

Landmine Monitor 2014



International **TO BAN**
CAMPAIGN
LANDMINES

Landmine Monitor 2014



**Monitoring and Research
Committee, ICBL-CMC
Governance Board**

Handicap International
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Mines Action Canada
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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor@icblcmc.org.

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International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.



@Lucy Pinches/ICBL-CMC, June 2014

Preface

Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War

Pace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim. Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive devices are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) is explosive ordnance that has not been used during armed conflict but has been left behind and is no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers' fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another

route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to development and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, and communities don't bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come.

▲ *Mine Ban Treaty envoy Princess Astrid of Belgium meets with ICBL campaigners from Southeast Asia at the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique; (pictured left to right) Seevue Xaykia, ICBL Ambassador Tun Channareth, Princess Astrid, and Chanhpheng Sivila.*

International Campaign to Ban Landmines

The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working with in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children's rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL's membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.

Part of the ICBL's success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL's work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, which

provides the most effective framework for eliminating antipersonnel landmines. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

On 1 January 2011 the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) merged with the ICBL to become the ICBL-CMC. The CMC and ICBL remain two separate and strong campaigns with a dedicated team of staff for both. In the few years prior to the merger, the ICBL, CMC, and the Monitor had increasingly been sharing resources to achieve their similar goals: to rid the world of landmines and cluster munitions. The merger has strengthened the work toward these goals while still ensuring that the three components (CMC, ICBL, and the Monitor) continue to be the global authorities in their distinct areas of work. The ICBL-CMC is committed to pushing for the complete eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the *de facto* monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties' implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community's response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The Monitor represents the first time that NGOs have come together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and problems, thereby successfully putting into practice the concept of civil society-based verification.

In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as "the Monitor") to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations

they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor is not designed to send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements the transparency reporting by states required under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network and an annual report. A network of more than 30 researchers and a 12-person Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the CMC and ICBL's campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

About this report

This is the 16th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010. *Landmine Monitor 2014*, launched on the 17th anniversary of the Mine Ban Treaty's opening for signature, provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.

Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling in every country in the world, and also includes information on contamination, clearance, casualties, victim assistance, and support for mine action. The report focuses on calendar year 2013, with information included up to October 2014 when possible.

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Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board, which is comprised of research team leaders, ICBL-CMC staff experts, and four NGOs. Members include: Handicap International (Marion Libertucci), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose, ban policy team leader), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Norwegian People's Aid (Atle Karlsen, mine action and support for mine action team leader), Loren Persi Vicentic (casualty and victim assistance team co-coordinator), Tamar Gabelnick (ICBL-CMC policy director), and Jeff Abramson (Monitor program manager). Sylvie Brigot-Vilain (ICBL-CMC executive director) is an *ex-officio* member. The Editorial Team undertook research for Landmine Monitor primarily from January to June 2014, taking into account major developments at the treaty's Third Review Conference held on 23-27 June in Maputo, Mozambique

The Editorial Team included:

- Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Andrew Haag, Katherine Harrison, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Mary Wareham;
- Contamination, clearance, and support: Kathryn Millett, Nick Cumming-Bruce, Atle Karlsen;
- Casualties and victim assistance: Megan Burke, Loren Persi Vicentic, Clémence Caraux-Pelletan, with initial data support from Hugh Hosman

Jeff Abramson provided final editing from August to November 2014 with assistance from Vincent Farnsworth and Morgan McKenna (publication consultants), and Emily Glander (Monitor intern). Marion Loddo conducted initial research on support for mine action. Amelie Chayer (ICBL-CMC) closely reviewed drafts and contributed many improvements to this edition.

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1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Table Key

States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of November 2014

Signatories: Signed, but not yet ratified as of November 2014

States not Party: Not yet acceded as of November 2014

The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Argentina
Bahamas	Barbados
Belize	Bolivia
Brazil	Canada
Chile	Colombia
Costa Rica	Dominica
Dominican Rep.	Ecuador
El Salvador	Grenada
Guatemala	Guyana
Haiti	Honduras
Jamaica	Mexico
Nicaragua	Panama
Paraguay	Peru
St. Kitts & Nevis	St. Vincent & the Grenadines
Saint Lucia	
Suriname	Trinidad & Tobago
Uruguay	Venezuela
Cuba	United States

East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Australia
Bangladesh	Bhutan
Brunei	Cambodia
Cook Islands	Fiji
Indonesia	Japan
Kiribati	Malaysia
Maldives	Nauru
New Zealand	Niue
Palau	Papua New Guinea
Philippines	Samoa
Solomon Islands	Thailand
Timor-Leste	Tuvalu
Vanuatu	Marshall Islands
China	India
Korea, North	Korea, South
Lao PDR	Micronesia
Mongolia	Myanmar
Nepal	Pakistan
Singapore	Sri Lanka
Tonga	Vietnam

Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia

Albania	Andorra	Austria
Belarus	Belgium	Bosnia & Herzegovina
Bulgaria	Croatia	Cyprus
Czech Republic	Denmark	Estonia
Finland	France	Germany
Greece	Holy See	Hungary
Iceland	Ireland	Italy
Latvia	Liechtenstein	Lithuania
Luxembourg	Macedonia, FYR	Malta
Moldova	Monaco	Montenegro
Netherlands	Norway	Poland
Portugal	Romania	San Marino
Serbia	Slovakia	Slovenia
Spain	Sweden	Switzerland
Tajikistan	Turkey	Turkmenistan
Ukraine	United Kingdom	Armenia
Azerbaijan	Georgia	Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan	Russia	Uzbekistan

Middle East and North Africa

Algeria	Iraq	Jordan
Kuwait	Oman	Qatar
Tunisia	Yemen	Bahrain
Egypt	Iran	Israel
Lebanon	Libya	Morocco
Palestine	Saudi Arabia	Syria
United Arab Emirates		

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola	Benin	Botswana
Burkina Faso	Burundi	Cameroon
Cape Verde	Central African Rep.	Chad
Comoros	Congo, Dem. Rep.	Congo, Rep.
Côte d'Ivoire	Djibouti	Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea	Ethiopia	Gabon
Gambia	Ghana	Guinea
Guinea-Bissau	Kenya	Lesotho
Liberia	Madagascar	Malawi
Mali	Mauritania	Mauritius
Mozambique	Namibia	Niger
Nigeria	Rwanda	São Tomé & Príncipe
Senegal	Seychelles	Sierra Leone
Somalia	South Africa	South Sudan
Sudan	Swaziland	Tanzania
Togo	Uganda	Zambia
Zimbabwe		



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Major Findings

In 2014, States Parties committed to the goal a mine-free world by 2025 when they agreed to the Maputo Declaration at the Mine Ban Treaty's Third Review Conference in June. *Landmine Monitor 2014* details progress toward that goal, recording the lowest number of new casualties ever and the completion of clearance obligations in four states. However, in 2013, many states remained behind on their clearance plans and global funding for mine action decreased compared to 2012.

Treaty Status

There are 162 States Parties and one signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty.

- Oman acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 20 August 2014.
- The United States announced new policy measures in June and September 2014 to ban the production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, to destroy stockpiles, and to prohibit landmine use except on the Korean Peninsula, saying this is "signaling our clear aspiration to eventually accede to the Ottawa Convention."

Use

From September 2013 through October 2014, the Monitor confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of Syria and Myanmar, states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, as well as by military forces in the internationally unrecognized breakaway area of Nagorno-Karabakh.

- The same countries and areas emplaced new mines in the previous reporting period, but information available to the Monitor indicates a significantly lower level of new mine use in Myanmar.
- In the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists that erupted in early 2014, there have been allegations of landmine use and the presence of landmine stocks has been documented. But, it was not possible by

October 2014 to determine whether antipersonnel mines had been used or by whom.

Non-state armed groups used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen.

- This is one fewer country (Tunisia) than reported in the previous Monitor.

No new use of antipersonnel landmines by a State Party was confirmed to have occurred during the reporting period, but Yemen did admit that a violation of the ban on use occurred in 2011.

- A number of allegations of mine use in previous years by the armed forces of South Sudan (in 2013 and 2011), Sudan (in 2011), Turkey (from 2009), and Cambodia-Thailand (2008 and 2009) remain unresolved and warrant ongoing attention and resolution by those governments and other States Parties.

Stockpile Destruction

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 48 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than one million destroyed in 2013.

- More than nine million antipersonnel mines await destruction by six States Parties.
- Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation of the treaty after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline. Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
- The destruction process for Greece's mines halted after a series of explosions on 1 October 2014 demolished the Bulgarian facility where destruction was taking place, killing 15 workers.

In June 2014, China and the United States made important announcements regarding their antipersonnel mine stockpiles, with China stating that it held less than five million (compared to the long-standing estimate of 110 million), and the United States stating it held some

▲ A sign just north of Donetsk, Ukraine, reads "Detour: Mines." Allegations of landmine use and the presence of landmine stocks have been documented, but as of October 2014 it was not possible to determine whether antipersonnel mines had been used or by whom.

three million (compared to the more than 10 million previously reported by the government).

Transfer and Production

For the past decade, the global trade in antipersonnel mines has consisted of a low level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers, but the appearance of mines in Sudan and Yemen indicates that some form of market for, and trade in, antipersonnel mines exists.

- At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including six landmine producers, have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the United States.

Down from a total of more than 50 producing states before the Mine Ban Treaty's existence, currently only 11 states are identified as potential producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

- The Monitor has removed the United States from its list of landmine producers following its 27 June 2014 policy announcement forswearing any future production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.
- Active production may be ongoing in as few as four countries: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.

Non-state armed groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Tunisia produce antipersonnel mines, mostly in the form of victim-activated improvised explosive devices.

Casualties

In 2013, recorded casualties caused by mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices, cluster munition remnants, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) decreased to the lowest level since the Monitor started recording casualties in 1999.

- In 2013, a global total of 3,308 casualties were recorded, a 24% decline compared with the total of 4,325 in 2012.
- The incidence rate of nine casualties per day for 2013 is about one-third of that reported in 1999, when there were approximately 25 casualties each day.
- In many states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is anticipated to be significantly higher. Nevertheless, the decrease in casualties is likely even more significant because of improvements in recording over time.

Casualties were identified in 52 states and three other areas in 2013, of which 34 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

- Although down 26% in absolute numbers, the vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties (79%) were civilians.
- In 2013, child casualties accounted for 46% of all civilian casualties where the age was known, up

seven percentage points from the 39% of recorded casualties for 2012; female casualties remained 12% of all casualties where the sex was known.

- Seventy-four percent of recorded global casualties occurred in States Parties.
- Steady declines in annual casualty totals continued in the three States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that have regularly recorded the highest number of annual casualties over the past 15 years: Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Colombia.
- The 31 States Parties with significant numbers of mine/ERW casualties have reported between 226,000–358,000 landmine survivors over time through 2013.
- In Syria, a state not party to the convention, casualties due to landmines/ERW more than tripled in 2013 compared to 2012.
- In 2013, casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices were identified in seven states, a decrease from the 12 states identified in 2012 and less than in any previous year since 2008.

Contamination and Land Release

Some 56 states and four other areas were confirmed to be mine-affected as of October 2014. A further six states have either suspected or residual mine contamination.

- At least 185km² of mined areas were cleared in 2013—less than the at least 200km² in 2012—destroying almost 275,000 antipersonnel mines and 4,500 antivehicle mines.
- The largest total clearance of mined areas in 2013 was achieved in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Croatia, which together accounted for 75% of recorded clearance.
- Over the past five years, clearance operations have resulted in the clearance of approximately 973km² of mined area and the destruction of more than 1.48 million antipersonnel mines and 107,000 antivehicle mines.

In 2013, three States Parties formally declared completion of clearance of all known mined areas: Bhutan, Hungary, and Venezuela. Burundi completed clearance of its suspected mined areas in April 2014.

- As of October 2014, 28 states and one other area have declared themselves cleared of mines since the treaty entered into force in 1999.
- Within the next five years, the Monitor believes that 24 States Parties and 16 states not party as well as three other areas are fully capable of completing clearance.
- Of the 32 States Parties that have confirmed outstanding mine clearance obligations, 23 (72%) have been granted at least one extension period, more than half of which are deemed to either not be on track with their extension requests or their progress is unclear.
- Ten States Parties were granted extension requests within the past year, either at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013 or the Third Review Conference in June 2014. Ethiopia

had indicated that it would submit an extension request, but had not yet done so as of 1 November 2014. Ethiopia's current clearance deadline is 1 June 2015.

- Among States Parties, massive antipersonnel mine contamination, defined by the Monitor as more than 100km², is believed to exist only in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Turkey, and very probably in Iraq. Several other states report suspected contamination at this level, but better survey is needed to confirm actual contamination.

Victim Assistance

Most States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine victims made considerable progress in victim assistance under the Cartagena Action Plan (2009–2014), establishing a solid starting point to rapidly accelerate under the Maputo Action Plan (2014–2019) the kinds of achievements that make a real impact on the lives of victims.

- As of June 2014, approximately two-thirds of States Parties had active coordination mechanisms and relevant national plans in place to advance efforts to assist mine victims and uphold their rights.
- In nearly all States Parties, survivors were participating in decisions that affect their lives and in the implementation of services—although in many countries, their participation must be better supported, especially for survivors to be effectively included in coordination roles.
- In most States Parties, victim assistance efforts have been integrated into other disability rights and development efforts, through collaborative coordination, combined planning, and/or survivor participation.

At the Mine Ban Treaty's Third Review Conference all States Parties committed to advance the full, equal, and effective participation of mine victims in society. Statements made during the session on victim assistance and by 40 states during the high-level segment stressed the importance of commitments on victim assistance.

- A new Committee on Victim Assistance, officially involving the ICBL, has a fresh mandate to support States Parties in implementing victim assistance and to raise the needs and rights of victims in other relevant frameworks and fields.
- During the reporting period, members of the international community took important steps to strengthen ties between disarmament, human rights, and development efforts.

Support for Mine Action

Donors and affected states contributed approximately US\$647 million in international and national support for mine action in 2013, a decrease of \$34 million (5%) from 2012 when the contributions recorded totaled \$681 million.

International assistance in 2013 was \$446 million, a decrease of almost \$51 million from 2012.

- A total of 47 states and three other areas received support from 31 donors.
- Contributions from the top five mine action donors—the United States, Japan, Norway, the EU, and the Netherlands—accounted for 65% of all donor funding.
- This is the eighth consecutive year that international contributions for mine action have totaled more than \$430 million.
- Afghanistan received \$72.6 million in funding in 2013, more than any other country for the eleventh consecutive year and more than twice the funds received by the second largest recipient, Lao PDR.

Eighteen affected states provided \$201 million in national support for their own mine action programs, an increase of \$17 million compared with 2012.

In addition to those contributions, appropriations from the UN General Assembly for mine action within 11 peacekeeping operations provided \$150 million in 2013, an increase of 33% compared with 2012.



© Ban Landmines Campaign Nepal (NCBL), April 2014

Ban Policy

A Global Overview of Banning Antipersonnel Mines

The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty remains one of the great success stories in disarmament and in broader global humanitarian efforts, as demonstrated by its impressive implementation and the widespread adherence to the norm it is establishing against antipersonnel landmines.

Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty was signed on 3 December 1997 by 122 countries and entered into force more than 15 years ago on 1 March 1999. The year 2014 marked an important milestone in the life of the treaty as Mozambique hosted the treaty's Third Review Conference in June in Maputo, the location of the treaty's First Meeting of States Parties back in May 1999.

Oman joined the Mine Ban Treaty since the *Landmine Monitor 2013* was published, making a total of 162 States Parties or more than 80% of the world's countries. The United States (US) announced several policy measures banning landmines in 2014 and President Barack Obama commented that the US is "going to continue to work to find ways that would allow us to ultimately comply fully and accede to the Ottawa Convention," as the US calls the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

Most of the countries outside the treaty abide by its key provisions, indicating near-universal acceptance of the landmine ban.

During this reporting period, September 2013 to October 2014, China and the US provided new information indicating that their stockpiles of antipersonnel mines are significantly smaller than previously believed. China informed *Landmine Monitor* that its stockpile totals "less than" five million, a great reduction from the previous

estimate of 110 million antipersonnel mines.² The US has confirmed that its stockpile is three million, which is far fewer than the previous known total of 10.4 million mines.

New use of antipersonnel landmines has become a relatively rare phenomenon, but remains a concern in a small number of countries, most notably by non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The only confirmed use by government forces in the reporting period was in Syria and Myanmar (Burma).

While overall implementation by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty has been impressive, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties related to use of the weapon and destruction of stockpiles by the treaty-mandated deadlines. Full implementation and universalization of the treaty remain key objectives for the cooperative and enduring partnership of governments, international organizations, and the ICBL.

This overview chapter has two parts. The first provides a global overview of banning antipersonnel mines, as well as the use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines by states not party. The second section examines the implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty. The focus of the reporting is on the second half of 2013 and first three quarters of 2014.

Universalizing the ban on antipersonnel mines

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states that had not signed it by then may no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process

▲ *Campaigners marching together for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty in Nepal, one of only 35 countries yet to become a State Party to the convention.*

¹ Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks by the President at Clinton Global Initiative," The White House, 23 September 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/remarks-president-clinton-global-initiative.

² ICBL/Monitor interview with Ji Haojun, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Col. Wu Gang, Policy Division, Ministry of Defense, in Maputo, 24 June 2014. There is uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely delivered systems, so-called "scatterable" mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines.

that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 162 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 30 acceded.³

One country has joined the Mine Ban Treaty since *Landmine Monitor 2013* was published; Oman acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 20 August 2014. With Oman's accession, half of the Gulf Coordination Council (GCC) members are now party to the treaty, while Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have not joined.

The 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty includes the Pacific state of the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory left to ratify.

The US government announced new policy measures in June and September 2014 to ban production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, accelerate stockpile destruction, and ban use, except on the Korean Peninsula.⁴ The White House said the new landmine policy means the US is "signaling our clear aspiration to eventually accede to the Ottawa Convention."⁵

Palestine in June 2014 again reiterated its strong desire to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible, which it is now eligible to join following its new status at the UN.

Annual UN General Assembly resolution

An annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution provides an important opportunity for states outside the Mine Ban Treaty to indicate their support for the ban on antipersonnel mines and the objective of its universalization.⁶ Many countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 have done so after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions, including Oman.⁷

On 5 December 2013, UNGA Resolution 68/30 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 165 states in favor, none opposed, and 19 abstentions.⁸ The abstentions included States Parties Yemen and Zimbabwe, neither of which has explained their vote. The number of affirmative votes and abstentions was the same as in 2012.⁹ For the first time, non-signatory Libya voted in support of the resolution.

A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea (since 2007), Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan (since 1999), the US, and Vietnam (since 1998).¹⁰

Non-state armed groups

A significant number of NSAGs have indicated their willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines since the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence, showing the strength of the growing international norm. At least 64 NSAGs have committed to halt the use of antipersonnel mines over the past 12 years through the efforts of the Swiss NGO Geneva Call.¹¹ The exact number is difficult to determine, because NSAGs may split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

More than 40 NSAGs have signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, which includes a ban on any use, production, trade, or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines. In August 2014, two factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement, the SLM-AW headed by Abdel Wahid El Nur and the SLM-MM headed by Minni Arko Minawi, renounced use of antipersonnel mines by agreeing to the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.¹² Two Kurdish NSAGs in Syria—the People's Protection Units (YPG) and the Women's Protection Units (YPJ)—endorsed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in June 2014. The Hazzm

³ The 30 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of "succession." These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.

⁴ Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy," The White House, 23 September 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy.

⁵ Office of the Press Secretary, "Press Gaggle by Press Secretary Josh Earnest en route Joint Base Andrews, 6/27/2014," The White House, 27 June 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/27/press-gaggle-press-secretary-josh-earnest-en-route-joint-base-andrews-62.

⁶ The US was the first country to introduce a resolution to ban landmines in 1996, urging states "to pursue vigorously" an international ban treaty "with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible." UNGA Resolution 51/45S was passed on 10 December 1996 by a vote of 156–0, with 10 abstentions. Since 1997, the US has abstained on every UNGA resolution in support of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Of the 18 states not party (at the time) that voted in support of Resolution 68/30 on 5 December 2013, eight have voted in favor of every Mine Ban Treaty resolution since 1997 (Armenia, Bahrain, Georgia, Oman, Poland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the UAE), while 10 that consistently abstained or were absent previously now vote in favor (Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, and Tonga).

⁷ This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey.

⁸ The 19 states that abstained were comprised of 17 non-signatories (Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam) and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Yemen and Zimbabwe. Since 1997, Yemen and Zimbabwe have both voted in support of every annual UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty. Both voted in support for the First Committee vote, but then changed to abstain from the final vote. See the voting record available at: www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/68/PV.60.

⁹ The 165 affirmative votes secured in 2013, and 2010 is the highest number since the first UNGA resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty passed in 1997. The lowest number of votes in support was 138 in 2001. The first resolution in support of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, UNGA 52/38A, secured a vote of 142 in favor, none against, and 18 abstained.

¹⁰ Uzbekistan voted in support of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.

¹¹ As of October 2014, 44 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment), see www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/. Prior to 2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.

¹² "Final two Sudan rebel groups sign landmine ban," *Radio Dabanga*, 15 August 2014, www.radiodabanga.org/node/78593.

Movement, a major brigade of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), endorsed it in October 2014.¹³

Convention on Conventional Weapons

Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. The inadequacy of the original protocol gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2014, a total of 101 states were party to Amended Protocol II. One state ratified the protocol since the publication of *Landmine Monitor 2013*; Iraq on 24 September 2014.

Only 10 of the 101 states that are party to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983 and, while it was largely superseded by Amended Protocol II, there are still 10 states that are party to the original protocol that have not ratified the amended protocol, including Cuba, Lao PDR, Mongolia, Uzbekistan and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties: Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Togo, and Uganda.

A total of 17 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also landmine producers.

States that stockpile antipersonnel mines but are not party to the CCW

Armenia	Kyrgyzstan	Syria
Azerbaijan	Lebanon	UAE
Bahrain	Libya	<i>Vietnam</i>
Egypt	<i>Myanmar</i>	
<i>Iran</i>	Nepal	
Kazakhstan	Saudi Arabia	
<i>Korea, North</i>	<i>Singapore</i>	

Note: *Italics indicate states that also reserve the right to produce antipersonnel mines*

Use of antipersonnel landmines

In this reporting period, September 2013 through October 2014, the Monitor has confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of Syria and Myanmar,

¹³ See Geneva Call Press Release, "Syrian Kurdish armed non-State actor commits to ban anti-personnel mines, sexual violence and child recruitment," 16 June 2014, www.genevacall.org/syrian-kurdish-armed-non-state-actor-commits-ban-anti-personnel-mines-sexual-violence-child-recruitment/; and Geneva Call Press Release, "Major brigade of the Free Syrian Army commits against anti-personnel mines and sexual violence," 27 October 2014, www.genevacall.org/syria-major-brigade-free-syrian-army-commits-anti-personnel-mines-sexual-violence/.

states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, and by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, and Yemen as well as in the internationally unrecognized breakaway area of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Myanmar

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, the Monitor has consistently documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and NSAGs in many areas of Myanmar (Burma). During this reporting period (since September 2013), information available to the Monitor indicates a significantly lower level of new mine use.

