEMAC coordinates and implements VA activities under NMAC’s supervision. YEMAC has a Victim Assistance Advisory Committee comprised of various ministries to assist with planning, but the committee had no decision-making capacity and met infrequently.\(^{51}\) Coordination between YEMAC and relevant government organizations or civil society is limited to referral of people to services and some limited information exchange with ministries.\(^{52}\) YEMAC does not involve disability NGOs or disabled people’s organizations in its policy-making process.\(^{53}\)

In 2008, YEMAC reported that it aimed to close its VA program by 2014, but it is unclear if any transition mechanisms are in place.\(^{54}\) In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Yemen noted that “The National Mine Action Program has a plan to continue to do so [provide services] with all victims in Yemen.” YEMAC services were only available to mine survivors and not for other persons with disabilities.\(^{55}\)

The Ministry of Public Health and Population and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs are in charge of disability issues. Both ministries are responsible for the physical rehabilitation sector, but did not coordinate adequately, hampering functioning of service-providing centers, which

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\(^{46}\) Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009.

\(^{47}\) Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 2.

\(^{48}\) Email from Aisha Saeed, Director, YMAA, 30 April 2009.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

\(^{50}\) Ibid.

\(^{51}\) Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.

\(^{52}\) Ibid.


\(^{54}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, Head, Victim Assistance Department, YEMAC, 3 August 2008.

\(^{55}\) Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009.
are dependent on ministry funding. The Social Fund for Development and the Rehabilitation Fund and Care of Handicapped Persons (Disability Fund) finance projects and direct support to persons with disabilities. The Social Fund for Development, an independent body under the Prime Minister, has a national disability program and is the only public institution working on disability policy reform and service delivery. YEMAC does not envision cooperation with the Social Fund for Development or the Disability Fund “in the near future.”

**Data collection and management**

The latest version of IMSMA was installed in YEMAC in August 2008. However, problems accessing data have led to an older version being used for operationally.

YEMAC maintains casualty data received through its field teams, hospitals, police, security departments, and other government bodies in IMSMA. Data from the LIS is also incorporated into the database. YEMAC is not able to collect casualty data in Sa’daa, but initiated casualty data collection in the neighboring governorate of Amran in 2009. In 2008, it was said that there were one to three casualties per month (12 to 36 annually).

**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plans**

The National Mine Action Strategic Plan was based on the LIS results and covered the period 2001–2005. The plan was revised in June 2004 for 2005–2009. The plan’s vision is to “put an end to the suffering of the people and the casualties caused by antipersonnel mines in mine-affected areas by the end of March 2009.” In March 2008, YEMAC updated its strategic mine action plan to cover April 2009 to September 2014, the extension period it sought in its Article 5 deadline extension request (see Progress since becoming a State Party section below).

RE is part of the National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2005–2009, and in 2006 a new RE strategy was developed in response to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) livelihoods recommendations and in accordance with national RE standards. YEMAC has consulted stakeholders on the effectiveness of the plan, and concluded that it is appropriate and does not need revision.

VA is included in the 2005–2009 plan and its main strategic objective is: “All landmine/ERW survivors should receive medical care, and the centre should provide them with corrective surgery, physical therapy, prosthetic devices, wheelchairs, eyeglasses and hearing aids, as needed...This objective will be met when all known survivors are registered and provided with assistance as per the centre’s medical and rehabilitation programme.”

YEMAC operates a four-step program for VA: identification of survivors, medical examination, medical and rehabilitation treatment, and socio-economic reintegration. Socio-economic reintegration was added in 2004, but the remainder of the program is unchanged since it started in 2001.

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60 Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 13 August 2008.
62 Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 6 March 2009.
63 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 10.
In May 2009, YEMAC noted that there was no need to change the program, as it provided “tangible support” to survivors. Nevertheless, psychological support and social reintegration are not included in the program because there was no funding for these components. Additionally, YEMAC did not find psychosocial support a priority issue, as it thought this was provided by the family network, even though an evaluation in 2006 showed that mental health care was needed.

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Yemen provides over 50% of program funds through in-kind contribution of staff, facilities, and social benefits for the national staff, said to be equivalent to US$3.5 million (€2.4 million) annually. This support covers salaries for the deminers, insurance, social security, compensation, and field allowances, and office and training premises for the program.

In a statement to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, YEMAC’s director noted that “there were no funds to carry out VA activities as planned,” and that he “could hardly manage to keep the YEMAC VA department open.” YEMAC’s VA program operates entirely under national management and, since 2007, increasingly supported by national funding.

Although the YEMAC program was evaluated in 2005 as “...probably one of the best and most advanced in the world... due to strong support by the YEMAC Programme Manager,” a further evaluation showed that the program’s “coverage to date is limited...” Most survivors had not heard of the YEMAC program and lived without appropriate medical and socio-economic support.

YEMAC delegated the socio-economic reintegration part of its VA program to the NGO Yemen Association for Landmine and UXO Survivors (YALS) which has experienced financial difficulties. In its latest Article 7 report, Yemen noted that YALS was in great need of funds and had been struggling since 2006. Even though several organizations exist to provide small loans and credits to vulnerable groups, including persons with disabilities, the YEMAC VA program did not attempt to link with them.

National management

Yemen’s mine action program is fully nationally managed. UNDP continues to support the program, but there has been no international technical advisor since 2005.

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68 Ibid.
71 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 11.
72 Ibid, p. 10.
76 Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009.
77 Email from Rashida al-Handami, Member, NMAC, 27 July 2009.
78 Telephone interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 12 August 2009.
National budget
In 2008, the national budget allocation to YEMAC was cut due to the economic crisis, directly affecting RE and VA activities, as the government reportedly noted that funding provided was prioritized for clearance. The last international funding for VA was received in 2007.\(^\text{79}\) International donors had been approached, but to no effect. YEMAC also noted that relevant ministries had generated some international funding for assistance to persons with disabilities and other vulnerable groups but that this had not benefited mine/ERW survivors.\(^\text{80}\)

The Social Fund for Development funded some 63 projects providing assistance to persons with disabilities (for an amount of $2.77 million).\(^\text{81}\)

Program evaluations
An evaluation of UNDP support to the Yemeni mine action program in 2005 recommended that Yemen should conduct a socio-economic assessment of the use of released land. This was carried out in 2006. Based on the results of the assessment, YEMAC planned to establish a department to promote socio-economic development of cleared areas. This had not occurred as of August 2009.\(^\text{82}\)

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
Mine clearance in Yemen is undertaken solely by the Engineering Forces of the Ministry of Defense who are seconded to YEMAC. YEMAC uses a variety of demining tools: manual deminers, MDDs, and, since early 2007, demining machines. A backhoe demining machine, delivered to YEMAC by the US Department of Defense for testing, has been used since January 2007. The machine is intended to clear antipersonnel mines deeper than 1.5 meters in desert areas but, as most minefields consist of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, it has not proved particularly efficient.

The major obstacles to demining in 2008 and 2009 were said to be shortfalls in funding and security concerns in some affected areas.\(^\text{83}\) On 11 February 2009, the directors of YEMAC and the Croatian Mine Action Center signed a cooperation agreement in Cairo. Under the agreement, Croatia will offer modern clearance equipment to Yemen.\(^\text{84}\)

Identifying hazardous areas
Land release on SHAs is conducted by YEMAC through technical survey. YEMAC never releases any land without technical survey and QA. QA teams must visit every suspected mined area to cross-check the information.\(^\text{85}\)

Demining and battle area clearance in 2008
YEMAC has reported mine clearance of 5.23 km\(^2\) in 2008 and no battle area clearance, despite destroying a significant quantity of UXO.

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\(^\text{79}\) Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
\(^\text{80}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{82}\) Telephone interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 12 August 2009.
\(^\text{83}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{84}\) “Yemen, Croatia sign cooperation agreement of mine action,” Yemen News Agency (Cairo), 11 February 2009, www.sabanews.net.
\(^\text{85}\) Telephone interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, 20 August 2009; and see Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2008, p. 9.
Demining in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>Area released by survey (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demining Units</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survey Teams</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>34.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDD teams</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26,322</td>
<td>34.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Break-down of items destroyed, by operator, was not available at time of publication.

Quality assurance/Quality control
There is no independent quality management system of demining operations. YEMAC has a QA section to verify the quality of its clearance.

Progress since becoming a State Party
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Yemen was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. Despite concerns about the reliability of its data, Yemen has made significant progress in mine clearance since becoming a State Party to the treaty. On 31 March 2008, however, Yemen submitted a request for a six-year extension to 1 March 2015. On 6 November 2008, it submitted a revised request but did not change the extension period sought.

Yemen cited a series of factors for its failure to meet its 1 March 2009 deadline, including shortfalls in funding (especially in 2003, 2005, and 2006) and the presence of mines in shifting sands as well as their depth (some up to six meters below the surface), as well as its mountainous areas and problems using mine detectors in the ferrous soil.

In granting Yemen’s extension request, the Ninth Meeting of States Parties noted that while the extension “seemed workable,” success in implementation would be “very much tied to securing donor support.” The meeting also noted the “value of further clarity regarding the extent of Yemen’s remaining challenge and on steps taken by Yemen to overcome the technical challenges that have posed as impeding circumstances in the past.”

Thus, Yemen still needs to provide accurate data on the remaining area to be cleared and to confirm that no mined areas will be excluded from the demining program during the extension period. Previously, Yemen had claimed that certain mined areas would be “permanently marked” due to the “impossibility” of clearance.

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86 Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 21 July 2009.
88 For example, on several occasions Yemen has reported to Landmine Monitor different figures for clearance and land released by survey for the same years.
90 Decisions on the request submitted by Yemen for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.
Demining from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Area released through survey (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>34.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>218.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>179.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>41.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>140.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.94</td>
<td>38.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>40.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>47.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>6.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>21.12</strong></td>
<td><strong>746.82</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk Education

The only organization which had an RE program in 2008 was YEMAC, which consists entirely of military staff, and is funded by the government. YMAA did not have a program due to lack of funding, but YMAA members delivered emergency RE in response to incidents.

The total number of RE recipients for 2008 of 210,559 is a very significant increase on previous years; 80,931 people were reached in 2007 and 45,524 people in 2006.

In accordance with the National Mine Action Strategic Plan, most affected areas were reached. RE was conducted year-round for 12 days each month. Priority-setting was based on the LIS but, since 2008, recent casualties and emergency situations have been given higher importance in determining RE priorities.

YEMAC delivered RE using child-to-child and woman-to-woman methods in homes, through direct presentations to men at social gatherings, and through plays, films, and posters. Survivors also participated in delivering RE messages. YEMAC conducted RE in 132 villages in the following governorates: Abyan, Al-Bayda, Al-Mahra, Hadramout, Ibb, Lahij, and Ta’izz. The total population reached in communities and schools was 109,558 males and 101,001 females. YEMAC also trained teachers in workshops at the district level, although there is no formal RE program with the Ministry of Education.

YEMAC has eight male and two female RE facilitators. Most female beneficiaries were girls at school, but few women received RE.

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91 Email from Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 21 July 2009. This data does not match with information previously provided to Landmine Monitor and it has not been possible to reconcile this data with earlier reports.
93 Email from Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 30 April 2009.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Email from Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 30 April 2009.
99 Email from Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 30 April 2009.
Community liaison is conducted before, during and after demining. A handover ceremony is conducted, and YEMAC demonstrates that clearance has been conducted by walking or driving over the land. This builds community confidence, which had been reported by GICHD in 2006 to be lacking.\textsuperscript{100}

Most materials used by YEMAC in 2008 were produced by YMAA about four years earlier, and included posters, booklets, stickers, and games, and they were shared with other implementing organizations.\textsuperscript{101} YEMAC uses models for explanations and gives out material during presentations. YEMAC distributed 57,200 posters during presentations in 132 villages.

Challenges included reaching remote desert areas with a scattered Bedouin population, a lack of funding, and addressing high-risk behaviors resulting from poverty.\textsuperscript{102} UNDP visits the field every three months to monitor RE.\textsuperscript{103}

RE has been conducted since 1999 by YEMAC and YMAA working together. It was coordinated by YEMAC, through the Mine Awareness Advisory Committee until 2007, when YMAA stopped its program due to lack of funding. By March 2009, a total of 1,094,879 beneficiaries were reported to have received RE.\textsuperscript{104} YEMAC conducted RE and community liaison. YMAA trained community leaders to pass RE on to their communities and to report contamination to the demining unit, and produced RE materials. YMAA also conducted child-to-child training.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Yemen is unknown, but is at least 2,458. From 2008–2009, VA was severely hampered by financial difficulties, as noted above.\textsuperscript{105} The survivor organization YALS also noted that the activities implemented ignored many needs of survivors. Survivors were not included in planning or implementation of VA activities.\textsuperscript{106} It was also remarked that the assistance provided by YEMAC took time and that “survivors had to wait for their turn, even if they need urgent support.”\textsuperscript{107}

YEMAC noted that the Social Fund for Development and the Disability Fund only assist those persons with disabilities registered at either fund, but that many survivors are not registered because they live in remote areas.\textsuperscript{108}

Service provision for persons with disabilities in Yemen is weak, primarily urban-based, and largely inaccessible to those who need it. Cross-sector initiatives such as community-based rehabilitation (CBR) are virtually non-existent.\textsuperscript{109} The ICRC noted that, “Many people remain without services, especially in rural areas where there is a near total absence of disability support services, including health education and rehabilitation.”\textsuperscript{110} For women access is even more limited.\textsuperscript{111}

Health and rehabilitation services are highly centralized and mainly located in the major cities (Aden, Sana’a, and Ta’izz) and many persons with disabilities needed to travel long distances for assistance. The centralization of services was a major obstacle to receiving care. Transport and accommodation costs were unaffordable for many, and even more challenging for women

\textsuperscript{100} Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Geneva, 29 May 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, 733.

\textsuperscript{101} Email from Aisha Saeed, YMAA, 30 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Mansoor al-Azi, YEMAC, Sana’a, 6 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{103} Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, Geneva, 29 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{104} See Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{105} Email from Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 27 July 2009.


\textsuperscript{107} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by YMAA, 20 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{108} Interview with Mansour al-Azi, YEMAC, in Geneva, 26 May 2009.


who often needed a male caretaker to accompany them. Medical assistance was of variable quality.112

Patients had difficulties maintaining their orthopedic appliances, given the distances to physical rehabilitation centers.113 Only one physical rehabilitation center operates in the remote Hadramout governorate.114 The Ta‘izz rehabilitation center, which did not receive assistance, was not functioning at capacity in 2009,115 and it has not functioned well since Handicap International (HI) handed the center over in January 2005.

Psychosocial support activities for mine/ERW survivors were very limited and their importance not recognized. Some limited services were only available in the main cities.116 Existing economic reintegration programs for survivors and other persons with disabilities were weak and few persons with disabilities had access to educational and economic opportunities.117 According to NMAC, a newly-opened bank provides credit to vulnerable groups and poor people, but no agreement has been reached for the bank to include mine/ERW survivors in its mandate.118 Employment quotas stipulate that 5% of government jobs should go to persons with disabilities and by law disabled students are exempt from paying tuition fees. It is unknown to what extent these laws are implemented and schools are often not accessible.119 Mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities receive a pension, but this was insufficient to maintain a reasonable standard of living.120

Yemen has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but it is unknown whether it is enforced and discrimination remained.121 On 26 March 2009, Yemen ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and its Optional Protocol.

Progress in meeting VA26 victim assistance objectives
Yemen is one of the VA26 group, composed of 26 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors and “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation, and reintegration of survivors. Yemen prepared its 2005–2009 VA objectives for November 2005 and in April 2007 it presented its four-phase program as the plan to achieve its objectives.122 The plans or objectives have not been revised since, and do not cover all components of VA, as the program is very medically oriented, and the economic reintegration component largely defunct.123

Yemen reported on VA in Form I of its Article 7 reports submitted from 2005–2009; it also reported on VA during meetings of States Parties from 2005–2009 and at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings from 2005–2007 and in 2009.124 These statements were limited

114 Ibid.
116 Email from Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 27 July 2009.
117 HI, Voices from the Ground: Landmine and Explosive Remnants of War Survivors Speak Out on Victim Assistance, Brussels, 2 September 2009, pp. 221–222.
118 Email from Rashida al-Hamdani, NMAC, 27 July 2009.
to statistical updates on the number of people assisted in the first three phases of the YEMAC program.

In 2008, as in previous years, Yemen did not reach its target of assisting 500 persons per year with medical care, and of reaching 2,000 people with physical rehabilitation between 2005 and 2009. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Yemen stated that some 2,033 survivors had been interviewed since 2001, 1,530 had received medical examinations, and 1,638 provided with medical/rehabilitation services (compared to 1,447 people interviewed, 1,165 medical examinations, and 1,313 services provided to the end of 2007). The target to assist 500 people with economic reintegration from 2005–2009 was not reached due to financial and capacity issues at YALS; some 202 people received vocational training from 2005–March 2009.

Progress on needs assessments and infrastructure improvements by the Ministry of Public Health and Population, which had a deadline of 2006, the establishment of six vocational training centers, or disability awareness-raising was not reported or identified.

A VA expert was present at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2007 and at meetings of States Parties in 2007 and 2008.

**Victim assistance activities**

In 2008, YEMAC assisted 230 survivors with medical and rehabilitation services, and some 288 medical procedures were carried out. An additional 12 survivors obtained physical rehabilitation assistance at the Aden Rehabilitation Center without YEMAC support. Since 2001, some 1,339 mobility devices have been provided. Yemen also reported that community-based rehabilitation projects were training more field staff to expand coverage to all priority areas.

In 2008, the ICRC continued to provide raw materials and components, as well as training to three physical rehabilitation centers (Sana’a, Aden, and Hadramout). It provided financial support to set up a mobile clinic in Sa’ada. Through ICRC-supported centers, 7,652 people were assisted in 2008; 1,216 prostheses were produced (400 for mine/ERW survivors), and 3,967 orthoses (76 for mine/ERW survivors). Seven prosthetic-orthotic technicians were sponsored for training in India. The ICRC also provided war-surgery training in Sa’ada, but movement restrictions in the governorate hampered medical service provision. Two ICRC-supported hospitals assisted 74 weapon-injured in 2008, including one mine/ERW casualty.

In 2008, the Aden Rehabilitation Center received patients from Abyan, Aden, and Lahij and conducted outreach services in these governorates. The center treated 2,326 people in 2008, produced 104 prostheses (44 for mine/ERW survivors), and distributed 2,255 assistive devices in 2008. It also carried an average of 680 physiotherapy sessions per month.

The Aden Association of People with Special Needs continued to provide vocational and marketing training and income-generating opportunities, with financial support by the Disability Fund and the Social Fund for Development. In 2008, 45 persons with disabilities received

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125 Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009; and information provided by Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Sana’a, 23 March 2008.

126 Article 7 report (for period from 31 March 2008 to 31 March 2009), Form I, 31 March 2009.

127 Yemen has not reported on these objectives since it submitted the objectives in 2005, nor did not include an update on progress towards these objectives in its responses to Landmine Monitor or its Article 7 Reports in 2005–2009. See for example, statement of Yemen, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008; Article 7 report, Form I, 31 March 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 759.

128 Interview with Dr. Fouad al-Shamiri, YEMAC, Sana’a, 7 March 2009, as in previous years Yemen reported varying figures in its Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009; and in its statement to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.

129 Article 7 Report, Form I, 31 March 2009.


132 Interview with Abdullah al-Duhaimi, Director, Aden Rehabilitation Center, Aden, 28 February 2009. The statistics for mobility devices and persons assisted are included in those reported by the ICRC.

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training and employment, and the association assisted four persons with disabilities in obtaining government jobs.\(^{133}\)

From 2008–2009, YALS received some limited support from the Social Fund for Development, but YEMAC was not able to provide assistance.\(^{134}\) In 2008, 48 survivors received vocational training from YALS, eight were assisted in setting up small businesses, and 12 received assistance to access education. YALS also conducted awareness-raising, follow-up of its graduates, and recreational trips for its members. Aside from financial difficulties, YALS noted that reaching survivors in remote areas (where most live) and lack of services in these areas were challenging. Additional obstacles were high illiteracy rates, particularly among women, and cultural constraints preventing women from receiving training.\(^{135}\)

The Aden Association for the Physically Disabled received funding from Save the Children to carry out inclusive education and advocacy on the CRPD in 2008.\(^{136}\)

Save the Children continued to support three disability associations in Sana’a and the community-based rehabilitation network in Abyan, Aden, and Ibb, as well as in the Kharaz camp for Somali refugees, where it assisted 80 children with disabilities. Save the Children also organized a regional consultation on the CRPD in cooperation with the Arab Human Rights Foundation (AHRF) and published a CRPD implementation guide in December 2008.\(^{137}\)

In 2008, the AHRF initiated a psychosocial unit in Sana’a, which was accessed by a few survivors.\(^{138}\)

**Support for Mine Action**

Yemen has reported a total cost estimate of $31,216,667 (€21,198,334) for completing mine clearance during 2009–2014.\(^{139}\) This does not take into account costs required to fulfill RE and VA obligations. Yemen’s contribution to mine clearance during the extension period is projected to approximately $18.8 million, while international assistance is expected to be an estimated $10.5 million and funds from other sources to total roughly $1.9 million.\(^{140}\) NMAC is responsible for the allocation and management of national funds for mine action.\(^{141}\)

**National support for mine action**

As of November 2008, Yemen reported national funding to mine action in 2008 to be $3.6 million.\(^{142}\) Yemen reported providing $3.5 million (€2.4 million) to mine action in 2007. From 1999 to 2008, Yemen reported a total of $50,277,298 (€34,141,856) in funding from all sources, of which $35,700,220 (€24,242,985) or 71% came from Yemen’s national budgets.\(^{143}\) In its strategic plan for completing mine clearance, Yemen projected reduced government funding in 2009 ($2.8 million) followed by a return to current levels. It noted that the government had assumed a 10% annual inflation rate in setting its annual funding levels. Government funds were projected to account for some 60% of total required funds. In addition to the 34% required from international sources, Yemen must identify “resources available from other sources” for the remaining 6% of required funds, or almost $1.9 million.\(^{144}\)

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133 Interview with Afrah Abdo, Deputy-Director, Aden Association of People with Special Needs, Aden, 25 February 2009.
135 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by and interview with Saleh al-Dahyani, YALS, Sana’a, 23 July and 1 March 2009.
136 Interview with Aref al-Olaqi, Chairperson, Aden Association for the Physically Disabled, Aden, 25 February 2009.
137 Information provided by Aisha Saeed, Senior Program Coordinator, Save the Children, Aden, 25 February 2009.
138 Interview with Rajaa al-Masabi, Chairperson, AHRF, Sana’a, 6 March 2009.
139 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 6 November 2008, p. 14.
143 Ibid.
144 Ibid, p. 7.
International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, three countries—Germany, Italy, and the US—reported providing $1,005,172 (€682,583) to mine action in Yemen. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was approximately 9% less than reported in 2007. Funding at current levels is insufficient to meet the annual amount projected by Yemen as required to carry out its mine clearance strategy during the extension period—ranging from $1.25 million in 2009 to $1.9 million from 2010 to 2013—which does not directly address RE or VA needs.145 In its revised Article 5 extension request, Yemen reported that shortages in funding have occasionally caused the delay or suspension of mine action activities, including the replacement of equipment, deployment of explosive ordnance disposal units and QA and monitoring teams, and restructuring of clearance units.146 YMAA reportedly suspended all activities during 2008 due to a lack of funding.147

Yemen reported receiving $1,331,000 in funding in 2008, including $1,031,000 from the European Commission (EC) and $300,000 from UNDP.148

### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Yemen: Monetary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>From the Department of State</td>
<td>Equipment replenishment</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Support of MDD center</td>
<td>$357,912 (€243,048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Capacity building</td>
<td>$147,260 (€100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total $1,005,172 (€682,584)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In February 2009, Croatia signed a cooperative agreement with Yemen, under which Croatia will provide equipment to support clearance operations in Yemen, and the two countries will exchange technical expertise in areas related to treaty implementation. The types of equipment and value of in-kind support were not reported.150

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146 Ibid, p. 4.
149 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revision), 6 November 2008, Annex III, p. 41.
150 “Yemen, Croatia sign cooperation agreement of mine action”, Yemen News Agency (Cairo), 11 February 2009. www.sabanews.net.
ZAMBIA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 August 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>11 (2007: 19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>At least 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 August 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>4.78km² (14 SHAs) and 11 roads were released in 2008–2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary


Zambia was contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of non-state armed groups from neighboring countries having used Zambia as a haven in the 1970s and 1980s. The Zambia Anti-Personnel Mine Action Centre (ZMAC), created in 2001, is responsible for mine action. Until Norwegian People’s Aid began a nationwide survey in 2008 the problem was ill-defined. In June 2009, preliminary survey results showed that Zambia’s problem is principally from ERW and no residual antipersonnel mine contamination had been confirmed.

ZMAC recorded at least 152 mine and ERW survivors in Zambia until 2007. Until 2003, there were no organized or sustained risk education programs, and it has remained limited. ZMAC has been the main implementing organization, though some risk education activities have also been conducted by NGOs. The main target group has been refugees. ZMAC’s capacity to carry out victim assistance has remained limited and access to healthcare and disability services was poor.

Mine Ban Policy

Zambia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 February 2001, becoming a State Party on 1 August 2001. Zambia enacted comprehensive domestic implementation legislation on 12 December 2003, which includes penal sanctions.¹

Zambia submitted its seventh Article 7 report on 3 April 2009, which covers calendar year 2008.2

At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, Zambia was named co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, having served as co-rapporteur the previous year. Zambia made a statement during the general exchange of views calling for universalization of the treaty and for greater international assistance with clearance globally. It also made a statement on mine clearance and provided comments on Zimbabwe's Article 5 clearance deadline extension request.

Zambia attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it made a statement on mines retained for training purposes. Zambia also provided an update on mine clearance.

Zambia has intervened on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1 and 2. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Zambia reported that its national implementation legislation directly covers many of these issues.3 It stated that it joins others in calling for a common understanding that any mine that can be set off unintentionally by a person, thereby functioning as an antipersonnel mine, is banned, including antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or sensitive anti-handling devices. It also stated its understanding that transit of antipersonnel mines is prohibited, and that participation in joint military operations must be in adherence with the convention.4

Zambia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008 and ratified on 24 August 2009.5

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

Zambia has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Zambia completed the destruction of a stockpile of 3,345 antipersonnel mines in October 2004.

There were discrepancies in the number and types of mines retained and consumed for training purposes reported in Zambia's Article 7 reports covering 2007 and 2008.6 In its Article 7 report for 2008, Zambia stated that its previous report included "arithmetic and typographical errors." Zambia cited 3,346 as the original number of mines retained for training purposes, with 1,226 of those mines used during training in 2007, leaving 2,120 mines retained.7 Although field training was planned for 2008, none took place, and 2,120 mines were still retained at the end of 2008 as follows: 100 ALPHER-120 (China); 100 AUPS-24 (Italy); 100 POMZ-2 (Russia); 100 T. V ARS-40 (Italy); 200 MAUS (Russia); 205 T. V ARS-50 (Italy); 230 T69 (China); 383 T59 (Russia); and 702 T58 (China).8

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3 The legislation is explicit about a prohibition on antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes or anti-handling devices which function as antipersonnel mines. It states that "transfer" includes "the transit of anti-personnel mines into, out of, or through Zambia by any means," and says that members of the armed forces can participate in operations or other military activities with the armed forces of a state not party to the Convention, "Provided that the operation, exercise or military activity is not in contravention of the Convention and that such participation does not amount to active assistance in any activity prohibited by the Convention and this Act."
6 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 764–765. In its report for 2008, Zambia stated it was retaining 3,346 mines for training purposes. Article 7 Report, Forms D and F, 10 April 2007. The retained mines included: 110 POMZ-2 (Russia); 113 T. V ARS-40 (Italy); 267 ALPHER 120 (China); 286 AUPS-24 (Italy); 287 T. V ARS-50 (Italy); 338 MAUS (Russia); 430 T69 (China); 613 T59 (Russia/Iraq); and 902 T58 (China). In its 2008 report, Zambia reported variously 1,020 and 1,226 mines used in training during 2007, with 2,232 mines retained as of the end of the year. Article 7 Report, Form D, 17 April 2008.
7 Article 7 Report, Forms B and D, 3 April 2009.
8 Ibid, Form B.
At the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Zambia stated that 2008 field training exercises were cancelled as a result of budgetary constraints. It said that field training exercises were planned for 2009, which would further reduce Zambia’s reserve of mines.9

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Zambia was contaminated with landmines and ERW as a result of non-state armed groups from neighboring countries having used Zambia as a haven in the 1970s and 1980s.10 However, the preliminary results of a nationwide survey found Zambia is primarily contaminated with ERW, including cluster munition remnants, and only one antivehicle mine and one fuze had been found as of July 2009.11

Several surveys since 2003 have provided a partial picture of the problem. One in 2003–2004 by ZMAC identified 41 areas affected by mines and/or ERW, but the survey teams did not access all areas and the results were therefore not exhaustive.12 Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) determined from an initial assessment in 2007 that tourism, farming, and hydroelectric power—all key pillars for economic growth and development—are affected by the threat of landmines.13 ZMAC, however, has reported only that contamination has hindered the exploration of uranium deposits and the development of infrastructure in national game parks.14

In 2008, the government of Zambia asked NPA to survey seven of its nine provinces—Eastern, Southern, Lusaka, Western, North-Western, Central, and Luapula—primarily in the border areas with Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The survey, which began on 1 September 2008,15 was expected “to provide standardized and technical data on the location, nature and impact of landmines and explosive remnants of war on communities in the country.”16 NPA based its survey on the 41 locations identified by the 2003–2004 ZMAC survey.17

By late July 2009, NPA had visited 570 locations in 46 districts and identified 14 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and three confirmed hazardous areas, two of which contained cluster munition remnants and the third ERW. The areas were spread across nine districts: Chienge, Chongwe, Kalabo, Kaoma, Luangwa, Sesheke, Shangombo, Siavonga, and Solwezi. None of the SHAs were suspected to contain mines.18

During the resurvey, a police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer was paid by NPA to destroy the items left by its survey team, including two unexploded submunitions located in Zhaba in Shangombo district in Western province. Items destroyed were one antivehicle mine, one antivehicle mine fuze, and 22 ERW, composed mainly of hand grenades and mortar bombs,

14 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by ZMAC, 14 April 2009.
18 Email from Mário Penedo Tomé Nunes, NPA, 27 July 2009.
as well as two unexploded submunitions. Preliminary results as of late July 2009 indicated no antipersonnel mines had been found during the survey.\(^{19}\)

In March 2009, ZMAC and UNDP began recruiting an evaluator to assess the survey to ensure it meets both national and international standards.\(^{20}\)

**Casualties**

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 11 new ERW casualties, including six people killed and five injured in Zambia. On 5 September 2008, an ERW incident in Zimba, Southern province, resulted in two casualties (one killed and one injured).\(^{21}\) On 24 September 2008, one man was killed and three injured while tampering with ERW in Katete, Eastern province.\(^{22}\) On 23 December 2008, another incident resulted in four people killed and one injured.\(^{23}\)

Casualties continued in 2009 with one adult male reportedly injured by ERW in February.\(^{24}\)

In 2007, ZMAC identified at least 152 mine survivors across 122 communities in six mine/ERW-contaminated provinces.\(^{25}\) Landmine Monitor identified 62 mine/ERW casualties in Zambia between 1999 and 2008 (10 killed, 28 injured, and 24 unknown).

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

In accordance with legislation adopted in 2003, the National Committee on Anti-Personnel Landmines (NCAL) serves as the national mine action authority. Coordination of mine action is the responsibility of ZMAC, set up in 2001 by governmental decree and formalized by the 2003 legislation.\(^{26}\)

**Risk education**

In 2008, ZMAC was the main coordinating body for mine/ERW risk education (RE) and worked with the Commissioner for Refugees in the Ministry of Home Affairs. RE is based on the International Mine Action Standards and national standards which were developed in 2003.\(^{27}\) RE is discussed at the quarterly NCAL meetings which are held to review progress, and the Zambian Campaign to Ban Landmines (ZCBL) attends on invitation.\(^{28}\)

**Victim assistance**

As coordinator of the national mine action strategy, which includes victim assistance, ZMAC is primarily responsible for victim assistance, but activities remained limited and mine/ERW survivors benefit from general disability programs under the Ministry of Community Development and Social Services.\(^{29}\)

\(^{19}\) Ibid, 22 and 27 July 2009.


\(^{23}\) Email from Sheila Mweemba, ZMAC, 28 May 2009.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.


\(^{27}\) Email from Silumelume Mubukwanu, Information Management Officer, ZMAC, 12 June 2009.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 772.
Data collection and management
ZMAC is officially mandated to collect mine/ERW casualty data in Zambia. NCAL contracted NPA to conduct survivor registration as part of its national survey. It is expected that ZMAC will enter all the data from the survey into the Information Management System for Mine Action database, which it houses.

Plans

Strategic mine action plans
In 2005, Zambia drafted a three-year Humanitarian Demining Program (2005–2007), which included the objective of clearing hazardous areas by the end of 2007. The document was updated to cover 2005–2009, adjusting the vision “to be mine-free by the end of 2008.” As in previous years, this target objective was largely dependent on national will, mobilization of Zambian resources, and international donor assistance. It also depended on the results of a nationwide survey, which did not begin until September 2008. The NPA survey and the follow-up to clear the SHAs identified in the survey will form the basis of future Zambian mine action planning.

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Zambia has demonstrated a continuing commitment to mine action, but until 2008 progress in meeting its Article 5 obligations had been slow, primarily due to limited resources.

National management
Mine action in Zambia is nationally managed, with ZMAC playing an important role in coordination. As noted above, the nationwide survey was conducted by NPA, but destruction of items found was carried out by the Zambian police EOD personnel.

National budget
In June 2008, the Zambian Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs expressed concern over the lack of progress in addressing the mine problem. The committee recommended increasing funding to ZMAC significantly. Parliament, however, allocated ZMK550 million (about US$90,000) but by the end of the year had disbursed only half of the amount.

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures
National mine action legislation was adopted in 2003 and entered into force the following year. Standing operating procedures for demining were developed by ZMAC in 2001–2002.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
Mine and battle area clearance is conducted by army deminers working for ZMAC and spot clearance is also carried out by police EOD personnel.

In 2008, ZMAC conducted a landmine verification and clearance project in the Lower Zambezi National Park on behalf of the Zambia Wildlife Authority. The project was unable to meet all its goals because it was based on an outdated budget. ZMAC submitted a new budget
with the agreement of the director of the Zambia Wildlife Authority, but as of the end of 2008 new funds had not yet been approved.\textsuperscript{40} While clearing 1,071m\textsuperscript{2} of SHAs, 182 items of UXO were found and destroyed.\textsuperscript{41}

ZMAC was contracted in 2008 by OmegaCorp Limited, a subsidiary of Denison Mines Corp and a mineral exploration company, to conduct demining in Siavonga district. It was also asked by ZESCO Limited, the state power utility, to demine before work began on a construction project, also in Siavonga district. ZESCO personnel had previously found hand grenades at the Kariba North Bank Power Extension Project site where the Sinohydro Corporation of China had been contracted to build an extension of the electrical plant. As the table below indicates, one antivehicle mine and nine items of UXO were found and destroyed after surveying and clearing 4.78km\textsuperscript{2}. After clearance, ZMAC handed over the land to OmegaCorp for mining exploration, and in March 2009, construction of the electrical plant began.\textsuperscript{42}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Province/ district</th>
<th>Land release (m\textsuperscript{2})</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed during mine clearance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zambian army deminers/ZMAC</td>
<td>Siavonga district, Southern province</td>
<td>4,326,950</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambian army deminers/ZMAC</td>
<td>Kariba North Bank, Siavonga district</td>
<td>452,530</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambian army deminers/ZMAC</td>
<td>Lower Zambezi National Park, Luangwa and Chiawa districts</td>
<td>1,071</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4,780,551</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>191</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Zambia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2011. In May 2009, at the Standing Committee meetings, Zambia stated that it was likely all remaining mined areas would be cleared by the Second Review Conference in December 2009 and that Zambia would be able to declare itself mine-free.\textsuperscript{44} In July 2009, the NPA national survey was close to completion, with no antipersonnel mine contamination having been found.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{40} Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “ZMAC 2008 Annual Report,” Lusaka, 8 January 2009, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{41} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by ZMAC, 4 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{43} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by ZMAC, 4 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{45} Emails from Mário Penedo Tomé Nunes, NPA, 22 and 27 July 2009.
Risk Education

RE in 2008 was aimed at refugees and their host communities. The focus was on training trainers of key communicators who would work in their own communities. School-based RE was also being developed and was expected to be completed by the end of 2009. Approximately 13,000 people received RE in four refugee camps: Meheba (Solwezi), Kala (Kawambwa), Mwange (Mporokoso), and Mayukwayukwa (Kaoma), out of a total population of 55,490 in the camps. NPA also conducted some RE where necessary alongside its nationwide survey, although this did not form part of their contractual obligations.

Once the survey is completed, it will provide a better understanding of the needs for RE, and this will be used to develop a national mine action strategy that includes RE. During field work, NPA found that communities were generally aware of the issue. At the Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Zambia stated that “Mine risk education continues to play a significant role in the prevention of mine related accidents.”

The number of ZMAC RE staff was reduced in 2008. ZMAC had two permanent staff and four co-opted staff from other ministries who assist when required for field work. Training of 51 key communicators (20 female and 31 male) was conducted in September 2008 in accordance with agreements between Zambia, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Angola, which require Zambia “to sensitize all repatriating refugees on mine awareness.” The key communicators then conducted RE in their own communities, in schools, and at the departure centers. They also conducted RE for Zambian nationals, particularly schoolchildren living in areas awaiting clearance. RE campaign materials were distributed in refugee camps in collaboration with the Commissioner of Refugees of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Repatriation of refugees took place from May 2008, and ZMAC provided RE materials for distribution at the departure centers.

To monitor activities, ZMAC periodically visited camps and communities. In 2009, ZMAC conducted a monitoring and evaluation exercise with UNICEF assistance to assess the effectiveness of the training that took place in 2008. It found that key communicators were working effectively, and that 80% of people were “mine aware.”

Progress was made in the inclusion of RE in the school curriculum in areas suspected to be affected. ZMAC, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education’s Curriculum Development Centre, conducted a workshop in Choma in November 2007 to finalize a teachers’ handbook for RE. A student handbook was also designed. As of May 2009, 100 schools had been identified for a pilot test in seven of Zambia’s nine provinces.

46 Email from Silumelume Mubukwanu, ZMAC, 12 June 2009.
48 Email from Silumelume Mubukwanu, ZMAC, 12 June 2009.
49 Email from Sheila Mweemba, ZMAC, 28 May 2009.
52 Emails from Sheila Mweemba, ZMAC, 28 May 2009; and from Reuben McCarthy, UNDP, 5 August 2009.
54 Email from Silumelume Mubukwanu, ZMAC, 12 June 2009.
57 Email from Silumelume Mubukwanu, ZMAC, 12 June 2009.
58 Ibid.
61 Article 7 Report, Form J, 3 April 2009.
Most RE activities are funded by UNICEF, while UNHCR supports RE activities related to repatriation. The government contributed $9,340 for RE in 2008, in addition to salaries and other related costs incurred. Inadequate budgetary funding is reported to be a major hindrance to activity implementation and prevents RE from being provided to all target beneficiaries.

Until 2003, there were no organized or sustained RE programs, and it has remained limited. ZMAC began conducting RE in 2003, and in 2003 RE was also carried out by the Association for Aid and Relief Japan, and in 2006 by the Lutheran World Federation and Christian Outreach and Development. The main beneficiaries have been refugees so that they are aware of the risks in their own countries when they are repatriated. Limited emergency RE was also conducted in response to incidents.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown but is estimated to be at least 152. In 2008, as in previous years, ZMAC’s capacity to carry out victim assistance (VA) remained limited due to inadequate financial resources. Only $2,639 was approved by the Ministry of Finance for ZMAC’s VA activities in 2008. No further details were made available. On 6 March 2009, ZMAC held a workshop to identify and help fill gaps that exist in the structures, services, and policies assisting survivors.

Access to quality healthcare remained poor, with people walking long distances to reach facilities, especially in rural areas.

In 2008, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) continued to support the University Teaching Hospital; it also provided training opportunities. However, production of devices at the center decreased by 47% in 2008 compared to the previous year, mainly due to lack of qualified staff. In 2008, 170 prosthetic and orthotic fittings were made; the number of fittings for mine/ERW survivors was not specified.

Zambia has disability legislation, but it has not been adequately enforced. On 9 May 2008, Zambia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and on 29 September 2008 signed its Optional Protocol; it had not ratified the convention as of 1 July 2009.

Support for Mine Action

Zambia’s Mine Action Completion Plan, released in May 2006, includes among its five objectives the creation of a “residual capacity that is sustainable by national resources after the end of international assistance.” The plan does not include a cost estimate for completion or a resource mobilization strategy. In May 2007, UNDP reported that fulfillment of Article 5 obligations in Zambia would cost $1.4 million (€1,021,078), based on cost estimates related to the UNDP Completion Initiative for the country. As of June 2009, Zambia’s mine action
budget needs remained to be determined based on the results of the national survey being conducted by NPA.

**National support for mine action**

According to figures reported by the Zambian Parliamentary Committee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, as of September 2008 the Zambian government had allocated ZMK550,993,582 ($110,199) for ZMAC annual operations in 2008, a substantial decline from national funding reported by ZMAC in 2007, and only 22% of the ZMK2.5 billion budget requested. The lesser amount was allocated because of reported “ministerial budgetary ceilings.” The committee stated that “by far, the major constraint faced by the Centre in meeting its annual work plans was insufficient funding.”

As a result of national funding shortfalls, most mine action activities were funded from external sources, through UNDP, UNICEF, and private partnerships. In its annual report for 2008, ZMAC reported that ZMK18.6 million (approximately $5,580 at 2008 exchange rates) owed to Zambian army deminers from clearance carried out in 2004 was paid by the Zambian government in 2008. ZMAC did not report whether these payments were made from the overall government allocation and did not report any additional funding. ZMAC reported a total of ZMK3,263,741,000 ($979,122) in overall national funding in 2007.

**International cooperation and assistance**

No international funding was reported for Zambia for 2008. In 2007, France reported providing a $6,850 (€4,996) in-kind contribution in the form of training. In its 2008 annual report, ZMAC reported that an overall shortfall in funding “continues to be the major hindrance to the implementation of ZMAC activities.” ZMAC reported “a slight increase” in international funding for 2009 compared to 2008, but stated that funds still fall short of program requirements. ZMAC verification and clearance activities in Lower Zambezi National Park were curtailed because original budgets for the project, established in 2006, were no longer valid in 2008. ZMAC reported that a new budget and workplan for the remaining tasks had been established and submitted for approval and financing.

Zambia reported allocations of $550,000 from UNDP to NPA for survey activities in 2008. According to UNDP, this was not new money, but referred to funds provided through UNDP for the impact survey which, due to delays, only started in 2008. UNDP itself reported $257,000 in expenditures on the survey in 2008, via funds from Canada ($149,000) and Sweden ($108,000). Neither Canada nor Sweden reported funds to Zambia in 2008; Canada reported funding to UNDP in 2006 of C$350,000 ($308,641 at 2006 rates) for mapping in support of mine action program. ZMAC also reported funding by UNICEF to support ZMAC RE activities in 2008.
ZIMBABWE

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party since</th>
<th>1 March 1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>810km² of mined areas as of end 2008, but to be reduced significantly by technical survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>Two (2007: seven)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but could be 1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)</td>
<td>Deadline: 1 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original deadline: 1 March 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Mined areas: 3.9km²</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary


Landmines in Zimbabwe were laid in the 1970s during its war for independence. Assistance from the United States and the European Union ended in 2000, leaving Zimbabwe largely alone to support mine action from national funding. As a result, Zimbabwe has since made little progress in meeting its Article 5 mine clearance obligations. In November 2008, States Parties granted Zimbabwe a 22-month extension of its Article 5 deadline to resurvey the mined areas to identify more accurately the remaining problem.

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, Zimbabwe reported that some 1,550 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties had occurred between 1980 and 2008. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 104 mine/ERW casualties in Zimbabwe (25 killed, 75 injured, and four unknown). Mine/ERW risk education activities were included in Zimbabwe’s five-year mine action plan for 2005–2009, but by 2008, the target to reach more than 2.6 million people in five provinces had not been achieved. There were no specific victim assistance activities in Zimbabwe, and few survivors have adequate access to healthcare and services.

Mine Ban Policy


Zimbabwe submitted its ninth annual Article 7 report, dated December 2008, covering calendar year 2008.²

Zimbabwe attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it made a presentation on its Article 5 clearance deadline extension request, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it made a statement on mine clearance.

Zimbabwe has provided its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3. In May 2006, it stated that in joint military operations Zimbabwean forces will not assist or participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines. It said that the Mine Ban Treaty “clearly bans” foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, and also prohibits antivehicle mines with sensitive antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes that can function as antipersonnel mines. Finally, it said that the number of mines States Parties chose to retain should only be in the hundreds or thousands and not tens of thousands.3

Zimbabwe is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. As of 1 July 2009 Zimbabwe had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.4

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

The government maintains that there has been no mine production since independence.5 Government and other sources indicate that Zimbabwe was before then a producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines, but not on a significant scale.6 On 15 November 2000, Zimbabwe destroyed its stockpile of 4,092 antipersonnel mines,7 retaining 700 mines for training and development purposes (500 PMD-6 and 200 R2M2).8

In its Article 7 report for 2008, Zimbabwe reported 550 mines retained for training purposes (400 PMD-6 and 150 R2M2). During 2008, 50 R2M2 mines were consumed during training exercises.9 Zimbabwe has acknowledged that it also stockpiles Claymore-type devices, but without tripwire fuzes because Zimbabwe considers these illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty.10

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Zimbabwe is contaminated with landmines, mostly antipersonnel, and ERW. As of December 2008, the mine threat was across 10 minefields laid in the 1970s. Combat with liberation movements operating out of Mozambique and Zambia also resulted in significant quantities of UXO.11

As of end 2008, Zimbabwe had an estimated 810km² of mined areas, with a number of small suspected hazardous areas (SHA) still be surveyed (see table below) from an initial contaminated area of 1,119.9km², having released some 310km² since 1980.12 The estimate of the remaining contaminated area is highly improbable when compared to the known mine problems in other

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5 Article 7 Report, Form E, December 2006.
6 Earlier statements by Zimbabwe government sources and others indicated that production of two types of Claymore mines, the Z1 and ZAPS, ended when Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, while production of PloughShare mines was stopped between 1990 and 1993. For more information on past production and export, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 97–99.
8 Article 7 Report, Form B, 4 April 2001.
12 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 2.
affected countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia.\textsuperscript{13} It is likely to be significantly reduced following technical surveys. Zimbabwe’s demining records do not indicate how much of the cleared area was released by survey as opposed to full clearance.

**Estimated area of contamination in Zimbabwe as of end 2008\textsuperscript{14}**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHA</th>
<th>Size of SHA (km(^2))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Musengezi to Rwenga</td>
<td>436.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner</td>
<td>178.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rusitu to Muzite Mission</td>
<td>97.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheba Forest to Beacon Hill</td>
<td>65.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rushinga</td>
<td>29.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma Valley</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kariba Power line</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukumbura</td>
<td>Not surveyed yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusulu</td>
<td>Not surveyed yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional mined area at Sango Border</td>
<td>Not surveyed yet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post to Crooks Corner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 810.90

Zimbabwe’s minefields are known to have one of the highest densities of mines in the world. For example, the border minefields, known as the “Cordon Sanitaire,” consisted of a 25m-wide strip of three rows of antipersonnel mines at a density of approximately 5,500 mines per km.\textsuperscript{15} Zimbabwe has also reported, surprisingly, that 920,413 mines had been destroyed either by animals or the climate, including more than 788,000 mines in the Victoria Falls to Mlibizi minefield, which was declared cleared by June 2005.\textsuperscript{16}

The Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) reported in 2008 that landmines have adversely affected commercial crop farming and forestry and, in turn, Zimbabwe’s exports and hard currency earnings. Much of the timber in mine-affected areas is well past its maturity and has already lost its commercial value.\textsuperscript{17} It is estimated that landmines have blocked access to 300km\(^2\) of communal land, 107km\(^2\) of commercial farm land, and 50km\(^2\) of game parks, plus an unknown quantity of tea and timber plantations, and border posts. Zimbabwe has estimated that all but 5% of the total SHA could be used for economic development.\textsuperscript{18}

The Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield lies largely within the Gonarezhou National Park, which has now been merged into the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park that Zimbabwe shares with South Africa and Mozambique. Many animals are said to have been killed or maimed by mines in this area. Zimbabwe fears a further delay in clearing the park of mines will result in a major loss of tourist dollars in 2010 when South Africa hosts the Football

\textsuperscript{13} The data describing the landmine problem is the result of four major surveys or assessments since 1980, as well as from records from the former Rhodesian army.


\textsuperscript{16} Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, p. 6.
World Cup, Zimbabwe reported 3.9km² of land was cleared in this area in 2008. The US$5 billion Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme of March 2009, however, does not cite landmines as a factor impacting tourism or hindering tourists from visiting the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park. In June 2009, a Harare-based commercial company, Might-Hope Demining Services International, reported to Landmine Monitor their belief that due to its distance and isolation, the severity of the problem in the park was underestimated by some local officials.

During a Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining visit to the border with Mozambique and South Africa, landmine survivors reported that mines did affect their communities and sometimes killed wildlife.

### Casualties

In 2008, ZIMAC reported that two boys were killed when picking up a rifle grenade. No further details were available. However ZIMAC added that, “several cases are not reported because of [the] remoteness of the areas where accidents occur.” It also stated that, some incidents occur as people knowingly engage in “criminal activities” using mines.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009. An internet news report in January 2009 stated that a man in Rushinga district in northeastern Zimbabwe was killed when landmines exploded in his arms as he prepared to bury them in an effort to keep elephants off his land. The same report also mentioned that two people had been injured by landmines earlier in January. In February, two girls from Rushinga (one and five years old) were injured after a landmine they were playing with exploded: the older later died in hospital. As of June 2009, ZIMAC was unable to confirm these incidents.

Between 1980 and November 2008, the government reported more than 1,550 casualties due to mines. Some 120,000 livestock had also reportedly been killed. The number of survivors was estimated at 1,300. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor has identified at least 104 mine/ERW casualties (25 killed, 75 injured, and four unknown) in Zimbabwe.

### Program Management and Coordination

#### Mine action and risk education

The interministerial National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAZ) was established in 2000 and is chaired by the Deputy Secretary of the Ministry of Defence. ZIMAC was also established in 2000 and is headed by a Zimbabwean army colonel. ZIMAC is responsible for...
coordinating and implementing mine/ERW risk education (RE) according to the five-year mine action plan for 2005–2009.34

Victim assistance
NAMAZ is responsible for formulating national victim assistance policy and ZIMAC is responsible for coordinating activities.35 In 2008, however, no specific victim assistance strategic framework or activities existed. The dedicated ZIMAC departments were inactive.36 The Social Dimension Fund of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare is responsible for persons with disabilities.37

Data collection
Landmine casualty data is collected and reported to ZIMAC by risk educators38 and police officers, who work with health centers and local authorities.39 ZIMAC reported that information about known casualties had been gathered through interviews in mine-affected areas but these interviews only reached a small sampling of the total population.40 A Southern African Development Community report from 2007, previously unavailable to Landmine Monitor, recommended that Zimbabwe conduct a survey of mine casualties to determine the full extent of the problem.41

Plans

Strategic mine action plan
In August 2004, in preparation for the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Zimbabwe drafted a five-year mine action plan for 2005–2009.42 ZIMAC said that the plan was under revision as of June 2007.43 No new plan had been developed as of June 2009, but it was expected that the technical survey of remaining contamination, planned to be completed during Zimbabwe’s first extension period to its Article 5 deadline, will lead to the development of a new strategic mine action plan.44

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
Despite claims that landmines impact economic development, two key planning documents for Zimbabwe do not list addressing the mine problem as a priority for 2009. The $5 billion Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme of March 2009, which outlines the priorities for governance, social protection, and economic stabilization, does not include mine action as a component that would assist recovery. Similarly, the $718 million humanitarian consolidated appeal by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in May 2009 makes no reference to mines.45

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35 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 9.
38 Statement of Zimbabwe, Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 3 June 2008.
40 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 6.
43 Email from Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 29 June 2007.
45 Government of Zimbabwe, “Short Term Emergency Recovery Programme (STERP): Getting Zimbabwe Moving Again,” Harare, March 2009, www.savezimbabwenow.com; and OCHA, “Consolidated Appeal for Zimbabwe 2009: Revision,” 29 May 2009, ochaonline.un.org. OCHA believed mine action was excluded from the appeal because UNDP was already providing funding and no mine action NGOs were operating in Zimbabwe. Email from Giovanni Bosco, Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA, 5 June 2009.
National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Zimbabwe has made little progress in demining since international sanctions began in 2002. According to ZIMAC’s director, mine clearance has not been a government priority during the national economic crisis. Nonetheless, ZIMAC has continued to operate, albeit with limited results.

National management
Zimbabwe’s mine action program is nationally managed. Zimbabwe has not received any international support since 2000.

National budget
In March 2008, when it submitted its initial request to extend its Article 5 deadline, Zimbabwe noted that, “Since 1980, the government has been consistently allocating an annual budget to demining operations, though inadequate to totally clear all the mines. The allocations fall far too short of the total requirements especially in the area of contracting commercial demining companies to complement the military’s efforts to carry out humanitarian demining.”

Zimbabwe has reported that ZIMAC has had a $10,000 annual budget since 2002. It is difficult to assess what could be achieved with such a small annual contribution.

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures
No national mine action legislation has been adopted. Zimbabwe uses standing operating procedures developed by RONCO in 1998–2000, which was then providing assistance to Zimbabwe.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Zimbabwe National Army engineers, under the command of the National Mine Clearance Squadron, provide the country’s manual demining capacity. Although the lack of accurate data, old and insufficient equipment, difficult terrain, and fierce weather provide for a challenging environment, the primary reason for extremely slow progress in clearing mined areas since 2002 is the impact of international sanctions and the political instability in the country.

Although 35 deminers were trained in 2008, raising the total number of deminers to 167, only limited demining occurred in 2008 due to lack of funds. Zimbabwe has reported that only 3.9km² of SHAs were released from the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield.

Quality control/quality assurance is conducted by army engineer deminers on an irregular basis and without independent quality management of clearance tasks.

In May 2009, at the Standing Committee meeting on mine clearance, Zimbabwe stated that it planned to sign a 12-month renewable contract with the Might-Hope Demining Services International (MHDSI) company, to clear 20km² of mined areas near the border with South Africa. The company’s website announced that on 30 May 2009 they would launch “the Gona

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48 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 16.
49 Ibid, pp. 4, 17.
53 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 10 June 2009.
54 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 16; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 779.
Re Zhou Transfrontier Park landmine clearance project in preparation for and post the World Cup 2010. In June 2009, MHDSI confirmed they had signed a contract with the government to clear the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield “on a voluntary basis,” and that, despite not having received any funding, they were sending a manual demining team to the area to initiate mine clearance operations.

**Progress since becoming a State Party**

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Zimbabwe was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. Despite considerable demining in the first six years after it became a State Party, and subsequent statements that it was doing everything possible within its capacity to comply with its obligations, Zimbabwe submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline in March 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Demining (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>7.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003–2005</td>
<td>220.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2002</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>232.72</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = not available

Zimbabwe initially requested a seven-year extension based on additional funding from the international community. However, the estimate of more than 800km² of residual mined areas does not seem credible. The ICBL recommended the contaminated area be resurveyed before an operational plan is finalized. New equipment, the latest survey techniques, and applying land release principles, where necessary, should reduce the size of the mined areas (though probably not the number of mined areas), and enable Zimbabwe to re-submit an extension request with more accurate data. In May and November 2008, Zimbabwe submitted revised extension requests and in November 2008, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty granted it a 22-month extension.

The 22-month extension period is intended to enable resurvey of the mined areas and the development of a plan based on more realistic data and information. As of late May 2009, ZIMAC was waiting for $150,000 worth of demining and survey equipment from UNDP. The delay in receiving the equipment had caused ZIMAC to postpone its training course for survey

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57 Email from Hatiwande Hama, MHDSI, 10 June 2009.
58 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 March 2008.
59 2005 represents the year in which the release of 220km² was completed; annual clearance figures for this one mined area, Victoria Falls to Mlibizi, are not available. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 781.
61 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (First Revision), 27 May 2008; and Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 28 November 2008.
teams. ZIMAC reported that if the equipment was received by September 2009 they could complete the surveys by March 2011 as set out in the plan in its revised extension request.62

Risk Education

According to the UN, there is an ongoing need for repeated risk education (RE) messaging in mine-affected areas.63 RE was conducted by ZIMAC and army RE teams in 2008. ZIMAC reported that 23,480 individuals were reached in 2008 in four provinces: Matabeleland North, Manicaland, Masvingo, and Mashonal and Central.64 This was a decrease from 2007 when 40,000 people received RE.65

In 2008, the number of ZIMAC RE staff was reduced to 10. In 2007, ZIMAC also trained 21 army engineers to form four RE teams, and these became operational in 2008. All RE personnel are male.66 ZIMAC reported that as a result of shortfalls in funding in 2008, only four of the 18 RE sessions planned for the year were conducted.67

The majority of people who received RE were reached during the Zimbabwe International Trade Fair and at provincial agricultural shows, where people visited the ZIMAC stall.68 ZIMAC also organized RE sessions in communities with key individuals such as school officials, community leaders, and police officers.69 The majority of recipients of RE were women and youth.70

Limited RE campaigns began in 1998, with teams trained by US Army personnel and civilians. In 2001, RE intensified due to the number of people resettling in affected areas. However, RE was continuously hampered by a lack of funding, and in 2004 ZIMAC reported that it was only being conducted in regional centers, thus people in remote border areas did not benefit from these campaigns. In 2007, ZIMAC expanded coverage to all four mine-affected provinces, with children a specific target group. Some emergency RE was also conducted in 2007 in Rushinga because clearance had not been conducted to international standards. There is no mention of national RE standards, although in 2005 RE was said to follow the International Mine Action Standards.71

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown, but could be as many as 1,300.72 In 2008, as in 2007, Zimbabwe stated that, “Completely nothing has taken off in this country in terms of victim assistance.”73 It blamed lack of funding as the main factor impeding compliance with its victim assistance commitments.74

In its latest Article 7 report, Zimbabwe said that survivors can receive rehabilitation services at National Rehabilitation Centres. However, Zimbabwe said that “Very few” survivors are able to access such services, as they live in “far remote rural areas.”75 In 2009, ZIMAC said the

64 Email from Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 25 May 2009.
66 Ibid.
67 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 10 June 2009.
68 Email from Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 15 June 2009.
70 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 2.
73 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (First Revision), 27 May 2008, p. 17; and statement of Zimbabwe, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Dead Sea, 19 November 2007.
74 Article 7 Report, Form J, December 2008.
75 Ibid.
government could only provide dedicated assistance to military deminers injured on duty. These survivors are being referred to neighboring South Africa, where medical facilities are better.\textsuperscript{76}

Government under-funding has compelled medical facilities to charge for their services, making them inaccessible for the majority of the population.\textsuperscript{77} Strikes in the health sector, and a lack of supplies and medication further exacerbated the situation in 2008.\textsuperscript{78} ZIMAC reported that problems in the health sector have seriously affected mine survivors.\textsuperscript{79}

In its latest Article 7 report, Zimbabwe stated that most survivors live in rural areas, with poor access to rehabilitation services, which are largely located in urban centers.\textsuperscript{80} On 5 June 2008, the government banned all NGOs from field operations, which is likely to further affect service provision.\textsuperscript{81}

The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled continued to provide material, technical support, and management training to three rehabilitation centers. Although statistics for 2008 were not available, it was assumed that overall production dropped by 10\% in 2008 due to staffing challenges and declined outreach activities.\textsuperscript{82} Continued support in 2009 is dependent on the level of services provided at the center.\textsuperscript{83}

Zimbabwe has legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but implementation was hampered by the lack of resources and discrimination persisted. In September 2008, the government announced that it was reviewing the 1992 Disabled Persons Act to make it consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which it had not signed as of 30 May 2009.\textsuperscript{84}

\textbf{Support for Mine Action}

No comprehensive long-term cost estimates are known to have been reported by Zimbabwe for fulfilling all of its mine action obligations, including RE and victim assistance. Zimbabwe’s revised Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in May 2008 reported cost estimates in excess of $40 million for the period 2009–2016.\textsuperscript{85} Zimbabwe’s second revised extension request for 2009–2011, submitted in November 2008, includes cost estimates totaling $6,856,000 for resurvey of previously known mined areas, survey of newly identified mined areas, and clearance of the area from Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner. Cost estimates were reported as $2,028,000 for resurvey, $1,528,000 for survey, and $3,300,000 for clearance.\textsuperscript{86} In June 2009, however, ZIMAC reported a projected budget for 2009 alone totaling $8,080,130 for survey, resurvey, and clearance.\textsuperscript{87}

\textsuperscript{76} Email from Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 25 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{79} Email from Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 25 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{80} Article 7 Report, Form J, December 2008.
\textsuperscript{82} This applies only to the Bulawayo Hospital, not to the other two centers supported by the ICRC-SFD. ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, December 2008, p. 27; and email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 4 August 2009.
\textsuperscript{86} Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, pp. 21–22.
\textsuperscript{87} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 10 June 2009.
On completion of its survey initiatives in 2011, Zimbabwe intends to submit a second extension request based on survey findings, with a time schedule and revised budget, including projections of international funds required.88

The responsibilities of NAMAZ include mobilization of funds and coordinating external assistance from the UN and other organizations or States Parties.89 ZIMAC reported that as of June 2009 there was no formal resource mobilization strategy for mine action; instead, funds were directed from the national budget by the Ministry of Defence via the Disaster Management Plan Budget.90

**National support for mine action**

In its second revised Article 5 deadline extension request, Zimbabwe reported a national commitment of $10,000 to support mine clearance in 2008.91 The same annual amount was reported from 2002 to 2007.92 In May 2009, Zimbabwe entered a renewable 12-month contract with MHDSI for mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, and RE tasks, beginning in June 2009.

In the absence of international funding, national funds will presumably apply to costs associated with the MHDSI contract.93 In June 2009 the project-coordinator of MHDSI reported that demining 70km within the Gonarezhou National Park will cost approximately $720,000; as of June 2009, MHDSI had received only $2,000 for operations—reportedly from the Zimbabwe National Social Security Authority—and explosives donated by a Zimbabwean arms manufacturer for clearance purposes.94 ZIMAC has reported that current government allocations “fall far too short” of covering costs for contracting commercial demining companies.95

**International cooperation and assistance**

No international funding was reported by donors for mine action in Zimbabwe in 2008. ZIMAC reported receiving $150,000 from UNDP in 2008.96 No international funds were reported for 2007.

As of November 2008, Zimbabwe reported economic sanctions, a shortage of demining equipment, a lack of national funding and an absence of international support as the main factors impeding compliance with its mine clearance obligations.97

ZIMAC reported that as a result of shortfalls in funding in 2008, the planned mine victim survey could not be conducted; of the 18 RE sessions planned for the year, available funds allowed only four to be undertaken; and of the targeted 13km² to be cleared in the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield, only 3.9km² were cleared. As a result of continuing shortfalls in 2009, further demining operations in the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield and elsewhere had not started; training of minefield surveyors had been deferred; the planned victim survey has still not been undertaken; and RE was not taking place.98

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88 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 3.
89 Ibid, p. 10.
90 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 10 June 2009.
91 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 16.
92 Ibid.
95 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 16.
97 Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Second Revision), 3 November 2008, p. 17.
98 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Col. Jardinous Garira, ZIMAC, 10 June 2009.
NON-AFFECTED STATES PARTIES

From 1999–2004 Landmine Monitor reported on every country in the world. Starting in 2005, Landmine Monitor observed developments in but did not prepare country reports for States Parties that had met their core treaty obligations. This is a summary of developments in these 94 countries covering 1999–2008.

Andorra

The Principality of Andorra signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 29 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Andorra has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Andorra believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. In 2009, Andorra submitted its fifth Article 7 transparency report.

Andorra is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.


Antigua and Barbuda

Antigua and Barbuda signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 3 May 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 November 1999. Antigua and Barbuda has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel landmines, including for training purposes. Antigua and Barbuda has stated that existing legislation makes any treaty it joins part of domestic law, and as such has no plans to enact separate legislation imposing penal sanctions as required by the treaty. Antigua and Barbuda submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 29 March 2000, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Antigua and Barbuda is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Australia


Australia destroyed its stockpile of 128,161 antipersonnel mines in 1999, well before its treaty-mandated destruction deadline of 1 July 2003, and in 2000 it destroyed an additional 6,460 mines. Australia initially retained a total of 10,000 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, but this was reduced to 6,785 by the end of 2008.1

Australia served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committees on stockpile destruction (2000–2002), victim assistance (2002–2004), and mine clearance (2007–2009), and was president of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in 2006.

Australia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Australia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.2

From 1999–2008, Australia contributed $93.2 million to mine action.

1 Australia Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2009.
Austria


Austria served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committees on general status and operation of the convention (2001–2003) and victim assistance (2005–2007), and was the president of the First Review Conference in 2004.


From 1999–2008, Austria contributed $18.1 million to mine action.

Bahamas

The Commonwealth of the Bahamas signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 31 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. The Bahamas has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. The Bahamas has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2009, the Bahamas submitted its third Article 7 transparency report. The Bahamas is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Barbados

Barbados signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 26 January 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 July 1999. Barbados has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Barbados has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Barbados submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 12 May 2003, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Barbados is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Belgium


Belgium destroyed its stockpile of approximately 433,441 antipersonnel mines in September 1997. It initially retained 5,980 antipersonnel mines for training, but this was reduced to 3,245 by the end of 2008.

Belgium served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committees on general status and operation of the convention (1999–2001 and 2004–2006), mine clearance (2001–2003), and victim assistance (2007–2009), and was president of the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in 2002. Belgium initiated and has coordinated the Article 7 Contact Group.

3 Ibid, pp. 35–38.
4 Belgium Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2009.
Belgium is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but not Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Belgium signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^5\)

Belgium has no known mined areas, though mines and UXO from World War I and World War II are still found occasionally.

As of 1 July 2009, no mine/ERW casualties had been reported in Belgium since 2001, when one person was killed and another injured by UXO. Four Belgian deminers were injured in Lebanon in 2007.\(^6\)

From 1999–2008, Belgium contributed $57.3 million to mine action.

**Belize**

Belize signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 27 February 1998 and ratified it on 23 April 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Belize has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was enacted on 10 January 2004. Belize submitted its third Article 7 transparency report on 24 March 2006 but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Belize is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Benin**


Benin is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Benin signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^7\)

In 2002, Benin opened a regional demining training center for Economic Community of Western African States members.

**Bolivia**


Bolivia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines but not Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Bolivia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^8\)

In November 2007, Chile reported there have been 16 Bolivian mine/ERW casualties on Chilean territory. Mines are emplaced on the Chilean side of the border with Bolivia.

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\(^8\) Ibid, p. 43.
Botswana

The Republic of Botswana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 1 March 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 September 2000. Botswana has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically has not yet been enacted. Botswana submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 28 September 2001, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports. In 2001, Botswana reported retaining seven inert antipersonnel mines and three antivehicle mines for training purposes, but has not subsequently reported on the status of these mines.

Botswana is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.

Brazil

The Federative Republic of Brazil signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 30 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999. Brazil is a former antipersonnel mine producer, importer, and exporter. Brazil ceased production and export of antipersonnel mines in 1989. Brazil has never used antipersonnel mines. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was enacted in 2001. In 2009 Brazil submitted its 10th Article 7 transparency report.

Brazil completed destruction of its stockpile of approximately 27,852 antipersonnel mines in March 2003, ahead of its 1 October 2003 treaty-mandated destruction deadline. Brazil initially retained 17,000 mines for training purposes, but this was reduced to 10,986 by the end of 2008. Of all States Parties, Brazil maintains the third highest number of mines retained for training. In its Article 7 transparency report for 2008 Brazil stated, “The Brazilian Army decided to keep its landmine stockpiles for the training of demining teams up to 2019, taking into consideration the extension of the deadline to the destruction of landmines, in accordance with Article 5, para. 3. Brazil will keep its mines for training purposes whenever there are minefields spread round the world.”

Brazil is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines but not Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, Brazil had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Members of Brazil’s military engaged in overseas demining operations have been involved in landmine accidents; one soldier was injured in 1999.

Brunei

Brunei Darussalam signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 April 2006, becoming a State Party on 1 October 2006. Brunei has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically has been drafted but not yet enacted. Brunei submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report covering activities up to April 2007 but has not submitted subsequent reports.

Brunei is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

10 Brazil Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D.
11 Ibid.
13 Brunei Article 7 Report (for unspecified period ending April 2007), Form A.
States Parties

Bulgaria


Clearance of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas was completed by 31 October 1999, well in advance of its 1 March 2009 mine clearance deadline. From 1999–2008, Landmine Monitor identified two soldiers killed and one injured in 2001 when a mine exploded during a training exercise. A child was killed by a mine in Bulgaria in 1997.16

Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 16 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Burkina Faso has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Burkina Faso was the 40th country to ratify the treaty, triggering its entry into force six months later. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was enacted in 2001. Burkina Faso submitted its ninth Article 7 transparency report on 31 March 2008.


Cameroon

The Republic of Cameroon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003. Cameroon has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically has not been enacted. Cameroon submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 5 December 2005, but has not provided subsequent annual reports.

Cameroon apparently retains 3,154 “inactive mines” for training purposes. Cameroon has not provided further reporting on the use of retained mines as agreed by States Parties in 2004.

14 Bulgaria Article 7 Report (for the period 31 March 2008 to 31 March 2009), Form D.

**Canada**


Canada completed destruction of its stockpile of 90,000 antipersonnel mines in November 1997, before the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature. Canada initially retained 2,000 mines for training purposes, but this was reduced to 1,939 by 19 April 2009.\(^\text{18}\)

Canada served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention (1999–2000), and as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committees on victim assistance (2000–2002), stockpile destruction (2003–2005), and mine clearance (2006–2008). Canada established and has coordinated the Universalization Contact Group. Canada hosted the treaty signing conference in December 1997 and has been instrumental in promoting the treaty’s universalization and full implementation.

Canada is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Canada signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^\text{19}\)

From 1999–2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 10 Canadian landmine casualties in Afghanistan, of whom three were killed and seven injured.\(^\text{20}\)

From 1999–2008, Canada contributed $250.42 million to mine action.

**Cape Verde**

The Republic of Cape Verde signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 14 May 2001, becoming a State Party on 1 November 2001. Cape Verde has never used, produced, or exported antipersonnel mines. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically has not been enacted. Cape Verde has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due 30 April 2002. As part of a NATO operation, the Latvian military destroyed Cape Verde’s stockpile of 1,471 antipersonnel mines in June 2006. Cape Verde’s deadline for destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines was 1 November 2005. It is not known if Cape Verde retained any mines for training purposes.

Cape Verde is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines but not Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^\text{21}\)

\(^\text{18}\) Canada Article 7 Report (for the period 18 April 2008 to 19 April 2009), Form D.


Central African Republic

The Central African Republic (CAR) acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 8 November 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 May 2003. CAR has reported that it has not produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes, and it is not known to have ever used them. CAR believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. CAR submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due by 27 October 2003, in November 2004, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

CAR is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.22

Antivehicle mines were used in October 2002 during a period of internal conflict. CAR has residual contamination from these mines but there are no known mined areas.

Comoros

The Islamic Republic of the Comoros acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 19 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003. Comoros has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically has not been enacted. Comoros submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 20 April 2003 and a subsequent report on 24 June 2004, but has not since provided annual updates.

Comoros is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.23

Cook Islands


The Cook Islands is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.24

Costa Rica

The Republic of Costa Rica signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 March 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 September 1999. Costa Rica has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was enacted on 17 April 2002. On 29 April 2005, Costa Rica submitted its third Article 7 transparency report, covering 18 November 2004 to 28 April 2005, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.


Costa Rica’s northern border with Nicaragua was contaminated by mines laid by parties to the 1980s conflict in Nicaragua. In a ceremony on 10 December 2002, Costa Rica announced the completion of clearance in all known mined areas, well ahead of its 1 September 2009 Article 5 clearance deadline.


23 Ibid, p. 60.
Czech Republic

The Czech Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 26 October 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2000. The former Czechoslovakia produced and exported antipersonnel mines. Production ceased in 1989 and a transfer moratorium was enacted in 1994. National implementation legislation entered into force on 3 December 1999 and the criminal code was amended to provide penal sanctions for violations of the treaty. In 2009, the Czech Republic submitted its 11th Article 7 transparency report.

The Czech Republic completed destruction of its stockpile of 324,412 antipersonnel mines on 15 June 2001, far in advance of its 1 April 2004 treaty-mandated destruction deadline. The Czech Republic initially retained 4,849 mines for training and development purposes, which was reduced to 2,543 by the end of 2008.26

The Czech Republic is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. The Czech Republic signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.27

The Czech Republic has no known mined areas, but mines and UXO from World War II are still found. In 2004, the Czech Republic finished clearing two military areas contaminated by World War II UXO.

From 1999–2008, the Czech Republic contributed $5.46 million to mine action.

Dominica


Dominica is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 30 June 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 December 2000. The Dominican Republic has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. The Dominican Republic has stated that it has not enacted domestic implementing legislation because it is not mine-affected and does not stockpile antipersonnel mines. The Dominican Republic submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 10 March 2009.

The Dominican Republic is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Equatorial Guinea

The Republic of Equatorial Guinea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 16 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. It never responded to a Landmine Monitor inquiry into an allegation of antipersonnel mine use on the island of Bioko. Equatorial Guinea has never produced antipersonnel mines. It has not formally declared the presence or absence of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, but it is not believed to possess a stockpile. Equatorial Guinea has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Equatorial Guinea has not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due 28 August 1999.

26 Czech Republic Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D.
Equatorial Guinea is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Equatorial Guinea is not believed to be mine-affected.

Estonia

The Republic of Estonia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 May 2004, becoming a State Party on 1 November 2004. Estonia has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. The Estonian criminal code and specific legislation which entered into force on 5 February 2004 provide for the imposition of penal sanctions as required by the treaty. On 13 January 2009, Estonia submitted its fifth Article 7 transparency report. Estonia has stated at times that it had a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines and other times that it did not maintain a stockpile. Its Article 7 report for calendar year 2008 states that Estonia does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines or mines retained for training purposes.28

Estonia served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from 2005–2007.


There are no known mined areas in Estonia, but it is contaminated by mines and UXO from World War I and World War II.

From 1999–2008, there were at least 77 mine/UXO casualties (12 killed and 65 injured), including 21 UXO casualties in 2003.

From 1999–2008, Estonia contributed $806,000 to mine action.

Fiji

The Republic of the Fiji Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 10 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Fiji has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Fiji has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Fiji submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 21 August 2002 and has not provided subsequent annual reports.

Fiji is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.30

Three Fijian peacekeepers were injured in a landmine incident in south Lebanon in 1999.

France

The French Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. National implementing legislation, which includes penal sanctions, was enacted on 8 July 1998. On 30 April 2009, France submitted its 11th Article 7 transparency report. In the past, France produced, exported, and used antipersonnel mines. France completed destruction of its stockpile of 1,397,547 antipersonnel mines on 20 December 1999, well in advance of its 1 March 2003 treaty-mandated deadline. France initially retained 4,539 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, but this number was reduced to 4,144 by the end of 2008.31

30 Ibid, p. 73.
31 Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2009.
France served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Technologies for Mine Action (1999–2000), and as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on victim assistance (2001–2003).

France is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. France signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.32

On 28 May 2008, in advance of its 1 March 2009 mine clearance deadline, France declared it had successfully completed clearance or an area around its ammunition storage area near La Doudah, Djibouti. France has no known mined areas, but mines and UXO from World War I and World War II are occasionally found.

In April 2001, a French soldier serving with the SFOR peacekeeping mission operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina was killed by a mine.33 In July 2002, two French soldiers with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan were seriously injured while clearing mines near Kabul airport.34 A French national working for the German NGO HELP was killed in Chad in 2003.35 Two soldiers were killed by landmines in Afghanistan, one in 2005 and the other in 2006.36 One French deminer was killed in Tajikistan in 2006.37 One French deminer was killed in Lebanon in 2007.38 One French soldier was killed in Djibouti in 2008 when a grenade exploded.39 One French aid worker was killed in Somalia by a mine in 2008.40

From 1999–2008, France contributed $22.3 million to mine action.

Gabon

The Gabonese Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001. Gabon has never used, produced, or exported antipersonnel mines. It has destroyed its stockpile of 1,082 antipersonnel mines. It is not known if Gabon retained any mines for training purposes. Gabon has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Gabon submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 25 September 2002 and has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Gabon is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but not its Protocol II on Landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Germany produced, imported, and exported mines. Production was renounced in April 1996, and a 1994 export moratorium was made permanent in 1996. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically entered into force on 9 July 1998. On 27 April 2009, Germany submitted its 11th Article 7 transparency report. Germany destroyed its stockpile of 1.7 million antipersonnel mines in December 1997. Germany initially retained 3,000 mines for training and development purposes, and this was reduced to 2,437 mines by the end of 2008.41

41 Germany Article 7 Report, Form D, 27 April 2009.

Germany is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Germany signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified it on 8 July 2009.\(^{42}\)

Germany has no known mined areas. In December 1995, the government announced that all mine-affected areas on the old East-West divide had been cleared. Mines and UXO dating back to World War II continue to be discovered.

One soldier was killed by a landmine in Afghanistan in 2003.\(^{43}\)

From 1999–2008, Germany contributed $183.2 million to mine action.

**Ghana**

The Republic of Ghana signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 30 June 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 December 2000. Ghana has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Ghana has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Ghana submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 24 July 2002 but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Ghana is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^{44}\)

**Grenada**

Grenada signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 August 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Grenada has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Grenada has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Grenada submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 21 June 2004 but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Grenada is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.\(^{45}\)

**Guatemala**

The Republic of Guatemala signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 26 March 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 September 1999. Guatemala has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was passed in 1997. In 2009, Guatemala submitted its seventh Article 7 transparency report.


Guatemala is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^{46}\)

Guatemala was contaminated by UXO and antipersonnel mines, a result of its 36-year internal conflict. With the completion of its national demining plan in December 2005, Guatemala has no known mined or battle areas. Explosive remnants of war, however, continue to be found.


\(^{43}\) Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, “Coalition Deaths by Nationality,” icasualties.org.


\(^{45}\) Ibid, p. 208.

\(^{46}\) Ibid, p. 85.
According to the Organization of American States (OAS), mines/UXO killed 23 people and injured 20 others from 1994–2003.\textsuperscript{47} In May 2004, two children were killed by a grenade found in a garbage dump. In June 2005, two young men, aged 17 and 18, were killed and five children under 10 were injured when a grenade found near a military base in Jutiapa department exploded. Also in June 2005, two soldiers were injured in an explosion in a military ammunition storage area.\textsuperscript{48}

**Guinea**

The Republic of Guinea signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 8 October 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 April 1999. Guinea has never used, produced, or exported antipersonnel mines. Guinea has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. On 24 June 2004, Guinea submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, which was due 28 September 1999, but it has not submitted subsequent annual reports. Guinea completed destruction of its stockpile of 3,174 antipersonnel mines in November 2003 and did not retain any mines for research or training purposes.

Guinea is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\textsuperscript{49} Guinea is not mine-affected but areas near the border with Sierra Leone are contaminated by UXO.

**Guyana**


Although Landmine Monitor received information that Guyana had a stockpile, Guyana reported in 2006 that it did not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. It is possible that a stockpile was destroyed in an ammunition storage area explosion in 2000.

Guyana is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Haiti**


Haiti is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Holy See**

The Holy See signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 February 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. The Holy See has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. The Holy See believes that new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty is unnecessary since it does not possess antipersonnel mines. In 2009, the Holy See submitted its ninth Article 7 transparency report.

\textsuperscript{47} See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 474.

**Honduras**

The Republic of Honduras signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was adopted on 29 June 2000. Honduras submitted its sixth Article 7 transparency report on 24 April 2007 but has not provided subsequent annual reports. Honduras is not known to have used, produced, or exported antipersonnel mines. Honduras completed destruction of its stockpile of 7,441 antipersonnel mines on 2 November 2000. Honduras initially retained 826 antipersonnel mines for training purposes; this number was reduced to 815 in 2005. It is not known if any mines have been consumed during training activities in 2005–2008.

Honduras served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in 2000–2002.

Honduras is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines but not its Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Honduras signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.51 Honduras was contaminated by mines and UXO along its borders with El Salvador and Nicaragua, the result of armed conflict in those two countries in the 1980s. Honduras completed its national demining program in 2004; however, one person was killed by a mine in 2005 after clearance was completed. Despite the closure of its demining program, Honduras remains affected by residual contamination from mines and UXO.

As of 5 March 2008, the OAS had identified 58 casualties from 43 incidents, including 10 people killed and 48 injured who had never been officially registered or received assistance. Four casualties were military and 54 civilian.52 Previously reported casualty information indicated that there may be as many as 200 landmine survivors in Honduras.53 In 2007, there were eight casualties from three incidents involving grenades; three were killed (all children) and five were injured (three children and two men).54

**Hungary**


Hungary served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction in 1999–2000.

Hungary is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Hungary signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.55 Hungary has no known mined areas but is contaminated by UXO and mines from World War II.

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50 Ibid, pp. 87–89.
51 Ibid, p. 89.
One explosive ordnance disposal expert was confirmed killed in the period from 1999–2008. An amateur collector of war relics was killed by an item of UXO in November 2003, though it has been estimated that there have been an average of two to three civilian deaths each year.\textsuperscript{56}

From 1999–2008, Hungary contributed $218,000 to mine action.

\textbf{Iceland}

The Republic of Iceland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 5 May 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 November 1999. Iceland has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was enacted on 7 May 2001. In 2008, Iceland submitted its sixth Article 7 transparency report.

Iceland is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Iceland signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\textsuperscript{57}

From 1999–2008, Iceland contributed $2.5 million to mine action.

\textbf{Ireland}

Ireland signed and ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Ireland has never used, produced, stockpiled, or exported antipersonnel mines. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was enacted in 1996, with updated legislation passed in 2008. In 2009, Ireland submitted its 11\textsuperscript{th} Article 7 transparency report. Ireland did not have an operational stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but initially retained 129 antipersonnel mines for training purposes; this number was reduced to 67 by the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{58}

Ireland is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Ireland signed and ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008.\textsuperscript{59}

From 1999–2008, Ireland contributed $32.7 million to mine action.

\textbf{Italy}

The Italian Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999. Export of antipersonnel mines ceased in 1993 and a moratorium on production and export was declared in 1994. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was enacted on 29 October 1997. With amendments, this was used for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty when the ratification legislation was approved on 26 March 1999. In 2009, Italy submitted its 10\textsuperscript{th} Article 7 transparency report.

Italy completed destruction of its stockpile of 6,529,811 antipersonnel mines on 20 November 2002, well in advance of its 1 October 2003 treaty-mandated destruction deadline. Italy initially retained 811 mines for training and development purposes; this number was reduced to 689 by the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{60}


\textsuperscript{58} Ireland Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D.
\textsuperscript{60} Italy Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D.
States Parties

Italy is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines but not Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Italy signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.61 Italy has no known mined areas, though UXO from World War I and World War II are still found occasionally.

From 1999–2008, Italy contributed $49.2 million to mine action.

Jamaica

Jamaica signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Jamaica has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. It submitted its sixth Article 7 transparency report, an undated report covering January 2005 to December 2006, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.


Japan


Japan completed destruction of its stockpile of 985,089 antipersonnel mines on 8 February 2003. Japan initially retained 15,000 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes; by the end of 2008 this number had been reduced to 3,320.


In 2009, Landmine Monitor identified five new ERW casualties, one killed and four injured in two incidents in Okinawa. Three of these casualties occurred on 24 March 2009, in the worst incident since 1974. A United States marine was killed and another marine and sailor were injured while disposing of ordnance at a US military facility.63 Okinawa, a site of fierce fighting in World War II, was contaminated by an estimated 2,500 tons (2.5 million kg) of ERW.64 While much of this has now been removed, Japanese authorities and the US military clear some 30 tons (30,000kg) of ERW from the island every year. The Japanese government is reportedly setting up a ¥1 billion ($9.7 million) fund to compensate Okinawan survivors.65

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Landmine Monitor had not previously identified landmine and ERW casualties in Japan. However, Japanese media have reported a total of 59 ERW casualties (eight killed and 51 injured) on Okinawa since 1974. Mainland Japan is also affected by ERW from World War II; in May 2008, around 16,000 people were evacuated from a Tokyo residential area while authorities disposed of a bomb.  

From 1999–2008, Japan contributed $293.4 million to mine action.

**Kiribati**

The Republic of Kiribati acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001. Kiribati has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Kiribati believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. Kiribati submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 4 June 2004 but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Kiribati is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions as of 1 July 2009. Kiribati has residual UXO contamination from World War II.

**Lesotho**

The Kingdom of Lesotho signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 2 December 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 June 1999. Lesotho has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Lesotho believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. Lesotho submitted its third Article 7 transparency report on 11 May 2006, covering 30 April 2002 to 20 April 2006, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Lesotho is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Lesotho signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.

**Liberia**

The Republic of Liberia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 23 December 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2000. Mines were used during the country’s first civil war (1989–1997). Liberia has never produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Liberia has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Liberia submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report nearly four years late, on 20 October 2004, and has not submitted subsequent reports.


Liberia has no known mined areas but is affected by explosive remnants of war, the result of 14 years of internal and regional warfare.


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68 Ibid, p. 108.
Liechtenstein

The Principality of Liechtenstein signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 5 October 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2000. Liechtenstein has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was passed on 9 September 1999. In 2009, Liechtenstein submitted its 10th Article 7 transparency report.

Liechtenstein is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Liechtenstein signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.69

Lithuania

The Republic of Lithuania signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 22 February 1999 and ratified it on 12 May 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 November 2003. Production and import/export of antipersonnel mines have not been licensed since 1990, and an export moratorium has been in place since 1998. Lithuania states that its law provides for the imposition of penal sanctions as required by the treaty. Lithuania submitted its seventh Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2009. Lithuania completed destruction of its stockpile of 4,104 antipersonnel mines on 7 June 2004. Lithuania modified 3,987 mines to only function in command-detonated mode, and did not retain any antipersonnel mines for training.

Lithuania served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from 2006–2008.

Lithuania is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Lithuania signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.70

Lithuania is contaminated by UXO and mines from World War II but there are no known mined areas.

Luxembourg

The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 14 June 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 December 1999. Luxembourg has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but previously imported mines. Export of antipersonnel mines was banned in April 1997. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically entered into force in December 1999. Luxembourg submitted its ninth Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2008. Luxembourg finished destruction of its stockpile of 9,600 antipersonnel mines in August 1997. It initially retained 988 mines for training purposes, and this number was reduced to 855 by the end of 2007.


Madagascar

The Republic of Madagascar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 16 September 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2000. Madagascar has never used, produced, or exported antipersonnel mines, and it does not have a stockpile, including for training purposes. Madagascar may have had a stockpile of mines prior to becoming a State Party to the treaty. Madagascar has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Madagascar submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2008.

70 Ibid, pp. 109–111.
Madagascar is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^\text{72}\)

**Malawi**


Malawi is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\(^\text{73}\)

There may be some residual mine and UXO contamination near the border with Mozambique. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 10 mine/ERW casualties in Malawi: three killed and seven injured.

**Malaysia**


Malaysia served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from 1999–2001.

Malaysia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and as of 1 July 2009 had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In 2008, two people were killed by a World War II-era bomb.\(^\text{74}\)

**Maldives**

The Republic of Maldives signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 October 1998 and ratified it on 7 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001. Maldives has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Maldives has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Maldives submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 6 April 2006 but has not submitted subsequent reports.


**Malta**

The Republic of Malta signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 7 May 2001, becoming a State Party on 1 November 2001. Malta has never used, produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to

\(^\text{72}\) Ibid, p. 114.

\(^\text{73}\) Ibid, p. 115.

enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was adopted on 27 April 2001. Malta submitted its sixth Article 7 transparency report in 2008.

Malta is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Malta signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.75

**Mauritius**


Mauritius is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, Mauritius had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Mexico**

The United Mexican States signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 9 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Mexico has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Mexico believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. In 2009, Mexico submitted its 11th Article 7 transparency report.

Mexico served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration from 1999–2000 and as the co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention from 2002–2004.

Mexico is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Mexico signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified it on 6 May 2009.76

**Monaco**

The Principality of Monaco signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 17 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. Monaco has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was adopted on 30 August 1999. On 16 March 2009, Monaco submitted its eighth Article 7 transparency report.

Monaco is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines but not Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Monaco signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.77

**Nauru**

The Republic of Nauru acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 August 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2001. Nauru has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Nauru’s initial Article 7 transparency report, due 31 July 2001, was submitted on 28 July 2004; no subsequent reports have been submitted.

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76 Ibid, pp. 118–119.
77 Ibid, p. 121.

**Netherlands**

The Kingdom of the Netherlands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 12 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999. The Netherlands is a former antipersonnel mine producer and importer. The government announced a unilateral ban on use in March 1996. The Netherlands believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. It submitted its ninth Article 7 transparency report on 9 May 2008.

Between 1996 and 2002 the Netherlands destroyed its stockpile of 254,798 antipersonnel mines. The Netherlands initially retained 4,076 mines for training and development purposes but this number was reduced to 2,516 by the end of 2007.\footnote{The Netherlands Article 7 Report, Form D, 9 May 2008.}

The Netherlands served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committees on mine clearance (1999–2001) and general status and operation of the convention (2002–2004).


One Dutch soldier was killed by a landmine in Afghanistan in 2007.\footnote{Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, “Coalition Deaths by Nationality,” icasualties.org.} A Dutch tourist was injured in Croatia in 2005.

From 1999–2008, the Netherlands contributed $182.2 million to mine action.

**New Zealand**


New Zealand served as the co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committees on general status and operation of the convention (2003–2005) and victim assistance (2006–2008).


From 1999–2008, New Zealand contributed $13.4 million to mine action.

**Niue**

Niue signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 15 April 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Niue has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Niue submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 27 April 2006 but has not submitted subsequent reports.

Niue is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Norway


Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was passed on 16 June 1998. In 2009, Norway submitted its 11th Article 7 transparency report.

No significant production of antipersonnel mines is known to have taken place in Norway; some mine components were manufactured in the early 1990s. Mines were previously imported. Production and transfer of antipersonnel mines were first legally prohibited in 1998. Norway completed destruction of its stockpile of 160,000 antipersonnel mines in October 1996; no mines were retained for training and development purposes.


Norway established and coordinated the Contact Group on Resource Mobilization.

Norway is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Norway signed and ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and led the Oslo Process, a diplomatic initiative to create a legally-binding instrument outlawing cluster munitions and establishing a framework for clearing contaminated areas and meeting the needs of cluster munition victims.83 From 1999–2008, Norway contributed $307.6 million to mine action.

Panama

The Republic of Panama signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 7 October 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 April 1999. Panama has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Panama believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. Panama submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 7 May 2003 but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Panama is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines but not Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Panama signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.84 Panama has a problem with explosive remnants of war, primarily UXO, as a result of US military exercises and weapons testing on military ranges in the Canal Zone during the three decades prior to 1999.

Papua New Guinea

Papua New Guinea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 28 June 2004, becoming a State Party on 1 December 2004. Papua New Guinea has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Papua New Guinea believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. Papua New Guinea submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 29 November 2004 but has not submitted subsequent reports.

Papua New Guinea is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.85 It is not believed to be mine-affected but parts of the country are contaminated by UXO from World War II.

83 Ibid, pp. 134–140.
84 Ibid, p. 141.
Paraguay

The Republic of Paraguay signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. Paraguay has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was adopted on 1 May 2002. Paraguay submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 8 October 2007.

Paraguay is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Paraguay signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\textsuperscript{86}

Portugal

The Portuguese Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 February 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 August 1999. Portugal is a former antipersonnel mine producer, importer, and exporter. In May 1996 Portugal announced an indefinite moratorium on the production, export and use (except for training purposes) of antipersonnel mines. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was enacted on 22 July 2004. In 2009, Portugal submitted its ninth Article 7 transparency report.

Portugal completed destruction of its stockpile of 271,967 antipersonnel mines in March 2003, in advance of its 1 August 2003 treaty-mandated destruction deadline. Portugal initially retained 1,115 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, but this was reduced to 760 mines by the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{87}

Portugal is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.\textsuperscript{88}

From 1999–2008, Portugal contributed $147,500 to mine action.

Qatar

The State of Qatar signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 October 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 April 1999. Qatar has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. Qatar submitted its fifth Article 7 transparency report on 25 March 2009.

Qatar is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.\textsuperscript{89}

From 1999–2008, Qatar contributed $200,000 to mine action.

Romania


\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, p. 142.
\textsuperscript{87} Portugal Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, pp. 228–229.
Romania completed the destruction of its stockpile of 1,075,074 antipersonnel mines in March 2004. Romania initially retained 4,000 antipersonnel mines for training purposes but revised this number to 2,500 in 2004. Romania has not reported on the use of these retained mines, a step agreed to by States Parties in 2004.

Romania served as co-rapporteur and later co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from 2001–2003.

Romania is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, Romania had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.90

From 1999–2008, a total of eight Romanian soldiers were killed while on duty in Afghanistan (three killed and five injured).

**Saint Kitts and Nevis**

Saint Kitts and Nevis signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 2 December 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 June 1999. Saint Kitts and Nevis has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Saint Kitts and Nevis submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 27 November 1999, which covered 1 March to 27 November 1999, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Saint Kitts and Nevis is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Saint Lucia**

Saint Lucia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 13 April 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 October 1999. It has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. As of 1 July 2009, Saint Lucia had not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due 29 March 2000.

Saint Lucia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Saint Vincent and the Grenadines**

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 1 August 2001, becoming a State Party on 1 February 2002. Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was enacted on 24 December 2002. As of 1 July 2009, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines had not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due 29 March 2000.

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Samoa**

The Independent State of Samoa signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 23 July 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Samoa has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Samoa believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. Samoa submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2008.

Samoa is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.91

San Marino

The Republic of San Marino signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 18 March 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. San Marino has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. San Marino believes that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. In 2009, San Marino submitted its seventh Article 7 transparency report.

San Marino is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified it on 10 July 2009.92

São Tomé e Príncipe


São Tomé e Príncipe is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.93

Seychelles

The Republic of Seychelles signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1999 and ratified it on 2 June 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 December 2000. Seychelles has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was adopted on 8 April 2004. Seychelles submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 8 July 2005, covering January 2000 to December 2004, but has not submitted subsequent reports.


Sierra Leone

The Republic of Sierra Leone signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 July 1998 and ratified it on 25 April 2001, becoming a State Party on 1 October 2001. Sierra Leone has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Limited quantities of mines were used in various civil conflicts. Sierra Leone has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. On 9 February 2004, Sierra Leone submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due 20 March 2002, but has not submitted subsequent reports.

Sierra Leone destroyed its stockpile of between 956 and 959 antipersonnel mines (the exact number was not confirmed) on 11 February 2003.


There are no known mined areas but Sierra Leone has residual UXO contamination. From 1999–2008, there were a total of two mine/ERW casualties (both injured). In 2006, Landmine Monitor noted that it had not recorded any new mine/ERW incidents in Sierra Leone since the end of the civil war in 2002.95

93 Ibid, p. 149.
Slovakia


Slovakia finished destruction of its stockpile of 187,060 antipersonnel mines on 31 August 2000. It initially announced it would retain 7,000 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes but reduced this to 1,500 by July 2001; as of the end of 2008, 1,422 mines were retained.

Slovakia served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from 1999–2001.

Slovakia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.96

There are no known mined areas in Slovakia, but UXO from World War II is found occasionally.

From 1999–2008, Slovakia contributed $34.5 million to mine action.

Slovenia


Slovenia completed the destruction of its stockpile of 168,898 antipersonnel mines on 25 March 2003, just ahead of its 1 April 2003 treaty-mandated destruction deadline. Slovenia initially announced it would retain 7,000 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, but later reduced the quantity to 3,000; as of the end of 2008, Slovenia had reduced the number of mines retained to 1,991.97

Slovenia served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on mine clearance from 2004–2006 and as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention from 2008–2009.


Mine clearance in Slovenia was completed in the early 1990s; there are no known mined areas in Slovenia. Slovenia is contaminated by UXO from World War I, World War II, and the independence war of 1991.

From 1999–2008, Slovenia contributed $4.1 million to mine action.

Solomon Islands

The Solomon Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 26 January 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 July 1999. The Solomon Islands has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It believes

97 Slovenia Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2009.
that existing legislation is sufficient to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically. The Solomon Islands submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report on 11 February 2004, covering 1 July 1999 to 31 December 2004, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

The Solomon Islands is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Solomon Islands is contaminated by UXO from World War II.

**South Africa**


South Africa completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in October 1998. It initially retained 5,000 antipersonnel mines; this number was reduced to 4,380 by the end of 2007.99


South Africa is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines but not Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. South Africa signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.100

From 1999–2008, one South African was killed and one injured by mines, both while working overseas.

From 1999–2008, South Africa contributed $178,224 to mine action.

**Spain**

The Kingdom of Spain signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 January 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 July 1999. Spain is a former mine producer, importer, and exporter. Production officially ceased in May 1996 and a 1994 export moratorium was made indefinite in 1996. Spain last used antipersonnel mines in 1975 on the Moroccan border of its then-colony of Western Sahara. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was passed in October 1998. Spain submitted its tenth Article 7 transparency report in April 2009.

Spain completed destruction of its stockpile of 496,415 antipersonnel mines on 3 October 2000, well in advance of its 1 July 2003 treaty-mandated destruction deadline. Spain initially announced it would retain 10,000 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes but reduced this number to 4,000 in 2000, and by the end of 2008 Spain had further reduced this to 1,797 mines.101


One Spanish soldier was killed by a landmine in Afghanistan in 2007.103 Five Spanish peacekeepers were killed and two injured by an antivehicle mine in Lebanon in 2007.104

From 1999–2008, Spain contributed $47.5 million to mine action.

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101 Spain Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2009.
**Suriname**


Suriname destroyed its stockpile of 146 antipersonnel mines on 25 February 2004, and retained 150 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. Suriname noted in its Article 7 report for 2007 that it did not have any antipersonnel mines retained.

Suriname is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Suriname destroyed its stockpile of 146 antipersonnel mines on 25 February 2004, and retained 150 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. Suriname noted in its Article 7 report for 2007 that it did not have any antipersonnel mines retained.

Suriname is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Suriname is affected by explosive remnants of war, primarily abandoned explosive ordnance.

**Swaziland**

The Kingdom of Swaziland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 22 December 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 June 1999. It has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Swaziland submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 11 May 2006, covering 31 January 2000 to 31 March 2005, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Swaziland had a suspected hazardous area, the result of conflict spilling over from neighboring Mozambique, but technical survey did not find any antipersonnel mines. In November 2007, Swaziland announced it had fulfilled compliance with Article 5 almost two years before its 1 June 2009 treaty-mandated deadline.

Swaziland is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

**Sweden**

The Kingdom of Sweden signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 25 November 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 May 1999. Sweden is a former antipersonnel mine producer and exporter, and Swedish forces used antipersonnel mines. National implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was achieved primarily by additions to existing legislation, including penal sanctions for violations of the treaty’s prohibitions, which also entered into force on 1 May 1999. In 2009, Sweden submitted its 11th Article 7 transparency report.

Sweden destroyed 3,365,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 1996 and December 2001, including 2,348,149 after the treaty entered into force on 1 May 1999. Sweden initially announced it would retain 13,948 antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes, but revised this total upwards to 16,015 in 2003. As of the end of 2008, Sweden still retained 7,364 antipersonnel mines.105

Sweden served as co-rapporteur and then co-chair of the Standing Committee on mine clearance from 2003–2005.


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105 Sweden Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form D.
One Swedish deminer working for Mines Advisory Group was injured in Lebanon in 2007. From 1999–2008, Sweden contributed $125.8 million to mine action.

Switzerland

The Swiss Confederation signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 March 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Switzerland is a former antipersonnel mine producer and importer but did not export mines. Production ceased in 1969 and export of antipersonnel mines was banned in December 1996. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically was adopted on 13 December 1996 and subsequently amended to confirm with the Mine Ban Treaty. Switzerland submitted its 11th Article 7 transparency report on 15 April 2009.

Switzerland destroyed its stockpile of 3.85 million antipersonnel mines by 15 March 1999. Switzerland did not retain any antipersonnel mines for training or development purposes.


From 1999–2008, Switzerland contributed $104.2 million to mine action.

Tanzania


Tanzania completed destruction of its stockpile of 22,841 antipersonnel mines in July 2004, well ahead of its 1 May 2005 treaty-mandated deadline. It initially reported 1,146 antipersonnel mines retained for training and development purposes but reported an apparent total of 1,780 by the end of May 2009.

Tanzania served as the co-rapporteur and later co-chair of the Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction from 2004–2006.

Tanzania is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.

Timor-Leste

The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 7 May 2003 and became a State Party on 1 November 2003. It has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. On 22 June 2004, Timor-Leste submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report, due 28 April 2004, but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Timor-Leste is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Timor-Leste has residual UXO contamination.


Togo

The Togolese Republic signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 9 March 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 September 2000. It has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically took effect in 2009. Togo submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 1 March 2004 but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Togo is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but as of 1 July 2009 had not ratified it.  

Trinidad and Tobago

The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 27 April 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Trinidad and Tobago has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically took effect on 1 June 2000. In 2009, Trinidad and Tobago submitted its third Article 7 transparency report.

Trinidad and Tobago is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009, it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 January 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. It has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines. Turkmenistan inherited a stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former Soviet Union. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Turkmenistan submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report on 6 April 2006 but has not submitted subsequent annual reports.

Turkmenistan reported completing destruction of its stockpile of 6,631,771 antipersonnel mines in April 2005. Most were destroyed prior to its March 2003 deadline. It later destroyed 69,200 “cassette” mines (572,200 individual antipersonnel mines) that it had initially planned to retain for training and development purposes.


Uruguay

The Eastern Republic of Uruguay signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 7 June 2001, becoming a State Party on 1 December 2001. It has never used, produced, or exported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Uruguay submitted its fourth Article 7 transparency report December 2007.

On 15 September 2004, Uruguay completed destruction of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines, more than a year ahead of its 1 December 2005 treaty-mandated deadline. The number of mines reported as destroyed has varied. Uruguay’s Article 7 report for 2007 reported that 2,013 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed. Uruguay initially retained 500 antipersonnel

112 Ibid, p. 249.
mines for training and development purposes; as of the end of 2007 Uruguay had reduced this number to 260.114
Uruguay is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 but had not ratified it as of 1 July 2009.115

**Vanuatu**

The Republic of Vanuatu signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 16 September 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2006. It has never used, produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. It has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty. Vanuatu submitted its second Article 7 transparency report on 30 April 2008.

Vanuatu is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Vanuatu does not appear to have mined areas, but is affected by UXO from World War II.

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114 Ibid, Form D.
SIGNATORIES

MARSHALL ISLANDS

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of the Marshall Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has not yet ratified it. In 2008, the Marshall Islands re-engaged in the Mine Ban Treaty process, but has not committed to ratify within a specific period. Since 2005, the Marshall Islands has voted in support of the annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution.

Mine Ban Policy

The Marshall Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has yet to ratify it. In November 2008, a representative of the Marshall Islands said that the government strongly supported the goals and objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty, but cited its relationship with the United States and the burden of treaty participation on small states as principal reasons for not ratifying.1

In June 2008, the Marshall Islands elaborated on the challenges to ratification posed by its Compact of Free Association with the US. It said that it could not provide “a timeline or detailed approach” for ratification due to “limited technical capacity” and pressing demands including climate change.2


On 2 December 2008, for the fourth consecutive year, the Marshall Islands voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.4

The Marshall Islands confirmed in June 2008 that it has not produced landmines and has no known stockpiles.5

The Marshall Islands is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and has not yet signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Scope of the Problem

In June 2008, the Marshall Islands said that while a “largely successful” large-scale clearance effort was undertaken in 1950, some areas of atolls affected by UXO from World War II “were potentially overlooked due to difficult weather conditions or heavy vegetation.” It said the

3 In June 2003, the Marshall Islands said it was reassessing its position on the Mine Ban Treaty. Letter to Landmine Monitor from Raymond Gideon, Acting Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Marshall Islands, 9 June 2003. Also in June 2003, Minister of Foreign Affairs Gerald Zackios told New Zealand’s Minister for Disarmament Marian Hobbs that while the Marshall Islands did not suffer from the effects of landmines, it was nonetheless important to join the international efforts against them.
4 The Marshall Islands voted in support of the annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution from 2005–2007, but either abstained or was absent from the votes from 1998–2004.
government “lacks the necessary budget support and technical capacity for UXO surveys, removal, and destruction” and will require outside assistance. The last recorded landmine casualty in the Marshall Islands was more than 50 years ago.
Poland

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Poland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has yet to ratify it. From 1997 through 2003, Poland repeatedly cited several pre-conditions to its ratification. In 2004, it decided ratification could go forward, but in January 2007 named 2015 as the target year. In 2009, the date was advanced from 2015 to 2012. Poland has voted in favor of each of the annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions. Poland has submitted an annual voluntary Article 7 report each year since 2003. It first disclosed a stockpile of 1,055,971 mines at the end of 2002, which had been reduced to 333,573 mines by the end of 2008, including the destruction of 651,117 mines in 2008.

Poland remains contaminated by large quantities of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and, to a much lesser extent, mines from World War II. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 204 mine/ERW casualties (38 killed and 166 injured). Risk education activities have been conducted since 2002 for local communities, including schoolchildren, by demining patrols of the engineering forces. Persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, receive adequate assistance although employment opportunities remain limited.

Mine Ban Policy

Poland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997, but has yet to ratify it. A policy change in 2004 set the goal of ratification as early as 2006, but Poland began to back away from this commitment in early 2006, and reversed course in early 2007. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to the ICBL in January 2007 stating, “Ministry of National Defense specialists have recently determined that Poland should not become bound by the Convention before 2015. It is projected that by that time the Polish Armed Forces will obtain alternatives to antipersonnel mines.”

However, in February 2009, Poland decided that it would join the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012. In a letter to the ICBL, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official wrote, “I am pleased to inform you that Poland has taken all necessary steps in order to accede to the treaty at the earliest possible date.” On 6 February 2009, the government of Poland adopted a policy “Information on the state of readiness of the Council of Ministers to bind the Republic of Poland by the Convention,” where it assured its commitment to ratify the treaty in 2012. In addition, the government obliged the Ministry of National Defense to perform all actions—necessary from the national defense perspective—that need to be completed before the introduction of the convention into Polish law.

It continued, “The adoption of the Information by the Government is the first step in the ratification process that will be initiated formally in due course. We hope that we will be able to announce the beginning of the preliminary preparations to the process during the treaty’s Second Review Conference that will take place in Colombia in December 2009.”

2 Letter from Janusz Stanczyk, Under-secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Jody Williams, ICBL Ambassador, 26 January 2007. The Ministry of National Defense made an assessment that replacing antipersonnel mines with effective alternatives would require between eight and 13 years and cost more than PLN1 billion (more than US$421 million).
3 Letter from Marek Szczygiel, Deputy Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Simona Beltrami, Advocacy Director, ICBL, 18 March 2009.
4 Letter from Marek Szczygiel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Simona Beltrami, Advocacy Director, ICBL, 18 March 2009.
The Council of Ministers formally accepted the Information on 17 February 2009. It states, “The ratification process of the Ottawa Convention is multi-level and complex. It should take into account the need to balance between the state’s defense needs and financial, political and legal consequences in the sphere of internal and international relations. Taking this into account, the Council of Ministers assumes the position that binding the Republic of Poland by the Convention should take place in 2012.”

It also states, “Draft bills, necessary to implement the norms of the Ottawa Convention into the Polish legal system, will be placed on the legislative agenda of the Council of Ministers, within a period enabling the binding of the Republic of Poland by the Ottawa Convention in 2012.”

Poland had on several occasions throughout 2008 indicated that this policy change was coming. In a letter to the Polish Red Cross in February 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assured that “to the best of our abilities, we will aim at shortening the date of ratification, as much as it will be possible without detriment to our defense capabilities.” In March 2008, the chairpersons of the Polish Parliament’s committees on national defense and foreign affairs told the ICBL that there are no obstacles to ratification of the treaty in Parliament, but that the ratification process has to be initiated by the government. The President of the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, visited Poland in August 2008 and met with several Polish officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of National Defense. Although no formal commitment was given, officials indicated during the visit that Poland would move forward the ratification date from 2015 to 2012.

Poland attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, but made no statements. Poland submitted its seventh voluntary Article 7 report in 2009, which was undated but covered calendar year 2008. The report contained information on Poland’s stockpiled antipersonnel mines and their destruction, its plans to reduce further the stockpile, and its international clearance activities.

On 2 December 2008, Poland voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42, which called for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Poland has voted in favor of each of the annual pro-ban treaty General Assembly resolutions since 1997.

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5 The decision stated, “The Council of Ministers, upon a motion by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, has accepted the Information on the state of readiness of the Council of Ministers to bind the Republic of Poland by the Convention and has obliged the Minister of National Defense to undertake adequate compliance actions, subsequent to the state’s defense needs, which should be completed before introducing the Convention into the Polish legal system.” Council of Ministers, Protocol of Decisions, No. 7/2009, Section 8, subsection 16, 17 February 2009.

6 Information, February 2009, provided by email from Maria Wejs-Domżalska, Third Secretary, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 2009.

7 Ibid.

8 Letter from Witold Waszczykowski, Under-secretary of State, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Andrzej Trybusz, President, Polish Red Cross, 19 February 2008. In April 2007 Poland stated, “We are fully committed to the Mine Ban Treaty and are taking every possible effort to ratify it at the soonest possible moment... We believe the decade-long success of the Mine Ban Treaty lies primarily in its role as a general framework for actions undertaken with a purpose to diminish and ultimately prohibit the use of APMs... The role of the Treaty reaches far beyond mere addressing the problem of the use of APMs. It has opened a new chapter in dealing with the question of arms control and disarmament.” Statement of Poland, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007.


12 Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Forms B, F, and J. All other forms were marked unchanged or not applicable.
Poland is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Poland submitted an annual report in accordance with the protocol’s Article 13 on 15 September 2008. Poland is not party to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, but told Landmine Monitor in April 2009 that it planned to complete the ratification process in 2009.\(^{13}\)

Poland has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.\(^{14}\)

**Production, transfer, use, stockpiling, and destruction**

Since signing the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997, Poland has regularly stated that it does not produce, export, or use antipersonnel mines. In March 2006, Poland told Landmine Monitor that current military doctrine does not foresee the use of antipersonnel mines, including in joint military operations or exercises with other states.\(^{15}\) However, in January 2007, Poland said that it planned to install self-destruct or self-neutralization mechanisms on some antipersonnel mines.\(^{16}\) In March 2008, officials stated that Poland does not rely on antipersonnel mines for the defense of its national territory or its bases abroad.\(^{17}\)

In the past, Poland produced three types of antipersonnel mines and imported a fourth type. Poland exported antipersonnel mines until 1993. An export moratorium in 1995 was made permanent by cabinet decree on 7 April 1998, which was then superseded by a law adopted in September 2002.\(^{18}\)

Poland undertook a significant destruction of two-thirds of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines in 2008. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2009, Poland stated that at the end of 2008 it stockpiled 333,573 mines.\(^{19}\) This is a reduction of 651,117 mines from the 984,690 mines Poland had reported holding at the end of 2005.\(^{20}\) It destroyed a total of 467,718 PMD-6 mines and 183,399 POMZ-2(2M) mines. It planned to destroy a total of about 139,000 of the same two kinds of mines in 2009.\(^{21}\) This is a much more rapid destruction of stockpiles than previously planned.\(^{22}\)

In 2007, Poland stated that it planned, while destroying most of its stockpile, to carry out the “[g]radual installation in the remaining anti-personnel mines of modern time fuses with self-destruction or self-neutralization mechanisms. As a result, the mines, if used, would pose no threat to civilians after the conflict ends.”\(^{23}\) However, antipersonnel mines with such mechanisms are clearly prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
In April 2009, Poland informed Landmine Monitor, “In 2008, a research project, aiming at the development of a modern and comprehensive system of engineering obstacles (barriers), has been started. As part of this system, there is an expected role for explosive devices, controlled by an operator. These might be considered to be an alternative to antipersonnel mines. 450,000 PLN [US$189,900] have been spent on this in 2008.”

In June 2008, a Polish diplomat confirmed that Poland intends to retain about 5,000 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. He emphasized that Poland will not commit to a specific number until after ratification and after the stockpile has decreased significantly. In its Article 7 reports, Poland has not reported that it will retain mines for training or development purposes, but rather has stated “not applicable” in Form D concerning retained mines. In 2008, Poland used 295 empty antipersonnel mine casings to train demining squads for missions abroad, up from the 144 casings it used in 2007.

Poland has acknowledged that it possesses Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, and said that these are “meant exclusively for mine-controlled detonation…[which] excludes the possibility of accidental detonation.” The MON-100 is described in Poland’s first Article 7 report as a “[d]irectional fragmentation mine, if equipped with a MUW fuse attached to a tripwire.”

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Poland remains contaminated by large quantities of ERW and, to a much lesser extent, mines from World War II. Poland has consistently stated there are no known or suspected mined areas in Poland. The Ministry of National Defense reported that scattered “single” mines, mostly antivehicle, are found emplaced but most mines destroyed are remnants of World War II stockpiles.

**Casualties**

In 2008, the Polish police identified at least 10 mine/ERW casualties, including one killed and nine injured. Information on the location of the incident, and the gender, age and civilian status of the casualties was not made available to Landmine Monitor. ERW caused five casualties and an antipersonnel mine one; four casualties were caused by unknown devices. Activities at the time of the incident included attempting to detonate ERW (five) and being a bystander (four). An additional 29 casualties caused by explosive devices were reported by the police, but were not included in the above total, as it was not possible to determine the devices that caused them. The police stated only that these casualties occurred in the course of criminal acts.

The 2008 casualty rate decreased compared to 2007 (42) and 2006 (21). Comparisons with previous years are most likely misleading, because since 2005 casualties caused by all types of explosive devices, including those in criminal acts and industrial incidents were included in the police records.

