NON-SIGNATORIES

AFGHANISTAN

Key developments since May 2001: Afghanistan has experienced dramatic political, military, and humanitarian changes. The cabinet approved Afghanistan’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 July 2002 and the following day the Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the instrument of accession on behalf of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan.

Mine action operations were virtually brought to a halt following 11 September 2001. The mine action infrastructure suffered greatly during the subsequent military conflict, as some warring factions looted offices, seized vehicles and equipment, and assaulted local staff. Four deminers and two mine detection dogs were killed in errant U.S. air strikes. Military operations created additional threats to the population, especially unexploded U.S. cluster bomblets and ammunition scattered from storage depots hit by air strikes, as well as newly laid mines and booby-traps by Northern Alliance, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters.

A funding shortfall for the mine action program in Afghanistan prior to 11 September 2001 had threatened to again curtail mine action operations. But since October 2001, about $64 million has been pledged to mine action in Afghanistan. By March 2002, mine clearance, mine survey, and mine risk education operations had returned to earlier levels, and have since expanded beyond 2001 levels.

In 2001, mine action NGOs surveyed approximately 14.7 million square meters of mined areas and 80.8 million square meters of former battlefield area, and cleared nearly 15.6 million square meters of mined area and 81.2 million square meters of former battlefields. Nearly 730,000 civilians received mine risk education. A total of 16,147 antipersonnel mines, 1,154 antivehicle mines, and 328,398 UXO were destroyed. In all of these activities, 95 to 99 percent of the actions were completed prior to 11 September 2001.

The ICRC recorded 1,368 new landmine and UXO casualties in Afghanistan in 2001, but that number is not comprehensive.

Background

Mine action activity in Afghanistan was suspended after it became clear that a military response in Afghanistan would follow the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. International and local NGO staff was evacuated, although some local staff voluntarily remained behind to handle emergencies. The training of deminers was suspended, due to fears that their training camps would be mistaken as terrorist camps. The cessation of mine action came as many civilians fled cities for rural areas, crossing mined areas in the process, due to the threat and the eventual reality air strikes. Both the Program Manager of the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) and the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mine risk education unit considered population movements as increasing the risk of casualties from mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).

As international and local staff departed, the Taliban and other warring factions raided a number of UN and mine action NGO offices. They seized buildings, vehicles, and equipment, and assaulted local staff. The Kandahar offices of MAPA and several other local mine action organizations were repeatedly attacked and occupied by Taliban forces between the end of September and the middle of October. Mine action NGOs were also assaulted in Kabul and

Jalalabad during the same period. By 20 October 2001, MAPA estimated it had lost 80 vehicles to the Taliban, as well as millions of dollars in equipment.

Beginning on 7 October 2001, mine action personnel and facilities were also affected by coalition air strikes. On 9 October 2001, bombs struck the Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC) office in Kabul. Four local staff members were killed and four more injured. The building was destroyed, along with two vehicles and two electrical generators. On 25 October 2001, a bomb hit the mine detection dog training center near Kabul. Two dogs were killed, two vehicles destroyed, and a number of buildings damaged. The Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA) headquarters site was also hit by air strikes, destroying many of their vehicles, mechanical equipment, and other stores.

Weapons used in the air strikes but not previously encountered in Afghanistan posed new dangers, both to civilians and mine action personnel. One particularly deadly unexploded munition was the BLU-97 bomblet, which was dispensed from the U.S. CBU-87 and CBU-103 cluster bombs. Afghan deminers had no operational experience or training in clearing these devices. Furthermore, MAPA reported an increased UXO threat due to bombing of ammunition storage locations, which spread UXO over a large radius sometimes reaching five kilometers.

On 24 October 2001, MAPA asked the United States to provide information on locations of munitions deployed and at the end of October moved 4,000 deminers out of the country for training on cluster bomb disposal. Key training staff also visited the Kosovo Mine Action Coordination Center to gather lessons learned and to develop and appropriate training plan. On 3 November 2001, MAPA announced plans to hold training sessions in Quetta, Pakistan in mid-November for 1,000 staff and mine clearance trainers, and 3,000 staff in Peshawar, Pakistan. On 28 November 2001, the U.S. State Department announced it would spend an additional $7 million to help demine Afghanistan, including funds to train Afghan deminers how to clear cluster bombs. According to the Program Manager of the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (MACA), the U.S. was cooperative in providing information about coalition cluster bomb strikes, providing map coordinates of cluster bomb strikes to the UN, the Danish Demining Group (DDG), and HALO. Specialists from MACA were also deployed on 7 December 2001 in Herat to help train local mine action staff to deal with the new ordnance dropped by coalition strikes. In co-ordination with the MAPA, DDG established new drills, techniques, and procedures to enable the teams to deal with the unknown ordnance in Afghanistan. At the beginning of December 2001 a joint Afghan

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9 Statement by Dan Kelly, Program Manager, UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan, during a press briefing by the UN Offices for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Islamabad, 24 October 2001.
12 Statement by Dan Kelly, Program Manager, UNMACA, Islamabad, 3 November 2001.
Technical Consultants (ATC) and DDG course about new munitions used by the coalition forces was conducted for field staff.\textsuperscript{16}

Three days after the Taliban left Kabul, HALO had survey teams on the ground conducting an urgent assessment of the mine and UXO threat along former Northern Alliance/ Taliban fronts. HALO began survey work in the north a week later.\textsuperscript{17} At the end of November 2001, some mine clearance teams resumed work. MAPA activated mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams in Kabul. HALO resumed work around Bagram, clearing mines and UXO in preparation for area residents to return home to the Shomali plain area.\textsuperscript{18} DDG EOD teams were on call for emergency clearance from 20 November 2001. DDG teams assisted in a number of EOD tasks in and around Kabul, clearing unexploded Coalition ordnance at Wazir Akber Khan and Maidan Shahr main road.\textsuperscript{19}

Additional clearance teams began to clear 500-2,000 pound unexploded aircraft bombs in and around Kabul, including three at the airport.\textsuperscript{20} DDG resumed operations around Kabul and was given the co-ordination responsibility of the day-to-day operations of mine action organizations working at Kabul International Airport. DDG combined its manual and EOD capacity with mine clearance flails from the Danish and British peacekeeping forces supporting the clearance of a safety belt for the runway at the Kabul airport.\textsuperscript{21}

In addition, local mine action staff cleared cluster bomblets from 54 homes in the village of Qala Shater, near Herat, by 28 November 2001.\textsuperscript{22} At the time, according to HALO, unexploded cluster bomblets and other coalition munitions were the most significant danger facing Afghan civilians trying to return home.\textsuperscript{23} In the Shomali Plain area, HALO had 500 deminers working by 10 December 2001, and eight days later, 12 villages in the area were declared to be mine-free.\textsuperscript{24}

By the middle of December 2001, 920 deminers from various agencies were engaged in survey, mine risk education, and mine clearance operations in and around Kabul and another 120 were doing similar activity in the northern part of the country. Another 200 personnel were scheduled to arrive in the region by the beginning of January.\textsuperscript{25} The security situation in the southern and eastern regions did not permit mine action to resume, but 20 senior deminers were carrying out assessments in and around Jalalabad and Kandahar and 900 deminers were prepared to go to work in each region.\textsuperscript{26}

By the end of December, MAPA and its local implementing partners had almost finished clearing UXO from Kabul, had surveyed and cleared 24 kilometers of the road to Bagram, and almost finished clearing cluster bomblets from the old road north of Kabul.\textsuperscript{27} OMAR had also resumed operations and by the end of January had destroyed 290 cluster bomblets, mines, and UXO.\textsuperscript{28} A section of a manual clearance team and 2 EOD teams from DDG made a general

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Email to Landmine Monitor (NPA) from Danish Demining Group (DDG), 29 July 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tom Dibb, Central Asia Desk, HALO, 19 July 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Statement by Peter John Lesueur, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Adviser, Press Briefing by the UN Offices for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Islamabad, 28 November 2001.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Danish Demining Group (DDG) email to Landmine Monitor/Norwegian Peoples Aid, 29 July 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Statement by Peter John Lesueur, Islamabad, 28 November 2001.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Danish Demining Group (DDG) email to Landmine Monitor/Norwegian Peoples Aid, 29 July 2002.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Statement by Stephanie Bunker, UN Spokesperson, Islamabad, 29 November 2001.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Paul Heslop, Vice President of HALO, quoted by Claire Soares, “Unexploded Munitions the Focus for Afghan Deminers,” Reuters (Washington), 29 November 2001.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Statement by Yusuf Hasan, UN Spokesperson, Press Briefing by the UN Offices for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Kabul, 18 December 2001; Marcus George, “Afghanistan’s Hidden Killers,” BBC, 10 December 2001.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Statement by Dan Kelly, Program Manager UNMACA, Kabul, 18 December 2001.
  \item \textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Statement by Eric Falt, Director of the UN Information Center, Press Briefing by the UN Offices for Pakistan and Afghanistan, Islamabad, 31 December 2001.
\end{itemize}
assessment of the UXO problems in Jalalabad in order to respond to the emergency high priority tasks, which endanger the lives of many civilians. Farm Hadda, a cluster strike area, where people from the nearby IDP camp collect wood on a daily basis, was cleared by DDG.29

Troops from coalition forces also conducted some “area clearance” activities and some UXO clearance in locations in proximity to their operations. U.S. EOD units in and around Bagram began some limited mine clearance.30 By 5 December 2001, they had removed over 200 unexploded bombs from Bagram air base.31 On 14 December 2001, American troops began clearing mines and UXO at the Kandahar airport.32 Coalition forces also provided medical assistance including casualty evacuation for some injured deminers.

The International Security Assistance Force began some limited clearance of mines and UXO in their immediate area of operations. By the beginning of January, British teams were at work demining five sites in the Kabul area, including the airport, where they were assisting DDG with Aardvark mechanical demining machines. Two Danish Hydrema mine clearance flails also began work at the Kabul airport. At the same time, French and Jordanian troops were clearing areas around Mazar-i-Sharif,33 and Norwegian troops began clearing the Kandahar airport.34 At the beginning of February, Russia announced plans it was considering to build a center for mine clearing in Kabul.35 French soldiers reportedly completed the destruction of 70,000 antipersonnel mines stockpiled at Kabul airport.36

The sudden focus of international attention on Afghanistan prompted many governments to offer their support, including specifically to demining programs. At the international donors conference in Tokyo on 21-22 January 2002, officials from 24 countries and international organizations pledged $27 million for mine action in Afghanistan.37 A total of about $64 million has been pledged for mine action since September 2001. Prior to September 2001, the mine clearance program in Afghanistan was experiencing a funding shortage that threatened to curtail demining operations again, as was experienced in 2000, and forced staff to take a 1/3 pay cut to enable continued operations.

Mine Ban Policy

The cabinet of Afghanistan’s transitional government approved the country’s accession to the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 July 2002, and the following day the Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the instrument of accession on behalf of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan. According to Foreign Minister Abdullah, the cabinet’s action is all that is necessary for joining the treaty in the absence of an Afghan Parliament.38 The instrument of accession is expected to be officially deposited at the United Nations in the near future.

The approval of accession came during Afghanistan’s first international conference on antipersonnel mines, “Building a Peaceful Future for Afghanistan: A Total Ban on Antipersonnel Mines,” organized by the government, the United Nations, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines, held in Kabul 28-31 July 2002.

Hamid Karzai, while chairman of the Afghanistan interim administration, had on several occasions publicly expressed its support for a total ban on mines. In a statement to the International

29 Danish Demining Group (DDG) email to Landmine Monitor/Norwegian Peoples Aid, 29 July 2002.
36 “French Soldiers Destroy 70,000 mines found at Kabul Airport,” Associated Press (Kabul), 6 February 2002.
Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo in January 2002, Karzai said, “We are committing ourselves to signing the Ottawa Anti-Landmine Treaty.” He stressed, “Also critical will be the acceleration of the mine clearing program. Our citizens are falling victim to them daily.”

Prior to September 2001, Taliban authorities imposed a national ban on mines by issuing a decree in October 1998. The head of the Northern Alliance told the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL) in May 2001 that the Northern Alliance was not using antipersonnel mines. However, reports of continued use of mines at the frontlines persisted, and the two sides accused each other of ongoing use.

**Production, Transfer and Stockpiling**

There is no evidence of antipersonnel mine production in Afghanistan. The Taliban stated in 1998 that they had denounced the import and export of mines and claimed not to maintain stockpiles. Subsequent use of mines indicates stockpiles in fact existed.

In previous years, the Taliban accused Russia and Iran of supplying mines to the Northern Alliance/United Front. In 2002, mine clearance organizations have reported finding Iranian-manufactured YM1 and YM1-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 1999 and 2000, on recently abandoned Northern Alliance front lines.

Iran had declared a moratorium on export of antipersonnel mines in 1997.

**Use**

Most of the landmines in Afghanistan were emplaced during the Soviet occupation and the subsequent communist regime between 1980 and 1992. Landmines were also used in the internal fighting among various armed groups after 1992, particularly in Kabul city and its outskirts. The Taliban claimed to have stopped use in 1998, though some allegations persisted. The Northern Alliance admitted to use in 1999 and 2000, but said it stopped in 2001, despite evidence to the contrary.

In the fighting following 11 September 2001, there were reports of limited use of mines and booby-traps by Northern Alliance, Taliban, and Al-Qaeda fighters. The mines were reportedly used mainly in areas near the front lines where Northern Alliance and Taliban forces faced each other close to Kabul, and at airports under Northern Alliance, Taliban, or Al-Qaeda control. In January 2002, an official from the UN MAPA told Mine Ban Treaty State Parties of “new mining by Taliban in new front lines post Sept. 11.” However, the general perception is that mines were used in very limited areas, because of the rapid changes during the fighting.

There is no evidence of coalition forces using mines during their operations.

**Landmine Problem**

The interim administration has identified mine action as a priority area for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Even before the latest conflict, the full extent of the landmine and unexploded ordnance problem in Afghanistan was not determined. In addition, there is limited information

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42 Information provided to Landmine Monitor and ICBL by HALO and DDG, July 2002.
available thus far about the UXO contamination caused by the ground battles and aerial bombing (especially of ammunition storage facilities) during the recent military activities.\(^{46}\)

Despite continued progress made by MAPA and its implementing partners over the past decade, Afghanistan is still believed to be one of the most severely mine- and UXO-affected countries in the world. MAPA continues to discover, at a rate of 12 to 14 million square meters per year, areas that were mined years ago, but remained inaccessible due to armed conflict.\(^{47}\) Notably, until recently, there was no access to 100 million square meters of former Northern Alliance front lines.\(^{48}\)

The known mine/UXO contaminated area is estimated to total approximately 737 million square meters of land in 206 districts of 28 provinces. Of this, some 360 million square meters are classified as high priority land for clearance. The areas affected include vitally important agricultural land, irrigations systems, residential areas, grazing land, and roads. Priority areas include those where there is a high risk of accident, high repatriation, and the area is vital to meet the basic needs of villagers.

### Known Landmine Problem in Afghanistan (as of December 2001)\(^{49}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Residential</th>
<th>Irrigation</th>
<th>Road</th>
<th>Grazing</th>
<th>Total Area (Square meters)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total mined area cleared</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(All high priority)</td>
<td>98,022,000</td>
<td>29,185,000</td>
<td>8,414,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>74,175,000</td>
<td>239,618,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High priority area remaining to be cleared</td>
<td>162,618,000</td>
<td>16,058,000</td>
<td>3,090,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>143,699,000</td>
<td>360,011,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low priority area remaining to be cleared</td>
<td>26,029,000</td>
<td>126,000</td>
<td>582,000</td>
<td>7,135,000</td>
<td>343,416,000</td>
<td>377,288,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total mined area remaining to be cleared</td>
<td>188,647,000</td>
<td>16,184,000</td>
<td>3,672,000</td>
<td>41,673,000</td>
<td>487,115,000</td>
<td>737,299,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Survey and Assessment

Landmine surveys are an ongoing process in Afghanistan. The first “Afghanistan Mines Survey” was conducted by MAG in 1990, and published in February 1991, with funding from the Norwegian Committee for Afghanistan, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, and Austrian Relief Committee for Afghan Refugees. A Level One General Impact Survey was conducted in 1993 and is regularly updated. Level Two Technical Surveys are undertaken where clearance operations are planned within a period of less than one year. A socio-economic survey of landmines and mine action operations is also being integrated into the survey component of MAPA.

As of December 2001, general survey of approximately 803 million square meters of landmine- and UXO-contaminated areas had been completed since the start of survey operations in 1990.\(^{50}\) In addition, a technical survey of about 311.5 million square meters of minefields and more than 429 million square meters of former battle areas had been completed.\(^{51}\) The Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) and HALO are the two organizations that undertake various survey activities in Afghanistan. Survey data from MCPA is used by all clearance agencies except HALO, which conducts survey operations for its own clearance teams.

Survey data is currently being integrated into the newly established Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).\(^{52}\) The UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan headquarters

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\(^{46}\) Interview with Noel Spencer, Technical/Training Advisor MAPA, Islamabad, 24 January 2002.


\(^{48}\) Philip Patterson, Presentation by the MAPA to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, 30 January 2002.


\(^{50}\) MAPA database GIS information for December 2001.


\(^{52}\) Email from MAPA to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 25 June 2002.
and regional staff have been trained on the IMSMA. Software has been installed to enable improved collection, collation, and analysis of mine information at the national and regional level. The transfer of existing data from MAPA’s Management Information System mine action database to the IMSMA is being done with technical assistance of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). This task will be done in several stages and it is estimated that it will take about 12 months.53

A full Landmine Impact Survey, with technical support and oversight from the Survey Action Center, is scheduled to begin in September 2002.54 This will provide a clearer picture of the socio-economic problems caused by mines and UXO and significantly strengthen the priority setting and planning capacity of the MACA. This survey will be a retrofit of existing data, building on that which currently exists, augmenting these resources to complete the data sets currently available. This process, linked with the IMSMA, will provide an effective tool for the MACA and the Afghan Interim Administration to direct mine action activities at the national level.55 The European Commission will provide funding for the project.56

Additionally, in an attempt to obtain a quick picture of the landmine/UXO contamination resulting from the coalition military intervention in Afghanistan, a Post-Conflict Contamination Assessment will be undertaken by MCPA in all areas affected by the latest military activities. The assessment was scheduled to start in March 2002 and last for three to four months. Funding for the project was secured through the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF).57

Landmine survey in Afghanistan was significantly hindered by the events following 11 September 2001. A total of 14,739,089 square meters of minefields and 80,889,272 square meters of former battlefield area were surveyed in 2001. Of that, over 99 percent of minefield surveys and over 95 percent of battlefield surveys were done prior to 11 September 2001. By March 2002, the survey rate had increased to a level comparable to the pre-11 September 2001 figures, with 21,685,463 square meters accomplished in the first three months of 2002. All known and accessible cluster munitions strike sites have been surveyed and are being cleared.58

Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA). MCPA employs 309 people and conducts survey operations throughout Afghanistan, with its head office in Kabul and offices in Gardez, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Herat. Mine detection dogs from the Mine Detection Dog Center support MCPA technical survey teams. Each MCPA survey team consists of four surveyors and a team leader, with one surveyor or team leader trained in first aid. In 2001, MCPA operated with 31 survey teams and identified, marked and mapped about 10.8 million square meters of mine-contaminated area and about 5.5 million square meters of former battle area contaminated by UXO. MCPA is also involved in the development and maintenance of a comprehensive computerized management information system for MAPA. It also serves as the coordinating agency for the Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines.

HALO Trust. In addition to clearance, HALO undertakes survey operations for its own clearance teams in the central and northern provinces of Afghanistan. HALO has 13 technical survey teams each with 10 men, and eight general survey teams with four men in each. HALO survey teams use mine detecting dogs, but receive support from mechanical assets including area reduction rollers. In 2001, HALO operated with five survey teams and identified, marked and mapped approximately 3 million square meters of mine-contaminated area and about 71 million square meters of former battle area contaminated by UXO.59

53 Interview with Marc Yarmoshuk, GICHD, Islamabad, 23 January 2002.
54 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from SAC, 24 July 2002.
55 Email from MAPA to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 25 June 2002.
56 Interview with Philip Paterson, Deputy Program Manager, MAPA, Islamabad 23 January 2002.
57 Ibid.
58 Email from MAPA to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 25 June 2002.
59 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tom Dibb, Central Asia Desk, HALO, 19 July 2002.
Mine Action Coordination and Planning

In order to address the new realities impacting the landmine problem in Afghanistan, the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan has drafted a new strategic mine action plan. This will presumably supplant the plans which guided mine action in Afghanistan for many years. According to the new draft plan, Afghanistan could become a landmine-impact-free country in a period of 7-10 years at an estimated cost of $700 million. Donors and the Afghan Interim Administration have been briefed and the plan continues to be updated as the situation changes. This plan is based on the past years’ studies, experience, and outcomes. It recommends that priority should be given to the clearance of land that will immediately be put back into productive use when it is cleared of mines and UXO. Among land types, irrigation systems and roads receive top priority, because they generate highest net socio-economic benefits. Clearance of productive agricultural land is also of high priority. The program will concentrate on: advocacy against the use of landmines and for expansion of mine/UXO clearance; advocacy and training in explosive ordnance disposal; expanded mine risk education initiatives inside Afghanistan; surveying of the contaminated areas; and, clearance of minefields and former battlefields.

In the post-11 September period, mine action has been recognized as a stand-alone sector within the Relief, Recovery and Reconstruction response of the UN, and the MACA has been designated the lead agency (Program Secretariat) in this regard. A coordinated work plan for all mine action activities for the remainder of 2002 was under finalization as of June. MACA has outlined expansion plans and budgets to all implementing NGOs, with integrated procurement of necessary equipment for tasks during the remainder of the period.

MACA is being strengthened to enable better service provision to the national implementing partners and the Afghan Interim Administration. This involves recruitment of additional Afghan staff into key administrative, logistics and financial positions, along with appropriate skills transfer. Approximately 15 additional expatriate staff have joined MAPA as short-term technical advisors to do skills transfer with Afghan staff since 11 September 2001. These advisors have stayed from two to six months. Only one staff member has been seconded full-time by a government with one more due to arrive in July 2002 and additional short-term assistance also being provided by a number of states.

Support to the Afghan administration is also being strengthened through the provision of support to government infrastructure and skills transfer to the identified counterpart organization. This is the Office of Disaster Preparedness/Department of Mine Clearance, which has the lead role within the Afghan government for coordination of the national mine action response. This body is being assisted by both the MACA and UNDP to ensure that it is able to steadily increase its role in the mine action activities underway throughout the country. Close relationships also exist with other relevant ministries, and partnership agreements have been signed with the government to ensure closer cooperation.

MACA and implementing NGOs have moved their head offices from Pakistan and established headquarters within Afghanistan. All five Regional Mine Action Centers are now operating: Central Region (Kabul), Southern Region (Kandahar), Eastern Region (Jalalabad), Northern Region (Mazar) and Western Region (Herat). New regional sub-offices will also be established in Bamyan, Gardez and Kunduz in order to respond to a new UN eight-area structure.
Both the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and coalition forces are coordinating with the MACA. ISAF assigned a liaison officer to work in MACA in Kabul and ISAF capabilities have also been used by the MACA to carry out specialized tasks where possible.\textsuperscript{66} MAPA liaison with the Coalition is mainly through weekly meetings with the Coalition Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) in Kabul.

The process of transferring the responsibility for the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan from the former UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), with the UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) as the implementing agency, was to be completed by 1 June 2002.\textsuperscript{67}

**Mine Action Funding**

Funding of mine action operations has been primarily through the Afghan Emergency Trust Fund (AETF) under the auspices of UNOCHA. Some donors have also provided direct funding to some NGOs and some donors provide in-kind contributions. UN funding is now directed through the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, managed by the UN Mine Action Service. Funding requests for the MAPA are included in the annual consolidated funding appeal for the United Nations programs in Afghanistan and the UN Portfolio of Mine Related Projects.

MAPA received approximately $193 million in funds from 1991 through August 2001. In mid-2001, MAPA was considering reduction of its operational capacity due to funding constraints, as it had received only $13 million of its $20 million budget. This was overtaken by events when mine action operations were suspended in September 2001.

The following table summarizes funding for mine action in Afghanistan from 1991 through August 2001.

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{67} UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “OCHA Afghanistan Brief,” 2 May 2002.
## Funds received by MAPA from 1991 through August 2001 (all figures in US$) 68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Balance brought forward from last year</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4,817,433</td>
<td>3,890,841</td>
<td>2,749,931</td>
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<td>16,667</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>127,992</td>
<td>200,000</td>
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There has been greatly increased interest in mine action activities in Afghanistan since the Taliban regime collapsed and the new interim administration took over in December 2001. MAPA developed a new budget of $61 million dollars for the period October 2001 to December 2002. 69 The total amount of funding pledged and contributed to mine action between October 2001 and June 2002 is $66,433,770. Most notable is Japan’s contribution of $18.2 million, which has allowed for replacement of much of the damaged and destroyed equipment that was lost since September 2001.70

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69 Email from MAPA to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 25 June 2002.
70 The Japanese government reports this as a pledge of $19.22 million, including $18.22 million to the UN and $1 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
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Mine Clearance

There are nine organizations involved in mine and UXO clearance operations in Afghanistan. During the military interventions in Afghanistan, all of these organizations had to relocate their offices, with the majority moving to Pakistan and the remainder to several other neighboring countries. By February 2002, most had returned to their respective locations. The coalition forces have also conducted some landmine/UXO clearance operations in some areas where they have set up bases and camps.

From 1990 to 2001, over 239.6 million square meters of mined areas and approximately 401 million square meters of former battle areas were cleared of mines and UXO. During these operations, 230,077 antipersonnel mines, 10,194 antivehicle mines, and 1,571,260 UXO were detected and destroyed. The areas cleared of mines/UXO were all high-priority clearance, requested by individuals, groups, local authorities, and organizations involved in humanitarian programs in Afghanistan (a breakdown of areas cleared is given under the Landmine Problem section above).

In 2001, organizations cleared 15,645,634 square meters of mined area and 81,297,888 square meters of former battle areas. A total of 16,147 antipersonnel mines, 1,154 antivehicle mines, and 328,398 UXO were destroyed during clearance operations. As with landmine survey operations, the rate of mine clearance in 2001 dropped dramatically in the months following 11 September 2001. More than 99 percent of minefield clearance and more than 95 percent of battlefield clearance took place prior to 11 September 2001. Between September 2001 and December 2001, 13,100 square meters of minefield and 244,000 square meters of former battlefields were cleared.

In the first quarter of 2002, as mine clearance operations reconstituted and re-commenced, a total of 4,000,514 square meters of minefields and 19,825,097 square meters of battlefield areas were cleared. During this period, 16,196 antipersonnel mines, 751 antivehicle mines, and 251,169 UXO were cleared and destroyed.

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71 Email from MAPA to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 25 June 2002.
73 Email from MAPA to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 25 June 2002.
74 Ibid.
On-going security constraints in conflict zones have prohibited the re-establishment of operations in some areas. In order to address needs in high priority areas, these security constraints are being closely monitored. Based on recent assessment missions to Paktia and Paktika provinces, as well as the Tora Bora region, clearance and survey capacity is being re-established in those priority areas.

The clearance of BLU-97 cluster bomblets has been a high priority activity in all regions and new procedures have been put in place to address this new post-September 2001 threat. Clearance of cluster munitions is also being achieved at a rate faster than anticipated.\(^\text{76}\)

**Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC).** ATC has more than 1,300 employees. In 2001, manual and mechanical teams of ATC carried out landmine/UXO clearance operations in central, southern and western regions of Afghanistan, covering the provinces of Kabul, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Laghman, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Kandahar, Zabul, Gelmand, Nimroz, Farah, and Herat. The 21 Manual Clearance Teams, four Mechanical Excavation Teams, and four Explosive Ordnance Teams of ATC cleared 2.5 million square meters of minefields, and 11.5 million square meters of former battlefields.

During these clearance operations, ATC destroyed 2,508 antipersonnel mines, 37 antivehicle mines, and 134,828 UXO in 22 provinces of Afghanistan.\(^\text{77}\) ATC activity was suspended on 12 September 2001, and ATC partially resumed its landmine/UXO clearance operations in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Herat in late November and early December. Four employees of ATC were killed when the ATC office compound in Kabul was destroyed in a coalition air strike. In addition, ATC equipment worth $400,000 was damaged or looted during the recent military activities in Afghanistan.\(^\text{78}\)

**Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan (AREA).** One of the AREA’s projects is community-based mine clearance in Sorkhrod and in the Khogiani districts of Nangarhar province in the eastern part of the country. AREA employs 114 people, in three demining teams. In 2001, AREA cleared 186,691 square meters of mine-contaminated area and destroyed 27 antipersonnel mines, 2 antivehicle mines, and 146 UXO.\(^\text{79}\)

**Danish Demining Group (DDG).** DDG operates in the Central and Eastern regions of Afghanistan with the head office in Kabul, a field office in Jalalabad, and a logistical rear office in Islamabad. By the end of 2001, DDG had three manual mine clearance teams as well as 12 quick response teams in Afghanistan. In 2001, DDG’s staff increased from 108 to 193 employees. The program is financed through DANIDA, SIDA, EU, and ECHO.

In 2001, DDG cleared approximately 136,294 square meters of mined area and 895,289 square meters of former battlefield area. During these clearance operations, DDG teams destroyed 163 antipersonnel mines, 13 antivehicle mines, and 5,533 UXO.\(^\text{80}\) DDG’s budget for 2001 was approximately $863,317. ECHO provided an additional $295,950 for the EOD teams. DDG did not suffer any losses/damage to its equipment or staff in recent military activities in Afghanistan.\(^\text{81}\)

By June 2002, DDG had cleared 14,088,911 square meters of battlefield and strike areas, disposing of 74,221 items UXO. A total of 16,353 square meters of mined land had been cleared of 68 antipersonnel mines and 7 antivehicle mines. The total budget for 2002 is approximately $4.5 million.\(^\text{82}\)

**Demining Agency For Afghanistan (DAFA).** DAFA conducts mine clearance mainly in the southern and western regions of the country, with its head office located in Kandahar. It

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\(^\text{76}\) Email from MAPA to Landmine Monitor/HRW, 25 June 2002.

\(^\text{77}\) MAPA Database, Clearance reports by Agency from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001.

\(^\text{78}\) Email from ATC, 20 January 2002.

\(^\text{79}\) MAPA Database, Clearance reports by Agency from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001.

\(^\text{80}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{81}\) Response by fax from DDG, 23 January 2002.

\(^\text{82}\) Unless otherwise noted, all information on DDG activities from email to Landmine Monitor/Norwegian People’s Aid, 29 July 2002.
employs about 658 people with a 2001 budget of $3.9 million. In 2001, DAFA operated with 11 manual clearance teams, four battle area clearance teams, and three mechanical mine clearance teams, clearing about 1.148 million square meters of mine-contaminated area and 3.3 million square meters of former battlefield area. During these clearance operations, 267 antipersonnel mines, 94 antivehicle mines, and 11,069 UXO were destroyed. DAFA states that it suffered damage/loss of equipment worth $5-6 million dollars during the recent military operations in Afghanistan.

HALO Trust. HALO has been operational in Afghanistan since 1988 and works mainly in northern and central regions of the country, coordinating its activities with MACA. HALO employs more than 1,800 people. In 2001, HALO operated with 31 manual clearance teams (682 demining lanes), five battle area clearance/EOD teams with ten members each, and 11 mechanical mine clearance teams with eight members each, and five survey teams with ten members each. In 2001, HALO cleared 3.230 million square meters of mined areas and 69.3 million square meters of former battle area contaminated by UXO, destroying 14,478 antipersonnel mines, 713 antivehicle mines, and 132,693 UXO. HALO’s budget for 2001 was approximately $3.25 million dollars. Its main donors were the U.S., ECHO, the Netherlands, and an unnamed private donor. In addition to clearance, HALO undertakes survey activities.

In 2002, HALO has close to 1,900 Afghan staff in 43 manual demining teams, 10 mechanical clearance teams, 18 battle area clearance teams, eight general survey teams, 13 technical survey teams, and eight mine risk education teams. These teams are clearing villages in Northern and Central Regions in direct support of the tens of thousands of returning refugees and IDPs. The U.S., the Netherlands, European Commission and ECHO, AAR Japan, and Germany are providing funding for HALO activities in Afghanistan in 2002.

Mine Detection Dog Center (MDC). MDC conducts mine and UXO clearance throughout Afghanistan, with its head office in Kabul and offices in Gardez, Kandahar, Jalalabad, and Herat. MDC employs 732 people. In 2001, MDC operated with 17 mine dog groups and provided 33 mine dog sets to MCPA to support its survey operations. In 2001, MDC cleared more than 6.145 million square meters of mine/UXO-contaminated area, destroying 75 antipersonnel mines, 146 antivehicle mines, and 895 UXO. Equipment worth $600,000 was damaged or lost during the recent military operations in Afghanistan. In addition, a bomb from a coalition air strike in Kabul accidentally killed two of MDC’s mine detection dogs. MDC’s budget for 2000 was $4.6 million. However, due to funding shortages, it only received approximately $2.5 million.

Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). OMAR conducts mine and UXO clearance and mine awareness in various parts of the country, with its head office recently relocated from Peshawar to Kabul and offices in Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat. OMAR has 645 employees, with 550 involved in mine clearance and 95 in mine awareness education. It also runs primary education, health care, and rehabilitation projects with a separate staff and budget. In 2001, OMAR operated with ten manual clearance teams, four battle area clearance teams, and three mechanical mine clearance teams, clearing more than 1.9 million square meters of mine contaminated area. During these clearance operations, 1,526 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine, and 1,727 UXO were destroyed.

OMAR requested technical support and training assistance from the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) a British NGO. During April-May 2002, funded by NOVIB, MAG provided OMAR’s national mine and UXO clearance staff with training to EOD Class 2. As per new training

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83 Telephone interview with Abdul Sattar, Director DAFA, 22 January 2001; and response by fax from DAFA, 23 January 2002.
84 MAPA Database, Clearance reports by Agency from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001.
86 Unless otherwise noted, information updated by email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tom Dibb, HALO, 19 July 2002.
87 MAPA Database, Clearance reports by Agency from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001.
88 Interview with Mr. Obaidullah, MDC and HADAF Newsletter of MDC, Volume 6, January 2002, p. 2.
requirements set out by MACA, once the staff have six months field experience at Class 2, they will attend Class 1 training.\(^{90}\) OMAR has requested that MAG provide a full-time training and supervision capacity through 2003. This supervision is now required by the new MAPA training requirement.\(^{91}\)

**Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA).** While MCPA is primarily engaged in survey, it also undertakes clearance as part of the two-meter minefield boundary clearance and reduction of suspected mined areas. In 2001, MCPA identified, marked, mapped, and recorded 10.85 million square meters of minefield and 5.5 million square meters of former battlefield. During the survey operation, survey teams reduced/cleared about 663,000 square meters of mine-contaminated area. As part of special tasks, MCPA also cleared an area of 119,730 square meters in 2001. During these operations MCPA teams destroyed 32 antipersonnel mines, 31 antivehicle mines, and 146 UXO. Reduction of suspected mined area during the survey process is an important element of the technical survey, as it saves significant mine clearance resources.\(^{92}\)

**Monitoring, Evaluation and Training Agency (META).** META is responsible for monitoring and evaluating mine action operations in the field, training mine action staff, and reporting to MAPA. It has 74 employees. In 2001, META conducted 150 demining-related training courses attended by approximately 3,500 mine action personnel. In addition, META conducted four middle management training courses attended by 80 staff members from various demining organizations. This included one middle management training course conducted in collaboration with Cranfield University.\(^{93}\)

**Mine Risk Education**

Mine risk education is carried out throughout Afghanistan and for returning refugees in Pakistan and Iran. The major aim is to reduce accidents, injuries and deaths caused by mines and other explosive devices through educating people on identification and avoidance of risk in a contaminated area. Planning is based on civilian mine accident data from hospitals reported by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), World Health Organization (WHO), and Handicap International Belgium, and on requests from local organizations. The mine risk education program in Afghanistan currently consists of 150 mine risk education trainers and approximately 2,000 community volunteers. Each NGO implements its activities using a number of different approaches to presenting a core set of information.\(^{94}\)

In the year 2001, 729,318 civilians received mine awareness education in various parts of the country.\(^{95}\) In the first quarter of 2002 (January to March), mine risk education training was provided to 140,873 civilians.\(^{96}\) Implementing partners of MAPA provided mine awareness education to more than 7.3 million people from 1990 to 2001.

