OTHER

ABKHAZIA

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001, Abkhazian authorities for the first time told Landmine Monitor that Abkhazian soldiers are using antipersonnel mines. Abkhazia maintains that both Abkhazian and Georgian forces used landmines in the Kodor Valley in October 2001. Private armed groups from Georgia continued to cross into Abkhazia and lay antipersonnel mines. From 1998 through February 2002, HALO Trust cleared a total of 945,868 square meters of land. The most important elements of Abkhazia’s infrastructure have been demined. As of March 2002, mine awareness education had been provided to about 40,000 people in Abkhazia.

Mine Ban Policy
After the disintegration of the USSR, the long-standing dispute over the political status of Abkhazia resulted in the outbreak of war between Abkhazia and Georgia, with significant use of mines by both sides, followed by a cease-fire agreement in May 1994. Peace negotiations are ongoing, but no progress has been made on agreement on the political status of Abkhazia. On 3 November 1999, a national referendum took place, resulting in an Abkhazian declaration of independence, which remains unrecognized by the international community.1 Because Abkhazia is not an internationally-recognized State, it cannot become party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In early April 2002, in an interview with Landmine Monitor, the Abkhazian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Shamba, reaffirmed the readiness of Abkhazian authorities to ban landmines in the context of a signed and internationally-recognized peace treaty with Georgia. He stated, “Our attitude towards landmines develops in the light of mine war against Abkhazia.”2

Use
In its previous three annual editions, Landmine Monitor did not report use of antipersonnel mines by either the Georgian Armed Forces or Abkhazian forces.

In 2001, Abkhazian authorities for the first time told Landmine Monitor that Abkhazian army soldiers are using antipersonnel mines. The Head of Military Headquarters of the Abkhazian army stated that mines are used only for self-protection, such as when soldiers have overnight stays in observation posts in the forests around Gal and Kodor Valley regions. He claimed that afterwards, the soldiers always dig up the mines and leave the ground clear.3

An Abkhazian military official told Landmine Monitor that both Abkhazian and Georgian military forces used antipersonnel mines in October 2001, when Abkhazia claims that Georgian armed irregulars, with the active support of regular Georgian troops, moved into the northern part of the Kodor Valley in violation of the cease-fire agreement of May 1994.4

Private armed groups from Georgia continued in 2001 and 2002 to cross into Abkhazia and lay antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. It has been alleged that these groups are linked to the Georgian government.5 In January 2002, the armed groups “White Legion” and “Forest Brothers”

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1 UN Security Council Resolution, S/RES/1287, 31 January 2000, called the referendum “unacceptable and illegitimate.”
2 Interview with Sergei Shamba, Abkhazian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sukhum, 1 April 2002.
3 Interview with Vladimir Arshba, Head of Military Headquarters of Abkhazian Army, Sukhum, October 2001.
reportedly began mining footpaths linking Georgia’s Zugdidi region with the Gali region of Abkhazia, including paths to Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping positions, and mining the left bank of the Inguri River, separating Abkhazia and Georgia. They reportedly warned the CIS peacekeepers of mine-laying.6

The government of Georgia denies any use of antipersonnel mines, or any support for armed Georgian partisans in use of antipersonnel mines.7

The CIS peacekeepers from Russia are said to have previously laid mines, including in areas around their checkpoints for the purpose of self-protection.8 In August 2001, the Russian Federation told Landmine Monitor that its peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia had not used mines.9

**Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling**

It is not believed that Abkhazia has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Abkhazia currently maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, though its size and composition is unknown. Mines used in the conflict have been of Soviet manufacture. Russian engineering units serving with the CIS peacekeeping forces may also have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.10

In early May 2002, Russian peacekeepers and United Nations military observers on patrol in the Georgian-controlled section of the Kodor valley in Abkhazia reportedly found a stockpile of weapons in a school, including 600 landmines. The Georgians are reported to have said that they “did not manage to get rid of it on time,” and promised to remove them as soon as “the roads open.”11

**Landmine and UXO Problem**

According to HALO Trust, which has carried out survey and clearance work, “Abkhazia resembles the worst-affected areas of Bosnia, yet receives a fraction of the international aid deployed in the Balkans.”12 Mines in Abkhazia are now an obstacle to the repatriation of more than 300,000 displaced people. Mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) contaminate agricultural land, orchards, and industrial estates—a huge blow to the economy, which was based in part on citrus fruits, vineyards, and light industry.13

HALO Trust estimated in 1998 that there were close to 50,000 mines in Abkhazia, but further clearance work and extensive survey led them to conclude in 2000 that the maximum number of mines in Abkhazia was never more than 15,000.14 In January 2001, Abkhazian authorities estimated that there were between 30,000-35,000 landmines in approximately 102 mined locations throughout Abkhazia, mostly located in the Sukhum, Ochamchira, Tquarchal, and Gal regions.15 In March 2002, Georgian Minister of Defense David Tevzadze reportedly claimed that there are no fewer than 70,000 mines in Abkhazia.16

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7 Letter from Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Merab Antadze to Mary Wareham, Coordinator, Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2002.
9 Response to Landmine Monitor Questionnaire by Vassily V. Boriak, Counselor to the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the US, 16 August 2001. It was unclear if this meant no use of mines ever or no use of mines in that Landmine Monitor reporting period (since May 2000).
13 Ibid.
Some, but not all, of Abkhazia’s mined regions are mapped. The Abkhaz Ministry of Defense provided HALO Trust with maps of Abkhazian and Georgian minefields on the Gumista River. HALO Trust reports that Georgian authorities also provided maps of minefields along the Gumista.

In Ochamarie, the most mine-affected region of Abkhazia, minefields were not mapped. According to HALO Trust, in Ochamchire “mine laying took place in a much less disciplined and random manner during inter-communal fighting,” and little to no information exists regarding the exact locations of mines.

About seven percent of contaminated land in Abkhazia is considered Priority 1 (land next to human habitation, where pressure for use of land is great), about 23 percent is Priority 2 (land close to human habitation, cleared land likely to be used), about 22 percent is Priority 3 (land not close to human habitation, cleared land may be used), and about 48 percent is Priority 4 (land not close to human habitation, cleared land is unlikely to be used).

Mine Action Coordination and Funding

Mine action in Abkhazia is coordinated by the Abkhazian Mine Action Center (AMAC). AMAC deals with survey, marking contaminated areas, mine awareness activities, and anti-mine campaigns. AMAC forwards maps and data to HALO Trust, which implements demining operations. HALO Trust transfers the information into digital format, and it is accessible in a user-friendly format to ensure that any visitor can quickly and easily be given accurate information regarding mines or UXO reported in Abkhazia.

In its fiscal year 2001, the United States provided US$1 million to HALO Trust, to fund clearance operations in Ochamchira province. Another US$1.1 million is allocated for HALO Trust for 2002. Germany has reported providing US$146,119 to HALO in 2001.

Mine Clearance

From 1998 through February 2002, HALO Trust cleared 3,493 antipersonnel mines, 233 antivehicle mines, and 2,386 items of UXO. A total of 945,868 square meters of land have been deemed mine-free. The most important elements of Abkhazia’s infrastructure have been demined, such as Babushera Airport (Gulripsh region), the M-27 highway, and bridges linking populated areas. HALO Trust has also demined fields around the central water supply station in Sukhum and areas around water-pipes. Two water pumping stations have been completely demined. Approximately 80 percent of arable land was mined in Abkhazia, and as of early 2002 some 20 percent of that mined land is back in use.

HALO Trust operates in Abkhazia with two demining platoons; it has nine 23-man-strong manual mine clearance teams, three mine awareness teams (each consisting of five mine awareness specialists), one Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team, six mechanical mine clearance vehicles

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17 Interview with Simon Conway, Program Manager, HALO Trust, Abkhazia, Sukhum, 28 January 2001.
18 Email from HALO Trust Caucasus Desk Officer to Abkhazian Committee of the ICBL, May 2002.
19 Ibid.
25 United Nations Mine Action Investment Database.
26 HALO Trust, Abkhazia, “Clearance Statistics, 01/01/97 - 29/02/02,”
27 Ibid. A total of 380,967 square meters was manually demined and 564,901 square meters mechanically demined.
28 Interview with HALO Trust representative, Sukhum, 12 March 2002.
29 Ibid.


In 2002, HALO Trust transferred its headquarters from Sukhum to Ochamchira. In January 2002, HALO Trust demining teams cleared the territory of the tea factory in Kindyg village in Ochamchira. As of mid-2002, HALO had three manual mine clearance teams operating in Ochamchira, three teams in Sukhum, and three teams in Gali. One team was conducting mine clearance around a factory in the village of Kaman, to the north of Sukhum. Two teams were working on the territory to the north of Ochamchira and the village of Adzubzha. In Gali, the teams were demining in Tageloni, Zeni, and Tsipuria on the bank of the Ingur River.\footnote{HALO Trust, Abkhazia, “Report on Activity of the Humanitarian Organization on Mine Clearance (November 2001 - January 2002).”}

In October 2001, the Abkhazian army cleared mines allegedly laid by the Forest Brothers. The army removed or destroyed 96 antipersonnel mines. During this operation, an Abkhazian reservist was injured by a mine.\footnote{Interview with Colonel Huta Kurt-Ogly, Head of AMAC, Engineering Forces, Ministry of Defense, Sukhum, 18 March 2002.}

The CIS peacekeeping forces conduct some demining in their areas of deployment.

**Mine Risk Education**

Since 1999, AMAC and HALO Trust have been running a mine awareness/mine risk education program in Abkhazia aimed at schoolchildren in mine-affected communities. This program is now conducted in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC conducts training for HALO Trust personnel to prepare them to implement mine risk education programs. As of March 2002, mine risk education had been provided to about 40,000 people in Abkhazia.\footnote{Interview with Julie Aiba, Mine Awareness Officer, HALO Trust, Sukhum, 1 April 2002.}

In its mine risk education planning, the ICRC is targeting the key sections of the population such as shepherds, non-ferrous metal and wood collectors, hunters and people living next to mine-affected areas. During the harvest season, when there is increased transit across the Ingur River, HALO Trust places mine risk education stands at crossing-points to ensure that newcomers and returnees are aware of the dangers from mines and UXO.\footnote{Interview with Chris Barron, Program Manager, HALO Trust, Sukhum, 1 April 2002.}

The processes of mine risk education and mine clearance are directly linked. While conducting mine risk education in villages, the local population (mostly children) provide HALO Trust with important information concerning minefields or UXO in the area.\footnote{Interview with Julie Aiba, Mine Awareness Officer, HALO Trust, Sukhum, 1 April 2002.} HALO Trust mine risk education programs are sponsored by USAID and the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Foundation.

**Landmine/UXO Casualties**

There is no systematic data collection on landmine casualties in Abkhazia. According to the Ministry of Interior, in 2001, one person was killed and four others injured in landmine and UXO incidents;\footnote{Abkhazian Ministry of Interior, “List of terrorist attacks committed on the territory of Abkhazia”, Sukhum, 2001.} in 2000, two people were killed and one injured;\footnote{Ibid.} and in the first three months of 2002,
one person was killed and seven others injured.\textsuperscript{40} In one reported incident in April 2001, four children were injured when a landmine exploded.\textsuperscript{41}

The Abkhazian Campaign to Ban Landmines (AbCBL) believes the information collected by the government underestimates the actual number of new mine casualties. The AbCBL, together with the NGO Association of Invalids with Spinal Injuries (AIS), is monitoring the situation in the field and is developing a database of persons with disabilities which will include data on landmine survivors. The AbCBL information on mine incidents comes from a range of sources, including interviews with survivors, media sources, national and international NGOs, government agencies, United Nations Military Observers, and the internet. However, the AbCBL admits that it is not always possible to report objectively on all landmine incidents.

In January 2001, two CIS peacekeepers were severely injured in an antivehicle mine incident,\textsuperscript{42} and on 12 April 2002, two CIS peacekeepers were injured as the result of a landmine incident in the northern part of the Kodor Valley.\textsuperscript{43} More than 50 CIS peacekeepers have reportedly been killed by landmines in Abkhazia over the past several years.\textsuperscript{44}

Other reported landmine/UXO casualties in 2002 include an incident on 8 January 2002, in which an old man was killed after his horse-carriage hit a device that reportedly consisted of two antivehicle mines.\textsuperscript{45} On 7 May 2002, four people were killed and two injured when their horse stepped on an antivehicle mine in the Ochamchira region; two were killed instantly, and the other two died an hour after the explosion. The two injured people received first aid at the Ochamchira city hospital, after which they were transferred to Sukhum for further treatment.\textsuperscript{46}

The Gagra Orthopedic Center (GOC) collects data on landmine survivors. In 2001, four new mine survivors were registered, another four in each of 2000 and 1999, 10 in 1998, 16 in 1997, 12 in 1996, 22 in 1995, 57 in 1994, 99 in 1993, 12 in 1992, and year of the incident is unknown for five registered mine survivors. Of the mine survivors registered at the Center, 219 are men, 24 are women, and two are children.\textsuperscript{47} Mine/UXO survivors from the Gal region are usually taken to western Georgia for treatment and are not included in the Gagra Orthopedic Center database.

**Survivor Assistance**

Health facilities in Abkhazia are in poor shape due to a lack of resources. The ICRC provides equipment, supplies, and medicines to three referral hospitals and two front-line hospitals in Abkhazia. In October, emergency surgical assistance was also provided to the Agudzera military referral hospital and several other facilities. In 2001, three mine/UXO casualties benefited from ICRC assistance.\textsuperscript{48} Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) continues to provide emergency medical care and support to health facilities in Abkhazia.\textsuperscript{49}

The three main Abkhazian organizations working with the disabled, including landmine survivors, are the Gagra Orthopedic Center, the Association of Invalids with Spinal Injuries (AIS), and the Gagra Rehabilitation Center (GRC).

The Gagra Orthopedic Center was established by the ICRC in cooperation with the Ministry of Healthcare. The Center provides physical rehabilitation and orthopedic devices. All the services

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\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{41} “Two dead, four children injured in Abkhazia incidents,” Agence France-Presse (AFP), 10 April 2001.


\textsuperscript{43} Apsnypress (Abkhazian State Press Agency), 12 April 2002.

\textsuperscript{44} Vladimir Mukhin, military correspondent for Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "Peacekeeping an explosive issue in Abkhazia. Some efforts to allow NATO to bring in troops," The Russia Journal, 24 February-2 March 2001, Issue No. 7 (100), p. 18.

\textsuperscript{45} Interview with UNOMIG officer, Gal, January 2002.

\textsuperscript{46} Apsnypress (Abkhazian State Press Agency), 7 May 2002.

\textsuperscript{47} Data provided by the Gagra Orthopedic Center, 2 April 2002.


\textsuperscript{49} See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 933.
at the GOC are provided free-of-charge for patients. In 2001, the Center provided 96 prostheses, 21 orthoses, 255 crutches, and two wheelchairs. The responsibility for running the GOC was shared between the ICRC and the Ministry of Healthcare in 2001, but all responsibilities have now been handed over to Abkhazian health authorities.

The activities of the Sukhum-based NGO, Association of Invalids with Spinal Injuries, initially focused on people disabled by spinal injuries; however, with increased funding AIS has now expanded its activities. AIS programs cover physical rehabilitation, psycho-social rehabilitation, and vocational training, including computer classes. Two mine survivors are employed by the AIS. AIS’s physical rehabilitation activities are implemented in cooperation with the Center for Humanitarian Programs and the Agudzera Republican Hospital. About 40 people have benefited from the programs, including eight mine survivors. AIS also promoted the creation of the Association of the Disabled in Abkhazia, which has branches in Gagra, Gudauta, and Sukhum. The budget for the AIS program in 2001 was US$19,688 (621,342 rubles), of which US$4,753 (150,000 rubles) was spent on social services and US$1,901 (60,000 rubles) on medicines distributed by the Obligatory Health Insurance Foundation.

In the past, the Gagra Rehabilitation Center provided a wide range of rehabilitation facilities and was capable of accommodating a few hundred patients. Currently it serves more as an accommodation facility for amputees waiting for their prostheses to be made; there are 150 staff and about 30 patients. The GRC covers all the expenses for care and accommodation of patients in the Center. The annual budget of the Center is US$27,788 (877,000 rubles), with the Ministry of Healthcare providing US$24,715 (780,000 rubles) a year directly from the State Budget.

The politically-oriented “Amtsahara” movement is attempting to raise awareness of the problems facing disabled people in Abkhazia. In the past, a number of disabled persons who could not receive adequate treatment in Abkhazia were taken to the Yerevan Center for Medical Rehabilitation in Armenia by the Center for Humanitarian Programs. High-level discussions are taking place between Abkhazian and Armenian government officials, and representatives of NGOs and private enterprises, on future plans to send people for treatment in Armenia.

Disability Policy and Practice

Abkhazian legislation does not specifically address the needs of landmine survivors; all persons with disabilities in Abkhazia are treated equally. However, it appears that priority is given to the support of disabled war veterans. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security is responsible for assistance to the disabled in Abkhazia, however there is little evidence that the pensions provided are adequate to provide a minimum standard of living.

The Obligatory Health Insurance Foundation is managed by the Ministry of Healthcare. Three percent of taxes from local enterprises are directed towards the foundation. The Ministry of Healthcare provides the Obligatory Health Insurance Foundation with the sum of US$3,802 (120,000 rubles) annually to assist those disabled by spinal injuries. A government project on the creation of a Voluntary Health Insurance Foundation is being considered.

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50 Interview by Landmine Monitor Georgia with Rainer Knoll, Head of Orthopedic Program, and Peter Schoenenberger, Ortho-prosthetist, ICRC Orthopedic Center, Tbilisi, 8 January 2002.
51 Interview with Sandra Dessimoz, Head of Mission, ICRC Abkhazia, Sukhum, 27 March 2002.
52 Interview with Alena Kuvichko, AIS Administrative Manager, 25 March 2002.
53 Ibid.
54 Interview with Vika Zhiba, Head of the Obligatory Health Insurance Foundation, Sukhum, March 2002.
55 Interview with Liudmila Avidzba, Healthcare Minister, 26 March 2002.
56 Interview with press office of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Abkhazia, 1 April 2002.
Other 801

**CHECHNYA**

**Key developments since May 2001:** Russian and Chechen forces continued to use antipersonnel mines. UNICEF and the ICRC continued mine risk education and survivor assistance programs in the North Caucasus. In 2001, there were at least 154 civilian casualties caused by landmines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance.

**Background**

In September 1991, Chechnya declared independence from Russia, and adopted the name Chechen Republic “Ichkeria.” On 11 December 1994, the Russian Federation (RF) sent troops into Chechnya where mines were used extensively in the fighting by both sides. Although peace agreements were signed in August 1996, relations remained tense and deteriorated to the point of Russia sending troops back into Chechnya in September 1999. Chechen forces evacuated Grozny in February 2000 and the conflict entered a guerrilla war phase. Fighting, replete with massive violations of human rights and laws of war, including widespread use of mines by both sides, continues.

See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* for details regarding production, trade, and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines in Chechnya; no new information is available.

**Use of Mines by Russian Forces**

Russian officials admit to large-scale use of mines in Chechnya, describing the conflict as a “mine war,” but have repeatedly rejected allegations of the indiscriminate use of mines by the Russian forces. In early 2001, a Russian military official reportedly said at a press conference that Russian forces had sown more than 500,000 landmines in Chechnya. In July 2002, a Chechen official claimed that Russia had sharply increased its use of mines in 2002, planting as many as one million in the past five to six months; he claimed Russia has planted a total of approximately three million mines during the second Chechen war.

Again in early 2002, Russian officials stated that the requirements of Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) are taken into account when mines are used in Chechnya (even though the Russian Federation is not party to CCW Amended Protocol II). They claim that all minefields are fenced and marked to prevent civilian casualties, and that once active military operations are over, minefields are cleared.

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3. See, for example, Remarks of then Deputy Chief of the Military Engineering University, Major General A. Nizhalovskii, in roundtable discussion of engineer equipment and military operations in Chechnya, reported in *Armeyskiy sbornik* (Army collection), No. 6, June 2000, pp. 35-40. *Armeyskiy sbornik* is a specialized monthly analytical periodical covering a wide range of military-related issues and problems. It contains a “roundtable section” in which military authors may publish articles on a given subject. See also, “Chechens Say Russians Laid 300,000 Mines,” *Kavkaz-Tsentr News Agency* (Internet), 5 June 2000; interview with Lieutenant-General Nikolai Serditsev, December 1999; “Night Patrol of ‘Fittermice,’” *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (official daily newspaper of Russian government), 21 January 2000.
Neither past nor current reports coming out of Chechnya substantiate these claims. For example, in January 2002, the Commandant of the Leninskaya neighborhood of Grozny, Colonel V. Dushukhin, told Landmine Monitor he did not have any information on the mined areas or maps of minefields. He said mine clearance is only carried out when requested, for example, to clear a shell or a mine from a house or yard.\(^7\) In Landmine Monitor field research in January 2002, villagers in a district near the border with Georgia said they could not tell where the minefields begin or end.

In August 2001, Russia described its mine use in Chechnya and Tajikistan to Landmine Monitor: “Mine barriers have been laid to blockade specific base areas used by [rebel] units and to close movement routes and convoy paths across the state border, using fragmentation-action antipersonnel mines with self-destruction mechanisms and control options that comply with requirements in [Amended Protocol II]…. Mines are emplaced primarily on sectors of the border where difficult physical and geographical conditions do not permit other forces or methods to be employed effectively, where there are virtually no local inhabitants, and to protect and guard positions and places where border divisions are stationed.”\(^8\)

According to Chechen officials, in 2001 and 2002, the Russian Army continued to mine areas and paths leading to their troop positions, paths to checkpoints, around commanders’ offices and governmental agencies. Many places that the Army lists as “suspicious” are also mined. The purpose of this mining is to restrict access through specific checkpoints to control the population. There are 700 checkpoints and about 20 large and middle-sized Army garrisons in Chechnya. Temporary military camps periodically appear and disappear in different parts of Chechnya and land around these camps is usually mined.\(^9\)

There is also concern that with many different Army and Police detachments, as well as contracted military personnel from different parts of Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States countries (including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine), engaging in the fighting in Chechnya and rotating out on a frequent basis (every three to six months), forces may lay mines without providing their replacements with proper mapping and other information.