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26 See Article 7 Reports, undated (for calendar year 2008), 14 April 2008, 6 April 2007, and 25 April 2006.
28 Letter from Grzegorz Poznanski, Deputy Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 May 2008.
29 Letter from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 February 2001; and Article 7 Report, Form H2, 5 March 2003. The “MUW” is likely the MUV fuze.
31 Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by email from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2009.
33 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 792. For the 1999 to 2008 casualty figures included here, Landmine Monitor has subtracted 18 of these casualties in 2005, as they were from a bomb explosion, manufacturing illegal explosives and an accident in an explosives manufacturing plant. These do not conform to the Landmine Monitor definition of mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that there were no casualties among Polish deminers conducting clearance activities abroad in 2008. However, the ministry reported eight casualties (all killed) among Polish soldiers in Afghanistan, including one soldier killed in an antivehicle mine incident, and seven by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (unknown if victim-activated or command-detonated). \(^{34}\)

No new mine/ERW casualties were reported in 2009 through May. \(^{35}\)

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Poland is not known. Landmine Monitor identified at least 185 casualties (38 killed and 147 injured) between 1999 and 2008. \(^{36}\) With incomplete data collection, casualties may have been under-reported. Between 1945 and 1973, 3,833 civilians (including 3,189 children) were killed and 8,221 (including 6,656 children) were injured in mine/ERW incidents. \(^{37}\) Between 1944 and 1994, 658 soldiers were killed and several thousand injured in clearance operations. \(^{38}\)

Between 1999 and 2008, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that there were at least 17 Polish landmine casualties (eight killed and nine injured) who were engaging in military, peacekeeping, or mine clearance operations and other activities outside Poland. \(^{39}\) Landmine Monitor also identified three Polish casualties of victim-activated IEDs (two killed and one injured) in Afghanistan in 2008. \(^{40}\)

According to 2007 government statistics, there are some 3.8 million persons with disabilities registered in Poland. \(^{41}\) Poland’s 2002 census recorded approximately 5.5 million persons with disabilities, more than 10% of the population. \(^{42}\)

### Program Management and Coordination

#### Mine action

Poland does not have a formal civilian mine/ERW action program. The army conducts clearance operations of former military facilities and in response to reports from the general public under a 2002 Ministry of National Defense order as well as other guidelines. \(^{43}\) Polish deminers have also engaged in demining abroad as part of UN or multinational operations. In 2008, this covered the UN peacekeeping operation in Syria, the NATO operation in Kosovo (Kosovo Protection Force), the NATO operation in Afghanistan (International Security Assistance Force), and the European Union Force in Chad. \(^{44}\)

#### Victim assistance

The government has stated that as Poland is not mine-affected, there is no specific victim assistance (VA) program for mine survivors. \(^{45}\) The Government Plenipotentiary for Disabled People, under the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, is responsible for disability issues. \(^{46}\)

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\(^{34}\) Email from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2009.

\(^{35}\) Ibid; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 May 2009.


\(^{39}\) One casualty was reported in 2008; the remaining casualties were reported between 1999 and 2006. Email from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 831.

\(^{40}\) Landmine Monitor media monitoring from January to December 2008.


\(^{43}\) Ibid, p. 792.

\(^{44}\) See Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form I.


National Consultation Council for Disabled Persons is an advisory body to the Government Plenipotentiary for Disabled People. There is a State Fund for Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons which allocates funds for rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of persons with disabilities.

Data collection and management
The police record mine/ERW casualty data in Poland, but since 2005, have included casualties caused by all types of explosive devices, including those used in criminal acts and industrial accidents.

Risk Education
There is no formal risk education (RE) program in Poland, and Form I of the latest Article 7 report is marked as “non applicable.” Since 2002, however, RE has been conducted by demining patrols of the engineering forces on a regular basis, through community meetings, lectures, school presentations, distribution of posters, and through the media. Demining patrols delivered RE during children’s activities in rural areas, and also for people vacationing in contaminated areas. In August 2008, representatives of the engineering forces conducted classes on RE for the Polish Red Cross Youth Trainers course.

Victim Assistance
The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown but at least 157. Polish law does not differentiate between mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities. Civilian mine/ERW survivors are entitled to the same healthcare benefits as other people with health insurance, for whom all necessary surgical and rehabilitation services, including prostheses and most orthopedic equipment, are provided free of charge. Military casualties are entitled to free medicine and orthopedic equipment and are eligible for military pensions.

Employment for persons with disabilities remains problematic, but in 2008 the employment rate increased to 24.9% of persons with disabilities (compared to 22.6% in 2007). In 2009, the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy stated that the social reintegration of persons with disabilities was a high priority. In 2008, the ministry encouraged the employment of persons with disabilities in the public and private sector through training and awareness-raising. People permanently unable to work as a result of war-related injuries, including mine/ERW survivors, are entitled to compensation.

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48 Ibid.
49 Email from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2009.
51 See Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form I.
54 Including 147 injured inside Poland, plus 10 casualties injured outside Poland, from 1999 to 2008.
55 Email from Barbara Abramowska, Assistant to the Board of Directors, Polish Forum for Persons with Disabilities, 23 March 2009.
58 Email from Barbara Abramowska, Polish Forum for Persons with Disabilities, 23 March 2009.
59 Email from Magdalena Boruc, Specialist, Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Disabled People, Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 1 April 2009.
Poland has legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities in employment, education, healthcare, and in the provision of other state services.\textsuperscript{62} The Charter of Rights for People with Disabilities and its amendments ensure equal status and opportunities for persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{63} Some societal discrimination against persons with disabilities continued to be reported.\textsuperscript{64}

On 30 March 2007, Poland signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. As of 1 July 2009, Poland had not ratified the convention or signed its Optional Protocol. In 2009, the government reported that it could reconsider signing the protocol after the treaty’s entry into force.\textsuperscript{65} It also stated that it would take the time necessary to analyze the legal and financial implications of the convention before ratifying.\textsuperscript{66}

**Support for Mine Action**

Poland has reported providing in-kind contributions to mine action in 2008 in the form of 45 mine clearance personnel from the Polish Armed Forces in support of the UN Disengagement Observer Force in Syria, in KFOR (Kosovo) and ISAF (Afghanistan), and with the European Union Force in Chad. As in previous years, Polish personnel carried out mine clearance, explosive ordnance disposal, and RE tasks.\textsuperscript{67} Poland did not provide a value for these contributions.

\textsuperscript{65} Email from Barbara Abramowska, Polish Forum for Persons with Disabilities, 23 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.
 STATES NOT PARTY

ARMENIA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
<th>Not a State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>320km² of mined and battle areas, though likely to be reduced significantly by technical survey; areas under control of Armenia probably contain cluster munition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>0 (2007: one)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $208,099 (2007: $0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Armenia has expressed support for the Mine Ban Treaty, but has consistently maintained that it cannot join unless Azerbaijan does so. It has voted in favor of every annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997.

Armenia has made little progress in clearing mined and battle areas from its war with Azerbaijan which ended in 1994. A landmine impact survey, completed in 2005, is widely believed to have significantly overstated the extent of the problem, which remains to be accurately defined.

From 1999–2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 91 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Armenia, although in the absence of effective data collection, casualties may have been under-reported or occasionally double-counted. Mine/ERW risk education has been provided irregularly and activities ended in mid-2007. There are no specific victim assistance policies, structures, or activities in Armenia. Armenia has structures to address the needs of persons with disabilities, including survivors, but access remains problematic and the quality of services is poor. Despite legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities, discrimination continued to occur.

Mine Ban Policy

Armenia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In a letter to Landmine Monitor in June 2009, Armenia stated that it “values the Mine Ban Treaty as an important step toward the elimination of an entire category of excessively injurious conventional weapons.” It said that while it cannot join “at the moment,” it “considers the possibility of accession.” It also noted that it “supports the Treaty and values the idea of transparency and confidence-building measures.” It insisted, however, “Armenia makes it clear that it cannot sign the Treaty unless Azerbaijan agrees to

1 Letter from Armen Yedigarian, Head, Department of Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 June 2009. It further stated, “However, Armenia expects that other countries of the region express clear intention to accede to the same idea and share the similar information and express readiness for common transparency.”
do so…. [T]o assume legally binding obligations, Armenia expects that other countries of the region express clear intention to accede to the [Mine Ban Treaty].’’ It has made similar statements in the past.3

Officials have often said that Armenia cannot join the treaty given the country’s security issues and the fact that the territorial dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh has not yet been resolved. Armenia still views mines along the border with Azerbaijan as essential to its defense, and officials have stated that they will not be removed until peace is established.4

Armenia has voted in favor of each annual UN General Assembly resolution supporting the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997, including Resolution 63/42 on 2 December 2008.

Armenia attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but made no statements. It did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Armenia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.5 As of 1 July 2009, it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In June 2009, Armenia repeated past statements that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.6 Armenia inherited a stockpile from the Soviet Union, but its size and composition is not known. Armenia has stated that this information is sensitive and that “the issue to provide this kind of data is contingent on a similar level of political commitment by other parties in the region to present the same information.”7

Officials have said that Armenia last used antipersonnel mines in April 1994.8 In 2007 and 2008, Azerbaijan officials accused Armenian armed forces of continuing to use antipersonnel mines.9 However, no evidence has been made publicly available, and Landmine Monitor has not been able to verify these allegations. In December 2008, it was reported in the Azerbaijan press that, following a cross-border exchange of fire, Azerbaijan specialists discovered and neutralized an unknown number of antipersonnel mines which they claimed had been laid by the Armenian side.10 There was no other evidence provided and no independent confirmation of this claim.


3 For example, in September 2006, it said “Armenia has on many occasions expressed its willingness to accede to the Convention perceiving it as one of the instruments for elimination of an entire category of excessively injurious conventional weapons. Armenia’s accession to the Convention is contingent upon the readiness of other countries of the region to adhere to the Convention and comply with its regime. In this context we believe that the simultaneous accession of regional countries to the Convention will ensure the effectiveness of the Convention and will reciprocally reduce the security threat perception in the region.” “Position of the Republic of Armenia on Ottawa Convention and the Issue of Anti-Personnel Landmines,” written statement distributed at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18–22 September 2006.


5 Armenia said in September 2006 that it voluntarily submits annual transparency reports to the UN Secretary-General in keeping with Article 13 of Amended Protocol II, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to obtain copies of these reports. “Position of the Republic of Armenia on Ottawa Convention and the Issue of Anti-Personnel Landmines,” written statement distributed at the Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 18–22 September 2006.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 832–833.

9 In December 2007, the director general of the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action accused Armenia of recent mine use along the Contact Line. He stated that Armenian armed forces had used antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in military operations “in the past six to seven years” and that mine clearance teams had found mines of Armenian manufacture with a production date of 2003 on them. He said discoveries of Armenian mines on the Contact Line in December 2007 were still being investigated. “Nazim Ismailiyev: Sappers found mines ‘made in Armenia’ on the contact line,” Azeri Press Agency (Karabakh), 18 December 2007, en.apa.az. Similarly, in March 2008, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated that “Armenian military forces use a wide range of mines in occupied Azerbaijani territories and even now they are involved in this process.” Statement by Hikmet Hajiyev, Second Secretary, Department of Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baku Public TV, 3 March 2008.

10 “Mine found in trench in Terter Region,” Azeri Press Agency (Karabakh), 27 December 2008.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Armenia is affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily as a result of the conflict with Azerbaijan in 1988–1994. In 2005, the Armenia Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 60 communities impacted by a total of 102 suspected hazardous areas. The areas were in five districts bordering Azerbaijan. It was estimated that 321.7 km$^2$ were contaminated by mines and ERW, but this total is likely to be significantly reduced by subsequent technical survey. According to the United States Department of State, some 40,000 internally displaced persons have still to return, in part due to fear of landmines.\textsuperscript{11} It is not known whether Armenia’s borders with Georgia and Turkey are also contaminated.

In addition to the recorded dangerous areas, there are also believed to be ammunition stockpiles and depots left over from when Armenia was under Soviet control. There is believed to be significant mine and ERW contamination, including cluster munition remnants, on territory that was seized from Azerbaijan during the 1998–1994 conflict and which remains under the control of Armenia.\textsuperscript{12}

Casualties
There have been no new reports of mine/ERW casualties in Armenia in 2008 or in 2009, as of May.\textsuperscript{13} However, casualties may be under-reported, as there is no systematic casualty data collection. The last identified casualty occurred in 2007, when one civilian was injured in a mine incident in Ichevan, Tavush province.\textsuperscript{14} The US Department of State reported that “two military personnel were killed and 19 military personnel injured by landmine explosions,” but it was unclear whether these were in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh, or elsewhere.\textsuperscript{15}

The total number of mine/ERW casualties remains unknown. From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 91 mine/ERW casualties (six killed, 34 injured, and 51 unknown), although in the absence of effective data collection, casualties may have been under-reported or occasionally double-counted. Between 1990 and April 2007, the Armenian National Committee of the ICBL (ANC-ICBL) database contained information on at least 548 survivors (including at least 10 children and 11 women). The LIS identified 394 casualties (110 people killed and 284 injured) in 39 communities of 11 districts.

There are some 158,700 persons with disabilities registered in Armenia.\textsuperscript{16}

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
An Interagency Governmental Commission on Mine Action was set up in October 2005, but it is not known whether it is still active.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{12} See reports on Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
\textsuperscript{13} Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008–31 May 2009; email from Edmon Azaryan, Head of Disaster Management and Population Movement, ARC, 6 May 2009; email from Alvard Poghosyan, Education Officer, UNICEF, 4 May 2009; and telephone interview with Alla Bakunts, Democratic Governance Portfolio Analyst, UNDP, 26 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{14} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 798.
\textsuperscript{17} The commission is “responsible for developing the national mine action strategy, demining contaminated areas in support of economic development, and mobilizing the necessary resources.” See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 797.
Victim assistance
There is no specific government agency responsible for victim assistance (VA) in Armenia. The Department of Disabled and Elderly People within the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is responsible for disability issues, although it was reportedly not particularly effective. An Armenian official reported that a National Commission on Persons with Disabilities was established in February 2009, but no further information was available.

The 2005 LIS reported that VA needed expansion and capacity-building. However, a 2006 ICRC assessment concluded that the needs of mine survivors were adequately met (and ICRC assistance was not needed). Based on recommendations made in the LIS, the UNDP mine action project for 2006 had a VA component; activities included a full survey of mine casualties, the development of VA strategy, draft legislation for survivors, medical and physical rehabilitation projects, and training of medical personnel in affected regions. However, UNDP has not been involved in VA activities since the project ended in December 2006.

There is no mention of VA in Armenia’s Second Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, although the strategy aims at improving social assistance programs for persons with disabilities.

Data collection and management
There is no comprehensive casualty data collection mechanism in Armenia. There were two primary sources of casualty data: the 2005 LIS and the ANC-ICBL. The ANC-ICBL did not provide updated casualty information from April 2007 to May 2009, and it is unknown if the database is still operating. The Ministry of Defense does not provide information on military mine casualties.

Plans
Strategic Mine Action Plan
With UNDP support, Armenia produced a national mine action strategy for 2007–2010, though UNDP ended its humanitarian demining project in Armenia in December 2006. Little or no progress has been reported in the implementation of this strategic plan.

National ownership
There is scant evidence of any commitment to mine action by the government of Armenia. Following the end of the UNDP humanitarian demining project, major mine clearance operations appear to have ended. Draft national mine action legislation was prepared in 2005 but is not thought to have been adopted. National mine action standards are not believed to have been drafted. The program is nationally managed without external technical advisors.

The 2007–2010 strategy foresees an annual increase in demining capacity of 37%, but this has not happened. The strategy also mentions that the economic situation and the level of potential economic development are such that the support of the international community and specific donors will be necessary, but there is no evidence of any active effort to search for international funds.

Program evaluations
Funding for the UNDP program came from the European Commission (EC). Its support was evaluated by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining in 2008, but the results of the evaluation were not publicly available as of 1 July 2009.
Demining and Battle Area Clearance

The Ministry of Defense has provided the only demining capacity in Armenia; manual and mechanical methods and mine detection dogs have been used in the past. There has been no independent quality assurance system in place for clearance operations. It is not known whether demining is still being actively conducted. Overall, demining in Armenia has been slow and productivity rates low, with the Ministry of Defense reporting some 1.8km² of land cleared from 2002 to the end of 2008. Reasons previously cited for the lack of progress have included weather conditions that restrict clearance from May to October and difficult terrain that sometimes allows only the use of manual assets.

The end of EC and UNDP support appears to have further slowed demining progress, although the United States provided mine detection and disposal equipment to Armenia in early 2008 and claimed that the delivery marked the beginning of a larger program of US support for demining in Armenia in 2008. Subsequently, the US reported that it had provided two weeks training in demining in early April 2008 for Armenian deminers using trainers from the Kansas National Guard. The training was funded through the US European Command’s Humanitarian Mine Action office. No further progress has been reported.

Progress since 1999

Reporting by Armenia on its mine clearance operations has been extremely poor. In August 2009, Armenia reported clearance figures for 2002 to 2009, which are set out in the table below. It has not been possible for Landmine Monitor to verify the figures provided, and it is not known whether the clearance figures include battle area clearance as well as mine clearance, although 10,000 items of ERW were reportedly destroyed in 2006.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2001</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = not reported

In 2009 through August, a further 17,500m² were reported to have been cleared, with mine clearance operations said to be underway in Nerqin Hand village in Syunik province.

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28 Email from Maj. Armen Zakaryan, Ministry of Defense, 10 August 2009. The figures reported in August 2009 for clearance in 2005 and 2006 were significantly higher than those provided previously to Landmine Monitor (0.09km² and 0.22km², respectively).
Risk Education

No formal mine/ERW risk education (RE) activities have been conducted in Armenia since mid-2007.30 In 2008, mine risk topics continued to be included in the Primary Military Preparedness course taught by secondary school teachers. UNICEF expressed concerns about the appropriateness of the course, but authorities asserted that, with Armenia being in a “no war no peace situation,” preparedness classes were of crucial importance, particularly for boys, who undertake two years of compulsory military service starting at age 18.31 Although UNICEF completed its activities in 2007, it had trained 50 educational staff and school administrators with a view to making RE self-sustaining.

RE started some 10 years after the conflict with Nagorno-Karabakh was over, and activities were conducted irregularly. RE was provided to an unknown number of beneficiaries, but mainly men and children, in 2003, 2005, 2006, and 2007 through school and community-based activities. Operators included the Armenian Center of International Association of Puppeteers, supported by the ICRC, AHDC, Armenian Red Cross Society (ARC), and UNICEF supported by UNDP; RE was also provided through public dissemination in local media in 2005–2006.

No evaluation has been conducted, but in 2005 the ANC-ICBL conducted a survey of 250 people in three mine-affected border villages in Tavush, Syunik, and Gegharkunik provinces. The survey revealed that only 17% of those interviewed considered they received sufficient mine/ERW awareness.32

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown, but is at least 548.33 There is no specific VA strategy, and mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities in Armenia.34 Services for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, remain insufficient,35 although some new programs were introduced in 2008.36 The US Department of State reported that “hospitals, residential care, and other facilities for persons with serious disabilities are substandard.”37

Armenia has a wide network of healthcare facilities, and emergency care is provided at district hospitals or first-aid posts. Although some progress has been registered in the healthcare sector, particularly in primary healthcare, access in rural areas remains difficult.38 For instance, in Syunik, one of the contaminated provinces on the border with Azerbaijan, there is a serious lack of health personnel (there are no surgeons and no anesthesiologists in the region) and ambulances. Residents in need of medical care need often to travel long distances on mountainous roads.39 In 2009, the government announced an increase in healthcare expenditure.40

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30 Email from Edmon Azaryan, ARC, 6 May 2009; and email from Alvard Poghosyan, UNICEF, 4 May 2009.
31 Email from Alvard Poghosyan, UNICEF, 4 May 2009.
34 Telephone interview with Alla Bakunts, UNDP, UNDP, 26 June 2009.
41 “Armenian government to increase support for healthcare system,” ARKA News Agency (Yerevan), 16 July 2008.
Medical care is provided free of charge for persons with disabilities, and the government provides free wheelchairs and prosthetics, but, access remains problematic.41 In 2008, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs approved a specific social protection program for persons with disabilities, which included 70 provisions on legislative reforms, medical and social guarantees, training, and employment. 42

In Yerevan, there are rehabilitation structures to address survivors’ needs.43 The International Post-Trauma Rehabilitation Center for patients with spinal cord injuries and the Pediatric Trauma, Orthopedics and Rehabilitation Center in Yerevan reportedly provide modern rehabilitation services with well-trained physiotherapists. However, the Center for Prosthetics and Orthotics (Interorto), formerly the Yerevan Prosthetic-Orthopedic Enterprise, is reportedly the only rehabilitation service provider to receive state funding to provide free prostheses for persons with disabilities in Armenia. In mine-affected districts, rehabilitation services remain less comprehensive.44

In 2008, the ICRC supported the training of one military and one civilian surgeon at a war-surgery seminar in Nalchik, Russia.45 In 2008, the Marshall Legacy Institute funded the training of one rehabilitation team from the Pediatric Trauma, Orthopedics and Rehabilitation Center at the Institute for Rehabilitation in Slovenia.46

It is unknown if psychosocial support services are available for civilian survivors. Lack of employment opportunities for persons with disabilities is an issue of concern, with some 90% of persons with disabilities unemployed.47 In November 2008, the country’s first job fair for persons with physical disabilities was organized in Yerevan.48 Access to inclusive education for children with disabilities continued to be limited.49

Military mine survivors have greater access to higher quality services than civilians. Military and civilian survivors with a disability receive pensions based on the degree of disability, although the pensions were inadequate to provide a minimum standard of living.50

In 2009, a staff member from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs participated in a regional workshop to promote service provision for mine survivors in Tbilisi, Georgia. The workshop was organized by the ICRC and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF).51

Armenia has legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities and mandating accessible government buildings, yet discrimination continues to be a problem.52 On 30 March 2007, Armenia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol; neither had been ratified as of 1 July 2009.

43 Email from Edmon Azaryan, ARC, 6 May 2009.
44 Ibid.
46 Telephone interview with Elise Becker, Program Manager, Marshall Legacy Institute, 29 June 2009.
48 “First job fair for disabled to be held in Yerevan, Armenia,” ARKA News Agency (Yerevan), 14 November 2008.
Support for Mine Action

In 2008, two countries reported providing $208,099 (€141,314) in funding to mine action in Armenia. No international funding was reported for 2007.

The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) reported supporting rehabilitation training for two specialists from Armenia in 2008, with the Marshall Legacy Institute and Slovenia as donors.53

### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Armenia: Monetary54

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>US European Command</td>
<td>Mine action</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$8,099 (€5,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$208,099 (€141,314)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In August 2009, Armenia reported that “all financial resources for the maintenance of the Armenian Humanitarian De-Mining Center have been provided by Armenian government since 2008. Also, the financing of all mine clearance annual program actions has been committed from the national budget since 2008.”55 No details have, however, been provided to Landmine Monitor.

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55 Email from Maj. Armen Zakaryan, Ministry of Defense, 10 August 2009. The figures reported in August 2009 for clearance in 2005 and 2006 were significantly higher than those provided previously to Landmine Monitor (0.09km² and 0.22km², respectively).
AZERBAIJAN

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
<th>Not a State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>268km² (not including land occupied by Armenia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>23 (2007: 32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown, estimated to be at least 1,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>3.1km² of battle areas 1.46km² of mined areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>104,416</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Azerbaijan has stated that it will not join the Mine Ban Treaty until its conflict with Armenia has been settled. Azerbaijan has shown greater support for the treaty in recent years, notably by submitting voluntary Article 7 reports in 2008 and 2009, and voting for the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution every year since 2005.

Azerbaijan’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem is primarily a result of conflict with Armenia from 1988–1994 and abandoned ammunition from the Soviet era. It has made significant progress in all forms of land release in recent years, under the auspices of the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA).

There are no conclusive mine/ERW casualty figures for Azerbaijan. ANAMA was unable to provide adequate data on casualties from 1999 to 2008. For the same period, the Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines reported 360 mine/ERW casualties (82 killed and 278 injured). RE has been conducted in Azerbaijan since 2001, primarily by ANAMA with UNICEF support.

The provision of victim assistance in Azerbaijan has advanced over the past decade. The growing national economy has seen a substantial increase in government investment in social services, including healthcare provision across the country. Yet victim assistance services still suffered from a lack of funding.

Mine Ban Policy

Azerbaijan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In recent years, Azerbaijan has shown greater signs of support for the mine ban, although it has also continued to state that it cannot accede to the treaty until the conflict with Armenia has ended.¹

On 2 December 2008, Azerbaijan voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42, the fourth successive year it has supported the annual resolution calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

¹ Officials have made positive statements regarding the treaty since 2005. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 842–843.
In November 2008, Azerbaijan submitted its first voluntary Article 7 transparency report, covering the period from June 2000 to November 2008. While the report has details about mine clearance, victim assistance, and risk education activities, it does not include any information on Azerbaijan’s stockpiled antipersonnel mines. It submitted a second report on 17 July 2009, covering the period from November 2008 to April 2009.

In the report submitted in 2008, Azerbaijan said that it “can not accede to the Ottawa Convention without settlement of the armed conflict, restoration of territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and having a threat of hostility resumption, even though Azerbaijan stopped planting of additional mines. Therefore adherence to the Ottawa Convention will be possible only after the final settlement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”

This report also asserted that Azerbaijan fully supports the goals, purposes and principles of the Mine Ban Treaty including the comprehensive ban on use, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel landmines. Azerbaijan considers this “an important humanitarian objective of the world community in the XXI century…. Despite the difficulties, Azerbaijan follows most of the provisions of the Convention by not producing or transferring antipersonnel mines…. As the sign of our real dedication and support to the Ottawa Process, Azerbaijan is taking a free will initiative in submitting the Report pursuant to the Article 7 of the Convention.”

In March 2008, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated, “Azerbaijan supports the solution of humanitarian mine problems on a global level. Azerbaijan fully supports the principles and philosophy of the Ottawa Convention. Azerbaijan is ready to meet obligations in a national level and to provide its contribution.”

Azerbaijan attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, and made a statement about its mine action program, its support of the Mine Ban Treaty, its voluntary Article 7 report, and its reasons for not joining the treaty. It also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, but made no statements.

Azerbaijan is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use
Azerbaijan has stated on several occasions, including in its voluntary Article 7 report submitted in 2008, that it does not produce or export antipersonnel mines. In June 2005, Azerbaijan said that it is “unilaterally committed to non producing and non accumulating” antipersonnel mines. Azerbaijan’s landmine stockpile is a legacy of the Soviet era, but the number and types of landmines held are not known. The voluntary Article 7 report did not include information on Azerbaijan’s stockpile.
Officials have stated that Azerbaijan has not used antipersonnel mines since the end of its conflict with Armenia in 1994 and does not intend to use them in the future, but would not rule out the possibility. Landmine Monitor is not aware of any specific legal measures Azerbaijan has taken to prohibit production, trade, or use of antipersonnel mines.

Azerbaijan officials have alleged that Armenian forces have used antipersonnel mines in recent years, yet no evidence has been made publicly available and Landmine Monitor has been unable to verify the allegations. In December 2008, local media reported that, following a cross-border exchange of fire, Azerbaijan specialists discovered and neutralized an unknown number of antipersonnel mines, which they claimed had been laid by the Armenian side. There was no evidence provided and no independent confirmation of this claim.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Azerbaijan is contaminated by mines and ERW, primarily as a result of the armed conflict with Armenia in 1988–1994. A general survey of contamination was undertaken in 2001, followed by a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in 18 districts carried out from September 2002 to June 2003. The LIS identified 480 mine-impacted communities and 163 ERW-impacted communities in 18 districts. In total, 970 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering 736km² of land were found to be affecting 514,000 people.

In late 2006, ANAMA significantly reduced the overall estimate of contamination to 306km², based on a survey conducted with the support of local authorities of the 11 mine/ERW-affected districts. This revised figure included areas not identified by the LIS. The estimate was further reduced to 268km² by the end of 2008 as a result of land release efforts. ANAMA continues to revise the estimate of contamination using its Resurvey Team from its Training, Survey and Quality Assurance Division (TSQAD), (see Demining and battle area clearance section below).

There are also significant amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance, including cluster munition remnants, especially in and around warehouses at a former Soviet ammunition storage area (ASA) at Saloglu in Agstafa district. In 1991, when Azerbaijan gained independence, the departing Soviet army blew up the facility, scattering tens of thousands of munitions over an area of 44km². As of July 2009, about 1.35km² of sub-surface contamination remained to be cleared.

The precise extent of the mine/ERW problem in areas of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia is unknown. In addition to Nagorno-Karabakh, the districts of Gubadly, Jabrayil, Kelbajar, Lachin, and Zangilan, as well as parts of Aghdam, Fizuli, and Terter are under the control of Armenian forces. These areas are expected to have extensive mine/ERW contamination with estimates of the total size of affected areas varying from 350 to 830km².

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9 See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 844. See also, Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period June 2000 to November 2008), Form A.
10 In December 2007, ANAMA's director general accused Armenia of recent mine use along the LoC. He stated that Armenian armed forces had used antipersonnel and antitank mines in military operations “in the past 6–7 years,” and that mine clearance teams had found mines of Armenian manufacture with a production date of 2003 on them. He said discoveries of Armenian mines on the LoC in December 2007 were still being investigated. “Nazim Ismayilov: Sappers found mines ‘made in Armenia’ on the contact line,” Azeri Press Agency, 18 December 2007, en.apa.az. Similarly, in March 2008, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated that, “Armenian military forces use a wide range of mines in occupied Azerbaijani territories and even now they are involved in this process.” Statement by Hikmet Hajiyev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Public TV, 3 March 2008.
13 Email from Nigar Vagabova, Planning and Development Department, ANAMA, 27 July 2009.
14 See Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period November 2008 to April 2009), Form A.
15 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Nigar Vagabova, ANAMA, 19 June 2009; and see Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period November 2008 to April 2009), Form A.
Casualties

ANAMA reported three new mine/ERW casualties (all injured) in Azerbaijan in three antivehicle mine incidents in 2008. Two incidents occurred during agricultural activities: the activity at the time of the third is unknown. Two of the casualties were civilians and the occupation of the third was not reported.16

ANAMA reported to Landmine Monitor in July 2009 that there were three mine/ERW casualties in 2007, not the previously reported 20 casualties (four killed and 16 injured).17 The reported reason for the discrepancy was duplications of mine/ERW casualties entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. In 2009, ANAMA staff worked to remove all duplicated casualty results from IMSMA for the data from 1999 onwards.18

The Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzCBL) reported 23 new mine/ERW casualties (one killed and 22 injured) from 19 incidents in 2008. The majority of casualties were men (21); there was one woman, and the other casualty was a child of unknown gender. More civilians (14) reportedly became casualties than military (nine) in 2008. The only person AzCBL reported killed in 2008 by a mine/ERW was a civilian. Antipersonnel mines caused the highest number of incidents (eight), while six were caused by antivehicle mines, and five by other ERW. The AzCBL data represents a decrease from its numbers reported in 2007 (33 casualties including 10 killed and 23 injured) and in 2006 (35 casualties with four killed and 31 injured).19

Discrepancies between the data collected by ANAMA and AzCBL continued in 2008. This was reportedly the result of different data collection processes and scope, including differing ranges of coverage, sources of information, verification processes, and the definition of casualties. However it was reported to Landmine Monitor that ANAMA and AzCBL began crosschecking casualty data in 2008.20

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, with ANAMA recording eight mine/ERW casualties (all injured, as of 10 June. All casualties were male with the exception of one military personnel.21 AzCBL reported 11 new mine/ERW casualties (two military personnel killed and nine civilians injured), as of June 2009.22

The total number of casualties from mines/ERW in Azerbaijan is unknown. As of May 2009, ANAMA reported a total of 2,347 casualties (361 people killed and 1,986 injured). The start date for this data is unclear.23 ANAMA was unable to provide adequate data on casualties from 1999 to 2008.24 There are also mine survivors in Azerbaijan from the war between the former Soviet Union and Afghanistan, although the total number is not known. From 1999 to 2008, AzCBL has identified 360 casualties (82 killed and 278 injured). Of these, 191 were civilians and 169 were military personnel. Men were the majority of casualties (313), women five, and 42 were children of unknown gender. From 2005 to 2008, antipersonnel mines caused the greatest number of incidents (35), antivehicle mines caused 19, and other ERW 18. Since 2005, the reported number of casualties annually has been decreasing.25 The decrease in casualties has been attributed to the increase in risk education in affected areas.26 There are reportedly some 275,000 persons with physical disabilities in Azerbaijan.

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16 Data from ANAMA provided by emails from Murad Rahimov, Information Manager, ANAMA, 3 July 2009, 9 July 2009, 13 July 2009, and 14 July 2009.
17 Data from ANAMA provided by emails from Murad Rahimov, ANAMA, 3 July 2009 and 9 July 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 808.
18 Email from Murad Rahimov, ANAMA, 14 July 2009.
19 Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, Director, AzCBL, 23 June 2009.
20 Email from Murad Rahimov, ANAMA, 9 July 2009.
21 Data from ANAMA provided by email from Murad Rahimov, ANAMA, 14 July 2009.
22 Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, AzCBL, 23 June 2009.
24 ANAMA provided some data, but it was lacking in casualties provided in previous years and was unable to provide explanation for the discrepancies.
25 Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, AzCBL, 23 June 2009.
26 Email from Murad Rahimov, ANAMA, 14 July 2009.
Risk profile
The majority of casualties are men on active military duty. Civilian casualties mainly occur during livelihood activities such as cattle grazing, collecting firewood, cultivating/plowing, and burning vegetation.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
ANAMA was established as a civilian organization in 1998 by Presidential Decree and serves as the national mine action center. A Joint Working Group, consisting of representatives from various ministries, was created in 1999 to provide regular guidance to ANAMA. The Joint Working Group has not met since 2005 “due to lack of need.” ANAMA has been dealing with concerned ministries and state bodies on a bilateral basis.

ANAMA undertakes its mine action management role from its headquarters in Baku, regional office in Fizuli, regional training center in Khanlar, and three operational centers in Agstafa, Agjabedi, and Terter. As of the end of 2008, ANAMA had a total of 383 employees: 253 operational staff and 130 administrative support staff. Since 1999, UNDP has provided support to ANAMA. UNDP manages a trust fund for mine action in Azerbaijan, but has not provided a technical advisor since 2005.

Risk education
ANAMA also coordinates mine and ERW risk education (RE) activities. The ANAMA Mine Risk Education Working Group includes representatives from relevant ministries and NGOs and meets when necessary.

Victim assistance
ANAMA managed the Azerbaijan Mine Victim Association (AMVA), fundraised for victim assistance (VA) services, and implemented a number of programs for mine/ERW survivors in 2008. ANAMA coordinated VA in 2008 through the Mine Victim Assistance Working Group. Both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare are responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.

Data collection and management
The IMSMA database was installed at ANAMA in September 1999; it continues to use an older version of the system, due to concerns about the loss of data during migration to a more recent version. Reports of RE activities conducted by community volunteers are provided to ANAMA, but not entered in IMSMA as the older version does not accept RE data.

ANAMA coordinates government collection of mine action and mine/ERW casualty data in Azerbaijan and has used IMSMA since 2001 to store the information. ANAMA collected casualty data in 2008 from its network of district offices, media reports, national NGOs, and in coordination with the Azerbaijan Red Crescent Society (AzRCS). ANAMA and AzRCS signed a partnership agreement in December 2007 that facilitates a broader coverage of mine/ERW casualty data collection across the country. In 2008, the partnership trained and used AzRCS

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27 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Nazim Ismaylov, Director, ANAMA, 19 June 2009.
28 Ibid.
29 Interview with Nazim Ismaylov, ANAMA, Baku, 19 June 2008; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 668.
30 Statement by Musa Jalalov, Mine Risk Education Department Manager, ANAMA, Baku, 27 February 2009. This statement was at an AzCBL-organized roundtable meeting on the mine problem in Azerbaijan and globally.
32 Telephone interview with Murad Rahimov, ANAMA, 4 July 2009.
33 Email from Musa Jalalov, ANAMA, 9 July 2009.
regional branch staff to begin collecting casualty data and information on mine/ERW survivor needs.35 Only incidents that have been verified by ANAMA are recorded in IMSMA.36 AzCBL continued to utilize a network of regional coordinators to collect casualty data from civil and military hospitals, rehabilitation centers, and media reports. AzCBL collected data in all mine/ERW-affected areas of the country except the Nakhichivan Autonomous Republic.37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data</th>
<th>VA</th>
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<tr>
<td>ANAMA</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>AzCBL</td>
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<td>International Eurasia Press Fund</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relief Azerbaijan</td>
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</table>

**Main program operators in 2008**

**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plans**

ANAMA’s mine action strategy for 2009–2013 seeks to: reduce and clear accessible suspected hazardous areas (about 170km2); develop and expand operational capacity; and support intensified and extended RE and VA programs. In the longer term, ANAMA plans to further increase and reinforce its operational and management capacity to enable it to address the mine and ERW threat from the occupied areas once they are returned to Azerbaijan. ANAMA foresees the need for up to seven regional offices, 700 operational staff, 120 mine detection dogs, and 18 demining machines.38 RE activities outlined in the Azerbaijan National Strategic Mine Action Plan of 2003 included: integration of RE into the school curriculum; conducting sustainable community-based RE activities; training field operation teams in RE; developing and disseminating RE materials; coordinating the working group; ensuring the involvement of organizations operating in affected areas; and conducting RE for military “operating in the newly liberated areas.”39

The main directive for the Mine VA Working Group is the strategic plan developed from the Country Mine Victim Needs Assessment Survey in 2004.40 In 2008, a revision of the MVA Strategy was finalized, with key objectives reviewed and a stronger coordination role given to the working group.41

**Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development**

In 2008, ANAMA completed its support for the State Plan for Socio-Economic Development of the Regions 2004–2008. A total of 30km2 of land was released for use, including clearance of 183 houses, one school, and one hospital. The Ministry of Economic Development has elaborated a Socio-Economic Development Plan of Regions of Azerbaijan for 2009–2013, which includes a provision for mine action.42

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35 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Imran Safaraliyev, MVA Officer, ANAMA, 22 June 2009.
36 Ibid; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 807.
37 Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, AzCBL, 23 June 2009.
38 Interview with Nazim Ismaylov, ANAMA, Baku, 4 June 2009.
40 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Imran Safaraliyev, ANAMA, 22 June 2009.
41 Ibid; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 810.
42 Interview with Nazim Ismaylov, ANAMA, Baku, 4 June 2009.
**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

The government of Azerbaijan has provided significant financial support to the mine action program. In 2008 Azerbaijan provided more than 80% of the mine action program budget, one of the largest national contributions on a percentage basis in the world.\(^{43}\) The provision of VA in Azerbaijan has also advanced over the past decade.

**National management**

Azerbaijan’s mine action program is under full national management.

**National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures**

There is no national mine action legislation in force, although a draft law has existed since 2002. National mine action standards were initially developed in 2000 and then revised in 2006 to meet the International Mine Action Standards. A review of all national mine action standards was planned to start in June 2009.\(^{44}\) In 2007, a new area reduction standing operating procedure (SOP) was developed and adopted. A new resurvey SOP was drafted and approved by ANAMA in 2008.\(^{45}\)

**Program evaluations**

In 2008, two independent international evaluations were conducted of the mine action program in Azerbaijan. The first was an evaluation of UNDP’s support to mine action in Azerbaijan since 1999, with the remit also to assess the relevance of ANAMA’s proposal to support mine action abroad, including through the creation of an international mine action training and resource centre in Azerbaijan\(^{46}\) (see Support for mine action, below). The evaluation concluded that: “The mine action programme is highly integrated with all aspects being co-ordinated by ANAMA. The ‘hard issues’ of mine clearance and unexploded ordnance disposal (EOD) are well managed and targeted. The ‘soft issues’ of mine risk education (MRE) and victim assistance are also well managed.”\(^{47}\) It praised a major clearance project at Zobjuq (to facilitate construction of new houses to resettle 2,104 internally displaced families) for its use of innovative procedures: “Some of these new procedures were developed by ANAMA alone and are well ahead of those in many other countries.”\(^{48}\)

The evaluation also concluded that: “ANAMA wishes to expand its reach beyond Azerbaijan, initially – possibly – to Afghanistan, Georgia and Tajikistan. With the possible exception of Afghanistan, this appears entirely possible... Its wish to create a centre of excellence has already been achieved but its apparent wish to become a regional centre needs further thought. The concept has merit but the form it would take and the geographical spread are unclear.”\(^{49}\)

In May 2008, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted a mission in Azerbaijan as part of a broader evaluation of European Commission support to mine action programs in South Caucasus and Central Asia. The results of the evaluation were not publicly available as of July 2009.\(^{50}\)

In June 2009, UNDP conducted a mission to carry out a feasibility study on the establishment of an International Mine Action Center in Azerbaijan. The main purpose was to evaluate current ANAMA capacities in terms of provision of international training and assess the opportunities for it to become an internationally recognized service provider.\(^{51}\) The results of the evaluation were not publicly available as of July 2009.

\(^{43}\) Ibid.
\(^{44}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Samir Poladov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 19 June 2009.
\(^{45}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Murad Rahimov, ANAMA, 19 June 2009.
\(^{46}\) Interview with Nazim Ismaylov, ANAMA, Baku, 4 June 2009.
\(^{48}\) Ibid, p. 7.
\(^{49}\) Ibid, p. 3.
\(^{50}\) Email from Vera Bohle, Senior Expert, Evaluation, International Humanitarian Law, GICHD, 24 July 2009.
\(^{51}\) Email from Nigar Vagabova, ANAMA, 6 July 2009.
States Not Party

Azerbaijan

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Demining is primarily carried out by two national NGOs, which together employ 158 staff, and ANAMA, while battle area clearance (BAC) is largely the responsibility of ANAMA alone. In 2008, ANAMA operated with three manual clearance teams while the two national NGOs—Dayag (“Relief Azerbaijan”) and the International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF)—each operated with 38 deminers performing manual clearance operations in five mine-affected regions: Aghdam, Fizuli, Gorandoy, Khojavend, and Terter.52

ANAMA has an 18-person Emergency Response Team, a 52-person manual demining team and a 60-person UXO clearance team that operated on the Saloglu project.53 The total number of people involved in mine action in Azerbaijan is 541 (including support staff); there are 27 mine detection dogs and seven demining machines.54

Identifying hazardous areas

In 2008, ANAMA established a new Resurvey Team. The main function of the team is to update data collected during the LIS and revise it together with the local authorities. During 2008, the team resurveyed 282 communities in 13 districts and released 11.6km² of SHAs as not being contaminated.55 From January–May 2009, ANAMA released a further 5.95km².56

Demining and battle area clearance in 2008

In 2008, ANAMA cleared 3.1km² of battle areas (2.68km² of battle areas in Fizuli and 0.43km² of explosive ordnance disposal in the Saloglu project), destroying in the process 12,971 items of UXO. Total mined area cleared decreased in 2008 (1.46km², see table below) compared to 2007 (2.12km²), while release of land by technical survey increased (14.1km²) compared to 2007 (12.22km²).57

![Table: Demining in 2008]( UrTra42T1InW6AId8AAADxJREFUeNpi++/8/AwAAAEfIkqIwAAAAASUVORK5CYII)

52 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tural Mammadov, Operations Department, ANAMA, 19 June 2009.
53 Email from Fikret Aliyev, Training and Quality Assurance Senior Officer, Operations Department, ANAMA, 7 July 2009.
54 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Nazim Ismaylov, ANAMA, 19 June 2009.
56 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 June 2009.
57 Email from Nigar Vagabova, ANAMA, 27 July 2009.
58 Data provided in response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 June 2009, and by email, 7 July 2009; and email from Nigar Vagabova, ANAMA, 27 July 2009. Somewhat surprisingly, no antipersonnel mines were reported destroyed in 2008, although for the period November 2008 through April 2009, Azerbaijan reported 11 antipersonnel mines destroyed during clearance operations in Fizuli district. See Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period November 2008 to April 2009), Form G.
In 2009, ANAMA was expecting to reduce and clear a total of 12 km² of contaminated land and release a further 17.5 km² through resurvey. On 10 June 2009, the government tasked ANAMA to clear 400,000 m² in Guzdek, close to Baku. The 12-month clearance is of a former ASA.

Internal quality assurance (QA) is carried out by the clearance team engaged in clearance while external QA is now the sole responsibility of ANAMA’s TSQAD, which in early 2008 was moved from the Operations Department and put under the director of ANAMA to give it more independence. Quality control (QC) is conducted immediately after clearance is completed, through a process of sampling on up to 50% of the cleared land. Most quality control checks in 2008 were implemented by the Sampling/QA/QC Team, which consists of eight deminers and two MDD sets. Given this capacity, ANAMA has now stopped using the “exchange method” in which one demining team was used to conduct external QA/QC of an area cleared by another team.

Land is handed over to the end users through the provision of a clearance certificate, with a sketch map of the cleared area attached. These documents are given either to the landowner or to the local municipality.

### Release of Mined and Battle Areas from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>SHAs released by survey (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>25.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>12.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>12.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11.74</td>
<td>24.22</td>
<td>53.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Risk Education

In 2008, 104,416 people received RE, a similar number to 2007. RE was conducted by the education sector, local committees, the AzRCS, and two national demining NGOs, Dayag and IEPF. It was delivered at schools, through a network of community volunteers managed by...
the District Executive Authorities, and by demining teams alongside clearance operations. In 2008, no military personnel received RE, but some units in contaminated districts were provided with RE materials.65 RE activities mainly target 13 districts along the border with Armenia, and include camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee settlements.66

In January 2008, the UN Department of Public Information-Azerbaijan, ICRC, AzRCS, relevant ministries, and NGOs attended a seminar in Baku on UNICEF experiences in financial handover of RE programs to state budgets. In 2008, all school-based and community-based RE activities were funded by the state.67

The Ministry of Education is responsible for the RE school program, including monitoring and integration of RE into school curricula.68 Refresher training was given to 16 master trainers. By the end of 2008, a total of 2,335 teachers from 1,185 schools in 24 districts had been trained to deliver RE in Azerbaijan.69

ANAMA reported that, as a result of community-based RE, the population has developed increased awareness in recent years. People report suspected contamination to the local authorities, ANAMA offices, and police.70 Dangerous areas are marked during survey and clearance, and the methods are publicized through RE activities.71

In 2008, the ICRC and AzRCS built new safe-play areas in seven villages along the Line of Contact (LoC); in total, 42 safe-play areas have been built with Norwegian Red Cross funding.72

### Activities in 200874

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AzRCS</td>
<td>Safe-play areas (seven new areas in 2008)</td>
<td>5,000 children accessed safe-play areas (not included in beneficiary total)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Executive Authorities</td>
<td>Community-based RE through 116 volunteer committees—awareness-raising sessions and distribution of materials</td>
<td>51,104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEPF and Dayag</td>
<td>RE alongside demining operations</td>
<td>1,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>School-based RE</td>
<td>52,000 students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Monitoring and evaluation is conducted by the ANAMA RE department with the involvement of donors and partner organizations.73

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65 Email from Musa Jalalov, ANAMA, 9 July 2009.
66 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period November 2008 to April 2009), Form I.
67 Email from Musa Jalalov, ANAMA, 9 July 2009.
68 Interview with Musa Jalalov, ANAMA, Baku, 18 March 2009.
69 Statement by Musa Jalalov, ANAMA, Baku, 27 February 2009.
70 ANAMA, “Mine Risk Education,” Baku, 2009, pp. 24–26; and Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period November 2008 to April 2009), Form I.
71 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period November 2008 to April 2009), Form I.
72 Email from Bayram Valiyev, Weapon Contamination Advisor, AzRCS, 28 February 2009.
74 Email from Musa Jalalov, ANAMA, 9 July 2009; and email from Bayram Valiyev, Weapon Contamination Advisor AzRCS, 28 February 2009.
75 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period November 2008 to April 2009), Form I.
In 2001, ANAMA and UNICEF implemented a joint RE project in 20 districts, including eight districts with a high concentration of IDP settlements, including training community members, teachers and health workers, as well as theater and distribution of materials. In September 2002, an external evaluation commended UNICEF for building national capacity, with an indicator of success being that children were reporting suspicious objects. The report’s recommendations were later implemented, including building strong relations with partners, integration of RE into the school curriculum, and encouraging volunteers to form mine committees.

In 2003, the demining NGO IEPF started to conduct RE. In 2004, the AzRCS with ICRC started to conduct RE, train volunteers, and build safe-play areas for children. In 2004, the NGO Relief Azerbaijan started RE with prioritization based on LIS data and ongoing casualty information. In 2005, regular coordination meetings started and national standards were developed. In 2006, RE was delivered through radio and television for the first time. In 2007, the transition of RE to government bodies began as the Ministry of Education assumed responsibility for the implementation and monitoring of RE in schools, and district authorities managing the volunteer community-based RE activities. In 2007, emergency RE sessions were held and warning billboards set up in hazardous areas in response to mine/ERW incidents.

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be at least 1,986.76 Government departments, and local and international NGOs and organizations ran a variety of services for mine/ERW survivors in Azerbaijan in 2008. The situation for mine/ERW survivors is reported to have improved through government and NGO efforts.77 As the national economy continued to prosper, in 2008, the government increased budgetary allocations to the health sector considerably.78 Yet, despite the increases, it was reported that there were “still inadequate budgetary allocations to the social sectors.”79 According to ANAMA, a primary challenge in 2008 for the government VA services was inadequate funding.80

In 2008, the Ministry of Health approved the National Concept Paper on Health Reform. The paper addressed the improvement of the primary healthcare services throughout the country, and the establishment of a healthcare financing system.81 In 2008, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare initiated a needs assessment survey of persons with disabilities and started to offer professional skills development services to persons with disabilities.82

A government-facilitated program funded by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic resulted in the construction of three medical centers in regional areas. A fourth that was due to be built in Fizuli in 2008 was delayed and is planned for construction in 2009.83

The State Social Protection Fund carried out pension reforms in collaboration with UNDP and the World Bank in 2008.84 In September 2008, a Presidential Decree ordered a monthly pension for permanently disabled war veterans. The pension will be aggregated depending on the severity of the disability and administered through the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.85

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77 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Imran Safarallyev, ANAMA, 22 June 2009.
79 Ibid, p. 10.
80 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Imran Safarallyev, ANAMA, 22 June 2009.
82 Ibid, p. 9.
85 “Azerbaijan’s head of state decrees on instituting President’s grant for war invalids,” 9 September 2008, www.president.az.
The government’s AMVA program in 2008 provided a range of services to mine/ERW survivors. This included the provision of prosthetic and mobility devices to 211 mine/ERW survivors, physical rehabilitation to one survivor, loans through a micro-credit scheme to 52 survivors, and vocational training to 29 survivors. The two new branches of AMVA set up in 2007 in Fizuli and Agstafa districts became better established in 2008.\(^{86}\) A primary challenge to ANAMA’s VA work for 2008, and continuing into 2009, was raising the funds to ensure continuation of the programs.\(^{87}\)

The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for providing rehabilitation services. In 2008, it operated four rehabilitation centers. The Ahmedly Prosthetic Orthopedic Rehabilitation Center in Baku provided 95 prostheses and 12 orthoses to mine/ERW survivors in 2008, nine of whom attended the clinic for the first time.\(^{88}\) The Nakhchivan center delivered 16 prostheses and three orthoses to mine/ERW survivors in 2008.\(^{89}\) The center in Ganja provided 30 prostheses and eight orthoses to mine/ERW survivors in 2008.\(^{90}\)

The fourth center, the Rehabilitation Center of Invalids of the Republic in Baku, provided rehabilitation, diagnostic, and psychosocial support to 252 mine survivors in 2008, 14 of whom attended the center for the first time. This center reported that in 2008 there was an outstanding need for training of medical staff, wheelchairs, and functional hospital beds. A new building was due to be constructed in 2009 and planned to house an additional 120–150 beds.\(^{91}\) The ICRC concluded its support to the three rehabilitation centers (Baku, Ganja, and Nakhchivan) at the end of 2007, but continued close contact with the centers’ management throughout 2008.\(^{92}\) The ICRC cited indifference to “repeated attempts… to raise concern about weak points in the physical rehabilitation sector” as the reason for terminating direct technical support.\(^{93}\)

From May 2008, ANAMA and Chirag Humanitarian Development Public Union distributed wheelchairs provided by the Wheelchair Foundation to mine survivors in five districts.\(^{94}\)

A number of government departments and NGOs provided business and vocational skills training to mine/ERW survivors and their families in 2008. It was reported, however, that persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, had limited employment and education opportunities.\(^{95}\)

In 2008, the International Organization for Migration continued to implement a two-year socio-economic reintegration project that began in late 2007. The project operated in six mine/ERW-affected districts under the supervision of the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) and ANAMA. Since the project began, it has provided business skills training to 85 mine survivors, 52 of whom also received small business loans. The work has been financially supported by ANAMA, Austria, Slovenia, and South Korea through the ITF.\(^{96}\)

The Ojag Humanitarian Union implemented a vocational training project financed by the Marshall Legacy Institute from August 2008, through the Ganja City Regional Resource Center. The project trained 12 mine survivors and family members in 2008 in carpet weaving and

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\(^{86}\) Some of the services provided by national organizations might be included in the ANAMA statistics for 2008. Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Imran Safaraliyev, ANAMA, 22 June 2009.

\(^{87}\) Ibid.

\(^{88}\) Interview with Ilham Bagirov, Director, Ahmedly Prosthetic Orthopedic Rehabilitation Center, Baku, 13 March 2009.

\(^{89}\) Telephone interview with Mubariz Rustamli, Assistant Head Doctor, Nakhchivan Prosthetic and Orthopedic Rehabilitation Center, 13 March 2009.

\(^{90}\) Ibid; and interview with Ilham Bagirov, Ahmedly Prosthetic Orthopedic Rehabilitation Center, Baku, 13 March 2009.

\(^{91}\) Interview with Seadat Mahmudova, Head Physician, Rehabilitation Center of Invalids of the Republic, Baku, 16 March 2009.


\(^{93}\) Ibid; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 811.


tailoring. Ojag also provided support to develop a marketing strategy and business plan to enable the center to distribute its goods to a wider population.

In November 2008, the NGO Centre of Social and Psychological Rehabilitation for Youth (also called “Dirchelish”) and ANAMA began a five-month project funded by the United States Embassy in Azerbaijan to ensure equal opportunities in employment and education for young mine survivors.

AzCBL ran micro-credit projects in two regions in 2008, funded by the Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims Aid. Four mine/ERW survivors and 20 family members of survivors participated in the project. All loans were repaid, enabling the project to continue. AzCBL also received a grant to run a legal awareness campaign targeting persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, funded through the Abilis Foundation.

National legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education and access to healthcare, or other state-provided services. Yet discrimination against persons with disabilities was reported in 2008. A number of international and local NGOs ran educational campaigns to change social perceptions of children with disabilities and to encourage their social integration. Most public buildings remained inaccessible to persons with disabilities.


Support for Mine Action

No comprehensive long-term cost estimates are known to exist for meeting all mine action needs in Azerbaijan. The current ANAMA workplan includes several strategic funding objectives, including the development of a national private sector partnership, establishing an in-country trust fund for mine action and establishing a charitable fund in support of mine victim activities. As a result of joint research by the Azerbaijan government and the World Bank into the return of internally displaced persons to Nagorno-Karabakh in the event of a resolution to the conflict with Armenia, the head of ANAMA stated in September 2007 that US$600 million was required to complete mine and UXO clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied areas of Azerbaijan.

International support to mine action

In 2007, the UN reported that the government “has expressed an interest in Azerbaijan’s potential transition to a donor country…and pursuing opportunities for regional leadership” including international support of mine action. In June 2009, Azerbaijan began a training program for mine clearance personnel from the Afghan National Mine Action Authority. The government is reportedly funding the program, in which four groups of Afghan personnel will observe and receive training from ANAMA staff in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has not reported a

99 Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, AzCBL, 25 June 2009.
100 Ibid, 24 June 2009.
valuation for this in-kind assistance. In July 2009, ANAMA initiated training at its Goygol Regional Training Base for personnel of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia.

**National support for mine action**

ANAMA reported national funding in 2008 totaling $6,312,500, an increase from $2,235,296 provided in 2007. In total, Azerbaijan has reportedly contributed roughly $12.3 million to the mine action program from 1999 to the end of 2008, to cover the costs of capacity-building, resource mobilization, and overall support to the mine action program.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, four countries reported providing $1,723,262 (€1,170,217) to mine action in Azerbaijan. Reported international mine action funding in 2008 was approximately 54% less than reported in 2007. There are no baseline statistics or cost estimates against which to measure the adequacy of 2008 funding levels.

The ITF reported supporting a VA project in Azerbaijan during 2008, with funding for micro-credit and small business training to landmine survivors. Austria, Slovenia and South Korea were reported as donors. The ITF reported funding from South Korea of $70,000 for VA in Azerbaijan in 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Via Department of State Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related program</td>
<td>$1,480,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Capacity-building, mine clearance</td>
<td>$163,005 (€87,897)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency</td>
<td>Emergency mine action</td>
<td>$73,630 (€50,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$6,627 (€4,500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$1,723,262 (€1,170,217)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

109 ANAMA reported receiving $2,579,231 in annual international funding for 2008. Donors reporting funding in 2008 were: NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund ($123,648); Sweden ($23,858); UK ($271,490); UNDP ($350,000); US ($1,613,113); and the World without Mines Foundation, Switzerland, ($177,122).
BAHRAIN

Ten-Year Summary

The Kingdom of Bahrain has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty but has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996. Since 2004, it has shown increasing interest in the Mine Ban Treaty and in 2008 said it was closely studying accession. Ministry of Defense officials have said Bahrain keeps a “limited” stock of antipersonnel mines for training purposes only.

Mine Ban Policy

Bahrain has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Increased interest in treaty accession seen in 2007 did not appear to have intensified in 2008 or 2009.1 In a November 2008 letter to the ICBL, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “Bahrain endorses the treaty’s aims and principles and continues to study closely the possibility of accession. Such accession would involve complex legal, domestic and international issues, and a number of relevant authorities in Bahrain are continuing to carry out close study of such issues.”2 Officials have also cited the need to coordinate with other Gulf Cooperation Council member states regarding accession.3

Bahrain was one of the focal countries during the ICBL’s universalization activities at the time of the 10th anniversary of the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 March 2009.4

Bahrain did not participate as an observer in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 or in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. This was in contrast to its attendance at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007 and the June 2008 intersessional meetings.

Bahrain has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, including Resolution 63/42 promoting universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty on 2 December 2008.

Bahraini officials have stated that the country has never produced, exported, or used antipersonnel mines and is not mine-affected.5 Ministry of Defense officials have said Bahrain keeps a “limited” stock of antipersonnel mines for training purposes only.6

Bahrain is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. As of June 2009, it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.7

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1 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 814. In November 2007, during an ICBL mission, members of the Bahraini House of Representatives, including the Vice-Speaker, expressed support for accession to the treaty, and a Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative spoke of accelerating the accession process. In May 2007, in response to an ICBL letter, Bahrain wrote, “His Highness the Prime Minister and his Government are tackling this issue with sincere concern and full commitment.” During a March 2007 ICBL mission, several Bahraini officials and legislators expressed support for accession to the treaty.


3 Various officials expressed this to ICBL delegation members during advocacy visits in 2008 and 2009.

4 See “1400 NGOs called on Bahrain to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty,” Alwasat, 1 March 2009; and “Bahrain joining the Mine Ban Treaty will enforce its international image,” Alwatan, 2 March 2009.

5 ICBL meeting with Mohamed Ghassan Shaiko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Manama, 12 April 2005. Notes by the ICBL.


China

Ten-Year Summary

The People’s Republic of China has continued to insist on the military necessity of antipersonnel mines, but has endorsed the “ultimate goal of a total ban.” Since 2003, China has shown increased interest in the Mine Ban Treaty. After repeatedly abstaining from voting on the annual pro-ban treaty UN General Assembly resolution from 1997 to 2004, it has voted in favor from 2005 to 2008. China has not laid any antipersonnel mines in the past 10 years, its export moratorium has remained in place, and officials told Landmine Monitor in 2008 that production facilities were either idle, shut down, or converted to manufacture other products. While still believed to have the world’s largest stockpile of antipersonnel mines, since the late 1990s China has reported the destruction of more than two million stockpiled mines that had either expired or were not compliant with Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It has also modified antipersonnel mines that did not meet the protocol’s requirements, most notably for detectability.

China is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) along its borders with India, Russia, and Vietnam, although three clearance “campaigns” on the border with Vietnam since 1992 have vastly reduced the extent of the problem and promoted significant cross-border trade.

The exact number of mine and ERW casualties between 1999 and 2009 is unknown but likely higher than reported. There was no systematic mine/ERW risk education (RE) in China, but since 2005, the People’s Liberation Army has provided some ad hoc RE in Yunnan province. Since 1999, mine/ERW survivors have lacked access to services because of centralization in urban areas and cost. Disability awareness and legislation have improved, especially since 2007, but the impact on the lives of mine/ERW survivors has not yet been observed.

Mine Ban Policy

China has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. China attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it stated that “China endorses the purposes and objectives of the Convention, and appreciates the humanitarian spirit reflected therein.”

On 2 December 2008, China, for the fourth consecutive year, voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution (Resolution 63/42) calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. China stated that its vote “reflects the recognition and attention that China gives to the important status and role of the Convention.”

China attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, but made no statements. In an interview with Landmine Monitor at that time, a Chinese official gave no indication of further movement toward joining the Mine Ban Treaty.

China is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, and has made clear its preference for the CCW restrictive approach that still considers use of antipersonnel mines to be legitimate. China attended the Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2008 and submitted its annual report required by Article 13 in September 2008.

China is not party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. China has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

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2 Ibid.
**Use, production, and transfer**

China has been one of the world’s largest producers of antipersonnel mines. Two government-owned companies, China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and Chinese State Arsenals, produced at least 22 types of antipersonnel mines, including six copies of Soviet designs.\(^5\) Since 1997, antipersonnel mine production in China has been limited to mines with self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms, which are compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II.\(^6\) Officials told Landmine Monitor in 2008 that production facilities were either idle, shut down, or converted to manufacture other products;\(^7\) there has been no official confirmation of this information.

In September 2008, China repeated that it was making progress in developing alternative weapons to antipersonnel landmines.\(^8\)

Since 1996, China has had a formal moratorium on the export of any mines that do not comply with Amended Protocol II. In practice, it is not known to have exported any type of antipersonnel mine since that time. China has apparently not laid new minefields in many years, but reserves the right to do so.

**Stockpiling and destruction**

China is believed to have the largest antipersonnel mine stockpile in the world. Landmine Monitor has estimated the Chinese antipersonnel mine stockpile at 110 million, including perhaps 100 million Type 72 mines.\(^9\) Chinese officials dispute this figure but have never offered an alternative number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines.\(^10\)

In ratifying Amended Protocol II, China exercised the optional nine-year deferral period for compliance with key restrictions. The deadline for China to comply with the protocol’s technical specifications on the detectability and reliability of antipersonnel mines was 3 December 2007. In November 2007, the government stated that “China has strictly implemented obligations of the Protocol. China conducted technical modification to or destroyed stockpiled APLs [antipersonnel landmines] which failed to meet the requirements of the Protocol.”\(^11\)

However, China continues to possess stocks of non-compliant antipersonnel mines whose use would be prohibited under Amended Protocol II. The protocol does not prohibit possession, or require destruction, of stockpiles of non-compliant mines, it only prohibits their use. China’s September 2008 Article 13 report states, “In 2008, Chinese military continued to destroy a group of out-dated Anti-personnel landmines and other explosives according to the CCW Op Prot II.”\(^12\) When asked to clarify this statement, a Chinese official said that these were old mines that were not compliant with Amended Protocol II and had been scheduled for destruction. He said destruction will continue in the coming years.\(^13\)

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\(^6\) Interview with Shen Jian, Deputy Division Director, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 23 March 2006. This information has also been stated in China’s Article 13 reports.

\(^7\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 817.


\(^9\) The Landmine Monitor estimate is based on interviews with non-Chinese government officials involved in CCW Amended Protocol II discussions in 1995 and 1996.


\(^12\) Article 13 Report, Form C, September 2008.

\(^13\) Telephone interview with Wang Chang, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of China to the UN in Geneva, 29 May 2009.
China’s most recent Article 13 report notes that new techniques will allow them to accelerate the process of destroying obsolete mines. China has reported destroying quantities of antipersonnel mines for the past several years, but has provided few concrete details.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

China has emplaced antipersonnel mines on its borders with India, the Russian Federation, and Vietnam. The United States estimated in the 1990s that China had planted some 10 million mines along these borders. China’s military has estimated that around two million mines of a wide variety of types were emplaced on the Vietnam border alone.

Minefields on the Vietnam border have inflicted heavy casualties among local residents and cross-border traders, caused loss of livestock, and held back cultivation of land. At the end of 2008, Chinese media cited local authorities in Yunnan province as reporting that the border prefecture of Wenshan alone had almost 6,000 landmine casualties since 1979. Sharen village in the prefecture’s Funing county is said to be known internationally as a landmine-ridden village. Most of the 87 villagers have reportedly lost one or both legs to landmines.

China reported in December 1999 that the mine threat on its side of the border with Vietnam, namely in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, “has been basically removed” following major clearance operations between 1992 and 1999. At that time, however, the border had not been fully demarcated, and several dozen square kilometers of land where minefields remained were disputed. Border demarcation and clearance of these mined areas, which restarted in 2005, were reported to be nearly complete by the end of 2008.

The clearance has paved the way for prosperous border trade. China has been Vietnam’s largest trade partner since 2007, with trade hitting US$16.6 billion in the first 10 months of 2008, according to the Chinese government.

**Casualties**

In 2008, three new antipersonnel mine casualties were reported; two men and one woman were injured in Malipo county along the Sino-Vietnamese border. In 2007, two antipersonnel mine casualties occurred in Yunnan province. A Chinese deminer was also injured in Lebanon in March 2008.

No new mine/ERW casualties were reported for 2009 through 1 April. Due to the lack of public information about mine/ERW casualties, it is certain that some go unreported.

15 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 818; Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 809; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 870; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 689–690. These cite information which China has made available in its Article 13 reports or in statements by China at meetings of States Parties to the CCW.
18 Ibid.
19 Ministry of Defense, “Postwar Demining Operations in China,” December 1999, p. 11. Before the clearance operations, there were said to be more than 560 minefields covering a total area of over 300km².
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
In June 2008, a Chinese official said that no mine/ERW casualties had occurred in China or among Chinese citizens (including deminers) since 1999, but in 2009 a representative of the Chinese military was quoted as saying: “Almost every minesweeping soldier has a scar on their [sic] body.”

Landmine Monitor has identified 5,707 mine/ERW casualties, mostly in Wenshan prefecture in Yunnan province. This figure was confirmed when at the end of 2008 Chinese media cited local authorities in Yunnan province as reporting that the border prefecture of Wenshan alone had had almost 6,000 landmine casualties since 1979. In Sharen village in the prefecture’s Funing county, “Most of the 87 villagers have lost one or both of their legs to landmines.”

Since 2000, 16 additional mine casualties (all injured) have been reported, although the actual number is probably significantly higher.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
There is no formal mine action program in China. Mine clearance is conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a military activity. Demining of the Vietnam border was conducted in three “campaigns” in Yunnan province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The first campaign in 1992–1994 cleared 102.8km² and resulted in another 159.5km² being “closed off.” The second campaign in 1997–1999 reportedly cleared some 500,000 landmines and 180,000 ERW, but no details were provided of the area cleared. Press reports cited claims by the Chinese military that this second clearance operation was the largest in world military history.

These two campaigns did not, however, deal with minefields located in disputed areas of the border, where 500,000 mines reportedly covered 40km². After technical survey of mined areas in the former disputed area on the Vietnam border, China embarked on the third clearance campaign, in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and Yunnan province, in 2005 which continued through 2008.

Victim assistance
Mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities under China’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010). The Chinese Disabled People’s Federation (CDPF) coordinates disability issues and serves as the Secretariat for the State Council Working Committee on Disability, a body including representatives of government ministries and agencies.

Data collection and management
It is believed that the government collects information on mine/ERW casualties, but this information is not publicly available.
Risk Education

No systematic risk education (RE) activities were recorded in 2008, but in June 2008 a Chinese official reported that the PLA carried out mine awareness campaigns for civilians living in former disputed areas in Yunnan province. These activities have been ongoing since 2005, when the PLA began providing RE to civilians as a trial.

Between 1999 and 2009, the only reported RE took place in Yunnan province; this included awareness-raising on markings for local residents and RE for children in school and at home in 2003.

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown but at least 4,224. In 2008, access to services for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, improved in major cities but the majority (75%) who live in rural areas had limited access to services. Access to assistance is unequal due to the centralization of services in cities and increasing costs. While many physical rehabilitation service providers exist in China, the two main providers are the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the CDPF. However, the hospitals under the Ministry of Health are also playing an increasing role in physical rehabilitation services.

In 2007, new regulations on the employment of persons with disabilities were passed. However, in 2008, fewer than 1% of persons with disabilities were assisted in finding employment, and only 17% received a pension or subsidy. In July 2008, China revised its Law on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities and included measures to improve social security. While conditions for persons with disabilities are still far from what the law calls for, this reform created a “relatively clear general regulatory framework.” Advances have also been made in raising disability awareness. On 1 August 2008, China ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol.

At the end of 2008, the ICRC completed the first five years of its support to the Red Cross Society of China, Yunnan Branch’s (RCSC-Yunnan) rehabilitation activities for poor amputees. It helped establish a center in Kunming and two repair workshops, supported training, and donated materials and equipment. As of 2008, the RCSC-Yunnan managed all physical rehabilitation activities, but the ICRC planned to continue to monitor and provide materials. In 2008, RCSC-Yunnan provided 40 prostheses (a quarter of the total 176 produced) to mine survivors, including to four people who had never previously had access to services. Between 2004 and 2008, RCSC-Yunnan assisted nearly 300 mine/ERW survivors.

40 Ibid.
42 Interview with Ma Ying Ming, President, the China Disabled People’s Federation, Wenshan, 27 February 2003.
43 Email from Jean Van Wetter, HI, 30 March 2009; and email from Iris Li, Support Services Coordinator, HI, 26 July 2009.
46 Email from Jean Van Wetter, HI, 27 July 2009.
48 Email from Thierry Meyrat, ICRC, 23 March 2009.
50 Email from Jean Van Wetter, HI, 30 March 2009.
51 Ibid.
53 Email from Thierry Meyrat, ICRC, 23 March 2009; and email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 29 July 2009.
Support for Mine Action

China provides mine action assistance abroad under a joint program started by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense in 1998. The annual budget for mine action support is around CNY6 million (approximately $860,000), including a contribution to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. In view of budgetary constraints, countries are said to be selected according to the urgency of their needs. Since 2007, China has provided financial support for demining in Ecuador, Eritrea, and Peru. In November 2008, China reported having contributed funds for mine action to Ecuador, Ethiopia, and Peru, but without specifying the dates or value of contributions.

China has stepped up its contribution to international humanitarian demining operations by sending engineers to participate in UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon. As of April 2008, China had four 15-person teams of combat engineers (each including 10 deminers/explosive ordnance disposal operators) deployed with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) as the Chinese Engineer Battalion (CHINBATT), operating in areas south of the Litani river. A 275-person unit of engineers prepared to deploy to Lebanon in February 2009 for the fifth rotation of Chinese troops in UNIFIL.

The first contingent, consisting of three demining teams, arrived in Lebanon in May 2006 and became operational in August 2006 after the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre South Lebanon (MACC-SL) provided assistance in developing CHINBATT’s standing operating procedures and training to international standards and Lebanese National Technical Standards and Guidelines. The teams were trained by MACC-SL for battle area clearance (BAC) in order to assist clearance of cluster munition remnants.

The first three teams rotated back to China in February 2007 and were replaced by four teams, also trained and accredited for BAC. They were replaced by another four teams who received accreditation in November 2007, two for BAC and two for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). A fourth rotation occurred in May 2008, and a fifth team formed in January 2009 prepared to deploy in February. China reported in January 2009 that its engineers had destroyed more than 600 landmines since September 2007. Since their first deployment, one Chinese team member was wounded during an EOD operation in November 2007. The casualty had not been certified for EOD by MACC-SL.

At the 2007 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, China pledged “to continue to support and take part in the humanitarian demining operations in Africa” and to “provide financial and material assistance and related training for African countries within its capacity.” In 2007, China provided training and equipment for 47 deminers from Angola,
Burundi, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique at the PLA Engineering Science and Technology University in Nanjing.\textsuperscript{63}

Starting in April 2008, China sponsored a six-week mine clearance training course for 20 military officers from northern and southern Sudan at the PLA Engineering Science and Technology University.\textsuperscript{64} In January 2009, China donated 20 sets of mine clearance equipment to the Government of Sudan.\textsuperscript{65} China also sent a four-person team to Egypt to train deminers and in January 2009 provided 70 detectors.\textsuperscript{66}

China continued in 2009 to contribute engineers to UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon. As of April 2009, it had four 15-person teams of combat engineers deployed with UNIFIL. In March 2009, the contingent received certification from the UN Mission in Sudan for mine and battle area clearance.\textsuperscript{67} China did not report the value of in-kind contributions to Lebanon in 2008.


\textsuperscript{64} “China launches humanitarian demining training course for Sudan,” Xinhua, 7 April 2008, www.chinaview.cn; and interview with Shen Jian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 1 April 2008.

\textsuperscript{65} “China presents demining equipment to Sudan,” Xinhua (Khartoum), 28 January 2009, english.sina.com.cn 2009.


\textsuperscript{67} “Chinese de-mining troops in Lebanon get UNMACC certification,” People’s Liberation Army Daily, 23 March 2009, english.pladaily.com.cn.
**CUBA**

**Ten-Year Summary**

The Republic of Cuba has not conducted any mine clearance in its minefields around the United States naval base at Guantánamo over the last 10 years.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Cuba has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In a February 2009 meeting with an ICBL delegation, Cuba’s Ambassador to Nicaragua reaffirmed Cuba’s support for the humanitarian aspects of the Mine Ban Treaty but also emphasized that Cuban policy on antipersonnel mines is governed by its view of the military utility of the weapon. He expressed Cuba’s interest in attending the Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference in Colombia in November 2009.1

On 2 December 2008, Cuba abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had with previous annual General Assembly resolutions in support of the antipersonnel mine ban. Earlier, it explained its opposition, saying that due to continued “hostility and aggression” against it, Cuba was unable to renounce the use of mines needed for the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It stated that it would continue to support efforts to address the impact of landmines “which maintain the necessary balance between humanitarian concerns and national security.”2

Cuba did not attend as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009.3

Cuba’s state-owned Union of Military Industries (Unión de las Industrias Militares, UIM) is believed, in the absence of any denial or clarification from the government, to continue to produce antipersonnel mines.4 Since 1996, Cuba has stated on several occasions that it does not and has never exported antipersonnel mines.5 There is no official information available on the size and composition of Cuba’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines.6 Cuba declined to respond to a questionnaire submitted by Landmine Monitor.7

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1 ICBL meeting with Amb. Luis Hernández Ojeda, Embassy of Cuba, Managua, Nicaragua, 25 February 2009. Notes by the ICBL.
3 Cuba last attended Mine Ban Treaty meetings in 2006 (Seventh Meeting of States Parties) and 2004 (First Review Conference).
4 Jane’s Information Group lists Cuba as producing three types of antipersonnel mines (a plastic blast mine and two types of stake-mounted fragmentation mines) as well as an antivehicle mine. *Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance 2008*, (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008), CD-edition. According to the US Department of Defense, Cuba has produced three different types of antipersonnel mines: PMFC-1 and PMFH-1 fragmentation mines and the PMM-1 wooden box mine. US Department of Defense, ORDATA Online, ordatamines.maic.jmu.edu.
5 Letter from Juan Antonio Fernández Palacios, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 June 2003. Cuban antipersonnel mines have, however, been cleared by deminers in Angola and Nicaragua.
6 One source has reported that Cuba stockpiles the Soviet-manufactured OZM-4, POMZ-2, and POMZ-2M mines, in addition to mines manufactured domestically. Online update, *Jan e’S Mines and Mine Clearance*, 18 November 1999.
7 Email from Rodolfo Benítez Versón, Permanent Mission of Cuba to the UN in New York, 23 February 2009, noted that the questionnaire had been forwarded to Havana. Cuba has declined to provide updated information to Landmine Monitor every year since 2003.
Cuba is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) but has not joined Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Cuba has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.8

**Scope of the Problem**

Cuba’s mine contamination remains unchanged from previous years.9 Cuba maintains minefields around the United States naval base at Guantánamo in the southeast of Cuba. In 2007, Cuba said it carries out “a strict policy with regard to guaranteeing a responsible use of antipersonnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for [Cuba’s] national security.”10 According to an earlier statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, existing minefields are duly “marked, fenced and guarded” in accordance with CCW Amended Protocol II.11 According to a book published in 2008, mines laid around the naval base detonate “at least once a month,” but it has not been possible to independently confirm this claim.12

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12 “The Cuban mines detonate at least once a month, sometimes starting fires that sweep across the fence line. [Staff Sergeant Kaveh Wooley of the US Marines] ... described a fire that started the previous summer and turned into a giant cook-off, with about 30 mines exploding....” Daniel P. Erikson, *Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution* (USA, Bloomsbury, October 2008), pp. 196–197.
Egypt

Ten-Year Summary

The Arab Republic of Egypt has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, insisting that it needs antipersonnel mines for border defense. Egypt has abstained on every annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution. Egypt has often participated as an observer in Mine Ban Treaty meetings, most recently in November 2008. In 2004, Egypt said that the government had imposed a moratorium on production and export of antipersonnel mines, claiming that it last produced in 1988 and exported in 1984.

Egypt has made slow progress in setting up a civilian mine action program to support the clearance of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) on its territory dating back to World War II. Clearance operations, part of the first phase of a joint government-UNDP project related to the North West Coast, began in February 2009.

Landmine Monitor recorded at least 190 mine/ERW casualties (55 killed and 135 injured) in Egypt between 1999 and 2008. There has never been a formal risk education program in Egypt, and only very limited ad hoc activities have been reported in the last 10 years, including in 2008. Progress in recent years has been made in providing mine/ERW survivors in Egypt with medical care and economic support. However, there is no national victim assistance strategy in Egypt and the majority of survivors did not receive specialized assistance in 2008. Discrimination against persons with disabilities continued to be reported in 2008.

Mine Ban Policy

Egypt has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Egypt has often stated its reasons for opposing the treaty, including that antipersonnel mines are seen as a key means for securing Egypt’s borders and that responsibility for clearance is not assigned in the treaty to those who laid the mines in the past.

On 2 December 2008, Egypt was one of only 18 countries that abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42, which promotes the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Egypt has abstained on similar resolutions in previous years. In a statement to the UN First Committee, Egypt said it abstained,

“… due to the particular unbalanced nature of this instrument which was developed and concluded outside the United Nations context…. Egypt views this convention as lacking balance between the humanitarian consideration related to APLM [antipersonnel landmine] production and their legitimate military use for border protection. Furthermore, the convention does not acknowledge the legal responsibility of States for demining APLM they themselves have laid, in particular in territories of other States, making it almost impossible for many States to meet alone the Convention’s demining requirements….The mentioned weaknesses are only complemented by the weak international cooperation system of the Convention which remains limited in its effect and much dependent on the will of donor States. The weaknesses of Ottawa convention have kept the largest world producers and some of the world’s most heavily affected States outside its regime, making the potential for its universality questionable and reminding us all of the value of concluding arms-control and disarmament agreements in the context of United Nations and not outside its framework.”

Egypt attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but it did not make any statements. It did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, although it has often attended these meetings in the past.

In March 2009, an Egyptian parliamentarian stated that the government had failed to adequately address the problem of landmines in Egypt, calling for the dismissal of the Minister of State for International Cooperation. He cited the slow removal of mines as delaying Egypt’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.2

Egypt signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons in 1981, but has not ratified it. It attended as an observer the Tenth Annual Conference of State Parties to Amended Protocol II in November 2008.

Egypt has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.3

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Egypt has stated that it stopped production of antipersonnel mines in 1988 and export in 1984.4 At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2004, Egypt’s Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister stated that “the Egyptian government has imposed a moratorium on all export and production activities related to anti-personnel mines.” This was the first time that Egypt publicly and officially announced a moratorium on production.6 This statement, combined with the apparent lack of any production activities for many years, led Landmine Monitor to remove Egypt from its list of antipersonnel mine producers in 2005. However, Landmine Monitor still is not aware of any official decrees or laws by the government to implement permanent prohibitions on production or export of antipersonnel mines.

Egypt is believed to have a large stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but no details are available on the size and composition of the stockpile, as it is considered a national security secret.

In 2008 and 2009, Egyptian authorities continued to find and seize mines and other ordnance in the Sinai Peninsula. In July 2008, authorities discovered a large quantity of munitions, including 20 antivehicle mines, in the town of Al-Sheikh Zoeid, near Egypt’s border with Gaza.7 In August 2008, police found a cache containing 500kg of explosives taken from mines and other ordnance in the city of Rafah, bordering Gaza.8 In May 2009, Egyptian authorities reportedly seized 48 antipersonnel mines, among other weapons, allegedly destined for Palestinian groups in Gaza.9

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Egypt is contaminated with mines and ERW, especially UXO, from World War II. Most of the battles took place in the area between the Quattara depression and Alamein at the Mediterranean coast. Other affected areas lie around the city of Marsa Matrouh and at Sallum near the Libyan

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4 See, for example, Statement of Egypt, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 22 September 2006.
6 Egypt told a UN assessment mission in February 2000 that it ceased export of antipersonnel mines in 1984 and ended production in 1988, and several Egyptian officials over the years also told Landmine Monitor informally that that production and trade had stopped. However, Egypt had not responded to repeated requests by Landmine Monitor to make that position formal and public in writing. Thus Landmine Monitor kept Egypt on its list of producers. Egypt reportedly produced two types of low metal content blast antipersonnel mines, several variations of bounding fragmentation mines, and a Claymore-type mine. There is no publicly available evidence that Egypt has produced or exported antipersonnel mines in recent years. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 957.
7 "Weapons and contraband tunnels found in Egypt’s Sinai.," Agence France-Presse, 18 July 2008.
In addition, ERW from armed conflicts between Egypt and Israel in 1956, 1967, and 1973 remains to be cleared, especially in eastern areas (the Sinai Peninsula and Red Sea coast).

No reliable figures for the extent of contamination exist. The joint Egypt/UNDP project document of November 2006 referred to 2,680km² of contamination, which is almost four times the estimated contaminated area in Afghanistan. Similarly, the number of mines and ERW that remain to be cleared can be little more than speculation. The Egyptian army has estimated that 16.7 million explosive items have still to be found, including both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and much larger quantities of UXO.

Casualties

In 2008, there were 40 new mine/ERW casualties recorded in Egypt in eight governorates from 11 incidents, which resulted in 14 people killed and 26 injured. Casualties included 28 men, one woman (injured), 11 boys (seven killed and four injured), and no girls. ERW caused 33 of the casualties, landmines caused six, and an unknown device caused one casualty. Three incidents involving four casualties occurred in Matruh governorate, where the Ministry of International Cooperation (MIC) and UNDP mine action program operates. The other incidents occurred outside the area covered by the mine action project, including two incidents in Ismailia, and one incident in each of Albihira, Al Suez, Alqaliobia, Alexandria, North Sinai, and Alsharqia governorates. Two incidents causing five casualties occurred while people were trying to illegally cross the Egypt-Libya border. The vast majority of casualties occurred during activities relating to the scrap metal trade (29 casualties). Other activities at the time of incident included playing with ERW (three), playing/recreation (three), travel (three), agriculture (one), and fishing/hunting (one). Except for the two incidents that occurred at the Egypt-Libya border, none of the casualties witnessed any danger signs or had received risk education, despite some living in or near to mine/ERW-affected areas.

The 2008 figures represent an increase compared to the 25 mine/ERW casualties (eight killed and 17 injured) recorded in 2007, and is the highest annual number of casualties since 1999. One incident in May 2008 in Alexandria governorate, the explosion of a World War II shell that was being dismantled for scrap metal caused 17 casualties (four killed and 13 injured). People in the street were caught in the blast, as well as those in the workshop.

Casualties continued in 2009, with 22 new mine/ERW casualties recorded (13 people killed and nine injured), as of 30 June 2009. Nine casualties were boys (eight killed and one injured) and the rest were men. Activities at the time of the incidents included agriculture (four), fishing/hunting (four), travel (three), playing with ERW (three), playing/recreation (three), and providing security (one); the activities of four casualties were unknown. In May 2009, a police officer was injured when he handled a landmine while working at the Egypt-Israel border.

The MIC, with UNDP and the local NGO Peace Gardens, conducted a mine/ERW survivor survey from January to May 2008, on the North West Coast (primarily in Matruh governorate). The primary objective of the survey was to verify existing information on survivors collected by the Office of the Governor of Matruh and the governorate’s Social Solidarity Department. Interviews were also conducted to identify previously unknown survivors in cooperation with local authorities. It is estimated that some 80–90% of mine/ERW-affected communities were covered by the survey.

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13 Unless stated otherwise, information collected by Protection and Mine Action and Human Rights Foundation for Mine Victims in Egypt, and provided by Ayman Sorour, Director, Protection, Cairo, 24 July 2009.
14 It was not reported whether the casualties were caused by antipersonnel or antivehicle mines.
15 Unless stated otherwise, information collected by Protection and Mine Action and Human Rights Foundation for Mine Victims in Egypt, and provided by Ayman Sorour, Director, Protection, Cairo, 24 July 2009.
The survey identified 645 mine survivors living on the North West Coast, 94% of whom were males and three percent children. It should be noted the survey recorded the age of the person at the time of the survey, not when the mine/ERW incident occurred. Among the injured, 48% suffered upper body injuries, 37% lower body injuries, and 15% other injuries. The number of people injured annually from 2002 to 2004 was found to be 18, but by 2007 the number had decreased to three.\textsuperscript{16}

The number of mine/ERW survivors recorded in the survey was considerably lower than the estimate of 8,000 mine/ERW casualties which, according to UNDP is “understood to relate to casualties in the whole country.”\textsuperscript{17} It should be noted that the Peace Gardens survey included only those injured and those who still lived on the North West Coast at time of survey. A number of survivors particularly from Bedouin communities are assumed to have moved from the area since they were injured by mines/ERW. As a result, the survey does not capture all those injured by mines/ERW in the survey area. The survey did not include military casualties from mines/ERW. The Ministry of Defense estimated that about 700 people, soldiers and civilians, have been killed in mine explosions since 1945.\textsuperscript{18}

Landmine Monitor recorded at least 190 mine/ERW casualties (55 killed and 135 injured) in Egypt between 1999 and 2008.\textsuperscript{19}

**Risk profile**

People are at risk from a significant number of mines and UXO, especially near urban settlements and potential development areas (Alamein, Dabaa, Matruh, and Sallum). Casualties are increasingly being caused by scrap metal collection. According to the Ministry of Interior, explosives used in a number of criminal acts over the past few years have been taken from mines and ERW in the Sinai Peninsula. Population growth, new development projects, expansion of urban zones, and increased tourism has resulted in more people being in affected areas, increasing the potential for further casualties.\textsuperscript{20}

**Socio-economic impact**

The impact of contamination is said to be significant. Irrigation projects, an essential facet of national development projects in desert areas, have experienced delays because of the need to clear mines and UXO.\textsuperscript{21} It has been claimed that mines and UXO in the Western Desert may deny access to an estimated 4.8 billion barrels of oil reserves as well as 13.4 trillion cubic feet (379 billion m$^3$) of natural gas.\textsuperscript{22} New kinds of tourism, such as safari and eco-tourism, can encroach on affected areas, increasing the risk of incidents. It is necessary to warn people of potential hazards, but there is a fear of discouraging travel to the country.\textsuperscript{23}

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

In 2000, the Prime Minister issued a decree establishing a National Committee for Supervising Mine Clearance and the Development of the North West Coast to supervise demining of this area. The National Committee serves as the focal body for the North West Coast Development Plan, approved in October 2005 by the Cabinet of Ministers, as well as for mine action coordination within the Egyptian government. The committee is chaired by the Minister of International Development and Cooperation and includes experts from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Interior, the Supreme Council of Antiquities, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the National Research Institute. The committee is supported by a National Supervision Team, consisting of experts from the Egyptian Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the National Research Institute. The committee also coordinates with international organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and Landmine Monitor. The committee has established guidelines for mine clearance and demining operations, including the use of demining equipment, training of deminers, and post-demining activities. The committee has also developed a strategic plan for mine clearance and demining in the North West Coast, which includes a timeline for completing the demining process, a budget for the project, and a plan for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the demining efforts. The committee has also established a system for reporting on the progress of the demining process, including the number of mines removed, the number of casualties prevented, and the number of people living in affected areas. The committee has also established a system for coordinating with other international organizations involved in mine clearance and demining, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), and the International Mine Action Foundation (IMAF). The committee has also established a system for reporting on the progress of the demining process, including the number of mines removed, the number of casualties prevented, and the number of people living in affected areas. The committee has also established a system for coordinating with other international organizations involved in mine clearance and demining, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), and the International Mine Action Foundation (IMAF).


\textsuperscript{21} Ibid


Cooperation who oversees and coordinates mine action activities. The committee consists of 20 ministries, four governorates, and five NGOs. A project agreement was signed between Egypt and UNDP in November 2006 to establish a mine action program to address contamination in the North West Coast.

On 28 October 2007, the MIC issued a decree formally establishing the Executive Secretariat for the Demining and Development of the North West Coast (the “Executive Secretariat”) as a unit in the ministry.24 The Executive Secretariat is the coordination body for all mine action activities within the Egyptian government, with the UN, civil society, and the donor community. In June 2008, the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) was installed in the secretariat’s Cairo headquarters.

A UNDP Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) was recruited in October 2007 and assigned to the Executive Secretariat. Following his resignation at the end of April 2009, recruitment of a new CTA was ongoing, but had not been completed as of August 2009.25

Victim Assistance
Victim assistance (VA) is one of the Executive Secretariat’s four strategic goals. Part of the long-term development plan of the North West Coast is the development of social services and local community capacities, through which mine/ERW survivors and their families would benefit.26

The first phase of the UNDP and government project “Support to the North West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Project,” scheduled for February 2007 to July 2008, envisioned implementing a VA needs assessment, developing a VA strategy, and initiating implementation of the strategy. By June 2009, the casualty survey had been completed and subsequently some potential projects had been identified, and one had started implementation.27

In November 2008, the Executive Secretariat contracted a consultant to carry out a study on planned local initiatives by NGOs for mine/ERW survivors and families of casualties in the North West Coast region.28 A field office of the Executive Secretariat was established in Mara Matruh in January 2009, tasked with coordinating VA activities and updating casualty data, among other responsibilities.29 A national VA strategy had yet to be completed, however, and the implementation of the second phase had not begun as of April 2009.30 UNDP noted that this phase was scheduled to start on 31 December 2009.31

The Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Social Solidarity share responsibility for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.

Data collection and management
Two NGOs, Protection Against Armaments and Consequences (Protection) and the Mine Action and Human Rights Foundation for Mine Victims in Egypt jointly collected mine/ERW casualty data in 2008. The two organizations gathered information through interviews with government and NGO staff, from media reports, hospital records, and police reports. The information was compiled and provided to Landmine Monitor by Protection.

In June 2008, IMSMA was installed at the head office of the Executive Secretariat in Cairo to record casualty data. The MIC, with UNDP and Peace Gardens, conducted a mine/ERW survivor survey from January to May 2008, primarily in Matruh governorate. The primary objective of the survey was to verify existing information on survivors collected by the Office of the Governor of Matruh and the governorate’s Social Solidarity Department. Interviews were also conducted to identify previously unknown survivors in cooperation with local authorities. It

25 Email from Hala Nour, Monitoring and Coordination Officer, Executive Secretariat, 8 August 2009.
30 Email from Ulrich Tietze, 25 July 2009.
31 Email from Rania Hedeya, UNDP, 31 August 2009.
is estimated that some 80–90% of mine/ERW-affected communities were covered by the survey. By September 2008, the data collected by the Peace Gardens survey had been integrated into IMSMA.32

**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plan**

The “Support to the North West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Project” between Egypt and UNDP was signed in November 2006 and, following an extension, was due to run until December 2009. This project constitutes the first phase and was to focus on the following: (i) The establishment of an Executive Secretariat for Mine Clearance and Development of the North West Coast within the MIC to ensure that an effective coordination mechanism for the North West Coast Development Plan is in place and that mine action support is provided to facilitate the implementation of the Plan; (ii) The development of a communications and resource mobilization strategy and coordination with donors, civil society and private sector; (iii) The conduct of pilot demining operations in response to identified humanitarian and developmental needs; (iv) The conduct of risk education/VA; and (v) An outline of the scope of Phase II. Based on the achievements and lessons learned of the first phase, the aim of the second phase will be to expand the mine clearance operations, enlarge the scale and accelerate the implementation of development projects in the area, strengthen the structures and procedures of the Executive Secretariat, mobilize more resources, and expand victim assistance activities.33

In July 2009, the Executive Secretariat reportedly released a strategy paper for risk education, prepared in collaboration with the GICHD. The Executive Secretariat planned to launch a “structured campaign” later in the year.34

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Egypt has been slow to set up a functioning civilian mine action program, despite support from UNDP, and there has been little public reporting of progress in demining. It has also suffered from a significant turnover of staff.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

The Egyptian army is the only authorized demining operator in Egypt and it has carried out demining operations both within and outside the country. It is reported that 300 army personnel have been involved in clearance, which is conducted according to national standing operating procedures.35 Demining operations are usually carried out using manual techniques. The army claims to have adequate experience with technical survey, which will be a key component of the demining operations given that extensive survey and area reduction will be required because of the lack of accurate minefield maps.

From 7 February 2009 until 31 July 2009, demining operations were reported to have cleared 210,214 items of UXO and 13,720 mines from 14,474 acres (approximately 58.6km²).36 It has not been possible to verify these figures, which seem high given the available resources.

**Risk Education**

There has not yet been a formal risk education (RE) program in Egypt, and only very limited *ad hoc* activities have been reported in the last 10 years, including in 2008.

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33 Information from Executive Secretariat, contained in email from Reuben McCarthy, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Specialist, Sub-Regional Office for Eastern and Southern Africa, UNDP, 31 August 2009.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Email from Hala Nour, Executive Secretariat, 8 August 2009; and information provided by Hala Nour, in email forwarded by Amb. Fathy El Shazly, Executive Secretariat, 30 August 2009.
RE was included in the joint UNDP/Egypt project signed in November 2006, yet little has been implemented. In July 2008, the Chair of the State Information Service stated that a three-month RE campaign in Matruh, Alexandria, Suez, Al-Arish, northern and southern Sinai, and Ismailia governorates would take place, but no activities had taken place as of July 2009.

A consultant was hired to draft a strategy and needs assessment in 2008, but after the field work had been conducted, the strategy was not completed. In November 2008, UNDP’s CTA stated that an RE poster had been designed and that RE sessions were underway. As of July 2009, the poster had not been distributed. RE sessions, conducted by the RE officer at the Executive Secretariat, consisted of general discussions with people about the dangers of mines and UXO during the collection of casualty data. Emergency RE was also delivered in late 2008 and in 2009 in response to incidents.

The Executive Secretariat has gathered RE materials from other countries to adapt for use in Egypt; it has also obtained a set of RE resources for children which, once finalized, will be used through the media; and an agreement has been made with Hanz Zeidle Foundation and the Nile Media Centers (belonging to the State Information Service) to conduct RE in Matruh governorate in the school year from September 2009 to July 2010.

Prior to 2008, some very limited RE was conducted by NGOs, and media coverage of the mine issue generated some awareness of the danger of mines and UXO.

### Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown, but is at least 658. In 2008, the government began a number of initiatives to assist survivors. Previously, very few services were available to survivors. The Executive Secretariat began facilitating the provision of physical therapy to high-priority survivors, supporting the development of a community-based development association for survivors and families of casualties, and initiating vocational and economic support to survivors.

In July 2008, the Executive Secretariat established emergency evacuation procedures for explosion incidents, including a map of all the medical facilities along the northwest coast. The government also reported the purchase of 609 new ambulances in fiscal year 2007–2008.

In general, however, government health and employment services available to the majority of survivors and persons with disabilities were of poor quality and unevenly distributed. Services were centralized in cities; few were available in rural and desert areas, where the majority of mine/ERW incidents occur and survivors live. The cost of transportation into cities for medical treatment is unaffordable for some survivors. In Matruh governorate, the most mine/ERW-affected area of the country, infrastructure is poor, social services inadequate, and education levels low. From Matruh, some casualties have to travel up to 150km to reach a hospital. The army-run Al-Agouza Center for Rehabilitation in Agouza was the only provider of comprehensive rehabilitation services in the country.

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38 Email from Ayman Sorour, Protection, 24 July 2009.
39 Email from Hagar Mostafa, Media and Mine Risk Education Officer, Executive Secretariat, 29 July 2009.
41 Email from Ayman Sorour, Protection, 24 July 2009; and telephone interview with Hagar Mostafa, Executive Secretariat, 20 August 2009.
42 Email from Hagar Mostafa, Executive Secretariat, 29 July 2009.
48 Ibid.
From the Peace Gardens survey results, the Executive Secretariat identified 206 survivors in need of artificial limbs. In October and November 2008, 27 survivors were provided with artificial limbs and physical rehabilitation through the Al-Agouza Center for Rehabilitation.49 Precedence was given to young survivors with a good occupational prognosis.50 The Executive Secretariat covered all costs for the survivors to access and receive the artificial limbs.51 In June 2009, 61 more survivors received artificial limbs at the center.52 The New Zealand government provided funds for this initiative.53

On 13 January 2008, the Minister of International Cooperation, who is also Chair of the National Demining and Development Committee, signed a cooperation agreement with the Secretary General of the Social Development Fund to offer 500 job opportunities to mine survivors and families of casualties.54 The Social Development Fund was established to finance small and medium-sized projects for persons with disabilities in Egypt, including providing vocational training and capacity-building.55 Throughout the reporting period, 33 individual projects tailored to the economic and social needs of survivors were developed through this agreement.56 However, by April 2009, no job had been provided to a survivor.57

The Executive Secretariat, in coordination with the Office of the Governor of Matruh and with substantive participation of traditional Bedouin chiefs, created the community development association Productive Society for the Survivors of Mines Accidents (PROSSMA) in 2008. PROSSMA planned to coordinate and financially support small and medium-sized enterprises owned by survivors or their families from 2009 onwards.58 The governor’s office agreed to provide land and financial and administrative support to PROSSMA.59

No laws in Egypt prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities and widespread discrimination was reported in 2008. Law provides that all businesses must designate 5% of their jobs to persons with disabilities. Statistics regarding the implementation of the employment law were unavailable and it was reported by a government official that most employers do not comply.60 Egypt ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 14 April 2009, but as of 1 July had not signed the Optional Protocol.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Egypt. In January 2008, a news report cited Egyptian officials estimating that a sum of $250 million (€169.8 million) was required for clearance of all areas in Egypt affected by mines and ERW.61 No other figure has been reported, and no detailed breakdown or explanation of costs has been provided to support the $250 million estimate.

57 Email from Ulrich Tietze, 25 July 2009.
The MIC has responsibility for developing a resource mobilization strategy to support the North West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action Project including coordination with donors, civil society and the private sector. UNDP supports the MIC in donor coordination and resource mobilization.62

**National support for mine action**

In 2006, the government of Egypt pledged to provide $261,730 to the North West Coast Development Plan and Mine Action project along with in-kind support from the Egyptian army and government ministries.63 During 2008, the Egyptian army agreed to provide 250 mine clearance personnel for the demining of two pilot areas within the North West Coast project.64

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, two countries reported contributing a total of $918,244 (€623,553) via UNDP to mine action in Egypt. Reported funding in 2008 was 25% more than reported funding in 2007. As of October 2008, UNDP Egypt reported a $780,200 shortfall in mine action funding. On 30 June 2009, UNDP and MIC agreed on a budget revision that deducted $770,000 from the budget originally set for the project (of about $3,148,000).

**2008 International Mine Action Funding to Egypt: Monetary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$775,224 (€526,432)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$143,020 (NZ$200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$918,244 (€623,553)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In February 2009, China contributed 70 sets of demining equipment and the services of five demining experts to support mine clearance in Egypt.66 China has not yet reported a valuation for this assistance.

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62 UNDP, “Mine Action on Mine Awareness Day: The Government of Egypt and UNDP sign a project document that promises to eradicate all mines from Egyptian soil,” Press release, Cairo, 4 April 2008. UNDP reported that a resource mobilization strategy was jointly approved in the first half of 2009 by UNDP and MIC. Email from Reuben McCarthy, UNDP, 31 August 2009.


FINLAND

Ten-Year Summary

In 1997, the Republic of Finland set the goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006, but in 2004 pushed the date for accession back to 2012. Finland has voted in favor of every pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution since 1997, and has participated in most Mine Ban Treaty meetings. Finland has not been willing to reveal any details about its stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but claims that all mines are in storage and none are deployed in minefields.

Mine Ban Policy

Finland has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is the only European Union (EU) country that has not signed, ratified, or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In September 2004, Finland announced that it would join the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012, six years later than its previously stated goal, and would destroy its mine stockpiles by 2016.¹

Finland attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where during the general exchange of views it reiterated its intention to join the treaty in 2012 and destroy all stockpiles by 2016.² In March 2009, a Ministry of Defense official confirmed that this timeline had not changed.³ Finland participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009, but made no statements.

On 2 December 2008, Finland voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has voted in favor of all annual pro-ban General Assembly resolutions since 1997.

Finland told Landmine Monitor in June 2008 that it will not submit a voluntary Article 7 report before acceding to the treaty, although other states not party to the treaty have done so.⁴

Finland has declared that it “does not produce or export anti-personnel landmines and, during peacetime, anti-personnel mines are in stockpiles. There are no minefields in Finland.”⁵ Production of antipersonnel mines in Finland ceased in the early 1970s, and Finland has not acquired any antipersonnel mines since then. An EU Joint Action obliges Finland not to procure more antipersonnel mines.⁶ The Ministry of Defense will not reveal details regarding Finland’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines.⁷

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¹ The decision to step back from Finland’s long-stated goal to join the treaty in 2006 was included in the Security and Defense Policy Review 2004, which was approved by parliament on 21 December 2004. The goal of joining the treaty by 2006 was first stated in December 1997, reiterated in December 1999 and December 2000, and confirmed by a government report on foreign and security policy approved by parliament in December 2001.
⁷ Following entry into force of CCW Amended Protocol II, Finland destroyed some types of antipersonnel mines (Sakaramina 57 and 61) and adapted others (SM-65). CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, 4 December 2000.
Finland has said that it needs to have alternatives to antipersonnel mines in place before joining the treaty.\(^8\) The Finnish Defense Force has suggested replacing them in part with cluster munitions. In June 2008, a Finnish diplomat confirmed that the option of replacement with cluster munitions is still being considered.\(^9\) According to the Prime Minister, it needs them to protect its borders.\(^10\) As of June 2009, Finland had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.\(^11\)

Finland is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It submitted its annual report, as required by Article 13, on 22 September 2008. Finland is also party to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

Support for Mine Action

Finland reported contributing €4,982,526 (US$7,337,268) to mine action in 2008, an increase of approximately 37% compared to 2007 and nearer to average funding levels for 2006 and earlier years.\(^12\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), HALO Trust</td>
<td>Landmine and ERW survey, mine clearance</td>
<td>$3,092,460 (€2,100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Handicap International, HALO, Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
<td>Mine/UXO victim information system, mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,568,319 (€1,065,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>HALO, ICRC, FinnChurchAid</td>
<td>Mine clearance, victim assistance</td>
<td>$1,178,080 (€800,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global or Other</td>
<td>UNMAS, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, KEO-70</td>
<td>Core funding, monitoring visits</td>
<td>$614,849 (€417,526)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
<td>Mine detection dog capacity, technical survey</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Victim assistance</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$7,337,268 (€4,982,526)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finland directed funding to Iraq in 2008 but not in 2007. All other states and Somaliland received funds in both 2007 and 2008.

\(^8\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 821. The Security and Defense Policy Review 2004 stated that the Finnish Defense Force would be provided with €200 million in extra funding over eight years for replacements for landmines, and the army would have to allocate an additional €100 million. The replacement process is to start in 2009 and continue until 2016. The Review proposed to replace antipersonnel mines with close combat weapons and sensors.


\(^10\) “Finland will not join cluster bomb ban: PM,” Agence France-Presse, 31 October 2008.


\(^12\) Email from Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 February 2009.

\(^13\) Ibid.
2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
<th>Not a State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Scattered mines and significant UXO contamination following the armed conflict with Russia in August 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>BAC: At least 7.89km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>44,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>$8,705,885</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has expressed support for it and has voted in favor of every annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the treaty. Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996. However, it appears that Georgian Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines every year from 2001 to 2004, and in 2006 in the upper Kodori Gorge.

Georgia remains contaminated by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) including cluster munition remnants. Contamination is primarily a result of conflict over the breakaway areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, most recently in August 2008, as well as from minefields around former Soviet military bases handed over to Georgia by Russia. As of 2009, a national mine action program was being established with international support.

The number of mine/ERW casualties decreased from more than 100 in 1999 to 35 in 2008. However, since Georgia has lacked a casualty data collection system, casualties are recorded from media sources, which is probably not reliable. Emergency risk education was conducted after the August 2008 conflict; previous activities were limited. Planned ICRC handover of the main prosthetics provider to local ownership was hampered by insufficient revenue and delayed state funding. There were no significant improvements in emergency medical care, psychological support, social or economic reintegration, or laws. Positive public policy measures were taken, however, to address the rights of persons with disabilities, including mine survivors. Most healthcare and other services to persons with disabilities were provided by the state, but were inadequate. Few victim assistance services were provided by NGOs.

Mine Ban Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Georgia has not made notable public statements regarding its landmine policy since April 2007, although it has continued to participate in Mine Ban Treaty meetings, including the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Over the years, Georgia has frequently stated its general support for a ban on antipersonnel mines. It has voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty every year since 1997, including Resolution 63/42 on 2 December 2008. In April 2007, Georgia stated “Georgia is well aware that the negative impact of landmines far outweighs their military value, and tries to make its possible contribution in facilitation of the process of elimination and eradication of this threat…Georgia fully shares
the principles and objectives of the Ottawa Convention and the concern of the international community regarding the challenge of anti-personnel landmines.”1

At the same time, Georgia has consistently said that it has refrained from joining the Mine Ban Treaty due to its inability to fulfill the treaty’s obligations in disputed territories not controlled by the government—Abkhazia and South Ossetia.2 In a September 2008 meeting with the ICBL, and in March 2009 communications with Landmine Monitor, Georgian officials reiterated this as a reason for not acceding to the treaty.3

Georgia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and joined Amended Protocol II on landmines on 8 June 2009 and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 22 December 2008.4 It had previously said it could not adhere to Amended Protocol II for the same reasons as the Mine Ban Treaty.5

Georgia has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.6

Use

Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996.7 In April 2007, a representative from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told States Parties, “Since that time [1996] corresponding official structures of Georgia have been strictly refraining from use of anti-personnel mines. I have the chance to confirm my country’s firm resolution to keep this commitment in the future.”8

Despite its denial of past use, it appears that Georgian Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines every year from 2001 to 2004, as well as in 2006 (see below).9 Opposition forces and Russian peacekeepers also alleged that Georgian forces laid mines in South Ossetia in 2006 and 2007. Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm the allegations.10

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2 For example, in September 2006, Georgia told States Parties, “Over the years, one of the principle reasons for not acceding to the Convention has been the existence of...territories uncontrolled by the central authorities of the state and therefore, incapability to fulfill the obligations put forward in the convention. However… discussions concerning the possibility of reconsideration of the above-stated position have started.” Statement of Georgia, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 September 2006.
3 Internal Report on ICBL Meeting with the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, 23 September 2008; email from George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009; and email from Kartlos Koranashvili, Deputy Head of Administration, Department of International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Defense, 23 March 2009.
4 Each protocol enters into force for Georgia six months after these dates on which it formally gave its consent to be bound.
7 The moratorium was proclaimed by President Eduard Shevdarnadze at the UN in September 1996 and has been repeated by officials many times since. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 792; and Note Verbale to the OSCE, 17 January 2001.
There were allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both Georgia and Russia during the heavy fighting related to South Ossetia in August 2008.\(^{11}\) Each side has denied the allegations.\(^{12}\) Human Rights Watch conducted extensive on-the-ground research in Georgia during and after the conflict in 2008, but was not able to confirm any use of antipersonnel mines. Both sides did, however, use cluster munitions, causing numerous civilian casualties.\(^{13}\)

**Upper Kodori Gorge**

The Kodori Gorge is a narrow river valley in the Zemo-Abkhazia administrative region adjoining the Abkhazia breakaway region of Georgia. Paramilitary organizations allied with Georgia occupied the northern section of the gorge in mid-2006. In mid-July 2006 new conflict erupted after a paramilitary leader refused to disarm and declared autonomy from Georgia. Georgian security forces responded by invading the gorge and seizing control of its northern section. There were reports and allegations of mine use by both Georgian forces and paramilitary units.\(^{14}\)

While not referring specifically to the Kodori Gorge operation, Georgia told Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in statements made in September 2006 and again in April 2007 that it had not used antipersonnel mines since 1996.

During the 2008 conflict, Abkhazian and Russian forces moved into the upper Kodori Gorge and retook it from Georgian forces. The British NGO HALO Trust has confirmed to Landmine Monitor that it encountered minefields suspected to be laid since 2006 containing antipersonnel mines in parts of the upper Kodori Gorge when it gained access to the area after the August 2008 conflict.\(^{15}\)

**Production, transfer, and stockpiling**

Georgian officials maintain that Georgia has never produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel landmines since independence in 1991.\(^{16}\) Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former Soviet Union, but the exact size and composition of that stock remains unknown.\(^{17}\) Georgian officials have said in the past that the moratorium on use (see above) also covers production and transfer.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{14}\) At the time, Russian peacekeepers alleged that Georgian forces laid new mines near a new Georgian checkpoint, on the northern side of Broken Bridge, the point of separation between Abkhazian and Georgian controlled sections of the gorge. Abkhazian officials accused Georgian troops of mining roads and bridges in the upper part of the gorge.

\(^{15}\) Emails from HALO, 7 August 2009 and 9 July 2009.

\(^{16}\) Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007. Georgia has said this many times in the past.


\(^{18}\) Statement to the ICBL–Georgia Committee by David Nardaia, Head, Department on International Cooperation, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, October 2006. A similar statement was made during the international workshop “Regional Cooperation and Confidence Building through Mine Action,” Tbilisi, 4–6 October 2005.
South Ossetia
South Ossetia is a breakaway region of Georgia that shares a border and has very close ties with Russia. South Ossetian officials have not made any public statements about a mine ban and have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Prior to the 2008 conflict, South Ossetia was judged to have only a minor landmine problem. The armed conflict between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia lasted one week in August 2008. As noted above, there is no evidence that either side used antipersonnel mines during the conflict. However, both used cluster munitions and a wide variety of other weapons that left behind extensive ERW contamination in South Ossetia and other parts of Georgia.

Georgia and Russia are both party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Under this instrument, the duties of user states include “provid[ing] where feasible” assistance for ERW clearance. Affected States Parties must also take “all feasible precautions” to protect civilians, including through risk education, and all States Parties “in a position to do so” must provide assistance for clearance and risk education.

Scope of the Problem
Contamination
Georgia is affected by landmines and ERW, although the full extent of the problem was not yet publicly known, pending the completion of a General Mine Action Assessment (see below). Most of the contamination is a legacy of armed conflict over the breakaway areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The conflict in August 2008 added new ERW contamination, including cluster munition remnants.

The bulk of the problem in Georgia comes from mines laid around former Russian military bases. HALO surveyed Georgia, where military restrictions permitted access, in 2004. HALO found an “immediate requirement for clearance” around Sagarejo military base about 45km east of the capital, Tbilisi, due to a remaining PFM-1 and PFM-2 mine threat in the woodlands surrounding the base used by locals. As of July 2008, however, funding for the clearance project had not been secured. All former Russian military bases on territory under Georgian control have been closed and transferred to Georgia: the last of these was handed over in November 2007. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, suspected mined areas are located in Akhalqalaqi, Gongi Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Viaziani. There is also contamination in areas around the “Red Bridge” on the border between Azerbaijan and Georgia.

19 During the Soviet era, South Ossetia was an autonomous region of the Georgian SSR. In autumn 1990 it proclaimed full sovereignty within the USSR. Georgia’s government reacted by abolishing the autonomous status of South Ossetia in December 1990, leading to armed conflict in 1991–1992. The conflict culminated with South Ossetia’s de facto secession from Georgia in 1992. In June 1992 a cease-fire brokered by Russia created a Joint Control Commission and Joint Peacekeeping Forces, with Georgian, Russian, and Ossetian units. Tensions escalated in 2004 after Georgia decided to prioritize the restoration of its territorial integrity, with increased instability and occasional skirmishes. Relations between Georgia and Russia also became increasingly strained. See HRW, “Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia,” January 2009, pp. 16–20.

20 Russia formally submitted its consent to be bound by the Protocol on 21 July 2008, and the instrument took effect for it on 21 January 2009. Georgia gave its consent to be bound on 22 December 2008, and it entered into force on 21 June 2009. After agreeing to be bound, the countries must not “defeat the object and purpose” of the Protocol, even prior to entry into force.


22 Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 6 September 2009.


25 Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

26 Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009. HALO’s survey of the area found a barrier minefield approximately 7km long.
Assessments prior to the conflict had concluded that the mine problem in South Ossetia was minor and its impact low. Following the armed conflict in August 2008, there was evidence of a potentially significant problem with UXO in South Ossetia and elsewhere in Georgia, although its full extent was not known. A 20km-wide corridor between Gori and Tskhinvali where the bulk of the conflict took place was particularly affected. According to HALO, this area has been contaminated with cluster munition remnants, S-8 and BM-21 rockets, and abandoned ammunition.  

HALO has found three types of unexploded submunitions: the AO-2.5 RTM, 9N210, and M095. As of June 2009, HALO estimated that up to 9km² of primarily agricultural land would require clearance. As of mid-August, however, it had not been granted access.

In addition to the contamination centered on South Ossetia, other areas were bombed including the upper Kodori Gorge. There is also a threat from UXO, including cluster munition remnants, in Poti harbor, which is used by the coast guard, and which was bombed during the conflict.

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified new 26 casualties due to mines, submunitions, and other ERW in 13 incidents, including nine people killed and 17 injured. Most casualties were men (17), one was a woman, and the gender of one adult was unknown. The remaining eight were children (six boys, one girl, and one of unknown gender). Eight casualties were police and the other 18 civilian. No demining casualties were reported. Five casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, two by an antivehicle mine, seven by unspecified mines, seven by submunitions, and five by unknown devices. The most common activities at the time of the incident were: collecting scrap metal (seven) and collecting wood and handling explosive devices (five each). Of the total, eight casualties were recorded in South Ossetia in four incidents. Six were police casualties (including five in one incident) and the other two were children.

This is an increase compared to 2007 when only three people were injured by mines in South Ossetia. Due to a lack of comprehensive data collection, however, the total number of casualties in 2008 is not known.

In 2008, another 11 civilian casualties were reportedly injured in four mine incidents while crossing the border area of the Gali district of Abkhazia into Georgia. Casualties from at least from three of those incidents received medical care in Georgia.