The Monitor received one report from the Free Burma Rangers stating that the Tatmadaw (the name of Myanmar's army) used antipersonnel mines in April 2014 in Tan Tada, Mansi Township, Bhamo District in Kachin State, which reportedly resulted in at least one casualty.¹⁴

Syria

In late 2011, the first reports of Syrian government mine use emerged in the country's border areas.¹⁵ A Syrian official acknowledged the government had "undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines."¹⁶ Both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were emplaced on the borders with both Turkey and Lebanon.¹⁷

In April 2014, the use of Type 84 remotely-delivered landmines by government forces was recorded in Sawaysa, Quneitra in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights.¹⁸ Due to its sensitive magnetic fuze that also functions as an anti-disturbance device, the Chinese-manufactured mine can detonate from changes in its immediate magnetic environment, including proximity to a vehicle or a person wearing or carrying a sufficient amount of metal, such as military equipment or even a camera. Mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes that explode from an unintentional or innocent act are considered antipersonnel mines under the Mine Ban Treaty and therefore prohibited.

¹⁴ Free Burma Rangers (FBR) statement, "Civilian Killed by Landmine, Teenage Girl Raped and Over 3,600 New IDPs in Kachin State," 24 April 2014, www.freeburmarangers.org/2013/01/07/burma-army-opens-new-offensive-in-pang-wa-and-laiza-areas-using-helicopters-and-landmines-in-attacks-in-kachin-state/. In follow up email with FBR it was clarified that the mine had been laid by the Tatmadaw sometime between November 2013 and January 2014. See Myanmar/Burma Landmine Monitor Ban Policy profile, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/find_profile/MM/2014.

¹⁵ ICBL Press Release, "ICBL publicly condemns reports of Syrian forces laying mines," 2 November 2011, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2011/icbl-publicly-condemns-reports-of-syrian-forces-la.aspx.

¹⁶ "Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border," *The Associated Press*, 1 November 2011, www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/assad-troops-plant-land-mines-on-syria-lebanon-border-1.393200.

¹⁷ "Syria: Army Planting Banned Landmines: Witnesses Describe Troops Placing Mines Near Turkey, Lebanon Borders," Human Rights Watch (HRW), 13 March 2012, www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/13/syria-army-planting-banned-landmines. Stephanie Nebehay, "Syria using mines and cluster bombs on civilians: campaigners," *Reuters*, 29 November 2012, www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/29/us-syria-crisis-landmines-idUSBRE8ASoRF20121129.

¹⁸ Mark Hiznay, "Remotely Delivered Antivehicle Mines Spotted in Syria," *Landmine and Cluster Munition Blog*, landminandclustermunitionblog.wordpress.com/2014/04/25/remotely-delivered-antivehicle-mines-spotted-in-syria/.

A September 2014 video posted on YouTube shows antivehicle mines on a road near al-Hamaydia in Quneitra governorate that opposition forces said were laid by government forces.¹⁹ A video uploaded in April 2013 shows antivehicle mines on a road in al-Raqqa governorate that opposition forces said were laid by government forces.²⁰ In August 2014, *Reuters* reported that Islamic State forces were killed by landmines during an attack on a Syrian government airbase at Tabqa, near the city of Raqqa.²¹

Non-state armed groups

Since September 2013, NSAGs used antipersonnel mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that fall under the Mine Ban Treaty's definition of antipersonnel mines in at least seven countries: States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, and Yemen, and states not party Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria. This is one less country than previously cited by the Monitor, with Tunisia being removed from the list.²²

In **Afghanistan**, there has been extensive use of victim-activated IEDs by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, which are opposing the Kabul government and NATO/International Security Assistance Force forces. In February 2014, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported a decline for 2013 in incidents caused by pressure-plate IEDs resulting from a decline in use of victim-activated weapons and a corresponding increase in command-detonated IEDs. However, in the first half of 2014 UNAMA recorded an increase in incidents caused by victim-activated IEDs compared to the same time period in 2013. UNAMA stated that the majority of IEDs used in Afghanistan now are victim-activated IEDs, most of which utilize pressure plates.²³ UNAMA has previously

called on armed groups in Afghanistan to prohibit their members from using pressure-plate IEDs.²⁴

In **Colombia**, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) continued to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. FARC is probably the most prolific user of antipersonnel mines among rebel groups anywhere in the world. Colombian NSAGs lay mines near their campsites or bases, on paths that lead to areas of strategic importance (such as to their bases, or to main transit routes), and to protect caches of explosives, weapons, medicine, and clothing. In 2013, FARC was accused of laying mines near destroyed infrastructure to prevent or delay its reconstruction.²⁵ NSAGs, predominantly FARC, also plant antipersonnel mines in or near coca fields to prevent eradication efforts, which caused casualties among coca eradicators. Mines are also used by the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) and by United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC) successor groups.

In **Libya**, in September 2014, reports emerged alleging new use of antipersonnel mines at Tripoli International Airport, which saw fighting in July/August between the Zintan alliance of militia groups and forces of the Libya Dawn Alliance.²⁶ A Human Rights Watch (HRW) investigation found that antipersonnel mines were likely laid in 2014 and not earlier but could not determine the party responsible for the use.²⁷ On October 29, HRW spoke by telephone with the commander of the Misrata Revolutionaries engineering unit within the Libya Dawn alliance which has been responsible for clearing landmines and other unexploded ordnance in Tripoli since August. The commander said his unit on August 24, the day of the airport takeover, had discovered a mined area of the airport.²⁸ He said a pickup truck mounted with anti-aircraft weapons entered the "old airport area" and

¹⁹ "شوق تافلخم نم ماغلأ كئيفت: قروفلأ | ناقرفلأ قيوأ 2014-9-12," YouTube, 12 September 2014, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gdno9qKnsJ.

²⁰ "شوق تافلخم نم ماغلأ لوح ماغلأ عزى ماظنلا قورلا 2013-4-17," YouTube, 19 April 2013, www.youtube.com/watch?v=WUgUOgzG_o&list=PLPCoUdeof3T6NPdHiWgDvc8zAzafWxSZC&index=2.

²¹ Tom Perry, "Syria Reinforces Air Base Under Islamic State Attack: Monitor," *Reuters*, 22 August 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/22/us-syria-crisis-islamicstate-idUSKBN0GMOF920140822.

²² NSAG used mines in at least eight countries in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries in 2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine countries in 2007.

²³ In 2013, UNAMA reported 557 civilian casualties from pressure-plate IEDs that had been planted on roads routinely used by civilians. This was significant decrease from 913 casualties in 2012. However, in the first six months of 2014, UNAMA documented 308 victim-activated IED casualties, an increase from the same period in 2013. UNAMA, "Afghanistan Annual Report 2013, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," Kabul, February 2014, p. 20, unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/Feb_8_2014_PoC-report_2013-Full-report-ENG.pdf; and also UNAMA, "Afghanistan Mid-year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 2014," Kabul, July 2014, p. 17, unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/human%20rights/English%20edited%20light.pdf.

²⁴ UNAMA, "Afghanistan Annual Report 2012, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict," Kabul, February 2013, p. 14, unama.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=Kob5RL2XYcU=. In 2011, UNAMA called on the Taliban to publicly reaffirm its 1998 decree banning mine use. See, statement of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan on the Problem of Landmines, 6 October 1998, in *Landmine Monitor Report 1999*, pp. 433–434, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=afghanistan&pqs_section=.

²⁵ "Three Killed by Landmine in Colombia," *Latin American Herald Tribune* (Bogotá), 16 August 2012, www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=558948&CategoryId=12393.

²⁶ Video footage reportedly filmed in September at Tripoli International Airport by *Alnabaa*—a private Libyan satellite TV network—and by *Al Jazeera* shows the clearance of at least 20 T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines and at least one PRB M3 antivehicle mine. Reports by both TV networks alleged that the mines were laid by the Zintani-led forces, which controlled the airport from 2011 until August 2014. See you. be/iuDv4vwwHk?t=1m3s and you. be/g1yZ1rW_vr!t=1m32s.

²⁷ HRW, "Evidence of New Landmine Use in Tripoli," 5 November 2014, www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/libya-evidence-new-landmine-use-tripoli. The Zintan alliance of militia groups, a coalition of militias from the inland mountain town of Zintan, controlled Tripoli Airport from the end of 2011 until August 2014, when Libya Dawn Alliance of militias from the coastal city of Misrata seized control after five weeks of intense fighting. At the time of fighting, a Zintani force known as the Airport Security Katiba was controlling Tripoli Airport and its vicinity.

²⁸ The commander informed HRW that his unit has found and cleared approximately 600 landmines since August 24, mostly T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines, from the Tripoli International airport compound.

detonated a mine, killing one fighter from the Misrata Umm al-Maarek brigade, Mohamed Abubaker Ali, and wounding several others.

In **Myanmar**, antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs dropped significantly compared to previous years due to a significant decrease in armed conflict as most groups have engaged in negotiations on a nationwide ceasefire. Continued fighting in the north of the country between government forces and the Kachin Independence Army and allied groups has resulted in some new mine use.

In **Pakistan**, the government has reported that antipersonnel mines have been used throughout the country, and attributes the use to “terrorists.”²⁹ Media reports register a large number of casualties, apparently from newly laid mines, in Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly the North-West Frontier Province), where the Pakistan Army and security forces have been engaged in armed conflict with Pakistani Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Baloch insurgents.

In **Syria**, in December 2013 militants of Jabhat Al-Nusra and the Islamic State were alleged to have laid explosive booby-traps and mines as they were pushed from Ras Al-Ain by Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG).³⁰ Previously, anti-regime rebels have apparently used antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs. Rebels reportedly used antipersonnel landmines in the fighting at Qusair, which fell to government forces in early June 2013.³¹ According to the *Associated Press*, in the year prior to the defeat at Qusair “rebels holding the town had heavily fortified it with tunnels, mine fields, and booby traps.”³² According to one witness from the town, the Syrian military removed mines from around Qusair and cleared roads after the town fell.³³ A July 2013 media report featured a rebel engineer who designed a victim-activated IED.³⁴

In **Yemen**, there were credible reports of use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Sada’a governorate. In its 2014 Article 7 report, Yemen repeated that “YEMAC [Yemen Executive Mine Action Center] face new challenge in Sada’a governorate after insurgences war. New kinds of mines made manually by insurgences and planted in

Sada’a, some of them demined by the insurgences and they missed others...lot of mine accidents happened and many of people killed and injured.” There have also been landmine casualties in Haijyah governorate, which borders Sada’a governorate and where Houthi rebels have been fighting local Sunni tribes backed by the government. In September 2013, a representative of the district of Al-Asha bordering Sada’a governorate told media that Houthi rebels were planting landmines “in the mountainous areas under their control.”³⁵

In previous Landmine Monitor publications since 2009, there were reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by the insurgency in southern Thailand. While no new use of antipersonnel mines by the group was reported this year, it is still active and has not publicly renounced use of the weapon.

There were reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Mali, Pakistan, Sudan, South Sudan, and Ukraine.

Ukraine

Ukraine has accused Russian forces of laying antivehicle and antipersonnel mines on Ukrainian territory, but as of October 2014 it was not possible to confirm the use by any party of antipersonnel mines, or other devices prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty such as victim-activated IEDs and booby-traps. It appears that reports of minefields being emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea were actually either “phony minefields” or areas containing trip flares.³⁶

However, landmines appear to be a part of the conflict between government forces and Russian-backed separatists that erupted in early 2014 initially in the Crimea and then in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. There is significant evidence present at different locations that antipersonnel mines of Soviet-origin with production markings from the 1980s are available to combatants and unconfirmed reports of emplaced antipersonnel mines being cleared.

On 11 October 2014 at a primary school in the city of Ilovaisk in Donetsk province, HRW researchers encountered four fuzeless OZM-72 mine bodies that had been ejected from a vehicle attacked while parked on school grounds in late August. Separatists showed the researchers another undamaged fuzeless OZM-72 mine³⁷ already in their possession in their vehicle.

Other areas

In July 2013, **Nagorno-Karabakh’s** military chief General Movses Hakobian was reported by the media to have stated that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line

²⁹ CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 13 March 2014, [www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/4BD911629947013FC1257CD1004DEBC6/\\$file/Pakistan_APIII_NAR_2014.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/4BD911629947013FC1257CD1004DEBC6/$file/Pakistan_APIII_NAR_2014.pdf).

³⁰ Hannah Lucinda Smith, “Land Mines in Ras Al-Ain,” *Asharq Al Awsat*, 7 December 2013, www.aawsat.net/2013/12/articles55324635.

³¹ According to the London-based *al-Quds al-Arabi* newspaper, Hezbollah and Syrian army units conducting mine clearance in Qusair found dozens of mines provided by Hezbollah to Hamas in 2007–2008. Sources hinted that Hamas may have provided the mines to Syrian rebels. The report has not been confirmed by Hezbollah’s leadership. Roi Kais, “Report: Mines found in Qusair provided by Hezbollah to Hamas,” *Ynet*, 10 June 2013, www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4390325,00.html.

³² Sarah El Deeb, “Syrian rebels reeling from loss of Qusair,” *Associated Press*, 11 June 2013, bigstory.ap.org/article/syrian-rebels-reeling-loss-qusair.

³³ Albert Aji and Sarah El Deeb, “Syrian army captures Qusair, key border town, in blow to rebels,” *Associated Press*, 5 June 2013, www.mercurynews.com/cl_23393574/syrian-army-captures-qusair-key-border-town-blow.

³⁴ Matthieu Aikins, “Makers of war,” *Wired*, July 2013, www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/diy-arms-syria/.

³⁵ Nasser Al-Sakkaf, “10 killed by landmine,” *Yemen Times*, 5 September 2013, www.yementimes.com/en/1709/news/2845/10-killed-by-landmine.htm.

³⁶ CCW Amended Protocol II defines it: “‘Phoney minefield’ means an area free of mines that simulates a minefield. The term ‘minefield’ includes phoney minefields.” Article 2, paragraph 8.

³⁷ These multi-purpose antipersonnel munitions can be emplaced in either a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode, they are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

of contact' east and north of the disputed territory."³⁸ General Hakobian said the use was aimed at preventing sabotage attacks by Azerbaijani troops.

In a 4 September 2013 response to an ICBL letter seeking clarification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh did not deny the allegations and said that "due to the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan... today we are not in a position to refrain from using AP [antipersonnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of contact." He also wrote that "these mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances and ceasing any possible military aggression against us."³⁹

Stockpiled antipersonnel mines and their destruction

The Monitor estimates that of the 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, as many as 31 stockpile the weapon. In the past, the Monitor has estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel mines. However, China has informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is "less than" five million⁴⁰ and the US has confirmed that its stockpile is three million.⁴¹ Previously, China was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in stockpile and the US possessed 10.4 million. Therefore the global total may now be less than 50 million.

The states that stockpile the most antipersonnel mines are listed below:

Largest stocks of antipersonnel mines

Russia	26.5 million
Pakistan	estimated 6 million
India	estimated 4–5 million
China	"less than" 5 million
US	3 million
Total	45 million

³⁸ Lusine Musayelian, "Karabakh Enhances Defense Capabilities," *Asbarez* (Stepanakert), 26 July 2013, asbarez.com/112014/karabakh-enhances-defense-capabilities/.

³⁹ Statement by the ICBL, "ICBL gravely concerned about use of antipersonnel mines by Nagorno-Karabakh," 20 September 2013, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2013/icbl-gravely-concerned-about-use-of-antipersonnel.aspx.

⁴⁰ There is an amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely delivered systems, so-called "scatterable" mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines.

⁴¹ For China; ICBL/Monitor interview with Ji Haojun, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Col. Wu Gang, Policy Division, Ministry of Defense, in Maputo, 24 June 2014. For the US: "We have an active stockpile of just over 3 million anti-personnel mines in the inventory." US Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room," 27 June 2014, www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5455.

States not party that may stockpile antipersonnel mines

Armenia	Korea, North	Russia
Azerbaijan	Korea, South	Saudi Arabia
Bahrain	Kyrgyzstan	Singapore
China	Lao PDR	Sri Lanka
Cuba	Lebanon	Syria
Egypt	Libya	UAE
Georgia	Mongolia	US
India	Morocco	Uzbekistan
Iran	Myanmar	Vietnam
Israel	Nepal	
Kazakhstan	Pakistan	

It is not certain that all of these 31 states stockpile antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes. Three states not party, all Pacific states, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga.

In June 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that it currently stockpiles five million antipersonnel mines, a great reduction from the 110 million previously cited by the Monitor.⁴² Chinese officials have often disputed that estimate, but it was not until a meeting with Landmine Monitor in June 2014 that Chinese representatives clarified for the record that the current stockpile is less than five million antipersonnel mines.⁴³ In a statement to the Third Review Conference, China said it has destroyed "several hundred thousand old and dysfunctional" antipersonnel mines "over the last two decades" and said "only a very limited number of [CCW] protocol compliant [antipersonnel mines] were kept for defense purpose."⁴⁴

As part of the 2014 policy announcements, the Department of Defense disclosed that the US has an "active stockpile of just over 3 million antipersonnel mines in the inventory."⁴⁵ This represents a significant reduction from the previous total reported in 2002 of

⁴² The older estimate is based on interviews with non-Chinese government officials involved in CCW Amended Protocol II discussions in 1995 and 1996.

⁴³ ICBL/Monitor interview with Ji Haojun, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Col. Wu Gang, Ministry of Defense, in Maputo, 24 June 2014. There is uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely delivered systems, so-called "scatterable" mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines.

⁴⁴ Statement of China, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/friday/13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_China.pdf.

⁴⁵ "We have an active stockpile of just over 3 million anti-personnel mines in the inventory." US Department of Defense, "Department of Defense Press Briefing by Rear Adm. Kirby in the Pentagon Briefing Room," 27 June 2014, www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5455.

approximately 10.4 million antipersonnel mines.⁴⁶ The shelf-life of existing antipersonnel mines stockpiled by the US decreases over time, including deterioration of batteries embedded inside mines as they age. The new policy precludes the US from extending or modifying the life of the batteries inside the existing stockpile.⁴⁷

Destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines in states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely occurs as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.

Non-state armed groups

Few NSAGs today have access to factory-made antipersonnel mines compared to a decade ago due to the halt in trade and production and due to destruction of stockpiles under the Mine Ban Treaty. A few NSAGs have access to mine stocks from former regimes (such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia) while others produce their own improvised mines or acquire mines by removing them from minefields. In states not party, NSAGs have also been known to capture antipersonnel mines, steal them from arsenals, or purchase them from corrupt officials.

During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups were reported to possess stocks of antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, and Pakistan. The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.

Production and transfer of antipersonnel mines

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past.⁴⁸ A total of 40 of these have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and most recently, the US.⁴⁹ A majority of major producers from the 1970s to 1990s are among those states that have stopped manufacturing and joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Monitor identifies 11 states as potential producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not actively producing mines but reserve the right to do so. Active production may be ongoing in as few as four countries: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.

The Monitor has removed the US from its list of landmine producers following the 27 June 2014 policy announced by the US forswearing any future production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.⁵⁰

NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Tunisia produce antipersonnel mines, mostly in the form of victim-activated IEDs. In July 2014, the Pakistan Army claimed they seized a landmine factory in North Waziristan.⁵¹ In 2013, the Colombian Army continued to locate and destroy places of landmine assembly belonging to FARC.⁵²

Trade in antipersonnel mines

A *de facto* global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines.

While the Monitor has reported for the past decade that the global trade in antipersonnel mines had consisted of a low level of illicit and unacknowledged transfers, the abrupt appearance of mines in Sudan and Yemen in recent years raises the specter that some form of market for antipersonnel mines exists.⁵³

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including six landmine producers, have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they now have stopped exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also

⁴⁶ Information provided by the US Armed Services in Spring/Summer 2002, cited in US General Accounting Office, "GAO-02-1003: MILITARY OPERATIONS: Information on U.S. use of Land Mines in the Persian Gulf War," September 2002, Appendix I, pp. 39–43. See also: US entry in ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2009* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, 2009), bit.ly/1wAJ0ma.

⁴⁷ A US official confirmed to HRW that the US would not extend the shelf-life of existing systems, for example, by replacing their batteries. Meeting with US Delegation, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 27 June 2014. Unofficial notes by HRW.

⁴⁸ There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that have been cited by some sources as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has been a producer.

⁴⁹ Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe.

⁵⁰ The landmine policy announcement was made by the US ambassador to Mozambique on June 27, at the Mine Ban Treaty's Third Review Conference and detailed in a White House fact sheet. Statement by Ambassador Douglas Griffiths, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/friday/13_HIGH_LEVEL_SEGMENT_-_United_States.pdf; and Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy," The White House, 27 June 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/27/fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy.

⁵¹ "Miranshah: Another landmine manufacturing factory unearthed," *Dunya News* (Miranshah), 4 July 2014, dunya.com/index.php/en/Pakistan/227582-Miranshah-Another-landmine-manufacturing-factory.

⁵² See for example, "Ejército ubicó 100 minas antipersona," *Emisora del Ejército Nacional*, 30 October 2013, www.emisoraejercito.mil.co/content/ej-rcito-ubic-100-minas-antipersona.

⁵³ In Yemen, the appearance of East German PPM-2 antipersonnel mines, in connection with two allegations of new use, suggests that a new supply channel is in place given that Yemen did not declare the type to be in stockpile or as part of existing mine contamination. PPM-2 antipersonnel mines are known to be present in Somalia, across the Gulf of Aden. In Sudan, the appearance in the past two years of significant numbers of No. 4 antipersonnel mines with Farsi-language markings also seemingly indicates that stockpiles of antipersonnel mines are available to the various actors engaged in the conflict in the southern provinces of Sudan.

claims to have stopped exporting, despite evidence to the contrary.⁵⁴

Status and Operation of the Mine Ban Treaty

In general, States Parties' implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. However, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition, some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including those concerning mine clearance and victim assistance.

The treaty's compliance provisions—contained in Article 8—have not been formally invoked to clarify any compliance question. At the Third Review Conference in June 2014, States Parties agreed to create a “cooperative compliance” committee to “facilitate compliance” under Article 8.1 of the treaty and to follow up on specific cases of possible non-compliance. The ICBL has on numerous occasions called for States Parties to operationalize Article 8's formal mechanisms in order to be prepared for any eventual need. The ICBL believes it may become necessary for States Parties to consider this process if the apparent use of antipersonnel mines by forces loyal to the government of Yemen in 2011 and other serious allegations of use by States Parties are not adequately addressed by the concerned states.

Compliance

In December 2013 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, numerous states expressed concern about confirmed use of antipersonnel mines in Yemen and allegations of use in South Sudan, Sudan, and Turkey, and many states called for independent investigations.⁵⁵ Norway said that alleged and known instances of use were a threat to the viability of the convention.