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\(^{90}\) In Afghanistan, Class 1 is the disposal of all calibers of ammunition including aircraft bombs and guided weapons. Class 2 is for the disposal of UXO between 85mm and 160mm.

\(^{91}\) Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, MAG Director for Policy, 26 July 2002.

\(^{92}\) Information obtained from MAPA’s Data section, 6 March 2002.

\(^{93}\) Response letter from META, 11 January 2002.


\(^{96}\) Email from MAPA to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 25 June 2002.
Mine Risk Education Report from 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2001

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The NGOs engaged in mine risk education include:

**Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS).** Four mine awareness teams and two quick mine awareness response teams of the ARCS have been conducting mine risk education training in Kabul, Wardak and Parwan provinces. It has 13 employees. In 2001, ARCS provided mine awareness training to 43,135 people in 579 villages, with funding provided by the ICRC.

**Ansar Relief Institute (ARI).** In 2001, this Iran (Mashad)-based organization provided mine risk education training to approximately 9,014 returning Afghan refugees. It has 41 employees. The training was mainly conducted at the UNHCR encashment centers and five border crossing points.

**Association for Aid and Relief (AAR) Japan.** AAR-Japan runs three mine risk education teams in Kabul, Parwan, and Takhar provinces in cooperation with HALO.

**BBC Afghan Education Project (BBC/AEP).** BBC/AEP disseminates mine risk education messages through its popular radio drama series “New Home, New Life” and in the illustrated magazine that accompanies the program. The series is broadcast on the Pashto and Persian services of the BBC World Service three days a week, as well as from the Peshawar center of Radio Pakistan.

**Handicap International Belgium (HIB).** The community-based mine risk education activities of HIB are mainly concentrated in the southern region and Farah province of western region. HIB has 41 employees. In 2000, 31 HIB field staff and a network of 1,100 volunteers provided community based awareness training to more than 259,000 people. In November 2000, HIB conducted a survey in central province of Ghazni to assess mine risk education needs and as a result of the survey, mine risk education activities in eight districts of this province started in February 2001. HIB also collected more than 600 reports of UXO, as an integrated activity to mine awareness, and provided them to RMAC Kandahar for necessary action. HIB’s budget for 2001 was about $280,000. Main donors included European Union, Australia, Christian Aid, and Handicap International.

**Organization for Mine Awareness and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR).** In 2001, OMAR provided mine risk education training to more than 275,000 people in various parts of the country. It has 95 mine awareness staff. OMAR distributed mine risk education materials including notebooks, posters, silk-screens, identification books and storybooks, which were designed to assist

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98 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from ICRC Legal Adviser, 8 August 2002.
99 Email from Yukie Osa, AAR-Japan, 1 March 2002.
100 Email from Pascal Rigaldies, Afghanistan Desk Officer, Handicap International Belgium, 16 July 2001.
people who have received training to subsequently provide information and education to friends and family members.

**Save the Children Fund-US (SCF-US).** SCF-US continued its Landmine Education Project (LEP) in hospitals, clinics, mosques, and Kuchi settlements in Kabul and in the surrounding districts of Paghman, Khaki Jabar, and Sarobi. It employs 72 people. In the year 2001, SCF-US provided mine risk education to 29,130 people through its field staff and a network of about 400 volunteers.

**Afghan Campaign to Ban Landmines (ACBL).** In 2001, ACBL conducted a series of activities to promote the landmine ban campaign in Afghanistan and in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. About 28,340 signatures in favor of banning landmines were collected. Five newsletters were published and distributed in various languages, as were calendars and notebooks with ban messages. The ACBL sent three letters to U.S. President Bush, from Afghan youth, landmines victims, and mothers of landmine victims. Letters were also sent to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and to Hamid Karzai, the head of the Interim Government of Afghanistan, requesting them to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. An ACBL information center was opened in Kabul University library.

**Landmine Casualties**

The collection of comprehensive landmine casualty data in Afghanistan remains problematic, due in part to transportation constraints and the time needed to centralize all the information. Nevertheless, data is available on reported landmine casualties, giving an indication of the extent of the problem. However, it is believed that approximately 50 percent of mine victims die before reaching a medical facility so are unlikely to be reported.

As of February 2002, the ICRC had identified 1,218 new landmine/UXO casualties throughout Afghanistan in 2001; this was later updated to 1,348 new casualties as additional information became available. The ICRC data does not include casualties who died before reaching medical assistance; consequently, only 5.1 percent of the recorded casualties were deaths, or 62 people, which was a similar fatality rate to that recorded by the ICRC in 2000.

Of the initial 1,218 casualties recorded, 638 (52.3 percent) were children under the age of 18. Men and boys accounted for 1,115 (91.5 percent) of the total casualties, while 6 percent were girls under 18 years of age, and only 2.4 percent were women. In Afghan society, the active labor force is predominantly male, and women are not very involved in outdoor activities. A total of 65.5 percent of the people injured were tending animals, farming, traveling, collecting wood/water/firewood, and other productive activities at the time of the incident.

Of the 1,218 casualties, the type of device causing the incident was identified for 1,110: landmines 472 casualties, UXO 476 casualties; antivehicle mines 35 casualties; booby-traps 14 casualties; fuses 50 casualties; and cluster munitions 63 casualties. Of the 63 cluster munition casualties, 48 occurred between October and December 2001.

In 2000, the ICRC recorded 1,114 mine and UXO casualties throughout Afghanistan, while MAPA recorded 1,003 casualties.

In the period January to June 2002, the ICRC has collected data on 658 new landmine/UXO casualties in Afghanistan, of which 91.9% are civilians. Of the total casualties reported, 5.9 percent (about 39) were killed, and almost half of the reported casualties, 323, were children. Antipersonnel landmines were responsible for 31.8 percent of the casualties.

As of June 2002, the ICRC database contained information on 5,168 mine/UXO casualties between March 1998 and June 2002, plus more than 1,500 casualties recorded of people injured

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102 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from ICRC Legal Adviser, 8 August 2002.
between 1980 and 1998. Data collection in an on-going process and statistics are continually updated as casualties, both new and from previous periods, are identified.

MAPA receives data on new casualties from the ICRC, Handicap International Belgium, and Save the Children Fund-U.S. In 2001, 928 mine/UXO casualties were recorded in the MAPA database: 64 people were killed, 300 required an amputation, and 564 received other injuries. Of the 928 casualties, 848 were male and 80 female. Casualty data was collected in the provinces of Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Nangarhar, Takhar, and Baghlan. Data gathering activities were restricted after the events of 11 September 2001. MAPA receives 80 to 90 percent of its data from the ICRC. In addition, for the period January to 11 September 2001, Handicap International Belgium collected data on 161 new mine/UXO casualties, which were transmitted to MAPA. The discrepancy in casualties recorded in 2001 may be caused by a time delay in recording available data.

Initially, the ICRC was only collecting casualty data from 36 ICRC supported health facilities in the Kabul region. However, in order to better understand the mine problem, data collection was expanded to over 300 health facilities with the support of several organizations, including the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), Afghan Red Crescent Society, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Aide Medicale International, Healthnet, Ibn Sina, Mercy Committee International, Afghan Health and Development Services, Norwegian Afghanistan Committee, and Swedish Committee for Afghanistan.

Since January 2002, the ICRC has initiated community-based data gathering in all mine-affected areas of Afghanistan, except the Kandahar region where Handicap International Belgium has been involved in community-based data collection since 1998. Using a 10-person team the ICRC Mine Data Collection Program includes: interviewing mine/UXO casualties in hospitals and clinics; providing training on mine victim data collection; managing the database; producing statistics and analytical reports; preparing/collection of reports about suspected minefields; and cooperation and coordination with other mine action organizations.

In 2001, as of August, six deminers/surveyors had been injured during demining operations. MAPA’s record of demining accidents indicates that from 1990 to August 2001, 59 deminers/surveyors were killed and 552 injured during mine clearance operations. In December 2001, one deminer working with HALO was killed and three injured in an accident while clearing a Taliban ammunition dump hit by a coalition air strike.

In 2002, foreign nationals in Afghanistan have been killed and injured while engaged in mine or UXO clearance and disposal. In March, three Danish and two German peacekeeping soldiers were killed and another eight injured while destroying missiles at a munitions dump in Kabul. In April, four U.S. EOD soldiers were killed and one injured in an explosion that may have been caused by a booby-trap. In an early accident in February, the commander of the unit was injured after stepping on a fuze. And in May 2002, a Bosnian demining specialist lost a foot after stepping an antipersonnel mine.

Since the U.S.-led ground war in Afghanistan, several soldiers have been killed or injured in landmine incidents. In December 2001, four U.S. soldiers and one British soldier were injured; two...
of the victims had a foot amputated.\footnote{Doug Mellgren, “U.S. Marine Loses Foot in Blast,” \textit{Associated Press}, 17 December 2001; and “Second U.S. Serviceman Loses Foot in Mine Blast,” \textit{Reuters}, 19 December 2001.} Between January and March 2002, one Australian soldier was killed and another injured, while one U.S. soldier was killed and three injured, in landmine incidents.\footnote{“First Australian Soldier Killed in Afghanistan,” \textit{Reuters}, 16 February 2002; Mark Forbes, “SAS destroys weapons stashes,” \textit{The Age}, 23 January 2002; “American soldier killed in Afghan land mine blast,” \textit{CBC}, 28 March 2002; and “U.S. Soldier Injured by Land mine in Afghanistan,” \textit{Reuters}, 12 February 2002.} There are also reports of Afghan soldiers fighting with coalition forces falling victim to landmines. In March 2002, two Afghan soldiers were killed and another two injured in a mine blast,\footnote{John O’Callaghan, “Afghan Soldiers Killed by Landmine, Grenade,” \textit{Reuters}, 10 April 2002.} and in April another Afghan soldier was killed when his vehicle hit a mine near Kandahar.\footnote{See also \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2001}, pp. 514-517.}


Decades of conflict have had a severe impact on health care in Afghanistan: the health infrastructure was damaged or destroyed; health care workers disappeared without being replaced, while at the same time the demand for care increased. Afghanistan has 17 national, 9 regional, 34 provincial and 41 district hospitals, along with a network of 365 basic health care centers and 357 health posts. However, of the available 8,333 hospital beds, 50 percent are in the capital, Kabul; 20 percent of districts have no health care facilities.\footnote{WHO health update Afghanistan, 5 April 2002, at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/0405hcaid.htm (accessed 21 June 2002).} According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 65 percent of Afghans do not have access to health facilities.\footnote{Theo Verhoeff, Director of Physical Rehabilitation Programs, ICRC, address to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 29 January 2002.} As previously reported, it is believed that as many as 50 percent of mine victims die before reaching a medical facility due to the lack of emergency medical care or an adequate evacuation/transport system to a suitably equipped health facility. In many mine-affected areas no regular ambulance service exists and the roads are in poor condition or non-existent. It has been reported that sometimes casualties are transported by donkey or pack mule.\footnote{WHO, \textit{Reconstruction of the Afghanistan Health Sector}, 2002, pp. 8-9.} According to the WHO, one of the priorities in Afghanistan should be establishing and strengthening of emergency health services with the appropriate geographic coverage.\footnote{Theo Verhoeff, ICRC, address to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, 29 January 2002.}

In 2001, the ICRC supported up to sixteen first aid posts and clinics with supplies, and more than 25 hospitals were regularly supplied with surgical materials. In addition, the ICRC has been providing surgical training in emergency techniques to Afghan surgeons for nearly ten years.\footnote{“More than 50 MSF international aid workers inside Afghanistan,” http://www.msf.org (accessed 21 June 2002); see also “Regional Update: September 25, 2001, MSF Programs in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran,” http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/news/2001/aip_09-2001.shtml (accessed 21 June 2002).} Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) provides essential medical aid in Afghanistan, with a team of more than 50 expatriate staff and over 400 Afghan staff working from Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Taloqan, Kabul, Faizabad and Jalalabad. MSF’s program supports emergency interventions, surgical care, general health care, and safe blood transfusions in several hospitals and health clinics throughout Afghanistan.\footnote{WHO update Afghanistan, 5 April 2002, at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/sasia/afghan/text/0405hcaid.htm (accessed 21 June 2002).}

The Italian NGO Emergency has operated surgical centers in Anabah since 1999 and Kabul since April 2001, providing emergency medical care, surgery, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social reintegration programs for victims of war, including mine victims. In 2001, the
Anabah Center provided assistance to 1,106 surgical patients, of which 87 were landmine victims. In Kabul, activities were suspended from 17 May to the beginning of November. Since November 2001, 242 surgical patients were assisted, of which 33 were mine victims.

It has been estimated that 4 percent of the Afghan population is disabled as a result of landmines and UXO, armed conflict, accident or illness. Only 60 out of 330 districts have rehabilitation or socioeconomic reintegration facilities for the disabled and even in those districts the needs are only partially met. National and international NGOs and agencies play an important role in the delivery of assistance to disabled persons including landmine survivors in Afghanistan. Prior to 11 September, approximately 26 organizations and NGOs provided assistance to disabled persons. However, only six of these organizations were actively and directly involved in providing various types of assistance to disabled persons, including landmine survivors.

The Comprehensive Disabled Afghans’ Program (UNOPS/CDAP) operates a community-based rehabilitation program that reaches about 25,000 disabled persons a year, including landmine survivors, in almost 45 urban and rural districts of Afghanistan. UNOPS/CDAP’s main area of work includes orthopedic services, physiotherapy, employment support, home-based therapy, and special and primary education. In 2001, approximately 400 paid staff and a network of approximately 1,000 community volunteers were engaged in the program. UNOPS/CDAP’s budget for 2001 was about $1.2 million and the main donors were UNDP, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Japan, and the United Kingdom. In 2002, CDAP is working with the new Afghan government through the Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled with the aim of building national capacity in the field of disability and the establishment of a national coordination mechanism.

The ICRC operates prosthetic/orthotic centers in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad, Gulbahar, and a new center in Faizabad which opened in August 2001. Most of the staff at the centers are disabled Afghans, including landmine survivors. In 2001, physical rehabilitation services were provided for patients, including the supply of 3,985 prostheses, of which 76% were for mine victims. In addition, approximately 400 ICRC-produced components were supplied to centers assisted by the Swedish Committee for CDAP in Ghazni and by Guardians in Kandahar. The ICRC socio-economic program for people with disabilities resulted in jobs for 78 disabled persons, 57 young disabled people received vocational training, 493 children attended public schools and 61 children attended home classes, and 376 micro-credit programs were provided for new activities. Although all ICRC expatriate staff left the country between September and November 2001, there was no disruption to services as national staff continued the fitting of patients and successfully protected the equipment and premises.

Sandy Gall’s Afghanistan Appeal (SGAA) engages in physical rehabilitation for disabled persons, including the prosthetics, orthotics and physiotherapy, with a staff of over 100 technicians and support staff. It has a rehabilitation center in Jalalabad, Nangarhar province, five outreach units in Kabul and one in Peshawar (Pakistan). Funding for the program comes from the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund, the Community Fund in the UK, the European Union, UNICEF, and private donors. In March 2002, training commenced for 16-20 candidates in a three-year physiotherapy training course in Jalalabad.

Guardians provide physical rehabilitation services to people with disabilities, including landmine survivors, and limited health services. Its main rehabilitation center/orthopedic workshop is located in Kandahar and it has two health units in Quetta (Pakistan). Since June 2001, Handicap International Belgium (HIB) has been working with Guardians in Kandahar. HIB is responsible for the production of orthoses, wheelchairs and walking aids, while Guardians produces and fits

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125 Email to Landmine Monitor researcher for Italy from Giorgio Raineri, Emergency, Milan, 16 May 2002; and response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 24 April 2002.
prostheses. Up to 11 September 2001, HIB produced 48 wheelchairs, 1,236 walking aids, and provided support to the physiotherapy department. HIB also assisted disabled Afghan refugees in camps in Baluchistan province, Pakistan. Activities focused on physiotherapy visits and the production of 82 walking aids and 20 pairs of crutches.\textsuperscript{130}

The International Assistance Mission (IAM) provides a variety of rehabilitation services to disabled people in Afghanistan including landmine survivors. It operates the Noor Eye hospital in Kabul and eye clinics in Herat and Mazar-i-Sahrif and provides financial and technical support to the Physiotherapy School of Kabul and the Blind School of Kabul as well as providing limited vocational training and primary mental health care.

The WHO Assessment report stated that “the international aid and donor community have immense responsibilities to ensure that the health needs of Afghans are being addressed, and met accordingly.”\textsuperscript{131} Early indications suggest that donor funding is being made available to support landmine survivor assistance programs in 2002 and beyond. Details are not available to Landmine Monitor on all new programs to be introduced; however, at least two programs will assist mine survivors in 2002. In January 2002, an Indian orthopedic team arrived in Kabul with 1,000 prostheses for Afghan amputees, which will be fitted free of charge. The Indian government funded the project, with the prostheses provided by the BMVSS charity from Jaipur. Each prosthetic leg comes with the so-called Jaipur foot, specially designed for rough or hilly ground.\textsuperscript{132} And in May 2002, the Association for Aid and Relief-Japan (AAR) started a physiotherapy program in Takhar province to assist disabled persons, including landmine survivors.\textsuperscript{133}

ARMENIA

\textit{Key developments since May 2001:} The Armenian National Mine Action Center was officially opened in March 2002. Two 80-person companies are being trained in humanitarian mine action, including a Mine Detecting Dog section.

\textbf{Mine Ban Policy}

Armenia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty and maintains that it will not do so unless Azerbaijan agrees to join. During a regional Landmine Monitor meeting held in Armenia from 8-10 November 2001, researchers met with Vahram Gabrielian, Head of the Department for Arms Control and International Security of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss various aspects of the Mine Ban Treaty.\textsuperscript{1} According to Gabrielian, the main reasons the government will not accede to the treaty are its geopolitical situation, technical difficulties in complying with the treaty, and insufficiently clear guarantees of international assistance for mine clearance.\textsuperscript{2}

Gabrielian suggested that a viable option might be to discuss a ban on landmines, as well as issues related to mine clearance, within the context of ongoing negotiations in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group and during bilateral negotiations with Azerbaijan. He stated that Armenia would welcome simultaneous declarations by countries from the region of moratoria on the use and transfer of antipersonnel mines. Gabrielian said Armenia


\textsuperscript{1} Interview with Vahram Gabrielian, Head of the Department for Arms Control and International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yerevan, 8 November 2001. 

\textsuperscript{2} Interview with Vahram Gabrielian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yerevan, 8 November 2001.
was ready for any other form of collaboration on the landmine issue, including admitting Azeri combat engineers to be trained in the regional mine action center in Armenia.3


Armenia did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, but did attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. The government had anticipated that many aspects of the landmine issue would be discussed during an international meeting that had been scheduled to take place in Armenia in November 2001, with the financial support of the OSCE and Canada. Due to the tragic events in the United States in September 2001, the meeting was postponed. It has been rescheduled for early October 2002, and Armenia welcomes wide participation of international NGOs.4

Armenia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW); as with the Mine Ban Treaty, Armenia holds that it cannot take unilateral steps it believes would place it at a disadvantage in the region.5 Armenia did not participate in the third annual meeting of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in December 2001. In May 2001, Armenia said that it “is considering the possibility to submit, on a voluntary basis the annual report required under article 13 [of Amended Protocol II] and to contribute to improving the coordination and effectiveness of global mine action.”6

From 8–10 November 2001, the Armenian National Committee of the ICBL hosted a regional meeting of members of the ICBL to prepare research for Landmine Monitor Report 2002, as well as strategize on advocacy in support of the ban on antipersonnel mines. The campaigners and researchers met with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited Yerevan’s Center of Trauma, Orthopedics, and Rehabilitation, and held a roundtable discussion with Armenia’s Deputy Minister of Defense. They also conducted a field visit to the mine-affected Tavush border region north of Yerevan.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Armenia is not believed to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It states that it has not imported mines since its independence. It claims that landmine stocks, left from the dissolution of the Soviet Union, are “negligible.”7 Although antipersonnel mines have previously been used by both Armenia and Azerbaijan in the conflict,8 there have been no credible allegations of new use in this reporting period. The Defense Ministry states that the military has been prohibited from laying new mines.9 According to the Minister of Defense, during the conflict antipersonnel mines were, in the overwhelming majority of cases, used by non-professionals and were not mapped.10

Landmine Problem

As mentioned in previous Landmine Monitor Reports, the 900-kilometer line that divides the parties to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as large adjoining territories, is affected by

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
7 Interview with Lt. General Vagharchak Harutjunian, Minister of Defense, Republic of Armenia, 19 April 2000.
9 Interview with General Yury Khachaturov, Deputy Minister of Defense, Yerevan, 9 November 2001.
10 Statement of Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian at the inauguration of the Armenian Mine Action Center, 16 March 2002.
antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{11} According to the government, there are 50,000-80,000 landmines in the border area.\textsuperscript{12}

The Gegharkunik region, which includes the territory of the Lake Sevan basin, has a 140-kilometer-long common border with Azerbaijan. Over 20 localities in Chambarak and Vardenis district were an arena of warfare and more than 100 kilometers of mountainous areas to the east and south of Chambarak were reportedly mined.\textsuperscript{13} The mined territories in Gegharkunik are estimated to cover 100 million square meters and are designated as a “prohibited area.” An additional area of about the same size is designated as a “risk area.” There is no civilian access to those areas. Thus, 200 million square meters of arable croplands have not been used for almost ten years.

The town of Chambarak claims annual budget losses of AMD7 million (about US$12,500) and the population is said to lose AMD 40 million (about US$71,400) because they cannot use the mined farmland.\textsuperscript{14} Similarly, the local budget of the village of Vahan, whose location is the most dangerous, sustains annual losses of about AMD5 million (about US$8,900).\textsuperscript{15}

In Ararat region, according to the regional administration’s estimates, 3 million square meters of privatized arable land next to the border are mined and thus, are not used.\textsuperscript{16}

On 6 November 2001, the Armenian National Assembly discussed the issue of the land tax that thousands are required to pay even though their land is mined.\textsuperscript{17} On 21 February 2002, the government decided to grant a land tax exemption to the residents of 147 borderline communities and to write off debts to local budgets on land tax.\textsuperscript{18}

In autumn 2001, following pressure by NGOs and the public, the National Assembly passed its first reading of the\textit{ Law On Borderline Territories}, which contains proposals and programs for rehabilitation of borderline territories, including landmine clearance. In December 2001, a government commission was established to examine the issues related to the country’s mined agricultural lands. The Commission is headed by the Deputy Minister of the Territorial Administration and Industrial Infrastructures, and among its members are governors of the borderline regions and representatives of the country’s ministries and agencies.

The issue of clearing the section of the Armenian-Georgian border near Krasny bridge was discussed during a meeting of the Armenian Foreign Minister, Vardan Oskanian, with the Speaker of the Georgian parliament, Nino Burjdanadze, in Tbilisi in early February 2002.\textsuperscript{19} According to the Foreign Ministry, Armenian specialists helped clear mines near Krasny bridge.

**Mine Action Funding, Survey, and Assessment**

In 2001, Armenia received US$3.15 million in humanitarian demining assistance from the United States.\textsuperscript{20} For 2002, the US allocated $1.2 million for Armenia.

On 14 January 2002, two experts from the Office of Humanitarian Mine Action Programs of the US Department of State were present at a monitoring mission on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The mission was to carry out a preliminary assessment of mine action needed to return two

\textsuperscript{12} Reply of the Republic of Armenia to the Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, FSC.DEL/92/00, 29 March 2000, as reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 794.
\textsuperscript{13} Khosrov Khelgatian, “Landmines will always be a hazard to life,” Zhanamaki oughekits/Time guide (weekly), 8 September 2001.
\textsuperscript{14} Information provided by Hayk Lazarian, Chambarak Mayor, August 2001.
\textsuperscript{15} Information provided by Husik Apressian, head of community, August 2001.
\textsuperscript{16} Information provided by Bagrat Sargsyan, Secretary of Ararat Regional Governor’s Office, 12 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{17} “Questions & Answers in the National Assembly,” Armenian Public TV Program, 6 November 2001.
\textsuperscript{18} Orakarg/Agenda (a weekly Armenian Public Television program), 4 March 2002.
\textsuperscript{19} Orakarg/Agenda (Armenian Public Television program), 17 February 2002, reporting on Vardan Oskanian’s official visit to Tbilisi.
watercourses that ran parallel to the old road to their original pre-war condition. The assessment found that the project would take about three months to complete, but would require necessary security guarantees from the authorities in Armenia and Azerbaijan for the duration of the work. The Armenian Ministry of Defense offered to organize a meeting between the local authorities of Tavush (Armenia) and Kazakh (Azerbaijan) regions and high-ranking military officers of both sides under the chairmanship of the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman to sign a Protocol concerning the security guarantees.21

The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation is providing technical support to RONCO to conduct a training needs assessment and train Armenian national staff to ensure the National Mine Action Center is equipped to conduct a Landmine Impact Survey to support national strategic mine action planning.22

Mine Action

Armenia is determined to build its landmine clearance capacity. The US began working with Armenia in 2000 to renovate facilities, train staff of the National Mine Action Center, carry out mine risk education and information management, and develop survey capabilities.23 Armenia also intends to integrate mine detection dog teams into its mine action program.24

In November 2001, RONCO, announced it would train and equip two 80-person companies in humanitarian mine action, including a Mine Detecting Dog Section and six to ten medical technicians. In addition, RONCO was to train National Mine Action Center staff to manage and implement a comprehensive mine action program.25

On 16 March 2002, the Armenian National Mine Action Center was officially opened in Echmiadzin, 25 kilometers from the capital, Yerevan. Serzh Sargsian, the Armenian Defense Minister; John Ordway, US Ambassador to Armenia; top officers from the Armenian armed forces; as well as the heads of other foreign embassies in Armenia, took part in the ceremony. Minister Sargsian declared that the Center would be important both for the Armenian armed forces and for residents of the country’s mined border areas. Sargsian also noted the significance of the willingness to start mine action in border areas, backed by confidence that war would not break out again between Armenia and Azerbaijan.26 The US provided $1 million for equipment for the center. Ten US military instructors were scheduled to arrive in Armenia in summer 2002 to beginning training Armenian deminers.27

In a November 2001 meeting with Landmine Monitor researchers, the Deputy Minister of Defense had noted that since the ceasefire, minefield maps had been drawn and he claimed that clearance could take place in all areas, except Shurnukh in Goris.28

Mine Risk Education

In order to find out how well informed the population is about various aspects of the landmine problem as well as attitudes about the government’s position on accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, the Armenian National Committee of the ICBL conducted a survey of 260 respondents in four borderline regions of Armenia in December 2001 and January 2002.29

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21 Information provided by G. Kocharian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yerevan, 29 March 2002.
22 Interview with William E. Barron, Planning and Logistics Officer, Mine Action Program, VVAF, Yerevan, 21 February 2002.
24 Information provided by G. Kocharian, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Yerevan, 29 March 2002.
26 Interview with Armenian Defense Minister, Serzh Sargsian, on Haylur (news program), Armenian Public Television, 16 March 2002.
28 Interview with General Yury Khachaturov, Deputy Minister of Defense, Yerevan, 9 November 2001.
29 Some 60 people were surveyed in Kapan and 39 in Goris, in Syunik region; 30 in Chambarak, in Gegharkunik region; 56 in Eghegnadzor, in Vayots Dzor region; and 56 in Idjevan and 19 in Noyemberian, in Tavush region.
A little over 35 percent of the respondents have had landmine casualties among their friends or relatives. The survey demonstrated that a majority of respondents (over 63 percent) knew which areas were mined, but 19 percent did not know, and the rest were not sure. Numbers varied significantly between regions, with greater knowledge in more affected areas. The least informed (27 percent) were respondents in Vayots Dzor region, where very few areas are mined. Only about 11 percent of all those surveyed said that there were warning signs around the mined areas, while approximately 63 percent had never come across such notices and another 25 percent were not sure.

People were also asked which problems concerned them most, as residents of a borderline region. Many respondents stressed the necessity of assistance for people affected by landmines, in particular a land tax exemption (41 percent), a change of tax policies (40 percent), and an increase in disability pensions. Some 31 percent felt the rights of civilians injured by landmines should be the same as those of military personnel.

In all the regions, those surveyed felt landmine clearance was progressing very slowly, and only 37 percent of those interviewed were aware of such efforts. Agricultural lands, particularly privatized land, as well as roads and adjoining forests, are said to be a priority. With respect to who should initiate and carry out mine action in the country, the majority of respondents (58 percent) believed that should be the role of the Armenian government, 19 percent said local governments, a little over 12 percent said the United Nations and other international organizations, including NGOs, and just under five percent said Armenian NGOs.

The survey also sought to find out whether the residents of border regions receive mine risk education. The responses indicated that schools do not provide children with adequate information. Only 34 percent were confident that such training is given at schools. Special courses, however, were not provided in any of the regions.

Only 18 percent of respondents could recall mine risk education initiatives that targeted residents in their houses. About 95 percent stressed the necessity of providing the population with information about landmines and precautions to take. Virtually no one had any doubts about the necessity of communicating such knowledge to schoolchildren. Only 14 percent of respondents regarded their knowledge as sufficient to identify a landmine and to take measures to inform relevant authorities. Some 66 percent felt television to be the most critical vehicle for raising awareness about landmines; the same percent said they had never seen a single TV program on landmines.

**Landmine Casualties**

There are no official statistics available on the number of landmine casualties in Armenia. It would appear that the majority of landmine casualties are young men drafted into the army. The Armenian National Committee of the ICBL is compiling and verifying a database on landmine casualties among Armenian citizens. As of April 2002, the database contained information on 343 survivors, including both soldiers and civilians injured in landmine incidents in 11 provinces of Armenia; of these survivors, 228 were injured after the armistice was signed in May 1994. There were five mine casualties reported in 2001.

**Survivor Assistance**

Military mine casualties have greater access to medical and rehabilitative facilities than civilian casualties, but generally Armenia has an adequate material-technical base and qualified personnel for specialized medical assistance, for producing prosthetic appliances, and for rehabilitating and reintegrating landmine survivors. However, a lack of adequate resources limits the capacity of existing facilities to adequately and efficiently address the needs of landmine survivors.

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30 The database contains full details including the names and addresses of survivors, both military and civilian. Data is collected mainly through medical and rehabilitation facilities and interviews with survivors. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 853.
Armenia has a wide network of health-care facilities. As of 1 January 2001, there were 171 civilian hospitals and six military hospitals, including two in Yerevan (the Central Clinical Military Hospital and the Yerevan Garrison Hospital), a field military hospital in Vanadzor and Tavush, and two field military hospitals in border areas. The largest specialized medical and rehabilitation facilities are concentrated in Yerevan and include the Center of Traumatology, Orthopedics & Rehabilitation, the A. Mikaelian Institute of Surgery, the Research Institute of Health Science and Physical Medicine, the First Aid Research Center, the Stress Center, the Center for Medical Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons, and the Yerevan Prosthetic-Orthopedic Enterprise (POE). Civilian mine casualties can receive emergency care in military field hospitals. All amputees, both military and civilian, can get their prosthetic appliances from the POE.

In January 2002, the Yerevan Prosthetic-Orthopedic Enterprise stopped providing assistance because of a lack of state funding. This is a repeat of the situation reported in the previous year when the POE closed between October 2000 and February 2001. On 8 May 2002, disabled veterans of the Nagorno-Karabakh war staged a rally at the Government Building to protest the fact that POE could not provide services to persons with disabilities because the Government has not disbursed the funding allocated for its operation. Commenting on the protest action, the chief financial officer of the Ministry of Social Security stated that for the previous seven months the POE had not received funding of about US$205,500 (AMD120 million) and, as a result, was unable to purchase materials to produce prosthetic and assistive devices. The provision of services to persons with disabilities could be resumed in a matter of days once the funding was disbursed.

Disability Policy and Practice

Armenia’s “Law on Social Protection of the Disabled in Armenia” protects the rights of civilians with disabilities, including landmine survivors. The rights of military landmine survivors and their family members are covered by “On social security system for military personnel and their family members.” At the national level the coordination of disability issues is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Security, and the social security division of the Ministry of Defense.

Medical services are provided free to persons with disabilities within the framework of existing laws, but in reality the lack of state resources makes access problematic. The desperate socioeconomic situation of the country has resulted in the growing inaccessibility of medical services for a majority of the population, including persons with disabilities.

AZERBAIJAN

Key developments since May 2001: A general survey was carried out in 11 districts and found 50 million square meters of land to be affected by mines and unexploded ordnance; 84 minefields were identified and marked. With UNDP assistance, an Azeri National Strategic Plan for mine action was adopted in October 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Azerbaijan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Although it voted in favor of the 1996 pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution, it has abstained on all subsequent resolutions in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, most recently on UNGA Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001.

33 Edward Gevorkian, Chief Financial Officer, Ministry of Social Security, interview on Zham (news program), Armenian television, 8 May 2002.
34 For full details see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 798.
The government’s policy position has not changed in recent years. “The Republic of Azerbaijan supports the idea of a comprehensive international legal document on the ban of use, storage and transfer of antipersonnel landmines…[but] Azerbaijan at present stage cannot become the party to the Convention, since it is deprived of the opportunity to fulfill the obligations stemming from it…[because of the] continuing occupation of 20% of Azerbaijan’s territories by the armed forces of Armenia and the remaining threat of resumption of hostilities.”

In an October 2001 letter to the Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzCBL), the Azeri Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vilayat Guliyev, said that despite the government’s support of the goals of the Mine Ban Treaty (Ottawa Convention), “There can not be any talk of Azerbaijan’s signing this Convention until the territories occupied by Armenia are liberated. For this reason the non-joining of Azerbaijan to this Convention must be explained by its incapability to fulfill the obligations put forward in the Convention.”


Azerbaijan is not a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It did not attend the Third Annual Meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the CCW, or the Second CCW Review Conference, both of which were held in Geneva in December 2001. Azerbaijan continues to state, as it has in the past, that it considers the Conference on Disarmament as an appropriate forum for the discussion of antipersonnel mine issues.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Azerbaijan has stated that it does not produce landmines and does not permit the transfer of mines through its territory. When the Soviet army withdrew from Azerbaijan in 1992, it left landmines and other weapons behind. This is believed to be the source of Azerbaijan’s mine stockpiles, although the number of mines they possess is not known.