In addition, one Georgian soldier was killed by what appears to have been a landmine in Iraq in June 2008; it was not known if the device was command-detonated.

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28 HALO, “An Introduction to the Ammunition Threat in the Gori-Tskhinvali Corridor,” www.halogeorgia.org. The submunitions are stamped M095 but are said to be identical to the M85 submunition.
31 Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 11 August 2009.
34 Information based on Landmine Monitor media monitoring between 1 January and 31 December 2008.
35 These casualties have been included in the total for Abkhazia for 2008. See report on Abkhazia in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), at least 16 civilians were killed and 54 injured during cluster munition strikes during the 2008 conflict. These casualties of direct cluster munition use are not included in the total mine/ERW casualties for 2008.38

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, with six casualties reported to mid-June (three killed and three injured). Three casualties were men and three were women. Mines caused four casualties and ERW two.39

There is no complete account of casualties for the period since 1999. Between 2001—the start of ICBL Georgian Committee (ICBL-GC) data collection—and the end of 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 387 casualties (104 killed, 267 injured, and 16 unknown). ICBL-GC recorded 383 casualties based primarily on media coverage from 2001 to May 2007, when it ceased reporting. However, the reliability of the information gathered was questioned and no verification of the data was subsequently undertaken. HALO recorded 27 mine casualties in Georgia, excluding Abkhazia, between 2001 and 2005.40 Casualties decreased from 111 in 2001 to 16 in 2005. After this period casualties appeared to be on the rise again but adequate reporting was not available.41

In 2009, the Georgian Foundation for Prosthetic and Orthopedic Rehabilitation (GEFPOR) reported that it had registered at least 591 amputee mine survivors, including survivors from past conflicts since World War II.42 In 2007, GEFPOR provided details on 357 amputee mine/ERW survivors injured from past conflicts.

Risk profile

Since August 2008 the risk to people from ERW, particularly unexploded submunitions, has increased significantly. People engaged in “community clearance” are at risk but, according to HRW, “Despite the risk, locals say they are driven to clear by the need to protect their families and work in the field.”43 People also remain at limited risk from mines, particularly near the Inguri river that divides Abkhazia from the rest of the country.44

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

As of mid-2009, a formal mine action program was being established in Georgia, and coordination was somewhat confused, with a variety of national and international actors engaged in two, seemingly parallel initiatives.

On 9 October 2008, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the United States-based organization, the Information Management & Mine Action Programs (iMMAP).45 iMMAP was tasked by the US Department of State to support the Georgian government, in particular by establishing an Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC).
The official opening of the ERWCC was held on 25 February 2009 in Tbilisi. According to Giorgi Muchaidze, Georgia’s Deputy Minister of Defense, who spoke at the launch, “It is more important to reorganize the above mentioned office as a national mine action centre, which would be [a] step forward for struggling with this problem.” It is envisioned that the ERWCC will ultimately become a nationally owned endeavor, supported by international technical advisors, to address Georgia’s ERW problem. The future development of ERWCC will see the addition of a national director and other local managerial staff. As of mid-2009, ERWCC/iMMAP was hosting weekly operational coordination meetings with mine action actors in Georgia.

A second mine action coordination initiative is located within the Georgian Ministry of Defense, which was working to establish its Georgian Mine Action Center (GMAC) as a national entity. The Georgian Ministry of Defense initially responded to the need for mine action coordination by setting up a mine action cell within Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces in the J-3 Operations Department in October 2008. The Ministry of Defense planned to expand the national coordination capacity and transform the mine action cell from military to civilian oversight.

On 23 October 2008, a two-year Memorandum of Understanding on “humanitarian mine action assistance” was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and the Slovenia-based International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF). The ITF initiated a national capacity-building program in January 2009. The ITF’s contributors—the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia—have supported a program to train staff and set up a national mine action center, in coordination with the Ministry of Defense and ERWCC/iMMAP.

**Risk education and victim assistance**

There was no coordination body for risk education (RE) or victim assistance (VA) in 2008. The ERWCC has a mandate to coordinate RE. In early 2009, iMMAP made preparatory measures to also take on victim assistance coordination. The Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs (MoLHSA) of Georgia is responsible for coordination of disability issues.

**Data collection and management**

Upon request from the Georgian Ministry of Defense, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) provided the ministry with the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMMSA). The installation of the system and adequate training of the national personnel was carried out by iMMAP. GICHD trained two ERWCC staff in the latest version of the database. These two staff members (one local and one international) have in turn conducted training for Georgian counterparts in Tbilisi including the ministries of defense, internal affairs, and health, as well as a number of international organizations engaged in the mine action program.

There was no mine/ERW data collection system in Georgia in 2008. In early 2009, iMMAP collected information on survivors from GEFPOR and the state prosthetic center, and was planning to standardize data for use in IMSMA.

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48 Email from Dave Armitt, Program Manager, iMMAP, 26 June 2009.
49 Email from with Randy Kerel, Operations Manager, iMMAP, 26 June 2009.
50 Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2009.
52 Interview with Lela Rekhviashvili, Operations Assistant, ERWCC/iMMAP, Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.
53 Interview with Loilita Shengelia, Senior Specialist, Social Protection Department, MoLHSA, Tbilisi, 2 May 2009.
54 Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.
55 Email from Randy Kerel, iMMAP, 26 June 2009.
56 Interview with Lela Rekhviashvili, ERWCC/iMMAP, Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.
Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casuality data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GEFPOR</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs</td>
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<th>RE</th>
<th>Casuality data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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<td>ITF</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Plans

**Strategic mine action plans**

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) implemented a four-month General Mine Action Assessment, which was due to be completed by end-2009. This information will assist the ERWCC to develop a strategic mine action plan and determine national priorities.\(^{57}\) The assessment would be complemented by an underwater survey of Poti harbor.\(^{58}\)

The short-term priority for the Georgian Ministry of Defense was to clear all areas contaminated during the August 2008 conflict. It then planned to establish a national mine action authority to manage mine action nationwide as well as to carry out quality management of clearance and issue the requisite certificates.\(^{59}\)

The long-term aim is to develop demining capabilities in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to clear all of Georgia, and to develop a stronger VA capacity.\(^{60}\) In response to a request by Georgia for assistance in dealing with its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict, as of March 2009, NATO’s Maintenance and Supply Agency was seeking to set up a project to be led by Estonia and Lithuania to develop the skills of the Military Engineer Brigade of the Georgian army in humanitarian demining and ERW clearance. The project, which was expected to start before the end of 2009, will involve provision of modern EOD training and equipment.\(^{61}\)

In December 2008, the Georgian parliament reviewed a Concept Paper on the Social Integration of Persons with Disabilities as a first step toward signing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the introduction of a national disability plan for Georgia. The government is required to develop a national disability action plan based on the articles of the paper and submit it to parliament by September 2009. It also needed to revise

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\(^{57}\) Email from Jonathon Guthrie, NPA, 8 September 2009.


\(^{59}\) Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2009.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.

\(^{61}\) Email from Gvantsa Kvinikadze, Project Manager, NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund Project Georgia, 23 March 2009.
States Not Party

Georgia

relevant legislation and propose actions for implementation of the plan by November 2009. The concept paper had been developed by the Coalition for Independent Living, a national coalition of disabled persons’ organizations, in cooperation with MoLHSA.

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Georgia has stated its commitment to eradicating the mine threat in the country and has been cooperating with international organizations to address the threat from ERW. On 10 October 2008, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces (J-3) created a section to deal with the mine problem. As of mid-2009, however, there was not yet a fully operational mine action program in Georgia, and no national authority responsible for mine action. Previously, the Ministry of Defense had announced plans to elaborate a mine action strategy and establish a mine action center, which would be managed in accordance with “the relevant principles of the Mine Ban Treaty and CCW Amended Protocol II.”

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

As of June 2009, there was no national mine action legislation in Georgia. Soviet standing operating procedures are currently used for demining by Georgian military personnel, which use a range of military breaching techniques, although personnel are said to have been trained to NATO standards as well. According to a Georgian Ministry of Defense official, in the future Georgia would like to adopt demining procedures that meet IMAS requirements. No national standards had been adopted as of June 2009, although iMMAP had reported taking a lead in their development.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Demining and battle area clearance were carried out in 2008 by Georgian military deminers and two international NGOs: HALO and NPA. Clearance of populated areas, roads, and railroads remains the responsibility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, while the special engineering unit of the Ministry of Defense is responsible for clearing military areas. Both were engaged in clearance operations of cluster munition remnants and other UXO after the August 2008 conflict. When Russian forces withdrew from Gori and Kareli districts, the Georgian military stepped in with an engineering unit of 80 deminers. Georgian clearance personnel reportedly focused on surface clearance, handing over affected areas to international deminers to do subsurface clearance.

As of February 2009, however, Georgian military clearance personnel had ceased operations, but NPA was training 26 national deminers to start work in March 2009. NPA signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Defense in September 2008 and

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63 Interview with Loilita Shengelia, MoLHSA and Rati Ionatamishvili, Public Relations Manager, CIL, Tbilisi, 2 May 2009.

64 Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2009.


67 Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 30 June 2009.


69 Telephone interview with Randy Kerel, iMMAP, 25 June 2009.


71 Ibid, p. 70.

72 Ibid p. 71.

73 Ibid, p. 71.

an implementing agreement was signed between the two parties on 20 February 2009. To expedite the process, NPA brought in experienced deminers who had worked previously in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Lebanon. The MoU was due to expire in September 2010 and the implementing agreement to conduct battle area clearance will expire on 12 December 2009. NPA is not conducting mine clearance in Georgia, only battle area clearance (BAC). NPA clears submunitions to a depth of 30cm. It expected to continue clearance in Georgia until at least September 2009.

HALO started clearance operations immediately after the conflict because it had already established a demining program in Abkhazia. A new MoU between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and HALO was signed on 5 September 2008. As of February 2009, HALO had 40 teams of 6 deminers working in Georgia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>Unexploded submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>Other UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>more than 2,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/R = not reported

Other international demining personnel were also involved in BAC following the August 2008 conflict. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, before their withdrawal, Russian military forces conducted clearance of mined areas around their checkpoints. Civilians reported clearance by Russian troops in Disti, Kvemo Khviti, Meurneoba, Tirdznisi, Variani, Varianis, and Zemo Khviti. They have not reported in detail on their clearance as of 1 July 2009, although statements to the CCW cited clearance by EMERCOM personnel of 3,000 items of ERW from 3 August to 16 September 2008.
On 6 September 2008, five Estonian explosive ordnance disposal specialists were deployed in the east and south of Georgia to help locate and disarm UXO left over from the conflict. The Estonian personnel cleared a number of items of UXO before leaving the same month. In addition to demining activity the specialists helped Georgia in building the mine clearance system and carried out relevant training sessions.

Local people have also tried to clear items of UXO. Despite the risks, locals say they are driven to clear by the need to protect their families and to work in their fields.

Quality management

One of the biggest initial challenges facing deminers was said to have been a lack of coordination among the demining operators, which used different methods of clearance. As described above, the Georgian military focused on (faster) surface clearance, while the international organizations adopted a slower, more thorough approach, including proper record keeping.

Both HALO and NPA have their own internal quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) procedures. NPA has requested the ERWCC to conduct QA/QC prior to handover of land. As of June 2009, the ERWCC was said to be conducting external QA and QC activities and was in the process of establishing and developing a national quality management capacity.

Risk Education

In response to the August 2008 conflict and the new ERW contamination, two emergency RE programs were launched by the ICRC and HALO, together with UNICEF and the Ministry of Education. Activities included mass media broadcasts; RE presentations in communities, centers for internally displaced persons, and schools; and distribution of materials. Until 10 October 2008, the ICRC was the only organization able to implement RE in the “buffer zone” (the zone between the north of Gori and South Ossetia, controlled by Russia in August until 10 October 2008). Once the buffer zone opened up, HALO also started activities there. More than 44,000 people were reached, including in 180 schools. HRW noted that, “Witness testimony and the limited number of civilian casualties from duds suggest that these programs may have been successful in at least some cases.”

A hotline number to report contamination to police was aired on television and printed on flyers. At the request of several mine clearance organizations, the ICRC supplied signs to mark contaminated areas.

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88 Ibid, p. 75.
90 Email from Randy Kerel, iMMAP, 26 June 2009.
91 Email from Narine Berikashvili, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 26 June 2009.
Limited RE was conducted between 1999 and 2006 by the ICBL-GC, Ministry of Education, and HALO, with support from UNICEF and the ICRC. In 1999, the ICBL-GC began a campaign working with the local government in the western Zugdidi region. In 2001, Georgia reported that RE was conducted in schools, but the ICBL-GC found that only very limited RE was conducted, without support. In 2003, HALO started an RE program particularly targeting people illegally crossing the border with Abkhazia, then expanding to focus on areas around former military bases. Information gathered by HALO in 2004 found that many people had not received RE and were unaware, uninformed, and at times reckless. In early 2006, HALO ended its activities due to lack of funding.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is not known but reportedly numbers at least 591.96 The medical and rehabilitation sectors in Georgia continued to suffer from lack of funding, poor infrastructure and equipment, inadequate and low-quality services, and additional payments for services. Psychological support and economic reintegration opportunities were lacking. Little progress was made in enforcing legislation or implementing plans to improve the lives of persons with disabilities including mine survivors. However, progress was made in NGO-government coordination and policy making.97 Persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, have little access to adequate quality medical services or community-based alternatives.98 Since 2006, health system capacity was being enhanced with World Bank loans, which were extended to the end-2010. However, government privatization of the health sector posed a substantial risk to equal availability of services.99 In response to the 2008 conflict, the ICRC supported two hospitals in central and western Georgia assisting weapon-injured patients. The ICRC also provided minor repairs to Tskhinvali hospital, located within the 2008 conflict zone.100 Access to rehabilitation and prosthetics services and other necessary devices is generally insufficient.101 GEFPOR provides services including prostheses free of charge to landmine survivors. People from isolated areas pay for their transport and there is limited accommodation at the center for them. GEFPOR has the only technicians trained to the International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics’ category II in Georgia; one is a mine survivor. Due to ongoing financial difficulties and delayed government funding, some 130 people were on a waiting list for devices in May 2009. There was no reported increase in beneficiaries requiring prostheses as a result of the recent conflict. In accordance with its sustainability planning, GEFPOR produces devices using ICRC technology. In addition, Otto Bock brand prostheses are sold as part of a cost recovery system. Technicians received training from the ICRC and the Otto Bock company in 2008.102 The ICRC continued to cover approximately one-third or more of GEFPOR’s costs and continued to cover prosthetic treatment costs at the Vladikavkaz Orthopedic Center in Russia. The ICRC also provided training on psychological support to physiotherapists.103 There is a recognized shortfall of specialized personnel in the field of psychological support and social reintegration, including social workers, occupational therapists, and psychological assistance workers. There is little access to inclusive education, continuing education, and

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96 Email from Marika Kalmakhelidze, GEFPOR, 24 April 2009. However, this figure reflects the number of registered mine survivors that are in need of some orthopedic device. Casualties that do not need for example an amputation might never visit the GEFPOR centre and thus would never be registered.
97 Interview with Loilita Shengelia, MoLHSA, and Rati Ionatamishvili, CIL, Tbilisi, 2 May 2009.
102 Interview with Marika Kalmakhelidze, GEFPOR, Tbilisi, 30 April 2009.
vocational training. Georgia lacks teachers with experience in addressing the needs of persons with disabilities and no special training is available.104

The Law on the Social Protection of the Disabled was not fully implemented and persons with disabilities faced discrimination in employment, education, and access to services.105 The mobility and social participation of persons with disabilities was inadequate.106 Many persons with disabilities, including amputees and mine survivors, rarely leave their homes.107

In May 2009, the MoLHSA hosted a three-day regional workshop organized by the ICRC and the ITF on comprehensive approaches to rehabilitation and reintegration services for mine victims and other persons with disabilities. Participants attended from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan and well as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia. One of the objectives of the workshop was to initiate discussions on developing comprehensive national VA program in Georgia. The ITF planned to initiate a socio-economic reintegration for mine survivors’ project in late 2009.108

Victim assistance activities

The NGO Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled Children (ADW) continued in 2008 to provide assistance to persons with disabilities and their families, including mine/ERW survivors in the Zugdidi region. In 2008, ADW provided school textbooks for six children, including two survivors and two family members, and provided wheelchairs to two mine survivors and assisted a mine survivor’s child with disabilities to access pre-primary school education. In cooperation with the Swiss NGO Geneva Call, ADW undertook a socio-economic needs assessment survey of landmine survivors in the Zudidi and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia in June 2008. In cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Science, ADW supported one mine survivor in continuing college education.109

GEFPOR reported providing services to 23 amputee mine/ERW survivors in 2008; at least 16 survivors received prostheses.110

In 2008, the ICBL-GC continued its vocational training project providing small business opportunities to some 20 mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities; part of the project funding was carried over to 2009 to provide opportunities for new beneficiaries.111

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive cost estimates for overall clearance, RE, or VA in Georgia. No comprehensive estimates have been reported for mine action in South Ossetia.

As a result of ERW and cluster munition remnants contamination left by the August 2008 conflict, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) included a mine action component in its August 2008 flash appeal for humanitarian assistance to Georgia. Funds requested for mine action included US$125,000 to the UN Mine Action Service for coordination of emergency mine action, and $350,000 to UNICEF for RE. After a review of the humanitarian situation, OCHA issued a revised appeal in October 2008, in which only the $350,000 RE appeal remained, which had already been surpassed by contributions and commitments totaling

107 Interview with Marika Kalmakhelidze, GEFPOR, Tbilisi, 30 April 2009.
108 Email from Luka Buhin, Project Manager, ITF, 4 September 2009.
109 Email from Madona Kharebava, Head, ADW, 18 March 2009; and email from Nicholas Florquin, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 4 September 2009.
110 Interview with Maia Buchukuri, Coordinator, ICBL-GC, Tbilisi, 3 May 2009.
$394,926.\textsuperscript{112} OCHA reported that no additional or separate funding was needed for the mine action sector because HALO operations in Georgia were fully covered during the period covered by the revised appeal.\textsuperscript{113}

**National support for mine action**

Georgia did not report contributions to mine action operations in 2008. No national funding was reported in 2007.

**International cooperation and assistance**

Eight countries and the European Commission (EC) reported contributing $8,705,885 (€5,911,914) to mine action in Georgia. No international funding was reported in 2007.

### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Georgia: Monetary\textsuperscript{114}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>HALO, government of Georgia</td>
<td>Emergency survey and response, mine action coordination</td>
<td>$5,200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>iMMAP</td>
<td>Capacity-building, cluster munitions/ERW clearance</td>
<td>$906,842 (€966,679)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Cluster munitions/ERW clearance</td>
<td>$736,300 (€500,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Psychosocial support and RE</td>
<td>$515,410 (€350,000)</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Cluster munitions/ERW clearance</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In October 2008, the ITF and the Georgian Ministry of Defense signed a two-year MoU to support development of Georgia’s mine action capacities, starting in January 2009. The agreement covers management, quality assurance, assessment, standing operating procedures, and victim assistance, and may be extended to other mine action activities. The ITF reported the Czech

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\textsuperscript{112} UN OCHA, “Georgia Crisis Flash Appeal: Revised,” October 2008, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid, p. 18.

Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia as contributors to the project. The ITF supported training of Georgian rehabilitation specialists in 2008, with Slovenia reported as the sole donor.\textsuperscript{115}

In addition to its specific monetary contributions in 2008 to national mine action initiatives, the European Commission reported in May 2009 a €39 million ($57,431,400) general commitment during 2008 to mine action in a number of countries. Georgia was among the states named as recipients within the overall commitment.

INDIA

2008 Key Data

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mine Ban Treaty status</strong></td>
<td>Not a State Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stockpile</strong></td>
<td>Unknown; estimated 4–5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contamination</strong></td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, IEDs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated area of contamination</strong></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Casualties in 2008</strong></td>
<td>33 (2007: 170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</strong></td>
<td>Unknown but estimated 1,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demining in 2008</strong></td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk education recipients in 2008</strong></td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of India continues to view antipersonnel mines as legitimate weapons necessary for use on its borders. India has abstained from voting on every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1997. India planted large numbers of mines along its border with Pakistan between December 2001 and July 2002 during an escalation of tensions. India is one of the world’s few remaining mine producers. In 2007, India reported that it had converted a large existing stockpile of M14 antipersonnel mines to make them detectable in accord with Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventions Weapons. India has had an export moratorium in place since 1996.

The Indian Army has taken responsibility for demining but has not reported on the extent or results of its operations. Despite official statements that clearance of the heavily mined border with Pakistan has been completed, media reports indicate extensive residual contamination.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 2,931 casualties in India from mines/ explosive remnants of war (ERW)/improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (1,028 killed and 1,903 injured). However, India lacks effective or systematic data collection of mine/ERW/ IED incidents. There has been some risk education (RE) by the Indian Army, the Indian Red Cross Society, and various civil society actors, but there has never been a systematic RE policy framework or program in India. The Indian government claims survivors are provided with compensation, employment, and assistance, but survivors struggle to access healthcare and rehabilitation services, which are often urban-based and overwhelmed. Compensation is not provided systematically and often not at all. In 2008, the government tried to improve employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, but discrimination continued to be widespread.

Mine Ban Policy

India has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In October 2008, India again asserted, “Landmines continue to play an important role in the defence of the states that have long land borders with difficult and inhospitable terrains.” At the same time, it stated, “India will also continue to pursue the objective of a non-discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel mines in the manner that addresses the legitimate defence requirements of states.”

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1 Statement by Arjun Charan Sethi, Member of Parliament, First Committee of the 63rd Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 21 October 2008.
On 2 December 2008, India abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has on similar annual resolutions since 1997. In explaining its vote, India said it “supports the vision of a world free of the threat of anti-personnel mines” and noted that the “availability of militarily effective alternative technologies that can perform, cost-effectively, the legitimate defensive role of anti-personnel landmines will considerably facilitate the goal of the complete elimination of anti-personnel mines.”

India sent an observer to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2008 in Geneva. It detailed the “measures and steps taken by [India that] underline its commitment to the humanitarian ideals” of the Mine Ban Treaty. It also attended the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, but did not make a statement.


India has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

On 18 March 2009, the Control Arms Foundation of India, in collaboration with the Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University, organized a “Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: Commemorative Conference on 10 Years of Entry Into Force of the Mine Ban Treaty and Other Disarmament Treaties.” The conference brought together campaigners, scholars, students, researchers, lawyers, diplomats, and other representatives from government to share knowledge, raise issues, and determine ways to persuade the government of India to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. In a presentation at the event, retired Major-General Nilendra Kumar stated that “a number of senior officers who had been mine victims have risen to the top positions in the Army…. It is a matter of regret that despite this, the military top brass has not really accepted that landmines do not offer any significant military advantage.”

In January 2009, a public demonstration in Srinagar against mine use in Kashmir called on India and Pakistan to join the Mine Ban Treaty. In February 2009, an International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Kashmir, which held hearings in Indian-administered Kashmir in 2008 and early 2009, issued a memorandum on its findings to Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah. Among the findings was that “the placement of landmines along the border and other sensitive areas in Jammu and Kashmir continues to endanger lives, including those of children. While the Government of India is not a signatory to the [Mine Ban Treaty], and has continued to justify landmine use in Jammu and Kashmir, we ask that the Government of Jammu and Kashmir institute a comprehensive ban on the use of landmines. We ask that an
audit be conducted to ascertain the impact of landmines on local communities, to determine
the extent of casualties, devastation, and displacement, and undertake rehabilitation of those
affected and de-mining.” Upon receipt of the memorandum on 11 February 2009, Chief Minister
Omar Abdullah made a public statement saying that he would consider the memorandum at the
highest level, and would invite the International People’s Tribunal for further discussions.10

Production, transfer, and stockpiling
India is one of the few countries still producing antipersonnel mines. India claims that all
production is vested with government agencies.11 In response to a Right to Information Act
(RTI) request, the Ministry of Defence confirmed that active production of landmines took place
between 1 January 2007 and 31 December 2008. Five mine types were produced during that
period, including two types of antipersonnel mines (AP NM-14 and AP NM-16) and two types
of antivehicle mines (AT ND 1A and AT ND 4D), as well as the APER IB mine.12 Landmine
Monitor is not familiar with the APER IB mine, presumably an antipersonnel mine. It does
not appear in standard reference works on mine types, and has not, to our knowledge, been
referred to publicly by India before. The Ministry of Defence declined to answer an RTI request
regarding how many mines were manufactured during this period.13

The Ministry of Defence said that no landmines produced by Ordnance Factories were
exported during the period.14 India has had a formal export moratorium of unlimited duration in
place since 3 May 1996. It has stated that it favors an outright ban on transfer of antipersonnel
mines even to States Parties of CCW Amended Protocol II.15 However, five Mine Ban Treaty
States Parties have reported Indian-made mines in their stockpiles: Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Mauritius, Sudan, and Tanzania. India has previously denied that any transfer of landmines to
these countries took place.16

In 1999, Landmine Monitor estimated that India stockpiled between four and five million
antipersonnel mines, one of the world’s largest stockpiles.17 India has neither confirmed nor
denied this estimate. In March 2008, Brigadier Vijai Sharma, Deputy Director of the Directorate
of Military Operations, stated that India does not possess mines which can detonate due to
the presence of mine detectors and does not possess—nor is it designing—any mine with
antihandling characteristics.18

10 ICBL, “People’s Tribunal Requests Jammu & Kashmir Government to Determine the Impact of Landmines
11 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form D, 4 December 2006. However, as reported by Landmine
Monitor in 2007, some of the production process appears to be carried out by commercial entities. See Landmine
12 Email reply to RTI request, made by Control Arms Foundation of India on behalf of Landmine Monitor, from
Saurabh Kumar, Director, Planning and Coordination, Department of Defence Production, Ministry of Defence,
2 April 2009. This is the first time India has provided information on landmines through the RTI.
13 The Ministry of Defence said, “Disclosure of such information may prejudicially affect the sovereignty,
integrity and security of the country and hence this information is exempted from disclosure u/s 8(1) (a) of the
RTI Act 2005.” Email reply to RTI request from Saurabh Kumar, Ministry of Defence, 2 April 2009.
14 Email reply to RTI request from Ministry of Defence, 2 April 2009.
15 Statement by Amb. Jayant Prasad, Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II,
Geneva, 6 November 2006.
17 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 467. The figure may no longer be accurate following the large number
of mines planted along the Pakistani border in 2001 and 2002, or in light of new production of mines.
18 Control Arms Foundation of India, “Conference on the Indispensability of Anti-Personnel Mines for India’s
Defence: Myth or Reality?” Conference report, New Delhi, 26 March 2008, p. 75.
Use
In April 2008, a senior Indian official repeated the assertion that, “There is no minefield or mined area in any part of India’s interiors,” but acknowledged that “minefields are laid, if required, along the border areas as part of military operations.”

He said that the infiltration of Kashmiri militants across the Line of Control (LoC) between Pakistani and Indian-administered sections of Kashmir is the main rationale for mines laid along the LoC, as well as the international border. Similarly, in October 2007, Ministry of Defence spokesperson Colonel A. K. Mathur in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir, reportedly stated that mines are laid there only by the army to halt infiltration of militants, but not by the militants themselves.

Indian government representatives have often stated that India does not use mines for “counter-insurgency or counter terrorist operations or for maintenance of law and order or internal security situations.” However, this does not appear to apply to counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir, where mines have been laid in the Kashmir valley. In March 2009, two civilians were reportedly injured by antipersonnel mines near army posts. In one case, the Superintendent of Police in Handwara reportedly said the mine was planted “around OP post of 33 RR Camp in 84–85 forest compartment of Magam,” explaining that the army has laid mines around army posts to prevent militant attacks. An Army 15 Corps spokesperson reportedly said the Handwara incident was being investigated to determine if the army or non-state armed groups (NSAG) had mined the area.

India’s last major use of antipersonnel mines took place between December 2001 and July 2002, when the Indian Army deployed an estimated two million mines along its 2,880km northern and western border with Pakistan in Operation Parakram. This was probably the most extensive use of antipersonnel mines anywhere in the world since the Mine Ban Treaty was negotiated and first signed in 1997.

Non-State Armed Groups
On 4 March 2009, the Zomi Re-unification Organisation (ZRO) renounced mine use by signing Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment. Geneva Call stated that the ZRO began to destroy its stockpiles and clear the mines that it had laid after commencing dialogue with Geneva Call in 2008, and that the ZRO completed these tasks prior to signing the Deed of Commitment. In its statement to Geneva Call, ZRO President Thanglianpau stated, “I am proud that as an armed revolutionary movement, we have prioritised humanitarian issues, and consider this a major step forward and hope it will serve as an example to others.”

The ZRO had not previously been identified as a mine user by Landmine Monitor.

Antipersonnel Mines in Kashmir.  

In August 2006, the Kuki National Organization in Manipur pledged not to use antipersonnel mines by signing Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment, as did the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak/Muivah (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland in October 2003.

In March 2009, two women and a teenage girl were injured by what appears to have been a victim-activated IED while they were tilling land near an NSCN-IM military camp at Shikavi village near Dimapur. NSCN-IM denied having laid the device and told Geneva Call that it believes “enemies” placed the device in its territory with the intention of discrediting the NSCN-IM.

The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army, have continued to use command-detonated IEDs. While these were frequently reported as “landmines” in the media and specialized reports on the conflict, Landmine Monitor could not identify any incidents clearly involving victim-activated mines or explosive devices. CPI-M IEDs have caused civilian casualties. In 2008, Human Rights Watch reported that the CPI-M recruits children for manufacture and deployment of landmines and IEDs.

Kashmiri insurgents continued to use command-detonated IEDs, with some resulting in civilian casualties. Again, these were often reported as “landmines” in the media, but Landmine Monitor could not identify any incidents clearly involving victim-activated mines or explosive devices. A June 2008 Indian government report on IED use by militant organizations states that Maoist and Kashmiri groups both use command-detonated devices.

In February 2009, security forces reportedly discovered three pressure-activated IEDs in two locations while on patrols in Khangtun and Old Changpol in Samtal, Chandel district, Manipur. The area is known to be a United National Liberation Front stronghold.

In December 2008, security forces reportedly recovered 15 antipersonnel mines, among other weapons, from a camp of the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup, an armed group operating in Manipur. This group was not previously known to possess antipersonnel mines.

In January 2009, security forces reportedly recovered four unidentified mines among other weapons from a camp of the Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front, an armed group operating in Assam. In February 2009, security forces reportedly recovered one unidentified mine among other weapons from surrendering militants of the National Liberation Front of Tripura and its associate Borok National Council of Tripura. Neither group was previously known to possess mines of any type.

30 Email from Nicolas Florquin, Geneva Call, 22 June 2009; and email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 10 August 2009.
31 The Communist Party of India-Maoist and a few other smaller groups are often referred to collectively as Naxalites. The Maoists also have a People’s Militia with part-time combatants with minimal training and unsophisticated weapons.
34 Anubhav Misri, “Minor among 5 people killed, 9 wounded in landmine blast,” News Agency of Kashmir, 24 April 2009, naknews.co.in.
36 “IED Recovered,” ImpHAL Free Press, 27 February 2009, ifp.co.in.
Media continued reporting seizures of mines, mostly unidentified, by authorities in different parts of India, including Jammu and Kashmir\textsuperscript{40} and Andhra Pradesh.\textsuperscript{41}

### Scope of the Problem

#### Contamination

India is contaminated with mines, mainly as a result of mine-laying by government forces on and near the northwestern border with Pakistan during the 2001–2002 stand-off between the two countries. Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were laid on cultivated land and pasture, and around infrastructure and a number of villages.\textsuperscript{42} India also contends with increased use of IEDs and mines by non-state armed groups in other parts of the country (see Use section above).\textsuperscript{43} The extent of India’s ERW problem is not known.

In its Amended Protocol II Article 13 report submitted in November 2005, India claimed that it had concluded mine clearance operations along its northern and western borders and all arable land had been cleared and returned to its owners, except land required “for operational purposes.”\textsuperscript{44} Defence Minister A. K. Anthony repeated the claim in March 2008.\textsuperscript{45}

India’s Engineer-in-Chief’s Staff Directorate reported in 2009 that “all mines laid during Operation Parakaram were recovered/cleared (99.32%) by 2006.” It stated that the very few stretches where demining was not possible “due to terrain conditions” were fenced in accordance with UN protocols. The Staff Directorate also indicated some clearance of these mined areas had continued (see Demining and battle area clearance section below).\textsuperscript{46}

Unofficial estimates cited in the Indian media, however, put the area still contaminated in 2007 at 160km\textsuperscript{2} of Jammu and 1,730km\textsuperscript{2} of Kashmir.\textsuperscript{47} An army officer interviewed in 2009 said no official assessment has been made of the extent of remaining contamination but that such estimates could still be correct.\textsuperscript{48} Military authorities acknowledge that areas prone to infiltration by militants are still mined but say the areas are clearly marked. However, they also say heavy rainfall, snow, mudslides, and avalanches can cause mines to move.\textsuperscript{49}

According to some reports, as much as 280km\textsuperscript{2} was mined along the LoC during Operation Parakram, which directly affected more than 6,000 families across 21 villages.\textsuperscript{50} Although substantial border areas have been returned to civilian owners, other sources say some sections of the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir remain heavily mined.\textsuperscript{51} The Uri sector of Baramulla district, for instance, is said to have remained mined and fenced along the LoC since 1990. In the Karna sector of Kupwara district, mines were laid through villages cut in half by the LoC. Kupwara


\textsuperscript{44} CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 23 November 2005.


\textsuperscript{46} Fax to Control Arms Foundation of India from Engineer-in-Chief’s Branch, Engineer Staff Directorate, 27 July 2009.


\textsuperscript{48} Interview with army officer on condition of anonymity, Jammu and Kashmir, 14 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{50} Tejinder Singh Sodhi, “Demining of Chhamb fields begins,” \emph{The Tribune} (Gigrial), 8 November 2007, www. tribuneindia.com.

district was heavily affected by the 8 October 2005 earthquake, and authorities are said to fear that mines planted in the area were displaced as a result.\textsuperscript{52}

An army officer stated in April 2008 that demining was underway, and that most of the areas in Jammu and Kashmir have been demined and handed over to the farmers.\textsuperscript{53} However, a field visit by Landmine Monitor to Khari village in Poonch district in May 2009 found that mines planted in 1965 had not been removed and were located only 100m from one resident’s house.\textsuperscript{54}

Minefields also reportedly remain from the 1962 war with China along the Tankso valley to Spangmik road in the vicinity of Pangong Tso Lake in the Himalayas.\textsuperscript{55} Mine contamination in Sikkim, a landlocked Indian state in the Himalayas, was acknowledged in 2008 by a government ministry for the first time. Mines in remote areas were reported to have caused casualties among wildlife, including yak, Tibetan sheep, and Tibetan wolves.\textsuperscript{56} Civil society organizations also report continuing casualties from landmines in Manipur, bordering Myanmar.\textsuperscript{57}

An explosion at an Indian Army ammunition storage area in Khundru, south Kashmir, in August 2007 was reported to have killed six people and left 25 people missing.\textsuperscript{58} Media quoted a senior army officer as saying that UXO had affected an area of 225km\textsuperscript{2}.\textsuperscript{59} A little over a year later, Indian media cited authorities in South Kashmir as saying the army had reported clearing 60% of rice fields in affected areas but residents were still reluctant to return to their land.\textsuperscript{60}

Casualties

Landmine Monitor identified 33 casualties (12 killed and 21 injured) of mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs in 2008. Antipersonnel mines caused the most casualties (13), followed by ERW (nine), IEDs (five), and other mines (five). One casualty resulted from an unknown device. The majority of casualties (24) were civilians and nine were security forces. The largest number of casualties were adult men (14), followed by adult women (5), girls (5), and boys (4); the gender of five casualties was unknown. The most common activities at the time of the incident were handling a device (10), security and patrolling (7), gardening (3), and collecting wood and water (3). Most casualties occurred in Jammu and Kashmir (20), followed by Manipur (12).

The 33 casualties in 2008 represent a decrease from the number identified in 2007 (170 casualties: 41 killed and 129 injured) and 2006 (107 casualties: 41 killed and 66 injured). Due to the lack of a systematic data collection system, however, this should not be considered indicative of a trend.\textsuperscript{61}

The cumulative number of casualties in India is not known. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor has identified 2,931 mine/ERW/IED casualties in India (1,028 killed and 1,903 injured). A 2003–2004 survey by the Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament and Environmental Protection (IIPDEP) identified some 1,295 civilian casualties (325 killed and 970 injured) in Rajasthan, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir.\textsuperscript{62} A 2008 study in Poonch district estimated that more than 700 people were disabled by mines in the last 10 years.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{52} Comments by a retired senior military officer, Indian National Seminar on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Allahabad University, 27 February 2006. Notes by Landmine Monitor. The officer was involved in Operation Parakram and the subsequent clearance operations.


\textsuperscript{54} Interviews with residents in Khari village, Poonch district, 15 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{55} Information provided to Landmine Monitor on condition of anonymity, New Delhi, 20 October 2007.

\textsuperscript{56} Envis Centre Sikkim on Ecotourism, “Eco-destination of India: Sikkim Chapter,” p. 44, undated, scstsenvis.nic.in.

\textsuperscript{57} Email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Geneva Call, 10 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{58} “Six dead after army depot fire,” IOL (Srinagar), 13 August 2007, www.int.iol.co.za.


\textsuperscript{60} “60 pc fields cleared in Khundru but residents hesitant to go back,” Kashmir Times, 15 September 2007, www.kashmirtimes.com.


The Sinlung Indigenous Peoples Human Rights Organisation reported a total of 47 landmine casualties (22 killed and 25 injured) between 2001 and 2008 in Chandel and Churachandpur districts of Manipur. The casualties included 31 males, 16 females, and three whose gender was unidentified. A casualty list compiled by the Army headquarters in Manipur and obtained by the Indian Institute for Peace, Disarmament and Environmental Protection showed 52 civilian casualties in 2004–2006, including 16 killed.64

India’s 2001 Census and 2002 National Sample Survey estimated that persons with disabilities made up 2% of the population;65 alternative estimates suggest it could be as high as 4% to 8%.66 Casualties occurred at a higher rate in 2009, with 45 casualties (15 killed and 30 injured) as of 13 June.

Risk profile
People living in the conflict-affected states of Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Punjab, and Rajasthan, are particularly at risk from mines, ERW, and IEDs. Adult men and security forces are most at risk.

Socio-economic impact
In addition to causing casualties, inhabitants state that mines prevent cultivation of large areas of agricultural land and harm livestock. The speaker of Jammu and Kashmir’s legislative assembly said in 2007 that more than 6,000 families and some 3,500 acres (14km²) of agricultural land in his constituency alone are mine-affected.67 Disruption to livelihoods as a result of the Khundru ammunition storage area explosion prompted south Kashmir authorities to distribute food rations to the population in affected areas.68

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
India has no civilian mine action program and no structured mechanism to address the problems from mines and ERW.69 Its international point of contact for clearance activities is the Disarmament and International Security Affairs Division within the Ministry of External Affairs. The Director-General of Military Operations decides on mine clearance after receiving assessment reports from the command headquarters of the respective districts where mine clearance is needed.70

Victim assistance
There is no systematic policy framework for the management, implementation, or coordination of RE or victim assistance (VA) in India. The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment’s Disability Division is responsible for coordinating the education and welfare of persons with disabilities.71 The ministry’s disability Central Coordination Committee (CCC) is a coordination body of NGOs and governmental agencies working on disability issues.72 The Rehabilitation Council of India regulates and monitors services for persons with disabilities.73

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64 Email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Geneva Call, 10 August 2009.
71 Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, “List of Members of Central Coordination Committee (CCC),” undated, socialjustice.nic.in.
the Chief Commissioner for Persons with Disabilities investigates claims of mistreatment of persons with disabilities.  

**Data collection and management**

India has no mine/ERW/IED casualty data collection system. Landmine Monitor monitors casualties reported in the media, but under-reporting is likely given the remoteness and insecurity of the areas where casualties occur.

India collects information on persons with disabilities through its census and National Sample Surveys. In 2008, India launched a National Disability Register. Persons with disabilities can register for certification of their disability to become eligible for services. The register will also be used for data collection and as a source of reference. The government’s disability web portal has an online form to facilitate registration, but the form does not distinguish between disabilities that occur “by accident” and mine/ERW/IED incidents.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for clearing mines as well as IEDs placed by non-state armed groups. Media reports indicate police also play an active part in clearing mines and IEDs in states dealing with insurgency.

The Engineer-in-Chief’s Staff Directorate reported that few LoC minefields had been demined between the start of 2007 and the end of 2008 but the army had recovered and destroyed 927 mines, of which 524 were antivehicle mines and 403 were antipersonnel mines.

In November 2007, the army reportedly deployed three tanks in the Chhamb area of the LoC to act as demining machines, with operations said to be due to last four to five months. An army source interviewed by Landmine Monitor in May 2009 said that the Chhamb sector had been cleared, primarily because the flat terrain made demining possible. An army official interviewed in Jammu and Kashmir was unaware of plans for any further demining operations in the Kashmir valley, citing the difficulties of demining in the hilly terrain.

Indian Army units have sustained heavy casualties in the course of demining operations, notably since the start of mine-laying on the Pakistan border in December 2001. Minister of Defence A. K. Anthony reported in March 2008 that 61 people had been killed and 292 injured in the course of demining operations.

**Risk Education**

In 2008, India asserted that, “Information on mines laid along border areas is disseminated among the civilian population of the area and the media” and that minefields were fenced and well marked. In March 2008, the Indian Army organized workshops in remote areas of Poonch district for schoolchildren on how to identify explosive devices and take safety measures to save their lives.

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76 “Disability Registration/Enrolment Form,” [Punarbhava](http://punarbhava.in), 2008, punarbhava.in.

77 Article 13, Form B, 6 November 2006.


79 Fax to Control Arms Foundation of India from Engineer-in-Chief’s Branch, Engineer Staff Directorate, 27 July 2009.


In March 2009, however, the Coalition of Civil Society claimed marking and fencing of minefields in Kashmir was inadequate. Landmine Monitor field research in Jammu and Kashmir found that while the army was disseminating some information on mines, ERW, and IEDs, no efforts were made to coordinate activities with the Ministry of Education. The ICRC and Indian Red Cross Society (IRCS) state that since they were unaware of any landmine casualties in Jammu and Kashmir, they were not undertaking any RE efforts there. They had not included RE in their earlier program activities in Rajasthan and Punjab. The ICRC did not have precise figures of the number of landmine casualties in Jammu and Kashmir, and confirmed that the organization was not permitted to enter the border areas of Jammu and Kashmir where most mine incidents were understood to occur.

Since at least 2000, the police, military, and other security forces have engaged in some information dissemination, particularly in conflict-affected regions such as Jammu and Kashmir. They provided information on the presence of minefields, precautions to be taken when encountering mines/ERW/IEDs, and how to report them to authorities. The most concerted effort at RE has been led by the IRCS in Rajasthan and Punjab since 2003. With technical support from the ICRC, IRCS volunteers collected information, briefed the media, trained trainers, delivered basic safety messages, and held workshops. While some efforts were made by the IRCS to provide RE in Jammu, plans to expand the program to Jammu and Kashmir were never realized. The other main player has been IIPDEP, which has raised awareness since 1999, particularly through workshops from 2003 to 2007.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be 1,903. At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, India asserted that, “Concerted efforts have been made to rehabilitate casualties…by providing monetary compensation, employment and assistance.” However, India does not have specific VA policies or activities and survivors generally receive the same care as other persons with physical disabilities.

Emergency and continuing healthcare is provided by the public sector, along with the private and non-profit sectors. State hospitals in urban areas have the capacity to treat mine/ERW/IED survivors, but such services are not available in rural areas, where many incidents occur.

India’s health system is reportedly “overwhelmed” by high levels of disease, underinvestment, and a large population. In May 2008, *Time* magazine said that “India’s economic boom has had, so far at least, little impact on health standards.” It quoted Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as admitting that public health spending was “seriously lagging behind other developing countries in Asia.”

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87 Interview with Charlotte Harford, ICRC Delegation in India, Srinagar, 14 May 2009; and email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 12 August 2009.


The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment continued to provide rehabilitation services to rural areas through 16 district centers. The government plans to expand rehabilitation services to 400 districts, but, according to the United States Department of State, “The impact of government programs was limited due to the concentration of funding provided to a few organizations,” generally in urban areas. This made rehabilitation difficult to access for mine/ERW survivors living in remote areas, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir.

Through its Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD), the ICRC continued to support the prosthetic and orthotic services and training for the Christian Medical College in Vellore, and for Mobility India in Bangalore. Through the two centers, in 2008 the ICRC funded the provision of 559 prostheses and 111 orthoses to 424 persons with disabilities, identified through community-based rehabilitation programs. The ICRC also supported two teachers from each center to attend a seminar on prosthetics and orthotics at the Vietnamese Training Centre for Orthopaedic Technologists (VIETCOT).

Through its Physical Rehabilitation Program and in partnership with the IRCS, the ICRC continued to support two artificial limb centers in Jammu and Srinagar, which produced 76 prostheses (17% of them for mine survivors), 95 orthoses (17% of them for mine survivors), and distributed 20 pairs of crutches and 19 wheelchairs. The ICRC provided mentoring and training and funded two staff from the hospital to study prosthetics and orthotics at the Mobility India center. The IRCS also ran a rehabilitation center at the Government Medical College in Jammu.

The Composite Regional Center in Jammu is located near mine-affected areas and provides free services and prosthetics. In 2007–2008, it distributed 54 prostheses and 235 orthoses and provided rehabilitation services to 1,988 people in “outreach camps” in the community.

In Srinagar, the Sultan-ul-Arifeen Artificial Limb Centre continued to provide Jaipur limb prostheses. Jaipur limbs are produced by Bhagwan Mahaveer Viklang Sahayata Samiti, which in 2007–2008 produced more than 20,000 artificial limbs. The parastatal ALIMCO (Artificial Limbs Manufacturing Corporation of India), also produced artificial limbs and has established Limb Fitting Centres around the country. It claims to provide limbs and components to a million persons with disabilities in India every year.

Disability and Development Partners (until 2005 the Jaipur Limb Campaign UK) continued to support a variety of disability projects in partnership with Mobility India in Bangalore, including rehabilitation services, an accessible taxi service, educational opportunities, training, and research.

In June 2008, the Indian Army’s 5/5 Gorkha Rifles, under the banner of the Army Wives Welfare Association (AWWA), hosted a rehabilitation camp in the Uri sector of the Kashmir valley to help people to help disabled survivors. Some 45 wheelchairs, 53 crutches, 40 hearing aids, and 59 walking sticks were distributed.
In March 2009, Indian media reported on the efforts of Jagbir Singh Sudan, a local school principal and philanthropist in Poonch, whose trust has reportedly provided 3,000 mine survivors with artificial limbs. The trust is named after his father, Pritam Singh, who was a World War II amputee.106

A variety of rehabilitation and vocational services are available to disabled Indian military personnel. The Queen Mary’s Technical Institute (QMTI), in Range Hill, Pune, provides vocational training. The Paraplegic Rehabilitation Centres in Kirkee and Mohali provide rehabilitation to disabled military veterans. The Red Cross Home in Bangalore is a home for disabled former soldiers and also provides rehabilitation.107

The Indian government claims that mine survivors and families of those killed by mines are compensated.108 A brigadier in the Indian Army posted to Jammu and Kashmir told Landmine Monitor that “India has a system of compensation in place which has matured over a period of time and is quite responsive…All cases of compensation to mine victims are dealt with on priority.”109 In March 2008, India’s Ministry of Defence reported that 353 civilian mine casualties had received compensation.110 Implementation of compensation appeared unsystematic, however, with the media reporting some casualties (or their families) receiving compensation between Rs10,000 (US$230) and 300,000 (US$6,900).111 Others reportedly received no compensation at all.112 In meetings with 21 mine survivors in Poonch in 2009, Landmine Monitor found that none of them had been compensated. Indeed, field research revealed that, partly due to the long bureaucratic claims process, no compensation had been given in Poonch for four years.113 Survivors in Poonch confirmed that they received a pension of Rs300 ($7) every six months, but said that they are not compensated for the long distances they must travel to claim it.114

Psychosocial support for survivors is lacking, particularly in Kashmir, where the mental health system is reportedly strained by the ongoing conflict.115 On 27 February 2009 in Sri Ganganagar, Rajasthan, 128 mine survivors marched to raise awareness of their difficulties and call on the Indian government to ban landmines. They also presented a petition to local officials asking for physical and economic rehabilitation support.116

In 2008 and early 2009, the Indian government announced a variety of policy initiatives aimed at increasing economic opportunities for persons with disabilities. In July 2008, the government created a program providing incentives to companies employing persons with disabilities.117 In October 2008, the government announced an effort to provide 100,000 persons with disabilities

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106 Pawan Bali, “This real hero provides limbs to landmine blast victims,” IBN Live, 10 March 2009, ibnlive.in.com.
109 Responses to Landmine Monitor questionnaire provided on condition of anonymity by a brigadier in the Indian Army posted to Jammu and Kashmir, 20 March 2009.
114 Ibid.
116 “Making a difference on the ground in India,” Aiming for Prevention News (Rajasthan), February 2009, www.ippnw.org; and email from Dr. Balkrishna Kurvey, Coordinator, Indian CBL, 13 February 2009.
with jobs. In June 2009, Indian railways reported it would hire more than 4,000 persons with disabilities. Indian law requires that 3% of all public sector jobs and educational opportunities be reserved for persons with disabilities, but in reality they comprise only 0.44% of public sector employees and 1% of students. The National Handicapped Finance and Development Corporation offers loans for persons with disabilities.

India’s Persons with Disabilities Act protects equal rights for persons with disabilities. However, the law’s provision making implementation dependent on the government’s “economic capacity” reportedly weakened its effect. Discrimination against persons with disabilities was reportedly “widespread.” Buildings and transport are rarely accessible, although in July 2008, the government pledged to make accessibility improvements at India’s universities. While a variety of NGOs and associations for persons with disabilities lobby for better policies for persons with disabilities, mine/ERW survivors are often not included in such efforts as they live in remote and conflict-affected regions.

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The Indian government continued to maintain a detailed National Interactive Web Portal on Disability, with news, services directories, and useful information for persons with disabilities.

India ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 1 October 2007; it entered into force in May 2008. As of 1 July 2009, India had not signed its Optional Protocol.

**Support for Mine Action**

India did not report on national funding for its own mine action programs in 2008 or 2007. India reported providing training to Cambodian army demining personnel in 2008 under an agreement to provide annual training to Cambodia. India also reported providing demining equipment to the Cambodian army in September 2008.

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123 Ibid.

124 Email from Medha Bisht, Researcher, Landmine Monitor, 4 June 2009.


**Ten-Year Summary**

The Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy on banning antipersonnel mines has not changed in the past decade. It has cited its perceived need for antipersonnel mines on its borders as the main reason for not joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Iran has abstained from voting on every annual UN General Assembly pro-ban resolution since 1997. There is evidence that Iran has produced and exported antipersonnel mines in the past decade, despite government statements that it stopped both activities.

Iran has one of the world’s largest mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problems, but the precise extent of contamination is not known. Seemingly huge demining operations have been undertaken in past years under the auspices of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mine Action Center (IRMAC), but reported results are unreliable and demining methods do not appear to meet the International Mine Action Standards.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 840 mine/ERW casualties (238 killed, 542 injured, and 60 of unknown status). Under-reporting is significant, however, and there might have been more than 10,000 total casualties. From 2002–2008, risk education was provided by several governmental organizations and NGOs in affected provinces. There is no specific victim assistance framework and little is known about Iran’s victim assistance activities. Services are in place for war-injured persons, including mine/ERW survivors, and healthcare has improved over the last decade, but remote areas are not well-served and not all survivors are eligible for state support.

**Mine Ban Treaty**

Iran has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Iran has cited its perceived need for antipersonnel mines on its borders as the main reason for not joining the treaty.¹

Iran has abstained from voting on every annual UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997, including Resolution 63/42 on 2 December 2008. In explaining its vote, Iran stated that it “shares the humanitarian concerns” of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and welcomes “every effort to stop this trend” of irresponsible mine use. It continued, “The Ottawa Convention, however, focuses mainly on humanitarian concerns while neglecting or not adequately taking into account legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, for the use of APLs [antipersonnel landmines] in defending their territories. Due to the difficulties of monitoring sensitive extensive areas by established and permanent guarding posts of effective warning systems, landmines continue to be the effective means, for those countries, to ensure the minimum security requirement of their borders.”²

Iran has never participated as an observer in the annual meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and, with one exception (May 2001) has not attended meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees in Geneva.

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¹ In a February 2006 letter to Landmine Monitor, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “Due to our expansive borders and problems resulting from narcotics and terrorist trafficking, our defense institutions are considering the use of landmines as a defensive mechanism.” In August 2005, the director of IRMAC stated that Iran is against the use of landmines, but war in and occupation of two countries bordering Iran were not conducive to Iran joining the Mine Ban Treaty. Government representatives told Landmine Monitor in January 2004 and July 2003 that they believe that if mines were removed from the country’s borders more Iranian soldiers would be killed while protecting the borders and drug trafficking would increase dramatically. They also stated that the cost of Iran joining the Mine Ban Treaty would be enormous. In July 2003, the government stated, “Landmines continue to be the sole effective means to ensure the minimum security requirement of borders in countries with long land borders.” For detailed sources, see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 857–858.

In December 2008, Iranian authorities raided and temporarily closed the NGO Center for Participation in Clearing Mined Areas, also known as the Mine Clearing Collaboration Campaign (MCCC), run by 2003 Nobel Peace Laureate Shirin Ebadi. The ICBL protested the closure. Ebadi had launched the NGO, which she created to support mine action in Iran, at the Mine Ban Treaty’s First Review Conference in November–December 2004. She has also called on Iran to join the Mine Ban Treaty, and make a greater effort on mine clearance and victim assistance.

Iran is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use
IRMAC’s director told Landmine Monitor in August 2005 that Iran neither uses nor produces landmines. In September 2002, the Ministry of Defense declared, “The Islamic Republic of Iran, since the termination of its war [1988], has not produced anti-personnel mines.” Iran is thought to have a large stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but no official information is available on its size and composition.

Iran exported a significant number of antipersonnel mines in the 1990s and earlier. An export moratorium was instituted in 1997, but it is not known if it is still formally in effect. In February 2006, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “It has been several years since Iran voluntarily halted export of anti-personnel mines.”

Despite these government statements, there is evidence that Iran has both produced and exported antipersonnel mines in the past decade.

In January 2008, media reports claimed that Afghan authorities seized stocks of Iranian-produced antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan’s Farah province, as well as in other provinces in prior months.

Tajikistan, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, reported that in 2007 two Iranian YM-1 antipersonnel mines were “transferred from the stockpiles of the force structures of the Republic of Tajikistan to the Tajikistan Mine Action Center for the purposes of destruction. The indicated antipersonnel mines were confiscated or detected by the force structures as a result of counter-terrorism activity.”

2 Iran told Landmine Monitor it has “announced its support for the regulations stipulated in the second protocol of this convention regarding the method of utilizing antipersonnel landmines.” Letter to Landmine Monitor (Human Rights Watch), File No: 322-1/153811, from Ali Jazini, Director, Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, DC, 1 February 2006, transmitting the response of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a letter sent on 7 September 2005.
4 Interview with Hossein Vaziri, Director, IRMAC, Tehran, 28 August 2005. He did not state when Iran allegedly stopped using and producing mines, nor if there is a formal policy or law prohibiting use and production. Iran has manufactured several types of antipersonnel mines, including the YM-1, MK4, and a Claymore-type mine. Jondollah activists allege that Iranian forces maintain an “internal border” with mines in order to control insurgency in Baluchi areas of Iran. See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 846.
8 Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form B2, 3 February 2008.
In November 2006, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia reported shipments of arms including landmines from Iran to combatants in Somalia in violation of the embargo. The type of mine, antipersonnel or antivehicle, was not specified. In response, Iran stated that it had not transferred any arms to Somalia.

Landmine Monitor received information in 2002, 2003, and 2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were removing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines.

**Non-state armed groups**

In April 2009, the Congress of Nationalities for a Federal Iran (CNFI), a grouping of Iranian opposition political parties, called for an antipersonnel landmine ban in Iran, urging Iranian armed groups to sign the Deed of Commitment administered by the Swiss NGO Geneva Call and for the Iranian government to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In 2009, three factions of the Komala party signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, pledging no use of antipersonnel mines. On 7 April 2009, the Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran (the Komala) and the Komala Party of Kurdistan signed the Deed of Commitment, followed on 16 June 2009 by the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan. All three factions acknowledged that they used antipersonnel mines sporadically in the past.

The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (Parti Démocratique du Kurdistân d’Iran, PDKI) signed the Deed of Commitment on 5 December 2007. In August 2008, the PDKI showed Geneva Call a stockpile of more than 400 antipersonnel mines that it said would be destroyed as soon as possible. The PDKI also admitted to previous use of antipersonnel mines prior to halting armed activities. On 1 September 2008, a stockpile of 392 PDKI antipersonnel mines was destroyed in Koya, northern Iraq. Mines destroyed included Chinese and Italian versions, as well as mines of Russian and United States design but of unknown manufacture.

Militants in the Baluchi areas of Iran have carried out attacks using explosives, but few if any appear to have been antipersonnel mines or other victim-activated devices.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Mines and ERW, especially UXO, remain in Iran from the 1980–1988 conflict with Iraq, affecting particularly the provinces of Ilam, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, and West Azerbaijan.\(^{20}\) UXO is said to include cluster munition remnants.\(^{21}\) No credible estimates exist for the extent of contamination remaining and the socio-economic impact is poorly understood. In April 2007, Brigadier General Morteza Habibi, who at that time headed IRMAC, claimed that 9,000km\(^2\) of land remained to be cleared in the five provinces. It was also claimed that 34,000km\(^2\) had been demined since 1988. Previously, the eastern provinces of Khorasan and Sistan-Baluchestan have also been reported to be affected by mines, especially in border areas with Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Casualties
In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 87 mine/ERW casualties: five killed and 82 injured.\(^{22}\) IRMAC reported 75 of these casualties, and the media 12. The majority of casualties were civilians of unknown gender and age (70); eight were deminers (men, civilian/military status unknown); and four military/police (men). The age, gender, and civil status of five casualties are unknown.

Little information is known about the device type, location, or activity at the time of the incident. At least eight casualties were engaged in clearance operations and one in security activities (the activity of the remaining 78 casualties is unknown). Landmines caused at least 12 casualties; the device type for the remaining 75 casualties is unknown. Casualties were recorded in at least two western provinces, Kermanshah (seven) and Ilam (five), but the location of 75 casualties was unknown. An additional 11 casualties (nine killed and two injured) were identified through media reports but not were included in the total as it was not possible to verify if they were already counted in IRMAC’s total.

In 2009, the Ministry of Defense reported that casualty rates had decreased,\(^{23}\) and in 2008 IRMAC was reported saying the casualty rate had fallen to 1.5 casualties per day. However, the MCCC estimates that there are on average 2.2 incidents per day.\(^{24}\) The Iranian Minorities Human Rights Organization (IMHRO) reported that there are approximately 1,000 new, mainly civilian, casualties each year.\(^{25}\) Between September 2008 and April 2009, IMHRO reported 250 casualties (mainly children and women).\(^{26}\)

Casualties continued to be identified in 2009, with at least eight mine casualties (two killed, four injured, and two of unknown status), as of 31 May 2009.\(^{27}\) At least six casualties were civilians; the status of two was unknown. Three casualties were males of unknown age; one was a man and one was a female of unknown age; the age and gender of three casualties was unknown. Activities at the time of the incident included traveling (four) and conducting agricultural activities (two); the activity of two casualties was unknown. Antipersonnel mines caused five casualties and unknown mines three. Casualties occurred in West Azerbaijan province (four) and in Kurdistan province (two); the location of the remaining two casualties was unknown.


\(^{22}\) Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008; and interview with Amir Hossein Saeedi, Director, IRMAC, Tehran, 6 November 2008.


\(^{27}\) Landmine Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 May 2009.
The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Iran remains unknown. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 840 mine/ERW casualties including 238 killed, 542 injured, and 60 of unknown status.28 One local media report estimated that from 1994 to 2008 some 10,000 people were killed in landmine incidents.29 The number of deminer casualties is unknown, but local media reported that between 2000 and 2008, 168 people were killed in clearance operations.30

According to a 2006 study by the Janbazan Medical and Engineering Research Center (JMERC), between 20 August 1988 and 20 March 2003 at least 3,713 persons were injured by landmines and ERW, including 1,499 people who underwent amputations in five western provinces of Iran. Among the amputees, 92% were male and 8% female; the average age at the time of the incident was 13–23 years old. The most common activities at the time of the incident were grazing livestock (29.6%), farming (8.1%), tampering (7.9%), and playing (4.5%). The study found that 33.1% of casualties were registered in Kurdistan, 22.2% in Kermanshah, 19.8% in West Azerbaijan, 15.1% in Ilam, and 9.9% in Khuzestan.31

Another study, carried out between 1998 to 2004, collected information on 156 casualties (six killed and 150 injured) who were treated at the Shahid Motahhary Hospital in West Azerbaijan province. It found that 80% of casualties were civilians and 20% military. The majority of casualties were male (95%) and 5% were female; 65% of casualties were between 15 and 35 years old. Activities at the time of the incident included herding, farming, smuggling, and playing; no statistics on activities were provided.32

In 2006, the UN reported that since the early 1990s, there had been approximately 10,000 casualties in Iran (some 4,000 people killed and 6,000 injured). During the same period more than 850 casualties among military deminers were reported.33 Ministry of Interior data, used by the Iranian Mine Victim Resource Center (IMC), recorded 6,765 mine casualties in Iran (2,840 people killed and 3,925 injured) from 1988–2002 in five provinces. The Sina Trauma and Surgery Research Center (STSRC) also recorded 990 people killed and 1,270 injured in incidents in Kermanshah province from 1994–2004. According to the STSRC, more than 95% of the mine incidents it recorded resulted in civilian casualties and around 15% involved children.

**Risk profile**

At-risk groups are men conducting livelihood activities (farmers, nomads, and shepherds), children and women living in western provinces,34 as well as military personnel and deminers (see Casualties section above). Pilgrims traveling to Karbala in Iraq are also said to be at risk.35

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28 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor. Landmine Monitor Report 2007 did not report a total casualty figure for 2006, however, it cited a Ministry of Defense report that nine deminers had been killed and 20 injured in clearance operations and that the IRCS recorded “more than 60 civilian casualties.” Therefore, for this report, Landmine Monitor has counted 89 casualties (nine killed, 20 injured, and 60 unknown) in 2006. Landmine Monitor Report 2005 reports two sets of figures for 2003, 34 killed and 101 injured recorded by IMC and 45 killed and 21 injured reported in the media. As there is no way to determine whether these figures overlap, for this report, Landmine Monitor has counted 135 casualties (34 killed and 101 injured) for 2003. Landmine Monitor Report 2004 reported 191 casualties (69 killed and 122 injured) in 2001. However, Landmine Monitor Report 2003 reported 18 civilians killed, 52 army deminers killed and 122 army deminers injured in 2001. Therefore, for this report, Landmine Monitor has counted 192 casualties (70 killed and 122 injured) in 2001.


35 Interview with Mr. Ziyai, Head of Mine Risk Education, State Welfare Organization, Tehran, 3 November 2008; and interview with Amir Hossein Saeedi, IRMAC, Tehran, 6 November 2008.
Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
The National Mine Action Council (NMAC) was established in 2003 by the government (the legislative basis is not known). It consists of the ministries of interior, foreign affairs, health and medical training, the provincial governors of the five mine-affected border provinces in the west, the joint chief of command for the armed forces, IRMAC, national mine action NGOs, and operational demining units belonging to Iran’s armed forces. The NMAC is chaired by the Minister of Defense.

In 2003, NMAC established IRMAC, a civilian body, to implement and coordinate mine action activities. IRMAC has five regional offices (one in each of the five western contaminated provinces).

Risk education
IRMAC is responsible for the coordination of risk education (RE) and established an RE committee in December 2005 that includes representatives from the ministries of defense, education, and welfare, the Iranian Red Crescent Society (IRCS), and the ICRC. There has been no coordination meeting since 2007, although IRMAC is kept informed of ongoing RE activities by operators.

Victim assistance
Despite the high number of mine/ERW casualties, there is no specific victim assistance (VA) framework in Iran. IRMAC does not implement or coordinate VA activities. The Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs is the main organization responsible for war-injured persons, including mine/ERW survivors, although some services are provided by the State Welfare Organization, the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, and the IRCS.

Policies created by IRMAC under the Ministry of Defense do not include any objectives on VA, but have the general aim of “raising the standards of victim assistance and integrating mine action activities with development projects.”

Data collection and management
IRMAC does not have a robust data collection and management system and does not use the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). There is no comprehensive data collection system in Iran and it is unclear which organization has the final responsibility to collect information on mine/ERW incidents. Casualty data is recorded by hospitals (although there is limited information in existing medical files), police, and provincial authorities.

As in previous years, IRMAC did not respond to Landmine Monitor requests for detailed casualty data. IRMAC stated that it collects casualty data, but one source reported to Landmine Monitor that IRMAC does not collect/verify casualty data directly and it has no casualty data system.

See also IRMAC, “Demining activities,” www.irmac.ir.
38 Interview with Amir Hossein Saeedi, IRMAC, Tehran, 1 November 2008.
40 Landmine Monitor source requesting anonymity.
41 Telephone interview with Nima Dadbin, ICRC, 27 July 2009; and email from Dr. Reza Soroush, Director, JMERC, 6 May 2009.
42 Email from Dr. Reza Soroush, JMERC, 6 May 2009.
44 “Iran to clear mines in border areas by 2011,” Fars (Tehran), 14 February 2007.
46 Interview with Amir Hossein Saeedi, IRMAC, Tehran, 6 November 2008.
database. Landmine Monitor was not able to confirm this information. IRMAC reported that the IMSMA “could not be received for political reasons.”

JMERC maintains a mine casualty database with medical and demographic details. In 2006, JMERC, in collaboration with the ICRC, published the first phase of an epidemiological study of mine/ERW injuries in five western provinces of Iran. A second phase of the study, which includes casualty data collection, was ongoing as of July 2009; results are expected in 2011. Several research institutes in Iran have conducted historical casualty data collection for research purposes. It is unknown if the IMC collected casualty data from 2008–2009.

**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plans**

In February 2007, the Minister of Defense reportedly declared that a 40-year timetable for mine clearance was being reduced to five years. He further noted that “In view of the president’s special attention to this matter, the ministry has given priority to mine clearance operations.” He claimed that operations would be concluded in West Azerbaijan and Kurdistan provinces by 21 March 2007, and that one year later, the province of Kermanshah would be cleared of mines. Finally, he declared that, “in line with our schedule and taking into account the high level of contamination in Khuzestan and Ilam Provinces, these two provinces will be decontaminated by 1389 [2011].”

On 5 May 2009, the UNDP Deputy Representative in Iran, Sagen Bayeva, met with NMAC and IRMAC staff and discussed possible Iran-Iraq cooperation in mine action in border areas with the support of UNDP. The extent of any subsequent progress has not been reported.

It is not known if the 2007 national action plan for RE has been implemented.

**National ownership**

**Commitment to mine action and victim assistance**

Despite Iran’s predictions of completing mine clearance within five years, there is little evidence that this will be achieved. Iran’s mine action program is under full national management and all mine action operations are funded from national resources. In 2007, the International Congress on Landmine Induced Injuries was held in Tehran and VA was identified as a priority for mine action in Iran. In 2000, the First International Conference on Landmine Victim Assistance during Peace Period was held in Tehran to discuss VA efforts.

**National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures**

On 5 April 2009, the Iranian Parliament adopted legislation to support deminers of private companies. Under the new legislation, the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs, a governmental organization, is responsible for providing medical and socio-economic support to deminers who are injured or killed during their duties, as well as their families. New national mine action standards and supporting standing operating procedures were said to have been drafted in 2008; as of July 2009 it was not known if they had been formally approved. In 2005, IRMAC claimed to have developed national mine action standards based on the International Mine Action Standards.
Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Iran’s demining capacity consists primarily of engineer units of the Iranian army and the Revolutionary Guard. Demining projects in support of oil exploration often use the private sector, which typically recruits retired veterans. One such commercial demining company is ISOP (Immen Sazan Omran Pars), which was established in 2004 in Tehran by war veterans with authorization from the Ministry of Defense. Deminers use manual methods and machines, but not mine detection dogs. In March 2007, a total of 941 deminers (300 from the army, 200 from the Revolutionary Guard, and 441 from private companies) were reportedly employed in demining operations. In accordance with Iran’s five-year demining plan it was planned to deploy a total of 8,000 people for demining, but more recent figures for demining capacity are not available.

Demining and battle area clearance results for 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Area released (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ilam</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>43,560</td>
<td>25,420</td>
<td>75,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kermanshah</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13,676</td>
<td>3,580</td>
<td>42,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khuzestan</td>
<td>1,204</td>
<td>38,225</td>
<td>48,896</td>
<td>82,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdistan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10,875</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Azerbaijan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12,253</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,006</strong></td>
<td><strong>118,589</strong></td>
<td><strong>77,896</strong></td>
<td><strong>200,402</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the past, the casualty rate among deminers was very high. In 2007, IRMAC reported that 168 demining personnel had been killed and a further 697 injured over the course of eight years. This would represent the highest known casualty rate for deminers in the world. In 2008, there were a further 61 reported demining casualties (of whom four were killed and 57 injured). In response to the level of casualties, demining units are now obliged to use personal protective equipment systematically and the use of mechanical demining equipment, such as flails, has been increased.

Quality management and handover of cleared land

Quality management is performed for IRMAC by Mohandesin Moshaverine Omrane Iran (Omran Iran Consulting Engineers, OICE). Once quality management is complete, IRMAC issues a handover certificate, which should be signed first by the contractor, then by OICE, thirdly by IRMAC, and lastly by the land owner (beneficiary). Governors General (the representatives of the government at the provincial level) monitor the post-clearance use of land. They report any incident in previously cleared areas. The contractor is responsible to re-clear lands on which any incident occurs.

Ibid.
Interview with Amir Hossein Saeedi, IRMAC, Tehran, 1 November 2008.
Interview with Mr. Raesi, Deputy Director, OICE, Tehran, 2 November 2008.
States Not Party

Risk Education

In 2008, RE was provided by the State Welfare Organization of the Ministry of Welfare and Social Security (Behzisti), the IRCS, and local NGOs. The ICRC continued to provide technical and financial support. The number of beneficiaries reached is unknown, but target groups included schoolchildren, teachers, nomads and shepherds living in five affected western provinces (Ilam, Kermanshah, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, and West Azerbaijan), as well as Afghan returnees across the country.

The State Welfare Organization provided school-based RE in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and IRMAC in the five affected western provinces. Awareness messages were provided in all schools in Ilam and between 60 and 80% of all schools in contaminated areas of the remaining provinces. In 2008, with ICRC support, it organized a training session for RE trainers in Ilam province. The State Welfare Organization used various RE materials including books, leaflets, and documentaries translated into local languages. It also implemented a pilot RE project that specifically targeted farmers and nomads in Kermanshah province. In 2009, the State Welfare Organization’s RE activities were expanded to target some 30,000 people in Ilam province (from some 5,000-6,000 people previously).

The IRCS provided awareness messages for local people in the five affected western provinces and for Afghan returnees. The IRCS training program for volunteers in affected provinces included an RE component. The ICRC also supported another local NGO which was working with the army to mark some dangerous areas in Kermanshah province.

The NGO Pishgaman Maaf implemented an RE pilot project in 10 villages in Kurdistan province. Thirty-one members of Pishgaman Maaf received RE training from the ICRC and the IRCS. In 2009, coverage has been expanded to 40 villages.

From 2002 to 2008, RE has been provided in affected areas by several governmental and non-governmental organizations including the IRCS, the State Welfare Organization, IRMAC, local NGOs, Zaynab Welfare Agency, ICRC, and UNHCR.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown but estimated to be between 546 and 6,000. Little information is available on governmental and NGO agencies providing assistance to persons with disabilities, including war-injured and mine/ERW survivors. In 2009, during the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, the Ministry of Defense

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81 The lower number is based on Landmine Monitor data (1999–2009); the higher one is based on UN statistics from UN, “2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, 2007, p. 199. For more information see the casualty section in this report.
stated its commitment to support mine survivors and their families.82 However, in 2008, several persons with war injuries expressed their dissatisfaction with the assistance received, stating that many disabled do not enjoy decent standards of living.83

Services to assist mine/ERW survivors are in place, although quality and accessibility varies between urban centers and remote villages.84 Eligibility criteria for mine/ERW survivors who want to receive government services is an issue of concern, as the procedures are time-consuming.85 Certain categories of people are excluded from services/benefits (for instance those who intentionally entered a minefield or tampered with a device).

Specialized care is available in large cities (usually provincial capitals). Institutions providing medical and rehabilitation services to mine/ERW survivors included the Mehran Emergency Center, Ilam provincial hospital, Sanandaj Besat Hospital in Kurdistan province, the STSRC in Tehran, and the Kowsar Orthotics and Prosthetics Center.86 While there are state funds for vocational training of persons with disabilities, these centers are mainly in urban areas.87

Iran has legislation protecting persons with disabilities. Accessibility for persons with disabilities remained an issue of concern.88 As of 1 July 2009, Iran had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

**Victim assistance activities**

The number of mine/ERW survivors assisted in 2008 or in the last 10 years is unknown. The Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs provides a wide range of services to war-injured persons (including mine/ERW survivors) and their families, including healthcare, education, and financial support.89

JMERC does not implement VA activities but conducts research on mine/ERW casualties. As of May 2009, ongoing projects included: a comparative study on post-traumatic stress disorder among mine/ERW and chemical weapons survivors in Kurdistan province; a study to increase the knowledge of mine/ERW survivors using a special educational package; and a collective medical examination camp for 50 young survivors of mine/ERW survivors.90

In April 2008, IRMAC initiated a new project to provide support, including social and psychological assistance, for the families of mine casualties, specifically focused on deminers’ families. No progress was reported as of July 2009.

**Support for Mine Action**

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs in Iran. Iran has not reported on the value of national funding to its own mine action program in 2008, as in 2007. As of May 2009 Iran had contributed three battle area clearance teams to support clearance efforts in southern Lebanon.91 It has not reported on the value of this contribution to date.

85 Email from Dr. Reza Soroush, JMERC, 6 May 2009.
88 Ibid.
89 Email from Dr. Reza Soroush, JMERC, 6 May 2009; and interview with Dr. Reza Soroush, JMERC, Tehran, 3 November 2008.
90 Email from Dr. Reza Soroush, JMERC, 6 May 2009.
### ISRAEL

#### 2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
<th>Not a State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO, AXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>Two (2007: two)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 13 since 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Ten-Year Summary

The State of Israel’s policy has not changed over the past decade. It supports the humanitarian goals of the Mine Ban Treaty but views antipersonnel mines as a necessary and legitimate means for security. Israel said it stopped production and importation of antipersonnel mines in the early 1980s; in 2004, Israeli officials disclosed for the first time that production lines had been dismantled. Israel declared a moratorium on the transfer of antipersonnel mines in 1994, which has been extended for three-year periods until July 2011. The last confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by Israel was during its withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000. Israel was alleged to have used antipersonnel mines in several specific instances in Gaza and the West Bank (Occupied Territories) in 2000 and 2001, and to have laid antipersonnel mines during the July–August 2006 conflict in Lebanon, but has denied the charges.

Israel is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), although the precise extent remains unclear. In 2008, the Israeli Defense Forces reportedly cleared 11,000 mines. Since 1999, at least six mine/ERW casualties have been recorded. No formal mine/ERW risk education (RE) activities exist, but ad hoc RE is provided in awareness sessions in schools, as part of army training, and by local authorities. Israeli health and social services are able to respond adequately to mine/ERW survivors’ needs.

#### Mine Ban Policy

Israel has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In November 2008, an Israeli official reiterated that “Israel is not in a position to join the Mine Ban Treaty. The regional circumstances prevailing in the Middle East prevent Israel from committing to a total ban on anti-personnel mines and unfortunately have not improved since our previous communication.” In April 2007, Israel said that “while Israel supports the humanitarian goals of the convention, it is unable to disregard its specific military and security needs, it cannot commit to a total ban on anti-personnel mines as they are a legitimate means for defending its borders against possible incursions such as terrorist attacks and therefore is not in a position to consider membership.”

Since 1997 Israel has abstained each year from voting on annual UN General Assembly resolutions calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including UNGA Resolution 63/42 on 2 December 2008.

Israel did not participate as an observer in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008, but attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. It did not make any statements.

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1 Letter from Rodica Radian-Gordon, Director, Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 November 2008.
2 Email from Joshua Zarka, Counselor for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 18 April 2007.
Israel is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Israel submitted an annual report in accordance with Article 13 in November 2008. Israel is not party to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, Israel had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.3

**Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use**

The size and composition of Israel’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines remains unknown, but it includes both hand-emplaced and remotely-delivered mines.4 Israel has said it “ceased all production and imports of antipersonnel mines in the early 1980s.”5 It has dismantled its antipersonnel mine production lines.6

Israel declared a moratorium on the transfer of antipersonnel mines in 1994, which was extended for three-year periods in 1996, 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2008. The current moratorium is effective until July 2011.7

On 31 December 2007, the Defense Export Control Act entered into force in Israel. The act “criminalizes, inter alia, any violation of the export without an export license or contrary to its provisions. This Act serves as Israel’s statutory framework for the implementation of its obligations under the CCW regarding restrictions and prohibitions on transfer and the Moratorium on any sales of [antipersonnel mines].”8

Israel’s November 2008 CCW Amended Protocol II annual report states, “There were no newly emplaced minefields this year.”9

In December 2008, Israel launched 22 days of intense military operations in Gaza. According to one news report, the law department of the Israeli Armed Forces sanctioned use of antipersonnel mines during the conflict, but there has been no confirmation of their use.10 Israel used numerous antivehicle mines for controlled demolition of structures, but a Human Rights Watch field mission found no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines.11 There was also no evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by Palestinian groups, though Israel apparently anticipated it, as demonstrated by Israel’s use of numerous “CARPET” minefield-clearing fuel-air-explosive weapons.12

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Israel is affected by landmines and ERW. Mines dating from World War II remain, and Israel has subsequently used mines along its borders, near military camps and training areas, and near civilian infrastructure. The exact extent of overall contamination is not known, but unconfirmed

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4 Israel reported that in 2005 the IDF destroyed 15,510 outdated mines at an ammunition disposal facility. It has not reported any further destruction of mines since that time. CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form C, 22 November 2005.

5 Email from Meir Itzchaki, Regional Security and Arms Control Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 February 2003. In the past, Israel produced low metal content blast antipersonnel mines, bounding fragmentation mines, and Claymore-type directional fragmentation munitions, designated M12A1, No. 2, No. 3, No. 4, and No. 6.

6 Interview with members of the Israeli delegation to the Eighth Session of the CCW Group of Government Experts, Geneva, 8 July 2004.


10 Dina Kraft, “Israeli army lawyer who sanctioned bombings under attack over university post,” The Telegraph (Tel Aviv), 4 February 2009, www.telegraph.co.uk.


12 Ibid. For information regarding reports of use of antipersonnel and antivehicle IEDs by Hamas militia during the conflict, see report on Palestine (OPT) in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
press reports have suggested that some 33km² of land are suspected to be mined in Israel, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights.¹³ A total of 70,000 antivehicle mines and 50,000 antipersonnel mines were reportedly laid by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Jordanian Armed Forces in the Jordan Valley in past decades, although exact dates of placement are not available.¹⁴ According to a report published by the Knesset Research Unit in 2002, 350 minefields in Israel and the Occupied Territories were regarded as no longer necessary to Israel’s security.¹⁵

As a result of various conflicts, some parts of Israel are also contaminated by ERW—both abandoned explosive ordnance and UXO—remaining in the areas of confrontation and near military training areas. A further hazard has arisen from Palestinian improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In addition, Israeli military training fields are said to be sometimes improperly fenced or not fenced at all, and some UXO go uncollected.¹⁶ According to the commander of the bomb squad of the National Police, all known strike locations of cluster munitions fired into Israel from Lebanon by Hezbollah were cleared of any remnants found at the time. No survey was conducted, nor was there any attempt to identify strikes that may have landed in the desert.¹⁷

In 2006, mined areas in Israel were said to be fenced and marked with warning signs in Hebrew, Arabic, and English, clearly positioned on the perimeter of every minefield.¹⁸ However, it had earlier been reported that some of the areas, especially in the south, were not marked or fenced, and were potential hazards to the civilian population; the IDF policy of marking mined areas and not fencing them was criticized.¹⁹ In recent years, landmines exposed and moved by flooding in the northern Golan Heights have presented a new danger for local civilians.²⁰ On 11 February 2008, the Peace Court of the city of Haifa ordered the State to award NIS62,240 (US$14,939) in compensation to two brothers in Majdal Shams in the Golan Heights for the damages incurred in 2000, when landmines were swept down the hill from a minefield to their courtyard. The court concluded that the IDF was aware of the dangerous position of the minefield but took no preventive measures.²¹

Israel has declared that information on the location of minefields is provided to the Israeli Mapping Center. Maps are reportedly available to the public and periodically updated. Further information regarding minefield locations is provided by local municipalities in response to land rights and use inquiries.²² Minefields are clearly marked with signs in Hebrew, Arabic, and English.²³

Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified two new ERW casualties: an 11-year-old boy was killed and his father injured by an unexploded shell while hiking near Ramat Hovav in Negev. The media reported that they “wandered into an IDF firing range.”²⁴ In its 2008 CCW Article 13 report, Israel also reported two civilian casualties occurring between November 2007 and

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¹⁴ See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 856; and IDF website, dover.idf.il.
²¹ “The State will compensate residents of Majdal Shams whose house was hit,” Walla News (Tel Aviv), 11 February 2008, women.walla.co.il.
²³ Telephone interview with Meir Itzchaki, Permanent Mission of Israel to the UN in Geneva, 2 April 2009.
November 2008 while they tried to “steal mines from a fully fenced and marked minefield.”25 Further details and the date of the incident were not made available. Therefore, the casualties were not included in the 2008 total. In 2007, two mine/ERW casualties were reported.26

Casualties continued to be reported in the first quarter of 2009. On 1 March, a farmer was injured by a mine while looking for mushrooms.27 On 11 March, a man sustained severe injuries after entering a clearly marked minefield with two friends. He subsequently died while being rescued by helicopter; two other people were unhurt.28

Media reported on Israeli military mine casualties in Gaza during Operation Cast Lead in December 2008–January 2009.29 Landmine Monitor was told by an Israeli official that these casualties were caused by IEDs, not mines. Further detail was not provided.30 Instances of people inadvertently entering minefields in the Golan Heights have been reported but without casualties.31

The total number of mine/ERW casualties between 1999 and 2009 is unknown, with Landmine Monitor recording only one incident prior to 2007—a soldier injured in 2000.32 In 2005, it was reported that IEDs caused “many casualties among Israeli civilians,” but it is unclear whether these were victim activated or command detonated devices.33 Additionally, at least 19 Israeli military mine/ERW casualties occurred outside of Israel: four killed and four injured in Gaza (2003); and six killed and five injured in Lebanon (2006).34

**Program Management and Coordination**

There is no national agency to manage or coordinate demining efforts. On 17 February 2000, the government decided that mine clearance would be implemented by civilian companies and supervised by a civilian authority, which would initiate clearance requests. However, the IDF decided a year later that it held sole responsibility for mine clearance.35 Mine/ERW survivors are not treated differently from other persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Social Services is responsible for disability issues.36

**Data collection and management**

Mine/ERW casualty data is not publicly available although an Israeli official reported that there are several casualty databases in the country, including a database at the Ministry of Defense which, however, does not make a distinction between casualties from mines and those from other explosive devices.37

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25 Article 13 Report, Form F, November 2008. It is possible that the casualties in this report are the same as those reported by the media on 23 May 2008.
29 “Mitchell flies into Israel as Obama envoy,” *Independent* (Dublin), 29 January 2009, www.independent.ie. The media article appears to indicate that the device was remote-detonated; therefore, casualties would be excluded from mine/ERW casualty totals.
30 Telephone interview with Meir Itzchaki, Permanent Mission of Israel, 2 April 2009.
37 Telephone interview with Meir Itzchaki, Permanent Mission of Israel, 2 April 2009.
Demining and Battle Area Clearance

During 2008, 500 inspections of fencing and markings of minefields were conducted by the IDF Engineering Corps, and 11,000 mines were reportedly cleared. In addition, in October 2008, the IDF reported that clearance of minefields in the northern Jordan Valley had been conducted as a training exercise. As of November 2008, the IDF Engineering Corps was continuing to measure minefields using global positioning systems, as well as what appears to be recording of the “history” of minefields.

In 2008, the IDF Northern Command began to promote usage of private clearance companies, so as to limit the IDF’s legal responsibility in areas it had cleared and then declared safe. An Israeli civil company conducted “two significant mine clearance projects,” one involving UXO clearance in Ramat Hovav and the other involving unspecified clearance in Pardes Hana. The extent of the areas cleared, and the number of items of ordnance disposed of, were not reported.

Risk Education

In 2008, mine/ERW risk education (RE) continued to be provided on an ad hoc basis, as has been the case since 1999. Formal risk education is reportedly not needed as the level of awareness among Israelis is high. RE messages were provided to schoolchildren during terrorism awareness sessions, as well as to all Israelis in military service. Local municipalities continued to provide information on minefield locations to citizens, and field trip organizers needed to coordinate their routes with the IDF which provided “appropriate mine awareness instructions.”

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown but is at least 13 since 1999. Israel has sufficient capacity to address the needs of persons with disabilities, as well as vast experience in trauma surgery and rehabilitation. Medical, rehabilitation, and socio-economic reintegration costs of insured persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, are covered by the Israeli National Insurance Institute. Mine/ERW survivors can also be eligible for financial compensation under the Benefits for Victims of Hostilities Law of 1970. However, in 2009, Israeli veterans reported gradual cuts in government support for welfare, with voluntary organizations having to fill the gaps. They also said that negotiating compensation can be time-consuming. As of 1 July 2009, Israel had not ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or signed its Optional Protocol.

In 2003, it was also reported that Israeli rehabilitation specialists were sent out under UN auspices and that rehabilitation exchange agreements were concluded with several countries.
Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Kazakhstan has repeatedly stated that it needs landmines to protect its border. In 2007 and 2008, Kazakhstan voted in favor of the annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution, after abstaining in all previous years. The Minister of Defense stated in 2007 that 3,000 expired mines had been destroyed from stockpiles and more would be destroyed in the future. Government officials have at times acknowledged the use of landmines in border areas and at other times denied the existence of minefields in Kazakhstan.

Mine Ban Policy

Kazakhstan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has expressed support for the treaty’s humanitarian objectives, but cited the perceived need for antipersonnel mines to protect its border and the perceived need for alternatives to the weapon as the reasons Kazakhstan has not yet joined.1

On 2 December 2008, Kazakhstan voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This was the second year in a row it voted for the annual pro-ban resolution, after abstaining each year since 1997.

Kazakhstan did not attend as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2008, nor did it attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Kazakhstan has stated that it is not a producer of antipersonnel mines. It has had a moratorium of unlimited duration on export and transit of landmines since 1997.2

The size of Kazakhstan’s antipersonnel mine stockpile is not known, but a 1998 media report estimated that the government had between 800,000 and one million antipersonnel mines.3 Officials have said that many of the mines have expired, that some have been destroyed in recent years, and that a plan for further destruction is in place.4

A media report on 18 July 2008 stated that police found an ammunition cache containing antivehicle and antipersonnel mines in the Aktobe region.5

Government officials have at times acknowledged the use of landmines in border areas and at other times denied the existence of minefields in Kazakhstan.6

Kazakhstan is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. As of 1 July 2009, it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.7

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1 For examples, see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 870.
2 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 862, for details on statements regarding production and trade.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—North Korea—has not engaged at all in efforts to ban antipersonnel mines. It has not responded to annual requests from Landmine Monitor to provide information on its policies and practices. It is considered a producer and stockpiler of antipersonnel mines. The scope of the problem and the extent of any demining in North Korea remain unclear. No information about mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties is publicly available, and no mine/ERW risk education has been reported. There are no specific services for mine/ERW casualties, and sanctions, floods, and restrictions for international organizations have reduced the country’s capacity to address the needs of persons with disabilities.

Mine Ban Policy

North Korea has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials have stated that North Korea supports the aims and objectives of the treaty but is not ready to accede, given its complex security situation.1 On 2 December 2008, North Korea abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It did not offer any explanation of its vote.2 It has never attended an international or regional meeting on the landmine issue. In May 2009, an official told the ICBL that North Korea is “not interested in engaging on that topic.”3

North Korea produced antipersonnel mines in the past, but no information is available on possible current production.4 North Korean mines have been found in Angola and Sudan, but there are no reports of recent transfers.5 The size of North Korea’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines is not known, but it is probably substantial.

North Korea is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.6

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2 North Korea also abstained from voting on the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UNGA resolution in December 2007. It was absent from every previous vote from 1997–2006. It was one of only 10 nations to abstain on the first UNGA landmine resolution in 1996 calling for the negotiation of an international agreement to ban antipersonnel mines.
3 Telephone interview with unidentified official at the Permanent Mission of the DPRK to the UN in Geneva, 27 May 2009.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination
North Korea admitted in 1998 that it had laid landmines in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between the north and south of the peninsula. The affected areas are reported to be marked and fenced. In early 2006, officials commented to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit that North Korea had not laid mines elsewhere in the country, despite fears noted in Landmine Monitor Report 2004 that sections of the east or west coast were also mined. In December 2006, a North Korean defector claimed that in 1981, when he was stationed in Ryongyon-kun, South Hwanghae province, on the west coast just above the 38th parallel, he had observed mined areas along the shore that were fenced and marked with warning signs.

There are also believed to be ERW, particularly UXO, in North Korea left from the conflict on the Korean peninsula in the 1950s.

Casualties
As in previous years, it is not known if new mine/ERW casualties occurred in North Korea in 2008 or in 2009 through 1 April. The ICRC reported that 0.17% of 1,204 prostheses it provided in 2008 went to mine survivors; it is unknown when they were injured.

Since 1999, Landmine Monitor recorded one mine incident when, in December 2002, a North Korean soldier involved in construction work in the DMZ lost a foot in a landmine explosion. It is likely that other incidents remained unreported.

Program Management and Coordination

The needs of mine/ERW survivors are addressed by existing services with several bodies responsible for service provision, including the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces, and the Korean Federation for the Protection of Disabled People (KFPD).

Victim assistance
While North Korea is still considered “one of the least hospitable societies for people with disabilities,” it took steps towards improving the quality of life of persons with disabilities in 2008 by re-engaging with some international organizations that were forced to leave in 2005, once again allowing them to assist health facilities and to reform institutions housing persons with disabilities. In 2004, North Korea was believed to have had a comprehensive system for assisting persons with disabilities, but the 2005 expulsion of NGOs, UN sanctions in 2006, and floods in 2006–2007 had reduced the country’s capacity to address the needs of persons with disabilities.

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2 Email from Kerry Brinkert, GICHD, 1 February 2006.
6 Telephone interview with NGO representative speaking on condition of anonymity, 30 March 2009.
12 Telephone interview with NGO representative speaking on condition of anonymity, 30 March 2009.
In 2003, the government adopted the Law of Disability Protection, but implementing legislation had not been passed by 2008. As of 1 July 2009, North Korea had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

The ICRC continued to support government physical rehabilitation centers. In November 2008, representatives from these centers, the KFPD, and government bodies expressed their interest in developing a national rehabilitation structure that would standardize regulations and methods.\textsuperscript{21}


Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Korea (ROK)—South Korea—has insisted on the military necessity of antipersonnel mines, while acknowledging the negative humanitarian consequences. South Korea has consistently abstained from voting on the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. South Korea began producing remotely-delivered, self-destructing antipersonnel mines in 2006. It has maintained an indefinite moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines since 1997. In May 2006, South Korea revealed that it had a stockpile of 407,800 antipersonnel mines, but in 2009 said the figure is classified.

Demining has remained exclusively in the hands of the army which committed substantial numbers of personnel but limited funds to mine action and made limited headway clearing the main areas of contamination. Mines are estimated to affect some 32km², especially in the heavily affected Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ).

Landmine Monitor has identified 63 mine casualties between 1999 and 2008 (six killed and 57 injured). South Korea had very limited risk education activities during this period. There have not been any specific services for mine/ERW survivors during this 10-year period but medical and rehabilitative care is of good quality, and all citizens are covered through the national health insurance system. Government compensation is also available, but only seven claimants have been successful since 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

South Korea has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has never sent observers to the annual meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, but has attended intersessional meetings sporadically, as well as some regional landmine meetings. It did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

On 2 December 2008, South Korea abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has in previous years. South Korea accompanied this vote with a statement that “due to the unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula, we are compelled to give priority to our security concerns, and unable to accede to the Convention at this point.”

South Korea is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. South Korea submitted its annual report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II. South Korea adhered to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) on 23 January 2008, becoming a State Party to the protocol on 23 July 2008. South Korea has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

1 Statement by Youn Jong Kwon, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 63rd UN General Assembly meeting, New York, 29 October 2008.
Use, production, and transfer

South Korea told Landmine Monitor that it did not engage in any new use of antipersonnel mines during 2008. It also said that there was no production, export, or importation of antipersonnel mines in 2008. In 2007, a private company, the Hanwha Corporation, produced about 10,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, as well as an unknown number of Claymore directional fragmentation mines.

South Korea has produced two types of Claymore mines, designated KM18A1 and K440. South Korean officials have stated that the country only produces the devices in command-detonated mode, which is lawful under the Mine Ban Treaty, and not with tripwires, which are prohibited.

In 2008, South Korea stated that it has “faithfully enforced an indefinite extension of the moratorium on the export of AP [antipersonnel] mines since 1997, which does not include Claymore-type mines.”

In June 2009, South Korea told Landmine Monitor, “The government-led R&D program on the development of ‘remotely-controlled mine’ which will replace anti-personnel mines is underway. The newly developed mines will meet the requirements set out in the Amended Protocol II to the CCW.”

According to one report, the Korean military is planning to deploy remote-controlled “Spider bombs” along the DMZ by 2013. Bids have been solicited for development of the weapon, apparently a copy of the US XM-7 Spider Networked Munitions System. As developed by the United States, the Spider system initially had a “battlefield override switch” that, in addition to remote detonation, would allow the device to function in a victim-activated mode, making it incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. After criticism from the US Congress, this feature was dropped. It is not known whether South Korea’s version will have such a feature.

Stockpiling

In 2009, South Korea told Landmine Monitor that the size of its stockpile is classified. However, in response to annual questionnaires from Landmine Monitor from 2006 to 2008, South Korea said its stockpile consisted of 407,800 antipersonnel mines. Previously, the government stated that it held a stockpile of about two million antipersonnel mines.
For many years, the US military has stockpiled about 1.1 million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines for use in any future war in Korea. The US military also keeps in South Korea a substantial number of self-destructing, scatterable antipersonnel mines. In 2005, the South Korean government reported that the US held 40,000 GATOR, 10,000 VOLCANO, and an unknown number of MOPMS mines.

Most of the US mines in South Korea have been part of the more extensive War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K). The WRSA-K consisted of munitions stored in South Korea but kept under US title and control, which would be made available to US and South Korean forces in case of an emergency. On 30 December 2005, US President George W. Bush signed Public Law 109-159, authorizing the sale of items in the WRSA-K to South Korea during a three-year period, after which the WRSA-K program would be terminated, which occurred at the end of 2008.

In June 2008, the South Korean government told Landmine Monitor, “Landmines are excluded from the negotiations between the ROK and US” regarding sale or transfer of War Reserve Stocks. In June 2009, the South Korean government told Landmine Monitor, “AP mines were not included in the list of items for sale or transfer in the WRSA-K negotiations, and therefore, no AP-mines were bought or obtained.”

It is not clear what has or will be done with the US antipersonnel mines from the WRSA-K. The law ending the program states that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of Defense.” Moreover, US policy is to stop the use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea in 2010. But, according to one report, South Korea may still safeguard the antipersonnel mines for 10 years, without actually taking ownership of them. At an annual meeting between the South Korean Minister of National Defense and US Secretary of Defense in Washington, DC, on 17 October 2008, a memorandum was signed that, in addition to the stocks South Korea is acquiring from the US, would have South Korea store 89,000 tons (89 million kg) of weapons and ammunition for the US until 2018, including non-self-destructing landmines.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

The DMZ and the CCZ (which adjoins the southern boundary of the DMZ) remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world due to extensive mine-laying during the Korean War and in the 1960s, 1978, and 1988.
South Korea reports that about one million mines are emplaced in 1,300 sites between the DMZ and the capital, Seoul; a level of contamination unchanged for several years.\textsuperscript{23} South Korea had indicated in May 2006 that about 970,000 mines were emplaced in the southern part of the DMZ, about 30,000 mines in the CCZ, and about 8,000 mines in 25 military sites covering an area of some 3km\textsuperscript{2} in the northern parts of Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon-do provinces, below the CCZ.\textsuperscript{24} UXO, another legacy of the Korean War, is also present in many parts of the country, and an explosion in Gyeonggi-do province in November 2006 injured one man.\textsuperscript{25}

South Korea informed Landmine Monitor that the 1,300 mined sites cover a total area of about 32km\textsuperscript{2},\textsuperscript{26} unchanged from the previous year but substantially more than the 21.8km\textsuperscript{2} of confirmed minefields reported by the Ministry of National Defense in 2003.\textsuperscript{27} At that time, the ministry also reported unconfirmed minefields covering an additional 90.7km\textsuperscript{2}. The South Korean army defines unconfirmed minefields as areas that are suspected to be mined, but for which there are no maps or other reliable information; it marks them with “Unconfirmed Minefield Danger” signs.\textsuperscript{28}

\section*{Casualties}

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified two men injured by landmines. On 25 January, a civilian was injured on the island of Gangwha\textsuperscript{29} and in October, a South Korean soldier was injured in the DMZ.\textsuperscript{30}

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, when an adult man was killed due to an antipersonnel mine explosion on 25 April. He was reportedly in a minefield in the CCZ, just below the DMZ.\textsuperscript{31}

The number of mine/ERW casualties is unknown but the Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance stated in March 2009 that there are at least 500 civilian survivors.\textsuperscript{32} In 2007, the media reported that there were at least 1,000 civilian casualties and the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) estimated there were 2,000 to 3,000 military casualties.\textsuperscript{33} Landmine Monitor identified 63 mine casualties between 1999 and 2008 (six killed and 57 injured). At least 20 casualties were military personnel, including one American soldier injured in 2001.\textsuperscript{34}

Figures are likely incomplete as there is no comprehensive official data on mine casualties in South Korea.\textsuperscript{35} The Ministry of National Defense only records military mine/ERW incidents.\textsuperscript{36} Civilian casualties are identified mainly through the media.

\textsuperscript{23} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009. The number of emplaced mines is unknown; some sources have estimated there are two million mines in the DMZ. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 682.

\textsuperscript{24} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 May 2006. South Korea refers to the CCZ as the Military Control Zone.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 16 June 2008.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, 9 June 2009 and 16 April 2007.

\textsuperscript{27} See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1,022.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{29} “Tourist Injured in Suspected Landmine Explosion,” The Chosun Ilbo, 29 January 2008, english.chosun.com; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{30} Telephone interview with Kim Ki-Ho, Executive Director, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, Seoul, 19 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{31} KCBL, www.kcbl.or.kr.

\textsuperscript{32} Emails from Kim Ki-Ho, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 and 23 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{33} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 879.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.

Program Management and Coordination

South Korea does not have a civilian mine action program. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs (MIHWAF) is the lead ministry responsible for persons with disabilities. In 2008, the MIHWAF initiated a five-year plan to implement a comprehensive set of disability policies.

Demining

South Korea has undertaken limited demining in the DMZ and CCZ but has concentrated most effort on demining military bases in rear areas. Clearance operations are conducted by the South Korean army.

In its latest CCW Article 13 report for the period 1 September 2007 to 31 August 2008, South Korea stated that demining by 53,000 troops covered 169km² and cleared 2,249 landmines. Separately, South Korea told Landmine Monitor that demining operations in 2008 involved 38,000 troops and resulted in clearance of 104,000m² and removal of 1,470 mines, substantially less than in the two previous years (see table below). It also said that it spent KRW980 million (US$891,955) in 2008, close to double the amount in 2007. South Korea said it planned to clear six sites covering about 170,000m² in 2009.

South Korea’s 2007 Article 13 report stated that demining work was underway on 14 “military bases or sites,” including three unconfirmed minefields, and that the work would be completed by 2009. Its 2008 Article 13 report stated that mine clearance work was “currently in progress on 7 unconfirmed minefields. The work would be completed by 2009.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine clearance in South Korea</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area (m²)</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>169,000</td>
<td>229,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines cleared</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>7,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Work on a 5.6km-long railway link below the DMZ (from Shintan-ri Station in Yeoncheon County, Gyeonggi-do province, to Daema-ri in Cheorwon county, Gangwon-do province) began in September 2008 as part of plans to reopen an inter-Korean railway. About 13% of the link had been completed by February 2009 when media reports said work had involved clearance of three antipersonnel mines, four antivehicle mines, and one unexploded bomb.

The government says there are no civilian demining companies in South Korea but that it is drafting legislation that will allow private companies to engage in mine clearance operations on private land. Press reports in 2008 cited the Ministry of National Defense as saying the

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41 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.
46 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 16 June 2008.
legislation would be passed in September 2008, while in March 2009 private sector sources said the bill would be introduced to parliament in June 2009. In the meantime, unofficial reports say land speculators are buying mine-contaminated land inside the CCZ, having the land cleared, and selling it for a profit.

However, a private mine clearance research group, the Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, said that it conducted mine clearance operations at Dutayon, Yanggu-kun, Gangwon-do (a site inside the CCZ) between 14 March and 2 April 2008, clearing three antipersonnel mines, three antivehicle mines, and 12 ERW. The institute also said it conducted demining operations at Baekhak-myon, Yonchon-kun, and Gyeonggi-do on 10–20 April 2008, covering some 12,000m² and clearing two antipersonnel mines, 12 “illumination mines,” and seven antivehicle mines. The institute said it employed a clearance machine, the “Dove System,” which it had developed as more suitable to the Korean environment than foreign mine clearance machines.

Mechem deployed two MV-4 mini-flails and five mine detection dog teams to South Korea in March 2008 as subcontractor to Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Inc. (EODT), a US-based commercial company active in Afghanistan. EODT engaged Mechem on a US Corps of Engineers contract at Camp Casey but, as a result of contractual issues between EODT and the Corps of Engineers, the contract was terminated after four months—before Mechem’s assets became operational.

Risk Education

Since 2003, the government has reported providing mine/ERW risk education (RE). In June 2009, it stated that “the military holds meetings with local people to provide specific information on landmines.” It provides two types of RE: one for the armed forces and the other for civilians, mainly as community liaison prior to clearance. In its latest CCW Article 13 report, South Korea indicated that there had been no changes to the way landmine information was disseminated. South Korean NGOs dispute the government’s description of RE activities, which are believed to be limited to the placement of mine warning signs in the CCZ and displaying models of mines at the entrance gates to the CCZ.


Victim Assistance

The number of survivors is unknown, but civilian survivors are estimated to number at least 500.

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48 Email from Kim Ki-Ho, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 March 2009.
50 Email from Kim Ki-Ho, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 March 2009.
52 Email from Ashley Williams, Chief Executive Officer, Mechem, 12 June 2009.
54 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.
55 Ibid.
57 Email from Kim Ki-Ho, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 March 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1,024.
59 Emails from Kim Ki-Ho, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 and 23 March 2009.
Compared to other developed countries, the government of South Korea provides good quality healthcare services to its citizens.° Soldiers injured on duty receive free medical services and a monthly pension that depends on the degree of disability—estimated, for example, to be KRW1,040,000 ($947) for a partial limb amputation.°° Civilian mine survivors, like all Korean citizens, are covered by the national health insurance system.°°° In 2008, the MIHWAF “established a task force to introduce a long-term medical care system and opened a national rehabilitation research center to increase opportunities and access for persons with disabilities.”°°°°

Civilian mine survivors can apply for government compensation through the Ministry of National Defense Special Compensation Commission (SCC) and under the State Compensation Act, but just seven claims have been successful.°°°°° In 2008, one new claim was filed with the SCC and one claim was settled successfully with KRW200 million ($182,032) awarded to a survivor and the survivor’s family.°°°°°°° A draft Special Act for Compensation of Mine Victims submitted to the National Assembly in November 2003 by the KCBL remained pending as of April 2009, as did a draft provincial law to assist landmine survivors and families of deceased casualties in Gangwon-do province.°°°°°°°°

In April 2008, the Anti-Discrimination Against and Remedies for Persons with Disabilities Act took effect. This act adopted a comprehensive definition of discrimination and it established penalties for deliberate discrimination of up to three years in prison and KRW30 million ($27,305) in fines.°°°°°°°° In early 2009, following media coverage of disability discrimination, the National Human Rights Commission of Korea issued a number of key decisions on opportunities in higher education and access to commercial buildings to protect the rights of disabled persons.°°°°°°°°°

On 11 December 2008, South Korea ratified the UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol.

Support for Mine Action

South Korea did not report international funding for mine action in 2008.

°°°°° Email from Kim Ki-Ho, Korea Research Institute for Mine Clearance, 22 March 2009.
°°°°°°°° Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the ROK to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.
°°°°°°°° Email from Un Young Moon, Staff Member, KCBL, 2 April 2009.
Ten-Year Summary

The Kyrgyz Republic has expressed support for the goal of a mine-free world but insists it needs mines for border protection. Since 2002, it has abstained from voting on the annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution. In 2005, a military source indicated that various government agencies had stockpiles of several tens of thousands of antipersonnel mines. Kyrgyzstan has acknowledged that it used antipersonnel mines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its borders. Kyrgyzstan is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), although the scope of the residual problem is not clear. Little progress has been made on demining in recent years. Mine/ERW risk education has primarily been delivered by the Kyrgyzstan Red Crescent Society, but no activities were reported in 2008. The number of mine/ERW casualties between 1999 and 2009 is unknown, but there were at least six casualties. No specific services for survivors exist.

Mine Ban Policy

Kyrgyzstan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Officials have said that while Kyrgyzstan supports the goal of a mine-free world, it does not yet have necessary alternatives for border defense, and it lacks financial and technical resources to implement the treaty.  

Kyrgyzstan has welcomed the decreasing use of antipersonnel mines around the world, and said that a step-by-step approach—beginning with mine clearance, then stockpile destruction—could prepare the basis for Kyrgyzstan to accede.  

On 2 December 2008, Kyrgyzstan was one of 18 countries to abstain from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It abstained or was absent from votes on similar General Assembly resolutions in previous years.

Kyrgyzstan did not attend as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Kyrgyzstan states that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but inherited a stockpile of mines from the Soviet Union. A military source told Landmine Monitor that the Ministry of Defense has tens of thousands of PMN and OZM-72 antipersonnel mines, Border Services have 1,000 to 2,000 antipersonnel mines, and most if not all of these mines are beyond their shelf-life date and are unsafe to use.

Kyrgyzstan has acknowledged that it used antipersonnel mines in 1999 and 2000 to prevent infiltration across its borders, but maintains that these areas have since been demined (see Contamination section below).

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3 Kyrgyzstan voted in support of pro-mine-ban UN General Assembly resolutions from 1996 to 1998 and was absent during the votes on these resolutions in 1999 and 2001. It abstained from voting in 2000, and from 2002 to 2008.
5 Interview with military source requesting anonymity, Bishkek, May 2005.
Kyrgyzstan is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Kyrgyzstan is contaminated by landmines, mainly in the southern Batken province bordering Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as a result of mine use by Uzbekistan’s military between 1999 and 2000. It has been reported that rainfall and landslides caused some mines to shift.7 Kyrgyzstan is also contaminated with ERW, primarily UXO, in the Ferghana Valley region where Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan meet.8 When Kyrgyzstan was part of the Soviet Union, Soviet forces used Kyrgyzstan as a weapons testing ground, raising the possibility of additional residual UXO contamination.9 Casualties from ERW have continued to occur.10

The extent of residual mine contamination is uncertain. In 2003, Kyrgyz authorities estimated that Uzbek forces had mined approximately 42km of the 1,300km border11 and around the Uzbek enclaves of Sokh and Shakhimardan located within Kyrgyzstan. The Shakhimardan enclave was said to have been demined in 2005.12 Press reports have suggested that Uzbek troops partially cleared territory around the Sokh enclave in 2004–2005. 13 Also in 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked previously mined areas of the border around the settlements of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared by Uzbek deminers, and had confirmed that they were now cleared.14

The head of Kyrgyzstan’s Border Service was quoted in 2003 as acknowledging that Kyrgyzstan had also used landmines in mountain passes to stop cross-border movements by “bandits.”15 A Ministry of Foreign Affairs representative stated that Kyrgyzstan laid “a small amount of mines” on its “southern” border, apparently with Uzbekistan. In a statement at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006, Kyrgyzstan claimed that all the mines it laid had been cleared, although no details were provided. Moreover, it was stated that due to unresolved border issues between its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan cannot consider demining separately from demarcation and delimitation of its borders.16 According to Danish Demining Group (DDG) in 2006, mines continue to pose a major risk to the civilian population and present an obstacle to agricultural development in the region.17

Casualties
In May 2008, two boys and one woman were killed and a man was seriously injured by ERW found at a military training field in Osh.18 In 2007, two men were injured trying to disassemble a landmine in Bishkek.19 No new mine/ERW casualties were identified in 2009 to 1 April. Boys are particularly at risk from ERW.20

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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
19 Ibid. These were the first mine casualties since 2003. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1032.
The Kyrgyzstan Red Crescent Society (KRCS) recorded 16 mine/ERW casualties in Batken and Osh provinces (10 killed and six injured) between 1999 and May 2008, but figures are incomplete. In 2004, a media article stated that at least 11 Kyrgyz citizens had been killed by mines between 1999 and 2004. In 2001, it was reported that mines along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border had killed 20 people.

**Program Management and Coordination**

There is no formal mine action program in Kyrgyzstan. Clearance is the responsibility of the army and the border guards, although in the past DDG has been involved in demining. Clearance does not appear to have occurred since late 2006 when DDG left the country, reportedly because of the lack of agreement on delimitation and demarcation of Kyrgyzstan’s borders with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The Ministry of Emergency Situations has been responsible for mine/ERW risk education (RE) by government decree since 2001.

There is no victim assistance program or comprehensive casualty data collection mechanism in Kyrgyzstan. A National Coordination Council for Disability within the office of the Prime Minister includes representatives from relevant ministries and some NGOs.

**Risk Education**

The KRCS, which has been actively involved with RE since 2003, was the only known RE provider in Kyrgyzstan since DDG ended its activities in 2006. However, no activities were reported in 2008. In the evaluation of the DDG project’s impact, respondents stated their behavior had changed after RE training.

**Victim Assistance**

The number of survivors is unknown but is at least six. Disability services in Kyrgyzstan are inadequate and unaffordable for those without insurance. Village health committees have been developed with support from the Swiss Red Cross to improve primary healthcare. Rehabilitation and inclusion should be available for registered persons with disabilities, but insufficient resources were available to meet program requirements. Persons with disabilities had difficulty finding employment because of discrimination and high general unemployment. Kyrgyz legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities and mandates physical access to buildings and public transportation, but implementation is lacking. As of 1 July 2009, Kyrgyzstan had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol.

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27 Telephone interview with Kydyralieva Ainagul Baryktabasova, South Regional Representative, KRCS, March 2009.
LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
<th>Not a State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Mainly UXO, including submunitions, some antipersonnel and antivehicle mines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unknown; up to 25% of villages affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>100 (2007: 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Clearance of mined areas: unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearance of battle areas: 55.2km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>At least 322,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progress towards victim assistance aims</td>
<td>Average</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>International: $12.7 million (2007: $12.2 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

In 2004 the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) decided that it would join the Mine Ban Treaty at some point, but did not set a timeline. It has shown increasing interest in acceding since 2007, when, for the first time, it voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It did so again in 2008. Lao PDR stated in 2008 that it has not used mines in decades, but acknowledged that it possesses a small stockpile.

Lao PDR has the world’s worst problem of unexploded (cluster) submunitions, but after more than 12 years of UXO/mine action, there is no credible estimate for the total area contaminated in the country. Clearance productivity improved sharply after 2005 as a result of changes in clearance and survey methodologies and equipment, while the creation of a National Regulatory Authority (NRA) which became active in 2006 has improved coordination and started work creating a national database.

Between 1999 and 2008, the first phase of the Lao National Survey of UXO Victims and Accidents (conducted in 2008) found a total of 2,184 casualties (834 killed, 1,349 injured, and one unknown). In total, more than 50,000 casualties have been recorded since 1964. Risk education has been conducted in Lao PDR since 1994 mainly by UXO Lao and the World Education Consortium (WEC) with the Ministry of Education. Risk education initially aimed to build awareness of the dangers of UXO and mines but a new risk education strategy launched in 2008 focused on changing behavior through risk reduction.

Coordination of victim assistance has improved with the creation of the NRA’s victim assistance unit. Service provision for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors, including emergency and continuing care and physical rehabilitation, has become more accessible and available. However, it remains inadequate to meet the needs of the more than 7,000 survivors.

Mine Ban Policy

Lao PDR has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In May 2009, at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson told States Parties that the government made a decision in 2004 to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, but needed time to prepare to meet the obligations. He also said that Lao PDR is “now considering a voluntary
transparency report, which can help the international community better understand the facts and reality on the ground, as well as to demonstrate the desire and the intention of Lao PDR toward the goal and aspiration of this Convention.”

Lao PDR participated in the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia in April 2009, the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the treaty’s Second Review Conference.

In December 2008, Lao PDR for the second consecutive year voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution (Resolution 63/42) calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. In providing an explanation of its vote, Lao PDR said that it “supports the humanitarian endeavors of the Mine Ban Treaty…The Lao Government continues to express its interest in acceding to the Treaty. However, it still needs time and resources to prepare necessary conditions that would enable the country to accede to the convention and meet all provisions prescribed therein.”

Lao PDR sent observers to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008. The Lao delegation stated that the “general obligations of the convention do not cause any difficulties for the Lao Government; the implementation of Article 5 remains its only concern. Taking into consideration the report of the Analyzing Group, according to which 15 State Parties, less UXO-contaminated, but technically more advanced than the Lao PDR have been unable to meet the deadline for clearance, confirms the concerns of the Lao Government.” Since 2004, the Lao government has cited the treaty’s mine clearance obligation under Article 5 as an obstacle to accession.

Lao PDR has also expressed concern regarding the possible diversion of resources from UXO clearance to a focus on antipersonnel mines. In June 2008, it stated that “it needs the assurance from the States Parties that, once the Lao PDR becomes signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty it will not be forced to abandon or stop its current UXO clearance operations.” At the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, it said, “Laos has much greater cluster munition contamination than landmine contamination, and the impacts of cluster munitions on the people are far greater, since most of the accidents recorded are caused by cluster munitions.” Lao PDR stated that if new obligations arising from the Convention on Cluster Munitions were combined with those of the Mine Ban Treaty, it could “result in an overload for the Lao Government, whose resources are already limited.”