In April 2014, Belgium and New Zealand reported that in their role as co-chairs of the Working Group on General Status and Operation of the Convention they had written letters to Sudan, South Sudan, and Turkey requesting that they communicate developments within their country regarding compliance.

⁵⁴ Landmine Monitor received information in 2002, 2003, and 2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were removing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

⁵⁵ A total of 18 states and one regional group took the floor during the meeting to express concern: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Germany, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa and Switzerland, as well as the European Union. ICBL, “Summary of Compliance Issues,” Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, Switzerland, 2-5 December 2013.

At the Third Review Conference, States Parties to the convention created a new Committee on Cooperative Compliance. The new committee will consider whether a concern about compliance with the convention's prohibitions contained in Article 1.1 is potentially credible and, if so, to consider any follow up that might be appropriate for States Parties.⁵⁶

Use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties

In this reporting period, commencing in September 2013, there has been no confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by government forces of States Parties. Prior to *Landmine Monitor 2013*, there has never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became law in 1999. With the confirmation by Yemen that a violation of the convention by its forces occurred in 2011, that is no longer the case. Additionally, a number of allegations of mine use in previous years by the armed forces of South Sudan (in 2013 and 2011), Sudan (in 2011), Turkey (from 2009), and Cambodia/Thailand (2008 and 2009) remain unresolved and warrant ongoing attention and resolution by those governments and other States Parties.

Yemen

At the treaty's intersessional Standing Committee meetings in May 2013, 15 states as well as the President of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties and the ICBL called for a thorough investigation of alleged use of antipersonnel mines, expressed concern at the civilian casualties, and urged rapid mine clearance as well as an investigation that would report back to States Parties.⁵⁷

In November 2013, the prime minister's office issued a statement that admitted a “violation” of the Mine Ban Treaty occurred in 2011 during the popular uprising that led to the removal of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh.⁵⁸ At the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013, Yemen said it had “lost control on the ground” during the 2011 political crises and committed to be “serious

⁵⁶ The committee will also, “When appropriate, in close consultation with the States Parties concerned, clarify the situation, and if as a result it assesses that the concern is credible, make suggestions on steps that the States Parties concerned could take to ensure that the Convention remains strong and effective; For cases where the concern is credible, present preliminary observations at intersessional meetings if need be, and conclusions and recommendations at Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences; Remain transparent and accountable, including by reporting on activities at both intersessional and Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences.” . “Decisions on the Convention's Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf.

⁵⁷ Afghanistan, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Ireland, Jordan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Slovenia, and Switzerland.

⁵⁸ “The government pledges its commitment to implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty,” *Saba News Service*, 19 November 2013, www.sabanews.net/ar/news331538.htm. See also, ICBL Web Post, “Yemen mine use: official communiqué,” 22 November 2014, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2013/yemen-mine-use-official-communiqué-17-11-2013.aspx.

and transparent on that issue.”⁵⁹ The final report of the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties expressed concern at the “breach” of the Mine Ban Treaty at Bani Jarmooz and welcomed Yemen’s commitment to provide to them, through the president, a final report on the investigation by 31 December 2014.⁶⁰

HRW has raised the need for clearance of Bani Jarmooz minefields with Yemeni government representatives on multiple occasions, including in meetings with President Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi and other high-ranking officials and political party leaders in Sana’a in January 2014.⁶¹

Yemen provided an interim report on 29 March 2014 that indicated plans had been made for clearance, marking, risk education, and victim assistance.⁶² In April 2014, a HRW investigation confirmed no evidence of any mine clearance, nor any marking or fencing of mine-affected areas, and few if any risk education and victim assistance activities.

At the treaty’s Third Review Conference in June 2014, Yemen stated that the Military Prosecutor’s Office has begun an investigation to identify those responsible for the mine use at Bani Jarmooz, but gave no details about its progress or any of the other elements it committed to report on at Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, such as the possible origin of the mines.⁶³

As of October 2014, the area of Bani Jarmooz was no longer under government control because it has been seized by Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthi rebellion).⁶⁴

⁵⁹ It said the Prime Minister had directed that an inter-agency investigation committee be established to look into the incident and determine who was responsible, applying criminal sanctions in accordance with the 2005 implementation law. Yemen reported that the “Minister for Defense had given the order to implement this investigation, to account for those who participated in that action, and to clear the mines.” It stated that the engineering corps and the general reserve forces had commenced clearance operations at Bani Jarmooz. Statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2013. Original in Arabic, translation by the Monitor, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/other_languages/arabic/MBC/MSP/13MSP/11g_COMPLIANCE_CONCERNS_-_Yemen.pdf.

⁶⁰ This report would include information on (a) the status and outcomes of Yemen’s investigation; (b) the identification of those responsible for deploying antipersonnel mines, and subsequent measures taken; (c) information on the source of the antipersonnel mines and how those mines were obtained, particularly given that Yemen had long ago reported the destruction of all stockpiles; (d) the destruction of any additional stocks discovered and the clearance of the mined areas in question; and (e) action to prevent and suppress any possible future prohibited activities undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

⁶¹ HRW meeting with Maj. Gen. Ahmed Hussein al-Akily, Director of the Office of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, Sana’a, late January 2014.

⁶² According to the report, local people in Bani Jarmooz and Arhab districts intervened to stop the demining operations on their first day in protest at the government’s failure to provide compensation for mine-related deaths and injuries, damaged vehicles, and loss of agricultural income. “Yemen Initial Report to the President of the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties,” 29 March 2014, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-apr14/Yemen-interim-report-29Mar2014.pdf.

⁶³ Interview with Yemen’s Delegation to the Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014. Notes by HRW.

⁶⁴ Email from HRW’s researcher based in Sana’a, 21 October 2014.

Allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties

South Sudan

There have been no confirmed reports of new antipersonnel landmines in the internal armed conflict that erupted in South Sudan in late 2013 and early 2014.

During 2011, there were several incidents in which landmines were apparently laid in South Sudan, including in the states of Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile; however, the Monitor could not determine who was responsible for the mine use or whether antipersonnel mines in addition to antivehicle mines had been laid.⁶⁵ The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) visited the states of Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, and Western Bahr El Ghazal in June–July 2013 as part of a fact-finding investigation into the landmine use allegations, where it engaged in discussions with civil authorities in each state, including the governor and the deputy governor as well as the sector and division commanders from the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Both the civil authorities as well as the SPLA denied allegations of being involved in new mine laying activities and explicitly stated that no antipersonnel mines are held in SPLA stocks. The SPLA, however, confirmed that new mines had indeed been laid by rebel forces in Unity and Jonglei states.⁶⁶ In March 2014, the UN shared with the ICBL the seven-page report of the investigation by the three-person NMAA team led by Nyang Chol Dhuor.⁶⁷

In July 2013 after a visit to Jonglei state, the NGO Refugees International issued a report that stated that “multiple UN and NGO sources have...reported that members of the SPLA have been laying anti-personnel mines in civilian areas. However the UN Mine Action Service has been unable to conduct an investigation that would confirm this.”⁶⁸

Sudan

There have been no confirmed instances of government forces using antipersonnel mines since Sudan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, but there have been several allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in Sudan—including in 2013 and the first half of 2014—that the Monitor has been unable to confirm. For example, in 2011 multiple reports emerged of new mine-laying in the Republic of Sudan’s South Kordofan state in the Nuba Mountains near the border with South Sudan as

⁶⁵ Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 25 May 2012.

⁶⁶ UNMAS has been unable to independently verify the allegations due to access restrictions to the alleged sites. Email from Lance Malin MBE, UNMAS, 14 October 2013.

⁶⁷ Email to Tamar Gabelnick, Policy Director, ICBL, from Gustavo Laurie, Acting Senior Liaison Officer, UNMAS Geneva, 13 March 2014, containing the NMAA report dated 12 March 2014 and entitled “NMAA investigation report on alleged re-mining in the Republic of South Sudan.”

⁶⁸ Refugees International, “South Sudan: Protection and Assistance Challenges Demand a Firm Response,” 11 July 2013, www.refintl.org/policy/field-report/south-sudan-protection-and-assistance-challenges-demand-firm-response.

part of clashes between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the northern branch of Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) now called SPLM-N.⁶⁹

It is clear from evidence and testimony from various sources that antipersonnel mines are available for use in the southern part of the country, but the Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about whether such mines have been laid, and if so, what forces may have used antipersonnel mines. There is also a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. In its Article 7 reports and statements, the government of Sudan has provided little to no official information on the mine use allegations, which it has denied responsibility for.⁷⁰

In 2012, Sudan acknowledged the use allegations and committed to conduct an investigation and "declare the findings" in its next annual Article 7 report.⁷¹ However, the Article 7 reports provided in April 2013 and April 2014 contain no new information with respect to the use allegation in South Kordofan state.

In August 2013, the South Kordofan state secretary for the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Eng. al-Rehema Ismail Fedail, reportedly accused the government of Sudan of planting landmines in North and South Kordofan states, identifying several newly mined locations including Um 'Djamena, southern al-Dabek,

southern Abu Zabad, and al-Tamjoyah, in addition to al-Dashol and Abu Janok areas.⁷²

On 29 August 2013, a delegation of the SPLM-N, comprised of Deputy Chairman Abdelaziz Alhilu and Secretary General Yasir Arman, signed the Geneva Call's Deed of Commitment, thereby agreeing to prohibit the use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, to cooperate in humanitarian mine action activities, and to destroy its stockpiles. Upon signing, Alhilu pledged to destroy all antipersonnel mines in SPLM-N possession as soon as possible, which he said were captured during military operations.⁷³ The SPLM-N is the third armed opposition group from Sudan to pledge non-use of antipersonnel mines, after JEM in April 2012 and the SPLM/A in 2001.⁷⁴

At the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, government officials committed to look into the presence of antipersonnel mines in the south and have since formed a committee including ICBL member JASMAR, although security problems have so far impeded an on-site investigation. In February 2014, the ICRC issued a statement condemning the use of antipersonnel mines by any actor and calling on all parties to abide by international law after a Sudanese Red Crescent Society volunteer and other civilians were killed and injured in a landmine explosion involving a vehicle near Abu Jubaiha in South Kordofan.⁷⁵

Turkey

In 2009, there were serious allegations of at least two instances of use of antipersonnel mines by members of the Turkish Armed Forces in southeastern Turkey near the border with Iraq, in Sırnak province (April 2009)⁷⁶ and

⁶⁹ After years of conflict, the government of Sudan and the southern-based rebel group the SPLM/A signed a peace agreement on 9 January 2005 that led to a referendum in January 2011 approving self-determination for the South. The Republic of South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011 and the SPLA became the regular army of the new Republic of South Sudan while the SPLM became the governing political party. The northern branch of the SPLM became an independent party in Sudan after the South's secession. See Salma El Wardany, "Sudan Army, Opposition Fighters Clash in Southern Kordofan," *Bloomberg*, 24 September 2011, www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-23/sudan-clashes-resume-in-southern-kordofan-state-smc-reports.html. UN reports stated that both the SAF and the SPLM-N were reported to have laid antipersonnel mines in strategic areas of Kadugli, the capital of South Kordofan state. UNHCR, "Thirteenth periodic report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in the Sudan: Preliminary report on violations of international human rights and humanitarian law in Southern Kordofan from 5 to 30 June 2011," August 2011, para. 25; and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Sudan, South Kordofan – Situation Report No. 12," covering the period 12–17 July 2011, reliefweb.int/report/sudan/south-kordofan-situation-report-no-12.

⁷⁰ During 2012, several mine use allegations in South Kordofan were reported by international media outlets and NGOs (see ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Sudan," www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/find_profile/SS/2013, 2013). The ICBL has expressed "grave concern" at allegations of antipersonnel mine use by armed forces of the Republic of the Sudan in Southern Kordofan and urged the government of Sudan to clarify whether its forces used antipersonnel mines. Letter from Kasia Derlicka, Director, ICBL, to Ali Ahmed Karti, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sudan, 8 March 2012.

⁷¹ Letter from Mohamed Eltaib Ahmed, Chief of Operations, National Mine Action Centre (NMAC) on behalf of the government of the Republic of the Sudan, to the ICBL Director, dated 25 May 2012, and provided to the ICBL by Sudan's Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, 24 May 2012; and intervention of Sudan on compliance, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 24 May 2012. Notes by the ICBL. At a HRW side event briefing on landmine use allegations, the Sudan delegation stated that Sudan would in fact investigate the allegations. Statement by Steve Goose, HRW, for the ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 25 May 2012, www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/25/statement-compliance-mine-ban-treaty.

⁷² "JEM identifies sites in Kordofan where government is burying mines," *Radio Tamazuj*, 2 August 2013, radiotamazuj.org/en/article/jem-identifies-sites-kordofan-where-government-burying-mines.

⁷³ Geneva Call, "Major Sudanese armed group commits against anti-personnel mines," 29 August 2013, www.genevacall.org/sudan-justice-equality-movement-pledges-anti-personnel-mines/.

⁷⁴ Geneva Call, "Sudan: the Justice and Equality Movement pledges against antipersonnel mines," 24 April 2012, www.genevacall.org/sudan-justice-equality-movement-pledges-anti-personnel-mines/. JEM was party to two previous peace agreements in Sudan that prohibited mine use and required cooperation on mine action. See ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Toward a Mine-Free World* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2008), p. 620, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/countries/sudan.html.

⁷⁵ ICRC, "The International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement deplores the death of a Sudanese Red Crescent Society volunteer," 16 February 2014, www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/02-14-sudan-red-crescent-volunteer-death.htm.

⁷⁶ The Turkish newspaper *Taraf* published a document allegedly belonging to the 23rd Gendarmerie Division Command indicating that members of the Turkish Armed Forces laid M2A4 antipersonnel mines in Sırnak province on 9 April 2009. Melis Gönenc, "Mine news became evidence," *Taraf online*, 16 April 2010; and "Allegation: Turkey breaking landmine ban," *United Press International*, 16 April 2010, www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2010/04/16/Allegation-Turkey-breaking-landmine-ban/UPI-19481271424759/.

Hakkari province (May 2009).⁷⁷ In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties regarding the first incident, stating, “A detailed investigation comprising a consequent administrative legal scrutiny were undertaken. Let me share with you, for the record, that there has not been an explosion. Moreover the registry of Turkish Armed Forces shows that the mine allegedly in question was destroyed before the end of 2009, together with the stockpiled ones.”⁷⁸

In the second case, an investigation by the Chief Prosecutor’s Office in Van determined that the mine belonged to the Turkish military and was planted on the orders of a Turkish Commander.⁷⁹ In May 2013, Turkey informed States Parties, “The most recent hearing of the trial was held by this Military Court on April 19, 2013. The court rendered its verdict and sentenced a Turkish Brigadier General to 6 years and 8 months of imprisonment due to ‘causing death and injury by negligence.’” Turkey informed States Parties that this was an initial verdict and not a final decision.⁸⁰

In December 2013, Turkey stated that following reports of an explosion in 2009, one member of its military had been sentenced to more than six years imprisonment following a thorough investigation. According to information provided by Turkey in May 2013, the verdict and sentence are unrelated to Turkey’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, since there was no mention of the illegal use of antipersonnel mines. Turkey also notified States Parties that the case was under appeal.⁸¹ In April 2014, Turkey stated that “confirmed use and allegations of use are two different things. We will continue to be as transparent as possible.”⁸²

⁷⁷ The second case relates to seven Turkish soldiers who were killed and eight wounded by an antipersonnel mine near Çukurca on 27 May 2009. “Askerlere mayınlı tuzak: Altı şehit” (“Tripwire mine incident kills six soldiers”), *Radikal* (Hakkari), 29 May 2009, www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalHaberDetay&ArticleID=938124&Date=29.05.2009&CategoryID=98; and Mustafa Yuksel, “Jandarma, 7 askerın şehit olduđu patlamayı masa başında inceledi” (“Explosion which killed seven soldiers under desk investigation”), *Zaman*, 9 April 2010, www.zaman.com.tr/newsDetail_openPrintPage.action?newsId=971113.

⁷⁸ Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 27 May 2013, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-may13/Speeches-GS/4_COMPLIANCE_Turkey.pdf.

⁷⁹ Metin Arslan, “Last photo of TSK mine victims in Çukurca revealed,” *Today’s Zaman*, 7 May 2010, www.todayszaman.com/national_last-photo-of-tsk-mine-victims-in-cukurca-revealed_209560.html. The case was forwarded to the Turkish General Staff Military Prosecutor’s Office in 2010. According to media accounts, in September 2010 a report on the incident to the military’s prosecutor’s office found that the device used was an “anti-personnel landmine.” Brigadier General Zeki Es, who allegedly ordered the emplacement of the mine, was arrested in November 2010 and a case was opened in the Turkish Martial Court. Metin Arslan and Fatih Karakiliç, “General who planted deadly Çukurca mines sent to jail,” *Today’s Zaman*, 8 November 2010, www.todayszaman.com/newsDetail_getNewsByld.action;jsessionid=C251025604FC927FED73437Do8C4DDE2?newsId=226646&columnistId=0.

⁸⁰ Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 27 May 2013, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-may13/Speeches-GS/4_COMPLIANCE_Turkey.pdf.

⁸¹ Intervention by Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2013. Notes by the ICBL.

⁸² Statement of Turkey, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 9 April 2014. Notes by the ICBL.

Cambodia/Thailand

In March 2013, three Thai soldiers were injured by what the Thai military described as newly planted mines near the Ta Kwai Temple in Phnom Dong Rak district. Cambodia investigated and in its report to States Parties found the mines were old, dating from the Cambodian civil war.⁸³ Cambodia provided a copy of its investigation report to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit and the ICBL at the May 2013 intersessional meetings and to the government of Thailand through diplomatic channels.⁸⁴

Other allegations made by Thailand of Cambodian use of antipersonnel mines on the Cambodian/Thai border in 2008 and 2009 were never resolved.⁸⁵

Stockpile destruction

A total of 156 of the 162 States Parties do not stockpile antipersonnel mines, including 88 States Parties that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 65 that have declared never possessing antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training purposes).

⁸³ See ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Thailand: Mine Ban Policy,” www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/3088, 28 November 2013. According to a request made by the ICBL, Cambodia conducted a fact-finding mission to the site from 10–12 May 2013 that determined the Thai soldiers were injured by mines laid during the Cambodian civil war. It said its soldiers found indications of the incident on the same day, and recorded a GPS reference that differed from the reference declared by the Thai military. Cambodia stated that the incident took place to the side of, not on, a specially cleared path used for military-to-military meetings between the Thai and Cambodian military in the area. The Cambodian delegation provided copies of the report at the May 2013 intersessional meeting in Geneva.

⁸⁴ Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Compliance, Geneva, 30 May 2013. Notes by the ICBL; and Investigation Report on Thailand’s Allegation of New Mines Laid by Cambodia, 17 May 2013. Report copy provided to ICBL at the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meeting, 31 May 2013. Report prepared by a five-person team from the Cambodian Mine Action Authority and the Cambodian National Center for Peacekeeping Forces and ERW Clearance.

⁸⁵ In October 2008, two Thai soldiers stepped on antipersonnel mines while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. Thai authorities maintained that the area was previously clear of mines and that the mines had been newly placed by Cambodian forces. Cambodia denied the charges and stated that the Thai soldiers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts. In April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries. In September 2009, Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, Gen. Anupong Paochinda, stated that Cambodian troops were laying fresh mines along the disputed areas and close to routes where Thai soldiers make regular patrols. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2009*, pp. 243–244, 719–720, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2009/; and ICBL, “Country Profile: Cambodia: Mine Ban Policy,” www.the-monitor.org/index.php/cp/display/region_profiles/theme/617, 6 August 2010.

The status is unclear for three others, but they are not thought to stockpile:

- Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.⁸⁶
- New State Party Oman will declare any stocks when it submits its initial transparency report due by 31 July 2015.⁸⁷
- Somalia, while initially declaring not to possess any antipersonnel mines, is undertaking a stockpile inventory to determine if it currently possesses any antipersonnel mines.

Of the remaining six States Parties with stockpiles, Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after having failed to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline.⁸⁸ Finland and Poland are in the process of destroying their stockpiles. Guinea-Bissau apparently still needs to destroy a small quantity of antipersonnel mines that were discovered after its 1 November 2005 deadline had passed.

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 48 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than one million destroyed in 2013. In February 2014, Côte d'Ivoire completed the destruction of the 1,526 antipersonnel mines of four types found during an inventory inspection.

Six States Parties possess more than nine million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (5,767,600), Belarus (3,356,636), Greece (452,695), Finland (55,181), Poland (16,957), and Guinea-Bissau (at least seven mines).

Stockpile destruction deadlines

Somalia	1 October 2016
Finland	1 July 2016
Poland	1 June 2017

Finland has completed more than 95% of its stockpile destruction and was on track to finish the destruction by the end of 2015. It states that a total of 744,891 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in 2013, a significant increase from the 200,000 mines destroyed in 2012.⁸⁹

In June 2014, Poland reiterated previous announcements first made in 2012 that it had already completed destroying more than one million antipersonnel mines or 97% of its stockpile and that

stockpile destruction would be completed “well before the 2017 deadline.”⁹⁰

The inability of Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine to complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep concern for States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 calls on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states to provide a plan for the destruction of their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.

Belarus

Belarus reported in April 2014 that Spanish company Explosivos Alaveses SA (EXPAL) had completed the construction of the destruction facility and that personnel were testing and adjusting equipment. Belarus announced that EXPAL destroyed the first mines at the facility on 26 March 2014 when it conducted two tests that destroyed two KSF-1 canisters, each containing 144 PFM-1 mines.⁹¹ In June 2014, Belarus announced that the facility opened in May 2014 and was expected to reach its planned operational capacity of the destruction of 8,500 mines a day by the end of June.⁹² Belarus stressed its full support for the convention's goals and pledged to spare no effort to complete its obligations “in the near future” but did not provide a timeline for the expected completion of the stockpile destruction.⁹³

Greece

Greece announced in June 2014 that 239,112 mines had been transferred to the VIDEX facility in Bulgaria, where 107,058 DM31 mines had been destroyed.⁹⁴ It stated that Hellenic Defence Systems S.A. (EAS) and VIDEX were expected to complete destruction of the stockpile by the end of 2015 “notwithstanding...any future unforeseen circumstances.” EAS estimated that the transfer of the stockpile to Bulgaria would be completed by 18 August 2014, the date on which the contract expired.

In October 2014, a Greek official informed the ICBL that a total of 452,695 antipersonnel mines remained in Greek stockpiles awaiting transfer for destruction. A total of 500,590 mines were transferred to Bulgaria for destruction, but the destruction process halted after a series of explosions on 1 October 2014 demolished the Bulgarian facility, killing 15 workers (13 men and two women).⁹⁵ The blasts completely obliterated the factory,

⁸⁶ Tuvalu stated in 2002 that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.

⁸⁷ An Omani official informed the Monitor in 2007 that the country's stockpile consists of fewer than 2,000 antipersonnel mines, and that there had been no new procurement of mines in more than 20 years. Interview with Staff Cmdr. Maj. Elbarami, Ministry of Defence, Mine Ban Treaty Eighth Meeting of States Parties at the Dead Sea, 19 November 2007.