Landmines were used by all sides throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and sporadically after the signing of the armistice in May 1994. Landmine Monitor has not received any specific allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines during this reporting period (since May 2001). However, in December 2001, Azerbaijan implied ongoing use by both sides: “[W]hile the enemy broadly uses landmines in Azerbaijan’s territory, Azerbaijan is obliged to take appropriate measures as a deterrent factor.”

Landmine Problem and Survey

The conflict with Armenia resulted in around 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory being occupied by Armenia; more than one million Azerbaijan citizens became refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs). As reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2001, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) believes that up to 45 of Azerbaijan’s 65 regions may be mine-affected.
In 2001, the International Eurasia Press Fund conducted a limited level one (general) survey on the territory of 11 districts where combat operations had occurred and which are close to the front line. The survey, which was funded by Norway, the United States, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), was completed in September 2001.\(^\text{10}\) It found that some 50 million square meters of territory are affected by mines.\(^\text{11}\) According to the Fund, 84 minefields were discovered and marked and the local populations were informed of the danger.\(^\text{12}\)

The most heavily mine-affected areas are farmland and cropland, but mines are also found in the irrigation systems, river basins, and near high voltage power lines, wells with drinking water and approaches to them.\(^\text{13}\)

A full-scale Landmine Impact Survey is scheduled to begin in September 2002.\(^\text{14}\) The survey is being conducted through the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), and its local partner, the International Eurasia Press Fund. Financial support has been provided by the European Union through UNDP and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).\(^\text{15}\)

**Mine Action Funding**

Mine action funding for Azerbaijan for 2001 totaled about US$5.5 million, with contributions from the United States, European Commission, UNDP, Switzerland, and the government of Azerbaijan.

The US reports that in its fiscal year 2001, its total contributions to Azerbaijan mine action were $3.4 million. The State Department provided $1.1 million ($600,000 to extend the UNDP Mine Detection Dog program, $250,000 for demining equipment, and $250,000 to help establish a Mine Detection Dog capability within ANAMA). The Defense Department allocated an additional $2.3 million.

The European Commission reported funding of $1,460,226 for Azerbaijan in 2001, and Switzerland reported $60,000.\(^\text{16}\) The Swiss contribution was in-kind donation of a mine awareness adviser ($50,000) and mine clearance equipment ($10,000).\(^\text{17}\)

ANAMA indicates that it received $1.7 million in 2001, including $1,132,000 from the United States, $473,641 from UNDP, and $108,719 from the government of Azerbaijan.\(^\text{18}\)

On 2 July 2002, wineries in the state of New York in the United States held an event to raise funds to clear mines and restore once-flourishing vineyards in the Fizuli region of Azerbaijan. The fundraising event, held at the UN headquarters, was organized by the New York Wine and Grape Foundation, representing over 160 vineyards across New York State, and the nonprofit Humpty Dumpty Institute.\(^\text{19}\)

**Coordination and Planning**

The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action was created on 18 July 1998 to serve as the national mine action agency responsible for coordinating all aspects of mine action within Azerbaijan. This includes coordination, planning, priority-setting based on the needs of affected communities, enforcement of international standards, quality management, resource mobilization, and operations.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^{10}\) Letter from the International Eurasian Press Fund to AzCBL, Baku, 11 January 2001.


\(^{13}\) Zerkalo (newspaper), 26 May 2001.

\(^{14}\) Email from Survey Action Center, 24 July 2002.

\(^{15}\) See the report of the Survey Action Center in the appendices to this edition of Landmine Monitor.

\(^{16}\) Funding reported to United Nations Mine Action Investment database.

\(^{17}\) See country report on Switzerland.


ANAMA’s priorities are to clear areas with life-threatening dangers; support resettlement of IDPs through clearance of houses and infrastructure required to support communities; clear reconstruction sites as requested by aid and development agencies; and help provide for food security through the clearance of agricultural and grazing lands.\(^{21}\)

In 2001, UNDP substantially increased its support to ANAMA. This included training local ANAMA staff in the use of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and translating IMSMA into Russian. UNDP is also assisting ANAMA in improving its level one (general) survey capacity.\(^{22}\)

An Azeri National Strategic Plan was adopted in October 2001 and aims to create a basic mine action capacity for dealing with the problem in accessible areas. The goal is for ANAMA to manage most mine action projects and operational activities by January 2003, with minimal outside technical support. According to UNDP, ANAMA will receive further management and technical training in 2002. Two senior ANAMA staff members have completed the UNDP’s Management Training Course at Cranfield University in the United Kingdom.\(^{23}\) To increase mine action capacity in 2002-2003, UNDP plans to increase the operational capacity by 38 deminers, six surveyors, and 10 EOD staff.\(^{24}\)

**Mine Clearance**

In 2000, two national NGOs, Relief Azerbaijan and the International Eurasia Press Fund, were trained in mine survey and clearance. Since then, mine action achievements include the training of 38 national deminers, six national mine surveyors and five national instructors; 65 mine-affected communities with a total area of about 50 million square meters of mine- and UXO-affected areas have been identified. The primary beneficiaries have been 350,000 inhabitants of the affected communities, including IDPs and residents who remained in their area of origin.\(^{25}\)

In 2001, a total of 896,143 square meters of land was cleared; 56 million square meters underwent general survey and 486,629 square meters underwent technical survey.\(^{26}\) More than 1,165 items of unexploded ordnance, 45 antipersonnel mines and 22 antitank mines have been destroyed.\(^{27}\)

Areas targeted for mine clearance have been: the high voltage power lines in the Fizuli district, water channels, houses, and two schools of the Goranboy district. As a result of clearance operations in the Fizuli district, some 26,000 people have returned to the area.\(^{28}\)

The UK-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG) in April 2000 began training and supervising deminers and surveyors for Relief Azerbaijan. In mid-March 2001, Relief teams began clearance that allowed repairs to the national power line that runs 30 kilometers through the Fizuli district to the town of Horadiz.\(^{29}\) MAG’s contract was completed at the end of November 2001, but it continued to support Relief up to 13 December 2001 at its own cost.\(^{30}\)

Since the May 1994 armistice, Azerbaijan claims to have cleared 41,000 mines, including 19,000 antipersonnel mines and 22,000 antivehicle mines.\(^{31}\)

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\(^{23}\) Ibid.


\(^{25}\) Ibid.

\(^{26}\) Email from Sayed Aqa, UN Chief Technical Adviser, ANAMA, 23 July 2002.


\(^{31}\) 525 gazet (daily newspaper), 29 June 2001; Response to OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 13 December 2001.
Mine Risk Education

Implementation of UNICEF’s “Mine Awareness Education Project” continued during the reporting period in Azerbaijan, targeting the following 12 districts: Agdam, Agjebedy, Agstafa, Beylagan, Dashkesen, Fizuli, Goranboy, Kazakh, Kedabek, Khanlar, Ter-Ter, and Tovuz. The program was also carried out in the eight districts with concentrated settlements of IDPs: Jabrayil, Khojavand, Lachin, Khojali, Kelbadjar, Zangilan, Gubadli, and Shusha. As a part of this project, the US government supplied funding for mine awareness activities in the border communities of Azerbaijan most affected by mines and UXO.32

Program activities included production and dissemination of mine awareness materials, including three posters (26,382 in total), two leaflets (172,411 in total), a school notebook (99,415 in total), and a training manual. A mine awareness theater production for children was shown in 18 IDP/refugee settlements. A “train-the-trainers” course on mine risk education was given to 15 people, 800 teachers were trained in the use of the Mine Awareness Manual, and 500 health workers were trained in mine awareness. Finally, a needs assessment for mine survivors was carried out, resulting in the development of a proposal for a mine survivor support project (see below).33 The UNICEF project is scheduled to continue through December 2003.

Landmine Casualties

There are no comprehensive official statistics on mine casualties in Azerbaijan. The AzCBL reports that there were at least 25 new mine and UXO casualties in 2001; two people were killed and 23 were injured.34 In 2000, ten mine incidents were reported; four people were killed and six injured.35 According to the survey undertaken by ANAMA and the International Eurasia Press Foundation (IEPF), in the two years before the end of the survey (September 2001), 12 people were killed and 43 injured by landmines and UXO.36

The total number of mine casualties in Azerbaijan is unclear. Official state bodies and ministries do not give information to the public on mine casualties, or the number of people killed or injured during the war with Armenia. However, ANAMA reported a total of 1,222 mine/UXO casualties following the general survey of 11 districts carried out by the IEPF.37 The majority of casualties were aged between 15 and 29.38 The majority of mine casualties are believed to be civilians. According to a UNICEF press release in May 2001, approximately 65 percent of mine casualties are civilians.39 Azerbaijan’s response to an Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) questionnaire supports this assertion.40

Mine incidents are also reported in the press. On 13 July 2001, a seven-year-old and 12-year-old were injured by a mine explosion in the Juhari Kurdmahmudu village of Fizuli district, and one child later died at the hospital.41 In November 2001, a shepherd was injured by a mine while herding sheep in Gishlag village in the Agdam district.42

There have also been press reports of mine incidents involving military personnel in 2001. On 5 January 2001, a private was killed by a mine. In July 2001, two officers and a private were

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33 Ibid.
34 Information on 16 casualties (2 killed and 14 injured) was collected during the IEPF survey which ended in September 2001. Four incidents resulting in 9 injuries were reported by UNICEF mine awareness teams in October and November.
38 See www.anama.baku.az:8101/pages/_l-3-Scope.htm (accessed 21 July 2002).
40 Response to OSCE Questionnaire on Anti-Personnel Landmines, 13 December 2001.
injured clearing mines in an area near a former Soviet military base. On 6 November 2001, two
soldiers were injured and one was killed by a mine.43
On 3 July 2001, a deminer with Relief Azerbaijan lost two fingers of his right hand as a result
of a mine incident.44

**Survivor Assistance**

Medical and surgical facilities in Azerbaijan are believed to be adequate to treat mine
casualties. Medical expenses for mine survivors and other persons with disabilities are covered by
the Ministry of Health.45

In 2001, there were two orthopedic centers in Baku: one supported by the Ministry of Labor
and Social Protection (MOLASP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and
the government-run Prosthetic and Orthopedic Rehabilitation Center. In 2001, the MOLASP/ICRC
Darnagul Prosthetic-Orthotic Center assisted over 632 patients, providing 292 prostheses, 545
orthoses, and more than 137 crutches, walking sticks, and wheelchairs; of fitted-amputees about 46
were mine survivors. In addition to receiving free treatment, transportation and meals for patients
coming from the districts were provided. In July 2001, seven Azeri Orthopedic Technologists
(Category II) graduated after completing an advanced training course recognized by the
International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotists (IPSO).46

The government-run Prosthetic and Orthopedic Rehabilitation Center assisted around 7,000
people in 2001, free-of-charge, providing physical rehabilitation, prostheses, orthoses, and other
assistive devices. Azerbaijan does not produce wheelchairs, so they must be imported. The
number of mine survivors assisted at the Center is not available as they are registered more
generally in the category of war-disabled.47

On 31 December 2001, the Darnagul Prosthetic-Orthotic Center ceased its activities.
However, all the machines, equipment, and stock were handed over to MOLASP. ICRC-trained
staff were also transferred to other facilities. In 2002, physical rehabilitation services will be
decentralized with a new ICRC-supported rehabilitation center opening in Ganja, Azerbaijan’s
second-largest city, and the upgrading of an existing workshop in Nakhichevan.48

Thirty-five NGOs are working with persons with disabilities in Azerbaijan. However, there
are no programs focusing on mine survivors. AzCBL has plans to implement a special program to
assist mine survivors.49 UNICEF continues to seek funding of US$350,000 for a two-year survivor
assistance program in Azerbaijan. The program would assist existing psychological rehabilitation
centers, provide vocational training to mine and other war-wounded persons, and assist in the
domestic production of wheelchairs and prosthetic devices. UNICEF already works with a network
of 15 specialists providing psychological rehabilitation to mine and other war-wounded people in
Azerbaijan.50

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43 Express, 9 January 2001; Comsomolskaya Pravda – Baku, 18 July 2001; Echo, 7 July 2001.
45 Interviews with Shahnaz Hashimova, Deputy Chair, Department of Prevention of the Ministry of
46 Interview with Shalala Ahmedova, ICRC Baku, 17 January 2002; ICRC Physical Rehabilitation
Programmes Annual Report 2001, accessed at www.icrc.org; and ICRC Baku Information bulletin, January-
47 Interview with Shamsaddin Hudaverdiyev, Prosthetic and Orthopedic Rehabilitation Center, Baku, 17
50 “Assistance for Mine Victims in Azerbaijan,” ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance
Disability Policy and Practice

In April 1997, the Parliament of Azerbaijan adopted the Law of Prevention of Disability, Rehabilitation of Persons with Disability and their Social Protection. This Law applies to all persons with disabilities in Azerbaijan, including mine survivors.51

Following the Presidential Decree of 26 December 2001, some of the entitlements (free public utilities such as gas, electricity, water, and sewerage, free telephone installation and use, free use of transportation within the city and beyond, and the right to free medicine) were due to be replaced by a monthly payment of 90,000 Manats (approximately US$18).52 Those disabled during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, some of whom are mine survivors, have been particularly badly affected as a result.

Prior to the issuance of the decree, there were hunger strikes by some of the disabled, a number of public attempted suicides, and violent clashes with the police, mostly involving members of the Karabakh War Invalids' Society.53

BAHRAIN

Bahrain has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Bahrain did not attend any Mine Ban Treaty meetings during the reporting period, but did vote in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on the universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it did on similar pro-ban resolutions in previous years. While Bahrain is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, its Geneva-based representatives attended the second review conference in December 2001.

Bahrain is not believed to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines. It remains one of just a handful of countries for which Landmine Monitor does not have a clear indication whether antipersonnel mines are stockpiled. As first reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2000, the United States stockpiles 3,124 antipersonnel mines in Bahrain.

Bahrain is not mine-affected. It is not believed to have contributed to any international mine action programs in 2001 or 2002.

BELARUS

Key developments since May 2001: Belarus has reiterated its willingness to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as it has received the necessary assistance to enable it to destroy its stockpile of nearly 4.6 million antipersonnel mines. In 2001, Belarus destroyed 3,276 stockpiled mines, and cleared 3.5 million square meters of land, including 11,926 UXO and 65 antipersonnel mines. In March 2002, Canada donated 20 mine detectors to Belarus—the first time the country has received international assistance for its mine and UXO clearance.

Mine Ban Policy

While Belarus has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, government officials have reaffirmed their support for the treaty on a number of occasions.1 In September 2001, a representative of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared, “Belarusian public opinion and [the] Belarusian Government view successful implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of

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52 Halg (daily national newspaper), 27 December 2001.
Antipersonnel Mines as one of the important conditions for strengthening international security."  

In January 2002, the Army Engineer Corps Chief of Staff said, “Belarus expresses a willingness along with the international society to join the ban movement, complying with the terms of the Ottawa Convention and to join it in the foreseeable future.”

Belarus claims that its accession to the Mine Ban Treaty is dependent on finding environmentally safe technologies to enable the destruction of its 3.6 million PFM-1 and PFM-1S antipersonnel mines and receiving the necessary funding. Research into the environmental effects of open-air detonation of PFM mines, which is being carried out by the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2002. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Michael Khvostov: “As soon as an environmentally safe technology of destruction of PFM mines is identified and a formal agreement of cooperation between Belarus and international donors is signed Belarus will immediately accede to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty.”

Belarus has consistently voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly resolutions supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, including UNGA Resolution 56/24M adopted in November 2001, which calls for universalisation of the treaty.

Belarus attended as an observer the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 and made a statement in support of the treaty. Belarus attended the intersessional Standing Committee meeting on Stockpile Destruction in May 2001 and January 2002, with the sponsorship of the UNDP office in Minsk. At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, Belarus was represented by Alessandri Baichorov from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Lieutenant-Colonel Igor Lapchinsky from the Ministry of Defense.


Belarus is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II on landmines. As reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2001, Belarus is said to have completed domestic procedures for the ratification of CCW Amended Protocol II on 7 October 1996, but has not yet submitted the instrument of ratification “due to financial constraints on its implementation.”


In 2001, Belarus requested support and cooperation with humanitarian demining from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but as of June 2002 it had not received any response, official or unofficial.

Production and Transfer

The Ministry of Defense claims that Belarus has never produced and will not produce or modernize antipersonnel mines or their components, including Claymore-type mines or any other
mines, in the future. Government officials say that since 1992, Belarus has not exported antipersonnel mines. The current moratorium on the export of all types of landmines—in place since 1995—has been extended to the end of 2002. A decree at the beginning of 1998 banned the transit of antipersonnel mines and certain other goods through the territory of the Republic of Belarus.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Belarus’s mine stockpiles—concentrated primarily in the Gomel region—consist of landmines left behind from the Soviet era. Details of Belarus’s stockpile of nearly 4.6 million antipersonnel mines, including 3.6 million PFM and PFM-1S, were included in Landmine Monitor Report 2001.

In 2001, Belarus destroyed 3,276 antipersonnel mines, including 3,244 PMN-2 blast mines, 17 MON-50, and 15 MON-200 directional mines. This is an increase of more than 2,000 over the number destroyed the previous year (1,216). Between 1997 and January 2002 Belarus destroyed, by detonation, a total of 11,459 antipersonnel mines and booby-traps. The numbers and types destroyed are detailed in the following table:

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10 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 863.
17 Ibid.
Antipersonnel Mine Stockpiles and Stockpile Destruction

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<tr>
<td>Circular area</td>
<td>POMZ-2m</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,908</td>
<td>90,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OZM-4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bounding</td>
<td>OZM-72</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>300,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>POM-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>70,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blast</td>
<td>PMN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>54,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PMN-2</td>
<td>3,244</td>
<td>4,460</td>
<td>295,698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directional</td>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>55,425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MON-90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,088</td>
<td>37,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MON-100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>39,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MON-200</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booby-trap</td>
<td>MC-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Booby-trap</td>
<td>MB-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blast</td>
<td>PFM-1 and PFM-1S</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,625,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,276</td>
<td>11,459</td>
<td>4,586,525</td>
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</table>

Belarus military officials argue that the MON series, OZM-72 and POMZ-2M mines can be converted to command-detonated devices, which are not illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty.19

Belarus has declared its intention, in spite of its economic problems, to destroy some 900,000 antipersonnel mines (except for the PFM-1/1S type) without international assistance.20 The government has estimated that it would need US$46 million to develop the technologies necessary to carry out the destruction of all its stocks, including PFM-1 mines.21

Landmine Problem and Mine Clearance

Belarus is still contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from World War II. As reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2001, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) conducted an assessment mission to Belarus in 2000. UNMAS found that the majority of contaminated areas are agricultural lands and forests and that UXO poses a greater threat than landmines.22

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18 The total of the chart (4,586,525) is a slightly higher figure than previously reported (4,584,953) despite the destruction of 3,276 mines in 2001. According to the Ministry of Defense there were mistakes in the numbers provided to Landmine Monitor for the last report. Interview with Colonel Sergei Luchina, Chief of Staff, Engineers Corps, Belarusian Armed Forces, Minsk, 19 July 2002.

19 Interview with Colonel Sergei Luchina, Chief of Staff, Engineers Corps, Belarusian Armed Forces, Geneva, 29 January 2002.

20 Ibid.


The Ministry of Defense cleared 11,991 UXO and antipersonnel mines in 2001, the largest number since 1994, and over 4,000 more pieces than were recovered in 2000. Details of clearance since 1992 are included in the table below.

### Mines and UXO cleared, 1992-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AP Mines</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>18,733</td>
<td>57,443</td>
<td>84,985</td>
<td>7,527</td>
<td>10,521</td>
<td>6,396</td>
<td>4,704</td>
<td>10,437</td>
<td>7,566</td>
<td>11,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>18,761</td>
<td>58,663</td>
<td>85,332</td>
<td>7,577</td>
<td>10,703</td>
<td>6,504</td>
<td>4,954</td>
<td>10,726</td>
<td>7,730</td>
<td>11,991</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Broken down by region, in 2001 the majority of mines and UXO were cleared in the Minsk region, where 7,432 pieces of UXO and mines were cleared and in the Vitebsk region, where 2,078 were cleared. Other regions include Gomel (802), Grodno (590), Mogilev (589), and Brest (500).

In 2001, a total area of 3.5 million square meters was cleared, most of which could not previously be used for agricultural or other economic purposes.

The areas still needing to be cleared total some 350 million square meters. Belarus provided UNMAS with a list of areas, in priority order, that remain to be cleared, broken down by region and district. The list was reprinted in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*. The most affected are: Dubrovitsa district (172 km²) in Vitebsk; Slavgorod district (36 km²) and Dribinsk district (24 km²) in Mogilev; and Loyevsk district in Gomel (24 km²).

The primary responsibility for mine/UXO clearance in Belarus rests with the Ministry of Defense. Deminers from the Ministry of Defense carry out planned clearance operations at the request of local authorities. Deminers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs are supposed to react to emergency calls.

In March 2002, Belarus received international humanitarian demining assistance for the first time—20 modern mine detectors at a cost of US$46,000 were donated to Belarus by Canada and a corresponding training of Belarus deminers by international trainers, sponsored by Canada, took place in April 2002.

### Mine Awareness/Mine Risk Education

Mine awareness is provided to the civilian population in affected areas by the Ministry of Defense Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams prior to the commencement of clearance operations. A proposal by a group of NGOs, including BCBL and SCAF, to the Ministry of Education to include mine awareness education in the curriculum for primary and secondary schools conflicted with plans to reduce the existing national curriculum as Belarus is moving from a six-day to a five-day school week. In spite of the fact that 58 children were killed or injured in Belarus by landmines and UXO in the ten years to 1999, UNICEF has not had any involvement with mine awareness issues in Belarus due mainly to a lack of resources.
Landmine Casualties

In 2001, three people were killed by UXO and four others were injured, including one child.34 There were 105 mine and UXO victims recorded in Belarus between 1990 and 2001. Landmine Monitor has a breakdown year-by-year, for injuries and fatalities, for adults and children. For the entire period, 14 adults were killed and 33 injured and 23 children were killed and 35 injured.35

Survivor Assistance

Medical, surgical, rehabilitation, and reintegration services are available through the Ministry of Health network of hospitals and healthcare institutions.36 In 2001, the Belarus Prosthetic Rehabilitation Center produced 1,309 wheelchairs, 12,061 prosthetic devices, and 4,312 other assistive devices.37

Despite the existence of prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities in Belarus, according to Vladimir Yarmolik, the Executive Director of the Belarus Red Cross, some 600 mine/UXO victims in Belarus are on the waiting list to receive electric wheelchairs and other devices.38 The types of prosthetic devices needed are not produced locally due either to a lack of funding or to inadequate technology.

Physiotherapy and psychosocial rehabilitation facilities appear to be very limited. Reintegration of survivors appears problematic, although companies are requested to engage disabled people. The average monthly pension of a disabled person in Belarus is roughly US$48.39 The Belarus Red Cross considers the development of a mine victim assistance program one of its priorities, but lacks the necessary funding.40

A national disability law exists in Belarus.41

BHUTAN

Bhutan is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has stated that its lack of institutional capacity has been the main obstacle to joining.1 At the intersessional meeting of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on General Status and Operation on 27 May 2002, Australia and Japan reported that Bhutan had responded positively to their diplomatic initiatives promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty in the Asia-Pacific region.2

Bhutan did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001. Bhutan voted in favor of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, as it had in previous years. Bhutan is not believed to use, produce, trade, or stockpile antipersonnel mines. However, the Royal Bhutan Army receives training from India and it is not known if this training includes mine laying and mine clearance techniques, or whether Indian forces stockpile mines in Bhutan to support training activities.

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34 Interview with Colonel Luchina, 5 February 2002; letter no. 18/197 from the Ministry of Defense to Support Centre for Associations and Foundations, 11 February 2002; and interviews with survivors.
35 Landmine Monitor has full details of all the landmine survivors injured in 1999-2001.
36 For details see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 869.
37 Interview with Larisa Andreeva, Head of Planning Department, Belarus Prosthetic Rehabilitation Center, Minsk, 21 January 2002.
38 Interview with Vladimir Yarmolik, Executive Director of the Belarus Red Cross, 29 March 2002.
39 Interview with Lilia Vitshkovskaya, Center of Social Information, Minsk, 27 March 2002.
40 Interview with Vladimir Yarmolik, Belarus Red Cross, 29 March 2002; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 869.
2 Oral remarks to the Standing Committee, notes taken by Landmine Monitor researcher.
Bhutan apparently does not have a landmine problem. However, insurgents from the Assam state of India, including the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) maintain bases in southern Bhutan and reportedly possess landmines and/or improvised explosive devices.³

On 31 July 2001, six Bhutanese nationals were killed and eight injured when a Bhutanese government vehicle triggered a mine in India’s Assam state, three kilometers from the India-Bhutan border. The dead included five Bhutanese forest officials and a student. The landmine was reported to have been planted by the NDFB.⁴ According to the police the attack could be a warning to the Bhutanese government which has been putting pressure on the NDFB to leave the country.⁵

**BURMA (MYANMAR)¹**

*Key developments since May 2001:* Myanmar’s military has continued laying landmines inside the country and along its borders with Thailand. As part of a new plan to “fence the country,” the Coastal Region Command Headquarters gave orders to its troops from Tenasserim division to lay mines along the Thai-Burma border. Three rebel groups, not previously identified as mine users, were discovered using landmines in 2002: Pao People’s Liberation Front, All Burma Muslim Union and Wa National Army. Thirteen rebel groups are now using mines.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Myanmar’s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Myanmar abstained from voting on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. SPDC delegates have not attended any of the annual meetings of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings. Myanmar declined to attend the Regional Seminar of Stockpile Destruction of Anti-personnel Mines and other Munitions, held in Malaysia in August 2001. Myanmar did not respond to an invitation by the government of Malaysia to an informal meeting, held on the side of the January 2002 intersessional meetings in Geneva, to discuss the issue of landmines within the ASEAN context (other ASEAN non-signatories, such as Vietnam, did attend). Myanmar was one of the two ASEAN countries that did not participate in the seminar, “Landmines in Southeast Asia,” hosted by Thailand from 13–15 May 2002.

However, two observers from the Myanmar Ministry of Health attended the Regional Workshop on Victim Assistance in the Framework of the Mine Ban Treaty, held in Thailand from 6-8 November 2001, sponsored by Handicap International (HI). One health officer attending the meeting acknowledged that if Myanmar joined the mine ban it would be a good preventative health measure.²

**Nongovernmental Organizations**

Nonviolence International’s (NI) Southeast Asia office launched a Mine Ban Advocacy and Research Program focused on Burma in 2000. This program has consistently sought to engage political authorities of the government, the opposition National League of Democracy, and the numerous armed non-state actors (NSAs) in Burma. NI has published the Landmine Monitor

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¹ The military junta now ruling the country changed the name from Burma to Myanmar. Many ethnic groups within the country still prefer to use the name Burma. In this report, Myanmar is used when referring to the policies and practices of the State Peace and Development Council, and Burma is used otherwise.

² Their opinion was voiced during an informal discussion with a Landmine Monitor researcher. The observers were Dr. Tin Win Maung, a director of Medical Care at the Myanmar Ministry of Health, and Dr. Ye Hlaing, a director of the Institute of Paramedical Sciences in Mandalay.
Non-Signatories report in the Burmese language every year since 1999 and distributed it both within the country and along its border regions where the mine problem is particularly severe. NI has developed a special kit to educate and encourage unilateral cessation of mine use by the armed ethnic or political organizations operating in Burma.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling

Myanmar has been producing at least three types of antipersonnel mines: MM1, MM2, and Claymore-type mines. The MM2 blast mine reportedly will be fitted with a delay fuze, which activates the mine 30 minutes after it has been laid.

Myanmar is not known to have imported or exported any antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. The Myanmar government will release no official information about the types and quantities of antipersonnel mines it stockpiles. As previously reported in Landmine Monitor, Myanmar has obtained and used antipersonnel mines of Chinese, Israeli, Italian, Russian, United States, and unidentified manufacture. Additionally, another mine found in significant quantities in Burma, and still used by government forces, is the LTM-76 antipersonnel mine. Experts have told Landmine Monitor that these are likely to be decades-old mines of Indian-manufacture. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs denies any transfer of such mines in the past, and states that there are no such mines in the current inventory of the Indian Army.

Use

Myanmar’s military force, the Tatmadaw, has continued laying landmines inside the country and along its borders with Thailand. As part of a new Tatmadaw plan to “fence the country,” the Coastal Region Command Headquarters gave orders in April 2001 to its troops from Tenasserim division to lay mines along the Thai-Burma border. According to a government soldier, since the last week of April 2001, the following troops are responsible for laying landmines: Infantry Battalion (IB) 273 for eastern Ye Phyu township, IB 25 for eastern Tavoy township, IB 285 for eastern Thayetchaung township, IB 103 for eastern Palaw township, IB 17 for eastern Tenasserim township, IB 224 for eastern Bokepyin township, and IB 228 for eastern Kawthaung township. Government troops laid mines in Pa-an and Dooplaya district in Karen state. In a joint operation with the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA), the Tatmadaw laid mines as part of offensive operations in Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) areas of Karen State.

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4 Interview with the Free Trade Union of Burma, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November 2001.


6 One expert identified the LTM-76 as Indian-manufactured because: “1. the colourings and markings are identical to British munitions before 1975, which both India and Pakistan used. 2. the ‘DI’ marking on the mine is also found on many India munitions. This indicates the arsenal from which the weapon comes from—in this case the Dum Dum Arsenal in India.”

7 Fax to Landmine Monitor researcher from Sheel Kant Sharma, Jr. Sec. (D&ISA), Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2 January 2002.

8 Information provided to Landmine Monitor on a confidential basis by an SPDC soldier, April 2001. This comprises all border townships in southern Burma, which are adjacent to Ratchburi, Phetburi, Prachuapkirikhan, and Chumphon Provinces of Thailand.


10 DKBA is a former section of the Karen National Union, but split from the latter, operating at times in alliance with, and with the support of, the Burmese Army since 1992.
bases in southern Shan State across the border from Chiang Rai have reportedly had their perimeters mined.\textsuperscript{11}

Previous Landmine Monitor reports documented use of mines by the Na Sa Ka (Myanmar’s border security force) on the Bangladesh-Burma border, and even inside Bangladesh. However, this practice may have abated or even ended in the past year, according to a Bangladesh border security force (BDR) official and a Burmese rebel leader. The BDR official said that the situation had improved thanks to several meetings between the officials of the border security forces of the two countries.\textsuperscript{12} A leader of an armed opposition group in Arakan, Burma, said, “The cause behind Burma’s not planting new mines this year is the fact that Burma has been facing international criticism for its mines activities. The Burmese authority has also understood that we remove mines planted by them. It does not mean that the whole border area is mine-free. We only de-mine our passage with the help of our own experts with some mine-sweeping equipment. Another cause of it may be that we had minimal activities within Burma this year.”\textsuperscript{13}

Nevertheless, in March 2002 there were several newspaper reports of mine use by Na Sa Ka forces, and an armed opposition group leader told Landmine Monitor that on 17 March 2002, Na Sa Ka men were seen carrying basketfuls of mines to the no-man’s land and emplacing them.\textsuperscript{14}

\section*{Non-State Actors}

Burma has a large number of armed political organizations operating within its borders. According to one source, there are 38,700 men under arms from opposition groups or former opposition groups.\textsuperscript{15} Thirteen armed rebel groups admit that they use antipersonnel mines. Some groups claim not to use mines in offensive operations. In mid-2001 the Lahu National Organization declared a no-mine-use policy and issued a command to its soldiers to neither use nor acquire antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{16}

\section*{NSA-Production, Transfer, Stockpiling}

Several armed militias are capable of building blast and fragmentation mines or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Former DKBA combatants verified their involvement in producing handmade mines, as well as receiving factory-made mines from the Burmese Army.\textsuperscript{17}

These same DKBA combatants also alleged that they purchased mines and components from Thai businessmen who operate logging concessions in DKBA-controlled areas close to Myawaddy.\textsuperscript{18} Even more disturbing, another armed group leader claimed to have been approached in late 2001 by a local Thai military commander offering antipersonnel mines for sale.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{11} Email correspondence with humanitarian aid worker in the Shan community, who heard this from Burmese Shan refugees interviewed arriving from Mong Yawn, 4 April 2002.

\textsuperscript{12} LM-Bangladesh interview with Lt. Col. Reza Noor, Commanding Officer, Naikongchari BDR, Naikongchari BDR camp, 16 January 2002.

\textsuperscript{13} LM-Bangladesh interview with a leader of an NSA of Arakan, Bangladesh-Burma border, 18 January 2002.


\textsuperscript{15} International Institute for Strategic Studies, \textit{The Military Balance 2000-2001}, (London: Oxford University Press, 2001). Although some of these groups have verbal agreements to cease armed hostility, a formal ceasefire has been signed with only one group. All groups maintain their arms and no further actions on a peace accord are being pursued.

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with U Aye Maung, LNO General Secretary, Chaing Mai Province, 5 September 2001.

\textsuperscript{17} Interview with former Democratic Karen Buddhist Army members, Thay Ka Ya village, Burma, 30 November 2001.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with ethnic group leader, Chaing Mai, Thailand, November 2001.
is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty and sale or transfer of antipersonnel mines by a Thai national is prohibited. Several armed groups admit to having antipersonnel mine stockpiles, though none will reveal quantities. Since the publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2001 in September 2001, four more ethnic armed groups have been discovered to maintain stockpiles: National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN); United Wa State Army (UWSA); Wa National Army (WNA); and All Burma Muslim Union (ABMU), as well as a cluster of smaller organizations in southern Karen State who field a few combatants under the banner of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB Column).

**NSA-Use**

At least thirteen ethnic and rebel armed groups are believed to use antipersonnel mines. Three armed groups, not previously identified as mine users, were discovered using landmines in 2002: Pao People’s Liberation Front (PPLF); All Burma Muslim Union; and Wa National Army. The DAB Column organizations have also admitted to use of antipersonnel mines.

Ten NSAs named in last year’s report have continued to use antipersonnel mines: Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO); Chin National Army (CNA); Shan State Army (SSA); United Wa State Army (UWSA); Karenni Army (KA); Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA); Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA); All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF); People’s Defence Forces (PDF); and Myiek-Dawei United Front. One former mine user, God’s Army, is now out of operation.

The Karen National Liberation Army is believed to maintain at least two extensive minefields in the Pa-an district of Karen State; the KNLA states that the mines are necessary to protect internally displaced Karen people (estimated to be in the hundreds of thousands) from attacks by the Burmese Army. It appears that KNLA use of mines may have increased during the reporting period. Mines in Tenasserim division, according to the Karen Human Rights Group, regularly cause casualties among government army patrols. The government issued landmine warnings to alert its soldiers after suffering twenty-four casualties in nineteen incidents from 19 February to 7 April 2001.

Shan State Army reportedly mined areas around its bases straddling the border between Thailand and Burma in those areas of Shan State that are adjacent to Chaing Rai Province of Thailand.