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2 Lao PDR Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.6, UN General Assembly, New York, 29 October 2008. The statement was made during the vote on the resolution when it was before the First Committee. Similarly, in June 2008, Lao PDR told States Parties that “the Lao Government is considering the eventuality of joining the Ottawa Convention.” Statement by Amb. Maligna Saignavongs, NRA, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 2 June 2008.
5 Statement by Amb. Maligna Saignavongs, NRA, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 2 June 2008. He said, “If this is the case, the Lao Government will not be in a position to accept it, because our priority is UXO clearance; since most of the accidents are caused by UXO, particularly by cluster munitions.”
In 2008, Lao PDR acknowledged that it has used mines in the past “to protect its borders,” but said it has not used them for the past two decades. It also said that the government is not a producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines, but continues to hold a small stockpile.8

### Scope of the Problem

#### Contamination

Lao PDR has the world’s worst contamination from unexploded submunitions but it also has extensive air-dropped and ground-fired UXO as well as antivehicle and antipersonnel mines. The cluster munition remnants date back to the Indochina War of the 1960s and 1970s when it experienced the heaviest aerial bombardment in history. The United States dropped more than two million tons (two billion kg) of bombs between 1964 and 1973,9 including more than 270 million submunitions. Clearance teams have found at least 186 types of munitions, including 19 types of submunition.10

After more than 12 years of UXO/mine action, there is no credible estimate for the total area contaminated in the country. Lao PDR lacks up-to-date information on the location and impact of ERW, the amount of land that has been cleared, or even the extent of land designated a priority for clearance.11 The NRA says that 10 of Lao PDR’s 17 provinces are “severely contaminated” by ERW, affecting up to a quarter of all villages.12 A 2002 evaluation by the Japan International Cooperation Agency estimated that 236.8 km$^2$ of potential agricultural land was contaminated by UXO.13

Lao PDR is creating a comprehensive national database that will bring together a wide range of different datasets (see Data collection and management section below). In the meantime, the partial survey by Handicap International (HI), published in 1997, although acknowledged as out of date,14 remains the primary data source. It found that 15 of the country’s then 18 provinces—all those it surveyed—had districts significantly or severely affected by UXO and that, among the affected villages, 1,156 had large bombs ranging from 100 to 1,000 kg.15

The extraordinary intensity of aerial bombing has tended to obscure the extent of other forms of contamination left by the war on the ground. Bombies (the local term for unexploded submunitions) accounted for little more than a quarter of items removed or destroyed in 2008,16 while UXO Lao reports that during 12 years of operations, ground forces munitions made up most (52%) of total items cleared and submunitions for a little under half (47%).17

All sides in the war laid antipersonnel mines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. The HI survey found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages,18 and clearance operators have estimated Lao PDR may have 1,000 minefields.19 The remote location of most minefields meant that mines had little impact, accounting for only

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15 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 878. There were 18 provinces at the time of the survey; reduced to 17 in 2006. Email from Tim Horner, Senior Technical Advisor, NRA/UNDP, 5 August 2009.
17 UXO Lao, “2008 Annual Report,” Vientiane, undated but 2009, p. 5. UXO Lao reported in 2008 that bommies accounted for 38% of UXO cleared by its roving teams and 61% of UXO cleared by its area clearance teams.
1% of the total items of ordnance cleared since 1996, and 0.001% of items cleared in 2007. A fatal antivehicle mine incident in 2007 on land cleared by UXO Lao and the clearance of a minefield as part of an infrastructure project indicated mines may require greater attention as economic development progresses.

Casualties

In 2008, at least 100 new mine/ERW casualties were reported, including 30 killed, 69 injured, and one unknown. There is overlap in data provided by information providers; UXO Lao reported 89 casualties, and HI reported 19 casualties. HI and UXO Lao do not systematically collect casualty data. As such this cannot be taken as a full representation of all casualties that could have occurred during this period and extensive under-reporting of casualties is assumed.

At the time of writing, the NRA was undertaking a two-phase survey of all mine/ERW casualties in the country from 1964 onwards. This survey had been completed for the period to the end of 2007. Only incomplete data had been compiled for 2008 onwards and was not released by the NRA for publication in Landmine Monitor. Available data from the survey analyzed by the NRA suggested that the total number of mine/ERW casualties would probably exceed 300 for 2008.

From the data supplied by UXO Lao and HI, boys were the largest casualty group (47) followed by men (30), girls (16), and women (6); the age of one male casualty was not reported. Most casualties were caused by ERW (90), including 57 submunition casualties. An unspecified mine caused one casualty, and unknown devices nine. The majority of casualties occurred while digging (nine), followed by burning and tampering with explosive devices (seven), and cutting vegetation (four). Casualties also occurred while burning vegetation to clear land (two), playing (two), scrap metal collection (one), and fishing/hunting (one). For 74 casualties the activity at the time of the incident was not reported.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, with at least 37 (12 killed and 25 injured) reported by UXO Lao as of 30 May 2009, including 25 adults and 12 children. Males made up the majority of 37 casualties (33).

The NRA data from the first phase of the Lao National Survey of UXO Victims and Accidents that showed from 1999–2007, annual casualties were lowest in 2001 (128) and highest in 2004 (279), though the NRA predicts this figure may have been exceeded in 2008. These trends could
be attributed to the drop and subsequent rise in the price of scrap metal.\textsuperscript{29} The NRA provided detailed information to Landmine Monitor in June 2009 on 1,866 mine/ERW casualties (725 killed and 1,141 injured) that occurred from 1999–2007.\textsuperscript{30} Subsequently, the NRA identified a further 329 casualties for this time period, where the annual breakdown was not provided.\textsuperscript{31} As this was the first nationwide victim survey, the NRA’s figures are probably more accurate than casualty statistics reported in previous Landmine Monitor reports. Therefore, based on these latest statistics, Landmine Monitor has identified 2,295 casualties (915 killed, 1,379 injured, and one unknown) from 1999–2008 in Lao PDR.

Preliminary results of the first phase of the Lao National Survey of UXO Victims and Accidents found that 50,136 mine/ERW casualties occurred between 1964 and 2008; these results are, however, partial. Verification of phase one surveying was conducted in October 2008, with 204 of the villages revisited. An average under-reporting of 21% was discovered; not all casualties were reported by villagers in the survey’s first round.\textsuperscript{32} The second phase of the data collection is expected to lead to complete results for 2008 and verification of all data collected by operators in 2008.\textsuperscript{33} Extrapolations indicate that there could be 51,598 casualties, including 31,724 that occurred during the conflict period (1964–1973)\textsuperscript{34} and 19,874 casualties in the post-conflict years from 1974 to 2008 (with partial results).\textsuperscript{35}

The type of devices causing the largest number of casualties since 1964 follows clear patterns. During the conflict years (1964–1973) mines were the main cause, followed by large bombs, and cluster munitions. In the decade directly following the conflict (1974–1983), mines (1,941) and cluster munitions (1,783) again caused the most casualties. From 2004–2007, submunitions were the largest cause (374 casualties), followed by unknown devices (162), and mines (161).\textsuperscript{36}

**Risk profile**

People are at risk from cluster submunitions, mines, and other ERW in a quarter of all villages throughout Lao PDR and in 15 out of 17 provinces,\textsuperscript{37} with most incidents occurring in Xieng Khouang and Savannakhet.\textsuperscript{38} Research reveals a high level of awareness among both adults and children, however, they continue to interact with UXO on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{39} A Mines Advisory Group (MAG)/UNICEF needs assessment in 2006 found that “while contributing factors of voluntary exposure were often rooted in poverty, it was rarely perceived by communities or individuals as the only option. More commonly, intentional UXO risk-taking was found to be based on a rational decision-making process involving weighing the potential costs and benefits of a range of available options.”\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{30} Data supplied to Landmine Monitor by email from Saysomvang Sounvannavong, NRA, 11 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{31} Email from Tim Horner, UNDP/NRA, 5 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{32} At the end of March 2009, 41,000 surveys of individual casualty data had been entered into data management system and verified. All results recorded here are based on this data, extrapolated to a total of 51,598 casualties. Data and analysis provided by response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Michael Boddington, NRA, 31 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{33} Email from Michael Boddington, NRA, 8 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{34} Although fighting ceased in early 1973, the data provided by the NRA takes the whole of 1973 as a conflict year.

\textsuperscript{35} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Michael Boddington, NRA, 31 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, p. 894.

\textsuperscript{39} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 896; Jo Durham, “Needs Assessment in Lao PDR,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 11.1, Summer 2007, maic.jmu.edu; and HI, “Summary of Village Feasibility Survey,” Vientiane, February 2009. However, UXO Lao reported that 28% of casualties for whom they collected information in 2008 were unaware of the related dangers of UXO. However, this information was only collected in areas where UXO Lao operated, and thus under-reporting could be assumed as it did not cover all ERW/mine affected areas.

In almost all the villages surveyed in January 2009 evidence was found of scrap metal collection and the MAG/UNICEF survey found that half of all children surveyed were engaged in this activity. Scrap metal collection was the cause of 32% of incidents reported by UXO Lao in 2008. However, according to a 2008 MAG knowledge, attitude, and practice survey in Xieng Khouang of scrap metal dealers, the economic slump has resulted in a drop in the price of scrap metal and a decrease in the number of dealers.

**Socio-economic impact**

Lao PDR’s National Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006–2010 observes that “there appears to be a significant correlation between the presence of UXO and the prevalence of poverty.” It identifies UXO as “one of the major security challenges facing the poor communities in terms of access to land and markets. It is also a major risk, especially for children.”

UNDP has declared that “UXO/Mine Action is the absolute pre-condition for the socio-economic development of Lao PDR.” UNDP reports that as a result of submunition contamination “economic opportunities in tourism, hydroelectric power, mining, forestry and many other areas of activity considered main engines of growth for the Lao PDR are restricted, complicated and made more expensive.” The Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric dam, one of the country’s biggest economic development projects, spent more than US$16.7 million on UXO clearance between February 2003 and October 2007.

The HI survey noted that UXO contamination “limited agricultural and forest-based activities and increases the cost of rural infrastructure projects.” An independent UXO action sector evaluation in 2008 suggested it would take 16 years at current clearance rates to clear all potential rice paddy land in the 47 poorest districts and “a proportion of” potential upland paddy land.

UXO also poses a significant threat because of its value as scrap metal. UNDP reported a sharp rise in UXO-related casualties in 2004 and commented that “the growing scrap trade, facilitated by the ubiquitous presence of cheap and effective Vietnamese metal detectors, often rented out by scrap merchants, is a significant driver of this change.”

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

The government created the National Regulatory Authority by decree in 2004 but did not appoint a director until December 2005, and it became active in 2006. UXO Lao, a civilian government body, had primary responsibility for coordinating and regulating all UXO action as well as clearance until 2004, and it remains by far the largest clearance operator in Lao PDR.

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43 Email from Heuangphachanh Panpadith, Deputy Chief of Programme Unit, UXO Lao, 23 March 2009.
44 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gregory Cathcart, Programme Officer, MAG, 29 April 2009.
The NRA’s role includes setting policy, coordinating and regulating the mine action sector, accrediting operators, setting standards, and conducting quality management. It also has the mandate to serve as the technical focal point for matters relating to international disarmament treaties. It reports to the Deputy Prime Minister and a Board of Directors comprising nine government ministries, including defense, foreign affairs, security, and planning and development.\(^{54}\)

The NRA employed 25 national staff and seven international advisors in 2008, under the management of the NRA Director, Maligna Saignavongs, and a chief technical advisor.\(^{55}\) The NRA has two sections: Operations, with units handling clearance, RE, victim assistance (VA), and information management; and Policy, Administration and Standards. With US Department of State funding, ArmorGroup provided a technical advisor for standards and quality management, who conducts desk evaluations and accreditation of operators. The NRA coordinates sector-wide activity through technical working groups for clearance, RE, and VA, as well as a “Sector Working Group” involving mine action organizations and donors which facilitates discussion on design and implementation of the clearance program.\(^{56}\) NRA priorities for 2009 included a review of strategy to prepare for drafting a new 10-year plan and a pilot program to open two provincial offices, as well as preparing for the First Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, scheduled for November 2010.\(^{57}\)

**Risk education**

The NRA’s RE unit is responsible for the accreditation, coordination, and monitoring of all mine/ERW RE activities, and an RE officer was appointed in January 2008.\(^{58}\) A technical advisor was funded through MAG from March 2007 to December 2008.\(^{59}\) A mine risk education (MRE) Technical Working Group (TWG) met bimonthly.\(^{60}\) Standards for RE were developed by the NRA and the MRE TWG in 2008 and were enforced in January 2009.\(^{61}\) They outline four components: data collection, public information dissemination, education and training, and community initiatives.\(^{62}\) Community liaison is no longer included in standards, but RE must be integrated with other ERW/mine action activities.\(^{63}\)

Monthly activity reports are submitted to the NRA, and have been entered into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) since January 2009.\(^{64}\) The NRA conducted informal monitoring visits in 2008,\(^{65}\) and a “Monitoring Framework for the NRA MRE unit” was finalized in November 2008.\(^{66}\)

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\(^{57}\) Interview with Tim Horner, NRA/UNDP, in Geneva, 26 March 2009; and email from John Fenech, Public Information Advisor, UNDP, 5 August 2009.

\(^{58}\) Email from Thongdy Phommavongsa, MRE Officer, NRA, 24 March 2009.

\(^{59}\) Ibid.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.

\(^{61}\) Email from Thongdy Phommavongsa, NRA/UNDP, 20 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gregory Cathcart, MAG, 29 April 2009.


\(^{65}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gregory Cathcart, MAG, 29 April 2009.

The mine action strategy for 2003–2013 included “delivering RE training to all UXO/mine-affected communities.” A national RE strategy for 2007–2010 was developed by the NRA and the TWG, based on needs assessments and evaluation recommendations, and approved in January 2008.

**Victim assistance**

The NRA’s VA unit is responsible for VA policy development, sector coordination, and liaison between stakeholders, to ensure all mine/ERW survivors’ needs are met. In 2008, the unit focused on the casualty survey and the establishment of a casualty database. The NRA reported that information compiled by the nationwide casualty survey will provide the sector with a comprehensive basis for developing a VA strategy (which had originally been planned for 2008).

The unit continued to coordinate VA through bimonthly meetings of the VA TWG. The working group’s role includes coordination of VA programs, resource mobilization, and facilitating relations between government, operators, and donors. Throughout 2006–2008, the VA TWG worked to develop the VA section of the first Lao PDR National Mine Action Standards. An international technical advisor continued to support the unit.

Responsibility for providing services to persons with disabilities is divided between the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.

**Data collection and management**

The NRA is creating a national UXO database that will combine the latest demographic data, US bombing data, records of operators’ clearance, victim data collected in a survey undertaken in early 2008, and data on clearance related to major infrastructure, development, and commercial projects.

The NRA installed the latest version (5.02) of IMSMA with assistance from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in July 2007, but technical difficulties delayed bringing it into operation until 2008. The NRA started entering results of a victim survey in March 2008 and UXO Lao clearance data in March 2009. In January 2009, the NRA instructed operators to submit monthly completion reports in an IMSMA-compatible format. Accessing information in the database, however, remains problematic. The NRA has hired a computer specialist to facilitate access to data.

In 2008, the NRA established the Lao Victim Information Service (LVIS) to store information collected by the national casualty survey. The NRA planned to use IMSMA as the analytical and reporting tool for the LVIS.

The first phase of the Lao National Survey of UXO Victims and Accidents covering 95% of all villages in Lao PDR found that casualty figures quoted in previous years could represent as little as 40% of actual casualties. In previous years, operators (including UXO Lao and HI) reported incidents only from the areas where they operated.

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68 Ibid, p. 896; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gregory Cathcart, MAG, 29 April 2009.
72 The Deputy Prime Minister of Lao PDR, who is also the Chairman of the NRA, issued a decree 8 January 2009 underpinning the Standards with a solid legal instrument. Email from Tim Horner, NRA/UNDP, 20 April 2009.
73 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Michael Boddington, NRA, 31 March 2009.
75 Telephone interview with Tim Horner, NRA/UNDP, 17 June 2009.
77 Interview with Khammoungkhoun Southivong, NRA, Vientiane, 7 April 2009.
78 Interview with Tim Horner, NRA/UNDP, Vientiane, 7 April 2009.
80 Email from Michael Boddington, NRA, 4 March 2009.
81 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Michael Boddington, NRA, 31 March 2009.
82 District Enumerators collected mine/ERW casualty information from 9,066 of the 9,583 villages in Lao PDR. Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Michael Boddington, NRA, 31 March 2009.
The second phase of the national survey, started in June 2009, will complete information on casualties occurring in 2008 and 2009.\textsuperscript{83} The NRA also intends to appoint a district focal point, to whom village chiefs can report future incidents.\textsuperscript{84}

### Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Battle area clearance</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UXO Lao</td>
<td>x</td>
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<td>COPE</td>
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<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>Ministry of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>International operators and activities</td>
<td>Battle area clearance</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Casualty data collection</td>
<td>VA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Association for Aid and Relief Japan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>BACTEC</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>FSD</td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<td>Milsearch</td>
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<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phoenix Clearance</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>World Education/Consortium</td>
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</table>

### Plans

**Strategic Mine Action Plan**

A National Strategic Plan for the UXO Programme 2003–2013, “The Safe Path Forward,” adopted by government decree in April 2004,\textsuperscript{85} laid down broad objectives for the UXO action sector:\textsuperscript{86}

- clearance of not less than 180km\(^2\) of high and medium priority land by UXO Lao alone;
- reduction of UXO/mine casualties to fewer than 100 per year;
- deliver RE training to all UXO/mine-affected communities; and
- develop a national database on mine/UXO incidents.

\textsuperscript{83} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Michael Boddington, NRA, 31 March 2009; and email from Michael Boddington, NRA, 8 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{84} Email from Michael Boddington, NRA, 8 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{85} Prime Minister’s Decree No. 33, 29 April 2004.

However, the plan predated the creation of the NRA and has been largely overtaken by developments in the sector, including an overhaul of UXO Lao’s clearance methodology leading to higher productivity, NRA initiatives to develop the database, and Lao PDR’s ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in 2009. An evaluation of the UXO action sector in 2008, conducted for UNDP, found that the sector did not consider the issue of spot tasks at all, and the absence of performance standards for such tasks meant their importance was underrated.87

The NRA, in consultation with UNDP, UXO Lao, and other stakeholders, reviewed the strategy in 2009 and drafted a new 10-year strategic plan for 2010–2020 that would overlap with, and feed into, the next five-year National Socio-Economic Development Plan.88 In the meantime, Lao PDR has set the goal of removing the UXO threat in the country’s 47 poorest districts by 2020 as part of a strategy to remove itself from the lower ranks of the Least Developed Countries by that deadline.89

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
The 2008 evaluation noted that “the strategy for UXO is not fully aligned and integrated with national socio-economic development and poverty alleviation strategies.” It also observed that the government’s development partners and commercial investors have failed to take account of the effects of UXO contamination and “there is still much work to be done to integrate UXO planning into wider development efforts that require use of contaminated land.”90

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
The Lao PDR government identifies UXO clearance as an integral part of its poverty reduction strategy, with national operator UXO Lao the biggest of the clearance organizations. The government’s contribution to UXO and mine clearance is limited to in-kind contributions; funding is provided by foreign donors (78% of total funding of $20.8 million for the sector in 2007) or through private sector investment projects (22%).91 Donors have expressed disappointment at the low level of government financial support for the sector, and some take the view that the government should demonstrate its commitment to the sector by also committing funds from the national budget.92

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
Lao PDR’s first national UXO/mine action standards, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), were completed in English, distributed to all operators, and posted on the NRA website in December 2006. The chair of the NRA’s board93 approved the 24 chapters of national standards in a decree issued on 8 January 2009. In view of the prevailing focus on clearing UXO, the NRA requires operators undertaking any demining task to submit a workplan for approval.94

Program evaluations
An independent evaluation commissioned by UNDP and completed in July 2008 examined the progress of the UXO sector towards achieving objectives, the role of the NRA, the effectiveness of UXO Lao, and government and donor support. The evaluation found UXO Lao had exceeded the area clearance targets set out in the “Safe Path Forward” in 2003–2006 and was on course

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93 Lt.-Gen. Douangchai Phichith, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense.
94 Interview with Tim Horner, NRA/UNDP, Vientiane, 6 April 2009.
to achieve overall targets by 2013 but questioned the appropriateness of the plan’s targets and priorities.\textsuperscript{95} The evaluation called for greater study of how much of the land contaminated by UXO could be developed for agriculture as a basis for planning and prioritization.\textsuperscript{96} It also recommended greater emphasis on roving tasks, developing a simple system of priority-setting that addressed priorities of development and poverty reduction, and the definition of an exit strategy for the NRA and UXO Lao.\textsuperscript{97}

It found the prioritization process “complicated, unwieldy and as a result rather unresponsive” and noted that there is no set of criteria or national principles to guide task selection. It also reported a “prevalent sense of risk averseness” among UXO Lao managers in dealing with aircraft bombs, resulting in a backlog of such roving tasks, and found that an increase in roving tasks by UXO Lao appeared to be “critical” to address the problems of UXO incidents among intentional risk takers.\textsuperscript{98} The evaluation also described as a “significant shortfall” a lack of quality management capacity in UXO Lao.\textsuperscript{99}

The study commended the NRA’s introduction of national standards but noted it lacked the capacity to fulfill its designated role in conducting external quality assurance on clearance operations, has yet to establish regulatory control over activities on projects managed by government agencies, and concluded that in its present form, totally dependent on donor funding, the NRA is not sustainable.\textsuperscript{100} The evaluation commented that “some donors are disappointed with the low level of financial support from Government for the projects and programme activities in the sector.”\textsuperscript{101}

**Battle Area Clearance**

UXO Lao, set up in 1996 and operating in nine provinces, represents the main UXO clearance capacity. In 2008, it worked with approximately 1,000 staff, including 11 international advisers.\textsuperscript{102} Other organizations engaged in UXO clearance included the international NGOs, HI, MAG, and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and three commercial companies, BACTEC, Milsearch, and Phoenix Clearance. Norwegian People’s Aid, which had provided technical advisors to support UXO Lao, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Lao PDR in 2009 with a view to operating its own clearance teams. The army undertakes clearance operations in border areas and has taken on commercial tasks linked to road development and rural electrification, but little is known about the scope, quality, or results of its activities.

*Identification of hazardous areas*

The NRA reported technical survey by demining NGOs on a total of 2.7km\(^2\) of land in 2008. However, the emphasis in Lao PDR is not on surveying contaminated areas but on access to full US bomb strike data. The Lao PDR and UNDP funding request prepared at the end of 2008 also calls for a geophysical survey of 2,000km of roads.\textsuperscript{103}

*UXO/mine clearance in 2008*

Operators reported total area clearance of 54.09km\(^2\) in 2008 (see table below), 29% more than in 2007.\textsuperscript{104} The NRA reported a further 2.74km\(^2\) that was released through enhanced technical survey.\textsuperscript{105}

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\textsuperscript{96} The evaluation cites an estimate by JICA that only some 23,680 hectares (236.8km\(^2\)) of land with agricultural potential was contaminated by UXO. Robert Griffin, Robert Keeley, Phetdavanh Sayyasouk, “UXO Sector Evaluation Lao PDR, June–July 2008, Final Report,” July 2008, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, pp. 38–40, 49–50.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid, p. 71.
\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Edwin Faigmane, UXO Lao/UNDP, 8 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{105} NRA, “UXO Sector Annual Report 2008,” Vientiane, undated but 2009, p. 10. The NRA figure included release by UXO Lao of 2km\(^2\) through technical survey. UXO Lao reported a higher figure.
UXO Lao continued to raise the amount of land it cleared, although at a lower rate (about 4%) than in the previous year (about 20%) when productivity registered the immediate gains of operational reforms and acquisition of new equipment.\textsuperscript{106} UXO Lao also attributed the lower rate of growth to the deployment of clearance teams on more remote tasks than previously. However, as evidence of better task selection and evaluation, UXO Lao reported that only around 5% of clearance tasks failed to yield any UXO in 2008 compared with around 30% four years earlier.\textsuperscript{107} UXO Lao embarked on land release as a result of desk appraisal and survey in 2007 when it released 0.4km\textsuperscript{2}. In 2008 UXO Lao reported it released 3.8km\textsuperscript{2} through technical survey.\textsuperscript{108} UXO Lao has also field tested and started applying the prioritization model developed by GICHD as a tool for accelerating land release and concentrating clearance assets on contaminated land. UXO Lao approved a standing operating procedure for use of this tool at the end of 2008.\textsuperscript{109}

UXO Lao, following up recommendations in the UNDP-commissioned evaluation, planned to set up 27 roving teams in 2009 to cover every poor or very poor district in the nine provinces in which it already operates, as well as three other provinces.\textsuperscript{110} UXO Lao intended to dedicate nine of the teams to the destruction of big bombs in the nine provinces. It estimated the overall cost of the program over three years at $6 million. As of April, however, UXO Lao had yet to attract the funding required to put this proposal into action.\textsuperscript{111} A UNDP management response to the evaluation accepted the need for extra roving capacity but said it would not be “at the expense of clearance tasks which are critical to support the implementation of the National Socio-Economic Development Plan.”\textsuperscript{112}

### Battle area and mine clearance in 2008\textsuperscript{113}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Area cleared (km\textsuperscript{2})</th>
<th>Total UXO removed/destroyed</th>
<th>Unexploded submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>Mines cleared and destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BACTEC</td>
<td>8.62</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>5,045</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIB</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>1,442</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG*</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>37,133</td>
<td>8,244</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milsavek</td>
<td>10.60</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>1,030</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO Lao</td>
<td>26.54</td>
<td>68,214</td>
<td>32,475</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54.09</strong></td>
<td><strong>116,158</strong></td>
<td><strong>45,006</strong></td>
<td><strong>170</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*\textsuperscript{*MAG also cleared 60,330 items of small arms ammunition.*


\textsuperscript{107} Interview with John Dingley, Senior Technical Advisor, UXO Lao, in Geneva, 25 March 2009.


\textsuperscript{109} Interview with John Dingley, UXO Lao, Vientiane, 8 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{110} UXO Lao already operates in Luang Prabang, Huaphanh, Xieng Khouang, Khammouane, Savannakhet, Saravane, Sekong, Champassak, and Attapeu. UXO Lao proposed that three roving teams in Luang Prabang would also cover Phongsali and Oudomxay provinces and two teams in Khammouane would also cover Bolikhamxay.


\textsuperscript{113} Unless otherwise specified, data provided by Khammoungkhoun Southivong, Information Management Officer, NRA, 7 April 2009; see also UXO Lao, “Annual Report 2008,” Vientiane, undated but 2009, p. 3; and emails from Nigel Orr, Program Manager, FSD, 4 March and 10 May 2009; Kim Warren, HI, 25 March 2009; David Hayter, Country Program Manager, MAG, 3 April 2009; and from Gregory Cathcart, MAG, 16 and 17 June 2009.
MAG, the largest of the NGO operators with 172 staff, 10 clearance teams, and one explosive ordnance disposal team, also reported a slight increase in the area cleared, helped by switching from two-person to one-person lane drills. It recorded a more than six-fold rise in UXO items destroyed as a result of MAG’s engagement in clearing UXO accumulated at a scrap metal foundry in Xieng Khouang province. This project alone accounted for some 85,773 of the small arms ammunition and UXO items destroyed in 2008, including 60,330 rounds of 20mm projectiles. MAG planned in 2009 to add four technicians to each clearance team, expanding capacity without the need to buy more vehicles.114

Among other NGOs, FSD, operated with 71 staff in three teams in Savannakhet and Sekong, and more than doubled the area cleared, a result it attributed to increased staff experience and better coordination and planning. It also obtained funding for a fourth team but as of March 2009 still awaited government approval of amendments to its Memorandum of Understanding.115 HI (54 staff) undertook area clearance and roving tasks in 29 villages of Savannakhet and also reported increased area clearing and roving tasks. HI hired a technical advisor every two to three months to conduct quality control and staff refresher training.116

Among the commercial operators, BACTEC continued to work under contract to OZ Minerals on its Sepon gold and copper mining project. It also undertook pathfinder tasks for Australian Survey Company and Salamander Energy plc.117 Milsearch, a joint venture between Australian company Milsearch Pty and Bolisat Phathana Khet Phoudoi Group (BPKP), which works under the Lao PDR Prime Minister’s Office, supported exploration by Phu Bia Mining, undertaking clearance tasks related to the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project.118 Phoenix PCL also undertook clearance tasks linked to Nam Theun 2 and as of April 2009 had some 70 operators working on five contracts.119

Risk Education

RE was conducted in the nine most contaminated provinces: Xieng Khouang, Huaphan, Luang Prabang, Khammouan, Savannakhet, Salavan, Sekong, Champasak, and Attapeu, and was expanded to new communities within these provinces.120

A national RE strategy launched in 2008 encouraged a shift from the information/education communication model that had evolved since 1999 to a behavior change communication approach based on discussions of options and minimizing risk for intentional adult risk takers. The approach for children was to continue to discourage any risk taking.121 Further studies on the strategy were conducted in 2008 by HI,122 MAG,123 and FSD with Care Australia.124

MAG, HI, and FSD adopted the new strategy in 2008, and World Education/Consortium (WEC) was in the process of adapting it in 2009. HI and MAG used community liaison teams as part of an integrated approach to clearance and RE, with MAG focusing on reducing risk in

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114 Interview with David Hayter, MAG, Vientiane, 6 April 2009; and emails from Gregory Cathcart, MAG, 16 and 17 June 2009.
115 Email from Nigel Orr, FSD, 4 March 2009.
116 Email from Kim Warren, HI, 25 March 2009.
117 Interview with Alan McKeown, BACTEC, Vientiane, 7 April 2009.
118 Interview with Ron Hawkins, Manager, Milsearch, Vientiane, 7 April 2009.
119 Interview with Michael Hayes, Manager, Phoenix Clearance, Vientiane, 7 April 2009.
120 Email from Thongdy Phommavongsa, NRA, 26 March 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 896.
121 Ibid.
122 In September 2008, HI conducted a knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) survey on UXO and scrap metal collection in three districts in Savannakhet province, resulting in a shift to a “parent to child” approach. Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Kim Warren, HI, 23 March 2009; and email from Kim Warren, HI, 25 March 2009.
123 MAG conducted a pre- and post-project KAP survey with 23 scrap metal dealers as part of its foundry project. Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gregory Cathcart, MAG, 29 April 2009.
124 Care Australia and FSD conducted a detailed baseline study in 2008 for their project, which commenced in November 2008. Email from Stefan De Coninck, Provincial Operations Manager, FSD, 12 April 2009.
States Not Party

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

the scrap metal trade.\textsuperscript{125} However, UXO Lao Community Awareness teams continued to use the old method in 2008.\textsuperscript{126}

WEC and the Ministry of Education started to implement a plan for sustainable UXO risk education in all primary schools in 2008, putting RE in the school curriculum and training teachers in the nine most affected provinces, building on the RE that had been conducted in schools for 10 years.\textsuperscript{127}

In November 2008, FSD and Care Australia started an RE project in Sekong as part of their UXO risk reduction strategy focused on children and the scrap metal trade. They conducted training to start RE activities in 2009.\textsuperscript{128} Phoenix PCL also reportedly conducted RE in 2008 in Khammouane province,\textsuperscript{129} but details were not available.

The NRA RE unit, funded by UNICEF, organized three training courses for RE operators focusing on behavioral change techniques\textsuperscript{130} and a workshop to develop an RE radio broadcasting plan.\textsuperscript{131}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UXO Lao</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Mobile community awareness teams</td>
<td>Luang Prabang, Huaphanh, Xieng Khouang, Khammuane, Savannakhet, Saravane, Sekong, Champasack, and Attapeu</td>
<td>145,332 people (including 69,417 children) in 601 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Community-based RE volunteers network, parent-to-child education</td>
<td>Savannakhet province</td>
<td>16,500 people in 36 villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEC and Ministry of Education</td>
<td>NGO and government</td>
<td>School-based RE</td>
<td>Provinces: Xieng Khouang, Huaphanh, Luang Prabang, Khammuane, Savannakhet, Salavan, Sekong, Champasack, and Attapeu</td>
<td>4,890 teachers, 155,244 children in 533 primary and 1,077 village schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Community liaison; participatory safety training to scrap metal collectors in the foundry project</td>
<td>Vientiane, Xieng Khouang, Khammuane, Savannakhet, and Champasack Huaphanh</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{125} Emails from Thongdy Phommavongsa, NRA, 11 May 2009; and from Kim Warren, HI, 20 March 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gregory Cathcart, MAG, 29 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{126} Email from Thongdy Phommavongsa, NRA, 11 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{128} Email from Stefan De Coninck, Provincial Operations Manager, FSD, 12 April 2009.


\textsuperscript{130} Emails from Thongdy Phommavongsa, NRA, 24 March 2009; Heuangphachanh Panpadith, UXO Lao, 23 March 2009; and Kim Warren, HI, 23 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{131} Email from Thongdy Phommavongsa, NRA, 20 March 2009.

\textsuperscript{132} Emails from Barbara Lewis, UXO Program Coordinator, WEC, 31 March 2009; Kim Warren, HI, 20 March 2009; and Stefan De Coninck, FSD, 12 April 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Gregory Cathcart, MAG, 29 April 2009.
The NRA also reprinted RE materials that had been developed in 2007 in additional ethnic languages, and 30,000 RE materials for the UXO School Curriculum project.  

A UXO/mine action sector evaluation in 2008 reported that “basic knowledge of UXO and UXO risks is widespread and general education efforts are likely to be yielding diminishing returns.” It recommended that donor support be shifted from education-based RE to expansion of roving clearance. RE stakeholders responded that “Education-based activities can be very different in strategy and outcome than simply raising community awareness. This recommendation is not therefore based on current MRE approaches.”

Several needs assessments conducted over the last few years contributed to this new strategic direction. A risk assessment conducted by UNICEF, MAG, and the Lao Youth Union in 2006 found that a new approach to RE was needed which would “require a change from zero-risk to risk minimization and recognition of the often valid risk assessment processes and risk reduction strategies indigenous communities employ.” Key recommendations were to establish a process for engaging stakeholders, revise RE messages, strategies and information management systems, develop risk reduction strategies for children and young people, scrap metal collectors, people who dismantle UXO, and for farmers.

A GICHD study in February 2007 also noted that although most victims had knowingly engaged in hazardous activity, “Community Awareness seemed largely to target unintentional risk-taking and not necessarily among the highest risk groups.” The needs assessment fed into the workshop held in October 2006 to develop the new strategic plan for January 2007 to December 2010 and new standards.

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be at least 7,000. In 2008, services and infrastructure in Lao PDR continued to be insufficient to meet their needs. Survivors predominantly live in the poorest, most isolated, and rural parts of the country, resulting in high levels of inaccessibility to medical services. The cost of surgery and medical care is very high compared to the annual income of a rural family and is the main reason survivors have not accessed medical assistance.

Emergency medical care throughout Lao PDR remains inadequate to meet needs, although progress has been achieved in this area. Some 96% of all villages in the country have a trained village health volunteer who is supplied with a medical kit. Between 2001 and 2008, an Asian Development Bank project with the Ministry of Health improved the spread of primary health care services in eight northern provinces, working with hospitals to renew equipment and supplies, train staff and volunteers, and support the village volunteer network. At the end of the project in December 2008, it was reported that almost all villages in the eight provinces were within two hours of health assistance.

133 Emails from Thongdy Phommavongsa, NRA, 24 March 2009; Kim Warren, HI, 23 March 2009; and Barbara Lewis, WEC, 31 March 2009.
143 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Michael Boddington, NRA, 31 March 2009.
Physical rehabilitation services are reasonably well-developed and run by the government in association with the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE). However, they remain centralized and not easily accessible for survivors from remote villages.145

There is only limited psychosocial support for mine/ERW survivors.146 Social and economic reintegration programs for mine/ERW survivors are limited.147 Although there are some educational and vocational training opportunities for a small number of mine/ERW survivors, employment opportunities remain limited and laws on employment quotas for persons with disabilities are not enforced.148

Lao PDR has no specific laws prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare has established regulations protecting persons with disabilities from discrimination and requiring accessible buildings. However, these policies do not have the force of law.149 Lao PDR has signed the UN Convention on the Rights of the Person with Disabilities, but had not ratified as of 1 July 2009. It has not yet passed the Decree on the Rights of the Persons on Disabilities that was drafted at the beginning of 2008.150

Victim assistance activities
WEC financially supported the initial medical treatment and continuing medical care of 74 mine/ERW survivors in five provinces in 2008, through a fund that has helped 650 survivors access medical treatment since its inception in 1995. WEC also provided training in emergency medical care in 2008 to health staff in two mine/ERW-affected provinces. WEC coordinated a project that provided animal husbandry and veterinary training to 33 mine/ERW survivors in Xieng Khouang province in 2008. Follow-up activities with mine/ERW survivors in Xieng Khouang who received training indicated that their income had increased.151

The HI community-based rehabilitation project continued in coordination with a number of government ministries in 2008. Working in Savannakhet province with 30 villages, the project provided support to 365 beneficiaries in 2008.152

The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) program expanded support to the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise at the beginning of 2008. This included provision of materials to all five physical rehabilitation centers and subsidizing the costs of poor beneficiaries to the center in Pakse province and the National Rehabilitation Center in Vientiane.153 To develop sustainable and locally led rehabilitation services, in 2008, COPE collaborated with the Ministry of Health and the College of Health Care Technology to determine whether training for health care professionals can be developed.154

In 2008, the Association for Aid and Relief Japan worked with the Ministry of Health to expand operations to six new target provinces in northern Lao PDR. Wheelchair Assessment Training was provided to Lao staff working in provincial hospitals of each province. The distribution of wheelchairs and tricycles to the northern area started gradually in December 2008.155

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145 Email from Jo Pereira, Project Coordinator, COPE, 19 March 2009.
147 Email from Barbara Lewis, WEC, 31 March 2009.
150 Email from Tim Horner, NRA/UNDP, 19 March 2009.
151 Email from Barbara Lewis, WEC, 31 March 2009.
152 Email from Sichanh Sitthiphonh, CBR Project Coordinator, HI, 27 March 2009.
155 Email from Nori Okayama, Program Manager, AAR Japan, 20 March 2009.
The Lao Disabled People’s Association, a self-help, membership based organization, continued to work in 2008 in 11 provinces to promote inclusion of people with disabilities in society.156

**Support for Mine Action**

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Lao PDR. Overall cost estimates (totaling roughly $5.1 million) presented in the 2003–2013 strategic plan have been rendered invalid by the expansion in recent years of the mine action sector and related costs and budgets.157 In its 2008 annual report, UXO Lao reported an annual budget for 2008 of $6,318,035 and actual expenditures of $6,795,781.158 The UXO Lao 2009 Work Plan estimates costs for 2009 totaling $6,859,494.159 COPE’s 2008–2013 plan in support of VA reportedly includes a cost estimate of $5.38 million.160

The NRA coordinates and reviews implementation of the National Strategic Plan for the mine/UXO action sector. Among its financial duties, the NRA manages mine/UXO action assets transferred from the government to mine action operators, acts as the formal depository for funding agreements between donors and mine action operators, and approves commercial investment projects involving mine action.161 Identifying future funding strategies was among the priority tasks defined for the NRA as of July 2007.162 In October 2006, the NRA established a government-donor UXO Sector Working Group.163

**National support for mine action**

No mine action funding was reported by the government of Lao PDR in 2008 or 2007 except in-kind support.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, eight countries and the European Commission (EC) reported providing $12,745,518 (€8,655,112) to mine action in Lao PDR, approximately 4% more than in 2007. Funding at 2008 levels remains higher than budget estimates reported in the 2003-2013 strategic plan, but remains insufficient to address the full range of mine/UXO action and VA needs.

New Zealand reported supporting MAG clearance operations in Lao PDR during 2008 but did not report the value of its support.164

As of May 2008, UXO Lao reported secured funding of $4.2 million for 2008. Government donors included Australia, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Poland, Switzerland, the UK, and the US.165 International funding reported by donors above may include multiyear funds, accounting for the difference.

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160 Email from Tim Horner, NRA/UNDP, 29 August 2008.
164 Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Lao PDR: Monetary\(^{166}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Via the Department of State</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>$3,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>UN Mine Action Service, UXO Lao, Japan Mine Action Service, Association for Aid and Relief Japan</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance, victim assistance</td>
<td>$2,623,764 (¥270,491,108)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>UXO Lao, MAG</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance</td>
<td>$1,914,380 (€1,300,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,472,600 (€1,000,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,007,814 (CHF931,825)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>CARE Australia, NRA</td>
<td>RE, VA, East Asia Regional Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
<td>$975,748 (A$1,142,964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$727,678 (£392,385)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>$605,384 (€411,099)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>UXO Trust Fund</td>
<td>$368,150 (€250,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>East Asia Regional Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions</td>
<td>$34,455 (A$40,360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$12,745,518 (€8,655,112)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{N/R} = \text{not reported}\)

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\(^{166}\) USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2008, from “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” by email from Timothy Groen, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 18 June 2009; email from Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation; and emails from Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Policy Assistant, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009; David Keating, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2009; Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; Caroline Mulas, Mine Action Coordinator, AUSAID, 22 June 2009; Kathleen Bombell, Mine Action Unit, AUSAID, 21 July 2009; and Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, DFID, 17 March 2009.
LEBANON

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
<th>Not a State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other UXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>74km² of mined areas 15.81km² of battle areas, including significant areas with cluster munition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>28 (2007: 130)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 2,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>119,918m² of mined areas 10km² of cluster munition remnant areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>425,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Lebanon’s progress toward joining the Mine Ban Treaty was set back by the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. Lebanon has abstained from voting on the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution, but has been a regular participant in treaty-related meetings. Israel used antipersonnel mines in Lebanon prior to its May 2000 withdrawal. The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre for Southern Lebanon (MACC SL) accused Israel of using antipersonnel mines in its conflict with Hezbollah in 2006. It appears Hezbollah used antipersonnel mines in ambushes on the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in 2006. Fatah al-Islam used explosive booby-traps in a Palestinian refugee camp in 2007.

Lebanon is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially cluster munition remnants, as a legacy of 15 years of civil conflict which ended in 1990 and conflict with Israel. The 2006 conflict resulted in up to 500,000 unexploded submunitions being scattered across more than 1,000 cluster strike sites. At the beginning of 2009, the UN and NGOs reported major funding shortages to clear the remaining submunitions, which have resulted in closing operations and less clearance. The Lebanese National Mine Action Authority, a government body, is responsible for mine action policy. MACC SL was handed over from the UN to the Lebanese government and became the Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) in January 2009.

From 1999 to 2008, Landmine Resource Center (LMRC) of Balamand University and MACC SL reported a total of 511 mine/ERW casualties (100 killed and 411 injured). During the same period, Landmine Monitor identified 703 mine/ERW casualties (120 killed, 567 injured, and 16 unknown). The additional casualties in the Landmine Monitor total were identified through media reports and information from the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC).

Risk education (RE) has been primarily conducted by national NGOs with support from LMRC, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and UNICEF, and under the coordination of LMAC. It has mainly been implemented through community-based activities by volunteers, with a focus on school-based RE from 2004, as well as use of mass media. Emergency RE was delivered following the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, the war with Israel in 2006, and the conflict in Nahr al-Bared Palestinian camp in the north.
Victim assistance services in Lebanon have grown in scope and quality since 1999. The provision of emergency healthcare, including emergency transport, and continuing healthcare have been expanded and improved. The targeting and reach of rehabilitation services have increased. Social and economic integration projects have also assisted many survivors and their families. However, the cost of services and transport, and lack of awareness of services available are barriers for survivors to access such services. Coordination, although still problematic, has improved with the establishment of the National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance, providing a platform for mostly local NGOs to share information and begin coordinated planning.

Mine Ban Policy

Lebanon has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Positive movement toward joining the treaty in 2005 and 2006 was set back by the July–August 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.¹ Lebanon has long held the position that it is unable to join the treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel, and the 2006 war heightened concerns about the security of its southern border.² Accession is still under consideration, although regional politics and the unstable internal political situation may hinder steps forward. Lebanon’s signature of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions has given rise to hopes that it will also join the Mine Ban Treaty.

On 2 December 2008, Lebanon abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has with similar resolutions in previous years.³ In explaining its vote, Lebanon said it respected the treaty, but had not acceded to it due to self-defense concerns emanating from Israel’s “aggression.”⁴

A Lebanese army representative attended the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where he provided a statement detailing LMAC’s activities. LMAC’s director participated in the intersessional Standing Committees meetings in Geneva in May 2009, but made no statements.

Lebanon is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Lebanon signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, but had not yet ratified it as of 1 July 2009.⁵

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use

In November 2004, Lebanon confirmed that it “has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.”⁶ The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) stockpile an unknown number of antipersonnel mines. In March 2008, LMAC’s director told Landmine Monitor that the stockpile consists

¹ See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 892; Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 987–988; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 799. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late 2005 initiated a process of consultations with the Lebanese Armed Forces, Ministry of National Defense, and the NDO regarding the ramifications of and procedures for accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. This process was, at the time, expected to lead to a recommendation to the government that Lebanon accede. In its 2005 annual report, the NDO reported that it had completed position papers recommending the submission of a voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report. In June 2006, the ICBL’s Diplomatic Advisor undertook a special advocacy mission to Lebanon. The Prime Minister and army chief told him they were not averse to accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Minister of Foreign Affairs said that Lebanon was giving serious consideration to accession, that inter-ministerial consultations were underway, and it was only a matter of time until Lebanon accedes to the treaty.

² See for example, Statement by Amb. Michel Haddad, First Review Conference, Nairobi, 3 December 2004. The ambassador cited the “failure of the Government of Israel to submit all the maps showing the deployment of landmines” and the “continued occupation by Israel of parts of Southern Lebanon.”

³ Lebanon voted in support of the annual pro-mine ban resolutions in the UN General Assembly in 1996, 1997, and 1998. In December 1999, it became the first and only country to ever vote against the annual resolution. It abstained from voting each year from 2000 to 2004. In October 2005, Lebanon voted in favor of the resolution in the UNGA First Committee, but it was subsequently absent from the final vote. Since 2006, Lebanon has continued to abstain from the vote.

⁴ UN Department of Public Information, Sixty-third General Assembly, First Committee, 20th Meeting (PM) GA/DIS/3378, 29 October 2008. The remarks were made following the vote on the resolution in First Committee.


of a small quantity of mines, which he described as being lower than the maximum number permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty for training purposes.\(^7\)

MACC SL accused Israel of using antipersonnel mines during the conflict with Hezbollah in 2006, a charge Israel denied. In addition, it appears a local Hezbollah commander ordered the use of antipersonnel mines as part of ambushes on UNIFIL troops on at least two occasions in 2006.\(^8\)

In May and June 2007, the non-state armed group Fatah al-Islam used antivehicle mines and explosive booby-traps in the Palestinian refugee camp at Nahr al-Bared.\(^9\)

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Lebanon is contaminated with mines and ERW, especially cluster munition remnants, as a legacy of 15 years of civil conflict which ended in 1990 and of conflicts with Israel. The 2006 conflict between Hezbollah and Israel resulted in heavy new contamination in southern Lebanon with 1,073 confirmed cluster strike sites containing an estimated 500,000 unexploded submunitions as well as other types of UXO.

The estimates of the total area contaminated with cluster munition remnants have changed over the three years since August 2006. The original estimated area was 34\(\text{km}^2\).\(^10\) In December 2008, MACC SL reported the total contaminated area to be 48\(\text{km}^2\), but in May 2009 LMAC revised the figure down to 35.36\(\text{km}^2\), of which 15.81\(\text{km}^2\) of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) remained to be cleared.\(^11\) With 45% of the SHAs cleared, some 236,000 unexploded submunitions and items of UXO had been found and destroyed as of May 2009 (see table below). In addition, 5,794 landmines were destroyed as part of the Operation Emirates Solidarity (OES) and Al Aadeisse project, which coincided with the clearance of cluster munitions.\(^12\)

Of the remaining land to clear, 2.5\(\text{km}^2\) is within 50m of the last submunition found and 42 locations covering 200,000\(\text{m}^2\) will not be cleared because the owners of the land refuse to authorize clearance.\(^13\) As of May 2009, 260 locations were designated as high and medium priority for clearance based on the seasonal agricultural growing cycle, as farming is the main occupation in southern Lebanon.\(^14\)

On 14 May 2009, UNIFIL announced that the Israeli Defense Forces had handed over technical strike data and related maps on the cluster munitions they had used in Lebanon during the 2006 conflict. Mine clearance organizations said their work had been hampered by the lack of records from Israel and welcomed the handover. Brigadier-General Mohammed Fehmi, LMAC’s director, however, told IRIN, “If the Israelis had sent those maps in 2006 when we

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\(^7\) Interview with Col. Mohammed Fehmi, Director, LMAC, Beirut, 3 March 2008 [Colonel Fehmi was subsequently promoted to Brigadier General. His rank at the time of the citation is used throughout this report]. The Mine Ban Treaty requires destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines, but allows retention of “the minimum number absolutely necessary” for training purposes. States Parties have generally agreed the number retained, if any, should be in the hundreds or thousands, and not tens of thousands.

\(^8\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, pp. 893–894. Based on photographic evidence provided to Landmine Monitor in 2007, it appears that Hezbollah used captured or recovered Israeli No. 4 type antipersonnel mines, M18A1 Claymore mines, and tripwire assemblies of unknown origin.

\(^9\) The booby-traps caused Lebanese military casualties. The use of explosive booby-traps that are victim-activated is prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty because they function like antipersonnel mines. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, pp. 894–895.


\(^12\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 895; presentation by Brig.-Gen Mohammed Fehmi, LMAC, to the ISG, Beirut, 14 May 2009; and email from Allen Kelly, Chief of Operations and Plans, UNMACC, 8 September 2009.

\(^13\) Presentation by Brig.-Gen. Mohammed Fehmi, LMAC, to the ISG, Beirut, 14 May 2009. This is designated as declined/declared land, indicating that the land will not be cleared at this time as per the landowners’ instructions, due to crops, etc. Email from Allen Kelly, UNMACC, 8 September 2009.

\(^14\) Presentation by Brig.-Gen. Mohammed Fehmi, LMAC, to the ISG, Beirut, 14 May 2009; and email from David Horrocks, Country Program Manager, MAG, 4 August 2009.
requested them we could have saved a lot of casualties. After three years what are these maps for?"15

In February 2009, countering earlier assertions by the UN that the south would be freed of contamination from cluster munition remnants, first by the end of 2007, and then by the end of 2008, Lieutenant-Colonel Hassan Fakeeh, the head of RMAC, stated that a further two years would be needed to “minimize” the problem.16 A UNDP job advertisement posted in July 2009 for a quality assurance (QA) officer to work with mine action personnel in Lebanon on landmine clearance claimed that the cluster munition problem would be “largely mitigated” by mid-2010.17 Mines Advisory Group’s (MAG) program manager for Lebanon, however, was quoted by IRIN as saying that 20 demining teams clearing 800m² per working day would take eight years to clear the remaining estimated 16km².18 In May 2009, because of funding constraints LMAC was planning for only 14 battle area clearance (BAC) teams across southern Lebanon (down from more than 50 in June 2008).19

The landmine problem, which has been overshadowed by the 2006 conflict, was defined by the 2002–2003 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), based on which Lebanon estimated that 150km² of land was affected by mines and UXO. In early 2009, however, LMAC increased the estimate for the total mined area to 165km². As of May 2009, 91km² had been released, leaving 74km² to be addressed.20 LMAC has recorded 2,314 hazardous areas in its three regional areas of operation: El Jenoub (Mount Lebanon), Jabal Lubnan, and Nabatiye.21

<p>| Number of Hazardous Areas as of May 2009 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Operation</th>
<th>No. of SHAs</th>
<th>Mined Areas</th>
<th>Minefields</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Jenoub</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabal Lubnan</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabatiye</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>1,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>761</strong></td>
<td><strong>454</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,099</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,314</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By the end of 2008, there were still landmines in the south along the UN-delineated Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel, and in areas north of the Litani river, in the Bekaa valley, and across Mount Lebanon. MACC SL estimated that about 375,000 landmines remained along the Blue Line and up to about 3km inside Lebanese territory, covering an area of more than 7km². It was reported that in 2008 UNIFIL cleared 14 mined areas along the Blue Line.22

In May 2007, fighting between the Lebanese army and the armed Islamist group Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp resulted in UXO contamination and the laying of booby-traps by Fatah al-Islam, including antivehicle mines.23 In April 2008, MAG conducted a rapid risk assessment for survey teams and found that while all areas of the camp were contaminated with UXO the level of risk was highest in the center of the camp.24 The survey

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17 Presentation by Brig.-Gen. Mohammed Fehmi, LMAC, to the ISG, Beirut, 14 May 2009.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid. Jabal Lubnan (Mount Lebanon) covers the coast all the way to Tripoli, El Jenoub is south of the Blue Line, and Nabatiye is north of the Blue Line.
21 Interview with Col. Mohammed Fehmi, LMAC, and Allan Poston, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, Beirut, 4 March 2008.
was later used by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for planning purposes. Handicap International (HI) began explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations at the surface level in October 2008 and as of 21 April 2009, HI had cleared one of the eight zones in Nahr al-Bared Old Camp and found and destroyed 6,000 items. During this period one HI employee and two members of a local NGO were injured by uncontrolled detonations; one of the local NGO staff was badly injured and neither were wearing protective equipment.25

On 14 July 2009, a Hezbollah underground weapons depot in the village of Khirbet Silim, about 16km north of the Israeli border, exploded. There were no casualties. The depot was located in an abandoned building and had been guarded by Hezbollah militia.26 Alain Le Roy, the Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, told the UN Security Council in July 2009 that Hezbollah had been storing the weapons. According to Le Roy, the storage facility did not contain old ammunition reserves as Hezbollah claimed, but was instead full of weapons that were “actively maintained.”27

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During the investigation, which uncovered three houses suspected of containing weaponry that survived the explosion, 14 UNIFIL personnel were slightly injured when clashes broke out between UNIFIL and local residents, who opposed the UN’s role in the investigation. One Lebanese soldier was reported injured by an explosive during the investigation.28

**Casualties**

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 28 new mine/ERW casualties in Lebanon (two killed and 26 injured). LMRC recorded 20 of the casualties but noted that the data supplied for 2008 to May 2009 was incomplete, as they had not completed verifying all incidents with LMAC.31 MACC SL reported one clearance accident in 2008—a male Belgian UNIFIL deminer was killed by a submunition during clearance operations in Aytarun in southern Lebanon.32 The UN Mine Action Coordination Centre (UNMACC) reported they could only provide Landmine Monitor with data on UNIFIL clearance accidents and not on overall casualties, due to LMAC taking over responsibility of all reporting of casualties from January 2009 onwards.33 Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports identified seven additional casualties.

Based on the ongoing victims’ survey (conducted by LMAC), total mine/ERW casualties between 1 January 2008 and 1 May 2009 were 54 (50 killed and 4 injured; 39 men and 15 boys). Cluster submunitions caused 36 casualties, antipersonnel mines six, antivehicle mines two, other ERW seven, and unknown devices three. The most common activity at the time of the incident was reported as agriculture (37). Nine of the casualties were clearance operators (eight civilians and one LAF member).34 LMAC was unable to provide calendar year data, despite repeated requests.35

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25 Emails from Sylvie Arien, Mine Action Programme Manager, HI, 21 and 27 April, and 8 September 2009.
29 Unless otherwise stated, data provided by Habbouba Aoun, Coordinator, LMRC, 6 July 2009; Tekimiti Gilbert, Programme Manager, UNIFIL, 17 July 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring from January 2008–May 2009.
30 Data provided by Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 6 July 2009. An additional eight casualties (one killed and seven injured) were identified in media reports and/or reports from UNIFIL.
31 Emails from Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 6 July 2009 and 20 July 2009.
32 Email from Tekimiti Gilbert, UNIFIL, 17 July 2009.
33 Email from Tekimiti Gilbert, UNIFIL, 9 June 2009.
34 Emails from LMAC, 5 and 7 September 2009.
The number of casualties reported in 2008 is a significant decrease compared to the 130 mine/ERW casualties recorded in 2007 (37 killed and 93 injured) and the 207 casualties reported in 2006 (31 killed and 176 injured). Under-reporting is assumed for 2006 to 2008. LMRC said that its data was incomplete, due to an unfinished verification process.

Mine/ERW casualties continued in 2009, with Landmine Monitor identifying five casualties, including two people killed and three injured, as of 31 May. Landmine Monitor identified three of the casualties through analysis of media reports. LMRC reported two of the casualties. Three of the casualties were men and one was a boy. Two were injured by antipersonnel mines: submunitions caused the remaining three casualties. One civilian clearance operator was injured in January by a submunition during operations. Again, under-reporting of casualties is likely.

The total number of casualties in Lebanon is unknown. LMAC reported that from 1975 to June 2009 there were a total of 3,857 mine/ERW casualties (960 killed and 2,897 injured) in Lebanon.37 As of July 2009, LMRC had records on 2,720 living survivors.38 From 1999 to 2008, LMRC and MACC SL reported a total of 511 mine/ERW casualties (100 killed and 411 injured). Data on historical casualties supplied by LMRC to Landmine Monitor in 2009 is inconsistent with data supplied by the same organization in previous years. The discrepancies are reportedly due to the ongoing verification process. During the same 10-year period, Landmine Monitor identified 703 mine/ERW casualties (120 killed, 567 injured, and 16 unknown). The additional casualties in the Landmine Monitor total were identified through media reports and information from LMAC.39

Risk profile
Southern Lebanon, Nabatiye, and west Bekaa are the main areas contaminated by mines, cluster munition remnants, and ERW, and there are also areas affected by mines in Mount Lebanon. Nahr al-Bared still has contamination inside the camp area, especially farmers and shepherds, who are compelled by economic necessity to farm or graze animals on contaminated land. Most casualties are adult males, followed by children of both genders.41 An assessment in 2007 found that there was a generally high level of awareness about mines and submunitions, although only half of the respondents were able to correctly describe them, or recognize a dangerous area. Almost all mined areas are marked and fenced.42

Socio-economic impact
A study of the economic impact of cluster munition contamination in Lebanon found that two-thirds of the area affected in 2006 was agricultural, representing close to 5% of all agricultural land in southern Lebanon. It estimated current and projected losses of agricultural production would total between US$22.6 million and $26.8 million.43

36 Data provided by Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 6 July 2009.
37 Email from Lt.-Col. Fares, LMAC, 11 June 2009.
38 Email from Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 9 July 2009.
39 Ibid.
40 For 1999, Landmine Monitor Report 2000 cites a variety of reports for various sources on casualties. However, it is impossible to know whether some of these may overlap. Therefore, for this report, Landmine Monitor has used the Agence France-Presse report of 20 casualties (five killed, 15 injured). See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 949. For 2000, Landmine Monitor Report 2001 and Landmine Monitor Report 2002 both reported 113 casualties (14 killed and 99 injured), but Landmine Monitor Report 2004 reported 119 casualties. Therefore, for this report, Landmine Monitor has counted 199 casualties (14 killed, 99 injured, and six unknown). For 2001, Landmine Monitor Report 2002 reports 90 casualties (18 killed and 72 injured), but Landmine Monitor Report 2004 reports 93 casualties. Therefore, for this report, Landmine Monitor has counted 93 casualties (18 killed, 72 injured, and three unknown) for 2001. For 2002, Landmine Monitor Report 2003 reported 42 casualties (four killed and 38 injured), but Landmine Monitor Report 2004 updated the figure to 49 casualties. Therefore, for this report, Landmine Monitor has counted 49 casualties (four killed, 38 injured, and seven unknown) for 2002. For 2003, Landmine Monitor Report 2004 and Landmine Monitor Report 2005 report that there were 26 casualties but then break it down into three killed and 24 injured, which totals 27. Therefore, for this report, Landmine Monitor has counted 27 casualties (three killed and 24 injured) for 2003.
41 Email from Lt.-Col. El Cheikh, Acting Head of the MRE section, LMAC, 27 April 2009.
MACC SL reported at the end of 2008 that largely due to the extensive clearance operations since the cease-fire in August 2006, casualty rates had dropped dramatically and that southern Lebanon had avoided a potential disaster. Still, cluster munitions and other UXO continue to pose a threat to communities and impede agriculture, the main source of income for many people in the area.44

A World Bank report estimated the economic cost of cluster munitions in terms of mortality and morbidity in Lebanon ranged from $10 million to $86 million. Indirect costs include immediate and ongoing health care, the emotional and psychological impact of incidents on both victims and the victim’s family, and the impact on households from the loss of income and its effects on women and children.45

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

The Lebanese Mine Action Authority (LMAA), an interministerial body established in 1998 by the Council of Ministers is chaired by the Minister of Defense. The LMAA is responsible for the Lebanon National Mine Action Program.46 LMAC, under the command of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the LAF, is the coordinating body for all mine action in Lebanon and is responsible for implementing and coordinating the Mine Action Program.47 The LAF implements the End-State Strategy for Mine Action in Lebanon (ESS).48 The ESS was designed in partnership with the Ministry of National Defense and the UNDP mine action capacity building project in 2003–2004 and contains the assumptions for mine action planning and the desired description of Lebanon at the end of clearance operations.49

As planned, in January 2009 MACC SL transitioned from UN management to the newly constituted RMAC and was relocated from Tyre to Nabatiye.50 RMAC took responsibility for all clearance operations in the south except for those conducted by UNIFIL, whose operations are coordinated by UNMACC.51 MACC SL, a joint operation between the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), LMAC, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), was established in 2001 and had been responsible for coordinating clearance below the Litani river; in Area 6, an area north of the Litani comprising Hasbaya and Nabatiye in Nabatiye governorate; and in Jezzine in South governorate.52 With the transition the LAF would continue as part of the new RMAC in Nabatiye and the remaining UNMACC staff would support UNIFIL in BAC, mine clearance, and EOD operations. The UN planned to support the transition through donations of capital, equipment, and in-kind donation of civilian staff on UN contracts through 2009.53

Risk education

LMAC coordinates and supervises RE. A National Steering Committee on Mine Risk Education represents the various professional and political groups in the country, and the members work in the communities they represent. The ministries of education and of social affairs are also members. There were no new members in 2008.54 The committee met regularly until May

54 Email from Lt.-Col. El Cheikh, LMAC, 27 April 2009.
2008, when the unstable political situation prevented activities from taking place. They did not resume until early 2009.55 Local law prevents international organizations from conducting RE in Lebanon.56 Oversight of RE is conducted by LMAC, which conducts weekly field visits,57 and LMRC.58 Technical and financial support to the RE steering committee was provided by NPA and UNICEF,59 while LMRC continued to provide training support and donor liaison to committee members.60 UNICEF provided $7,000 in funding for 2008, and was transitioning out of RE in 2009, although it planned to maintain an emergency response RE capacity.61 NPA contributed $76,000 to RE activities in 2008 and planned to continue RE in Lebanon until the end of 2011.62

Victim assistance
LMAC took full responsibility for mine action coordination in Lebanon at the beginning of January 2009, including victim assistance (VA).63 The National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance offered information-sharing opportunities among operators and is coordinated and chaired by the LMAC Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and Mine Victim Assistance Section Head. However, NGOs have criticized the committee for its lack of VA planning.64 Although there are positive activities for mine/ERW survivors undertaken at the local level in Lebanon, it was reported that these successes remained localized and were not translated into achievements and coordination at the national level.65

Data collection and management
The Information Management section of LMAC is responsible for the management of mine action data. Its database, using IMSMA software, includes data from the 2002–2003 LIS as well as the results from the technical survey project that began in 2005 following the LIS (see Strategic mine action plan section below).66 RE activities are recorded in IMSMA.67

LMAC is the national repository for mine/ERW casualty data in Lebanon. In 2009, steps were taken by LMAC to consolidate mine/ERW casualty data collected by various operators in Lebanon. From 1 January 2009, LMAC assumed sole responsibility for mine action activities in Lebanon, including the collation and distribution of casualty data. As such, all requests for statistical information on casualties should be directed to the LMAC IMSMA and Mine Victim Assistance Unit.68 Casualty data from MACC SL and LMRC from 2000 to 2009 were reportedly being consolidated into IMSMA in June 2009. However, data from casualties prior to August 2006 remained in a database managed by LMRC and Landmine Monitor was referred by LMAC to receive all data from this period from this database.69

LMAC collected casualty data in 2008 and 2009 through LMAC community liaison officers, army intelligence units of each governorate, and received information through LMRC and MACC SL. LMAC regularly distributes casualty data to operators and answers requests for information.70 LMRC collected casualty data in 2008 through a network, covering the whole

55 Email from Haboubwa Aoun, LMRC, 17 March 2009.
58 Email from Haboubwa Aoun, LMRC, 17 March 2009.
59 Email from Maha Damaj, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF, 20 April 2009.
60 Email from Haboubwa Aoun, LMRC, 17 March 2009.
61 Email from Maha Damaj, UNICEF, 20 April 2009.
63 Email from Lt-Col. Fares, LMAC, 11 June 2009.
64 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Haboubwa Aoun, LMRC, 1 June 2009.
65 Ibid.
68 Email from Lt-Col. Fares, LMAC, 11 June 2009; and email from Tekimiti Gilbert, UNIFIL, 9 June 2009.
69 Telephone interview with Lt-Col. Fares, LMAC, 7 July 2009.
70 Email from Lt-Col. Fares, LMAC, 11 June 2009.
country, of trained data collectors, social workers, and university students majoring in public health.\textsuperscript{71} LMRC also maintained a comprehensive database of survivor information that has been used as the information base for planning VA projects.\textsuperscript{72}

In 2008 and into 2009, LMAC conducted phase one of a mine/ERW casualty survey. Phase one verified the IMSMA database of mine/ERW casualties that occurred from the end of the July-August 2006 conflict. The survey also aims to provide LMAC with comprehensive information (including assistance received) on each survivor in the country. Data collection for phase one was completed in July 2009 but the results were not available for this edition of Landmine Monitor. LMAC was seeking funding for two additional phases of the survey.\textsuperscript{73} Phase two would cover casualties from 2000 to August 2006, and phase three, casualties prior to 2000.\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
National operators & Demining & RE & Casualty data collection & VA \\
\hline
LAF & x & & & \\
NGOs & & & & \\
DanChurchAid & x & & & \\
HI & x & & & \\
MAG & x & & & \\
NPA & x & x & x & x \\
Swedish Rescue Services Agency & x & & & \\
\textbf{Commercial companies} & & & & \\
BACTEC & x & & & \\
\textbf{UNIFIL battalions} & & & & \\
Belgium & x & & & \\
China & x & & & \\
France & x & & & \\
Italy & x & & & \\
Spain & x & & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Mine action program operators as of May 2009}
\end{table}

\textbf{Plans}

\textbf{Strategic mine action plan}

In 2007, Lebanon adopted a Long Term Plan for 2008–2012 to reflect the results of the 2006 conflict and clearance scheduled for 2007. A primary goal was to implement technical surveys and eliminate the impact in all high- and medium-impacted communities identified in the 2002–2003 LIS by 2011.\textsuperscript{75} The LIS identified 28 high-impacted communities and 164 medium-

\textsuperscript{71} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 1 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} Phase 1 of the casualty survey was supported by NPA, which most probably will be able to cover the needed funds for phase 2. Email from Khaled Yamout, NPA, 5 September 2009.

\textsuperscript{74} Telephone interview with Lt.-Col. Fares, LMAC, 7 July 2009.

LMAC stated they have technical survey and coordination capacity to clear all high- and medium-impacted communities in five years, assuming sufficient support from donors.\textsuperscript{76} The End State Strategy, which has as its goal to make Lebanon “impact free,” was established in 2004 to combine the humanitarian need to save lives and to support national development plans.\textsuperscript{77} It provides 12 implementation guidelines and direction for associated long-term and annual plans.\textsuperscript{78}

An annual RE action plan was produced for 2007–2008. It included community campaigns, media activities, training in RE, school-based RE, summer activities, and evaluations.\textsuperscript{79} LMAC’s Long Term Plan, revised in 2008 and covering 2008–2012, aims to develop VA standards and guidelines, an accreditation system for members of the national steering committee, adequate coordination mechanisms to avoid duplication, a transparent monitoring and evaluation system, and a comprehensive five-year plan with indicators.\textsuperscript{80} LMAC is reportedly creating a monitoring system for VA projects.\textsuperscript{81} LMAC reported having “technical issues” in implementing the plan, resulting in cancelling or combining some programs.\textsuperscript{82} LMRC reported that the plan was yet to be implemented by the National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance.\textsuperscript{83}

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

The Lebanese Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) is the government’s coordinating agency for development projects. UNDP and CDR jointly support the post-conflict socio-economic rehabilitation in southern Lebanon, in which mine and ERW-affected communities receive assistance in developing businesses, rebuilding infrastructure, and training of human resources.

In September 2008, MACC SL received on behalf of all humanitarian operators in Lebanon the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees’ annual Nansen Refugee Award, based on their contribution to the safety and security of internally displaced persons and returnees in Lebanon and the safe delivery of humanitarian assistance. In December, MACC SL used the $100,000 prize money to purchase and distribute 300 cows to seven agricultural communities in southern Lebanon.\textsuperscript{85}

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Lebanon appears generally committed to mine action. It has adopted a national mine action policy, a five-year plan, and has taken over responsibility for coordination and management of mine action in Lebanon. The Ministry of National Defense took over responsibility for coordination of the south from the UN at the beginning of 2009.

National management

Lebanon’s program is nationally managed with continuing UN support. UNDP has supported LMAC’s institutional development through the provision of an international technical advisor and national information technology and administration staff since 2001.\textsuperscript{86} UNMAS managed MACC SL from 2001 until it was handed over to the government in January 2009 and converted...
into the RMAC. In 2009, UNMAS continued to provide technical advice to the RMAC as required through the UNMACC and in July, UNDP was recruiting a specialist in quality management to provide technical advice to the RMAC and the LMAC.87 UNMAS employed a transition officer from the then MACC SL to facilitate the transition to national ownership.88 On 11 July 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon presented UNMACC staff with a UN 21 award—an award that recognizes excellence in the delivery of UN organization programs and services—for its efforts in response to the 2006 conflict.89

National mine action legislation
In May 2007, the National Demining Office (NDO), the body that preceded LMAC, approved the mine action policy that set the organizational structure for mine action and gave NDO the responsibility for the management of the mine action program. The policy document includes the mine action structure, authorized bodies for mine clearance operations, the creation of the International Support Group (ISG)—consisting of representatives from UNDP, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Poverty Reduction Support Grants program, ambassadors from donor countries, demining regulations, and monitoring guidelines. It also states that Lebanon aspires to join the Mine Ban Treaty.90

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
Mine and ERW clearance is conducted according to the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG), which are said to be based on the International Mine Action Standards. Mine clearance operators are accredited based on their adherence to the NTSG.91 A final draft of national RE standards was being reviewed by LMAC as of May 2009.92 National VA standards and guidelines were developed during 2008 and 2009, under the supervision of the LMAC, with technical support from LMRC and funding from World Vision.93

Program evaluations
An UNMAS review of emergency clearance coordinated by MACC SL in 2007 concluded that the overall response was rapid and effective, despite a lack of early contingency planning, and that the UN rapid response framework was well suited to large-scale, high-profile emergencies. The review identified a need to improve coordination between UN agencies with mine action responsibilities and for increased emphasis on RE, which was found to have been overwhelmed by the rush of returnees immediately after the 2006 conflict.94 LMAC hired a consultant to evaluate VA in Lebanon in May 2009. The results were not available as of June 2009.95

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
With support from UNDP and UNMAS, Lebanon has made significant progress in clearing mined and battle areas following armed conflicts since 1975. Prior to the 2002–2003 LIS that serves as the baseline for the landmine problem in Lebanon, the Lebanese Armed Forces cleared 20km² of land, destroying in the process 40,000 antipersonnel mines, 5,500 antivehicle mines, and 60,000 items of UXO from 1990–2003. Considerable mine and unexploded submunition

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88 Presentation by Allan Poston, UNDP, Twelfth Meeting of National Directors and UN Advisors, Geneva, 24 March 2009; and email from Allen Kelly, UNMACC, 8 September 2009.
93 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Habbooba Aoun, LMRC, 1 June 2009.
94 Email from Marie-Anne Menier, Programme Officer for Southern Lebanon, UNMAS, 22 May 2008.
95 Email from Lt.-Col. Fares, LMAC, 11 June 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Habbooba Aoun, LMRC, 1 June 2009.
contamination remains, however, with earlier predictions that clearance of cluster munition remnants would already have been completed proving ill-founded.

Resources for clearing submunitions reduced significantly in 2008, as a result of funding constraints, and LMAC projected further decreases in 2009. At the end of 2008, HI closed its operations due to a lack of funding.96 BACTEC followed in March 2009, also due to a lack of funding.97 The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) closed its program at the end of 2008, but returned in April 2009 with new funding from the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs for four months to resume clearing submunitions.98 However, at the end of July FSD left again due to lack of funding.99 It was also reported that the Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) was running short of funds and might have to close its operations by September 2009.100

**Battle area clearance in 2008**

In December 2008, MACC SL reported that 42.5 km$^2$ of the 48.1 km$^2$ of battle areas in southern Lebanon had been cleared including 10 km$^2$ in 2008.101 On 14 May 2009, LMAC revised the contaminated area down to 35.4 km$^2$ and claimed that 15.9 km$^2$ remained to clear. LMAC estimated that approximately 10% of the remaining area requires sub-surface clearance. They also reported a considerably higher number of cluster munition remnants than those previously reported by MACC SL, particularly in the number of munitions found by the LAF.102

### Summary of cluster munition remnants problem as of May 2009

- Contaminated Area: 35.36 km$^2$
- Area Cleared: 19.55 km$^2$
- Area Remaining: 15.81 km$^2$
- Cluster munitions found: 194,447
- Mines found: 5,794
- UXO found: 41,051

### Number and type of item found during clearance of cluster submunitions as of May 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Unexploded submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>Mines destroyed</th>
<th>Other UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LAF</td>
<td>106,578</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>35,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>28,068</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>3,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>32,975</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Companies</td>
<td>25,263</td>
<td>5,098</td>
<td>1,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Defense Force</td>
<td>1,563</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>194,447</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,794</strong></td>
<td><strong>41,051</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2008, mine clearance consisted of clearing 119,918,000 m$^2$.103 All mine clearance activities were suspended in July 2006 in response to the priority in locating cluster munition strikes and clearing submunitions.104 MAG reported that it restarted its mine clearance operation in May 2007 with one technical survey team and two mine detection dog teams, in Mtolle, in the

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99 Email from Armen Harutyunyan, Programme Manager, FSD, 29 July 2009.
102 Presentation by Brig.-Gen. Mohammed Fehmi, LMAC, to the ISG, Beirut, 14 May 2009.
Chouf Mountains in central Lebanon with funding provided by the United Kingdom and in
2008 cleared 47,729m². From January to June 2009, MAG cleared another 14,675m². During
clearance operations nine Israeli No. 4 mines were found.105

BACTEC cleared more than 70,000m² in the Al Aadeisse mined areas, adjacent to the Blue
Line, from July–September 2008, and destroyed 4,569 mines in the process. Al Aadeisse is
considered cleared. It was also reported that UNIFIL cleared 14 mined areas adjacent to the
Blue Line.106

In October 2008, HI began EOD operations to remove 500,000m³ of rubble in the Nahr al-
Bared refugee camp at the surface level under a contract with UNRWA that runs until March
2010.107 Four teams work in conjunction with a rubble removal contractor to clear Nahr al-Bared
Old Camp and adjacent areas of explosive ordnance. The project includes the provision of UXO
awareness briefings to all UN staff, contractors, camp residents, and others authorized to enter
the camp. As of 21 April 2009, HI had cleared one of the eight zones in the Old Camp and found
and destroyed 6,000 items. LMAC is responsible for external QA and issues completion reports
before the area is handed over to UNRWA for planning the return of people displaced from the
camp and supporting humanitarian relief and development projects.108

Operation Emirates Solidarity project
When Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in May 2000 it left behind some 400,000
landmines. The UAE has supported clearance in this area since 2001 through the OES project.
In 2005, five of the six areas had been cleared and, after the 2006 conflict, the UAE continued
the project.109 The clearance of Area 6, the last remaining area, was completed in March 2008.
A total of 648,442m² was cleared.110

Quality assurance/Quality control
Each organization has its own internal quality management system. External quality control is
conducted by LMAC or RMAC depending on the area of operation.111 QA is conducted during
clearance operations as well as after they are completed, based on the Standing Operating
Procedures for Quality Control. Two major factors considered in the sampling size are the
level of accreditation of the demining operator and how the land will be used after clearance is
completed.

105 Email from David Horrocks, MAG, 4 April 2009.
107 Emails from Sylvie Ariens, HI, 21 April and 8 September 2009.
108 Emails from Sylvie Arien, HI, 21 and 27 April 2009.
109 Email from Julia Goehsing, Programme Officer, MACC SL, 17 August 2007.
Summary of Clearance from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Area cleared (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>Submunitions destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OES phase one</td>
<td>2001–2005</td>
<td>4,932,434</td>
<td>56,455</td>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>4,211</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OES phase two</td>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td>972,442</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine clearance based on LIS</td>
<td>2003–2008</td>
<td>91,000,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine clearance in Al Aadeisse</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>77,768</td>
<td>4,568</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG clearance</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>42,150</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Reduction by survey – Souk El Gharb</td>
<td>2005–2007</td>
<td>503,996</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unexploded submunitions</td>
<td>2006–2008</td>
<td>19,552,230</td>
<td>5,794</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>41,051</td>
<td>194,447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>117,081,020</strong></td>
<td><strong>192,331</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,101</strong></td>
<td><strong>45,653</strong></td>
<td><strong>194,447</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N/A = not available

Risk Education

RE activities are conducted by national NGOs. Activities included presentations to farmers and their families and RE by school students, including plays. RE activities covered all contaminated areas in Lebanon, including north of the Litani river. All communities in the south received RE, and the majority of communities in the rest of the country although to a lesser degree, as these were of lower priority. RE was also delivered to Palestinians and Lebanese in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp.

RE was delivered by the following members of the steering committee: Al-Jarha Association for the War Wounded and Disabled in Lebanon (Al-Jarha Association), Islamic Risala Scouts Association, Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped (LWAH), Vision Association, Welfare Association for the Handicapped in Nabatiye, the Islamic Health Council, and Lebanese Association for Health and Social Care. The military also delivered RE through LMAC. In addition, INTERSOS and World Vision contributed to RE.

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113 Most of the RE activities conducted by local NGOs were funded by NPA, which remains the main donor for RE activities in Lebanon. Email from Khaled Yamout, NPA, 5 September 2009.
114 Email from Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 17 March 2009.
115 Email from Lt.-Col. El Cheikh, LMAC, 27 April 2009.
117 Ibid.
118 Email from Lt.-Col. El Cheikh, LMAC, 27 April 2009.
Approximately 425,000 people received RE in 2008 in Nabatiye, Tyre, Bint Jbeil, Hasbaya, Rashia, and West Bekaa. This figure consists of beneficiaries of community-based activities, including people who attended a large exhibition organized by Al-Jarha Association in August 2008, and school students: 69,492 of these beneficiaries were reached by LMAC. New groups provided with training by LMRC included social workers in the south, and youth activists in an NGO that was to start RE in 2008. Awareness messages were also delivered through the media. The army distributed flyers at military checkpoints.

LMRC worked on integrating RE messages into the school curriculum and conducted training of teachers with the support of UNICEF and NPA. By 2010, RE is expected to be part of the school curriculum, and will consist of RE sessions for about five to six hours a year. Materials were developed but not printed. In October 2008 five training courses with teachers to test RE messages took place. Refresher training that had been planned was postponed.

LMAC has community liaison officers in the south regional office (RMAC). In addition, clearance organizations have a community liaison capacity, and the members of the RE steering committee also provided information on contamination to LMAC.

A needs assessment conducted by LMRC with UNICEF found that communities have sufficient knowledge about risks but adoption of safe behavior was “limited.” According to UNICEF, RE has been effective, as evidenced by a consistent decrease in the number of casualties, but it needs to be institutionalized (such as through the education curriculum) and awareness techniques could be revamped.

RE activities in Lebanon were severely hampered by political insecurity and violence in May 2008, which prevented the implementation of many of the recommendations made in the assessment. These were: development of measurable objectives; improvement of communication skills; introduction of participatory techniques; and revision of RE materials. The problem of conflicting messages being given by UNIFIL reported last year was resolved, and UNIFIL only conducted limited RE in their areas of operation.

Over the last 10 years RE has been conducted primarily by national NGOs working firstly with the mine awareness committee established at Balamand University by LMRC from 1999 to 2001, then through the National Mine Risk Education Committee headed by LMAC (until 2007, the NDO). The military delivered RE in the early stages, and emergency RE following the 2006 war, but from 2004 their role was primarily in coordination, monitoring, and supervision. Community liaison has been conducted by LMRC, MACC SL, and mine clearance operators. Training support for RE was provided by LMRC, with technical and financial support by UNICEF and NPA, and by the ICRC for the Lebanese Red Cross.

RE has primarily been focused on the south, particularly when emergency RE was required after the May 2000 withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon, resulting in the return of civilians to former military areas, and after the July–August 2006 war when the south became heavily contaminated with cluster munitions and other UXO affecting around 150 communities. In 2003, RE also started to be conducted in Mount Lebanon and Batroun, and in 2004 in other parts...
of the north. Emergency RE was also provided following the May 2007 crisis in Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in the north.

Methods of delivering RE include community meetings, lectures, workshops, discussion sessions, distribution of materials, and the use of mass media. Since 2004, school-based RE in mine-affected areas received strong emphasis. RE has been primarily delivered through NGO volunteers who receive a stipend for travel. By 2004 there were 250 volunteers, increasing to 318 in 2006. RE reached 500,000 beneficiaries from mid-2002 to mid-2003, and one million from mid-2003 to mid-2004. Needs assessments have been conducted region by region, prior to implementation.132

An UNMAS/UNIFIL evaluation in February 2002 and a Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining evaluation in March 2002 emphasized the need to stop producing awareness literature and introduce more interactive and participatory RE. The 2002–2003 LIS found people had been exposed to RE, and in January 2004 a UNICEF external evaluation found that people remembered messages and methods and found them appropriate, but called for RE to be more focused on schools through trained teachers.

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Lebanon is unknown, but is at least 2,720.133 There are reportedly adequate human resources and medical facilities to meet the needs of mine/ERW survivors in Lebanon but the cost of treatment and the location of facilities remained a barrier for some. Both private and government emergency medical facilities were reportedly within a 30-minute drive from all communities in mine/ERW-affected areas.134 But not all hospitals in these areas were sufficiently equipped to provide survivors with adequate medical care.135

The cost of services remained prohibitively high for many. The Ministry of Public Health provides free medical care for all mine/ERW victims who are Lebanese citizens. However, it was reported that when medical costs become too expensive, financial support. However, it was reported that when medical expenses for some services become too high, the Ministry can decide to not pay for the service.136 Holders of disability pension cards are eligible for free health care at government medical centers. But, in some cases, the benefits do not cover any or all of the costs.137 Non-Lebanese nationals are not eligible for government support.138 Government services for mine/ERW survivors have also been criticized for not treating cases holistically, with little to no coordination across the range of services required by a mine/ERW survivor, from physical rehabilitation to economic and social reintegration.139

There are a variety of programs and initiatives for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors in Lebanon, although the sector continued to rely heavily on international funding. A peak in international support for mine action followed the 2006 conflict, but this funding had significantly decreased by the end of 2008. LMAC reported that inequalities in the distribution of services prevented Lebanon from meeting the needs of all survivors, although sufficient national capacity exists.140 NGOs involved in VA reported a significant decrease in international funding for VA in 2008, resulting in a reduction of the number and scope of

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133 Email from Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 9 July 2009.

134 Email from Lt.-Col. Fares, LMAC, 11 June 2009.

135 Ibid.

136 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 1 June 2009.

137 Email from Lt.-Col. Fares, LMAC, 11 June 2009.

138 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 1 June 2009.

139 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Reem Makki Haddara, Executive Director, LWAH, 9 July 2009.

140 Email from Lt.-Col. Fares, LMAC, 11 June 2009.
programs. The majority of government funds for mine action were allocated to clearance; only a small amount of funding went to VA.

The ministries of social affairs and public health manage physical therapy services. More than 100 health centers throughout Lebanon provided physiotherapy services. A number of NGOs also provided comprehensive physical rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors, including the distribution of assistive devices. However, rehabilitation services were reportedly concentrated in major towns and lacking in the most economically disadvantaged, mine/ERW-affected areas.

Limited psychological support was available through the Ministry of Social Affairs and some NGOs, although it was often expensive and consequently unaffordable for some survivors. Numerous NGOs coordinated economic integration projects in 2008, including vocational training and income-generating projects. Yet unemployment among persons with disabilities remained high, reportedly due to discrimination from employers. Many income-generating projects were destroyed in the conflict in 2006, and have yet to be re-established. The UNDP National Human Development Report for Lebanon for 2008–2009 reported that in Lebanon “being disabled increases the likelihood of poverty.” More than 41% of people with a disability live on less than the country’s average monthly wage, 38% are illiterate, and 69% do not have health insurance. Only 5% complete secondary school and only 3% graduate from university. UNDP reported this was mainly due to the failure to integrate students with disabilities into mainstream schools.

In 2008, a network of disability organizations advocated for implementation of the disability legislation passed by the Lebanese government in 2000. An implementing decree had been drafted by the government but had not passed as of June 2009. On the 14 June 2007, Lebanon signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, but as of 29 June 2009 had not ratified either instrument.

Victim assistance activities
The members of the National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance run the majority of programs assisting mine/ERW survivors. Due to the large number of NGOs working with mine/ERW survivors in Lebanon this report may be incomplete and only organizations that provided information to Landmine Monitor have been included.

NPA financially supports VA projects implemented by local NGO members of the VA steering committee. NPA is the only organization in the VA National Committee that funds VA projects and in 2008 in provided $185,000 to VA activities. NPA also provides technical support to local NGOs to implement VA activities. Direct support to victims is only provided in special cases. Many of the activities mentioned by the local NGOs are supported by NPA.
NPA's program aims to enhance the participation of mine/ERW survivors in society and increase the application of laws and policies concerning the rights of persons with disabilities. Through its partners it provided: artificial limbs and mobility devices to 160 survivors, funding to cover full medical costs for 18 survivors, income-generating projects for 20 survivors, and funding to cover educational costs for 12 survivors. NPA also supported sporting activities to enhance the social status of survivors, involving 15 survivors. In west Bekaa, 130 mine survivors have had access to a newly adapted center.153

The Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped provided services to 536 mine/ERW survivors (including 22 new survivors) in 2008. Services included: assisting 126 survivors with continuing medical care, providing 20 with prosthetics and devices, three with physical rehabilitation, 163 with psychological support (predominantly through peer support), 12 with social and sporting activities, 19 with economic integration and education support, 105 with non-medical aid, and 139 home visits.154

Al-Jarha Association worked with some 300 mine/ERW survivors and their families in 2008.155 They provided social assistance, continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation and provision of artificial limbs, economic programs, and vocational and life-skills training. Funding came from local donations and NPA. There was an increase of the numbers of survivors who participated in vocational training in 2008 compared to previous years. Al-Jarha Association reported that a key challenge was a lack of sufficient funding to meet survivors' needs.156

The World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) in 2008 provided technical and material assistance to the Jezzine Landmine Survivor Development Cooperative. The cooperative governs and organizes the business activities of its members. In 2008, the cooperative moved towards financial and organizational autonomy with the gradual transfer of assets and operational functions to members from WRF. In 2008, 173 mine/ERW survivors received material and/or capacity-building support through WRF, including 10 people who were injured by mines/ERW in 2008.157

In 2008, World Vision Lebanon involved 47 mine/ERW survivors in an income-generating project and assisted child mine/ERW survivors through a summer camp. They also implemented an awareness campaign targeting 10,000 people in southern Lebanon, to break down negative stereotypes of mine/ERW survivors and encourage the government to sign the Convention on Cluster Munitions. World Vision concluded its VA program in February 2009.158

In February 2008, LMRC concluded a project with the Islamic Risala Scouts Association, funded by Austcare, which provided 15 survivors with computer training and English language classes. LMRC promoted mental health sessions with psychologists for mine/ERW survivors in 2008, working directly and indirectly with 450 survivors.159

The Swiss Foundation for Demining (FSD) covered the cost of continuing medical care for 24 mine/ERW survivors in 2008, psychological support to three survivors, economic assistance to three, and education support for two. The organization reported that a decrease in international funding had reduced the scope of their VA projects significantly.160

INTEROS facilitated economic assistance to survivors and their families from 2006 to March 2008. There are no plans to re-establish the VA component of their mine action program.161

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153 Ibid, 10 July 2009.
155 Telephone interview with Imad Khosman, Programs Coordinator, Al-Jarha Association, 9 July 2009.
156 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Imad Khosman, Al-Jarha Association, 9 July 2009.
157 Email from Toufic Rizkallah, Project Coordinator, WRF, 1 July 2009.
159 Email and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Habbouba Aoun, LMRC, 1 June 2009 and 4 June 2009.
160 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Armen Harutyunyan, FSD, 11 June 2009.
161 Telephone interview with and email from Alessandro Guarino, Programme Coordinator, INTEROS, 9 July 2009.
Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Lebanon. The Long Term Plan 2008–2012 for mine action, however, provides a detailed resource mobilization strategy for the five-year period, and highlights the resource mobilization strategy as one of two principle elements for achieving its overall mine action goals, along with yearly Integrated Work Plans (IWPs). The priorities of the Long Term Plan—national technical survey; capacity building and maintenance; mine action coordination; VA; and RE—are to be fulfilled through the annual workplans based on available resources for each year.

In July 2008, MACC SL reported a cost estimate for 2008 of $10.77 million (approximately €7.31 million) to cover operational expenses and “achieve key clearance objectives” of cluster munition strike areas in southern Lebanon, ending the need for large-scale international financial assistance to related programs.

MACC SL costs were covered largely by UNIFIL’s peacekeeping assessed budget, UNMAS Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance (UNVTF), UN Trust Fund for Human Security, UN Rapid Respond Plan contributions, the UAE OES project, and bilateral funding.

National support for mine action

There is no national budget for mine action in Lebanon. Mine action costs are covered at the national level through the LAF budget. LMAC reported mine action funding by the government of Lebanon totaling $5.5 million (approximately €3.7 million) in 2008. Overall national support included administrative support to LMAC and the LAF engineering regiment, other logistical support, provision of personnel, coordination support, and inter-ministerial support to the Lebanon National Mine Action Program. Lebanon reported $5.5 million in national funding in 2007.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, 15 countries and the European Commission (EC) reported providing $27,768,535 (€18,856,808) to mine action in Lebanon. Reported international mine action funding in 2008 was approximately 2% less than reported in 2007. As of November 2008, Lebanon cited overall resource mobilization and competition with other regional mine action programs as reasons for a funding shortfall and to weak support to victim assistance. MACC SL reported funding shortages resulted in the closure of two of seven NGO demining programs in the last quarter of 2008. The number of active clearance teams operating in southern Lebanon reportedly fell from 44 to 29 in 2008 and LMAC projected in May 2009 that by October there would be only 14 BAC teams.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Lebanon: Monetary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/ Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>USAID, US Department of State Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$5,059,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>FSD, HI, DanChurchAid, MAG</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance, battle area clearance</td>
<td>$4,315,369 (€2,930,442)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>SRSA</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$2,867,096 (SEK18,874,890)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance, VA, RE</td>
<td>$2,528,599 (NOK14,253,656)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>UNVTF, Lebanon Ministry of National Defense</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance</td>
<td>$1,375,408 (€934,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>MACC SL</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>MAG, UNMAS</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance, capacity-building</td>
<td>$1,102,882 (£594,706)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
<td>$982,500 (DKK5,000,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>$675,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance</td>
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<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>HI, UNMAS</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance</td>
<td>$464,612 (CHF502,501)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Integrated mine action</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$21,959,986 (€14,912,390)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2008 International Mine Action Support to Lebanon: In-Kind

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Form of In-Kind Support</th>
<th>Monetary Value (where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance platoon</td>
<td>$4,953,826 (€3,364,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Training of 25 mine clearance personnel, mine clearance personnel via UNIFIL</td>
<td>$854,724 (€580,418)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$5,808,550 (€3,944,418)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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171 Belgium Article 7 report, Form J, 30 April 2009; and Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
Funding by Saudi Arabia was reported by the Embassies of Saudi Arabia in Beirut and Washington as two separate contributions, one of $500,000 and the other of $1 million.\textsuperscript{172}

In addition to the in-kind assistance noted above, Switzerland provided EOD systems to LMAC; New Zealand contributed 10 mine clearance personnel to MACC SL/RMAC, and Portugal provided technical assistance in mine detection and clearance to UNIFIL.\textsuperscript{173}

In October 2008, the US announced a contribution of $825,000 to MACC-SL/RMAC to support mine/UXO clearance.\textsuperscript{174} In April 2009, the US reported that it would contribute an additional $1.5 million to MAG for clearance in Lebanon, and a further $1.7 million was approved for MAG in July 2009 to continue funding 10 clearance teams in the south.\textsuperscript{175} As well in 2009, the US contributed $59,049 to the Marshall Legacy Institute to replace retiring mine detection dogs, and $1,591,672 went to DynCorp to continue to develop the LMAC, integrate all humanitarian mine action aspects, complete technical survey and establish QA/quality control.\textsuperscript{176}


\textsuperscript{173} Email from Rémy Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; New Zealand Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009; and Portugal Article 7 report (for calendar year 2008), Form J.


\textsuperscript{175} “U.S. to Donate $1.5 million For Munitions Clearing in Lebanon”, Media News Line, 29 March 2009. newsblaze.com; and email from Stacy Davis, US Department of State, 2 September 2009.

\textsuperscript{176} Email from Stacy Davis, US Department of State, 2 September 2009.
States Not Party

Libya

Ten-Year Summary

The Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Great Jamahiriya has consistently stated that it cannot join the Mine Ban Treaty and in recent years has called for its revision. It has abstained from voting on every annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1998, however it has participated in many Mine Ban Treaty and other landmine-related meetings. In 2004, a Libyan official stated that Libya no longer has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

Little clearance has taken place in Libya since 1999 and little is known about the precise extent of the problem, although the UN initiated support to the mine action program in Libya in 2009.

For the first time since reporting started, Landmine Monitor identified casualties in Libya in 2008 and 2009. No systematic mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) risk education activities were conducted in Libya between 1999 and 2008 despite mention of frequent casualties. Throughout the period, Libya placed responsibility for assisting mine/ERW survivors on those having placed landmines, but little is known about actual services provided.

Mine Ban Policy

Libya has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In November 2008, Libya attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan, and called for revision of the treaty in order to facilitate the accession of all countries. It again repeated that a key reason it has not joined is because the treaty does not require states that have planted mines in the past to pay for clearance and compensate for damages.

Libya has also said in the past that it would require too much money and human resources to fulfill the treaty’s clearance obligations. More generally, it has said that it has the legal right to defend itself and to protect the security of its vast borders, sometimes declaring that mines are important obstacles to infiltration and illegal immigration.

Libya attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, but made no statements. In November 2008, the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation (Gaddafi Foundation) organized an international conference on demining and development in cooperation with UNDP and Libya’s National Anti-mines and Cultivation Programme.

On 2 December 2008, Libya was one of 18 states to abstain from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42, which promotes the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has abstained from voting on similar resolutions every year since 1998.

3 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 917. In October 2007, Libya’s President Muammar al Gaddafi strongly criticized the treaty saying it is “a faulty and flawed instrument. It must be reviewed. Otherwise, the states that hastened to adhere to it must withdraw from it.” He noted that while mine clearance, victim assistance, and the rehabilitation of affected environments are positive elements of the treaty, the prohibition of production and use of mines, as well as the requirement to destroy stockpiles, are not acceptable. He asserted that mines “are the means of self-defense of the weak countries.” Speech by President Muammar al Gaddafi, “The 1997 Ottawa convention must be reviewed,” 17 October 2007, www.algathafi.org.
4 “Libya organizes conference on land mines,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, 3 November 2008.
5 Libya reiterated its objections to the treaty in its explanation of its vote. Explanation of vote on draft Resolution A/C.1/62/L.39.
Libya has stated in the past that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, and that it no longer has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Libya imported mines from the former Soviet Union, including POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M antipersonnel fragmentation mines, as well as from the former Yugoslavia, including PMA-3 blast mines. Libya is not known to have used antipersonnel mines since its war with Chad from 1980–1987.

Libya is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Libya is contaminated with mines and ERW, mainly UXO, as a result of the World War II campaign in North Africa, as well as wars with Egypt in 1977 and Chad from 1980–1987. The borders with Chad, Egypt, and Tunisia are affected by mines and UXO, as are areas in the north and south of the country. Minefields are said to exist in deserts, ports, and urban areas. The precise extent and impact of the problem are, however, not known as no nationwide survey has been conducted.

Casualties
In July 2008, Landmine Monitor identified three casualties, all police officers who were killed when mines being transported in their vehicle exploded near Tobruk. These are the first casualties Landmine Monitor has been able to confirm since 1999, despite reports of frequent casualties. There were no official records or confirmations of additional casualties in 2008. During a demining conference in November 2008, however, one speaker noted that casualties had occurred during clearance conducted by the Libyan Army and the De-mining Society (also known as the Anti-Mines Association). No further details were made available. Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with at least seven people killed and five injured in one incident on the Libyan side of the border with Niger. The incident occurred when a vehicle transporting approximately 30 Gambians, allegedly trying to reach Europe, drove over a landmine. At least nine of the casualties were young males; details about the others were unknown.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Libya is not known. The De-mining Society and the Libyan Civil Defense Department had registered 1,852 mine casualties by the end of 2006. Previous estimates were around 12,000, with the Libyan Police reporting 11,845 casualties between 1940 and 1995 (6,749 killed and 5,096 injured) and the Libyan Jihad center reporting 12,258 (3,874 killed and 8,384 injured) between 1952 and 1975.

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Program Management and Coordination

Mine Action
Libya does not yet have a fully fledged mine action program, despite the announcement in 2005 of a “national campaign” to remove landmines along the borders with Egypt and Chad. In a conference in November 2008, however, Libya took further steps towards establishing a civilian mine action program.18 The interministerial committee of the national program for demining and land reclamation serves as the national mine action authority in Libya.19 It is not known what decisions this committee has taken.

On 25 May 2008, the De-mining Society of the Gaddafi Foundation signed a Letter of Intent with UNDP in Libya. The agreement provides for cooperation on various aspects of mine action, including victim assistance, and the creation of an information management system.20 The De-mining Society reported signing a number of other agreements: with the army’s engineering department; with the German organization the Santa Barbara Foundation; with a commercial company on clearance for the benefit of oil companies in Libya; and with the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD).21

UNDP announced plans to conduct capacity-building in 2009 to support the De-mining Society and the Libyan government in mine action activities.22 It sought to hire a chief technical advisor to support the nascent mine action program; the deadline for applications was 15 July 2009.23

The May 2008 Letter of Intent between the De-mining Society and UNDP stipulated that support be provided to initiatives rehabilitating mine survivors, and included provisions on mine/ERW risk education (RE). The letter noted that UNDP’s resident representative and the De-mining Society’s director would be in charge of coordinating the projects but that implementation was subject to adequate funding.24 For victim assistance, no progress has been reported since the signature of the letter. For RE, a strategic plan was reportedly developed, including establishment of “communication groups,” information dissemination, and development of a database to track activities.25 A general assembly was held in March 2009 to discuss budget and project implementation for 2009–2010.26

The Social Solidarity Fund is responsible for providing rehabilitation services and assistance to persons with disabilities.27

Data collection and management
There is no public data collection mechanism to record mine/ERW incidents, and casualties are rarely reported in the media. No progress appears to have been made on implementing the Letter of Intent between the De-mining Society and UNDP, which stated that technical assistance

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19 Email from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, Administration and Public Relations Director, De-mining Society, 29 June 2009.
would be provided to “strengthen statistical data collection, and [to set up] information management systems in the domain of mines.”

The establishment of a “Libyan information national center to compile information and statistics on mines and their victims” was also one of the recommendations of the International Conference on De-mining for Development held in November 2008.

In February 2007, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) signed a Cooperation Memorandum with Libya in which GICHD offered to provide technical assistance and training for Libyan mine action personnel. The memorandum also envisaged discussion as to the possible installation of the Information Management System for Mine Action in Libya. No specific progress has occurred since.

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

There is no strategic mine action plan in place, although there are said to be plans to adopt national mine action standards, conduct survey and capacity-building in demining, as well as to establish victim assistance and RE programs.

National mine action standards

Draft national standards were prepared with UNDP assistance and were due to be presented to the General People’s Committee for approval before the end of 2009.

National ownership

Libya has announced a number of abortive efforts in mine action over the past few years, but as of July 2009, a mine action program appeared to be in the early stages of development.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

The Ministry of Defense and the Civil Protection Unit, located within the Ministry of Interior and Justice, each have responsibilities for various aspects of mine action. The Ministry of Defense is reported to clear areas serving either a military or civilian development purpose. The Civil Protection Unit has carried out clearance in affected communities.

The Oujanga Kbeer demining project, which was conducted by Chad’s National Demining Office (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND) and the De-Mining Society, started on 1 August 2008 and ended 31 January 2009. By the end of 2009, the second stage of the De-mining Society’s demining project in Chad was due to start in the Doum valley. Demining along the Libyan border with Egypt was also said to be a priority for the De-mining Society as of June 2009.

The results of these demining efforts have not been reported in detail, although the De-mining Society claimed that clearance along the border with Egypt had led to the removal of 77,645 antipersonnel mines and 45,483 antivehicle mines.

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31 Telephone interview with Jean-Paul Rychener, Deputy Head, Information Management Section, GICHD, 29 June 2009.

32 Email from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, De-mining Society, 29 June 2009.

33 Ibid.


35 Email from Reuben McCarthy, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Specialist, Sub-Regional Office for Eastern and Southern Africa, UNDP, 6 August 2009.

36 Email from Abdulmonem Alaiwan, De-mining Society, 29 June 2009.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.
Risk Education

As in 2007, no mine/ERW RE activities were reported in 2008. In 2006, the De-mining Society and the ministries of interior and defense reported RE activities.\textsuperscript{39} In 1999, Libya also stated that it provided mine awareness and training programs to warn people about the dangers of mines.\textsuperscript{40} A general awareness campaign was launched in June 2008, but it did not include specific RE messages.\textsuperscript{41}

Victim Assistance

As in previous years, Libya called upon those who had used mines in Libya to “provide… assistance to the victims, and to rehabilitate them” in its statement to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties.\textsuperscript{42} The final declaration of a November 2008 conference in Libya called for the same.\textsuperscript{43} Italy included support to victim assistance compensation claims of survivors or families of those killed due to landmines in a friendship agreement signed with Libya in 2008 and ratified in 2009.\textsuperscript{44} The agreement further noted that Italy will carry out some special initiatives to benefit the people of Libya, including “treatment in Italian institutions of mine/ERW survivors who cannot receive adequate treatment in the Benghazi rehabilitation center.”\textsuperscript{45}

Very few specialized services for persons with disabilities are available. The Libyan government provides free healthcare to all citizens and has achieved high basic health coverage.\textsuperscript{46} Two of the Gambians injured in 2009 were treated in the Libyan town of Sabha. A third person was first treated in Niger and then transferred to Dakar, Senegal. The deceased were said to be buried at the site of the incident.\textsuperscript{47}

The Benghazi Rehabilitation Center, run by the Social Solidarity Fund, is one of the main physical rehabilitation centers in Libya. Italy’s support to the center since 2000 has covered renovations, training, and strategic planning assistance. The center has been unable to operate at full capacity due to a lack of qualified staff, materials, and a data management system.\textsuperscript{48} On 31 December 2008, the Italian Directorate for Development Cooperation ended its support to the center due to a lack of funding.\textsuperscript{49} In total, the Italian government provided US$6,495,000.\textsuperscript{50}

People with a permanent disability receive a pension,\textsuperscript{51} and Libyan law protects the rights of persons with disabilities and their right to access services was generally protected.\textsuperscript{52} Libya signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol, on 1 May 2008. As of 1 July 2009, the convention had not been ratified.

\textsuperscript{40} See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2004}, p. 1,066.
\textsuperscript{44} “Text of the Convention on Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation between Libya and Italy,” \textit{Akhbar Libya} (government newspaper), www.akhbar-libyaonline.com.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2008}, p. 930.
\textsuperscript{47} “Gambia: 7 Gambians Die in Sahara Desert… as Vehicle Hits Landmine,” \textit{The Daily Observer} (Banjul), 19 February 2009; and “Seven Gambian Youths Die along Niger-Libya Border,” \textit{The Point} (Banjul), 19 February 2009.
\textsuperscript{49} Email from Dr. Carmine Nutolo, Cooperation Office, Embassy of Italy, 25 May 2009.
In November 2008, UNDP stated that it would help to raise public awareness of disability issues and would lobby the government to include the needs of persons with disabilities when preparing development plans, particularly relating to health and education. In 2008, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in Libya included health, material, financial, and vocational assistance to persons with disabilities in its refugee camps in Libya.

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States Not Party
Micronesia

**MICRONESIA**

**Ten-Year Summary**

The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, but has shown support since 2005. From 2005–2008, the FSM voted in favor of the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly Resolution: it had previously abstained. The FSM attended annual meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2005 and 2008. A draft resolution approving accession has been awaiting congressional approval since mid-2008.

**Mine Ban Policy**

The FSM has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In December 2008, the FSM informed a regional legal meeting that the government was “very close to fulfilling its internal legal requirements in order to accede to the Mine Ban Convention.”

A draft resolution approving accession has been awaiting congressional approval since mid-2008. In November 2008, an FSM official attending the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva stated that the FSM Congress would shortly pass a resolution that would help fulfill its internal legal requirements to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Earlier, in November 2005, an FSM representative told the ICBL that legal measures to approve accession were being drafted, and that the United States, which has a Compact of Free Association with the FSM, had given the green light to accession.

On 2 December 2008, the FSM voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has voted in support of the annual resolution since 2005, while previously it abstained every year from 1997–2004. The FSM did not attend the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. In August 2008, the FSM attended a Mine Ban Treaty workshop held in Palau.

The FSM has stated that it has never used, produced, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

The FSM has not yet signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions and is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

In August 2008, the FSM noted that while there are no known mined areas in the FSM, the four FSM states are affected by explosive remnants left over from World War II.

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3. Statement by Johnson Asher, Assistant Attorney General for the FSM, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008. Prior to this, the only Mine Ban Treaty meeting it ever attended was the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Zagreb in November 2005.
4. Email from Amb. Satnam Jit Singh, Diplomatic Advisor, ICBL, reporting on his meeting with Martin Zvachula, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the FSM to the UN in New York, at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Zagreb, 28 November–2 December 2005. In July 2005, a government official informed Landmine Monitor that the Executive Branch had completed a review of the treaty and expected to submit it to Congress in September 2005. Prior to that statement, the FSM had not expressed any support for the treaty.
MONGOLIA

Ten-Year Summary

Mongolia has regularly participated in Mine Ban Treaty meetings since 2002. In September 2004, the government announced a Program of Action aimed at accession to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2008. In a key step in December 2006, parliament passed an amendment to the State Secrecy Law which permitted Mongolia to make information publicly available on antipersonnel mines, including stockpiles. In 2007, Mongolia issued a voluntary Article 7 transparency report that revealed Mongolia possesses a stockpile of 206,417 antipersonnel mines.

Mongolia is affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and possibly antivehicle mines, but is not believed to be affected by antipersonnel mines. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified nine ERW casualties (two killed and seven injured). During this period, there have not been specific services for mine/ERW survivors. There has been a lack of availability of services more generally for persons with disabilities. Awareness-raising by disability organizations resulted in Mongolia’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in May 2009.

Mine Ban Policy

Mongolia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty and did not fulfill its objective, announced in 2004, of joining the treaty in 2008 through a step-by-step approach. Mongolia attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008, where it stated that it “firmly denounces the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines and fully supports the efforts being undertaken by the international community to ban this dangerous weapon.” However, it said that accession “is still a challenge,” citing “in particular, a lack of financial, technical and human resources necessary for stockpile destruction.” It said that “cooperation and assistance in this area… would be invaluable for us, perhaps, prior to Mongolia’s actual accession.” In an interview with Landmine Monitor, Mongolia voiced concern about whether it would receive international assistance for both stockpile destruction and clearance of areas contaminated with unexploded ordnance, especially Soviet-era firing ranges.

A document obtained by Landmine Monitor dated November 2008 stated that the Ministry of Defense still has a number of concerns regarding accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. These included the possible need for alternatives to landmines, in order to ensure the security of the country given its vast and sparsely populated territories; the need for sufficient aid and technical assistance to ensure that all treaty requirements can be met; and the integration of Mongolia’s existing efforts to clear ERW with new treaty obligations. Additionally, a representative of the Mongolian Armed Forces told Landmine Monitor that Mongolia needs to consider that the country’s two powerful neighbors have not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

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2 Statement by Gunaajav Batjargal, Deputy Director, Department of Multilateral Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Ninth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 26 November 2008.
4 Correspondence between the Department of Strategic Management and Planning of the Ministry of Defense and the Department of Multilateral Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, dated November 2008.
5 Interview with Col. L. Gantumur, Management and Support Division, General Staff of the Mongolian Armed Forces, Ulaanbaatar, 29 March 2009.
Mongolia voted in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 on 2 December 2008, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has voted in favor of every annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1998, except in 2005 when it was absent.

In March 2009, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor that there was no collaborative plan of action among ministries regarding how to proceed now with the step-by-step agenda for joining the Mine Ban Treaty. He indicated that such a plan should be initiated by the Ministry of Defense. A Ministry of Defense official confirmed that no collaborative plan of action had yet been developed.

Representatives of the government of Canada and the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit undertook a mission to Mongolia in April 2009 in order to encourage accession.

Mongolia attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009, where it expressed its support for the treaty, but said that “due to particular considerations related to our national security and some specific circumstances of the country, Mongolia has not joined…. As a future consideration, we are drafting an interagency action plan to implement its step-by-step accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, which will coordinate agencies activity, and to create legal, financial and technological foundation for it.”

It further said, “Mongolia is considering its economic, technological and financial realities to implement this strategy…considering that our country has very limited [resources]…. Therefore, for us the cooperation, assistance and support through both bilateral channels and international organizations are fully appreciated.”

The ICBL’s Diplomatic Advisor conducted an advocacy mission to Mongolia from 30 June to 2 July 2009, where he met with the ministers of foreign affairs and defense, and other high level officials. Both ministers acknowledged with a sense of regret that Mongolia had not met the objective of acceding to the treaty in 2008, and both pledged support for accelerating the process. Discussions with the armed forces, however, confirmed that some reservations on the issue remained. At the same time, the military was preparing a stockpile destruction plan, in case the political leadership of the country decided to go ahead with accession.

Mongolia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. Mongolia has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Use, stockpiling, production, and transfer
Mongolia issued a voluntary Article 7 report in August 2007. The report revealed a stockpile of 206,417 antipersonnel mines, inherited from the Soviet Union. In May 2009, Mongolia said that it had invited experts from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining to investigate the technical quality of its mine stocks and advise on destruction methods, sites, and costs.\textsuperscript{14} Mongolia reiterated to Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in November 2008 and May 2009 that it “has never deployed and will never deploy landmines on its territory,” and that it will not produce, transfer, or acquire them.\textsuperscript{15}

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Mongolia is not believed to be affected by antipersonnel mines. In its only voluntary Article 7 report to date, Form C on the location of mined areas was marked as “Not Applicable.”\textsuperscript{16} Mongolia has an extensive problem with ERW, including both UXO and abandoned explosive ordnance.\textsuperscript{17} In 2008, abandoned antivehicle mines were reportedly discovered on several occasions.\textsuperscript{18}

**Casualties**

Landmine Monitor identified two ERW casualties (both boys, both injured) in Mongolia in 2008, through media reports.\textsuperscript{19} Additional incidents related to firearms and other explosives were identified through media reports, but insufficient information was provided to determine if the incidents were caused by ERW. The Ministry of Defense reported that there could be as many as 34 casualties in 2008, although there is no mechanism in place to collect mine/ERW casualty data.\textsuperscript{20}

The two casualties identified in 2008 are a slight decrease from three reported casualties (one killed and two injured) in 2007.\textsuperscript{21} The government reported that there were “about 10–15 casualties,” all injured, between 2006 and 2008.\textsuperscript{22} No casualties were confirmed in 2009 as of 31 May.

Between 1999 and 2008, through media reports, Landmine Monitor identified nine casualties (two killed and seven injured), all as a result of ERW.\textsuperscript{23} It is likely that other casualties were not reported. Government estimates for specific years within this period suggest a higher total (see above).

**Program Management and Coordination**

There is no mine action program in Mongolia, and there are no specific services for mine/ERW victims. The Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor coordinates the National Program to Support Persons with Disabilities. Mongolia also has a National Coordination Council on Disability, an interministerial body that includes representatives of the Mongolian Federation of Disabled People’s Organizations.\textsuperscript{24}

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\textsuperscript{16} Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period 2007–2008), Form E.


\textsuperscript{22} Kh. Galbaatar, “Interview with S. Sodov, specialist of Operational Department, General Staff Mongolian Armed Forces: More than 1000 explosive ordnances found in 11 aimags,” Deedsii Khureelen, 16 March 2009.


\textsuperscript{24} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 934.
Mongolia’s national disability action plan is based on the actions set out by the Biwako Millennium Framework, established as part of the Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons 2003–2012. The government tracks activities implemented in the field of disability within this framework.25

Data collection and management
No government agency collects data on mine/ERW casualties although the Mongolian Armed Forces stated that they were aware of casualties in recent years.26 Landmine Monitor casualty data is gathered from local media reports.

Victim Assistance
The total number of survivors is unknown, but there has been at least six since 1999. There have been no specific services for mine/ERW survivors over the last 10 years, nor does the situation warrant specific attention. In its most recent voluntary Article 7 report, Mongolia indicated “Not Applicable” in Form J.27 Services for persons with disabilities are under-developed. The healthcare system lacks trained staff, equipment, and medicines, and suffers from uneven availability of services in rural areas, where some hospitals do not have doctors.28 Despite laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, only one in four persons with disabilities was employed.29 While pensions for persons with disabilities were increased in 2007, the government recognized in 2008 that increases had not kept pace with inflation and that pensions were insufficient to live on.30

On 13 May 2009, Mongolia ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol. Adherence followed an awareness campaign led by the National Human Rights Commission with the support of 27 local disability organizations.31

26 Interview with S. Sodov, Senior Officer, Management and Support Unit, Mongolian Armed Forces, Ulaanbaatar, 19 March 2009.
27 Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period 2007–2008), Form J.
Morocco

Ten-Year Summary

The Kingdom of Morocco has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty but has taken an active interest in it, participating as an observer in every annual Meeting of States Parties, as well as nearly every intersessional Standing Committee meeting. In February 2001, Moroccan officials for the first time claimed that Morocco no longer uses or stockpiles antipersonnel mines. After abstaining on the annual pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly resolution from 1997–2003, Morocco has since voted in support. Morocco has submitted three voluntary Article 7 reports since 2006.