⁸⁸ Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.

⁸⁹ Statement of Finland, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 23 June 2014. Previously at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013, Finland reported that stockpile destruction was 90% completed. Statement of Finland, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2013.

⁹⁰ Statement of Poland, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.

⁹¹ Statement of Belarus, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Standing Committee Meetings, Geneva, 11 April 2014. Notes by ICBL.

⁹² Statement of Belarus, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014. Notes by the Monitor.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 27 June 2014.

⁹⁴ Statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.

⁹⁵ Email from Yannis Mallikourtis, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN in Geneva, to Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 22 October 2014.

leaving behind two craters the size of football fields and scattering debris over several hundred feet from the site.⁹⁶

The cause of the explosions could not immediately be determined, however Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev blamed the incident on “arrogant nonobservance” of safety procedures.⁹⁷ Two months prior to the incident, Bulgarian officials raised serious concerns about safety breaches at the plant.⁹⁸ There had been at least three previous unplanned explosions at the destruction facility in 2006, 2007, and 2010, which caused fatalities and injured six people, and in 2010, destroyed two buildings.⁹⁹

It appears that all mines present at the facility at the time of the explosion on 1 October 2014 were destroyed, but some could remain at the site as unexploded ordnance. Greece has yet to announce a new plan for the destruction of its remaining 452,695 mines, but an official informed the ICBL that it intends to submit a revised destruction plan to States Parties by the end of 2014, as called for in Action 5 of the Maputo Action Plan.¹⁰⁰

Ukraine

Ukraine and the NATO Support Agency (NSPA)¹⁰¹ signed an agreement on 21 September 2011 to implement a project to destroy 2.7 million PFM mines in cassettes and blocks using €2.35 million (US\$3.27 million) in funding coming from the EU through a NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund over a period of three years.¹⁰² It has since reported a number of bureaucratic issues leading to repeated delays in the transfer of these funds from the EU. Additionally, Ukraine has not provided clear information on plans to destroy the three million PFM mines contained in 220mm rocket warheads not covered by its agreement with NPSA, nor has Ukraine publicly announced plans to destroy its stockpile of 149,096 POM-2 mines.¹⁰³

In its 2014 Article 7 transparency report, Ukraine reported the destruction of 332,352 PFM mines in 2013 with funds provided by Germany.¹⁰⁴

The impact on the stockpile destruction program of the political and military conflict currently gripping Ukraine is not known.

Mines retained for training and research (Article 3)

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 73 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 39 have retained more than 1,000 mines and three (Finland, Bangladesh, and Turkey) have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-four States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 31 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past. A total of 31% of the States Parties that retain mines failed to submit an annual transparency report for calendar year 2013, which was due by 30 April 2014.

Reporting is necessary to understand the intended purposes or actual uses of retained mines. Because of this lack of information, it is not possible to present a total figure of mines retained for 2013 that would serve as a basis of meaningful comparison for previous years.

Key updates from calendar year 2013 were:

- Bhutan submitted its first report since 2008, showing a reduction of 4,001 mines.
- Slovenia eliminated 89% of its retained mines, putting it below the 1,000-mine threshold.
- Bosnia and Herzegovina eliminated 40% of its retained mines, putting it below the 1,000-mine threshold.
- Australia eliminated more than 40% of its retained mines, a total of 1,870 mines.
- Brazil eliminated nearly 20% of its retained mines, a total of 1,336 mines.
- Slovenia eliminated nearly all of its retained mines, a total of 2,619 mines.

In addition to those listed on the following page, an additional 33 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines and together possess a total of 13,959 retained mines.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁶ Georgi Kantchev, “After Deadly Blast, Bulgaria Asks If Arms Disposal Is Worth It,” *The New York Times*, 2 October 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/world/europe/deadly-blasts-in-bulgaria-rip-through-plant-decommissioning-land-mines.html.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Tsvetelia Tsoleva and Stoyan Nenov, “Blasts kill 15 people at Bulgaria explosives plant,” *Reuters*, 2 October 2014, www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/02/us-bulgaria-blast-idUSKCN0HR12Q20141002.

⁹⁹ Georgi Kantchev, “After Deadly Blast, Bulgaria Asks If Arms Disposal Is Worth It,” *The New York Times*, 2 October 2014, www.nytimes.com/2014/10/03/world/europe/deadly-blasts-in-bulgaria-rip-through-plant-decommissioning-land-mines.html; and Sean Carney, “Bulgarian Munitions Factory Blast Kills 15,” *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 October 2014, <http://online.wsj.com/articles/no-survivors-likely-in-bulgarian-munitions-factory-blast-1412257715>.

¹⁰⁰ Email from Yannis Mallikourts, Permanent Mission of Greece to the UN in Geneva, to Tamar Gabelnick, ICBL, 22 October 2014.

¹⁰¹ In June 2011, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), which had previously been engaged with Ukraine for stockpile destruction, was reorganized and renamed NSPA.

¹⁰² The agreement is Phase II of a broader €25 million (\$35 million) demilitarization project being conducted under the auspices of NATO/PfP and numerous NATO member states. Interview with NAMSA Representative, Kiev, 8 November 2011; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties, Phnom Penh, 1 December 2011, www.apminebanconvention.org/meetings-of-the-states-parties/11msp/what-happened/day-5-thursday-1-december/statements/. Average exchange rate for 2011: €1=US\$1.3931. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2012.

¹⁰³ Statement of the ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 27 May 2013.

¹⁰⁴ Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 1 April 2014, [www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/D594702AoE4C212EC1257B4A004C38B3/\\$file/Ukraine+2012.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/D594702AoE4C212EC1257B4A004C38B3/$file/Ukraine+2012.pdf).

¹⁰⁵ States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines under Article 3: Angola (972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Bosnia and Herzegovina (865), Jordan (850), Argentina (841), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), Portugal (694), Italy (628), South Africa (576), Cyprus (500), Bhutan (490), Zimbabwe (450), Nicaragua (448), Togo (436), United Kingdom (371), Slovenia (361), Congo (322), Ethiopia (303), Cote d'Ivoire (290), Lithuania (269), Uruguay (260), Cape Verde (120), Iraq (107), Eritrea (101), Ecuador (100), Gambia (100), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (16), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).

States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

State	Last total declared (for year)	Initial declaration	Consumed during 2013	Year of last declared consumption	Total quantity reduced as excess to need
Finland	16,500 (2013)	16,500	0	None ever	—
Turkey	14,944 (2013)	16,000	97	2013	—
Bangladesh	12,050 (2013)	15,000	450	2013	—
Sweden	6,235 (2013)	13,948	695	2013	—
Greece	6,142 (2013)	7,224	16	2013	—
Belarus	6,022 (2013)	7,530	0	2012	—
Algeria	5,970 (2013)	15,030	0	2009	—
Croatia	5,714 (2013)	17,500	3	2013	—
Brazil	5,251 (2013)	17,000	1,336	2013	—
Venezuela	4,874 (2011)	4,960	Not reported	2010	—
Tunisia	4,770 (2013)	5,000	70	2013	—
France	3,958 (2013)	4,539	0	2012	—
Yemen	3,760 (2013)	4,000	0	2008	—
Bulgaria	3,557 (2013)	10,466	115	2013	6,446
Nigeria	3,364 (2011)	3,364	Not reported	None ever	—
Thailand	3,227 (2013)	15,604	123	2013	4,517
Serbia	3,149 (2013)	5,000	0	2011	1,970
Djibouti	2,996 (2004)	2,996	Not reported	None ever	—
Chile	2,925 (2013)	28,647	87	2013	23,694
Cambodia	2,827 (2013)	701	0	Unclear	—
Belgium	2,564 (2013)	5,980	5	2013	—
Indonesia	2,454 (2013)	4,978	0	2009	2,524
Romania	2,395 (2013)	4,000	105	2013	1,500
Czech Rep.	2,301 (2013)	4,859	59	2013	—
Peru	2,015 (2013)	9,526	0	2012	7,487
Japan	1,930 (2013)	15,000	231	2013	—
Canada	1,909 (2013)	1,781	12	2013	—
Germany	1,880 (2013)	3,006	231	2013	—
Denmark	1,820 (2013)	4,991	12	2013	2,900
Tanzania	1,780 (2008)	1,146	Not reported	2007	—
Uganda	1,764 (2011)	2,400	Not reported	2003	—
Spain	1,691 (2013)	10,000	19	2013	6,000
Namibia	1,634 (2009)	9,999	Not reported	2009	—
Netherlands	1,557 (2013)	4,076	193	2013	—
Mozambique	1,363 (2013)	1,427	0	2012	260
Australia	1,264 (2013)	10,000	1,870	2013	7,033
Slovakia	1,220 (2013)	7,000	52	2013	5,500
Kenya	1,020 (2007)	3,000	Not reported	2007	—
Botswana	1,019 (2011)	1,019	Not reported	Unclear	—
Partial Total	151,815	315,197	5,781		69,831

A major concern for the ICBL is the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities, which is typically the case for most countries, and no other details have been provided about how the mines are being used. Eight States Parties have never reported consuming any

mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.

Numerous States Parties have reported decreases in the number of mines retained, but only a few have explained the reductions in their transparency reports. Among the states that reduced the number of mines retained without explanation for calendar year 2013 were Bhutan (4,001 fewer mines), Bosnia and Herzegovina

(759 fewer mines), Brazil (1,336 fewer mines), Czech Republic (59 fewer mines), Lithuania (36 fewer mines), the Netherlands (193 fewer mines), Slovakia (52 fewer mines), Thailand (123 fewer mines), and Turkey (97 fewer mines).

Three States Parties increased the number of their retained mines in the reporting period. Cambodia retained an additional 1,637 mines cleared in its demining operations. Senegal's total increased by 13 mines. France retained an additional two mines.

While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty:

- Australia keeps no serviceable detonators for more than 1,200 retained mines in stock.
- Canada reported it has transferred 84 mines from Afghanistan without fuzes.
- Serbia reported that 1,045 of its mines were fuzeless.
- Cambodia has 60 antipersonnel mines without fuzes in training fields maintained by NGOs.
- Lithuania reported it has 269 mines with command controlled fuzes, which are not covered under the treaty.
- France reported it has 75 mines that either do not have detonators, igniters, or are otherwise incapable of functioning.
- Eritrea, France, Germany, Mozambique, and Senegal also reported that some of the mines they retained were inert or fuzeless, or were otherwise incapable of functioning as antipersonnel mines.

A total of 22 States Parties have over time used expanded Form D of annual transparency reports to voluntarily report additional information on retained mines.¹⁰⁶

Transparency reporting

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party "report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party" regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

During the reporting period, September 2013 to October 2014, an initial report was submitted by Equatorial Guinea (originally due 28 August 1999)

and Liberia provided its first annual update since the submission of its initial report in October 2004. Oman's initial transparency report is due by 31 July 2015. Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012) has never submitted an initial report.

As of 1 October 2014, only 52% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar year 2013. Encouragingly, three States Parties (Bhutan, Burkina Faso, and Liberia) submitted an annual transparency report in 2013 after not turning in a report for two or more years.

Of the 77 States Parties¹⁰⁷ that have failed to meet this legal obligation, 62 have failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more years. Among the States Parties that did not submit reports for 2013 are five States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations (Ethiopia, Niger, Palau, Somalia, and Tajikistan).

No state submitted a voluntary report in 2014. In previous years, Morocco (2006, 2008–2011, and 2013), Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Laos (2010), Mongolia (2007), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary reports.

Treaty meetings

Two major meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty took place in the reporting period: the Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique on 23–27 June 2014 and the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty held at the UN in Geneva on 2–6 December 2013.

Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties

A total of 115 states attended the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties: 101 States Parties and observer delegations from 14 states not party to the treaty.¹⁰⁸ An ICBL delegation of more than 150 campaigners, including landmine and cluster munition survivors, participated in the meeting.

The meeting's opening ceremony featured remarks by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon delivered by the UN Geneva Office Acting Director Michael Møller, and addresses by ICRC Vice President Christine Beerli, Nobel Peace laureate Jody Williams for the ICBL, and Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) President Barbara Haering.

The Permanent Representative of Algeria to the UN in Geneva Ambassador Boudjemâa Delmi, was appointed president of the Thirteenth Meeting of States

¹⁰⁶ Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, Gambia, Germany, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Romania, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Zambia. Some States Parties on this list only used some voluntary elements of Form D.

¹⁰⁷ Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroun, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Montenegro, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niger, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zambia.

¹⁰⁸ The 14 states not party were: China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Palestine, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and US.

Parties. During the meeting, four States Parties—Bhutan, Germany, Hungary, and Venezuela—declared the completion of mine clearance, fulfilling their Article 5 mine clearance obligations. The meeting granted mine clearance deadline extension requests to six states: Chad (until 2020), Mozambique (2014), Niger (2015), Serbia (2019), Sudan (2019), and Turkey (2022).

The three States Parties that remain in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty for missing their deadlines for destroying stockpiled antipersonnel mines—Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine—all reported on their stockpile destruction efforts. The meeting requested that Yemen undertake an investigation and report back on reported antipersonnel mine use. It issued a Geneva Progress Report, detailing mid-term progress in implementing the 2010–2014 Cartagena Action Plan adopted by the Second Review Conference in 2009.

Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty

The Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty was held in Maputo on 23–27 June 2014. A total of 92 states attended: 81 States Parties and observer delegations from 11 states not party to the treaty.¹⁰⁹ The conference's opening ceremony included remarks by Mozambican President Armando Guebuza as well as the governor of Maputo and Mozambican landmine survivors. The Maputo Review Conference included a two-day “high-level segment” with statements and official endorsements of a “Maputo +15 Declaration” that both marks progress achieved over the past 15 years since Mozambique hosted the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 1999 and also urges states to move toward completion of the treaty's time-bound obligations “with the urgency that the completion work requires” and “to meet these goals to the fullest extent possible by 2025.”

Mozambique's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Henrique Banze was elected President of the Third Review Conference, a position he will serve until the end of 2014 when Belgium takes the role as president-designate of the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties.

States Parties Belarus, Greece, Finland, and Poland gave updates on their progress in stockpile destruction while the conference granted Article 5 mine-clearance deadline extensions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (by 2021), Eritrea (2020), Yemen (2020), and Zimbabwe (2018). State Party Ethiopia was not present and failed to provide an extension request for its June 2015 clearance deadline.

The Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty will be held at the UN in Geneva on 30 November–4 December 2015, while intersessional Standing Committee meetings are next scheduled for 4–5 June 2015.

¹⁰⁹ The 11 states not party were: China, Egypt, India, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and US.



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Mine Action

The international mine action community has made significant strides toward putting an end to the suffering caused by antipersonnel mines. As of October 2014, 28 states and one other area have declared themselves cleared of mines since the treaty entered into force in 1999, and more do so with every passing year.

While the amount of clearance dropped in 2013, the ICBL believes that more than 200km² of mined area could be cleared annually and that the remaining antipersonnel mine threat could be removed in almost every State Party within 10 years if operators, donors, and national authorities employ the right resources in the right way.

Summary of Progress in 2013–2014

As of October 2014, 56 states and four other areas still have an identified threat from antipersonnel mines. Of the 56 affected states, 32 are party to the Mine Ban Treaty. A further six States Parties had either suspected or residual mine contamination.

Three States Parties formally declared completion of clearance of all known mined areas in 2013: Bhutan, Hungary, and Venezuela, bringing the total to 28 plus one other area. In the first half of 2013, Greece had reported that its verification efforts in a previously mined area in Rhodes had been completed in March 2013. Burundi announced in April 2014 that it had completed survey and clearance of its remaining suspected mined areas and reiterated this announcement in June 2014. Jordan reported completion of clearance in 2013, but it appears that it still has mined areas containing antipersonnel mines to release and therefore should seek a further extension to its Article 5 deadline.

Six States Parties—Chad, Mozambique, Niger,¹ Serbia, Sudan, and Turkey—submitted deadline extension requests in 2013 that were approved at the

¹ Niger submitted its request in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of a state's Article 5 deadline.

Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013. Germany withdrew its extension request submitted in April 2013 having found no mines in an area previously reported as having suspected contamination.² A further four States Parties submitted Article 5 deadline Extension Requests in 2014 that were subsequently approved at the Third Review Conference: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.³ In addition, Ethiopia had indicated that it would submit an extension request, but this has not yet been received as of 1 November 2014.⁴

In 2013, mine action programs released at least 185km² of mined areas⁵ through clearance and survey. In 2012, mine action programs released at least 200km² of mined areas.

Mine-Affected States and Other Areas

As of October 2014, 56 states and four other areas still have an identified threat from antipersonnel mines. In most cases (32) contamination is on territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party.

² Germany, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014, [www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/A838DA4E60D93E1DC1257CD000442E9D/\\$file/Germany+2013.pdf](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/A838DA4E60D93E1DC1257CD000442E9D/$file/Germany+2013.pdf).

³ APLC/CONF/2014/CRP.1, Final Draft Document, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, 27 June 2014, pp. 6–10, www.maputoreview-conference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf.

⁴ In its statement to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance on 9 April 2014, Ethiopia stated that it would request a two-year extension of its clearance deadline, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/IM-apr14/4_ARTICLE_5_EXTENSION_SUBMITTED_2014_-_Ethiopia.pdf. By June 2014 at the Third Reference Conference, however, a request had not yet been received: “Report on the Analysis of Requests for Extensions to Article 5 Deadlines,” Third Review Conference, Maputo, 23 June 2014, pp. 1 and 2, www.maputoreview-conference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Article5-analysis-report-23Jun2014.pdf.

⁵ The term “clearance of mined areas” refers to physical clearance to humanitarian standards of an area to a specified depth using manual deminers, mine detection dogs, and/or machines to detect and destroy (or remove for later destruction) all explosive devices found.

▲ *Children walk by a landmine-contaminated area in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2014, the country was granted a second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, committing to clear all known mined areas by 1 January 2021.*

Mine-affected states and other areas with confirmed mined areas as of October 2014

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Angola	Argentina*	Afghanistan	Armenia	Algeria
Chad	Chile	Cambodia	Azerbaijan	Egypt
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Colombia	China	Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Jordan**
Eritrea	Cuba	India	Croatia	Iran
Ethiopia	Ecuador	Lao PDR	Cyprus	Iraq
Mauritania	Peru	Myanmar	Georgia	Israel
Mozambique		North Korea	Kyrgyzstan	Lebanon
Niger		Pakistan	Russia	Libya
Senegal		South Korea	Serbia	Morocco
Somalia		Sri Lanka	Tajikistan	Palestine
South Sudan		Thailand	Turkey	Syria
Sudan		Vietnam	United Kingdom*	Yemen
Zimbabwe			Uzbekistan	<i>Western Sahara</i>
<i>Somaliland</i>			<i>Kosovo</i>	
			<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics

* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, which still contain mined areas

** Jordan reported completion of clearance in 2013, but it also reports ongoing survey and clearance of areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines

States and other areas with suspected or residual mine contamination

In addition to states in which mine contamination is confirmed, a further six states—all of which are party to the Mine Ban Treaty—have either suspected or residual mine contamination. These States Parties have an obligation to make “every effort” to identify mined areas under their jurisdiction or control that contain antipersonnel mines and then to clear any that they find. In cases when they are unable to complete this work within their Article 5 deadline, they must request an extension in order to remain in compliance with the treaty.

Extent of contamination

The Monitor does not publish a global table of mine contamination by state because it believes that many of the estimates cited by states are far higher than the true extent of contamination. Instead, an order of magnitude for contamination as of October 2014 is given.

Today, massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by the Monitor as more than 100km²) is believed to exist only in Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Turkey, and very probably also in Iraq. Heavy antipersonnel mine contamination (more than 20km² and up to 100km²) is believed to exist in several states: Angola, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.⁶ The situation in Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam is not known, but may also be heavy. Other states have either medium contamination (more than 3km² and up to 20km²) or light (up to 3km²).

⁶ According to the Landmine Monitor’s assessment of actual antipersonnel mine contamination.

Mine clearance in 2013

There are continuing problems in discerning true mine clearance from battle area clearance (BAC) or land release by survey, in large part because of the poor quality of record-keeping and reporting.⁷ However, the Monitor has determined that at least 185km² of mined areas were cleared in 2013 (compared with at least 200km² in 2012), with the destruction of approximately 275,000 antipersonnel mines and 4,500 antivehicle mines. This global clearance figure is conservative and understates the extent of clearance due to the fact that several states do not report while others do not disaggregate clearance figures.⁸ The largest total clearance of mined areas was achieved in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Croatia, which together accounted for 75% of recorded clearance.

Over the past five years, approximately 200km² of mined area has been cleared to international standards each year. Overall, five years of clearance operations have resulted in the clearance of approximately 973km² of mined area and the destruction of more than 1.48 million antipersonnel mines and 107,000 antivehicle mines as well as countless items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).

⁷ For example, states as well as certain demining operators sometimes report cancellation by non-technical survey (NTS) as clearance. Furthermore, despite reported release of large areas of land, conducting NTS of possibly contaminated areas does not constitute land release, according to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

⁸ Far greater land release is achieved through cancellation by NTS or reduction by technical survey (TS) than by physical clearance. Some states do not disaggregate clearance from cancellation by NTS or reduction by TS. Where states have not disaggregated clearance data, the Monitor has not included their reported figures.

States with suspected or residual contamination as of October 2014

Africa	Asia-Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Djibouti Namibia	Palau Philippines	Moldova	Oman

States and other areas fully capable of clearance by end of 2019

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Democratic DRC Eritrea Ethiopia Mauritania Mozambique Niger Senegal Somalia South Sudan* Sudan* Zimbabwe <i>Somaliland</i>	Argentina** Chile Colombia Cuba Ecuador Peru	China India Pakistan South Korea* Sri Lanka	Armenia Croatia Cyprus* Georgia* Kyrgyzstan Russia Serbia Tajikistan Turkey* United Kingdom** Uzbekistan <i>Kosovo</i> <i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Algeria Egypt Jordan Iran Libya Morocco Palestine Yemen* <i>Western Sahara</i>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas in *italics*

* Clearance subject to adequate security and control of territory, but all mined areas under effective control can be cleared (or have been cleared, such as in the case of Cyprus)

** Without prejudice to the sovereignty dispute between Argentina and the UK on the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, if the UK clears the islands in accordance with its international obligations, Argentina's legal obligations under Article 5 will also be complete

Major mine clearance programs in 2013

State	Mined area cleared (km ²)	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed
Afghanistan	60.1	19,181	752
Algeria	5.5	76,283	0
Angola	3.8	3,820	861
Azerbaijan	4.7	10	117
Cambodia	45.9	21,618	498
BiH	1.9	1,700	100
Croatia	32.3	1,771	775
Iraq*	5.3	8,552	323
Israel	2.2	34,006	122
Jordan	1.2	238	24
Sri Lanka	6.4	72,296	287
South Sudan	4.9	845	215
Sudan	2.6	1,053	254
Tajikistan	0.9	22,486	3
Thailand	0.3	2,142	60
Zimbabwe	0.8	6,052	0
Total	178.8	272,053	4,391

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**

* Only partial results were obtained for Iraq, so the true clearance figures are higher

Mine clearance in 2009–2013 (km²)

Year	Mined area cleared	Antipersonnel mines destroyed	Antivehicle mines destroyed
2013	185	275,000	4,500
2012	200	240,000	9,300
2011	190	325,000	29,900
2010	200	388,000	27,000
2009	198	255,000	37,000
Total	973	1,483,000	107,700

Within the next five years, the Monitor believes that 24 States Parties and 16 states not party, as well as four other areas, are fully capable of completing clearance.