A former second commander of a DKBA battalion estimated 1,000 mines had passed through his hands to his soldiers during the previous six years. People in three villages in Myawaddy township claimed to have heard detonations daily starting October 2001, after the DKBA planted many hundreds of mines, in reprisal for an ambush by the KNLA. By the following month, a

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20 Interview with a rebel officer, 5 September 2001; interview with a leader of an ethnic group, 6 September 2001. For information on NSAs involvement in landmine use, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, pp. 474-476.
21 The DAB Column is the armed wing of political opposition organizations including the Democratic Party for a New Society, the People’s Patriotic Party, and others.
22 Interviews with the leadership of various ethnic and rebel groups. These took place at locations in Chaing Mai, Mae Hong Son, Mae Sariang, Mae Sot Kanchanaburi, and Sangkhlaburi, Thailand between September and November 2001.
23 Interview with Karen Human Rights Group member, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November 2001.
25 Interview with a SPDC military officer, April 2001.
26 Email correspondence with humanitarian aid worker in the Shan community, who heard this from Burmese Shan refugees arriving from Mong Yawn, 4 April 2002.
27 Interview with former Democratic Karen Buddhist Army members, Thay Ka Ya village, Burma, 30 November 2001.
villager and two Buddhist monks had stepped on mines in separate incidents, in which one of the monks died.28

The DKBA also controls a timber concession area by surrounding it with antipersonnel mines. Thai businessmen obtain permission to cut the forest from the DKBA, and the DKBA place mines to deter attacks upon their revenue base by the rival KNU, while simultaneously preventing the businessmen from unilaterally enlarging their concession area.29 A mine planted near an abandoned sawmill in the DKBA-controlled area injured a 19-year-old Karen girl while she was looking for bamboo shoots in May 2001.30 She said she saw some signs saying, “Don’t go further into the jungle,” but had ignored them.

In Karenni State, some mines are allegedly laid in paddy fields, which prevents villagers from farming crops and, instead, leads them to grow opium which requires less space and which is taxed by the NSAs in the area.31 According to one insurgent, mines are also laid near methamphetamine manufacturing factories in southern Shan States at Namsan and Hsi Hseng, in order to prevent people from going near the factories.32

In April 2001, a woman and her daughter were reportedly killed by an antipersonnel mine near a commercial mining concession in Mote Hso, Tavoy province, while they were en route to Thailand.33

**Landmine Problem**

Nine out of fourteen states and divisions in Burma are mine-affected, with a heavy concentration in eastern Burma.34 The Dawna mountain range and Moi riverside close to the Thai-Burma border is reportedly heavily mined.35 Some mountains in Karen State, formerly used as fire bases by the Karen National Liberation Army, have been “no go” areas for over a decade due to severe mine infestation.36 Areas to the north, east, and south of Papun and to the west, south, and north of Myawadi are heavily mine-affected.37

Mines are laid close to areas of civilian activity by the Burmese Army, allegedly to prevent people from returning to their native villages after a forced eviction during counterinsurgency campaigns.38 Interview records with mine survivors show more than 14 percent are injured within half a kilometer from the center of a village. The same records reveal 63 percent of civilian survivors had been to the area often before they stepped on mines.39

Antipersonnel mines planted by both government forces and ethnic armed groups injured and killed not only enemy combatants, but also their own troops, civilians, and animals. Interviews with

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28 Email correspondence with FTUB, 27 November 2001 and interview with FTUB members, Mae Sot, 28 November 2001.
29 Interview with ex-DKBA commander, Thay Ka Ya village, Burma, 30 November 2001.
30 Interview with Naw Mya Win, Mae Tao Clinic, Thailand, 18 September 2001.
31 Interview with insurgent who arrived directly from southwest Shan State, Mae Hong Son, Thailand, May 2001.
32 Ibid. At least three civilians were reported to have been injured by mines in these “off-limit” areas in 1998 and 1999. 33 Interview with insurgent who arrived directly from southwest Shan State, Mae Hong Son, Thailand, May 2001.
34 Chin State, Kachin State, Karen State, Karenni State, Mon State, Pegu division, Rakine State, Shan State, and Tenasserim division.
36 Interview with former ABSDF commander, Chaing Mai, Thailand, 22 March 2002. He stated that these mountains were former guerrilla bases, but were mined heavily when they were forced to abandon them to prevent government forces from using them.
mine survivors reveal that more than 40 percent of the Karen National Liberation Army mine casualties were self-inflicted (injury or death while laying, lifting, or stepping on their own mines, or those of their comrades). A survey by Handicap International reports six percent of all survivors interviewed for their survey were laying or lifting mines at the time of incident.

No systematic marking of mined areas is done within Burma. In some cases, mine victims witnessed some indicators, such as a dead body, cross-cut in a tree, parts of mines and wires, or vague warnings such as the sign seen by the victim quoted above. Although combatants have repeatedly told Landmine Monitor researchers that they give “verbal warnings” to civilians living near areas which they mine, no single civilian mine survivor interviewed by Nonviolence International during the past three years has ever mentioned or reported the issuance of verbal warnings.

Mine Clearance and Mine Risk Education

No humanitarian demining activities have been implemented in Burma. At least one commercial mine clearance company is believed to have been in the country for verification prior to the construction of the Yadana Gas Pipeline. Mine clearance by the Burmese Army for some commercial ventures is believed to have taken place. Some rebel groups and villagers remove mines with any equipment available. In Karen State, a group of villagers carried out clearance with a simple consumer quality metal detector and a rake. Several rebel groups have mine detection equipment.

Although mine detection equipment of UK, French, South Korean, and domestic manufacture is possessed by military engineers within the Burmese Army, some frontline troops have allegedly been ordered to undertake clearance using sharpened bamboo probes to seek and clear suspected mined areas.

Mine risk education is not currently available to ordinary people in Burma. Handicap International has run a Mine Risk Education program in three refugee camps in Thailand along the Burma border since June 2001. The target audience is Burmese refugees in Thailand. This program is financially supported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

A workshop to educate some Myanmar government agencies about landmine risk was organized under the auspices of the Human Rights Committee of Myanmar, which operates within the Ministry of Home Affairs. The workshop took place in Rangoon on 18-20 February 2002. The Mines Advisory Group provided the key resource person and trainer for the workshop, which was attended by 40 representatives of the police, fire brigades and Myanmar Red Cross, and was funded by AusAID (Australian government). The Mines Advisory Group stated that the attendees were to further instruct communities in mine-safe behavior. Also in February 2001, Asian Landmine

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40 Ibid.
43 Some NSAs and the Tatmadaw conduct military demining. In some cases, NSAs remove SPDC mines then re-deploy them. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 522 for detail.
44 Photograph evidence given to Landmine Monitor during interview with the chief prosthetic technician of the Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November 2001.
45 Photographic documentation from various sources, all undated, showing NSAs involved in detection and lifting operations with electronic detectors.
47 Interview with an SPDC military officer, April 2001.
50 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG, 22 July 2002.
Solution (ALS), a commercial demining company, gave a technical briefing on humanitarian demining to three agencies operating within the country: Association for Aid and Relief (AAR), Swiss Aid, and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. However, the government of Myanmar does not currently allow any international aid agency to set up programs in mine affected areas.

**Atrocity Demining**

Burmese Army units operating in areas suspected of mine contamination near the Thai border have repeatedly been accused of forcing non-Burman ethnic local people, or anyone compelled to serve as a porter for the military, to walk in front of the soldiers to detonate any mines. (See *Landmine Monitor Reports 1999-2001*). According to a Burmese Army defector, on 21 April 2001 in Tennaserim division, three prisoner porters, 22-year-old Aung Hsan Nyunt, 26-year-old Maung Maung Than, and 20-year-old Ko Hsan, were allegedly forced to walk in front of soldiers in suspected mined areas; they were later killed during a firefight between the Burma Army and a guerrilla group. A March 2002 report claims that in Papun and Nyanglebin Districts of Karen State civilians were seized during counterinsurgency operations by the Burmese Army and used as human minesweepers. According to the survey by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), more than seven percent of interviewed refugees identified “forced to walk on minefields” as a source of trauma. Landmine Monitor cannot verify these reports, but notes that the consistent behavior reported by different sources over the past four years is extremely disturbing.

A newly reported practice demands those taken to porter for the military to manually clear mines without adequate training or tools. A former porter who escaped from Burmese Army service told the Landmine Monitor researcher that he was forced to seek mines using a long sharpened bamboo prod, piercing the ground and removing any found mines by hand. According to the KNLA, in September 2001, during a joint military operation, SPDC and DKBA troops seized forty villagers in Thaton district and forced them to work clearing landmines in this manner.

**Landmine Casualties**

Although landmine casualties appear to be increasing, especially during the last five to six years, the total number of landmine casualties in Burma remains unknown. Systematic collection of data remains difficult, especially in relation to those who are killed rather than injured in an incident. However, there were reports of new casualties in 2001: between 19 February and 7 April, 24 soldiers were killed or injured in landmine incidents; in April, a woman and her daughter were killed by an antipersonnel mine in Tavoy province; and in May, a 19-year-old Karen girl was injured by a mine planted near an abandoned sawmill in the DKBA-controlled area.

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51 Interview with organizations that participated in the briefing, 27 February 2001.
52 Interview with Burmese Army defector, 24 April 2001.
54 International Rescue Committee and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Mental Health Assessment among Karenni Refugees in 3 Camps in Mae Hong Son,” Thailand, August 2001.
55 Interview with a former porter who served for SPDC military during February and March 2001. Interview was conducted on 21 April 2001.
58 Interview with a SPDC military officer, April 2001.
59 Interview with insurgent who arrived directly from southwest Shan State, Mae Hong Son, Thailand, May 2001.
60 Interview with Naw Mya Win, Mae Tao Clinic, Thailand, 18 September 2001.
in November, in separate incidents, a villager and two Buddhist monks stepped on mines and one of the monks died.61

According to the Thailand Landmine Impact Survey data, in two of the highest mine-incident provinces adjacent to Burma, Burmese mine casualties increased from 14 in the period June 1999 to May 2000, to 30 in the period June 2000 to May 2001.62 The casualty data of Thailand’s Landmine Impact Survey includes many Burmese survivors residing in Thailand.63 Data from the Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) emergency medical clinic in Mae La refugee camp, on the Burma/Thai border, recorded 17 mine casualties sent to Thai hospitals for surgery between June and December 2001.64

Handicap International conducted a mine casualties survey focused on mine survivors in Tak Province, Thailand, including refugees living in three camps.65 It recorded 132 casualties between 1959 and 1995, nine casualties in 1996, 14 in 1997, 16 in 1998, 11 in 1999, 22 in 2000, and ten in the first two months of 2001. All but one of the 214 landmine survivors interviewed were Burmese. Handicap International revealed that in three of the largest refugee camps on the Burma/Thai border covered in their survey, 10 percent of all disabled persons were victims of landmines.66 The survey was funded by UNHCR.

A survey conducted by Nonviolence International (NI) reveals a similar increase in mine casualties between 1996 and 2000.67 Interviews of landmine survivors now residing in Thailand and Bangladesh reveal that 40 percent were civilians at the time of incident. Survivors under 16 years comprise six percent of all survivors interviewed, yet half of these were conducting military activities at the time of the incident. Twelve child soldiers were found from the interviews, which account for 11 percent of military mine casualties in the survey.68 Data from an NSA medical unit collected in three townships in Nyaunlaybin District, Karen State also reveals an increase in mine casualties between 1996 and 2000; one casualty was recorded in 1996 and twelve in 2000.69 Landmine Monitor research has found that the number of casualties within an NSA’s own group, by their own mines, to be higher than what the NSAs sometimes publicly admit.

All surveys reported that the majority of mine casualties are male (94 percent in NI survey, 95 percent in HI survey, 93 percent in the Landmine Impact Survey, and 96.6 percent in IRC/CDC); and the majority were engaged in military activities at the time of the incident (61 percent in NI, 61.5 percent in HI, 52 percent in Landmine Impact Survey, and 65 percent in IRC/CDC).70

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61 Email correspondence with FTUB, 27 November 2001 and interview with FTUB members, Mae Sot, 28 November 2001.
62 These figures, only for mine victims from Burma, taken from Thailand’s Landmine Impact Survey data, were extracted from the database at the Thailand Mine Action Center by Landmine Monitor researchers.
64 Statistics on War Injuries from MSF, provided to Landmine Monitor, 15 March 2002. In the same period in 2000, 16 mine casualties were transferred. Information was not available for the full year as data for some months had been lost.
66 Ibid., pp. E5-6.
68 NI’s survey shows five casualties in 1996 and 23 in 2000. The survey, started in 1999, is ongoing and includes data obtained from landmine survivors as well as from mine-affected communities. NI has attempted to include other agencies in the data collection process and is negotiating with Myanmar’s Ministry of Health to develop a Mine Incident Surveillance Database within the National Rehabilitation Hospitals. NI’s survey received financial support from the Canadian government, Open Society Institute, and the ICBL’s Landmine Monitor.
71 The figures from the Landmine Impact Survey data were extracted from the database at the Thailand Mine Action Center by the Landmine Monitor researchers. Statistics for mine casualties sent for emergency surgery from the MSF border clinic for 2000-2001 are 97 percent male, 3 percent female (MSF data was sent to Landmine Monitor 15 March 2002, but is missing some months of 2001 due to data loss).
The pan-ethnic medical organization, Back Pack Health Worker Teams (BPHWT),\textsuperscript{71} conducted a survey in several internally displaced communities in Karen State from January to June 2001. The survey used a cluster sampling method and covered 776 households. Of those households in which a person above five years of age had died during the previous year, five percent of deaths were reported to have been caused by landmines.\textsuperscript{72}

Limited information is available on landmine casualties in 2002. Handicap International has established a reporting system with Thai border hospitals in order to improve data collection on landmine casualties in Tak province. In the period January to April 2002 nineteen new casualties were reported, including two people killed and seventeen injured. Fourteen of the casualties were the result of incidents on the Burma side of the border.\textsuperscript{73}

**Survivor Assistance**

Availability of medical care depends on where the incident occurred, with an average of 12 hours elapsing before first medical attention, according to interviews by Nonviolence International.\textsuperscript{74} After the emergency care, the survey by Handicap International showed that 77 percent of landmine survivors were hospitalized in Thailand, while 23 percent were hospitalized in Burma.\textsuperscript{75} A survey by NI shows similar results: 63 percent were hospitalized in Thailand, 27 percent in Burma, and 4 percent in Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{76}

Survivor assistance for Burmese mine casualties comes from three main sources: assistance from the public health system; assistance available from non-state sources; and assistance from neighboring states as many members of mine-affected communities have fled the country to seek asylum, or are in rebel controlled areas.

**Survivor Assistance Within Myanmar**

Survivor assistance continues to be marginal due to the neglect and impoverished state of the medical system in Myanmar.\textsuperscript{77} A mine survivor who received medical treatment in Myawaddy governmental hospital said it had cost nearly 100,000 kyat (around US$105); being unable to pay, he sent sacks of rice harvested from his farm instead.\textsuperscript{78} Military casualties from within the Burmese Army are eligible to receive treatment in military hospitals in Myanmar, although some have reported having to wait unless they pay a bribe.\textsuperscript{79}

Physical rehabilitation and prosthetics are available to landmine survivors within Myanmar through the National Rehabilitation Centers (NRC), provided they can travel to the workshops. The ICRC runs a joint program with the NRCs to provide rehabilitation and prosthetic devices at five centers, two of which are run by the Ministry of Defense and three by the Ministry of Health. There are two centers in Rangoon, and one Mandalay, Maymyo, and Yenanthar.\textsuperscript{80} The Myanmar Red Cross registers and refers amputees to the centers while the ICRC covers the costs of transport, lodging, and food during the time needed for a fitting. The ICRC organizes regular refresher courses for technicians, and has trained orthopedic surgeons from Mandalay Hospital in basic prosthetics. The ICRC and Myanmar Red Cross will open a new center for prosthetic production

\textsuperscript{71}Back Pack Health Worker Team consists of 60 small groups who travel in ethnic-controlled areas of Burma with medicines, food and tools for emergency care in backpacks.

\textsuperscript{72}Backpack Health Worker Team Program, Summary of Descriptive Analysis of Water, Sanitation and Mortality Survey, January-June 2001.

\textsuperscript{73}Fax to Landmine Monitor Thailand from Saowaluk Sac-Tang, Mine Risk Education Project Manager, Handicap International, Mae Sot, 15 May 2002.


\textsuperscript{77}See also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp.524-526.

\textsuperscript{78}Interview with a landmine survivor in Mae La Refugee Camp, 19 March 2002. He was hospitalized from 20 March 2001 until the end of May 2001.

\textsuperscript{79}Interview with Dr. Cynthia Maung, Director, Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November 2001.

and rehabilitation in Hpa-An, a capital of Karen State, later in 2002.\footnote{ICRC (Geneva), \textit{Special Report, Mine Action 2001}, July 2002, p. 25.} Prostheses are provided for free through these hospitals, though in one case, a mine survivor paid 50,000 Kyats (around US$53), while waiting for their prostheses for food and accommodation fees, during a 20-day stay in the National Rehabilitation Center, and additional transport costs for an attendant who helped the survivor to travel.\footnote{Interview with a landmine survivor, Rangoon, November 2001.}

The ICRC is the only assistance organization directly involved in physical rehabilitation programs with the government. Orthopedic devices produced with ICRC assistance represent 80 percent of the total national production. In 2001, the ICRC program provided 1,539 prostheses to mine survivors. This accounted for 72 percent of total prosthetic/orthotic production in its joint programs with the Ministries of Health and Defense. Of 14 ICRC Prosthetic/Orthotic programs worldwide in 2001, Myanmar accounts for the third highest number of mine survivors receiving prostheses, after Afghanistan and Angola.\footnote{ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programmes, \textit{Annual Report 2001}, ICRC, Geneva, 4 April 2002.}

NGOs provide some vocational training to disabled people in Myanmar. The Association for Aid and Relief, Japan in Rangoon has been providing training in tailoring and hair cutting since March 2000; over 150 people have received training, of which about 20 percent are landmine survivors.\footnote{Email to Landmine Monitor from Yukie Osa, AAR Japan, 19 June 2002.} A vocational workshop for disabled people organized by Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC) was held in Rangoon on 19-29 November 2001. All 45 participants were from Kayah State, including at least two landmine survivors.

\section*{Survivor Assistance Within NSA Areas or Among the Internally Displaced}

In areas close to its borders where ethnic-based militias may control or access territory, some minimal care is provided by their relief and medical arms.\footnote{Interviews with 54 landmine survivors by Nonviolence International show that 26 percent of mine victims who received medical care inside Burma went through either mobile clinics or ethnic group’s frontline medical team.} The BPHWT also provides some emergency care for casualties in NSA-controlled areas of Mon, Karen, Karenni, and Shan States.\footnote{Some foreign missionary aid groups also provide services.} The Trauma Care Foundation runs three “jungle clinics” inside the country to provide primary medical care.\footnote{Landmine Monitor interview with a member of Trauma Care Foundation, 18 January 2002; Annual Report 2001 of Trauma Care Foundation. The Norwegian government supports the foundation with its activities.} Available medical care remains poor to non-existent as it relies on mobile medical staff being in the area at the time of need. Low numbers of medical staff, rugged terrain, and the normal chaos and insecurity of civil war means luck is a major factor in receiving trained medical care. International NGOs active in refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border have not pursued provision of cross-border medical care in NSA-controlled areas due to the presence of landmines.\footnote{Comment from an MSF member at the Committee for Co-ordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand, 13 March 2002.}

The Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People (CIDKP) maintains a prosthetic workshop in a KNU-controlled area. Medical organizations such as BPHWT refer mine survivors to CIDKP’s workshop.\footnote{Interview with a coordinator of BPHWT, 18 March 2002.} Through the assistance of Maryknoll Thailand, a building for a vocational rehabilitation program was built in Mae La Potah, in Karen ethnic area, but it was burned to the ground by a military attack prior to use.\footnote{Interview with Dr. Cynthia Maung, Director, Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 13 March 2002.}

\section*{Survivor Assistance Available to Burmese Mine Survivors in Neighboring States}

In areas near its borders, the security situation and poor internal facilities drive some Burmese to seek access to services in neighboring states. The Mae Tao Clinic, which is located...
near the Thai-Burma border, as well as Médecins Sans Frontières, the International Rescue Committee, American Refugee Committee, Aide Médicale International, and Malteser Germany, all provide emergency medical referral of war injury survivors who arrive at their facilities in refugee camps to hospitals in Thailand.91 The cost of medical treatment varies according to the extent of the injury, but on average costs over 20,000 Baht (US$454) per person.92 The cost of transportation alone prohibits some Burmese from seeking medical care in Thailand. To go from mine-affected Pa-an district to Mae Sot, Thailand, a distance of 40 kilometers, costs 5,000 Kyats (around US$5) each way, which is more than two months wages for farmers.93 In some cases, those who could not reach any medical attention try to treat themselves with herbal leaves.94

Both Thai and international organizations continue to provide prosthetics for refugees in Thailand. Handicap International operates four prosthetic workshops in refugee camps along the Thai-Burma border. Vocational training is available at two refugee camps, provided by the Karen Handicapped Welfare Association in Mae La camp, and the Disabled People’s Rehabilitation Team in Nu Po camp; both run candle making, sewing, and mechanics training for disabled people. These local groups are financially supported by Handicap International. The Mae Tao clinic also runs a sewing training program for the disabled. Three of the instructors are landmine amputees. Some Burmese migrants to Thailand who are landmine survivors cannot access official assistance offered by international organizations if they are not accepted into an organized refugee camp. Since April 2001, the Mae Tao Clinic in Thailand, which specializes in assisting Burmese migrants, has operated a prosthetics section. During 2001, it provided 28 free prostheses, 70 percent of which were for landmine survivors; it also provided training in prosthetics for six people from Burma’s ethnic minority areas. The prosthetic section was funded by Clear Path International in 2001.95 In the Sangkhlaburi area close to the Thai-Burma border, a joint project by Nonviolence International, Handicap International, the River Kwai Christian Hospital, and a local organizer, provided 28 prostheses for illegal Burmese immigrants in 2001, with funding from individuals in Belgium and Japan.96

The International Rescue Committee in Mae Hong Son and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention conducted a mental health assessment in three Karenni refugee camps in May-June 2001, focusing on the general camp population and on landmine survivors. The results of the study showed that refugees injured by landmines have high prevalence rates for non-specific psychological problems: depression (59 percent) and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (10 percent).96 The IRC provides a counseling service in the refugee camps; it is not known how many mine survivors benefit from this service.97

Less medical care is available on the Bangladesh-Burma border. In one case, a Bangladeshi mine survivor from near the Burma border went through five clinics and hospitals until he reached an NGO, Bangladesh Rehabilitation Center for Trauma Victims (BRTC), who provided him treatment at a private hospital in the capital that had enough facilities and skill to treat mine injuries.98

91 MSF referred 30 mine casualties to Mae Sod hospital in Thailand from April 2001 to November 2001, according to the MSF office in Mae Sod, 10 December 2001.
92 Email correspondence with MSF office in Mae Sot, 22 March 2002.
93 Interview with Dr. Cynthia Maung, Director, Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 28 November 2001; Burma Fund, “Humanitarian Crisis, Aid and Governance of Burma,” April 1999.
95 Interview with Dr. Cynthia Maung, Director, Mae Tao Clinic, Mae Sot, Thailand, 13 March 2002.
96 International Rescue Committee and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Mental Health Assessment among Karenni Refugees in 3 Camps in Mae Hong Son,” Thailand, August 2001. The survey covers 58 landmine survivors in the three refugee camps.
98 Interview with a landmine survivor by Landmine Monitor Bangladesh researcher, January 2002.
Disability Policy and Practice

No disability law exists in Myanmar. Landmine Monitor was told that a disability policy exists, but no one could give details of the content of the policy, even in institutions serving disabled persons. There is an initiative by Disabled People International (DPI) Thailand for improvement of the environment for persons with disabilities in Myanmar. DPI organized a First National Leadership Seminar for People with Disabilities in Rangoon from 20-22 February 2002, funded by the Japan Foundation. Acknowledging the lack of a clear disability policy, either in existence or implementation, DPI submitted a declaration from the seminar, encouraging the government to establish and implement disability laws.99

Two observers from the Ministry of Health attended the South East Asia Regional Conference on Victim Assistance, held in Thailand from 6-8 November 2001, sponsored by Handicap International.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

Key developments since May 2001: In June 2002, the President signed the law to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. The CAR publicly stated for the first time that it has a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines for training purposes, but that it has never used, produced, or exported mines.

The Central African Republic has not yet formally acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, in May 2002, the government’s focal point on landmine issues, Colonel Nassin Nicaise of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that a bill to accede to the treaty was before the National Assembly; it was subsequently reported that the National Assembly approved the accession law and the President signed it on 25 June 2002.1 This completed the domestic steps necessary for accession, however, as of 31 July 2002, the instrument of accession had not yet been officially deposited with the UN Secretary-General.

Because of conditions in the country after a mutiny in May 2001, the Central African Republic was not able to participate in the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua, Nicaragua, in September 2001 or in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, in January 2002.2 However, the government did attend the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002.

Colonel Nicaise told Landmine Monitor that the Central African Republic has not used antipersonnel mines in the past, and that there was no reported mine use during the May 2001 mutiny.3 He confirmed, for the first time, that the Central African Republic has a very limited quantity of antipersonnel mines in stockpile, kept for training purposes only.4 Colonel Nicaise reported to States Parties that the Central African Republic has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.5 He has also stated that the Central African Republic would never allow the

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99 The declaration, written in Burmese, was submitted to the leaders of the Myanmar government and stated that participants would “cordially welcome a law for the disabled.”


2 Telephone interview with Col. Nassin Nicaise, Officer in Charge of Security Matters, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 May 2002. Colonel Nicaise indicated the CAR would like to attend the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2002, but that financial support was needed. Phone interview, 12 February 2002.

3 Interview with Col. Nassin Nicaise, Officer in Charge of Security Matters, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bangui, 12 February 2002.

4 Telephone interview with Col. Nicaise, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 May 2002. He said he would contact the Army Chief of Staff and, if necessary, the military schools to get all the relevant information on the type and quantities of mines stockpiled.

transit of landmines through its territory or airspace,\(^6\) and that the government has found no evidence of transit of antipersonnel mines.\(^7\)

The Central African Republic was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 November 2001. It is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and did not participate in the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the CCW, or the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001.

Although the Central African Republic is not believed to be mine-affected, authorities are concerned about the risk of mines on its borders with Chad and Sudan. Joint military patrols have been organized with neighboring countries to minimize the risks.\(^8\) There are no reports of any mine victims in the Central African Republic.

CHINA

Mine Ban Policy

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. China continues to insist on a military requirement for antipersonnel mines at the present time, while acknowledging the importance of a total prohibition from a humanitarian point of view.

At the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in December 2001, Ambassador Sha Zukang stated:

There are currently two major international legal instruments on landmines: the amended Landmine Protocol...and the so-called Ottawa Convention... Both instruments are aimed at reducing and eliminating threats to civilians posed by APLs. They are complementary to each other. If we look at the issue exclusively from the humanitarian perspective, the approach of a total ban adopted by the Ottawa Convention is obviously the better of the two. Countries with a more benign security environment and less dependence on APLs can certainly opt for the Ottawa approach. We respect the sovereign choice by the states parties to the Ottawa Convention. However, for those countries with a more complex security environment and higher reliance on APLs thus unable to give up the right of the legitimate use of APLs for the purpose of self-defense, the amended Landmine Protocol becomes a natural choice. Striking an appropriate balance between humanitarian concerns and security needs, the amended Protocol attempts to address the humanitarian concerns through restrictions on the use of APLs and strengthened post-war demining efforts. It is fair to say that the two legal instruments share the same objectives.\(^1\)

In September 2001, China did not participate as an observer in the Third Meeting of States Parties. It did, however, participate in some of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. China was one of the nineteen states to abstain from voting on pro-ban treaty UN General Assembly Resolution 26/54M in November 2001.

On 4 November 1998, China ratified CCW Amended Protocol II and indicated it would exercise the optional nine-year deferral period for compliance with key restrictions. At the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the CCW in December 2001, China strongly opposed the proposal for an antivehicle landmine (AVL) protocol: “Further restriction on use of AVLs might help reduce the accidental civilian casualties caused by such weapons. However, we should


\(^7\) Statement by Col. Nassin Nicaise, Officer in Charge of Security Matters, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the intersessional Standing Committee Meetings, Geneva, May 2002.

\(^8\) Telephone interview with Col. Nicaise, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 May 2002.

recognize that the AVL is a crucial and irreplaceable means of national defense for many countries, including China. Any inappropriate restrictions on the use of AVLs may be detrimental to the security interests of those countries, which in itself runs counter to the basic spirit of humanitarianism.”

China submitted its national annual report as required under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II. China also produced a documentary film entitled “China in Action” to provide an introduction to China’s implementation of the Protocol for distribution to interested delegations upon request.

Production

China is known as one of the world’s largest producers of antipersonnel mines. China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) and Chinese State Arsenals have been producing approximately twenty-two types of antipersonnel mines, six of which are based on Soviet designs and the rest of which are Chinese.

China reported that since 1997, it has ceased the production of antipersonnel mines without a self-destruct capability and, “Since 1999, China has stipulated that all the new APLs under research, development and manufacturing should have self-deactivation capability.” China also reported to have issued a document, “The Functional Requirements of Anti-Personnel Landmines of PLA in Compliance with Protocol II,” containing the requirements for the new production of antipersonnel landmines: “…the newly produced mines should be detectable to the extent that the mines should provide a response signal equivalent to a signal from eight grammes or more of iron in a single coherent mass with common-available mine-detectors.”

The 2001 Article 13 Report did not report on mines produced before 1997, and whether they were destroyed or whether 8 grammes of metal were added. Following a request from Landmine Monitor to clarify this point, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded, “As illustrated in our national report to the 3rd Annual Conference of States Parties to the Landmine Protocol of the CCW last December, the Chinese Government has been consistently complying with the Protocol and made great efforts in executing its obligations.”

Transfer

In the past China was one of the world’s largest exporters of antipersonnel mines. On 22 April 1996, the government of China declared a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are incompatible with Protocol II requirements. China’s commitment was re-affirmed by Ambassador Sha Zukang in his statement to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to the CCW Amended Protocol II: “Since April 1996, China has faithfully abided by its commitment to a moratorium on the export of APLs incompatible with the technical specifications contained in the amended Landmine Protocol.” Landmine Monitor is unaware of exports of any Chinese antipersonnel mines of any type since that time.

Stockpiling

China is believed to have the largest antipersonnel mine stockpile in the world. Based on interviews with non-Chinese government officials involved in Protocol II discussions, Landmine Monitor has estimated the Chinese antipersonnel mine stockpile at 110 million, including perhaps 100 million Type 72 mines.

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6 Ibid., p. 4.
7 Email from Zhao Li, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, 13 March 2002.
In late 1999 China reported that it had destroyed over 1.7 million old-type antipersonnel mines.\(^9\) China’s December 2000 and December 2001 Article 13 reports did not mention any updated figures. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has never responded to Landmine Monitor requests for clarification on the number of antipersonnel mines in stockpiles. China attended the regional stockpile destruction seminar held in Malaysia in August 2001.

**Landmine Problem and Clearance**

China has used antipersonnel mines along its borders with Russia, India, and Vietnam, planting an estimated ten million mines along these borders over the years.\(^{10}\) The government states, “China is not a country seriously affected by mines.”\(^{11}\) After major clearance operations from 1992-1999, China maintains that the “mine threat on the Chinese side along the Sino-Vietnamese border has been basically removed.”\(^{12}\) The danger to civilians from mines laid along China’s borders with India and Russia is reportedly minimal due to the sparsely populated or mountainous terrain.\(^{13}\) However, China reported problems with other unexploded ordnance: “Today, a large number of unexploded ordnance left over from World War II remains on the Chinese territory, posing serious threats to the lives and property of local people.”\(^{14}\)

China reported that no mine clearance activities have been conducted since 1999, when China completed clearance of its border with Vietnam, “basically resolving the mine problem within its territory.”\(^{15}\) For some minefields, covering a total of 20-30 million square meters, China decided to mark and “seal” the areas instead of clearing them.\(^{16}\)

**Mine Action**

China has contributed to international humanitarian mine clearance efforts since 1998. China donated $100,000 to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for assistance in mine clearance for the period 1999 to 2000; in addition it sponsored two international mine clearance training courses in China.\(^{17}\)

In 2001, China donated mine detecting and clearing equipment worth $1,260,000 to seven mine-affected countries including Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, and Rwanda.\(^{18}\) The donated equipment was used in the post-war mine clearance operations in border areas in Yunnan and Guangxi provinces from 1992 to 1999, and includes mine detectors, minesweeping blasting cartridges, rocket blasting devices, and personal demining protective equipment.\(^{19}\) In 2001, the Chinese government sent a delegation of government officials and

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\(^{12}\) Ministry of National Defense, Postwar Demining Operations in China, December 1999, p. 11. Before the clearance operations, landmines posed a threat to civilians in the border areas with Vietnam, where there were more than 560 minefields covering an area of over 300 square kilometers.


\(^{17}\) For more details, Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 485.


\(^{19}\) Ibid.
demining experts to Eritrea for on-site demonstration of, and training in, the use of China’s
demining equipment. The delegation also conducted a survey on the local landmine problem. At
the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to the CCW Amended Protocol II in December
2001, China offered “to conduct cooperation and exchanges with interested countries and
international organizations in the field of demining assistance, so as to make further contributions
to international demining efforts.”

Landmine Casualties

Although the government of China is believed to be collecting information on landmine
casualties, no comprehensive data is available. In February 2001, Landmine Monitor conducted a
field survey in the provinces of Guangxi and Yunnan, both bordering Vietnam. The survey found
that most mine incidents occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In Guangxi, three counties
were surveyed and 359 mine casualties identified. No new mine casualties had been reported in
these counties since 1996. In Yunnan Province, Landmine Monitor surveyed Wenshan Prefecture,
and 5,310 mine casualties were identified, including 3,811 survivors. The latest recorded mine
incident occurred in September 2000.

The China Disabled Person’s Federation (CDPF) in Beijing did not approve a planned field
survey in 2002 by Landmine Monitor to Honghe and Simao in Yunnan Province. However, a
report was provided by the local CDPFs in Honghe and Simao. The Simao CDPF did not collect
any data on mine casualties as few people were affected by landmines. In Honghe prefecture,
Landmine Monitor received information from the Jinping, Luchun and Hekou CDPFs, although the
information was incomplete.

The Jinping CDPF report identified twelve landmine survivors, who needed either new or
replacement prostheses. The report from the Luchun CDPF identified ten landmine survivors,
who needed either new or replacement prostheses. In the Hekou Yao ethnic minority autonomic
county, the CDPF identified 15 landmine survivors, in a total population of 1,133, who needed new
or replacement prostheses. The majority of survivors identified were farmers.

Survivor Assistance, Disability Policy and Practice

As a result of the field survey conducted in February 2001, information is available on
survivor assistance programs in some mine-affected areas in Guangxi and Yunnan provinces.
Adequate assistance is problematic as the mine-affected areas are a relatively long distance from
medical and rehabilitation facilities.

China’s December 2000 Protocol II report included for the first time a section on
Rehabilitation and Relief of Civilians Accidentally Injured by Landmines. The section reported the
measures undertaken by the Chinese government to assist, rehabilitate, and relieve civilians injured
by landmines during and after the conflict with Vietnam.