Since January 2007, Morocco has been engaged in a major demining operation in areas under its control in the disputed Western Sahara in the south of the country. Almost 10,000 personnel are said to be engaged in the effort, although questions remain about the clearance figures reported as well as the efficiency of the procedures being used.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 18 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties in Morocco (seven people killed and 11 injured). No mine/ERW risk education was reported outside the Moroccan-controlled areas of Western Sahara in 2007–2008. Casualty data collection remained inadequate throughout the period.

Mine/ERW survivors in Morocco had access to the same services as other persons with disabilities. Some disability services had reportedly improved since 2007, although services were inaccessible to many mine/ERW survivors, who are mostly nomadic people. The health system lacked staff and resources. Psychological support services were inadequate. Morocco ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in early 2009. In 2008, national legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities was not adequately enforced.

Mine Ban Policy

Morocco has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. An ICBL delegation visited Morocco from 26–29 October 2008.1 Officials told the delegation that the dispute over Western Sahara was the only obstacle preventing Morocco from acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty.2 Morocco also stated this in response to a Landmine Monitor questionnaire in May 2009.3

Morocco attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, where it stated that it has been voluntarily implementing the Mine Ban Treaty’s provisions on demining, stockpile destruction, mine risk education, and victim assistance. Morocco made a similar statement to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009.

In April 2009, Morocco submitted its third voluntary Article 7 report, covering calendar year 2008.4 As with the previous submissions, the report omits Form B (stockpiled antipersonnel mines). In May 2009, Morocco told Landmine Monitor that it does not include Form B because it has no stocks.5 Under national measures, the report cites existing laws governing the production,

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1 The delegation was comprised of Tamar Gabelnick, Treaty Implementation Director, ICBL, and Ayman Sorour, director of ICBL member NGO Protection. They met with government officials and military representatives in Rabat and Agadir in the south, and also undertook field visits to Guelmim and Dakhla to review mine clearance, victim assistance, and risk education activities. ICBL, “Mission Report: Morocco, 26–29 October 2008.”
4 The previous reports were submitted in April 2008 for calendar year 2007 and August 2006 for the period from September 2005 to September 2006.
use, stockpiling, and transfer of explosives, munitions, and weapons from 1914 (as modified in 1934 and 1954) and 1958, as well as a 2003 anti-terrorism law.\textsuperscript{6}

On 2 December 2008, Morocco voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This was Morocco’s fifth consecutive vote in favor of the annual pro-ban resolution. From 1997–2003, Morocco abstained from voting on the resolution.

Morocco is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It submitted its annual report required by Article 13 of the protocol. Morocco is not a party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War.

Morocco has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.\textsuperscript{7}

\textbf{Use, stockpiling, production, and transfer}

Morocco has acknowledged extensive use of mines in the past, most notably at the berms (earthen walls about three meters high) it built from 1982 to 1987 to secure the northwestern corner of Western Sahara. In the past decade, Morocco and the Polisario Front (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro) have periodically traded accusations of new mine use, but both have denied it.\textsuperscript{8} In October 2008, Moroccan officials told the ICBL delegation that Polisario rebels were still laying mines.\textsuperscript{9} In May 2009, however, Morocco told Landmine Monitor that it did not have any information about Polisario mine use in 2007 or 2008.\textsuperscript{10}

Also in May 2009, in response to the question from Landmine Monitor, “Does Morocco reserve the right to use antipersonnel mines in the future?” Morocco replied, “Non.”\textsuperscript{11} Morocco stated that it stopped the use and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines in 1987 and reaffirmed that it has never produced antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{12} In July 2006, Morocco told Landmine Monitor that it stopped using antipersonnel mines at the time of the Western Sahara cease-fire in 1991 and that it no longer stockpiled antipersonnel mines, except for training purposes.\textsuperscript{13}

In May 2009, Morocco confirmed that it still possesses antipersonnel mines that are used for training its army to take part in peacekeeping operations.\textsuperscript{14} Its voluntary Article 7 report submitted in April 2009 does not provide the number of retained mines, which it describes as “inert.”\textsuperscript{15}

Morocco has said on several occasions that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, and that it stopped importing them prior to entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty in March 1999.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{6} Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2008.


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. It also said this in statement of Morocco, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 25 May 2009. It stated this date in its May 2009 response to the Landmine Monitor questionnaire as well.

\textsuperscript{13} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Morocco, July 2006. In its statement to the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 2004, Morocco included a claim that it had not used antipersonnel mines since entry into force of the treaty in 1999. Morocco first claimed in February 2001 that it does not use, produce, import, or stockpile antipersonnel mines, and has repeated that on several occasions. See, for example, \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2004}, p. 1.071.


\textsuperscript{15} Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2009.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Morocco is significantly contaminated with mines and ERW, especially in the territory it controls in Western Sahara, where it has mined the berms it constructed. It claims to monitor the mined areas and to have records of where the mines were laid.17

The exact extent of contamination is not known but according to the British NGO Landmine Action, Western Sahara is one of the most heavily mined territories in the world.18 Morocco has claimed that 120,000km² are contaminated.19 In its latest voluntary Article 7 transparency report, Morocco identified the following areas as being mined by Polisario: Douiek, Gor Lbard, Itgui, Lagounia, Jdiriya, Gerret Auchfaght, Glibat Jadiane, Imilili, Bir Anzarane, Tarf Mhkinza, and Gor Zalagat.20 Following the death of a senior Moroccan dignitary due to a landmine, Morocco embarked on a major demining effort in January 2007. Morocco has declared it will clear all the mines it has laid as soon as the conflict is resolved.21

Casualties
Landmine Monitor identified five mine/ERW casualties in Morocco in 2008. Two people were killed and three injured in three incidents. Two casualties were caused by an antivehicle mine (both men), and one adult (gender unknown) and two boys were injured by unknown devices (reportedly mines).22 There were also 19 casualties in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.23

This represented an increase from the one mine casualty identified in 2007 in southern Morocco, in addition to 29 casualties in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.24

Morocco reported 11 mine/ERW casualties (three killed and eight injured) in 2008 in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. Details, including the location of incidents, were not reported.25 Landmine Monitor identified 19 casualties (eight killed, 10 injured, and one unknown) in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.26

Landmine Monitor did not identify mine/ERW casualties in Morocco in 2009, as of 29 June 2009.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 18 mine/ERW casualties in Morocco (seven killed and 11 injured).27 Due to a lack of accurate data collection in Morocco, this total is likely to under-represent the problem.

21 Ibid, 28 August 2006.
The cumulative number of mine/ERW casualties in Morocco is not known. In late 2008, the UN reported that since 1975 the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) has recorded 2,171 casualties, including 541 people killed. In July 2008, Morocco reported that a total of 2,187 casualties (544 killed and 1,643 injured) had been recorded since 1975. Presumably these figures include both casualties of incidents which occurred in Western Sahara and some survivors living in Western Sahara, although this distinction was not reported. Morocco has reported that between March 2000 and March 2001 authorities registered 51 military antivehicle mine and ERW casualties in Western Sahara. The total number of military casualties in Morocco is not known.

In addition, at least four Moroccans were injured while they tried to cross a minefield on the Greek-Turkish border in 2004. The number of Moroccan casualties from mine incidents in Greece may be significantly higher, as the nationality of many mine casualties on the Greek-Turkish border remains unknown.

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
Morocco does not have a national mine action authority or mine action center. All demining is carried out by the RMA.

Victim assistance
The Department for Prevention and Social Integration of People with Disabilities in the Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity is the focal point for disability issues. The department is responsible for coordination of government programs for persons with disabilities and support to civil society activities for the integration of persons with disabilities, including program evaluations.

Data collection and management
Until 2009, the RMA used its own information management system to record demining data. In March 2009, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining installed the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).

Information on mine/ERW casualties is recorded by the RMA, the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) and civilian authorities, as well as by local organizations that were encouraged to report casualties to the RMA. In 2008, for the first time, Morocco reported annual casualty data in its voluntary Article 7 report, but the data lacked detail.

In 2009, MINURSO continued to record information on mine/ERW incidents, including in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, but was not yet entering the data into IMSMA as of June. It was not reported if the RMA was using IMSMA to record casualty data. A number of groups record mine/ERW casualties in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, including the Collective of Saharawi Human Rights Defenders El-Aaiun Western Sahara (Collectif des défenseurs saharauis des droits de l’homme El-Aaiun Sahara Occidental, CODESA), the provincial offices of the Moroccan Red Crescent Society (MRCS), and local authorities.

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29 See the report on Greece in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
33 Telephone interview with Tammy Hall, MINURSO MACC, 29 June 2009.
Plans

Strategic mine action plans
There does not appear to be a strategic plan for the demining operation, although efforts to make one continued as of May 2009.34 In 2009, a 10-year national action plan for the integration of persons with disabilities was reportedly still being finalized.35 No planning specifically for risk education was reported.

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
There is no evidence of a link between the demining effort and broader development work, although in May 2009 Morocco declared that the released areas were “opened for the diverse activities of the population.”36

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Despite not being a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Morocco has embarked on a major clearance effort. All demining operations have been funded from national sources, although the cost of the demining operations is not known. Morocco’s demining operations are fully under national management.

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures
No national mine action legislation or standards have been adopted in Morocco, but Morocco has claimed that “normal safety and environmental protection standards have been followed.”37

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

As noted above, all demining is carried out by the RMA manually, with 10,000 personnel said to be engaged in the effort, although there are only 400 detectors between them.38 This raises serious questions both about the procedures being used and the accuracy of the clearance figures being reported.39 Morocco has also stated that the clearance effort is conducted in collaboration with MINURSO observers and in accordance with Military Agreement No 3,40 which covers the exchange of mine-related information, the marking of mined areas, and the clearance and destruction of mines and ERW.41

Morocco has reported that clearance in 2008 covered 422km² and resulted in the destruction of 278 antipersonnel mines, 160 antivehicle mines, and 2,734 items of UXO.42 MINURSO observed the destruction by the army of 70 antipersonnel mines, 62 antivehicle mines, and 1,644 pieces of “large-caliber” UXO.43 Operations were conducted in the north of the region at Akka, Tuizgui, Mahbes, and Farcia; in the center at Ilaouza, Smara, Amgala, and Guelta;

37 See Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form F, 13 May 2009; and Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form F, April 2008.
39 Landmine Monitor considers clearance to be the systematic use of manual deminers, demining machines, and/or mine detection dogs to detect and clear all explosive threats over a defined area and to a specified depth.
40 Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form F, 13 May 2009; and see MINURSO, “Military Agreement No. 3,” www.minurso.unlb.org, for a translation of this agreement.
41 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 937; and see also MINURSO, “Military Agreement No. 3,” www.minurso.unlb.org for a translation of this agreement.
42 Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form F, 13 May 2009.
and in the south at Oum Dreiga, Beggari, Aousserd, Tichla, and Bir Guendouz.\textsuperscript{44} As with the previous year’s reported clearance figure of 256km\textsuperscript{2}, it is likely that a major percentage of the area reported as cleared was actually released by other means, such as cancellation or reduction by technical or non-technical survey.\textsuperscript{45}

**Risk Education**

No risk education activities were reported to have occurred in Morocco outside Western Sahara from 1999 to 2008.

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is not known, although 1,643 people injured by mines/ERW have been recorded by Morocco since 1975. The number of mine/ERW survivors still alive and living in Morocco, as distinct from Western Sahara, was not reported.

Morocco reported that assistance to mine/ERW survivors was made available at facilities in La’Youn (in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara) and the Military Hospital in Guelmim in 2008.\textsuperscript{46} Casually data indicates that survivors also receive emergency medical care at Assa hospital in Morocco and in Dakhla and Al Farcia Hospitals in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{47} In 2008, Guelmim Military Hospital’s director claimed they could manage trauma cases, although the surgeons had no specific trauma care training. The military reportedly covers payment for the care of landmine survivors; otherwise, a system of payment either from the patient directly or through health insurance exists at the hospital.\textsuperscript{48}

Mine/ERW survivors reportedly receive the same healthcare treatment as other persons with disabilities. Medical care should be free for disability cardholders. Such cards are often difficult to obtain by mine/ERW survivors, who are usually nomads without the required paperwork. Similarly, although Morocco provides free or heavily subsidized prostheses to poor persons with disabilities, the complicated application process deters many mine/ERW survivors. It involves sending a “handwritten application” to the Minister of Social Development, Family and Solidarity and producing three or four separate certificates as well as personal identification.\textsuperscript{49}

Shortages of staff and resources affect most Moroccan hospitals. There was a severe lack of qualified personnel able to provide psychological assistance in the health system, and only 14 psychologists for hospital patients throughout the country.\textsuperscript{50}

In 2009, a mine survivors’ association called specifically for increased healthcare services and monetary compensation.\textsuperscript{51} In principle mine/ERW survivors are entitled to financial aid or compensation, but these were not usually provided.

\textsuperscript{44} Permanent Mission of Morocco to the UN in Geneva, “Response to Questions from the Canadian NGO Mines Action Canada,” 18 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{47} *Landmine Monitor* analysis of casualty data provided by email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO MACC, 29 June 2009.

\textsuperscript{48} Interview with director of Gelmim Military Hospital, Gelmim, 27 October 2008 in ICBL, “Mission Report: Morocco, 26–29 October 2008.”


Morocco has legislation regarding persons with disabilities.\(^{52}\) Reportedly, the government did not effectively implement laws ensuring access to buildings for persons with disabilities. Despite efforts by the Ministry for Social Development, Family, and Solidarity to integrate persons with disabilities into society, in practice integration was largely left to private charities and families supporting persons with disabilities.\(^{53}\)

On 8 April 2009, Morocco ratified both the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol. In May 2009, the national Advisory Council on Human Rights and Handicap International held a seminar on the implementation of the convention and its protocol. The seminar assessed national initiatives for persons with disabilities in relation to the requirements of the convention and made recommendations for improved implementation.\(^{54}\)

**Victim assistance activities**

Morocco reported providing assistance to eight survivors in 2008, at facilities in La’Youn and the Military Hospital in Guelmim. As in 2007, assistance reportedly included the provision of medical services, financial support, and socio-economic reintegration, as well as other contributions.\(^{55}\) The Guelmim hospital, which was fully functional since January 2007, had assisted two or three mine survivors by October 2008.\(^{56}\)

In 2008, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled continued to support a project at the Ministry of Health Prosthetic and Orthotic School in Marrakech with training, materials, and monitoring. A new intake of students for the three-year prosthetics course started in September 2008. Reportedly, the production of prostheses significantly increased with the additional trainees.\(^{57}\)

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States Not Party

MYANMAR/BURMA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
<th>Not a State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use</td>
<td>Government and NSAG use continued in 2008 and 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>721 (2007: 438)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 2,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>$1 million (2007: $185,000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Union of Myanmar has remained outside efforts to ban antipersonnel mines. Government forces and armed ethnic groups have used antipersonnel mines regularly and extensively throughout the last decade. Between 2003 and 2007, six insurgent groups agreed to ban antipersonnel mines. Myanmar remains one of the few countries still producing antipersonnel mines.

Continuing hostilities between the Myanmar government and ethnic minority armed opposition groups have increased mine contamination, but political conditions have not permitted any humanitarian mine clearance program. The precise extent of mine or explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination, although significant, remains unknown.

Landmine Monitor identified 2,325 casualties (175 killed, 2002 injured, and 148 unknown) from 1999 to 2008. Despite this high level of casualties, mine/ERW risk education was either non-existent or inadequate in areas with reported casualties. Assistance to mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities in Myanmar is marginal due to many years of neglect of healthcare services by the ruling authority. Myanmar governing authorities have not developed a victim assistance program or strategy.

Mine Ban Policy

Myanmar has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Myanmar was one of 18 countries that abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 on 2 December 2008, which called for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has abstained on similar annual resolutions since 1997.

Myanmar has rarely participated in Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings, but did attend the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South East Asia, from 1–3 April 2009. This was the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the treaty’s Second Review Conference. At the workshop Myanmar stated, “Myanmar believes that the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines created the deaths and injuries to the innocent civilians in the affected areas. Transfers and exports of antipersonnel mines contribute to their proliferation and increase chances of an indiscriminate use consequently. Therefore, Myanmar maintains that a step-by-step approach would be most appropriate way to deal with the issue. We also believe that the transfer and exports of anti-personnel mines should be addressed together with the total ban on

1 The military junta ruling the country changed the name from Burma to Myanmar. Many ethnic groups within the country and a number of states still prefer to use the name Burma. Internal state and division names are given in their common form, or with the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) designation in parentheses, for example, Karenni (Kayah) state.
use of anti-personnel mines…. To establish mine control scheme in the remote and delicate areas, peace is the most essential element for us.”

Myanmar did not attend as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009. Myanmar is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In March 2009, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (UN Special Rapporteur) drew attention to the use of antipersonnel mines as a serious threat to the lives of villagers. The UN Special Rapporteur called for a moratorium on the use of landmines and accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, and encouraged authorities to seek international support for mine clearance and victim assistance.

The Halt Mine Use in Burma campaign, which was launched by the ICBL in 2003, distributed 1,200 copies of the Burmese-language translation of the Myanmar chapter of Landmine Monitor Report 2008. In 2009, Landmine Monitor collaborated with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs to produce a general map of townships with known mine pollution.

**Use**

The Myanmar Army (Tatmadaw) and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used antipersonnel mines consistently throughout the long-running civil war and continued to use mines in 2008 and 2009.

The UN Special Rapporteur has reported on the use of landmines, citing among other evidence, a meeting with a 13-year-old boy who had been blinded by an antipersonnel mine, and who explained how mines had been laid near his village.

The Free Burma Rangers (FBR), an organization that supports 49 teams providing medical and other assistance to internally displaced persons (IDPs) in some conflict areas, has reported numerous specific incidents of use of antipersonnel mines by the Myanmar Army. For example, it reported that on 7 January 2009 army units laid six landmines between Bu Koh and Gay Loe villages in southern Karenni (Kayah) state.

The FBR reported that in 2008, the Myanmar Army’s Military Operations Command was responsible for the following: on 5 September 2008, troops on patrol laid landmines in the Hsaw Wah Der area; on 3 May 2008, the Myamar Army’s Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) laid landmines in Sho Ko village; and on 13 April 2008, troops from LIB placed numerous landmines in Ler Ker Der Kho, K’Yeh Yu, Sho Koh, Pra Mu Der, Haw Law Gaw Lu Der, and

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2 Statement by Kyaw Swe Tint, Director-General, International Organizations and Economic Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangkok Workshop on Progress and Challenges in Achieving a Mine-Free Southeast Asia, 3 April 2009.

3 UN General Assembly, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar,” A/HRC/10/19, 11 March 2009, para. 63, www.ohchr.org. The Special Rapporteur noted that the government has justified its refusal to join the Mine Ban Treaty on the basis that rebels still use antipersonnel landmines, but asserted that “violations of international humanitarian law by one party to a conflict is no justification for non-compliance by other parties” (para. 97(c)).

4 See map on ICBL website, www.icbl.org.


6 Interview with FBR, in Bangkok, 26 February 2009.

7 FBR, “Pictures of Oppression: Attacks, Displacement and Oppression in Karen and Karenni States,” 19 January 2009, www.freeburmarangers.org. Burma has states and divisions, which are virtually identical sub-state level administrative districts. States are the “home area” of ethnic groups, and are always named after one; other areas which are not seen as the home area of a specific ethnic group are called divisions.


Naw Kwe Koh villages and in the trails and farms surrounding them.\textsuperscript{10} According to the FBR, all these operations resulted in civilian injuries or deaths from the mines.

According to the Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), in July 2008, members of LIB 256 warned villagers in the Mae Wah tract of Hpaung township not to travel outside their villages to farm their fields because the battalion had planted landmines on the road leading to the fields. Some days later, a villager’s cow was injured by one of these mines.\textsuperscript{11}

According to an official document obtained by Landmine Monitor, Northern Commander Major General Soe Win instructed troops in November 2008 to counter insurgent attacks by using landmines.\textsuperscript{12}

During late 2008, tensions increased between Myanmar and Bangladesh, resulting in the movement of troops to the border. While there were some allegations of new mine laying by the army, Landmine Monitor investigations could not confirm any new use of mines during the mobilization.

\textbf{State production, transfer, and stockpiling}

Myanmar Defense Products Industries (Ka Pa Sa), a state enterprise at Ngyaung Chay Dauk in western Pegu (Bago) division, produces fragmentation, blast, and non-detectable antipersonnel landmines.\textsuperscript{13} Authorities in Myanmar have not provided any information on the types and quantities of stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Monitor has reported that, in addition to domestic production, Myanmar has obtained and used antipersonnel mines of Chinese, Indian, Italian, Soviet, United States, and unidentified manufacture.\textsuperscript{14} Two mine types not previously known to have been used in the country were identified in this reporting period: the US-made M26 bounding antipersonnel mine and the Italian-made VAR40 non-detectable antipersonnel mine.\textsuperscript{15} It is not known when or how the mines were obtained.

Myanmar is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines, but has no formal moratorium or export ban in place.

\textbf{Non-state armed group use, production, transfer, and stockpiling}

Many ethnic rebel organizations exist in Myanmar. Landmine Monitor has identified at least 17 NSAGs that have used antipersonnel mines since 1999. Some of these groups have ceased to exist or no longer use mines.

Six current and former armed opposition groups have unilaterally renounced the use of antipersonnel mines by signing the Deed of Commitment administered by the NGO Geneva Call.\textsuperscript{16} These include the Chin National Front/Army (CNF/A), which Landmine Monitor had


\textsuperscript{12} Myanmar Army, “Northern Command Divisional Commanders Briefing for the 2nd 4 months period as instructed by the Chief of Command,” Official minutes, Mykina, November 2008. Obtained unofficially by Landmine Monitor and translated from Burmese.

\textsuperscript{13} Myanmar produces the MM1, which is modeled on the Chinese Type-59 stake-mounted fragmentation mine; the MM2, which is similar to the Chinese Type-58 blast mine; a Claymore-type directional fragmentation mine; and a copy of the US M14 plastic mine.

\textsuperscript{14} See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2004}, p. 938. The mines include: Chinese Types-58, -59, -69, -72A; Soviet POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, PMN, PMD-6; US M14, M16A1, M18; and Indian/British LTM-73, LTM-76.


identified as both a producer and user of antipersonnel mines. In 2008, the CNF/A told Geneva Call that it had completely destroyed its stockpile of mine components.

On 8 February 2009, Colonel Yawd Serk, leader of the Shan State Army (SSA) South, is reported to have stated, “The SSA don’t use landmines. They only endanger both ourselves and our people. Only the Burma Army uses them.” Landmine Monitor has received many reports that the SSA has used mines both during operations and for perimeter defense of their camps. Requests to the SSA from Landmine Monitor for clarification of the statement were not answered.

General Saw Mutu Say Pho, Commander-in-Chief of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), confirmed to Landmine Monitor in February 2009 that the KNLA has used landmines and would continue to do so. He stated that the KNLA was increasing its use of command-detonated mines.

Use

Armed conflict between different ethnic armed groups and the army appeared to decline during 2008 and early 2009, but the KNLA, the Karenni Army, and the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) continued to use antipersonnel mines. The Landmine Monitor believes at least a dozen other armed groups, some with non-hostility pacts with the ruling authorities, continue to possess mines, have not renounced use, and may make limited use of the weapon.

The Myanmar Army stated that it recovered mines from surrendering soldiers from the SSA during 2007 and blames most mine casualties on use by insurgents. In April 2009, both the SSA and KNLA denied allegations by the government that they were primarily responsible for mine use in the country.

A Karen development organization stated that the KNLA had laid mines along a road in central Karen (Kayin) state in early 2009. Villagers caught in fighting between the KNLA and DKBA protested in October 2008 when KNLA forces operating in Dta Greh township, Pa’an district, wanted to deploy landmines in order to obstruct the DKBA’s operations. The villagers feared retribution from the DKBA if they were injured by KNLA mines in the vicinity of their villages. The KNLA agreed not to plant landmines in the area.

On 11 October 2008, the DKBA laid landmines in a village close to the Thai border after an attack. A Thai soldier was wounded by a landmine from this attack when his unit inspected damage to the area.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Landmine Monitor has previously reported that the KNLA, DKBA, Karenni Army, and the United Wa State Army have produced blast and fragmentation mines. Some also make Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, mines with antihandling fuzes, and explosive booby-traps. Armed groups in Myanmar have also acquired mines by lifting army-laid mines from the ground, seizing army stocks, and from the clandestine arms market. Although some former combatants have non-hostility pacts with the ruling authorities, they have not disarmed.
and some still possess antipersonnel mines. The Palaung State Liberation Army, which has a non-hostility pact with the ruling authorities, turned in 35 mines in 2008 as part of a wider surrender of arms.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Landmines in Myanmar are concentrated on its borders with Bangladesh and Thailand, and in eastern parts of the country as a result of post-independence struggles for autonomy by ethnic minorities. Some 23 townships in Chin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan states, as well as in Pegu and Tenasserim (Tantharyi) divisions suffer from some degree of mine contamination, primarily from antipersonnel mines. Karen state and Pegu division contain the most heavily mine-affected areas. Myanmar is also affected by ERW, including ordnance used in World War II.

Ethnic minority communities in eastern states bordering Thailand and humanitarian organizations reported that government troops continued to use mines in 2008 and 2009 as part of an offensive against minority anti-government armies, adding to the problem in what was already believed to be the most mine-affected part of the country.

No estimate exists of the extent of contamination, but Landmine Monitor has identified mined/hazardous areas in the following townships during 2008 or early 2009: every township in Kayin (Karen) state: Thandaung, Hlaingbwe, Hpapun, Myawady, Kyain Seikgyi, and Kawkareik; Mese, Hpasawang, Loikaw, and Demoso townships in Kayah (Karenni) state; Thanbyuzayat, Thaton, and Ye townships in Mon state; Tantabin, Kyaukkyi, and Shwekyin townships in Bago (Pegu) division; Maungdaw township in Rakhine state; Mongpan, Mawkmai, Hshiseng, and Tachilek townships in Shan state; and Thayetchaung, Thanintharyi, Dawei, Bokepyin, and Yebu townships of Tenasserim division.

Landmine Monitor has also identified additional suspected hazardous areas in Hakha, Htantlang, Kanpetlet, Madupi, and Paletwa townships of Chin state; Bawlakhe and Shadaw townships of Karenni state; Buthidaung township of Rakhine state; and Namhsan, Namtu, and Nanhkan townships in Shan state.

Casualties

In 2008, at least 721 new mine/ERW casualties were reported in Myanmar (89 killed and 632 injured), based on state and independent media reports, information provided by NGOs and other organizations, and some records obtained by Landmine Monitor.

26 About a dozen armed organizations have agreed verbally to cease hostilities with the SPDC. Although frequently referred to as “ceasefire groups,” none have signed a formal ceasefire protocol leading to a negotiated settlement. All maintain their arms, including any stockpile of antipersonnel landmines.

27 Interview with Mai Aik Pone, General Secretary, Palaung State Liberation Front, 20 February 2009.

28 Burma has states and divisions, which are virtually identical sub-state level administrative districts. States are the “home area” of ethnic groups, and are always named after one; other areas which are not seen as the home area of a specific ethnic group are called divisions.


30 See Use section of this report.

31 Survey conducted by Landmine Monitor between February and May 2009. Data sources included casualty information, sightings of mine warnings and use reports by NGOs and other organizations, and interviews with field staff and armed forces personnel. Survey included casualty data from January 2007 to present and other informants from January 2008 to present.

32 Unless noted otherwise, Landmine Monitor analysis of 24 media reports published by the New Light of Myanmar between 1 January and 31 December 2008; interview with staff from the Back Pack Health Worker Team, Mae Sot, 26 March 2008; information from published and unpublished sources, provided by email from KHRG, 4 March 2008; and information provided by the ICRC’s War Wounded Program.
Landmine Monitor obtained more detailed information about the 213 civilian casualties (30 killed and 183 injured) than the military casualties. Most of the civilian casualties were male (172), including six boys; 12 were female, including two girls; and 29 were of unknown gender. Antipersonnel mines caused the vast majority of civilian casualties (191), antivehicle mines caused 11, and unknown or unconfirmed devices caused 11. For the majority of civilian casualties, the activity at the time of incident was unknown (154). Where the activities were known, the most common were collection of water or forest products (21), travel (15), agricultural activity (9), and portering or forced labor (8). At least two civilians were injured by antipersonnel mines during “atrocity” demining—the use of forced labor for mine clearance—in 2008.33

Throughout 2008, media articles appeared in the New Light of Myanmar, the newspaper run by the ruling authority, providing details for 34 mine/ERW casualties. The KHRG reported 18 new mine casualties in 2008 from the areas of the country they monitored.34 The ICRC’s War Wounded Program reported 71 mine survivors. In July 2008, a medic working with Back Pack Health Worker Teams was injured by an antipersonnel mine while traveling in Hsihseng township in southern Shan state. He was taken to Mae Hong Son hospital in Thailand to receive treatment. Another organization supported him financially to receive a prosthetic.35

Landmine Monitor received information on 508 military casualties in 2008 (59 killed and 449 injured). In previous years Landmine Monitor has not received reports of military casualties from the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). During a military briefing for the ruling authority soldiers, the Northern Command Divisional Commander, Major General Soe Win, stated that from January to April 2008, 18 soldiers died and 174 were injured in 171 landmine incidents; and from May to August 2008, nine soldiers died and 97 were injured in 94 landmine incidents. The commander warned soldiers to be more vigilant for insurgent-laid mines during operations.36 One news report placed the number of military personnel who have lost limbs over the past two decades in combat near to 10,000, stating, “Most of the soldiers were injured by landmines.”37

The reported number of mine/ERW casualties in 2008 is an increase compared to the 438 casualties reported in 2007 (47 killed, 338 injured, and 53 unknown), and the 243 casualties reported in 2006 (20 killed and 223 injured). It is not possible to reach firm conclusions from this data about trends in casualty figures due to the lack of systematic data collection, the reluctance of all combatant groups to share information for security reasons, and the restrictions on local and international organizations on movement, surveying, and access to many mine/ERW-affected areas.38

Landmine Monitor identified at least 2,325 casualties (175 killed, 2,002 injured, and 148 unknown) between 1999 and 2008.39

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with 19 casualties (two killed and 17 injured) as of 31 May 2009. The two fatalities were adult men. Of those injured, 13 were adult men, two were boys, and two were adult women. All reported incidents were caused by antipersonnel mines. Eight incidents occurred when collecting water or forest products, six during travel, four during portering or forced labor, and one during agricultural activity. The New Light of

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38 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
Myanmar reported seven of the casualties. The newspaper stated one of the incidents took place in the Mon state, and the remainder in Pegu division. Casualties result from gathering food and jungle produce, collecting wood, traveling, agriculture, portering, and forced labor.

**Program Management and Coordination**

There is no functioning mine action program in Myanmar.

**Victim assistance**

There is no national strategy or guidelines for victim assistance (VA) in Myanmar. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement is responsible for disability issues. Myanmar’s fifth National Health Plan (2007–2011) includes activities that should benefit persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors. No information is known about the plan’s implementation process and monitoring.

**Data collection and management**

No official or systematic data collection of mine/ERW casualties has been established in Myanmar. The ruling authority collects some general health information through hospitals and health centers, but does not differentiate mines and ERW from other causes of traumatic injuries.

Several organizations working in mine/ERW-affected areas collect a limited amount of data on mine/ERW casualties where they operate but there is no common data collection standard or unified database for verification and elimination of duplicate reports. Under-reporting is likely, due to the limited scope of data collection and a lack of access to conflict-affected areas. The systematic collection of casualty data also remained difficult due to the SPDC restrictions introduced in 2006 prohibiting the involvement of international NGOs in surveys not authorized within their original contracts.

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

No humanitarian mine clearance programs are known to exist, although some demining activities have been undertaken on an ad hoc basis in Myanmar. The FBR include a course on mine identification and emergency clearance procedures for their relief teams. The most recent training took place in November 2008. Mines encountered on their missions are generally not removed by FBR personnel, but by anti-junta militia. In cases where mines are removed by FBR personnel, they are turned over to anti-junta militias. The FBR noted that they encountered mines less frequently in 2008 than in 2007 due to a decrease in activity by the Myanmar Army, which withdrew from many outposts in the north of Karen state.

Some sporadic military mine removal and village demining have been reported in previous years. Landmine Monitor received photographs of Myanmar Army soldiers using probes to manually clear a path between two military camps in Hpa’an township in January 2009.

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40 Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports published by the *New Light of Myanmar* between 1 January and 31 May 2009; and survey conducted by Landmine Monitor during field visit, February to March 2009.


45 Ibid.


47 Email from FBR, 2 May 2009.

48 Some NSAGs and the Myanmar Army have previously reported conducting military demining. In some cases NSAGs remove mines laid by government forces and re-use them.

49 Photographs provided by FBR, Bangkok, 25 February 2009.
Photographs by the KHRG show M14-type mines manufactured by Myanmar Defense Products Industries being removed by the KNLA in April and August 2008.\(^{50}\) During 2008, the Karen National Union (KNU) received hand-held metal detectors from the NGO Gemeinsam gegen Landminen Austria (GGL-A), and a volunteer from GGL-A assisted in training KNU personnel in their use.\(^{51}\)

The Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) started a one-year demining project in May 2008, supported by GGL-A. CIDKP trained six demining teams of three deminers each and planned to deploy them for two months tackling demining tasks determined by CIDKP. GGL-A agreed to provide a total of €20,000 (US$29,452) for the project, including the cost of metal detectors, but it suspended payments before completing disbursement pending receipt of progress reports from CIDKP. GGL also provided support for risk education (RE) conducted by CIDKP.\(^{52}\)

The CNF/A reported that it cleared and destroyed mines that it had planted in the border area between Myanmar and India, including 1,600–1,800 mines removed from three sites. The CNF/A provided details of the amount of stockpiled components (TNT, gelatin sticks, detonators, and bamboo casings) that it destroyed.\(^{53}\)

"Atrocity" demining\(^{54}\)

The UN Special Rapporteur described as “particularly worrying” the “reported practice of human minesweepers, whereby civilians are forced by the military to clear brush in suspected mined areas or to serve as porters for the military in areas where there is a mine hazard. According to reports, civilians have been requested to remove mines without training or protective equipment, or to repair fences in mined areas; serious casualties have been reported.”\(^{55}\) In previous years, Landmine Monitor received credible reports of civilians being forced by the military to undertake these activities.\(^{56}\)

A Karen village woman told the KHRG in June 2008 how the Myanmar Army’s LIB 343 forced her and others to carry supplies to the Gk’Hee Gkyo military camp in Hpapun township despite their refusal because of the mine danger. On 9 June 2008, one porter was injured by a landmine and died the same day after the military insisted on taking him to the camp instead of a hospital.\(^{57}\) Saw Bpo Heh, a 35-year-old resident of Bpaw Baw Hta village, died of landmine injuries after DKBA Battalions 907 and 999 entered his and nearby villages on 22 February 2008, and forced residents to serve as guides and porters along local trails.\(^{58}\)

The FBR reported in January 2008 that villagers near the road between Busakee army camp and Ler Mu Plaw camp (between Hpapun and Thandaung townships) had faced almost daily army demands for labor as minesweepers, road-clearers, and porters.\(^{59}\) Also in January, a man who was captured and forced to porter for the Myanmar Army escaped and ran into the jungle only to step on a landmine. He was discovered and treated by KNU medics.\(^{60}\)

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\(^{50}\) KHRG, Photos B 123, 124, and 125, www.khrg.org.

\(^{51}\) Information provided by humanitarian field worker requesting anonymity, Mae Sot, 23 February 2009.

\(^{52}\) Telephone interview with Rita Eyi, GGL-A, 3 July 2009.

\(^{53}\) Email from Nicolas Florquin, Geneva Call, 23 June 2009.

\(^{54}\) The term “atrocity” demining is used by Landmine Monitor to describe forced passage of civilians over confirmed or suspected mined areas or the forced use of civilians to clear mines without appropriate training or equipment. “Atrocity” demining is sometimes referred to in human rights reports as “human mine sweeping.”


Risk Education

Despite a large mine problem and significant mine/ERW casualties, mine/ERW RE is either non-existent or inadequate in areas with reported casualties. Limited activities are carried out by Karen state by the CIDKP, in Tenasserim division by the Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW) and in Karenni state by the Karenni Social Welfare and Development Centre (KSWDC).51

There are no state-run RE activities, although “beware mines” signs have been placed by authorities in some parts of the country.52

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NGO activities in 200863</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDKP</td>
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<tr>
<td>KDHW</td>
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<td>KSWDC</td>
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RE in Myanmar has been very limited throughout the last 10 years. Several international NGOs conducted needs assessments to explore the possibility of establishing a program, but have only conducted very limited activities. Several national NGOs have conducted limited activities, which increased in 2006.64

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors is unknown, but at least 2,019 survivors have been identified since 1999.65 Adequate medical care was not available to survivors and persons with disabilities in 2008. The ruling authority reportedly directed less than 3% of the national budget annually to healthcare, resulting in limited services for the population generally.66 The New Light of Myanmar carried several reports of assistance to new mine casualties in 2008, although the type of assistance was not mentioned.67 Continuing regime restrictions impeded the ability of some international organizations to provide assistance and protection to populations, particularly within contested areas.68

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61 RE activities in Karen state by CIDKP, in Tenasserim division by the KDHW and in Karenni state by the KSWDC are supported with technical assistance by a Danish NGO. RE data by CIDKP, KDHW, and KSWDC provided to Landmine Monitor by a Danish NGO, 17 June 2009.
62 Photographic and verbal reports collected by Landmine Monitor, Yangon, 2–6 February 2009.
63 Data on RE by CIDKP, KDHW, and KSWDC provided to Landmine Monitor by a Danish NGO, 17 June 2009.
64 Ibid.
65 This is based on 2,002 injured casualties between 1999 and 2008, plus 17 injured casualties in 2009 (see Casualties section). See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
67 Landmine Monitor analysis of 24 media reports published by the New Light of Myanmar between 1 January and 31 December 2008.
No official information on military assistance to soldiers injured by mines/ERW was provided to Landmine Monitor for 2008. A media report that interviewed a mine-injured military veteran stated disabled veterans received a monthly stipend of MMK10,000 (about $9.50). The article reported the housing allowance had been withdrawn for injured military veterans and since the end of 2007, disabled veterans (most of whom were reported to have been injured by landmines) were no longer allowed to live indefinitely in military quarters.69

Physical rehabilitation, orthopedic surgery, and prosthetics were available to some mine/ERW survivors through rehabilitation centers in 2008, both within Myanmar and in Thailand near the border. The Ministry of Health was responsible for medical rehabilitation of persons with disabilities. It ran three physical rehabilitation centers independently and three centers with the Ministry of Defense.70 The National Rehabilitation Hospital provided prosthetics free of charge. The Shwe Min Tha Foundation assisted persons with physical disabilities to access medical care by covering incidental costs, such as transportation to medical centers and food. However, the foundation was unable to support all those who requested assistance due to a lack of funding.71 The six government-operated rehabilitation centers provide 4,225 people with physical rehabilitation services.72

After it suspended full operational support to the six rehabilitation centers run by the ruling authority in June 2007, the ICRC in 2008 supplied the centers with sufficient equipment to continue meeting clients’ needs.73 The ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme, with the Myanmar Red Cross Society, provided management training and financial and technical support to the Hpa-an Orthopaedic Rehabilitation Centre in 2008. Located in the most mine-affected area of the country, the center provided services for 1,194 clients in 2008.74 In total, all seven rehabilitation centers provided 1,867 prostheses (1,291 to mine/ERW survivors) and 1,204 orthoses (eight to mine/ERW survivors).75

Since 2002, Clear Path International (CPI) has provided prosthetics, physical therapy, and socio-economic services to mine/ERW survivors along the Thai-Myanmar border. Prosthetics and physical therapy were provided at four workshops in 2008—two based in Thailand and two in Myanmar. Of those in Myanmar, the Loi Kaw workshop in Karenni state was permanently staffed in 2008, providing approximately 100 prosthetics.76 Help without Frontiers (Helfen ohne Grenzen, HoG) worked in 2008 with CPI and the Shan Health Committee to develop two prosthetic workshops in Shan state.77 Two private companies also provided commercial prosthetic services.78 CPI believes they assisted approximately 160 survivors in Myanmar in 2008.79

The Back Pack Health Worker Teams provided primary and emergency medical care to people in rural areas and conflict-affected regions, including services to 22 mine/ERW casualties in 2008.80 The FBR trained and supported 49 mobile teams that provide medical and other humanitarian assistance to IDPs in some conflict areas.81 The provision of healthcare to many populations in contested areas of Myanmar remained limited due to the high level of

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71 Interview with Myat Thu Winn, Director, Shwe Min Tha Foundation, Yangon, 6 February 2009.
74 Ibid.
76 Email from Melody Mociulski, South East Asia Program Director, CPI, 18 June 2009. For more information on CPI activities in Thailand, see the report on Thailand in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
77 Emails from Karl Förster, Director, HoG, 9 May 2009 and 9 June 2009.
78 Interview with Myat Thu Winn, Shwe Min Tha Foundation, Yangon, 6 February 2009.
79 Email from Melody Mociulski, CPI, 18 June 2009.
danger to the workers themselves from armed conflict, the presence of mines/ERW, and risk of
imprisonment.82

There are no known psychosocial services available to mine/ERW survivors in Myanmar,
although limited services were available in Thailand near the border with Myanmar.83 The
Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement facilitated socio-economic and rehabilitation
services, including the running of the Vocational Training School for Adult Disabled. Many of
the school attendees were mine/ERW survivors.84 The Association for Aid and Relief Japan
provided vocational training for 91 people in 2008, including 13 mine/ERW survivors.85 CPI
developed three farms to provide income for mine/ERW survivors. Two farms are located on
the Myanmar-Thailand border, one near the Loi Kaw Wan IDP camp and another near the Loi
Tai Leng IDP camp, both in Shan state. The third farm is near the Khung Jor refugee camp
in Thailand. In 2008, each farm had approximately 15 beneficiaries.86 HoG supported the
development of five fishponds at Loi Kaw Wan in 2008.87

In Thailand, medical care was provided to mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar at clinics in
refugee camps and public district hospitals in the border provinces with Myanmar. The Mae
Tao Clinic (MTC), Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders), International Rescue
Committee, Malteser International-Germany, and other aid organizations provided emergency
medical referral to mine/ERW survivors in these border provinces.88 In 2008, 219 persons with
disabilities from central Myanmar and its border areas with Thailand traveled into Thailand
to receive prostheses from the MTC Prosthetic Center. Eighty-six percent of those receiving
prosthetics (188 people) were landmine survivors.89 HoG and CPI provided financial support
for the production of around 200 prostheses in 2008 to MTC, some surgery supplies, and
training for technicians.90 In 2008, six new prosthetic technicians, all mine survivors, graduated
from the MTC Prosthetics Department training program. All returned to Myanmar and work
in prosthetic centers run by independent health and welfare sections of ethnic communities.91
Handicap International also operated prosthetics workshops within refugee camps in Thailand
for mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar.92 Since 2006, no new reports have been received by
Landmine Monitor of mine/ERW survivors from Myanmar receiving medical care in Indian or
Bangladeshi facilities.93

In 2008, no active discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, access to
healthcare, or provision of other state-run services was reported. However, there was inadequate
state funding for services to assist persons with disabilities. The majority of persons relied on
their families to provide for their welfare. Discrimination against persons with disabilities was
reported.94

Myanmar had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its
Optional Protocol as of 1 July 2009.

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83 See report on Thailand in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
84 Asia-Pacific Development Center on Disability, “Current Situation of Persons with Disabilities,” 10 October
85 Email from Sayako Nogiwa, Director, Myanmar Project, AAR Japan, 11 March 2009.
86 Email from Melody Mociulski, CPI, 18 June 2009.
88 See report on Thailand in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
89 Email from Eh Thwa Bor, Administrative Officer, Mae Tao Clinic, 18 March 2009; and see report on Thailand
in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
90 Emails from Benno Röggla, Chair of the Board, HoG, 10 March 2009 and 11 March 2009; and email from
Melody Mociulski, CPI, 18 June 2009.
91 Email from Eh Thwa Bor, Mae Tao Clinic, 18 March 2009.
92 See report on Thailand in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
93 Landmine Monitor researchers in Bangladesh and India monitor for reports of Myanmar citizens seeking
services for landmine injuries.
25 February 2009.
Support for Mine Action

In 2008, two countries, Spain and Denmark, reported contributing $1,020,134 (€692,743) to mine action and VA in Myanmar, a significant increase compared to the $183,800 reported for 2007. \(^{95}\)

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\(^{95}\) Spain Article 7 report, Form J, 30 April 2009; and email from Mads Hove, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2009.
### Nepal

**2008 Key Data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
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<td>Contamination</td>
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<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
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<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>73 (2007: 104)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Clearance of 13,200m² of mined areas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>$1,051,395 (2007: $1.75 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Ten-Year Summary**

The Republic of Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Since 1999, some of Nepal’s most senior officials have expressed support for a ban on antipersonnel mines and various leaders have regularly stated that Nepal is carefully studying accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Nepal voted in support of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution from 1996 to 2006, then abstained the past two years. Both Maoist rebels and government forces used antipersonnel landmines and/or improvised explosive devices, including victim-activated devices, in the decade-long conflict that ended in 2006. Mine use was prohibited under the May 2006 cease-fire agreement and subsequent November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

Since the end of its internal armed conflict and despite not being party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Nepal has made slow but steady progress towards clearance of mined areas with UN support.

Landmine Monitor identified a total of 756 casualties from victim-activated devices (205 killed and 551 injured) between 2003 and 2008. From 1999 to 2002, the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines reported 1,326 casualties (522 killed and 804 injured), but these were unconfirmed and include incidents involving command-detonated devices.

Since 2004, a large number of NGOs—with the Nepal Red Cross Society, the army, and the police—have been involved in delivering risk education (RE), coordinated by UNICEF. Community-based RE is delivered through thousands of volunteers, supported by village facilitators. In 2009, a program was established to introduce more systematic RE into schools.

The armed conflict left state services at a minimum in affected areas. The health sector remains severely lacking in government funding, trained medical staff, and material resources. Yet there have been improvements, particularly since the end of the conflict. With the support of NGOs, rehabilitation services have improved to international standards. The government and victim assistance stakeholders, with support from UNICEF and Handicap International, developed a National Victim Assistance Strategic Framework in August 2009.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) committed the government and the Unified Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist (UCPN/M) rebels to halt the use of landmines, and required the parties to assist each other to mark and clear mines and booby-traps within a certain time.

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1. It was formerly known as the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN/M). It changed its name in January 2009 when it absorbed another Nepalese communist political party.
2. Comprehensive Peace Agreement between Government of Nepal and CPN/M, 21 November 2006, points 5.1.1(i), 5.1.2 and 5.1.4. Earlier, the May 2006 bilateral cease-fire between the government of Nepal and the CPN/M, and accompanying Code of Conduct, committed both sides to forego use of landmines.
After registering to participate, Nepal did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2008 in Geneva. On 2 December 2008, Nepal abstained from voting on the annual UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This was the second consecutive year that Nepal abstained, after voting in favor of all previous pro-ban resolutions since 1996.

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told a visiting ICBL delegation in December 2008 that the decisions not to participate in the Ninth Meeting of States Parties, and to abstain on the UNGA vote, reflected the current government thinking that Nepal should not associate itself with treaties of which it was not a member. He added that there was a lack of convergence of views on the question of accession among major stakeholders such as the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and the army.3

The ICBL mission to Kathmandu from 14–16 December 2008 met with the Army Commander-in-Chief, Minister of Peace and Reconstruction, Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Secretary, Defense Secretary, leaders from major political parties, and others. Subash Chandra Nembang, the Chair and Speaker of the Constituent Assembly, stated that the time was right to act on this issue and promised to extend his full support.4 It appears, however, that the army wishes to retain the option to use landmines again to protect its defense posts in case of renewed insurgency.5

Nepal attended the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia held 1–3 April 2009, the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the treaty’s Second Review Conference, but did not make any statements. It did not attend the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva.

It is likely that progress toward accession has been slowed by the stalemate on integration of the Maoist rebels into Nepal’s army, as well as the resignation of the Maoist Prime Minister and change of government in May 2009.

On 10 August 2008, the Minister of Peace and Reconstruction, Ram Chandra Poudel, signed the August Declaration on Mine Action and the Ottawa Treaty, prepared by the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL) which stated, “We will make efforts to create an environment conducive to making the Nepal government sign the Mine Ban Treaty and enforce it immediately on our respective behalf.” The declaration set the short-term goal of accession prior to the Second Review Conference in November 2009.6 Also in August 2008, the NCBL received signatures from 13 out of 25 political parties in the Constituent Assembly to a “Letter of Commitment” to pursue accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.7

Nepal is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

No new use of antipersonnel mines by the Nepal Army has been reported since the 2006 cease-fire. Previously, the Nepal Army used antipersonnel mines as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) assembled in-country around military installations, police posts, and infrastructure. The Nepal Army has stated that it started using mines in 2002, and estimates it deployed around 14,000 antipersonnel mines (including 11,000 PMD-6 mines and 3,000 POMZ-2 and NMM 14 mines). It also estimates that it used about 25,000 command-detonated IEDs.8

4 ICBL meeting with Subash Chandra Nembang, Chair and Speaker, Constituent Assembly, Kathmandu, 16 December 2008. Notes by Landmine Monitor.
In December 2008, General Rukmang Katwal, the army’s Chief of Staff, told an ICBL delegation that Nepal had never used landmines on its borders, and could not conceive of a situation which might necessitate their use. He acknowledged that the few thousand mines in Nepal’s stockpile could hardly afford any protection.9

A Nepal Army spokesperson said in 2007 that the army had a stockpile of about 3,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, including POMZ-2 and PMD antipersonnel mines. Nepal imported its mines from China, India, and the former Soviet Union, mostly in the 1980s.10 Nepal is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines.

In 2003 and 2005, Nepali officials told Landmine Monitor that Nepal produced antipersonnel mines.11 Since the 2006 cease-fire and CPA, army officials have insisted that there has never been any production of antipersonnel mines. In 2007, an army officer denied any antipersonnel mine production, while acknowledging that soldiers frequently made command-detonated IEDs at barracks using munitions such as mortar shells, rockets, bombs, and antivehicle mines.12 In March 2008, another army official told Landmine Monitor that Nepal did not produce or use any victim-activated mines or IEDs.13 In December 2008, General Rukmang Katwal told the ICBL that Nepal had no capacity to produce landmines, nor did it ever have such capacity.14 No Nepali-produced antipersonnel mines have been found in minefields.

It does not appear that Nepal is currently producing antipersonnel mines, but the conflicting information about past production remains to be clarified. Landmine Monitor will continue to list Nepal as a producer until Nepal makes an official, formal statement that it does not produce antipersonnel mines and does not intend to do so in the future.

Non-state armed groups

Although the former rebel Communist Party of Nepal/Maoist (CPN/M) became a part of the interim government in April 2007, its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) still exists and is being demobilized. In the past, the PLA was expert at the manufacture and use of a variety of IEDs, including victim-activated, time-delayed, and command-detonated types.15 There have been no reports of new use of antipersonnel mines, victim-activated IEDs, or booby-traps by the PLA since the May 2006 cease-fire.16

In December 2008, Shree Ram Dhakal (also known as Prasanta), Secretary of the CPN/M central office, told ICBL representatives said that the struggle is not over yet and nobody knows what may happen in the future. Under the terms of the CPA and the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies agreement, the PLA was cantoned at seven sites and obligated to turn in all IEDs at designated storage locations a safe distance from the sites. Some observers believe some PLA cadres, and their arms, remain outside the UN camps. Shree Ram Dhakal said that all weapons and explosives were handed over to the UN, but that some might have been inadvertently left out.17

12 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 936. In April 2007, Brig.-Gen. Lok Bahadur Thapa, Head of the Engineers Directorate, told Landmine Monitor that Nepal does not have the capacity to produce factory-made landmines, and that the Sunchari factory only produces plastic grenades.
16 In December 2006, nine Maoists were reportedly injured while assembling IEDs inside the Maoist cantonment in Surkhet. The CPN/M has refused to disclose any details about the incident. “9 Maoists injured in cantonment in Surkhet,” Rajdhani (newspaper), 18 December 2006.
Rebel armed groups still exist in Nepal, especially in the Terai region. There is no evidence that any of them have used or possessed antipersonnel mines. Many use command-detonated IEDs (see Casualties section below).

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Nepal is affected by landmines, almost all antipersonnel, as well as by ERW. The decade of internal armed conflict that ended in November 2006 left Nepal contaminated by IEDs, used by both Nepal’s army and police, and by the CPN/M. More recent violence involving autonomy-seeking groups in Nepal’s southern Terai region is adding IED contamination, albeit not yet on a large scale.18

The Security Forces, which include both the Nepal Army and the Armed Police Force, laid 53 antipersonnel minefields, and a further 300 or so areas are protected with command-detonated devices (including IEDs),19 as defensive perimeters around military installations, police posts, and infrastructure.

As of July 2009, the Nepal Army had cleared 17 minefields and 90 IED fields.20 That left 36 minefields covering an estimated 3.25km². On the basis of existing clearance capacity (two to three demining platoons), the UN Mine Action Team (UNMAT) projected that all mined areas could be cleared by mid-2011.21

In July 2008, the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) concluded destruction of all Category 1 (unstable) IEDs at Maoist cantonment sites in accordance with the CPA. In excess of 7,250kg of explosive items were destroyed in nine locations.22 UNMAT continued destruction of Category 2 (safe to store) IEDs in 2009. As of July, 7,926 IEDs had been destroyed and a further 18,308 items remained to be destroyed.23

A UN interagency mine action assessment conducted in late 2007 was still awaiting comment by the government as of December 2008.24

**Casualties**

In 2008, the Nepali NGO Informal Service Sector Center (INSEC) recorded 73 new mine/ERW casualties (four killed and 69 injured) from victim-activated explosions in 38 incidents.25 Boys accounted for the majority of casualties (33 casualties), followed by men (17), girls (13), and women (10). Most casualties were caused by tampering with explosive devices (60), followed by collecting wood and water (four). Children were 72% (43) of all the casualties that occurred while tampering with explosive devices. In addition, there was one demining accident in August 2008, which resulted in a deminer losing several fingers.26

The number of casualties in 2008 decreased by 29% from the 104 casualties (13 killed and 91 injured) reported in 2007: the number of incidents decreased by 7% (from 42 in 2007).27 Despite the overall decrease in incidents, there was an increase in incidents related to armed groups in the Terai region.

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18 Telephone interview with Stephen Robinson, Program Manager, UNMAT, 28 July 2009. The UN provided mine action support through UNMIN until the end of 2008, when that role transitioned to UNMAT.
20 The Nepal Army reported 99 IED fields cleared in a 9 July 2009 meeting organized by the NCBL on ‘Mine Action and Budget.’ Email from Purna Shova Chitrakar, Coordinator, NCBL, 28 August 2009.
21 Email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 11 May 2009; and telephone interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 28 July 2009. ncb: delete
23 Email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 29 July 2009.
25 Unless specified otherwise, all information in this section is based on casualty data provided by email from Prashannata Wasti, Coordinator, INSEC, 23 June 2009.
The total number of casualties from victim-activated devices in Nepal is unknown, owing to the late onset of data collection. Landmine Monitor identified a total of 756 confirmed casualties from victim-activated devices (205 killed and 551 injured) between 2003 and 2008, using information provided by INSEC, UNICEF, and media reports. However, the data for 2003 and 2004 is only partial, gathered retrospectively by UNICEF from 2005 onwards. Casualties are certainly under-reported by INSEC, as from 2006 to 2008 only non-combatant casualties were included in their database. From 1999 to 2002, the NCBL reported 1,326 unconfirmed casualties (522 killed and 804 injured). However, as this data includes casualties from targeted attacks, this does not represent an accurate picture of the numbers killed and injured by victim-activated weapons.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009. By 23 June, 15 incidents caused 32 casualties, killing eight and injuring 24. Nineteen casualties were boys, six men, four women, and three girls.

In 2009, with UNICEF support, a separate database was established by INSEC for incidents caused by intentional (command) detonation of explosive devices. The database is based on secondary sources, such as historical INSEC data and media reports. As of July 2009, the database contained 254 casualties (including 21 killed) for 2008, from 76 intentional explosions in 20 districts, including one incident that caused 41 casualties. Casualties from intentional explosions amounted to 78% of all casualties from explosions in Nepal in 2008.

There are no comprehensive statistics on people injured and killed in the conflict or on persons with disabilities. The National Federation of the Disabled planned to conduct a nationwide disability survey to address the lack of data once funding has been secured.

**Risk profile**

The greatest risk comes from IEDs. The majority of casualties occurred in Terai and an increasing number were caused by the activation of IEDs placed by new armed groups. Tampering and handling were the main causes of explosions. Children accounted for 63% of casualties in 2008. In November 2008, the UN claimed that, “as the situation is now more stable, the return of internally displaced people and the increased number of abandoned barracks surrounded by minefields could lead to an increase in casualties.”

**Socio-economic impact**

Despite the limited extent of contamination, the benefits of clearance could be considerable—opening up power delivery to communities that in many areas go unserved for most of the day, and permitting the construction of more cell phone towers, in addition to increasing land available for cultivation.

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

Nepal’s cabinet decided in June 2007 to set up a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), consisting of an interministerial Steering Committee with strategic policy responsibility and an implementing Technical Committee, both under the auspices of the Ministry of Peace and

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29 Casualty data provided by email from Prashannata Wasti, INSEC, 23 June 2009.
30 Interview with Nir Lama, Surveillance Coordinator, INSEC, Kathmandu, 25 March 2009.
31 Landmine Monitor was unable to determine how many in the database were classified as “injured.”
34 Ibid, 13 July 2009.
38 Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, in Bangkok, 3 April 2009.
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Reconstruction (MOPR). As of July 2009, however, the Steering Committee had met only once. Restructuring underway at the MOPR was expected to lead to the establishment of a mine action office to serve as a focal point for coordinating mine action.

In the meantime, a Mine Action Joint Working Group, an informal committee which meets every four to six weeks and is chaired by UNMAT, addresses all mine action issues, including mine/ERW risk education (RE) and victim assistance (VA). The Joint Working Group’s 26 members included the MOPR, the army and police, UN agencies, Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS), NCBL, various national and international NGOs, and the ICRC as an observer.

The Nepal Army set up a Mine Action Center (NAMAC) in 2007 in the Army Engineers Directorate, but this coordinates only the work of army engineers.

Victim assistance

The NMAA’s Steering Committee and Technical Committee are tasked with coordinating mine action, including VA, but as of July 2009 had not become operational and did not have terms of reference. Moreover, neither committee included the Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare, the lead ministry for people with disabilities, nor the Ministry of Health and Population. UN agencies continued to interact with the government on the need for an operational national mine action authority.

Data collection and management

NAMAC operates a database equipped with the latest version of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The database was accidentally wiped out in 2008, and in 2009 work started repopulating it with clearance records.

RE activities are not entered into IMSMA and all organizations maintain their own records. As of July 2009, UNICEF was working on gathering these records, but the data was not available to Landmine Monitor.

The MOPR is officially responsible for collecting and managing mine action data, but since June 2006, INSEC has been the de facto source of casualty data for the mine action sector in Nepal. Working in partnership with 50 organizations, the INSEC surveillance system of mine/ERW/IED explosions monitors all 75 districts of Nepal. At the Joint Working Group in December 2008, the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force, and Nepal Army agreed to provide INSEC with data on casualties in their own ranks from 2008 onwards.

Data is collected by INSEC in a standardized form, with case definition, differentiation of device types and detonation mechanisms, incident location, and casualty information. The INSEC database allows for ongoing prioritization of RE, VA, advocacy, and clearance programs in Nepal. Members of the Joint Working Group used the data from INSEC in planning and prioritizing of their work in 2008.


Email from Danee Luhar, Project Officer, Mine Action, UNICEF, 22 July 2009.


The definition for “casualties from victim-activated devices” was revised by the Joint Working Group in 2008 and was to be used by members, including INSEC, from 2009 onwards. The revised definition includes “casualties injured or killed…when they have activated an Explosive Device (ED) unknowingly, or without the intention to harm, hurt or terrorize.” EDs are defined as IEDs, including booby-traps, antipersonnel mines, other explosive munitions, and ERW. The definition was also widened from that previously used by INSEC to include military and security personnel, in addition to civilians.52

UNICEF did not maintain a database for ERW casualties in 2008, although it continued to monitor media reports and support the development of the INSEC surveillance system.53

Mine action program operators

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<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Nepal had no comprehensive national mine action strategy as of December 2008.54 The army has set a target of completing clearance of all minefields within five years.55

In August 2009, the MOPR, Handicap International (HI), UNICEF, and VA stakeholders developed a first national VA strategic framework. On this occasion the participants decided to create a new VA Working Group under MOPR leadership. The new group was to be operational by November 2009.56

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

There has been some effort by the army to coordinate demining with reconstruction needs.57 The Nepal Army is said to prioritize tasks in accordance with the wishes of local people but no formal mechanism links mine clearance to national development.58

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55 Interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, in Bangkok, 3 April 2009.
56 Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 27 August 2009.
58 Email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 29 July 2009.
National ownership
Nepal has demonstrated commitment to mine action by initiating clearance of affected areas without international legal obligations to do so. The Nepal Army’s work is supported by UNMAT, which represents the first country deployment by the UN’s Inter-agency Standing Committee on Mine Action.

Mine clearance is conducted exclusively by the Nepal Army while IED clearance is conducted by the Nepal Army and the Armed Police Force (see Demining section below), but in October 2008, the government requested UN support in a letter which stated “this activity is likely to take a couple of years.”

UN support to clearance was initially provided through the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) and was originally due to terminate at the end of 2008. After the government’s request for continuing mine action support in October 2008, responsibility transferred on 1 January 2009 to UNMAT, comprising the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and UNICEF. ArmorGroup provided operational supervision and some capacity-building support under an UNMIN contract awarded through a process of international tender, which ended in July 2008. ArmorGroup support was replaced by three UN technical advisors who focused mainly on providing capacity development of Nepal Army demining teams.

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures
Mine action is governed by a 2007 cabinet decree. Standing operating procedures for demining were drafted based on the International Mine Action Standards and training provided by ArmorGroup, and their further development was ongoing as of December 2008.

UNMAT developed national technical guidelines and safety standards for RE, and the draft was under discussion with the Joint Working Group as of July 2009.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

The Nepal Army’s 14th Brigade is the only demining operator in Nepal, with two 20-person platoons operating in 2008. Two other platoons have been trained but have yet to be equipped or deployed for operations. The army intended to deploy a third platoon in 2009. Nepal’s Armed Police Force, which works independently of the Nepal Army, deployed one EOD team in 2008, and in 2009 had a further EOD section in each of the six brigade headquarters.

Identification of hazardous areas

The Nepal Army provided the UN with details of 53 minefields, including maps described as of a “good standard” for 44 of them. The army also identified some 300 security posts protected by command-detonated explosive devices.

The extent of residual ERW contamination remains unclear. A 2007–2008 assessment that visited 117 locations, including 37 sites of clashes between the army and insurgents, found a limited threat, mostly isolated items of UXO or remnants of old stockpiles of IEDs in communities.
Mine and IED clearance in 2008

All clearance of mines and ERW in Nepal is by manual means. In 2008, the army cleared six minefields covering an area of about 13,200m², destroying 1,136 antipersonnel mines. In 2009, before the onset of the monsoon season in July, the Nepal Army had cleared a further 10 minefields covering 20,700m² and destroying 1,482 antipersonnel mines. The total amount of land released amounted to 1.1km² in 2008 and 0.6km² in the first seven months of 2009.67

After clearance operations in Kopche Community Forest in Siraha district, media reports cited a Nepal Army officer as saying deminers had been able to clear 98 mines of the 202 that had been emplaced there and that the others had been destroyed by fire or swept away in landslides. Clearance certificates for the task were reportedly presented to local residents by the United Kingdom’s ambassador to Nepal, Andrew Hall.68

The Armed Police Force reported in 2009 that it had completed clearance of all 3,041 IEDs laid around its police posts, although this had not been verified.69

Demining and battle area clearance from 2004–2009

Systematic clearance operations began in 2007, following the end of the armed conflict. The army reported clearing three minefields and 25 battle areas in 2007 although the UN had reports of only one minefield cleared in 2007; the area cleared has not been reported.70

Risk Education

RE was implemented through two types of activity in 2008: emergency RE and community-based RE. In 2009, systematic RE was introduced into the school system.71 It is estimated that the total number of beneficiaries in 2008 was approximately 100,000.72 This is a significant increase from 2007, when the number of beneficiaries reported was 7,508.73 Although UNICEF considers that RE is adequate in terms of messages and prioritization, coverage is inadequate due to lack of funding.74

RE has been conducted by NGOs since 2003 and is now delivered through a network of organizations, too numerous to mention all by name. The major implementing organizations were the NRCS, army, police, and the Armed Police Force, NCBL, the NGO Himalayan Human Rights Monitors (HimRights), Save the Children, UNMIN, and the Ministry of Education, with UNICEF playing a coordinating role.75 A UNICEF/GICHD needs assessment in 2005 resulted in a strategic framework which integrated RE within the social mobilization campaign.76

Emergency RE was conducted from 2006 as a result of new explosive incidents.77

Casualty data is used to inform RE and to select and prioritize districts for RE programs. A 2008 Knowledge, Attitude and Practices survey commissioned by UNICEF and conducted by the Center for Research on Environment Health and Population Activities (CREHPA) in six of the most mine-affected districts of Nepal found exposure to RE negligible in all districts, despite a nationwide RE campaign.78 It found that people were unaware of where explosive

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67 Email from Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 29 July 2009.
69 Telephone interview with Stephen Robinson, UNMAT, 28 July 2009; and email, 4 August 2009.
72 Email from Hugues Laurence, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.
74 Email from Hugues Laurence, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.
devices could be encountered and how to practice safe behavior. However, their actual exposure to ERW was moderate and communities had other priorities. The survey concluded that there was a need for a systematic RE campaign that favored electronic media and direct training in the community through existing networks, for example through the school system. It also recommended that a “climate” conducive for reporting be established as some people expressed fear of reporting contamination to the police. A baseline study by Partnership Nepal in June 2008, found that at-risk groups were not aware of the dangers of IEDs.

A national emergency RE network of 409 governmental, NRCS, and NGO focal points had the capacity to deploy prevention activities in 68 affected districts in a timely manner. In 2008, UNICEF trained 250 RE focal points in 30 districts in emergency RE. They delivered RE following incidents, at the request of communities or where risk was identified. UNICEF monitored the delivery of RE. Some of the organizations also provided standard RE, in addition to emergency RE. The Ministry of Education was involved in emergency RE in about 20 districts through 20 RE trainers.

A network of hundreds of village facilitators, paid by the government and UNICEF, works with thousands of volunteer community mobilizers and they conduct RE alongside their other work in all UNICEF programs—health, nutrition, water and sanitation, education, and other protection issues. UNICEF further developed the community network in 2008 by training 38 district level trainers and 149 village facilitators in 14 districts. The network has a separate monitoring system, run by the UNICEF district officers, that covers all issues, not only RE.

In September 2008 four video clips were broadcast through six TV channels, and radio spots were aired through 35 national and local radio stations.

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is at least 550. HI criticized VA in Nepal in 2009, saying it was the weakest of the five pillars of mine action and that there was an “absence of a national strategy, no data on total numbers of victims and casualties, poor coordination, a lack [of] clear policies and procedures for emergency response, limited tertiary healthcare, and almost-absent psychosocial care.” Services offered were often concentrated in urban centers. The majority of facilities are operated by NGOs. Government funding was provided to a small number of NGOs for support services to persons with disabilities, but the majority of those with a disability relied almost exclusively on family for assistance.

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81 Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.
82 Ibid.
83 Interview with Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, Kathmandu, 2 April 2009.
84 Email from Danee Luhar, UNICEF, 22 July 2009.
86 Email from Danee Luhar, UNICEF, 24 July 2009.
87 Email from Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 13 July 2009.
88 Ibid.
91 Ibid
Citizens are eligible to access basic healthcare free of charge at government facilities. However, in 2008, government clinics were reportedly poorly equipped and few in number. Some health clinics in rural areas were forced to close due to Maoist intimidation.93 There was also a severe lack of trained primary healthcare staff.94 Emergency medical care was available at eight well-equipped government hospitals, all located in larger cities, as well as at private and NGO-run medical centers. The majority of facilities were located in the Kathmandu valley, forcing most survivors to travel long distances to access them. Poor roads, irregular public transport and high travel fares (which increased by 60% in 2008) often made it impossible to access services.95 Evacuation of severely injured casualties, particularly from poor, rural areas impacted by mines/ERW, remained difficult due to unclear emergency procedures and inability to pay costs. The ambulance system has been criticized for inadequately equipping vehicles with medical supplies and paramedics.96 NRCS ambulances charged for emergency evacuation according to the distance traveled, while others required a “donation” of no set amount.97 In 2008, HI provided training for INSEC district representatives on how to access emergency medical attention immediately after an incident.98 Nepalese district and regional hospitals have been criticized as “poor in terms of infrastructure, equipment, manpower and management.”99 In 2008, the construction of a trauma center at Bir Hospital in Kathmandu was completed. Although it was not yet operational as of February 2009, it had already been criticized for its inaccessibility due to the hazardous and overcrowded surrounding roads.100 Physical rehabilitation services were provided through centers in five regions of Nepal and through mobile camps. The vast majority of physical rehabilitation services in Nepal are provided by international and national NGOs.101 As a result of the efforts of international NGOs, facilities improved and meet international standards.102 The government-run Aerahiti National Rehabilitation Centre in Kathmandu began providing services to people with spinal cord injuries in June 2008.103 Managed by the army, it is the first government-run rehabilitation center in Nepal and provides services to both military personnel and civilians.104 The Ministry of Women, Children and Social Welfare provides free education and medical care for persons with disabilities, and it encourages other government and NGO agencies to provide rehabilitation services and assistance in employment.105 There were no counseling programs in Nepal to assist mine/ERW victims and their family members, but the NCBL provides some ad hoc counseling assistance.

Economic reintegration of mine/ERW survivors and families of victims remained marginal in 2008. Financial compensation, pensions, and training were available for security force casualties. Families of people killed during the conflict are eligible for a one-time payment;
those injured or killed after the peace accords are not eligible. Post-conflict casualties can receive assistance if their injuries happened at or near military posts. The process to acquire the necessary documentation to access free services often takes months.

Nepalese law mandates access to employment, education, transportation, and other state services for persons with disabilities, but there are no laws prohibiting discrimination. In 2008, discrimination against persons with disabilities was reportedly common in healthcare, employment, education, and provision of other state services. Nepal signed the UN Convention of the Rights of People with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol on 3 January 2008: it had not ratified either instrument as of 1 July 2009.

**Victim assistance activities**

Since 2005, HI has operated a physical rehabilitation project targeting persons with disabilities caused by the conflict. The project supported five centers and three satellite units managed by local partners in 2008. In total, the services provided physiotherapy to 5,013 people, including three mine/ERW survivors, and provided 2,044 orthopedic devices. HI also helped 516 of the poorest rehabilitation beneficiaries to access treatment through a Socio-Economic Fund. The cost of surgery for five survivors of victim-activated explosions was covered by the fund, in addition to the cost of emergency medical treatment for two other casualties of victim-activated explosions. HI operated seven mobile camps in 2008 in remote areas, bringing rehabilitation services to isolated communities and areas affected by the most recent conflict. This was a decrease from the 16 mobile camps operated by HI in 2007.

Although the need for physical rehabilitation in remote areas continues, the decrease in service provision was due to a lack of funding. HI also supported community-based rehabilitation programs in 13 districts in 2008, which assisted 144 persons with disabilities to make significant improvements in their physical mobility, and 203 to improve their ability to perform daily activities. From June 2008 to January 2009, HI also provided 2,160 persons with disabilities with information on health, education, and economic, social, and political involvement. The number of mine/ERW survivors was not specified.

The ICRC continued to collaborate with Green Pasture Hospital in Pokhara and the NRCS in providing rehabilitation services to more than 1,098 people and produced 97 prostheses and 174 orthoses in 2008. Four mine/ERW survivors received prostheses and one received an orthosis. The center began providing artificial upper limbs for clients in 2008. In response to the increase in travel costs in 2008, the ICRC increased its reimbursement of transportation costs by over 70% compared to 2007. Outreach visits were also organized through the partnership. The Micro-Economic Initiative program, supported by the ICRC and implemented through the NRCS, provided financial assistance to survivors to start small businesses.

The NGO Friends of the Disabled managed the Hospital and Rehabilitation Centre for Disabled Children, assisting under-privileged children with physical disabilities. The hospital’s community-based rehabilitation program mobilized local resources to improve beneficiaries’ quality of life in a large number of districts and facilitated mobile camps in six districts.

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The NCBL provided scholarships to 170 children who were direct survivors of conflict, including 50 survivors of explosions, and vocational training to 25 mine/ERW/IED survivors in 2008.\textsuperscript{119} The NCBL is also the ICBL’s VA focal point, advocating for the rights of survivors with the government and raising awareness of VA�

In 2008, HimRights covered the costs of emergency medical assistance to five new casualties of victim-activated explosions in four districts.\textsuperscript{120}

**Support for Mine Action**

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates or resource mobilization strategies for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Nepal. The interministerial Steering Committee within the NMAA holds responsibility for setting strategic mine action policy.\textsuperscript{121} UNMIN and UNICEF coordinated UN assistance according to a strategic agreement between the two agencies for the period 2007–2008.\textsuperscript{122} In November 2007, a UN assessment was completed in response to Nepal’s request for assistance in mine action, as of December 2008, the draft report was still awaiting comment by the government.\textsuperscript{123}

**National support for mine action**

Landmine Monitor is not aware of funding for mine action from the national budget of Nepal in 2008. No national funding was reported in 2007.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, three countries, Australia, Canada and the UK, as well as the European Commission (EC) reported providing $1,051,395 (€713,972) to mine action in Nepal. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was roughly 40% less than the $1,756,621 reported for 2007. There are no strategic plans or baseline cost estimates against which to judge the adequacy of 2008 funding levels in fulfilling Nepal’s mine action needs.

### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Nepal: Monetary\textsuperscript{124}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$437,492 (C$466,360)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Support for mine action</td>
<td>$265,068 (€180,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>Support for mine action</td>
<td>$256,110 (A$300,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Capacity-building, mine clearance</td>
<td>$92,725 (£50,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$1,051,395 (€713,972)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As of June 2009, the UN reported that no funding or pledges had been received for mine action projects within the 2009 Nepal Humanitarian Transition Appeal. The original request for mine action within the appeal was $572,608, but as of June 2009 had been revised downward to $236,334.\textsuperscript{125} No reasons were specified for the change in required funding.

\textsuperscript{119} Email from Purna Shova Chitrakar, NCBL, 30 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{120} Minutes of Mine Action Joint Working Group meeting, Kathmandu, 1 July 2008, provided by Hugues Laurenge, UNICEF, 14 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{125} UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Humanitarian Appeal: Mid-Year Review,” 2009, p. 33, ochadms.unog.ch.
OMAN

Ten-Year Summary

The Sultanate of Oman has long said that it is supportive of the Mine Ban Treaty, and it has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996. An official stated in 2007 that accession was under active consideration. In 2001, Oman revealed for the first time that it had a limited stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes, and in 2007 it disclosed that it consisted of less than 2,000 mines. Oman is believed to have a small residual mine/UXO problem, mostly in the Dhofar region in the south, but its precise extent remains unknown.

Mine Ban Policy

Oman has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Increased interest in treaty accession seen in 2007 did not appear to have intensified in 2008 or 2009.1

On 2 December 2008, Oman voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Oman has voted in favor of every annual pro-ban General Assembly resolution since 1996.

Oman attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008, but made no statements. It did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

Oman has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but has imported and used them in the past.2 An Omani official stated in November 2007 that Oman’s stockpile consists of fewer than 2,000 antipersonnel mines and that Oman has not bought any new mines for more than 20 years.3 Omani officials have on several occasions stated that Oman now only possesses antipersonnel mines for training purposes.4

Oman is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. As of 1 July 2009, it had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.5

Scope of the Problem and Demining

Oman is believed to have a residual mine and UXO problem, mostly in the Dhofar region in the south, the result of an internal armed conflict in 1964–1975.6 The precise extent of the residual problem remains unknown, although it was described by a United States Army deminer as

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1 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 971. In November 2007, an official told the ICBL that the decision about accession was at cabinet level. An ICBL delegation visiting Oman in October 2007 was assured in meetings with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Oman would seriously consider accession, and these officials expressed the hope that this would happen soon. In April 2007, an Omani military official told the ICBL that Oman already basically abides by the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty and that “something will happen soon” regarding accession.


“low to moderate” in 2001. In 2007, the Ministry of Defense reported that “almost 99%” of mined areas had been cleared and all remaining suspected hazardous areas were marked and fenced. The Royal Oman Police also have a Special Task Force which deals with any explosive devices. No further details are available on the extent of clearance over the last few years.

Ten-Year Summary

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan’s mine ban policy has changed little in the past decade: it has repeatedly stated that antipersonnel mines are a necessary part of its self-defense strategy. Pakistan has abstained from voting on every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996. It made extensive use of antipersonnel mines from December 2001 to mid-2002, during an escalation of tensions with India. In December 2006, Pakistan stated its intention to mine some sections of its border with Afghanistan, but did not after widespread international criticism. The country remains one of the few mine producers, manufacturing both detectable hand-emplaced antipersonnel mines and remotely-delivered mines. Pakistan’s ban on the export of antipersonnel mines has been in place since 1999. Non-state armed groups have used antipersonnel mines in the North-West Frontier Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Balochistan.

Pakistan is affected by both mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) close to its border with Afghanistan, along its border with India, and possibly also in the Swat Valley as a result of combat between the army and members of non-state armed groups. The army retains the primary responsibility for demining.

Landmine Monitor recorded at least 1,969 casualties from mines, ERW, and victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) between 1999 and 2008 (728 killed, 1,146 injured, and 95 unknown). Mine/ERW risk education (RE) was conducted in Pakistan from 2000 to 2006 by a number of NGOs, mainly for at-risk communities and Afghan refugees. By 2008, however, no NGOs were active in RE. The army was reported to have conducted some RE activities, but no evidence was found of this. While Pakistan asserted that mine/ERW/IED survivors “are properly looked after,” most survivors live in poor, conflict-affected regions with limited access to services. Pakistani law protects the equality of persons with disabilities and provides employment quotas but enforcement is lacking.

Mine Ban Policy

Pakistan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In April 2009, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official confirmed that Pakistan’s views have not changed. It has consistently maintained that: “Pakistan remains committed to pursue the objectives of a universal and non-discriminatory ban on anti-personnel mines in a manner which takes into account the legitimate defence requirements of States. Given our security compulsions and the need to guard our long borders, not protected by any natural obstacle, the use of landmines forms an important part of our self-defence strategy. As such, it is not possible for Pakistan to agree to the demands for the complete prohibition of anti-personnel landmines till such time that viable alternatives are available.”

Pakistan attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008, but did not make any statements. It has not attended any intersessional Standing Committee meetings since 2002.

On 2 December 2008, Pakistan abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It abstained on all previous annual UNGA resolutions in support of the treaty.

1 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for the period 16 August 2006 to 15 August 2007), Form B.
2 Interview with Muhammad Kamran Akhtar, Director, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 23 April 2009.
Pakistan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Pakistan submitted its annual report required by Article 13 in September 2008. Pakistan became a party to CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War in February 2009. As of 1 July 2009, Pakistan had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.4

Pakistan NGOs Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO) and Community Appraisal and Motivation Programme (CAMP) distributed 500 copies of the Urdu translation of the Pakistan chapter of Landmine Monitor Report 2008. SPADO organized a poster competition held at the University of Peshawar on the national impact of landmines and cluster bombs.5

**Use**

The last confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by Pakistan took place between December 2001 and mid-2002, when it laid very large numbers of mines during an escalation of tensions with India.6 In December 2006, Pakistan stated its intention “to fence and mine some selective sections” of its border with Afghanistan to prevent cross-border militant activity, but did not do so after widespread international criticism.7

In addition, Pakistan maintains permanent minefields along certain portions of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. There were reports of new use of mines by Pakistani troops in Kashmir during the Kargil crisis in mid-1999.8

Interviews conducted by Landmine Monitor in 2009 in Balochistan, the Frontier Region of Kohat, North and South Waziristan, and Bajaur, Kurram, Mohmand, and Orakzai agencies revealed a general perception that Pakistani security forces use antipersonnel mines to protect military installations. But local populations could not offer specific details, and Landmine Monitor was not able to substantiate the allegations.9 According to a January 2009 news article, a person was killed when he stepped on an antipersonnel mine within the boundaries of a police station in Bannu Tehsil, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).10

**Production, transfer, and stockpiling**

Pakistan is one of a small number of countries still producing antipersonnel mines.11 Since January 1997, Pakistan Ordnance Factories has produced detectable versions of hand-emplaced blast mines in order to be compliant with CCW Amended Protocol II.12 In 2007, Pakistan reported that it “has also planned incorporation of self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanism in its

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6 The posters were later displayed at a public exhibition. Emails from Raza Shah Khan, Executive Director, SPADO, Peshawar, 4 and 7 June 2009.
8 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 949–951. In April 2009, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Pakistan decided to postpone consideration of laying mines on the Afghan border following international criticism, but also noted that those who criticized the contemplated action did not recommend any alternatives. Interview with Muhammad Kamran Akhtar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 23 April 2009.
9 Landmine Monitor conducted interviews with community elders, staff of NGOs and humanitarian agencies, and journalists in Balochistan from 28–30 March 2009, and in the other locations from 15–20 March 2009. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 974.
11 Pakistan Ordnance Factories, located in Wah cantonment, is a state-owned company established in 1951 that in the past produced six types of antipersonnel landmines, two low-metal blast mines (P2 Mk1 and P4 Mk2), two bounding fragmentation mines (P3 Mk2 and P7 Mk1), and two directional fragmentation Claymore-type mines (P5 Mk1 and P5 Mk2).
future production” in order to meet Amended Protocol II requirements.\textsuperscript{13} The protocol requires that all remotely-delivered mines have self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms. Pakistan reported in 2002 that it was developing a remotely-delivered antipersonnel mine system, but has provided no further details.\textsuperscript{14}

Pakistan’s Statutory Regulatory Order No. 123 (1) of 25 February 1999 makes the export of antipersonnel mines illegal.\textsuperscript{15} The law penalizes importation of mines, but no data is available regarding whether people have been arrested or charged under this law. Pakistan states that it has not exported mines “since early 1992.”\textsuperscript{16} In the past, the country was a major exporter of landmines. Pakistani-made mines have been found in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere.

There is no official information available on the size of Pakistan’s antipersonnel mine stockpile. Landmine Monitor has estimated that Pakistan stockpiles at least six million antipersonnel mines, the fifth largest stockpile in the world.\textsuperscript{17} Pakistan has neither confirmed nor denied this estimate. In previous years, Pakistan reported that it destroyed “a large number of outdated mines every year.” However, no information about the quantity or types of mines destroyed has been made available for 2008.\textsuperscript{18} In 2007, Pakistan stated that it had “met the deadlines to improve the specifications on detectability of mines” to be compliant with Amended Protocol II.\textsuperscript{19}

Non-state armed groups
Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have sporadically used antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and IEDs in attacks on Pakistani security forces and civil administration, and in sectarian, inter-tribal, and inter-family conflicts.\textsuperscript{20} Use of mines has been recorded in some districts of the NWFP, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), including North and South Waziristan and the Frontier Regions of Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Kohat, and Tank, and in Balochistan province.

\textsuperscript{13} Article 13 Report (for the period 16 August 2006 to 15 August 2007), Form C. In its Article 13 report for the period 16 August 2007 to 15 September 2008, Pakistan used the short form, and Form C is marked “unchanged.”


\textsuperscript{15} Article 13 Report, Form D, 10 November 2006 states “Pakistan has declared a complete ban on export of landmines, even to States Parties, with effect from March 1997.”

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Muhammad Kamran Akhtar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, 23 April 2009. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 725.

\textsuperscript{17} In a December 1999 meeting between the ICBL and Brig. Feroz Khan, Director, Arms Control and Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defense, in Geneva, Brig. Khan noted that since 1997 Pakistan had converted 2.5 million antipersonnel mines to detectable status. He said that at one time this represented about one-third of Pakistan’s total stockpile, but [in 1999] represented a higher proportion. He noted that the stockpile number is a state secret, and that the number is fluid and could increase in the future. Based on these comments, the ICBL estimated that Pakistan could maintain a stockpile of at least six million antipersonnel mines.

\textsuperscript{18} In its Article 13 Report (for the period 16 August 2007 to 15 September 2008), Pakistan used the short form, and Form B is marked “unchanged.” It is unclear if this means they continue to destroy large numbers of mines each year, as was stated in the previous Article 13 Report (for the period 16 August to 15 August 2007). The same was reported in Pakistan’s Article 13 reports submitted in November 2006 and November 2005.

\textsuperscript{19} Article 13 Report (for the period 16 August 2006 to 15 August 2007), Form C. The nine-year deadline for Pakistan to destroy or modify all stockpiled low-metal-content (non-detectable) antipersonnel mines was 3 December 2007. Pakistan provided no details about how or when it met the requirement.

\textsuperscript{20} Pakistan has stated in its previous annual Article 13 reports that NSAGs “have several times used mines and improvised explosive devices against army personnel and civil administration. The Corps of Military Engineers continues to assist both military and civil authorities in defusing and clearing such devices.” In its Article 13 Report for the period 16 August 2007 to 15 September 2008, Pakistan used the short form, and indicated this is “unchanged.” See Article 13 Reports (for the period 16 August 2006 to 15 August 2007), 10 November 2006, and 2 November 2005.
States Not Party

Pakistan

North-West Frontier Province

Increased armed conflict took place in Upper Dir, Lower Dir, and Swat districts of the NWFP in 2008 and 2009 between government troops and Taliban groups. During its offensive in the Swat Valley, Taliban groups were reported to have used antipersonnel landmines. According to Human Rights Watch, in mid-May 2009, the Taliban laid mines in eight locations in Mingora and in four places in nearby Sharifabad after they had seized those areas. The Pakistani army media officer in Mingora told the ICBL that the army has encountered victim-activated IEDs and factory-made antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in the Swat Valley, which it attributes to the Pakistani Taliban and “foreign elements.”

Federally Administered Tribal Areas

With increased fighting in several parts of FATA in 2008 and 2009, there have been reports of antipersonnel mine, antivehicle mine, and IED incidents in Bajaur and Mohmand agencies. Prominent members of different agencies in FATA confirmed on the condition of anonymity that militants continued to use antipersonnel mines. Despite an earlier ban on the sale of mines in FATA, the collapse of state authority in some areas meant that mines were available in local markets. Tribes and sub-clans living along the Durand Line in Waziristan are believed to have kept stockpiles of mines since the time of Afghan-Soviet conflict.

Balochistan

The Balochistan Liberation Army, Balochistan Republic Army, Balochistan Liberation United Front, and Taliban groups used antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and/or IEDs in 2008 and 2009, mostly targeted at the Pakistani army and Frontier Corps, but civilians have also been killed and injured. In August 2008, a man died after stepping on an antipersonnel mine in Dera Bugti district; another man was injured in September 2008 after stepping on an antipersonnel mine in Nasirabad district. In April 2009, three children were killed by an antipersonnel mine in Jaffarabad district (See Casualties section below). In October 2008, it was reported that the Frontier Corps had seized antipersonnel mines, among other weapons, in Balochistan.

Kashmir

Many political and armed organizations opposing the Indian government reside in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, but they do not carry out armed activities in Pakistan. In October 2007, the United Jihad Council issued a statement in which it pledged not to use antipersonnel mines.

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24 Interview with Ghulam Qadir Khan, Secretary Law and Order, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar, 20 April 2009. For example, in April 2009, a woman was injured after stepping on an antipersonnel mine in Bajaur agency. In July 2008, a man was injured after stepping on a mine in Kurram agency (see Casualties section).
25 Interviews with community elders, NGO and humanitarian agency staff, and journalists in North and South Waziristan, Bajaur, Kurram, Mohmand, and Orakzai agencies, and the Frontier Region of Kohat, FATA, 15–20 March 2009.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Despite clear evidence to the contrary, Pakistan has repeatedly affirmed that it “faces no problem of un-cleared mines; hence no casualties were caused accidentally.” It has also stated “mines have never caused humanitarian concerns in Pakistan, despite having fought three wars with India and... [a] military standoff during 2001–2002.”

However, evidence that Pakistan is affected by both mines and ERW includes mine/ERW casualties recorded during 2008 and 2009. Moreover, Pakistan’s Article 13 report published in 2007 reports that “in the area adjoining Pakistan-Afghanistan border, sometimes mines are encountered, but these are mines left by the former Soviet troops.” It also states, “Existing perimeter marking signs have been painted and marked according to [Amended Protocol] AP-II standards,” acknowledging that some mined areas remain.

No estimate exists of the extent of contamination but growing conflict between the government and militants in 2009 has reportedly resulted in new use. Human Rights Watch cited residents of Mingora town in the Swat Valley as saying the Taliban had placed mines in the town as the army embarked on its offensive to drive them out of the area in May 2009. Pakistan has declared that mines it laid on the Indo-Pakistan border during the 2001–2002 stand-off with India “have been completely cleared.” It has also claimed that “minefields laid along the Line of Control (LoC) are properly fenced and clearly marked to impose requisite caution on civilians living in the surrounding areas.” However, inhabitants of Pakistani-administered Kashmir report consistently that some areas along the LoC are still contaminated and have not been properly fenced by the militaries of either India or Pakistan. Inhabitants of Garhi Sher Khan in Poonch district, for example, informed Landmine Monitor that villages on both sides of the LoC were contaminated by mines and ERW, and that rainfall caused mines to drift onto the Pakistani side of the border from higher areas on the Indian side.

The government has acknowledged that a mine problem does exist from mines left by Soviet troops on the Pakistan-Afghan border. Contamination dates from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989), when mines were scattered by Soviet and Afghan forces from helicopters, and the mujahideen used mines to protect their bases in the tribal areas. In North and South Waziristan, local inhabitants told Landmine Monitor during field research in 2007, 2008, and 2009 that NSAGs, including the Taliban and tribal armed elements, continued to use former mujahideen bases, and that the area around these camps was contaminated with mines.
emplaced by the NSAGs as well as by mines dating back to the Afghan-Soviet war. Inhabitants of the two tribal areas said mine incidents were still occurring, but did not provide specific casualty data.44

Casualties

In 2008, there were at least 341 mine, ERW, and victim-activated IED casualties (145 killed and 196 injured) in Pakistan. Most of the casualties were civilian (190) and 151 were security forces. The overwhelming majority of the casualties were men (302), 13 were boys, and seven were women: for 19 casualties, age and gender were unknown. Antivehicle mines were the main cause of casualties (145, including 69 civilians), followed by antipersonnel mines (67, including 50 civilian casualties), other mines (44, including 39 civilians), and ERW (18, all but one civilian). For the remainder, the device causing the casualties was unknown.45 Due to increased conflict the casualty rate in 2008 is an increase from the 271 recorded casualties in 2007, but remained lower than 2006 (488).46

Casualties continued to occur in 2009 with at least 67 mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties (38 killed and 29 injured) as of 31 May. All were caused by mines, including five antipersonnel mine casualties. Fifty-one casualties were civilian (including four children) and 16 were military.47

The total number of mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties in Pakistan is unknown. Landmine Monitor recorded at least 1,969 casualties between 1999 and 2008 (728 killed, 1,146 injured, and 95 unknown).48 Between 1980 and 2002, the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines identified 1,038 landmine/ERW casualties (377 killed, 566 injured, and 95 unknown).49

Landmine Monitor visited several refugee camps in April 2008 and April 2009 and identified at least 60 survivors out of some 24,000–30,000 refugees in Raro, Amboor, and Manakpaiyan I, II, and III refugee camps. Most survivors were injured when crossing the LoC.50 In 2007, a Response International (RI) household survey in Pakistani-administered Kashmir identified at least 234 survivors in Abbaspur and Hajira in Rawalakot district close to the LoC.51

In its Sixth Five Year Plan, the government estimated that persons with disabilities comprised approximately 2.5% of the total population.52

Risk profile

In recent years, people have been at increased risk of mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs due to exacerbated conflict and mine use in tribal disputes. Although the army is sometimes targeted, civilians are most at risk, particularly while traveling.53 In Kotli and Bhimber, RI found that found that people near the LoC in Kashmir are most at risk from antipersonnel mines, especially after periods of heavy rainfall when mines tend to drift. Most at risk are men and boys engaged in cutting wood, grazing animals, or farming.54

44 Landmine Monitor field research, North and South Waziristan, 2–5 April 2007, 16–22 March 2008, and 15–20 March 2009. Bermal, which is located half in Pakistan and half in Afghanistan, was bombarded by American forces, while Azam Warsak is 40–50 miles (64–80km) inside Pakistan. Shakai is on the boundary of North and South Waziristan. These camps were operational in the Afghan-Soviet war and are still operational under the command of local Taliban leaders.


48 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.


54 Ibid.
Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
Pakistan has no formal civilian mine action program. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed plans in 2007 to establish a Training Center for Demining and Awareness to act as a mine action center for operations in Pakistan and overseas, and to provide RE in affected areas of Pakistan. However, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor in April 2009 that the ministry had made no progress with this initiative.55

Victim assistance
Pakistan does not have programs or a strategic framework specifically addressing the needs of mine/ERW/IED survivors. The National Council for the Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons formulates disability policy and also provides “some job placement and loan facilities as well as some subsistence funding.”56 The Ministry of Women’s Development, Social Welfare and Special Education and the National Institution of the Handicapped, within the Ministry of Health, coordinate and provide services.57

The 2002 National Policy for Persons with Disabilities established objectives and strategies for the full integration of persons with disabilities by 2025.58 In 2006, a five-year action plan was developed to implement the policy.59 In 2008, the government announced the creation of a “National Task Force on welfare, education, training and rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities,” chaired by the Secretary Ministry of Social Welfare and Special Education.60 In May 2009, Landmine Monitor was unable to confirm specific outputs of the task force.

Data collection and management
There is no comprehensive casualty data collection mechanism in Pakistan. Hospital records do not differentiate between mine/ERW survivors and other amputees. Many incidents go unreported by the media, as they generally occur in remote, conflict-affected regions. Landmine Monitor obtains much of its casualty data from SPADO and CAMP, which monitor the media and obtain casualty information through their field operations. They developed a unified monitoring system in 2008, but a SPADO representative told Landmine Monitor that many casualties go unreported.61

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
Mine and battle area clearance is carried out by engineer units of the armed forces.62 The army was reported to have conducted demining operations in the area of Chamalang in Balochistan in 2009, clearing antivehicle mines and other unspecified mines.63 In 2007, the army cleared 200 mines from the Chamalang coalfield in Loralai district after a dispute over its ownership.

61 Email from Raza Shah Khan, SPADO, 11 May 2009.
between the Marri and Luni tribes led to the laying of mines. The clearance operation was reportedly completed without any deminer casualties.64

Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Constabulary and army engineers are said to have also undertaken demining operations in FATA.65 However, the FATA security apparatus does not have the technical capacity or equipment to undertake demining operations and are unable to provide security for mine clearance.66

**Risk Education**

Pakistan has no strategic framework for mine/ERW RE, nor are any organizations providing RE for civilians in contaminated areas. As noted above, there was no evidence of any progress in plans to create a government Training Center for Demining and Awareness.67 In its latest CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, Pakistan stated that its RE situation was “unchanged” since it reported in 2007 that its army engineers were educating people in the “border belt regarding the hazards posed by mines.”68 However, in field research and interviews with aid workers, activists, and journalists, Landmine Monitor was unable to identify any measures put in place by local authorities in border areas to protect civilians from mines.69

In 2008, RI conducted needs assessments in Kotli and Bhimber districts, which showed an “acute” need for RE.70 But it was unable to secure funding, and thus did not provide any RE in 2008.71

RE started in Pakistan in 2000 with one NGO in Bajaur agency (FATA). The number of organizations and geographical coverage increased in 2001 and RE was delivered in Afghan refugee camps, as well as to local communities. In 2006, RE activities reduced considerably, and by 2007 RI was the only NGO implementing an RE program and it worked to leave a residual capacity and train community-based organizations.72

**Victim Assistance**

The estimated number of survivors is unknown, but at least 1,146. There are no specific victim assistance (VA) programs in Pakistan and survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities.

In its latest CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, Pakistan asserted that survivors “are properly looked after” with compensation, rehabilitation, and a disability allowance.73 Since most survivors live in poor, conflict-affected regions, they have limited access to services. Landmine Monitor field research in March 2009 confirmed a continuing lack of the necessary emergency and continuing medical care services in the mine-affected areas of Balochistan, FATA, and Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Seriously injured survivors continued to be referred to hospitals in major cities. Healthcare in the conflict regions deteriorated further in 2008, as NGOs continued to pull out, due to the security threat.74

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65 Interview with Ghulam Qadir Khan, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar, 21 April 2009; and interview with Mohammed Tashfeen, former Political Agent of Kurram, Parachinar, 4 February 2006.
66 Interview with Ghulam Qadir Khan, FATA Secretariat, Peshawar, 21 April 2009.
68 Article 13 Report, (for the period 16 August 2006 to 15 August 2007), Form B.
69 Landmine Monitor field research, North and South Waziristan and other areas of FATA, 15-20 March 2009; and telephone interviews with CAMP, 28-30 March 2009.
71 Interview with Altaf Khan, Risk Education Instructor, RI, Kashmir, March 2009.
72 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
73 Article 13 Report (for the period 16 August 2006 to 15 August 2007), Form B.
74 Landmine Monitor field research, North and South Waziristan and other areas of FATA, 15-20 March 2009.
Military hospitals in the conflict areas reportedly provided better medical care to mine/ERW/IED casualties than civilian hospitals. However, these hospitals were largely closed to civilians, even though some Kashmiri migrants injured by landmines while crossing the Kashmiri LoC were reportedly treated.75

According to the ICRC, “political turmoil continued to hamper access to services in most regions where the ICRC provides assistance for physical rehabilitation services.”76 It added that, “the network of centres providing physical rehabilitation services remained inadequate to meet existing needs.”77

In 2008, the Pakistani government launched the Benazir Income Support Fund, a social security fund to assist poor and vulnerable people.78 The fund will reportedly provide Rs1,000 (US$14) a month for persons with disabilities and Rs2,000 ($28) a month for those with severe disabilities.79

Pakistani law protects the equality of persons with disabilities and provides an employment quota, reserving 2% of jobs for them in the public and private sectors. Employers that do not adhere to the quota are supposed to pay a fine to a disability assistance fund, but there was a “lack of adequate enforcement mechanisms.”80

The National Council for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled provided job placement and financial assistance. It also ran the Pakistan Society for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled, which provided “rehabilitation, vocational training, and some medical support to persons with disabilities.”81

Pakistan signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 25 September 2008, but it had not yet ratified the convention or its Optional Protocol as of 1 July 2009.

Victim assistance activities

In 2008, the ICRC continued to provide support through training, mentoring, and funding for physical rehabilitation projects. Altogether, 5,277 patients attended the ICRC-funded centers and 758 prostheses (39% for mine survivors), 1,078 orthoses (8% for mine survivors), 118 wheelchairs, and 309 pairs of crutches were provided.82 The ICRC also provided 104 grants to persons with physical disabilities in the Muzaffarabad district, who were registered at the Muzaffarabad Physical Rehabilitation Center. The aim of this project was to reintegrate persons with disabilities “into mainstream society by improving their socio-economic conditions.”83

In 2008, the Pakistan Institute of Prosthetic and Orthotic Sciences (PIPOS) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the ICRC to provide free rehabilitation services to persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, in FATA and the NWFP.84 The ICRC provided formal prosthetic and orthotic training to three PIPOS staff in 2008.85

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75 Email from Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Director, CAMP, 17 May 2009.
77 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Zia Ur Rehman, Rehabilitation Manager, PIPOS, 27 March 2009.
CAMP operated a Disability Resource Center in Mansehra, offering referral and a national advocacy campaign in cooperation with the UK-based NGO Leonard Cheshire Disability. In 2008, it provided assistance to 110 people, including three survivors from Bajaur agency.\textsuperscript{86} CAMP also started a Primary Trauma Care Course in collaboration with local authorities in FATA. The training aimed to provide basic trauma care skills to health workers in remote areas. As of December 2008, 100 health workers had participated in the course and seven District Headquarters Hospitals were assisted with mobile Primary Trauma Kits. The center is also authorized to issue disability certifications facilitating access to services available for persons with disabilities. It issued 62 such certificates during 2008.\textsuperscript{87}

Hayat Shaheed Teaching Hospital in Peshawar reported that it had provided 11 prostheses to mine survivors from different parts of FATA on a “no loss, no profit” basis. Financial support for these survivors was provided by the Ministry of Religion’s Zakat fund for humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{88}

In 2008, the Human Development Promotion Group, which has provided prosthetics to some 80 mine/ERW survivors since 2003, announced a new project to assist a further 15 survivors, with support from First Hands Foundation of the United States.\textsuperscript{89} While RI provided assistance to survivors in the past,\textsuperscript{90} it did not do so in 2008.

Other organizations providing services to survivors (and other persons with disabilities) were Helping Hand for Relief and Development,\textsuperscript{91} the Lady Reading Hospital,\textsuperscript{92} Sarhad Society for Rehabilitation of the Disabled, the Hayatabad Medical Complex, and the Habib Physiotherapy Complex, which also continued to run its physiotherapy degree program.\textsuperscript{93}

\textsuperscript{86} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Irfan Ud Din, Project Manager, Disability Resource Center, CAMP, 30 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{87} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Irfan Ud Din, CAMP, 30 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{91} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Iftikhar Shahzad, Rehabilitation Director, Helping Hand for Relief and Development, 20 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{92} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Johar Shah, Senior Technician, Orthopedic Workshop, Lady Reading Hospital, 27 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{93} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Mehboob Ur Rehman, Managing Director, Habib Physiotherapy Complex, 27 March 2009.
Ten-Year Summary

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Russia has not attended a Mine Ban Treaty meeting since May 2003. It has consistently abstained in voting on the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. In the past decade, Russia has used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on its border with Georgia. It is not believed to have used antipersonnel mines in the August 2008 conflict with Georgia over South Ossetia. Russia stated it stopped production of blast mines in 1997. It is not known to have exported any antipersonnel mines since 1994. In November 2004, Russia for the first time revealed that it had a stockpile of 26.5 million antipersonnel mines, stating that it had destroyed 19.5 million since 2000. It has apparently been destroying about one million mines per year since 2005. Russia ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II on landmines on 2 March 2005 and Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 21 July 2008.

Russia is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). The mine problem, especially in Chechnya, remains to be addressed effectively by the authorities. In July 2009, federal and regional leaders pledged to speed up demining of the republic.

Landmine Monitor identified 2,795 casualties in Russia from 1999 to 2008, of which 2,609 (616 killed and 1,993 injured) occurred in Chechnya and 186 (63 killed, 120 injured, and three unknown) in the rest of the country.

UNICEF, the ICRC, Danish Demining Group, and Voice of the Mountains were the most significant providers of risk education (RE) over the last ten years, which was largely focused on Chechnya. A lack of funds has reduced RE coverage in the last three years. Attempts to transfer responsibility for data collection and RE from UNICEF to a Chechen Mine Information Center have been stymied by a lack of local government funds.

Emergency and continuing medical care, rehabilitation, and reintegration services are available for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, throughout Russia, but quality and coverage varies across regions. The healthcare system is reportedly understaffed and suffering from widespread corruption. Benefits for persons with disabilities improved somewhat in 2008, but remained inadequate. Despite legal prohibitions against discrimination, persons with disabilities faced widespread social exclusion.

Healthcare in Chechnya improved in 2007 and 2008, with increased government funding. However, considerable challenges remained, exacerbated by ongoing instability. Victim assistance (VA) in Chechnya improved from 2001 to 2004, with UNICEF support to prosthetics production, physical rehabilitation, and vocational training. However, due to lack of funds, UNICEF has progressively reduced its involvement in VA in Chechnya. There were thus few opportunities for psychosocial support or economic reintegration in 2008.

Mine action, particularly RE, VA, and advocacy in Chechnya faced a major setback with the murder of Zarema Sadulayeva, head of the NGO Let’s Save the Generation, and her husband in August 2009.

Mine Ban Policy

Russia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has often cited the military utility of antipersonnel mines, the lack of viable alternatives, and the financial difficulties in destroying its large stockpile within four years as reasons for not joining. However, Russia continues to express support for the
treaty’s humanitarian objectives. In November 2007, Russia said that “movement along the road towards peace without mine weapons should be realistic and consistent.” In November 2008, Russia repeated the need for progress to be “realistic and consistent.” In June 2009, a Russian official told Landmine Monitor that Russia is committed to the objective of a mine-free world, but reiterated that any prohibition must take into account national security considerations. According to the official, Russia’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty is dependent on “solving a number of technical, financial and other tasks” related to implementation.

On 2 December 2008, Russia abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has done on every annual pro-ban General Assembly resolution.

Russia did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008, or the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings. The last time Russia attended a Mine Ban Treaty meeting was in May 2003.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It submitted a national annual report as required by Article 13 on 30 October 2008. Russia used Amended Protocol II’s optional nine-year extension to defer (until 3 December 2007) its compliance with the protocol’s technical requirements for self-destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms for remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines and detectability for antipersonnel mines. In November 2007, Russia said, “By the end of this year a set of measures to implement requirements of the Protocol…will be nearing its completion.” In November 2008, Russia said it had “fine-tuned and adopted for execution a national system for technical standards of landmines, including [antipersonnel mines] APMs.”

Russia has provided few details about how it is complying with the protocol’s technical requirements. In June 2009, a Russian official told Landmine Monitor that an array of measures have been undertaken including destruction and disposal of outdated landmines and deployment of new mine detection and clearance devices.

Russia ratified CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War on 21 July 2008. As of 15 August it had not yet provided a national report as required by the protocol (due 20 July 2009).

Russia has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction
Russia has produced at least 10 types of antipersonnel mines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POMZ-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production

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2 Russia stated in November 2006 that “a mine-free world remains our common goal. Nonetheless, we have noted on several occasions that our movement towards this goal has to be realistic and gradual, sustaining the necessary level of security and stability.” Statement of Russia, Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2006.
5 Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Moscow, June 2009.
6 Russia submitted a series of declarations with its ratification instrument that will guide its national implementation of Amended Protocol II. For details of the declarations, see Landmine Monitor Report 2005, pp. 854–855.
9 In November 2008, Russia said, “Information on implementation of Protocol II by Russia has been submitted in a question-answer form to the Secretariat of our Conference.” Statement of Russia, Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 12 November 2008.
10 Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Moscow, June 2009.
of blast mines stopped in 1997. Russia has been conducting research on modifications to existing landmines, new landmines, and alternatives to landmines since at least 1997.

Russia has had a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or equipped with self-destruct devices since 1 December 1994. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, but Russian officials have stated, most recently in June 2009, that it is still being observed. Russia is not known to have made any state-approved transfers of any type of antipersonnel mine since 1994.

In November 2004, Russia for the first time released official information on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles, when Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov cited a figure of 26.5 million. The minister forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015. He said that in 2000 Russia stockpiled 46 million antipersonnel mines, but had since destroyed or disposed of about 19.5 million of them.

It appears that in recent years, Russia has been destroying about one million stockpiled antipersonnel mines per year. Russia has provided varying numbers and time periods for the total number of stockpiled antipersonnel mines that it has destroyed. In November 2008, Russia stated that “about 10 million anti-personnel mines” had been destroyed in “recent years.” In November 2007, an official said “around 9 million anti-personnel mines” had been destroyed in “previous years.” In November 2006, a Russian official said, “more than 8 million” antipersonnel mines had been destroyed over “recent years.” In January 2005, a Russian official said more than seven million stockpiled antipersonnel mines had been destroyed.

Russian officials have acknowledged that Russian military units in other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States maintain antipersonnel mine stockpiles, such as 18,200 in Tajikistan and an unknown number in Georgia (Abkhazia).

References:
16 Statement of Russia, Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 12 November 2008. Perhaps contradicting this trend, an official asking not to be identified told Landmine Monitor in June 2009 that Russia had destroyed “more than 8 million” antipersonnel mines during “the last few years.” Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Moscow, June 2009.
20 Tajikistan has reported that bilateral negotiations concerning Russian stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in Tajikistan are ongoing. Tajikistan Article 7 Report, Form B, 3 February 2008. Russia has apparently destroyed the stockpile of antipersonnel mines it had in the disputed Transnistria region of Moldova. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 535.
Use
The government of Georgia accused Russia of using antipersonnel mines during the August 2008 conflict over South Ossetia.\(^{21}\) Investigations by Human Rights Watch (HRW) found that Russian forces fired cluster munitions into populated areas of Georgia causing civilian casualties, but found no evidence of antipersonnel mine use by either Russia or Georgia.\(^{22}\) In a 30 January 2009 letter to HRW, a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official denied Russian use of either antipersonnel mines or cluster munitions in the conflict.\(^{23}\)

Over the past decade, Russia has used antipersonnel mines on a regular basis, primarily in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the border with Georgia.\(^{24}\)

In June 2006, Russian officials confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, both newly emplaced mines and existing defensive minefields, noting, “Antipersonnel mines are used to protect facilities of high importance.” They indicated that forces of the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, and Border Guards used mines.\(^{25}\) In discussions with Landmine Monitor since 2006, Russian officials have not stated that use of antipersonnel mines has stopped. Landmine Monitor will continue to cite Russia as an ongoing and active user of antipersonnel mines until an official denial is made and confirmed by the facts on the ground.

Russia has generally argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop flows of weapons, drugs, and terrorists, and maintained that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II.\(^{26}\)

The Russian domestic media regularly reports stories of bombings and attacks against state structures conducted by insurgent, separatist, or criminal groups in the Caucasus regions of Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and other locations. While many reports referred to “landmines,” it appears that in most cases armed groups used command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), time-delay bombs, or antivehicle mines, according to available information in media reports.\(^{27}\)

Chechen insurgents are considered expert at the manufacture and use of explosives, and regularly claim credit on the internet for the use of command-detonated IEDs and suicide bombs.\(^{28}\) In June 2009, Russian officials told Landmine Monitor that Russia needed international

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\(^{21}\) For example, Georgia provided the ICBL and others with a document titled “Bombed and Mined Areas During Russian Occupation (from 7 August 2008),” dated 26 August 2008, that alleges Russian use of antipersonnel mines in at least eight locations from 7 August to 21 August 2008.


\(^{23}\) “Despite Georgian aggression in South Ossetia, the Russian Federation did not employ the use of cassette [cluster] bombs or antipersonnel landmines.” Letter to HRW from Andrei Kelin, Director, Fourth Department for CIS Countries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 January 2009.

\(^{24}\) For a summary of past use, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, pp. 1,186–1,187.

\(^{25}\) Interview with Russian delegation, CCW Group of Governmental Experts, Geneva, 23 June 2006. Translation by Russian delegation and notes by HRW. They insisted that all use of antipersonnel mines “complies with Amended Protocol II,” that “all necessary documentation for minefields is retained,” and that all minefields “are fenced and the civilian population informed.” Russia has regularly acknowledged using antipersonnel mines in Chechnya in the past.

\(^{26}\) See, for example, Statement by Amb. Anatoly I. Antonov to the CCW Group of Governmental Experts, Geneva, 18 November 2003. The Ministry of Defense has developed guidelines on laying minefields in compliance with the protocol’s requirements. These are taught at the military schools and at special training courses in the armed forces.

\(^{27}\) Statement of Russia, Eighth Annual Conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Geneva, 6 November 2006.


assistance to conduct a full-scale humanitarian mine clearance operation in Chechnya due to the “active use” of antipersonnel mines by “Chechen rebels.”

Landmine Monitor has not conclusively identified any new use of antipersonnel mines by armed groups in Russia since 2007. Casualties from antipersonnel mines continue to occur, but the date of placement of the mine, or who did so, is not certain.

In May 2009, a militia member was killed by a tripwire mine in the Urus-Martan district forest. In March 2009, a civilian in Dargo, Vedeno district of Chechnya, was killed by a landmine that was believed to be recently placed. Also in March, a Russian soldier was killed by a mine while on patrol in the Sunzhensk district of Ingushetia. On 30 November 2008, two Russian soldiers were killed by a landmine near the village of Elistanzhi. In December 2008, it was reported that the Russian military must methodically clear mines, laid frequently by militants, in order to travel on the Elistanzhi-Vedeno highway.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Russia is heavily contaminated with mines and ERW, much of it resulting from World War II as well as conflict in the north Caucasus since the early 1990s. In addition to Chechnya, mine/ERW incidents have been reported in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia. ERW remain an acute problem in Dagestan, specifically in Botlikh, Buiynaksk, and Novolaksky districts.

Mines have been used quite extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the number vary greatly, because there has been no effort to comprehensively survey or catalogue the impact or scope of the problem. In 2008, Chechen officials estimated that 24.5km² of land was affected—approximately one third of the contaminated areas were forest and the remainder was farmland.

Casualties

Landmine Monitor identified 45 mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties (10 killed, 32 injured, and three unknown) in Russia in 2008. Of these, 18 (five killed and 13 injured) were in Chechnya. Twelve (five killed and seven injured) of these were recorded by UNICEF, the rest were identified by Landmine Monitor from media reports. The other 27 casualties (five killed, 19 injured, and three unknown) were from other regions of Russia.

Of the casualties in Chechnya, 10 were men, six boys, and two of unknown gender. Five casualties were military, and the civil status of the remaining 13 was unknown. Four casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, one by an antivehicle mine, two by ERW, and one by a victim-activated IED; ten casualties were caused by unknown devices. The most common activity at the time of the incident was playing/recreation (six casualties), travel (four), handling ERW (two), collecting wood, water, or food (one), and herding (one); the activities of four casualties were unknown. Ten casualties had not received RE; it was not known whether the other eight had.

29 Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, Moscow, June 2009.
Of the casualties in the rest of Russia: five were men; one was a woman; one was a girl; the gender of two children was unknown; and the gender and age of the remaining casualties was unknown. Most of the casualties were civilians (23), three were security forces, and the civil status of one casualty was unknown. Three casualties were caused by victim-activated IEDs, one by ERW, one by an unspecified mine, and the devices causing the remainder of casualties were unknown. Fifteen casualties were caused by an unknown device on Loo Beach, Lazarevsk district, Sochi, which exploded when a girl unwrapped a package she had found.

The 45 casualties in 2008 represent a decline from 2007, when Landmine Monitor identified a total of 53 casualties (21 killed and 32 injured), 44 (19 killed and 25 injured) of which were in Chechnya and nine (two killed and seven injured) in the rest of Russia. However, due to probable under-reporting of casualties, this is not necessarily indicative of a trend.