**Use of Mines by Chechen Rebels**

During a June 2002 trip to Chechnya, Olara Otunnu, the United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, said “insurgent groups continued to enlist children, paying them to plant landmines and other explosives, and to target civilians perceived to be cooperating with the government administration.”\(^10\)

In interviews with Landmine Monitor (Russia), Russian engineers who have served in Chechnya have stated that mine use by Chechen rebels increased during 2001 and 2002. They view this as predictable because the Chechens view mine warfare as effective and because of the ready availability of components for the production of improvised explosive devices.\(^11\) These engineers believe Chechen combatants are increasingly relying on IEDs, perhaps in part because of the lack of mass-produced landmines, but also because of the abundance of artillery shells, grenades, explosives, and other components necessary for makeshift production of homemade mines.\(^12\)

Ongoing use of mines by Chechens is such that Russian Army deminers monitor and carry out mine clearance in Grozny and the main roads in Chechnya every day. Roads used by Russian

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\(^7\) Interview with Colonel V. Dushukhin, Commandant of Leninskaya, Grozny, 27 January 2002.


\(^9\) ORT television report, with Akhmad Kadyrov, Head of the Chechen administration, and Stanislav Ilyasov, Head of the Chechen government, March/April 2002.


\(^11\) Interviews with engineers that served in the Chechen republic.

\(^12\) Interviews with engineer experts.
Army military columns are the only ones that are demined by Army Engineer troops. Col-Gen. Nikolay Serdtsev, Chief of Russia’s engineering forces, said in April 2001, “Every day our sappers discover and disarm 10-15 landmines set by rebels for activation by wire and radio and camouflaged as cellular telephones, radio receivers, tape recorders, and other objects.” 13 From 3-9 September 2001, the Russian Army reported that it had neutralized approximately 270 explosives, including 32 landmines. 14

Several times Landmine Monitor researchers were involuntary witnesses to explosions of armored vehicles by IEDs in Grozny (on Zhukovskaya Street, Pervomaiskaya Street and Staropromislovsky highway). In these cases, Russian Army officers opened fire and detained all people in the nearby area. There were numerous reports in 2001 of Russian Army retaliation resulting in civilian casualties following military casualties from rebel-laid IEDs. 15 According to one media source, in 2001, there were an estimated 500 incidents, mostly from IEDs, involving armored vehicles resulting in 87 Russian Army deaths. 16

Mine Problem

With the renewed fighting, it is impossible to get accurate information about mined areas, but given that very limited mine clearance took place after the 1994-96 war and given the continued mine-laying by both sides, the mine problem can only be getting worse each day. 17

During his June 2002 trip to Russia, Otunnu called Chechnya “one of the most landmine-polluted zones in the world.” After touring Chechnya and neighboring regions, he said, “We estimate that 500,000 landmines have been planted in Chechnya, which makes it one of the most landmine-polluted zones in the world, especially given its size.” 18

Previous editions of Landmine Monitor have provided details on areas known and suspected to be mined, and on the lack of marking of known mined areas. Landmine Monitor conducted field research in Vedensky in January 2002, interviewing over 100 local inhabitants. The Vedensky district and the Argunskiy canyon on the border with Georgia are particularly dangerous mine-affected areas. The local population believes the land surrounding all 26 villages in Vedensky to be mined, and they report a high number of mine casualties.

Russian Army units are stationed near the villages and their bases are protected by minefields. Villagers said that Russian helicopters spread mines from the air, and that it is impossible to know where the minefields begin and end. Village elders have repeatedly appealed to the command of the Russian Army for information about exact locations of mined areas, but to no avail.

Inhabitants of Mahketi village said that all of their fields and pastures are mined. People have not been able to go to their hayfields for the past three years, and instead have been forced to buy hay at the market. One inhabitant interviewed by Landmine Monitor said, “We cannot go to the forest for firewood and are forced to purchase it in neighboring villages, where people still gather firewood risking their lives.” Up to 40 percent of the population is not able to obtain firewood and during the winter moves to areas supplied by gas. The local population is often

15 For example, see Scott Peterson, “‘Lawless’ Russian Actions Reflect Mounting Frustration,” Christian Science Monitor, 13 July 2001.
17 For details of the mine problem resulting from the 1994-96 fighting, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 844. See also Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 870-871, for a description of the problem by the end of that monitoring period.
injured by mines as they graze cattle or enter forested areas, and mines have claimed at least 200 cattle. The villagers say the only ones being blown up by the mines are civilians and their animals, not rebel fighters.

Flash floods in May-June 2002 reportedly dislocated numerous mines laid by both sides, resulting in new mined areas with no exact location identified.19

Mine Clearance

There are no humanitarian mine clearance operations underway in Chechnya. The HALO Trust carried out humanitarian mine clearance in Chechnya between 1997 and December 1999 when Russian military operations forced clearance to be suspended.

Russian engineering troops conduct military mine clearance operations on a daily basis, to support the safe movement of Russian troops along the roads and railroads, and the safe operation of field water supply points.20 Col-Gen. Nikolay Serdtsev, Chief of Russia’s engineering forces, has said, “Every day 50-60 engineering-reconnaissance patrols are detached from our troops along defined routes to check for the presence of mines and explosive devices and to ensure the uninterrupted movement of military columns and civilian equipment.”21 From January to mid-June 2002, Russian engineers reportedly defused 417 landmines and 944 explosive devices in Chechnya.22

Mine Risk Education

International agencies such as the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross are responsible for the bulk of mine risk education (MRE) activities in affected areas in Russia. UNICEF launched a comprehensive MRE and survivor assistance program in the north Caucasus during the reporting period, working in conjunction with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the ICRC, the Danish Demining Group (DDG), and a group of local NGOs, including Voice of the Mountains (Chechnya/Ingushetia). UNICEF acts as the coordinator for all mine-related activities carried out by the UN and other NGOs in the region.

The centerpiece of the mine risk education program is the training of approximately 194,000 children in Chechnya and Ingushetia.23 So far, 460 teachers from 458 functioning schools in Chechnya have taken UNICEF’s “training-the-trainer” course and will teach mine risk education to children ranging in age from 6 to 17. All school children in Chechnya will receive the mine risk education course, which also includes distribution of booklets, posters, leaflets, notebooks, t-shirts, pens, pencils, drawing sets, and sweatshirts with mine awareness messages.24 The curriculum was developed by UNICEF in collaboration with the Chechen Ministry of Education, ICRC, UN, and NGO partners.25 In 2001, UNICEF spent approximately $1 million on the mine risk education and survivor assistance program. In 2002, the program will concentrate on reaching teachers and students in remote districts of Chechnya.

ICRC mine risk education efforts were focused on Ingushetia, Dagestan, and the region including North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and other areas. Internally displaced people (IDPs)
from Chechnya were the main target group in Ingushetia.26  Billboards placed in IDP centers are
aimed mainly at the adult population, who were also targeted through presentations and the
distribution of posters. Some 600 adults in Ingushetia are believed to have attended these seminars
during the reporting period.27  Children in Ingushetia are targeted by the ICRC’s “child-to-child”
program and over 500 children are believed to have been reached through this program.28

In North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and southern Russia, children were also the main
target of the ICRC’s mine risk education effort. Chechen children come to the North Caucasuses
throughout the year to stay in sanatoria “as a break from the dire living conditions in Chechnya.”29
During the reporting period, the ICRC provided approximately 2,000 of these children with lessons
in the “child-to-child” program. A few hundred teenagers participated in a “teenager-to-teenager”
program. Approximately 9,000 of the Chechen children have also seen an MRE puppet show. The
ICRC also distributed various mine awareness leaflets, comic books, and game sheets to children
and teachers.30

Landmine Casualties

There is no comprehensive official data on landmine casualties in Chechnya. However, there
were almost daily reports of mine incidents causing casualties in Chechnya in 2001. A
representative of Chechnya, when writing about the number of war-wounded people, including
landmine survivors, needing artificial limbs stated that in 2001 it was estimated that the numbers
had increased to 14,000, adding that there is “no opportunity to receive more accurate information.
We just know that the number of victims increases daily.”31

An analysis of reported incidents indicate that in 2001 there were at least 1,153 new
casualties caused by landmine, UXO or IED incidents: 367 were killed and 786 injured.32  Of
these new casualties, 137 were civilians (62 killed and 75 injured) including 23 children, 43 were
Chechen fighters (26 killed and 17 injured), 963 were from the Russian armed forces, including
police and interior ministry (279 killed and 684 injured), and the status of ten casualties was not
reported.

In 2001, UNICEF recorded 154 new civilian casualties, of which 21 were killed and 133
injured.33  According to the head receiving nurse at Hospital Number Nine in Grozny, the hospital
records five or six casualties of gunfire or landmines every day.34  NGOs working in hospitals in
Chechnya claim that there are between 30 and 50 civilians injured each month in landmine
incidents, with the majority of casualties occurring in Grozny.35  In 2001, medical institutions in
Chechnya registered 1,020 casualties with gunshot and landmine injuries, as compared to 814 such

27  Data Compiled from ICRC Russia Web Site, at:
28  Ibid.
29  Emergency action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South
of Russia (April-May 2002), at:
30  Ibid.
31  Letter to Landmine Monitor (Tamara Mazaeva) from Ali Asaev, Representative of the Chechen
32  Data collated by Landmine Monitor from media reports, human rights reports, RF MoESDC, Ministry
of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Health.
33  Emails to Landmine Monitor from Aida Ailarova, National Officer for Mine Action and Enrico
34  Sharon LaFraniere, “Grozny Experiences Peace in Name Only Despite Russian Assurance of Safety,
35  Information from various unofficial sources sent to Landmine Monitor (HIB) by Catherine Naughton,
Program Manager, Handicap International North Caucasus, 30 July 2002.
casualties registered in 2000.36 The ICRC reported treating 240 mine/UXO casualties in the hospitals it supports in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan in 2001.37

Included in the mine incidents in 2001 involving civilians are the following. On 1 June 2001, a pregnant medical student was on her way home from exams when a landmine exploded; she lost both her legs and the baby.38 On 4 August 2001, one 12-year old boy was killed and another injured after disturbing a tripwire on a mine/IED causing it to explode in Grozny School 37, which had been destroyed during military operations.39 On 7 August 2001, a local resident was killed by a mine in forested land in the October area of Grozny. Relatives asked Chechen militia to help remove the corpse. Two militia deminers were clearing the site when another mine exploded, killing one deminer and injuring the other.40 On 16 October 2001, a resident of Soltamuradov, bled to death after stepping on a mine while collecting berries in a forest near his village.41

Olaru Otunnu, the United Nations special representative for children and armed conflict, said in June 2002, “We estimate between 7,000 and 10,000 people have been maimed by landmines [in the course of two Chechen conflicts], and easily more than half of those are children.”42

In 2001, UNICEF trained 30 UN and NGO staff on data collection and the local NGO, Voice of the Mountains (VoM) on data management using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). Five trained representatives of three local NGOs, VoM, Minga, and Let’s Save the Generation, currently work on gathering data in the territory of Chechnya and two VoM staff manage the database in Ingushetia. As of July 2002, 750 landmine casualties have been identified, of which 210 are children. Of the total casualties recorded, 7 percent were killed and 93 percent injured, 82 percent are male and 18 percent female, and 32 percent required below-knee amputations while another 19 percent required above-knee amputations.43

From May 2000 to March 2001, the Human Rights Investigation Bureau of Chechnya conducted field research in the southeastern region of Chechnya, and in Ingushetia. The survey identified nearly 400 landmine casualties.44

Survivor Assistance45

Surgical and general health facilities in Chechnya remain devastated because of war damage and a lack of resources and maintenance. When describing Grozny’s Hospital Number Nine, a journalist reported that the hospital “has a sign and a gate; otherwise it could be mistaken for more ruins. The five-story main building, once the hospital’s pride, is windowless and pockmarked by bullets.”46 In 2001, there were 55 hospitals, 34 polyclinics, 46 mobile clinics, and 187 mobile clinic points in Chechnya; however, many often function without running water, proper heating, or sewerage systems.47 A lack of skilled staff, equipment, and the security situation also hampers the delivery of adequate assistance.48 In June 2001, the ICRC held a two-day regional seminar in

39 “Confrontation in Chechnya: The chronicle of violence,” information from the “Memorial” human rights center in Nazran.
40 “Confrontation in Chechnya: The chronicle of violence,” information from the “Memorial” human rights center in Nazran.
41 Ibid.
44 For full details on the survey and other casualty data see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 944-946.
45 Information in this section focuses on civilian mine casualties as Russian military mine casualties receive medical care in military hospitals and subsequent rehabilitation.
Moscow on war surgery; among the 30 participants were ten surgeons and traumatologists from six Chechen hospitals and from Ingushetia and Dagestan. The ICRC regularly provides surgical support, medicines, and medical supplies to improve the quality of care to nine referral hospitals in Chechnya and two other hospitals in Ingushetia and Dagestan. In 2001, 700 war-wounded patients were treated, including 240 mine/UXO casualties. The ICRC also supports four mobile medical teams and a medical post run by the Russian Red Cross. On 13 March 2002, the ICRC signed an agreement with the Chechen Ministry of Health and the Chechen branch of the Russian Red Cross to assist the health facilities in Chechnya. Assistance will include the repair of facilities, the supply of medicines, and two Russian Red Cross mobile clinics will visit villages that only have a first-aid post once or twice a week.

The World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF provide assistance throughout Chechnya. Several other international agencies and NGOs also support the health infrastructure in Chechnya with medicines, hospital supplies, expertise, and training for local staff through hospitals, health posts, and mobile clinics in 11 towns, 42 villages, and in the IDP camps. These organizations include Medecins du Monde, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Handicap International, International Humanitarian Initiative, Hamme F的所有or, and World Vision International.

The Russian Center of Disaster Medicine (RCDM) “Zaschita” also provides health services for civilians in the northern Caucasus.

UNICEF and UNHCR work in close cooperation with WHO and ICRC to provide a comprehensive approach to survivor assistance by facilitating services for the physical, psychosocial and vocational rehabilitation of mine survivors. According to Boris Spivak, Head of the Department of Scientific Medical Problems of Orthopedics of the Federal Center of Prosthetic Aid and Rehabilitation of Invalids, among children alone there are currently at least 850 amputees (upper and lower limbs) in Chechnya needing regular prosthetic aid and rehabilitation.

In August 2000, UNICEF commenced its Mine Action Program in the North Caucasus with survivor assistance being one of the main components. The program which focuses on mine-injured children and women from Chechnya includes physical rehabilitation, the fitting of prostheses, psychosocial counseling, and vocational training. The program also established two amputee football clubs for about 120 child mine survivors in Grozny and the IDP camps in Ingushetia. To date UNICEF has not been able to raise sufficient funds to fully implement the program.

The physical rehabilitation component of the program started at the Vladikavkaz Rehabilitation Center in December 2001 when 15 mine-affected children started a two-month cycle of visits for ultrasound diagnostics, massage, physiotherapy treatments, and psychosocial support. UNICEF transports children and women from Chechnya and the IDP camps to the Vladikavkaz Rehabilitation Center and the Vladikavkaz Prosthetic Center where in addition to receiving orthopedic and assistive devices, there is a psychosocial counselor to assist the patients in coping with their disability. In 2001, 89 children and women were fitted with artificial limbs and

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51 ICRC Fact and Figures, Emergency Action of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement for the North Caucasus and the South of Russia, December 2001, p. 3.
53 UN OCHA website; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 907.
55 Interview with Boris Spivak at the Federal Center of Prosthetic Aid and Rehabilitation of Invalids, July 6, 2001.
57 Email from Aida Ailarova, UNICEF, 29 July 2002.
received counseling, about 60 received corsets and bandages, and 240 wheelchairs, 1,050 walking sticks, and 510 crutches were also provided.\(^{58}\)

Handicap International, supported by UNHCR, ECHO, Stichtung Fluchtling, and Refugee International Japan, works in Chechnya to identify the needs of persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, in physical rehabilitation. In 2001, HI carried out an assessment on the rehabilitation of persons with disabilities in Chechnya, interviewing 2,200 people. As no facilities exist in Chechnya, future activities will focus on the development of rehabilitation services. HI also supported the traumatology departments and distributed surgical equipment to five hospitals, and distributed 1,000 walking sticks, 850 crutches, and 250 wheelchairs.\(^{59}\) In 2002, it plans to provide training in post-surgical rehabilitation to surgeons and nursing staff from seven hospitals.

In October 2001, the ICRC signed an agreement with the federal Ministry of Labor to provide further training for qualified Chechen staff to work at the prosthetic/orthopedic center in Grozny. Throughout the year, the ICRC provided wheelchairs and crutches to patients with disabilities.\(^{60}\) In November, the WHO also held a training course for 14 prosthetic technicians and doctors on manufacturing techniques for different types of prostheses.\(^{61}\)

On 20 February 2002, representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Development of North Ossetia, the directors of the Grozny and Vladikavkaz prosthetic/orthopedic workshops, and representatives of WHO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and Handicap International met in Vladikavkaz for the fourth interagency coordination meeting on prosthetic/orthopedic and psychological assistance to war-wounded persons from Chechnya. Agreements in principal were reached on the allocation of approximately 1 million Russian roubles (about US$31,700) earmarked by the federal Ministry of Labour and Social Development for prosthetic assistance to the war wounded from Chechnya. Initially, the funding will be used for transporting ten Chechen amputees to Vladikavkaz each month until the allocated funds are used up and the Grozny workshop is able to serve the amputees itself. WHO agreed to further extend the prosthetic program in Vladikavkaz to assist about 40 adult casualties of the war.\(^ {62}\)

As of July 2002, the prosthetic/orthopedic workshop in Grozny had not reopened.\(^ {63}\)

UNICEF, in cooperation with CARE International, continues to provide psychosocial support to landmine and war traumatized children in the Doverie Center in Vladikavkaz and in a counseling service at an IDP camp in Ingushetia.\(^ {64}\) UNICEF’s Psychosocial Program started in mid 2001 with an assessment of 167 children, including 30 mine survivors and their families, in IDP camps in Ingushetia. Three follow-up workshops have been held for 70 counselors, doctors, lawyers, social workers, and monitors on assisting mine/UXO injured children and their families.\(^ {65}\)

The UNICEF vocational training program provides children with daily four-hour classes in English and computers. Vocational training is also offered at the Sleptsovskaya Vocational Training College in Nazran in computers and accountancy to mine survivors and female heads of households.

UNICEF also provides material assistance to mine survivors when a special need is identified. For example, together with assistance from UNHCR and the World Food Program, assistance in the form of mattresses, bed linen, blankets, and food rations were provided to three children, who were all double amputees as a result of landmine incidents and their families who lived in remote areas of Chechnya.\(^ {66}\)


\(^{59}\) Email to Landmine Monitor from Catherine Naughton, Program Manager, Handicap International North Caucasus, 29 July 2002.


\(^{63}\) Email from Catherine Naughton, Handicap International North Caucasus, 29 July 2002.

\(^{64}\) UN OCHA, Humanitarian Action in the North Caucasus information bulletin, 1-16 June 2002.

\(^{65}\) Email from Aida Ailarova, UNICEF, 29 July 2002.

Disability Policy and Practice

The Federal Fund of Obligatory Medical Insurance and a Russian Federation Ministry of Health decree, dated 16 May 2001, ensures medical care for the Chechen population in other republics. In 2001, about 4,000 Chechen received medical care in neighboring regions because it could not be provided in Chechnya.67

EUROPEAN UNION

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001, the EU and its Member States contributed €142.5 million ($127.9 million) to mine action, including €28.39 million ($25.5 million) from the EU itself.

Background

The European Union (EU) is a supra-national body to which its Member States have delegated sovereignty in some areas. In other areas, including foreign policy and defense, the EU functions on a largely intergovernmental basis. The Member States make mandatory financial contributions. The EU’s total budget for 2002 is €98.655 billion (US$88.592 billion). From these funds, the EU makes financial contributions in many areas, including mine action. In 2001, the EU contributed mine action funding of €28.39 million ($25.5 million); during the same period, the total mine action funding of the EU and its Member States amounted to €142.5 million ($127.9 million).1

Fifteen States are currently members of the EU, including 13 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom), one signatory (Greece) and one State not party to the treaty (Finland). The current EU membership represents a population of 374 million.

By 2004, when the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty takes place, an additional 10 States may be EU members, including four States Parties to the treaty (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia), three current signatories (Cyprus, Lithuania, Poland) and two States currently not party (Estonia, Latvia). It is expected that accession talks for these countries will be concluded at the end of 2002, with membership by 2004. Two other States, Bulgaria and Romania (both of which are party to the Mine Ban Treaty), are also EU-applicants. One non-party, Turkey, is seeking to start the negotiation process.

In November 1993, the Maastricht Treaty establishing the Union entered into force, incorporating for the first time the objective of a common foreign policy. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is largely based on intergovernmental positions. All EU activities in relation to the mine ban and mine action are carried out within the CFSP, which shares the same institutions as other Community policies. These include the following:

The European Council brings together the Heads of State or Government of the 15 Member States and the President of the European Commission. It determines the CFSP principles and guidelines, including those with defense implications.

The Council of the European Union is composed of ministerial representatives of each Member State. The Council is responsible for formulating and implementing the CFSP.

The Presidency of the European Union chairs the European Council and other subordinate bodies, and represents the EU in CFSP matters. Each member State takes the Presidency for a six-month period. In the second half of 2001, Belgium held the Presidency, followed by Spain and Denmark in 2002. Because Denmark has opted out of defense matters, Greece is responsible for

1 Exchange rate at 29 April 2002: €1 = US$0.898, used throughout. See later section on Mine Action Funding.
defense in the latter half of 2002, and Greece will hold the Presidency for the first six months of 2003.

The European Commission is responsible for external economic relations, development cooperation and humanitarian aid, including mine action funding. It ensures consistency of these activities with the CFSP.

The European Parliament is elected every five years by direct universal suffrage. It has final say over the EU budget and adopts resolutions calling on the Commission and the Council to modify existing policies or introduce new ones. As such, it can act as a political driving force.

Mine Ban Policy

All EU member States signed the Mine Ban Treaty in December 1997, with the exception of Finland. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom had ratified it by the end of 1998. Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain had ratified the treaty by the end of June 1999.

Greece signed the treaty on 3 December 1997, and, in March 2002, its Parliament voted unanimously in favor of ratification. It is expected to deposit its instrument of ratification at the same time as Turkey accedes. Finland has consistently supported the objective of a global ban on antipersonnel mines and in December 2001 reiterated its goal of acceding to the treaty in 2006. However, Finland’s position as a non-State Party has had an impact. The EU Commissioner for External Relations declared, “I cannot hide this fact: the Union’s powers of persuasion in seeking to achieve universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty are obviously somewhat limited by the remaining difficulties of some Member States in signing and ratifying the Convention.”