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Obligations

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties have specific international legal obligations to find, clear, and destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas within a defined time period. Twenty-eight states and one other area have declared themselves cleared of mines since the treaty entered into force in 1999,⁹ and more

⁹ States Parties that have completed their Article 5 obligations are listed in the table "States Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation since 1999." In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999.

do so with every passing year. In 2013, Bhutan, Hungary, and Venezuela completed clearance of all known areas containing antipersonnel mines. Germany declared it was in compliance with Article 5 after verifying that there were no antipersonnel mines in an area previously reported as suspected of contamination.¹⁰ Greece, which had already declared completion of Article 5 obligations in 2009, completed verification of a suspected area without finding any contamination. Similarly, Burundi, which had reported additional suspected mined areas after declaring completion of its Article 5 obligations in 2011, announced that its subsequent survey and clearance efforts in 2014 had been completed.¹¹ In addition, Montenegro has still formally to report completion of its Article 5 obligations.

States Parties that have completed Article 5 implementation since 1999

Albania	Gambia	Nicaragua
Bhutan	Germany	Nigeria
Bulgaria	Greece	Rwanda
Burundi	Guatemala	Suriname
Congo	Guinea-Bissau	Swaziland
Costa Rica	Honduras	Tunisia
Denmark	Hungary	Uganda
France	Malawi	Venezuela
FYR Macedonia	Montenegro	Zâmbia

States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires each State Party to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. Ensuring full compliance with these mine clearance obligations is one of the greatest challenges faced by States Parties to the treaty.

Thirty-eight States Parties, as set out in the table below, were confirmed or suspected to be affected by antipersonnel mines as of October 2014 and therefore had obligations under Article 5 of the treaty.

Six states listed above have not declared that they have (or still have) Article 5 obligations, but the Monitor believes they may be mine-affected and thus their fulfillment of their treaty obligations may be in doubt:

Djibouti,¹² Namibia,¹³ Moldova,¹⁴ Oman,¹⁵ Palau,¹⁶ and the Philippines.¹⁷

Jordan officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations on 24 April 2012 and submitted its formal declaration of completion to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2012.¹⁸ However, Jordan acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas where landmines have been emplaced.”¹⁹ Verification and clearance continued in 2012 in the Jordan Valley as well as along the northern border with Syria. Jordan said it expected verification efforts to continue for a further two years.²⁰ Jordan stated at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference that an additional 4.5km² remains to be verified in the Jordan Valley while its verification work on its northern border has been suspended since February 2013 in light of the conflict in Syria.²¹

¹² Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict between Djibouti and Eritrea in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.

¹³ Despite a statement by Namibia given at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.

¹⁴ Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert its jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC_june08/Speeches-GS/SCGS-Universalization-2june08-Moldova-en.pdf.

¹⁵ Oman may have residual mine/UXO contamination stemming from a 1964–1975 internal conflict. The Mine Ban Treaty enters into force for Oman on 1 February 2015 and its initial report declaring any mined areas will be due by 31 July 2015.

¹⁶ Palau submitted an Article 7 report in 2011 in which it declared for the first time that it had areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory. In its 2012 Article 7 report, Palau reported suspected contamination in the Umubrogol Mountains (on Bloody Nose Ridge). In May 2013, Palau reported that two mine clearance operators were working in Palau to clear UXO, including land and sea mines, but that it faced a “bottle neck from the government permitting bodies due to lack of Standard Operating Procedures and the technical knowledge to review and approve clearance methodologies.”

¹⁷ The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.

¹⁸ “Declaration of completion of implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling and transfer of antipersonnel mines and on their destruction,” submitted by Jordan, 4 December 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-may12/Speeches-MC/2_ARTICLE_5_COMPLETED_-_Jordan.pdf.

¹⁹ “Jordan becomes the first Middle Eastern country free of all known landmines,” Press Release, Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit (ISU), 24 April 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/press-releases/PressRelease-Jordan-24Apr2012.pdf.

²⁰ Statement of Jordan, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 29 May 2013, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-may13/Speeches-MC/6_ARTICLE_5_DISCOVERED_AFTER_DEADLINES_-_Jordan.pdf.

²¹ Statement of Jordan, Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 24 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_Jordan.pdf.

¹⁰ Statement of Germany, Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2014, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/MSP/13MSP/day3/11b_ARTICLE_5_COMPLETED_-_Germany.pdf.

¹¹ Burundi had previously declared itself “mine-free” at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in 2011. Burundi subsequently reported the discovery of new suspected mined areas at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties. Following technical and non-technical survey in 2013, Burundi reported at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in April 2014 that all areas had been cleared of mines as of one day before its official Article 5 deadline of 1 April 2014. Burundi reiterated their achievements at the Third Review Conference but, as of 31 October 2014, has had not yet submitted a voluntary declaration of completion as recommended by States Parties at the 7th Meeting of States Parties, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/IWP/SC-may13/Speeches-MC/5_ARTICLE_5_OTHER_STATES_PARTIES_-_Burundi.pdf.

States Parties with outstanding Article 5 obligations

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Angola	Argentina	Afghanistan	BiH	Algeria
Chad	Chile	Cambodia	Croatia	Iraq
Djibouti	Colombia	Palau	Cyprus	Jordan
DRC	Ecuador	Philippines	Moldova	Oman
Eritrea	Peru*	Thailand	Serbia	Yemen
Ethiopia			Tajikistan	
Mauritania			Turkey	
Mozambique			United Kingdom	
Namibia				
Niger				
Senegal				
Somalia				
South Sudan				
Sudan				
Zimbabwe				
15 States Parties	5 States Parties	5 States Parties	8 States Parties	5 States Parties

States Parties and Article 5 deadline extensions

Significant challenges remain in implementing the Mine Ban Treaty’s survey and clearance obligations; the number of Article 5 deadline Extension Requests that have been made far exceed the number of States Parties that have declared completion of their Article 5 obligations.

As mentioned above, in accordance with Article 5 states are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years under Article 5.3.

However, in accordance with Action 27 of the Nairobi Action Plan adopted at the First Review Conference in 2004, States Parties committed to “strive to ensure that few, if any, States Parties will feel compelled to request an extension.”²² The Cartagena Action Plan adopted at the Second Review Conference in 2009 went further, stating that extensions should only be needed “due to exceptional circumstances.”²³ These are clear indications that States Parties believe that deadline extensions should be the exception and not the rule. Considering the high percentage of states granted, or seeking, deadline extensions—some for the second, third, and in one case, fourth time—as well as the number that will likely need extensions in the future, the ICBL has called

on States Parties to act with greater urgency in fulfilling their clearance obligations, and has noted that the trend toward requesting extensions has been “disappointing.”²⁴

As of October 2014, 33 States Parties in total have requested deadline extensions since 2009, of which only seven have reported completion of their Article 5 obligations: Congo, Denmark, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Nicaragua, Uganda, and Venezuela. Seven States Parties have requested multiple extensions since 2009: Chad (three extensions), Denmark (two extensions), DRC (two extensions), Eritrea (two extensions), Mozambique (two extensions), Yemen (two extensions), and Zimbabwe (four extensions). Of these, DRC, Eritrea, Yemen, and Zimbabwe submitted deadline extension requests in 2014.

Of the 32 States Parties with outstanding Article 5 clearance obligations²⁵ (not including those States Parties deemed by the Monitor to have suspected or residual risk of contamination), a highly disappointing 72% (23) have current deadline extensions in place.²⁶

Many of the States Parties granted extensions to their Article 5 deadlines have since made only limited progress and risk not being able to complete the plans they put forward along with their extension requests. The ICBL has called on states that have fallen significantly behind the benchmarks they laid out in their extension requests to submit revised plans to States Parties.²⁷

²² “Final Report, Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” Nairobi, 29 November–3 December 2004, APLC/CONF/2004/5, 9 February 2005, p. 99: Part III: “Ending the suffering caused by anti-personnel mines: the Nairobi Action Plan 2005–2009,” www.nairobi-summit.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC1/prep_mtgs/2nd_prep_june04/draft_action_plan_en.pdf.

²³ “Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-personnel Mines,” 11 December 2009, p. 4, www.cartagena-summit.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC2/2RC-ActionPlanFINAL-UNOFFICIAL-11Dec2009.pdf.

²⁴ “ICBL Comments on Mine Clearance,” Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/MSP/12MSP/day3/10bi_ARTICLE_5_OTHER_STATES_PARTIES_COMMENTS_-_ICBL.pdf.

²⁵ See table on “Mine-affected states and other areas with confirmed mined areas as of October 2014.”

²⁶ Contaminated States Parties still within their initial deadlines include: Ethiopia (2015), Iraq (2018), South Sudan (2021), and Somalia (2022).

²⁷ Statement by ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2012, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/MSP/12MSP/day3/10bi_ARTICLE_5_OTHER_STATES_PARTIES_COMMENTS_-_ICBL.pdf.

An overview of the status of Article 5 deadline extensions*

States Parties	Original deadline	Extension period	Deadline	Status
Afghanistan	1 March 2013	10 years	1 March 2023	Unclear
Algeria	1 April 2012	5 years	1 April 2017	On track
Angola	1 January 2013	5 years	1 January 2018	On track
Argentina	1 March 2010	10 years	1 March 2020	No change since extension requested
BiH	1 March 2009	10 years	1 March 2019	Not on track
Cambodia	1 January 2010	10 years	1 January 2020	Not on track
Chad	1 November 2009	14 months (1st extn.) 3 years (2nd extn.) 6 years (3rd extn.)	1 January 2020	Not on track
Chile	1 March 2012	8 years	1 March 2020	On track
Colombia	1 March 2011	10 years	1 March 2021	Not on track
Congo	1 November 2011	14 months	1 January 2013	Completed
Croatia	1 March 2009	10 years	1 March 2019	Not on track
Cyprus	1 July 2013	3 years	1 July 2016	Unclear
Denmark	1 March 2009	22 months (1st extn.) 18 months (2nd extn.)	1 July 2012	Completed
DRC	1 November 2012	26 months (1st extn.) 6 years (2nd extn.)	1 January 2021	Unclear
Ecuador	1 October 2009	8 years	1 October 2017	Not on track
Eritrea	1 February 2012	3 years (1st extn.) 5 years (2nd extn.)	1 February 2020	Unclear
Guinea-Bissau	1 November 2011	2 months	1 January 2012	Completed
Jordan	1 May 2009	3 years	1 May 2012	Completion announced but ongoing verification work reported
Mauritania	1 January 2011	5 years	1 January 2016	On track
Mozambique	1 March 2009	5 years (1st extn.) 10 months (2nd extn.)	31 December 2014	On track
Nicaragua	1 May 2009	1 year	1 May 2010	Completed
Peru	1 March 2009	8 years	1 March 2017	Unclear
Senegal	1 March 2009	7 years	1 March 2016	Not on track
Serbia	1 March 2014	5 years	1 March 2019	Unclear
Sudan	1 April 2014	5 years	1 April 2019	
Tajikistan	1 April 2010	10 years	1 April 2020	Unclear
Thailand	1 May 2009	9.5 years	1 November 2018	Not on track
Turkey	1 March 2014	8 years	1 March 2022	Not on track
UK	1 March 2009	10 years	1 March 2019	Unclear
Venezuela	1 October 2009	5 years	1 October 2014	Completed
Yemen	1 March 2009	6 years (1st extn.) 5 months (2nd extn.)	1 March 2020	Unclear
Zimbabwe	1 March 2009	22 months (1st extn.) 2 years (2nd extn.) 2 years (3rd extn.) 3 years (4th extn.)	1 January 2018	Unclear

* Niger is not included on this list because its extension request was granted in accordance with a procedure for mined areas discovered after the expiration of a state's Article 5 deadline

Risks to Deminers

In addition to the hazards faced during clearance operations (see *Casualty demographics* section in the *Casualties and Victim Assistance* chapter), demining operators remain at risk of attacks and abductions in some areas where non-state armed groups operate, especially in Afghanistan and more recently in Mozambique, Senegal, and Somalia.

In Afghanistan, insurgency and criminality continued to pose the main threat to deminers, although the number of security incidents dropped from 53 in 2012 to 39 in 2013. Eight mine action staff were killed and four injured in security incidents in 2013, compared with six killed and 10 injured in 2012. Mine action teams suffered a number of abductions by anti-government elements or criminals.²⁸ In March 2014, an adult and a child were killed during an attack by extremists on the guesthouse of the demining and development organization, Roots of Peace.²⁹ In January 2014, 57 HALO Trust deminers were abducted by the Taliban near Herat, but subsequently released after a few hours.³⁰

In November 2013, two deminers with Handicap International were shot by Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) members in an attack on a convoy travelling through Sofala Province, Mozambique.³¹

An attack by a suicide bomber and armed attackers on a UN compound in Mogadishu, Somalia in June 2013 by al-Shabab militia resulted in the deaths of three deminers from Mechem.³²

Amid ongoing instability and internal conflict in Yemen in June 2013, six deminers and three soldiers were kidnapped by armed insurgents in the southern province of Abyan.³³

In May 2013, 12 demining personnel from Mechem were held prisoner at a camp run by the Movement for the Democratic Forces of Casamance in Guinea-Bissau for several weeks, prompting an order from Senegalese authorities to halt all survey and clearance operations in the country.³⁴

Maputo Action Plan: Addressing Mine Action Challenges

Challenges in mine clearance

The Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in June 2014 in Maputo, Mozambique offered a timely opportunity for States Parties to review and report on the progress made toward completion of their clearance obligations under Article 5.³⁵ The Review Conference also provided opportunities for recommendations to be made on improving the performance of mine action programs and for states to reinvigorate their commitment to the clearance of mined areas on their territory.

Despite the progress in mine clearance over the last 15 years, States Parties, international organizations, and civil society remained concerned that mine action activities had been hindered by a general lack of political will, poor surveys to accurately identify the extent of mine contamination, the continued use of outdated baseline surveys, an over-willingness to rely on extension requests, continued clearance of areas that are not contaminated, and poor data management.

In a statement to the Third Review Conference, the ICBL lamented that Article 5 implementation had been a “rocky road” despite generous support from states, innovation among mine action practitioners, and a raft of tools and methodologies available for effective land release. In line with its “Completion Challenge” issued at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013³⁶ in which all affected states were challenged to complete their Article 5 obligations within 10 years, the ICBL stated that:

If efforts are well-directed to areas of actual mine contamination, we should be left with only a handful of affected states in five years’ time. Out of this handful of states, we are confident that every State Party with contamination can finish clearing their known mined area by 2025, barring armed conflict that prevents access, if operators, donors, and national authorities employ the right resources in the right way.³⁷

In order to achieve this, the ICBL noted that states need to re-intensify their efforts through prioritizing mine action at a political level and within their development goals and national budgets. The ICBL further stated that national mine action centers should focus mine clearance efforts on actual contamination through the effective use of survey and rigorous information management.³⁸

²⁸ Email from Abdel Qudos Ziaee, Mine Action Coordination Centre for Afghanistan (MACCA), 11 February 2014.

²⁹ K. Sieff and S. Salahuddin, “Taliban attacks guesthouse of U.S. based charity,” *The Washington Post*, 28 March 2014, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/taliban-attacks-western-guest-house-afghan-officials-say/2014/03/28/d28af42c-b681-11e3-a7c6-70cf2db17781_story.html.

³⁰ “Kidnappers release Afghan mine clearance workers,” *The Guardian*, 21 January 2014, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/21/kidnappers-seize-57-afghan-mine-clearance-workers.

³¹ “Mozambique: Sofala tensions hinder demining,” *AllAfrica*, 10 December 2013, www.allafrica.com/stories/201312110647.html.

³² “Somalia: Five foreigners including three South Africans confirmed dead in Mogadishu attacks,” *AllAfrica*, 19 June 2013, www.allafrica.com/stories/201306200092.html.

³³ “Yemeni tribesman kidnap 3 army soldiers, 6 demining workers,” *Aden Tribune*, 18 June 2013, www.adentribune.com/yemeni-tribesmen-kidnap-3-army-soldiers-6-demining-workers/.

³⁴ “Demining on hold in Senegal’s Casamance region,” *IRIN*, 24 May 2013, www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=98094.

³⁵ Eighteen affected States Parties reported on their Article 5 implementation efforts: Afghanistan, Algeria, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ecuador, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Niger, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and the UK.

³⁶ See ICBL website for the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, www.icbl.org/en-gb/the-treaty/treaty-meetings/review-conferences/the-third-review-conference-of-the-mine-ban-treaty.aspx.

³⁷ ICBL, Statement to the 3rd Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 24 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_ICBL.pdf.

³⁸ Ibid.

A report by clearance operator Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), entitled "Clearing the Mines" highlighted these concerns, noted that the primary obstacle to effective and efficient clearance of mined areas was the lack of political will.³⁹ It further stated that low-quality survey had been "perhaps the single biggest obstacle to faster and better mine clearance,"⁴⁰ and that without an accurate estimate and assessment of the extent of the mine contamination, states and operators had compounded the problem through the application of costly and time-consuming full clearance activities, thereby slowing land release and wasting valuable resources. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) also noted that the lack of clarity on the level of contamination was a "consequence of poor survey and weak information management practices."⁴¹ The NPA report outlined the architecture of an effectual and efficient mine action program while emphasizing the need for an effective survey capacity, accurate data management, gender-mainstreaming, and good governance.

The report also assessed and ranked the performance of national mine action programs according to 10 criteria: problem understood; target date for completion of clearance; targeted clearance; efficient clearance; national funding of program; timely clearance; land release system; national mine action standards; reporting on progress; and improving performance.⁴² Each criterion received a score based on a scale of one to ten; the average of the combined scores for each criterion gave the overall program performance scoring. The results of the exercise showed that, of the 30 states assessed, half fell short in their mine action performance with a ranking of "poor" or "very poor."⁴³ A further third was rated as "average" or "average and improving"⁴⁴ while just four received a rating of "good" or "good and improving."⁴⁵ The lowest ranked countries were South Sudan, Senegal, Ethiopia, Turkey, and Chad. States with the highest ranked programs were: Algeria, Mauritania, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Croatia.⁴⁶

Also of concern to a number of participants at the Third Review Conference was both the number and the poor quality of Article 5 deadline Extension Requests.

³⁹ NPA, "Clearing the Mines: Report by the Landmine Monitor Mine Action Team for the Third Review Conference of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty," June 2014, www.npaid.org/Media/20_Files/Mine-action/Mine-Action-Team-Report-for-the-Third-MBT-Review-Conference.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 5–6.

⁴¹ GICHD, Statement to the 3rd Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Maputo, 24 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_GICHD.pdf.

⁴² NPA, "Clearing the Mines: Report by the Landmine Monitor Mine Action Team for the Third Review Conference of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty," June 2014, p. 12.

⁴³ Angola, BiH, Chad, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (UK).

⁴⁴ Chile, Colombia, DRC, Jordan, Mozambique, Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

⁴⁵ Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Croatia, and Mauritania.

⁴⁶ NPA, "Clearing the Mines: Report by the Landmine Monitor Mine Action Team for the Third Review Conference of the Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty," June 2014, p. 13.

Ireland noted with concern the "lack of specific timelines and detail in requests;"⁴⁷ Norway emphasized that the majority of extension requests had been unnecessarily caused by "overblown estimates of suspected mined areas" and that, with the developments in land release techniques, the challenges that lead to extensions requests are largely of a political and organizational nature, rather than technical.⁴⁸ During the high-level segment at the Third Review Conference, both Algeria and Japan voiced their concern over the number of states requesting deadline extensions. A report by the Analyzing Group highlighted several issues, including that there was a general lack of consistency with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) within the extension requests and that several requests had not clearly provided annual benchmarks and milestones. It further stated the importance of regular reporting to States Parties of progress made and of updating work plans.⁴⁹

Responses to meet the challenges in the Maputo Action Plan

The need to address such issues was recognized by States Parties at the Third Review Conference and subsequently embodied in the Maputo Action Plan (MAP) Actions 8–12 in which States Parties with ongoing mine clearance obligations agreed to "commit to intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires."⁵⁰ In order to complete their Article 5 obligations as soon as possible and no later than by their respective clearance deadlines, States Parties with ongoing mine clearance obligations agreed to:

8. ...undertake all reasonable efforts to quantify and qualify its remaining implementation challenge as soon as possible, and report this information through its Article 7 transparency report by 30 April 2015 and annually thereafter. This information should identify the precise perimeters and locations, to the extent possible, of all areas under its jurisdiction or control that contain anti-personnel mines and therefore require clearance, and that are suspected to contain anti-personnel mines and therefore require further survey. This information is to be incorporated into national demining plans and relevant broader development and reconstruction plans.

⁴⁷ Statement of Ireland, Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_Ireland.pdf.

⁴⁸ Statement of Norway, Third Review Conference of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/tuesday/07c_CLEARING_MINED_AREAS_-_Norway.pdf.

⁴⁹ "Report on the Analysis of Requests for Extensions to Article 5 deadlines, 2013–2014," Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 23 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Article5-analysis-report-23Jun2014.pdf.

⁵⁰ "Maputo Action Plan," Maputo, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.pdf.

9. ...ensure as soon as possible that the most relevant land-release standards, policies and methodologies, in line with the United Nations' International Mine Action Standards, are in place and applied for the full and expedient implementation of this aspect of the Convention. These land release methodologies will be evidence-based, accountable and acceptable to local communities, including through the participation of affected communities, including women, girls, boys and men, in the process...
11. ...apply the recommendations endorsed by the Twelfth Meeting of the States Parties as contained in the paper "Reflections on the Article 5 Extension Process" on ensuring that high-quality requests for extended mine clearance deadlines continue to be submitted, that high-quality analyses of these requests continue to be prepared, and that cooperative engagement of Article 5 implementing States Parties continues after requests have been granted.⁵¹


The Third Review Conference also decided to establish the Committee on Article 5 Implementation and thereby replace the Standing Committee on Mine Action.⁵² The mandate of the new committee is to review and report to States Parties on relevant information on Article 5 implementation, seek clarity when necessary, and provide advice and support in a cooperative manner to States Parties on the fulfillment of their obligations to report on Article 5 implementation. The committee is also mandated to analyze and report to States Parties on Article 5 deadline Extension Requests, and to continue to engage with those States Parties granted an extension to their clearance deadline on the implementation of their commitments contained in the requests.⁵³ The ICBL expressed its hope that with a mandate to pay greater and more systematic attention to Article 5 implementation, increased focus would be given to the efforts of mine-affected States Parties in responding to and overcoming the challenges noted in mine clearance.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Maputo Action Plan, pp. 2–3. See also APLC/MSP.12/2012/4, "Reflections on the Article 5 Extension Process," www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=APLC/MSP.12/2012/4.