The total number of mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties in Russia is unknown. Landmine Monitor identified 2,795 casualties (679 killed, 2,113 injured, and three unknown) in Russia from 1999 to 2008, of which 2,609 (616 killed and 1,993 injured) occurred in Chechnya and 186 (63 killed, 120 injured, and three unknown) in the rest of the country. UNICEF reported a total of 3,106 casualties in Chechnya (725 killed and 2,381 injured) from 1994 to 2008. Landmine Monitor Report 2005 reported a total of 5,321 casualties (857 killed and 4,464 injured) in Chechnya reported by the Chechen Center of Catastrophe Medicine between 2002 and 2005. However, it is likely that this total included many casualties of command-detonated devices.

Of the casualties reported by UNICEF in Chechnya from 1994 to 2008, the majority were men (1,894), followed by boys (636), women (442), and girls (134). Antipersonnel mines caused the most casualties (1,030), followed by ERW (913), antivehicle mines (234), and victim-activated IEDs (220); 709 were caused by unknown devices. Most casualties were bystanders/passers-by at the time of the incident (752), other activities included travel (685), handling or tampering with explosive devices (322), collecting wood, water, or food (303), agriculture (221), herding (197), playing/recreation (180), fishing or hunting (19), or scrap collection (13); the activities of 414 casualties were unknown. Only 52 casualties had received RE and 2,084 had not; it was unknown whether the remaining 970 had.

43 Casualty statistics provided by email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009.
45 Casualty statistics provided by email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 28 July 2009.
Landmine Monitor identified 38 casualties (16 killed, 20 injured, and two unknown) in Russia in 2009, as of 16 June. Of these, 14 (three killed, nine injured, and two unknown) occurred in Chechnya; 24 (13 killed and 11 injured) occurred in other parts of Russia. UNICEF provided no confirmation of the casualties that occurred in Chechnya in 2009.46

There were an estimated 15 million persons with disabilities in Russia47 and 110,613 in Chechnya.48

Risk profile
Chechnya continues to be the most at-risk region of Russia, though there has been a significant decrease in casualties, which has been attributed to RE efforts.49 The reduction may also be due to an increased use of gas, removing the need to collect firewood for fuel from dangerous areas.50 Within Chechnya, mountainous areas, forests, and areas where military confrontations took place are the most dangerous. Casualties are usually men aged 15–40 and incidents tend to be clustered in the spring and summer period. People engaged in seasonal labor, such as grazing livestock or gathering wood, hay, berries or wild garlic are particularly at risk.51

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action and risk education
There is no formal, civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. A special committee to deal with mine and ERW problems has, though, been set up within Chechnya, comprising different ministries.52 In 2008, UNICEF continued to act as the focal point for coordination of mine action in the North Caucasus.53 UNICEF conducts occasional, ad hoc coordination meetings, which are attended by Laman Az (Voice of the Mountains, VoM), Danish Demining Group (DDG), and the ICRC.54

Victim assistance
There are no coordination structures or plans for VA in Russia in general, or Chechnya in particular. The Ministry of Health and Social Development is responsible for programs and benefits for persons with disabilities.55 On 19 December 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree establishing a Council for the Disabled, which will develop proposals for implementing government policy on persons with disabilities and drafting changes in Russian law to ensure equal rights and opportunities.56

46 Landmine Monitor media monitoring, 1 January 2009–16 June 2009.
48 Letter from Z.A. Alemkhanova, Deputy Minister, Ministry for Labour, Employment, and Social Development of the Chechen Republic, 1 June 2009.
Data collection and management
There is no comprehensive and publicly available casualty data collection mechanism in Russia. UNICEF has collected information on civilian casualties in all administrative districts of Chechnya since 2001. It uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) through its local partner NGO, VoM, to store data on mine incidents.57 The latest version had been due for installation in June 2007, but this date was postponed until mid-2008. As of mid-August 2009, however, no updated version had been installed.58 Casualties in the rest of Russia are not systematically reported and the media remains the main source of information.

Until 2008, RE activity data was managed by VoM.59 This data was shared at the coordination meetings to avoid duplication of effort. However, due to a lack of funds in 2009, VoM no longer collected RE data.60 UNICEF originally planned to hand over data gathering and RE components to local authorities in 2008, but the Chechen authorities were not able to fund such programs.61

Plans
Strategic mine action plans
There is no known strategic mine action plan either for Russia as a whole, or for Chechnya in particular. Since 2008, however, Russia has stated that “planned” demining operations have been “ongoing” in Chechnya.62 Through the end of 2009, it was reportedly planned to clear some 1.2km² of mined areas in Chechnya.63

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
Russia has previously demonstrated insufficient commitment to clearing mines and ERW from Chechnya. In 2009, however, there were signs that this might be changing. On 22 July 2009, the Minister of Emergency Situations, Sergey Shoygu, officially stated that “within 10 days” the ministry would set up “special groups” to demine agricultural land in Chechnya.64 Following this statement, the president of Chechnya claimed that all mines and ERW would be cleared from the territory of the republic in “a short time.”65

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures
On 29 December 2008, the Russian government issued a decree on the use of federal vehicles during emergency demining operations.66 On 10 June 2009, the parliament of Kaliningrad adopted a law governing clearance of mines and ERW left over from World War II.67 EMERCOM has stated that all its operations are implemented in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards.68

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58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 4 August 2009.
65 Ibid.
66 Russian Government Decree No. 1041 “Requirements for transport vehicles of federal service of security, which could be used for emergency demining operations, to prevent terrorist act and illegal crossing of the frontier,” KADIS, www.kadis.ru.
Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Mine clearance continues to be carried out by the federal Engineering Troops of the Ministry of Defense, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialized demining units, EMERCOM Demining, and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks.69

No comprehensive reporting of demining in Chechnya has been made public. For 2008, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported the destruction of 9,085 explosive devices in the Chechen republic,70 while the Russian Engineering Forces from the North Caucasus Military District Armed Forces reported the destruction of some 96,000 explosive devices.71

In April to May 2009, MES deminers from “Leader” conducted demining operations on “Zarya” state agricultural land near Grozny. As a result some 500,000m2 of agricultural land was cleared and approximately 170 ERW were destroyed.72

Before Russian military forces withdrew from the buffer zone adjoining South Ossetia on 10 October 2008, Russian military forces reportedly conducted extensive clearance of unexploded submunitions. Civilians reported clearance by Russian troops in Disti, Kvemo Khviti, Meurneoba, Tirdznisi, Variani, Varianis, and Zemo Khviti.73 They have not reported in detail on their clearance as of 1 July 2009, although statements to the CCW cited clearance by EMERCOM personnel of 3,000 ERW from 3 August to 16 September 2008.74

Risk Education

In 2008, RE was only reported in Chechnya. UNICEF stated that, “Regardless of the fact that fortunately there is a significant decrease in casualty rate, there is still a need to continue informing people about the existing threat.” However, UNICEF also reported that a reduction of funds had resulted in a decrease in RE activity, and that there was a lack of government programs for RE.75 UNICEF stated that RE efforts had “undoubtedly…contributed to the overall decrease of casualties among civilians, especially among the children in Chechnya.”76

RE was implemented by DDG, VoM with UNICEF support, and the ICRC. Together, they reached 76,324 beneficiaries (21,864 adults and 54,460 children)—a similar number as in 2007 (72,000) but a significant decrease from 2006 (110,000).

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76 Email from Eliza Murtazaeva, UNICEF, 4 August 2009.
Risk education activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographical location</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>RE to schoolchildren, seasonal workers, people reconstructing their war-damaged homes and agricultural workers. Regional festival “Children against Mines.” Establishment of 23 safe play areas.</td>
<td>Groznskiy, Urus-Martanovskiy, Shalinskiy, Nozhay-Yurtovskiy and Vedenskiy regions Safe play areas in: Kurchaloevskiy, Nozhay-Yurt, Vedenskiy, and Urus-Martanovskiy regions</td>
<td>44,324 people, 27,460 of whom were schoolchildren and 16,864 were adults (9,230 men and 7,634 women)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VoM</td>
<td>Direct RE presentations, leaflets, posters, and training school teachers.</td>
<td>Vedenskiy district, Urus-Martanovskiy, Shatoiskiy and Grozny</td>
<td>Some 25,000 people (approximately 20,000 children and 5,000 adults)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Direct RE and support to RE activities: school teachers’ and journalists’ competition, media articles, youth groups, billboards, murals, safe play areas (32 rehabilitated out of 56 built). Microeconomic projects for safe economic activities for families vulnerable to weapon contamination.</td>
<td>Chechnya urban and rural areas</td>
<td>139 teachers, 20 journalists, and over 20,000 children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNICEF monitored the work of DDG and VoM in 2008. In both cases it found increased community awareness after people had attended the NGOs’ presentations.78

A UNICEF needs assessment in 2000 found low levels of awareness about mines/ERW in Chechnya and limited local capacity for implementing RE programs. UNICEF initially sponsored RE programs focusing on Chechen internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ingushetia.79 Also in 2000, DDG started implementing RE within Chechnya itself, as did a variety of local NGOs.80 Since then, DDG has reached out to a wide variety of target audiences, including both children and adults.81 In 2001 and 2002, UNICEF worked with the Chechen Ministry of Education to develop an RE school curriculum, distributing 304,000 RE textbooks and 5,000 teacher’s guides. In 2002, the first 770 teachers were trained in RE by DDG and VoM.82 UNICEF revised and improved the curriculum in 2007. From 2004–2005, UNICEF partnered with the Chechen State Drama Theater to develop RE dramas and deployed teams.

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of instructors to provide interactive RE presentations in rural and mountainous areas. Since 2005, UNICEF has sponsored the creation of RE “focus groups” comprising local officials, medical personnel, education professionals, religious, and youth leaders to increase community ownership of RE provision at the community level. Many of UNICEF’s activities, especially those at the community level have been implemented through its local partner VoM, which was the first local NGO to address the issue of mines/ERW in 2000.

The ICRC has partnered with the Chechen branch of the Russian Red Cross Society, the republic and districts Houses of Children’s Creativity, and local authorities in providing a variety of RE activities, often reaching out to teachers and journalists, as well as constructing safe play areas. Until 2003, in addition to Chechnya, the ICRC also provided RE for the Chechen IDPs in Ingushetia, both children and adults, for the Chechen IDPs and resident population of the Botlikh and Novolak regions in Dagestan, as well as for Chechen children that underwent rehabilitation in sanatoriums in North Ossetia and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Let’s Save the Generation, a local NGO, has also engaged in RE activities, such as distributing materials, producing mine awareness videos, drama in partnership with the Chechen State Drama Theater, and a televised game show.

**Victim Assistance**

There are an unknown number of mine/ERW survivors in Russia. However, there have been at least 2,386 mine/ERW injured casualties within Chechnya since 1994 and 129 in Russia outside Chechnya since 1999.

Emergency and continuing medical care, rehabilitation, and reintegration services are available for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, throughout Russia, but quality and coverage varies across regions. The Russian military has extensive medical experience in dealing with blast injuries. Healthcare is provided free of charge, though according to media reporting, “hospitals are understaffed, poorly equipped and rife with corruption.” A 2008 study on disability in Russia found many persons with disabilities had negative experience with the healthcare system, citing “long queues, large waiting times, red tape and even humiliation…by medical and social examination personnel.”

The ICRC supplied hospitals in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, and Chechnya with emergency supplies for the surgeries of 275 patients. It also provided ad hoc assistance to the Ingush Republican Hospital to help treat casualties of an explosion in Nazran in June 2008. The ICRC partnered with the Saint Petersburg Military Medical Academy, North-Ossetian State Medical Academy, and Chechen State University in an emergency surgery seminar in June 2008, which attracted participants from Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

A 2008 study found that “most individual rehabilitation programmes currently designed for disabled people are totally inadequate....” In October 2008, a new policy on physical rehabilitation came into force, aimed at broadening and simplifying access, and improving the

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83 Ibid.
84 Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, ICRC, 4 September 2009.
85 This includes the UNICEF cumulative total from 1994–2008, plus the injured casualties in 2009.
86 This includes the 1999–2008 cumulative total, plus the injured casualties in 2009.
88 Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, p. 3, rehabsys.ru.
90 Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, p. 3, rehabsys.ru.
quality and efficiency of services. There are at least five major rehabilitation centers specifically equipped to address the needs of disabled Russian war veterans, including amputee mine/ERW survivors. War veterans are eligible for free treatment, including prosthetics, rehabilitation, and psychosocial support. However, service provision was not consistent in all regions. The ICRC provided an orthopedic training seminar to 33 doctors from 15 republican hospitals and polyclinics in 2008.

The European Union (EU) continued to support the Russian government in its “Rehabilitation System: Services for the Disabled” program at the federal level and in four pilot locations: Kostroma, Moscow, and Saratov regions and in St. Petersburg. The project aims to improve disability law, train rehabilitation specialists, and encourage the use of NGOs and companies in service provision. In November 2008, the project sponsored a research conference in St. Petersburg on “Social support to disabled people in St. Petersburg,” which presented a variety of policy recommendations for improving accessibility for and social integration of persons with disabilities. The project also supported the first ever survey on disability issues in Russia, released in 2008.

Opportunities for economic reintegration were limited and President Medvedev admitted in April 2009 that persons with disabilities were particularly vulnerable to the recent economic crisis. While government benefits, including a disability pension, existed for persons with disabilities and for caregivers, they were not adequate to meet needs. Some regions, such as Moscow, had better benefits than others. On April 7, 2008, the federal government issued amendments to the regulations on recognizing persons with disabilities. The amendments aimed to simplify legal procedures for receiving the status of a person with disabilities and subsequent care and support. In May 2008, the Russian government extended additional support to certain veterans with disabilities in 2008, offering a free car or lump sum of RUB100,000 (US$4,040).

In 2008, the Ministry of Health and Social Development continued to support several local NGOs—the All-Russian Society of Disabled Persons, All-Russian Society of the Blind, All-Russian Society of the Deaf and Disabled War Veterans of Afghanistan—in the provision of assistance for the creation of new businesses, job opportunities and rehabilitation for persons

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96 Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, rehabsys.ru.
100 Ibid.

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with disabilities. The EU study found that local disability NGOs were viewed favorably by persons with disabilities and their families.

Employment quotas for persons with disabilities were mandated by law, but employment discrimination continued and there were no penalties for failing to comply with quotas. NGO advocacy reportedly succeeded in convincing some international companies to consider hiring persons with disabilities and local authorities in Moscow reportedly encouraged employment of persons with disabilities.

Russian laws prohibit discrimination against and mandate accessibility for persons with disabilities, but were inadequately enforced. Discrimination was reported in education, employment and services in 2008. The EU study found that persons with disabilities lacked sufficient information on the legal framework for disability.

The EU-supported disability survey found broad acceptance among the general population for inclusion of persons with disabilities. However, the United States Department of State stated that in Russia, “Persons with disabilities were generally excluded from the social and political life of their communities and isolated from mainstream society.” Institutions for persons with disabilities were allegedly “poor, with unqualified staff and overcrowding.”

In May 2008, President Medvedev admitted that disability was “an issue we did not talk about at all for a long time.”

Young persons with disabilities were often discouraged by authorities from attending school. UNICEF and Perspectiva, a local NGO, promoted inclusive education in 2008, raised funds for improving school accessibility, and held seminars with teachers on including children with special needs in the classroom. In March 2009, children and youth NGOs and community organizations wrote an appeal to the Republic of North Ossetia’s Ministry of Construction and Architectural Policy calling for laws mandating accessibility to businesses and public buildings.

Russia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 24 September 2008, but not its Optional Protocol. As of 1 August 2009, Russia had not ratified the convention.

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105 Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, rehabsys.ru.


108 Saratov Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies, “Key findings of the survey on disability and disabled people in Russia,” 2008, p. 5, rehabsys.ru.


Victim assistance in Chechnya

Healthcare in Chechnya received increased federal and local government funding, allowing the ICRC scale down its medical assistance.\(^{116}\) Health infrastructure improved in 2007 and 2008.\(^{117}\) Nonetheless, health needs in Chechnya were reportedly “extensive” and healthcare provision was hindered by ongoing instability.\(^{118}\) Many international humanitarian agencies had withdrawn by 2008.\(^{119}\) There were few opportunities for psychosocial support or economic reintegration. Many persons with disabilities in Chechnya were living in Temporary Accommodation Centers, but, according to Amnesty International, faced forced evictions, even in winter.\(^{120}\)

The ICRC made a donation of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to six hospitals in Chechnya in 2008. It concluded its seven years of support to the Grozny Prosthetic-Orthopedic Center in 2008 and provided training to Chechen prosthetic/orthotic technicians. The ICRC also supported two courses organized by the Pirogov Medical Surgical Centre in Moscow and the Scientific Research Work Institute of Traumatology and Orthopedics in St. Petersburg for seven surgeons and four traumatologists from Chechnya.\(^{121}\)

On 3 April 2008, VoM, in partnership with UNICEF, Handicap International (HI), and several government agencies, organized a marathon for persons with disabilities to raise awareness of the mine/ERW threat and disability issues.\(^{122}\) VoM and UNICEF continued to support a football team of mine and UXO survivors.\(^{123}\) UNICEF also continued to support a network of 19 psychosocial school programs and rehabilitation centers for children traumatized by war in Chechnya.\(^{124}\)

From 2008–2009, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) supported HI in a livelihood project targeting persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, in Chechnya. The project benefited 110 households, all of which had at least one person with disabilities.\(^{125}\)

Due to ongoing insecurity, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) continued to implement a “remote control” program of medical assistance in Chechnya, managed and monitored from Moscow. In particular, they supported the trauma department and reconstructive surgery department for war-injured at Grozny’s Hospital 9, which have benefited mine/ERW survivors.\(^{126}\)

The World Health Organization provided support to two local NGOs, Let’s Save the Generation and Association of Chechen Women Doctors, to provide medical, rehabilitation, and psycho-social support to children and teenagers with disabilities.\(^{127}\) Let’s Save the Generation’s work faced a major setback with the murder of their director Zarema Sadulayeva in August 2009.\(^{128}\)

\(^{119}\) Ibid.
\(^{125}\) Email from Carlos Afonso, Head, ECHO Moscow, 7 August 2009; and email from Omar Gamdullaev, North Caucasus Projects Coordinator, HI, 1 September 2009.
In October 2008, the families of three Chechen mine casualties received compensation of €20,000–35,000 ($36,815–51,541), following a European Court of Human Rights decision that the Russian government had failed to adequately protect them from the threat of mines.129

Support for Mine Action

In April 2008, the MES signed an agreement with the Serbian Ministry of Trade to carry out demining operations in Serbia starting in 2008. Russia was to cover the full cost of the operations, estimated at around $35 million.130 In July 2008, the MES sent 60 demining personnel to Serbia to clear an airfield near Niš and the adjoining area: cluster submunition clearance at the airport began in August 2008.131 Clearance operations continued as of August 2009.132 Russia has not reported a value for its contributions to international mine action during 2008 or 2009.

In August 2009, Russia announced approximately $6 million in bilateral funding to the government of Nicaragua to cover mine clearance operations until May 2010. Of the total contribution, approximately $3 million is reportedly a combination of in-kind contributions of equipment and monetary contributions to purchase equipment, including mine detectors and road building machinery to improve accessibility to mine-affected areas: roughly $3 million will cover the costs of clearing the remaining mined areas. Nicaragua planned to set aside a small portion of the contribution to fund a rapid response clearance team until the end of 2010.133 In December 2008 the rapid response teams had ceased operations due to a funding shortage.134


133 Telephone interview with Dr. Juan Umaña, Technical Secretary, National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional de Desminado), 18 August 2009; and email from Carl Case, Director, Office of Humanitarian Mine Action, Organization of American States (OAS), 18 August 2009. The OAS reported slightly different figures, citing $6.5 million overall funding with $3.5 million to support clearance operations and at least $1.9 million earmarked for equipment purchases.

134 Interview with Carlos J. Orozco, Regional Coordinator, OAS Assistance Program for Demining in Central America, Managua, 2 March 2009.
SAUDI ARABIA

Ten-Year Summary

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has participated in most Mine Ban Treaty meetings since December 2000 and has continuously claimed that it has never produced, exported, or used antipersonnel mines. In 2002, Saudi Arabia indicated for the first time that it stockpiles antipersonnel mines, which it confirmed again in 2008.

Saudi Arabia is not mine-affected, but may have a residual UXO problem, possibly including cluster munition remnants.

Mine Ban Policy

Saudi Arabia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In July 2008, Saudi Arabia told Landmine Monitor that it “is still in the process of studying” the treaty.\(^1\) Officials have said that while it supports the humanitarian objectives of the treaty, Saudi Arabia does not want to give up its option to use antipersonnel mines in the future.\(^2\)


On 2 December 2008, Saudi Arabia was, as in previous years, absent from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 which called for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Landmine Monitor has previously reported that Saudi Arabia has never produced, exported, or used antipersonnel mines but that it stockpiles a small number imported in the past.\(^3\) In July 2008, Saudi Arabia wrote to Landmine Monitor, “Recently the Kingdom has not produced nor exported any type of mines…The Kingdom possesses a stockpile of old anti-personnel mines however; these mines have never been used. There are no stockpiles of American-owned anti-personnel mines inside the Kingdom.” It went on to note that it has “a number of legislations and procedures…that regulate importing, producing and storing anti-personnel mines.”\(^4\)

Saudi Arabia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons but has yet to join its Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. As of 1 July 2009, Saudi Arabia had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.\(^5\)

Scope of the Problem

Saudi Arabia is not mine-affected, but some parts are believed to still be affected by UXO, possibly including cluster munition remnants from the 1991 Gulf War. The engineering corps of the Saudi army is reported to have a unit in every region of the kingdom to respond to requests for clearance.\(^6\) No information is available on any clearance activities over the last few years.

Support for Mine Action

Saudi Arabia reported contributing US$1.5 million in 2008 to the UN Mine Action Coordination Centre Southern Lebanon. A contribution of $500,000 was made in April 2008, followed by a $1 million donation in October 2008. In 2007, the Saudi Red Crescent Society donated $200,000 to the ICRC and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies for persons with disabilities and mine survivor projects.

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8 “Donated 200,000SUS for handicapped and mine survivors reintegration, Prince Faysal Ben Abdalah discuss Saudi prisoners abroad with international humanitarian organization and the Red Cross and Crescent,” Alriyadh (Saudi Arabia), 30 April 2007.
Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Singapore’s position on the Mine Ban Treaty has not changed during the past decade. It continues to view antipersonnel mines as legitimate weapons necessary for self-defense, and it remains one of the few mine producers. Still, it has maintained a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines since February 1998, has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, and has attended as an observer all but one of the annual meetings of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties.

Mine Ban Policy

Singapore has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In March and April 2009, Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials reiterated that while Singapore supports all initiatives to overcome the humanitarian consequences of landmine use, it reserves the right to use antipersonnel landmines for self-defense.1

On 2 December 2008, Singapore voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42, calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has in previous years. At the same time, it asserted, “Singapore firmly states that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defense of any State cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines might therefore be counterproductive.”2

An official told Landmine Monitor in 2009 that Singapore continues to attend Mine Ban Treaty-oriented meetings in order to keep abreast of international developments regarding mines and factor that into its policy considerations.3 In November 2008, Singapore sent an observer to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva but did not make any statements. In April 2009, Singapore participated in the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the treaty’s Second Review Conference. Singapore did not attend the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings.

Singapore is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and as of 1 July 2009 had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.4

Use, stockpiling, production, and transfer

Singapore has said that its army only uses antipersonnel landmines for training, but that it must retain the option to use mines for self-defense.5

In March 2009, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official restated that Singapore will not disclose any information regarding its stockpile of antipersonnel mines for defense and security reasons. The official stated that Singapore maintains stringent controls on its stockpile management system and that all mines are destroyed after their expiration date.6

1 Telephone interview with and email from Sharon Seah, Assistant Director, International Organizations Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 March 2009; and statement by Col. Tony Teo, Defense Attaché, Embassy of Singapore, Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, 3 April 2009.
2 Statement of Singapore, “Singapore’s Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.6,” 63rd UN General Assembly, First Committee, New York, 4 November 2008, app.mfa.gov.sg. These remarks are identical to the explanation of vote offered in the previous two years.
3 Email from Sharon Seah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009.
6 Telephone interview with and email from Sharon Seah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 March 2009.
Singapore has long acknowledged that it produces antipersonnel mines, but officials have declined to reveal if production lines are currently running.\(^7\)

Singapore declared an indefinite moratorium on the export of all antipersonnel mines in February 1998.\(^8\) In April 2009, a defense official confirmed that the moratorium remains in place.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) Singapore is known to have produced two types of antipersonnel mines: a plastic blast mine (VS-50) and a bounding fragmentation mine (VS-69), both copies of Italian designs. Singapore Technologies Engineering (STE), through its subsidiary Singapore Technologies Kinetics, is the government-linked company that produces antipersonnel mines. Norway, New Zealand, and the Netherlands have ordered government investment funds to withdraw any investments in STE due to its involvement in landmine production. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2007*, p. 975, and *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 645.

\(^8\) Email from Sharon Seah, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009.

\(^9\) Statement by Col. Tony Teo, Embassy of Singapore, Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, 3 April 2009.
SOMALIA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
<th>Not a State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, UXO, AXO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 1,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Spot clearance of ERW only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>$0.8 million (2007: $6.3 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

There has been continuous conflict in Somalia, including use of antipersonnel mines by various factions, throughout most of the past decade. Since 2002, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia has published a number of reports with allegations of the transfer of antipersonnel mines to various Somali parties from a number of countries, including Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Eritrea and Ethiopia. From 2002 to 2005, 17 Somali factions signed the NGO Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel mines.

Landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) affect Somalia as a result of internal and international conflicts which have taken place in the country since 1964. The Landmine Impact Survey identified 35 impacted communities in nine districts in the Puntland area and a further 90 impacted communities in Sanaag and Sool regions. The extent of the problem in southern Somalia is less well known. There is no centralized mine action program in Somalia. In 2008, clearance of ERW was coordinated through mine action centers in Baidoa in south central Somalia and Garowe in the northeast of the country.

Landmine Monitor has identified 2,354 mine/ERW casualties (832 killed, 1,405 injured, and 117 unknown) in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) between 1999 and 2008. Risk education during that period has been sporadic and largely ad hoc, especially in the south of the country.

There are no specific victim assistance policies or activities in Somalia. The health care situation continued to deteriorate in 2008 and there was little capacity to provide emergency surgery or trauma care outside of Mogadishu. Rehabilitation and healthcare facilities are difficult to access and there was very little psychosocial or economic support for mine/ERW survivors.

Background

The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Somali Republic was created under a 2004 charter; since then it has been engaged in various levels of armed conflict. Since early 2007, al-Shabaab (the Youth) and other armed groups have carried out attacks and at times engaged in intense fighting against government forces, Ethiopian troops, and the African Union peacekeeping mission to Somalia (AMISOM). In September 2007, a number of other

\[1\] In January 2004, leaders of many Somali groups signed an agreement to adopt a Transitional Federal Charter under the Intergovernmental Authority on Development-facilitated process in Nairobi, Kenya. The charter provides the legal framework for a five-year transitional period of government in Somalia. The charter, government, and parliament make up the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia.
opposition groups created a formal coalition, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS).\(^2\) In February 2009, after signing a peace agreement with and incorporating the ARS into the government, the TFG became the Government of National Unity (GNU). As of June 2009, al-Shabaab and another group, Hezbul Islam, continued to fight against the GNU, including in Mogadishu.\(^3\)

**Mine Ban Policy**

Somalia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Prime Minister attended as an observer the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nairobi in November–December 2004 where he stated the TFG’s intention to outlaw antipersonnel mines.\(^4\) The government did not attend any Mine Ban Treaty meetings in 2008 or 2009.

Somalia was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 in December 2008 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It voted in favor of a similar annual resolution for the first time in December 2007.

Somalia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008, but had not yet ratified as of 1 July 2009.\(^5\)

Several Somali factions have renounced use of antipersonnel landmines by signing the Deed of Commitment administered by Geneva Call. Most of these signatories are members of the Transitional Federal Institutions (government and parliament), but some may also continue to control independent militia forces and territory.\(^6\)

In June 2009, Geneva Call and the Puntland Mine Action Center (PMAC), the institution responsible for mine action in the northern Somali region of Puntland (see Program Management and Coordination section below), held a workshop on implementation of the Deed of Commitment. Participants included the President of Puntland and representatives from the Inter-Ministerial Commission for Mine Action, the House of Representatives, the Puntland military, UN agencies, and mine action NGOs.\(^7\) The meeting reviewed progress in implementing the Deed of Commitment in Puntland and explored future actions to fulfill the obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^8\)

**Production and stockpiling**

Somalia has never been known to manufacture landmines, but mines are thought to be widely available (see Transfer section below). Most factions involved in armed conflict in Somalia are believed to possess landmines.\(^9\) Demobilizing militias have turned in landmines; photographs of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program available on the AMISOM

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\(^4\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2005*, p. 869. The only other treaty meeting attended by a Somali delegation was the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2005, at which the then-Deputy Prime Minister reaffirmed the TFG’s resolve to accede to the treaty.


\(^6\) Between 2002 and 2005, Geneva Call received signatures from 17 factions. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 1064. Geneva Call informed Landmine Monitor that eight signatories were no longer active. Emails from Pascal Bongard, Program Director, Geneva Call, 3 May 2007 and 12 August 2008, and from Nicholas Florquin, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 26 August 2009.

\(^7\) Email from Nicholas Florquin, Geneva Call, 26 August 2009.


website in July 2009 showed antivehicle mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In June 2008, Ethiopian troops based in Luuq district reportedly seized a vehicle transporting antipersonnel mines, as well as antivehicle mines and a variety of other weapons.

The armed groups in Somalia that signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment have pledged to undertake stockpile destruction. In June 2009, Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere” of the Jowhar Administration informed Geneva Call that it only possessed antivehicle mines. Also in June 2009, United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) chair Hussein Mohamed Farah Aideed informed Geneva Call that it had handed over its stockpiles to AMISOM in Mogadishu in early 2007, and AMISOM then destroyed them. The USC/SNA had previously stated it had 1,800 antipersonnel landmines in its stockpile.

In August 2008, Geneva Call informed Landmine Monitor that the Somali National Front (SNF) had reportedly completed an inventory of its stockpile and had approached UNDP in Baidoa to request technical assistance for stockpile destruction. In June 2009, the SNF told Geneva Call that its stockpiles had been moved to Dolow in the Gedo region and that it needed technical and financial support for their destruction.

On 24 July 2008, PMAC destroyed 48 stockpiled PMP-71 antipersonnel mines near Garowe on behalf of the Puntland authorities. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) provided technical assistance to PMAC. In April 2009, MAG and a Puntland police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team destroyed 78 Pakistani-made P4 antipersonnel mines in Bosasso. The Juba Valley Alliance and Rahamweyn Resistance Army previously stated to Geneva Call that they possessed antipersonnel mines, but did not reveal the types or numbers or any action taken to destroy them.

Transfer

Since 2002, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia has published a number of reports containing allegations of the transfer of antipersonnel and other mines from a number of countries to various Somali parties. The most recent report was submitted on 10 December 2008. Neither that report, nor the two previous ones (24 April 2008 and 18 July 2007) make new allegations of transfers of antipersonnel mines from states into Somalia. In response to past claims by the UN
Monitoring Group, the Presidents of the Seventh and Eighth Meetings of States Parties wrote to the chair of the group for clarification and further information of relevant evidence presented in reports, including seeking further details on the specific types of mines allegedly transferred.\(^{23}\) As of July 2009, no response to either request, or further progress in analyzing the Monitoring Group’s allegations, had been reported.

In February 2009, it was reported that the Russian Navy had captured three boats of “Somali pirates” smuggling arms in the Indian Ocean, and a spokesperson cited landmines (type unspecified) among the weapons seized.\(^{24}\)

Landmines are evidently still being bought and sold at arms markets in Somalia.\(^{25}\) In June 2009, Reuters reported the continued sale of landmines and other weapons at markets in Mogadishu. It said that one dealer claimed to sell landmines (type unspecified, but likely antivehicle) for approximately US$100 apiece.\(^{26}\)

**Use**

Landmine Monitor has not identified any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines from May 2008 to May 2009 by government forces or any of the non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in Somalia. NSAGs continued to use IEDs in large numbers, with media sources often referring to command-detonated bombs and IEDs as “landmines.” While all victim-activated mines and other explosive devices are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, command-detonated mines and devices are not. Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports indicates that most, if not all, of the explosive attacks attributed to landmines were command-detonated devices.

For 2008, the Somali NGO Security Preparedness and Support Program (SPAS) reported at least 84 incidents (including seizures and recoveries, as well as attacks) involving “landmines,” resulting in 237 casualties. None involved use of victim-activated antipersonnel mines, although there were nine incidents involving IEDs without reported remote-control capabilities.\(^{27}\)

In March 2009, GNU Interior Minister Sheikh Abdulkadir Ali Omar reportedly suffered minor injuries when an explosive device detonated in the Bakaraaha market, killing one of his bodyguards and injuring another.\(^{28}\) Although the media reported the device as a “landmine,” the type of explosive device could not be confirmed.

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Landmines and explosive remnants of war—both abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and UXO—affect many parts of Somalia.\(^{29}\) In a March 2007 evaluation (see Program evaluations section below), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) concluded that ERW were “very widespread” and, in most of the country, “constitute a greater threat than do minefields.”\(^{30}\)

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\(^{25}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 1,003–1,005, for details. In April 2008, the Monitoring Group stated that mines (type unspecified) were purchased at Arjantin or other arms markets in 2007 and 2008, by al-Shabaab and representatives of Somali clans. The report also stated that at the Arjantin arms market or other arms markets, mines (type unspecified) were sold in 2008 by TFG military officers, the Somali National Security Agency and Mohamed Omar Habeeb “Dheere.”


\(^{27}\) Incident and casualty data taken from SPAS weekly reports for calendar year 2008, www.somaliangoconsortium.org.


Two phases of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) have been conducted in the regions of Puntland (in 2004–2005), and Sool and Sanaag (in 2007). In total, 125 communities were found to be impacted by 263 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). Roads and pastures are most heavily contaminated in terms of land of socio-economic value. The communities in Sanaag and Sool under the jurisdiction of the Somaliland Mine Action Center are being resurveyed by the British NGO HALO Trust. HALO planned to complete the survey in September 2009.

No LIS has been undertaken for south central Somalia, but surveys undertaken in four districts in 2008 indicate a contamination level of 10% of all communities, a lower rate than found elsewhere in Somalia. The office of the UN mine action team in Somalia reported that the survey did not include Mogadishu where fighting has been the most severe and it is believed the final results will show that contamination is scattered across south central Somalia. In Bay region, for example, 26 communities in Baidoa district were found to be contaminated, a number much higher than in the other surveyed areas.

Fighting between Ethiopian troops—who entered the country in 2007 in support of the TFG—and non-state armed groups added to the contamination in the south, and media reports have attested to the use of roadside bombs, IEDs, and mines, as well as to resultant casualties. Danish Demining Group (DDG), a demining NGO operating in Somalia, has conducted surveys in Mogadishu which found that some parts of the city have a serious UXO problem. According to David Bax, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Mine Action Programme Manager, “communities in South Central Somalia are exposed to large quantities of Explosive Remnants of War…and the socio-economic impact on the local population is immeasurable.” Fighting continued in central Somalia and Mogadishu as of June 2009, with heavy artillery bombardment of urban areas.

Casualties
Landmine Monitor identified 116 mine/ERW casualties (39 killed and 77 injured) in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) in 2008.

Of the total for Somalia, PMAC identified 58 mine/ERW casualties (17 killed and 41 injured) in the Puntland region in 2008. The majority of these casualties were boys (30), followed by adult men (17), girls (nine), and women (two). This data lacked details on device type, civil status, and/or activity at the time of the incident. According to UNMAS, the majority of casualties were caused by ERW.

The remaining 58 casualties (22 killed and 36 injured) were identified by Landmine Monitor using data from media, UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), and SPAS reports covering the south and central regions of the country. The South Central Mine Action Center

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33 Email from Neil Ferrao, Programme Manager, HALO, 21 May 2009. Somaliland is covered in a separate chapter in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
35 Email from Tammy Orr, Program Officer, Mine Action Somalia, UNMAS, 26 June 2009. Data is taken from the UN Somalia Mine Action Team’s IMSMA database for south central Somalia.
38 Formerly, David Bax was the UNDP Chief Technical Advisor for mine action in Somalia.
39 Email from David Bax, UNDP, 30 April 2008.
41 Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.
43 Landmine Monitor media monitoring for calendar year 2008.
(SCMAC), which covers the south central region of the country, identified six casualties (three killed and three injured) in the south and central regions of Somalia in 2008. No further details on these casualties were available and there was no way to tell if the SCMAC figures overlapped with media, UNDSS, and SPAS figures. SCMAC figures were thus not included in Landmine Monitor Report 2008 casualty figures. Likewise, the Somalia Red Crescent Society (SRCS) reported 58 injured mine casualties in 2008 (18 injured casualties reported at Howlwadag branch clinic and three at Isha branch clinic in Baidoa; 11 at Farjanno branch clinic in Kismayo; five at Lafole, four at Km-13; and two at T-da emergency branch clinics in Mogadishu; and one at Bal’ad branch clinic). However, it was not possible to determine whether these casualties overlapped with the Landmine Monitor figures above.

The 116 casualties identified in 2008 represents an increase compared with 2007, when Landmine Monitor identified 74 casualties (26 killed, 40 injured, and eight unknown). Given the lack of systematic data collection, this should not be necessarily considered indicative of a trend. Landmine Monitor has identified 2,354 mine/ERW casualties (832 killed, 1,405 injured, and 117 unknown) in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) between 1999 and 2008. PMAC was able to provide cumulative data (lacking details of device type, civil status, or activity) for 207 of these mine/ERW casualties (71 killed and 136 injured) between 2005 and 2008. SCMAC was able to provide cumulative data (lacking details of device type, civil status, gender, or activity) for 18 of these mine/ERW casualties (12 killed and six injured) between 2005 and 2008. At the end of 2008, SCMAC’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database had a total of 96 casualties (50 killed and 46 injured) with varying amounts of detail. The earliest incident recorded was in 1996 but some records are missing the dates of the incidents.

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with Landmine Monitor identifying 25 casualties (eight killed and 17 injured), as of 31 May. PMAC recorded 17 casualties (five killed and 12 injured) and SCMAC recorded four (two killed and two injured), as of 31 May. An additional four casualties (one killed and three injured) were reported by UNMAS in an ERW incident at Baidoa market. The ICRC identified 33 “cases of explosive ordnance related incidents from our two hospitals in Mogadishu” in January–May 2009, but did not have information about whether incidents involved victim-activated or command-detonated devices.

Risk profile

In Puntland, most casualties are male adults engaged in herding or traveling. A knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP) survey found that men and older people had a better knowledge and understanding of the risk, and recommended targeting females and younger people with risk education messages. In south central Somalia people are most at risk from ERW, including AXO, mainly in urban centers, in particular Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Dhusa Mareb. Particular risk groups include children playing, adult men harvesting explosives, women street cleaners in Mogadishu, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and nomads.
Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

There is no centralized mine action program in Somalia. A number of UN agencies are involved in supporting mine action in Somalia, known collectively as the UN Mine Action Team. UNDP Somalia Mine Action (executed by the UN Office for Project Services, UNOPS), headquartered in Nairobi, provides assistance to authorities in Somalia through the UNDP multiyear Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme. Since 6 February 2009, UNMAS has been the lead agency for mine action in south central Somalia. After many years of UNDP facilitating UN activities it was recognized that under the prevailing security situation it would be unrealistic for it to continue implementing mine action activities in south central Somalia. Consequently, the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia formally requested that UNMAS take responsibility for mine action activities in south central Somalia. UNMAS, as a department of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, is accustomed to implementing mine action programs in complex humanitarian emergencies. UNICEF provides support for risk education.

Activities are coordinated through mine action centers in Baidoa in south central Somalia and Garowe in the northeast.

Northeast Somalia

PMAC, which was established by Presidential Decree No. 097/2003 in 2003, coordinates and facilitates mine action activities, including risk education (RE), in Puntland. PMAC is directly supported both financially and operationally by UNDP. An interministerial committee provides governmental oversight and supervision: it consists of the ministries of interior, planning, health, education, information, and justice.

South central Somalia

In 2008, the UN Mine Action Team in Somalia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the TFG on mine action in collaboration with Ministry of Home Affairs and Internal Security, and the SCMAC was established in Baidoa. The Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) began conducting surveys, RE, and EOD in collaboration with UNDP Somalia Mine Action in the region. Surveys were conducted in 791 villages in Bakol, Bay, Gedo, and Hiran regions. Approximately one in 10 (a total of 79) villages were found to be contaminated. The mine and ERW-affected villages are in the districts of Baidoa, Bioley, Huddur, Qansah Dere, and Wajid. RE is also coordinated by SCMAC.

Risk education

Capacity development and support in managing RE was provided to SCMAC and PMAC by UNDP Somalia Mine Action through an in-kind SRSA technical advisor. In addition, Handicap International (HI) provided a four-day RE training course in May 2008 to PMAC staff, MAG, police EOD personnel, and the Puntland Ministry of Security.

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57 Email from David Bax, Program Manager, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.
58 Email from Katherine Grant, UNICEF, 31 March 2009.
59 Emails from Yngvil Foss, Program Officer Mine Action, UNDP, 27 May 2008; and from David Bax, UNDP, 31 July 2008.
61 Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 30 April 2009.
62 Ibid.
63 Interview with Xhevdet Gegollaj, Mine Risk Education Project Coordinator, HI, Hargeisa, 8 April 2009; and email from Xhevdet Gegollaj, HI, 30 March 2009.
Victim assistance
PMAC and SCMAC are mandated to coordinate victim assistance (VA) in their respective areas of operation. However, there are no specific VA policies, strategies, plans or functioning coordination mechanisms.64

Data collection and management
The PMAC office in Garowe manages the mine action database using IMSMA while the office of the UN Mine Action Team in Baidoa manages the IMSMA database for south central Somalia.65 RE data is entered into IMSMA, but it is not complete.66 PMAC has collected information on mine/ERW casualties since 2005 through its regional liaison officers, resulting in what UNMAS called, “a relatively comprehensive understanding of the casualty trends…”67 Casualty information collected by PMAC is entered into IMSMA.

The situation in south central Somalia is very different, with “only sporadic and unverified casualty data.”68 The quality of information has improved since 2007, when the UN Mine Action Team and its partner, DDG, began to verify information in the Bakool, Bay, and Mogadishu regions. However, the “volatile security situation continues to restrict movement, at times preventing verification of casualties.”69 Therefore, there is likely to be significant under-reporting of casualties in the south central region.

Basic data on mine/ERW/IED casualties was gathered in Mogadishu hospitals and in SRCS branch clinics, which are supported by the ICRC. However, the ICRC and SRCS data was reportedly very “rough.”70 Patients are themselves often unable to determine the kind of device that injured them.71 UNDSS in Somalia72 and SPAS73 also collected data on mine/ERW/IED incidents, along with other security information. They also were not always able to distinguish between victim-activated and command-detonated devices.74

Plans
Strategic mine action plan
The UN has stated that its mine action program works to ensure that all mine action activities in Somalia are implemented according to the 2006–2010 UN Inter-Agency Strategy. The project is headquartered in Nairobi with staff rotating between there and the three regions of Somalia. As a consequence of the differing security, development, and capacity issues in Puntland and south central Somalia, the strategy for mine action in each region is distinct.75 The short-term strategy (2009–2010) is to strengthen support and technical assistance for PMAC to develop its coordination capacities across all five pillars of mine action. New EOD teams will also be trained, equipped, and capable of conducting EOD under the supervision of technical advisors.76 In the medium-term (2010–2012), technical assistance and capacity development support to PMAC will be scaled down. In the long-term it is planned that PMAC

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64 Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.
66 Email from Noe Falk Nielsen, UNDP/SRSA, 26 June 2009.
67 Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Email from and telephone interview with Hugo van den Eertwegh, ICRC, 29 June 2009.
71 Interview with Dr. Ahmed M. Hassan, President, SRCS, and Afi Abdulkadir Ibrahim, Communication Officer, SRCS, Nairobi, 30 March 2009.
74 Landmine Monitor analysis of SPAS and UNDSS data.
will operate independently to deal with the residual mine and ERW problem with only minor monitoring assistance to ensure quality control.\textsuperscript{77}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{National operators} & \textbf{EOD} & \textbf{RE} & \textbf{Casualty data collection} & \textbf{VA} \\
\hline
Pun'land police & x & x & x & \\
Somali Demining and UXO Action Group Center & & x & & \\
\hline
\textbf{International operators} & \textbf{EOD} & \textbf{RE} & \textbf{Casualty data collection} & \textbf{VA} \\
\hline
Abilis Foundation & & & x & \\
HI & x & & & \\
ICRC & & & x & \\
MAG & x & x & & \\
SRSA & x & x & x & x \\
Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims Aid & & & x & \\
UNDP Somalia Mine Action & x & x & x & x \\
UNICEF & & & x & \\
UNMAS & x & x & x & x \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Mine action program operators}
\end{table}

Until the security situation in south central Somalia stabilizes and a more permissive operational environment emerges it is not possible to determine the level of activities that can be undertaken. As a result the mine action program operates with a high degree of flexibility.\textsuperscript{78} The primary aim for 2009 was to support the SCMAC and clearance capacities. This includes developing capacities to undertake high-priority clearance, continually training EOD teams, and enhancing the capacities of existing \textit{ad hoc} survey, RE, and emergency medical teams.\textsuperscript{79} It was also planned, depending on the security situation, to provide assistance to AMISOM to enhance their EOD capacities; this initiative had begun by June (see Demining and battle area clearance in 2008 section below).\textsuperscript{80}

There are no national standards or a strategy for RE.\textsuperscript{81} UNDP Somalia Mine Action has developed their own RE plan which consists of three main activities: transfer of the UNDP national RE coordinator and some UNDP/SRSA facilitators to the SCMAC as RE implementation staff, implementing direct RE activities in all areas of south central Somalia, and ensuring the sustainability of RE activities by training local RE community focal points in all targeted areas.\textsuperscript{82} The transfer of RE teams to SCMAC had not taken place as of June 2009.\textsuperscript{83}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Interview with Noe Falk Nielsen, UNDP/SRSA, Nairobi, 4 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{82} Noe Falk Nielsen, “Mine Risk Education Project Somalia,” SRSA, 4 March 2009, pp. 18–19.
\textsuperscript{83} Email from Noe Falk Nielsen, UNDP/SRSA, 26 June 2009.
\end{flushright}
Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
A GICHD evaluation in 2007 (see Program evaluations section below) concluded that mine action contributes to other pillars of international support to Somalia. It stated that by clearing pastureland and traditional migration routes, mine clearance enhances livelihoods and reduces vulnerability for pastoralists. In this regard, all aspects of mine action could be viewed simply as public services, the effective delivery of which restores public confidence in the state and its organs.84

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
In the absence of effective national governance, commitment to mine action in Somalia has been demonstrated through agreements between local officials, the UN, and Geneva Call. Despite several years of UN assistance to mine action in Puntland, PMAC is not yet ready to take full ownership of mine action in this region. In a letter to Geneva Call on 10 January 2007, however, the Vice President of Puntland Hassan Dahir Mohamud reiterated Puntland’s commitment to banning landmines and reducing the risks from mines.85

National management
In the absence of a functioning central government, the UN maintains de facto responsibility for coordinating, planning, managing, and monitoring mine action activities on behalf of the TFG and the Puntland and Somaliland authorities.86

National mine action legislation
PMAC was established by presidential decree in 2003, which formally makes it responsible for mine action in Puntland.87 Mine action legislation has not been passed in south central Somalia.

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
Police EOD teams follow standing operating procedures developed by MAG.88

Program evaluations
From March–April 2007, GICHD conducted an evaluation of European Commission (EC)-funded mine action in Africa, including Somalia.89 GICHD recommended that UNDP/UNOPS should assist PMAC in revising its mine action strategy and continue capacity development of core local capacities (while formulating an exit strategy). As already noted, some of these recommendations are now being acted upon by the UN (see Strategic mine action planning section above).

The evaluation also recommended that HALO consider initiating mine clearance in Puntland, focusing on the larger minefields in the border regions of northern Mudug.90 HALO has indicated that it is considering a move into Puntland, once most of the high- and medium-priority SHAs in HALO’s current area of operations in Somaliland are completed and the security situation allows for safe operations.91

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
Police teams undertake EOD activities in Puntland and south central Somalia under direct supervision by MAG. In Puntland, EOD operations are coordinated with UNDP, and in south central Somalia, activities are supervised by SRSA and coordinated with UNDP/UNMAS.92 SRSA staff provide in-kind support to UNDP Somalia Mine Action.93

85 Letter from Hassan Dahir Mohamud, Vice President of Puntland, to Geneva Call, 10 January 2007.
87 Puntland Region Presidential Decree No. 79, dated 13 July 2003.
88 Email from John McFarlane, Team Leader, MAG, 26 June 2009.
89 Email from Ted Paterson, Head of Evaluation Section, GICHD, 21 May 2007.
91 Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 21 May 2009.
93 Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 26 June 2009.
No mine clearance has occurred in Somalia since the Puntland LIS was conducted in 2004–2005. The priorities have been training police EOD units, conducting EOD and, since 2007, seeking to establish a mine action program in south central Somalia.94

In 2008, MAG trained six members of the Puntland police in basic EOD. The police EOD team is supported financially by UNDP Somalia Mine Action. MAG also trained nine members of the Puntland police and military (the Darawish) as EOD team medics. In June 2009, MAG planned to assess the six EOD police personnel to determine if they are qualified to become EOD Level 2 operators.95

In May 2008, MAG, in collaboration with UNDP, started a Conventional Weapons Management and Destruction (CWMD) project in Puntland with funding from the United States Department of State. As part of the project MAG established a basic explosives and UXO warehouse and improved the Central Demolition Site in Garowe.96

SRSA conducted a basic EOD course for Somali police officers in Baidoa, south central Somalia, in January–April 2008. Following the training, 17 men and four women graduated as EOD operators, trained to International Mine Action Standards Level 2. Three EOD teams, including the four women graduates, were then based in Baidoa.97

**Demining and battle area clearance in 2008**

In 2008, in Puntland, the Puntland EOD police team disposed of “visible ammunition.” Under the MAG project, a total of 2,594 ERW were disposed of in 45 EOD tasks.98

No mine clearance was possible either in south central Somalia due to the ongoing conflicts.99 UXO spot clearance in and around Mogadishu, however, was reported as being carried out by AMISOM troops from Burundi and Uganda.100 Also in 2008, DDG marked for safe disposal 264 ERW, completed 57 dangerous area reports in IMSMA format, updated ERW threat maps for Mogadishu, and facilitated the disposal of 56 items of UXO by AMISOM.101 DDG teams also found two landmines in a former military bunker in an IDP camp near Arbis in the Afgooye corridor outside Mogadishu. The mines were not active.102

Clearance efforts in Puntland appeared to gather momentum in 2009. In January–June in Garowe, Puntland’s administrative capital, EOD teams conducted 240,000m² of visual battle area clearance and 1,000m² of subsurface clearance, destroying a total of 109 items of UXO.103

The EOD teams also discovered 100kg of explosives from the 1980s that had been buried in the rubble of an abandoned ammunition storage area. The contents of the storage area were subsequently destroyed with the cooperation of the Puntland authorities. An estimated 1,000 people live very close to the area, which has now been cleared and verified as free of UXO.104

Also in 2009, in Galkayo, a large town near the Ethiopian border in Puntland that has often been off limits because of security concerns, EOD teams found and destroyed 454 ERW from the main police station. The munitions destroyed included 370 new hand grenades.105

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95 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Simon Wooldridge, Project Manager, Somalia Program, MAG, 18 February 2009; and email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 26 June 2009.
97 Email from David Bax, UNDP, 30 April 2008.
98 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Simon Wooldridge, MAG, 18 February 2009.
99 Email from Yngvil Foss, UNDP, 27 May 2008.
102 Email from Klaus Pedersen, Representative Horn of Africa and Armed Violence Reduction, DDG, 5 May 2009.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
In June 2009, through the UN Mine Action Team in Somalia, MAG began training peacekeeping forces deployed with AMISOM in Mogadishu in EOD techniques.\textsuperscript{106}

\section*{Risk Education}

RE in 2008 consisted primarily of emergency RE through direct presentations in IDP camps, to at-risk communities and in schools, and through radio broadcasts.\textsuperscript{107} Training of trainers was conducted for SCMAC staff, national NGOs, and teachers.

The UNDP/SRSA mine risk education officer trained 112 RE facilitators across south central Somalia between April and September 2008. Of these, 38 were selected to be deployed as SRSA RE facilitators.\textsuperscript{108}

The lack of information available constrained the development of an RE strategy.\textsuperscript{109} In Puntland, a KAP survey in three districts conducted by HI found that more than half of those surveyed “used ERW” for selling and making money, and for digging wells, and one-quarter entered mined areas. It found that only a small proportion of those surveyed had received RE, and thus concluded there was a low level of knowledge.\textsuperscript{110}

Security issues plagued RE plans throughout Somalia in 2008 and both national and international staff had restricted access, resulting in delays and reduced activities.\textsuperscript{111}

Specific RE materials have been developed for Somalia by the UNDP/SRSA mine risk education officer and field teams, using a participatory approach and taking into account the low literacy rates, targeting dangerous behavior, and reflecting the greater risks from ERW than mines.\textsuperscript{112}

The UNDP/SRSA mine risk education officer monitored activities in the Baidoa area in August and September 2008 and concluded that RE was satisfactory, and was having a positive impact on risk behavior. The officer identified a need for more RE, using more creative approaches, with increased sustainability through the training of more community focal points. Severe security restrictions and the lack of standards restricted the monitoring of UNDP partner organizations.\textsuperscript{113}

Very little RE has been conducted over the last 10 years in Somalia.\textsuperscript{114} In 2000, UNDP ran a mine awareness program in Somali refugee camps in Djibouti.\textsuperscript{115} In 2005, SOMMAC organized a seminar to raise awareness among journalists.\textsuperscript{116} In 2005, HI produced RE materials for Puntland and trained members of PMAC and the Puntland police EOD teams who then continued to deliver limited RE through to 2008. This activity resulted, for the first time, in communities reporting UXO to EOD teams. In January 2006, GICHD also provided training to PMAC staff.\textsuperscript{117} In 2007, HI launched an RE project in Puntland, and DDG delivered RE messages in IDP camps and Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{118}

\begin{thebibliography}{118}
\bibitem{106} Ibid.
\bibitem{108} Ibid, p. 13.
\bibitem{109} Ibid, p. 17.
\bibitem{111} Noe Falk Nielsen, “Somalia Mine Risk Education Project,” SRSA, 4 March 2009, p. 38; and interview with Noe Falk Nielsen, UNDP/SRSA, Nairobi, 4 March 2009.
\bibitem{114} See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
\bibitem{117} See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1069.
\bibitem{118} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 982.
\end{thebibliography}
### Activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographical area</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP/SRSA</td>
<td>Train the trainers and direct RE</td>
<td>South central Somalia – Baidoa area, Bay region</td>
<td>26,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>RE in child protection activities in IDP camps and vulnerable communities. Life skills-based education and child-to-child clubs program started end 2008</td>
<td>Throughout Somalia</td>
<td>Est. 30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOMMAC</td>
<td>RE</td>
<td>Mogadishu</td>
<td>Not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Emergency RE</td>
<td>Mogadishu and IDP camps</td>
<td>26,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Training of trainers, mass media, materials production and support to PMAC</td>
<td>Radio across whole of Puntland; training courses in Galkayo, Galdogob, Bossaso, and Burtinle; RE materials in Galkayo.</td>
<td>350,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Limited one-off emergency RE in response to one major incident</td>
<td>Garowe, Puntland</td>
<td>80 teachers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora Action Group</td>
<td>Awareness activities</td>
<td>Near Hagar in Lower Juba (southern Somalia close to Kenyan border) at the end of October</td>
<td>Not known</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be 1,405. There were no specific VA policies or activities in Somalia in 2008 and mine/ERW survivors faced the same challenges as other persons with disabilities. The health care situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate in 2008, with NGOs facing increasing security risks. There is little capacity for emergency surgery or trauma care outside of Mogadishu. Rehabilitation and healthcare facilities are difficult to access in remote areas. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) reported that “external assistance is dwindling in quality and quantity due to high insecurity and increased targeting of humanitarian workers.”

With intensified fighting in May and June 2009, Mogadishu hospitals were reportedly “overwhelmed” and “overcrowded.” Medical personnel in the city faced routine “threats and intimidation” by armed groups. The Medina Hospital in Mogadishu reported in June 2009 that it was unable to feed its patients.

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The UNMAS/UNDP Mine Action Medical team, consisting of a trauma nurse seconded from SRSA and eight medics, can provide care for mine/ERW/IED casualties on an ad hoc basis when they are not in the field supporting the south central Somalia EOD operations. For instance, in early 2009, the team provided emergency care at the Bay Regional Hospital in Baidoa to four casualties of an ERW incident at Baidoa market.125 The team also provided support to the Bay Regional Hospital, training staff in first-aid and traumatology and treating some 1,200 patients.126

Following an ERW accident in Garowe in October 2008, MAG medic trainers provided first-aid to the casualties. Through liaising with the Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victims Aid, MAG helped arrange for one of the injured survivors to get further medical treatment in Ethiopia.127

The ICRC supported the main referral hospitals for surgery in both Mogadishu (Keysaney Hospital, run by the Somali Red Crescent Society, SRCS) and Medina. The ICRC provided funding, supplies, training, and supervision. The Keysaney hospital treated 1,209 weapon-wounded in 2008, though none of these casualties were caused by mines.128 A team from the Qatar Red Crescent Society worked alongside local staff at Keysaney hospital but had to be withdrawn for security reasons at the end of 2008. The ICRC also delivered medical supplies to other hospitals around the country and first-aid posts in the Bay, Galgudud, Lower Juba, and Middle Shabelle regions.129

Through its Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD), the ICRC, along with the Norwegian Red Cross Society, provided support to three SRCS rehabilitation centers: in Galkayo (Puntland), Hargeisa, and Mogadishu.130 The centers provide prosthetic and orthotic services and physiotherapy. The ICRC provided training and supported staff to do courses on prosthetics, orthotics, and physiotherapy in Addis Ababa and Somalia. The Galkayo Center assisted 114 patients with prostheses and 79 with orthoses and provided 885 patients with physiotherapy. The Mogadishu Center assisted 188 patients with prostheses and 238 with orthoses and provided 969 patients with physiotherapy.131 The ICRC said that the “quality of services improved in 2008” at the Galkayo Center but accessibility remained a problem, due to security issues and lack of public transport. Production of prostheses and orthoses at the Mogadishu center decreased by 40% in 2008, compared with 2007.132

MSF continued to be the primary provider of free medical services in central and southern Somalia. This included facilities equipped for emergency surgery and trauma care in Belet Weyne, Daynile, Dinsor, and South Galkayo. However, ongoing insecurity hampered MSF’s operations. In 2008, four MSF employees were killed, projects in Bosasso, Kismayo, and Mogadishu had to be closed, and all international staff were evacuated in April.133 In June 2009, MSF announced its withdrawal from the Bakool region, where it had run a health center and

125 Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.
130 Email from Camilla Waszink, ICRC, 26 August 2009.
four health posts, for security reasons.\textsuperscript{134} MSF said, however, that “none of our projects treat a substantial number of landmine victims in Somalia.”\textsuperscript{135}

There is very little psychosocial or economic support for mine/ERW survivors or persons with disabilities in Somalia.\textsuperscript{136} Abilis Foundation provided small grants to local organizations of persons with disabilities for income generation, including the Disabled Women for Bread in Janaale, Technical Aid for Disabled Community Organization in Wanlewey, and Banadir Disabled Concern Organization in Mogadishu.\textsuperscript{137}

Both the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) and the Puntland Charter prohibit discrimination. The TFC gives the state responsibility for the welfare of persons with disabilities and the Puntland Charter protects the rights of persons with disabilities. However, the US Department of State said, “In the absence of functioning governance institutions, the needs of most persons with disabilities were not addressed.”\textsuperscript{138} There was reportedly significant discrimination against them.\textsuperscript{139}

Somalia had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities or its Optional Protocol as of 1 July 2009.

**Support for Mine Action**

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Somalia. The mine action program in Somalia is wholly funded from international sources with the exception of a monthly contribution to PMAC (see below) since January 2004.\textsuperscript{140} UNDP coordinates mine action in cooperation with UNMAS, UNICEF, and other UN agencies, as well as national and international NGOs. PMAC coordinates mine action in the Puntland region.\textsuperscript{141}

**National support for mine action**

The government of Puntland has reportedly contributed SOS1.5 million ($1,095) to PMAC monthly—or SOS15 million ($10,950) annually—since at least January 2004.\textsuperscript{142} The specific uses of the contributions have not been reported.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, two countries reported providing $840,450 (€570,725) to mine action in Somalia.\textsuperscript{143} There are no baseline estimates of mine/ERW contamination against which to measure the adequacy of funds in addressing mine clearance and RE needs. No international funds in 2008 addressed VA needs in Somalia, which remain extensive.


\textsuperscript{135} Email from Susan Sandars, Regional Information Officer, MSF, 23 March, 2009.

\textsuperscript{136} Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.


\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{140} Email from Abdirisak Issa Hussein, Manager, PMAC, 27 June 2009.


\textsuperscript{142} Email from Abdirisak Issa Hussein, PMAC, 27 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{143} Comparison of funding in 2008 to funding 2007 is not provided because some funds reported by donors in 2007 as contributions to Somalia were evidently for mine action in Somaliland, which Landmine Monitor calculates separately. Funds reported for 2008 have been differentiated in greater detail. As a result, direct year-to-year comparisons may not be valid.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Somalia: Monetary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>EOD in Puntland, unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$655,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>Capacity-building, mine clearance, emergency response</td>
<td>$185,450 (£100,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$840,450 (€570,725)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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144 USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2008, from “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” received by email from Timothy Groen, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 18 June 2009; and email from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DFID, 17 March 2009.
SRI LANKA

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mine Ban Treaty status</th>
<th>Not a State Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contamination</td>
<td>Landmines, ERW, abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>79 (2007: 50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>At least 1,158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|Demining in 2008| Mined areas: 4.3 km²  
Battle areas: 164.5km² |
|Risk education recipients in 2008| At least 85,000 |
|Support for mine action in 2008| International: $8,173,696  
(2007: $7,586,350) |

Ten-Year Summary

The Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Both government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) used antipersonnel mines extensively until the February 2002 cease-fire. Sri Lanka has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution. In October 2002, the government announced its willingness to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty contingent on reaching an agreement with the LTTE prohibiting the use of mines. In 2005, Sri Lanka submitted a voluntary Article 7 transparency report. The LTTE resumed using antipersonnel mines in 2006, and apparently laid large numbers of mines in 2008 and early 2009. There were allegations of government use of mines in 2007 and 2008, which Sri Lanka strongly denied.

Mine action has been shaped by the war with the LTTE. Soon after demining started in 1999 it was halted by fighting. When it resumed in 2002, the Sri Lankan Army played the main role, but the creation of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action that year also paved the way for a concerted demining effort, supported and coordinated by UNDP and involving foreign NGOs. The collapse of the cease-fire in 2006 and escalating fighting severely constrained the pace of humanitarian action. The LTTE’s military defeat in May 2009 led to a new government focus on demining as a prerequisite for resettlement of people displaced by the conflict.

Landmine Monitor identified 1,272 casualties in Sri Lanka from 1999 to 2008 (117 killed, 421 injured, and 734 unknown). Risk education has been delivered through emergency provision in internally displaced persons’ camps, the training of volunteers in children’s clubs, community-based organizations, NGOs, and through schools.

Sri Lanka’s health system has improved since 1999, including advancements in the provision of services to persons with disabilities in general and mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors specifically. Awareness and provision of physical rehabilitation services for survivors have increased, although in 2008 there was a lack of trained personnel and resources. The resumption of fighting in 2006 adversely affected the delivery of healthcare in the conflict areas, where the majority of mine/ERW incidents occur. The cost of services, military restrictions on travel, and lack of affordable transport remained primary barriers to survivors accessing services. Government involvement in victim assistance was reported to have decreased since 2006.
Background

In January 2008, the government of Sri Lanka terminated the 2002 Cease Fire Agreement with the LTTE. On 20 May 2009, the government declared an end to the war with the LTTE after seizing all territory previously under LTTE control, bringing an end to two decades of armed conflict between the government and the LTTE, which sought a separate homeland for Tamils in the north and east of the country.

Mine Ban Policy

Sri Lanka has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Government representatives have previously stated that Sri Lanka’s accession was dependent on progress in the peace process, and have linked accession to agreement by the LTTE to forego use of the weapon.

Sri Lanka voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly Resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, UNGA Resolution 63/42, on 2 December 2008, as it has for every annual pro-ban General Assembly resolution since 1996.

Sri Lanka provided a voluntary Article 7 report in 2005. It subsequently indicated it would provide an update, but has not yet done so. In December 2008, an official told the ICBL that due to the security situation and other priorities, Sri Lanka was not in a position to provide an update, but would endeavor to submit a report, including information on stockpiles, during 2009.

Sri Lanka sent observers to the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in November 2008, but did not make any statements. It also participated in the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia in April 2009—the second in a series of regional meetings leading up the Second Review Conference in November—where it made a presentation on mine clearance in the country. Sri Lanka did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.


Sri Lanka has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum, a non-governmental network which previously advocated for an antipersonnel mine ban in Sri Lanka, has not been active since January 2008 due to lack of funding, as well as the lack of response from the government on the issue.

5 Presentation by Brig. Lasantha Wickramasuriya, Brigade Commander, Sri Lanka Army Engineers Corps, Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, 2 April 2009.
8 Information provided to Landmine Monitor by a Landmine Ban Advocacy Forum (LBAF) member in mid-2009. For more background on LBAF, see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 988.
Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

During the height of armed conflict in late 2008 and 2009, both sides accused the other of using antipersonnel mines.9 Landmine Monitor was not in a position to verify these accusations first-hand, as Sri Lanka restricted access by journalists and NGOs to the conflict zone.10

From the beginning of the cease-fire in February 2002 until mid-2006, Landmine Monitor received few allegations and no compelling reports of use of antipersonnel mines by the LTTE, other than command-detonated Claymore-type devices that are permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty. Since May 2006, the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) has repeatedly accused the LTTE of planting antipersonnel mines.11

It appears that in 2008 and 2009, the LTTE laid large numbers of mines in defense of its military installations throughout the north. An SLA representative said that they came across many new mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and booby-traps between late November 2008 and March 2009, including Rangan 99 antipersonnel mines with a motion sensor.12 In April 2009, the SLA was still publicly accusing the LTTE of continuing to use antipersonnel mines.13 The war ended on 20 May 2009.

The SLA frequently reported recoveries of mines from the LTTE in 2008 and 2009.14 In a survey of SLA reports and some news articles between June 2008 and May 2009, Landmine Monitor noted the recovery of 2,264 antipersonnel mines, 22 antivehicle mines, 10 Claymore mines, and 14 IEDs; although this does not constitute a comprehensive accounting. According to one report citing “top defence sources,” during the fighting the military recovered more than 1.5 million antipersonnel landmines from the LTTE.15 It is unclear, but this figure may include mines seized from arms caches and manufacturing sites, as well as mines removed from the ground. Through July 2009, the SLA continued to find caches of antipersonnel mines and other weapons.16

It was reported that the SLA encountered at least two large LTTE factories producing exclusively antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines in Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts, as well as more than 10 makeshift antipersonnel mine production facilities. Sri Lankan national news telecasts showed video clips of these landmine manufacturing plants with huge stocks of raw materials used for making mines.17

For many years, the LTTE has been considered expert in making explosive weapons. It was known to produce several types of antipersonnel mines: Jony 95 (a small wooden box mine), Rangan 99 or Jony 99 (a copy of the P4 MK1 Pakistani mine), SN 96 (a Claymore-type mine), fragmentation antipersonnel mines from mortars, and variants of some of these antipersonnel mines.

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15 “Lanka troops recover more than 1.56 million landmines in North,” The Hindu, 12 June 2009.
mines, including some with antihandling features, as well as Amman 2000, MK1, and MK2 antivehicle mines.18

Landmine Monitor has not seen compelling evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by Sri Lankan forces in this reporting period (since May 2008). There were serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Sri Lankan security forces in 2007 and early 2008; Sri Lanka has strongly denied all accusations.19

In April 2009, Brigadier Lasantha Wickramasuriya of the SLA acknowledged in a presentation at the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia that the SLA had used antipersonnel mines in the past, but stressed that such use was only in the past and that the SLA was not currently laying mines.20 He said the army had used non-detectable Chinese, Belgian, and Italian mines, as well as bounding and fragmentation mines of United States, Pakistani, and Portuguese manufacture.21 Landmine Monitor had previously reported that Sri Lanka had acquired antipersonnel mines from China, Italy (and/or Singapore), Pakistan, Portugal, and perhaps Belgium, the US, and others.22

There is no evidence that the government of Sri Lanka has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It is likely to still have a stockpile, but the size and composition are not known.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Sri Lanka is extensively contaminated by mines and ERW resulting from the armed conflict between the government and the LTTE as well as by abandoned explosive ordnance.

Both sides used landmines, including belts of Pakistani-made P4 mines laid by the SLA and nuisance minefields laid by the LTTE in years leading up to a 2002 cease-fire. The extent of mine contamination worsened after the cease-fire collapsed in 2006, when the government repeatedly charged the LTTE with further use of antipersonnel mines.23 The government also faced allegations, which it denied, that security forces used mines in 2007 and 2008 (see Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling section above).

Renewed conflict is believed to have resulted in extensive new UXO contamination, particularly in the northern Vanni region, as a result of government use of air- and ground-delivered ordnance and LTTE artillery attacks, which reached a peak in 2009 as government

18 Presentation by Brig. Lasantha Wickramasuriya, Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, 2 April 2009. Sri Lanka previously provided technical details of the Jony 95 and Jony 99 mines, which it identified as “produced and used” by the LTTE. Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form H, 13 June 2005. See also, Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,017. Maj. Mangala Balasuriya of the SLA Field Engineering Brigade stated that during the last stages of the war they encountered a modified antipersonnel landmine which used white phosphorus. Telephone interview with Maj. Mangala Balasuriya, Field Engineering Brigade, SLA, 25 June 2009.
21 Ibid. The presentation included a section titled “Types of Mines Used by the Sri Lankan Army,” followed by photographs and titles: P4 MK1 (Pakistan antipersonnel mine); M72 (China antipersonnel mine); VS-50 (Italy AP mine); M16 A1 (US bounding antipersonnel mine, however the photograph shows what appears to be a P7 MK 1 Pakistan or PRB M966 Portugal bounding mine); PRB 415 (photograph shows what appears to be a NR 409 Belgian antipersonnel mine); PRB 413 (photograph shows what appears to be a Portugal M421 antipersonnel mine); M15 and ND MK 1 antivehicle mines; and M18 A1 Claymore mines.
22 In its voluntary Article 7 report, Sri Lanka noted the presence of these antipersonnel mines in minefields: P4 MK1, P4 MK2, P4 MK3, P5 MK1, Type 69 (Pakistan); PRB 413 (Portugal/Pakistan); PRB 409, M696 (Portugal); Type 66, Type 72 (China); and VS-50 (Italy/Singapore). Voluntary Article 7 Report, Forms C and H, 13 June 2005. Landmine Monitor previously identified the following antipersonnel mines as having been used by government troops in the past: P4 and P3 MK (manufactured by Pakistan); Type 72, Type 72A, and Type 69 (China); VS-50 (Italy or Singapore); NR409/PRB (Belgium); M409 and M696 (Portugal); and M18A1 Claymore (US). See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 1,118; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 881.
forces sought to capture the last LTTE positions.24 A UN spokesperson alleged the government used cluster munitions in a bombardment in February 200925 but after further investigation retracted the statement.26

The National Steering Committee for Mine Action (NSCMA) reported in April 2009 that Sri Lanka had 402km² of land contaminated by mines and UXO.27 Even before the final intensive rounds of fighting, however, the government had acknowledged it did not have precise knowledge of the total extent of contamination.28

Sri Lanka’s last voluntary Article 7 report submitted in June 2005 identified approximately 12.6km² of land (308 mined areas in nine districts) known to be contaminated by antipersonnel mines and 141.2km² of suspected hazardous areas (2,341 SHAs in 10 regions)29 but pointed out that this was a rough estimate and actual contamination might prove much less.30 In addition, the government estimated some 99km² of land were affected by ERW. UNDP estimated that at the end of 2007 Sri Lanka had a total of 29km² of confirmed mine contamination and an additional 523 recorded SHAs.31 UNDP, which had recorded 863 affected villages on its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database in 2005, had reduced that number to 394 by the end of 2008.32

The northern Jaffna peninsula, a focal point of fighting before the cease-fire, is the most severely affected area. About half of all mines laid in Sri Lanka up to the 2002 cease-fire were estimated to be in the peninsula and to affect some 228 villages, excluding military-occupied High Security Zones (HSZ).33 However, northern districts of Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya, and eastern districts of Amparai, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee have also been affected by resumed conflict.

Sri Lanka has some 62km² of HSZ—areas near military emplacements, camps, barracks, or checkpoints—often protected by a defensive perimeter of mines. These zones are not accessible to demining agencies.34 After the flare-up in fighting in August 2006, the SLA also put other clearance tasks off-limits to operators because of their proximity to SLA positions.35

Casualties
Landmine Monitor identified at least 79 new mine/ERW casualties in Sri Lanka in 2008, including 11 killed and 68 injured. The casualties included 69 security force personnel, seven civilians including two deminers, and three of unknown civil status. UNDP recorded six civilian casualties, including one deminer: one person killed and five injured in four incidents. The rest of the casualties were identified through media reports.36 These totals exclude casualties from command-detonated Claymore mine and IED attacks. Of all the casualties identified in 2008, 77 were males (73 men, three boys, and one of unknown age) and one girl. The age and gender

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28 Interview with M.S. Jayasinghe, Chair, NSCMA, Colombo, 4 April 2007.
29 Voluntary Article 7 Report, Form C, 13 June 2005.
30 Ibid. For survey results in previous years, see Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1,119–1,120.
31 Email from Katrine Kristensen, Programme Analyst, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Team, Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, 10 September 2008.
32 Email from Floor Beuming, Programme Analyst, UNDP, 9 July 2009.
34 Ibid, p. 31.
of one person was not reported. Antipersonnel mines caused 48 of the casualties, other mines caused 20, other ERW caused three, a victim-activated IED caused one, and the devices causing seven casualties were unknown.

This is a sharp increase compared to the 50 casualties identified by Landmine Monitor in 2007. Comparison with previous years since 2006 may be unreliable, however, due to the limited access to conflict areas and media focus on large-scale military attacks.\(^{37}\)

The total number of mine/ERW casualties recorded in IMSMA from 1985 to 2008 is 1,378 (220 killed and 1,158 injured);\(^{38}\) 920 of these casualties (156 killed and 764 injured) occurred from 1999 to 2008.\(^{39}\) UNDP reported an additional six mine/ERW casualties (two killed and four injured) from 2007 that were not printed in Landmine Monitor Report 2008, due to late verification of these casualties.\(^{40}\) Landmine Monitor identified 1,272 casualties in Sri Lanka from 1999 to 2008 (117 killed, 421 injured, and 734 unknown).\(^{41}\)

The annual mine/ERW casualty rate increased from 1999 to 2001, due to heightened conflict in the north. In 2002, the Ceasefire Agreement was signed and a decrease in casualties was observed. Yet the numbers remained high as a result of renewed civilian movement in the mine/ERW-affected areas and the lack of public awareness about mines and ERW. Clearance and risk education (RE) efforts were cited as reasons for a decrease in annual casualty figures from 2002 to 2005, but with the resumption of conflict in 2006 casualty figures rose again. From 2006 to May 2009 accurate casualty information has been difficult to access, probably resulting in under-reporting.\(^{42}\)

Casualties continued in 2009 with Landmine Monitor identifying five new mine/ERW casualties, all injured, as of May. Of these, UNDP reported three casualties, and the remainder were reported by the media.\(^{43}\) The casualties included three civilians and two military personnel. All were injured by antipersonnel mines in five separate incidents, three of which occurred in the first 17 days of April.

Civilians continued to be injured and killed in remote-detonation Claymore mine or IED attacks in 2008. In the first two months of 2008, the UN Secretary-General reported two Claymore mine attacks killing at least 25 people and injuring at least 10, including 15 children killed and 10 injured. It was noted that the full scale of civilian casualties from Claymore mine attacks and other military offensives is unknown, due to restricted access to conflict areas.\(^{44}\) Landmine Monitor identified 51 casualties from Claymore mine attacks in 2008 from media reports, including 36 killed and 15 injured. Forty-one of the casualties were civilians (29 killed and 12 injured) and 10 were military personnel (seven killed and three injured). The UN Department of Safety and Security in Sri Lanka recorded 1,619 casualties from Claymore mine/directional fragmentation devices from 2006 to 8 September 2008, including 250 casualties from 1 January to 8 September 2008.\(^{45}\)

### Risk profile

People are at risk from both mines and UXO, and recent conflict has increased this risk. The northern Jaffna peninsula is the most severely affected area. People are most at risk in September when harvesting and planting begins. The most at-risk groups are men aged 18–45,

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\(^{39}\) Data supplied by email from Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 13 July 2009.

\(^{40}\) Email from Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 28 July 2009.


\(^{42}\) Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire provided by email from Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 13 July 2009.

\(^{43}\) Data supplied by email from Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 13 July 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring, January–May 2009.


children, and those displaced by conflict, as there are a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), many of whom resettled in 2008 and needed RE.\(^\text{46}\) Around 20% of recorded casualties are children.\(^\text{47}\) High-risk activities include collecting scrap metal, honey, forest fruits, or firewood, and fishing or hunting.\(^\text{48}\)

**Socio-economic impact**

When heavy fighting was still continuing, the UN cited landmines as a threat holding back convoys trying to deliver emergency relief to communities displaced by war.\(^\text{49}\) Since the end of the fighting, the crucial A9 road connecting the Jaffna peninsula to the rest of Sri Lanka has reopened. Yet mine and UXO contamination have continued to pose a major obstacle to resettlement of the more than 280,000 people estimated as of July 2009 to be internally displaced.\(^\text{50}\) Resettlement of IDPs is regarded by authorities as a priority for political stabilization as well as socio-economic recovery from years of conflict and natural disasters, such as the 2004 tsunami. In Jaffna, mined areas and HSZs have imposed severe constraints on the amount of land available for cultivation.

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**

Mine action management as of July 2009 was in a state of transition as the government adjusted to new political and socio-economic priorities that emerged after the military defeat of the LTTE in May.

Since its creation in August 2002, the NSCMA has held responsibility for setting mine action policy and priorities, and for coordinating mine action, mine/ERW RE, and victim assistance (VA).\(^\text{51}\) With the escalation of hostilities in 2006, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and SLA area commanders came to play an increasingly dominant role in deciding which areas were open to demining, approving the allocation of tasks and issuing authorization for the movement of staff, equipment, and supplies.\(^\text{52}\)

In July 2009, however, Basil Rajapaksa, a member of parliament and senior advisor to the President, revealed that responsibility for mine action had passed to the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province, of which he is chairperson. Rajapaksa stated that the Task Force would make all decisions on clearance and that demining operators and donors should submit all proposals to the Task Force, not the MoD (although visas for expatriate staff would still require MoD approval). The Task Force would appoint a coordinating director to each operator to handle such issues as visas and security passes for demining personnel and equipment.\(^\text{53}\)

The NSCMA, as of July 2009, was in the process of transitioning to a National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) and moving from the Ministry of Nation Building and Estate Infrastructure and Development (MNBEID) to new premises close to the Rajapaksa-led Task Force. Draft terms of reference drawn up by an international consultant set out a governance structure for the NMAC and proposed functions and responsibilities relating to operations, quality assurance (QA), information management, and RE.\(^\text{54}\)


\(^{47}\) Ibid, p. 2.


\(^{52}\) Interviews with mine action operators; and presentation by Monty Ranathunga, Secretary, NSCMA, MNBEID, Colombo, 14 May 2009.

\(^{53}\) MNBEID, “Special Meeting on Demining in Northern Province,” Meeting minutes, Colombo, 10 July 2009.

\(^{54}\) Emails from Niloufer De Silva, Senior Program Manager, UNDP, 26 June and 8 July 2009.
In 2007 and 2008, the UNDP Support to Mine Action Project, reporting to the NSCMA, was responsible for identifying priorities, coordinating operations through tasking, QA and quality control, and issuing of completion reports. Under a three-year agreement with the government that ended in 2006 but was extended annually up to 2009, UNDP provided international technical advisors and managed a mine action database.

UNDP provided support through a project office in Colombo and District Mine Action Offices (DMAOs) in Jaffna and Vavuniya. At the NSCMA’s request, UNDP opened a mine action sub-office in the eastern city of Trincomalee in June 2007 to expedite mine action in the districts of Amparai, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee, and another sub-office in Batticaloa in February 2008 to cover the districts of Amparai and Batticaloa. The Batticaloa sub-office has functioned as the key DMAO for eastern Sri Lanka since August 2008 and the Trincomalee office had ceased operating as of January 2009.

UNDP mine action support suffered from high turnover of international staff. Its Colombo-based technical advisor (who acted as program manager) left in November 2006 and was not replaced. A technical advisor stationed in Jaffna also left in November 2006, and had not been replaced as of mid-2009. An international technical advisor recruited in July 2007 resigned in November 2008 for personal reasons. UNDP selected another technical advisor but as a result of delays in government approval of his visa he took up another appointment. Task Force chairperson Rajapaksa said the government had approved recruitment by UNDP of only one international technical advisor and other appointments would be considered in future.

**Risk education**

The NSCMA is responsible for coordinating RE, with support from UNICEF. UNICEF RE staff presence in DMAOs ended at the end of 2007. In May 2008, UNICEF hired an international consultant to revive its mine action program, and he joined in December 2008. Coordination meetings organized by UNICEF at district level to review activities continued to be disrupted by conflict and displacement of local populations in 2008. It was only possible to hold regular meetings in Jaffna. A Technical Working Group (TWG) comprising major stakeholders also held only two meetings in 2008.

** Victim assistance**

There is no government coordination of VA in Sri Lanka. To date, UNICEF has been the coordinator of VA activities in the country.

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57 Telephone interviews with Krishanti Weerakoon, Project Manager, Mine Action Office, UNDP, 23 April and 8 June 2007; and email from Nicola Perera, UNDP, 14 June 2007.
58 Telephone interview with Steven Kerwin, Technical Advisor, UNDP, 2 June 2008.
60 Ibid, 9 September 2008.
61 Interview with Niloufer De Silva, UNDP, Colombo, 17 March 2009; and email from Reuben McCarthy, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Specialist, UNDP, 13 September 2009.
62 Interview with Niloufer De Silva, UNDP, Colombo, 29 July 2009.
63 MNBEID, “Special Meeting on Demining in Northern Province,” Meeting minutes, Colombo, 10 July 2009.
66 Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 23 July 2009.
69 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
Data collection and management

Until May 2009, UNDP maintained the Sri Lanka Mined Area Database using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) at its office in Colombo. UNDP’s sub-office in Batticaloa also operates a read-only IMSMA terminal. In May 2009, management of the database was transferred to the MNBEID. UNDP will continue to support the collection of casualty data and the maintenance of this database.

A March 2009 review by Norwegian-supported mine action consultants, Scanteam, found the database “in some disarray” and observed that “reporting from the field is slow and of varying quality. Decisions on how to report on different phases of mine clearance have not been agreed upon. IMSMA data is not being used, as far as the evaluation team was able to verify, for priority-setting and tasking.” UNDP said the assertion was inaccurate and that data from the IMSMA database was being used for planning, tasking, and monitoring.

UNDP collected casualty data in 2008 through a network of RE operators, including UNICEF, and the NGOs Sarvodaya and Community Trust Fund. Information is gathered directly from community members, local government officers, the security forces, and clearance agencies. UNDP verifies community reports of casualties.

Casualty data collection was affected by stringent security restrictions particularly in the northern Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts. Informal reports indicate that the number of casualties could be much higher than those recorded in IMSMA.

There are no reliable national statistics for the number of people with disabilities in Sri Lanka. The Community-Based Rehabilitation program of the Ministry of Social Services and Social Welfare (MoSS) estimates that 7% of the population is disabled. The World Health Organization, with other donors, provided financial and technical assistance to the Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition to establish a national injury surveillance system, including mine/ERW casualties. The project was piloted in six hospitals, including the National Hospital of Sri Lanka, and there are plans to extend it to other district hospitals.

Detailed RE activity reports are entered into IMSMA. However, by July 2009, entry of 2008 activities was not complete, and data on RE activities by partner organizations in Amparai and Batticaloa districts was not recorded. There is a well-developed system for monitoring RE, both internally by the operators and UNICEF, and externally by the DMAO QA teams.

72 Telephone interviews with Niloufer De Silva, UNDP, 30 July and 8 August 2009; and emails from Niloufer De Silva, UNDP, 26 June and 8 July 2009.
73 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
75 Email from Reuben McCarthy, UNDP, 13 September 2009.
76 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
77 Ibid.
79 Ibid, pp. 21–22; and email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 12 September 2009.
81 Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 23 July 2009.
Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Trust Fund</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kachcheri Child Focus MRE Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Milinda Moragoda Institute for People’s Empowerment</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
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<td>White Pigeon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jaffna Jaipur Center for the Disability Rehabilitation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarvodaya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valvuthayam Mannar Rehabilitation Center</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Swiss Foundation for Mine Action</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Handicap International (HI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizon</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Internews</td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sarvatra</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td></td>
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<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Plans**

**Strategic mine action plan**

Since 2004, Sri Lanka has repeatedly set itself the goal of becoming mine-free, but the deadline for completion of mine clearance slipped from 2006 to 2008 and in that year officials changed their position to say “all mined areas except HSZ will be cleared by the end of 2009.”\(^{83}\) Those targets, however, became impractical in view of the disruption to demining resulting from the revival of hostilities in 2006, the extent of known contamination, reports of possible new use, and the refusal of the military to allow clearance of minefields in and near the HSZs.\(^{84}\)

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\(^{83}\) M.S. Jayasinghe, NSCMA, and Wuria Karadaghy, Senior Program Manager, UNDP, “News First,” Television interview, Channel 1 MTV, Colombo, 4 April 2008.

\(^{84}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 1,016–1,018.
Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

Sri Lanka’s mine action strategy prioritizes clearance that supports the resettlement of displaced persons; reconstruction of infrastructure such as roads, bridges, powerlines, and drinking water supply; and community needs such as schools and hospitals. After a visit by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in May 2009, Sri Lanka also called for international support for demining as “an essential prerequisite to expediting the early return of IDPs.” After taking the lead in mine action in Sri Lanka in July 2009, the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province described demining as “the foremost operation in order to enable resettlement and other development initiatives.”

After security forces regained control of large areas previously occupied by the LTTE in 2006, the government prioritized emergency demining of these areas to expedite its “Re-awakening of the East Programme” aimed at resettlement, reconstruction, and development to rebuild houses, schools, public buildings, roads, and bridges while creating employment and encouraging investment in these areas. In November 2008, the government launched its “Reviving the North” (“Uthuru Wasanthaya”) program which included Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya districts.

National ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

For several years, Sri Lanka has exercised full national control of mine action through the MNBEID, the NSCMA, and DMAOs. In 2009, the government appealed for international support for demining but made clear in discussions with international organizations that national authorities would dictate the scope and location of their activities. Officials compared performance of international demining NGOs unfavorably with those of national and Indian agencies, and suggested donors should channel funding through the government to agencies recommended by the MNBEID.

National management

As a transitional measure towards establishing a National Mine Action Center, UNDP committed to supporting six full-time government positions. Five staff members had been recruited as of July 2009: a Senior Programme Officer for Mine Action, an IMSMA Officer, a Mine Action Secretary for the MNBEID in Colombo, and two Mine Action Quality Control Officers for the DMAOs in Jaffna and in Vavuniya.

National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures

Sri Lanka has not enacted any national mine action legislation. UNDP drafted national standards in 2003 that were approved by the MNBEID in 2005 and published on 4 April 2006. A UNDP technical advisor started updating Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) in September 2008 at the NSCMA’s request to bring them more into line with the International Mine Action Standards but did not complete the task before he resigned in November 2008.

A communications strategy was developed, and existing RE standards were revised in March 2009 (and were awaiting NSCMA approval as of July 2009) with support from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining. There are no national standards for VA in Sri Lanka.

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87 MNBEID, “Special Meeting on Demining in Northern Province,” Meeting minutes, Colombo, 10 July 2009.
88 Interview with Monty Ranatunga, NSCMA, Colombo, 28 March 2008; and Rohitha Bogollagama, Minister of Foreign Affairs, “Counter Terrorism–Sri Lanka Experience,” www.dailynews.lk.
91 Emails from Niloufer De Silva, UNDP, 26 June and 8 July 2009.
92 Interview with Niloufer De Silva, UNDP, Colombo, 17 March 2009.
93 Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 24 July 2009.
Lanka. UNICEF and a number of NGOs have begun working with the Ministry of Healthcare and Nutrition to develop a national VA policy, to be integrated into the NMAS.94

**Program evaluations**

A review of mine action programs receiving Norwegian support, conducted in February–March 2009 found the national mine action program “in some disarray.” The report observed that “the mine action program in Sri Lanka is not presently planned according to good practice standards and processes. The Ministry of Nation Building and the UNDP as its counterpart have little capacity and competence and the mine action database (IMSMA) is not updated and consequently not used for strategic planning.”95 UNDP disputed the findings observing that the IMSMA database had been updated and synchronized and was used for planning and other purposes, including tasking and monitoring.96

The review concluded that “the planning, prioritisation and tasking of national authorities leaves much to be desired and this has a real and negative impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the mine action work. The information provided by national authorities, and based on information from the SLA, is insufficient and hampers the implementation.” It further stated that “UNDP does not have the capacity to support the national authorities and so much needed capacity development in the areas of SOP [standing operating procedure] development, QA/QC and database population and use is not taking place.”97

UNICEF contracted the NGO Motivation Charitable Trust to carry out an evaluation of VA in Sri Lanka from August to September 2008. The focus was to assess VA work over the previous five years, verify the needs of victims, and identify future VA partners.98 The final report noted that although assistance for survivors was “on the right track,” there was a lack of long-term planning, and assistance focused too heavily on the survivors themselves and not on those affected by mines in general.99 Lack of coordination and holistic provision of services also reduced overall effectiveness.100 Survivors identified economic support as their major need. The assessment determined that economic reintegration needed to be holistic and offer a variety of opportunities to be sustainable and to meet all the needs of survivors and their families.101

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

Eight organizations carried out demining in Sri Lanka in 2008. The SLA’s Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU), trained by the US commercial company RONCO in humanitarian demining between 2003 and 2006, was the biggest operator. In addition, demining was conducted by the national NGO Milinda Moragoda Institute for People’s Empowerment (MMIPE), as well as two Indian NGOs, Horizon and Sarvatra, and four international NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD). Some operators worked jointly. NPA suspended operations early in 2008 and in December announced that it was withdrawing from Sri Lanka.102

Sri Lankan and Indian media reports in July 2009 said the Indian Army was about to deploy a team of 500 deminers to assist clearance in the north.103 It was unclear as of mid-2009 if the Indian Army was indeed preparing to deploy demining personnel or if these reports had

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94 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
96 Email from Reuben McCarthy, UNDP, 13 September 2009.
100 Ibid, p. 40.
101 Ibid, p. 34.
confused preparations by Indian demining NGOs working in Sri Lanka to increase staff, many of them ex-army.104

Identification of hazardous areas
No comprehensive national survey of mine/ERW contamination has been conducted: some operators have conducted surveys within their area of operation.105 In mid-2009, as pressure for clearance mounted following the end of the fighting, demining operators—with support from some donors—were keen to undertake survey of areas designated for resettlement of IDPs.106 The Presidential Task Force ruled in July 2009 that “General Mine Action Assessment should be carried out jointly with Sri Lanka Army as Army has much information about minefields.”107

Demining and battle area clearance in 2008
The government reported that demining released a total of more than 168km² in 2008, compared with 162km² in 2007.108 However, nearly three-quarters of the 2008 total was accounted for by the SLA, which mostly conducted emergency battle area clearance (BAC)—often only surface visual checks. Total mined area clearance nearly doubled in 2008, according to official data, of which almost half was attributed to the SLA (see table below).109 In eastern districts, operators cleared 1.14km² in 2008, down from 1.7km² the previous year.110

In the north and the east, from January 2008 through March 2009, DMAO staff assigned 88 new tasks to demining organizations, performed 482 QA visits, and supported local government authorities to release 267.6km² of land, mostly former battle areas, for IDP shelters, resettlement, and other socio-economic uses.111

Escalating hostilities in the northern Vanni region brought demining in the area to a standstill at the end of 2007 both as a result of fighting and tougher security restrictions by the military on movements of personnel and equipment to ensure that demining assets did not fall into the hands of the LTTE.112

Demining continued on northernmost Jaffna peninsula in 2008 but at a much reduced rate because the military only approved new tasks for demining in November. These included survey of suspect land in Uduvil and Tellippallai in HSZ buffer areas that were released after successful court action by local residents.

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104 “80 more Indians fly to Sri Lanka to clear landmines,” The Times of India, 2 August 2009, timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
106 Telephone interview with Gerhard Zank, Desk Officer, HALO, 23 July 2009.
107 MNBEID, “Minutes of the Special Meeting on Demining in Northern Province,” Meeting minutes, Colombo, 10 July 2009.
108 The UNDP database revised the 2007 total, previously reported as 156.25km²; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p.1,021.
110 Interview with Niloufer De Silva, UNDP, Colombo, 17 March 2009; and emails from Niloufer De Silva, UNDP, 26 June and 8 July 2009.
111 Emails from Niloufer De Silva, UNDP, 26 June and 8 July 2009.
112 Remarks by Lt.-Col. B.B. Randeniya, Liaison Officer, SLA Headquarters, 41st meeting of NSCMA, Colombo, 14 May 2009; and NSCMA, “39th and 40th meetings,” Meeting minutes, Colombo, 28 August and 30 October 2008, respectively.
Demining in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Mined area clearance (m²)</th>
<th>Anti-personnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>BAC (m²)</th>
<th>Total area released (m²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SLA</td>
<td>2,004,145</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>121,200,000</td>
<td>123,204,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMIPE</td>
<td>41,892</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>104,070</td>
<td>145,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horizon</td>
<td>102,867</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>29,880,506</td>
<td>29,983,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarvatra</td>
<td>154,971</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,006,180</td>
<td>8,161,151</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>262,708</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5,835</td>
<td>940,105</td>
<td>1,202,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>307,996</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,858</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>307,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>292,854</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,666,195</td>
<td>1,959,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>1,158,514</td>
<td>2,292</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>2,738,712</td>
<td>3,897,226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,325,947</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,420</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,302</strong></td>
<td><strong>164,535,768</strong></td>
<td><strong>168,861,715</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SLA had operated in 2007 with four field engineer regiments comprising a total of 505 deminers but in 2008 it kept a skeleton team of 150 deminers on BAC while the remainder were engaged in military operations.

NPA/HDU, working with the SOLIDAR consortium of NGOs in the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts of the LTTE-controlled Vanni region, had scaled down its operating staff in 2007 from some 650 to about 450 persons. This was because of growing constraints on operations imposed by the security situation, and reflected concerns by the authorities that its vehicles and equipment might fall into the hands of the LTTE. In addition, escalating hostilities brought forced recruitment of some NPA/HDU staff by the LTTE. In early January 2008, NPA suspended operations initially until April but then until August 2008, in the process withdrawing its program manager in July and cutting back to a skeleton staff in Colombo and Kilinochchi. NPA had intended to keep vehicles and equipment in storage until conditions permitted a resumption of operations but in December 2008 announced it was closing the operation and finally shut down in mid-2009. “We have decided to pull out because the authorities have

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113 Interview with Regunathan Umaphathy, MNBEID, Colombo, 22 June 2009; and email from Regunathan Umaphathy, 23 June 2009; MNBEID, “Progress Report on National Mine Action Program Year 2008,” 8 January 2009, pp. 2–10, and 14 May 2009, pp 3–6; and emails from Ramachandran Ajantha, IMSMA Assistant, DMAO, 27 March 2009, 3 April 2009, 8 April 2009, and 23 April 2008. UNDP’s clearance statistics are based on weekly clearance reports filed by demining operators, but are not all consistent with operators’ reports, due to the occasional time lag in reporting to the IMSMA database. No area reduction or cancellation was reported. No agency has conducted clearance operations in the Vanni region since 19 December 2007. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,021. FSD reported that in 2008 it cleared 1,326,628m² of mined area, 3,185,542m² of battle area, 2,485 antipersonnel mines, 217 UXO (and 1,741 other dangerous objects). Email from Marc Bonnet, Program Manager, FSD, 28 July 2009.

114 Interview with Capt. Thushara Jayawardhena, SLA, Mathegoda, 28 March 2008.


made our work impossible,” NPA General Secretary Petter Eide was quoted by the media as saying. NPA handed over all its available assets to the MNBEID.

HALO had worked in Jaffna with two international and 350 national staff in 2007. It continued demining in 2008 but by June 2008 had only five tasks remaining which it finished by the end of the year. By the end of 2008 HALO had reduced its staff to 30. Early in 2009, HALO started to receive new tasks in Jaffna and by February had raised its staff to 144 deminers working with two excavators. In mid-2009, in addition to its operating base in Jaffna, HALO had opened an office in Colombo. In response to the government’s emphasis on clearance for resettlement of IDPs, HALO raised its staff to 300 deminers but as of July had yet to receive clearance tasks.

FSD worked in Mannar and Vavuniya districts in 2007 and later took up operations in Batticaloa and Trincomalee districts, but in 2008 it received no tasks in the north and focused largely on Batticaloa. FSD worked with four international staff, reduced later to three, and approximately 89 nationals, supported by four mini-flails. By the end of 2008, FSD’s engagement in the east was winding down but it had increased staff to 180 in 2009 and thought the number could rise to as many as 300 by the end of the year as the government opened up clearance tasks in the north.

DDG had a total of 430 staff in 2007, including 280 in Jaffna and the remainder in Trincomalee but, like HALO, had to reduce its staff in Jaffna in 2008 due to lack of tasking and funding. It increased its operation in Trincomalee, adding one armored back-hoe loader and 114 deminers. By mid-2009, DDG had expanded to a total of 406 staff, including four expatriates, 266 deminers, 64 supervisory staff, 51 support staff, and 21 administrative staff in anticipation of receiving new tasks.

MAG worked in 2008 with two international and 55 national staff in three manual clearance teams, two of them supported by Bozena mini-flails, conducting demining and BAC in Batticaloa district. In 2009 it continued to undertake tasks in the district but operations there were winding down while MAG was expanding to take on tasks in Mannar and Vavuniya districts. By September 2009 it had opened an operational base in Mannar, increased staff to 190 and added four armored excavators.

MMIPE operated in Anuradhapura and Trincomalee districts in 2008 with 63 deminers and Horizon operated in the Mannar and Batticaloa districts with 64 deminers, including 24 Indian deminers and four excavators. Horizon increased its capacity to 85 deminers by October 2008 in Batticaloa. Sarvatra carried out manual demining and BAC in Mannar with 54 deminers. Horizon reportedly added 50 more deminers from India in August 2009. Sarvatra added 32 more in August and was reportedly planning to send another 32.

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120 Telephone interviews with Gerhard Zank, HALO, 30 June 2008 and 23 July 2009.
122 Interview with Rory Forbes, Program Manager, HALO, Colombo, 27 February 2009.
123 Telephone interview with Gerhard Zank, HALO, 23 July 2009.
124 Interview with, Mark Bonnet, FSD, Colombo, 19 March 2009; email from Mark Bonnet, FSD, 25 March 2009; and telephone interview with Mark Bonnet, FSD, 27 July 2009.
126 Email from Steen Wetlesen, Program Manager, DDG, Colombo, 27 July 2009
127 Emails from Mark Thomas, Regional Desk Officer, MAG, 14 August 2008; and email from Rob White, Director of Operations, MAG, 11 September 2009.
129 “80 more Indians fly to Sri Lanka to clear landmines,” Times of India, 3 August 2009, timesofindia.indiatimes.com.
Demining and BAC in Sri Lanka from 2002–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4.33</td>
<td>164.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>159.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>18.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12.89</td>
<td>349.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Risk Education**

RE has been delivered through: emergency provision in IDP camps; the training of volunteers in children’s clubs; community-based organizations; NGOs; schools; and local government (a district-based RE unit in Trincomalee). It consisted primarily of education, training, and community liaison. RE programs used formal and non-formal education systems, supported by public information dissemination (materials and mass media). According to estimates, at least 85,000 people received RE in 2008. In 2008, coverage was lower than previous years due to a reduced program period, and because most partners were without contracts for almost six months due to bureaucratic delays. In 2008, six districts were covered through three community-based RE partners, 51 field officers, and 701 volunteers and children who are animators.

Approximately the same number of men and women received RE. Particular effort was made to reach men, as they make up the highest proportion of casualties. The greatest number of people was reached through house-to-house visits, which was considered to be the most effective method.

UNICEF reports that its RE program has been very successful in contributing to a significant reduction in both mine incidents and mine casualties. It also identifies the high number of reports on UXO coming from affected communities and other suspected dangerous areas as another strong indicator RE’s positive impact.

Emergency RE was provided, despite the challenges faced due to the conflict in the north. Some NGO volunteers were themselves displaced due to the conflict, and some lost family members. Access to LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni region was difficult. UNICEF’s partnership in Vanni with the NGO White Pigeon came to an end. RE was conducted through Sooriyan Radio with the support of the NGO Internews to reach difficult-to-access populations in Vanni and IDPs.

School-based RE was provided in the north and east by including RE in teacher training at the National Colleges of Education (a total of 2,005 teachers have been trained since the program began) and to monitor their work through In-Service Advisors, a type of inspector and master trainer (a total of 200 have been trained). School principals in 2,400 schools also received RE orientation. Although the original plan was to include RE in the school curriculum, this did not happen, and it is up to the teacher to include the topic in class. School-based RE is reportedly

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130 Emails from Reganathan Umpathy, MNBEID, 23 June 2009; and Vartharajah Murugathas, National Information Management Associate, UNDP, 8, 12, and 14 June 2007, and 8 and 23 April 2008. No land release by survey was reported.

States Not Party

Sri Lanka

weak and, although a monitoring mechanism was introduced, data on how many schools have conducted RE is not available. NGOs have also provided RE in schools on request.

Community liaison was conducted by MAG and by community workers working with mine-affected communities to ensure they were aware of clearance activities being conducted in or around their areas, to provide a good link between clearance organizations and communities, and to collect information from communities about UXO and mine-related issues. RE teams also often served as an important link between aid and relief agencies and the government.

RE is increasingly integrated into other child protection issues, such as out-of-school children, under-age marriage, and child abuse.

### Risk education activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographic area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarvodaya</td>
<td>RE through community network, community liaison</td>
<td>Amparai, Batticaloa, and Jaffna districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Trust Fund</td>
<td>RE through community network, community liaison</td>
<td>Mannar, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya districts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kachcheri Child Focus RE Unit</td>
<td>RE through community network</td>
<td>Trincomalee district</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>Inclusion of RE in teacher training</td>
<td>North and east</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>InterNews</td>
<td>RE through mass media (radio and print)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF and partners</td>
<td>Landmine safety briefings for aid workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Community liaison</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2009, RE was continued prior to and immediately following resettlement of IDPs. Opening of new IDP sites in areas needing ERW clearance in Jaffna required emergency or rapid intervention RE for construction workers, aid workers, and IDPs.  

UNICEF started RE activities in Jaffna in 1998 with a focus on schoolchildren until activities were suspended due to hostilities in April 2000. Only limited RE was possible until after the February 2002 cease-fire when UNICEF and NGOs greatly increased activities. RE then became closely linked to resettlement of IDPs and mine clearance, with RE operators conducting community liaison.

In late 2003, UNICEF established an RE training-of-trainers capacity and conducted activities to reach out-of-school children. RE delivery increased each year to a peak of 686,274 people in 2005, but has diminished since then due to renewed conflict. In 2006 and 2007, emergency RE was provided to thousands of newly displaced people and aid workers, despite the obstacles created by renewed conflict.

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133 Email from Sebastian Kasack, UNICEF, 23 July 2009.


135 Ibid.


The NSCMA coordinates RE, based on reports provided by UNICEF and the district-based IMSMA databases maintained by UNDP.\textsuperscript{138} RE has also been coordinated at a district level, where QA is also conducted, but this has been disrupted by renewed conflict in recent years.\textsuperscript{139} National standards were produced in 2004.\textsuperscript{140} Two evaluations, by UNICEF and the EC Humanitarian Aid Office, in 2004 were broadly positive and concluded that RE may have contributed to a decrease in incidents.\textsuperscript{141} In mid-2007 UNICEF restructured its country program to be based on a broad vision of holistic child protection. In 2007, bureaucratic delays within UNICEF were blamed for leaving NGOs “isolated.”\textsuperscript{142}

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Sri Lanka is unknown, but is at least 1,158.\textsuperscript{143} Although there have been some improvements in VA provision in recent years, many challenges remain. There is no countrywide or centrally coordinated government effort to assist mine/ERW survivors. Assistance provided by a number of government agencies and NGOs is often \textit{ad hoc} and fragmented,\textsuperscript{144} and constrained by limited resources in both capacity and technology. Mine survivors have reported being denied specialist medical care when they have been unable to afford the cost.\textsuperscript{145}

Renewed fighting from 2006 to mid-2009 resulted in a significant decrease in VA, and health services generally, in the conflict areas, where the majority of mine/ERW incidents occurred.\textsuperscript{146} Government involvement in VA was also reported to have decreased over this period.\textsuperscript{147} Attacks directly on and near hospitals in the north further reduced their capacity.

Military controls on civilian movement in the north, already tight, became even more stringent in 2008 with military operations Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya districts, severely hampering transport of medical supplies into and around conflict areas and healthcare efforts.\textsuperscript{148} There was a lack of surgeons and specialists in most district hospitals in the northeast, and a need to improve the basic skills of health professionals in treating war-related injuries.\textsuperscript{149} Poor roads further limited access to services. Although distances are short on the Jaffna peninsula, irregular public transport and the high cost of transportation meant a trip of a few kilometers could be costly and time consuming.\textsuperscript{150}

Relief efforts were further hampered by the government reportedly refusing to extend dozens of international aid workers’ visas in June 2009, because they were considered sympathetic to the defeated LTTE.\textsuperscript{151}

\textsuperscript{143} From the 1,378 casualties recorded in IMSMA from 1985 to 2008, of which 1,158 were injured. UNICEF, “Assessment on UNICEF Survivor Assistance Programme and Mine Victims Needs,” undated, assessment carried out between August and September 2008, p. 19; and data provided by email from Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{144} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Birendra Katugampola, UNDP, 13 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{145} UNICEF, “Assessment on UNICEF Survivor Assistance Programme and Mine Victims Needs,” undated, assessment carried out between August and September 2008, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{151} Jeremy Page, “Aid workers forced to leave Sri Lanka under strict new visa rules,” Times Online, 3 June 2009, www.timesonline.co.uk.
National health policy calls for free primary medical care for all citizens, but it does not cover the specialist care that survivors often need. The MoSS is responsible for providing services to people with disabilities, including community-based rehabilitation (CBR). In the mine/ERW-affected north and east, CBR was only provided in the eastern Ampara and Batticaloa districts. Financial assistance from the government is said to be available to persons with disabilities including a monthly payment, medical assistance, self-employment grants, and housing programs. With few MoSS staff being located in the north and east there was limited awareness of and access to such programs in these areas. Survivors included in a UNICEF needs assessment in August–September 2008 reported that the level of financial support from the government was not enough to provide a decent standard of living.

Survivors in the UNICEF needs assessment identified physical rehabilitation as a “basic need” but services are insufficient to meet the demand. The government provided financial support to NGOs that assisted persons with disabilities, including subsidizing prosthetic devices and making purchases from suppliers with disabilities.

There are eight physical rehabilitation centers in Sri Lanka producing artificial limbs and assistive/mobility devices. All were supported by NGOs and offer the majority of services for free. Four centers are in the north and east provinces: Jaffna Jaipur Center for the Disability Rehabilitation (JJCDR); Jaffna White Pigeon Technical Institute of Prosthetics; Valvuthayam Mannar Rehabilitation Center; and the HI Physical Rehabilitation Center (PRC) in Batticaloa. The UNICEF needs assessment found the White Pigeon and Valvuthayam Mannar centers did not provide quality services because they lacked qualified personnel and used inappropriate technology. A severe shortage of physiotherapists was also reported in the northeast.

Sri Lankan military war disabled received free physical rehabilitation, financial compensation, and benefits. The Ranaviru Sevana Rehabilitation Centre is the main rehabilitation center of the SLA and provides a comprehensive range of services to injured and disabled soldiers. Services include the provision of artificial limbs and mobility devices, physical therapy, vocational training, and social reintegration support through rejoining a regiment. Of the center’s 312 staff, 80% have been physically disabled by the war.

The mine/ERW survivors interviewed in the UNICEF needs assessment identified loss of livelihood as having a major impact on their standard of living. The MoSS operated eight vocational training facilities for persons with physical and mental disabilities and provided job training and placements for graduates. There were 74 NGO-run schools and training institutions for persons with disabilities registered in 2008. Courses offered were not market-driven, resulting in a mismatch between skills training and employment opportunities.

Psychological care and social support are very limited in Sri Lanka and there is little awareness among survivors of available services. Only 3% of mine survivors interviewed in the UNICEF needs assessment had received psychological care and most were unaware of such services.

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154 Ibid, p. 28.
155 Ibid, pp. 34, 43.
services. Psychosocial care was predominantly provided in the mine/ERW-affected areas, by NGOs Sarvodaya and JJCDR in Jaffna and White Pigeon in Killinochchi.

It is against the law to discriminate against persons with disabilities in Sri Lanka, but discrimination was reported in 2008, limiting the access of persons with disabilities to employment, education, and other state-run services. Negative attitudes were also reported. Sri Lanka signed the UN Convention of the Rights of People with Disabilities, but not its Optional Protocol, on 30 March 2007. As of 1 July 2009, it had not yet ratified the convention.

**Victim assistance activities**

HI signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Health to gradually hand over its Physical Rehabilitation Center (PRC) to the Batticaloa Teaching Hospital by June 2011. In 2008, the PRC provided rehabilitation services and artificial limbs to more than 1,000 new clients, almost one-tenth of whom were mine/ERW survivors. It extended services in the north, including to Vavuniya, through mobile teams. A temporary emergency unit to treat those who fled the fighting and were injured was established with the support of HI in 2009. HI-supported services provided assistance to 97 mine/ERW survivors in 2008.

The JJCDR supplied prostheses, orthoses, tricycles, wheelchairs, crutches, and other mobility devices to 405 mine/ERW survivors in 2008. The JCRD services also included provision of physical therapy sessions to 65 survivors. The JCRD is the only physical rehabilitation service provider in the Jaffna peninsula and was unable to assist all those in need in 2008. ICRC continued support to the program in 2008, including meeting the costs of transport of persons going to the center, when needed. The quality of services was reportedly improved through on-the-job training by an ICRC ortho-prosthetist and an ICRC physiotherapist.

**Support for Mine Action**

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates or resource mobilization strategies for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Sri Lanka. The NSCMA, which oversees mine action policy, includes representatives from the donor community. The Donor Peace Support Group (DPSG) for Sri Lanka includes a sub-group on mine action that informs donors on progress in mine action and promotes collective policy strategies among donors.

**National support for mine action**

Sri Lanka did not report contributions to mine action from the national budget in 2007 or 2008.

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, six countries and the European Commission reported providing US$6,859,896 (€5,550,520) to mine action in Sri Lanka, 8% more than international support reported in 2007. Funding levels have decreased each year since 2004, when approximately $23.6 million was contributed and in 2008 were the lowest since 2002.

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164 Ibid, p. 42.


166 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Hilde Bergsma, HI, 15 July 2009.

167 Email from N. Sivanathan, Administrative Secretary, JJCDR, 17 July 2009.


### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Sri Lanka: Monetary\textsuperscript{170}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>MAG, FSD, DDG</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$2,027,697 (¥209,040,960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Centers for Disease Control, USAID Leahy, and Department of State</td>
<td>Mine clearance, VA</td>
<td>$2,004,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>FSD, UNICEF</td>
<td>Integrated mine action, mine clearance, RE, VA</td>
<td>$1,767,120 (€1,200,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>MAG, International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>Mine clearance, survey</td>
<td>$1,109,810 (AUSD1,300,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>MMIPE</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,135,360 (NOK6,400,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$92,725 (£50,000)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>FSD</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$36,984 (CHF40,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$8,173,696 (€4,658,357)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Starting in August 2009, India has provided technical assistance and personnel to support mine/UXO clearance in Sri Lankan territories previously occupied by the LTTE. As of July 2009, India reportedly planned to commit 500 personnel to its clearance efforts in Sri Lanka.\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{170} Email from Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department; US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” Washington, DC, July 2009; emails from Stacy Bernard Davis, Public Engagement, Department of State, 13 September 2009; Mari Cruz Cristóbal, Policy Assistant, Directorate-General for External Relations, 28 May 2009; Kathleen Bombell, Mine Action Unit, USAID, 21 July 2009; Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; and Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009.

Ten-Year Summary

The Syrian Arab Republic is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), including cluster munition remnants, especially in the Golan Heights. Little progress has been made in clearance since 1999. The number of mine/ERW casualties in Syria is unknown but some 600 casualties have been recorded in the Golan Heights since 1967. Risk education in Syria remained inadequate and limited to Quneitra governorate. Disability is not a government priority, but since 1999, mine/ERW survivors in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights have seen improved medical care and rights.

Mine Ban Policy

Syria has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Its position has not changed in recent years. While expressing concern for the plight of mine victims and support for risk education and other efforts to protect civilians, Syria still views antipersonnel mines as necessary weapons for national defense, and considers Israel’s continued annexation/occupation of part of the Golan Heights as an important reason for not joining the treaty.1

On 2 December 2008, Syria was one of 18 countries to abstain from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42, which called for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has abstained from voting on similar resolutions in previous years.

Syria did not attend the Ninth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2008 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009.

Syria has not usually been identified as a producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines. The size and origin of Syria’s mine stockpile is not known. Syria is thought to have last used mines during the 1982 conflict with Israel in Lebanon.