Accession to the Mine Ban Treaty is not a condition for joining the EU. The Commissioner for External Relations declared that: “We cannot penalise people when they have a lousy government. As for the applicant countries, we would expect them to support the joint action [on landmines] which I have just referred to. This is not Community acquis in the strict legal sense of that term, but we will obviously encourage them to do away with mines in their defence, to stop manufacturing mines or trading in them, and to sign and ratify the Mine Ban Treaty.”

The EU was represented by the European Commission at the First Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 1999 and at the Second Meeting of States Parties in September 2000. At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua, the EU was represented by Belgium, which held the EU Presidency from July to December 2001. Ambassador Jean Lint, joint head of the Belgian delegation, made a statement on behalf of the EU, referring to the progress made on universalization: “Since September 2000, 13 States have acceded to the Convention, and others have undertaken to do so in the near future. In view of the accession of such a large number of countries, there is no room for doubt: an international standard has been established…. However, we must do even better…. The European Union will continue to press for swift worldwide application of the Convention. It has accordingly made more than 60 demarches to that effect.”

He also cautioned: “We have no time to lose. The Convention establishes strict time limits for the destruction of stocks and the clearance of mined areas…. The countries affected should not be left on their own in this fight. The whole international community should contribute to attaining the objectives of the Convention…. The destruction of stocks of anti-personnel mines is crucial in attaining the objective of the total elimination of those weapons, which is the sole guarantee that new minefields cannot be created. It must be possible to achieve destruction as swiftly and

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3 Ibid. Community acquis, or acquis communautaire, denotes the whole body of principle, policy, laws, practices obligations and objectives that have been agreed within the European Union.
4 “Speech by the European Union to the Third Meeting of the States Parties to the Ottawa Convention,” Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001 (official English-language version). Ambassador Lint noted that many other countries aligned with the EU statement: “countries of central and eastern Europe…EFTA member countries belonging to the European Economic Area…Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Turkey.”
economically as possible, with minimal environmental impact... the European Union is involved in the effort to destroy stocks of anti-personnel mines and recognizes the need for greater international assistance in this area... [and] accordingly calls upon all States Parties to commit additional resources to aid those in need.\(^5\)

The Belgian Presidency also presented the EU position at the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001. It emphasized “the great complementarity” between the Mine Ban Treaty and Amended Protocol II and pointed out that assistance for mine clearance is discussed in the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, which are open to all States. The statement also expressed the EU position on proposals before the CCW conferences, in favor of extension of the CCW to non-international armed conflicts, a strongly mandated expert group to consider the issue of explosive remnants of war, stricter regulation of mines other than antipersonnel mines, and a light and flexible compliance mechanism.\(^6\)

Spain, holding the Presidency from January to June 2002, represented the EU at the intersessional Standing Committees meetings in January and May 2002. At the meetings in May 2002, Spain confirmed that the EU has supported the setting up of an expert working group on mines other than antipersonnel mines, within the context of the CCW, and the strengthening of CCW restrictions on antivehicle mines.\(^7\)

Responding to a letter from the Belgian Network of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Josep Piqué i Camps, Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the EU will continue to include the issue of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty in its political dialogue with the United States and invite it to reconsider its position on the treaty.\(^8\)

The EU has agreements with many countries and raises the mine issue and the Mine Ban Treaty during its dialogues with other countries. For example, Article 11 of the EU-ACP Cotonou partnership agreement on 23 June 2000 states that “particular emphasis shall be given to the fight against antipersonnel landmines.”\(^9\)

The EU responded to the antipersonnel mines challenge through the Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Parliament, with policies in support of mine action, humanitarian assistance, and research. The Council of Ministers has been actively engaged since 1995 through joint actions (unanimous decisions, which are binding on Member States) and resolutions (which represent consensus positions, but have no legal force). In May 1995, the EU issued a moratorium on the export of specified types of antipersonnel mines.\(^10\) In 1996 the moratorium was extended to all types of antipersonnel landmines and to all destinations.\(^11\) The Joint Action of November 1997 extended the previous Joint Action to include all transfers of antipersonnel mine technology, and issued a moratorium on production requiring Member States to take legal measures to ban production of antipersonnel mines.\(^12\)

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\(^8\) Letter to ICBL Belgian Network from Josep Piqué i Camps, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, 24 May 2002.

\(^9\) EU-ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement, Article 11, Cotonou, Benin, 23 June 2000.


The European Parliament has acted as a consistent advocate of the mine ban through successive resolutions and questions urging EU institutions to take proactive measures in support. On 29 June 1995 a resolution on antipersonnel mines called for the Council and the Commission to do more to prevent the dissemination of mines, to concentrate more resources on rehabilitation programs, and to expand mine action in affected countries. For example, the partnership between the EU and ACP (Africa, Caribbean & Pacific states) includes a EU Parliamentary Assembly resolution that was adopted on 26 September 1996 called for ACP countries and EU Member States to engage energetically in demining actions, for more research into demining techniques, and for significant progress to be made in achieving a global ban on antipersonnel mines. The European Parliament resolution on antipersonnel mines of 18 December 1997, in addition to encouraging wider adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its early ratification, also called for more effective coordination of international efforts in mine clearance and in the rehabilitation of victims.

In 2000, the European Parliament called on Member States and European institutions to reinforce measures in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, including its universalization, increased mine action funding and coordination of mine action. It also called on Council and Member States to “explicitly mention” in their national legislation antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that act like antipersonnel landmines “according to the definition contained in Article 2” of the Mine Ban Treaty.13

On 21 September 2000, four parliamentarians and the ICBL organized a conference on landmines at the European Parliament in support of two proposed funding mechanisms and to discuss ways to “improve the co-ordination, coherence, transparency, visibility, accountability, and effectiveness of the [funding] interventions.”14 The two new mechanisms (termed “Regulations”) were voted on and amended by the European Parliament in October 2000, and by the Commission in January 2001.15 They were again amended and voted on by the Council of the European Union in May 2001.16 On 23 July 2001, the Parliament and Council issued the two Regulations.17 Most of the amendments proposed by the Parliament were included, especially the addition of stockpile destruction as an explicit objective and support for local capacity-building for mine action.18 Each Regulation states that “operations financed under this Regulation shall in principle benefit those countries which are committed to the fight against anti-personnel landmines and are parties to the Ottawa Convention. Exceptions may be made for humanitarian emergency, for assistance to mine victims, and for actions in direct support of vulnerable civilian communities, such as refugees and displaced persons, or where the national administration is not functioning.”19

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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
In September 2001, the European Parliament voted in favor of a resolution calling for support of the efforts made by specialist NGOs to engage non-state actors in the mine ban process.\(^{20}\) As a follow-up, three parliamentarians promoted an “Information Meeting on Cooperation with Non-State Actors in Banning Anti-Personnel Landmines” on 7 March 2002; guest speakers included representatives from Geneva Call, the ICBL and the European Commission.

On 13 December 2001, the European Parliament called for a moratorium on cluster munitions under the CCW.\(^{21}\)

Mine Action Funding

In 1996, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament established a specific contribution to mine action, in addition to the mine clearance activities financed in the context of humanitarian aid, reconstruction and development cooperation.\(^{22}\) A specific antipersonnel mine budget line (B7-661) has allocated funds on a yearly basis. In addition, a range of geographical and thematic budget lines and other financial instruments, such as the European Development Fund, have substantially contributed to mine action funding.

Overall policy coordination for mine action is the responsibility of the External Relations Director-General. An ad hoc Mine Action Coordination Group, made up of EC country desk officers for mine-affected countries and representatives of different Commission units, meets regularly to establish mine action funding priorities.\(^{23}\) Member States have never coordinated the mine action funding effort. The 2001 Regulations attribute a specific coordination role to the EC in their Article 8: “The Commission shall...facilitate effective coordination of the assistance efforts undertaken by the Community and individual Member States, in order to increase the coherence and complementarity of their programs” and “[t]he Commission shall promote coordination and cooperation with international contributors and actors, in particular those which form part of the United Nations system and with NGOs, as well as with relevant centers such as the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining.”\(^{24}\)

The 2001 Regulations are the basis for EC mine action and identify the main areas for funding, including supporting civilian mine action strategy, assisting affected countries in their implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, creating and sustaining international structures and local capability for mine action in affected countries, responding to humanitarian emergency, preventing casualties and assisting the rehabilitation of mine victims, encouraging mine action consistent with sustainable development, supporting the introduction and use of appropriate mine action equipment and techniques, and promoting coordination among international mine action actors. The two Regulations also support the destruction of mines in stockpiles.\(^{25}\)

At the Third Meeting of States Parties, the Belgian Presidency of the EU announced that in 2000 the EU contributed €30 million to mine clearance and victim assistance. This was part of the total €125 million earmarked by the EU and member states for implementation of the treaty “which makes the European Union the world’s largest contributor in this field.” Ambassador Lint added that this represented an increase on EU funding of mine action in 1999, and that the EU’s

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\(^{20}\) RSP/2001/2599, Resolution on measures to promote a commitment by non-State actors to a total ban on anti-personnel landmines.


\(^{23}\) Interview with Daniela Di Corrado Adreoni, Chief of the Mine Action Coordination Group, European Commission, Brussels, 22 February 2002.


\(^{25}\) Ibid.
“minimum objective is to maintain the current level of financial support…that is approximately €240 million between 2002 and 2009, under a single budget heading.”26

In 2001, the European Commission contributed a total of €28,390,498 (US$25.5 million) to mine action. This does not include additional mine action funding by individual EU Member States.27

According to a draft EC brochure “The European Union Mine Actions in 2001,” mine action funding by the EC, added to mine action funding by individual EU Member States, totaled more than €142.5 million ($127.9 million) in 2001, an increase of 14 percent compared with 2000 ($125 million).28 Major recipient countries in 2001 included Afghanistan (€22.5 million), Mozambique (€10.2 million), Cambodia (€10.2 million), Bosnia and Herzegovina (€8.9 million) and Eritrea (€8.5 million). A total of 32 countries have received financial support from the EU in previous years.

European Commission Mine Action Funding in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Budget line</th>
<th>Amount (€/$)</th>
<th>Type of action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>B7-210</td>
<td>2,445,000</td>
<td>Unexploded ordnance Quick Response Team/ mine emergency</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>B7-661</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
<td>Landmine impact survey</td>
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<tr>
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<td>unspecified</td>
<td>B7-671</td>
<td>1,285,000</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>B7-661</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>Landmine impact survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12 months</td>
<td>B7-661</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>Regional cooperation on mine clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>B7-541</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>18 months</td>
<td>B7-541 CARDS</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>36 months</td>
<td>B6-61</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Information Society Technologies Program</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>B8-0110</td>
<td>880,000</td>
<td>Development of Mine Action Center (capacity building)</td>
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<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>9½ months</td>
<td>B7-210</td>
<td>215,000</td>
<td>Mine awareness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4 months</td>
<td>B7-210</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>Minefield demarcation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>B7-661</td>
<td>1,400,000</td>
<td>Landmine Impact Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>B7-671</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>Mine and UXO clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>2 months</td>
<td>B7-671</td>
<td>93,922</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>3 months</td>
<td>B7-671</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Equipment for demining training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>B7-431</td>
<td>1,579,576</td>
<td>Mine clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>B7-661</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>Landmine impact survey</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Budget line</th>
<th>Amount (€/$)</th>
<th>Type of action</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>18 months</td>
<td>B7-661</td>
<td>1,950,000/$1,751,100</td>
<td>Emergency mine action</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>3½ months</td>
<td>B7-210</td>
<td>120,000/$107,760</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Caucasus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>6 months</td>
<td>B7-210</td>
<td>150,000/$134,700</td>
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<td>North Caucasus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10 months</td>
<td>B7-661</td>
<td>660,000/$592,680</td>
<td>Landmine impact survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>B7-661</td>
<td>1,500,000/$1,347,000</td>
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<td>Survey</td>
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<td>TACIS B7-520</td>
<td>67,000/$60,166</td>
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<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>EDF-Humanitarian Plus</td>
<td>2,000,000/$1,796,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>B7-661</td>
<td>18,000/$16,164</td>
<td>Interpretation at intersessional Standing Committee meetings</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28,390,498/$25,494,667</td>
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</table>

The overall contribution of €240 million ($215.5) for 2002-2009 was established by the two Regulations issued on 23 July 2001. From this total, €140 million is allocated to the B7-661 budget line (averaging €16 million per year) and €100 million will be distributed through thematic and geographical programs. 29 Funding in 2002 will be allocated according to priorities established by the 2002-2004 Antipersonnel Landmine Strategy Paper (still in the approval process in July 2002). Under B7-661, €11 million ($9.9 million) is pledged for 2002 mine action funding. 30

In setting the priorities for 2001, the European Commission stated that “in the light of the ‘landmine free world’ goal set by the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty for 2009, all effort shall concentrate on accelerated mine clearance and victim assistance. This means that a substantial part of this horizontal budget line will initially be devoted not only to the very urgent and under-funded mine clearance operations but also to establishment of information, parameters, criteria, working and management methods required to make mine clearance efficient, rational and less expensive.” 31

Other geographical and horizontal programs and financial instruments allocated funds for mine action in 2001, as follows:

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South East Europe. This is an area of high priority for EU mine action programs due to the serious socio-economic and humanitarian disruption it has suffered, and its proximity to the core of Western Europe. The EU initiated, and has supported, the Stability Pact for South East Europe which aims to ensure cooperation among its participants on comprehensive measures for reconstruction and development of the region. EU actions in the framework of the Stability Pact include mine action projects and related research and development.

In 2001, the EU’s CARDS Program (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) financed mine clearance in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, through budget line B7-541, in support of the EU stabilization and association process.33

Africa, Caribbean & Pacific states (ACP). The ACP states are associated with the EU under the 1975 Lomé Convention, and receive financial aid from the European Development Fund (the EDF is not part of the Community budget; member States contribute directly to it). The Commission and each country jointly identify the priorities for EU support.44 Regarding support for mine action, the European Commission states that “it is indeed desirable to base all APL initiatives on the needs and priorities identified by the mine affected countries themselves and reflected in major EC and EU country strategies.”35 The 2001 Regulations against antipersonnel mines explicitly state that “Mine action shall be integrated into all country strategies for mine affected developing countries.”36 In 2001, the EDF financed demining along the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border in northeast Zimbabwe, as well as an assessment of the landmine problem in Sudan.37 Mine action in ACP states can also be supported through the budget line for rehabilitation and reconstruction for developing countries (B7-641), which is part of the Community budget.38

Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Thirteen countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Mongolia, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan) received grant-financed technical assistance under the Tacis Programme that mainly aims at enhancing their transition process.39 In 2001, Tacis financed a feasibility study for Ukraine’s Mine Action Center.40 Other budget lines relevant for mine action funding in the region are B7-520 for assistance to partner countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and B7-522: rehabilitation and reconstruction in partner countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.41

Mediterranean and Middle East. In 2001, mine action in Lebanon was financed under the budget line B7-431: rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Countries.42 Other financial instruments that may be used to support mine action in the

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38 Email to Handicap International Belgium from Daniela Di Corrado Adreoni, Chief of the Mine Action Coordination Group, European Commission, 25 March 2002.
41 Email to Handicap International Belgium from Daniela Di Corrado Adreoni, Chief of the Mine Action Coordination Group, European Commission, 25 March 2002.
region include: MEDA Program (B7-410) supporting measures to accompany the reforms to the economic and social structures in the Mediterranean non-member countries, special aid for the implementation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace accords (B7-420), and support for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian refugees in the North East (B7-421). 43

Asia and Latin America. In 2001, no Asian or Latin American countries except Afghanistan received mine action funding from the EC. Previously, Cambodia was the second largest recipient of EC mine action funding. Mainly horizontal programs have previously earmarked funds for mine action in these regions. However geographical budget lines may be used to support mine action and victim assistance. For Asia, they include B7-300 for financial and technical cooperation with Asian developing countries; and B7-302: aid to uprooted people in Asian countries, which covers measures to promote the self-sufficiency of refugees, displaced persons and other populations because of fighting, lack of security or other man-made crises. 44 In addition, in the B7-303: rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries in Asia, which covers measures to initiate the return to a normal life of people in the aftermath of a critical situation, financed actions including rehabilitation of basic infrastructure, mine clearance, raising awareness of danger, and assisting the disabled. 45 In Latin America, mine action and victim assistance funding can also be provided under B7-310 for financial and technical cooperation with Latin American developing countries; B7-312: aid to uprooted people in Latin America, and B7-313: rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries in Latin America. 46

In 2001, two horizontal programs have also provided mine action funding: ECHO (the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office) provides emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. For this purpose it manages a number of budget lines, including B7-201, which has financed mine action in post-conflict and emergency situations. Sources of ECHO funds are the general European Commission budget and the European Development Fund. In 2001, ECHO funded mine action in Afghanistan, mine awareness and minefield marking in Eritrea, and mine awareness in the Russian Federation/North Caucasus. 47

The Rapid Reaction Mechanism is an instrument designed for urgent intervention in crisis situations. It can be used both to conduct one-off actions arising out a crisis situation and to initiate projects requiring longer term follow-up through other assistance instruments. In 2001, it funded urgent mine/unexploded ordnance clearance in Afghanistan and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 48

Research and Development (R&D)

EU funding policy for mine-related R&D is implemented through multi-annual framework programs. The EU budget for R&D for humanitarian demining under the Fourth Framework Programme (1994–1998) was €17 million ($15.3 million) and €16 million ($14.4 million) under the Fifth Framework Programme (1998–2002). In 2002, the EC launched the sixth program (2002–2006). 49

The research goal of the European Commission is to boost European industrial and research institutions’ involvement in developing safer, faster and cost-effective tools to help humanitarian

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43 Email to Handicap International Belgium from Daniela Di Corrado Adreoni, Chief of the Mine Action Coordination Group, European Commission, 25 March 2002.
44 Ibid.
46 Email to Handicap International Belgium from Daniela Di Corrado Adreoni, Chief of the Mine Action Coordination Group, European Commission, 25 March 2002.
48 Ibid.
demining activities. The R&D activities are twofold: developing survey tools to help map affected areas more accurately, and developing better antipersonnel mine detection tools. The Commission has two separate lines of support: “direct actions” executed by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre, and “indirect actions” realized as cost-shared action projects financed in the Fifth Framework Programme through the Information Society Technologies program.

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) at Ispra in Italy has developed expertise in technologies relevant to minefield surveys and mine detection and identification, in particular infrared landmine detection and metal detectors. It supports a range of activities including the Multi-sensor Mine Signature Measurements Campaign, which assists research centers and other organizations in testing mine detection systems, and the ARIS (Action for Research and Information Support in Civilian Demining) network, which is a forum for information exchange between users, researchers, developers and producers of detection devices and systems. The JRC also participates to the Demining Technologies Information Forum which aims to provide a platform for the identification of demining technology gaps, for the synergistic exchange of ideas, for collaborative international program coordination and planning, and for the review of progress in the mine action technology area.

The International Test and Evaluation Programme for Humanitarian Demining (ITEP) was agreed on 17 July 2000 by Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Commission, represented by the Joint Research Centre. ITEP establishes a global network for measuring performance and evaluating the effectiveness and suitability of all forms of equipment, systems, and methods for use in humanitarian demining. In 2001, under EC leadership, members of ITEP from Belgium, Canada and the UK launched the first project: Systematic Inventory of Test & Evaluation (T&E) Activities, Capabilities & Needs in South Eastern Europe (SEE). The aim of this project was to collate information on current projects and capabilities that support demining efforts in the region.

The EC also took the initiative in standardization of humanitarian demining. In August 2000, the EC requested the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) to establish standard methodologies in the context of humanitarian demining, including minefield survey, close-in detection and identification of antipersonnel mines, and test and evaluation of tools in support of humanitarian demining. The CEN members, which are the national standardization bodies of the Member States of the EU and European Free Trade Association, plus the Czech Republic and Malta, cooperates with the International Organization for Standardization, the UN Mine Action Service and the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining. At the end of 2001 the CEN action plan identified as main fields of work: recognition of the International Mine Action Standards, test and evaluation of metal detectors, characterization of soils and mechanical equipment, training requirements for operators, and protective clothing. CEN promoted two technical meetings on test and evaluation of metal detectors on 3-5 December 2001 and on 8-10 April 2002 at the Joint Research Center.

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53 For details see: humanitarian-security.jrc.it and demining.jrc.it.
So-called indirect actions co-financed by the EC in 2001 include eight research projects on sensor development for reduction of mine-suspected areas and mine detection for removal. Two projects (ARC and SMART) are developing area reduction systems using a drone as a platform for sensor. The CLEARFAST project will mount the sensor on a wheeled vehicle to delineate fields by circling from outside the affected area. Four projects are focusing on locator systems developing different sensors. The BIOSENSOR project is developing a biological vapor detector called the artificial dog’s nose which will be able to find small quantities of explosive in mines. The DIAMINE project is developing a plastic detection system, based on the neutron back-scattering technique. The BULRUSH project, based on the concept of acoustic sonar rays, has been developed for mine detection in shallow inland water areas. The DEMAND project is aimed at the enhancement of three existing technologies for multi-sensor landmine detection. Finally, EUDEM2 is aimed at ensuring proper communication between researchers group and operational demining ones.\(^{56}\)

At a workshop on 18 February 2002, an EC representative identified as promising projects the Novel Ground Penetrating Radar system, improvements to commercial metal detectors, the BIOSENSOR, the artificial dog’s nose, and the two area reduction projects.\(^{57}\) Constraints on field implementation identified by participants were the large investment needed to turn a prototype into a commercial product, the small size of the market for demining equipment, funding limitations due to rules on free trade competition, and the small size of demining contracts.\(^{58}\)

In 2002, the Sixth Framework Programme entered into force. According to the Commissioner for Research this provides an opportunity to support R&D for humanitarian mine action: “the problem is complex and success will only be achieved through a combination of competencies and resources available at the national research centres and European industry, through achieving consensus on a common R&D strategy. I think that the objectives and instruments of the European Research Area (ERA) could answer this challenge. The aim of ERA is to create a single market for research, researchers and knowledge, an area in which research and innovation stakeholders, be they individual researchers, universities, research centres or private companies, can define their strategies and operate without constraint at European level…. It seems to me to be important to develop a strategy for research and development for humanitarian mine action technologies, which will allow us to create a critical mass of resources, activities, competencies and expertise.”\(^{59}\)

FALKLANDS/MALVINAS

The Falklands/Malvinas, administered by the United Kingdom but claimed by Argentina, have been a disputed territory since the nineteenth century. The islands’ landmine problem stems from the 1982 conflict, during which both parties laid thousands of antipersonnel and antitank mines, including remotely-delivered mines. Mined areas are located mainly at the beaches and in peat areas; these areas are for the most part, adequately marked and fenced.\(^{1}\)

Both Argentina and the UK are States Parties to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty and since the islands are under the authority of the United Kingdom, the U.K. is obliged, under Article 5 of the


\(^{57}\) Russell Gasser, Area (ERA) for Fielding Humanitarian Demining Systems, Brussels, 18 February 2002.