⁵² APLC/CONF/2014.CRP.1, Draft Final Document, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Final-report-Jun2014.pdf.

⁵³ APLC/CONF/2014/WP.6, Proposed decision related to the implementation machinery, 2 June 2014, pp. 3–4, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Proposed-decision-implementation.pdf.

⁵⁴ Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.



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Casualties and Victim Assistance

Casualties

In 2013, the number of recorded casualties caused by mines, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), cluster munition remnants,¹ and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth: mine/ERW casualties—decreased to the lowest level since 1999. This was the year that the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force and the Monitor began tracking casualties. This continued a trend of fewer total annually recorded mine/ERW casualties that has been fairly steady, with some minor annual aberrations, since 1999. Over the period, annual casualty totals have decreased by nearly two-thirds (64%).

The vast majority of recorded mine/ERW casualties were civilians. They continued to be disproportionately victimized as compared to military and security forces.² The percentage of civilian casualties as compared with military casualties was 79% in 2013, similar to the 81% in 2012 and thus continuing the significant rise from the 70% of civilian casualties in 2011.³ Child casualties represented 46% of all civilian casualties in 2013, the

second highest percentage of total annual civilian casualties since the Monitor began disaggregating casualties by age in 2005.⁴

Casualties in 2013⁵

In 2013, a total of 3,308 mine/ERW casualties were recorded by the Monitor. At least 1,065 people were killed and another 2,218 people were injured; for 25 casualties it was not known if the person survived.⁶ In many states and areas, numerous casualties go unrecorded; therefore, the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher. In addition, mine/ERW incidents impact not only the direct casualties—the women, men, boys, and girls who were killed, as well as the survivors⁷—but also their families struggling under new physical, psychological, and economic pressures. As in previous years, there was no data available on the total number of people impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties, including families and those in affected communities.

The 2013 casualty figure of 3,308 is a 24% decrease compared with the 4,325 casualties recorded in 2012;

▲
Luis Silvestre Wamusse, leader of the Mozambique national survivor network RAVIM, conducting a survivor survey with Salfina Elias Chauque.

¹ Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties from the use of cluster munitions in strikes during the deployment and dispersal of submunitions are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the overview on cluster munition casualties in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information specifically on casualties caused by cluster munitions, including both cluster munition remnants casualties and casualties which occur during cluster munition strikes, see ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2014*, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/Our-Research-Products/CMM14.

² Security personnel/forces include military personnel, police, and representatives of non-state armed groups.

³ Since 2005, civilians have represented approximately 73% of casualties for which the civilian status was known, annually. In the first five years of Monitor reporting, the percentage of civilian casualties averaged 81% per year. See the Monitor Victim Assistance Overview from ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Toward a Mine-Free World* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2008), www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?url=lm/2008/es/landmine_casualties_and_survivor_assistance.html.

⁴ In 2007, children were 49% of civilian casualties for which the age was known. This is the highest percentage recorded by the Monitor.


⁵ Figures include individuals killed or injured in incidents involving devices detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and victim-activated IEDs. AXO and UXO, including cluster munition remnants, are collectively referred to as ERW. Cluster munition casualties are also disaggregated and reported as distinct from ERW where possible. Not included in the totals are: estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not given, incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been caused by remote-detonated mines or IEDs (those that were not victim-activated), and people killed or injured while manufacturing or emplacing devices. For more details on casualty figures or sources of casualty data by state or area, please see country profiles on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

⁶ The outcome of just 25 casualties, or less than 1% of all casualties, was unknown in 2013; this was among the lowest number of unknowns in terms of outcome since Monitor recording began in 1999 and is an indication of improved data collection over the 14-year period. By way of comparison, in 1999 the outcome was unknown of 974 casualties or 10% of all casualties recorded in that year.

⁷ A survivor is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.

the casualty total in 2012 was the second lowest annual casualty total recorded by the Monitor.⁸ In 2013, there was an average of nine casualties per day, globally, as compared with approximately 12–13 casualties per day from 2010–2012.⁹ The annual incidence rate for 2013 is just 36% of what was reported in 1999, when there were approximately 25 casualties each day.¹⁰ Given significant improvements in data collection over this period, the decrease in casualties is likely even more significant with a higher percentage of casualties now being recorded.

Number of mine/ERW casualties per year (1999–2013)



Casualties were identified in a total of 55 states and other areas in 2013,¹¹ down from the 62 states and other areas in which casualties were identified in 2012¹² and significantly down from 72 states and other areas the Monitor first recorded for 1999. Of the total casualties in 2013, 2,131 occurred among the 31 States Parties¹³ to the Mine Ban Treaty identified by the Monitor as having responsibility for significant numbers of survivors; a total

⁸ Every year, the Monitor revises and updates annual casualty totals when new data becomes available. For example, in 2013 the Monitor reported a total of 3,628 casualties for 2012; this figure has now been revised to 4,325. The increase in the 2012 casualty total was primarily due to newly available disaggregated data on 642 victim-activated IED casualties in Afghanistan. This is the number to which the 2013 casualty total is compared. Updated figures for previous years have been used to recalculate all casualty country totals and percentages throughout the overview.

⁹ The Monitor identified 4,446 casualties in 2010, 4,590 in 2011, and 4,325 in 2012.

¹⁰ In 1999, the Monitor identified 9,220 mine/ERW casualties.

¹¹ See also the table at the end of this chapter. The 52 states and three other areas where casualties were identified in 2013 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Cuba, Egypt, Eritrea, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Pakistan, Palestine, Poland, Russian Federation, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe; as well as other areas: Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

¹² States registering casualties in 2013 but not in 2012 were: Armenia, Cuba, Israel, and Tunisia. States and other areas with casualties in 2012 but none in 2013 were: Belarus, Djibouti, Greece, Kenya, Mauritania, Montenegro, Peru, Philippines, South Korea, Ukraine, and Kosovo.

¹³ The 31 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Casualties were identified in all but five of these in 2013. The five where casualties were not identified were: Burundi, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, and Peru.

of 2,252 occurred among all (34) States Parties in which casualties were identified.¹⁴

While annual totals of new casualties have gone down since 1999, the thousands of casualties that have occurred have meant that the total number of survivors increased. Collectively, the 31 States Parties with significant numbers of mine/ERW survivors had 226,000–358,000¹⁵ survivors reported for all time through 2013, as recorded in Monitor country profiles.

Steady declines in annual casualty totals continued in the three States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that have regularly recorded the highest number of annual casualties over the past 15 years: Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Colombia. Together, these three countries represent 39% of all global casualties since 1999, as recorded by the Monitor. Gradual decreases in the number of casualties in these countries each year have significantly reduced the global casualty figure.

Afghanistan, which has recorded more people killed or injured by mine and ERW incidents every year than any other country, had the most annual casualties again in 2013, with 1,050 people killed and injured. This number was down significantly from the 1,422 casualties identified in 2012 and was about 90% less than the estimated 9,000 casualties in Afghanistan per year prior to the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁶ At that time, Afghanistan alone was suffering nearly three times the total global casualty rate in 2013.

Colombia was the second most impacted country, with 368 casualties. The 2013 figure was a 26% decrease compared with the 497 recorded in 2012, and nearly 70% less than the mine/ERW casualty rate in Colombia when it peaked in 2005 and 2006 at around 1,200 casualties recorded annually.

Cambodia, with the sixth most casualties (and fourth among States Parties) in 2013, also continued to record fewer casualties than in most previous years; the 111 casualties recorded in 2013 were 40% fewer than the 186 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2012 and more than 95% less than the over 3,000 casualties identified in 1996.

Other significant decreases in casualty totals among States Parties in 2013 were due to changing dynamics

¹⁴ Casualties were identified in the following States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2013: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Kuwait, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Poland, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. The total number of casualties in these 31 States Parties for 2013 differs slightly from the 2013 figures presented in the Monitor publication "Casualty trends 1999–2013" because additional information was subsequently available for some countries. These small changes did not affect the trends reported in the publication. "Casualty trends 1999–2013" is available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/Our-Research-Products/Maputo-3rd-Review-Conference/Casualty-trends-1999-2013.

¹⁵ A range is reported for the number of survivors in several States Parties.

¹⁶ Some of the decrease in the annual casualty total in Afghanistan from 2012 to 2013 may have been due to the changing availability of some casualty data as well as fluctuating conflict conditions. For example, there was a significant decrease in civilian victim-activated IED casualties from 2012 to 2013. However, by mid-2014 the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that the number of victim-activated IED casualties was again increasing. UNAMA Protection of Civilians Annual Report 2013, pp. 19–29; and email exchange with UNAMA, 17 February 2014.

in relation to armed conflicts or fluctuations related to inconsistent data collection. In Yemen, casualties rose to a peak of 263 in 2012 related to population movements following a reduction in armed conflict and to the 2011 new use of mines; in 2013, this annual casualty total decreased to 55, in line with casualty totals from other previous years. In Sudan, casualty figures decreased from 109 in 2012 to 30 in 2013, as security conditions improved.

The only significant increase in annual casualties occurred in Syria, a state not party, where the increased contamination by mines and ERW in 2013, coupled with increased population movements, caused casualties to increase from 63 in 2012 to 201 in 2013. Increases in casualties recorded in Angola (from 34 in 2012 to 71 in 2013) and in Iraq (from 84 to 124) can both be attributed to a lack of a reliable collection mechanism for casualty data in those countries that causes annual fluctuations in casualty totals but makes trends difficult to discern.

States with 100 or more recorded casualties in 2013

State	No. of casualties
Afghanistan	1050
Colombia	368
Pakistan	219
Syria	201
Iraq	124
Cambodia	111
Iran	107
Myanmar	101

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty indicated in bold

Methodology


The data collected by the Monitor is the most comprehensive and widely used annual dataset of casualties caused by mines and ERW. For the year 2013, the Monitor collected casualty data from 26 different national or UN mine action centers in 25 states and other areas with mine/ERW casualties during the year. Mine action centers recorded 42% of the casualties identified during the year.¹⁷ For all other states and areas, the Monitor collected data on casualties from various mine clearance operators and victim assistance service providers, as well as from a range of national and international media sources.¹⁸

It must be stressed that, as in previous years, the 3,308 mine/ERW casualties identified in 2013 only include

¹⁷ Of the 26 mine action centers which collected casualty data, 24 were national mine action centers. The other two were UN mine action centers or UN missions that also maintained mine/ERW data collection mechanisms. Mine action centers registered 1,385 of the 3,308 casualties identified in 2013.

¹⁸ The Monitor identified 777 mine/ERW casualties (23% of all casualties identified in 2013) through the media that had not been collected via official data-collection mechanisms. The majority of these casualties occurred in countries without any data-collection mechanism, although a significant number also occurred in countries with a data-collection system in place and/or other sources such as mine action operators and victim assistance service providers. A similar number of casualties, 21% (702) were reported by various UN bodies.

Greatest annual change in total mine/ERW casualties 2012–2013



recorded casualties. Due to incomplete data collection at the national level, the true casualty total is higher. Based on the updated Monitor research methodology in place since 2009, it is estimated that there are approximately an additional 800–1,000 casualties each year that are not captured in its global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries.

As in previous years, data collection in various countries such as Afghanistan, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, Iraq, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen was believed to be incomplete due either to the lack of a functioning official data collection system and/or to the challenges posed by ongoing armed conflict. In addition, while data collection within Iran is thought to be quite complete, it has not been made available to the Monitor consistently. However, the level of underreporting has declined over time as many countries have initiated and improved casualty data-collection mechanisms and the sharing of this data.

The 2013 estimate is a significant drop from the estimated total from 1999. By way of comparison, the Monitor identified some 9,000 casualties in 1999, but estimated that another 7,000–13,000 annual casualties went unrecorded.

Casualty demographics¹⁹

Since ICBL monitoring began in 1999, every year there have been about 1,000 child casualties from mines/ERW, with significantly greater numbers of children killed and injured in 1999 and 2001.²⁰ There were 1,112 child casualties in 2013, a slight decrease from the 1,272 child casualties in 2012, despite a greater overall decrease in the global casualty total between the two years. Child casualties in 2013 accounted for 46% of all civilian casualties for whom the age was known.²¹ This

¹⁹ The Monitor tracks the age, sex, civilian status, and deminer status of mine/ERW casualties, to the extent that data is available and disaggregated.


²⁰ The Monitor identified more than 1,500 child casualties in 1999 and more than 1,600 in 2001.

²¹ Child casualties are defined as all casualties where the victim is less than 18 years of age at the time of the incident.

was an increase of seven percentage points from the 39% in 2012 and was also the second highest percentage of child casualties (after 49% in 2007) since 2005. The average annual rate of child casualties since 2005 is 43% of civilian casualties.²²

In some of the states with the greatest numbers of casualties, the percentage was even higher in 2013. In Lao PDR and Lebanon, children made up all reported civilian casualties, with 27 and 16, respectively. In DRC, there were 19 child casualties, making up 90% of civilian casualties. Over the last few years, Yemen has consistently reported high numbers of child casualties, with 40 in 2013, 82% of its total recorded casualties.²³ South Sudan reported 33 child casualties, 75% of its total casualties.

Mine/ERW casualties by age in 2013²⁴



As might be expected, the highest numbers of child casualties in absolute terms occurred in those countries with the highest number of casualties overall. There were 487 child casualties in Afghanistan in 2013, representing nearly half of all civilian casualties in that country and nearly half (44%) of all child casualties recorded globally in 2013. In Colombia, there were 57 child casualties, making up 35% of civilian casualties; this was the highest percentage of child casualties that Colombia has reported, a percentage that has risen steadily since 2010. With 50 child casualties, Syria had the third highest number of child casualties in 2013.

As in previous years, the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (84%), while 16% were girls.²⁵ Among casualties of all ages, children were also disproportionately the victims of ERW; 72% of all civilian ERW casualties were children.

Nearly two-thirds of child casualties were caused by ERW, whereas ERW caused just 20% of adult civilian casualties.

Child casualties in significantly affected countries, as a percentage of civilian casualties in 2013²⁶


Country	Child casualties	Total civilian casualties	Percent of child casualties of Total civilian casualties
Afghanistan	487	1,008	48%
Colombia	57	165	35%
Syria	50	133	38%
Pakistan	45	172	26%
Yemen	40	49	82%

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty indicated in bold

In 2013, the percentage of female casualties among all casualties for which the sex was known was 12%, 357 of 3,048. This was the same as 2012, when females also constituted 12% of all casualties for which the sex was known (459 of 3,849). It was an increase compared to the annual average of 10% since 1999, although within the percentage range across this period.²⁷ As in previous years, the vast majority of casualties where the sex was known were male (88%).

In 2013, the sex of 260 casualties was unknown, or 8% of all registered casualties, down from 12% in 2012 and 15% in 2011 and 2010. This significant improvement in the disaggregation of casualty data by sex is plausibly, in part, a result of calls for improvements in this area by the Mine Ban Treaty's Cartagena Action Plan.

Mine/ERW casualties by sex in 2013²⁸



Between 1999 and 2013, the Monitor identified more than 1,500 deminers who were killed or injured while undertaking clearance operations to ensure the safety

²² Between 2005 and 2013, there were 9,608 child casualties of a total of 22,434 civilian casualties for which the age and outcome was known. The Monitor began to be able to systematically collect age-disaggregated mine/ERW casualty data for all states and areas in 2005.

²³ It is possible that casualty data for children in Yemen is more complete than casualty data for the population as a whole and thus that children are overrepresented as a proportion of total casualty figure. Half of all Yemen mine/ERW casualty data identified by the Monitor for 2013 was provided by UNICEF, which has a mandate to protect and collect data on the protection of children.

²⁴ This includes only the civilian casualties for which the age was known.

²⁵ The sex of 65 child casualties was not recorded.

²⁶ This includes only the casualties for which the civilian/security status and the age were known.


²⁷ Between 1999 and 2013, female casualties have represented 10% of all casualties on average for which the sex was known, with the percentage ranging from 8% to 13% per year. In that period, the sex of 58,430 casualties was known and of these 6,082 were females.

²⁸ This includes only the casualties for which the sex was known.

of the civilian population.²⁹ There were 85 casualties identified among deminers (nine deminers were killed and 76 injured) in 11 states³⁰ in 2013, a significant decrease in the number of demining casualties (132) reported to the Monitor in 2012.³¹ It was also lower than the average of 105 casualties among deminers per year since 1999.

In 2013, the highest numbers of casualties among deminers were in Iran (28), Afghanistan (18), and Cambodia (12). The 28 deminer casualties in Iran were less than half the 71 recorded there in 2012; 666 deminer casualties have been identified in Iran since 2006.³² Demining casualties in Afghanistan increased by 13% (from 16 to 18) compared between 2012 and 2013. With just one deminer casualty in Cambodia in 2012, the 12 deminer casualties there represent a steep increase. Together, these three countries represented more than two-thirds of all deminer casualties globally in 2013.

Mine/ERW casualties by civilian/military status in 2013³³



Civilian casualties represented 79% of casualties where the civilian/military status was known (2,543 of 3,213), compared to 81% in 2012. In absolute terms, civilian casualties decreased by 26% between 2012 and 2013 while military casualties decreased by 12%.

More than a third of all military casualties (203 of 585) occurred in Colombia in 2013. Syria, with 68 military casualties, had the second highest number in 2013. With just 11 military casualties in 2012, Syria saw a six-fold increase in 2013. The third highest number of military casualties in 2013 was in Algeria, with 59, approximately

²⁹ There have been 1,570 casualties among deminers between 1999 and 2013. Since 1999, the annual number of demining casualties identified has fluctuated widely from 29 to 231, making it difficult to discern trends. Most major fluctuations have been related to the exceptional availability or unavailability of deminer casualty data from a particular country in any given year and therefore cannot be correlated to substantive changes in operating procedures in international demining standards or demining equipment.

³⁰ Casualties among deminers occurred in Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mozambique, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

³¹ There were 132 demining casualties identified in 2012.

³² No data on deminer casualties in Iran prior to 2006 was available to the Monitor for inclusion in this report. Even based on partial data, Iran exceeded all countries in the total number of demining casualties since 1999. Afghanistan, with the second highest number of deminer casualties, has recorded 475 since 1999.


³³ This includes only the casualties for which the civilian/military status was known.

double the number recorded there in 2012. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan saw significant decreases in military casualties between 2012 and 2013. However, the availability of data on military casualties has been inconsistent in both of those countries, making it difficult to determine trends.

Victim-activated weapons and other explosive items causing casualties

In 2013, 49% of all casualties for which the specific type of victim-activated explosive item was known were caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines (27%) and victim-activated IEDs acting as antipersonnel mines (22%).³⁴ This was a decrease from the 56% of casualties from antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs recorded in 2012. The percentage of casualties caused by factory-made antipersonnel mines increased slightly (by two percentage points) but this increase was more than offset by the decrease in the percentage of casualties caused by victim-activated IEDs (by nine percentage points). In 2012, 25% of casualties resulted from antipersonnel mines and 31% from victim-activated IEDs.

Casualties by type of explosive device in 2013³⁵



In 2013, casualties from victim-activated IEDs were identified in seven states, a decrease from the 12 states identified in 2012 and less than in any previous year since

³⁴ In 2013, there were casualties from factory-made antipersonnel mines in 27 states: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Eritrea, Georgia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Mozambique, Myanmar, Pakistan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe; and in the following two other areas: Somaliland and Western Sahara.

³⁵ This includes only the casualties for which the device type was known. The number of cluster submunition casualties in 2013 was incomplete because casualties were not differentiated from other ERW casualties, as reported in *Cluster Munition Monitor 2014*. In addition to this general underreporting, in 2013 850 people were injured in Syria due to cluster munitions but have not been included in casualty totals because it is not possible to differentiate between those casualties from submunitions (which would be included in this report) and those from strikes (which would not be included here). According to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), "most of the injured were wounded by the cluster bombs when they passed near it, touched it...some of them were injured while trying to disarm it." Email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, Director, SNHR, 25 July 2014.

States/areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2013

Africa	Americas	Asia-Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa
Angola	Chile	Afghanistan	Albania	Algeria
Chad	Colombia	Cambodia	Armenia	Egypt
DRC	Cuba	India	Azerbaijan	Iran
Côte d'Ivoire	Nicaragua	Lao PDR	BiH	Iraq
Eritrea		Myanmar	Croatia	Israel
Guinea-Bissau		Nepal	Georgia	Kuwait
Mali		Pakistan	Poland	Lebanon
Mozambique		Sri Lanka	Russia	Libya
Niger		Thailand	Serbia	Palestine
Senegal		Vietnam	Tajikistan	Syria
Somalia			Turkey	Tunisia
South Sudan			<i>Nagorno-Karabakh</i>	Yemen
Sudan				<i>Western Sahara</i>
Uganda				
Zimbabwe				
<i>Somaliland</i>				

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**, other areas in *italics*

2008.³⁶ Starting in 2008, the Monitor began identifying more casualties from these improvised antipersonnel mines, likely due in part to an increase in their use and also to better data collection that made the distinction more possible to discern both between factory-made antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs and between command-detonated IEDs and victim-activated IEDs. Afghanistan saw the greatest fall in the number of annual victim-activated IED casualties, a drop of 43% from 987 in 2012 to 567 in 2013. This accounted for most of the decrease of victim-activated IED casualties from 2012 to 2013.³⁷

In 2013, antivehicle mines killed and injured 212 people in 13 states and other areas.³⁸ The states with the greatest numbers of casualties from antivehicle mines were Pakistan (118), Angola (25), and Cambodia (24). Between 2012 and 2013, the percentage of casualties caused by antivehicle mines, which are not prohibited or regulated under the Mine Ban Treaty,³⁹ declined slightly

compared to the total of mine/ERW casualties, but both years represented a significant decline as compared with 2011. In 2013, 212 casualties, or 7% of casualties for which the device was known, were caused by antivehicle mines, compared with 320 or 8% of casualties in 2012. Antivehicle mines caused 16% of casualties for which the device was known in 2011.

In 2013, 34% of casualties were caused by ERW in 41 states and areas, an increase from 31% of casualties in 2012.⁴⁰ Some notable increases occurred in Afghanistan, where there were 399 casualties due to ERW in 2013, an increase of 19% as compared to 336 in 2012, although the total annual casualties decreased. In Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Syria, the number of casualties caused by ERW more than doubled in each compared to those recorded in 2012.⁴¹

Victim Assistance

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty in which states committed to provide “assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration” of those people harmed.⁴²

Since 1999, the Monitor has tracked the provision of assistance to landmine and explosive remnants of

³⁶ DRC, Sudan, and Tunisia had casualties from victim-activated IEDs in 2013 but not in 2012. India, Myanmar, Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Thailand, and Yemen had casualties from victim-activated IEDs in 2012 but not in 2013. Casualties from victim-activated IEDs were identified in the following states in 2013: Afghanistan, Algeria, DRC, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, and Tunisia. In 2012, casualties from victim-activated IEDs were identified in: Afghanistan, Algeria, India, Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Russian Federation, Thailand, and Yemen.

³⁷ The decrease in the number of victim-activated IED casualties recorded in Afghanistan between 2012 and 2013 was 420, compared with a total decrease globally of 498.