Syria is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Syria has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.2

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Contamination by mines and ERW originates from Syrian involvement in Arab-Israeli wars since 1948. As a result of the 1973 war with Israel, large parts of the Golan Heights in Syria’s southwestern Quneitra governorate are heavily mined. In addition to the presence of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, the Golan Heights is contaminated with UXO, including unexploded submunitions.3

The Golan Heights is divided into three areas consisting of a Syrian-controlled area, an Israeli-controlled area, and a buffer zone—the Area of Separation (AOS)—monitored by the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).4 UNDOF considers all areas not cleared or

1 Telephone interview with Milad Atieh, Director, Department of International Organizations and Conventions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 January 2008; and interview with Mohd Haj Khaleel, Department of International Organizations and Conventions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Damascus, 25 February 2007. See also, for example, Statement of Syria, Seminar on Military and Humanitarian Issues Surrounding the Mine Ban Treaty, Amman, 19–21 April 2004.


4 UNDOF maintains an area of separation, which is some 80km long and varies in width between approximately 10km in the center to less than one km in the extreme south. The terrain is hilly and is dominated in the north by Mount Hermon. UNDOF, “Golan Heights – UNDOF – Background,” www.un.org.
marked by the UN as potentially contaminated.\textsuperscript{3} UNDOF officials previously reported estimates of 500,000 landmines in the AOS. One unconfirmed estimate has suggested there are at least 76 minefields in the Golan Heights; it is believed this refers only to the AOS. In consultation with the Syrian authorities, UNDOF instituted a minefield security and maintenance program in the AOS to identify and mark all minefields.\textsuperscript{6} No information is available regarding minefields in the Syrian-controlled and Israeli-controlled areas of the Golan Heights.\textsuperscript{7}

In UNDOF’s area of operation, especially in the AOS, the UN continues to report that mines affect UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants. UNDOF has claimed that the long-term presence of the mines and the “deterioration of their detonation systems” have increased the threat.\textsuperscript{9}

In other regions of Syria, the severity of the landmine threat is unclear. Mines are also planted along the Jordanian and Turkish borders with Syria, but it is not known if any of these mines have migrated into Syrian territory as a result of soil movement or climatic effects.\textsuperscript{9}

**Casualties\textsuperscript{10}**

In 2008, the Quneitra Health Directorate and local media reported at least 11 new landmine casualties\textsuperscript{11} in seven incidents, including four people killed and seven injured. Eight casualties were civilian (five children and three men) and three were Syrian military.\textsuperscript{12} Nine casualties were caused by antivehicle mines and two by antipersonnel mines. Nine casualties occurred in Quneitra governorate and two in the neighboring Daraa governorate. The civilian casualties were involved in shepherding (three), farming, and playing (two each); for two casualties the activity at the time of the incident was unknown.

The ICRC and Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) were aware of at least seven casualties in five incidents in 2008, but it is not possible to determine if these were included in the Quneitra Health Directorate’s figures.\textsuperscript{13} The 2008 casualty rate is similar to that of 2007 but it is possible that some incidents were not reported.\textsuperscript{14}

The Quneitra Health Directorate and UNDOF did not report any new mine/ERW casualties between January and 11 March 2009.\textsuperscript{15}

The cumulative number of mine/ERW casualties in Syria is unknown and estimates vary. Casualty data is not gathered nationwide, it is not shared, and the local population usually does not inform UNDOF of incidents.\textsuperscript{16}

The SARC has recorded 600 casualties since 1967 (248 killed, 210 injured, and 142 unknown). At least 350 casualties occurred in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights and 70 in the Israeli-controlled part.\textsuperscript{17} In June 2008, the General Association for Care and Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors reported that there were 533 mine casualties, including 203 killed and

\textsuperscript{5} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1033.
\textsuperscript{7} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1033.
\textsuperscript{8} Unless otherwise stated, Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided in emails from Dr. Hussam Doghoz, Health Officer, Quneitra Health Directorate, 23 February, 1 March, and 3 March 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1034.
\textsuperscript{10} One incident was erroneously reported in the media as an ERW incident. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1034.
\textsuperscript{12} The activity at the time of the incident was not reported but it is believed they were either on patrol or involved in demining.
\textsuperscript{13} Email from Srdjan Jovanovic, Regional Mine Action Advisor, ICRC, 22 March 2009; and email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 17 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{14} Email from Willem Steijlen, Field Security Advisor, UNDOF, 11 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{16} Email from Dr. Hussam Doghoz, Quneitra Health Directorate, 23 February 2009; and telephone interview with Willem Steijlen, Field Security Advisor, UNDOF, 11 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{17} Email from Dr. Hussam Doghoz, Quneitra Health Directorate, 23 February 2009; and telephone interview with Dr. Hussam Doghoz, Quneitra Health Directorate, 24 February 2009.
330 injured.¹⁸ UNDOF added that “some peacekeeper casualties occurred at the beginning of the UNDOF mission.”¹⁹

Between 1999 and December 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 66 mine/ERW casualties (17 killed, 41 injured, and eight unknown). Several Syrian casualties occurred abroad, mostly in neighboring Lebanon.²⁰ Casualty increases noted since 2005 are partly explained by a lack of marking, poorly maintained signs, increased population in areas of the Golan that were formerly closed, and economic necessity.²¹ The majority of casualties were children, shepherds, and farmers.

Program Management and Coordination

There is no formal mine action program in Syria. UNDOF carries out mine clearance for operational purposes in the AOS.²² Humanitarian mine clearance inside the AOS is Syria’s responsibility, but such activities have to be approved by UNDOF. According to UNDOF, “from time to time” the Syrian military conducts limited clearance operations.²³ In exceptional cases, UNDOF has also conducted clearance for humanitarian reasons where individual mines or grenades posed a severe danger to the civilian population. Clearance may otherwise be conducted in the Golan Heights under UNDOF supervision to support existing settlements, such as the building of health centers.²⁴

Since 2004, the Quneitra Mine Awareness Committee has coordinated mine/ERW risk education (RE) activities in the governorate.²⁵ In 2008, the Committee met three times; the directorates of social affairs, health, and education, as well as non-governmental representatives attended.²⁶

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

The explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team of the Polish battalion assigned to UNDOF (POLBATT) checks, marks, and certifies patrol paths and terrain. In March through June 2008, the POLBATT EOD team destroyed five casings of TM-46 antivehicle mines, one M-15 mine casing, and a mortar projectile.²⁷

Mine clearance in Syria outside the AOS is the responsibility of the Syrian Armed Forces. Previously, clearance was said to have been conducted in support of civilian infrastructure and agriculture.²⁸

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¹⁸ The time period which the data covers is not known. “A Syrian Severely Wounded by Landmines left by Israeli Occupation Troops in Quneitra,” SANA (Quneitra), 17 June 2008, www.sana.sy.
²³ Telephone interview with Willem Steijlen, UNDOF, 11 March 2009.
²⁶ Email from Dr. Hussam Doghoz, Quneitra Health Directorate, 1 March 2009.
States Not Party  

Syria

Jordan started demining along its border with Syria in January 2008. It was reported that Turkey completed demining in Nusaybin near its border with Syria in August 2008 in order to open a new border crossing between the two countries. As a result of the operations, 200,000m² were cleared, resulting in the destruction of 310 antipersonnel mines, 35 antivehicle mines, and one hand grenade.

Risk Education

In June 2008, a report of the UN Secretary-General noted that “mines continued to pose a threat to UNDOF personnel and local inhabitants” in the Golan Heights. UNDOF has raised the issue of the need for RE with UNICEF, as it believes that the majority of children have little or no awareness of the risk of mines/ERW. Risk-taking behaviors, such as moving mines to the roads so that UNDOF will clear them or throwing unexploded devices to the Israeli side of the Golan Heights, have been reported.

As in previous years, basic RE was conducted by SARC and the local authorities through public information dissemination, as part of the “Healthy Villages” program and in schools. In 2008, three new “safe gardens” were established with SARC support in Khan Arnaba, Beir Ajem, and Albaath. RE signs and posters were placed next to the gardens, in squares, and along minefields. The ICRC provided technical and financial support, and in 2009 it planned to carry out an evaluation of ICRC-SARC activities to plan future activities. UNDOF conducted some ad hoc awareness activities for the local population.

It is difficult to determine the impact of RE activities since 1999. However, given that casualty rates have not decreased, and there are no RE activities in some contaminated areas, it may be assessed that RE in Syria was inadequate.

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown but at least 330. Although authorities have paid increased attention to disability, it was not a government priority. Most persons with disabilities did not have access to services and had few employment and educational opportunities. They also faced discrimination, ignorance, and isolation.

The government provided basic health and social services free of charge. Health facilities were usually reached in “reasonable times.” Medical care remained better in the capital than elsewhere in Syria. Prior to 2002–2003, services for mine mine/ERW survivors were only available in the capital. Due to decentralization, casualties also receive free emergency and continuing medical care at the Mamdooh Abaza hospital in Khan Arnaba. The hospital treated

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32 Telephone interview with Willem Steijlen, UNDOF, 11 March 2009.
33 Ibid.
34 Email from Dr. Hussam Doghoz, Quneitra Health Directorate, 10 March 2009; and email from Srdjan Jovanovic, ICRC, 22 March 2009.
35 Telephone interview with Willem Steijlen, UNDOF, 11 March 2009.
36 Telephone interview with Willem Steijlen, UNDOF, 11 March 2009.
39 Telephone interview with Willem Steijlen, UNDOF, 11 March 2009.
41 Telephone interview with Willem Steijlen, UNDOF, 11 March 2009; and email from Dr. Hussam Doghoz, Quneitra Health Directorate, 10 March 2009.
six survivors in 2008.\textsuperscript{42} UNDOF can evacuate casualties and provide first-aid in its area of operation.\textsuperscript{43}

Physical rehabilitation is provided by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Defense, as well as by private centers.\textsuperscript{44} Persons with disabilities, including mine survivors, also received orthopedic devices and material support from SARC.\textsuperscript{45} Ten SARC volunteers received first-aid and weapons contamination training from the ICRC in 2008.\textsuperscript{46}

Since 2005, Syria has introduced disability legislation, a 4\% public sector employment quota, and disability benefits. Disability committees monitored implementation in each governorate,\textsuperscript{47} but it remained inconsistent in 2008.\textsuperscript{48}

**Support for Mine Action**

The report of the UN Secretary-General on UNDOF for the period from 1 July 2008 to 31 December 2008 highlighted shortfalls in funding for UNDOF operations in general due to unpaid assessments totaling US$23.7 million as of September 2008. As of 31 October 2008, an outstanding $2.4 million was owed to states which contributed troops to UNDOF. The UN Secretary-General reported that unpaid commitments “impede[d] the ability of the Secretariat to support the operations of the Force and to reimburse Member States contributing troops to the Force.”\textsuperscript{49} The report did not specify any delays of payments related to mine clearance during the period or impacts of shortfalls on mine clearance projects. On 12 December 2008, the UN Security Council unanimously extended the UNDOF mission until 30 June 2009, again drawing attention to unpaid funds for the force.\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{42} Email from Dr. Hussam Doghoz, Quneitra Health Directorate, 10 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{43} Telephone interview with Willem Steijlen, UNDOF, 11 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{44} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,035.
\textsuperscript{45} Email from Dr. Hussam Doghoz, Quneitra Health Directorate, 10 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{46} Email from Srdjan Jovanovic, ICRC, 22 March 2009; and email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, ICRC, 17 July 2009.
\end{footnotes}
Tonga

Ten-Year Summary

The Kingdom of Tonga has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Tonga has voted in support of every annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

Tonga has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In May 2007, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official indicated that it was not a lack of political will that held Tonga back from joining; rather, Tonga lacked the internal resources needed to complete the necessary accession procedures.  

On 2 December 2008, Tonga voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Tonga joined the UN in 1999 and has voted in support of every annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 2000.

Tonga’s first and only participation in a Mine Ban Treaty-related meeting was in May 2007, when a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official attended the regional Mine Ban Treaty workshop in Port Vila, Vanuatu.  

Tonga has stated that it has never produced, transferred, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.  

Tonga is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

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3 Fax from Falekava Kupu, on behalf of the Acting Chief Secretary and Secretary for the Cabinet, Prime Minister’s Office, 14 August 2001.
Tuvalu has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has indicated its support on several occasions, and has voted in favor of some annual pro-mine ban UN General Assembly resolutions, including in December 2008. Tuvalu has never attended a Mine Ban Treaty meeting.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Tuvalu has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has in the past indicated its intent to do so. In January 2004, a Tuvalu government official indicated that the main obstacles to joining the treaty were “limited manpower, and financial resources to meet other pressing needs on our budget.” In September 2008, Tuvalu’s first ambassador to the UN confirmed these constraints.

On 2 December 2008, Tuvalu voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. After becoming a member of the UN in September 2000, Tuvalu was absent from the votes on the annual pro-mine ban resolutions by the UN General Assembly in 2000–2003 and 2006–2007, but voted in support in 2004 and 2005.

Tuvalu has never attended a Mine Ban Treaty meeting.

Tuvalu has stated that it does not use, produce, import, or stockpile antipersonnel mines.

Tuvalu has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Ten-Year Summary

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. On several occasions over the last few years it has expressed interest in accession to the treaty. It has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996. The UAE has funded mine/UXO clearance in southern Lebanon since 2001 via the “Operation Emirates Solidarity” project.

Mine Ban Policy

The UAE has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In November 2007, a UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told the ICBL that the UAE planned to join the treaty in the near future. In October 2008, the Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed to receive a delegation from the ICBL sometime in 2009.

The UAE has voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, including UNGA Resolution 63/42 on 2 December 2008, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The UAE attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008, but did not make any statements. It did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2009.

The UAE has stated that it has not produced, used, or exported antipersonnel mines. While some officials have said that the UAE does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, Landmine Monitor has received conflicting information from another governmental source.

The UAE became party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons on 26 February 2009, including Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, but not Amended Protocol II on landmines. As of 1 July 2009, the UAE had not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

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1 Interview with Abdallah al-Naqbi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Dead Sea, 22 November 2007. The UAE has in the past expressed its support for the Mine Ban Treaty in principle. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) conducted an advocacy mission to the UAE in September 2004 and senior officials said there were no serious reservations about joining the treaty, but that it had not been a priority issue. Amb. Satnam Jit Singh, UNMAS consultant, “UNMAS Advocacy Visits,” 16 December 2004 (reporting on his trip to five countries); and email from Amb. Satnam Jit Singh, Diplomatic Advisor, ICBL, 7 October 2004. In 2000, the UAE stated that it supports “the international effort to ban antipersonnel landmines.” Letter to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 October 2000. Translated by the UAE Embassy, Washington, DC.

2 Letter from the Permanent Mission of the UAE to the UN in Geneva, 14 October 2008. The letter was a response to a request from the ICBL for a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As of August 2009, the visit had not taken place. The UAE wrote in March that that the minister’s schedule was still busy due to prior engagements. Letter from the Permanent Mission of the UAE to the UN in Geneva, 30 March 2009.

3 It has attended a number of Mine Ban Treaty meetings in the past including the Seventh and Eighth Meetings of States Parties in 2006 and 2007, and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2006 and April 2007.


5 The Secretary of Defense stated in September 2004 there were no stockpiles. Email from Amb. Satnam Jit Singh, ICBL, 7 October 2004. This was also claimed in a presentation by Ali al-Hosni, UAE military officer, at the Workshop on the Risks of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), Sharjah, 8-9 December 2003, organized by the Arab Network for Research on Landmines & ERW. In 2006, an official requesting anonymity told the ICBL that there were some stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.

Ten-Year Summary

The United States of America has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Clinton administration set the objective of joining in 2006. However, the Bush administration announced in 2004 that the US would not accede. US law has prohibited all antipersonnel mine exports since 23 October 1992 and in December 2007, the export moratorium was extended until 2014. The US has not used antipersonnel mines since 1991, nor produced them since 1997. In 2008, the Pentagon abandoned plans to produce a weapon that would have been prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2002, the US cancelled a program to combine existing antipersonnel and antivehicle mines into a “mixed” system. US antipersonnel mines stockpiled in Italy, Norway, and Spain were removed to comply with the Mine Ban Treaty obligations of those countries.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 207 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties who were US nationals (80 killed and 127 injured) from media reports and official US Department of Defense casualty reports. Comprehensive victim assistance services, including rehabilitation services and disability pensions, are provided to soldiers injured while on active duty, although cumbersome bureaucratic procedures have delayed a declaration of status that would allow for discharge from the military or resulted in a delay in receiving disability payments.

The United States has contributed at least $796.8 million in support of mine action between 1999 and 2008. Funds are directed to mine action via the US Department of State and the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, as well as to research and development via the US Department of Defense.

Mine Ban Policy

The US has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The US participated in the Ottawa Process that created the treaty, but the Clinton administration decided at the last moment against signing and instead set 2006 as the objective for the US to join. In February 2004, the Bush administration reversed course and announced that it did not ever intend to accede.

According to its policy announced in February 2004, the US can use any type of landmine (antipersonnel or antivehicle) that self-destructs and self-deactivates for the indefinite future and without any geographic restrictions.1

The policy also allows the US to use non-self-destructing (sometimes called “dumb” or “persistent”) antipersonnel mines, but only in Korea and only until the end of 2010. The US can use non-self-destructing antivehicle mines without geographic restriction, but only with presidential authorization, and only until the end of 2010.2

On 2 December 2008, the US abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has abstained on each annual pro-ban treaty UNGA resolution since 1997.

In January 2009, Secretary of State-designate Hillary Clinton told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “The incoming Administration has not taken a position on the landmines treaty. We are committed to working with our friends and allies around the world to reduce the

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2 Ibid.
threat posed by landmines.” In February 2009, US NGOs called on the Obama Administration to initiate a thorough review of US policy and to join the Mine Ban Treaty.

The US last attended a Mine Ban Treaty-related meeting in June 2005. Colombian leaders and ban supporters have urged the US to attend the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, which opens in Cartagena on 30 November 2009. According to US officials, the US is actively considering participating.


The US has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use

In May 2008, the Vice Chief of Staff of the US Army stated that the XM-7 Spider Networked Munition would be procured in a configuration that only allowed command-detonation.

Previously, the Spider system contained a feature that permitted it to function in a victim-activated mode, making it incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. This would have constituted the first production of antipersonnel mines by the US since 1997. The US Campaign to Ban Landmines had for several years strongly objected to Pentagon plans to move forward with the victim-activation feature, and the US Congress had taken steps to block a decision on full-scale production of victim-activated Spider systems. A total of US$56.4 million has been allocated for procurement of 147 Spider systems in fiscal year (FY) 2010.

In previous years, Landmine Monitor has reported on another landmine system being developed, the so-called Intelligent Munitions System (IMS). Pentagon budget documents once stated that the “IMS utilizes sensors linked to effects and is controlled over robust


10 For more background information on Spider, see Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 1,011–1,013.

11 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 1,011–1,012. Budget documents released in February 2007 indicated that a decade-long research and development effort, originally intended to develop alternatives to antipersonnel mines, was instead resulting in programs to produce two new landmine systems, Spider and IMS. The Pentagon requested $1.66 billion for research and production of these new systems between fiscal years 2006 and 2013 ($558 million for the Spider program and $1.1 billion for the IMS). Before the May 2008 announcement, it appeared these munitions would have a variety of ways of being initiated, both command-detonation (that is, when a soldier decides when to explode the mine, sometimes called “man-in-the-loop”) and traditional victim-activation (also called target-activation). The Pentagon made the decision to begin low-rate initial production of Spider in June 2006 and the first Spider systems were to be delivered in September 2008.

communications in either an autonomous mode or via Man-in-the-Loop control.” The use of the terms “autonomous mode” and “unattended employment” appeared to be synonymous with victim-activation, and would make this system incompatible with the Mine Ban Treaty. The army had requested a total of $1.1 billion for research activities and eventual production of 1,325 IMS units between fiscal years 2006 and 2013, including $307 million for research and $792 million for production.

The IMS program appears to have drastically changed both in scale and scope according to budget documents released in May 2009. The name of IMS was changed to “IMS Scorpion” and the description of the weapon, unchanged in all previous years, now says that Scorpion is “an anti-vehicular weapons system that provides highly responsive terrain-shaping and protection capabilities to the unit commander” and “Trained operators remotely control ground-emplaced munitions via a portable control station out to distances of 1.5 kilometers.” Reference in all previous years to antipersonnel effects, both lethal and non-lethal, associated with the planned capabilities of IMS were no longer present in the description of Scorpion in May 2009. The anticipated cost of the producing system and number of systems to be built were also dramatically reduced to just 49 Scorpion weapons at a cost of $19.5 million for FY 2010. This funding increment allows for the low rate of initial production of Scorpion, if the army makes the decision to proceed with it, which is now scheduled to be made in January 2010. No further funding for Scorpion was allocated in future fiscal years. Textron Systems of Wilmington, Massachusetts is the prime contractor for Scorpion.

Stockpiling

The US stockpiles approximately 10.4 million antipersonnel mines and 7.5 million antivehicle mines, the third largest landmine stockpile in the world after China and Russia. As of 2002, the stockpile had 1.56 million non-self-destructing landmines, including 1.16 million M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines and about 403,000 Claymore mines.

The US military stockpiles the M14 and M16 antipersonnel mines for use in any future war in Korea. US Army documents indicate about half of those mines are stored in the continental US. The US military also keeps in South Korea a substantial number of self-destructing, scatterable antipersonnel mines.

The policy announcement in February 2004 also stated, “Within two years, the United States will begin the destruction of those persistent landmines that are not needed for the protection of Korea.” It is not known if this has resulted in the destruction of any antipersonnel mines.

According to a November 2005 American Forces Press Service press release, the US sent 100,000 mines to Iraq to be used to initiate the explosive demolition of other captured weapons. The type of mine was not specified. On 26 December 2007, the comprehensive US moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines was extended for six years until 2014. US law has prohibited all antipersonnel mine exports since 23 October 1992, through a series of multi-year extensions of the moratorium.

13 Office of the Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), “Descriptive Summaries of the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Army Appropriation, Budget Activity 5,” February 2007, p. 797. The same budget justification materials also noted that IMS is “capable of unattended employment” in engaging its targets.


15 All information in this paragraph is from Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 Budget Estimates,” May 2009, pp. 423–427.

16 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1,013–1,014. In 2005, the South Korean government reported that the US held 40,000 GATOR, 10,000 VOLCANO and an unknown number of MOPMS mines.


19 Public Law 110-161, Fiscal Year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Section 634(j), 26 December 2007, p. 487.
Landmine Monitor previously reported there was uncertainty if the US planned to transfer some or all of its antipersonnel mines stockpiled in South Korea to the South Koreans as part of the termination of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies, Korea (WRSA-K) program. In June 2009, the South Korean government told Landmine Monitor, “AP mines were not included in the list of items for sale or transfer in the WRSA-K negotiations, and therefore, no AP-mines were bought or obtained.”

However, it is not clear what has or will be done with the US antipersonnel mines from the WRSA-K. The law ending the program states that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of Defense.”

Moreover, as noted above, US policy is to stop the use of non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in Korea by the end of 2010.

According to one report, however, South Korea may still safeguard the antipersonnel mines for 10 years, without actually taking ownership over them. At an annual meeting between the South Korean Minister of Defense and US Secretary of Defense in Washington, DC on 17 October 2008, a memorandum was signed that, in addition to the stocks South Korea is acquiring from the US, would have South Korea store 89,000 tons (89 million kg) of weapons and ammunition for the US until 2018, including non-self-destructing landmines.


See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1,014; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 877. Most of the US mines in South Korea were part of the more extensive WRSA-K. The WRSA-K were munitions stored in South Korea but kept under US title and control, then made available to US and South Korean forces in case of an emergency. On 30 December 2005, President George Bush signed Public Law 109-159, authorizing the sale of items in the WRSA-K to South Korea during a three-year period, after which the WRSA-K program was terminated. The law states that any items remaining in the WRSA-K at the time of termination “shall be removed, disposed of, or both by the Department of Defense.”

Reply to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the UN in New York, 9 June 2009.

Public Law 109-159, Section 1 (c) (2).

The last known use of antipersonnel mines by the US was in the first Gulf War in 1991.  

**Casualties**

In 2008, three ERW casualties were identified on US territory; two men were injured when ordnance exploded at a metal recycling plant in Raleigh, North Carolina, on 12 February, and a man died on 18 February while restoring a Civil War-era cannonball he had found. Two US national landmine casualties occurred on foreign territory: on 24 June, a male US soldier was killed by a landmine in Nangarhar, Afghanistan and on 3 August another was killed in Kabul, Afghanistan. Overseas casualties continued to be identified in 2009, with three men killed and two injured, as of 31 July. On 1 January, a male US soldier was killed by a landmine in Afghanistan. On 24 March, one US soldier was killed and two others injured when an ERW exploded at Camp Hansen in Okinawa, Japan. On 5 April, a male US soldier was killed by a landmine in Baghdad, Iraq. Numerous other landmine/ERW/improvised explosive device (IED) incidents involving US military personnel occurred outside of the US in 2008 and 2009. In 2008, 131 US soldiers were killed by IEDs in Iraq. In the first six months of 2009 there were 29 IED fatalities. Seventy-six US soldiers were killed by IEDs in Afghanistan in 2008, and 68 were killed in 2009 to 5 August. However, since the US military uses the term “improvised explosive device” to describe nearly all explosive devices encountered by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and makes no distinction between victim-activated and command-detonated IEDs, it is impossible to determine how many of these may have been caused by weapons banned under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 207 mine/ERW casualties of US nationals (80 killed and 127 injured) from media reports and official Department of Defense casualty reports. Of these, five (three killed and two injured, all from ERW in 2007 and 2008) occurred on US territory. The total number of landmine/ERW/IED survivors in the US is not known. As of May 2008, 24% of the soldiers who had served in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars (181,000 soldiers) were collecting disability benefits. Many of those disabilities were likely caused by IEDs. Traumatic brain injury (TBI) was found to be the leading injury and cause of long-term disability among US forces serving in Afghanistan and Iraq. IEDs were the most common cause of TBIs among casualties outside of the US in 2008 and 2009.

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25 The US apparently did not use mines in Yugoslavia (Kosovo) in 1999, and has not used them in the conflict in Afghanistan that began in October 2001, or in the conflict in Iraq that began in March 2003. It reserved the right to use antipersonnel mines during each of these conflicts, and deployed antipersonnel mines to the region, at least in the cases of Kosovo and Iraq. The US last used mines in 1991 in Iraq and Kuwait, scattering 117,634 of them mostly from airplanes.


33 “Fatalities Database,” icasualties.org.

34 Telephone interviews with military public affairs officers from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Central Command, 10 June 2004.


battle injuries.37 Between September 2001 and 12 January 2009, there were 935 major limb amputations and 351 minor amputations as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.38

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in the US is unknown, although there have been at least 127 injured casualties both within the US and overseas. Comprehensive rehabilitation services and disability pensions are provided to soldiers injured on active duty, although a narrowed definition of combat-related injuries and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures prevented or delayed some from accessing services and benefits in 2008.39

The US Army Amputee Patient Care Program, established in December 2001, provides individualized medical care, physical rehabilitation, and psychological support for active-duty amputees.40 On average, amputees spend from six to 18 months in rehabilitation before returning to active duty or civilian life.41 Social and economic reintegration support is provided by government and civil society organizations, although Survivor Corps found a lack of awareness of the challenges faced by veterans with disabilities in reintegrating into their local community.42

The Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) have disability compensation programs for injured service members: the amount of compensation a service member receives depends on the level of disability, years of service, and salary.43

Procedures to access benefits were found to be bureaucratic and confusing, which sometimes prevented access. In February 2007, problems were identified in the military’s disability evaluation system and in other administrative procedures related to care for injured soldiers.44 As of January 2009, the Department of Defense and the DVA were still working to expand the Disability Evaluation System in order to address concerns.45

In 2008, the Department of Defense narrowed the scope of its definition for “combat related,” restricting it to those injured in armed conflict and eliminating injuries incurred during training or other hazardous service.46 The Disabled American Veterans organization called the move “one of the most shameful we’ve seen so far.”47

46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
US law protects the rights of injured soldiers, persons with disabilities, and regulates care.\textsuperscript{48} The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination based on a person’s disability.\textsuperscript{49} On 30 July 2009, the US signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities but not its Optional Protocol.

**Support for Mine Action**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support for Mine Action</th>
<th>FY 2007 (actual)</th>
<th>FY 2008 (actual)</th>
<th>FY 2009 (estimate)</th>
<th>FY 2010 (request)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of State (NADR)</td>
<td>51.04</td>
<td>66.94</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>70.64</td>
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<td>Department of Defense (OHDACA)</td>
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<td>5.12</td>
<td>5.2</td>
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<td>International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF)</td>
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<td>12.89</td>
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<td>Department of Defense Research and Development</td>
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<td>14.29</td>
<td>14.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global War on Terror Supplemental Funding (for NADR and ITF)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>86.09</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.58</strong></td>
<td><strong>102.99</strong></td>
<td><strong>98.03</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Minus Research and Development</td>
<td>69.83</td>
<td>84.95</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>83.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Starting in FY 2009, three previously separate accounts for Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR), Humanitarian Demining (NADR-HD), International Trust Fund (NADR-ITF), and Small Arms/Light Weapons (NADR-SALW), have been combined into a single account for Conventional Weapons Destruction (NADR-CWD). The CWD program is funded through three separate NADR sub-accounts. As of May 2009, the FY 2010 request for globally-managed funds for NADR-HD was $14.8 million; the FY 2010 request for globally-managed funds for NADR-SALW was $48.9 million; and the FY 2010 request for the NADR-ITF was $7.5 million.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid, p. 96.
Mine action funding by country, FY 2008
According to figures reported by the US Department of State in “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” the US government spent $83.4 million in FY 2008 on humanitarian mine action programs in 32 countries and areas, in addition to $1.1 million to the Organization of American States for regional funding in the western hemisphere and $21.2 million on global or multilateral funding. This is a change of less than 1% compared to reported funding in the previous fiscal year. The two largest recipients of US funding in 2008 remained Afghanistan and Iraq, receiving $17.2 million and $16 million respectively. While Benin, Burundi, Chad, Mauritania, Senegal, Thailand, and Tunisia received assistance in FY 2007, they did not receive assistance in FY 2008. Armenia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Liberia, Montenegro, Peru, the Philippines, and Somalia were new recipients in FY 2008.

Victim assistance funding
The Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund, managed by the US Agency for International Development, has been in operation in post-conflict and conflict-affected developing countries since 1989. The fund was established to provide a dedicated source of financial and technical assistance for civilian victims of war including survivors of mine and UXO incidents. In FY 2008, the fund contributed an estimated total of $13.85 million, including $4.8 million to programs in Lebanon, Liberia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, as well as $9.1 million to numerous regional and international initiatives spanning multiple countries. The estimated budget for the fund in FY 2007 was $10 million. To date, the fund has provided more than $166 million to more than 40 countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>$1,500,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>$800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>$1,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-country</td>
<td>$9,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$13,850,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funding for victim assistance is also provided through the ITF. In calendar year 2008, $1,566,220 of Department of State mine action funds were spent on victim assistance through the ITF: $1,146,657 was allocated for victim assistance in calendar year 2007.

52 USG Historical Chart containing data for FY 2008, from “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” Washington, DC, July 2009, pp. 43–47. US funding amounts and recipients may differ from FY 2008 budget items presented in “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” according to later information provided to Landmine Monitor by the US Department of State. For details see recipient country reports in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
55 Ibid.
56 Email from Luka Bunin, Project Manager, ITF, 28 August 2009.
### US Funding for Mine Action, FY 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>$17,169,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>$5,955,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
<td>$3,643,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>$4,149,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>$500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** $83,399,000
Uzbekistan

Ten-Year Summary

The Republic of Uzbekistan has shown no interest in the Mine Ban Treaty. Uzbek officials have stated that mines are necessary to prevent the flow of narcotics, arms, and insurgent groups across its borders. Uzbekistan used antipersonnel mines on its borders with Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan between 1998 and 2001. Both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan contend that Uzbekistan also has laid mines inside their borders. Uzbekistan, it is believed, is still affected by mines it laid along its border with Afghanistan, but following clearance operations in earlier years, contamination has been reduced on its borders with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The extent of residual contamination is not known.

Information about mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties is incomplete, but at least 67 casualties have been recorded since 1999. No formal mine/ERW risk education activities have been reported in Uzbekistan, but some ad hoc activities took place between 2001 and 2004. It is not believed that specific victim assistance services were provided between 1999 and 2009.

Mine Ban Policy

Uzbekistan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Uzbekistan has stated that mines are necessary for national security to prevent the flow of narcotics, arms, and insurgent groups across its borders.¹

In December 2008, Uzbekistan abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It abstained on similar resolutions in previous years. Uzbekistan has not attended as an observer any of the annual meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, or any meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees.

Uzbekistan has stated that it does not produce antipersonnel mines.² It is not known to have exported the weapon. It inherited a stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union. The size, composition, and condition of the stockpile are not known. One Ministry of Defense official indicated the stock consisted of OZM-72, POMZ, and PMN antipersonnel mines, while another said it contains all types of mines which were made in the Soviet Union. The mines are held by both the Ministry of Defense and the Committee on State Border Protection.³

Uzbekistan has used antipersonnel mines in the past, including on its borders with Afghanistan in 1998, Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and Tajikistan in 2000.

Uzbekistan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its original Protocol II on landmines, but has not joined to Amended Protocol II or to Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War. It has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁴

² Letter from Amb. Shavkat Khamrakulov, Embassy of Uzbekistan to the United States, 31 July 2001. Other officials have also made this claim.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Uzbek forces emplaced mines along its international borders at various times: on its borders with Afghanistan in 1998, with Kyrgyzstan in 1999, and with Tajikistan in 2000; Soviet troops also laid mines on the Uzbek-Afghan border. Different sources have estimated that between 50,000 and 350,000 antipersonnel mines were laid on the three borders.5

Survey on the Tajik side of the border over several years had identified a total of 57 suspected hazardous areas (size unknown) as of December 2008.6 However, according to information received by Tajikistan from the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan had cleared 95% of minefields along the Tajik border by the end of 2007. Demining operations were said to have been conducted by Uzbek army deminers in cooperation with Tajik border troops.7

In 2005, media reports cited Kyrgyz officials in Batken province as saying Kyrgyz border guards had checked previously mined areas of the border around the settlements of Ak-Turpak, Chonkara, and Otukchu, which had been cleared by Uzbek deminers, and confirmed that they were free of contamination.8

According to the most recent information available (2005), Uzbekistan has no plans to clear mines laid on its 150km border with Afghanistan.9

In July 2008, an explosion at an army ammunition storage area in Kagan town in Bukhara region killed at least three people and injured 21.10 There were unconfirmed reports of further casualties.11 The extent of any residual contamination is not known.

Casualties
There are no official records of mine/ERW casualties in Uzbekistan; the government does not confirm reports and media reporting of incidents is rare.12 Landmine Monitor did not identify any new mine/ERW casualties from 2008 through April 2009. It was not reported if there were any ERW casualties as a result of contamination from explosions at the Kagan ammunition storage area in July 2008.13

The last casualties identified by Landmine Monitor occurred in 2004 (four killed).14 Between 1999 and the end of 2004, at least 67 mine casualties occurred (at least 47 killed), but the number is probably higher due to a lack of reporting.15 For example, in 2001 a border guard was reported as saying that civilian mine casualties occurred daily.16

Uzbek landmines were reported to have caused Tajik casualties in Sugd region on the Tajik-Uzbek border, with one Tajik source estimating that 69 Tajiks had been killed between 2000 and 2006.17

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6 Email from Jonmahmad Rajabov, Director, Tajikistan Mine Action Centre, 16 February 2009.
9 Ibid.
Program Management and Coordination

There is no formal mine action program in Uzbekistan. All clearance is apparently conducted by the army. The extent of any clearance in 2008 or 2009 through April was not known.

Assistance to mine/ERW survivors appears to be addressed by existing services with no need for a separate victim assistance program. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security is responsible for coordinating rehabilitation and reintegration services for mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Public Health coordinates access to healthcare for persons with disabilities.18

Risk Education

In 2008–2009, no formal risk education (RE) activities took place in Uzbekistan. No RE was carried out after the Kagan ammunition storage area explosion though residents were evacuated.19

Some ad hoc RE activities took place between 2001 and 2004. An association of Afghan war veterans conducted RE for children and border guards; they reportedly made residents in the Jizzakh province border region sign statements that they would avoid mined areas in 2001 and 2002.20 The National Society of Red Crescent in Uzbekistan provided RE training for employees in 2004.21 No RE has been recorded since.

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown but at least 20. Uzbekistan provides subsidized healthcare and physical rehabilitation, but widespread informal payments for services make medical care unaffordable for many, including persons with disabilities.22

Since 2003, benefits to persons with disabilities were adjusted to US$7 per month. However, in combination with societal discrimination, this reportedly resulted in poverty for many.23 In August 2008, a two-year cooperation project between the Ministry of Labor and Social Security and UN agencies started, aimed at developing a disability action plan and increasing social integration and employment opportunities for persons with disabilities.24

In June 2008, the 1991 law “On the Social Protection of Disabled Persons in the Republic of Uzbekistan” was amended to include fines for facilities which are physically inaccessible to persons with disabilities. However, no penalties were reported, and many public places remained inaccessible.25 On 27 February 2009, Uzbekistan signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities but not its Optional Protocol.

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VIETNAM

2008 Key Data

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Mine Ban Treaty status</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
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<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam continues to view antipersonnel mines as legitimate weapons necessary for self-defense. Vietnam has abstained every year from supporting the annual UN General Assembly resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has shown an increasing willingness to engage on the treaty since 2007. Vietnam has claimed it has not produced antipersonnel mines since the treaty came into effect, and that it has a policy not to export landmines.

Vietnam remains one of the world’s most affected countries, predominantly by UXO, including cluster munition remnants, although there is also a mine problem. Vietnam’s military has conducted most of the clearance since the end of the war with the United States in 1975. However, in the last decade, international organizations have been allowed to take on a small but slowly growing role in central Vietnam. The creation of a bomb and mine action coordination center in 2009 marked a new effort to mobilize resources and give added impetus to clearance.

Landmine Monitor recorded 1,545 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (589 killed and 956 injured) in Vietnam from 1999 to 2008.

Community and school-based risk education has been conducted through NGOs for over 10 years in six high-risk provinces. An evaluation of the UNICEF program in 2008 concluded, however, that it will take time to ensure a sustainable level of behavioral change.

The efforts of both the government and NGOs have led to an improvement in medical and rehabilitation services for mine/ERW survivors in Vietnam over the past decade. There has been an improvement in the quality and quantity of emergency and continuing medical care, provision of artificial limbs, and vocational training and micro-credit programs. Persons with disabilities have been included in the drafting of national laws and policies in relation to education, employment, and rights of persons with disabilities.¹

Mine Ban Policy

Vietnam has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. On 2 December 2008, Vietnam abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 63/42 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has abstained on all previous annual pro-ban treaty General Assembly resolutions. Vietnam has cited national security concerns, and especially border security, as reasons for not joining the Mine Ban Treaty.2

Since 2007, Vietnam has more frequently attended meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty. Vietnam made its first statement during an intersessional meeting in June 2008, where it stated:

“We therefore have joined the world community to welcome the various bans, moratoria and other restrictions already declared by States on anti-personnel landmines as well as the growing consensus against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines against civilians….We support the humanitarian aspects of the Ottawa Convention of Anti-personnel Landmines but we could not sign it yet as it regrettably does not duly take into account the legitimate security concerns of many countries including Vietnam.”3

Vietnam attended as an observer the Ninth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November 2008, but made no statements. It also participated in the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia from 1–3 April 2009, the second in a series of regional meetings convened in the lead-up to the treaty’s Second Review Conference. It did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2009.

Vietnam signed but has not ratified the Convention on Conventional Weapons. Vietnam has not signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions.4

Production, stockpiling, and transfer

Vietnam has not revealed any new information in the past year regarding its production or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. Vietnam has produced antipersonnel mines in the past.5

In 2008, officials said that Vietnam has not produced mines since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force, but also emphasized that Vietnam reserves the right to use and produce mines in the future.6 Until Vietnam issues an official public statement that it does not and will not in the future produce antipersonnel mines, Landmine Monitor will continue to list Vietnam as one of the few remaining global manufacturers.

In May 2008, an army official informed a Canadian government delegation that Vietnam’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines will expire in a few years. He stated that Vietnam has gradually started to destroy the mines “lot by lot.”7 The Ministry of National Defense told the ICBL in 2006 that the stockpile consists only of mines recovered from cleared minefields.8 In 2003, an official confirmed the existence of a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, saying, “Vietnam does not keep large stores of landmines, but we have enough to protect our country against invasion.”9

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5 In the past, Vietnam produced copies of Chinese, Soviet, and US mines. The only mine Vietnam has reportedly produced since the 1990s is the “apple mine,” which is a recycled version of the BLU-24 (cluster) submunition dropped by the US during the Vietnam War. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1,115; and Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 513.
Vietnam told States Parties in June 2008 that, “we strictly observe our policy not to export” antipersonnel mines.10 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs previously wrote Landmine Monitor stating, “Vietnam has never exported and will never export mines.”11

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Vietnam is heavily contaminated by ERW, mainly UXO, including widespread and extensive contamination by cluster munition remnants, which date back to the war with the US in the 1960s and first half of the 1970s. Vietnam also has a lesser problem of mines, mostly left by conflicts in the 1970s with neighboring Cambodia and China.

Almost all Vietnam’s provinces and cities are affected by ERW to some extent. The US dropped 413,130 tons (4.1 million kg) of submunitions on Vietnam between 1965 and 1973, striking 55 of its 64 provinces and cities including Haiphong, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Hue.12

The most affected provinces are Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, and Quang Tri in central Vietnam on either side of the former Demilitarized Zone that divided the north and south during the war. In 2009, Vietnamese officials estimated that some 66,000km² (20%) of the country is still affected by ERW,13 which is almost identical to official estimates in 2006.14 Officials reported in 2006 that clearance operations had tackled only 9–12% of the area affected by mines and UXO, and about one-quarter of the contaminating ordnance.15 An impact survey conducted in 2004–2008 estimated that almost 16,000km² of land was likely to be contaminated across the six central provinces.

Many items of UXO are also found along the border with the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, where the Ho Chi Minh trail was a target of intensive US bombing during the war.16 Much UXO contamination is still on the surface, but considerable quantities are found below the surface at depths of up to five meters and, in cases of heavy ordnance, at depths of up to 20m.17 Despite extensive surface clearance operations since the war, contamination at depths of 30cm or more remain “hardly investigated” and pose a significant threat.18

Casualties
In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 90 new mine/ERW casualties (36 killed and 54 injured).19 All the casualties were civilians: 52 men, 27 boys, six girls, and four women. One casualty was a female of unknown age. For 44 casualties, the device causing the incident was not recorded: submunitions caused 13 casualties, mines five, and other ERW 28. The majority of casualties were involved in scrap metal collection (24), agricultural activities (18), and

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11 Letter from Nguyen Manh Hung, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 March 2001. An internal policy document provided to Landmine Monitor by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Question of Antipersonnel Mines,” 2 March 2000, also stated that Vietnam has not and will never export antipersonnel mines. Despite the denial of past export, it appears Vietnam provided antipersonnel mines to Cambodia, perhaps until the early 1990s.
13 Presentation to LWG by Duong Van Nhan, Manager, Project Management and Foreign Affairs Division, VBMAC, Dong Ho, 9 April 2009.
14 See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1,024. At that time, officials said some 60,000km² or 21% of the country was contaminated.
15 Email from Col. Nguyen Trong Dac, Deputy Director, Europe and General Affairs Division, External Relations Department, Ministry of National Defense, 6 August 2006.
18 Email from Col. Nguyen Trong Dac, Ministry of National Defense, 6 August 2006.
19 Unless otherwise noted, Landmine Monitor analysis of data provided by: emails from Tran Hong Chi, Project Coordinator, CPI, 12 March 2009 and 1 July 2009; email from Phan Van Hung, Project Officer-Information/ Database/GIS, Project RENEW, 12 August 2008; and Landmine Monitor media analysis from January to December 2008.
playing, handling, or tampering with the explosive device (17). Incidents were reported in seven provinces, with most occurring in Quang Tri (42), Quang Nam (17), and Quang Binh (10).

The 90 casualties recorded in 2008 is a decrease compared to the 110 new mine/ERW casualties (48 killed and 62 injured) recorded in 2007 and 96 casualties (39 killed and 57 injured) in 2006.20 Due to limited data collection in Vietnam, comparison of annual recorded casualty data may not indicate a trend, nor represent the full scope of the problem.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, with at least 18 new casualties (eight killed and 10 injured) as of 30 June. All the casualties were civilians: 11 men, two boys, one woman, and one child of unknown gender. Nine casualties were caused by submunitions, another four by other ERW, and the devices causing five incidents were unknown. Most casualties occurred during the collection of scrap metal (eight), “burning” (three), and agricultural activities (two).

The cumulative number of mine/ERW casualties in Vietnam is unknown. Landmine Monitor analysis recorded 1,545 mine/ERW casualties (589 killed and 956 injured) from 1999 to 2008. Project RENEW, an NGO, has identified 6,941 mine/ERW casualties (2,587 killed, 4,349 injured, and five unknown) in Quang Tri province between 1975 and 2008.21 From 1975 to the end of 2007, the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MoLISA) recorded 104,701 mine/ERW casualties (38,849 killed and 65,852 injured).22 According to the Ministry of Public Security, there have been more than 138,000 mine/ERW casualties (38,000 killed and 100,000 injured) in Vietnam since 1975.23 People with war-related disabilities reportedly account for 26% of persons with disabilities.24

Risk profile
UXO poses a greater threat to the civilian population than do mines, particularly BLU-26 and BLU-36 submunitions and M79 rifle grenades, which have together been responsible for most of the casualties since 1975.25 The greatest risk is in the provinces of Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien-Hue.26 Incidents are caused by livelihood activities, collecting scrap metal, and playing/tampering. They mostly occur during the flood season and summer.27

According to a 2008 UNICEF evaluation of its support to mine action, three groups need to be targeted: the “unaware” (including children aged six to 10), the “reckless” (children aged 11 to 16 and adults, including scrap metal dealers and collectors), and the general public, whose knowledge maybe fair to good, but many of whom are misinformed.28

Socio-economic impact
Contamination imposes a heavy financial cost at a time of rapid economic modernization; it limits cultivation of affected agricultural areas and requires costly clearance operations for major infrastructure and industrial development projects.29

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21 Data provided by email from Phan Van Hung, Project RENEW, 12 August 2008.
24 Presentation by Nguyen Thi Thu Trang, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, “Presentation on Vietnam’s legislations, policies and practices in protecting and promoting the rights of persons with disability,” at the Bangkok Workshop on Achieving a Mine-Free South-East Asia, Bangkok, 31 March–3 April 2009. There was no further category break down for the cause of the “war-related” disabilities.
26 Email from Victor Pinga, Technical Manager, Global Agriculture and Economic Growth, and Phan Huong Giang, Special Projects Officer, CPI, 7 April 2009.
27 Email from Andrew Wells-Dang, Acting Representative, CRS, 28 March 2009.
The Vietnam UXO/Landmine Impact Assessment and Rapid Technical Survey also observes that “perhaps the most significant socio-economic impact of landmines and UXO is that their presence creates a burden of fear and concern among people living in contaminated communities and impedes full participation in a wide range of productive economic activities.”

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action

Under a 2006 Prime Ministerial Decision, the Ministry of National Defense oversees mine action at the national level and clearance is undertaken by the Army Engineering Corps of the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN). The Technology Center for Bomb and Mine Disposal (BOMICEN), part of the Ministry of National Defense, has acted as a central coordinating body for clearance activities.

Provincial authorities coordinate mine action below the national level. NGOs engaging in mine action must sign a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Foreign Affairs of the province in which they work. Mine action priorities are set by the provincial government. District People’s Committees, which select the sub-districts or other areas that should be targeted.

The Vietnam Bomb and Mine Clearance Action Center (VBMAC) opened in February 2009 in line with a government decision announced a year earlier with a mandate to implement and accelerate clearance and to mobilize foreign funding for mine action. VBMAC said it was “the wish of the government to do everything possible to double national clearance capacity.” Although VBMAC’s director, Nguyen Trong Canh, is also BOMICEN’s director and he expected to recruit many of his personnel from BOMICEN, VBMAC is a civilian organization under MoLISA. In addition to clearance, VBMAC intends to engage in risk education and victim assistance and seeks to integrate UXO/mine action into broader development plans.

As of mid-2009, it remained unclear to what extent VBMAC would act as coordinator of the UXO/mine action sector. VBMAC said BOMICEN remained the lead agency in Vietnam’s mine action, and said it had been set up as “an implementing unit, not a policy-making unit.” However, VBMAC said it would actively participate and “coordinate” with the Ministry of National Defense in preparing a national mine action plan and would try to develop national standards. VBMAC also negotiated an agreement with Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) for support in developing a database unit to manage data from the UXO/Landmine Impact Survey and use it as a tool for tasking clearance operations by different agencies.

Risk education

VBMAC is also responsible for the coordination of risk education (RE). However, in 2008 UNICEF was the de facto RE coordinator, and VBMAC will need more technical, financial and legal support to take on this coordination role. UNICEF’s role is to support its counterparts and implementing partners, facilitate coordination of RE activities through the Landmine Working Group (LWG), provide financial and technical support for national implementing partners’ RE projects, and advocate for the Mine Ban Treaty. The LWG met quarterly, rotating between the

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31 Prime Minister’s Decision 96/2006/QD-TTg, 4 May 2006.
34 Interview with Nguyen Trong Canh, Director, VBMAC, Hanoi, 10 April 2009.
35 Ibid; and presentation to LWG by Duong Van Nhan, VBMAC, Dong Hoi, 9 April 2009. “If you haven’t got a national plan, you can’t carry out mine action fluently,” Canh commented.
36 Telephone interview with Jan Erik Stoa, Program Manager, NPA, 4 August 2009.
38 Ibid.
central provinces and Hanoi. Most NGOs and government coordination agents participate.\textsuperscript{40} VBMAC participated for the first time in a Landmine Working Group meeting in April 2009.\textsuperscript{41}

**Victim assistance**

Formal coordination mechanisms did not exist in Vietnam for victim assistance (VA) in 2008. There was no VA framework and no agency had the clear mandate for coordination. However, the LWG quarterly meetings with NGO operators include collaboration on VA projects.\textsuperscript{42} VBMAC is also tasked with implementing government policies related to survivors and mine/ERW-affected communities.

MoLISA is responsible for disability issues and chairs the National Coordinating Council on Disability, which comprises 14 ministries and the Disabled People’s Organization (DPO). The National Action Plan for Supporting People with Disabilities (2006–2010) was revised in consultation with groups of persons with disabilities, and was implemented in 30 of 64 provinces in Vietnam in 2008. This reportedly contributed to improved care and protection of persons with disabilities in the provinces where it was implemented.\textsuperscript{43} Persons with disabilities were reportedly consulted in the development and review of national programs, such as the national poverty reduction program, vocational laws, and various education policies.\textsuperscript{44}

The Disability Forum is a network of disability groups and international NGOs, which addresses a range of issues, including rehabilitation and health services, employment, disability prevention, public awareness, barrier-free access to public places, as well as inclusive and vocational education.\textsuperscript{45} The forum acts as a coordination body for NGO activities.\textsuperscript{46}

**Data collection and management**

There is no comprehensive national data collection system in place in Vietnam. As such, under-reporting is certain. The 2008 and 2009 casualty data analyzed by Landmine Monitor was collected and supplied by Clear Path International (CPI). CPI has collected casualty data through news media and reports from local authorities in 14 provinces since 2001. However, CPI only records and reports on casualties for whom it has provided services.\textsuperscript{47} A number of other organizations collect data, including MoLISA, which is responsible for collection of data on persons with disabilities. Project RENEW collects data on Quang Tri province. The LWG has regularly discussed the need for increased information sharing and coordination work, including regarding collection and verification of casualty data.\textsuperscript{48}

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\textsuperscript{40} Email from Andrew Wells-Dang, CRS, 28 March 2009; and email from Nguyen Thi Thanh An, UNICEF, 16 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{41} LWG, “Minutes,” Dong Hoi, 9 April 2009.

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{43} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Nguyen Thi Linh Giang, LSN Viet Nam, 20 March 2009; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Nguyen Thang Loi, VNAH, 19 June 2009.


\textsuperscript{47} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tran Hong Chi, CPI, 13 March 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1,029.

Mine action program operators

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Plans

Strategic mine action plans

Vietnam has no strategic plan for mine action. VBMAC has indicated it will work with the Ministry of National Defense to prepare one (see Program management and coordination section above). VBMAC expected to have some 600 staff in 2010 or “maybe later,” including 20 to 25 clearance teams. These would also undertake RE and, unlike BOMICEN’s clearance units, would focus more on integrating clearance with development priorities. VBMAC also planned to open regional offices in the north, center, and south, but had no timetable for doing so.

There is no national strategic plan for RE. UNICEF has a five-year plan from 2005–2010 in six provinces which aims that, “The population over 6 years of age in affected areas is aware of UXO/mine risks and empowered to take preventative measures through effective education and training including mass media, community-based mine risk education, school-based mine risk education; and the marking of risk areas.”

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

BOMICEN operations have supported key national infrastructure projects, for example the expansion of Highway 1 between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, but do not form an integral part of any national economic development strategy. Clearance by international organizations is tasked by provincial and district authorities according to local priorities.

National ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

The government approaches UXO and mine contamination as a major impediment to economic development. VBMAC reported that in 2008, the government spent VND800 billion (US$48 million) on UXO/mine action. The government is, however, concerned that clearance is

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49 Interview with Nguyen Trong Canh, VBMAC, Hanoi, 10 April 2009.
50 Ibid.
51 Email from Andrew Wells-Dang, CRS, 28 March 2009; and email from Siegfried Block, Program Manager, SODI, 25 March 2009.
53 Presentation to LGW by Duong Van Nhan, VBMAC, Dong Hoi, 9 April 2009.
proceeding too slowly and in April 2009 it set up VBMAC in a bid to attract international resources to enable it to accelerate clearance.54

National management
The Ministry of National Defense has had responsibility for UXO and mine clearance, and it has conducted most clearance operations through BOMICEN. International NGOs undertake clearance under agreements with provincial authorities (see Program management and coordination section above).

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
BOMICEN operates according to standing operating procedures developed by the Ministry of National Defense. VBMAC plans to develop national standards and had discussions with Golden West Humanitarian Foundation in March 2009 about conducting a review of mine action standards in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards.55 A workshop to develop national standards for RE was facilitated by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in December 2007.56 Draft national standards dated 15 December 2008 were being reviewed by MoLISA as of July 2009.57

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
BOMICEN and PAVN have undertaken most of the UXO and mine clearance in Vietnam, operating with some 600–700 clearance personnel and reportedly clearing about 200km² a year,58 but details of their operations are not made public. VBMAC planned to initiate operations in 2009 by deploying 10 teams with 20 members each in two districts of Quang Tri province.59

International and local NGOs also engaged in mine and UXO clearance in 2008: Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Solidarity Service International (SODI), and PeaceTrees Vietnam (PTVN). NPA opened an office in Vietnam in November 2007 and in May 2008 started clearance operations in Cam Lo district, Quang Tri province, in cooperation with Project RENEW.60

Identification of hazardous areas
In July 2009, Vietnam released the final report of a UXO/Landmine Impact Survey conducted by BOMICEN with technical support from the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAf) in two phases between 2004 and 2008. The survey covered all 1,361 communes of six central provinces considered most heavily contaminated: Ha Tinh, Nghe An, Quang Binh, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien-Hue.61

The survey reported a total of 3,214 battle and mined areas covering 15,897km², more than one-third of the six provinces’ total land area of 45,115km², and affecting up to eight million people. Worst affected was Quang Tri province, with 739 bombed and mined areas affecting 3,866km² or 83% of its total land.62 Rapid technical response teams verified and cleared a total of 13.5km², less than 0.1% of the total area, removing 24,018 items of UXO.63

54 Interview with Nguyen Trong Canh, VBMAC, Hanoi, 10 April 2009.
55 Ibid.
57 Email from Nguyen Thi Thanh An, UNICEF, 16 July 2009.
58 Interview with Nguyen Trong Canh, VBMAC, Hanoi, 10 April 2009.
59 Ibid.
60 Interview with Lee Moroney, Project Manager (EOD), NPA, in Oslo, 1 September 2008; and NPA, “NPA Vietnam Progress Report, November 2007 to June 2008.”
63 Rapid Technical Response teams surveyed 13.5km² to a depth of five meters, conducting clearance to a depth of one meter on 11.5km² and to a depth of five meters on 2km². BOMICEN/VVAF, “UXO/Landmine Impact Survey,” July 2009, p. 7.
In the first phase, completed in May 2005, teams surveyed Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, and Quang Tri and confirmed 1,308 km² of land as contaminated and a further 3,057 km² as suspect. The survey’s second phase, between November 2006 and June 2007, covered the remaining 214 communes of the first three provinces, and all 619 communes of two additional provinces, Nghe An and Thua Thien-Hue. BOMICEN reported that teams verified 7.85 km² of land to a depth of five meters and destroyed nearly 17,000 items of UXO found to a depth of one meter. Another 40 detector signals indicating items buried at a depth of more than one meter were marked and reported to provincial military authorities. In 2008, VVAF and BOMICEN extended the survey to Quang Ngai and deployed 11 two-person survey teams to survey 180 communes as well as six 20-person rapid technical response teams. Fieldwork took place between May and July. VVAF reported clearance to a depth of five meters over an area of 2.12 km², with some 7,000 items of UXO destroyed.

MAG community liaison teams conducted needs assessments in the provinces of Nghe An, Quang Nam, and Quang Ngai in 2008, and Ha Tinh and Thua Thien-Hue in 2009, providing baseline data about UXO-related issues with a view to deciding the most appropriate province for expanding the program. NPA also conducted a needs assessment of Thua Thien-Hue due for completion in August 2009.

**Mine and battle area clearance**

MAG, the biggest international demining operator in Vietnam, had four international and 177 national staff as of May 2009. It operated in two central provinces, Quang Tri and Quang Binh with seven mine action teams which spend 90% of their time on roving tasks and only 10% on static clearance. In 2009, MAG expected to reduce its presence in Quang Tri from five to three teams with a view to expanding into Quang Nam province, subject to the availability of funds. Post-clearance assessments conducted on all MAG sites found 61% in use as planned, 35% still under development, and 4% under unplanned use.

NPA, working in partnership with Project RENEW, provides technical support and management for a roving explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Quang Tri. In 2008, it conducted 224 tasks and cleared a total of 977 items of UXO, of which 254 were submunitions and seven were mines.

PTVN, which has operated in Quang Tri province since 2005, added a second EOD team in 2008 bringing the number of technicians to 20. It also operated two RE teams with a total of 20 staff. In 2008, the EOD teams undertook 241 roving tasks, clearing a total of 53,298 m² and destroying 14,577 items of UXO.

SODI, with a total staff of about 170 people, operated in two provinces, Quang Tri and Thua Thien-Hue, deploying an area clearance team and mobile team in each province. SODI reported higher productivity as a result of area clearance teams switching from a 100% metal-free methodology to battle area clearance and deploying new detectors, including large-loop detectors. It also added a second roving unit within one of its mobile teams, improving speed of response and the range of operations. The area clearance teams cleared 1.66 km² in 2008, up

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65 Emails from Jonas Alm, VVAF, 16 and 17 July 2007.
66 Ibid.
67 Email from Thao Griffiths, Country Representative, and Nguyen Thu Ha, Program Manager, UXO/Landmine Impact Survey, VVAF, 21 August 2008.
68 Email from Jimmy Roodt, Country Program Manager, MAG, Hanoi, 17 May 2009; and MAGazine quarterly newsletter, July 2009.
69 Telephone interview with Jan Erik Stoa, NPA, 4 August 2009.
70 Email from Jimmy Roodt, MAG, Hanoi, 17 May 2009.
71 Email from Jan Erik Stoa, NPA, 5 August 2009.
72 Email from Joselynn Plank, Program Coordinator, PTVN, 16 July 2009.
from 1.48 km² in 2007, and destroyed 6,501 items of UXO, while the mobile teams cleared an area of 0.12 km² and destroyed 13,548 items of UXO, up from 8,510 in 2007.\(^\text{73}\)

VVAF provided technical support to BOMICEN for two clearance projects. The first, implemented in October–December 2008 in Quang Tri province, involved three 20-person clearance teams and resulted in surface clearance of 99,486 m² and clearance to a depth of five meters over 214,472 m², removing six landmines and 254 items of UXO, including one 500-pound (227 kg) bomb. The second project, implemented in June–August 2009 in Nghe Anh province, also involved three 20-person teams which cleared 202,000 m² and 17 items of UXO, including five bombs.\(^\text{74}\)

### Risk Education

RE was conducted by six NGOs in 2008, working in partnership with other organizations, and UNICEF working in partnership with the Research Centre for Ethnic Minorities’ Education (under the Ministry of Education and Training), the Departments of Education and Training in three provinces, Youth Unions, and Project RENEW.\(^\text{75}\) Total beneficiary numbers for the whole country are not available, but in Quang Tri and Thua Thien-Hue around 150,000 people were reached.\(^\text{76}\)

RE was delivered through community-based and school-based RE in six high-risk provinces: Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thua Thien-Hue, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Thanh Hoa, and through the mass media. Despite the need for RE in other provinces in the central and south-central region of Vietnam, NGOs have not been successful in raising funds for further expansion to these areas.\(^\text{77}\)

A 2008 UNICEF evaluation identified challenges to RE, including the lack of an updated nationwide UXO/mine casualty database and an effective coordination mechanism.\(^\text{78}\)

Limited needs assessments are conducted at the local level. A knowledge, attitude, and practice (KAP) survey was conducted as part of the UNICEF evaluation in July 2008. It found that there was a high level of understanding among children, but that children were also found to be scrap metal collectors. It also found that while adults had a higher knowledge and understanding of risks, a greater number had not reached a stage of adopting safer behavior.\(^\text{80}\) Catholic Relief Services (CRS) conducts baseline studies on UXO/mine contamination, casualties, and KAPs of at-risk groups each time it commences RE in a new district.\(^\text{81}\)

Two studies pointed to the challenge RE faced in addressing scrap metal collection. A Project RENEW/NPA study found that RE “interventions are ineffective in terms of modifying the behaviour of collectors” as in most cases people are aware of the risks but do it out of economic necessity. It suggested that RE activities be revised to determine whether a more effective message could be sent, such as focusing on schoolchildren, and working with women to discourage their husbands and sons from taking risks.\(^\text{82}\) The UNICEF evaluation also concluded that RE must go beyond the dissemination of information, for example by looking for incentives for safe behavior, and looking at safe practices in scrap metal collection.\(^\text{83}\) In 2008, the Golden

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\(^{73}\) Email from Ilona Schleicher, Vice-Managing Director, SODI, 26 May 2009.

\(^{74}\) Email from Thao Griffiths and Nguyen Thu Ha, VVAF, 12 September 2009.


\(^{76}\) Email from Nguyen Thi Thanh An, UNICEF, 16 July 2009.

\(^{77}\) Email from Andrew Wells-Dang, CRS, 28 March 2009.


\(^{79}\) Email from Nguyen Thi Thanh An, UNICEF, 16 July 2009.


\(^{81}\) Email from Andrew Wells-Dang, CRS, 28 March 2009.

\(^{82}\) Project RENEW/NPA/The Center for Social Sciences and Humanities, “Study on scrap metal collectors/dealers: Quang Tri, Quang Binh and Thua Thien Hue,” July 2008, p. 56.

West Humanitarian Foundation launched a project to reduce the risk of scrap metal collection by setting up 28 Safe Holding Areas in Quang Tri province.84

A UNICEF project in 2008 increased attention to building the capacity of the education sector and youth unions to provide RE in the school curriculum and using a child-to-child methodology to facilitate RE and other extracurricular activities. Teacher training was implemented in 18 schools in each province.85 However, KAP study findings show that results from schools not involved in mainstreaming RE into the school curriculum were indistinguishable from those in schools where it was used,86 and recommended that a monitoring system be put in place.87 Other NGOs, including Counterpart International and CRS, were also involved in school-based RE.88

The UNICEF evaluation also recommended that financial support for district mobile communication teams be discontinued, as it was “not a cost effective, efficient or appropriate vehicle for disseminating messages to the public.”89 CRS disseminated telephone hotline numbers from MAG, SODI, and Project RENEW in Quang Tri, resulting in several requests for clearance of ERW.90 MAG established its community liaison capacity in late 2007 in Quang Binh and Quang Tri, and gained a roughly 25% increase in productivity as a result of the improved quality of information obtained and trusted reporting structures developed with stakeholders. A cooperative agreement with CRS was signed in 2008 to participate and assist in existing school- and community-based RE programs.91

Although RE programs have a strong focus on capacity-building, the UNICEF evaluation recommended that it establish an explicit development strategy for its counterpart and implementing partners, demonstrating a clear transition by 2012 of the mine action project to government institutions.92 CRS works with local partners at every stage of project planning and implementation and conducts capacity-building, to enable them to take over the project with minimum support from international organizations.93 SODI’s program is nationally managed with one expatriate program manager for monitoring operations and giving managerial advice.94 Eighteen TV and radio programs were broadcast in the ethnic minority language for the Bru Van Kieu group in Quang Tri.95

No external monitoring takes place routinely.96 CRS staff, local partners, and community members conduct periodic monitoring of its activities.97 SODI activities are monitored occasionally by SODI headquarters staff or donor representatives during their program evaluations.98

UNICEF’s mid-term evaluation in 2008 concluded that, “while it is difficult to determine causality of association between UNICEF’s MRE program and its project aim of reducing the incidence and severity of injuries caused by UXO/landmines in Vietnam, UNICEF can claim due credit for contributing towards a decline in mortality and morbidity rates linked to UXO/mines in recent years. ... The most significant improvements were in the areas of increased awareness and knowledge of children and adults on UXO/mines, more effective counterpart

86 Ibid.
88 Email from Victor Pinga and Phan Huong Giang, CPI, 7 April 2009; and “Community outreach for UXO/mine risk education in Quang Binh and Quang Tri provinces,” CRS quarterly report No. 2, October to December 2008.
90 Email from Andrew Wells-Dang, CRS, 28 March 2009.
91 Email from Ruth Bottomley, Community Liaison Manager Southeast Asia, MAG, 23 July 2009.
93 Email from Andrew Wells-Dang, CRS, 28 March 2009.
94 Email from Siegfried Block, SODI, 25 March 2009.
95 Email from Nguyen Thi Thanh An, UNICEF, 16 July 2009.
96 Email from Victor Pinga and Phan Huong Giang, CPI, 7 April 2009.
97 Email from Andrew Wells-Dang, CRS, 28 March 2009.
98 Email from Siegfried Block, SODI, 25 March 2009.
and partner annual planning processes, and development and promotion of Vietnam’s National MRE standards. There is a long way to go, however, to ensure a sustained level of behavioral change of majority people.\(^99\)

### Activities in 2008\(^{100}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographical area</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterpart International</td>
<td>RE as a complementary component of its Safe Farms, Safe Schools project; four RE training courses in four elementary schools; four safe playgrounds; RE training courses</td>
<td>Bo Trach district, Quang Binh province</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Support community outreach teams; material development; mass media advocacy; school-based RE was completed in November 2008 in Quang Binh</td>
<td>Quang Binh and Quang Tri provinces</td>
<td>320 community outreach team members; 9,600 community members in Quang Tri; 6,691 through school-community RE in Quang Binh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Community Liaison</td>
<td>Quang Tri, Quang Binh provinces</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project RENEW</td>
<td>Training in Child-to-Child Radio and TV spots</td>
<td>Quang Tri province</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTVN</td>
<td>Overnight RE camps; billboards; meetings with communities, schools, Youth Union, and scrap metal collectors; TV and radio; distribution of materials</td>
<td>Dong Ha and Quang Tri provinces</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SODI</td>
<td>RE performances in schools four to five a month per province through mobile teams; gathering information on locations of ERW from children; destroying ERW</td>
<td>Quang Tri and Thua Thien-Hue provinces</td>
<td>1,875 teachers; 30,857 students; 2,722 other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF with Research Centre for Ethnic Minorities’ Education, education and training departments in three provinces, Youth Unions</td>
<td>Mainstreaming RE into the school curriculum; mobile communication teams at school and district level; mass media campaigns on TV and radio; information, education and communication materials</td>
<td>Ha Tinh, Nghe An, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, Thanh Hoa, and Thua Thien-Hue provinces</td>
<td>80 schools, 140 district and school-based teams; training to 1,000 RE trainers, 150 child educators, and 1,550 primary school teachers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{100}\) Ibid.
SODI headquarters conducted an evaluation of its work in 2008, monitoring one RE performance in a village. They concluded that there needed to be greater interaction and more audience participation.101

RE has been conducted in Vietnam for over 10 years, by up to six international organizations working with Vietnamese partners, including the Ministry of Education and Training, Women’s Union, Youth Union, the Committee for the Care and Protection of Children, and the Committee on Population, Family and Children. RE has mainly focused on six provinces, with most activities taking place in the three provinces of Quang Binh, Quang Tri, and Thua Thien-Hue. Many contaminated areas have been underserved. It has mainly been community-based, with a particular focus on school-based RE, with the training of teachers and the development of a curriculum-based classroom teaching program, and has also been delivered through mass media. RE has also been delivered alongside clearance activities.102 The number of beneficiaries increased each year until 2007, when it decreased slightly.103

In 1998, PTVN established the Danaan Parry Landmines Education Center in Quang Tri, which served as a training and resource center.104 UNICEF took on a major role in RE in 2004, and in 2006 appointed a full-time RE officer.105 From 2004, UNICEF implemented an injury prevention program in 15 provinces using mass media and a manual for use in homes, communities, and schools.106 In 2004, a program targeting scrap metal collectors was conducted, including income generation projects.107

Needs assessments and evaluations conducted in 2003 and 2004 showed that the majority of people were aware of the danger from mines and UXO, but most did not report or mark dangerous objects. They also concluded that RE did contribute to a reduction in casualties.108

**Victim Assistance**

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be 100,000.109 Healthcare and rehabilitation services were generally adequate in Vietnam in 2008. Yet services are unevenly distributed across regions and costs for transport and medical care itself remain a barrier for many persons with disabilities. The services can be difficult to access, particularly for populations living in rural and mountainous areas. The majority of mine/ERW incidents occur far from provincial centers, where the healthcare services are concentrated. National health insurance was only provided to a fraction of persons with disabilities.110

The Ministry of Health is responsible for the majority of medical care. Rehabilitation services are provided by the Ministry of Health in coordination with MoLISA, and with the support of the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD). More than 300,000 persons with disabilities in Vietnam are reported to have received rehabilitation services, including provision of prosthetics, orthotics, and wheelchairs over the past decade.111

101 Email from Siegfried Block, SODI, 25 March 2009.
102 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
Psychological and social support programs and economic reintegration activities were constrained by limited resources in 2008. NGOs and the government-sponsored rehabilitation program, which included approximately 100 vocational training centers for persons with disabilities, were the primary service providers. UNICEF reported in 2008 that 85% of all adolescents with disabilities did not finish primary school, and half of children with a disability are illiterate. However, the Vietnamese government reported, “The number of children with disabilities enrolled in secondary and tertiary education increases each year.” Moreover, an NGO working in Quang Binh province reported that the training, employment, and community participation of mine/ERW survivors has built a positive image of survivors’ capabilities in the general community.

The government has established a network of agencies and organizations operating at all levels throughout the country to protect the rights and interests of persons with disabilities, including MoLISA, the Viet Nam Association for the Support of Disabled Persons and Orphans, and the National Coordinating Committee on Disability. The National Coordinating Committee on Disabilities worked with local and international organizations to provide services in 2008, including social support, and advocacy for improved physical access to public buildings and transport, and employment opportunities.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that the national constitution and other laws “all affirm disabled persons are citizens, society’s members, having full rights and obligations of a citizen, enjoying together with other citizens social achievements.” Vietnam has legislation protecting the rights and encouraging employment of persons with disabilities. The law requires businesses to meet a 2–3% quota of their workforce for persons with disabilities. However the government reportedly enforces these provisions unevenly. Barriers reportedly remain in education, employment, and participation in social activities.

The government signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 22 October 2007, but as of 1 July 2009 had not ratified the convention nor signed its Optional Protocol. The government reported in April 2009 that it was drafting a “Law on the Handicapped” and had progressed towards ratifying the convention.

**Victim assistance activities**

A major challenge for the VA sector in Vietnam is resource mobilization. One NGO reported it could not expand its program to provide support for survivors and their families due to a lack of funding.
MoLISA and the Ministry of Health with the ICRC SFD provided rehabilitation services through 10 centers in 2008. The SFD subsidized the provision of assistive devices and rehabilitation care to 3,054 amputees, 59% of whom were war victims. The SFD continued to provide technical support and capacity-building, including a training course for 17 orthotic and prosthetic technicians through the Vietnamese Training Centre for Orthopaedic Technologists. In collaboration with the Vietnamese Red Cross Society, the SFD distributed 204 wheelchairs for persons with disabilities living in remote and impoverished regions.

Vietnam Assistance for the Handicapped (VNAH) provided technical support to five regional rehabilitation and prosthetics centers, vocational training, and advocacy on laws and policies for persons with disabilities in 2008. It also worked with one state-owned and three private wheelchair manufacturers, and a network of local government and civil society organizations to distribute the devices. VNAH provided 2,500 prosthetics in 2008, physical rehabilitation to 450 persons with disabilities, and vocational training to 230.

Since Project RENEW began operations in 2002 in Quang Tri province, it has assisted 1,178 mine/ERW survivors and their families through microcredit projects and assistive devices. In Huong Hoa district, Quang Tri province, the Prosthetic and Orthopedic Mobile Outreach Program provided physical rehabilitation to 171 persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors in 2008. The majority of those assisted were fitted with an artificial limb. Project RENEW reported the 25 mine/ERW survivors who attended their vocational training course all reported a significant increase in income after participating in the program. Fifty survivors and their families were assisted in 2008 through the micro-credit project.

Clear Path International provided a wide range of services to 1,664 persons with disabilities in 2008, including 1,144 mine/ERW survivors and their families. Of the mine/ERW survivors assisted, 72 were new casualties in 2008. Services included emergency and on-going medical care, family counseling for recent victims, prosthetics provision and rehabilitation, and small grants, including educational scholarships and sponsorship of sport events for persons with disabilities.

Landmine Survivor Network Viet Nam (LSN Viet Nam) coordinated a diverse peer support program in Quang Binh province, assisting 382 mine/ERW survivors in 2008. Activities included providing loans to 145 survivors and vocational training to 144. In addition, LSN Vietnam provided assistance to more than 400 persons with disabilities through 20 self-help groups in 66 communes. LSN Viet Nam is working towards national registration as an NGO.

PTVN provided medical assistance and economic reintegration to mine/ERW survivors in Quang Tri province in 2008.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Vietnam. In June 2005, BOMICEN stated that without exact statistics on contamination and casualties, an accurate estimate of general funds required for clearance and VA was not possible.

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127 Project RENEW reported the 25 participants have increased their monthly cash income to US$40 per month on average. Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Dang Quang Toan, Project RENEW, 20 March 2009.
129 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tran Hong Chi, CPL, 13 March 2009.
130 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Nguyen Thi Linh Giang, LSN Viet Nam, 20 March 2009; and email from Tirza Leibowitz, Director of Advocacy, Survivor Corps, 11 September 2009.
**National support for mine action**

Vietnam has never reported the amount of funds that it has spent on mine action with the exception of 2002 when the Ministry of National Defense stated that the government had invested “hundreds of billions of dong [tens of millions of US dollars] for mine detection and clearance” each year.132

**International cooperation and assistance**

In 2008, five countries reported providing $7,637,404 (€5,186,340) to mine action in Vietnam. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was approximately 93% more than reported in 2007.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>BOMICEN, Veterans for America, MAG, NPA, Vietnam Veterans Memorial Foundation, Golden West Humanitarian Foundation, Survivor Corps, CRS, PTVN, Humpty Dumpty Institute</td>
<td>Via the Centers for Disease Control, USAID Leahy and Department of State</td>
<td>$4,149,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>VBMAC</td>
<td>Mine/UXO clearance</td>
<td>$1,566,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>SODI</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,160,824 (€788,282)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$741,800 (€400,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>UNDP, NPA</td>
<td>Cluster munition workshop, mine action training</td>
<td>$19,085 (NOK107,580)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$7,637,404 (€5,186,340)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the funding listed above, in March 2009, Iceland announced providing €22,000 ($32,397) to raise public awareness of unexploded ordnance in Thua Thien-Hue province.134 Also in March 2009, Solidarity Service International (Germany) pledged €435,250 ($640,949) for clearance in Quang Tri province.135 SODI mine clearance projects in Vietnam are funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and private donations.136

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133 US Department of State, “To Walk the Earth in Safety 2009,” Washington, DC, July 2009; email from Stacy Bernard Davis, US Department of State, 11 September 2009; email from Hayashi Akihito, Japan Campaign to Ban Landmines (JCBL), 4 June 2009, with translated information received by JCBL from the Humanitarian Assistance Division, Multilateral Cooperation Department, and Conventional Arms Division, Non-proliferation and Science Department; Germany Article 7 Report, Form J, 27 April 2009; emails from Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, DfID, 17 March 2009; and Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009.


135 “German organisation funds mine clearance in Quang Tri,” VietNamNet Bridge, 21 March 2009, english. vietnamnet.vn.

OTHER AREAS

ABKHAZIA

Ten-Year Summary

Abkhazia has not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. In 2001 and 2002, Abkhazian authorities acknowledged that Abkhazian soldiers were still using antipersonnel mines. Georgian forces also used antipersonnel mines in the Upper Kodor Gorge in 2006. Until 2003, there were also allegations that private armed groups from Georgia entered Abkhazia and laid antipersonnel mines.

Demining in Abkhazia has been ongoing since December 1997. As a result of new contamination linked to the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, HALO Trust, the sole clearance operator in Abkhazia, hoped to be able to complete demining operations by the end of 2010, a delay of two years from its earlier plans.

Landmine Monitor has identified at least 136 casualties from mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including 33 killed, 92 injured, and 11 unknown, between 1999 and 2008. HALO recorded 119 casualties (31 killed, 77 injured, and 11 unknown) for the same time period. HALO has recorded some 701 mine/ERW casualties between 1992 and 2008, including 153 people killed, 438 injured, and 110 unknown, including peacekeepers, but data may be incomplete. HALO was the main provider of mine/ERW risk education, even though it decreased its operations in conjunction with decreased contamination. No specific framework for victim assistance exists in Abkhazia and services, despite slow improvements, were still inadequate.

Mine Ban Policy

Abkhazia is a breakaway region of Georgia and is only recognized by Russia and Nicaragua.¹ After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 1992–1993 conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia was characterized by significant use of mines by both sides. A cease-fire agreement was reached in May 1994.

Due to its status, Abkhazia cannot accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Officials have expressed sympathy with humanitarian concerns surrounding landmines, but made clear that they consider antipersonnel mines militarily essential. In August 2009, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia, Maxim Gunjia, told Landmine Monitor, “Our general policy towards landmines is still viewed through [the] perspective of our relations with Georgia. We still consider [that there is a] threat from their territory.”² A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official previously told Landmine Monitor that Abkhazia could prohibit antipersonnel mines only after Georgia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty and signed a peace treaty with Abkhazia.³

Use, stockpiling and retention, and production

Abkhazian forces were last confirmed to have used antipersonnel mines in 2002.⁴ According to 2008 news reports, Georgia accused Abkhazian forces, or Russian forces operating from Abkhazia, of laying mines on the border during and after the armed conflict in August 2008

¹ The Republic of Abkhazia is a member of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.
² Email from Maxim Gunjia, Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia, 24 August 2009.
between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia.\textsuperscript{5} In September 2008, Georgian field engineers reportedly demined areas after Abkhazian military forces withdrew from Ganmukhur village, Zugdidi district.\textsuperscript{6} Landmine Monitor has not been able to independently confirm these allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Abkhazian forces in 2008.

There were also reports of Georgian use of antipersonnel mines. During the conflict in August 2008, Abkhazian and Russian forces moved into the Upper Kodor (Kodori in Georgian) Gorge and retook it from Georgian forces. Media reports state that Abkhazian troops encountered minefields during their operations.\textsuperscript{7} Abkhazian and Russian forces in Abkhazia were also reported to be victims of newly laid antivehicle and Claymore mines.\textsuperscript{8} According to HALO Trust, demining personnel encountered minefields laid since 2006, when the area was under control of Georgian forces.\textsuperscript{9} Landmine Monitor has not been able to independently confirm allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Georgia in the Upper Kodor Gorge in 2008. In communications with Landmine Monitor, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia, Maxim Gunjia, did not allege Georgian use of antipersonnel mines. However, he did claim that Georgian LAR-160 rocket launchers had fired cluster munitions containing more than 10,000 M095 submunitions (also known as M85-type submunitions) in the Kodor Valley, affecting an area of eight hectares (80,000m\textsuperscript{2}). He also said that Georgia mined bridges with antivehicle mines.\textsuperscript{10}

Abkhazia is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but its military forces maintain a stockpile.\textsuperscript{11} Abkhazia has not revealed the size and composition of its stockpile. Russian engineering units stationed in Abkhazia may also stockpile antipersonnel mines.

\section*{Scope of the Problem}

\subsection*{Contamination}

Abkhazia was contaminated with mines and ERW during the 1992–1993 conflict between the breakaway republic and Georgia proper. Both Georgian and Abkhazian forces used landmines extensively during the conflict. Mines were also used in varying degrees between the May 1994 cease-fire and the late 1990s by individuals and small groups, primarily in relation to criminal activities.\textsuperscript{12} The main road leading to the upper Kodor Gorge is mined from both sides and HALO has been maintaining mine warning signs around that area. In addition, new mines

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item \textsuperscript{8} “Georgian TV says three Russian soldiers killed in blasts in separatist Abkhazia,” \textit{BBC Monitoring}, 30 October 2008. See also “Abkhaz special forces searching for Georgian saboteurs after vehicle explosion,” \textit{Russia & CIS Military Newswire}, 1 September 2008; and “Abkhaz police detail allegedly comes under bomb attack,” \textit{Russia & CIS Military Newswire}, 1 September 2008.
\item \textsuperscript{9} Emails from HALO, 7 August 2009 and 9 July 2009; and email from Matthew Hovell, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 19 August 2009. For further details see the report on Georgia in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
\item \textsuperscript{10} Email from Maxim Gunjia, Deputy Foreign Minister, 24 August 2009. This is the first time Landmine Monitor has received an allegation that Georgia used cluster munitions in the Kodor Gorge, though its use of cluster munitions elsewhere in August 2008 has been well documented. The Deputy Foreign Minister provided photographs of submunitions and containers, but Landmine Monitor has not been able to independently investigate and confirm the information.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Interview with Col. Garry Kupalba, Deputy Minister of Defense, Sukhum, 12 April 2007.
\item \textsuperscript{12} HALO, “Caucasus & Balkans, Georgia, The Problem,” www.halotrust.org.
\end{thebibliography}
appear to have been laid in the upper Kodor Gorge in 2006, when the area was under the control of Georgian forces.\textsuperscript{13} As of April 2009, 42 mined areas covering 0.9km\textsuperscript{2} had been identified by HALO as requiring clearance.\textsuperscript{14}

**Casualties**

Landmine Monitor identified at least 20 mine/ERW casualties in six incidents (three killed and 17 injured) in Abkhazia in 2008; at least 14 were civilians.\textsuperscript{15} HALO recorded three casualties in 2008 in one ERW incident (one man killed and two girls injured).\textsuperscript{16} The additional 17 casualties were identified through Landmine Monitor media monitoring and included 11 civilians involved in incidents with unspecified types of mines (three men, five adults, one child, and two unknown) and six Russian security forces involved in an antivehicle mine incident.\textsuperscript{17} All casualties occurred in Gal district.

The casualty rate in 2008 suggests a significant increase from the 14 casualties (three killed and 11 injured) identified by Landmine Monitor in 2007. However, this should not necessarily be considered indicative of a trend, as data remains incomplete.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009; Landmine Monitor identified four casualties (one killed and three injured) as of 31 May 2009. On 5 March 2009, a male construction worker was killed by an ERW in Sukhum district. Three men (two military and one civilian) were injured on 29 March 2009 by an IED in Ochamchira district.\textsuperscript{18}

Landmine Monitor has identified at least 136 mine/ERW/IED casualties (33 killed, 92 injured, and 11 unknown) between 1999 and 2008.\textsuperscript{19} HALO recorded 119 casualties (31 killed, 77 injured, and 11 unknown) for the same time period.\textsuperscript{20} HALO has recorded 701 mine/ERW casualties between 1992 and 2008, including 153 people killed, 438 injured, and 110 unknown, including peacekeepers, but data might be incomplete.\textsuperscript{21}

**Program Management and Coordination**

There is no mine action authority in Abkhazia. Mine action data collection, planning, and operational coordination continue to be provided by the Abkhaz Mine Action Centre (AMAC), established by HALO in 1999.\textsuperscript{22}

There is no specific framework for victim assistance in Abkhazia and risk education was mainly conducted by HALO.\textsuperscript{23} Mine/ERW survivors are included in the broader services for persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare continued to be responsible for the needs of persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{13} Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 9 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid; and HALO, “Caucasus & Balkans, Georgia, The Problem,” www.halotrust.org.

\textsuperscript{15} HALO casualty data provided by email from Ismet Zade, Deputy Program Manager, HALO, 3 February 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring, January–December 2008.

\textsuperscript{16} HALO casualty data provided by email from Ismet Zade, HALO, 3 February 2009.


\textsuperscript{18} Emails from Ismet Zade, HALO, 3 February and 4 April 2009; and Landmine Monitor media monitoring, January–May 2009.

\textsuperscript{19} Email from Ismet Zade, HALO, 3 February 2009; and see previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

\textsuperscript{20} HALO casualty data provided by email from Ismet Zade, HALO, 3 February 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,067.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} See Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 1,037.

\textsuperscript{23} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elena Kuvichko, Board Member, AIS, 25 May 2009.

\textsuperscript{24} Email from Elena Kuvichko, AIS, 25 May 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,068.
Data collection and management
HALO uses its own database to store mine action information and provide maps and other data to concerned organizations, including the UN Human Rights Office and the UN Observer Mission in Georgia.\textsuperscript{25}

There is no comprehensive casualty data management system in Abkhazia.\textsuperscript{26} HALO maintains a casualties database, which is shared with Abkhazia’s Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and with the disability NGO Association of Invalid Support (Association Inva-Sodeistvie, AIS).\textsuperscript{27} AIS is represented in all districts in Abkhazia and also continued to maintain a database of more than 4,000 persons with disabilities assisted since 1998.\textsuperscript{28} In 2008, HALO began expanding data collection to previously under-reported areas, with support from their branch office in Gal district.\textsuperscript{29}

The NGO Geneva Call, in partnership with local civil society organizations, began a survey on socio-economic needs of mine survivors in the South Caucasus, including Abkhazia, in June 2008. The survey was interrupted in August 2008, due to the Russia-Georgia conflict. However, by October 2008, all interviews, including with 69 people from Abkhazia, were complete. As of June 2009 the survey results were not available.\textsuperscript{30}

Plans
Strategic mine action plans
HALO produces its own workplan each year.\textsuperscript{31} For 2009, it planned to clear 42 mined areas covering an estimated 0.9km\textsuperscript{2}. Since the conflict in August 2008 HALO has also worked in the upper Kodor Gorge. The primary objective was to remove the threat posed to the remaining civilian population by ERW. The second objective was to identify the mined areas and start demining.\textsuperscript{32} HALO estimated it would be able to clear the newly identified minefields in the upper Kodor Gorge up to the end of 2010, pending completion of survey work in this area.\textsuperscript{33}

HALO expects that mines and UXO will occasionally be found in Abkhazia even after its demining operations have finished. As of 2009, in the lower part of Abkhazia, HALO was still destroying up to 30 items of UXO a month through call-outs.\textsuperscript{34} For this purpose, HALO plans to establish a small local explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity for a number of years after it leaves Abkhazia to deal with occasional call-outs.\textsuperscript{35}

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
Demining in Abkhazia continues to be carried out primarily by HALO using manual deminers and mechanical assets.\textsuperscript{36} As of 2009, it had four manual teams, six survey teams, one “Large Loop” demining team, one mechanical team, and one EOD team.\textsuperscript{37} Internal quality assurance and quality control continue to be carried out in accordance with HALO’s global standing operating procedures.

\textsuperscript{26} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,066.
\textsuperscript{27} Email from Elena Kuvichko, AIS, 25 May 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,066.
\textsuperscript{28} Email from Elena Kuvichko, AIS, 16 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Email from Markus Haake, Programme Director (Europe and Caucasus), Geneva Call, 16 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{32} Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 9 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{34} HALO, “Caucasus & Balkans, Georgia, Requirements for continued clearance,” www.halotrust.org; and email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 19 August 2009.
\textsuperscript{35} Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 9 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{36} HALO, “Caucasus & Balkans, Georgia, Requirements for continued clearance,” www.halotrust.org.
\textsuperscript{38} Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 9 July 2009.
In 2008, HALO cleared 1.39 km² of mined areas, with the destruction of 266 antipersonnel mines and 109 antivehicle mines, and 15,299 ERW. A further 35,000 km² of suspected hazardous area was released. Of this total, HALO’s EOD teams deployed in the Upper Kodor Gorge destroyed more than 14,000 items of ERW between August 2008 and April 2009.39

HALO began demining in Abkhazia in December 1997. As of April 2009, 250 minefields had been cleared by manual and mechanical clearance teams with the destruction of more than 35,000 mines and items of UXO.40 In addition, HALO has been conducting a survey of residual contamination since 2005. Up to the end of 2008, 109 (89%) of village administrations had officially recorded that they were satisfied that no further clearance was required in their areas of responsibility.41

Risk Education

In 2008, HALO’s mine/ERW risk education (RE) teams continued to conduct post-clearance follow-up and community liaison.42 RE was also conducted at the request of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia and the ICRC, and focused on the upper Kodor Gorge.43

AMAC and HALO ran an RE program from 1999 to 2006 with the support of the ICRC, reaching 183,163 people. It was targeted at schoolchildren and people engaged in livelihood activities. In 2004, it began to include internally displaced persons and refugees from Georgia. There was a strong link with clearance activities, and casualty data was collected. RE materials were produced in Russian, Abkhazian, and Georgian, and messages were broadcast on television. A 2002 needs assessment identified adult men as most at-risk, and found that people were aware of the danger from mines and UXO but they did not know how to minimize the risk. In 2006, the HALO/AMAC formal RE program ended and the roles of HALO’s RE teams were modified to focus on post-clearance follow up and community liaison.

Victim Assistance

The number of mine/ERW survivors in Abkhazia is at least 438.44 The health sector in Abkhazia improved slightly in 2008 and 2009.45 Individuals who, in the past had to travel to Sochi in Russia for such services, now receive them closer to home.46

The Republican Hospital in Sukhum is the referral hospital and has a centralized network of healthcare services under the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.47 In 2008, patient services increased in all hospitals in Abkhazia, due to general structural renovations and new equipment. Local personnel continued to lack up-to-date skills, however, and funding was still insufficient.48

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance and area reduction (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.31*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This figure differs slightly from that reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2005.
There are rehabilitation centers at the Republican Hospital in Sukhum and the Agudzera Hospital in Gulripsh district.\textsuperscript{59} Physical rehabilitation and prosthetics are also provided by the Gagra Orthopedic Center, managed by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare with ICRC support.\textsuperscript{50} In 2008, 369 individuals benefited from services provided at the Gagra Center; of these, 78 received prostheses and 100 received orthoses.\textsuperscript{51}

In 2008 and the first half of 2009, AIS continued to assist persons with disabilities, including 30 mine/ERW survivors, through the provision of mobility devices, psychological support, and socio-economic services including free access to education for children with disabilities and legal aid.\textsuperscript{52} AIS distributed 30 wheelchairs with support from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and private donations in 2008.\textsuperscript{53} The ministry also provided AIS with US$15,000 to purchase mobility devices for persons with disabilities; 20% were for mine survivors.\textsuperscript{54}

While disability legislation was drafted in May 2007, as of May 2009, no information was available on its status.\textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Support for Mine Action}

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates or resource mobilization strategies to fulfill mine action needs (including RE and victim assistance) in Abkhazia. The resource mobilization strategy for mine action is limited to strategic planning by HALO through AMAC. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is responsible for the healthcare and social care of persons with disabilities.

\textbf{International cooperation and assistance}

The United States reported contributing $700,000 (€475,350) to mine action in Abkhazia in 2008, to HALO for mine clearance.\textsuperscript{56} Following the conflict in 2008, a further $3.7 million was donated by the US Department of State for emergency clearance; of this $1.2 million was allocated to Abkhazia and the rest to Georgia.\textsuperscript{57}

\textsuperscript{59} Email from Elena Kuwichko, AIS, 16 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Email from Elena Kuwichko, AIS, 25 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{53} Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Elena Kuwichko, AIS, 25 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{55} Email from Elena Kuwichko, AIS, 25 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{57} Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 19 August 2009.
Scope of the Problem

The 1982 armed conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom resulted in many thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines being laid on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, most by Argentina. There is also UXO, including a number of areas that contain cluster munition remnants resulting from the use of BL-755 cluster bombs by the UK against Argentine positions. The precise extent of UXO contamination is not known. The UK has also noted the presence of booby-traps on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.¹

The UK has reported that 117 mined areas remain, covering a total area of some 13km²—a significant reduction from previous estimates of 20km²—which contain “just over” 20,000 mines.² Moreover, this reduced estimate includes four suspected hazardous areas amounting to almost 5.8km², which “probably have no mines but there are still suspicions.”³ The mined areas are mainly beaches and peat bogs. Three minefields are said to be within one mile (1.6km) of the capital, Port Stanley. When depositing its initial Article 7 report in August 1999, the UK included minefield maps for the Falkland Islands/Malvinas.⁴

Minefields are said to be surrounded by a three-strand fence and marked with danger signs at regular intervals around the perimeter, in addition to the NATO standard mine warning triangles. No human casualties from mines or UXO have been reported in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas since 1984, although there have been a number of “infringements of minefields” recorded, including a few children and several tourists, with some people arriving in the mined areas after disembarking from boats.⁵ A number of cattle have been killed in minefields.⁶ Presumably, minefields are not fenced where the edge of the minefield touches the coast. The UK has reported that six military personnel were injured in 1982 and a further two were injured in 1983. Most military accidents took place while clearing/lifting the minefields in the immediate aftermath of the 1982 conflict or in the process of trying to establish the extent of the minefield perimeters, particularly where no detailed records existed.⁷

¹ See UK Article 7 Report, Form C, 11 April 2006.
² UK Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 May 2008, p. 2.
⁵ Email from Tamar Gabelnick, Treaty Implementation Director, ICBL, 23 July 2009.
⁶ See report on the United Kingdom in this edition of Landmine Monitor.
KOSOVO

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other UXO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>55 known dangerous areas and 65 suspected areas (1 January 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>Six (2007: 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>0.94km² of mine and battle area clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>35,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008, but it is not yet a UN member state and is thus not eligible to adhere to international treaties such as the Mine Ban Treaty.

Throughout the armed conflict that ended in June 1999, both the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia armed forces used antipersonnel landmines. During March–June 1999, NATO forces dropped more than 1,200 cluster bombs on Kosovo. Mines were used sporadically after June 1999, mainly by unknown actors in attacks against the remaining Serbian minority in Kosovo, with the last reported use of antipersonnel mines in 2002. Local authorities and international troops continued to recover antipersonnel mines from caches or seize them from individuals.

Following the cease-fire between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO, the UN coordinated a major demining operation by international NGOs and commercial companies from June 1999 to December 2001. Despite claims that almost all mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) had been removed, significant clearance operations continue.

Landmine Monitor analysis of data from the authorities and additional reports of deminer and peacekeeping casualties identified 553 mine/ERW casualties (111 killed, 439 injured, and three unknown) in Kosovo between 1999 and 2008. Risk education was provided with no interruption by a large number of international and national organizations in Kosovo between 1998 and 2008, but activities decreased in 2007–2008.

Assistance for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors remains inadequate. While progress has been made in strengthening the health sector after the 1999 conflict, its infrastructure is limited and services insufficient.

Background

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008.1 When Kosovo’s constitution came into effect on 15 June 2008, 43 UN members recognized Kosovo as an independent state.2 By July 2009, more than 60 states recognized Kosovo.3

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1 In 1999, conflict between the armed forces of the then-FRY and the KLA led to the NATO bombing campaign against the FRY in Kosovo. In June 1999, Kosovo came under the administration of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which was granted authority by UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Beginning in October 2005, the UN facilitated negotiations on Kosovo’s future status. The negotiations discontinued in June 2007, when no agreement could be reached.


Serbian President Boris Tadić called the declaration of independence illegal and stated that, “Serbia considers Kosovo as its southern territory.”4 Russia, a permanent member of the UN Security Council holding a veto, considers Kosovo’s declaration of independence illegal, based on existing UN Security Council resolutions.5 Russia’s position impacts Kosovo’s ability to become a UN member state and thus be eligible to adhere to international treaties such as the Mine Ban Treaty.

Kosovo’s new constitution calls on the European Union (EU) to take over the oversight role from the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). On 13 June 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed a plan to downscale UNMIK’s activities and to allow the EU’s mission in Kosovo to operate under the UN’s umbrella.6 UNMIK, however, formally continues to exercise its authority according to Resolution 1244 until the Security Council decides otherwise.7

Mine Ban Policy

Use and stockpiling
Kosovo saw an increase in violence after the declaration of independence, but there have been no confirmed cases of new use of antipersonnel mines.8 Weapons possession is a criminal offense for all Kosovo residents except those holding UNMIK authorization, with penal sanctions for violations.9 In February 2009, a man was reportedly arrested in Štrpce by the Kosovo Police Service for possessing an antipersonnel mine.10

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Kosovo became contaminated by landmines and ERW, primarily UXO, during the conflict between the then-Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in the late 1990s which led to NATO bombing of the FRY and Serbia in 1999.11 However, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams continue to encounter items of UXO dating back to World War II.12 Contamination includes cluster munition remnants.

The UN coordinated a major demining operation by international NGOs and commercial companies from June 1999 to December 2001 and reported that “the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated.”13 However, further investigation since then has revealed considerably more contamination.

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6 “Tension as charter takes effect in Kosovo; Ongoing dispute over authority could hinder new country,” International Herald Tribune, 16 June 2008. Serbia and Russia both insist that the EU mission is illegal, as the Security Council has not approved it.
8 The last reported use of antipersonnel mines occurred in 2002 and of antivehicle mines in 2003. See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 748; and Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 955. In previous years, mines were used in attacks against the remaining Serbian minority in Kosovo, and against Serbian military and police forces on Kosovo’s border with southern Serbia.
The Office of the Kosovo Protection Corps Coordinator (OKPCC) has no estimate of the extent of residual mine and UXO contamination but in May 2009 it reported 120 known and suspected dangerous areas, compared with the total of 58 reported two years earlier, although this was lower than the 130 reported in 2008.\textsuperscript{14} The May 2009 estimate included 55 known dangerous areas and 65 suspected areas that require technical survey and possible clearance.\textsuperscript{15} The 55 known dangerous areas consisted of nine minefields and 46 areas contaminated with unexploded submunitions. The 65 suspected areas include 55 mined areas and 10 areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants.\textsuperscript{16}

A community liaison survey completed by the HALO Trust in August 2007 identified 126 additional mine or UXO clearance tasks.\textsuperscript{17} The OKPCC discounted 42 of these in 2008 and another 10 as of May 2009 after resurvey found they had no mine or UXO threat.\textsuperscript{18} HALO, however, said its clearance operations in 2008 and 2009 found contamination in areas OKPCC had discounted.\textsuperscript{19}

**Casualties**

In 2008, the OKPCC EOD Management Section and the Institute of Public Health (IPH) reported six ERW casualties (two killed and four injured) in three incidents.\textsuperscript{20} All casualties were civilian men. On 1 April 2008, one man was killed and three others injured by a submunition while collecting scrap metal in the village of Harilac, near Priština’s airport. On 25 May 2008, one man was killed by a submunition that was mixed into scrap metal while on duty in a private factory in Raskovë, north of Priština. On 16 December 2008, a man was injured by a grenade while working for a construction company in Priština. No antipersonnel mine casualties have been reported in Kosovo since 2004.\textsuperscript{21}

The 2008 casualty rate is a decrease compared to 2007 (14 casualties, all injured) and the lowest recorded since the end of the conflict in 1999.\textsuperscript{22} A change in the casualty profile and age group can be noticed: while in 2008 men collecting scrap metal were involved in all incidents, in 2007 the biggest casualty group was children tampering with devices.\textsuperscript{23}

Casualties continued to be recorded in 2009, with at least seven ERW casualties (one killed and six injured), in three incidents, as of 30 June 2009.\textsuperscript{24} On 5 March 2009, two boys aged 16 and 17 years were injured while playing with ERW in their house in Gračanica. On 14 April 2009, three men were injured by ERW while reconstructing a wall in their house in Kopirnica. In June 2009, a 29-year-old man was killed and his brother injured in their house in Kisnica by a submunition collected for its metal.

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Kosovo remains unknown. Landmine Monitor has identified 553 mine/ERW casualties (111 killed, 439 injured, and three unknown) between 1999 and 2008. These figures were based on Landmine Monitor analysis of records from 2001 onwards.

\textsuperscript{15} Email from Ahmet Sallowa, EOD OPS General Coordinator OKPCC, UNMIK, 11 May 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,072.
\textsuperscript{16} Email from Ahmet Sallowa, OKPCC, UNMIK, 12 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{17} HALO, “Kosovo Community Liaison Survey,” Final Report, Priština, September 2007, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{18} Email from Ahmet Sallowa, OKPCC, UNMIK, 11 May 2009; and telephone interview with Ahmet Sallowa, OKPCC, UNMIK, 18 August 2009.
\textsuperscript{19} Email from Admir Berisha, Programme Administrator, HALO, 3 June 2008; and email from Matthew Hovell, Caucasus and Balkan Desk Officer, HALO, 26 August 2009.
\textsuperscript{20} Email from Bajram Krasniqi, Public Information and Victim Assistance Officer, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009; and telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{24} Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009; and telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.
to 2007 provided by OKPCC detailing 91 casualties (16 killed and 75 injured),\textsuperscript{25} an OKPCC summary report for 1999 to 2009,\textsuperscript{26} and reports on four deminer casualties (one killed and three injured; three in 2001 and one in 2007) and four American and British peacekeeping casualties (one killed and three injured) in 2001 identified by Landmine Monitor.\textsuperscript{27} The vast majority of casualties (438) were recorded between 1999 and 2000 (86 killed and 352 injured), but raw data for this period was not available.\textsuperscript{28} From 2001 to 2008, a significant decrease in mine/ERW incidents was recorded, but data may be incomplete.\textsuperscript{29}

**Risk profile**
OKPCC/IPH data shows that the most at-risk groups are boys and men deliberately tampering with devices. In 2008 an increase in scrap metal collection activities was recorded.

**Socio-economic impact**
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), following up on a 2006 review of existing data, stated in early 2007 that “even if the true extent of contamination is more extensive than previously understood, its impact remains modest.”\textsuperscript{30} According to the OKPCC, both contamination records and the pattern of recent incidents continue to indicate that ERW, such as hand grenades and submunitions, pose the main humanitarian threat, while the threat from antipersonnel mines is limited.\textsuperscript{31} No human mine incident has been recorded since 2004.\textsuperscript{32}

**Program Management and Coordination**

**Mine action**
The OKPCC EOD Management Section, formerly under the control of UNMIK, was transferred to the government of Kosovo in May 2009.\textsuperscript{33} The EOD Management Section was expected to become the National Mine Action Authority under a government ministry, but as of July 2009 the government had not chosen a ministry.\textsuperscript{34} The EOD Management Section continues to serve as a mine action center, responsible for coordinating all demining and survey, as well as quality assurance, risk education (RE), public information, and victim assistance (VA). It coordinated the clearance operations of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) EOD teams and demining NGOs in 2008, and reported inspecting clearance sites on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{25} “Query on mine/UXO incidents 2002–2007,” provided by email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 16 April 2008.

\textsuperscript{26} “List of Mine/UXO Civilian Victims in Kosovo 1999–2009,” provided by email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009. This summary report has 551 casualties (113 killed and 438 injured), however, Landmine Monitor double-checked this data and cross-referenced it with the OKPCC individual records for 2001–2008 and the peacekeeping and deminer casualties to come to its own figure.


\textsuperscript{28} Landmine Monitor analysis of “List of Mine/UXO Civilian Victims in Kosovo 1999–2009,” provided by email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.

\textsuperscript{29} See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,080.

\textsuperscript{30} GICHD, “Report on the Follow-up Assessment into Operational Mine/UXO Activities in Kosovo,” July 2007, p. III.


\textsuperscript{32} Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 16 April 2008.


\textsuperscript{34} Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 10 July 2009.

Risk education
The OKPCC EOD Management Section was mandated by UNMIK to coordinate RE activities. Coordination meetings were held regularly in 2008.

Victim assistance
There is no VA strategy or plan in Kosovo. According to UNMIK’s “Multi Year Strategic Plan for the Kosovo Mine Action Program 2008–2010” (MYSP), the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MoLSW) is responsible for rehabilitation, reintegration, and support of mine/ERW survivors. The EOD Management Section is responsible for annual planning, reporting, and stakeholder management, while local organizations are to implement VA and rehabilitation activities. There are no VA objectives or activities listed in the MYSP, or in the 2008 OKPCC EOD Management Section Work Plan.

In 2008, some VA issues were discussed at the OKPCC EOD Management Section’s RE meetings. However, the key organizations that provide direct support to mine/ERW survivors or persons with disabilities did not attend RE meetings and it remains unclear which organizations, if any, were invited to participate. The OKPCC reported that VA activities are coordinated with the MoLSW and the IPH.

The Office of the Prime Minister is responsible for coordinating and promoting the rights of persons with disabilities through the Human Rights Coordinator. The MoLSW and the Ministry of Health, including its IPH, are the main public institutions with responsibilities for services to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors and other people injured during conflict. However, a United States Department of State report issued in 2008 noted that ensuring the rights of persons with disabilities was not a priority for the government.

The National Council on Disabled People is an advisory body to the government. In 2008, its priority was drafting a national platform on persons with disability but this was not achieved.

Data collection and management
The EOD Management Section maintains a mine action database using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA); the database contains completion reports of the KPC EOD teams and demining NGOs.

The UNMIK MYSP indicated that the Ministry of Health will be responsible for data collection through the IPH and the OKPCC, and will investigate mine/ERW incidents causing casualties in cooperation with police.

Since December 2001, the IPH has collected, maintained, and shared mine/ERW casualty data with the support of the EOD Management Section. Data is collected by the police and the KPC EOD teams; it is verified by the OKPCC and the IPH and recorded into IMSMA.
forms.\textsuperscript{49} Data is stored both in the IPH database and in the IMSMA database housed with the OKPCC.\textsuperscript{50} Data is shared with the Ministry of Health, the MoLSW, and the Red Cross of Kosovo (RCK), and information is available on request to any other organization.\textsuperscript{51} The IPH does not share information on recent casualties who may require prostheses with the National Ortho-Prosthetic Center (NOPC), which is on the same premises, or with other VA service providers or organizations for persons with disabilities.\textsuperscript{52} Because of decreasing casualty rates, no change in the current data collection mechanism is foreseen.\textsuperscript{53}

In 2008, the OKPCC reported the need for complete casualty data and a mine/ERW survivor needs assessment distinguishing between injured war veterans and civilians.\textsuperscript{54} The necessary information to start a needs assessment is stored at the IPH. However, no progress was reported as of July 2009.\textsuperscript{55}

The disability NGO HandiKos maintains a database of persons with disabilities, which is shared with other service providers including the NOPC.\textsuperscript{56} A census planned for November 2008 was rescheduled to April 2010.\textsuperscript{57} The Coalition of Organizations of People with Disability of Kosovo reported that the government will include questions on disability.\textsuperscript{58}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{National operators and activities} & \textbf{Demining} & \textbf{RE} & \textbf{Casualty data collection} & \textbf{VA} \\
\hline
KPC EOD & x & x & & \\
MoLSW & & & x & \\
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology & & x & & \\
Center for Promotion and Education & & x & & \\
RCK & x & & & \\
IPT & & & x & \\
\hline
\textbf{International operators and activities} & \textbf{Demining} & \textbf{RE} & \textbf{Casualty data collection} & \textbf{VA} \\
\hline
KFOR & x & & & \\
Mine Detection Dog Center (Bosnia and Herzegovina) & & x & & \\
Mines Awareness Trust & x & x & & \\
HALO & x & x & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Mine action program operators}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{49} Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, 1 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{55} Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{56} Email from Afrim Maliqi, Acting General Director, HandiKos, 13 July 2009; and \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2008}, p. 1,080.
\textsuperscript{57} Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.
\textsuperscript{58} Email from Nexhat Shatri, Country Program Manager for Kosovo, HI, 19 May 2009.
Plans

Strategic mine action plans

The MYSP for 2008–2010 prepared by UNMIK provides a framework for all mine action, setting out seven main goals. These include: establishing a national mine action coordinating mechanism; completing the identification, marking, and recording of suspected risk areas; developing demining and EOD capacity; and maintaining high levels of awareness among at-risk populations. To achieve these targets, the MYSP calls for the OKPCC to draw up annual integrated workplans for the new mine action coordination authority that will form the basis of a resource mobilization strategy. The workplans are also supposed to set measurable targets to provide a basis—previously lacking—for assessing progress.

The OKPCC’s 2008 workplan, however, identified three general goals: (1) oversight, coordination and management of UXO and mine clearance; (2) development of the KPC EOD capacity; and (3) management of NGOs and international donor funding. Although the plan identified activities, it did not set measurable objectives or targets.

Demining priorities under the 2008 workplan were to clear as many of the remaining dangerous areas as possible that have been confirmed to contain UXO, cluster munition remnants, or mines. However, OKPCC reported that “as quickly as the existing dangerous areas were surveyed and cleared, NGOs and members of the public were continuing to report new suspected areas.” A total of three community clearance requests were received in 2008, of which two were completed in 2008 and one was included in plans for 2009.

RE is included in the MYSP with one strategic goal: “maintain high levels of mine and EOD awareness in at-risk populations.” This goal was to be achieved through five operational objectives: developing RE targeted at the primary at-risk groups and their behavior (youths aged between 14 and 23 playing or tampering); developing an annual RE plan with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology; improving and maintaining coordination; engaging local media in RE dissemination; and increasing EOD teams’ RE capacity through training and materials. Planned activities included: developing a system for RE priority-setting and quality assurance by the end of 2008, and ensuring that RE activities in the annual workplans are adapted to changes in geographic and at-risk groups.

A National Disability Action Plan was developed by the Office of the Prime Minister in cooperation with disabled peoples’ organizations in 2008. The plan aims to strengthen existing services and create new ones for persons with disabilities in the health, education, social protection, employment, and information sectors. Implementation is scheduled to begin in September 2009.

National ownership

Kosovo embarked on the process of taking control of mine action from the UNMIK EOD Management Section in May 2009 (see Program management and coordination section above). Since June 2006, the EOD Management Section has been staffed entirely by Kosovars. The

62 Ibid.
64 Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 8 July 2009.
66 Email from Nexhat Shatri, HI, 19 May 2009.
67 Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.
EOD Management Section has stated that Kosovo’s mine action program does not require external advisors.\(^{69}\) The UNMIK MYSP acknowledges that there is a need to address the needs of survivors.\(^{70}\) In practice, however, there is no specific budget for VA within the OKPCC, and little progress has been noticed in government service provision.\(^{71}\) The KPC EOD team is staffed entirely by Kosovars, but there has been little progress in transferring responsibility for VA from UNMIK to a national mine action coordination authority. There is no specific legislation for mine/ERW survivors in Kosovo, but there is legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.\(^{72}\) Survivors can obtain some financial benefits through the MoLSW.\(^{73}\)

**National mine action legislation and standards/Standing operating procedures**

The MYSP identifies the preparation of mine action legislation as a strategic goal and calls for government agencies and Kosovo Protection Force (KFOR) Engineers to cooperate in drafting laws on handling explosives and risk reduction.\(^{74}\) Action on legislation was held up pending the government’s decision on which ministry would assume responsibility for mine action, expected before the end of 2009.\(^{75}\) The KPC has continued to use standing operating procedures (SOPs) based on UN national technical and safety guidelines and the International Mine Action Standards.\(^{76}\)

**Demining and Battle Area Clearance**

Four operators engaged in demining in Kosovo in 2008: the KPC, KFOR, Mines Awareness Trust (MAT), and HALO.\(^{77}\) HALO resumed clearance operations in May 2008 when the OKPCC renewed its accreditation for clearance which had expired in December 2006.\(^{78}\)

The EOD Management Section continued to cooperate closely with KFOR, which conducted improvised explosive device destruction and the two bodies exchanged technical information and advice.\(^{79}\)

**Demining**

The KPC continued to operate with seven EOD teams in 2008 as in 2006 and 2007.\(^{80}\) Staff increases in 2007 gave the KPC flexibility to operate teams as a single unit for large tasks or as two units of nine members for small tasks or EOD response.\(^{81}\)

The EOD Management Section had planned to disengage MAT by the end of 2007, leaving only national capacity for future clearance.\(^{82}\) In March 2008, however, the EOD Management Section stated that it was seeking funds to continue contracting MAT\(^{83}\) and it continued operating in 2008 with funding from the UN Mine Action Service. MAT was tasked to conduct

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\(^{69}\) Email from Ahmet Sallova, OKPCC, UNMIK, 11 May 2009.


\(^{71}\) Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.


\(^{73}\) Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009.


\(^{75}\) Email from Ahmet Sallova, OKPCC, UNMIK, 12 May 2009; and telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.

\(^{76}\) OKPCC EOD Management Section’s Guidelines and Technical Standards for UXO and Mine Clearance in Kosovo and email from Ahmet Sallova, OKPCC, UNMIK, 11 May 2009.


\(^{83}\) Interview with Ahmet Sallova, OKPCC, UNMIK, Pristina, 12 March 2008.
mine clearance around the mountainous Koshare region as well as spot clearance of any other suspicious items reported in that area.\textsuperscript{84} HALO, which was re-accredited for clearance on 26 May 2008 after an 18-month gap in demining operations, deployed two teams the same day onto tasks which had been identified in its 2006–2007 survey.\textsuperscript{85} The Mine Detection Dog Centre for South East Europe (MDDC) from Konjic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, provided support to the KPC EOD Management Team working with MAT in mine clearance, battle area clearance (BAC), technical survey, and area reduction.\textsuperscript{86} Kosovo’s affected areas are considered suitable for dogs and MDDC teams are said to have proved effective in accelerating survey.\textsuperscript{87}

**Identification of hazardous areas**

Of the 126 tasks HALO identified in its 2006–2007 survey, 10 had been cleared in accordance with International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) principles: HALO (four tasks), KPC (four), and MAT (two). HALO was working on four others as of July 2009. OKPCC had listed another 59 as “pending” and in need of further action but it had not entered them on IMSMA. It had discredited the remaining 53 after sampling conducted by MAT.\textsuperscript{88} HALO, however, advocates application of guidelines and principles laid down in IMAS 8.22, which states that sampling is unsuitable for technical survey of low density minefields.\textsuperscript{89} HALO also reported in July that subsequent clearance on 13 of the discredited sites conducted in 2008–2009 by HALO, KPC, or MAT had discovered a total of more than 400 mines or unexploded submunitions.\textsuperscript{90}

The KPC Quality Assurance (QA) Inspectors mark suspected hazardous areas throughout the year. They also mark the remaining dangerous areas prior to the onset of snowfall.\textsuperscript{91}

**Mine and battle area clearance**

Clearance operations in 2008 focused mainly on UXO, particularly cluster munition remnants, which constitute the biggest remaining threat. During 2008, the KPC, KFOR, HALO, and MAT cleared and handed back to the public almost 1km\(^2\) of land, destroying a total of 2,793 explosive items.\textsuperscript{92} For reasons that remain unknown, the OKPCC EOD Management Section does not distinguish in reporting between mine clearance and BAC.