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
25 Telephone interview with Yunnan Provincial CDPF, February 2002.
26 Details on the survivors were provided in the reports.
27 Report by the CDPF (China Disabled People’s Federation) of Jinping Miao, Yao, Dai ethnic minority
autonomic county, 29 March 2002.
28 Report by the CDPF (China Disabled People’s Federation) of Lu Chen, 28 March 2002.
29 CDPF Hekou Yao, “Report on disabled people affected by mines in Hekou Yao, Yunnan Province,”
March 2002.
31 Ibid., p. 533.
COMOROS

The Union of Comoros (formerly, the Islamic Federal Republic of Comoros) has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, government officials have informally told Landmine Monitor that the political will exists to do so as soon as possible, and when the situation in the archipelago stabilizes.1 A new political system is in place and in May 2002, a newly elected national President formed a new government for the Union of Comoros as part of a devolution process.2 According to a Foreign Affairs spokesperson, these constitutional changes mean that Comoros is in a better position to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.3


Comoros is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and did not attend the CCW meetings in Geneva in December 2001.

A number of coups and attempted coups have occurred in the Comoros since independence from France in 1975. Despite this history, there is no evidence that antipersonnel mines have ever been used in these conflicts.4 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Landmine Monitor in 2001 that Comoros has not produced, imported, exported, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines; Comoros is not mine-affected and there have been no landmine casualties.5

CUBA

Mine Ban Policy

Cuba and the USA remain the only countries in the Americas region that have not yet joined the Mine Ban Treaty. Cuba’s position has not changed since its Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided Landmine Monitor with a detailed policy statement in June 2000.1 That statement indicated that Cuba fully “understands and shares the humanitarian concerns caused by the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of antipersonnel landmines” and described its full support for “humanitarian efforts made by the international community to prevent or mitigate the effects of the indiscriminate use of this kind of weapons.”2

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1 Interview with Foreign Affairs spokesperson, during Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 30 January 2002.
2 Under the new system, the islands of Grande Comore, Anjouan and Moheli govern most of their own affairs, with their own federal presidents. The Fomboni All-Part Framework Agreement was devised to implement the transitional processes in returning the Comoros to constitutional rule and restoring the territorial integrity of the country.
3 Interview with Foreign Affairs spokesperson, during intersessional Standing Committee meetings, Geneva, 29 May 2002.
4 See previous editions of Landmine Monitor Report. On 20 December 2001, the OAU Military Observer Mission was deployed to supervise arms collection in Anjouan as part of the Fomboni All-Part Framework Agreement and it appears that no antipersonnel mines were identified during this process.
6 Interview with a diplomatic source, Moroni, 13 April 2001; telephone interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, 11 April 2001.
A delegation from the ICBL accepted an official invitation to visit Cuba in September 2001. Cuba viewed the invitation as an expression of Cuba’s humanitarian concern, but government officials continued to state that Cuba will not join a treaty that it “cannot comply with.” The visit included a tour of Cuban mined areas surrounding the US Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, as well as meetings with the officials of the Directorate of Multi-lateral Affairs in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and representatives of the Cuban Association of Physically Disabled People (ACLIFIM) and the Centre for the Study of International Humanitarian Law.

Cuba participated as an observer in the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua in September 2001. A representative from Cuba’s Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva attended the January and May 2002 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings. As it had done in previous years, Cuba in November 2001 abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Cuba is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II on landmines, but has not yet ratified Amended Protocol II. The ICBL delegation to Cuba was informed by the Multi-Sector Committee on Disarmament, that the process for ratification was ongoing, but had been delayed by the need to ensure that Cuba could fulfill all of its obligations and because a number of possible amendments to Amended Protocol II were being discussed in the lead-up to the Second Review Conference.

Cuba participated as an observer in the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and also participated in the Second CCW Review Conference, both in December 2001. Regarding the proposal for a new protocol on explosive remnants of war, Cuba stated that it shared the humanitarian concerns, but believed that further clarification and political, technical and legal discussion were needed; it supported the establishment of an open-ended intergovernmental group of experts with a broad mandate on the issue.

**Production, Transfer and Stockpiling**

Cuba’s state-owned Union of Military Industries (Unión de las Industrias Militares, UIM) is believed to continue production of antipersonnel mines. In April 2001, Cuban Defense Minister Raul Castro, told the media: “We manufacture them [landmines] of all types, but we never export them, nor are we going to.”

Since 1996, Cuba has maintained that it does not export antipersonnel mines. This was reiterated by government representatives during the ICBL visit in September 2001. The ICBL delegation raised the need for Cuba to establish a formal moratorium or prohibition on the export of antipersonnel mines to formalize these statements and government representatives indicated they would investigate whether a more formal and legal ban could be imposed.

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3 The ICBL delegation consisted of two representatives of the ICBL’s Coordination Committee: Noel Stott, Mines Action Southern Africa, and Diana Roa-Castro, Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas. The visit took place from 24-29 September 2001.


5 Statement made during a meeting between the ICBL and the Multi-Sector Committee on Disarmament, Havana, Cuba, 24 September 2001.


7 According to the US Department of Defense, Cuba has produced at least five types of landmines, including three antipersonnel mines: PMFC-1 fragmentation mine, PMF-1 fragmentation mine, PPM-1 wooden box mine. ORDATA II CD-ROM. For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 316.

8 “Cuba won't renounce use of landmines as defense weapons: Castro,” Agence France Presse (Havana), 26 April 2001.


No official information is available on the size and composition of Cuba’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but based on information in the military trade press, it appears that Cuba has OZM-4, POMZ-2, and POMZ-2M mines.11

Use

Both the US and Cuba planted landmines around the US Naval Base at Guantánamo in the southeast of Cuba. Cuban officials in charge of the military base at Guantánamo told the ICBL delegation that they could not provide ICBL with details on the number and types of mines laid on Cuban territory, but they stated that fragmentation mines are not used.12

Cuban authorities have stated that the Cuban minefields are duly “marked, fenced and guarded” to ensure the protection of civilians, as stipulated by the CCW’s Amended Protocol II.13 During the ICBL visit to Guantánamo this was confirmed and it was evident that the minefields were well maintained.

Clearance by the US of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines from the US minefields around Guantánamo began in September 1996 and was completed in 1999.14 Three verification stages were then carried out, with the final phase completed in May 2000.15 It is not known if the US maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines at the US Naval Base in Guantánamo.

Mine Action, Casualties, and Survivor Assistance

In 2001, two mine incidents were reported in which one person was killed and three others injured.16 No incidents were reported in the first six months of 2002.

Representatives of the Cuban Association of Physically Disabled People (ACLIFIM), a membership group of 50,000 people that provides a support network for people with disabilities, told ICBL that they have not encountered Cuban civilians with disabilities as a result of landmines.17 It is possible that Cuban soldiers participating in past conflicts overseas have been killed or maimed by antipersonnel mines but no accurate information is available.

While there is no specific program to deal with Cuban landmine survivors, Cuba has a free and universal healthcare system described in detail in the June 2000 statement to Landmine Monitor. Cuban law prohibits discrimination based on disability, and there have been few complaints of such discrimination.18 There are however no laws that mandate accessibility to buildings for the disabled and in practice buildings and transportation are rarely accessible to people with disabilities.

Cuba is not known to be directly involved in any humanitarian mine clearance activities but it contributes to victim assistance through 2,410 Cuban doctors who are working in 18 countries in Central America, the Caribbean, and Africa.19

14 For more details on the US clearance operation, see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 332.
17 Statement made during the ICBL/Landmine Monitor meeting with the Cuban Association of Physically Disabled People (ACLIFIM), Havana, Cuba, 26 September 2001.
EAST TIMOR

East Timor formally became an independent State on 20 May 2002. Shortly before then, on 30 April 2002, the East Timor transition government approved a list of Treaties and Conventions that Dili would adhere to when fully independent. The list included, among others, the Mine Ban Treaty.¹ In May 2002, Brazil offered to support the newly established government in all “demarches” needed for the accession of East Timor.²

It would appear that the independence fighters of the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor have never produced, obtained, or used antipersonnel mines. There is no evidence that either side used antipersonnel mines during the conflict from 1975 to 1999, which pitted the independence fighters against the Armed Forces of Indonesia.³ In March 2002, East Timor officials confirmed that no antipersonnel mines have been laid along the border with Indonesian West Timor, including the Oecussi area which is a part of East Timor located inside West Timor.⁴

While East Timor is apparently not affected by landmines, there have been problems with other types of unexploded ordnance (UXO). In 2000, the UN Transition Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) launched a public information campaign with radio messages and posters to increase people’s awareness about UXO dangers. UNTAET’s Civilian Police and the UN Peacekeeping Force established Standard Operating Procedures for UXO, and a Control Centre on UXO was established in Dili to gather information.⁵ Landmine Monitor Report 2001 reported on several UXO incidents in 2000.⁶

EGYPT

Key developments since May 2001: In May 2001, the Prime Minister announced that Egypt was launching a national program for the development of the northwest coast, including demining. The national committee on landmines has not met since May 2001. The United States conducted training of Egyptian deminers between May and August 2001. Eleven new mine or UXO casualties were reported in 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

Egypt has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In October 2001, Egypt told the UN General Assembly First Committee, “Egypt’s position will remain unchanged despite our appreciation for the humanitarian objectives of the Convention. This is due to the severe shortcomings of the Convention, the fact that it does not take Egypt’s concerns into account and its failure to deal with all the aspects of the problem.”¹ In particular, Egypt has said that the Mine Ban Treaty fails to

⁴ Interview with Joao Freitas de Camera, Director, and Michel Vanwolt, Advisor, Legal and Treaty Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Dili, East Timor, 20 March 2002.
require those who laid mines in Egypt in the past to be responsible for clearing them. Egypt also insists that it needs antipersonnel mines to defend its borders. 2

A representative of Egypt also claimed that the UN mine action strategy for the period 2001-2005 was a retreat from the policy adopted in 1998. In a statement made during the debate on the annual resolution supporting mine action, the Egyptian representative stated that the strategy had not taken into consideration Egypt's case, as one of the most affected states when it came to landmines and was not in conformity with its own purpose and basic role. 3

Egypt did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, but a member of Egypt's Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva attended the intersessional meetings in January and May 2002. In November 2001, Egypt again abstained in voting on the annual UN General Assembly resolution promoting universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has consistently done on past resolutions.

Egypt signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in 1982, but has since not taken any steps to ratify the Convention or any of its protocols. Egypt attended the third annual conference of State Parties to CCW's Amended Protocol II, as well as the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001 as an observer. It is a member of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and continues to view the CD is the most suitable forum, in the words of an Egyptian representative, “for a more thorough study of the landmines issue in the international negotiating forum that was directly related to the problem...in order to rectify the shortcomings of the Ottawa Convention.” 4

Production, Stockpiling, Transfer

In February 2000, Egypt’s Minister of Military Production told an UNMAS assessment mission that antipersonnel mine exports ceased in 1984 and production stopped in 1988. On several occasions Egyptian officials announced the same position, but no official or unofficial written statement in that regard was done. Thus, even though there is no publicly available evidence that Egypt has produced or exported antipersonnel mines in recent years, the Egyptian position on antipersonnel mine production and trade have not been issued in writing as formal policy statements and there has been no official decree by the government to implement them. For that reason, Landmine Monitor continues to list Egypt as a producer of antipersonnel mines. Egypt is likely to have a large stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but the government will not provide any details, saying such information is classified on national security grounds.

Landmine Problem

The Egyptian government cites a figure of 23 million landmines emplaced in the country. Official Egyptian sources estimate that 16.7 million landmines affect 2,480 million square meters in the western desert area (from Alexandria to the Libyan border and 30 kilometers deep from the Mediterranean sea beaches) and 5.1 million landmines affect 200 million square meters in eastern areas (Sinai peninsula and Red Sea coast). Other Egyptian officials have stated that only 20-25 percent of these “landmines” are really landmines, the remainder being other types of unexploded ordnance (UXO). 5 No surveys of the mine and UXO problem took place in Egypt in 2001. Very few mined areas are marked or mapped. 6

On 3 January 2000, three Egyptian citizens filed a case in an administrative court against the President of Egypt, the Prime Minister, the President of the Parliament and ministers of exterior, justice, defense and military production, and finance. They requested that the court reverse a government decision not to file a claim with the International Court of Justice against those

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3 Statement by Mahmoud Mubarak, to the UN General Assembly debate on assistance in mine action, 22 November 2001.
4 Ibid.
6 Based on a survey made by Landmines Struggle Center (LSC), an NGO based in Cairo, December 2001.
countries who laid mines in Egyptian territories. A set of questions on the matter was discussed in the foreign affairs and national security committees of parliament (Magles El Shaab) and in the consultation congress (Magles El Shoura) in March, May, July, and October 2001.7

The citizens want the government to sue Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and Israel for the costs of future mine clearance and victim compensation, as well as for the money spent by Egypt for mine clearance in the past. On 13 March 2001, an administrative court issued a decision on this case (number 3333/54) and claimed not to have jurisdiction (citing article 11 of law number 47/1972) to compel the Egyptian government to file the claim. The three citizens filed an appeal in April 2001 before the supreme administrative court to overturn the lower court’s decision.8

Planning and Coordination

A decree from the Prime Minister in 2000 established the National Committee to Supervise Mine Clearance and this group serves as the coordinating body for mine action in Egypt. The committee last met in May 2001.9

There is no national humanitarian mine action plan in Egypt and all mine clearance organizations must register to seek recognition from the Army in order to operate. In March and April 2002, a two-person team from the U.S.-based RONCO Consulting Corporation visited Egypt to help draw up a national mine action plan. The U.S. Agency for International Development funded this mission that visited many officials in various ministries and NGOs to discuss the mine action situation in Egypt.10

In May 2001, the national committee organized a conference, “The Development Perspective for the Northwest Coast of Egypt and the Negative Effect of Landmines.” The Prime Minister announced that Egypt was launching a national program for the development of the northwest coast, including demining using remote sensor technology, in cooperation with the international community. He declared that the first stage of the program would start with a limited region close to the coast. He said that “this problem…is basically a national problem and solving it must come first from Egypt.”11 The Prime Minister also pointed out that friendly countries have provided Egypt with historical maps for the landmine sites. However, he added that the Egyptian government still needs more maps, and technical assistance with remote and subsurface sensing.12

Mine Action Funding

The United States provided Egypt with $10,000 in fiscal year 2000 and $749,000 in fiscal year 2001 to fund a training program conducted by U.S. military forces and to acquire demining equipment. The training occurred between 17 May and 15 August 2001 and focused on mine detection and disposal, mine awareness, and survey and information management. Training also included a leadership and operations seminar for commanders. In 1999 and 2000, at the request of Egyptian authorities, the U.S. Department of Defense evaluated two mechanical demining systems in the former battlefields near El Alamain.13 The United States government has allocated $980,000

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8 Interview with one of the citizens, Giza, 2 April 2002.
9 Telephone interviews with the National Committee to Supervise Mine Clearance, 22 January 2002 and 27 March 2002.
10 Interview with Pete Owen and John Johnson, demining program managers, RONCO Consulting Corporation, Cairo, 28 March 2002.
11 Al Ahram, 6 May 2001; Al Akhbar (Cairo daily newspaper), 6 May 2001. The media later reported that the Foreign Minister indicated the project will cost $250 million, and will begin in 2003. Al Ahram, 5 July 2002; Arabicnews.com, 5 July 2002.
12 Statement of Prime Minister Dr. Atef Eibe, as quoted in Al Ahram, 6 May 2001.
to fund a technical secretariat for the national committee, but Egyptian authorities have yet to request the funds.\footnote{Interview with Charles W. Dunne, First Secretary (Political Military Affairs), U.S. Embassy Cairo, 27 January 2002.}

There were no other international contributions for mine action in Egypt in 2001. The UNDP trust fund for Egypt has received no contributions since its establishment in 2001.\footnote{Interview with Judy Grayson, UNDP Mine Action Specialist, Tunis, 17 January 2002; press release by Dr. Abdalah Merzban, First Secretary of Ministry of State for Planning, quoted in \textit{El Waf\'d} (daily newspaper), 23 October 2001.} There is no national budget for mine action activities in Egypt. One possible reason Egypt suffers from a lack of mine action resources is a single focus on mine clearance instead of a set of comprehensive actions including survey/assessment, mine awareness, and victim assistance.

**Mine Clearance and R&D**

Except for a limited number of mine clearance projects for commercial purposes such as tourism and oil exploration, no other mine or UXO clearance projects started or finished in 2001 or 2002. No statistics on the areas cleared or numbers of mines and UXO removed were made available to Landmine Monitor from these private companies engaged in mine clearance.

There have been several initiatives in Egypt regarding research and development of mine detection and mine clearance technology. Among them are: use of ultrasound waves from a jet engine to create pressure to detonate mines;\footnote{\textit{Al Akhbar}, 16 May 2000.} use of atomic rays or gamma rays to detect mines;\footnote{\textit{Al Ahram}, 14 November 2000.} and use of ground penetrating radar operating at 400 megahertz to detect mines.\footnote{\textit{Al Ahram}, 31 October 2001. In the case of the radar, the National Institute for Geophysics Research, working in cooperation with the Army, claims an 80% success rate in detecting both metal and plastic mines.}

**Mine Risk Education**

No mine awareness or mine risk reduction education programs are underway in Egypt. The Egyptian media continues to publish news about mines. A movie named "Hell under Ground" was shown in Egyptian cinemas in 2001 that told the story of a group of people who go to mined areas and experience the suffering of people living there.

Civilians routinely use mined areas in their daily life, especially in the western desert where Bedouins, who do not know which areas are mined, use land for cultivation, grazing, and housing. In eastern areas, people use mined areas without knowing whether the land is mined when they go to work on things such as new cultivation and infrastructure projects.\footnote{Based on an on-going survey process by the Landmines Struggle Center (LSC), an NGO based in Cairo.}

**Landmine Casualties**

In 2001, 11 new casualties were reported in nine mine or UXO incidents; three people were killed and eight injured. In 2000, there were 12 new mine or UXO casualties reported.\footnote{For information on reported casualties prior to 2000, see \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2000}, p. 926.}

All the new casualties in 2001 were civilians. Two casualties suffered injuries requiring an amputation in separate incidents in September and November in the eastern area (Red Sea). Six persons were reported injured in the western desert area, four required an amputation, from six incidents in January, March, June, August (two incidents), and November. The three fatalities occurred in October 2001 in El Monofia Governorate (60 kilometers from Cairo, far away from the two mine-affected areas) when three men were killed while checking a strange shell (artillery projectile) that was brought back from the Western desert.

Only two of the survivors received emergency financial help from the Office of Social Affairs (part of the Ministry of Social Affairs) in Sidi Barani, Matrouh Governorate. This financial help amounted to 200 Egyptian Pounds (approximately US$45). According to a survey conducted...
by the Landmines Struggle Center, none of the casualties received mine awareness or saw warning signs or fences in the incident areas. They received medical care according to the available health services in the mined areas.\footnote{All data in this section and the next are based on surveys by the Landmines Struggle Center (Cairo) in the two main mined areas in Egypt and other governorates next to those areas. This NGO receives news about mine or UXO incidents from media, hospitals, and other local sources. Staff then visits the accident area, interviews the victim or the victim’s family, visits the hospital treating the victim, interviews witnesses, and notes other indicators such as warning signs, education, rehabilitation, and social care.}

Many mine incidents are likely to go unreported, especially amongst the nomadic Bedouin tribes in the Western desert.

**Survivor Assistance**

The rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration facilities and services available to landmine survivors and disabled persons throughout Egypt have not changed in 2001.\footnote{See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, pp. 1003-1004.} There are no vocational training or employment programs in the mine-affected areas. The manufacture of orthopedic appliances is still solely a commercial activity, except at military centers. Civilians must pay for artificial limbs.

Health services differ for civilian and military casualties. Civilians have no access to military hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, or veterans associations. The Ministry of Health, through emergency departments located in every hospital, handles emergency medical care for civilians in Egypt. These emergency services differ from the capital to the suburbs and in particular in the mined areas. In Cairo there is modern equipment and trained staff while in the mined areas it is difficult to find modern equipment or trained staff. There are no NGOs or international organizations with special programs for landmine survivors in Egypt.

At the conference on the problem of landmine on the northern coast in May 2001, the UNDP representative stated, “The Ministry of Health and the Egyptian Red Crescent are capable of offering assistance to land mine victims,” however, he also called on the World Health Organization and other UN agencies to help mine survivors in Egypt.\footnote{Amin Sharqawi, UNDP Assistant Representative, cited in “UN report calls for helping landmine victims in Egypt,” Arabic News.com, 7 July 2001.}

**Disability Policy and Practice**

No new laws or decrees regarding landmine survivors were passed in 2001. There are no pending disability laws or decrees that have been proposed or discussed by the administration during the same year. No additional funds were available in 2001 to help implement law 39/1975, which is intended to ensure the right of integration and free rehabilitation for persons with disabilities.

Pensions received by landmine survivors differ for military personnel and civilians. The military has two systems: first, if the victim was working in a demining team and was injured or killed because of their work, the survivor or their family (according to the conditions) will receive compensation that could reach $25,000 and a pension depending on length of service; second, if the victim is not working in demining and was injured or killed, they will receive all medical care, including care abroad if necessary, for free and a pension. A civilian might receive compensation of $80 and no pension.
ESTONIA

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Estonia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. According to diplomatic sources, the Prime Minister indicated in April 2002 that Estonia was giving serious consideration to accession.1


Estonia is a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II. An annual report as required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II was submitted on 23 October 2001, giving updated information on donations to mine action and Estonia’s demining center.2 Estonia attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

In December 2001, Estonia submitted its annual report on landmines to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It repeated previous statements that Estonia considers the Conference on Disarmament “has a clear mandate to address conventional disarmament issues,” which include “strengthening the existing international regime against anti-personnel landmines.”3

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Estonia has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In official reports in October 2001 and December 2001, Estonia again stated it “does not possess antipersonnel landmines (maintaining only a limited number of mines for training purposes).”4 Officials had previously said that there were about 1,000 training mines.5 In March and April 2002, however, the Ministry of Defense informed Landmine Monitor that the stock of training mines had been destroyed and no antipersonnel mines remained.6

Explosives, including unexploded ordnance (UXO) and mines, continue to be used in criminal activity. The Rescue Board reports that in 2001 there were 25 explosions of a criminal character. This compares with 31 such explosions in 2000 and 35 explosions the previous year.7

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1 Interview with Malle Talvet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn, 9 April 2001, and email to Landmine Monitor researcher from Andres Talvik, Estonian Ambassador to France, 12 April 2002. Mr. Talvet indicated that Andres Talvik, Estonian Ambassador to France, said that Estonia was seriously considering joining the Mine Ban Treaty and claimed that this was confirmed by Prime Minister Siim Kallas at NATO headquarters in Brussels on 8 April 2002.


7 Telephone interview with Jüri Kask, Deputy Director, Rescue Board, 10 February 2002.
Mine/UXO Problem, Clearance, and Awareness

The government reports that “there are no special mine clearance programs in Estonia. Estonia is not a mine-affected country, but some old munitions left from the World War II can be found in the ground and in the seabed. In these areas, demining activities are carried out by the Estonian Defense Forces and/or Rescue Board.”8 The Ministry of Defense added that “there are no contaminated areas in Estonia which are fenced and guarded.” The Rescue Board is responsible for clearance of contamination (mainly UXO), except for military areas under control of the Defense Forces.9

In 2001, there were 1,301 calls for the destruction of explosives, and 1,347 items of UXO were destroyed. In 2000, 1,437 items of UXO were destroyed.10

The United States says that since its fiscal year 1999, it has provided $1.43 million in humanitarian demining assistance to Estonia, which has enable Estonia “to establish a National Demining Office, to coordinate demining activities, develop a comprehensive mine/UXO awareness program, acquire modern demining equipment and protective clothing, and expand demining/UXO clearance operations.”11

The U.S., in its fiscal year 2000, provided $998,493 “to establish a training center in Tartu and to enable U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) soldiers to conduct a train-the-trainer program emphasizing UXO disposal, while also providing mine clearance assistance...”12 The U.S. provided an additional $99,000 in humanitarian demining assistance in fiscal year 2001.

In early 2001, the Demining Center was transferred from the Defense Forces to the Rescue Board and renamed the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations Center (EODOC). Its functions include: to collect information on mines and UXO; to create a database on information collected; to coordinate and conduct civilian explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations; to provide basic EOD training for the rescue companies; to draft civilian legislative acts; and to inform the civilian population about dangerous areas and the dangers of mines and UXO.

Since 2001, EODOC has been using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).13 There are about 40 professional deminers/EOD specialists belonging to EODOC; currently EODOC has 18 deminers and EOD specialists working in the Tallinn area. Mine and UXO clearance is financed from state funds. Each year four training courses are organized, one in Tallinn and three in the provinces.14

In April 2001, a media campaign to inform the public about the dangers of mines and UXO was launched on national television, and leaflets in Estonian and Russian were distributed by mail and posters displayed. The United States Embassy provided assistance for these activities.15

In 2001, Estonia contributed US$2,000 to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance.16

Landmine/UXO Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Nine people were injured in mine and UXO incidents in 2001, including one deminer, and three people were killed, including one deminer.17 In 2000, 18 civilians were injured by UXO and mines, and two civilians were killed in separate incidents while handling UXO.

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9 Email from Hestrid Tedder, Advisor, Ministry of Defense, 19 March 2002.
10 Telephone interview with Jüri Kask, Rescue Board, 10 February 2002.
12 Ibid.
14 Telephone interview with Jüri Kask, Rescue Board, 10 February 2002.
Estonia reports, “There are no special rehabilitation programs for persons injured by mines in Estonia. If incident(s) happen, the injured person(s) is treated in civilian hospitals with all available medical means and resources.”

FINLAND

Key developments since May 2001: Finland’s Parliament approved the goal of adhering to the Mine Ban Treaty by 2006. Finland donated approximately $4.5 million to mine action programs in 2001. In addition, it had mechanical mine clearance projects in Cambodia, Mozambique, and Kosovo during the reporting period.

Mine Ban Policy

Finland remains the only country in the European Union (EU) that has not signed or acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The goal of joining the treaty by 2006 was confirmed in a governmental report on foreign and security policy approved by Parliament in December 2001. The report reiterated that Finland supports an internationally effective worldwide ban on antipersonnel mines and participates in EU efforts to achieve the treaty’s objectives. The report added that Finland does not produce or export antipersonnel mines, that its stockpile is kept in safe storage, and that antipersonnel mines “will not be used unless a threat of war exists against Finland.”

The report also explained:

- Finland has refrained from acceding to the Ottawa Convention because it does not at the moment have the economic or technical means to undertake to destroy the mines banned by the Convention and replace them with other means within the four years specified in the Convention. Giving up anti-personnel landmines without acquiring alternative systems would significantly diminish Finland’s defense capability.
- The working group [in the Ministry of Defense] is studying the issue… with a view to Finland acceding to the Convention in 2006 and destroying anti-personnel landmines by the end of 2010 without compromising Finland’s credible defense capability. The working group will submit its interim report to the Government Committee on Foreign and Security Policy by the end of 2003. Accession to the Convention and examining alternatives to anti-personnel landmines will be discussed in the report due in 2004 concerning the entire Finnish defense system.

The report was discussed by the Defense, Economic Affairs, and Foreign Affairs committees. The Foreign Affairs Committee pointed out that more than 140 countries have signed the treaty and that it is important for Finland to support implementation of the mine ban worldwide. The Committee demanded that the next defense review, brought forward to 2004, should consider in detail the question of Finland joining the Mine Ban Treaty. The Economic Affairs Committee was concerned about the lack of alternatives for antipersonnel mines. The Defense Committee supported the government’s position, but during discussion some committee members advised a longer timeframe for joining the treaty or excluding it from the next defense review. During parliamentary discussions of the report arguments against joining the treaty in the near future were...
either based on economic concerns (the cost of alternative weapons) or on perceptions that giving up mines represents a move away from a “people’s army” toward a more modern and expensive professional army.\(^4\)

The Finnish Campaign to Ban Landmines lobbied on the mine issue throughout the defense review process during 2001. The campaign wrote letters, talked to individual decision-makers, organized a demonstration and the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* was distributed in Parliament. The Campaign Coordinator expressed concern at the slow timetable and that “the emphasis of the government’s future work was put on the Defense Ministry, whereas previously it has been on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.”\(^5\)

Finland attended as an observer the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. The delegation made no statement or intervention, but a statement was delivered on behalf of European Union countries by Belgium.\(^6\) Finland also attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, in January and May 2002.\(^7\)


Finland is party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Finland submitted its report as required by Article 13 on 24 October 2001. This provides some new information on mine action funding and assistance.\(^8\) Finland participated in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

### Mine Action Funding and Assistance\(^9\)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs describes Finnish policy on mine action funding as being “based on humanitarian aspects. We give support to the countries which have most mines. These countries are at the moment Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia. There are security problems in Angola so we give the support through the Finnish Red Cross. In Bosnia we support prosthesis production. If there is a country where there are not many mine victims, we will not give a lot of support.”\(^10\)

From 1991 to the end of 2001, Finland allocated FIM164,537,840 (€27,672,022, or US$24,849,476) for mine action. The countries receiving most financial and other assistance during this period were: Cambodia – FIM58,136,190 (€9,777,361, or $8,780,070); Mozambique – FIM40,110,000 (€6,745,711, or $6,057,649) and Afghanistan – FIM27,550,000 (€4,633,367, or $4,160,763).

In 2001, Finland’s funding of mine action programs totaled FIM30 million (€5,045,409, or $4,530,777), which was allocated as follows:

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\(^4\) Information provided in interview by Laura Lodeniuss, Finnish Campaign to Ban Landmines, Helsinki, 10 January 2002.

\(^5\) Interview with Laura Lodeniuss, Finnish Campaign to Ban Landmines, Helsinki, 10 January 2002.

\(^6\) The delegation included Lars Backstrom and Riitta Korpivaara, Director and First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Sirpa Maenpaa, Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Finland in Managua. For the EU statement, see report on Belgium in this edition of the Landmine Monitor.

\(^7\) The delegations included Riitta Korpivaara, First Secretary, Mikko Hautala, Attaché, Olli Sotamaa, Counselor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Harri Maki-Reinikka, Counselor, Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva.


\(^9\) Unless otherwise indicated, all data in this section is from: Interview with Counselor Olli Sotamaa, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Development Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, 24 January 2002; and “Humanitaarinen miinanraivaus Suomessa vuosina 1991-2002” (Updated paper on Humanitarian Mine Action in Finland during the years 1991-2002), 30 April 2002. Exchange rate at 11 April: €1 = FIM5.946, and at 29 April 2002: €1 = US$0.898. For 2002, funding is given only in €.

\(^10\) Interview with Counselor Olli Sotamaa, Unit for Humanitarian Assistance, Development Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, 24 January 2002.
• **Afghanistan:** FIM3 million (€504,564, or $453,098) to the mine action program of the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) for demining.

• **Angola:** FIM2,762,000 (€464,535, or $417,179) to the Finnish Red Cross and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for victim assistance and mine risk education.

• **Bosnia-Herzegovina:** FIM3,550,000 (€587,067, or $527,186) including €168,188 to the Finnish Red Cross and ICRC for mine risk education and other mine action, and €428,879 to Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) for manual mine clearance and flails.

• **Cambodia:** FIM8,700,000 (€1,463,168, or $1,313,925) including €408,697 to the Mine Action Center, €672,752 to the HALO Trust for mine clearance, €21,826 to Finnish Church Aid for mine clearance, €84,094 to Handicap International Belgium for support to the mine/UXO victim information system, and €95,867 to the Finnish Red Cross and ICRC for mine risk education.

• **Croatia:** FIM20,000 (€3,364, or $3,021) to the Western European Demining Assistance Mission.

• **Mozambique:** FIM7,000,000 (€1,177,316, or $1,057,181) to the Accelerated Demining Program.

• **Northern Caucasus:** FIM1,000,000 (€168,180, or $151,026) to the Finnish Red Cross and ICRC.

• **UNMAS:** FIM2,000,000 (€336,376, $302,066)

• **UNICEF:** FIM1,768,000 (€297,343, $267,014) for Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Guinea-Bissau.

Included in the expenditure for 2001 was FIM200,000 (€33,638, or $30,207) to the Ministry of Defense for training a stand-by unit. During 2001, this funding was allocated in equal thirds to manual mine clearance; mechanical mine clearance; and mine survivor assistance, mine risk education, and provision of specialist personnel.

In addition to its financial contributions to mine action, Finland has had mechanical mine clearance projects in three countries, which by the end of 2001 had cleared 650,000 square meters of land in Cambodia since 1998 (project ending 28 February 2002), 550,000 square meters in Mozambique since 1999 (project ending 31 August 2002) and 440,000 square meters in Kosovo since 1999 (project ended in August 2001). There were two mechanical mine clearance units, with RAISU demining machines, in each of the three countries. When the current projects have finished, this type of assistance will be reduced, as the machines are not designed for continuous, heavy use.\(^\text{11}\)

In 2002, Finland planned to allocate a further FIM30 million (€5,045,409, or $4,530,777), distributed as follows:

• **Afghanistan:** €1,000,000 (€898,000) to the mine action program of UNOCHA for demining.

• **Angola:** €655,933 (€589,028) including €403,651 to the Finnish Red Cross and ICRC for victim assistance and mine risk education, and €252,282 to Finnish Church Aid and Mines Advisory Group for demining and mine risk education.

• **Bosnia-Herzegovina:** €1,009,128 (€906,197) including €168,188 to the Finnish Red Cross and ICRC for mine risk education and other mine action, and €640,940 to NPA for manual mine clearance and flails.

• **Cambodia:** €1,362,323 (€1,223,366) including €672,752 to the HALO Trust for mine clearance, €504,564 to Finnish Church Aid for mine clearance, €100,913 to Handicap

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International for support to the mine/UXO victim information system, and €84,094 to the Finnish Red Cross and ICRC for mine risk education.

- **Mozambique**: €336,376 ($302,066) to the Accelerated Demining Program.
- **UNMAS**: €504,564 ($453,098).

Included in the total for 2002 are non-earmarked funds of €177,315 ($159,229) promised to the Mine Advisory Group for Angola. Funding in 2002 is allocated 50 percent for manual mine clearance (with Afghanistan as the main focus), 10 percent mechanical mine clearance, and 40 percent mine survivor assistance, mine risk education, and provision of specialist personnel.

Finland reported to the UNMAS mine action investment database spending a total of $11,455,800 from 2000-2002, including $10,160,800 on country programs and $1,295,000 on regional and thematic programs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Unit for Humanitarian Assistance hopes to maintain future mine action funding at the level of FIM30 million ($5,045,409, or $4,530,777) per year.

**GEORGIA**

**Key developments since May 2001:** A Defense Ministry official told Landmine Monitor that Georgian Armed Forces laid antipersonnel mines in several passes in the Kodori gorge in 2001. The government has denied this. There were reports of private armed groups from Georgia laying antipersonnel mines in Abkhazia. Russia began the process of destroying its obsolete landmine stocks in Georgia. According to the ICBL Georgian Committee, in 2001 there were 98 new landmine/UXO casualties in Georgia.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has frequently expressed support for a global ban on antipersonnel mines. In a July 2002 letter to Landmine Monitor, Georgia said it “attaches great importance to the issue of banning antipersonnel mines” and expressed support for the “noble goal [of] a mine-free world.” On 29 November 2001, Georgia voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. It has supported similar UNGA resolutions in the past.

Georgia has stated that it is unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty at this time because it has no jurisdiction over mined areas in Abkhazia and Samachablo, and because it will have difficulty clearing the mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) left by the forces of the former Soviet Union and Russia. Georgia has said that “without financial and technological assistance, Georgia will not be able to fulfill its obligations” under the Mine Ban Treaty.