³⁸ In 2013, casualties from antivehicle mines were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand; and the following other areas: Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

³⁹ Since the conclusion of the negotiations of the Mine Ban Treaty, many States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC have emphasized that, according to the treaty's definitions, any mine (even if it is labeled as an antivehicle mine) equipped with a fuze or antihandling device that causes the mine to explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person is considered to be an antipersonnel mine and is therefore prohibited. This means that antivehicle mines equipped with trip wires, break wires, tilt rods, or highly sensitive antihandling devices should be considered banned under the Mine Ban Treaty.

⁴⁰ In 2013, casualties from ERW, which includes cluster submunitions, were identified in the following states: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Palestine, Poland, Russian Federation, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe; and in the following other areas: Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

⁴¹ In Iran, there were 11 recorded casualties from ERW in 2012 and 26 in 2013; in Iraq, 20 in 2012 and 73 in 2013; in Lao PDR, five in 2012 and 37 in 2013; and in Syria, one in 2012 and 27 in 2013.

⁴² Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, (Mine Ban Treaty) Article 6.3, www.apminebanconvention.org/overview-and-convention-text/.

war (ERW) victims⁴³ under the Mine Ban Treaty and its subsequent five-year action plans. In practice, victim assistance addresses the overlapping and interconnected needs of persons with disabilities, including survivors⁴⁴ of landmines, cluster munitions, ERW, and other weapons, as well as people in their communities with similar requirements for assistance. In addition, some victim assistance efforts reach family members and other people in the communities of those who have been killed or have suffered trauma, loss, or other harm due to landmines and ERW.

The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014, agreed upon at the Mine Ban Treaty's Second Review Conference in 2009, further developed the concept of victim assistance by combining its various elements into an integrated approach to addressing victims' needs. This approach stressed the importance of cross-cutting themes, particularly the accessibility of services and information, inclusion and participation of victims, particularly survivors, in all aspects of the treaty and its implementation. It also emphasized the concept that there should be no discrimination against mine/ERW victims, among mine/ERW victims, nor between survivors with disabilities and other persons with disabilities in relation to the assistance provided.⁴⁵

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims

Afghanistan	El Salvador	Somalia
Albania	Eritrea	South Sudan
Algeria	Ethiopia	Sudan
Angola	Guinea-Bissau	Tajikistan
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Iraq	Thailand
Burundi	Jordan	Turkey
Cambodia	Mozambique	Uganda
Chad	Nicaragua	Yemen
Colombia	Peru	Zimbabwe
DRC	Senegal	
Croatia	Serbia	

In June 2014 at the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, all States Parties committed to the Maputo Action Plan, a set of actions that would advance the “full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society” through 2019.⁴⁶ High-level representatives of at least 40 States Parties spoke out

on the continued importance of assisting mine victims, as called for by the Mine Ban Treaty. States Parties also agreed to the formation of a Committee on Victim Assistance to “support States Parties in their national efforts to strengthen and advance victim assistance.”⁴⁷

This victim assistance overview reports on the status of coordination and planning efforts designed to improve access to services and programs for mine/ERW victims in the 31 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims in need of assistance.⁴⁸ It also looks at the role of survivors in 2013 and into 2014 in mechanisms where decisions are made that affect their lives.⁴⁹ It is based on information available by the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty. This information will provide a baseline from which to measure progress by States Parties in implementing the Maputo Action Plan over the next five years. Baseline data on availability and accessibility of comprehensive rehabilitation in these 31 States Parties is available through the separate Monitor report, “Equal Basis 2014: Access and Rights in 33 Countries.”⁵⁰

Overview of the global situation of victim assistance

The Maputo Action Plan: a new roadmap for victim assistance through 2019

During 2013 and the first half of 2014, the ICBL and its members, including national campaigns and survivor networks, worked with States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, partners, including the ICRC, and other stakeholders to analyze progress made under the Cartagena Action Plan to define the remaining challenges toward meeting the needs and upholding the rights of landmine survivors and affected families and communities.

⁴⁷ “Decisions on the Convention's Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf.

⁴⁸ This corresponds with Actions 13, 14, and 15 of the Maputo Action Plan. The Monitor reports on the following 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties in which significant numbers of survivors have been reported: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This includes 28 States Parties that have indicated that they have significant numbers of survivors for which they must provide care, listed on the website of the Implementation Support Unit of the Mine Ban Treaty, www.apminebanconvention.org/background-status-of-the-convention/assisting-the-victims/. Since this list was compiled, Zimbabwe reported the same. Both Algeria and Turkey have reported hundreds or thousands of survivors in their official landmine clearance deadline extension request submissions. See ICBL-CMC, “Zimbabwe and the ‘victim assistance twenty something’ – what and who comes next?” Landmine and Cluster Munition blog, 15 April 2014, landmineandclustermunitionblog.wordpress.com/2014/04/15/zimbabwe-and-the-victim-assistance-twenty-something-what-and-who-comes-next/

⁴⁹ This corresponds with Action 16 of the Maputo Action Plan.

⁵⁰ The report also includes Lao PDR and Lebanon, State Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions who report significant casualties due to those weapons. ICBL-CMC, “Equal Basis 2014: Access and Rights in 33 Countries,” December 2014.

⁴³ The full definition of “victim” includes the survivors, the family members of those who are killed by mines/ERW, as well as the family members of survivors and affected communities, although victim assistance efforts have mainly been limited to survivors to date.

⁴⁴ As noted earlier, “survivor” is a person who was injured by mines/ERW and lived.

⁴⁵ “Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014: Ending the Suffering Caused by Anti-Personnel Mines,” Cartagena, 11 December 2009 (hereafter referred to as the “Cartagena Action Plan”).

⁴⁶ “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Maputo-action-plan-adopted-27Jun2014.pdf.

Two influential informal strategic meetings held by the co-chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance in 2013 guaranteed the participation of representatives from States Parties, ICBL/civil society including survivors, and the ICRC in deciding the future direction of victim assistance. These discussions were focused on driving victim assistance forward and also on supporting of the work of President-designate of the Third Review Conference (Mozambique), who would ultimately draft the Maputo Action Plan.

The first of those meetings,⁵¹ in May 2013, brought forth suggestions for ensuring that, following the Review Conference, States Parties' victim assistance actions would be concrete, measurable, and time-bound. Furthermore, participants held that States Parties should promote services and programs that would be sustainable, accessible, and linked to a range of disability, rights, development, health, and labor frameworks. There was a distinct call to make the process of developing the future planning for victim assistance inclusive of survivors, of representatives of affected and donor states, and of service providers.

The second informal meeting,⁵² in December 2013, identified the following proposals for incorporation into the Maputo Action Plan:

- Build on the comprehensive actions in the Cartagena Action Plan, retaining the fulfillment of that plan as an objective of the States Parties.
- Integrate actions into all government plans and policies that would address the needs and rights of mine victims.
- Balance immediate relief for the most vulnerable victims with longer-term actions that would enable victims to contribute to their communities and their country's development.
- Ensure effective participation of mine victims in policy- and decision-making, including by building the capacity of survivor associations and networks.
- Address the particular rights and needs of children, as well as the requirement for victim assistance to be age- and gender-sensitive.
- Improve outcomes on economic inclusion and psychosocial support.⁵³

Between these two events, the ICBL developed priorities for the future of victim assistance, identified through a civil society experts' meeting hosted by Handicap International in Paris in October 2013 and validated and refined through input by campaign members.

The Maputo Action Plan, approved by States Parties in Maputo, reflects the recommendations from this informal consultation process. It highlights the continued

relevance of the actions of the Cartagena Action Plan, issues a strong call for effective survivor participation, and underscores the importance of integrating victim assistance into other frameworks. The plan's seven victim assistance-related action points set an agreed path for States Parties to continue working to address the needs of mine victims with targeted and mainstream actions across a range of ministries and stakeholders and to raise the issue of mine victims in "international, regional and national human rights, health care, labour and other fora, instruments and domains" while continuing to report "measurable achievements" in victim assistance at international meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁵⁴ The relevant action points of the Maputo Action Plan may be summarized as follows:

- Assess the needs of mine victims. Assess the availability and gaps in services. Support efforts to refer victims to existing services.
- Communicate time-bound and measurable objectives (update annually).
- Enhance plans, policies, and legal frameworks.
- Strengthen local capacities, enhance coordination, and increase the availability of and accessibility to services, opportunities, and social protection measures.
- Enhance the capacity and ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organizations in all matters that affect them.
- Raise awareness of the imperative to address the needs and to guarantee the rights of mine victims.
- Report on measurable improvements in advance of the next Review Conference.

Re-committing to assist landmine victims at the Third Review Conference

At the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, in addition to statements made during the session on victim assistance 40 states spoke up during the high-level segment to re-affirm the importance of the Mine Ban Treaty's commitments on victim assistance. Fifteen States Parties affected by landmines and with the responsibility to respond to the needs of mine victims spoke on the importance of strengthening and accelerating those efforts.⁵⁵ Several high-level statements referred to national efforts to integrate victim assistance into other frameworks, focusing primarily on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and into responses to address the needs of broader populations, including armed conflict victims and persons with disabilities. States responsible for mine victims reminded all conference participants of the importance of partnerships—among states and with international organizations and NGOs—to enable these states to respond as effectively as possible.

⁵¹ Organized by Austria and the ICBL.

⁵² Organized by Austria, Costa Rica, and the ICBL, in collaboration with Mozambique. Held during the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva, 4 December 2013.

⁵³ Statement of Austria as Victim Assistance Co-Chair, First Preparatory Meeting for the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 6 December 2013.

⁵⁴ Actions 12 to 18 of the Maputo Action Plan.

⁵⁵ Algeria, Angola, BiH, Colombia, DRC, Jordan, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

Fifteen States Parties and one regional group that are traditional donors to mine action joined in voicing their commitment to assist mine victims.⁵⁶ Many states acknowledged the value to mine victims of the significant progress that had been made to date. There was also widespread recognition that there was more work to be done to ensure that victims' rights are upheld and their needs are met. For example, Canada pointed to the long-term effort that would still be needed on victim assistance while Austria spoke of its efforts to engage with survivors to better understand their remaining needs. Both donor and affected states pointed to progress that has been made in advancing the rights of persons with disabilities, often as a result of victim assistance efforts by the mine action community.

Six other States Parties, which are neither donors nor responsible to meet the needs of large numbers of victims, made strong statements on the importance of victim assistance commitments, some offering technical assistance and others calling for a long-term approach.⁵⁷ Argentina called for an "urgent commitment" from all members of the international community with greater emphasis on socio-economic inclusion.

Two states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, China and India, added their views on victim assistance, with China recognizing progress made internationally and India stressing the importance of the issue.

The new Committee on Victim Assistance, replacing the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, has a fresh mandate to support "States Parties in their national efforts to strengthen and advance victim assistance" and stimulate ongoing discussions of victim assistance within the framework of the Mine Ban Treaty itself while, for the first time, specifically requiring the committee to take the discussion of the needs and rights of victims to other relevant forums.⁵⁸ This theme had been promoted and explored extensively in 2013.

Victim assistance, disarmament frameworks, and disability rights

During 2013 and the first half of 2014, the international community took concrete steps to advance assistance to mine/ERW victims in multiple disarmament and disability rights frameworks.

Mine action and disability stakeholders were brought together at the country level in a series of national meetings in Peru, Ethiopia, and Tajikistan, sponsored by the European Union and supported by the Mine Ban Treaty's Implementation Support Unit. The meetings intentionally included representatives of both survivor networks and disabled persons' organizations (DPOs).

The purpose of the meeting in Lima was to ensure the explicit inclusion of mine survivors and their perspectives in Peru's Plan for Equal Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities.⁵⁹ The workshop in Addis Ababa increased the awareness of the implementing agencies of the national disability action plan and its connection to victim assistance.⁶⁰ Participants in the Dushanbe meeting outlined ways to make progress toward the full and effective participation of persons with disabilities including landmine/ERW survivors.⁶¹

"Bridges between Worlds," a global conference held in Colombia in April 2014, discussed assistance to victims of landmines/ERW in broader contexts.⁶² It revealed commonalities between mine victims and others with similar needs, and recognized contributions made by the mine ban community to promote disability rights as well as the contribution of the CRPD to strengthening legal frameworks to promote the rights of survivors. It identified seven practical steps to strengthen bridges between disarmament, human rights, and development efforts.⁶³ Subsequent "Bridges" meetings held in Geneva and Maputo reinforced these conclusions and forged additional relationships among individuals working primarily on disability, development, or assistance to victims from a humanitarian perspective.

These global conferences highlighted that action and commitments were still needed to assist victims through humanitarian disarmament instruments, while also carrying the concerns and experience of "victim assistance" to other arenas where decisions and policies are made that can impact the lives of victims. Another conclusion was that there is a need for investments in service delivery for immediate responses, while also pursuing policies and legal instruments to promote rights in the longer term.⁶⁴ These recommendations were very much in line with the ICBL-CMC victim assistance recommendations developed together with the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor's "Frameworks for Victim

⁵⁹ Held in April 2013, co-hosted by Peru's mine action center (CONTRAMINAS) and national disability council (CONADIS). See ICBL, "ICBL Participates in Peru Victim Assistance Meeting," 25 April 2013, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2013/icbl-participates-in-peru-victim-assistance-meeting.aspx.

⁶⁰ The National Stakeholders Symposium on Implementing the National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities (2012–2021) was held in November 2013. Email from Damte Alemu, Coordinator, Capacity Building Team, Ethiopian Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 4 April 2014.

⁶¹ The National Stakeholders Dialogue on Victim Assistance and Disability Rights was in March 2014. Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit, "Tajikistan takes stock of the wellbeing of landmine survivors in the context of broader disability efforts," 17 March 2014, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/press-releases/PressRelease-VA_workshop_in_Tajikistan-17March2014-en.pdf.

⁶² Held in April 2014 in Medellin, Colombia. Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit, "Bridges between Worlds," www.apminebanconvention.org/eu-council-decision/bridges-between-worlds/.

⁶³ Chairperson's Summary, "Bridges between Worlds: Global Conference on Assisting Landmine and other Explosive Remnants of War Victims and Survivors in the Context of Disability Rights and other Domains," Medellin, 3–4 March 2014, www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/APMBC/bridges-between-worlds/Bridges-Worlds-Summary-Apr2014.pdf.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Australia, Austria, Canada, European Union, Finland, Germany, Holy See, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and Spain. Sweden and the United Kingdom, while speaking on the importance of victim assistance, also each reiterated their positions that they chose to provide such assistance as part of their overall development assistance.

⁵⁷ Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, and Tanzania.

⁵⁸ Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, "Decisions on the Convention's Machinery and Meetings," 27 June 2014, p. 5.

Assistance: Monitor key findings and observations,” published in December 2013.⁶⁵

In March 2014, the ICRC and the African Union brought together in Ethiopia senior officials from 15 African states along with civil society experts to seek solutions to the challenges involved in providing assistance for people injured by landmines, cluster munitions, or other ERW, in line with disarmament treaty commitments and disability plans.⁶⁶ Recommendations of the workshop included: improve data collection on needs and relevant services; develop strong action plans and strategies; and ensure access to needed services to obtain maximum independence.⁶⁷

During the reporting period, progress was made by civil society organizations forging links across sectors and regions to advance the rights of mine/ERW victims. In March 2014, Handicap International, in collaboration with the ICBL-CMC, convened a Latin American seminar in Colombia on psychosocial assistance for victims of armed conflict, including mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities. Bringing together representatives of networks of mine/ERW survivors, networks of armed conflict victims, DPOs, and service providers, the seminar considered different approaches and experiences to overcoming trauma and promoting social inclusion.

The ICBL-CMC’s Survivor Networks Project trained representatives of survivor networks and DPOs on monitoring the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the CRPD as a means to promote the rights of survivors and other persons with disabilities through one-on-one support throughout the year, culminating in a workshop in Maputo in June 2014. Workshop participants shared their experiences monitoring victim assistance aspects of the disarmament treaties and the implementation of the CRPD at the national level.⁶⁸ Handicap International also trained mine/ERW survivors (“Ban Advocates”) on the links between the three treaties in 2013 and 2014.

In addition to these global meetings, NGOs, survivor networks, and DPOs in several mine-affected countries made efforts to collaborate with each other and with development and rights actors to promote the inclusion of mine/ERW victims and persons with disabilities in mainstream programs and in policy-making bodies at national and local levels.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ ICBL-CMC, “Frameworks for Victim Assistance: Monitor key findings and observations,” Geneva, December 2013, www.the-monitor.org/index.php/content/view/full/25067; and ICBL-CMC, “Frameworks for Victim Assistance: Recommendations for States,” victimassistance.files.wordpress.com/2013/12/recommendations.pdf.

⁶⁶ ICRC, “African Union: Experts discuss assistance for victims of mines and other explosive devices,” 4 March 2014, www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/news-release/2014/03-04-ethiopia-addis-aba-wokshop-victims-landmines.htm.

⁶⁷ Statements of Mexico and ICRC, Fifth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 4 September 2014.

⁶⁸ Survivor Networks, “Monitoring Treaties to Uphold Rights: Training Day,” 25 June 2014, survivornetworks.wordpress.com/2014/06/25/monitoring-rights-and-treaties/.

⁶⁹ Further information about such collaborations is available through the individual country profiles on victim assistance available on the Monitor website.

In 2013, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement resolved to promote disability inclusion within the movement.⁷⁰ National societies operating in countries with large numbers of mine/ERW victims also emphasized their continued commitment to help victims and to take the CRPD into account in victim assistance activities and advocacy efforts. The movement found that the impact of the CRPD was “undoubtedly” the key development in terms of victim assistance since the adoption of the revised Movement Strategy in November 2009,⁷¹ and that it “should shape how affected States meet their respective responsibilities” under disarmament conventions. The CRPD was “likely to increasingly influence the victim assistance activities of components of the Movement.”⁷²

Status of victim assistance efforts at the national level

The Maputo Action Plan calls on States Parties to take seven actions “with the same precision and intensity as for other aims of the Convention” in order to address victim assistance.⁷³ Most States Parties had already made some progress under both the Nairobi Action Plan (2004–2009) and the Cartagena Action Plan (2009–2014), particularly in the objectives of improving coordination and planning and of promoting survivor participation.⁷⁴ What follows gives an overview, as of mid-2014, of the current status in each of these areas in the 31 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with significant numbers of mine/ERW victims in need of assistance. Taking into consideration progress made under previous action plans, this is the starting point from which the progress of the Maputo Action Plan can be measured through to its completion in 2019.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, “Promoting Disability Inclusion in the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Resolution CD/13/R9),” Sydney, Australia 17–18 November 2013, www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/red-cross-crescent-movement/council-delegates-2013/cod13-r9-people-with-disabilities-adopted-eng.pdf.

⁷¹ See ICRC, “Resolutions: Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Nairobi, 23–25 November 2009,” 31 December 2009, www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review/review-876-p883.htm.

⁷² Council of Delegates of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, “Report on implementation of the Movement Strategy on Landmines, Cluster Munitions and other Explosive Remnants of War: Reducing the Effects of Weapons on Civilians (Resolution 6 of the 2009 Council of Delegates) Reporting period: Nov. 2009–June 2013,” Sydney, Australia, 17–18 November 2013, www.standcom.ch/download/cod2013/fu2011/CD13_11_4_Landmine_report_EN.pdf.

⁷³ “Maputo Action Plan,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 3.

⁷⁴ A review of progress made under the Cartagena Action Plan and remaining challenges is available through a series of regional reports on victim assistance published by the Monitor for the Maputo Review Conference, available on the Monitor website, the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/Our-Research-Products/Maputo-3rd-Review-Conference.

⁷⁵ Action 18 of the Maputo Action Plan commits States Parties to report on efforts that improve the lives of mine victims and promote their rights, as well to report on as on their remaining challenges, thereby providing the international community with the means by which to monitor this progress.

Status of victim assistance efforts in 2013/2014 in 31 States Parties

State Party	Coordination (collaborative or combined with disability)	Plan for assistance	Survivor participation (in coordination)
Afghanistan	Yes (collaborative)	No (expired)	Yes
Albania	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Algeria	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Angola	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
BiH	Yes (limited collaboration)	Yes	Yes
Burundi	Yes (collaborative)	Yes (inactive)	Yes
Cambodia	Yes (combined)	Yes (Disability plan)	Yes
Chad	No	Yes (inactive)	N/A
Colombia	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
DRC	No	No (expired)	N/A
Croatia	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
El Salvador	Yes (collaborative)	Yes (Disability plan)	Yes
Eritrea	No	No	N/A
Ethiopia	Yes (combined)	Yes (Disability plan)	Yes
Guinea-Bissau	No	Yes	N/A
Iraq	No	No	N/A (<i>ad hoc</i> meetings)
Jordan	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Mozambique	Yes (combined)	Yes (component of Disability Plan)	Yes
Nicaragua	No	No	N/A
Peru	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Senegal	No	Yes	N/A (<i>ad hoc</i> meetings)
Serbia	No	No	N/A (<i>ad hoc</i> meetings)
Somalia	No	No	N/A
South Sudan	Yes (combined)	Yes (inactive)	Yes
Sudan	Yes (collaborative)	No (expired)	Yes
Tajikistan	Yes (combined)	Yes	Yes
Thailand	Yes (collaborative)	Yes	Yes
Turkey	No	No	N/A
Uganda	Yes (combined)	Yes	Yes
Yemen	Yes (no collaboration)	Yes (inactive)	No (<i>ad hoc</i> meetings)
Zimbabwe	No	No	Unknown

Note: N/A = There was no active coordination mechanism in which survivors could participate

Ad hoc meetings = While there was no active coordination mechanism, survivors and their representative organizations met with relevant government authorities

Coordination

The Maputo Action Plan, through Action 15 and in its validation of the continued relevance of victim assistance actions from the Cartagena Action Plan, compels States Parties to enhance coordination activities in order to increase the availability and accessibility of services that are relevant to mine victims. In 2013 and into 2014, 20 of the 31 States Parties had active victim assistance coordination mechanisms or disability

coordination mechanisms that considered the issues of mine/ERW survivors.⁷⁶ Victim assistance coordination mechanisms were reactivated in 2013 in Algeria, Croatia, and Yemen after having been inactive in 2012 due to

⁷⁶ Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH (although suspended in early 2014), Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. States with no known or active coordination mechanism for victim assistance: Chad, DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Nicaragua, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

political transition or armed conflict. However, victim assistance was not included in mine action coordination mechanisms in DRC and Senegal, both of which had advanced victim assistance in previous years. In BiH, victim assistance was put on hold in early 2014. In Iraq, Senegal, and Serbia, victim assistance focal points held bilateral, *ad hoc* meetings with survivor networks but did not hold multi-sectorial coordination meetings. As in 2012, victim assistance coordination in Uganda continued at much reduced levels compared with some previous years.