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\textsuperscript{85} Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 22 May 2009.


\textsuperscript{88} Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 18 August and 26 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid, 26 August 2009.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid, 7 July 2009.


\textsuperscript{92} Email from Ahmet Sallova, OKPCC, UNMIK, 11 May 2009.
Mine and Battle Area Clearance in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demining operators</th>
<th>Mine and battle area clearance (m²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
<th>Unexploded submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>Other UXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KPC</td>
<td>545,833</td>
<td>208*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>89,108</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>249,694</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDDC**</td>
<td>59,180</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>1,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>943,815</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>427</td>
<td>1,941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes 158 antipersonnel mines found and destroyed during clearance of a Yugoslav army ammunition compound in Ljubure.
** MDDC was working with MAT on tasks assigned to MAT but has reported slightly different results to those reported by UNMIK.

Quality assurance/Quality control

The OKPCC EOD Management Section’s QA Inspectors provided external quality assurance of clearance teams, making daily visits to KPC and NGO task sites. The QA Inspectors also ensured the mine clearance teams conducted the appropriate internal quality control checks according to SOPs approved by the OKPCC EOD Management Section.

KPC, HALO, and MAT submitted completion reports for all tasks completed during 2008. Some tasks where continued clearance was required in 2009 were suspended. Investigations for all reported incidents involving members of the public injured by items of UXO and mines were conducted by either the QA Inspectors or by OKPCC EOD Management Section’s Public Information Assistants.

Progress since 1999

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on 17 February 2008. Serbia, as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2014. After Kosovo declared independence, OKPCC officials said it planned to accede separately to the treaty. If Kosovo becomes a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, it will have a different mine clearance deadline.

Lack of data on contaminated areas and the OKPCC’s decision not to distinguish between mine clearance and BAC have made it difficult to assess the progress of demining operations. A total of 45km² have been cleared since 1999 (see table below). HALO has estimated Kosovo will need 15 years to complete clearance at current rates.

Mine and Battle Area Clearance from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Clearance (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999–2001</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>45.02</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

95 Ibid, p. 3.
96 Ibid.
97 Email from Ahmet Sallova, OKPCC, UNMIK, 28 April 2008; and telephone interview with Ahmet Sallova, OKPCC, UNMIK, 16 June 2008.
98 Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 7 July 2009.
Risk Education

In 2008, RE was implemented by several international and national organizations—some working with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology—through public dissemination, community liaison (CL), and activities targeting children. RE activities continued to decrease in 2008, reaching 35,700 beneficiaries (43,000 in 2007 and 50,800 in 2006). The decrease was due to several factors, including the reduced number of incidents and reduced staff working on RE. These figures do not include indirect beneficiaries reached through media, however, and coverage remained higher than in 2005 (22,631 beneficiaries). There was no specific RE policy or communication change in 2008. RE continued to be based on previous messages/materials and remained mainly focused on schoolchildren. Because of increased casualties due to scrap metal collection activities, some efforts were reportedly undertaken to better adapt RE to at-risk groups in 2008.

Risk education was also provided through local media; 120 ERW/mine awareness messages were published in three main newspapers in 2008. Messages included pictures and information on what people should do and who they should report to.

MAT and KPC EOD teams have CL teams. Before, during, and after the clearance teams are deployed to a village, the communities within the surrounding areas are given information about clearance operations and general mine awareness messages. HALO does not have a CL team but clearance team leaders similarly inform local communities before and during clearance. Communities are advised to seek KFOR help whenever inhabitants come across suspicious objects. The KPC EOD teams received RE refresher training before being deployed at the beginning of the year.

Risk education has been provided without interruption by many international and national organizations in Kosovo between 1998 and 2008. According to Landmine Monitor data, some 315,924 people received risk education from 2002 to 2008. The population in Kosovo is said to have been saturated with RE activities since 1999.

The 2007 GICHD assessment concluded that until clearance and destruction of munitions held by the population is achieved, RE efforts should be continued.

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99 Email from Rajmonda Thaqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,080.
100 Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.
101 Email from Rajmonda Thaqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009.
103 Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009.
104 Email from Rajmonda Thaqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009.
105 Ibid; and email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 26 August 2009.
107 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
108 Ibid.
Activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RCK with Ministry of Education, Science and Technology</td>
<td>NGO and government</td>
<td>RE to schoolchildren through community networks</td>
<td>15,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>“Education against Landmine Danger” program to schoolchildren; children taught to recognize mines/ERW and marks of mine danger</td>
<td>8,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPC</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>CL and direct RE presentations in schools</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QPEA–Centre for Promotion of Education in cooperation with the Serbian NGO “Future” from Gracanica, Kosovo</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>“Mine Risk Education in the Frame of the Psychosocial Seminars for Teachers”</td>
<td>20 primary schools, 2,400 teachers and children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>CL and RE</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAT</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>CL and RE</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKPCC EOD Management Section</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Direct RE presentations and training of trainers, RE training to KFOR, materials production and distribution for schools, RE safety briefings to Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe staff and other agencies</td>
<td>7,748</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is believed to be at least 439. There was no marked improvement in VA implementation in 2008. Government service provision remained weak. NGOs continued to be the main service providers for persons with disabilities, but too few were effectively addressing survivors’ needs. The European Commission (EC) noted that the monitoring capacities among authorities and civil society in regard to the promotion and enforcement of human rights—particularly education, health and employment rights—are very limited.


Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009; and see also Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,082.

Email from Kastriot Dodaj, Program Manager, JRS, 11 May 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,082. 7.5 pt

Free primary healthcare is available at government institutions for mine/ERW survivors.\textsuperscript{115} While many health facilities have been repaired since the end of armed conflict in 1999,\textsuperscript{116} the health sector remains poor, with under-developed infrastructure, equipment, and hospital capacity.\textsuperscript{117} The Emergency Centre of Pristina University Clinical Centre is the only medical facility with the capacity to deal with major trauma cases.\textsuperscript{118}

Mine/ERW survivors are entitled to receive free orthopedic appliances through the Ministry of Health,\textsuperscript{119} but physical rehabilitation facilities continue to be insufficient.\textsuperscript{120} The government-funded NOPC is the only facility in Kosovo that produces and fits lower limb prostheses. As a result, many patients access services in neighboring countries. Frequent interruption in the supply of materials, due to funding shortages, resulted in service delays.\textsuperscript{121} In 2008, the NOPC received material from the Ministry of Health.\textsuperscript{122} Kosovo has approximately 150 trained physiotherapists, of whom about 25 graduated in 2008.\textsuperscript{123}

In 2008, limited psychological services were available, but some community mental health centers under the Ministry of Health were not in operation\textsuperscript{124} There is a lack of socio-economic reintegration programs and, among Kosovo’s unemployed population, persons with disabilities remain among the most disadvantaged groups.\textsuperscript{125} There is no legislation providing financial assistance to mine/ERW survivors injured after June 1999, but mine/ERW survivors, and families of persons that have been killed by mines/ERW, can receive financial support from the MoLSW; if the disability is more than 81%, the caregiver of the survivor can also receive financial assistance.\textsuperscript{126} A reduction of electricity bills is granted by the Ministry of Energy and Mining to survivors.\textsuperscript{127} Overall, pensions remained inadequate and discrepancies between war veterans’ benefits (six times higher) and civilian war victims were not addressed.\textsuperscript{128} Special education remains limited,\textsuperscript{129} and children with disabilities are often excluded from educational opportunities.\textsuperscript{130}

Kosovo has legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities,\textsuperscript{131} but HandiKos reported that existing provisions are not adequately implemented.\textsuperscript{132} The “Law on Material Support for Families of Children with Permanent Disabilities” entered into force in

\textsuperscript{115} Telephone interview with Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 1 July 2009; and email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{119} Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{122} Email from Lirie Makolli, Administrator, NOPC, 27 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{123} Email from Nexhat Shatri, HI, 19 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid, pp. 38–39.
\textsuperscript{126} Email from Bajram Krasniqi, OKPCC, UNMIK, 5 May 2009.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
June 2008, but was not implemented. Legislation on the provision of social services contracted through the MoLSW was approved in April 2005, but it is unknown if it was implemented.

Victim assistance activities

It is unknown how many mine/ERW survivors received assistance in 2008, or over the last 10 years, as often they were not differentiated from war-injured or other persons with disabilities. In 2008, 133 people received prostheses at the NOPC (133 in 2007 and 122 in 2006). An additional 88 prostheses were “in process of production/fitting.” It is unknown how many beneficiaries were mine/ERW survivors, as the NOPC does not differentiate patients by cause of disability.

Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS) continued to provide medical and logistical support, referral to the NOPC, materials, school transport fees, and psychosocial assistance to its network of some 68 mine/ERW survivors (65 in 2007). In July 2008, 30 young mine/ERW survivors attended the annual JRS summer camp in FYR Macedonia.

The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) reported that one patient from Kosovo received rehabilitation services at the IRRS in 2008. An unknown number of survivors from Kosovo attended a rehabilitation workshop for mine/ERW survivors from Southeastern Europe, organized by the Croatian NGO Bembo in Kranjska Gora, Slovenia, in March 2008.

Handicap International (HI) provided support to disability organizations through advocacy and capacity-building, to ensure that disability issues are mainstreamed into local policies. The three-year diploma course in physiotherapy developed and handed over by HI in 2004 was operating as planned, under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and Priština University in 2008.

The largest disability NGO in Kosovo, HandiKos, continued its advocacy and community-based rehabilitation activities.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of a comprehensive long-term cost estimate for fulfilling mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Kosovo. In the absence of a national mine action authority, the OKPCC retains responsibility for mine action planning and programming.

National support for mine action

Kosovo’s government contributed to mine action by funding seven KPC EOD teams in 2007; it did not provide a value for the contribution. In May 2008, the OKPCC reported that the government would continue its funding in 2008 but gave no further details.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, four countries reported providing $1,227,477 (€833,544) to mine action in Kosovo, more than double the amount reported in 2007. Funding at 2008 levels, in spite of the large increase compared to 2007, does not appear sufficient to meet mine action needs in Kosovo.

In 2008, the ITF allocated $251,010 (almost 1%) of its funds to Kosovo. Funds were allocated to demining, RE, and VA. In 2007, the ITF allocated $273,590 (1.2%) of its funds to mine action in Kosovo.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Kosovo: Monetary\(^\text{146}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action</td>
<td>Unspecified Mine Action</td>
<td>$220,890 (€150,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>Mine clearance, RE, VA</td>
<td>$261,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>ITF</td>
<td>VA</td>
<td>$7,363 (€5,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total $489,776 (€332,593)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2008 International Mine Action Support to Kosovo: In-Kind\(^\text{147}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Form of In-Kind Support</th>
<th>Monetary Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>KFOR: UXO clearance, RE</td>
<td>$443,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>KFOR: EOD personnel</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$737,701 (€500,951)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Portugal also reported providing technical assistance in mine clearance to KFOR during 2008, but did not report a valuation of the assistance.\(^\text{148}\)

HALO reported receiving a total of $633,000 from donors and foundations for its operations in Kosovo.\(^\text{149}\)

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147 Czech Republic Article 7 Report for calendar year 2008, Form J; and Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, April 2009.

148 Portugal Article 7 Report, for calendar year 2008, Form J.

149 Matthew Hovell, HALO, 26 August 2009.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, submunitions, other UXO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>13.7km² of mined areas, and 85km² of areas with cluster munition remnants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>14 (2007: four)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>5.79km² of mined areas, 28.84km² of battle areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>12,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for mine action in 2008</td>
<td>$1,498,549 (2007: $1.35 million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

Authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Leaders have stated their support for an eventual ban.

With the help of HALO Trust, Nagorno-Karabakh has made steady progress in clearing mine and battle areas, including cluster munition remnants. Since HALO restarted its clearance program in 2000 and through the end of 2008, more than 29km² of mined areas and 133km² of battle areas were cleared.

From 1999 to 2008, HALO recorded 214 mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (41 killed and 173 injured) in Nagorno-Karabakh. Since 1995, at least 329 mine/ERW casualties have been recorded. Risk education was conducted from 1999 to 2008, focused particularly on children and adults engaged in agricultural activities. Risk education decreased in 2008. Persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, can receive one-time financial compensation, free medical treatment, and pensions, but assistance remains insufficient.

Mine Ban Policy

Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized by any UN member state. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province voted in 1988 to secede from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and join the Armenian SSR, which resulted in armed conflict from 1988 to 1994. The region declared independence as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 1991.

Nagorno-Karabakh’s political and military leaders have previously stated their support for an eventual ban on antipersonnel mines, but have indicated that, even if eligible to do so, Nagorno-Karabakh would not join the Mine Ban Treaty until the conflict with Azerbaijan is resolved and all states in the region support a ban on antipersonnel mines.¹

Nagorno-Karabakh has stated that it has never produced or exported mines, and has not purchased new mines since 1995. Its antipersonnel mine stockpile consists of mines left over from the Soviet Union (OZM-72, PMN-2, and POMZ-3 mines).

¹ Meetings between the Nagorno-Karabakh Committee of ICBL, Naira Melkoumian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Masis Mailian, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stepanakert, 1–2 February 2002; and interview with Irina Beglaryan, Head of Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stepanakert, 3 February 2006.
Other Areas
Nagorno-Karabakh

Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Nagorno-Karabakh is affected by landmines and ERW, mainly UXO, from the 1988–1994 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Contamination includes mined areas covering some 13.7km² (around one-fifth containing antipersonnel mines) and cluster munition remnants over up to 85km², more than double the previous estimate of up to 40km². Contamination from unexploded submunitions is found especially in the Askeran and Martakert regions.2

Casualties
HALO reported 14 mine/ERW casualties (two killed and 12 injured) in 10 incidents in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2008.3 Most casualties were adults (11), and three were children. Only partial information was provided on gender; there were at least four men. Antivehicle mines caused four incidents, antipersonnel mines three, and ERW three. Information on activities and location was not provided. The 2008 casualty rate is an increase compared to 2007 (five, all injured), but similar to 2006 (14 casualties, two killed and 12 injured) and 2005 (15 casualties, three killed and 12 injured). The 2008 casualty rate is still lower than in 2004 (44 casualties, 11 killed and 33 injured).

Casualties continued to be reported in 2009, with seven mine casualties (one killed and six injured) in three incidents to 8 July 2009.4 All casualties were adults and were caused by antivehicle mines.

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Nagorno-Karabakh is unknown. HALO has information on 329 mine/ERW casualties (73 killed and 256 injured) in 251 incidents between 1995 and July 2009.5 The Ministry of Social Welfare recorded 360 casualties between 1994 and 2005, with at least 101 injured from 2000 to 2005.6

From 1999 to 2008, HALO recorded 214 mine/ERW casualties (41 killed and 173 injured) in 160 incidents.7 The majority of casualties were adults (155); there were 59 child casualties. Most incidents were caused by landmines (103)—antivehicle mines caused 56 incidents and antipersonnel mines 47—and ERW caused 57 incidents. Since 2004, a decrease in casualty rates has been reported.

The number of persons with disabilities in Nagorno-Karabakh is unknown. However, out of a population of approximately 140,000 people, 10,207 persons with disabilities receive pensions.8

Risk profile
HALO has reported that the main at-risk groups are children engaging in risk-taking behavior, and adults engaging in agricultural activities. The main threat is posed by ERW.9

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2 Email from Matthew Hovell, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 8 July 2009; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,087.
3 All information in this paragraph is from HALO, “Mines and UXO Accidents in Nagorno Karabakh corrected as at 1 July 2009,” provided by email from Matthew Hovell, 8 July 2009. Please note that HALO provided device data linked to incidents, not to casualties. Also HALO revised its 2007 mine/ERW casualty data upwards to five (all injured). Previously, it reported four casualties (all injured) in 2007.
4 HALO, “Mines and UXO Accidents in Nagorno Karabakh corrected as at 1 July 2009,” provided by email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009.
5 Ibid.
7 HALO, “Mines and UXO Accidents in Nagorno Karabakh corrected as at 1 July 2009,” provided by email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009.
9 Email from Valon Kumnova, Desk Officer, Horn of Africa, HALO, 3 August 2009.
Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
A Mine Action Coordination Committee is primarily responsible for liaison between the de facto government and HALO, but meets only when needed.\footnote{Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009.} HALO set up a mine action center in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2000, which is staffed by HALO personnel.

Victim assistance
There is no specific victim assistance (VA) framework and mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities in Nagorno-Karabakh. The Ministry of Social Welfare is responsible for the development and implementation of disability policies. Its tasks included ensuring medical assistance for persons with disabilities and the provision of prosthetic devices, employment, and psychosocial rehabilitation. In April 2008, the Center of Medical and Social Expertise, under the Ministry of Social Welfare, was set up to determine the different categories of disability, rehabilitation needs, and other disability-related issues.\footnote{“Four offices in one day,” KarabakhOpen (Stepanakert), 16 April 2008.}

Data collection and management
Since 1995, HALO has collected casualty data in Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2009, HALO reported that full details on “most casualties” were recorded in its database,\footnote{Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009.} but gaps remained in information provided to Landmine Monitor, including activity at the time of the incidents and locations.\footnote{HALO, “Mines and UXO Accidents in Nagorno Karabakh corrected as at 1 July 2009,” provided by email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009.} However, it appeared that casualty information has been verified and casualties previously unreported were inserted in the HALO database in 2009.\footnote{Ibid.} HALO risk education (RE) teams collect incident details, visit survivors in hospital, and enter the information into the database. The Ministry of Defense does not provide information on military casualties.\footnote{“Interview with Mikael Gasparyan, Working Group on Mine Problems, 14 February 2006.”}

In late 2007, the NGO Geneva Call provided representatives of civil society organizations from the South Caucasus, including Nagorno-Karabakh, with training in conducting socio-economic needs assessment surveys for landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities. In the second half of 2008, Geneva Call, together with local partner organizations, undertook a survey on the socio-economic needs of mine/ERW survivors in conflict areas, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The survey was limited to the areas directly affected by the armed conflict, covering at least 10% of the registered landmine survivors. As of August 2009, the results of this survey had not yet been published.\footnote{Email from Anne-Kathrin Glatz, Program Officer, Geneva Call, 4 August 2009.}

Plans
Strategic mine action plans
In July 2009, HALO estimated that, if current funding levels were sustained, between six and seven years’ work remained to clear Nagorno-Karabakh of contamination.\footnote{Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009. Previously, in April 2008, HALO had estimated that it would take around five years and $15 million to finish clearance. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,087.} HALO planned to continue to address contamination “based on priority” with about one-quarter of its resources devoted to battle area clearance (BAC) and three-quarters to mine clearance. HALO aims to clear all antivehicle minefields by the end of 2010 and to start its “Declared Minefield Free” process, region by region, in 2011.\footnote{Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009.}
Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

In 2008, HALO carried out a number of demining tasks to support reconstruction and development. A new gas pipe was installed in Martakert region, providing gas to four villages and Martakert town itself (the third largest town in Nagorno-Karabakh), benefiting some 5,000 people who previously had used bottled gas and wood burning stoves. The route the pipe had to take went through a mined area, which HALO cleared resulting in the destruction of two antivehicle mines and four items of UXO. Also in Martakert region, HALO cleared an area which was to be developed as a tourism/recreation area as it was suspected to have an antivehicle mine threat, and has conducted survey in support of a proposed new water pipe. Finally, HALO conducted survey and clearance in preparation for the construction of a gas pipe in Hadrut region. As of July 2009, construction of the pipe was underway.\(^{19}\)

Local ownership

HALO has found the local authorities to be committed to mine action and have cooperated with HALO on all aspects of its work. For example, the Nagorno-Karabakh Rescue Services coordinate with HALO on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs and other exchanges of information, and HALO’s RE program is fully supported by the Ministry of Education.\(^{20}\)

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Demining in Nagorno-Karabakh continues to be carried out primarily by HALO, using six teams for manual demining, four for BAC, one for general survey, one for EOD, one for mechanical demining, and one for RE. In 2008, HALO cleared almost 5.79km\(^2\) of mined areas and—a record for the program—more than 28.84km\(^2\) of battle areas (see tables below). There were three donor visits to the program in 2008 as well as visits from HALO headquarters staff.\(^{21}\) Nagorno-Karabakh Rescue Services (formerly called the Department of Emergency Situations) has continued to conduct limited EOD, responding to 68 call-outs in 2008.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mined area clearance in 2008</th>
<th>Battle area clearance in 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area cleared (m(^2))</strong></td>
<td><strong>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,785,712</td>
<td>943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Progress since 2000

Since HALO restarted its clearance program in 2000 and through the end of 2008, more than 29km\(^2\) of mined areas and 133km\(^2\) of battle areas were cleared.

Risk Education

In 2008, 12,717 persons, including schoolchildren, tractor drivers and shepherds, received RE in Nagorno-Karabakh.\(^{22}\) This is a decrease compared to 2007 (24,055).\(^{23}\) An increase in casualties was recorded in 2008, but overall, since RE activities began, mine/ERW incidents have decreased.\(^{24}\) RE is still believed to be necessary until clearance activities are completed.\(^{25}\)

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\(^{19}\) Ibid.
\(^{20}\) Ibid.
\(^{21}\) Ibid.
\(^{22}\) Ibid.
\(^{23}\) The number of RE recipients decreased because all the larger villages and towns were targeted in 2007; in 2008, RE was concentrated in rural areas. Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 3 August 2009.
\(^{24}\) For more information, see the Casualties section.
\(^{25}\) Email from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009.
### Demining from 1999–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mine clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Battle area clearance (km²)</th>
<th>Area cancelled/reduced by survey (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>5.79</td>
<td>28.84</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>17.67</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.99</td>
<td>14.13</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>2.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>14.28</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>14.50</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>14.67</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>29.14</strong></td>
<td><strong>133.16</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2008, HALO, working with the Nagorno-Karabakh Rescue Services and the Ministry of Education, was the only RE provider. A total of 7,489 adults and 5,228 children were reached, covering all regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and 102 schools. Awareness messages were delivered through interactive briefings, role-plays, games and audio-visual presentations. Messages were approved by the Ministry of Education and RE has been officially introduced into the school curriculum. Materials used included coloring books for children and posters and leaflets for both children and adults. HALO also organized RE training for 200 teachers in Stepanakert in March 2009.

From 1994 to December 2002, RE was provided mainly to children by the ICRC, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and the Civil Defense. From 2003 to 2005, the ICRC implemented a “Safe Play Areas for Children” program in close cooperation with the Azerbaijan Red Crescent Society. HALO started RE in March 2003 and worked in cooperation with the Nagorno-Karabakh Rescue Services and the Ministry of Education. From 2005 to 2008, 56,751 people were reached according to Landmine Monitor data. RE was coordinated through a Mine Awareness Working group from 1999 to 2002. There is said to be widespread public knowledge of the specific characteristics and risks of submunition contamination in Nagorno-Karabakh.

### Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is estimated to be at least 256. Nagorno-Karabakh’s healthcare system has been adversely affected by the conflict. In 2008, some efforts were made to strengthen existing health infrastructure, including allocating funds for the reconstruction of the Republic Hospital in Stepanakert and other medical facilities. However, the healthcare system still lacks resources, equipment, ambulances, and medicines. Most patients are sent to Armenia for treatment.

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26 Ibid.
27 Email from Krisztina Huszti Orban, Legal Attaché, Arms Unit, Legal Division, ICRC, 6 August 2009.
28 HALO, “Mines and UXO Accidents in Nagorno Karabakh corrected as at 1 July 2009,” provided by email from Matthew Howell, HALO, 8 July 2009.
The Stepanakert Policlinic, which is the only full-care outpatient medical center in Nagorno-Karabakh, received medical supplies and equipment from the Armenia Fund in 2008.\(^{33}\) In 2008, two surgeons from the Republic Hospital received training in Poland and Russia.\(^{34}\) The Ministry of Health acknowledged, however, that many doctors did not receive any training in the last 10 to 15 years.\(^{35}\)

Mine/ERW survivors receive free or discounted treatment at both civilian and military hospitals. Officially, most persons with disabilities are entitled to free medical care and free medicine if they present a disability certificate. In reality they often have to pay unofficial costs to receive services. In 2008, one mine survivor reported he was not able to get a disability certificate from authorities,\(^{36}\) while other people (who were reportedly not disabled) were listed among persons with disabilities through bribes and received benefits.\(^{37}\) The government stated that the process of granting disability certificates would be reviewed.\(^{38}\)

The Prosthetic and Orthopedic Center (operated by the Ministry of Social Welfare) and the Republican Rehabilitation Center (operated by the Ministry of Health), both located in Stepanakert, provide prosthetics, rehabilitation, and psychosocial support services.\(^{39}\) The Prosthetic and Orthopedic Center has the capacity to provide home care to 150 patients per year who cannot leave their houses. It plans to open a department specialized in the rehabilitation of children.\(^{40}\) Between 1999 and 2008, the center assisted 675 outpatients through 24,859 visits, 380 inpatients through 14,300 visits, and 460 patients with house calls through 6,647 visits.\(^{41}\)

Psychological support is available at the Center for Psychological Rehabilitation, in the Republic Children’s Hospital, at the Stepanakert rehabilitation centers, and at regional hospitals in Hadrut, Martakert, and Martuni.\(^{42}\) The government announced it will reimburse 2008 private and public university tuition fees for persons having a “first” or “second degree” of disability.\(^{43}\) Eight “first degree” persons with disabilities received special cars from the government to improve their mobility and the possibility for them to work as drivers.\(^{44}\) It is expected that all “first degree” disabled war veterans will be provided with a special car.\(^{45}\) In 2008, the government announced its intention to finance other income-generating activities,\(^{46}\) but it is unknown if they were implemented.

In 2008, the ICRC assisted 70 health centers and provided material assistance to vulnerable persons.\(^{47}\) Various veterans’ groups are active in assisting persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.

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\(^{38}\) Ibid.


\(^{41}\) Ibid.


\(^{45}\) Ibid.

\(^{46}\) Ibid.

Nagorno-Karabakh has laws to protect persons with disabilities, and provides monthly pensions corresponding to the level of disability. All new mine/ERW casualties or their families receive a one-time disbursement of financial compensation. In May 2007, pensions, including those for civilian war disabled and veterans with disabilities, were increased by up to 25%, in accordance with the rising cost of living. In January 2008, monthly benefits for children with disabilities were also increased.

Support for Mine Action

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, the Netherlands (US$817,293/€555,000) and the United Kingdom ($681,256/£367,353) reported contributing a total of $1,498,549 (€1,017,621) to HALO for mine action in Nagorno-Karabakh. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was approximately 11% more than reported in 2007. Funding has fluctuated between roughly $500,000 and $1.5 million per year since 2005.

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49 “Pensions and benefits will rise considerably from January 1,” KarabakhOpen (Stepanakert), 30 October 2007.
50 Emails from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, DfID, 17 March 2009.
PALESTINE

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, IEDs, other UXO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>16 (2007: 94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Unquantified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>150,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

The Palestinian National Authority (PA) participated as an observer at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 1999, calling for a “Middle East free of mines.” In April 2000, the PA stated its strong support for, and desire to join, the Mine Ban Treaty. It did not participate in another international landmine-related meeting until May 2009, and has not made any recent public statements regarding its mine ban policy. Hamas is alleged to have used mine-like explosive booby-traps in Gaza during the fighting in December 2008–January 2009. There were earlier allegations of armed Palestinian groups using mines and improvised explosive devices (IED).

Operation Cast Lead, Israel’s attack on Gaza in December 2008 to January 2009, has added to the explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). There has been little clearance of mines and ERW over the past few years, although the UN Mine Action Team in Gaza has been trying to address contamination resulting from the latest conflict.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 794 casualties from mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs in the OPT (127 killed, 654 injured, and 13 unknown). From 1999 to 2008, mine/ERW risk education activities have been provided in the West Bank and Gaza mainly through school-based activities and public information dissemination. After Operation Cast Lead, specific emergency risk education activities were carried out. There have been no specific mine/ERW victim assistance activities in the OPT. Access to health services continued to deteriorate, particularly in Gaza, in 2008–2009. Disability legislation remains inadequate and the quality of services poor.

Mine Ban Policy

Governance of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including Gaza and parts of the West Bank, is assigned to the Palestinian National Authority. Two Palestinian factions, Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank, both claim to be the legitimate governing authority of the OPT. Neither faction has made any recent public statements on its policy toward banning antipersonnel mines. The PA-Fatah sent a representative to the May 2009 intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, its first participation in Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings since the First Meeting of States Parties in Mozambique in May 1999.
Use, transfer, and stockpiling
In December 2008, Israel launched 23 days of intense military operations in Gaza. According to one New York Times report, Hamas fighters used victim-activated explosive booby-traps against Israeli forces. Use of such booby-traps is prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor did not find any other serious allegations of use of antipersonnel mines or mine-like devices by any Palestinian entity during this reporting period (since May 2008).

In May 2009, Egyptian authorities seized 48 antipersonnel mines, among other weapons, allegedly destined for Palestinian groups in Gaza. In February 2009, Hamas displayed antivehicle mines in its possession after the end of the conflict, but the source of the weapons is unknown.

Scope of the Problem
Contamination
The OPT are contaminated with mines and ERW, although the precise extent of contamination is not known. There are believed to be at least 15 confirmed minefields, all located in the West Bank on the border with Jordan. It has been suspected that mines have also been laid by Israeli forces on the border between Egypt and Gaza and in various areas across the Gaza Strip.

Further hazards exist as a result of the attacks by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) from 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009 during Operation Cast Lead, when the Gaza Strip was bombed by sea, air, and land. Before and during the 23 days of operations, Hamas and other Palestinian militant groups fired rockets from Gaza into southern Israel, and engaged the IDF in ground combat. The existence of UXO in the Gaza Strip hinders reconstruction. Israeli forces reportedly used antivehicle mines to demolish buildings in Gaza, but there is no evidence that antipersonnel mines were laid by either side. The main threat is from a wide variety of UXO.

In April 2009, the UN Mine Action Service’s (UNMAS) Mine Action Team (UNMAT) in Gaza initiated assessments to identify the locations of ordnance; these were still underway as of 1 July 2009. Based on preliminary results, however, it appears that urban centers were the most heavily damaged by explosive ordnance. The core remaining UXO threat lies within the ruins of collapsed and damaged buildings. As of early June 2009, of the 215 buildings assessed, just under half were categorized as having a high or medium risk of UXO contamination, thereby necessitating explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) follow-up.
Casualties

In 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 16 new mine/ERW casualties, including eight killed and eight injured in 14 incidents.11 The majority of casualties were men (10) and boys aged 13 to 16 (four); the age and gender of the remaining two is unknown. The most common activities at the time of the incident were herding (five) and tampering with explosive devices (four). ERW caused the majority of casualties (seven), and mines five (four were caused by unknown devices). Ten casualties were identified in the West Bank and six in Gaza.

The 2008 casualty rate is a significant decrease compared to 2007 (94) and 2006 (34),12 but this is due to a lack of available data.

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, but sources provided conflicting information. Landmine Monitor was able to confirm 21 mine/ERW casualties (six killed and 15 injured) in six incidents, as of 31 May 2009.13 All but three of these casualties were recorded in Gaza after Operation Cast Lead ended on 18 January 2009. Eight casualties were children. The majority of casualties were caused by ERW (18), while mines caused three casualties.

Data from the Ministry of Health reported 30 ERW casualties, including seven killed and 23 injured, in Gaza between January and April 2009.14 UNICEF reported at least 35 casualties (11 killed and 24 injured) in Gaza between 18 January and 2 June 2009. As of early July 2009, casualty data was in the process of being checked, and no more details were available.15

The total number of Palestinian casualties from mines, ERW, and victim-activated IEDs is not known, and data varies depending on the source. Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified at least 794 casualties (127 killed, 654 injured, and 13 unknown).16 Defense for Children International Palestine Section (DCI/PS) recorded more than 2,500 mine/ERW casualties occurring between 1967 and 1998.17

Risk profile

According to Landmine Monitor analysis of 2008 casualty data, the majority of recorded casualties were children and men tampering/playing with explosive devices and conducting livelihood activities. Both an Israeli official and a Palestinian official reported that scrap metal collection has increased in the OPT.18 In 2009, following Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, those involved in rubble removal, farmers, and residents of contaminated areas are believed to be most at risk,19 as well as humanitarian aid workers.20

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11 Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports from 1 January 2008 to 31 December 2008; analysis of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Protection of Civilians Weekly Report,” from 1 January to 31 December 2008; and information provided by email from Ayed Abu Eqtaish, Program Manager, DCI/PS, 15 April 2009.
13 Landmine Monitor analysis of media reports from 1 January to 31 May 2009; and analysis of UN OCHA, “Protection of Civilians Weekly Report,” from 1 January to 31 May 2009.
14 Email from Kerei Ruru, UNMAT, 20 April 2009.
16 Information for 1999 was not available. See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
18 Telephone interview with Meir Itzchaki, Counselor, Permanent Mission of Israel to the UN in Geneva, 2 April 2009; and interview with Baker Hijazi, First Secretary, Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the UN in Geneva, 26 May 2009.
Program Management and Coordination

The interministerial Palestinian Mine Action Committee (PNMAC) was established in 2002 and has been chaired by the PA Ministry of the Interior since 2006. It meets irregularly because of the lack of resources to implement activities and was reported to be suspended in August 2008. There is no information regarding PNMAC activity within Gaza. The Ministry of Interior within Gaza has a Director of Mine Action, but UNMAT has not been able to establish contact. UNMAT Gaza has not been involved in any activities in the West Bank, or with the PA.

It is unclear who has the final mandate to coordinate and monitor risk education (RE) and victim assistance (VA) activities. PNMAC does not have a formal mandate, and in 2008 its coordination role remained limited. In 2009, following Operation Cast Lead, UNICEF took a de facto coordination role for RE. The first RE coordination meeting was held in Gaza on 27 April 2009. One of the main recommendations of a 2005 UNDP assessment was the development of a comprehensive mine action strategy, including victim assistance and data collection. However, the recommendation has not been implemented, and in 2008 victim assistance was not on PNMAC’s agenda.

There is no specific VA strategic framework in place in the OPT, and mine/ERW survivors receive the same services as other persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs are responsible for disability issues.

Data collection and management

There is no comprehensive data collection mechanism in the OPT, and it is not clear who has the final responsibility to collect casualty information. Data is collected by the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Interior, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), the Palestinian Police, and some international and local organizations.

In 2005, the PRCS designed a casualty database. In June 2009, it reported that the database was still running, but casualty details were not made available to Landmine Monitor. In 2009, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported that casualty data collection in Gaza “has been difficult and ad hoc” and that it was undertaking visits to hospitals in Gaza to collect information. UNICEF reported that it was attempting to harmonize data from different actors in Gaza.

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22 Email from Elena Rice, UNMAT, 9 June 2009.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
30 Email from Asmahan Wadi Nasser, UNICEF, 5 June 2009.
36 Telephone interview with Khaldoun Oweis, PRCS, 5 June 2009.
37 Email from Julia Hume, MAG, 7 June 2009.
38 Emails from Sheri Ritsema, UNICEF, 31 May, 2 June, and 3 June 2009.
Plans and national ownership

Mine action is not a priority for the PA and is not mentioned in its Reform and Development Plan. On 23 January 2009, UNMAS entered Gaza to conduct a technical assessment mission and begin establishing a mine action project in response to contamination resulting from Operation Cast Lead. Two offices were set up, one in Gaza and the other in Jerusalem.

Demining and Battle area Clearance

Palestinian police EOD teams are the only Palestinian body engaged in clearance operations in the OPT. The extent of any clearance has not been reported. The IDF has also cleared mines and UXO on an emergency basis in some parts of the OPT. Cooperation between Palestinian EOD teams and the IDF has generally been limited.

Through 15 May 2009, UNMAT in Gaza had surveyed and cleared all known contaminated schools in Gaza (38 UNICEF-supported government schools and four UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East schools). UNMAT identified 197 items of UXO (56 containing white phosphorous and 141 containing high explosives).

MAG has been the key implementing partner for UNMAT, while Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) also operated briefly in Gaza between March and May 2009. Five MAG EOD teams removed and rendered safe UXO across the Gaza Strip, and conducted assessments in support of the operations of humanitarian and development organizations.

As of June 2009, MAG had not yet carried out demolitions in Gaza as it was still identifying a demolitions site and arranging for explosives and other equipment to be imported.

Risk Education

In 2008, mine/ERW RE, combined with activities raising awareness of the danger of small arms and light weapons (SALW), was provided by the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MoEHE) with UNICEF support in both the West Bank and Gaza. At the beginning of 2009, following Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, emergency RE was provided by an increased number of operators. As Gaza is densely populated, the ERW threat was considered “acute.”

In 2008, RE/SALW awareness messages reached approximately 150,000 people, including 100,000 children and 50,000 adults. This is a decrease compared to 2007 (when 256,677 were reached), but it remains higher than in 2006 (when 81,892 were reached). In total, 538 teachers, Scout leaders, and counselors were trained in RE, as well as 56 trainers from the MoEHE. RE sessions were given in 132 schools, messages were broadcast on school radio, and posters designed by children were displayed. Awareness sessions were also given to parents at 124 events/exhibitions. These activities were conducted in high-risk areas in the West Bank (Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilia Tubas, and Tulkarem) and the Gaza Strip (Gaza Middle Area, Khan Younis, Northern Gaza, Rafah, Gaza Middle Area, and Gaza City) due to their proximity to military bases/training zones, settlements, or minefields.

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43 Ibid.
44 Email from Elena Rice, UNMAT, 9 June 2009.
46 Email from Julia Hume, MAG, 9 June 2009.
47 Email from Asmahan Wadi Nasser, UNICEF, 5 June 2009.
In 2009, additional operators provided emergency RE. UNICEF continued to provide financial and technical support.50 World Vision distributed emergency supply kits that contained an RE brochure.51 Save the Children distributed family hygiene kits with a child-friendly flier.52 UNMAT/MAG conducted UXO/Safety Awareness Briefings for humanitarian workers.53 The Palestinian Center for Democracy and Conflict Resolution (PCDRC) provided awareness messages through TV and radio, and conducted community and school-based activities.54 The MoEHE continued to provide school-based RE covering an additional 72 schools in affected areas.55 The IDF issued a warning on the ERW threat to Gazan residents, which was relayed in Palestinian and other Arabic language media.56 As of April 2009, gaps that remained to be addressed included the limited capacity to conduct community liaison activities and to provide awareness of threats posed by UXO during rubble removal.57

The ICRC held safety presentations for PRCS field teams and firefighters, as well as a basic mine action training course for 27 PRCS volunteers. The ICRC and PRCS designed and distributed 10,000 leaflets with RE messages.58

Despite variable security situations, mobility restrictions, and the absence of a formal RE framework, awareness messages have been delivered without interruptions from 1999 to 2008 by different operators. Technical and financial support has been provided by UNICEF and the ICRC.59 In 2005, a UNDP mission concluded that given the situation in the OPT, remarkable achievements had been attained in raising awareness about mines among children, but that there was a great need to address the ERW threat.60

Victim Assistance

The estimated number of survivors is unknown but at least 654. Access to health services in the OPT, particularly Gaza, continued to worsen in 2008 due to health personnel strikes, mobility restrictions, and power cuts.61 The situation further deteriorated in 2009 due to Operation Cast Lead. At the end of the conflict, ICRC doctors reported that surgeons, burn doctors, and rehabilitation specialists were needed, and that the medical facilities in Gaza were not adequate to respond to healthcare needs.62 The PA also reported that the health system was not able to cope with demand.63

Handicap International (HI) estimates the number of persons with disabilities has now increased to 15% of the population, due to ongoing conflict.64 While there are several physical rehabilitation centers and programs to address the needs of persons with disabilities,65 the quality

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53 Email from Julia Hume, MAG, 7 June 2009; and email from Kerei Ruru, UNMAT, 20 April 2009.
55 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
64 Email from Violaine Gagnet, HI, 4 June 2009.
of services was a problem, and the main providers have remained NGOs.66 PA health insurance services were poor, and Palestinians injured by Israeli forces were not entitled to insurance or compensation in Israel.67

In 2008, the ICRC supported the Artificial Limb and Polio Center (ALPC) in Gaza City by donating material, components, physiotherapy equipment, and wheelchairs. They also renovated the center and provided training. The ICRC also supported the Al Shifa Hospital in Gaza in provision of post-surgical rehabilitation and in March 2008 organized a war surgery seminar.68

The PRCS continued to provide a wide range of center and community-based services.69 It provided emergency medical services and ensured the transport of injured and sick, with ICRC financial support.70 HI continued to support local organizations providing services for persons with disabilities through rehabilitation outreach teams; it also supported the ALPC during Operation Cast Lead.71

In 2009, the Slovenian government earmarked €146,000 (US$215,000) for rehabilitation of children in Gaza through the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF),72 to undertake medical evaluation and provide assistance to 25 mine/ERW survivors in Gaza.73

There is legislation to protect the rights of persons with disabilities, but it is not rights-based and remains largely unimplemented. Discrimination against persons with disabilities has been reported.74

Support for Mine Action

International support for mine action

Canada reported contributing C$4,000,000 ($3,752,400) in 2008 to UNDP for UXO clearance in Gaza.75 The UN reported receiving $137,676 from the Netherlands, $582,401 from the European Commission, and $623,524 from the United Kingdom. The Swedish International Development Agency provided an in-kind contribution of 3 staff (one medic and two EOD technicians).76 No international mine/ERW action funding was reported for the OPT in 2007.

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67 Telephone interview with Meir Itzchaki, Permanent Mission of Israel, 2 April 2009.
69 Telephone interview with Khaldoun Oweis, PRCS, 5 June 2009.
71 Email from Violaine Gagnet, HI, 4 June 2009.
75 Emails from Kim Henrie-Lafontaine, Second Secretary, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 6 June 2009 and 19 June 2009.
76 Email from Reuben McCarthy, Conflict Prevention and Recovery Specialist, Sub-Regional Office for Eastern and Southern Africa, UNDP, 22 July 2009.
SOMALILAND

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties in 2008</td>
<td>37 (2007: 97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but estimated 489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Mine clearance: 656,000m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battle area clearance: 45,000m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk education recipients in 2008</td>
<td>More than 500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

In 1999, the House of Representatives passed and the President of the Republic of Somaliland endorsed a resolution calling for a unilateral ban on landmines. In 2002, Somaliland destroyed 7,517 stockpiled antipersonnel mines. In 2004, the President proclaimed that Somaliland was already in “unilateral compliance” with the Mine Ban Treaty. Legislation banning antipersonnel mines and requiring mine clearance and stockpile destruction was passed and took effect in March 2009.

Somaliland is affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of a series of armed conflicts since 1964. The first mine clearance operations began in 1991 in and around the capital, Hargeisa. Impact surveys in 2003 and 2007 found all seven regions in Somaliland fully or partly under the control of the government in Hargeisa to be impacted by mines and ERW. There is some disagreement over the survey findings, and more recent surveys have shown the problem of ERW to be at least equally serious. In 2008, following an agreement between the HALO Trust and the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC) and UNDP, HALO began to resurvey the complete territory of Somaliland. Information management continues to be a weak point of the mine action program. International NGOs have conducted mine and ERW clearance, and police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel have also conducted “spot” clearance tasks. UNDP began assisting Somaliland with mine action in 1997, and continues to support SMAC.

Landmine Monitor identified 814 casualties (207 killed, 500 injured, and 107 unknown) between 2000 and 2008. Quality data was not available for 1999. Risk education (RE) efforts have become more targeted and expansive since 2006. Handicap International remains the largest provider of RE (reaching more than 490,000 people in 2008). The police EOD teams, HALO, and Danish Demining Group provide RE in coordination with their activities.

There were no specific victim assistance policies or activities. Healthcare is poor, while psychosocial support and economic reintegration services are limited. The ICRC and NGOs provided some rehabilitation services. Constitutional provisions prohibiting discrimination against persons with disabilities were largely unimplemented.
Mine Ban Policy

Somaliland proclaimed independence from Somalia in 1991 after the fall of the government of Siad Barre. Somaliland is not recognized by the international community as an independent state, and thus it is not in a position to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. Somaliland authorities have frequently expressed their commitment to a mine ban since 1997.1

On 24 March 2009, the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Act took effect. It mirrors the Mine Ban Treaty, including obligations for mine clearance within 10 years, stockpile destruction within four years, and victim assistance (VA). The Act provides for penal sanctions for persons found violating the prohibitions in the legislation, including extraterritorial violations of the prohibitions by its citizens.2

The law bans use, possession, development, production, acquisition, and transfer of antipersonnel mines by any civilian or government official. It requires citizens who possess mines to arrange for their immediate collection for destruction by the authorities.3

SMAC, under the direction of the Office of the Vice-President, is responsible for coordinating implementation of the Act. The Act requires the Office of the Vice-President to submit annual transparency reports to the Legislative Assembly on implementation of the Act.4

The ban bill was first introduced in the Legislative Assembly in 2007, but consensus was not achieved and it was taken off the table before a vote.5 In 2008, the bill was reintroduced with active campaigning by civil society.6 The House of Representatives approved the bill on 17 January 2009, and the House of Elders (Guurti) followed suit on 3 March 2009. The bill became law 21 days later.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use

There are no indications that Somaliland has produced, exported, or acquired new landmines since proclaiming independence. There have been no confirmed instances of new use of antipersonnel mines.7

Officials have acknowledged the existence of a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but have not provided information on numbers or types. The Antipersonnel Mine Ban Act requires the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines held by the government of Somaliland within four years.8

Somaliland has, in the past, periodically sent stockpiled antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, among other weapons and ammunition, to demining organizations operating in Somaliland for destruction.9

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1 On 1 March 1999, the House of Representatives passed a non-binding resolution calling for a total ban on landmines. In November 2004, the Vice-President of Somaliland spoke of “our already declared unilateral compliance” with the Mine Ban Treaty. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 976.
2 “Antipersonnel Mine Ban Act 2007,” English translation, Articles 5, 6, 7, and 10. Penalties for individuals or groups are one to three years imprisonment or a fine of SOS1–2 million. For a corporate body, NGO, or government official the penalty is a fine between SOS5–10 million.
4 Ibid, Article 15.
5 Emails from Dr. Ahmed Esa, Director, Institute for Practical Research and Training (IPRT), 19 July 2008 and 8 August 2008.
6 The bill was drafted by the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Internal Affairs, Security and Defense with the assistance of the IPRT, SMAC, and Geneva Call.
7 In late 2003 and early 2004 there were allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by the forces of both Somaliland and Puntland in their conflict over the town of Las Anod in the disputed Sool region. Both sides denied using mines, and no compelling evidence was found. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, pp. 1,228–1,229.
Scope of the Problem

Contamination
Somaliland is affected by mines and ERW as a result of the 1964 and 1977–1978 border wars with Ethiopia, and civil wars in 1988–1991 and 1994–1995.\(^{10}\) Hargeisa, the capital, was heavily mined around military bases, refugee camps, private homes, and the airport. Large perimeter antivehicle mine belts surrounded former military camps elsewhere in the country, and there are suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) near the borders with Ethiopia, and mined roads. The war between Ethiopia and Somalia also left behind large amounts of UXO.\(^{11}\)

Two Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) serve as the basis for measuring the extent of the problem in Somaliland. The first survey in 2002–2003 covered Awdal, Galbeed, Saaxil, Togdheer, and Woqooyi regions and identified 772 SHAs affecting 357 communities, while the LIS in 2006–2007 in Sanaag and Sool identified a further 210 SHAs impacting 90 communities.\(^{12}\) In August 2008, UNDP estimated that up to 450 SHAs remained to be cleared.\(^{13}\)

Views differ, however, on the scale and impact of the residual problem. SMAC considers Somaliland still to be “heavily mined.”\(^{14}\) In contrast, the results of demining by HALO and Danish Demining Group (DDG) since the first LIS was completed indicate that the mine problem is much less severe than the LIS suggested.\(^{15}\) During an evaluation of DDG’s mine action program in March 2008, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) thought the larger problem for communities in Somaliland was the presence of small arms.\(^{16}\) In 2008, HALO, in collaboration with SMAC, began resurveying all remaining SHAs identified by the LIS. HALO expected the survey to be completed in September 2009.\(^{17}\)

In 2008, Somaliland reported suicide bomb attacks on its territory, including car bomb attacks on the Presidential Palace, the UNDP compound, the Ethiopian consulate office in Hargeisa, and the intelligence headquarters in Bossaso, Puntland. Police EOD teams were the first to respond to each attack. It concluded that in two of the attacks explosives had probably been extracted from antivehicle mines and connected with fuzes and made into an improvised explosive device.\(^{18}\)

Casualties
SMAC recorded 19 mine/ERW incidents resulting in 37 casualties (nine killed and 28 injured) in 2008 in the regions covered by SMAC Regional Liaison Officers (Awdal, Hargeisa, Sahil, Sanaag, Sool, and Togdheer). Most casualties were male (26), 11 were female, 17 were adults, and 20 were children. The majority of incidents (14) were caused by ERW, three by antipersonnel mines, and two by antivehicle mines.\(^{19}\) SMAC also reported that “Three de-mining accidents occurred with HALO de-miners in 2008 with minor injuries.” It was not clear whether these were included in SMAC’s casualty figures.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{13}\) Email from David Bax, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP, 4 August 2008.


\(^{17}\) Email from Neil Ferrao, Programme Manager, HALO, 21 May 2009.


The 37 casualties recorded in 2008 are less than the 97 casualties (26 killed and 71 injured) identified by Landmine Monitor\textsuperscript{21} or the 72 casualties (16 killed and 56 injured) recorded by SMAC in 2007.\textsuperscript{22} Given possible under-reporting, this should not necessarily be considered indicative of a trend.

Landmine Monitor identified 814 casualties (207 killed, 500 injured, and 107 unknown) between 2000 and 2008. No reliable data was available for 1999.\textsuperscript{23}

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, with SMAC identifying 22 casualties (four killed and 18 injured), as of 31 May.\textsuperscript{24} According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the majority of these were caused by ERW (12), four by antipersonnel mines, and five by unknown devices. Boys were the largest group of casualties (eight), followed by girls (seven), men (five), and women (one).\textsuperscript{25}

### Risk profile

People are at risk from mine and other ERW contamination, particularly around Hargeisa.\textsuperscript{26} Nomads and shepherds are at particular risk, and children form the highest casualty group.\textsuperscript{27}

### Socio-economic impact

A 2007 GICHD evaluation of European Commission-funded mine action in Africa found that mine action contributes to other forms of international support for relief and development in Somalia, and concluded that by clearing pastureland and traditional migration routes, mine clearance enhances livelihoods and reduces vulnerability for pastoralists.\textsuperscript{28} While pastureland was the most reported socio-economic blockage in the LIS in 2003, with nomads and herders as the most affected population at the time, more recently the high number of incidents involving women and children indicates a wider vulnerability to mines than just nomads and herders.\textsuperscript{29}

Livelihood expert Laura Hammonds believes it is difficult to determine the impact of mine action on poverty reduction, and a study for DDG concluded that a livelihoods analysis with better-off groups could help to determine whether there has been an increase in income over recent years and whether the increase is related to the use of land cleared.\textsuperscript{30}

### Program Management and Coordination

**Mine action**

Mine action is organized under the office of the Vice-President, who heads the interministerial Mine Action Steering Committee. SMAC is Somaliland’s coordination body, and continues to be supported by UNDP Somalia from Nairobi. Bimonthly mine action coordination meetings involving international NGOs are organized by SMAC, as is an RE working group supported by


\textsuperscript{23} See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.

\textsuperscript{24} Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009. In the cumulative totals for 2009, SMAC reported 17 injuries, but there was an additional one in the detailed listed reports in this email.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{27} Ibid, 1,106.

\textsuperscript{28} GICHD, “Somalia report: Mission to Somalia (Somaliland and Puntland),” Final report, October 2007, pp. 20–21


UNDP. The National Demining Agency (NDA), part of the Ministry of Defense, is mandated to coordinate demining, RE, clearance, and survey, but is not operational.

SMAC organizes bi-monthly mine action coordination meetings, attended by HALO, DDG, Handicap International (HI), the police EOD teams, and the Mine Victim Association, a local NGO. An RE/VA officer was appointed in January 2009 and as of March 2009, was waiting for VA training to begin assisting with VA services. Along with the SMAC RE program coordinator, the RE/VA officer was responsible for chairing a biweekly RE working group meeting.

Data collection
One of the biggest challenges facing the mine action program is information management. Landmine Monitor has reported continual problems with the data in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database since 2002 when the mine action program began and IMSMA was installed. The problems result from a number of factors, including inadequate technical expertise at SMAC and the use of “incompatible” forms in previous surveys. This has caused a major lack of confidence in the accuracy of the data. In 2008, SMAC reported several persistent problems with the database beginning with the lack of training for its staff. Most of the skills acquired by the database staff are said to have been self-taught. SMAC continues to use an old version of IMSMA.

In July 2007, UNDP recruited a consultant to clean up the database but he was unable to do so during the term of the consultancy. According to UNDP, an action plan to check and review all entries in the database was adopted and began with the deployment of an international database expert from the Swedish Rescue Service Agency in September 2008 but the consultancy was cut short at the end of October when suicide car bombs went off in Hargeisa. The IMSMA officer returned to Hargeisa in March 2009 and conducted training for SMAC’s IMSMA section, and developed data input/analysis, reporting, and monitoring mechanisms for SMAC to use. Due to restrictions on international UN staff, it is not possible for the IMSMA officer to be based in Somaliland permanently.

Even if it had properly trained staff, the database suffers from some longstanding technical problems. The two LIS conducted in Somaliland are in separate databases and in different computers. SMAC has also reported that some towns and villages included in the LIS that covered Sanaag and Sool regions have no names or have coordinates that put them in the middle of the Gulf of Aden, although the maps produced for the LIS Final Report do not indicate such problems.
UNMAS reported that casualty information in Somaliland has been “systematically compiled since 2005” through the SMAC Regional Liaison Officers, “resulting in a relatively comprehensive understanding of the casualty trends in Somaliland.”45 SMAC reported that data collection methods improved, with incident reports now including location coordinates, casualty information, and location photos.46 Starting in January 2009, HALO collated casualty data from various regions in Somaliland, which was provided to SMAC at bi-monthly meetings.47 Nonetheless, under-reporting of casualties is likely.48

RE data is entered into IMSMA by SMAC but this needed further verification. HALO and DDG still maintain their own databases due to the inaccuracies of SMAC IMSMA data.49 SMAC reported that no progress was made on establishing a VA database in 2008.50

### Mine action program operators for 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disability Action Network (DAN)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive Community Based Rehabilitation in Somaliland (CCBRS)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Assistance and Volunteer Organization (GAVO)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland police EOD teams</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International operators</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>RE</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>VA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG (EOD)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abilis Foundation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Plans

#### Strategic mine action plan
Somaliland developed a strategic plan in 2002, which was revised following the results of the first phase of the LIS. In 2006, the plan was again updated and extended to 2010.51 The short-term strategy sought continued UN support to strengthen the capacities of SMAC and the police EOD teams and by the end of 2009 it was planned that Somaliland would take on greater financial responsibility. The strategy also called for UNDP to support the construction of an EOD Police Command and Training Centre, and expand SMAC’s survey capacity.52

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45 Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 29 June 2009.
46 Email from Dr. Ahmed Ali Mah, SMAC, 18 March 2009.
47 Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 24 August 2009.
48 Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.
49 Interviews with Karina Lynge, DDG, Hargeisa, 8 April 2009; and Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.
50 Email from Dr. Ahmed Ali Mah, SMAC, 18 March 2009.
The medium-term strategy (2010–2012) is to ensure that SMAC can operate independently, with a resource mobilization plan developed and implemented. All residual medium-priority areas identified by the LIS will have been dealt with, and the establishment of a national mine action authority will be pursued. It is planned that a VA, advocacy, and stockpile destruction strategy will be developed and implemented. In the long-term (beyond 2012), SMAC will be in a position to coordinate and undertake all mine action activities without the need for international supervision.53

There was no national strategic plan for RE in 2008.54 There is no strategy, plan, or policy framework for VA.55

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development

The Somalia Reconstruction and Development Programme 2008–2012 and the UN Transition Plan 2008–2009 form the framework for development in Somalia, including Somaliland, with particular emphasis on the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.56 Neither of these documents refers to the mine/ERW problem or to mine action.

Local ownership

Commitment to mine action and victim assistance

Somaliland has shown commitment to mine action through the creation of national structures, with the support of UNDP, and the adoption of national legislation. The government contributed US$15,000 to SMAC’s operations in 2006.57 No funding by Somaliland was reported in 2007 or 2008.58

National management

The Somaliland mine action program is executed and supervised by UNDP Somalia, which is based in Nairobi, Kenya. In its 2007 evaluation of the Somalia mine action program, GICHD concluded that on paper, Somaliland had a good institutional structure for mine action, but lacked adequate technical support from UNDP. Although previous UNDP personnel arranged training, equipment, facilities, and funding for SMAC personnel, and advice on policy matters, they did not provide ongoing support to help SMAC personnel apply their training. Additional problems included unclear job descriptions and travel/logistic problems for the UNDP staff. As a result, SMAC did not perform effectively.59 Since 2006, support from UNDP has included subcontracting for technical services from Mine Advisory Group (MAG), Mechem, Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA), and the International Mine Action Training Center (IMATC) in Nairobi. Technical training has been provided to upgrade the skills of the police EOD teams.60

National mine action legislation

Presidential Decree No. 016/2004, which regulates mine action in Somaliland, states that all mine action organizations and government entities must comply with its provisions.61 Legislation in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, passed in April 2009, requires the destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of Somaliland as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the law’s entry into force.62 This provision mirrors the text of Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. A new policy on mine action was being discussed

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54 Email from Stanislav Damjanovic, HALO, 17 March 2009.
55 Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.
57 Email from Dr. Ahmed Ali Mah, SMAC, 2 July 2007.
in parliament in early 2009, but the outcome and precise content of the policy were not known as of July 2009.

National mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
SMAC has developed standing operating procedures for mine action operations in Somaliland with the support of UNDP. There are no RE standards, although the organizations involved in RE activities state that they follow international standards.

Program evaluations
In April 2008, GICHD conducted an evaluation of DDG’s mine action program, commissioned by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). The evaluation concluded that DDG’s decision to close its mine clearance and EOD activities in Somaliland was justified, as mines and ERW in most of the communities where they had worked had become an insignificant factor. DDG had concluded, and GICHD agreed, that the capacities of HALO and the Somaliland police EOD teams were sufficient to address the remaining mine and ERW problem.

Demining and Battle Area Clearance
HALO is the only organization engaged in demining in Somaliland. The five police EOD teams, comprising a total of 24 personnel including paramedics, drivers, and supervisory staff, are part of the operations unit of the Somaliland Police Commission, which is under the Ministry of the Interior. SMAC provides task dossiers to the police EOD teams. UNDP has focused on developing the capacity of the police EOD teams to address the residual ERW problem.

Sool and Sanaag remain disputed regions in Somalia, making access problematic for the UN and international NGOs. Somaliland’s police EOD capacity does not include an EOD team dedicated to those regions, thus any EOD activities there are done by teams from other regions on a case-by-case basis. HALO has accessed some of these areas to conduct surveys and continues to assist with mine clearance assets and EOD call-outs when the security situation permits. In 2008, UNDP funded the construction of a police EOD compound at the Police Department for Criminal Investigation in Hargeisa consisting of office, classroom, and storage space.

Until HALO completes the resurvey that began in 2008 it is unknown how much more time and resources may be needed to clear all the remaining SHAs.

Demining and battle area clearance in 2008
In 2008, HALO conducted three battle area clearance (BAC) tasks covering much smaller areas than in 2007 and cleared 33 SHAs (see table below) covering 666,795m². HALO’s demining of mined areas included 356,649m² in manual clearance and 265,146m² in mechanical clearance. HALO deminers suffered three accidents in 2008, sustaining minor injuries.

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63 Email from Dr. Ahmed Esa, IPRT, 17 January 2009.
64 Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 1 July 2009.
65 Email from Stanislav Damjanovic, HALO, 17 March 2009; and interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.
67 Ibid.
69 Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 26 June 2009.
70 Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 24 August 2009.
72 Email from Neil Ferrao, HALO, 29 June 2009.
Demining in Somaliland in 2007 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mined area cleared (km²)</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In January–July 2008, SMAC tasked the five police EOD teams based in Borama, Burao, Erigavo, and Hargeisa with clearing 243 hazardous areas covering an estimated 2.4km². The teams found a total of 236 ERW.

Battle Area Clearance in Somaliland in 2007 and 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>BAC (km²)</th>
<th>UXO destroyed</th>
<th>AXO destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2.45</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>1,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>4,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.21</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>5,475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SMAC quality assurance teams visited HALO clearance sites 139 times, and visited 42 sites where EOD teams were conducting spot clearance (see below). SMAC also conducted quality assurance on 55 completed tasks by HALO. All completed areas were subsequently released to the local communities.74

EOD clearance in 2008

UNDP has supported EOD capacity-building with the Somaliland police since 2001. Operations consist of tasking by SMAC based on the UXO danger areas in the database and responses to requests from local villagers called “community callouts.” The teams responded to requests, mostly by telephone, from 551 communities and recovered a total of 4,309 UXO. Among the recovered items were 602 items of UXO handed over to the police EOD teams by the Governor of Sool region.75

EOD tasking was put on hold in July 2008 as the resurvey being conducted by HALO indicated that a majority of the SHAs identified by the LIS were being cancelled, while some new SHAs were being found. However, work continued through EOD call-outs. In order to avoid wasting time and resources on areas that were not contaminated or no longer contaminated, or where contamination had been previously over-estimated, it was planned to resume EOD tasking only after the new HALO contamination data was processed.76

In May 2008, DDG resumed its Village by Village EOD Clearance project as part of its new Community Safety and Enhancement project that assists communities in the management of small arms. By the end of December it had conducted 145 community visits in Galbeed, Saaxil, Sanaag, Sool, and Togdheer regions and destroyed a total of eight mines and 281 ERW.77

Progress since 2003

From 2003–2008 mine clearance averaged approximately 0.55km² per year. BAC has decreased each year since 2003 when 50km² were cleared, to 2008 when less than 1km² was cleared (see table below).

76 Email from Tammy Orr, UNMAS, 26 June 2009.
77 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Karina Lynge, DDG, 15 March 2009.
Since 2002, the Somaliland police EOD teams have cleared more than 48,000 items of UXO from 1,472 sites (see table below).78

### Risk Education

In 2008, RE in Somaliland was conducted both by NGOs and the police, through training of community focal points, direct RE presentations, mass media, and community liaison alongside EOD operations. More than half a million people received RE in 2008, including those reached through the mass media.

SMAC tasked the police EOD with RE assignments in coordination with their clearance work. For the first half of 2008, such tasks were prioritized using data from the LIS. For the latter half, they focused on call-outs, rather than LIS priorities, as they awaited information from HALO’s survey. HI focused on communities classified as medium risk in the LIS. HALO and DDG RE activities were coordinated with their clearance efforts.79 These activities were theoretically coordinated with SMAC, but according to GICHD these agencies “are all essentially self-tasking, although all operators ensure endorsement of their tasks by the SMAC.”80

At the end of 2008, SMAC conducted an assessment of HI’s RE activities and recommended that HI try to reach beyond community leaders and training of trainers and work more at the community level.81

Since 1999, RE activities have been conducted by a number of NGOs, local government agencies, and commercial demining companies. Early efforts were ad hoc and limited, with UNICEF and HI the main players. Since 2004, DDG and HALO have also emerged as major contributors to RE, alongside their clearance operations.82 Police EOD teams, which began in 2002, have expanded their RE activities considerably since 2006.83 RE activities have continuously increased since 2005.84 Since 2007, RE in Somaliland has become more systematic, with efforts to target high and medium risk areas identified by the LIS.85

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79 Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.
82 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
## RE activities in 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type of activity</th>
<th>Geographic location</th>
<th>No. of beneficiaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Training of 355 community focal points, RE materials development and distribution, radio broadcasts</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>493,029 (including those reached by mass media)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police EOD teams</td>
<td>RE messages alongside EOD, and through radio and TV</td>
<td>Areas around Borama, Burao, Hargeisa, and Erigavo</td>
<td>56,000 people in 794 communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Direct RE presentations and community liaison</td>
<td>Awdal, Galbeed, Sahil, and Togdheer</td>
<td>7,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Direct RE with EOD in villages and an internally displaced persons (IDP) settlement</td>
<td>Galbeed, Saaxil, Sanaag, Sool, Togdheer, and regions; Hargeisa’s Daani IDP settlement</td>
<td>2,447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

HI’s activities have included RE activities in refugee camps in Djibouti and Ethiopia for people from Somaliland in 2002, and a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) survey conducted in Awdal, Galbeed, and Togdheer. In 2006, HI conducted a second KAP survey and found that knowledge of mines and safe behavior continued to be limited and in some cases had even decreased. After a 10-month hiatus due to lack of funding, HI restarted its RE program in June 2007, again focused on young herders.

### Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown, but is estimated to be 489. SMAC admitted in 2009 that, “Landmine accident survivors receive [a] minimum of assistance.” Survivors suffer from a lack of adequate government support and resources. The LIS showed that only 17% of recent survivors received emergency care and none received physical rehabilitation.

Health facilities in Somaliland are reportedly “so ill-equipped and poorly staffed” that they are often unable to properly care for patients. Regional hospitals do not have surgeons and are unable to provide adequate emergency or continuing care. The Ministry of Health and Labour’s Hargeisa Group Hospital and Borama Regional Hospital, and the Edna Adan Maternity and Teaching Hospital were the only hospitals capable of treating trauma from mine/ERW

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incidents.\textsuperscript{93} However, the Edna Adan Hospital reported it had not treated any mine casualties during the past five years.\textsuperscript{94} Transportation and medical evacuation to hospitals are inadequate.\textsuperscript{95} HALO and DDG are capable of providing first-aid to civilian mine/ERW casualties until they can be evacuated to a proper hospital or medical center.\textsuperscript{96} HALO can provide first-aid to stabilize a casualty until evacuation to a proper hospital or medical center is possible.\textsuperscript{97} The Somaliland police EOD teams were trained in basic first-aid and initial treatment of casualties.\textsuperscript{98} In October 2008, they were given training in “victim rescue and evacuation drills” by EOD technical advisors contributed by the Swiss government, and assisted by the SRSA.\textsuperscript{99} The police EOD teams reported that their supply of medicines was “running short.”\textsuperscript{100}

Rehabilitation services are available at the Norwegian Red Cross/Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) and Disability Action Network (DAN) rehabilitation centers in Hargeisa, but were not easily accessible to survivors living in remote areas. The SRCS center assisted 366 patients with 262 prostheses and 201 orthoses and provided 2,254 patients with physiotherapy.\textsuperscript{101} While psychosocial support is available at some maternal and child health centers in Somaliland, there are few such resources accessible to most mine/ERW survivors.\textsuperscript{102} There were few efforts supporting the economic reintegration of survivors. Disabled former military personnel receive a pension from the government.\textsuperscript{103}

The Somaliland constitution prohibits discrimination and commits the government to assist persons with disabilities who have no one to care for them, but these provisions remained largely unimplemented.\textsuperscript{104} The Somaliland Ministry of Family and Social Development was working towards non-discrimination legislation that includes disability provisions. As of April 2009, it was still awaiting approval.\textsuperscript{105} HI assisted with translation support.\textsuperscript{106}

**Victim assistance activities**

Through its Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD), the ICRC, along with the Norwegian Red Cross, continued to support the SRCS Rehabilitation Center in Hargeisa. The SFD provides technical support and training, while the Norwegian Red Cross funds materials and salaries. The center also has an outreach team that provides free prosthetic and orthotic services to people living in rural areas. In 2008, the SFD provided training in clinical methods for lower-limb orthoses, special prosthetic cases and physiotherapy for lower-limb amputees. The ICRC said, “The quality of services is satisfactory, but access is a problem owing to the scarcity and high price of public transport.”\textsuperscript{107} Moreover, the security situation was a “major constraint” and was cited as a primary reason for the center’s 22% drop in prostheses and orthoses production in comparison with 2007.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{93} Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,108.
\textsuperscript{94} Email from Edna Adan Ismael, Hospital Director, Edna Adan Maternity and Teaching Hospital, 27 February 2009.
\textsuperscript{95} Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{97} Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 24 August 2009.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Farhan Adam Haibe, Executive Director, GAVO, Hargeisa, 8 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{103} Interview with Tammy Orr, UNMAS, Nairobi, 29 June 2009.
\textsuperscript{105} Interview with Abdirahman Mahamed, General Director, Ministry of Family and Social Development, Government of Somaliland, Hargeisa, 8 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{106} Interview with Mohamoud Aqli, Disability Senior Project Officer, HI, Hargeisa, 8 April 2009.
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
DAN continued to run its Hargeisa Rehabilitation Center, and reported that 15 mine survivors came to the center for walking aids, orthopedic shoes, wheelchairs, tricycles, and physiotherapy services. Statistics from the regional units supported by DAN are not yet available. DAN was awarded the 2008 STARS Impact Award for Health, which recognizes excellence in health provision to disadvantaged children. DAN continues to provide rehabilitation services on a cost-sharing basis, with HI support, and user-pay service fees.

The General Assistance and Volunteer Organization (GA VO) has focused on awareness and psychosocial support provision in Berbera and Burao. While mental health provision remains a huge gap, GA VO has recently established mental health centers in Berbera and Hargeisa.

The Abilis Foundation provided several small grants to local disabled people’s organizations in 2008 and 2009, supporting income generation, skills training, and advocacy efforts of the Somaliland National Disability Forum, Sahil Handicap Organization, Voice of Somaliland Minority Women Organization, Somaliland Women and Children with Disabilities, and Alkownin Women Voluntary Organization. In particular, they supported the Somaliland Advocacy Mine Victim Association in providing “employment generation and rights awareness for mine victims empowerment.” No further details were available.

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any long-term comprehensive cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Somaliland. The Mine Action Steering Committee is nominally the mine action authority for Somaliland. Details of resource requirements for Somaliland’s 2006–2010 mine action strategic plan were not available as of June 2009. No funding by Somaliland was reported in 2008, nor in 2007.

International cooperation and assistance

In 2008, three countries reported providing $4,392,941 (€2,983,119) to mine action in Somaliland. No reported funds in 2008 were addressed to VA activities, which remain inadequate.

In addition to the above, HALO reported $655,000 in funding from the United States during 2008. The US did not report funding to Somaliland in 2008.

109 Email from Ali Jama, Managing Director, DAN, 31 March 2009.
111 Email from Ali Jama, DAN, 31 March 2009.
112 Email from Farhan Adam Haibe, GA VO, 30 March 2009.
113 Interview with Farhan Adam Haibe, GA VO, Hargeisa, 8 April 2009.
115 Comparison of funding in 2008 to funding in 2007 is not provided because some funds reported by donors in 2007 as contributions to Somalia were evidently for mine action in Somaliland, which Landmine Monitor calculates separately. Funds reported for 2008 have been differentiated in greater detail. As a result, direct year-to-year comparisons may not be valid.
116 Email from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 24 August 2009.
### 2008 International Mine Action Funding to Somaliland: Monetary\(^\text{117}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Implementing Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Project Details</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>DDG, HALO, UNMAS</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$1,813,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance, RE</td>
<td>$809,930 (€550,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$443,500 (NOK2,500,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$294,520 (€200,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$214,662 (£115,752)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>HALO</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
<td>$138,690 (CHF150,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Unspecified mine action</td>
<td>$123,799 (SEK815,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total $3,838,181 (€2,606,398)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2008 International Mine Action Support to Somaliland: In-Kind\(^\text{118}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Form of In-Kind Support</th>
<th>Monetary Value (where available)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Provision of four demining experts to UNDP</td>
<td>$554,760 (CHF600,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{117}\) Emails from Dimitri Fenger, Humanitarian Aid Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 June 2009; David Keating, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Department of Foreign Affairs, 12 March 2009; Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 June 2009; Sirpa Loikkanen, Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 February 2009; Amy White, Deputy Program Manager, Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department, DfID, 17 March 2009; Rémy Friedmann, Political Division IV, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009; and Amb. Lars-Erik Wingren, Department for Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 31 March 2009.

\(^{118}\) Email from Rémy Friedmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 March 2009.
TAIWAN

2008 Key Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contamination</th>
<th>Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, ERW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated area of contamination</td>
<td>2.9 km$^2$ of mined areas (March 2009, for Kinmen and Matsu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated mine/ERW survivors</td>
<td>Unknown but at least 574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining in 2008</td>
<td>Not reported, but estimated by Landmine Monitor to be 0.6 km$^2$ of mined areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ten-Year Summary

Officials have expressed Taiwan’s support for a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines repeatedly since 1999. In 2001, a Ministry of National Defense spokesperson stated that Taiwan no longer uses antipersonnel mines. In 2002, Taiwan sent 42,175 stockpiled antipersonnel mines to Germany for destruction. In 2006, Taiwan enacted legislation that bans production and trade of antipersonnel mines, but not stockpiling and use; it requires clearance of mined areas within seven years and provides for compensation for future victims.

Taiwan is affected by mines and, to a lesser extent, by explosive remnants of war (ERW). It took its first tentative steps towards demining in 1999, bringing in a foreign clearance operator. In 2006, it scaled up its response, setting up a unit of army engineers to undertake humanitarian demining while continuing to bring in foreign organizations for specific tasks.

Landmine Monitor identified three mine/ERW casualties (two killed and one injured) in Taiwan between 1999 and 2008. Only very limited risk education has been provided by the Division of Army Engineers since 2007. Taiwanese mine survivors and persons with disabilities receive free medical care in one of the best healthcare systems in the region. Taiwanese law protects persons with disabilities’ rights, access to services and employment opportunities.

Mine Ban Policy

Due to its international status, Taiwan cannot accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Legislative Yuan (the national legislature) passed the Antipersonnel Landmines Regulations Act on 25 May 2006 and it came into effect on 14 June 2006. The legislation falls short of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines. It prohibits production and trade of antipersonnel landmines, sets a deadline for clearance of existing minefields, and provides for compensation for future victims. However, it permits stockpiling, as well as the use of antipersonnel mines “when it is imperative during war.”

The government inaugurated in 2008 has not taken any further action to unilaterally ban antipersonnel mines.

Production, transfer, use, and stockpiling

Production and transfer of antipersonnel mines are prohibited under the 2006 Antipersonnel Landmines Regulations Act. Taiwan has stated that it stopped production of antipersonnel mines in 1982. It is not known to have ever exported mines.

In 2001, a Ministry of National Defense spokesperson stated that Taiwan no longer uses antipersonnel mines, although in 2004 the ministry acknowledged that some of the minefields on the offshore islands have been maintained due to the military threat from China.\(^3\) Taiwan has committed to the removal of these minefields in seven years as required by the 2006 Antipersonnel Landmines Regulations Act.

Taiwan has never provided details on the size or composition of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines.\(^4\)

**Scope of the Problem**

**Contamination**

Taiwan is affected by mines and, to a lesser extent, by ERW. Taiwan laid landmines during the 1950s on its two largest offshore islands, Kinmen and Matsu (Lian Jiang county), as well as on a number of smaller uninhabited islands, because of their proximity to China. The islands also have some UXO left from conflicts dating back to World War II or even before, some of it too old to identify, as well as from military training.\(^5\)

The Ministry of National Defense stated in March 2004 that some of the minefields on Dong Yin, Kinmen, and Matsu islands would be “gradually” cleared once alternative weapons became available.\(^6\) In May 2006, a senior Ministry of National Defense official told Landmine Monitor there were “more than 200” minefields on the offshore islands.\(^7\)

Kinmen county (a group of islands) is the most heavily mined region. The county government has reported that 80% of Kinmen’s coastlines are mined and that the army had emplaced large numbers of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines on surrounding islands, including Dadan, Erdan, and Lieyu (Little Kinmen).\(^8\)

Official estimates of contamination on Kinmen Island have varied widely. In June 2008, the Ministry of National Defense announced that it had identified 154 minefields covering approximately 3.4km\(^2\) in Kinmen county and 154 minefields covering approximately 0.4km\(^2\) in Matsu.\(^9\) In March 2009, following mine clearance operations, the army claimed that Kinmen had 131 recorded minefields covering 2.6km\(^2\), containing an estimated 50,000 or more mines. The army said Matsu had 128 recorded minefields, covering 0.3km\(^2\), and containing an estimated 20,000 or more mines.\(^10\) In 2005, a Ministry of National Defense official claimed that all mine-affected areas were marked, fenced, and inspected weekly,\(^11\) but this has been disputed by local residents.\(^12\)

On 29 October 2008, a forest fire on the island of Silu (part of the Matsu group of islands) triggered several mine explosions, but no casualties occurred.\(^13\)

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\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2004*, p. 1,238, for known details on Taiwan’s production, stockpiling, and destruction of antipersonnel mines. In 2002, Taiwan sent 42,175 stockpiled antipersonnel mines to Germany for destruction.

\(^5\) Telephone interview with Maj. Lee Jhong-Fa, Division of Army Engineers, 5 August 2009.


\(^10\) Fax from Maj. Lee Jhong-Fa, Division of Army Engineers, 23 March 2009.


\(^12\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*, p. 1,191.

Casualties
In 2008 and 2009, as of March, neither media nor official sources reported any new mine/ERW
casualties in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{14} The last reported casualties, and the only ones identified by Landmine
Monitor since 1999, occurred in 2005 when two Zimbabwean deminers were killed and one was
injured.\textsuperscript{15} Taiwan does not have a mine/ERW casualty data collection mechanism but at least
574 mine survivors made successful compensation claims to the Ministry of National Defense
between 1999 and 2008.\textsuperscript{16}

As of 2008, about one million persons with disabilities had been identified in Taiwan, 5,050
of whom lived in the mine-affected county of Kinmen, and 361 in Matsu.\textsuperscript{17}

Program Management and Coordination

Mine action
Until 2006, Taiwan had no formal mine action program and the Ministry of National Defense
had responsibility for demining policy.\textsuperscript{18} A ministry official stated in 2005 that the military
did not have the capacity to handle Taiwan’s mine problems and that it contracted foreign
organizations for demining.\textsuperscript{19}

Regulations published by the Ministry of National Defense in January 2008 state that the
ministry itself is the national mine action authority responsible for setting policy while the army
is responsible for implementing it. The government reportedly considered setting up a national
mine action center in 2006 but, after analyzing the scope of the mine problem in Taiwan, the
Ministry of National Defense rejected the plan.\textsuperscript{20}

Plans
Strategic mine action plan
The army has not published a demining plan but in 2006 said it would complete clearance of
all mined areas within five years, two years earlier than required by legislation.\textsuperscript{21} Under the
Regulations on Eradication of Antipersonnel Landmines in Minefields issued under the 2006
Act and published in 2008, the Ministry of National Defense must give top demining priority
to land needed for development, followed by regions that are not militarily sensitive. The last
areas to be demined will be “military surveillance regions” where the ministry considers Taiwan
needs alternative forms of defense.\textsuperscript{22}

On Kinmen Island, the Kinmen county government is responsible for coordinating local
demining priorities. In January 2006, at the request of the Ministry of National Defense, the
county government gave the Kinmen Defense Command a list of 35 minefields that it identified
as priority for clearance.\textsuperscript{23} The county government submitted another letter identifying clearance
priorities to the Kinmen Defense Command on 30 April 2007. The county government convenes

\textsuperscript{14} Fax from Maj. Lee Jhong-Fa, Division of Army Engineers, 23 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{15} See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 1193.
\textsuperscript{16} Meeting Minutes of the Ninth Foreign and National Defense Committee Meeting on 2009 Central Government
General Budget Examination, the Second Session of the Seventh Legislative Yuan, “Interpellation of Legislator
Chen Fu-Hai,” The Legislative Yuan, 19 November 2008.
\textsuperscript{17} Ministry of the Interior, “The Physically and Mentally Disabled Population by Age and Grade,” Statistical
\textsuperscript{20} Interview with Section Chief Chen Huang-chen, Division of Army Engineers, Kinmen, 1 May 2008.
\textsuperscript{21} Ministry of National Defense, “The ROC Army Corps of Engineers has a great success in its first attempt to
\textsuperscript{22} Ministry of Justice, “Regulations on Eradication of Anti-personnel Landmines in Minefields,” 18 January 2008,
\textsuperscript{23} Kinmen County Government, “The County Government proposed 35 priority clearance areas,” 17 January
coordination meetings with concerned parties when it considers them necessary, and contacts the Kinmen Defense Command on changes to clearance priorities.24

In May 2008, the Ministry of National Defense told Landmine Monitor that from 2007 to 2009, the ministry had allocated NTD509.4 million (US$16.1 million) for foreign organizations to demine 12 minefields on Kinmen and 14 minefields on Matsu, and NTD373.87 million ($11.9 million) for army demining, including costs of covering technical service, insurance, and purchase of demining equipment. From 2010 to 2013, the ministry plans to allocate NTD340 million ($10.8 million) to contract foreign agencies and support the army’s demining program to clean up the rest of the minefields in Kinmen and Matsu.25 In March 2009, the ministry confirmed the amount allocated for demining by the Army Demining Division (ADD) and foreign organizations in 2007–2009 but said it planned to allocate about NTD1.8 billion ($57 million) to demine both Kinmen and Matsu from 2010 to 2013.26

Local ownership
Commitment to mine action
Taiwan’s military has committed to completing mine clearance by 2011 and is required to report annually to parliament on demining progress.

Mine action legislation
Taiwan’s Antipersonnel Landmines Regulations Act, which came into effect on 14 June 2006, requires the Ministry of National Defense to disclose the location of all minefields and to complete clearance of all mines within seven years.27 The ministry must submit annual reports to the legislature on the progress of demining; if demining is not completed within seven years, it may apply to the legislature for an extension. The law requires the government to compensate military personnel or civilians injured due to “negligence” during demining operations.28

Under the Regulations on Eradication of Antipersonnel Landmines in Minefields, issued under the 2006 Act, the Ministry of National Defense is responsible for setting policy, approving programs and annual plans, and for monitoring the safety and environmental impact of demining. The army is responsible for preparing mine action plans, arranging funding, calling for tenders, and coordinating, implementing, and reviewing operations.29

Mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
Taiwan has not adopted national mine action standards. Lieutenant-General Yang Tien-Hsiao, Commander of the Kinmen Defense Command, has said that army demining meets the latest version of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), and that the army would follow standing operating procedures for UXO clearance.30 The regulations require mines to be destroyed in situ unless they pose a threat to the public or the environment, in which case mines should be transported to a location agreed by the army and local government. Movement and destruction of landmines have to be announced publicly seven days in advance.31

The Army Demining Division on Kinmen Island released the third edition of its Manual for Humanitarian Demining Techniques in May 2008. The manual, which was developed for internal use, was revised to take account of the ADD’s field experience. It contains its standing operating procedures for demining, which are said to be based on IMAS, complemented by

24 Fax from Lt.-Col. Wang Jhih-Hong, Ministry of National Defense, 4 May 2008; and interview with Shen Shao-ming, Section Chief of Military Service Section, Civil Affairs Bureau, Kinmen County Government, Kinmen, 2 May 2008.
26 Fax from Maj. Lee Jhong-Fa, Division of Army Engineers, 23 March 2009.
comments of foreign advisors from Mechem, Explomo Technical Service Pte. Ltd. of Singapore, and the Cambodian Mine Action Center.32

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Until the ADD’s creation in mid-2006, only sporadic demining had occurred on Kinmen, conducted by Specialist Gurkha Services (1998–1999) and MineTech International in 2004–2005.33

As of March 2009, the ADD had 120 staff, recruited from the army’s Corps of Engineers and its Military Academy, including deminers, team leaders, and administrative officers. The ADD works on Kinmen Island, Lieyu (Little Kinmen), Dadan, and Erdan undertaking manual and mechanical demining, using mine-protected vehicles to dig to a depth of about three meters and to filter soil. The army said operations are externally quality-assured but did not identify by whom.34

Explomo Technical Services Pte. Ltd. replaced MineTech under contract to Kinmen Water Company in July 2006 and as of May 2008 still had some 80 deminers on Kinmen. Explomo also acted as technical advisors to ADD under a contract with the Ministry of National Defense valid until the end of 2009.35

Korean Mine Action Group (KMAG), a commercial company, was contracted in 2007 to undertake demining on Matsu, which has more challenging terrain. It started demining on Beigan Island36 in October 2007 and completed clearance there in July 2009.37

Demining in 2008

On Kinmen, from May 2008 to March 2009, the ADD cleared 13 minefields covering 144,004m², with the destruction of 3,063 antipersonnel mines, 1,910 antivehicle mines, and 877 items of UXO.38

Explomo cleared six minefields on Kinmen in 2008 covering 446,084m², removing 3,697 antipersonnel mines, 277 antivehicle mines, and 269 items of UXO.39 In 2009, to 3 August, Explomo cleared another six minefields on Kinmen covering 208,136m², removing 6,524 antipersonnel mines, 688 antivehicle mines, and 614 items of UXO.40

KMAG cleared 13 minefields on Matsu’s Beigan Island in the first phase of demining operations between October 2007 and January 2008;41 it cleared another 12 minefields in the second stage between October 2008 and January 2009.42 The next demining operation began in April 2009 and concluded in July, completing clearance of all the mines in Beigan.43

32 Interview with Col. Gwu Jean-Gen, Chief, ADD, Kinmen, 1 May 2008.
34 Fax from Maj. Lee Jhong-Fa, Division of Army Engineers, 23 March 2009.
36 Matsu archipelago has four townships and five islands; Beigan is one of the towns and the second largest island.
39 Ibid.
40 Telephone interview with Maj. Lee Jhong-Fa, Division of Army Engineers, 4 August 2009.
43 Fax from Maj. Lee Jhong-Fa, Division of Army Engineers, 23 March 2009, and telephone interviews, 25 March and 4 August 2009.
Risk Education

In 2007–2009, the Division of Army Engineers organized public events through the Kinmen county government and the Lienchiang county government (Matsu), and used local media to inform communities about its clearance activities and the risk of mines. The military also continued to improve fencing and marking of Kinmen minefields.44

In 2008 and through March 2009, the Eden Social Welfare Foundation organized a workshop for 50 students at National Chengchi University and delivered five presentations for 80 junior high school students, 20 university students, and 70 church members to raise awareness about landmines and UXO.45

The only other risk education activities were reported in 2007, when the Ministry of National Defense stated that troops stationed on the offshore islands are informed about risk education. It also stated that the military mails relevant information to local governments and requires them to inform local residents. The military also reinforced surveillance and marking of minefields.46

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is not known but is at least 574.47 Taiwanese mine survivors and persons with disabilities received free medical care in one of the best healthcare systems in the region.48 Yet there have been concerns that the system is inadequately funded and staffed.49

From 1999 until 30 November 2007, civilian mine survivors could apply for financial compensation under the Regulations on Compensation for Damage to the Public from Military Activities.50 At the end of 2008, 574 applications had been approved, although Chen Fu-Hai, legislator from Kinmen county, urged the Ministry of National Defense to accelerate approval processes.51 Until 2008, 59 civilian mine survivors in Kinmen and 49 in Matsu had received financial compensation, totaling NTD129,950,000 ($4,119,415).52

Mine survivors or their families can also receive compensation under the Antipersonnel Landmines Regulations Act of 2006. The Ministry of National Defense published the procedures to apply for compensation under this act on 16 August 2007. Survivors can receive between NTD50,000 ($1,585) and NTD1 million ($31,700), depending on the level of disability. The deceased’s legal heir can receive NTD150 million ($4.8 million). Those who have already been compensated for the same cause by another scheme are not eligible. A review committee of local officials, scholars, and other people invited by the Ministry of National Defense was to be set up.

44 Interview with Maj. Lee Jhong-Fa, Division of Army Engineers, 24 March 2009; and see Landmine Monitor 2008 p. 1,114.
52 Interview with Mr. Hung, Committee on Compensation for Damage to the Public from Military Activities, Ministry of National Defense, Taipei, 25 March 2009.
to examine the applications. Within certain restrictions, persons with disabilities are eligible for a labor insurance disability pension or lump-sum payment in Taiwan.

In February 2008, Kinmen county was selected as one of the three most accessible counties for persons with disabilities. The county grants persons with disabilities a monthly allowance of between NTD2,000 ($63) and NTD3,500 ($111), depending on the level of disability. In 2009, in order to enable persons with disabilities and economically disadvantaged families to receive necessary medical care on Taiwan island, the Kinmen County Assembly passed the "Measures of Airfare Compensation for Minority Groups in Kinmen County" to subsidize the costs of transportation.

In Matsu, persons with disabilities with proper identification can receive a monthly allowance of between NTD3,500 ($111) and NTD4,000 ($127), as well as grants for assistive technologies and a preferential price for transportation. The Lienchiang County Association for Persons with Disabilities was founded in 2005, and is the first and only NGO for persons with disabilities in Matsu.

With the entry into force of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 3 May 2008, the Eden Social Welfare Foundation and the League of Welfare Organizations for the Disabled Taiwan organized the "Proud to be Myself, Citizen Rights of Persons with Disabilities International Conference" on 8 and 9 December 2008. The two organizations announced during the conference a Declaration on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of Taiwan, proposed by persons with disabilities. President Ma Ying-Jeou promised to put the declaration into action.

The Eden Social Welfare Foundation also provides assistive technologies to persons with disabilities around the world. It has donated 10,713 wheelchairs valued more than NTD85 million ($2.69 million). In 2008, Eden donated 815 wheelchairs valued at NTD2,526,500 ($74,815) to China, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam. It also donated 150 crutches and 10 white canes valued at NTD79,200 ($2,511) to the Philippines.

The Taiwanese constitution and the (Physically and Mentally) Disabled Citizens Protection Act protect access to services and the rights of persons with disabilities. The latter was amended in 2007 to specify the rights and interests of persons with disabilities in healthcare, education, employment, economic security, and support and protection services. Private businesses with more than 100 employees must have persons with disabilities make up at least 1% of its workforce. As of July 2009, at least 3% of the workforce of all public entities (including offices, schools, and enterprises) with 34 or more employees must be persons with disabilities. All new public buildings must be accessible.

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56 Interview with Hsu Mei-Feng, Chief of Bureau of Social Affairs, Kinmen County Government, Kinmen, 2 May 2008.


Due to its international status, Taiwan cannot adhere to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

**Support for Mine Action**

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive cost estimates for fulfilling mine action needs in Taiwan. Partial cost estimates and multi-year allocations of funds have been reported in the past, but no new estimates have been provided based on mine clearance completed during recent years. In October 2008, media sources reported a cost estimate of roughly NTD5.8 billion ($183.9 million) for mine action operators to complete demining on Kinmen, based on comments by the head of Taiwan’s military demining unit.

In December 2007, the Ministry of National Defense reported allocations for demining by international operators of NTD168 million ($5.1 million) for 2007, NTD184.62 million for 2008 ($5.9 million), and NTD122.28 million ($3.9 million) for 2009. In addition, the ministry said allocations for demining by the ADD were NTD46.65 million ($1.4 million) for 2007, NTD269.2 million ($8.5 million) for 2008, and NTD 120.5 million ($3.8 million) for 2009. National allocations for 2008 would thus total NTD453.82 million ($14.4 million). Actual disbursements for 2008 had not been confirmed as of June 2009. In May 2008, however, the Ministry of National Defense reported to Landmine Monitor that from 2007 to 2009, the ministry had allocated NTD509.4 million ($16.1 million) for demining by international operators on Kinmen and Matsu, and NTD373.87 million ($11.9 million) for army demining.

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WESTERN SAHARA

Ten-Year Summary

Both the Polisario Front and Moroccan forces used antipersonnel mines until the 1991 UN-monitored cease-fire. In 1999, a Polisario representative stated that it would join the Mine Ban Treaty if eligible to do so. In November 2005, Polisario proclaimed a ban on antipersonnel mines by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment. Polisario has been destroying its stockpile of antipersonnel mines since 2006. Western Sahara is contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW). A 2008 survey by Landmine Action identified considerable contamination, particularly from unexploded submunitions and mines. Landmine Action initiated battle area clearance operations in 2008.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 151 mine/ERW casualties in Western Sahara (44 people killed, 102 injured, and five unknown) with most casualties reported in 2006–2008. Casualty data collection improved over the past decade, but was incomplete and the number of casualties was probably under-reported. Intensive risk education was carried out from 1998–2000. After this, efforts were limited and mostly carried out by volunteers in programs that lacked the funding necessary for adequate dissemination of risk messages.

Victim assistance efforts have been limited throughout the past decade. Emergency transport remained inadequate and many mine/ERW survivors died before reaching assistance. Medical facilities in refugee camps lacked adequately trained staff and resources. Rehabilitation and prosthetics improved in 2008, with the start of an ICRC-supported program. Despite some assistance, there was an acute lack of economic opportunities for survivors and psychological support in refugee camps.

Mine Ban Policy

The sovereignty of Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Rio de Oro). Polisario’s Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is a member of the African Union, but is not universally recognized. It has no official representation in the UN, which prevents formal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Polisario officials have, since 1999, stated that they would adhere to the Mine Ban Treaty if permitted to do so.

On 3 November 2005, Polisario Minister of Defense, Mohamed Lamine Buhali, committed Polisario unilaterally to a ban on antipersonnel mines through the Deed of Commitment administered by the NGO Geneva Call. The Deed pledges Polisario to a ban on use, production, transfer and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, and to cooperation in mine action.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Both Polisario and the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces used mines extensively until the 1991 UN-monitored cease-fire. In the past decade, Morocco and Polisario have periodically traded accusations of new mine use, but both have denied it. In October 2008, Moroccan officials told a visiting ICBL delegation that Polisario rebels are still laying mines, but no concrete evidence has been presented. In May 2009, however, Morocco told Landmine Monitor that it did not have any information about Polisario mine use in 2007 or 2008.

Polisario is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Polisario officials claim they acquired antipersonnel mines in the past by lifting them from Moroccan minefields, especially those around the berms (defensive earthen walls about three meters high). Based on mines destroyed in 2006, 2007, and 2008, Polisario stocks have included antipersonnel mines of Belgian, Chinese, German, Israeli, Italian, Portuguese, Romanian, Soviet, United Kingdom, and Yugoslav manufacture.

Polisario has not revealed the total number of antipersonnel mines it possesses. In 2002, Polisario told Landmine Monitor that it no longer had a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, except for 1,606 disarmed mines on display in a military museum. In January 2006, however, Polisario’s Chief Engineer told Landmine Monitor that its stockpile consisted of more than 10,000 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

Polisario has undertaken three public destructions of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, pursuant to the Deed of Commitment. It destroyed a combined total of 8,637 antipersonnel mines in February 2006 (3,316 mines), February 2007 (3,321 mines), and May 2008 (2,000 mines). Landmine Monitor had previously reported that the 2006 and 2007 destruction events included 284 antivehicle mines. Geneva Call, which requested clarification from Polisario, was told that the destroyed mines were MK1 antipersonnel mines, not K1 antivehicle mines.

Scope of the Problem

Contamination

Western Sahara is contaminated with mines and ERW, especially cluster munition remnants and other UXO, although the precise extent of contamination is not known. More than 2,000km of berms were built during conflict in the 1980s, and remained after the 1991 cease-fire between Morocco and Polisario. Moroccan troops emplaced antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in and around the berms. Landmine Action has claimed that Western Sahara is “one of the most heavily mined territories in the world.”

Landmine Action deployed to Western Sahara in 2006 and trained local operators to conduct a survey of dangerous areas and items. The survey, which concluded at the end of 2008, identified 154 cluster munition strike sites, 40 mined areas, one ammunition storage area, and 486 individual items requiring spot clearance. It found that contamination is concentrated around water holes, traditional settlement sites, and transport routes and determined that unexploded submunitions pose the greatest threat to people and animals. Landmine Action believes that further survey is required in the 5km buffer zone leading to the berms.
Casualties
Casualty data is hard to obtain. From reports received, Landmine Monitor identified 26 casualties (nine killed, 16 injured, and one unknown) in Western Sahara in 2008, resulting from 16 mine/ERW/cluster munition incidents. Casualties included 12 adults (11 men, one of unknown gender), four children (three boys and one girl) and 10 casualties of unknown age (at least three of whom were male, the gender of the rest was unknown). Antivehicle mines caused 10 casualties, antipersonnel mines four, submunitions four, and unknown devices eight. Seven casualties occurred in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara (one killed and six injured) and 19 casualties occurred in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara (eight killed, 10 injured, and one unknown). The most common activities at the time of the incident were travel (seven), herding/tending livestock (six), and playing (three). The activities of the other casualties at the time of the incident were not known.

Morocco reported 11 mine/ERW casualties (three killed and eight injured) in an annex to its voluntary Article 7 report for calendar year 2008, in mine-affected provinces of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. Mauritania’s National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD) reported that two men from Mauritania, both nomadic herders, became casualties in a mine incident in Western Sahara in 2008. It was not noted if they were killed or injured. It is not clear if these casualties overlap with those identified by Landmine Monitor in 2008.

The 26 casualties identified in 2008 represent a decrease from the 36 mine/ERW casualties in 18 incidents identified in Western Sahara in 2007 (12 killed and 24 injured). However, reporting for 2008 is not thought to be comprehensive. In 2007, seven casualties also occurred in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara (three killed and four injured) and 29 in were reported in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara (nine killed and 20 injured).

Casualties continued to occur in 2009, with 22 reported as of 10 August. One person was killed and 21 injured in nine mine/ERW incidents, include one citizen of Mauritania. Eight casualties occurred in Polisario-controlled Western Sahara (all were injured) and 14 were reported in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara (one killed and 13 injured). Six casualties were caused by antipersonnel mines, 11 by antivehicle mines, four by unknown mine types, and one by ERW. This number includes five people injured while crossing a mined area of the berm during a protest, some 70km from the Saharawi refugee camps.

In 2009, PNDHD reported two Mauritanian casualties, both nomadic men in two separate incidents in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. One incident was caused by an antipersonnel mine and the other by an antivehicle mine. Both casualties died while being transported to Mauritania for emergency medical assistance. There was insufficient detail to ascertain if these casualties were included in other reporting for Western Sahara.

Between 1999 and 2008, Landmine Monitor identified 151 mine/ERW casualties in Western Sahara (44 people killed, 102 injured, and five unknown). The majority, 86 casualties, were reported in the period from 2006–2008. This was most likely due to improved casualty data collection in recent years. The total probably under-represents the actual number of casualties during the period.

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14 Email from Tammy Hall, Senior Technical Advisor for Mine Action, MINURSO/MACC 29 June 2009; email from James Mbogo, IMSMA Officer, MINURSO/MACC, 19 August 2009; and email from Penelope Caswell, GIS Officer, Landmine Action, 16 July 2009.


17 Email from James Mbogo, MINURSO/MACC, 19 August 2009; and email from Penelope Caswell, Landmine Action, 16 July 2009.


total number of mine/ERW casualties in Western Sahara is not known and many incidents may not be recorded; estimates of the number of casualties since 1975 range up to some 2,500 people.\(^{21}\) According to official Polisario estimates found in the ICRC annual report there were some 450 mine/ERW survivors from Western Sahara among the refugee population living in camps in Algeria.\(^{22}\) A Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) assessment in the Tindouf refugee camps in 2000 identified 320 landmine survivor amputees. The Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines (SCBL) registered 345 mine/ERW survivors from the refugee camps. The Moroccan Association of Mine Victims in Smara reported that in 2007 at least 100 mine survivors were living in Smara, in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.

**Risk profile**

Based on casualty and survey data the people most at risk of mine/ERW incidents are nomads with their herds, children playing, and people driving cars or riding camels. Mine/ERW contamination is concentrated around water holes, traditional settlement sites, and transport routes.\(^{23}\)

**Program Management and Coordination**

The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) has established a mine action coordination center (MACC), which was upgraded from a mine action “cell” in February 2008. Western Sahara does not have official victim assistance or risk education coordination.

**Data collection and management**

The MACC began to collect mine/ERW casualty data in 2008, and data collection continued to improve in 2008–2009, though under-reporting likely continued.\(^{24}\) Due to the lack of facilities—including hospitals—in Western Sahara, incidents in remote areas often go unreported. In addition, people who are injured by mines/ERW close to the vicinity of the buffer zone often do not seek medical assistance, due to the political situation.\(^{25}\) As a result many of them unnecessarily die from their injuries.

As of June 2009, the MACC was not yet entering casualty data into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). IMSMA was being adjusted to accept casualty data for 2009.\(^{26}\) In October 2008, the MACC installed IMSMA at the Landmine Action office in Tifariti and provided training to both local and UK-based staff. The format of casualty data collection forms was finalized and they were being used by Landmine Action for entry of current incidents into IMSMA. No retrospective entry of casualty data had taken place as of August 2009. Landmine Action planned to work with the Chehid Cherif Landmine and War Victims Centre in Rabouni to verify casualty data at the center and enter it into IMSMA.\(^{27}\)

The Collective of Saharawi Human Rights Defenders El-Aaiun Western Sahara (Collectif des défenseurs saharaouis des droits de l’homme El-Aaiun Sahara Occidental, CODESA) occasionally identified casualties reported in the media, but did not systematically report on casualties in 2008. In 2008, CODESA continued to operate informally, but a lack of legal status hindered its activities.\(^{28}\) The SCBL did not provide casualty data to Landmine Monitor for 2008–2009.

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\(^{23}\) Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 20 February 2009; and see *Landmine Monitor Report 2008*, p. 1,123.

\(^{24}\) Telephone interview with Tammy Hall, MINURSO/MACC, 29 June 2009.

\(^{25}\) Email from Penelope Caswell, Landmine Action, 16 July 2009.

\(^{26}\) Telephone interview with Tammy Hall, MINURSO/MACC, 29 June 2009.

\(^{27}\) Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 20 February 2009; and telephone interview with Penelope Caswell, Landmine Action, 19 August 2009.

Mine action program operators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National operators and activities</th>
<th>Demining</th>
<th>Risk education</th>
<th>Casualty data collection</th>
<th>Victim assistance</th>
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<td>Moroccan Red Crescent Society</td>
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<th>Victim assistance</th>
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<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Plans

Strategic mine action plans
A strategic mine action plan is in place, and as of June 2009, an operational plan for MACC had been completed as well.²⁹

Integration of mine action with reconstruction and development
From 2008–2009, Landmine Action conducted an assessment of how development could be supported in areas cleared of contamination by its clearance teams. The assessment identified the need to increase food security for semi-nomadic populations in the northern sector where water supplies are intermittent. Goat herders are said to be most affected by lack of water and take risks by entering known contaminated areas to reach water. Some have initiated their own agricultural schemes which face suspension in the dry season when water is insufficient and herders are forced to return to the refugee camps. A proposed project would build on current entrepreneurial efforts to facilitate access to water for herders, to be launched in areas where Landmine Action has cleared farmland.³⁰

Local ownership
Commitment to mine action and victim assistance
In early 1999, Morocco and Polisario signed bilateral military agreements in which both parties agreed to cooperate with MINURSO in the exchange of mine-related information, marking of mined areas, and the clearance and destruction of mines and UXO in the presence of MINURSO observers. These agreements do not cover minefields along the berm and minefields that Morocco regards as an integral part of its defenses.³¹

Mine action standards/Standing operating procedures
Landmine Action uses its own standing operating procedures and works in accordance with Memorandum of Understandings it signed with MINURSO and Polisario.³²

Demining and Battle Area Clearance

Landmine Action was the only international demining operator in Western Sahara in 2008. It conducted only battle area clearance (BAC) and explosive ordnance disposal in 2008, but was seeking funding in 2009 to equip and train teams to conduct mine clearance.³³

²⁹ Email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO/MACC, 9 September 2009.
³⁰ Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 20 February 2009.
³² Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 19 June 2008.
Battle area clearance in 2008
In January 2008, while its survey was ongoing, Landmine Action began clearance operations. In June 2008, it completed clearance of the village of Budib and conducted its first community handover to the local population. Results of Landmine Action BAC in 2008 are summarized below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BAC in 2008*</th>
<th>Surface BAC (m²)</th>
<th>Sub-surface BAC (m²)</th>
<th>Unexploded submunitions destroyed</th>
<th>Other UXO destroyed</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines destroyed</th>
<th>Antivehicle mines destroyed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,911,138</td>
<td>32,201</td>
<td>548</td>
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</table>

* Visual inspection

Risk Education
Moroccan authorities continued to report mine/ERW risk education (RE) in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara in 2008—to 12,600 herders and nomads in 12 provinces. MINURSO provided improved safety training for UN staff. No activities were identified in the Polisario-controlled part of Western Sahara.

RE was provided by the Moroccan Army, local authorities and representatives from rural communes, provincial health authorities, the provincial offices of the Moroccan Red Crescent Society, the Disabled Persons Support Association (Association d’Appui aux Personnes Handicapées), and the Moroccan Association of Mine Victims in 2008.

The Moroccan Army and its Royal Moroccan Gendarmerie (state police under the military) conducted an RE campaign which included marking with warning signs, providing information to locals regarding forthcoming large-scale demining operations, and informing local people when the land had been cleared. An annual RE campaign is conducted through public outreach including conferences, media, pamphlets, and school visits to reach people likely to enter mine-affected areas. Local volunteers were trained to disseminate RE. There was no permanent capacity to implement RE and authorities had to continuously retrain RE volunteers.

A number of organizations have reported providing RE in past years, including, the Moroccan Association of Mine Victims (based in Smara) in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara in 2007, Landmine Action from 2006–2007, and the Saharawi Campaign to Ban Landmines from 2005–2007. From April 1998 to May 2000, NPA implemented a large-scale RE program for approximately 100,000 refugees in Western Sahara.

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35 Email from Melissa Fuerth, Landmine Action, 20 February 2009.
38 Telephone interview with Tammy Hall, MINURSO/MACC, 29 June 2009; email from Gaici Nah Bachir, Association of Saharawi Victims of Mines (ASAVIM), 24 March 2009.
Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors is unknown; reporting has indicated that there are 450 survivors in the Rabouni refugee camps near Tindouf in southwestern Algeria and at least another 100 in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. Due to a lack of comprehensive data, these are likely significant underestimates.  

People involved in mine/ERW incidents in remote areas continued to die from their wounds in the long periods before receiving medical attention. There are no ambulances and survivors have to wait for a passing vehicle to take them to the nearest health facility, which may be hours away. MINURSO increased its emergency response capacity for UN personnel working in contaminated areas in Polisario-controlled areas. On the Moroccan side of the berm, there are medical facilities in the towns of Dakhla, La’Youn, Ousserd, and Smara. Some survivors were also treated in nearby towns in Morocco.

Persons with disabilities are among the most vulnerable in the Saharawi refugee camps in Algeria. A continuing lack of adequate medical care and the absence of understanding about disability issues increased the vulnerability and distress of disabled refugees in the camps.

The Polisario authorities offer basic free healthcare for all Saharawis in each of the four refugee camps near Tindouf. The refugee camps’ health system consists of “regional hospitals” in camps and a referral hospital in Rabouni as well as a psychiatric hospital. Medical issues that cannot be treated in the camps are referred to nearby Tindouf, or more distant facilities if necessary. Medical facilities in the camps lacked resources, and services were dependent on international aid for medicines and materials. There was a lack of continuity of medical staff because qualified doctors and nurses work on a volunteer basis. Inadequate coordination between donors and humanitarian agencies contributing to the health system in the camps was reported in 2009.

The Chedid Cherif Landmine and War Victims Centre in the Rabouni refugee camp continued to provide rehabilitation and socio-economic assistance to mine/ERW survivors, but faced challenges in providing services due to a lack of resources.

In May 2008, the ICRC officially started producing and fitting prosthetic and orthotic appliances at the physical rehabilitation center established in the Chedid Cherif Landmine and War Victims Centre in 2007. ICRC services were directed to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities. The new center can produce 80–100 prostheses annually, as well as producing other mobility devices and providing physiotherapy. The ICRC began training nine locally-hired staff, five prosthetic-orthotic technicians, and four medical doctors.

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43 Email from Gaici Nah Bachir, ASAVIM, 15 August 2009; and Landmine Monitor analysis of casualty data provided by email from Tammy Hall, MINURSO/MACC, 29 June 2009.


47 See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,125. The Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria have identical names to these towns in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara, which may sometimes cause confusion as to the location of medical facilities.


49 Email from Gaici Nah Bachir, ASAVIM, 15 August 2009.

physiotherapists to build the capacity and sustainability of the center, and provided management support. In 2008, 50 people benefited from services at the center, 18 receiving prostheses (94% of them for mine survivors). Other mobility devices were also produced and most beneficiaries received physiotherapy. An improvement in the manufacture of prostheses was noted following the increased ICRC support.

There is pervasive unemployment in the refugee camps. Mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities are among the worst affected. There was no suitable work and most remained permanently unemployed. Polisario authorities and partner organizations in the camps have reportedly made significant efforts to assist persons with disabilities in economic reintegration, through income-generating schemes including small shops and a bakery. In 2008, the NGO Triangle Génération Humanitaire (TGH) continued to provide economic reintegration assistance to the elderly and to persons with disabilities through centers in the four refugee camps. For 2008, TGH project staff were not aware of any direct program beneficiaries who were mine/ERW survivors. Schools for children with disabilities, including physical disabilities, are run by Polisario in all of the Saharawi refugee camps. Psychological support for those in the refugee camps is inadequate and the mental health needs of refugees are not systematically addressed.

Morocco has reported that that the military makes land and air facilities available to transfer mine/ERW survivors to the nearest hospital, where they can receive medical care free of charge. Hospitals near mine-affected areas had their capacity increased in 2008. Other accounts from mine survivors’ organizations have reported that mine/ERW survivors injured in areas of Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara need to pay for their own emergency transportation and medical costs at hospitals in both Western Sahara and Morocco. An orthopedic center, including a prosthetics workshop and services for mine/ERW survivors, is connected to the in El Hassan hospital, La’Youn, in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara. The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) had planned to provide assistance to the orthopedic center in La’Youn in 2008, but the plan was delayed due to “procedural obstacles.”

Support for Mine Action

In 2008, Spain reported contributing US$294,520 (€200,000) to mine action in Western Sahara, for unspecified mine action via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance. Reported mine action funding in 2008 was 67% less than reported in 2007. No international funding reported to Landmine Monitor since 2000 has specifically addressed VA needs in Western Sahara. Landmine Action reported overall support for its programming in Western Sahara from Germany and Norway, as well as from UNMAS and the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund.

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53 Email from Gaici Nah Bachir, ASAVIM, 15 August 2009.
54 Ibid.
56 Email from Anne Trehondart, Project Manager, TGH, 7 April 2009.
60 Email from Gaici Nah Bachir, ASAVIM, 15 August 2009; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 1,125.
63 Spain Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2009.
CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

Preamble

The States Parties,

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

**Article 1**

**General obligations**

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a. To use anti-personnel mines;
   b. To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
   c. To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

**Article 2**

**Definitions**

1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.
Article 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a. The duration of the proposed extension;
   b. A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      i. The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
      ii. The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      iii. Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c. The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d. Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
   a. The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem
   b. The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
   c. The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
   d. Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
   e. Assistance to mine victims;
   f. The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.
Article 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
   a. The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
   b. The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
   c. To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
   d. The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
   e. The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
   f. The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   g. The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
   h. The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
   i. The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

Article 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfillment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
   a. The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
   b. The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
   c. The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.
   In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.
Article 9
National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including
the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party
under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 10
Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that
may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State
Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever
means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States
parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a
time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and
clarification of compliance.

Article 11
Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the
application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a. The operation and status of this Convention;
   b. Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c. International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d. The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e. Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f. Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent
meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until
the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant
international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International
Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited
to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12
Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations
five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall
be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more
States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be
less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review
Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
a. To review the operation and status of this Convention;
b. To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States
   Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
c. To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d. To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of
   this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant
   international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International
   Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited
   to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of
   Procedure.

**Article 13**

**Amendments**

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose
   amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated
to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on
whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a
majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation
that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an
Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant
   international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International
   Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited
to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules
   of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States
   Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be
   held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the
   States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall
   communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this
   Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments
   of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any
   remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

**Article 14**

**Costs**

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties,
   the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States
   Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with
   the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

Article 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.  
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.  
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.  
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

Article 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.
**Article 20**

*Duration and withdrawal*

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

**Article 21**

*Depositary*

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

**Article 22**

*Authentic texts*

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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# Exchange Rates

Currency equivalent represents US dollar value per unit of currency.1

## Average Exchange Rates for 2007

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<td>Angola</td>
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## Average Exchange Rates for 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Currency</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Currency</th>
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<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>TRY</td>
<td>0.6216</td>
<td>1 January–1 June</td>
</tr>
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Glossary

Abandoned explosive ordnance – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspect hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Community-based rehabilitation – Programs in affected communities (often rural areas) that are designed to supplement facility-based programs in urban centers. These programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities, and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to service, due to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and limited human resource capacity.

Community liaison – According to IMAS, “liaison with mine/ERW affected communities to exchange information on the presence and impact of mines and UXO, to create a reporting link with the mine action programme and develop risk reduction strategies. Community mine action liaison aims to ensure community needs and priorities are central to the planning, implementation and monitoring of mine action operations.”
Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Explosive remnants of war – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Failed cluster munition – A cluster munition that has been fired, dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so.

Improvised explosive device – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detoned. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detoned IEDs are not.

IMAS – International mine action standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

IMSSMA – The UN’s preferred information system for the management of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA provides users with support for data collection, data storage, reporting, information analysis, and project management activities.

Landmine Impact Survey – A national or regional assessment of the socioeconomic impact on communities caused by the actual or perceived presence of mines and ERW, in order to assist the planning and prioritization of mine action programs and projects.

Land release – The set of activities and methodologies intended to release previously suspect hazardous areas with the minimum possible risk.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some MACs also implement mine action activities.

Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training and community mine action liaison.

National mine action authority – A governmental body, normally interministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.

Non-state armed groups – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Risk reduction – Those actions which lessen the probability and/or severity of physical injury to people, property, or the environment due to mines/ERW. Risk reduction can be achieved by physical measures such as clearance, fencing or marking, or through behavioral changes brought about by mine/ERW risk education.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).

Survey – A study of the assessment of the location and impact of mines and ERW at the local or national level. General survey focuses on the location of mined and battle areas and the type of contamination they contain. A landmine impact survey also assesses the impact of explosive
contamination on nearby communities (see separate definition for landmine impact survey). Technical survey aims to confirm and identify the outer perimeters of the hazardous area using one or more demining tools and to gather other necessary information for clearance.

**Unexploded cluster munitions** – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

**Unexploded ordnance** – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate; unexploded submunitions are known as “blinds” or “duds.”

**Victim** – The individual directly hit by a mine/ERW explosion, his or her family and community.

**Victim assistance** – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, casualty data collection, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social reintegration, economic reintegration, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families and communities in society.