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1 Letter from Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Merab Antadze to Mary Wareham, Coordinator, Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2002.
2 Interview with representative of the Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 6 February 2002. The representative also provided written answers to questions submitted by Landmine Monitor. One written answer stated: “There do still exist the mined territories in Abkhazia and Samachablo, on which do not apply the jurisdiction of Georgia and naturally on these territories Georgia cannot carry out monitoring nor demining works. Besides on the territory of Georgia there are hundreds of military objects left by forces of former Soviet Union and Russia, objects where are set mines, explosive substances and the sources which cause various professional diseases, and in the budget of the state and the Defense Ministry of Georgia there were not foreseen the means for liquidation of sources of danger.”
Georgia did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, nor did it attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January or May 2002.

Georgia is party to the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II, but it has not ratified Amended Protocol II on landmines. Georgia did not participate in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, nor the Second CCW Review Conference, both held in Geneva in December 2001.

**Use**

Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996. However, in February 2002, a representative of the Ministry of Defense admitted that in 2001, Georgian Armed Forces laid antipersonnel mines in several passes in the Kodori gorge on the border with Abkhazia. In July 2002, the Defense official confirmed this information, including that antipersonnel mines, not antivehicle mines, were used by Georgian forces.

A press report in July 2002 stated that “Georgian frontier guards blew up while laying mines in the upper Kodori gorge of Abkhazia,” noting that one died and another was seriously wounded. It said that a press release from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeepers office stated that “the staff of Georgian Border Protection Department are laying mines in the upper part of the Kodori gorge...in particular the territory between the 107th post of CIS peacekeepers and the village of Kvabchara.” It said Georgia’s Defense Minister requested Russian peacekeepers to provide timely evacuation of the servicemen.

Abkhazian officials also accused Georgian troops of using antipersonnel mines in Kodor valley in October 2001 (see below). In early May 2002, Russian peacekeepers and United Nations military observers on patrol in the Georgian-controlled section of the Kodor valley in Abkhazia reportedly found a stockpile of weapons in a school, including 600 landmines. The Georgians are reported to have said that they “did not manage to get rid of it on time,” and promised to remove the weapons as soon as “the roads open.”

In an initial response to a Landmine Monitor letter about allegations of mine use, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia stated in July 2002, “Let me assure you that the official structures of Georgia, including the Georgian Armed Forces, strictly observes the moratorium declared by President Shevardnadze in 1996. Since then Georgia has been strictly abstaining from use, manufacture and import of antipersonnel mines.” In a second response, after receiving a full draft of the report from Landmine Monitor, the Deputy Minister said, “Georgian side reiterates that during the year 2002 [sic] neither Georgian Armed Forces nor the staff of the State Department of

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4 The moratorium was proclaimed by President Shevardnadze at the United Nations in September 1996 and has been repeated by officials many times since. See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 792, and Note Verbale to the OSCE, 17 January 2001.
5 Interview with representative of the Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 6 February 2002. The use of mines was confirmed in written answers to questions submitted by Landmine Monitor. He also stated mines were used in the Pankisi gorge.
6 Telephone interviews with Ministry of Defense official, Tbilisi, 23 and 24 July 2002. He stated that the areas where antipersonnel mines were laid are inaccessible to vehicles.
7 “Georgian frontier guards blown up on a mine in the upper Kodori gorge,” Caucasus Press (Sukhumi) Georgia, 2 July 2002.
10 Letter from Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Merab Antadze to Mary Wareham, Coordinator, Landmine Monitor, 19 July 2002.
the State Border Protection or any other official structures of Georgia laid any anti-personnel mines in the Pankisi and Kodori gorges or elsewhere in Georgia."11

Private armed groups from Georgia continued in 2001 and 2002 to cross into Abkhazia and lay antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. It has been alleged that these groups are linked to the Georgian government.12 In January 2002, the armed groups “White Legion” and “Forest Brothers” reportedly began mining footpaths linking Georgia’s Zugdidi region with the Gali region of Abkhazia, including paths to CIS peacekeeping positions. They reportedly warned the CIS peacekeepers of mine-laying. They also reportedly mined the left bank of the Inguri River, separating Abkhazia and Georgia.13

In October 2001, Abkhazian officials alleged that armed irregulars, with the active support of regular Georgian troops, moved into the northern part of the Kodor valley in violation of the cease-fire agreement of May 1994 and deployed new mines during the military operation.14

However, in his July 2002 letter, the Deputy Foreign Minister said that the “Georgian side would like also to reiterate its position and state that the government of Georgia has neither tacitly nor openly supported Georgian partisans in their alleged use of antipersonnel mines.”15

**Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling**

Officials continue to state that Georgia has never produced, exported, or imported antipersonnel landmines since independence. Georgia, however, inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the former Soviet Union. The exact size and composition of that stock remains unknown. An inventory of the landmine stocks was conducted three times in 2001 by representatives of the Defense Ministry, the office of the military prosecutor, and the security service.16

Russia began the process of destroying its obsolete landmine stocks in Georgia during the reporting period. Russia is believed to have landmines stockpiled at three military bases in Georgia.17 On 15 March 2002, Russia reportedly destroyed 500 mines stored at its former base at Sagarejo. However, differences remain between Moscow and Tbilisi regarding the timeframe for completing destruction of the Sagarejo stockpile. Tbilisi believes the process can be finished within nine months. Moscow believes it will take three years.18

Police confiscated 38 antivehicle shells, one antivehicle mine, grenades, and bullets from the inhabitants of the Kotchubani village in the Sagarejo region, indicating that stockpile security is a problem in Georgia.19

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11 Letter from Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 31 July 2002, received 6 August 2002.
15 Letter from Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, 19 July 2002.
16 Information provided by the Ministry of Defense to ICBL Georgian Committee, February 2002.
17 As reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 878, mines are at Sagarejo, Batumi, and Akhalkalaki bases.
18 “Ammunition is transferred from Russian military stock in Sagarejo” Svobodnaya Gruzia, (Free Georgia) 16 March 2002, p. 3; Independent TV channel of Georgia, “Kurier” program, 15 March 2002.
19 “Why did she need such arsenal?,” Khronika, 4-10 February 2002.
Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Past editions of Landmine Monitor have described the landmine problem in Georgia in detail. (See also separate Landmine Monitor entry on Abkhazia in this edition). Mines pose dangers to civilians in Georgia mainly in areas near the border with Abkhazia and near Russian military bases. The majority of accidents in 2001 took place near military bases. In March 2002, it was reported that HALO Trust and the Georgian Defense Ministry were going to conduct a survey of two Russian military bases.²⁰ HALO Trust, a British demining organization, operates primarily in Abkhazia, but does some survey and assessment work elsewhere in Georgia.

Georgia has no State programs for humanitarian mine clearance, mine awareness, or survivor assistance. Responsibility for mine clearance in the zone of military actions and at military bases is entrusted to the Ministry of Defense, whereas the Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for populated areas, roads, and railroads, and the State Department of Border Guards is responsible for border areas.

During the reporting period, Georgia’s Defense Ministry demined three paths of the Kodori gorge in the region of Amtkeli and Verkhniy Adjari; Georgian troops defused and removed numerous items of UXO and munitions.

Peacekeeping forces in the zone of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict found and destroyed four landmines in February 2001; peacekeeping forces in the region regularly clear unexploded ordnance.²¹

As a part of the “Beecroft Initiative,” the US transferred demining equipment to Georgia in 2001 and 2002. In 2001, the US transferred to Georgia five mine detectors, two generators, a computer, a car, and various engineering materials.²² In March 2002, the equipment included seven mine detectors, 10 sets of Personnel Protective Equipment, four SUVs, a truck, and other equipment, totaling US$80,000.²³ Present at the 12 March 2002 transfer ceremony were the US Ambassador to Georgia, the Georgian Assistant Minister of Defense, and a representative from the US State Department’s Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs.²⁴ The US trained 20 Georgians as instructors, who have in turn trained 34 others, giving Georgia a force of 54 trained deminers.²⁵

The US has said that the “recent creation of a US Train and Equip program” in Georgia has prompted the US to consider again Georgia’s request for mine action assistance, and a Policy Assessment Visit will occur in Georgia in the August-September 2002 timeframe.²⁶

The Assistant Minister of Defense announced at the March 2002 ceremony that Georgian sappers were ready to participate in demining operations on the territory of Abkhazia.

Mine Risk Education

Other than in Abkhazia, there are no governmental or non-governmental programs for mine risk education. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines Georgian Committee (ICBL GC) has criticized the Georgian Minister of Education for not taking measures to adequately educate students on the dangers of landmines.²⁷ The Minister of Education wrote in response that a decree was issued in 2001 requiring all secondary schools to teach a course on “Extreme situations and Civic Defense.” The Minister also said that such courses had been taught since 1995 during primary military training and in secondary schools in mountain and border regions, in addition to

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²⁰ Email from Chris Barron, Program Manager, HALO Trust in Georgia, to ICBL-GC, 14 March 2002.
²² Information provided by the Ministry of Defense to ICBL Georgian Committee, February 2002.
²⁴ Email from Black Sea Press Agency, 6 March 2002.
²⁶ Ibid.
²⁷ Letter No. 3-09 from ICBL Georgian Committee to Alexander Kartozia, Minister of Education, 7 September 2001.
one day a year devoted to mass defense activities. The ICBL GC has not been able to identify any instances of such courses being taught.  

**Landmine Casualties**

In 2001, the ICBL GC collected data on 98 new casualties in Georgia caused by landmines, UXO or improvised explosive devices (IEDs): 34 people were killed including four children, and 64 people were injured including 14 children. Casualties continue to be reported in 2002: in February, a 14-year-old boy was injured in Khashuri, two young men died in an incident in the Sagaredo region, and a seven-year-old boy was injured in the eye and his mother in hand in an incident in the Sachkhere region. The ICBL GC also reports 33 casualties from 1 January to 23 July 2002.

There are no comprehensive official statistics on the number of people killed or injured by landmines and UXO in Georgia. The Central Hospital of the Ministry of Defense registered four military mine injuries in 2001. The Defense Ministry registered three mine casualties in the Pankisi gorge: one border guard was killed, one military officer was injured, and one local inhabitant of the Kodori gorge was killed. The Head of Zugdidi Republican Hospital, the main health facility in the border region with Abkhazia, reported treating nine mine casualties in 2001.

**Survivor Assistance**

Hospitals throughout Georgia, including in Abkhazia, routinely run short of basic medical supplies due to a lack of funding. The International Committee of the Red Cross regularly provides equipment, supplies, and medicines to surgical hospitals, including the Zugdidi Republican Hospital, the regional referral hospital, and two facilities in Darcheli and Jvari. Three referral hospitals and two front-line hospitals were also assisted in Abkhazia. In October emergency surgical assistance was provided to the Agudzera military referral hospital and several other facilities. In 2001, 14 mine/UXO casualties benefited from ICRC assistance, including three in Abkhazia.

The ICRC, in collaboration with local authorities, supports two prosthetic/orthotic centers in Tbilisi and Gagra, for the disabled, including landmine survivors. The centers are the only facilities available for physical rehabilitation in Georgia. The main activities of the centers are the delivery of services to the physically disabled and professional training for technical staff. In 2001, physical rehabilitation services were provided for patients who were fitted with 463 prostheses; 21 percent of the fitted amputees were mine survivors. The Centers also produced 612 orthoses, 28 wheelchairs, and 688 crutches. All responsibilities for the running of the Gagra Center have been handed over to the Abkhaz health authorities.
Since May 2000, six orthopedic technicians have been undergoing training in order to reach a higher professional level in prosthetics and orthotics, equivalent to the International Society of Prosthetic and Orthopedics (ISPO) level II. Final examinations took place in May 2001 and five passed. The training course and its final diploma have been internationally recognized by ISPO.  

The government-run Social Rehabilitation Center for the Disabled in Tbilisi provides orthopedic devices to persons with disabilities. The center currently assists 10 to 13 patients a month with orthopedic appliances, however it has the capacity to assist as many as 30 a month. The center’s budget has been decreasing over the last few years. The 2001 budget was only US$4,800 (10,656 Georgian Lari). The center produces upper and lower limb prostheses, and other assistive devices. The center also operates a repair service for prosthetic devices. In 2001, 343 prosthetic devices were produced and 112 prostheses repaired at the center. There are currently 1,500 people on the waiting list for orthopedic appliances. All services at the center are free.

The Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Affairs is developing a special program to establish centers for the care and rehabilitation of the disabled in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, and Batumi. In 2002, the budget for the program is US$100,000 (222,000 Georgian Lari); part of the budget, US$25,000 (55,500 Georgian Lari), will go toward the ICRC Orthopedic Center and US$75,000 (166,500 Georgian Lari) to the Social Rehabilitation Center for the Disabled. Nevertheless, specialized medical rehabilitation and psychological support appears to remain inaccessible, or unavailable, for many mine survivors.

In May 2002, a representative of the UN Mine Action Service visited Georgia to discuss mine awareness and victim assistance.

Disability Policy and Practice

The June 1995 Law on the Social Protection of the Disabled outlines the rights of the disabled; however, it has not been fully implemented because of the economic situation in Georgia.

INDIA

Key developments since May 2001: In December 2001, India began laying antipersonnel and antivehicle mines along its 1,800-mile border with Pakistan. This is apparently one of the largest mine-laying operations anywhere in the world in years. There have been numerous reports of civilian casualties, raising concerns about the effectiveness of the measures taken to protect civilians, as required by CCW Amended Protocol II. There is also concern about possible Indian use of non-detectable mines. There were at least 332 new mine casualties reported in 2001, and another 180 mine casualties reported between 1 January and 17 June 2002. India’s Ambassador Rakesh Sood chaired the key Main Committee One during the Second CCW Review Conference and is now chair of the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the issues of explosives remnants of war and antivehicle mines.

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42 Interview with Archil Shavdia, General Director, Social Rehabilitation Center for the Disabled, 4 January 2002.
43 Interview with Ramini Kravelishvili, Director, Social Rehabilitation Center for the Disabled, 8 January 2002.
45 Interview with Marina Gudushauri, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs, 7 February 2002.
47 Email from Alexander Russetsky, ICBL GC, 27 May 2002.
48 Letter to ICBL GC from Marina Gudusauri, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs, Ref. 17/06-134, 23 April 2001.
Mine Ban Policy

India has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. No significant change has occurred in the Indian government position on landmines. In October 2001, Ambassador Rakesh Sood stated to the UN General Assembly, “India believes that a phased approach for a non-discriminatory, universal and global ban on anti-personnel mines, that addresses the legitimate defence requirement of States will help ameliorate the critical humanitarian crises that have resulted from irresponsible transfer and indiscriminate use of landmines. The process of complete elimination of APLs will be facilitated by addressing the legitimate defence role of anti-personnel landmines for operational requirements under the defence doctrines of the countries concerned, through the availability of appropriate militarily effective, non-lethal, and cost effective alternative technologies.”

India abstained from voting on the November 2001 UN General Assembly Resolution calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has done for the previous four years. India did not attend as an observer the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001, nor did it participate in any of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in 2001 and 2002.

India is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and ratified Amended Protocol II on 2 September 1999. It participated in the Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in Geneva on 10 December 2001, and submitted its annual report required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II. Previous editions of Landmine Monitor reported that India had exercised its right to defer compliance with certain technical requirements of Amended Protocol II. India apparently did not, and is fully bound by Amended Protocol II.

India was very actively involved in the Second CCW Review Conference, held in Geneva from 11-21 December 2001, with Ambassador Rakesh Sood chairing Main Committee One. The Conference’s main accomplishment was to agree to expand the scope of the CCW to include non-international armed conflicts, and India served as the Friend of the Chair on this issue. Ambassador Sood is now serving as chair of the Group of Governmental Experts established at the Review Conference to consider the issues of explosives remnants of war and mines other than antipersonnel mines.

At the Second Review Conference, India emphasized the need to focus on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs): “This Conference cannot stand by and ignore the devastation caused by IEDs. My delegation urges that exploration of this matter be initiated at this Review Conference, so that we could take concrete action at the earliest. This conference would then have responded to a humanitarian problem that knows no boundaries and threatens to cause greater devastation than some of the issues that we are attempting to tackle.”

During the reporting period, as a public education and awareness campaign, the Indian Campaign to Ban Landmines (IIPDEP) organized three national conferences and four regional seminars and photo exhibitions in various parts of India including Jammu & Kashmir, North East India, and Rajasthan. The delegates who attended the seminars are arranging public education and awareness programs and advocacy programs in their respective cities or villages in their local communities.

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1 Ambassador Rakesh Sood, Permanent Representative of India to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, at the General Debate in the First Committee, UN General Assembly, New York, 16 October 2001.
languages. HPDEP received financial support for the series of conferences and seminars from Canada and other public donations.

Use

Recent Use

In December 2001, India began deploying antipersonnel and antivehicle mines on its border with Pakistan. This is apparently one of the largest mine-laying operations anywhere in the world in years. Following the attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001, India amassed troops along its border with Pakistan and commenced mining of the 1,800-mile-long border, at times creating minefields three miles wide.4 Since December 2001, there has been a steady exodus from the border villages due to the presence of newly laid mines and fear of attack from across the border.5

Details of overall numbers of mines laid, locations of mines laid, or total amount of mined land, are not available.6 Media accounts and other sources provide a partial picture. A report from early July 2002, noting that limited mine clearance was commencing, indicates that the Indian Army mined 173,000 acres of land along the line of control in Kashmir.7 In late January 2002, the deputy commissioner of the Ferozepore district of Punjab stated that 27,127 hectares (271.3 square kilometers), including 350 villages, along the 210-kilometer long international border in the district had been acquired by the Indian Army to lay mines or construct fortifications.8 In many instances, the mines have been laid in cultivated farmlands. Also in January 2002, Army officers in Indian-administered Kashmir reported planting 700-900 antipersonnel mines near the Indian frontiers with Pakistan in the Jammu region.9 In another media report, the local army commander, Colonel Shirish Kulkarni said that a two or three acre plot was likely to contain 50 or 60 mines.10 He also said that once the mines are placed, clearing one field alone could easily take 20 days. In April 2002, the Indian army evacuated some Rajasthani villagers living near densely mined areas near the Pakistan border as rising summer temperatures set off a series of explosions.11

According to media reports, “Indian troops have completed two phases of laying the mines and in the third and final phase, they would lay mines to protect strategic targets near the frontier.”12 The final phase had not commenced as of July 2002.

In March 2002, the Ministry of Defence reported that seven civilians had been killed and 23 injured in mine blasts in the newly mined areas in previous three months.13 There have been many media reports of civilian casualties that have occurred in areas mined since December 2001. In

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5 “Border residents facing a tough time,” The Times of India, 20 February 2002; “Border residents move to safer places,” The Times of India, 19 May 2002.
6 India apparently restricted the movement of media persons in the border area after newspapers reported landmine casualties. It was reported that local prosecutors may take action using the Indian Official Secret Act to prevent information about minefields from being disseminated. “India slaps more curbs on media,” Frontier Post / APP (New Delhi), 11 January 2002.
11 Jay Shankar “Kashmir’s wheat fields turned into a basket of mines”, Agence France Press (Chanduchak, India), 11 June 2002.
12 “India to lay more mines,” BBC Online, 17 January 2002.
Jaisalmer, Rajasthan, in December 2001, one person was injured and twenty sheep died when the sheep entered a minefield. In Bikaner, Rajasthan, a cyclist trying to cross into a fenced minefield was killed on New Year’s Day. A week earlier, a child was injured in the same area. In Amritsar, Punjab, a villager was taking a shortcut to reach his field, when he stepped on a mine; he survived, but required an amputation. Also in Amritsar, on 18 January 2002, two farmers were injured in separate mine incidents near the villages of Mullakot and Khemkaran. A deputy commissioner in the Amritsar District has reportedly distributed compensation checks from the Indian Red Cross Society to six recent mine victims. Seven mine casualties have been reported in the Ferozepore district of Punjab. Also in January 2002, a woman and her son were killed near the village of Najjwak in the Ankhnoor sector in Kashmir as they took a short cut across a field that had been recently mined.

Incidents were still occurring in June 2002. In Ganganagar, Rajasthan, a ten-year-old girl was killed and three other children injured by an antipersonnel mine when they were bathing in the village canal. The mine was carried into that part of the canal from elsewhere. In other incidents in June, a boy was killed and three others injured when they triggered a landmine in a wheat field near the border with Pakistan, and one person was killed and another injured in a landmine blast that occurred when the man was tilling his field.

As a State Party to Amended Protocol II, India must provide effective exclusion of civilians from areas containing non-remotely-delivered antipersonnel mines. Reports of civilian casualties in India following the recent mine laying call into question the effectiveness of the measures taken to protect Indian civilians from the effects of mines.

It appears that, admittedly based on a small number of media accounts, India is at least taking some steps to fulfill its obligation. For example, a report in the 31 January 2002, Tribune notes that in the Ferozepore district in Punjab, the civilian administration and Indian Army are conducting mine risk education for the civilian population and fencing and warning signs in the Hindi and Gurmukhi languages are present.

However, other reports present a different picture on the steps taken to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from areas mined by the Indian Army. One media report noted, “Thousands of acres along the Indo-Pak border have been mined by the Army, with no markers to give warning. In some places, a narrow ribbon with a faintly written ‘Danger’ sign in Punjabi is the only indicator for the largely illiterate village population not to stray into these heavily mined fields.” The report also noted, “Army officials in Delhi counter these fears by insisting that all minefields are laid according to a plan and that records of the mine-laying are diligently maintained. Army spokesman

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14 “Anti-tank mine explosion leaves 5 injured,” The Times of India, 24 December 2001. According to another account, one person was injured and two camels and thirty goats and sheep killed when they strayed into minefields in the districts of Bikaner and Jaisalmer in Rajasthan. “Mines being laid along border,” Hitwada (Nagpur), 27 December 2001.
16 “Mines maim border villages,” The Times of India, 9 February 2002. This report notes that three other people from the same village were injured by landmines between 16-20 January 2002. All were reportedly treated at the government hospital and provided compensation of Rs. 5,000 (approximately US$110).
20 “India to lay more mines,” BBC Online, 17 January 2002. This report states that mines have taken additional civilian lives, but no official figures were available.
22 “Child killed in wheat field landmine blast near India-Pakistan border,” Agence France Press (Jodhpur), 4 June 2002.
23 “One killed, one injured in landmine blast near India-Pakistan border,” Agence France Press (Jodhpur), 16 June 2002.
Colonel Shruti Kant says, ‘Each mine is accounted for and taken out by the same set of troops after assigned task is over.’ Amended Protocol II also prohibits the use of low-metal-content (non-detectable) antipersonnel mines. While it is not known what types of mines India has been laying, most of India’s mines are believed to be low-metal-content M14 mines. In December 2001, prior to the start of its massive mine-laying operation, India reported that “a programme has been evolved” to modify the mines to make them detectable, but seemed to indicate that actual modification had not yet begun. (See section below on stockpiling).

Mines have also killed and injured a large number of Indian Army and border security troops while they were deploying the mines. According to a 7 March 2002 Ministry of Defence press release, a total of 50 soldiers had died and another 95 were injured in mine blasts in the previous three months. In late December 2001, there were reports of three Army personnel killed in Batala when a landmine they were laying near the border went off accidentally. A few days later, fourteen soldiers were killed and four injured in a mine-laying accident near Lombok village close to Jaisalmer in Rajasthan. In yet another December incident, a soldier was killed and five others were injured in two landmine blasts near the Line of Control in Jammu. A jawan (soldier) was blown up when he stepped on a landmine during an exercise. On 5 January, at least 18 persons, including 15 soldiers, were killed while transporting landmines in Amritsar. Reports indicate that the mishap took place due to improper handling of mines while they were being unloaded. Also in January, in the village of Mahawa in Amritsar, at least three soldiers were reported killed and another seven injured when one of their trucks carrying mines in crates mistakenly backed over one of the antivehicle mines they were assembling. Indian military officials are reported to be investigating the causes of these incidents. Indian military sources cite equipment failure as the cause for the large number of mine casualties.

**Past Use**

India used mines in its three wars with Pakistan in 1947-48, 1965 and 1971. It also used mines in its war with China in 1962. India asserts that it has not used mines in counter-insurgency operations in the northern and northeastern states. According to Pakistan’s Joint Staff Headquarters, “There are no permanently laid landmines (antitank or antipersonnel) along the international border between India and Pakistan. However, the situation is somewhat different along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, where for regular deployment of troops both India and Pakistan maintain permanently laid minefields along certain portions of the LOC.”

27 Ministry of Defence Press Release, “Incident of Mine Blast Along Border,” 7 March 2002. The incidents are blamed on “adverse climatic and terrain conditions...human error...[and in] certain cases, mines and fuzes held in inventory for a long period did not perform satisfactorily. The Government have initiated steps to ensure than new mines and fuzes are introduced to replace the old inventories.” http://mod.nic.in/pressreleases/content.asp?id=47.
34 During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, mines were laid in fertile areas and after the cessation of hostilities, the lands were demined. Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee and Mallika Joseph, _Anti-personnel landmines: A South Asian Regional Survey_, (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 1999) p. 6.
36 Letter to Coordinator, Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines, from Joint Staff Headquarters, Strategic Plans Division, ACDA Directorate, Chaklala Cantonment, dated 4 April 2002.
Non-State Actor Use

Non-state actors continue to use landmines and IEDs. In 2001, 264 antivehicle and antipersonnel landmines were recovered from militants in Kashmir. Between January and March 2002, forty-nine mines were seized. In 2001, 3,453 kilograms of explosives were recovered and, another 586 kilograms were recovered 1 January-31 March 2002. In Jammu and Kashmir five militant groups, including Hizbul Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Hakat-ul-Jihadi Islami, have been using landmines.

In Indian states other than Jammu and Kashmir, at least six other armed non-state groups have used mines and/or IEDs during the reporting period (since May 2001). In the three states of Bihar, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh, three militant groups, CPI (ML) - Party Unity, People’s War Group (PWG), and the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) were considered responsible for landmine attacks. In addition, there are reports of use of mines and IEDs use in Assam by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA); in northern Bengal by the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO); and in Manipur by Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup (KYKL).

Production

India had in the past produced two types of antipersonnel mines: M16A1 bounding mines and low-metal-content M14 blast mines. Pursuant to its obligations under Amended Protocol II, India declared that no low-metal-content mines have been produced since 1 January 1997.

In October 2000, India reported that it intends to produce new mines that meet Amended Protocol II technical requirements. It said that a new remotely delivered mine with self-destruct/self-deactivation mechanisms “has been designed. Prototype production and trial evaluation will follow.” India has not previously produced remotely delivered mines of any type. In addition, in December 2001, India indicated that a detectable version of the hand-emplaced M14 mine “has been designed and approved for production.”

Non-state actors in India produce IEDs that function as antipersonnel landmines.

Transfer

India has declared that it has never exported or imported antipersonnel mines and has had a comprehensive export moratorium in place since 3 May 1996. A mine found in significant quantities in Myanmar, and still used by Myanmar government forces, is the LTM-76 antipersonnel mine. Experts have told Landmine Monitor that these are likely to be decades-old mines of Indian-manufacture. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs

41 “Assam on high alert after militant attacks,” Times of India (Guwahati) 28 January 2002.
42 “6 CRPF men hurt in landmine blast,” Times of India (Siliguri, Bengal) 27 May 2002.
43 “Five soldiers killed in landmine blast in Manipur,” Hindustan Times (Guwahati) 8 January 2002.
48 See previous Landmine Monitor Reports; also, interview with Manpreet Vohra, Deputy Secretary, Disarmament and International Security Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs, 25 June 2001.
49 One expert identified the LTM-76 as Indian-manufactured because: “1. the colourings and markings are identical to British munitions before 1975, which both India and Pakistan used. 2. the ‘DI’ marking on the
denies any transfer of such mines in the past, and states that there are no such mines in the current inventory of the Indian Army.50

The Indian government and various media sources have accused Pakistan of supplying explosives, detonators and fuses used in making IEDs to various armed opposition groups in India.51 Pakistan denies such allegations.

Stockpiling

India has a stockpile of four to five million antipersonnel mines, with the great majority believed to be M14 mines.52 With regard to its M14s, India stated in December 2001, “The design, development and trials of anti-personnel mines, affixed with 8 grams of iron, which make them detectable, have since been completed. All necessary technical and procedural issues have been resolved and requisite financial support has also been obtained to effect the said modifications. In addition, the methodology of incorporation of the modifications to the existing stocks of anti-personnel mines have been issued to the entire field forces and bulk stocking agencies. A programme has been evolved and disseminated to ensure that implementation is completed well before the stipulated period, as per provisions laid down in the Amended Protocol II.”53

At the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001, India opposed the proposal that among other things would apply the same detectability requirement for antipersonnel mines to antivehicle mines.

India attended the regional seminar on stockpile destruction that was held in Malaysia in August 2001.

Landmine Problem

Prior to the current mine-laying operation, the most severe humanitarian problem was to be found in conflict areas where there has been extensive use of improvised explosive devices by non-state actors.

Indeed, in early December 2001, just prior to the current operation, India claimed, as it has in the past, “India is not a mine afflicted country.”54 Agricultural lands and other useful areas were immediately demined on cessation of previous hostilities.55 However, some mined areas still exist. These are generally in border areas with scant population, though mine incidents are still reported each year. There is a report that in Changia, a small village in Ranbir Singh Pura sector of Jammu, 23 residents were maimed by landmines deployed during the 1971 conflict; most of the incidents occurred in fields allegedly cleared of landmines.56 Minefields are generally mapped and marked

mine is also found on many India munitions. This indicates the arsenal from which the weapon comes from—in this case the Dum Dum Arsenal in India.”

50 Fax to Landmine Monitor researcher from Sheel Kant Sharma, Jt. Sec. (D&ISA), Indian Ministry of External Affairs, 2 January 2002.


52 This estimate was first provided to Landmine Monitor by non-Indian government officials involved in CCW negotiations with Indian officials. Subsequently, current and former Indian officials have verified the estimate.


54 Ibid.

55 International Committee of the Red Cross, Anti-personnel landmines: Friend or Foe?, p. 29.

in local languages. No surveys or assessments have been carried out by any agency, as until now, the situation did not seem to merit such exhaustive examination.

As noted above, following the fresh laying of mines by Indian troops, there have been a string of incidents that have resulted in civilian and army casualties. Antipersonnel mines were laid in crop fields and pastoral land preventing villagers from tending their crops and their livestock. Border residents have been forced to flee. In a media report, a spokesman for the Indian military in Jammu referred to the number of refugees being more than 40,000 from only one district.\(^{57}\) Another article reported that in Ferozepore hundreds of thousands have migrated following the mining and fortification operations.\(^{58}\)

**Mine Clearance**

With respect to the current mine operation, an Indian official has reportedly said, “The Indian army…will clear the area of all the mines if and when a military de-escalation takes place.”\(^{59}\) This process has apparently begun, at least partially, in early July 2002. A media report, quoting unnamed Indian officials, noted that, “the army began removing mines this week from the Ranbir Singh Pura and Hiranagar sectors.”\(^{60}\) The same report cites a statement issued by the Indian Defence Ministry that the Indian Army was only removing mines selectively in some low-lying areas along rivers prone to flooding. Quoting the Defence Ministry release, “This is being done to obviate mines drifting due to flood water, posing a serious hazard to our civilians residing in the adjoining areas...It is being ensured that such de-mining does not, in any way, compromise on the overall defence preparedness.”\(^{61}\)

The Corps of Engineers is the central agency tasked with mine clearance, and in previous years aided civil authorities in defusing and clearing improvised explosive devices used by militant groups in parts of the country.\(^{62}\) In the past the Indian Army has been involved in UN-sponsored mine clearance programs in various parts of the globe, including Congo, Angola, Cambodina, Somalia, Mozambique, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone.\(^{63}\)

In its October 2000 Amended Protocol II report, India proposed to establish a “Mine Information Center” at the College of Military Engineering in Pune, but no further action has been reported.\(^{64}\)

**Mine Action Funding**

India has neither contributed nor received any mine action funding. However, it has offered significant assistance internationally in the form of in-kind services in mine clearance in UN-sponsored programs, as well as victim assistance. In December 2001, it sent a team of doctors and technicians to Kabul to set up a camp to repair artificial limbs (Jaipur Foot) for Afghan amputees.\(^{65}\) The team is to repair or fit about 1,000 artificial limbs during their stay.

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64 Article 13 Report, 18 October 2000, p. 8. The Center is to focus on technical aspects of mines encountered, activation mechanisms, methods of laying, marking and recording mines, and types of mine clearance equipment.
There are no formal mine awareness programs in India. However, the increased use of explosive devices by non-state actors has raised the need for awareness efforts. Police and Army operating in conflict zones have been sensitizing the local population to the dangers of unidentified objects that could camouflage explosive devices. Electronic and print media have contributed to public awareness of explosive devices through wide coverage of the subject.

The fresh laying of mines in the border areas calls for a comprehensive mine risk education program. There are reports indicating that the Army has advised villagers to be careful and stay away from the mine infested fields. In the Ferozepore district in Punjab, the civilian administration and Indian Army are conducting mine awareness education for the civilian population and have fenced and displayed warning signs in Hindi and Gurmukhi. However, it has not prevented the increased number of incidents involving both civilians and military personnel in the mined areas.

In 2001, casualties occurred due to landmine use by both the Indian Armed Forces and militants. The exact number of casualties is not known, as there is no comprehensive data collection mechanism on landmine incidents in India. However, based on an analysis of media reports, information is available on at least 332 new mine casualties in 2001, of which 133 people were killed and 199 injured. Media reports tended to focus on military casualties. Of the 332 reported casualties, 225 involved military personnel or militants. Of the 107 civilian casualties, 32 were children. In one incident, one child was killed and twenty injured when their school bus ran over a landmine. Due to the remoteness and lack of transport and communication facilities in some of the mine-affected border areas it is believed that many civilian casualties are not reported.

In 2001, reported casualties were not confined to the Jammu and Kashmir areas. Incidents were reported in Assam. For example, on 31 July, six Bhutanese nationals were killed and eight injured in a landmine blast, and on 5 August, eight soldiers and two civilians were killed when their truck ran over a mine. Other incidents were also reported in the states of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.

In 2002, the media continues to report military and civilian landmine casualties. Between 1 January and 17 June 2002, 180 landmine casualties have been reported, of which 99 were killed and 81 injured, including 15 children.

The Indian Army maintains a website with statistics on civilian casualties in Kashmir. According to the data, in 2001, 133 civilians were killed and 2,120 injured due to landmines, IEDs and grenade incidents. It is not known how many of these casualties can be attributed to landmines. However, the statistics do reveal an increase in casualties from 2000 when it was reported that 129 people had been killed and 1,258 injured in similar incidents. In 2002, up to 31 March, 27 civilians are reported to have died and 290 were injured.