\(^{1}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 423.
treaty, to clear the island territory of antipersonnel mines by 1 March 2009, ten years after the
treaty entered into force.

The number of mines laid during the conflict and the number of minefields vary according to
the source.\(^2\) A March 2002 report to Landmine Monitor from the Ministry of Defence of the UK
estimated that 18,000 mines were laid during the war, including 14,000 antipersonnel mines, and
that Argentine forces laid a total of 127 minefields.\(^3\) The UK cleared some 1,400 mines
immediately following the conflict, but the clearance was suspended after several injuries to mine
clearance personnel.\(^4\) The UK reported in October 2001 that there were “117 minefields containing
either anti-personnel, anti-vehicle mines or a combination of both.”\(^5\) But in March 2002, the
Foreign Office said there are 101 minefields.\(^6\)

According to an Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, approximately 20,000
antipersonnel mines and 5,000 antitank mines were laid in the islands in 1982.\(^7\)

The Falkland Islands government reports, “The 120 minefields…cover an area of 20 km\(^2\). They
have all been fenced and are no-go areas.”\(^8\) The main problem areas for landmines are
Darwin, Port Fitzroy, Fox Bay, Goose Green, Port Howard, and especially around Port Stanley,
while the beach at Yorke Bay is reported to be totally inaccessible.\(^9\) According to a retired
Argentine Admiral, Carlos Büsser, there are also minefields near Port Stanley that the UK laid
during War World Two that were not cleared.\(^10\)

Following three and a half years of negotiations, on 11 October 2001, Argentina and the UK
agreed on a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the establishment of a feasibility study
on mine clearance in the islands.\(^11\) A UK-Argentine Working Group was set up, and in November
2001 the MOU was jointly sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations, for distribution to
the 56th Session of the General Assembly.\(^12\)

The feasibility study will include three phases: a preliminary phase, the main study, and a
final report that should include recommendations to both governments for future action according
to the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^13\) According to the MOU, the costs of the feasibility
study will be shared by both parties, in direct proportion to the number of mines laid by each party
during the 1982 conflict. Thus, Argentina will be responsible for most of the financial costs, while
it is expected that the UK will take care of technical aspects of the study. Total costs of the
feasibility study are estimated at $2 million; in 2002, Argentina budgeted $1 million for the study.\(^14\)

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\(^2\) Four types of antipersonnel mines were used in the conflict: No.4 (Israel); SB-33 (Italy); FMK-1 plastic
blast mine (Argentina); and P-4-B (Spain). See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 367.

\(^3\) Fax from Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK, 20 March 2002.

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) UK, Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II Article 13 report, Form B, October

\(^6\) Fax to Landmine Monitor (UK) from United Nations Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
of the UK, 20 March 2002.

\(^7\) Landmine Monitor (Argentina) interview with Guillermo Rossi, Directorate of Malvinas and South
Atlantic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Buenos Aires, 10 April 2002.

May 2002.


\(^10\) Admiral (Ret.) Carlos Büsser, “Malvinas, hoy: la visita del ministro de defensa Británico y el
desminado de las Malvinas,” *Cuadernos*, No.4, Buenos Aires, undated.


\(^12\) Interview with Guillermo Rossi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 April 2002.

\(^13\) See “Acuerdo con Gran Bretaña para desminar las Malvinas,” 12 October 2001. At

\(^14\) Ibid.
The joint Working Group met for the first time in Buenos Aires on 3-4 December 2001. According to the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the three phases of the feasibility study should take 18 months; no start date had been set as of March 2002.

In early March 2002, the UK’s Secretary of State for Defence, Geoffrey Hoon, met with the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Ruckauf, and Minister of Defense, Horacio Jaunarena, in Buenos Aires and, according to a media report, discussed the agreement to carry out the feasibility study. Hoon stated, “We very much welcome the agreement in principle. What we need to explore now are the practical ways in which it can be implemented. I do not believe that there are any stumbling blocks, it is a question of finding practical ways to implement the policy which we have agreed upon.” The UK also made a contribution of $19,000 to CAECOPAZ (Argentine Center for Training in Peace Operations) for humanitarian demining training.

An Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operation Center in Port Stanley provides warnings about the landmine danger to the islands’ communities and visitors. Full details of warning measures are included in the Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report submitted by the UK in March 2002.

No mine casualties were reported in the Falklands/Malvinas in 2001 or the first half of 2002.

KOSOVO

Key developments since May 2001: In December 2001, the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center stated that the clearance of all known minefields and cluster munition strike sites had been completed. It handed over responsibility for mine action to UNMIK and local bodies. Small-scale mine and UXO clearance will be needed for years to come. An estimated $85 million has been spent on mine action in the province since June 1999. This resulted in the clearance of more than 32 million square meters of land and the destruction of more than 50,000 mines, cluster bomblets and other unexploded ordnance. In 2001, over 8 million square meters were cleared. Caches of weaponry including antipersonnel mines continue to be discovered. Civilian deaths and injuries declined during 2001 with a total of 22 casualties, including nine fatalities.

Background

Kosovo remains a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but has been under the administration of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) since 1999. Elections were held on 17 November 2001 to form the Kosovo Provisional Assembly, as mandated by UNMIK. Nine previously UN-administered local government departments were then transferred to local government bodies, charged with all matters of internal administration with the exception of security, which, along with foreign affairs, remain under the direct administration of UNMIK.

The UN Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) completed its scheduled term and handed over responsibility for mine action to UNMIK and local bodies in mid-December 2001.

1 For details of events leading to the administration of Kosovo as a separate entity, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 874, and Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 948-949.
Survey and clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) was transferred to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which reports to UNMIK. Other aspects of mine action were handed to the Kosovo Cadastral Agency, the Ministry of Health Environment and Spatial Planning, and the Ministry of Education Science and Technology.

Use

Since 1999, landmines have been used by unknown persons in attacks on the remaining Serbian minority in Kosovo and on Serbian military and police forces operating on the province’s border with southern Serbia. In 2001 and 2002, the use of mines has declined substantially, as attested to by international personnel in Kosovo, KFOR and UNMIK reports, and a significant reduction in the number of mine casualties. The reduction in new use of mines is consistent with a reduction of tension in the Preshevë valley since early 2001, when militant ethnic Albanian groups conducted operations on the borders with southern Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Reported incidents involving mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) since June 2001, some of which may be new uses of mines/IEDs, include:

- 6 July 2001 - a mine severely injured a Serbian man near the village of Priluzje in Vucitrn.
- 30 September 2001 - a Serb woman was killed in Klokot by a booby-trap on the road.
- 21 January 2002 - a booby-trap explosion seriously injured a KPC officer and his family.

Caches of weaponry including antipersonnel mines continue to be discovered by security forces. Caches including mines were reported in June-July 2001 (5 boxes of antipersonnel mines, and 1,100 grenades and antipersonnel mines), August (2 antivehicle mines and an unspecified number of antipersonnel mines), October (14 antipersonnel mines), November (265 grenades and mines), December 2001 (13 antivehicle mines and 3 antipersonnel mines), and February 2002 (293 grenades and mines).

Weapons possession is banned for all Kosovo residents except those holding weapons authorization cards under UNMIK Regulation 2001/7. Illegal possession of weapons is punishable by a prison term of up to eight years or a maximum fine of €7,500 (US$6,735). Two periods of amnesty for the voluntary handing-in of weaponry by the civilian population have been held in

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3 The Kosovo Protection Corps is an unarmed but uniformed body of 3,000 ex-members of the Kosovo Liberation Army. The KPC reports to the new UNMIK Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP), previously the Department of Civil Security and Emergency Preparedness. See, “Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo,” UN Security Council, 15 January 2002.
5 For details of landmine/UXO casualties in Kosovo, see later section. For landmine/UXO casualties in southern Serbia, see report of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia/Serbia and Montenegro in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.
Kosovo, in early 2001 and 15 March-15 April 2002. In the latter case, a total of 90 mines were collected.\(^{11}\)

**Mine/UXO Problem**

In December 2001, it was announced that UNMIK had determined “that all known minefields and cluster munition strike sites in Kosovo have been cleared to internationally acceptable standards.”\(^{12}\) In its final annual report, the MACC stated that “the problems associated with landmines, cluster munitions and other items of unexploded ordnance in Kosovo have been virtually eliminated…. Whilst it may take years to completely eradicate all items of explosive ordnance from Kosovo, as indeed it will in most other countries in Europe, the situation is such that the level of contamination no longer impedes social and economic development within the province.”\(^{13}\) The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) stated, “While there still is a possibility that some mines may be found in the future, the remaining threat in Kosovo consists primarily of limited numbers of CBU [cluster bomb units] and other UXO.”\(^{14}\)

Some areas of known contamination were not yet cleared when the MACC completed operations. MACC clearance plans were delayed by unseasonably heavy rain in the middle of 2001 and early heavy snowfall in November 2001, resulting in more uncompleted “task dossiers” at the time of handover than initially envisaged. Task dossiers identify specific geographical areas verified as a “dangerous area” and contain details of surveys, past clearance, and other relevant information. A single task dossier may refer to more than one minefield or cluster bomb strike site, as dossiers identify dangerous areas.\(^{15}\)

As of 15 December 2001, 47 task dossiers remained to be completed. Subsequent discoveries of mine/UXO contaminated areas increased the total of outstanding task dossiers to 52 by April 2002. Of the 50 tasks outstanding in March 2002, 34 involved CBU strikes. Seventeen required the continuation of clearance activity and six required the commencement of clearance. The remainder required resurvey and an evaluation to assess the remaining threat.\(^{16}\)

When the MACC handed over responsibility for residual mine/UXO clearance to the KPC in December 2001, one minefield was still being worked on as a result of previous bad weather and other delays. The minefield, which is inside the Albanian border, was half-cleared before winter snows stopped work; it has been marked and passed to the Albanian Mine Action Executive for completion in 2002.

As agriculture, construction, and other economic activities resume, and as displaced persons return, potential areas of unknown mine/UXO contamination may pose more of a hazard than the known sites. Maps and information on the 620 minefields laid by the Yugoslav Army were handed to the MACC in 1999, but there is a possibility of some small, unknown minefields remaining. In addition, MACC was not given records of mines laid by Serb Ministry of the Interior police units and paramilitary groups.\(^{17}\)

At least one CBU strike site previously cleared has since caused a civilian casualty and is undergoing renewed clearance that is expected to take until the end of 2002.\(^{18}\) (See also later


\(^{12}\) “UN Set to Transfer Demining Activities to Kosovo Authorities,” UN News Service, 14 December 2001.


\(^{15}\) Interview with Steven Saunders, EOD Operations Officer, DCP, Pristina, 15 April 2002.

\(^{16}\) “Remaining Tasks in MNB Order, Amendment Six,” MACC, Pristina, 12 March 2002.


\(^{18}\) Grmija Task dossier, viewed 15 April 2002; see later section on Mine/UXO clearance.
section on Mine/UXO Clearance). Of the 295,700 cluster bomblets reportedly dropped on Kosovo, the MACC estimated initially that “as many as 30,000 individual bomblets may have failed to function.”19 In May 2002, a member of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal team (EOD) stated that about 17,000 bomblets had been cleared and the initial estimate has been revised downwards to fewer than 20,000 bomblets that failed to function.20

In its final annual report for 2001, the MACC stated that while some new mines may still be found, these are unlikely to be large-scale minefields and should be within the capability of KPC teams trained in technical survey. It added, “In the unlikely event of a large minefield, or a number of large mined areas being located in the future, then it will be possible to contract specialist assistance as required…. This is a more cost-effective solution than maintaining these capabilities in the Province when there is little likelihood that they will be used on a regular basis…. These new areas have generally been in extremely remote, difficult to access areas where the impact of the mines is minimal.”21

Mine Action Coordination and Planning
The structure and responsibilities of the Mine Action Coordination Center were described in previous Landmine Monitor reports. An external evaluation of the mine action program in Kosovo was carried out on behalf of the UNMAS by the independent Praxis Group in October-November 2001. This evaluation, delivered in February 2002, praised the achievements of the MACC, which had been constrained to operate on a new partnership model (as opposed to a command and control model), with “piecemeal funding” and seconded staff, in a context of “deprivation and improvisation.” The evaluation noted that, “With minimal equipment and a weak logistics link to its parent UNMIK … the UN team was forced to ‘make do’ often relying on mine action NGOs for support and assistance. Without the goodwill and help of the NGOs (and at least one major donor – the UK’s DFID), the fledgling MACC might well have failed to go much further.”22

The evaluation ascribes much of the “resounding success” of the mine action program in Kosovo to the MACC’s flexibility, vision and overall competence, and the acceptance of its central coordinating role by KFOR and the many NGOs establishing operations in the province. The evaluation notes the absence of “viable standby capacity on the part of UNMAS and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.”23

On 15 December 2001, responsibility for mine action and explosive ordnance disposal passed from MACC to Kosovo local government bodies and the UNMIK Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP). The DCP manages the Kosovo Protection Corps, which was formed from members of the disarmed KLA following its disbanding in 2000. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation is critical of the early and “political” decision to make the KPC responsible for ongoing mine/UXO clearance, “thereby effectively reducing the options available to the MACC for the creation of (civilian) long-term capacity in Kosovo.”24

To ease the transfer from the MACC to this new structure, two of the three international posts and all seven local staff posts within the DCP EOD management have been filled by staff from the previous MACC.25 International staff remain in the posts of Operations and Quality Assurance, and Mine Awareness/Public Information.

In August 2001, the KPC began a training program to develop seven teams with an EOD capacity, starting with initial training in CBU clearance and a period of practical operations in the field. Four of the teams had completed training and become operational by 15 December 2001 and the other three teams in early 2002. The training was carried out by the NGO Handicap

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20 Email from Steven Saunders, EOD Operations Officer, DCP, Pristina, 9 May 2002.
23 Ibid., pp. 5-10.
24 Ibid., p. 10.
International (HI) with KFOR monitoring, and HI provided supervision in the field.\textsuperscript{26} The Praxis evaluation team, visiting in October 2001, was surprised that “mine clearance was not on the curriculum. We later learned that a small group, no more than 16, would receive mine clearance training in the spring of 2002, notwithstanding KFOR’s objections….”\textsuperscript{27}

HI reports that it was contracted to provide managerial support and continue training in EOD, Battle Area Clearance, CBU search and clearance techniques, survey and humanitarian demining, as well as training support to KPC medical teams, until September 2002, with seven international and nine national staff.\textsuperscript{28} The MACC annual report for 2001 stated that all formal training of the KPC teams should be completed by May 2002 and “from this time the KPC will be capable of dealing with the anticipated residual threat from mines and unexploded ordnance in Kosovo. On the rare occasions when sophisticated NATO ordnance that has not been covered during training is encountered, these tasks can be undertaken under the supervision of experienced KFOR EOD teams.”\textsuperscript{29}

Each of the seven KPC teams consists of 11 EOD/clearance personnel, two medics and a driver, providing 77 staff trained in EOD/clearance activities, out of a total KPC complement of 3,000 (reduced from 4,300 in October 2001). The KPC is tasked with community development activities as well as disaster response, humanitarian assistance and demining.\textsuperscript{30}

KFOR will provide medical evacuation and storage of explosives as necessary. An emergency response system involving KFOR and the Kosovo Police Service was developed to “ensure that there is a timely, integrated response to EOD situations as they are encountered.”\textsuperscript{31}

Other MACC functions were transferred to a variety of local government bodies. International staff have expressed concern about the limited consultation with non-UN bodies in the division of MACC duties between the various local government departments, and how well the new arrangements are working in practice.\textsuperscript{32} Ongoing maintenance of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database system and supply of updated IMSMA information to the KPC and other organizations was transferred to the Kosovo Cadastral Agency, which received extensive training.\textsuperscript{33} However, serious delays occurred, and as of early April 2002 HI had received no update of the IMSMA database since November 2001.\textsuperscript{34} As a result, IMSMA entries are now verified and processed by the DCP Operations Officers and the updated information is then forwarded to the Agency.\textsuperscript{35} As of April 2002, the Ministry of Health had not supplied updated mine casualty statistics.\textsuperscript{36}

KPC teams are all ethnic Albanians, and there is concern whether they will be allowed entry to minority areas. A Prizren-based KPC EOD team assisted by an HI Technical Advisor withdrew
from the Serbian minority area of Vilica Hocha in November 2001 without completing its activities due to perceived hostility from the local population.38

The speed of the hand-over, the inflexibility (leaving no margin for operational delays) and lack of a planned transitional phase have been criticized as working against the stated intention of creating “a seamless transition from the existing international coordinated effort to locally managed and implemented projects.”39

Mine Action Funding

The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) channeled donations totaling US$7,176,650 to mine action agencies operating in Kosovo in 2001.40 In addition, the MACC received US$1,177,995 from Canada, via the UN Voluntary Trust Fund. These donations were used to cover the MACC operational costs in 2001 (with other donations received in 2000), to contract core assets, and to support a clearance project in the Dulje Pass area.41

After successful clearance in 2000, the number of NGOs and commercial clearance organizations was reduced to eight and three respectively, which all received bilateral funding/contracting in 2001. Although, in some case, the funding was delayed, which delayed or shortened operations in 2001, overall “the capacity available to the MACC in 2001 has been about right.”42

Throughout the period mid-1999 to December 2001, mine action in Kosovo was funded from the UNMIK budget, the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), the ITF, bilateral donations from governments and in-kind contributions. These donations have gone to the MACC or directly to the many mine action organizations operating in Kosovo. This variety of funding sources and routes, and the number of organizations supported, has allowed only estimations of the total mine action funding in Kosovo. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation concluded that a total of about $85 million had been invested in the mine action program in Kosovo from mid-1999 to the end of 2001, including over $59 million in bilateral funding and in-kind assistance by the donor community. However it is emphasized that this is not an exact figure, and the evaluation details some of the features of each source of funding.43

**UNMIK.** The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation gives no single figure as representing contributions to UNMIK for the MACC, but notes that administrative confusion and disputes between the different agencies involved resulted in funding of the MACC being both delayed and inadequate. It also notes that “funds for operations were far easier to access than funds for the management of these operations. While Kosovo was disproportionately blessed by donor attention, the MACC often was left to starve in the midst of plenty.”44

**UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF).** The VTF is described as the MACC’s “financial backbone;” funds channeled through the VTF totaled US$9,967,135. As noted above, the total for 2001 was $1.18 million. Over half the VTF funding came from donations by European Union countries and Canada. However, bureaucratic problems resulted in long delays

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38 Interview with David Hare, Technical Advisor, HI, 14 April 2002.
40 Email to Landmine Monitor from Eva Veble, Head of International Relations, ITF, 5 June 2002.
in some cases, and resulted in the withdrawal of €2 million pledged by the European Agency for Reconstruction and €1.7 million by the European Union.  

### Donations to mine action in Kosovo 1999-2001 via the VTF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Payments (US$)</th>
<th>Pledges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>314,654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>264,434</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,571,761</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>775,847</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>325,203</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>241,756</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxemburg</td>
<td>126,186</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>798,375</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>199,980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>14,978</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>735,421</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>4,113,540</td>
<td>1,706,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Payments</td>
<td>9,967,135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Payments/Pledges</td>
<td>11,673,135</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**International Trust Fund for Demining and Victims Assistance (ITF)** – This fund, set up by Slovenia in 1998, was favored by donors for its speed, low costs and lack of bureaucracy – and the doubling of donations via a matching-funds agreement with the United States. The ITF began supporting mine clearance in Kosovo in 2000, and in 2001 allocated nearly 25 percent of its funds to Kosovo. In 2001, $4,165,619 was donated by the ITF for demining (from donations by the US, Germany, Switzerland and France), $315,582 for mine awareness (US) and $543,314 for victim assistance (US). In addition, a number of NGOs received donations channeled through the ITF and the Canadian International Demining Agency channeled funds for the VTF through the ITF to attract US matching funds.

**Bilateral funding** – The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation identified the following bilateral donations to mine action in Kosovo, but presented this as only a “ball-park” indication of the breadth of bilateral support.

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45 Ibid., pp. 20-24, 90-93. The MACC Annual Report for 2001, Annex G, shows that the VTF received $10.6 million for Kosovo by the end of 2001; the difference is accounted for by $639,000 of unearmarked VTF funds.


47 Ibid., pp. 95-97.
### Bilateral funding of mine action in Kosovo 1999-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contribution (US$)</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>2,304,000</td>
<td>ECHO support for HI, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Intersos, and Mines Advisory Group (MAG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>Funding of Mine Tech/MACC core assets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2,700,000</td>
<td>Support for, inter alia, International Demining Alliance of Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>Funding of HALO Trust, via the ITF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>5,800,000</td>
<td>Support for Danish Church Aid (DCA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>Funding of HALO Trust and HELP via ITF; estimated on basis of HALO contract sheet, no HELP data; funded CARE through ITF, estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>963,046</td>
<td>Three contracts with HALO, £664,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>Estimate, co-funded Intersos for one year with ECHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>265,662</td>
<td>HALO contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,371,407</td>
<td>Three contracts with HALO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>Five contracts with NPA, totaling NOK50,522,650 (data from NPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>19,304,863</td>
<td>Equipment for MACC, contracts with several mine clearance operators, support to UNICEF for mine awareness (communication from DFID, 26 November 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>10,326,627</td>
<td>Contracts with RONCO, support for contracts negotiated by ITF (as reported to UN, OCHA website)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2,652,788</td>
<td>$1,800,000 for Emercom, $852,788 for HALO (interviews, HALO contract sheets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Communes</td>
<td>433,242</td>
<td>Contract with Halo £298,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Vision</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Co-funded MAG manual demining team (with ECHO, estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td>$2,269,567 Contract in 1999 with HELP, plus two supplementary agreements (HELP Final report part II, provided by UNHCR); contract with MINE–TECH in 2000, value estimated at US$1.3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Estimate</strong></td>
<td><strong>59,521,635</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The evaluation recognizes the crucial part played in the Kosovo mine action program by bilateral donations, and also regards this reliance on the generosity of a few donor governments as a fault of UN funding systems. This generosity extended beyond financial contributions to the in-kind assistance, since the MACC operation could not have established itself without the rapid secondment of staff and provision of equipment by Canada, Germany, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation concluded that: “The MACC’s ability to collect and track costs associated with the various mine action activities appears to have been severely hampered by the extensive number of bilateral funding agreements which the MACC was not always privy to.” As a result of the funding situation, planning was resource-driven rather than need-led.