Among the 20 States Parties with active victim assistance coordination in 2013, in all but two cases, this coordination mechanism either collaborated with or was combined with an active disability coordination mechanism.⁷⁷ In BiH, before victim assistance coordination was suspended in 2014, collaboration between the victim assistance and disability coordination mechanisms had been very limited. Among States Parties where both victim assistance and disability coordination mechanisms existed, only in Yemen was no collaboration identified. Coordination of victim assistance and disability issues were combined in Cambodia, Ethiopia, Mozambique, South Sudan, Tajikistan, and Uganda. In Afghanistan, a separate victim assistance coordination mechanism was re-established in 2013 after having been previously combined with disability coordination. Afghanistan's victim assistance coordination mechanism collaborated with the disability coordination mechanism.

During 2013, the victim assistance coordination mechanism in DRC was dissolved. The role of victim assistance planning and coordination shifted to the World Health Organization (WHO)-led cluster on disability; however, victim assistance issues were not specifically addressed by the cluster.

Planning

Actions 13 and 14 of the Maputo Action Plan call on States Parties to implement national policies and plans that contribute to “the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society.”

In 2013, 21 of the 31 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors had plans in place to address the needs and promote the rights of landmine victims.⁷⁸ However, in at least four of these states—Burundi, Chad, South Sudan, and Yemen—national victim assistance plans were inactive due to either a lack of resources to implement the plan, armed conflict, or a combination of both. Plans in Afghanistan, DRC, and Sudan had expired prior to 2013 and were not renewed.

Actions to respond to the needs of mine survivors had been incorporated into national disability plans in El Salvador, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, although these states did not have a distinct victim assistance plan. Several other countries had both a national victim assistance plan and had also considered the needs and rights of mine/ERW survivors in the development of disability plans and policies, as in Cambodia, Colombia, Peru, and Tajikistan. South Sudan, while unable to implement its plan, had combined victim assistance and disability issues in the same plan.

In Colombia and El Salvador, planning of mine/ERW victim assistance was also integrated into efforts to address the needs of all armed conflict victims. In Guinea-Bissau, assistance to mine/ERW victims was integrated into the national poverty reduction strategy.

Survivor participation

Through Action 16 of the Maputo Action Plan, States Parties have committed to “enhance the capacity and ensure the inclusion and full and active participation of mine victims and their representative organisations in all matters that affect them.”

Survivor participation increased significantly under the implementation of the Cartagena Action Plan. In 2009 at the start of the Cartagena Action Plan's implementation, the Monitor found that “few Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have fulfilled their commitment to involve survivors in planning, implementation, and monitoring of VA [victim assistance] activities at local, national, regional or international levels.”⁷⁹ In 2013, among the 20 States Parties with active victim assistance coordination, all but one (Yemen) included survivors in these mechanisms. Survivor participation in coordination in Afghanistan was reported to be inadequate. Survivor participation in Colombia, which was noted to be ineffective in recent years, improved in 2013.

Four States Parties without active multilateral victim assistance coordination also had survivor participation in programs and policy-making. In DRC, survivors were included in coordination of the disability cluster; in Iraq and Senegal, survivors were represented by survivor networks or DPOs in bilateral meetings with the national mine action center; and in Serbia, survivors were represented in meetings with the Ministry of Social Welfare and in committees to reform laws to protect the rights of disabled veterans and to develop and enforce national accessibility regulations. In 26 of 31 States Parties, survivors were involved in implementing physical rehabilitation, peer support, income-generating projects, data collection, and/or referral programs.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Uganda.

⁷⁸ Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. States with no plan: Afghanistan, DRC, Eritrea, Iraq, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

⁷⁹ ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, November 2009), www.the-monitor.org/lm/2009/.

⁸⁰ Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Uganda, and Yemen. It was not known if survivors were involved in the implementation of services and programs for mine/ERW survivors in Zimbabwe.

Conclusion

At the start of the Maputo Action Plan period, States Parties with significant numbers of survivors are not beginning with a blank page in organizing victim assistance efforts. Most have already benefited from their pursuit of commitments made in the two previous action plans to the Mine Ban Treaty. As seen above, approximately two-thirds of States Parties have active coordination mechanisms and relevant national plans in place. In nearly all States Parties, survivors participate in decisions that affect their lives and in the implementation of services—although in many countries their participation must be better supported, especially for survivors to be effectively included in coordination roles.

In most of these countries, victim assistance efforts have been integrated into other frameworks through collaborative coordination, combined planning, and/or survivor participation. Therefore, the Maputo Action Plan presents the opportunity for more states to rapidly accelerate the kinds of achievements that make a real impact on the lives of victims.

The Victim Assistance Team of the Monitor has produced a separate report⁸¹ on the availability and accessibility of comprehensive rehabilitation in mine/ERW-affected states which updates the status of services and programs for mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities in the relevant States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions.⁸² This report, “Equal Basis 2014: Access and Rights in 33 Countries,” presents progress in these states in the context of the WHO’s World Report on Disabilities⁸³ (2011) and the CRPD, as well as the disarmament conventions and their action plans. National-level details of progress and challenges in providing effective victim assistance are available in some 70 individual country profiles on the Monitor website for both States Parties and states not party to the relevant conventions.⁸⁴

⁸¹ ICBL-CMC, “Equal Basis 2014: Access and Rights in 33 Countries,” December 2014.

⁸² The 31 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties detailed here, plus Lao PDR and Lebanon (States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions), with significant numbers of cluster munition, landmine, and ERW victims.

⁸³ WHO, “World Report on Disabilities,” 2011, www.who.int/disabilities/world_report/2011/en/.

⁸⁴ Country profiles are available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp. Findings specific to victim assistance in states and other areas with victims of cluster munitions are available through *Landmine Monitor 2014*’s companion publication, ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2014*, the-monitor.org/index.php/LM/Our-Research-Products/CMM14.



Support for Mine Action

© Sean Sutton / MAG, May 2013

Key Figures


- In 2013, donors and affected states reported contributing approximately US\$647 million in international and national support for mine action.¹ This represents a decrease of \$34 million (5%) from 2012 when the recorded contributions totaled \$681 million.
- Thirty-one (31) donors contributed almost \$446 million in international support for mine action to 47 affected states and three other areas: a decrease of almost \$51 million from 2012.
- The Monitor identified 18 affected states which provided \$201 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs—an increase of \$17 million compared with 2012.
- International donor contributions accounted for 69% of support for mine action in 2013, while national contributions accounted for the remaining 31% of global funding.
- In addition to those contributions, appropriations from the UN General Assembly (UNGA) for mine action within 11 peacekeeping operations provided \$150 million in 2013, an increase of 33% compared with 2012.

International Contributions in 2013

In 2013, donors contributed almost \$446 million in international support for mine action—a decrease of almost \$51 million (10%) from \$497 million reported in 2012. While this marks a return to the same funding levels as in 2009, it is the eighth consecutive year that international contributions for mine action have totaled more than \$430 million.

▲
Deminer at work around a new monastery built on cleared land in Lebanon, a country that still suffers from landmine, cluster munition and ERW contamination.

International support for mine action by year



Donors

In 2013, 31 donors consisting of 27 States Parties, three states not party, and one international institution—the European Union (EU)—contributed a total of \$446 million to mine action.

Contributions from the top five mine action donors—the United States (US), Japan, Norway, the EU, and the Netherlands—accounted for 65% of all donor funding. Support from States Parties in 2013 accounted for 62% of all international funding with \$273 million. The top five State Party donors—Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UK), and Germany—provided \$181 million (41%).

¹ This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs as of October 2014. Mine action support includes funding related to landmines, cluster munitions, and unexploded ordnance, but is rarely disaggregated. State reporting on contributions is often varied in the level of detail and dependent upon different financial years. In addition, it is difficult to assess the amount of funding for various thematic sectors due to a lack of data. Funding for victim assistance activities are especially difficult to track because many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs for development and the rights of persons with disabilities. All figures presented in this chapter are in nominal amounts (unadjusted for inflation).

Contributions by donor: 2009–2013²

Donor	Contribution (US\$ million)				
	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009
US	113.9	134.4	131.4	129.6	118.7
Japan	64.0	57.6	43.0	46.8	48.0
Norway	49.6	48.4	53.4	50.3	35.7
EU	39.6	60.7	19.3	49.8	48.1
Netherlands	23.4	24.1	21.3	22.8	18.4
UK	22.8	22.0	18.0	16.3	17.9
Germany	22.1	23.8	23.6	23.4	23.7
Switzerland	20.8	18.4	17.5	15.7	15.0
Australia	14.5	24.0	45.7	24.4	19.4
Sweden	12.9	14.1	12.2	13.0	14.9
Denmark	9.3	8.7	9.3	10.2	11.2
United Arab Emirates	9.3	13.4	2.0	0	0
Belgium	8.0	7.2	8.1	11.9	10.4
Canada	7.9	6.8	17.0	30.1	18.1
Finland	7.7	7.2	7.4	6.7	7.0
New Zealand	6.7	5.4	4.3	3.3	2.2
France	2.1	2.0	1.3	3.6	4.5
Ireland	4.1	3.6	4.0	4.5	5.2
Luxembourg	1.9	1.2	1.2	0.9	1.0
Spain	1.6	1.9	5.3	5.4	14.8
Italy	1.5	2.8	3.4	4.0	3.9
Austria	1.2	0.9	2.8	1.9	2.1

The top 10 donors—the US, Japan, Norway, the EU, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, UK, Australia, and Sweden—contributed more than \$10 million each, representing a total of 85% of all international funding for 2013. The top 10 donors for 2013 remain unchanged from 2012. Nine of the 33 donors contributed less than \$1 million.

Several states decreased their funding in 2013, most notably the EU and the US which both contributed about \$20 million less than in 2012. The decrease of more than \$20 million from the EU reflects a drop in the number of mine action programs it supported from 15 in 2012 to 12 in 2013. However, approximately \$25 million was due to be provided for mine action in Angola, but no contracts had been issued under this funding as of May 2014.³

In total, 12 donors contributed more in 2013 than in 2012,⁴ including a \$2.4 million increase from Switzerland resulting in a total of \$20.8 million, the highest contribution Switzerland has made since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999. Nearly half of Switzerland's contribution went to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

² The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. Nine states contributed less than \$1 million: Andorra, Colombia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Oman, Slovenia, and South Korea.

³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jérôme Legrand, Policy Officer, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Conventional Weapons and Space Division, European External Action Service (EEAS), 5 May 2014; and email, 6 May 2014.

⁴ Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and UK.

As of October 2014, five donors from 2012 had not reported a contribution to mine action in 2013: Brazil, Iran, Monaco, Saudi Arabia, and Taiwan.

Funding Paths

In addition to bilateral aid, donors provided funding via several trust fund mechanisms, including the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), administered by UNMAS; the Cluster Munition Trust Fund for Lao PDR, administered by UNDP; ITF Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia); the Common Humanitarian Fund in Sudan; and the NATO Partnership for Peace Fund (PFP).

In 2013, 23 donors reported contributing a total of approximately \$51 million to the VTF, compared with 28 donors and \$59 million in 2012—a decrease of 14% in contributions. Japan was by far the largest donor to the VTF, followed by UK, Canada, and the Netherlands. The four countries combined provided 72% of all VTF contributions. Several small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action, including Andorra, Colombia, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Oman, and South Korea.

Recipients

In 2013, a total of 47 states and three other areas received more than \$379 million from 31 donors.⁵ A further \$67


⁵ Only 12 recipients were not States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: Armenia, Egypt, Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Marshall Islands, Myanmar, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Vietnam. The three other areas that received contributions were Kosovo, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

million was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies, without a designated recipient state or area. Most advocacy funding is contained within this category of funding.

The top five recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Iraq, Cambodia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)—received 44% of all international contributions. Afghanistan received twice as much funding as the second largest recipient (Lao PDR).

The Asia-Pacific region received 40% of all international funding; most of the contributions went to Afghanistan, Lao PDR, and Cambodia.

International Contributions by region in 2013



Note: MENA = Middle East and North Africa

The number of donors for each country and the amount of support each country received ranged from one donor contributing several hundred thousand dollars, to 19 donors contributing a total of more than \$72 million toward mine action in Afghanistan. Nine states, or 18% of all recipients, had only one donor.

Of the 50 recipients in 2013, 31 states and two other areas received more than \$1 million, while the remaining 17 received less than \$1 million. A small number of countries received the majority of funding. The top recipient states—Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Iraq, Cambodia, BiH, and Lebanon—received 44% all international support in 2013.

National Contributions in 2013

While there has been more transparency from affected states, overall national contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported as some States Parties and many states not party do not provide that information publicly. States Parties such as Algeria and Iraq as well as states not party India, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam—all mine-affected countries with significant contamination and major clearance operations (usually conducted by the army), as well as significant numbers of survivors and need for victim assistance—have never reported annual national expenditures.

International support recipients in 2013

Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)
Afghanistan	72.6	Tajikistan	4.1
Lao PDR	34.8	Syria	3.6
Iraq	33.2	Yemen	3.2
Cambodia	32.9	Sudan	2.6
BiH	23.1	Jordan	2.4
Lebanon	22.8	Zimbabwe	2.3
South Sudan	17.4	Mali	2.2
Mozambique	15.7	Palau	2.1
Libya	15.2	Mauritania	1.8
Colombia	13	Thailand	1.5
Somalia	12	Benin	1.3
Angola	10.1	Palestine	1.3
Sri Lanka	9.2	<i>Somaliland</i>	1.3
Vietnam	9	Philippines	1.2
DRC	8.5	Serbia	1.2
Myanmar	7.9	<i>Western Sahara</i>	1.2
Others*	7.3	Georgia	1.1
		Total	379

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated by italics

*Other recipients in 2013 included: **Albania**, Armenia, **Burundi**, **Central African Republic**, **Chad**, **Croatia**, **Ecuador**, **Egypt**, **Ethiopia**, **Guinea-Bissau**, **Kosovo**, Marshall Islands, **Peru**, **Senegal**, **Solomon Islands**, **Turkey**, and **Uganda**. All received less than \$1 million

Eighteen states reported \$201 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs in 2013,⁶ \$17 million more than the \$184 million reported in 2012. Angola (\$115.4 million) accounted for 57% of the total.

National support accounted for 31% of global funding in 2013.

Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping operations in Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Western Sahara have mine action programs that are partially funded by UNGA assessments as part of peacekeeping mission budgets. In 2013, approximately \$150 million—an increase of almost a third—was allocated to mine action for peacekeeping missions globally, including \$67 million in Sudan (Darfur) and South Sudan.

⁶ Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Colombia, Croatia, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Mozambique, Peru, Senegal, South Sudan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.

Peacekeeping assessed funds for mine action⁷

State/other area	Peacekeeping Operation	Assessed funds for mine action (US\$)
Somalia	African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	43,750,000
South Sudan	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)	40,341,972
Mali	UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	20,004,980
South Sudan	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	17,297,932
Sudan	UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)	9,515,018
Côte d'Ivoire	UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)	6,312,050
DRC	UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)	6,017,494
Western Sahara	UN Mission for the organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	2,997,150
Lebanon	UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	1,254,700
Liberia	UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	824,300
Syria	UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)	713,964
Total		149,029,560

⁷ UNMAS Annual Report 2013, pp. 37–58, bit.ly/LMM14SupportFN7.



@ICBL-CMC, June 2014

1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997 Mine Ban Treaty)

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign rather they may become bound without signature through a one step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any State that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 19 November 2014 there were 162 State Parties.

States Parties

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
 Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
 Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
 Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
 Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
 Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
 Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
 Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99
 Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
 Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
 Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00
 Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
 Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
 Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
 Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
 Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
 Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
 Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
 Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
 Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
 Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
 Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06

Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
 Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
 Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
 Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
 Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
 Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
 Cape Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
 Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
 Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
 Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
 Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
 Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
 Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a)
 Congo, DR 2 May 02 (a)
 Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
 Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
 Côte d'Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
 Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98
 Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
 Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
 Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
 Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
 Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
 Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
 Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
 El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
 Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
 Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
 Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
 Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
 Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
 Finland 9 Jan 12 (a)
 France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
 Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
 Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
 Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98

▲
Members of the ICBL delegation signing the Maputo Declaration at the Third Review Conference in Mozambique. The declaration picked up on the ICBL's Completion Challenge by declaring "the ending the era of anti-personnel mines in indeed possible," and voicing States Parties' aspiration to completing their major treaty obligations by 2025.

Ghana	4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00	Saint Kitts and Nevis	3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Greece	3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03	Saint Lucia	3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
Grenada	3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01
Guatemala	3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99	Samoa	3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Guinea	4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98	San Marino	3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
Guinea-Bissau	3 Dec 97; 22 May 01	São Tomé & Príncipe	30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
Guyana	4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03	Senegal	3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Haiti	3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06	Serbia	18 Sep 03 (a)
Holy See	4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98	Seychelles	4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
Honduras	3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98	Sierra Leone	29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
Hungary	3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98	Slovak Republic	3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Iceland	4 Dec 97; 5 May 99	Slovenia	3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98
Indonesia	4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07	Solomon Islands	4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Iraq	15 Aug 07 (a)	Somalia	16 Apr 12 (a)
Ireland	3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97	South Africa	3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
Italy	3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99	South Sudan	11 Nov 11 (s)
Jamaica	3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98	Spain	3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Japan	3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98	Sudan	4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Jordan	11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98	Suriname	4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Kenya	5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01	Swaziland	4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
Kiribati	7 Sep 00 (a)	Sweden	4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Kuwait	30 Jul 07 (a)	Switzerland	3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Latvia	1 Jul 05 (a)	Tajikistan	12 Oct 99 (a)
Lesotho	4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98	Tanzania	3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Liberia	23 Dec 99 (a)	Thailand	3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Liechtenstein	3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99	Timor-Leste	7 May 03 (a)
Lithuania	26 Feb 99; 12 May 03	Togo	4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Luxembourg	4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99	Trinidad and Tobago	4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Macedonia FYR	9 Sep 98 (a)	Tunisia	4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Madagascar	4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99	Turkey	25 Sep 03 (a)
Malawi	4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98	Turkmenistan	3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Malaysia	3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99	Tuvalu	13 September 2011 (a)
Maldives	1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00	Uganda	3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Mali	3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98	Ukraine	24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
Malta	4 Dec 97; 7 May 01	United Kingdom	3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Mauritania	3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00	Uruguay	3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Mauritius	3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97	Vanuatu	4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Mexico	3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98	Venezuela	3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Moldova	3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00	Yemen	4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Monaco	4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98	Zambia	12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
Montenegro	23 Oct 06 (s)	Zimbabwe	3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98
Mozambique	3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98		
Namibia	3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98	Signatories	
Nauru	7 Aug 00 (a)	Marshall Islands	4 Dec 97
Netherlands	3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99		
New Zealand	3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99	States not Party	
Nicaragua	4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98	Armenia	Libya
Niger	4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99	Azerbaijan	Micronesia
Nigeria	27 Sep 01 (a)	Bahrain	Mongolia
Niue	3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98	Burma/Myanmar	Morocco
Norway	3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98	China	Nepal
Oman	20 Aug 14 (a)	Cuba	Pakistan
Palau	18 Nov 07 (a)	Egypt	Palestine
Panama	4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98	Georgia	Russian Federation
Papua New Guinea	28 Jun 04 (a)	India	Saudi Arabia
Paraguay	3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98	Iran	Singapore
Peru	3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98	Israel	Sri Lanka
Philippines	3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00	Kazakhstan	Syria
Poland	4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12	Korea, North	Tonga
Portugal	3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99	Korea, South	United Arab Emirates
Qatar	4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98	Kyrgyzstan	United States
Romania	3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00	Lao PDR	Uzbekistan
Rwanda	3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00	Lebanon	Vietnam

Mine Ban Treaty

18 September 1997

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction

Preamble

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
 - a) To use anti-personnel mines;

- b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
 - c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article 2

Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

Article 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

Article 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible

but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

Article 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 - a) The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
 - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
 - (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
 - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
 - c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
 - d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

Article 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;

b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;

c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;

d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;

e) Assistance to mine victims;

f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

Article 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:

a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;

b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;

c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;

d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;

e) The status of programs for the conversion or decommissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;

f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;

g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines

destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;

h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and

i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

Article 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to

the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party

declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

- a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
- b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
- c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days,

and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

Article 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

Article 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

Article 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 - a) The operation and status of this Convention;
 - b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
 - c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
 - d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
 - e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
 - f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
 - a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
 - b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
 - c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
 - d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.
3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as

the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

Article 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

Article 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

Article 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

Article 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

Article 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

Article 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

Article 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

Article 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.
4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

Article 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

Article 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Appendix

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AXO	abandoned explosive ordnance
BAC	battle area clearance
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons
CHA	confirmed hazardous area
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition
DfID	UK Department for International Development
DPO	disabled persons' organization
EC	European Commission
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
ERW	explosive remnants of war
EU	European Union
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HI	Handicap International
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive device
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
ISU	Implementation Support Unit
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	non-governmental organization
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
NSAG	non-state armed group
OAS	Organization of American States
PfP	Partnership for Peace (NATO)
SHA	suspected hazardous area
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
USAID	US Agency for International Development
UXO	unexploded ordnance
VA	victim assistance

Glossary

Abandoned explosive ordnance – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is “A conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (bomblets) over a wide area. Bomblets are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Community-based rehabilitation – Programs in affected communities (often rural areas) that are designed to supplement facility-based programs in urban centers. These programs improve service delivery, equal opportunities, and protect human rights for a larger group of people with disabilities who have limited access to service, due to uneven service distribution, high treatment cost, and limited human resource capacity.

Confirmed hazardous area – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Explosive remnants of war – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Explosive ordnance disposal – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Improvised explosive device – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. Victim-activated IEDs are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

International Mine Action Standards – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

Information Management System for Mine Action – The UN’s preferred information system for the management of critical data in UN-supported field programs. IMSMA provides users with support for data collection, data storage, reporting, information analysis, and project management activities.

Landmine Impact Survey – A national or regional assessment of the socioeconomic impact on communities caused by the actual or perceived presence of mines and ERW, in order to assist the planning and prioritization of mine action programs and projects.

Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

Mine/ERW risk education – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from mines and ERW by awareness-raising and promoting behavioral change, including public information dissemination, education and training, and community mine action liaison.

National mine action authority – A governmental body, normally interministerial in nature, responsible for managing and regulating a national mine action program.

Non-state armed groups – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritiza-

tion and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Risk reduction – Those actions which lessen the probability and/or severity of physical injury to people, property, or the environment due to mines/ERW. Risk reduction can be achieved by physical measures such as clearance, fencing or marking, or through behavioral changes brought about by mine/ERW risk education.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition).

Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environ-

ment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate; unexploded submunitions are known as “blinds” or “duds.”

Victim – The individual killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), his or her family, and community.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.

Landmine Monitor 2014



Landmine Monitor 2014 provides a global overview of efforts in 2013 and the first part of 2014 to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally assess the international community's response to the global landmine and explosive remnants of war problem. It covers developments in the areas of antipersonnel landmine use, production, stockpiling, mine action, casualties, victim assistance, and mine action funding.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the unprecedented civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community's response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Left: Deminer Rebeca Carlitos Martinho records operational data as part of efforts to identify and clear the last remaining minefields in Mozambique.
© Werner Anderson/Norwegian People's Aid, November 2013

Cover: Celeste Munguambe, a landmine survivor (standing on back of wheelchair), performs with people with disabilities and other IncluArt dancers at the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique.
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