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68 Landmine Monitor collated data from 35 media reports between 1 January and 31 December 2001. Details of individual reports are available.
72 Landmine Monitor collated data from 33 media reports between 1 January and 17 June 2002. Details of individual reports are available.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
Survivor Assistance

India has a system of free medical care for all citizens, however, in rural areas the quality and availability of services can be problematic.76 In the mine-affected area of Jammu and Kashmir the State government has pledged to improve medical services in all health institutions in the State.77 The government of India has also indicated its support for the rehabilitation of mine survivors and the role of the Army’s Artificial Limb Center in providing prosthetics.78

Several NGOs operate within Jammu and Kashmir assisting the population, including persons with disabilities, with medical care, rehabilitation, education and training.79 The NGO ICNA Relief-helping Hand, for example, provides medical assistance through the Kashmir Surgical Hospital. The hospital provides medicines and surgical services, and has in-patient facilities, four ambulances, one operating theater, and sixty branch centers in refugee camps. In addition, there are five Primary Health Centers in refugee camps.80

The New Delhi-based NGO, Ortho Prosthetics Care and Rehabilitation (OPCAR) runs camps in mine-affected areas such as Jammu, Kashmir, and Madhya Pradesh, to provide prosthetics to mine survivors.81

In Jammu and Kashmir, as part of Operation Sadbhavna, the Srinagar-based 15-Corps, in coordination with Jyot Charitable Trust under guidance from NEVEDAC Prosthetic Center, Chandigarh, is providing artificial limbs to disabled persons. As of January 2002, 198 persons from Kashmir have been fitted with artificial limbs, including some of the survivors of the 1971 and 1965 wars. The Jammu-based 16-Corps has assisted many survivors by providing prosthetics, including 35 children.82 However, it is not known how many beneficiaries of these programs were landmine amputees.

In January 2002, an Indian orthopedic team arrived in Kabul, Afghanistan, with one thousand artificial limbs, which were available free-of-charge for amputees. The prosthetic legs, fitted with the so-called Jaipur foot, were provided by the BMVSS charity based in Jaipur. The program is funded by the Indian government.83

Disability Policy and Practice

According to the US State Department, with the adoption of the Persons with Disability Act,84 a disabled rights movement is slowly raising public awareness of the rights of the disabled. The act provides equal rights to all persons with disabilities, nevertheless, the practical effects have been minimal in part due to a clause that makes the implementation of programs dependent on the “economic capacity” of the government.85

The government has announced that compensation will be paid to casualties of military related explosions. For example, for casualties who are killed the payment is five lakh rupees (US$10,415), and a maimed person will receive 75,000 rupees (US$1,560). However, for a civilian

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77 “Mian Altaf for taking dental services to rural areas diagnostic facilities will be upgraded in all health institutions,” 22 September 2001, at http://jammukashmir.nic.in/view/sep222k1.htm (accessed 20 June 2002).
79 Details on the activities of these NGOs in 2001was not available to Landmine Monitor. For a list of the NGOs see http://www.kashmirgroup.freeserve.co.uk/ngo.htm.
81 ICBL, Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, September 2001, p. 61.
83 Ian McWilliam, “Jaipur foot for Afghan amputees: Thousands have lost limbs during 20 years of war,” BBC, 4 January 2002.
injured in a landmine explosion on the border the payment in the event of death is as little as one lakh (US$2,083), and for a civilian permanently disabled the payment is no more than 10,000 rupees (US$208).86

IRAN

Key developments since May 2001: Although Iran declared an export moratorium in 1997, mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan are encountering numerous Iranian mines, dated 1999 and 2000. Also, in early January 2002, the Israeli military seized Iranian-produced antipersonnel mines on a ship reportedly destined to Palestine. According to an Iranian military official, from March 2001 to March 2002, 70 million square meters of land was cleared, including more than 3.2 million antipersonnel mines, 914,000 antitank mines and 4,236 UXO. A new joint project with UNDP is aimed at establishing and implementing an integrated national mine action program.

Mine Ban Policy

Iran has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Unlike the previous year, Iran did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. On 29 November 2001 Iran again abstained, as it has done in previous years, in voting on the UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty.

An Iranian official told Landmine Monitor that while Iran has condemned landmines as inhumane weapons, it also views them as a “necessary evil.”1 The government believes that it needs to continue to use landmines to protect its borders and to combat drug smugglers.2

Iran has stated that it prefers to deal with the landmine issue through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which regulates use, not prohibits it.3 While Iran is not a party to the CCW or its Amended Protocol II on landmines, and has no plans to ratify, a government official told Landmine Monitor that Iran observs the CCW’s restrictions.4 Iran attended the second review conference of the CCW in December 2001.

Production, Stockpiling, Use

Iran is a manufacturer of antipersonnel mines, including the YM-I mine and the Mk. 4 mine, but it is not known if production is on-going or if it commences to meet specific requirements.5 The size and composition of Iran’s antipersonnel mine stockpile is not known. Iran is believed to maintain minefields along its borders with Iraq and Afghanistan.

Transfer

Iran exported a significant number of antipersonnel mines in the past. An export moratorium was instituted in 1997, but it is not known if it is still formally in effect.6 Landmine Monitor has received information that mine clearance organizations in Afghanistan are encountering many hundreds of Iranian YM1 and YM1-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 1999 and 2000, on recently abandoned Northern Alliance front lines.7 On 3 January 2002, the Israel Defense Force

2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. In particular, he claimed that Iran keeps records of where mines are placed.
7 Information provided to Landmine Monitor and ICBL by HALO Trust and the Danish Demining Group, July 2002.
(IDF) seized a ship, the Karine-A, about 300 miles south of the Israeli port of Eilat. Israel claimed the ship originated from Iran and was destined for Palestine via the Hezbollah in Lebanon.\(^8\) According to a manifest released by the IDF, the weapons on the ship included 311 YM-I antipersonnel mines, 211 YM-III antivehicle mines, demolition blocks, and other high explosives.\(^9\)

**Landmine Problem**

The mined areas in western and southwestern Iran, particularly the provinces of Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ilam, and Khuzestan, are the result of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq conflict. Government officials claim that some 12-16 million landmines were planted in Iran by Iraq during the war in an area of over four million hectares.\(^10\)

**Mine Action**

The Ministry of the Interior decides where mine clearance will take place, based on political, economic, and social priorities, while the Iranian Armed Forces, specifically the Army’s Engineer Units, are responsible for mine clearance projects.

Iran has undertaken massive mine clearance efforts since 1988. According to a senior military official, from the end of the Iran-Iraq War until early 2001, over 750,000 hectares (7,500 million square meters) of mined land and nine million mines and UXO were cleared.\(^11\) Just in the year 2000, more than 30,000 hectares (300 million square meters) of land was cleared, including more than 880,000 mines and UXO, according to statistics provided by the Ministry of the Interior.\(^12\)

According to Brigadier Mohammad Nabizadeh, a deputy head of the Army’s ground forces, from 20 March 2001 to 20 March 2002, 7,000 hectares (70 million square meters) of land was cleared, including 3.2 million antipersonnel mines, 914,000 antitank mines, and 4,236 other munitions.\(^13\)

Despite the progress, in some provinces, such as Ilam, less than half of the minefields have been cleared.\(^14\) In Kurdistan province, deminers had cleared 589 of the 765 mine-infested areas as of early 2001, according to the Deputy Governor-General for Military Affairs, Bahram Nasrollahizadeh.\(^15\)

The UN Development Program (UNDP) and the government are collaborating on a mine action project, “Support to Mine Action in Iran.” The project was initially developed in 1996, but delayed due to funding issues and lack of government approval. It was revived after a visit in 21-26 August 2001 by the UNDP’s Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery. The project has a budget of US$3.2 million (US$3 million from Iran and US$200,000 from UNDP). According to the project abstract, it is designed to “strengthen the national capacity of the relevant civilian Government Ministry (currently the Ministry of Interior) in its implementation of an integrated national Mine Action Programme. All activities will be coordinated by the Committee for Demining, which would consist of members of the Ministry of Defense and Foreign Affairs as well

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\(^10\) This is the equivalent of 40,000,000,000 square meters. “7,000 Hectares of Land Cleared from Iraqi Mines,” Islamic Republic News Agency (Khorramshahr), 25 March 2002. For a list of the mine types used by Iran and Iraq, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 1005.


\(^12\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 1005.

\(^13\) “7,000 Hectares of Land Cleared from Iraqi Mines,” Islamic Republic News Agency (Khorramshahr), 25 March 2002.

\(^14\) “Farmer Killed in Western Iran by Landmines Leftover from War with Iraq,” Islamic Republic News Agency (Ilam), 21 November 2001.

\(^15\) “Iran Demines 765 Areas Along Border with Iraq,” Islamic Republic News Agency (Sanandaj, Kordestan Province), 28 April 2001. He indicated the government had allocated 1.8 billion Iranian rials ($1.033 million) for mine clearance in the province.
as the governors of the affected provinces.” The UNDP representative in Iran said, “This project will address the negative humanitarian and socio-economic impact of widespread contamination caused by landmines and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO). It will enhance the capacity of the Government for an integrated mine action in the country.”

In 2000, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was contacted by Norsk Hydro, a Norwegian oil and energy producing company, to provide expertise in dealing with mine and UXO contaminated areas in relation to Hydro’s seismic explorations in Western Iran. As the Iranian Army is the only body allowed to conduct mine clearance in Iran, Norsk Hydro contracted the Iranian Army to undertake the demining. The program started in January 2001. NPA is responsible for training, advice and quality control for the demining work in the Anaran region of Iran. As of July 2002, NPA has 10 Technical Advisors present in Iran to ensure that the demining activities are in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards. In 2001, approximately 10 million square meters were cleared by the Army and under the supervision of NPA. The project is funded by Norsk Hydro and the national Iranian Oil Company. NPA is also assessing the possibilities for future humanitarian mine action programs in Iran.

Iran has favored greater sharing of information concerning landmine detection technology. The Amir Kabir University of Technology is hosting an international competition called, “The First International Mine Detector Robots Competition” in August 2002. The purpose of the competition is to identify new technologies and share the information with others around the world.

Mine Risk Education

The UNHCR and the government of Iran cooperate at the Dougharun border camp on the Iran-Afghan border in a program to instruct returning refugees about the issue of landmines. UNHCR is considering a proposal to incorporate mine risk education as a regular part of repatriations of Afghan refugees from both Iran and Pakistan. There are not believed to be any comprehensive efforts underway domestically on mine risk education.

The Iranian cinema has begun to address the issue of landmines. Over the past three years, a number of movies mention the landmine issues. Two of the movies, Takhte Siah (Blackboard) and A Time For Drunken Horses, take place in Kurdistan province in Iran. Kandahar, a movie made by an Iranian filmmaker Mohsen Makhmalbak, begins with landmine education for returning Afghan refugees in Iran and continues to examine how landmine survivors cope in Afghanistan.

Landmine Casualties

Landmine Monitor recorded 18 people killed by mines in 2001, and two people killed and seven injured in the first quarter of 2002, from a limited number of available media reports. The reports showed the majority of casualties were civilian, including children and shepherds. According to two media reports, every year dozens of livestock, locals and migrant tribesmen are killed or injured by mines.

In February 2001, an Iranian Army commander on a demining team in the southwest section of the country was killed in a mine accident. In March, five children were killed in a landmine explosion at an abandoned military base in the border province of West Azarbaijan.

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16 Email from Hossein Jafari Giv, Program Officer for Natural Resources Management and Disaster Response, UNDP, 19 March 2002.
17 Norwegian People’s Aid, Portfolio of Humanitarian Mine Action; Responses to LM Mine Action Questionnaire from Erik Tollefsen, Technical Advisor, NPA, Oslo.
20 Interview with Parviz Mohajer, Public Relations Officer, UNHCR, New York, 1 March 2002.
23 Ibid.
incident in March, two shepherds were killed by a mine in the western border city of Mehran, in Ilam province.\textsuperscript{24} In April, in the southwestern province of Ilam, six Iranian soldiers were killed after stepping on mines.\textsuperscript{25} In November, a farmer was killed in a mine explosion in Ilam province.\textsuperscript{26} In December, three people were killed by landmines, including two soldiers in Kurdistan.\textsuperscript{27} Mine incidents reported in Ilam province in 2002 included: in January, one person was killed and two injured in a landmine incident\textsuperscript{28}, and in March, one person was killed and five others injured in landmine explosions.\textsuperscript{29}

There is no systematic nationwide reporting of landmine survivors in Iran; a survey done in Ilam province in 2000 is the most in-depth study to date. Between 1989 and 1999, the survey recorded 1,082 casualties, of which 394 were killed.\textsuperscript{30} No comprehensive information is available on landmine casualties in other provinces. The Medical Engineering Research Center estimates that there are 300 landmine or UXO casualties in Iran every year, of which 36\% are killed.

**Survivor Assistance**

Little is known about survivor assistance programs in Iran. Military personnel injured by mines receive medical care, rehabilitation, prosthetics, and a pension, from the army. However, civilians injured by mines are referred to the relevant governor general department who then assigns them to a public or private department.\textsuperscript{31} The “Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation” provides a variety of services to people disabled during the Islamic Revolution and war with Iraq. According to their website, the Janbazan section provides many services for the members, including medical care, housing, employment opportunities, and advocacy on nondiscrimination laws and legislation. While this organization does provide assistance for soldiers affected by landmines, it is not clear who assists civilian mine survivors.\textsuperscript{32}

In 2000, the High Center for Research and Information, the Mostazafan and Janbazan Foundation, and the Norwegian Trauma Care Foundation, presented a proposal for a victim assistance program to the Ministry of Health. The program would provide training in emergency medical care to paramedics in mine-affected areas.\textsuperscript{33} No information on the activities of the program in 2001 is available. However, it is known that in 2001 the Trauma Care Foundation received US$41,000 in funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the program.\textsuperscript{34}

**IRAQ**

**Policy, Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use**

Iraq has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It did not attend any international meetings related to the issue of landmines in 2001 or 2002. In failing to pay its dues, Iraq has been ineligible to vote on UN General Assembly resolutions, including the annual resolution promoting the Mine Ban Treaty. Iraq is not a State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{24} “Two Killed in Iran Landmine Blast,” \textit{Agence France Presse}, 29 March 2001.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{25} “Six Iranian Soldiers Killed by Left-over Iran-Iraq War Mine,” \textit{Agence France Presse}, 1 May 2001.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{26} “Farmer Killed in Western Iran by Landmines Leftover from War with Iraq,” \textit{IRNA}, 21 November 2001.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{27} “Two Soldiers Killed in Mine Blasts on Iraqi Border,” \textit{Agence France Presse}, 18 December 2001.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{28} “One Killed, Two Injured by Landmine in Ilam,” \textit{Agence France Presse}, 29 January 2002.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{29} “One Killed, Five Wounded in Mine Explosions in Ilam,” \textit{IRNA}, 6 March 2002.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{30} For details on the Ilam survey, see \textit{Landmine Monitor Report} 2000, p. 930.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{31} See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report} 2001, pp. 1006-1007.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{33} Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs, ICBL, September 2000; see also http://www.traumacare.no (accessed 4 July 2002).}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{34} UN Resource Mobilization at http://www.mineaction.org (accessed 4 July 2002).}
In 2001, Iraq refused to issue visas to nearly 300 staff hired to work on electrical systems and mine clearance projects in the Kurdish-dominated north.\(^1\)

Iraq is a producer of antipersonnel mines, although it is not known if production is on-going or if it commences to meet specific requirements. Iraq remains the only known mine exporter that has neither instituted an export ban or moratorium, nor made a policy declaration of no current export. However, no confirmed evidence has been found of Iraqi exports of landmines in recent years. Iraq is assumed to have a significant stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but no details are available.\(^2\) There were no reports in 2001 or 2002 about new use or renewal of old minefields in Iraq.

**Landmine Problem and Mine Action**

Iraq is severely affected by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) as a consequence of the Gulf War, the Iraq-Iran War and two decades of internal conflict. Landmines and UXO continue to be a problem in the north, as well as along the Iran-Iraq border throughout the central and southern regions of the country.\(^3\)

In the summer of 2001, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted a survey in southern Iraq to assess the mine/UXO threat and evaluate the need to raise awareness. It identified cluster bombs and other UXO as the main threat.\(^4\)

In April 2001, the ICRC began a comprehensive mine/UXO risk education program by organizing four mine/UXO awareness days in three of the affected southern governorates of Basrah, Al Muthanna and Missan.\(^5\) The mine awareness days consisted of plays, lectures by civil defense personnel on the various types of mines and UXO, first-aid training by the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS), videos on the landmine and UXO problem, speeches from local authorities, and victim accounts. Approximately 1,700 people attended these events. The effort had the support of the respective governors, civil defense officials, the education and health departments, and the police. The ICRC plans to further develop mine risk education programs in southern Iraq.\(^6\)

There is no information regarding Iraq’s efforts to clear old minefields in areas under its control.\(^7\) Mine clearance and mine awareness activities continue in Northern Iraq (also known as Iraqi Kurdistan, see separate entry).

**Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance**

Mines and UXO located inside the country continue to inflict casualties, but information is limited. In 2001, at least 21 people were killed or injured in reported mine/UXO incidents, including 19 children. In February 2001, a boy was killed by a cluster bomblet in Karbala province, six children were injured in an incident in the southern city of Basra, and two boys were injured by a cluster bomblet while tending sheep in western Iraq. On 15 March, a shepherd was injured in a UXO incident near Nassiriyah.\(^8\) In the period March to September 2001, the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) reported five separate incidents of casualties in the

\(^1\) Hassan Hafidh, “U.N. wants Iraq to issue more visas for its staff,” *Reuters* (Baghdad), 29 January 2002.

\(^2\) In addition to its own production, Iraq has obtained mines from Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union, and the United States. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2000*, p. 931.


\(^5\) Email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Laurence Desvignes, ICRC Mine-Program Coordinator, 26 July 2002.


\(^8\) See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 1008.
southern sector. Four children aged between 6 and 12 years and one 18-year-old were injured; three died as a result of their injuries. On 19 September 2001, three boys were killed in a mine explosion in the Al-Deer district of the Basra province when a mine exploded while their father was plowing his land; three of their cousins were injured.

In the period September 2001 to March 2002, a UNIKOM German medical team carried out ten evacuations of Iraqi civilians injured by mine and UXO explosions. During the period under review, a 12-year-old girl died as a result of her injuries.

In 2000, UNIKOM treated 87 people injured by mines and UXO. The government is reported to provide assistance to mine survivors at Ibn al Kuff hospital and through designated medical centers.

In 2001, the ICRC completed rehabilitation work on six hospitals and ten primary health care centers as part of its integrated medical-emergency program. In 2001, the ICRC also provided support to four government-run prosthetic/orthotic centers located in Baghdad, Basra and Najef, as well as to the ICRC-supported center in Mosul and the Norwegian Red Cross-supported center in Arbil. It also supported the Baghdad Prosthetic/Orthotic School. In 2001, the ICRC manufactured 1,168 prostheses for mine survivors. In addition, four training courses for prosthetic/orthotic technicians and physiotherapists were organized for Iraqi staff.

ISRAEL

Key developments since May 2001: In June 2002, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon stated his strong opposition to laying mines along a new fence being constructed on the West Bank. Israel submitted its initial annual report for CCW Amended Protocol II, the first time Israel has made detailed mine related information available to the international community.

Mine Ban Policy

Israel has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In explaining Israel’s abstention in voting on the November 2001 UN General Assembly resolution supporting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, representatives said that Israel “is still required to resort to defensive operations against terrorists in order to prevent attacks on its civilians, therefore, we remain at present, unable to support an immediate enactment of a total ban on landmines. Israel supports a gradual regional process towards the eventual goal of a total ban on landmines, based on peaceful relations and regional cooperation.”

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13 Report of the UN Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1302 (S/2000/857), 8 September 2000, p. 6.
16 Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the ICRC, 1 June 2002. The ICRC has said that an estimated 3,000 patients per year receive ICRC prostheses, and of these, over 50 percent are mine survivors. ICRC Annual Report 2000, p. 198.
1 Statement to the UN General Assembly First Committee by Alon Bar, Director of Division of Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Meir Itzchaki, First Secretary, Division of Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New York, October 2001.


Israel has not enacted any additional domestic legislation to implement the provisions of Amended Protocol II as it believes that existing legislation is adequate, including export controls and Israel Defense Force (IDF) regulations for laying, marking, and disposing of landmines.\(^2\) Israel states that the IDF is aware of the provisions of the protocol, and their instructions and operating procedures have been reviewed in order to verify compliance. Any violation of these terms may result in an IDF investigation and possible disciplinary or penal measures. The IDF military law school maintains that the provisions of the CCW and Amended Protocol II remain integral parts of the curriculum, and IDF personnel receive lectures and workshops on this issue on a regular basis.\(^3\)

**Production, Transfer, Stockpiling**

In November 2001, Israel again stated that it has “ceased all production of antipersonnel mines,” but the date of the cessation has still not been made public.\(^4\) It remains unclear if this constitutes a permanent ban on production, or a moratorium pending future developments.

Israel declared a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines in 1994. In 1999, the moratorium was extended until 2002.\(^5\) A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official informed Landmine Monitor in July 2002 that the moratorium will be extended as soon as possible.\(^6\)

In July 2001, a report required under the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act (“655 report”) for fiscal year 2000, noted that the U.S. Department of State approved a direct commercial sale of $218,339 (license value) of “Mines Anti-Personnel” to Israel. The State Department corrected this entry in September 2001 to read “Mine Anti-Tank.”\(^7\)

The size and composition of Israel’s antipersonnel mine stockpile remains unknown, but Landmine Monitor received information which indicates that Israel stockpiles remotely delivered antipersonnel mines, as well as hand-emplace mines.\(^8\)

**Use**

There were no credible allegations in the reporting period (since May 2001) that the IDF had deployed any additional antipersonnel mines along its borders or used antipersonnel mines during military operations in Palestinian areas. It would appear that the role of antipersonnel mines is not significant in the on-going conflict between Israel and armed Palestinian groups. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official told Landmine Monitor in December 2001 that antipersonnel mines are not part of the Israel Defense Force doctrine in this conflict, and that antipersonnel mines have not been used by the IDF.\(^9\)

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\(^3\) Article 13 report, 26 November 2001, p. 5.


\(^6\) Email to Landmine Monitor/HRW from Meir Itzchaki, First Secretary, Regional Security and Arms Control Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 July 2002.


\(^8\) Discussion with Israeli official, Geneva, December 2001.

\(^9\) Interview with Meir Itzchaki, First Secretary, Regional Security and Arms Control Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 13 December 2001. This was reiterated in an email dated 30 June 2001.
In June 2002, Israeli media reported that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon told Knesset members that he “strongly opposes laying mines” as part of the construction of a new fence between Israel and the West Bank. When asked if the fence would be mined, Sharon reportedly said he strongly opposed this since the population in many areas was dense and included women and children. “Can we have them being blown up by mines?” he asked.10

A controversial incident occurred on 22 November 2001, when five Palestinian children were killed by an explosive device while walking to school in the village of Khan Younis (Khan Yunes) in the Gaza Strip. The type of device or the means of its detonation is uncertain. A Palestinian source claimed the device was a booby-trap.11 If this incident was the result of Israeli use of a booby-trap, it raises questions about Israel’s compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II.12 Explosive booby-traps are considered antipersonnel mines, and therefore banned, under the Mine Ban Treaty.

An initial report of the incident cited in subsequent media accounts attribute the explosion to an unexploded IDF tank shell.13 Radio Israel reported that the IDF investigation into the incident had “revealed serious flaws in the planting of the ordnance that killed the children,” implying that the IDF had planted the device.14 The U.S. Department of State attributed the cause of the explosion to unexploded ordnance.15

Israel’s Minister of Defense, Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, said that the explosion had occurred in an unpopulated area where Palestinian gunmen had carried out shooting attacks on nearby Jewish settlements and IDF outposts.16 According to the office of the Israel army spokesperson:

From an initial examination carried out by the Commander of the South command, Maj. Gen. Doron Almog, the possibility arises that the children were killed as a result of tempering [sic] with an explosive charge that an IDF force placed in the sandbag post that was used for shooting and terrorist activity against our forces. This post is placed in open terrain, outside of the residential area…. The IDF spokesperson emphasizes that the activity in the open terrain was aimed against terrorists and again expresses his condolences for the death of the children.”17

The spokesperson also indicated that the explosive charge was placed outside a residential area, but Palestinian sources claimed the weapon was planted on the route the five boys usually took to school. According to the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, located in the Gaza Strip, “The explosion occurred on a path that rings an agricultural area, with several houses barely 100

12 Amended Protocol II prohibits and restricts the use of booby-traps, which are defined in article 2, paragraph 4. Article 3 provides general restrictions on the use of these weapons, in particular paragraph 8(c) which prohibits placement “which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.” The prohibitions on the use of booby-traps and other devices in article 7, paragraph 3 may also be applicable in this case.
14 Ibid.
meters away. According to relatives of the victims and local residents, the boys met at that spot every day before going to school, and the path was regularly used by the community.\(^\text{18}\)

In another disputed incident, on 15 March 2001, a Palestinian woman, three of her children, and her nephew were killed when their donkey cart ran over a mine in the Al-Boureij area of the central Gaza Strip. Palestinian authorities claimed Israeli soldiers had planted the mine near a Palestinian security post. Israel denied the charges, and instead insisted that Palestinians had planted the mine to target Israeli armored vehicles.\(^\text{19}\)

*Landmine Monitor Report 2001* reported information provided by Al-Haq, a Palestinian human rights monitoring group, that an IDF unit had used antipersonnel mines in March and April 2001 near the village of al-Khader, west of Bethlehem. In a late July 2001 letter to Landmine Monitor, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not directly address the al-Khader incident but indicated that it “strongly rejects allegations” that Israel used mines in a manner contrary to their obligations under CCW Amended Protocol II.\(^\text{20}\) In a December 2001 interview, Israeli representatives stated that the mines at Al-Khader were not laid by the IDF and were placed in earlier conflicts.\(^\text{21}\)

In response to criticisms and recommendations contained in a 1999 audit conducted by the Israeli State Comptroller’s Office into mine laying practices by the IDF, particularly with respect to fencing and marking,\(^\text{22}\) an Israeli Foreign Ministry official stated that “improvements have been made in practices” and that new fencing has been erected around minefields in the areas of the Golan Heights controlled by Israel.\(^\text{23}\) The U.S. Department of State, citing the government of Israel, noted, “minefields on the Golan Heights are clearly marked.”\(^\text{24}\)

**Mine Action**

Israel is a mine-affected country.\(^\text{25}\) Israel has used mines along its borders, near military camps and training areas, and near infrastructure including water pump stations and electric power facilities.

No systematic humanitarian mine clearance took place during the reporting period by any actor. The IDF and its commercial Israeli contractors continue to clear mines, bombs, and unexploded ordnance on an emergency basis, and on a more frequent basis when circumstances permit.

With regard to mine risk education, Israel states that it requires organizers of field trips (such as those conducted by schools, youth movements, work places and private citizens) to coordinate their routes with the relevant IDF command in order receive briefings regarding the location of actual and suspected minefields in the area. Other preventive measures include warning signs in Hebrew, Arabic and English placed on the perimeters of minefields, as well as commercially


\(^{19}\) “Palestinian woman, three of her children and a nephew die in Gaza blast,” *Agence France Presse*, Gaza City, 15 March 2002; “5 Die in Gaza Blast,” *Times of India*, 16 March 2002.

\(^{20}\) Letter to Landmine Monitor from Meir Itzchaki, First Secretary, Regional Security and Arms Control Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 July 2001. See *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* (pp. 1011-1012) for full details of the allegation. If the allegations were correct, Landmine Monitor noted that the type of mine use at Al-Khader (i.e. failing to fence and mark a mined area) could constitute a violation of Amended Protocol II, article 5(2)(a).

\(^{21}\) Interview with Meir Itzchaki, First Secretary, Regional Security and Arms Control Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 13 December 2001.


\(^{23}\) Interview with Meir Itzchaki, First Secretary, Regional Security and Arms Control Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geneva, 13 December 2001.


available maps issued by the Israeli Mapping Center that indicate the topographic location of minefields in the area. In its Article 13 report, Israel stated that “further information regarding minefield locations is provided by local municipalities to the general population upon land rights and use inquiries.”

Israel has also been involved in mine risk education internationally. In 2001, it upgraded its involvement in a mine awareness program that it participates in with UNICEF in Angola, by providing funds for four Israeli volunteers to operate in the area.

Israel has not provided any other financial or other assistance to mine action activities internationally in the reporting period. The Maavarim Civil Engineering Company has engaged in mine clearance operations in the past both domestically and internationally, with some projects supported by the Israel Ministry of Defense.

**Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance**

No record of civilian landmine victims is available for inside the state of Israel because mine victims are listed under the umbrella category of “Victims of Hostile Activities.” Its Article 13 report notes that Israel “has vast experience in the field of rehabilitation, with over 2000 traumatic amputations within the IDF and several dozens of civilian victims to landmines, UXOs, improvised explosives and other devices.”

In November 2001, the U.S. Department of State noted, “The Government of Israel reports that there have been no landmine/UXO casualties within the Green Line or on the Golan Heights since at least January 1, 2000.”

The Israeli National Insurance Services (Bituach Leumi) cover the cost of treatment for all Israeli citizens injured by landmines. Coverage is also provided for tourists, students, and anyone who has entered the country legally, as they are included in the Health Services clause of Victims of Hostile Activities regulation, and therefore, given extensive treatment. Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories, however, are not provided such coverage.

The main Israeli hospitals and centers offering rehabilitation programs include “Tel-Hashomer” (“Shiba”) and “Loewenstein” in Tel Aviv, and “Rambam” and “Bnei Zion” in Haifa. As of January 2001, Israel had six workshops specializing in prostheses, ten specializing in orthoses, more than a dozen orthopedic shoemakers, and a number of physiotherapists working in the field of orthopedic rehabilitation.

**KAZAKHSTAN**

Kazakhstan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In November 2001, Kazakhstan was one of only 19 States to abstain from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. In October 2001, in the First Committee of the General Assembly, a representative of Kazakhstan declared, “We fully support the humanitarian orientation” of the Mine Ban Treaty.

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27 Ibid., p. 11.
28 In 1998, Israel participated in a project with Jordan, Canada and Norway aimed at mine clearance in the Jordan valley and medical rehabilitation for Jordanian mine victims. The previous year, Israel conducted a joint mine clearance project with Jordan in the Arava valley. Article 13 report, 26 November 2001, p. 11.
29 No time periods were cited with these statistics. Article 13 report, 26 November 2001, p. 7.
Kazakhstan did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. In January 2002, it participated for the first time in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings, represented by Ms. Dariya Kairgeldina, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations in Geneva. It did not attend the intersessional meetings in May 2002.

Kazakhstan is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and Landmine Monitor is unaware of any steps toward joining the CCW. However, the government has previously stated that Kazakhstan bases its policies on landmine issues on the provisions of the CCW and its Amended Protocol II.2

Kazakhstan has stated that it does not produce antipersonnel mines.3 In October 2001, it told the UN General Assembly that it was “strictly abiding by the unilateral moratorium on the export, including re-export and transit, declared by the Government of Kazakhstan in 1994.”4 Previously, it has been reported that Kazakhstan banned exports in August 1997.5 One newspaper report estimated that Kazakhstan stockpiles 800,000 to one million antipersonnel mines.6 There are no documented cases of recent antipersonnel mine use by Kazakh armed forces.

Kazakhstan declares that it is not mine-affected, although it acknowledges that its long borders are mined.7 There have been no recent reports of mine casualties. Kazakhstan is not known to have made any contributions to international mine action programs.

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Mine Ban Policy

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. The government has not made a policy statement on landmines since 1998.1 It has not attended any of the major international meetings on the landmine issue. The DPRK has been absent from every vote on the pro-ban UN General Assembly resolutions since 1997, including in November 2001. North Korea is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling and Use

No new information on the DPRK’s production, trade, stockpiling, or use of antipersonnel mines is available.2 North Korea has said, “We use landmines in the area along the military demarcation line (MDL), solely for defensive purposes.”3 It seems that North Korea has also

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2 Letter from E. Kazykhanov, Letter No.20/178, Embassy of Kazakhstan in Moscow, 19 April 2000; Response to Questionnaire on Antipersonnel Landmines, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the OSCE, FSC.DEL/32/00, Vienna, 3 February 2000.
7 Letter from E. Kazykhanov, Embassy of Kazakhstan to Moscow, 19 April 2000.
1 In 1998, the government said it fully supported the “humanitarian purposes and the nature” of the Mine Ban Treaty, but could not accede “for security reasons” under the present circumstances on the Korean peninsula. Statement of Counselor Kim Sam Jong, Permanent Mission of DPRK to the UN, New York, 4 December 1998.
2 See past Landmine Monitor Reports for the few known details. DPRK apparently still produces the Model 15 fragmentation stake mine and the APP M-57 blast mine.
3 Statement of Counselor Kim Sam Jong, Permanent Mission of DPRK to the UN, 4 December 1998.
planted some mines along the East Coast area between the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) and the port city of Wonsan.\(^4\)

**Mine Action**

There is no official information about any past mine clearance, mine risk education, or survivor assistance programs in the North. The DPRK has not contributed to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance.

Due to a general deterioration in relations between North Korea and South Korea, and between North Korea and the United States, North Korea has maintained a freeze on the agreed inter-Korean transportation project near Panmunjom. This project is to include mine clearance in and near the DMZ to permit construction of a highway and railroad line.\(^5\)

According to press accounts, North Korea agreed to open a new overland cross-border route on the East Coast.\(^6\) This would require the removal of landmines in and near the DMZ. The proposed highway in the East Coast would be 13.7 kilometers long and 50 meters wide. It would link the unification observatory at Songhyun-ri in South Korea and the village of Onjeong-ri at the base of Mount Keumgang in North Korea.\(^7\) In addition, it seems that North Korea is also willing to reconnect the Donghae rail line on the east coast. An agreement in principle between the two governments of Korea on these matters was reached in April 2002, but there has been no further progress.\(^8\)

**Landmine Problem and Casualties**

It is likely that landmine incidents continue in certain battle sites of the Korean War. Occasional injuries--to both soldiers and civilians--due to mines in or near the DMZ are also likely, just as it is happening in the South.

**Survivor Assistance**

The ICRC, in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Health and the DPR Red Cross Society, has launched an amputee rehabilitation program in a newly renovated prosthetic center in Songrim, 30 kilometers south of the capital Pyongyang. The center will provide rehabilitation services and produce up to 1,000 prostheses a year. Due to the economic situation and severe cutbacks in medical and social services, an estimated 11,000 people are in need of physical rehabilitation in North Korea.\(^9\)

Note to readers: A request from Landmine Monitor for information for this report was submitted through the DPRK Mission to the UN in New York in December 2001, but there has been no response. Similar requests in 1999 and 2000 also went unanswered.

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\(^4\) The Landmine Monitor researcher has seen a photograph of the apparent North Korean minefield, taken in 1996. See *Landmine Monitor Report* 2000, p. 541.

\(^5\) For more details, see *Landmine Monitor Report* 2000, p. 541.

\(^6\) Kwang-jong Yoo, “North Said Ready at Opening Border for Festival-Goers,” *Joongang Ilbo* (South Korean daily newspaper), 22 January 2002. North Korea has also proposed to open at the same time an overland travel route to Pyongyang through the truce village of Panmunjom, but this will not require any removal of landmines.


\(^8\) See joint press release of 6 April 2002, following the visit to Pyongyang by South Korean Special Envoy Lim Dong-Won; also *Korea update*, newsletter of the ROK embassy in the US, May 2002.