### Survey and Prioritization

Survey and, in particular, the use of the Information Management System for Mine Action in Kosovo were reported in the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation commented that Kosovo was the first use of IMSMA in a mine action program, which revealed many deficiencies in the original system, and resulted in a version 2.1 being delivered in November 2001.

In August 1999, the IMSMA database contained reports of over 4,000 dangerous areas. During the two and a half years of mine/UXO clearance; this was reduced to 47 remaining task dossiers by 15 December 2001 when the MACC closed. In April 2002, there were 52 task dossiers.

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48 Ibid., pp. 8-9.  
49 Ibid., p. 18.  
The MACC reported at the end of 2001 that Kosovo had been extensively surveyed for more than two years, and very few new mined areas had been located in the past 12-18 months. Although some mines may be found in the future, it is unlikely that these will be large-scale mined areas and “will be within the clearance capabilities of the teams trained in Technical Survey.”

Responsibility for IMSMA in 2002, post-MACC, is described in an earlier section of this report. The DCP Operations Officers will continue to oversee and prioritize tasking for EOD and clearance teams up to September 2002. Tasking will prioritize known minefields, followed by suspected minefields, known CBU strikes and reported UXO. Currently KPC EOD teams with HI supervision are providing support to teams removing wrecked cars from fields and roadsides. However, it has also been recognized that high-profile events such as in Grmija, where a previously cleared CBU strike site caused a civilian casualty in February 2002, will result in tasking priorities being changed.

Mine/UXO Clearance

From the beginning of operations in June 1999 through 2001, a total of 32,224,107 square meters of land were cleared, with the destruction of 19,457 antipersonnel mines, 5,515 antivehicle mines, 15,940 cluster bomblets and 13,896 other items of UXO.

Clearance during 2001 concentrated increasingly on the south and west of the province. Progress was slower than expected due to particularly bad weather, with heavy rain in June and July and early snow in November; also, clearance areas were more inaccessible than the high-priority areas cleared in 2000.

In 2001, following an assessment of tasks and resources made by the MACC in September 2000, clearance agencies were reduced from 16 to 11, with the number of commercial agencies going from eight to three, while eight NGOs remained.

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52 Interview with Steven Saunders, DCP, 15 April 2002; interview with Lance Malin, HI, 13 April 2002.
53 “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, para 9. Landmine Monitor has added in to the cluster bomblet total the 7,455 cleared by KFOR.
54 Interview with Steven Saunders, DCP, 15 April 2002.
## Mine Clearance Organizations Operating in Kosovo in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Operational Dates</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danish Church Aid/Action by Churches Together</td>
<td>Feb – Oct</td>
<td>127 manual clearance personnel and one Explosive Detection Dog (EDD) Team operating in MultiNational Brigade (MNB) West</td>
<td>Funded by Denmark (DANIDA).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence Systems Ltd</td>
<td>Jan – Dec June – Nov</td>
<td>Two 5-person EOD response teams Two 6-person survey teams One four-person Level 1/Level 2 survey/EOD team</td>
<td>Funded by the UK (DFID) to 27 August 2001, then funding gap until European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) funding October–December 2001. Operated as a MACC core asset, worked province-wide, contracted by UNOPS funded by Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMERCOM Demining Co.</td>
<td>Mar – Nov</td>
<td>Three manual clearance teams and three EDD teams, in MNB (S)</td>
<td>Funded by Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>Mar – Nov</td>
<td>Two CBU clearance teams (20 persons) in MNB (W) and MNB (S); One manual clearance team (20 persons) in MNB (W); Two Case armored front loaders in MNB (W); Ten CBU clearance teams in MNB (W), (C) and (E); Four CBU clearance teams in MNB (W), (C) and (E); One Mine Awareness Support Team (MAST) in MNB (W), (C), (S) and (E)</td>
<td>Funded by: Switzerland Ireland The Netherlands; rollers donated by UNICEF. UK (DFID) Germany, through the ITF UK (DFID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicap International</td>
<td>Mar – Nov</td>
<td>Two Battle Area Clearance (BAC) Teams, and one MAST, in MNB (W)</td>
<td>Funding for August provided by UNMAS through UNOPS. Funding from September by EAR, Netherlands through Stichling Vluchling and by France through ITF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELP</td>
<td>Apr- Nov</td>
<td>One Level One Survey Team and one Level Two Survey Team, supported by Mine Awareness Officer</td>
<td>Funded by Germany through ITF until end August, and direct thereafter. Operated Kosovo-wide as a MACC survey Asset.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERSOS</td>
<td>Mar-Nov</td>
<td>Three CBU clearance teams and one MAST, in MNB (C) to August and MNB (W) August onwards.</td>
<td>CBU teams funded by Italy to 19 August, EAR from 1 Sept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Tech</td>
<td>Apr- Nov Jun- Nov Jul – Nov Sept – Dec</td>
<td>Four manual mine clearance teams and one MAST; Four survey/clearance teams One mini-flail and support team Two manual clearance teams</td>
<td>Operating Kosovo-wide as MACC core asset funded by Canada through UNOPS, Canada through ITF with matching US funds. Operating Kosovovo-wide as required. MACC core asset funded by Canada Contracted by CARE International with German funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norwegian People’s Aid</td>
<td>Mar – Nov</td>
<td>Six manual clearance teams Two Sisu flails as MACC core assets Four CBU clearance teams and one MAST</td>
<td>Funded by Norway. Flails donated by Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RONCO</td>
<td>Mar – Oct</td>
<td>Six CBU clearance teams</td>
<td>US through IFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swiss Federation for Mine Action</td>
<td>Apr- Nov</td>
<td>One CBU clearance team</td>
<td>Funded by Switzerland.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The rate of casualties among deminers working for clearance agencies has caused concern. There were 30 accidents causing 32 casualties, including one fatality, from June 1999 to December 2001. Thirteen of these accidents occurred in 2001. The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation regarded this as unacceptably high, because “[w]orking conditions and the mine/UXO threat in Kosovo were neither unique nor particularly difficult compared to other country’s mine action programmes.” The evaluation singled out Danish Church Aid, which experienced seven accidents in less than 18 months. It said the HALO Trust (four accidents and five injuries/deaths in 30 months), Mine Tech (four accidents) and NPA (four accidents) all experienced accident rates higher than normal for experienced operators. The MACC investigated all the incidents and considered them to have been preventable.58 The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation linked the high rate of deminer accidents with the issue of missed mines/UXO devices in cleared areas.

Cluster bomblets pose an on-going clearance challenge. The MACC reported that by the end of 2001 all of the 224 CBU-affected locations had been worked to some extent but that 21 would require follow-up work.59 In February 2002, a civilian was killed in Grmija by a cluster bomblet. Grmija is a popular recreation sports and picnic spot on the outskirts of Pristina, that was surface-cleared in July-September 1999 by BACTEC, followed by limited sub-surface clearance in 2000. Since the incident, three KPC teams under HI supervision were tasked with sub-surface clearance of this site, and 44 more CBUs had been discovered and destroyed by April 2002. It is envisaged that the KPC teams will continue working on this site until the end of 2002.60

Because all CBU strike sites could not be sub-surface cleared before winter 2001, the MACC instructed all teams to concentrate on sub-surface clearance of high priority sites close to populated areas and to surface-clear as many other sites as possible. The lower priority surface-cleared sites were marked and listed for the KPC to work on in 2002.61 Sub-surface bomblet clearance on arable land became an issue of more concern early in 2002, when it emerged that every three years farmers usually plough to a depth of 75 centimeters to refresh the topsoil. MACC operating standards have required land to be searched to a depth of 50 centimeters, the normal ploughing depth in Kosovo in most years.62

Mine Awareness/ Mine Risk Education

Between June 1999 and December 2001, 945 villages and towns received community mine awareness training, 600 youth volunteers were trained and 71,500 youths participated in mine awareness education, 278 Imams and their wives were trained in mine awareness and 2,631 children were trained in child-to-child mine awareness activities.63

Mine awareness/mine risk education in 2001 continued to focus on community support, training of key community members and adolescent children, support to clearance organizations through the MAST (Mine Awareness Support Teams) initiative and the implementation of Operation Normal Life.64

MAST was initiated in 2000 due to confusion in some communities as to whether mine/UXO clearance had taken place, the extent of clearance, the remaining danger (if any) and similar issues. This arose mainly from the rapid tempo of clearance in 2000, which made integration of clearance and awareness activities difficult. Under the MAST program, “clearance organizations were required, to the extent possible, to undertake their own community based mine awareness liaison as

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60 Grmija Task Dossier, viewed 15 April 2002; interview with John Hare, Technical Advisor, HI, Pristina, 15 April 2002; interview with Ronen Shimoni, Administrator, HALO Trust, Pristina, 19 April 2002.
62 Interview with Steven Saunders, DCP, 15 April 2002.
63 Interview with Miranda Shala, Mine Awareness Officer, UNICEF, Pristina, 12 April 2002.
an integral part of their mine/UXO clearance activities. Clearance agencies without staff available for such tasks were assigned MAST teams from other NGOs. The process was formalized with the inclusion of a mine awareness handover certificate as part of the quality assurance inspection process.

Operation Normal Life (ONL) started in September 2001 and was completed in April 2002. The MACC described ONL as “an acknowledgement that during the initial stages of the programme, mine awareness was not fully integrated with clearance activities. This resulted in some villagers being unsure of the work conducted by the clearance teams. If cleared land is not being used, then clearance has not achieved the aim of returning land to normal use.” The goal was therefore “to make all communities in Kosovo aware of the extent of mine action in their area” ensuring that they had a chance to discuss “any issues they may have in regards to mine action especially with regard to ‘pre MAST’ days.” ONL was managed by the MACC in close coordination with UNICEF, and involved most mine awareness agencies including KFOR contingents. Of 570 villages visited, 12 required remedial action and one unknown cluster strike site was discovered. Follow-up work will be undertaken by KPC EOD teams.

Twelve organizations were accredited by the MACC to undertake mine risk education during 2001, including two contingents of KFOR (British and Swedish), as shown in the table below.

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65 Ibid., paras 27-28; interview with Leonie Barnes, Public Information Officer, MACC, Geneva, 12 November 2001.
### Mine Awareness/Mine Risk Education Organizations in Kosovo in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Capacity</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARKA</td>
<td>Operation Normal Life project</td>
<td>Funded by UNICEF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARITAS</td>
<td>Operation Normal Life project</td>
<td>Operating in MNB (S)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA/ACT</td>
<td>MAST Operation Normal Life project</td>
<td>Operating in support of clearance teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Systems Limited</td>
<td>MAST Operation Normal Life project</td>
<td>Operating in support of clearance teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HALO Trust</td>
<td>MAST Operation Normal Life project</td>
<td>Bilateral agreement with AAR Japan, Operating in MNB (W) in support of clearance teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>MAST</td>
<td>Operating in support of clearance teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELP</td>
<td>MAST</td>
<td>Operating in support of survey teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMD Response</td>
<td>Community Liaison Teams</td>
<td>Senior partner MNB (S) funded by US State Department through ITF. Education for adults and communities. Completed operations end-August.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>Safer Village community mine awareness teams MAST</td>
<td>The ICRC teams also provided direct support to EMERCOM, Swiss Federation of Demining and RONCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERSOS</td>
<td>MAST Operation Normal Life project</td>
<td>Operating in support of clearance teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Teams from UK and Sweden accredited to conduct Mine Awareness Operation Normal Life project</td>
<td>Teams from each MNB were trained by SweMATT to conduct specific awareness projects in schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>MAST Operation Normal Life project</td>
<td>Senior Partner MNB(W) operated in support of NPA clearance operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVAF</td>
<td>Community Liaison Teams</td>
<td>Funded by UNICEF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Praxis/UNMAS evaluation concluded that “Kosovo showed that the mine awareness lessons learned over the past ten years still primarily rest with various pioneering NGOs. The MACC was not in a position to lead from day one as there was no mine awareness experience represented within the MACC. NGOs such as the Mines Advisory Group, Handicap International and the ICRC introduced their own community based approaches, grounded in years of experience. These approaches were then adopted by the MACC and embodied in the mine action support team (MAST) concept.”

Following closure of the MACC in December 2001, it was intended that the Ministry of Education would be the lead agency for mine awareness and public information, partly because mine awareness was to be included in the new school curriculum. When it was decided that mine awareness would not be in the curriculum, it was considered better that the public information/mine awareness role remain within the DCP. Two local staff employed in the public information role within the MACC were transferred to similar duties in the DCP. UNICEF agreed to provide a

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75 Interview with Rajmonda Thaqi, Mine Awareness Assistant, and Bajram Krasiqi, Public Information, DCP, Pristina, 15 April 2002; interview with Miranda Shala, UNICEF, 12 April 2002; interview with Nora Demiri, Mine Awareness Officer, ICRC, Pristina 19 April 2002.
consultant to support and train these staff within six months of the handover, but as of April 2002, this had not been implemented.\textsuperscript{76}

Two KPC staff from each of the seven teams are being trained by the local organization ARKA in MAST activities. Though originally scheduled to be completed by the end of May 2002, the training did not begin until that month.\textsuperscript{77}

UNICEF and the Ministry of Education were piloting in early 2002 a curriculum component called life skills, which would include mine awareness. This was planned to be introduced in all schools in Kosovo for September 2002.\textsuperscript{78}

### Landmine/UXO Casualties

Civilian deaths and injuries resulting from landmine/UXO incidents continued to decline during 2001. According to MACC, there were 17 incidents that caused 22 casualties, of whom nine were killed and 13 injured.\textsuperscript{79} In 2000, there were nine deaths and 84 injured.\textsuperscript{80}

UXO incidents were more prevalent than mine or cluster bomblet incidents in 2001. There were five separate mine incidents, two bomblet incidents, and ten UXO incidents. Most UXO injuries involved intentional handling of items, indicating the need for continued public information campaigns on the dangers posed by UXO. Of the casualties, mines were responsible for two deaths and three injuries, cluster bomblets for three deaths, and UXO for four deaths and ten injuries. During 2001, there was one female casualty, an injury caused by UXO.\textsuperscript{81}

According to ICRC data, eight people were killed and 22 injured in mine/UXO incidents in 2001.\textsuperscript{82} It is not clear why there is a discrepancy between the MACC and ICRC statistics.

In April 2001, one British soldier was killed and two others injured when their vehicle hit a landmine in southwestern Kosovo.\textsuperscript{83} In another incident in June 2001, a US soldier was injured when he stepped on a landmine.\textsuperscript{84} The soldiers were all part of the KFOR peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. The incidents involving KFOR personnel are apparently not included in the MACC casualty statistics.

#### Verified Civilian Mine/UXO Accidents in Kosovo June 1999-December 2001\textsuperscript{85}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In February 2002, there were six civilian incidents, involving three deaths and three injuries. One death resulted from handling a cluster bomblet, one from a mine incident, and one from a hand grenade accidentally burnt with garden rubbish.\textsuperscript{86}

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\textsuperscript{76} “Post MACC exit strategy for UNICEF Kosovo,” UNICEF, November 2001; interview with Miranda Shala, Mine Awareness Officer, UNICEF, Pristina, 12 April 2002.


\textsuperscript{78} Interview with Miranda Shala, UNICEF, 12 April 2002.

\textsuperscript{79} “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 36-38; this data does not include deminers/EOD staff and is for the year to 15 December, the date of the handover of the MACC responsibilities.

\textsuperscript{80} See table below, “Verified Civilian Mine/UXO Accidents in Kosovo June 1999-December 2001.”

\textsuperscript{81} “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report 2001,” MACC, paras. 36-38.

\textsuperscript{82} ICRC, “ICRC Mine/UXO Awareness Programmes: Mine incidents in South Eastern Europe,” 28 January 2002. The ICRC figures also do not include accidents involving mine/UXO clearance staff.


Casualties among deminers working for clearance agencies from June 1999 to December 2001 totaled 32 (including 14 traumatic amputations, one fatality, one permanent incapacitation, and one loss of sight). \(^8\)

The ICRC provided support to the casualty surveillance system and maintained the database up to the handover of the MACC in December 2001. \(^8\) Responsibility for casualty data collection was to pass from the ICRC to the Public Health Institute (PHI) within the Ministry of Health Environment and Spatial Planning. \(^8\) The ICRC conducted a data collection training seminar for PHI staff on 13 February 2002. Initially, it was intended that a member of staff from each of the PHI’s seven regional offices would undertake casualty data gathering. However, it seems no reporting has taken place. \(^3\) As of early April 2002, no update of the IMSMA database had been supplied since November 2001. \(^9\)

**Survivor Assistance**

Kosovo has an extensive network of medical support across the region, with hospitals in most major towns. Mine casualties can generally reach some form of medical facility within a relatively short period of time. However, the facilities that exist in the different locations can vary widely, with Pristina Hospital the only hospital capable of handling major trauma cases. KFOR units provide an evacuation capability as well as immediate medical attention, particularly for serious cases. \(^9\)

The World Health Organization (WHO) made some contribution to the reconstruction of Kosovo’s healthcare infrastructure. But, the healthcare system remains poorly equipped to deal with trauma victims. There is little or no capacity to provide rehabilitation, occupational therapy, or psychosocial counseling. No investment was made in healthcare facilities for over a decade, and current funding is limited. \(^9\)

The difficulties encountered in providing adequate survivor assistance in Kosovo include: the absence of a social welfare system in Kosovo; uncoordinated donor support; uncoordinated medical evacuation of survivors out of Kosovo and the creation of expectations; low prioritization and understanding from the government authorities; absence of immediate emergency care after an incident; inappropriate care immediately after an incident, because of lack of expertise or facilities; lack of facilities for the replacement of prostheses, especially for growing children; and ongoing health and psychological problems. \(^9\)

The ICRC, in cooperation with National Societies, provided equipment, training and technical support to Gjilan hospital and regional primary healthcare facilities. Surgical instruments and equipment was also provided to the Mitrovica hospital. Red Cross teams in the Mitrovica region received training in emergency medical evacuations. In 2001, 52 war-wounded casualties, including 32 mine/UXO casualties were treated. The ICRC reports that with NGOs scaling down their activities in Kosovo, or leaving altogether, there are increasing reports of civilians needing medical, surgical, and rehabilitation assistance for war-related injuries. \(^9\)

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\(^8\) Interviews with Rajmonda Thaqi, Mine Awareness Assistant, and Bajram Krasniqi, Public Information Assistant, DCP, Pristina, 15 April 2002.


\(^8\) Interview with Nora Demiri, ICRC, 19 April 2002.


\(^9\) Interview with Nora Demiri, ICRC, 19 February 2002.

\(^9\) Interview with Lance Malin, Mine Action Program Manager, HI, Pristina, 13 April 2002.


\(^9\) Driton Ukmata, Program Director, Handicap International Kosovo, presentation at the ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 1 July 2002.

Handicap International was appointed as the lead agency for victim assistance by UNMIK in 2000, taking over this responsibility from the WHO. HI undertakes support in cooperation with HandiKos, a local disability NGO.\footnote{Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 969.}

HI operates a prosthetics workshop in Pristina with the capacity to produce and fit lower limb prostheses. The workshop is the only such facility in Kosovo, and has sufficient capacity to deal with the number of cases it receives. However, it is very difficult for some patients to access the facility on a regular basis, particularly those living in rural areas without family and friends in Pristina.\footnote{“UNMIK MACC Exit Strategy Discussion Paper,” 3 January 2001, p. 11.} In 2001, HI fitted 72 prostheses, distributed 290 wheelchairs and 460 crutches throughout Kosovo, and supported physical rehabilitation at the Kloko\v{c}t Physical Rehabilitation Center.\footnote{Interview with Driton Ukmata, HL, 15 April 2002; and response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 19 July 2002.} According to HI, there are currently only 24 physiotherapists in Kosovo – for a population of approximately two million. HI is seeking to support the University in Pristina in strengthening the Physiotherapy Department and developing training for physiotherapists to start in September 2002. In 2001, 360 landmine survivors benefited from the program.\footnote{Email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Robert Schmidt Jr, Head of Mission, VVAF, Pristina, 19 February 2002.}

Mine/UXO survivors can also receive assistance from the ITF in Slovenia, which has a specialist rehabilitation center in Ljubljana for mine survivors. In 2001, 28 mine survivors from Kosovo were treated at the Slovenian Rehabilitation Institute.\footnote{Sarah Warren, Program Development Officer, VVAF, presentation at the ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 1 July 2002.}

In February 2001, the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) set up a mine victim assistance program aimed at reducing the dependency of mine survivors and assisting their reintegration into society. In 2001, the program operated in Prizren where activities included assessment visits to 155 mine/UXO survivors of which 59 were children, assistance with school materials, and the distribution of food parcels and firewood to 30 families. The JRS program to assist women with disabilities training at the sewing center in Ferizaj is in its second year. Fifty women have completed the training and a new group started in October 2001.\footnote{“Annual Report 2001,” Jesuit Refugee Service, p. 57.}

The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) survivor assistance program ended on 28 February 2002, having been in Kosovo since November 1999. During 2001, the VVAF program provided psychosocial assistance to persons with war-related disabilities, including mine survivors, their families and communities, involved direct material assistance in food, medicine, or transport, educated survivors on their rights, and designed sports and recreational activities. In 2001 the program assisted 400 families, about 2,400 individuals. The program was budgeted at $595,000 with funds provided by UNICEF and the ITF.\footnote{Robert Schmidt Jr, Head of Mission, VVAF, Pristina, Response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 18 February 2002.} After the program’s closure, VVAF has recommended follow-up action. The CSWs, a part of the UNMIK Department of Social Welfare, have responsibility for ongoing support. According to VVAF, one of the great successes of this program was enrolling all of its beneficiaries who qualified with the CSWs. VVAF also enrolled its beneficiaries with HandiKos.\footnote{Ibid.} In 2002, VVAF started a new program called “Sports for Life,” which aims to promote rehabilitation, rights, and reintegration for all persons with disability, including mine survivors.\footnote{Ibid.}
HI is concerned that, rather than seeking to establish sustainable programs of rehabilitation in Kosovo, some organizations have sought to provide assistance through transporting those requiring rehabilitation or prosthetics to other countries. HI claims that such approaches are more expensive than local solutions, often of limited benefit for the intended beneficiary, and work against the reestablishment of an effective and well-funded Kosovo-based rehabilitation capacity for mine survivors.106

In its exit strategy the MACC acknowledged that “more emphasis will need to be applied to rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives because of the relatively low level of attention given to this aspect of mine action to date.”107 Under new arrangements of the provisional self-government, the Department of Health and Social Welfare has been split into the Ministry of Health, Environment and Spatial Planning, and the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, which will assume responsibility for the long-term aspects of survivor assistance.108

Legislation has been introduced in Kosovo, which provides all mine survivors with a small monthly stipend.109 HandiKos has been instrumental in establishing the Disability Council and the appointment of a Disability Adviser with the Prime Minister's Cabinet and the development of a Comprehensive Disability Policy Framework document, which is currently in the process of validation.110

NAGORNO-KARABAKH

Mine Ban Policy

Nagorno-Karabakh is an autonomous region in the South Caucasus. In 1988 it voted to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia, which resulted in armed conflict from 1988-1994. The region declared independence as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) on 2 September 1991. The NKR has not been recognized by the United Nations.

While Nagorno-Karabakh political and military leaders indicate they are supportive of a global landmine ban, they indicate they would not join the Mine Ban Treaty even if eligible to do so. The NKR Minister of Foreign Affairs Naira Melkoumian said Nagorno-Karabakh “will be able to join it only after the establishment of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan.”1 The National Assembly of NKR has never discussed the issue of banning landmines.2

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Nagorno-Karabakh states that it has not produced, exported, or imported landmines since its declaration of independence in 1991. Landmine Monitor has been told that the mines in stock include PMN-2, POMZ-3, and OZM-72 antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor has not received any reports of new use of antipersonnel mines by Nagorno-Karabakh forces in the reporting period.

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106 Interview with Driton Ukmata, HI, 15 April 2002. These views were also expressed by other participants at the ITF Workshop on Assistance to Landmine Survivors and Victims in South-Eastern Europe: Defining Strategies for Success, Ig, Slovenia, 1-2 July 2002.
110 Driton Ukmata, Handicap International Kosovo, presentation at the ITF Workshop, Slovenia, 1 July 2002.
1 Meeting between Nagorno-Karabakh Committee of ICBL and Minister of Foreign Affairs Naira Melkoumian, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Masis Mailian, 1 and 2 February 2002.
2 Correspondence from NKR National Assembly Deputy V. Atanesyan to NK Committee of ICBL, 19 December 2001.
Landmine Problem

Mines were laid by both Azeri and pro-Karabakh forces during the 1988-1994 war. HALO Trust (HALO) estimates that there are at least 10,000 mines in this territory in need of urgent attention, plus a further 15,000 on the line of contact; to clear after a peace deal. Additionally, according to HALO, unexploded ordnance (UXO) is “as great a problem in Nagorno-Karabakh as mines,” affecting approximately 167 villages.

Officials state that there may be over 150 million square meters of mined territory in Nagorno-Karabakh. This includes roads, land, and forests that remain to be surveyed for future mine clearance operations.

Much of the mined territory is reportedly agricultural land, with 37 million square meters of arable land and 35 million square meters of pastures affected, according to NKR’s Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Also, 80,000 square meters of vineyards are believed unusable as a result of landmines.

Landmines have also been reported to affect other areas of development. For instance, the discovery of a minefield between the towns of Aghdam and Askeran impeded plans to build a water pipeline to the nearby village of Khirmort. HALO clear the area and work on the pipeline has subsequently started. According to HALO, aid agencies in Nagorno-Karabakh have restricted their operations “due to fears of mines on or just beside roads” and because of UXO located in and around numerous rural villages.

The former head of NKR’s Mine Awareness Working Group (MAWG), Mels Hakobjanian, identified the areas of Askeran, Mardakert, Martuni and Hadrout as high-risk. Little is known about other areas. “It’s very difficult to figure out where the rest of the mines are,” Hakobjanian told an Armenian journalist. “Even around Shushi, which is supposed to be clear, a car was recently blown up by an antitank mine.”

Mine Action Coordination

Mine action in Nagorno-Karabakh is carried out by a number of bodies. The HALO Trust is involved in training and humanitarian demining. The Engineering Service of the Army and the Department of Emergency Situations conduct some basic mine clearance. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) carries out mine risk education.

Coordinating this effort among governmental and NGOs is the government’s Special Commission on Mine Issues, and its Working Group on Mine Problems (WGMP). HALO, the ICRC, relevant government ministries, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Committee of the ICBL are all members of the WGMP.

HALO established its own Mine Action Center (MAC) when it returned to Nagorno-Karabakh in early 2000. The MAC compiles information regarding landmines, UXO, and safe routes. It disseminates the information to all those who need it, particularly other NGOs and international organizations working in Nagorno-Karabakh.

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4 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from David Frederick, Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO, 1 August 2002.
5 HALO Trust Website, “The Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh”.
9 Email from David Frederick, HALO, 1 August 2002.
10 HALO Trust Website, “The Caucasus: Nagorno-Karabakh.”
Mine Clearance

Special units of the Department of Emergency Situations and the Army’s Engineering Service carry out some limited mine clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh, but are limited by lack of resources (the Department of Emergency Situations has just two metal detectors).

HALO reportedly significantly increased its staff and operations in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2001 and 2002, as it increased its civilian personnel from 28 to 141.14 HALO also has three Battle Area Clearance (BAC) teams, which clear hundreds of mines and UXO every month. In addition, HALO has two survey teams.15 In early 2002, two new manual mine clearance teams were established with a US$378,000 grant from the US Agency for International Development.16 HALO also imported several new vehicles, including trucks, ambulances, and armored demining vehicles.17

In 2001, HALO destroyed 441 antipersonnel mines, 145 antivehicle mines, and 13,536 UXO, according to Hakobjanian, the former head of MAWG. According to the former head of the MAWG, as of early 2002, a total of 5 million square meters out of 150 million square meters of contaminated land had been cleared.18

Mine Risk Education

In 2001 and 2002, the ICRC continued the mine/UXO risk education program in Nagorno-Karabakh begun in 1999. The program is made up of three projects: a mine awareness school program, the Community Based Mine Awareness (CBMA) program, and the Public Education Campaign (PEC). The program targets high-risk population groups such as children and residents of rural communities, particularly agricultural workers.19

For the school program, the ICRC developed a mine awareness curriculum that was approved by MAWG in 2000.20 The ICRC has worked closely with the Ministry of Education to ensure that all school children in the Nagorno-Karabakh are reached.21 Mine awareness lessons have been incorporated into the curriculum of 228 schools, reaching approximately 22,000 students. The ICRC regularly visits schools to evaluate the lessons and distribute materials to support instruction. The ICRC has been conducting a second round of distribution of mine risk education materials since the beginning of the 2001/2002 school year to the 228 schools.22

In 2001, the ICRC initiated two child-to-child projects to reinforce the mine risk education message taught in schools. In the summer of 2001, 120 children were trained as puppeteers and taught how to build puppets and props and perform puppet shows with mine risk education themes. Eight groups of fifteen children then organized puppet shows at different camps in August 2001, reaching nearly 1,100 children. In late 2001, the ICRC traveled to remote villages in the Shoushi and Hadrout regions to observe the school program and organize a tour of the puppet groups in particularly mine-affected villages. The shows reached about 600 children. In July 2001, another child-to-child project was initiated. The ICRC trained 20 youth instructors (grades 7-8) from various regions of Nagorno-Karabakh in mine awareness skills in order to assist teachers in working with the youngest students and to carry out mine awareness activities outside of school with both adults and children.23

14 Email from David Frederick, HALO, 1 August 2002.
16 Email from David Frederick, HALO, 1 August 2002.
17 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
The CBMA targets rural populations living in villages encircled by mined/UXO-contaminated areas. It aims to reinforce information available to local communities largely by distributing message boards placed in mine-affected areas to display preventative messages to warn residents of the danger. The ICRC, in cooperation with NKR Civil Defense has distributed 95 message boards since the project’s start in mid-2000. Billboards have also been placed around 46 communities, reportedly reaching over 40,000 people.\(^{24}\) At the rural level, the ICRC cooperates closely with NKR emergency services.

The Public Education Campaign targets the public as a whole. From 1999 to 2001, the ICRC produced six mine awareness public service announcements in cooperation with a local TV crew. The public service announcements were broadcast regularly on television and reached an estimated audience of 50,000 to 60,000 residents.\(^{25}\)

The ICRC has also conducted mine risk education activities for civil servants. In early/mid-2002, it held a two-day mine awareness seminar, organized jointly with the NKR emergency rescue service, for ten civil defense workers. In this “train-the-trainer” seminar, the civil defense workers were taught to train local volunteers in affected communities how to make rural populations more aware of the dangers posed by mines and UXO.\(^{26}\)

The Nagorno-Karabakh Committee of the ICBL reported having taken part in all mine-related activities, including an August-September 2001 mine awareness poll. The poll found that, out of 300 respondents, 85% of the respondents are acquainted with the mine problem; 63% know about the minefields in the places where they live; 89% consider it necessary to cover the problem in mass media; 96% positively evaluate the school mine awareness program; and everyone surveyed believes it necessary to clear the territory of mines.

**Landmine Casualties**

In 2001, four people were killed and 14 injured in reported landmine and UXO incidents.\(^{27}\) None of the casualties were children. This represents a small increase from 2000 when four people were killed and 11 injured, including two children. New landmine and UXO casualties had been steadily decreasing since the ceasefire in 1994.\(^{28}\) In 1995, there were 86 landmine casualties, 64 in 1996, 25 in 1997, 16 in 1998, and in 1999, 30 people were reported killed or injured, of which more than half were children.\(^{29}\)

On 5 November 2001, three Azerbaijani servicemen were injured after one of them stepped on a mine while crossing the line of contact between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.\(^{30}\) HALO Trust estimates that mine and UXO incidents have caused more than 900 deaths and injuries since the 1994 ceasefire.\(^{31}\)

**Survivor Assistance**

The health-care system in Nagorno-Karabakh has been seriously affected by the general economic situation, and by a lack of resources and skilled staff. The American Red Cross implements the ICRC’s primary health-care program. In 2001, the rehabilitation of 43 health facilities in Mardakert/Agdara and Martuni/Khocavend was completed and work has begun on


\(^{26}\) “Armenia/Azerbaijan: Spreading mine awareness in the Nagorny Karabakh territory,” ICRC Website.

\(^{27}\) Information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NKR, 19 March 2002.


\(^{29}\) Information provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of NKR, 19 March 2002.


upgrading 23 health facilities in the Hadrut district. The ICRC provided an emergency stock of drugs and surgical materials and arranged training for two surgeons in war-surgery.\textsuperscript{32}

All landmine survivors receive free treatment in the medical institutions of Nagorno-Karabakh. Physical rehabilitation, prosthetics, and psychosocial support services are available but their resources are limited.\textsuperscript{33}

**NORTHERN IRAQ (IRAQI KURDISTAN)**

*Key developments since May 2001:* From 1998 to mid-2002, over 9.7 million square meters of land were cleared under the UN Mine Action Program. In 2001, the non-governmental Mines Advisory Group and Norwegian People’s Aid cleared more than 1 million square meters of land. MAP completed a Landmine Impact Survey in April 2002. Between December 2000 and June 2002, MAP provided mine risk education to over 143,175 beneficiaries. Iraqi government delays and refusals to grant visas for essential mine action personnel have hindered the program.

**Background**

The region of northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan) has been autonomous from Baghdad since the 1991 Gulf War. Northern Iraq is under the nominative political leadership of the unified Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), but the two major Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), administer two separate zones. There is no formal diplomatic recognition of the KRG, the KDP, or PUK, but leaders of both the KDP and PUK have committed to ensuring that the principles and obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty are realized.\textsuperscript{1}

**Landmine Problem and Survey**

Landmine Monitor has received no allegations of use of antipersonnel mines in northern Iraq in 2001 or 2002 by the KDP, PUK or the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Northern Iraq’s mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) problem dates back to the end of World War Two, but mines were not heavily used until the 1960s and 1970s when the central government attempted to subdue Kurdish groups operating in rural areas. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, the north was mined again. There is also credible evidence that landmines were used in northern Iraq in more recent years during periods of factional fighting.

The Data Coordination Unit (DCU) of the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) has a database that holds records of more than 3,782 minefields in the most heavily contaminated areas.\textsuperscript{2} According to the DCU, there are 2,241 minefields and 760 mined villages in the three northern governorates which comprise northern Iraq: Dohuk, Erbil and Suleymaniyah.\textsuperscript{3} The greatest concentration of mines is along the Iran-Iraq border, specifically in the districts of Penjwin, Sharbazher and Qaladiza.\textsuperscript{4}

The UN Mine Action Program completed a Landmine Impact Survey in April 2002. The survey confirmed that all 25 districts within the three northern Governorates are mine-affected, and that a total of 3,444 distinct areas suspected of mine and/or UXO contamination affect over

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\textsuperscript{1} Letter to UN Secretary-General from Masoud Barzani, President of the KDP, dated 3 October 1999 and letter to UN Secretary-General from Jalal Talabani, PUK General Secretary, dated 26 January 2000.

\textsuperscript{2} MAG’s DCU figures do not include minefields and villages already cleared by other agencies or by villagers themselves. MAG’s figures may slightly differ from other agencies as MAG sometimes sub-divides minefields for ease of operational management. Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, Mines Advisory Group, 17 July 2002.

\textsuperscript{3} Email from Tim Carstairs, Mines Advisory Group, 17 July 2002.

148,000 families (more than one in five) living in 1096 mine-affected communities. Due to constraints on access to a five kilometer zone along the Iranian border, an area generally believed to be heavily contaminated, 74 mine-affected communities within this zone were not visited in the course of the survey. Nonetheless, it is expected that the data provided by the Landmine Impact Survey will allow the mine action community to develop more effective plans targeting areas posing the greatest, most immediate threat to affected communities.5

The results of the Landmine Impact Survey (to be released in the second semester of 2002) indicate the following:

- Of 3,444 areas suspected of mine/UXO contamination; 3,248 were assessed with “blockage factors” (inaccessible areas), for a total land surface of 339 square kilometers;
- Of 586 victims recorded within the last 24 months, 96% are male, and close to 46% are in the age group of 15-29 years of age;
- Close to 40% of all recent victims either were directly involved in, or were close to someone tampering with mines/UXO;
- 60% of mine-affected communities are in the Governorate of Sulaymaniyyah, 24% in the Governorate of Erbil, and 16% in Dahuk;
- The sectors of economic activity most affected by the presence of landmines are foraging, cattle farming, and agriculture.6

Mine Action Coordination, Clearance and Funding

Northern Iraq Mine Action Program (MAP) Since 1997, the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) has managed the northern Iraq Mine Action Program (MAP), under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (UNOHCI). Since 1999 national mine action offices have been set up and staffed in Suleimaniya and in Erbil governorates within the Ministry of Relations and Cooperation (MORAC) and the Ministry for Humanitarian Aid and Co-operation (MOHAC).7 These offices are mandated to monitor mine action in the region on behalf of the KRG, liaise with the NGO and UN implementing partners to provide co-ordination assistance and facilitate where required. The offices are currently funded by UNOPS. The MAP spent over US$28 million in 2001, and its budget for 2002 is approximately US$36 million.8 It is entirely funded by the 13 percent and 2.2 percent accounts of the Oil for Food Program under UN Security Council Resolution 986.9

The MAP supports UN agency projects for housing and resettlement, transportation, electrical infrastructure and drought eradication initiatives in the three northern governorates.10 As of November 2001, clearance operations were taking place in 64 minefields in the three governorates, of which eighteen were demined and five returned to the community in Erbil for grazing, farming, and infrastructure.11 From November 2001 to April 2002, clearance operations were completed in 24 minefields in the three governorates, and those were handed over to the local communities. A total number of 68 cleared minefields had been handed over to local populations as at 30 April 2002.12

According to the MAP, it has initiated a prioritization process that “ranks communities by incidence of landmines and UXO, the number of marked inaccessible areas, and the number of

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5 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Charles Downs, Division Chief, Mine Action Unit, UNOPS, 26 July 2001.
6 Ibid.
7 Email from Tim Carstairs, Mines Advisory Group, 17 July 2002.
8 Email from Charles Downs, Mine Action Unit, UNOPS, 26 July 2001.
9 UN Portfolio of Mine-related Projects, February 2002, pp. 142-143.
11 Ibid.
recent victims, to help in the planning of future mine clearance activities and ensure the efficient use of resources.\textsuperscript{13}

From 1998 to mid-2002, over 9.7 million square meters of land were cleared under the MAP. During that period, clearance teams working under the MAP destroyed over 9,600 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and over 45,400 UXO.\textsuperscript{14}

In 2002, the MAP project plans to expand to include the development of at least twelve new manual demining teams; twenty-six dual-purpose technical survey/area reduction teams; twenty-four impact survey teams; sixteen integrated manual/mine detection dog teams; two dog training schools; two manual deminer schools; six explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams; nine locally designed and manufactured mechanical ground preparation machines; nine imported remote-controlled mini-flails; and six locally-produced multi-purpose excavation machines.\textsuperscript{15}

The MAP also plans to form at least three local non-governmental demining organizations, each initially integrating no less than four manual demining teams. The need for the establishment and strengthening of local mine clearance capacity is viewed by the UN as crucial as the MAP faces insecure funding with a possible phase-out of the Oil for Food Program, or modification of UN-sanctions against Iraq.\textsuperscript{16}

It has also been reported that, in 2001 and 2002, the South African commercial firm Mechem continues working in northern Iraq under the MAP, supporting the development of a local Mine Detection Dog capacity, training Kurds as dog handlers, and removing mines around power lines.\textsuperscript{17}

In September and October 2001, seven visas were granted for the continuation of MAP’s core program, but delays and refusals to grant visas for essential personnel continue to hinder the program. As of 31 October 2001, UNOPS had withdrawn its request for 75 visas due to these difficulties and had to cancel a number of agreements with key contractors to which these visas were tied.\textsuperscript{18} According to the MAP, UNOPS has developed alternative approaches to address bottlenecks thus created (e.g. for the development of local demining NGO capacity), and discussions with the Iraqi government are “ongoing.”

Mines Advisory Group (MAG)\textsuperscript{19} MAG has conducted mine clearance operations in northern Iraq since 1992. Equipment provision, recruitment and training, and some technical surveys were carried out from mid-1992 with limited clearance by expatriate technical advisers during that year. Since then, MAG has built a considerable and highly professional local capacity. MAG local staff now have an average of eight years of mine action experience. MAG’s operations are based on community requirements across the region, and clearance priorities are decided based on strict criteria.

As of July 2002, MAG employed 694 national staff in demining, EOD, mechanical, survey, marking, mine awareness, and management and support roles. MAG has its main offices in Suleimaniya, Erbil and Dohuk, with three operational bases across the region. During 2001 and 2002, MAG increased its focus on management skills training for its local staff.

Since 2000, MAG has been developing a ‘Rotorvator’ mechanical aid, using locally available plant machinery, to augment manual demining and increase productivity. As MAG found it increasingly difficult to transport heavy equipment from outside into the area, it chose to try local production. The machine was developed using existing agricultural equipment and add-ons, developed and built by local Kurdish firms. With consulting assistance from the British charity

\textsuperscript{13} Report of the UN Secretary-General (S/2001/1089), 19 November 2001, p. 18.
\textsuperscript{14} UNOPS MAP data, July 2002.
\textsuperscript{15} UN Portfolio of Mine-related Projects, February 2002, p. 143.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 142.
\textsuperscript{18} Report of the UN Secretary-General (S/2001/1089), 19 November 2001, pp. 18-19.
\textsuperscript{19} The information in this section on MAG was provided in an email from Tim Carstairs, Mines Advisory Group, 17 July 2002.
DTW (Development Technology Workshop), which also builds the ‘Tempest’ vegetation cutter in Cambodia, MAG added an additional power pack to improve the Rotorvator, which is due to begin operations in mid-2002.

In northern Iraq, MAG is currently fielding Mine Action Teams consisting of 22 multi-skilled people that can be divided into three sub-teams as required by the task. As required, MAG also fields small teams to respond to other mine and UXO tasks: these may be call-outs for emergencies and accidents, small high-impact jobs, checking sightings of mines or UXO, destroying mines and UXO found by local people.

After several years of drought severely depleted traditional water sources, safe access to new water sources needed to be created during 2001: MAG’s emergency teams were able to provide this demining. Heavy snowfall snows in the winter of 2001/2002 and rainfall have improved the situation in 2002.

MAG operates in co-ordination with the local mine action offices, but is not able to operate under the MAP umbrella. It has supported the development of the offices and plans continued cooperation and support to further strengthen this local capacity. MAG’s clearance statistics are therefore provided separately to give a more complete picture of the operations underway in the northern Iraq region. In 2001, MAG cleared 11 minefields; 515,616 square meters of land was declared safe, including 137,686 square meters reduced. In 2001, MAG’s teams cleared and destroyed 2,548 mines and 921 UXO. In addition, MAG conducted 174 combined operations response tasks, which cleared 21,933 square meters, destroyed 959 landmines and 9,670 items of unexploded ordnance.

In the first half of 2002, MAG completed the clearance of two minefields. A further 140,458 square meters of land was cleared including 33,200 square meters reduced. MAG is working on 22 minefields during the year. To June 2002, 699 mines and 194 UXO had been destroyed. MAG’s combined operations response tasks had accounted for another 137 mines and 1,664 UXO.

The minefield demarcation throughout most of northern Iraq that MAG carried out in 1996 is still in existence. Where required, this demarcation is now being complemented and improved. In 2001, 23 further minefields were demarcated, a total of 1,237,315 square meters.

From 1993 to 30 June 2002, MAG had cleared 179 minefields. 4,596,409 square meters of land were cleared and handed back to the community. A further 1,178,859 square meters were reduced and declared safe. A total of 90,321 landmines were cleared and destroyed, and 345,557 items of UXO. Some 3,105 tons of uncounted ordnance has also been destroyed. Between 1993 and 1996, MAG did not record large areas cleared of surface-lying and stacked UXO (Battle Area Clearance): the actual totals of area cleared would be therefore, significantly higher. Over the same time period, MAG has demarcated 107,806,503 square meters of mined areas.

MAG’s program is annually funded by SIDA (Sweden), the Netherlands through Stichting Vluchteling, and the United Kingdom. The UK agreed a significantly reduced grant for one year from April 2002; this was the only exception to its policy of providing mine action funds to UN agencies. A number of other donors also contribute funding including Trocaire (Ireland) and Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society (SPAS).

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Norwegian People’s Aid started its mine action program in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1995 in response to a request from local authorities. Since then NPA has worked in the sub-district of Mawat in Sharbazher district in the Governate of Suleymaniyah.

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20 Email Tim Carstairs, Mines Advisory Group, 17 July 2002.
21 Reduction of minefields means, for MAG, that a portion of the area thought to be mined is resurveyed; and exploratory breaches are employed to help verify that areas are indeed mine-free. If the land is safe, it will be ‘reduced’ without formal clearance taking place. The entire process is clearly documented and fully agreed with the local community and authorities. To date MAG has clearly separated the recording of area cleared and area reduced.
area of operation was formally provided to NPA by the local Kurdish authorities in 1998. NPA coordinates its work with Mines Advisory Group. The NPA program consists of three operational demining teams conducting manual clearance of mines and UXO. Its goal is to make more land accessible for local peasants and shepherds and to reduce human suffering.\(^{23}\) The NPA program was fully nationalized in April 2001 and is now run by local personnel only.\(^{24}\) In 2001, 100,391 square meters of land was manually cleared and an additional 406,472 square meters cleared through battle area clearance.\(^{25}\) NPA clears both agricultural areas and rural areas according to priorities set by the regional and local authorities. The budget for the program in 2001 was approximately NOK 2.5 million (US$277,777), funded entirely by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.\(^{26}\) This represents a decrease in funding from 2000, which was NOK 4,776,757 (US$514,000).\(^{27}\) In 2001, the government of Norway reduced its support to NGO work in northern Iraq and increased its development assistance to the government of Iraq-controlled areas, which in turn forced NPA to reduce its demining capacity by fifty percent.\(^{28}\)

**Mine Risk Education**

Between December 2000 and June 2002, the MAP provided mine awareness instruction to over 143,175 beneficiaries. A new local NGO, the Kurdish Organisation for Mine Awareness (KOMA-Suleymaniya) was established in May 2001 to work on such activities in the Suleymaniya governorate.\(^{29}\) MAP has funded the mine awareness activities of KOMA-Suleymaniya and another local NGO, the Kurdistan Organisation for Mine Awareness in Erbil/Dahuk; KOMA Erbil/Dahuk was established in October 2000.\(^{30}\)

From 1993 to 30 June 2002, MAG mine awareness teams visited 6,436 villages and 2,205 schools and other institutes to conduct mine awareness education, in addition to 2,035 follow up visits to primary schools and training institutes, there were visits to a further 578 villages and 443 schools and other institutes in 2000.\(^{31}\) In 1998, MAG started to work with the Ministries of Education and Endowments and Religious Affairs to prepare a teaching curriculum on mine awareness education and to provide teachers with the necessary skills, knowledge, and materials to deliver the curriculum.

Between 1997 to 30 June 2002, MAG trained 2,306 teachers and 916 school supervisors.\(^{32}\) MAG was the first agency to apply “Child-to-Child” techniques to mine action, including MRE. This work continues within the schools program. In early 2000, MAG conducted and evaluation of its mine awareness program towards children, together with the Department of Education. The results indicated that 30% of children surveyed still had difficulty recognizing signs that an unmarked area might be mined, and not all could recognize the danger of playing with UXO and fuses. In 2001, MAG focused on addressing these problems and conducted a re-evaluation in mid-2001, which found the difficulties had been significantly reduced.

\(^{23}\) Response to LM mine action questionnaire by Ketil Volden, Advisor for Middle East, Norwegian People's Aid, 9 July 2002.


\(^{25}\) Response to mine action questionnaire by Norwegian People's Aid, 9 July 2002; email from Janecke Wille, NPA, 23 July 2002.

\(^{26}\) Response to mine action questionnaire by Norwegian People's Aid, 9 July 2002; email from Janecke Wille, NPA, 23 July 2002.

\(^{27}\) Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Janecke Wille, Norwegian People's Aid, 27 July 2001.


\(^{30}\) Email from Charles Downs, Mine Action Unit, UNOPS, 20 July 2001.

\(^{31}\) Northern Iraq Data Coordination Unit of Mines Advisory Group, “Activities Summary 1 January 1993 to 30 June 2001.” Attachment to Email from Tim Carstairs, Mines Advisory Group, 17 July 2002.

\(^{32}\) The 2,258 school and institute teachers trained includes 919 teacher trainings and 1,339 follow-up teacher trainings. Northern Iraq Data Coordination Unit of Mines Advisory Group, “Activities Summary 1 January 1993 to 30 June 2001.” Attachment to Email from Tim Carstairs, Mines Advisory Group, 17 July 2002.
MAG also uses the village mosque and the mullah as a respected method of delivering mine awareness messages. Between 1998 and June 2002 mine awareness teams visited 1180 mosques and 114 religious schools and institutes trained 298 village-based mullahs and instructors from the region’s Imamat and Khatabat institutes (religious training institutions) and Kurdistan Mullahs’ Union. MAG also trained an additional 1641 mullahs through mosque visits. It prepared and printed a mine awareness curriculum document and guide, which includes messages from the Holy Koran and is now taught in religious schools across the region. During the period, MAG continued to focus support on teacher training; and refresher visits to the religious schools, mosques and to villages carried out by MAG’s religious representative team. A June 2001 evaluation of the religious program showed up a continuing need for on-going monitoring and further inputs into the program, which MAG will address through increased focus through 2002.

There is a continued organized flow of returnees from Iran, and MAG provides Farsi-language mine awareness training at the Dyana reception centre, and refresher training in repatriation areas and schools where the returnees have been re-located. In the summer, Arab nomads and shepherds from the southern region move their flocks into the cooler, more mountainous north and MAG conducts targeted Arabic-language mine awareness to such populations at risk: identification of risk areas, how to behave if finding oneself in a mined area.

Landmine Casualties

According to a report of the UN Secretary-General, from 1 September to 31 October 2001, there were 154 new landmine and UXO incidents involving civilians throughout the three governorates. However, a UNOPS official has told Landmine Monitor that in 2001, reported UXO and mine explosions caused an estimated average of 30 casualties per month. He said that in the first quarter of 2002, reported casualties averaged 27 per month. These numbers represented a reduction from 48 per month in 2000 and 56 per month in 1999. Adult men comprise more than 75% of all recorded landmine/UXO casualties.

MAG provided Landmine Monitor with mine/UXO casualty statistics, which do not include data from Emergency and from surgical hospitals in Suleimaniya, New Kirkuk and Erbil. In 2001, MAG recorded 165 mine/UXO-related casualties: 101 casualties in Suleimaniya (68 injuries and 33 deaths), 24 casualties in New Kirkuk (11 injuries and 13 deaths), 28 casualties in Erbil (17 injuries and 11 deaths), and 12 casualties in Dohuk (all injuries).

From January to April 2002, MAG recorded 87 mine/UXO-related casualties: 42 casualties in Suleimaniya (33 injuries and 9 deaths), 13 casualties in New Kirkuk (8 injuries and 5 deaths), 21 casualties in Erbil (15 injuries and 6 deaths), and 11 casualties in Dohuk (10 injuries and one death).

Survivor Assistance

The UNOPS Victim Assistance Program is integrated into the MAP and provides a network of services to mine survivors, including four orthopedic limb centers (Dohuk, Diana, Halabja, and Suleymaniya), six orthopedic outreach centers, three rehabilitation centers, two emergency surgical hospitals, and 16 first-aid posts; all of these receive funding under the MAP. UNOPS considers the prosthetic and surgical centers as sufficient to meet the needs of survivors. The UN Secretary-General reported that in September/October 2001, the construction of a rehabilitation and...
vocational training center began in Dohuk, construction of another center in Diana was completed, and outreach posts were opened in Zakho, Choman and Penjwin.¹⁰

In 2001, a total of 1,239 prostheses were provided, of which approximately 650 were for landmine amputees.¹¹ From 1 January to 30 April 2002, 387 prostheses were provided, of which approximately 235 were for landmine amputees.¹² The UNOPS Victim Assistance Program assists 5,000 to 6,000 patients each year at an annual cost of around US$3.5 million and approximately 850 national staff are employed in all funded programs.¹³

The Italian NGO Emergency runs the Surgical Hospital for Civilian War Victims and provides services at the 18 first-aid posts throughout northern Iraq, in addition to surgical treatment at sites in Erbil and Suleymaniya.¹⁴ In 2001, 2,154 patients received surgical treatment, including 119 landmine casualties. The facility at Suleymaniya also provides rehabilitation services, including the fitting of 454 prostheses.¹⁵ Emergency is co-implementing rehabilitation and vocational training services with the Dohuk and Diana prosthetic limb centers. Over 60% of employees working in the centers are disabled.¹⁶

Handicap International Belgium (HIB) runs two orthopedic centers in Suleymaniya and Halabja. In 2001, the centers produced and distributed 673 pairs of crutches and 425 prostheses, and repaired 1,255 orthopedic devices.¹⁷ The centers also distributed 51 wheelchairs received from the Ministry of Health.¹⁸ In addition, 1,341 physiotherapy sessions were held at the Suleymaniya center and 2,200 at the Halabja center.¹⁹ HIB continues to operate a mobile team composed of a technician and a physiotherapist, which is able to reach isolated villages to ensure adequate follow-up.²⁰

The Norwegian Red Cross supports the ICRC prosthetic/orthotic centers in the cities of Erbil and Mosul and in 2001, 1,061 patients received physical rehabilitation, including 596 landmine survivors.²¹ The centers distributed 1,067 prostheses, 343 crutches and six wheelchairs.²² The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Norwegian Red Cross financially support the centers.²³

The Ministry of Public Health in Suleymaniya, the Rozh Society for Disabled People, the Helena Center, and the Handicapped Union (local NGOs) are also engaged in rehabilitation of the disabled in the region.

The Norwegian NGO, Trauma Care Foundation, runs a program training health care workers in emergency first aid and assists in the transporting of mine casualties to the nearest medical
no details of activities in 2001 were provided to Landmine Monitor. In 2001, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided US$194,444 in funding for the program.

**PALESTINE**

*Key developments since May 2001:* Twenty landmine and UXO casualties were recorded in 2001, and another 45 casualties were recorded in just the first four and one-half months of 2002. More than 90 mine risk education activities were conducted during the reporting period.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Palestinian Authority (PA) officials have made no new statements with respect to banning antipersonnel mines since April 2000, when an official stated the PA’s support for and desire to join the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. PA representatives did not participate in any international landmines-related meetings during the reporting period, including the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001.

**Stockpiling, Production, Transfer**

Some armed Palestinian groups are believed to have access to landmines, both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. A number of recent media reports indicate that these groups are taking the high explosives from landmines to manufacture other types of explosive devices. According to reports citing Israeli military intelligence sources, the explosive RDX has recently been found in remnants of human-activated bombs inside Israel and in bomb fabricating facilities seized in the West Bank. This type of explosive has not previously been encountered in the conflict. RDX is an explosive commonly used in conjunction with TNT in mines, especially antivehicle mines. In the past two years, there have been media reports that armed Palestinian groups have recovered emplaced mines from previous conflicts in order to utilize the explosive contents.

On 3 January 2002, the Israeli navy seized a ship, the *Karine A*, carrying weapons in international waters of the Red Sea. Immediately following the incident, the Israeli government stated that it possessed proof linking the weapons shipment with the PA. PA President Yasser Arafat denied any knowledge of the weapons shipment and Palestinian security services arrested PA personnel implicated in the shipment. The Israeli Army published a list of weaponry seized from the ship that included 311 YM-I antipersonnel mines and 211 YM-III antivehicle mines, both manufactured by Iran, in addition to demolition blocks and other high explosives. This is the second incident in recent years of Israeli-intercepted arms shipments containing landmines reportedly destined for Palestine.

**Use**

Not only antipersonnel mines, but also explosive booby-traps and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are victim-activated are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. Reports of incidents are not always clear whether the devices used are victim-activated or command-detonated. Media and other reports often use terms interchangeably, citing the use of bombs, landmines, booby-traps and improvised explosive devices by armed Palestinian groups and Israeli forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.

55 See http://www.traumacare.no.
1 Letter from the office of the Palestinian Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Gaza, 27 April 2000.
3 The Iranian-manufactured YM-III antivehicle mine contains 5.4 kilograms of Composition B, a mixture of RDX and TNT.
On 15 February 2002, it was reported that three Israeli soldiers died when their tank triggered the explosion of an antivehicle mine allegedly planted by armed Palestinian groups.\footnote{“Arabs Deploy New Explosive Against Tank: Three Israelis Die,” \textit{New York Times}, 15 February 2002.}

According to field research conducted by Human Rights Watch immediately after the April 2002 battle inside a refugee camp in the West Bank city of Jenin, armed Palestinians prepared for the attack by laying explosive booby-traps in many areas. An Explosive Ordnance Disposal expert told Human Rights Watch that he had defused forty Palestinian-made bombs in a single day.\footnote{Human Rights Watch, “Jenin: IDF Military Operations,” \textit{A Human Rights Watch Short Report}, Vol. 14, No. 3 (E), May 2002, pp. 8-9.}

Other sources with on the ground experience in Jenin have told Landmine Monitor that there was significant Palestinian use of tripwire-initiated IEDs and command wire-initiated IEDs in Jenin.\footnote{Information provided to Landmine Monitor Coordinator, July 2002.}

Allegations and incidents of Israeli use of explosive devices are reported in the Landmine Monitor country report on Israel.

Mine Action

Mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affect Palestinian villages adjacent to Israeli minefields and military training bases.\footnote{With the exception of two-thirds of one minefield, which fell under the control of the Palestinian Authority in 1999, all of the minefields (of British, Jordanian, and Israeli origin) are located in areas under Israeli jurisdiction.} The scope of the UXO problem increased during the reporting period beyond minefields and military training zones, to include areas of confrontation between the Palestinians and the Israeli soldiers, and areas subject to attacks like shelling and other direct and indirect firing. Many UXO have been found in these areas.

But, the mine and UXO problem does not constitute a priority for Israel or the PA at this time. No mine clearance took place in the Occupied Palestinian Territories during the reporting period. A 1999 audit by the Israeli State Comptroller reported that most Israeli minefields in the Occupied Palestinian Territories had no value from a military point of view.\footnote{See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2000}, pp. 935-936.}

Following the April 2002 conflict in the Jenin refugee camp, the United Nations brought in international explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts to work in the camp, suggesting a widespread presence of explosive objects. A technical mission from the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) arrived in Jenin on 29 April 2002 and set up the UN Explosive Ordnance Disposal Action Cell to deal with the threat to civilians there. A report from the UN Relief and Works Agency said on 1 May 2002 that many items of unexploded ordnance had already been cleared by EOD technicians, and two schools and several houses containing suspected items of UXO had been cleared. The report also noted that “items of UXO are sporadically being discovered by civilians.”\footnote{UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, “UN-led team helping clear unexploded ordnance from Jenin,” Jerusalem, 1 May 2002. The report said there were two qualified EOD technicians in Jenin, one from the UN Mine Action Program in Afghanistan, and one from the Swedish Rescue Services Agency.}

The mission’s work included assessing the situation, placing warning signs, and defusing Israeli UXO and Palestinian IEDs.

In the last week of April, UNICEF sent its deputy Global Landmines Coordinator, Ben Lark, to Jenin to make an initial mine/UXO/IED threat assessment on behalf of the UNMAS, and to initiate emergency mine risk education activities in camp. Lark reported that contamination in the camp was “severe,” clearance activities were urgently required and early attempts by National Red Crescent EOD operators had been stymied by poor security conditions.\footnote{“Occupied Palestinian Territories,” \textit{Things That Go Bang!} Newsletter by UNICEF, Issue Four, 13 May 2002.}

He indicated that there had been fourteen reported injuries, but the figures had not been verified. He said that civilians were picking up and moving ordnance, including taking it to the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA) headquarters. UNICEF cooperated with Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) volunteers in Jenin to implement a public safety campaign.

One mine clearance initiative in Husan village has yet to take place due to the security situation on the ground. In 2000 and 2001, the Mines Advisory Group conducted survey of the Husan minefield which occupies 18 dunums (18,000 square meters) of land. Four Palestinians have been killed and more than 10 injured by landmines because of the field. In 1985, Israel cleared a portion of the minefield in order to construct a bypass road. This divided the minefield in two; one side lies adjacent to the village’s houses, less than 3-5 meters away in places. At the urging of World Vision and the Palestinian Health Work Committees, the government of Canada and the Mines Advisory Group were attempting in early 2002 to coordinate with Israel, the PA and Jordan to clear the minefield.

The Palestinian Authority also has a limited Explosive Ordnance Disposal capability.

Mine Risk Education

Because the Israeli-imposed closures and blockades separate and prevent the movement of Palestinians, mass media such as newspapers, radio, and television have been used increasingly to convey mine risk education messages.

A mine risk education campaign by Defence for Children International/Palestine Section (DCI/PS) continued in 2001, primarily in mine-affected areas, military training zones, and the areas of confrontation. During the reporting period, more than 90 mine risk education activities were conducted in grade schools and summer camps including lectures, artwork, bulletin boards, morning announcements, and the integration of mine risk education into the school curriculum. Landmines and UXO were also raised on a mass scale through the project's distribution of colored educational booklets for children between the ages of 12 and 15, as well as distribution of two types of mine awareness stickers and colored school agendas.

The Palestinian Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL), established in December 2000, continued to conduct mine risk education activities in 2001 in Palestinian grade schools and summer camps.

Landmine Casualties

Defence for Children International/Palestine Section documented ten landmine and UXO incidents in 2001, resulting in twenty casualties (of which fourteen were children under the age of 18 years). Seven were killed, including six as a result of an explosive device (possibly a booby-trap) and one from a UXO found after the Israeli Army shelled the area.

This represents an increase when compared to eleven casualties recorded by DCI/PS between May 2000 and March 2001, including five deaths (four children) and six injured (four children).

In 2002, DCI/PS had recorded 45 landmine and UXO casualties by 15 May 2002, including ten deaths (nine of them children). Palestinian aid groups report that 31 of the casualties occurred in the period during and following Israeli military operations in the Jenin refugee camp. Given the difficult situation on the ground in 2002, comprehensive figures regarding the number of landmine/UXO casualties is unavailable.

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14 Email from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, Mines Advisory Group, 19 July 2002.
15 Telephone interview with Ibrahim Baragith, World Vision, Manager of the West Bethlehem Area Development Program, 12 February 2002.
16 Rädda Barnen (Save the Children Sweden) and the Ploughshares Fund provided US$40,000 for the project.
17 The Palestinian Campaign to Ban Landmines includes Defence for Children International/Palestine Section, Palestinian Red Crescent, and YMCA Rehabilitation Program.
18 Documentation provided from Palestinian Campaign to Ban Landmine members, DCI/PS and Palestine Red Crescent Society.
Survivor Assistance

Palestinian residents of the Occupied Palestinian Territories are not eligible for medical insurance coverage under the Israeli National Insurance Services (Bituach Leumi). Rather medical care for Palestinian mine and UXO survivors is provided through health care providers in Palestine. The most prominent health services providers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are the Ministry of Health, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, and NGOs. Private for-profit service providers (primarily involved in diagnostic services and individual or group specialized care) account for a relatively small proportion of services delivered. The Ministry of Health is responsible for a significant portion of both primary and secondary health care and some tertiary care. Moreover, the Ministry of Health purchases tertiary services from other health providers, both locally and abroad.

UNRWA plays an important role in health services delivery, providing primary health care free-of-charge, and purchasing secondary and tertiary services to for the 1,074,718 registered Palestinian refugees. UNRWA contracts services with NGOs, primarily for secondary and tertiary care, and with some Israeli facilities for limited specialized tertiary care.

Disability Policy and Practice

Law Number 4 (1999), the "People with Disability Rights Law," which entered into force in the Palestinian Territories on 10 November 1999, applies to mine and UXO survivors; while the law was officially passed, it has yet to be implemented in full. Various Palestinian ministries, including the Ministry of Education, Labor, and Health, lack guidelines for implementation. The Ministry of Social Affairs has played the primary role in developing the implementation mechanism, and the General Union of Palestinian Disabled assisted in modifying the regulations so that they met the needs of the disabled community, but the Union failed to achieve all its objectives. The General Union of Palestinian Disabled is working with relevant ministries to formulate the implementation regulations for the law. A legal advisor of the Union said the social environment in which the law is to be implemented is the major problem because the environment stigmatizes those with disability and views them with pity.

SOMALILAND

Key developments since May 2001: A comprehensive Landmine Impact Survey began in Somaliland in May 2002 and due for completion in February 2003. Three non-governmental organizations are conducting mine clearance. In 2001, 33 people were killed and 70 injured in 98 reported landmine/UXO incidents.

Mine Ban Policy

The self-declared Republic of Somaliland is not internationally recognized as an independent state and cannot therefore accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, it indicated as early as December 1997 that it would unilaterally abide by the Mine Ban Treaty. A parliamentary resolution on 1 March 1999 supported the Ban Treaty fully, but the Somaliland government has not passed any legislation implementing prohibitions on landmines. A National Mine Action Policy was formulated during a February 2002 workshop organized by the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC) in consultation with other mine action organizations, and is awaiting approval by

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19 Interview with Ziad Amr, Director, Palestinian General Union of the Disabled, Ramallah, 13 January 2002.
An Inter-Ministerial Commission on Mine Action was established in January 2002. The Somaliland Mine Action Center and UNICEF have become more active in advocacy concerning the Mine Ban Treaty. SMAC includes sessions on the treaty in all of its training workshops and UNICEF emphasizes the Mine Ban Treaty in its new mine risk awareness education program.

Production, Transfer, and Use
Somaliland does not produce landmines and there has been no indication that it has acquired new landmines.

No new landmines have been used in Somaliland since 1995. There are no militias or armed factions operating in Somaliland at the present time. A conflict in nearby Puntland could affect the eastern regions of Somaliland, but there are no reports of new landmine use in Puntland.

Stockpiling
The Danish Demining Group (DDG) is assisting the Ministry of Defense and the Army to destroy stockpiled mines, and accepted 5,135 antipersonnel mines from them for destruction.

The HALO Trust (HALO) has entered into several written agreements with the Ministry of Defense to destroy stockpiled mines across the country, in military camps including Borromir, Daraweyne, and Gore-Awl. HALO told Landmine Monitor that the government is giving HALO full access to the stockpiled mines when HALO is ready to start destruction of the stocks.

HALO told Landmine Monitor that mines held by villages and individuals are less in number than mines held in the military camps, but pose a far greater risk. HALO has reported increased success in addressing this problem in 2001, partly through the use of local liaison officers.

Mine Action Coordination
The Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation, and Reconstruction (MRR&R) is the government agency responsible for coordinating mine action. In 1998, MRR&R established the National Demining Agency (NDA) to develop a landmine policy and to oversee activities related to humanitarian mine action. In 1999, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), under its Somali Civil Protection Program (SCPP), helped establish the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC), based in Hargeisa. SMAC is composed of an external quality control unit, an information management unit for the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), six regional mine officers, and a training unit.

SMAC/UNDP held a three-day mine policy strategy meeting 14-16 January 2002 and plans to present recommendations from the meeting to the Somaliland government. The principal goal of the strategy adopted at the meeting is to render Somaliland free of the effects of mines in 7-10 years.

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1 The workshop took place in Hargeisa from 14-16 January 2002. Interview with Jab Swart, Chief Technical Advisor/Program Manager, Somali Mine Action Centre (SMAC), Hargeisa, 9 February 2002.
2 The Inter-Ministerial Commission has been proposed and formed twice, at two national workshops (October 2000 and January 2002). Landmine Monitor is not aware of any meetings of or actions by the commission.
4 Email to Landmine Monitor (NPA) from Bo Bischoff, Head of Mine Action Unit, Danish Demining Group, 27 July 2002.
5 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Hugh McNally, Program Manager, The Halo Trust Somaliland, 30 July 2002. The agreements date as far back as June 2000.
6 Ibid.
7 HALO Trust Activity Report for 2001, received by email on 17 April 2002.
8 Interview with Jab Swart, Somali Civil Protection Program/UNDP, 13 February 2002; interview with Mohamed Osman, SMAC Manager, 9 February 2002.
Landmine Problem, Survey and Assessment

Somaliland is heavily mined, following a long history of border conflict with neighboring Ethiopia and the persistent feuding of internal warlords. In March 2001, the Somali Mine Action Center in Somaliland reported the existence of 402 mined areas. However, the location and extent of these mined areas remains largely unknown, and the socioeconomic impact is not yet fully understood.

A number of surveys have been conducted in Somaliland over the past five years. During 2000, HALO conducted a comprehensive level one survey of the regions of Awdal and Woqooyi Galbeed. During 2001, HALO carried out a survey of a minefield at Gore Awl in July, and later a survey and confirmation of a route to be used by refugees returning from Aisha camp in Ethiopia to Zeila (Awdal region). HALO intends to do surveys in the regions of Togdheer and Sool during 2002.

The Survey Action Center (SAC) conducted an Advanced Survey Mission to Somalia and Somaliland in March of 2001 and developed a plan for a comprehensive Landmine Impact Survey (LIS). Due to the uncertain security conditions in the south, east, and west of Somalia, the plan calls for collection of data in the Somaliland area as a first phase. The Danish Demining Group is implementing the Landmine Impact Survey. The survey was initiated in March 2002 and field work began in May 2002. A SAC training team was in Somaliland from 20 June to 15 July 2002 and trained the senior national staff and supervised the first pretest. The recruitment of the interviewers will take place in early August 2002. The main data collection will start around 1 October 2002 after the completion of the second pretest and the pilot test. The survey should be completed in February 2003.

Mine Clearance

Three international demining agencies have active projects in Somaliland: the Danish Demining Group, the Santa Barbara Foundation (based in Germany), and HALO. In addition, SMAC/UNDP contracted with the UK-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to train a quick reaction Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team for the six regions of Somaliland. The first phase of the training involving 12 police officers was completed April 2001.

According to SMAC, 1.5 million square meters of land in 35 areas have been demined in Somaliland and turned over to local communities. Information provided by the mine clearance organizations indicates that in 2001, a total of 387,944 square meters of land was demined, plus an additional 21.4 million square meters of battle area was cleared.

HALO Trust

During 2001, HALO deployed four manual teams, an EOD team, and a Mine Detection Dog (MDD) team in four regions in Somaliland (Awdal, Galbeed, Togheer, and Sool, as well as in and around the city of Hargeisa. In addition, a Battle Area Clearance (BAC) team has worked to clear stray ammunition and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from the land around Hargeisa in preparation for the resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the area. The following ground was cleared by HALO during 2001: 111,790 square meters manually excavated; 11,486 square meters cleared by the MDD team; 21,172,500 square meters surface battle area cleared.

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9 Report received from Somaliland Mine Action Center. Additionally, Landmine Monitor received mine survey data pooled from regional mine officers reporting to SMAC, from SMAC/Hargeisa, 10 February 2001.
11 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Mike Kendellen, SAC, 30 July 2002. See www.sac-na.org.
12 While HALO is based in the UK, the work in Somaliland operates under HALO USA.
13 Interview with Mohamed Osman, SMAC Manager, 9 February 2002; interview with Jab Swart, Somali Civil Protection Program/UNDP, 13 February 2002.
2001, HALO cleared and destroyed 76 antipersonnel mines, 248 antivehicle mines, 3,003 items of UXO and destroyed 24,509 small arms ammunition.\(^{16}\)

In October 2001, the HALO team completed clearance in Mohammed Mooge (east of Hargeisa), considered a high priority due to returning refugees. Since then, approximately 800 IDP families have moved into the area. HALO also cleared areas in Hado, north of the city, in 2001.

Apart from these operations around Hargeisa, HALO clearance operations have primarily concentrated on minefields along the Somaliland/Ethiopia border to the west and south of Hargeisa. In 2001, clearance was completed at Jifu (Awdal region), and continued at Harirad and Gore Awl/Au Bare Road in Awdal, and Belishere and Bali-Abane in Woqooyi Galbeed. At sites such as Belishere and Bali-Abane, a large amount of time has been spent on area reduction in large, relatively low-density minefields.

HALO carried out extensive trials with mine detection dogs (MDDs) in Somaliland during 2000-2001. These trials were completed in April 2001 and convinced HALO that further use of MDDs in Somaliland would enable better clearance rates. It is anticipated that an MDD team will return to Somaliland in late 2002.

HALO reports having cleared 45 percent of the mine sites in western Somaliland, and projects that it will have completed clearance of the highest priority tasks by the end of 2002, after which it will redeploy clearance resources into the eastern districts of Somaliland. HALO states that "the mine problem in Somaliland is at a manageable level, and HALO would expect priority clearance to be finished within 3-5 years."\(^{17}\)

**Danish Demining Group**

DDG started its mine clearance program in Somaliland in 1999, focusing on repopulation of rural areas and clearance of infrastructure. DDG has three demining teams, three mine detection dog teams and two quick response teams (QRT). In 2001, they cleared a total of 136,000 square meters through clearance operations and a total of 261,000 square meters through battle area clearance, destroying 7,076 mines. With respect to use of the cleared areas, DDG enjoyed "an excellent cooperation with a number of development NGOs in Somaliland such as Danish Refugee Council, ICRC and GTZ."\(^{18}\)

DDG operates in the area between the three major cities of Hargeisa, Burao and Berberam (in the Galbeed, Sahil and Toghdheer regions). DDG has opened the infrastructure in the primary repatriation area, including the Jaraarto Road that connects lower land to upper land. DDG is conducting clearance at the Hargeisa airport, the Berbera airport, and the Bebera Naval Base (which is no longer military). In addition, DDG is clearing 170 SAM-2 and Styx missiles.\(^{19}\) At Hargeisa airport, the contaminated area is approximately 180,000 square meters containing a great deal of scattered ammunition from an exploded ammunition dump. In 2001, DDG cleared a total of 177 UXO and landmines from this area, while a total of 2,357 UXO and landmines have been cleared so far in 2002.\(^{20}\)

**Santa Barbara Foundation**

The Santa Barbara Foundation began mine clearance in Somaliland in 2000, and continued in 2001, focused in the "Gabiley District" and the city of Burao and its immediate surroundings. It cleared a total of 128,668 square meters of land, and destroyed 230 antipersonnel mines, five antivehicle mines, and 2,066 UXO pieces.\(^{21}\) More than 40 Somaliland deminers are now clearing

\(^{16}\) Email to from Hugh McNally, HALO, Somaliland, 30 July 2002.


\(^{18}\) Interview with/Mine Action Questionnaire with Bo Boshiff, Head of Mine Action Unit, DDG, Copenhagen 16 May 2002: from Bo Bischoff, DDG, 27 July 2002.

\(^{19}\) Email to from Bo Boshiff, DDG, 27 July 2002.


\(^{21}\) Santa Barbara report to SMAC, provided to Landmine Monitor.
mines in the Gabiley, and approximately 70 demining specialists are working manually, with the support of detectors and mine detection dogs, in Burao.\textsuperscript{22}

**Mine Risk Education**

In recent years, limited and ad-hoc Mine Risk Education (MRE) projects have been implemented in Somalia. UNICEF has created the Mine Risk Education Advisory Group to advise the National Demining Agency and SMAC on the development of effective MRE strategies and to improve the collection and dissemination of relevant data on mine incidents. UNICEF and Handicap International will conduct a “Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP) Study” between August and October 2002 in affected communities of three regions (Togdheer, Awdal and Galbeed) of Somaliland.\textsuperscript{23} Based on the results of the survey, existing mine awareness communication material will be field-tested, and additional communication materials and strategies will be developed.\textsuperscript{24}

UNICEF held a National Workshop on Mine Risk Education on 29-30 October 2001 in Somaliland.\textsuperscript{25} On 22 November 2001, UNICEF, the National Demining Agency and SMAC presented a draft policy on Mine Risk Education in Somaliland to the Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (MRR&R) for adoption by the government. The draft policy has not been adopted yet as a national policy. An MRE specialist has been hired by UNICEF to develop mine awareness programs for Somaliland.\textsuperscript{26}

SMAC and Handicap International have completed MRE projects in refugee camps in Djibouti and Ethiopia, respectively, for Somaliland refugees who plan to return to Somaliland under a UNHCR voluntary repatriation program. Action NordSud/Handicap International also plans to run a pilot MRE project in the Togdheer region during the summer of 2002.\textsuperscript{27}

**Mine Action Funding**

Donors generally report funding simply to “Somalia,” but nearly all mine action activities are taking place in Somaliland, and thus Landmine Monitor is reporting the funding here. It appears that donors provided about US$4.3 million for mine action in Somaliland in 2001.

The UN Mine Action Investments database lists the following contributions for 2001: Germany, $456,622; the Netherlands, $159,776; Switzerland, $80,000; United States $1.4 million; and the European Commission, $600,480.\textsuperscript{28} Germany funds the Santa Barbara Foundation. The Netherlands funds HALO Trust. Switzerland provides in-kind assistance to UNOPS and SMAC. The U.S. funds HALO Trust. The EC funds are for the Landmine Impact Survey.

In addition, Denmark reports $864,345 for the Danish Demining Group and $240,000 for the UNDP.\textsuperscript{29} Sweden reports $300,000 for DDG and $300,000 for the Landmine Impact Survey.\textsuperscript{30}

**Landmine/UXO Casualties**

In 2001, 33 people were killed and 70 injured, including 44 children, in 98 reported landmine/UXO incidents.\textsuperscript{31} This represents a small reduction from the 107 casualties reported in

\textsuperscript{22} Santa Barbara Foundation website, visited 11 July 2002, at www.stiftung-sankt-barbara.de/.
\textsuperscript{23} Telephone interview with Hugues Laurenge, MRE Coordinator, Handicap International, Lyon, 31 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Landmine Monitor participated in the workshop and Landmine Monitor researcher facilitated one of two working sessions.
\textsuperscript{26} Landmine Monitor received a copy of UNICEF’s report on the workshop on 7 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{27} Information provided by Florence Thune, Handicap International, 17 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{29} See Landmine Monitor country report on Denmark.
\textsuperscript{30} See Landmine Monitor country report on Sweden.
2000. Of the total casualties, 72 were male and 31 female. Antipersonnel landmines were the cause of 36 incidents. Activities at the time of the incident included: tending livestock 38 percent, tampering 16 percent, traveling 14 percent, passing/standing nearby nine percent, collecting water/food/firewood eight percent, playing seven percent, and other or unknown eight percent.

### Landmine/UXO Casualties – January to December 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Loss of limb</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Adult</th>
<th>Child</th>
<th>UXO</th>
<th>AP</th>
<th>AT</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Awdal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galbeed</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahnah</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sool</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togdheer</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rate of casualties has declined substantially from two to three casualties a day in Hargeisa alone in 1992 to around nine casualties per month throughout Somaliland in 2001. However, it is believed that the number of landmine casualties continues to be under-reported as many incidents take place in remote areas. There is no requirement or procedure for reporting incidents to the police or mine action officers.

### Survivor Assistance

Mine survivor assistance is coordinated through the Somaliland Mine Action Center with the assistance of UNDP Somalia; however, the focal point for execution is the World Health Organization. Public health facilities with the capacity to assist landmine casualties in Somaliland are reportedly minimal. Hospitals throughout Somaliland are poorly equipped and poorly staffed. Mine incident survivors are often treated at a surgical hospital in Berbera, run with the assistance of the Italian NGO, COOPI. This hospital is on the northern coast of Somaliland and is far from the most mine-affected regions. However, first aid is available and there is transport to take casualties to the nearest medical facility.

The majority of the people in Somaliland are nomads, where mobility is essential for their livelihood, but there are no training or reintegration programs for landmine survivors to help them seek alternative means of survival. Disabled survivors, therefore, become dependant on their families. The Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) and Action NordSud/Handicap International (AN/HI) continue to provide survivor assistance in Somaliland. SRCS runs an orthopedic workshop in Hargeisa, funded principally by the Norwegian Red Cross. The center provides physiotherapy, lower limb prostheses, orthoses, crutches and a repair service. In 2001, the center fitted 318 patients with prostheses including 86 landmine survivors. Since 1999, the center has operated a mobile clinic that makes periodic visits to regions outside of Hargeisa. AN/HI runs a physiotherapy center and a low cost prostheses workshop, and also makes crutches and wheelchairs. In 2001, the center assisted two landmine survivors. As the AN/HI center charges patients a small fee, most amputees prefer to go to SRCS center, which does not charge a fee.
TAIWAN

Mine Ban Policy

In July 1999, Vice President Lien Chan first expressed the government’s “all-out support” for a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines. Government officials reiterated this position in March 2001. Jody Williams, the 1997 Nobel Peace Laureate, visited Taiwan in August 2001 and ICBL ambassador Tun Channereth visited Taiwan in June 2001; both met with President Chen and other political leaders to discuss the landmine issue. President Chen signed a declaration in support of the anti-landmine campaign. In the past year, ICBL members in Taiwan have advocated for legislators to enact domestic laws banning the use, transfer, production and stockpiling of antipersonnel mines.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Taiwan no longer uses, produces, or transfers antipersonnel mines. In the past, Taiwan both produced and imported antipersonnel mines, but is not known to have exported. The current size and composition of Taiwan’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines is unknown, but is likely to consist of domestically produced copies of U.S. M16A1, M2A4, M3, and M18A1 mines, as well as some of the 36,747 antipersonnel mines imported from the United States (including 2,592 ADAM scatterable mines in 1992).

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

The landmine problem persists in the coastal areas of Kinmen Island, which was mined in the 1950s. Mine clearance operations have been undertaken on Kinmen Island, with clearance of priority areas completed in May 1999. At a March 2001 public hearing, the Ministry of National Defense declared that all the “strategically irrelevant” minefields had been cleared. However, officials maintained that certain minefields still have a defensive purpose and need to be kept. Nevertheless, there was a desire to rehabilitate and re-use strategically mined areas for local development on Kinmen Island as well as other islands. In 2001, some companies, such as the water and electricity companies, started to clear mined areas.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Landmine Monitor has no information on any new landmine incidents in 2001. However, at a public hearing in March 2001, the Ministry of National Defense declared that thirteen landmine survivors would receive compensation. Since 1997, Eden Social Welfare Foundation has provided wheelchairs to mine survivors and other disabled people in Taiwan, South Korea, Cambodia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Jordan, Mozambique, Vietnam and El Salvador. Eden holds regular mine awareness events. On 9 March 2002, a “thousand wheelchairs pledge” ceremony...
was held in front of the Taipei City Hall with hundreds of college students pledging support of the Taiwanese Campuses to be Barrier Free campaign.11

WESTERN SAHARA

Key developments since May 2001: Polisario states that it has not used antipersonnel mines since the 1991 cease-fire, and has no stockpile of mines. Polisario accuses Morocco of continuing to use mines. There have been no humanitarian mine action programs since May 2000.

Mine Ban Policy

The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between the government of Morocco and the Polisario Front (the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguía el Hamra and Río de Oro). The Polisario’s Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) is not universally recognized and has no official representation in the UN. Polisario representatives continue to state that the Saharawi government would join the treaty, if eligible to do so, but at the same time, they speak of a possible need for the weapon.1 In a detailed response to Landmine Monitor’s request for updated information, Polisario confirmed that there has been no change in policy toward the treaty in the past year.2

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

Polisario is not known to produce or export mines. In its response to Landmine Monitor, Polisario said it had not received mines from other countries in the past, but instead had acquired mines by lifting them from the Moroccan defensive walls (berms). It said Polisario forces would lift antipersonnel and antivehicle mines from Moroccan minefields and replant them to stop Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) troop movements.3

Polisario has said that it has no stockpile of mines. It keeps 1,606 disarmed antipersonnel mines on display in the Saharawi Liberation Army (ALPS) Military Museum, which is open for visitors. It claims all of its mines were taken from the Royal Moroccan Army.4

Use

Both Polisario and Morocco used mines extensively in the past. Polisario and Moroccan forces fought intermittently from 1975 to 1991, when a cease-fire went into effect and the UN peacekeeping force, UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), was deployed to the region. Landmine Monitor could not confirm any new mine use during the reporting period by either Polisario or Polisario in Western Sahara.

Polisario said that APLS has not layed, maintained or refurbished “any kind of mines” since “a cease-fire went into effect,” in reference to the 1991 cease-fire.5 Polisario claims that Royal Moroccan Army troops deployed in Western Sahara “refurbish and upgrade their minefields on a daily basis.”6 (See Morocco country report for more detailed allegations by Polisario).7

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1 Interview with SADR Minister for Europe, Mr. Mohamed Sidati, Oslo, 20 March 2002.
4 Ibid. There are five mine types in the museum, from Brazil, France, Italy and the United States.
Landmine Problem

Western Sahara is littered with mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) as a result of years of conflict. No in-depth landmine impact survey has been conducted. The 1991 cease-fire resulted in a territory that is divided between the Polisario and Morocco by defensive walls built by Morocco, known as berms (earthen walls of about three meters in height), which Morocco has fortified with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

A Polisario official expressed Polisario’s concern for “the enormous number of landmines in Western Sahara and the many innocent victims they claim every year.” Despite the landmine problem, approximately 10,000 Saharawi nomads live in mine-affected areas on both sides of the Moroccan berms.

Mine Action

Under bilateral military agreements signed by Polisario and Morocco in early 1999, both parties have committed to cooperate with MINURSO in the exchange of mine-related information, marking of mined areas, and clearance and destruction of landmines and UXO in the presence of MINURSO observers. Polisario stated to Landmine Monitor that ALPS military regions have clear instructions from their Ministry of Defense to cooperate with MINURSO within the framework of this agreement and spare no effort to provide any available information, assistance in marking and destruction of mines and UXO. It also indicated that it provided MINURSO with all maps and necessary information in 1991.

MINURSO does not have the personnel resources, equipment or funding necessary to conduct humanitarian mine clearance. Most clearance is done by the RMA and recent reports indicate a decreasing level of clearance. UNHCR has not produced an updated repatriation plan for the Saharawi refugees because of continued uncertainty regarding the political process. UNHCR official told Landmine Monitor, “It will be impossible to run a smooth repatriation without proper prior mine clearance.”

UNHCR also deems it necessary to open several more passages through the Moroccan berm and for logistical reasons, these heavily mine-affected areas would need to be surveyed and cleared well in advance.

No NGOs are known to have any plans to establish mine clearance or mine risk education programs in Western Sahara. No large-scale mine risk education has been provided in Western Sahara since Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted mine risk education in the five main Saharawi refugee camps near Tindouf (Algeria) from March 1998 to May 2000.

A Polisario representative stressed the “urgent need for greater support for mine action for the Saharawi people, particularly in the fields of victim assistance and better survey, research and documentation of the present landmine situation.”

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8 For a more detailed description of the landmine problem, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 921-924.
9 Interview with Mohamed Sidati, SADR Minister for Europe, Oslo 20 March 2002.
10 Interview with Major M. Morrow, Mine Information Officer, MINURSO, Laayoune, 7 January 2001.
12 According to the UN Peace Plan, UNHCR will be responsible for providing mine awareness for 120,000 refugees in Algeria and 26,000 refugees in Mauritania prior to the planned repatriation of Saharawi refugees. The UNHCR does not, however, have any concrete plans for such activities due to the delays in the peace plan and lack of funds.
13 Interview with Mr. Mohamed Hantosh, UNHCR Senior Desk Officer, North Africa and Western Sahara Operation, Geneva, 9 April 2002.
14 Ibid.
15 Interview with Mohamed Sidati, SADR Minister for Europe, Oslo 20 March 2002.
Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Polisario provided Landmine Monitor with a list of seven mine incidents from June 2001 to April 2002. Five involved antipersonnel mines, killing one person in 2001, and injuring one person and killing eight camels in 2002. Two involved antivehicle mines, injuring two people in 2001, and killing one person and injuring at least two others in 2002. The incidents took place in Smara (two), Farsia (three), Oum Draiga, and Mehairis.\textsuperscript{16}

MINURSO recorded 39 mine incidents from 1992-2000.\textsuperscript{17} A Moroccan organization named the Forum for Truth and Justice-Sahara Section has gathered information on landmine casualties in the Moroccan-controlled parts of Western Sahara. It states that there were a number of new landmine casualties during the reporting period, particularly among nomads in the southern part of Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{18}

NPA conducted a mine victim assessment mission in the Saharawi refugee camps in April 2000, which identified 320 landmine amputees and another 300 disabled due to polio, and other reasons. A number of landmine survivors live in Western Sahara, on both sides of the berm, but no figures were available. Access to emergency services, especially in remote areas, is limited to military medical facilities. No NGO is actively working with landmine survivor assistance in the refugee camps or in Western Sahara.\textsuperscript{19}

NPA prepared a proposal to establish a prosthesis workshop project in the camps and secured funding, but due to Algerian restrictions on visas to enter the region, the project was cancelled in early 2001. While the visa problems were solved in late 2001, neither NPA nor any other organization has gone ahead with the project yet.

The ICRC is developing contacts with representatives of the Polisario Front in order to sign an agreement regarding the fitting of lower-limb prostheses for Sahrawi refugees who are amputees at their center in Algiers.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{16} Polisario Response to Landmine Monitor, 27 June 2002.
\textsuperscript{17} See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2001}, p. 1063, for more detail. MINURSO has no full time mine action staff person responsible for maintaining and updating the landmine/UXO incident records. This responsibility lies with the MINURSO Force Training Officer, who is also the Mine Information Officer.
\textsuperscript{18} Interview with Brahim Noumria, Forum Verité et Justice- Section Sahara, Geneva, 8 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{19} See also \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2001}, pp. 1064-1065.