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001 the ROK cleared about 4,700 landmines from around military bases in the rear area. It also cleared 840 mines and 850,000 square meters of land in the inter-Korean transportation routes south of the DMZ. The ROK ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 9 May 2001. Landmine Monitor’s Asia-Pacific researchers held their regional meeting in Seoul in October 2001. Information came to light that nearly half of the 1.1 million US “dumb” mines for fighting in Korea are stored in the US, and that the US plans to transfer more than 560,000 mines already stored in South Korea to ROK forces at the outset of conflict.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Korea (ROK) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. South Korea abstained from voting on the UN General Assembly resolution supporting the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2001, as it had in previous years. South Korea did not participate as an official observer at the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001. However, the ROK has regularly attended the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings, including January and May 2002. It also participated in the regional seminar on landmine stockpile destruction hosted by Malaysia in August 2001.

The ROK ratified Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 9 May 2001, and it entered into force six months later.1 A South Korean representative attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, as well as the Second CCW Review Conference, in December 2001. The ROK submitted its first annual report as required by Article 13 of Amended Protocol II.

Members of the ICBL from the Asia-Pacific region came together in Seoul from 25-29 October 2001 to discuss their research for Landmine Monitor Report 2002 and their campaigning plans and priorities for 2002. The Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines (KCBL) hosted the meeting, which included a field trip to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) for an ROK military briefing. In the nearby village of Daekwang-ri they met with civilians injured by landmines from the DMZ while farming their rice paddies.2

The campaigners also sent an open letter to President Kim Dae-Jung urging his government to join the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible. The meeting coincided with a visit by Nobel laureate Jody Williams to Chungbuk National University, south of Seoul. On 30 October 2001, Williams met with the leader of ROK’s majority party (Grand National Party), Chairman Lee Hoi-Chang, who expressed sympathy for the humanitarian work of the campaign, but at the same time, stated that antipersonnel mines in the DMZ served a specific purpose as a deterrent. He indicated that if North Korea acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, the ROK would also, and expressed interest in interim steps short of joining the ban treaty.3

Production


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1 On 26 April 2001, the National Assembly passed Public Law 6476 implementing Amended Protocol II.
official told Landmine Monitor that South Korea has not produced any antipersonnel mines, including Claymore mines, after 2000.6

A standard reference work on landmines has reported that Hanwha also produces the M16A2, a licensed copy of the US bounding fragmentation mine. It is listed as in production and in use in the Demilitarized Zone.7 However, according to the Information Desk of Hanwha, a licensed copy of the US M16A2 was developed in 1987, but has not been produced for military use.8

Transfer

In 1997, the government extended a one-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines for an indefinite period.9 Apparently the moratorium does not include Claymore-type mines, as South Korea in 2001 offered to sell K440 Claymore-type mines to New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore.10

In the event of a renewed war in Korea, the United States plans to transfer more than 560,000 M14 and M16 non-self-destructing (“dumb”) mines that are stockpiled in South Korea to the ROK Army, for their immediate deployment.11 Questions have been raised about the applicability of the U.S. global transfer moratorium in place since 1992.

Stockpiling

South Korea is believed to possess some two million non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines in its stockpile. The estimate is based on the South Korean government statement that its antipersonnel landmine stockpile is “about twice as many as those that are buried;” the government has said the number of buried mines is around one million. (See below). In addition, South Korea holds an unknown number of self-destructing landmines, including US ADAM artillery-delivered mines12 and, according to one source, some US GEMMS mines.13

South Korea reported that by July 1999 it completed the modification of all low metal content M14 mines in its stockpiles, by attaching 8 grams of iron.14 This modification, to make the mines more easily detected, is required by Amended Protocol II. An official of the Ministry of National Defense indicated that a total of 960,000 M14 mines were modified.15

The US has long made it known that it is stockpiling more than one million M14 and M16 non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines, to be used in any future resumption of war in Korea.16 However, surprising information has recently come to light that nearly half of those mines are not in South Korea, but stored in the continental United States.

According to information provided to Human Rights Watch by the US Army, as of August 2001, the US has 1,138,600 non-self-destructing mines for use in Korea. A total of 510,600 mines (45) are stored in the continental United States, and would likely take weeks or months to get to Korea. Another 564,300 mines (50) are stored in the ROK, as “war reserves,” and would be

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8 Response from the Information Desk of Hanwha Corporation to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 28 February 2000.
10 The sales efforts were abandoned. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 453-454 for more details.
12 The US sold 31,572 ADAM mines to South Korea during 1986-88.
handed over to the ROK Army at the outset of conflict. The remaining 63,700 mines (five percent) are also stored in the ROK, for use by US forces. In addition to the non-self-destructing mines, the US also stockpiles remotely-delivered self-destructing antipersonnel mines in South Korea.

Landmine Problem

During the Korean War, the US Army and the ROK Army heavily mined the area along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Additional landmines were planted in the 1960s, 1978, and 1988 in the DMZ and within the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), which is a restricted area of three-to-twelve miles immediately below the southern boundary of the DMZ. The Demilitarized Zone and the adjacent CCZ are among the most heavily mined areas in the world. The ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade recently estimated the number of emplaced mines at 1,150,000. The US State Department in November 2001 estimated 1,125,000. The South Korean military has used a figure of about 1.2 million. The Ministry of National Defense stated that 1,368 million square meters are mined in the DMZ and CCZ.

The Ministry of National Defense has also reported the deployment of 49,149 landmines in 39 minefields located at 32 anti-aircraft sites and six US Army bases in the so-called “rear areas.” Seven of the 39 minefields have been cleared. However, there is a growing concern about the danger of landmines because of a public disclosure that more than 1,000 landmines have been lost since 1998, after being washed out from the minefields or military bases due to heavy rains.

In a joint initiative, two South Korean civic organizations surveyed minefields in 36 areas in South Korea and identified 13 as “highly dangerous areas exposed to possible landmine explosion.” These are mostly located on mountains or in villages near military bases.

Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education, Mine Action Funding

In April 2002, the ROK told Landmine Monitor that “about 4,700 M14 AP mines” were removed from military sites in rear areas in 2001. Previously, in December 2001, the ROK stated it had “cleared 4,532 landmines from the periphery of military camps and bases of the rear area in 2001. These landmines were buried to protect military camps and bases from a surprise attack by special forces of North Korea in war situation. ROK will continue to clear landmines for the sake of civilians safety from the periphery of some military camps and bases of the rear area which were buried in the ground before 1997.” In July 2001, the Ministry of National Defense announced the

19 Written response from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, to KCBL and ICBL, 11 April 2002.
Non-Signatories

completion of clearance of five minefields in the rear area,\textsuperscript{28} and in April 2002, the ROK told Landmine Monitor two more minefields in the rear had been cleared.\textsuperscript{29}

Other mine clearance operations were conducted as part of the inter-Korean transportation project, which South Korea and North Korea agreed during the Second Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks in July 2000. The September 2000 First Defense Ministerial Talks agreed that the ROK Armed Forces had the responsibility to clear an area spreading 9.2 kilometers south of the DMZ and north of the Imjin River.\textsuperscript{30}

In 2001, 840 landmines were removed from the construction sites of the Seoul-Shinuiju railway and Kaesong-Munsan highway.\textsuperscript{31} As of 20 November 2001, the ROK Armed Forces reported to have successfully cleared 850,000 square meters of minefields in the transportation linkage sites south of the DMZ without any accidents.\textsuperscript{32} South Korea stated that it would continue to clear mines in the transportation corridor within the DMZ, only if North Korea signs the February 2001 agreement governing the conduct of troops working in the DMZ.\textsuperscript{33}

The ROK government has not conducted any mine risk education campaigns for civilians. According to the survey in the rear area made by KCBL, the residents of 36 mine-affected districts have not received any mine risk education from the military or the local government. KCBL conducted mine risk education in primary schools near the DMZ using videos. In 2001, it reached 1,100 school children.

In 2001, the ROK government contributed US$150,000 for mine clearance abroad: US$30,000 to the International Trust Fund for Bosnia and Herzegovina and US$120,000 to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund, earmarking US$70,000 for Cambodia and US$50,000 for Laos.\textsuperscript{34}

\textbf{Landmine Casualties}

In 2001, four new casualties of landmine incidents were reported. Three were civilians: a 40-year-old man stepped on an M14 mine while at the beach with his family and suffered a leg injury; a 30-year-old man injured his leg while working on the sand bank of Hantan River;\textsuperscript{35} and a 35-year-old man was injured by an M16 mine as he rode on a small tractor in Chulwon.\textsuperscript{36} The fourth casualty was a US Army soldier, who also suffered a leg injury.\textsuperscript{37}

Casualties continue to be reported in 2002. In April, at Kegok-ri in Kyunggi-do, six people including a 5-year-old boy were injured by a mine in a rice field.\textsuperscript{38} And in a separate incident in April in the DMZ, three Korean soldiers were injured by a landmine while trying to recover the body of a man who had been killed in an earlier mine explosion.\textsuperscript{39} The man, who has been living close to the DMZ for 30 years, apparently entered a prohibited military area to pick herbs.

Although there is no reliable data, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines estimates that since the end of the war, there have been more than 1,000 civilian mine casualties, and 2,000-3,000 military mine casualties in South Korea.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{28} Joongang Ilbo (South Korean daily newspaper), Seoul, 26 July 2001. The five minefields were Mt. Joong-ri, and Haedae in Pusan, Keumo-ri in Hadong, Mt. Geomdan, and Kwangjoo in Kyongi-do. Also response of the ROK government, 24 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{29} ROK government response to Landmine Monitor, 24 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{30} Article 13 Report, 5 December 2001, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.; Response of ROK government, 24 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{32} Article 13 Report, 5 December 2001, pp. 10-11.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 11.
\textsuperscript{34} Response of ROK government to Landmine Monitor questionnaire, 24 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{35} KCBL database on mine casualties.
\textsuperscript{36} ROK government response to Landmine Monitor, 24 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{38} KCBL database on mine casualties.
\textsuperscript{40} See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 480.
Survivor Assistance
While the government states that it pays compensation to civilian casualties of landmines through the State Compensation Act, it seems very few survivors are actually receiving any government benefits. On 27 October 2001, Landmine Monitor researchers from the Asia-Pacific region visited a Korean village in the vicinity of Yoncheon, near the DMZ, and met with five landmine survivors; all stated that they did not get any government benefits.

The KCBL claims that the national compensation law has several limitations, such as a three-year statute of limitation, a low ceiling on the maximum amount of compensation, and burden of proof on claimants, which discourages mine survivors’ legitimate requests. The KCBL intends to sue the Korean and US governments and ask for compensation for the survivors who could not request it due to the three-year statute of limitation.

In June 2001, the Special Compensation Board of the National Defense Ministry denied the claim of two civilian survivors on the basis that they were injured by “unknown landmines which Korean Army has not used.”[41] The claimants were injured by landmines on 11 September and 2 October 2000 at Kangwhado Island. The ROK government has reported to Landmine Monitor that two civilian mine survivors filed compensation claims with the government in 2001, and that one was granted and one denied.[42]

KCBL provided financial support to 20 landmine survivors from March to December 2001. The survivors received 100,000 Won (around US$80) per month for ten months.

KUWAIT

Key developments since May 2001: Ministry of Defense sources told Landmine Monitor that Kuwait does not use landmines. Officials stated that the 45,845 antipersonnel mines Kuwait removed from the ground following the Gulf War and then stored for a period, have now been destroyed. Demining and quality assurance surveys of previously cleared land continue.

Mine Ban Policy
Kuwait has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Kuwait attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, but did not participate in intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January or May 2002. Kuwait was absent from the vote on the annual pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution in November 2001, as it has been for similar resolutions since 1999.

Although Kuwait is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, its Geneva-based representatives attended the treaty’s second review conference and third annual meeting of States Parties of Amended Protocol II, both in December 2001.

On 31 July 2001, the Ministry of Information arranged a seminar on the environmental impact of the 1990-1991 Gulf War attended by more than 100 participants from local and regional organizations and NGOs. A presentation on the types and hazards of mines and the legal framework of using mines was delivered during the seminar and many questions were raised about the Mine Ban Treaty and the main obstacles hindering Kuwait from joining the treaty.[1]

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
Ministry of Defense sources told Landmine Monitor that Kuwait does not use or produce landmines, and has not in the past.[2] The Ministry of Defense would not confirm if Kuwait has imported antipersonnel mines in the past, or if it currently maintains a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. However, officials clarified information contained in Landmine Monitor Report 2001: the
Non-Signatories

45,845 antipersonnel mines Kuwait removed from the ground following the Gulf War and then stored, at least until 1997, have since been destroyed. The Ministry of Defense also declined to comment on Landmine Monitor’s information that the United States likely stores 8,896 antipersonnel mines on the territory of Kuwait.

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Areas of Kuwait are still contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) of different types as a legacy of the 1990-1991 conflict. In several areas, especially the southern parts of the country, antipersonnel and antitank mines lie underneath a blanket of shifting sands. From 1991 to February 2002, 1,646,962 landmines were cleared in Kuwait, including 1,078,991 antipersonnel mines and 567,971 antitank mines. Most demining activities in 2001 and 2002 were focused in the strategic minefields crossing the southern part of the country, which has a length of more than 150 kilometers. Some 200 army deminers work in this area.

Between 20 February 2001 to 20 February 2002, 25 antipersonnel mines and 11 antitank mines were cleared from different areas of the desert of Kuwait including oil fields, military camps and air bases, agricultural areas, and other facilities. The mines were destroyed in the field. The Defense Ministry is responsible for survey, assessment, and quality assurance of landmines and UXO. The Ministry of Defense receives from 15-20 notices a day from public and governmental bodies (for each notice a number of UXO and mines are cleared). The Ministry of Interior deals with mines and UXO only on an emergency basis.

In 2001, quality assurance (QA) of cleared areas was conducted for 73.81 square kilometers of land. QA surveys were conducted in Al-Salmi (extreme southwestern part of Kuwait), Al-Wafrah (southeastern part), operational areas of the oil fields (southeast, northeast, north and west), Bubyan Island and Ras as Sabiyah (northeast), and other airbases and military camps. A minefield 17.8 kilometers long was surveyed along Al-Salmi road, which connects Kuwait with Saudi Arabia.

The public education activities described in previous Landmine Monitor reports continued. A 99-page Arabic booklet, “The Crime of Landmines in Kuwait,” on the problem of landmines in Kuwait was issued in July 2001, which also included information on the Mine Ban Treaty. An Arabic language version of the Landmine Monitor country report for Kuwait was also produced. Both publications were widely distributed to local and regional governmental organizations and NGOs.

Mine Action Assistance

In March 2002, Kuwait reported that it would provide Lebanon with technical support for demining operations in South Lebanon. A military delegation from Kuwait visited Lebanon for this purpose and met with the Lebanese Minister of Defense. A program of technical assistance is expected to begin soon.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

In 2001, there were at least three reported mine/UXO incidents in which one person was killed and another three injured. On 3 February 2001, one person was killed in the Wafra area in the southeast of Kuwait. Other casualties occurred on 23 February 2001 when one person was

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3 Ibid. No details were provided about when or how the mines were destroyed. For information on the collection of the 48,845 mines, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 939-940, citing Ministry of Defense information.


5 Extracted from the monthly reports (February 2001-February 2002) of the Engineering Force of the Kuwaiti Army.

6 Ibid.

7 The publications were written and distributed by the Center for Research and Studies.

8 Al Qabas (newspaper), 6 March 2002.
injured by a mine in the Kabd area, southwest of Kuwait city, and on 17 November 2001 when two people were injured in an explosion at an ammunition storage site in the Um Al rus area west of Kuwait city.9

As of March 2002, one mine incident had been reported for the year: in January, a mine exploded during a demining training exercise inside a military camp, injuring five military personnel. One of the soldiers had a leg amputated.10

A military official told Landmine Monitor researchers that there are one or two mine/UXO incidents per month in Kuwait. The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) also assists and records mine and UXO casualties occurring in the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait, but most of the incidents involve Iraqi civilians.

Previous editions of Landmine Monitor have reported a total mine casualty figure of 1,533 people between 1991 and January 2001, according to the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR).11 However, in February 2002, KISR published a new report on the injuries to civilians in Kuwait that was prepared by a panel of nine physicians from the Ministry of Health. The findings of this report indicate that mine injuries accounted for 1,026 (43%) of the 2,386 war injuries and 85 (20%) of the 421 deaths. UXO accounted for 175 (7%) injured and 119 (28%) killed.12

These numbers do not include the 1,800 injuries suffered by Iraqi military and civilians. Iraqi casualties were cared for by the Kuwaiti health services and other facilities.13

There were no changes in the health care system for mine survivors described in previous Landmine Monitor reports.14 In 2002, an NGO called the Kuwaiti Society for Landmine Victim Assistance was seeking approval from the Ministry of Social Affairs to officially form; its goal would be to register mine casualties and to assist mine survivors.15

KYRGYZSTAN

Key developments since May 2001: In June 2001, the Kyrgyz government issued a decree regarding mine clearance and mine awareness. Kyrgyzstan has reported the clearance of 320,000 square meters of land on the Uzbek border; the demining was declared illegal by Uzbekistan. Subsequently, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan agreed that new mine-laying in certain regions would not be allowed. The Ministry of Emergency Situations began conducting mine awareness programs among high-risk populations in the affected areas.

Mine Ban Policy

Kyrgyzstan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Kyrgyz officials say the country is not ready to become a State Party. In a letter to the ICBL, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that Kyrgyzstan “supports in general the idea of prohibition of production and use of landmines,” but that a number of “real problems” arose when the issue was discussed at various ministries.1 The problems the Ministry cites are: (1) the use of outdated mines in the mountainous border territories of Kyrgyzstan and problems related to their destruction; and, (2) problems related to replacement of

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9 Information provided by Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense, 7 April 2002.
10 Ibid.
13 For example, in the autumn of 1991, 157 patients injured by mine explosions were cared for by a Norwegian military medical unit attached to the United Nations mission.
14 For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 1018.
15 Al Watan (newspaper), 22 March 2002.
outdated mines “with new self-destructive mines.” However, the Ministry states that it will continue “expert analysis of the Convention,” and that it will develop “alternative means of accession.”

The Ministry also refers to its neighbor Tajikistan, which became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 April 2000: “Tajikistan withdrew its participation from the Ottawa Convention because it couldn’t fulfill its conditions and also because of the presence of threats to national security.” In fact, Tajikistan has not formally withdrawn from the Mine Ban Treaty, although there are concerns regarding its compliance. (See country report on Tajikistan).

A senior Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor that the Defense Ministry supports the “humane goals of the Ottawa Convention” and understands the need to destroy landmines as a weapon of “nonselective target.” But, he also cited the need to protect State borders in “numerous mountainous areas” as a reason for not acceding to the treaty, as well as the “harsh financial difficulties” of replacing the mines. The Head of the Engineers Unit told Landmine Monitor that stockpiled mines “might prove to be useful in the future should the need arise.”


In October and November 2001, Kyrgyzstan was absent during the votes on the General Assembly resolution in support of the Mine Ban Treaty, both in the First Committee and the full General Assembly. It had, for the first time, abstained from voting on the corresponding resolution in 2000, after supporting similar resolutions in previous years.

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

There is no evidence that Kyrgyzstan has ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Current landmine stocks were inherited after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. All mines are stored in Ministry of Defense warehouses. Landmine Monitor reported last year that the main problem with stocks are that the storage dates of the weapons have expired, and many of the mines are a special threat because they contain liquid explosive, which cannot be destroyed cheaply (i.e., PFM-1 and PFM-1S antipersonnel mines).

Use

The most recent confirmed case of landmine use by Kyrgyzstan was in 2000. The Ministry of Defense says Kyrgyz forces mined its border with Tajikistan during the second half of 2000 to

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2 Ibid. Self-destructing antipersonnel mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, though permitted by Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Interview with Iohenaly Asipov, Head of the External Affairs Unit, Ministry of Defense, Bishkek, 30 November 2001.
6 Ibid.
7 Interview with Colonel Daniar Izbasarov, Head of the Engineers Unit, Ministry of Defense, Bishkek, 27 November 2001.
8 Jamby Djanubaliev, First Secretary at the Permanent Mission of the Kyrgyz Republic to the United Nations in Geneva attended the meetings of the SC on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies, and the SC on the General Status and Operation of the Convention.
prevent incursions by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) rebel group. The mines were laid in the Batken and Chon-Alay districts of Kyrgyzstan’s Osh region.

The Chief of Engineering of the Kyrgyz armed forces said that mining on the border with Tajikistan was limited and carried out to protect Kyrgyz troops and territory. A Kyrgyz journalist, Azamat Kasybekov, claimed, “Kyrgyz Engineers had laid mines almost at every gorge and mountain pass of the southern Batken region in places of possible attacks by the guerrillas.”

There are some indications that Kyrgyzstan might have placed additional mines on the Tajik border in 2001, in anticipation of new IMU incursions that were expected to take place in the summer of 2001. It was reported in February 2001 that the “Kyrgyz leadership has announced that it will probably plant mines on part of its border with Tajikistan in order to ensure the safety of its border and to prevent an incursion by Uzbek opposition forces.” In June 2001, the Deputy Minister of Defense speculated that the IMU might have picked up emplaced antipersonnel mines and re-used them.

Landmine Problem

Kyrgyz-Uzbek Border

Uzbekistan started mining the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border in 1999 to prevent incursions by the IMU. Uzbek minefields are emplaced inside Kyrgyzstan, around the overwhelmingly Tajik enclave of Sokh, which belongs to Uzbekistan, around the Shakhi-Mardan enclave, and along the border areas.

The location of Uzbek landmines is a point of contention between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz governments. A top official in the Batken administration says Uzbekistan placed its mines 200-500 meters inside Kyrgyz territory. Uzbek officials claim that there are no mines on Kyrgyz territory and insist that their mines were deployed 200-250 meters within Uzbek territory.

Further complicating this scenario is the lack of an agreed-upon border between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. A GICHD consultant who visited Kyrgyz border regions on behalf of UNICEF in June 2001 recorded that “several kilometers of contested border area may have been mined by Uzbekistan.” Some observers have even suggested that Uzbekistan is using its mines to gain an upper hand in border negotiations. The lack of agreed borders not only obscures questions of whether Uzbek mines are on Kyrgyz territory, but also hinders Kyrgyz demining efforts (see mine action section below).

The specific locations of Uzbek mines are important unknown factors currently impeding mine awareness efforts. There is little evidence to suggest that the Uzbeks marked their minefields. They have also reportedly not provided Kyrgyz authorities with maps of the

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20 Ibid., p. 8.
minefields. Marking has been reported in a limited number of places, but became obscured by tall grass. Mine quantity and density similarly remain unknown in the absence of Uzbek maps or in-depth surveys by Kyrgyzstan. The presence of two types of mines has been established: the PMN blast mine and the OZM-72 bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine. In addition, the army has claimed that in a number of instances, Uzbeks laid mines on top of other mines, thus acting as an anti-lift device to prevent demining. The presence of antivehicle mines has not been reported.

There are concerns over civilian proximity to landmines. Twenty villages are reportedly near mined areas, which are said to be close to rivers and roads used by civilians. One report suggests that some mined areas are used by civilians as grazing areas. Mines further away from populated areas also pose a risk to Kyrgyz villagers who travel to the mountains in the fall to collect herbs for medicines. They will evidently go “where there are no explosions.” The GICHD mission found that adult shepherds and farmers are the most at risk.

Kyrgyz-Tajik Border

It is unclear whether there are still mines along the Tajik border. A Ministry of Defense press release claims, “After the cessation of military activities all of the mined areas were demined.” But the Kyrgyz Minister of Defense later noted that one minefield remains, at a high altitude, and in an unpopulated area. The Ministry of Defense asserted that necessary demining would take place in the future and that lack of access had prevented clearance. Casualty reports dated as late as June 2001, indicate that populations could still be at risk from mines along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border.

Mine Action

Amid pressure from Parliament and civil society, the Kyrgyz government issued on 7 June 2001 a decree on landmines. Specifically, the law stipulates that:

- The Ministry of Defense should carry out surveying, marking, and mine clearance, all while using discretion in dealings with Uzbekistan;
- The Ministry of Interior and the General Procurator’s Office should issue monthly reports on the effects of explosions;
- The Ministry of Emergency Situations and Ecology should carry out mine awareness activities for affected civilian populations, and develop a method to calculate damages to victims;
- The Batken regional administration should monitor population and cattle movements around the minefields;
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should inform Uzbekistan on measures taken to protect the population of Kyrgyzstan; and

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22 Ibid., p. 10.
23 Ibid.
26 Ibid., p. 8.
29 Ibid., pp. 1-4.
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should ask Uzbekistan to pay compensation to Kyrgyz victims, provide maps of minefields, and remove fencing on the edge of the minefields.  

The Ministry of Defense began demining shortly after the decree was issued. A total of 320,000 square meters of border territory were reportedly cleared at a cost to the Ministry of Defense approximately 45,000 Soms ($996). Nine mines were exploded during clearance.

Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Defense subsequently claimed that the Kyrgyz mine clearance operations were illegal, arguing the land cleared was Uzbek territory. Two high-ranking military commanders from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan met in an attempt to resolve the dispute. They agreed that any additional mining of the Chon-Kara and Batken regions of the Kyrgyz Republic would not be allowed, and that mine clearing shall only occur after the agreement of the two commanders.

The Ministry of Defense was supposed to conduct a mine survey in accordance with the June 2001 mine decree. However, it was reported that as of February 2002, the survey had not been carried out due to a lack of funds. Mined areas have not been marked for a similar reason.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not been successful in persuading Uzbekistan to pay compensation to Kyrgyz victims, provide maps of minefields, and remove fencing on the edge of the minefields. Kyrgyzstan claims to have officially requested minefield maps from Uzbekistan on a number of occasions, but to no avail.

Mine Risk Education

Under the terms of the decree, the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense is responsible for carrying out mine awareness. The Ministry has conducted mine awareness education among civilians of Batken Oblast. The Ministry also held discussions about border conduct with civilians living in high-risk areas but could not circulate warning leaflets due to lack of funds.

Mine risk education among civilians about the danger of visiting mined areas is held mostly in the form of discussion, since the government lacks the funds to produce videocassettes and posters and organize other activities. GICHD recommended to UNICEF that they support the work of the ministry, but this does not seem to have occurred.

The NGO IPPNW has distributed 500 mine awareness posters in high risk mine areas, and provided the military with a video about mine dangers for demonstration at schools. The Kyrgyz Association of the UN held an event in January 2002 in honor of mine victims across the globe.
Landmine Casualties

In 2001, four landmine incidents were reported in which one person was killed and three others injured. The last reported incident occurred in June 2001, and a Kyrgyz military official indicated that there have been no landmine casualties since then. Ramazan Dyryldaev, chair of the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights, said in April 2001 that landmines along the Kyrgyz-Tajik border have killed 20 people, but this has not been confirmed. In 2000, at least four people, including two children were injured in landmine incidents.

In 2001 and 2002, incidents involving unexploded ordnance (UXO) have been reported: on 29 August 2001, two children were killed in Batken while playing with a UXO; on 10 March 2002, a 13-year-old was reportedly killed while playing with a hand grenade, found in a military training field; a 14-year old was killed and an 8-year old injured while playing with a UXO.

Survivor Assistance

There are no specific assistance programs or financial allocations available to mine or UXO survivors; they are treated within the ordinary state medical service. Mine casualties are likely to be brought first to Batken Hospital for first aid; if surgical amputation or other specialized treatment is needed, the patient would need to go to Osh Hospital.

To improve medical response capabilities to mine incidents, the Ministry of Emergencies and Ecology has requested financial aid to send rescue personnel to the Russian Federation for a two-month training course. The skills acquired there would enable the rescue workers to carry out casualty evacuations when necessary.

Kyrgyzstan does not appear to have an orthotic and prosthetic center capable of fitting artificial limbs to mine amputees. Mine survivors requiring such treatment would have to travel to the Dushanbe Orthopedic Center in Tajikistan, run by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

All disabled civilians are protected under common law and there are no special laws or decrees for landmine survivors.

LAO PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Key developments since May 2001: In 2001, 8.74 million square meters of land were cleared in nine provinces. Mine risk education was provided to an estimated 182,000 people in 766 villages. According to UXO LAO records, 35 people were killed and 87 injured by UXO or mines in 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Laos) has not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. In the general debate of the UN General Assembly’s First Committee in October 2001, a Laotian

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representative stated, “We share the concern of the international community over the deadly consequences caused by the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines. In this respect, while noting the Ottawa Convention, our view remains that States have the legitimate right to use such weapons for the defense of their national independence and territorial integrity as provided for in the Charter of the UN.”1

Laos for the first time participated as an observer in the annual Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, held in Nicaragua in September 2001. On this occasion the Lao delegate called for financial support for mine and UXO clearance in Laos, but made no comment about intentions regarding the Mine Ban Treaty.2 Laos also attended the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, but it did not participate in the May 2002 meetings. From 13-15 May 2002, the director of UXO LAO (the national implementing agency for mine/UXO action) attended the regional seminar, “Landmines in Southeast Asia,” hosted by Thailand in Bangkok. He made a presentation on mine clearance, but no remarks on the ban treaty.3 Laos also participated in the regional seminar of stockpile destruction held in Malaysia in August 2001.

Laos has been absent from every vote on the pro-mine ban UN General Assembly resolutions since 1996, including Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. Laos is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II on landmines, booby-traps, and other devices but it did not participate in CCW meetings including the second review conference.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
Laos is not thought to produce or export mines. Laos is believed to maintain a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, but no specific information is available. It is believed that there are some old minefields in use for security and border control in the north of the country.4

Landmine/UXO Problem5
Laos is mainly affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO). The problem is the legacy of the Indochina War, especially from 1964 to 1973, when it is estimated that more than two million tons of ordnance were dropped on Laos.6 Of 18 provinces, 15 report significant contamination from UXO.7 More than 25 percent of villages have reported UXO contamination.8 The most severely contaminated area in the country is the eastern border of Savannakhet province, where the Ho Chi Minh Trail used to be.9

As the population is growing, wells are being dug and land prepared for agriculture activities, but it is difficult to select sites to develop for irrigation and agriculture purposes as there is a high risk of hitting a mine or UXO when using a hoe or plow.10 The high UXO contamination has had an impact on development, slowing down or even causing the abandonment of projects. Mine/UXO clearance priority is given to areas of public utility such as schools, clinics, hospitals and roads. Many agricultural areas needing demining are considered too small for immediate

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1 Statement by Ambassador Alounkeo Kittikhoun, Permanent Representative of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic to the UN, New York, 16 October 2001.
2 Landmine Monitor Asia Regional Coordinator’s notes on oral remarks of Lao delegate to the Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 19 September 2001.
4 Interview with an expatriate of a Foreign Embassy, Vientiane, 6 February 2002.
8 Email from Kathryn Sweet, Programme Office Advisor, UXO LAO, 1 August 2002.
10 Interview with Dr. Michael Handlos, Program Director, Action Nord Sud, Vientiane, 5 February 2002.
action. It is reported that villagers resort to de-mining themselves, driven by the need to use land and ensure family food security.\(^\text{11}\)

**Mine/UXO Clearance**

UXO LAO is responsible for clearance activities throughout the country.\(^\text{12}\) The UXO LAO national mission is to “reduce deaths and injuries from UXO and to open up land for agriculture and other development.”\(^\text{13}\) To pursue its mission in opening up land, UXO LAO uses five types of clearance operations, including roving clearance, surface area clearance, shallow area clearance, deep area clearance, and deep search. Roving clearance teams are teams that respond to emergency requests where the presence of UXO is a threat to villagers and property. In 2001, roving teams made 2,107 visits to villages in nine provinces.\(^\text{14}\)

In 2001, UXO LAO clearance and roving teams removed or destroyed 82,724 explosive war remnants, including 513 landmines, and 37,520 bombies. A total of 8.74 million square meters of land was cleared.\(^\text{15}\) The targeted clearance of 9.5 million square meters for 2001 could not be met due to weather constraints in some provinces.

In 2001, UXO LAO received the support of six international Partners: Handicap International Belgium, Mines Advisory Group, World Vision Australia, Norwegian People’s Aid, GERBERA and a detachment of Belgian Military Advisors.

Handicap International Belgium, funded by the European Union, provided explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technical advisors and equipment in Savannakhet province. In 2001, EOD technical advisors focused on capacity building of district and provincial office staff. They also developed a level of competency to measure progress of the capacity building effort. Handicap International Belgium is planning to withdraw from Savannakhet by the end of 2004.\(^\text{16}\)

World Vision Australia has provided technical advice and training for UXO clearance in Khammouane province since 1999. In 2001, the EOD training program included advanced render safe procedures for bombs, advance recovery procedures, and on-the-job training.\(^\text{17}\)

Mines Advisory Group (MAG), based in the UK, began clearance in Xieng Khouang province in 1994, and in Saravane province in 1997. By the end of 2000, MAG completed the process of transferring operations to UXO LAO; MAG handed over to UXO LAO trained personnel and about US$1 million worth of equipment. In 2001, MAG provided technical expertise to assist UXO LAO with total quality management and training.\(^\text{18}\)

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) has been operational in Sekong and Attapeu provinces providing training to UXO LAO technical personnel. At the end of 2001, NPA transferred responsibility for the provincial work to UXO LAO. In 2002, NPA is supporting UXO LAO with a financial advisor and a senior advisor engaged in EOD training and monitoring field operations.\(^\text{19}\)

GERBERA is a commercial demining company based in Germany. Since 1996, GERBERA has been developing UXO LAO’s clearance capacity in Houaphan province and since 1998 in Luang Prabang province.\(^\text{20}\)

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\(^\text{11}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{12}\) See earlier editions of *Landmine Monitor Report* for details on history and structure of UXO LAO.


\(^\text{15}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{16}\) Interview with Luc Delineuville, Handicap International Belgium Country Director, Brussels, 19 June 2002.


The government of Belgium has provided four military EOD advisors to support UXO LAO in Champassak province. The support will continue to 2003.21

As a major step in the development of national capacity building in the first half of 2002, the first Senior Explosive Ordnance Disposal course was conducted at UXO LAO’s National Training Center, in Y’lay village.22

The UXO LAO target for 2002 is 8.09 million square meters of land cleared, including 5.75 million square meters of agricultural land. UXO LAO is also engaged in clearance in support of a number of internationally-funded development projects aimed at: building schools; constructing walking paths, access roads, bridges, irrigation canals, fishponds and wells; creating infrastructure such as irrigation and drainage canals to improve crop production; and building infrastructure for water and sanitation projects. UXO LAO plans 1,392 visits to villages by roving teams to remove surface ordnance.23

The Survey Unit of UXO LAO is responsible for the collection of data that is used to prioritize areas to be cleared. Survey members use Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) units and maps to identify the exact location of UXO. In 2002, UXO LAO is continuing to adapt its database to be compatible with the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA).

Costs of Clearance

According to UXO LAO, in 2001 the average cost of clearance was US$3,551 per hectare (US$0.36 per square meter). Costs ranged from US$1,563 per hectare cleared in Xieng Khouang province to US$9,338 per hectare cleared in Khammouane province.24

Coordination and Planning of Mine Action

The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare is responsible for the coordination and implementation of UXO clearance and awareness activities. The Ministry hosts and chairs meetings of the National UXO LAO Steering Committee and provides assistance and coordination with other ministries and provincial authorities. The National Steering Committee is the policy making body for UXO LAO and provides guidance and direction. It includes representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security, and a representative from each of the nine mine/UXO-affected provinces, the National Programme Director, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF).25

Each UXO LAO Provincial Headquarters identifies its own priorities through consultation with provincial and district authorities. They prepare work plans that are then submitted to the UXO LAO National Office for consolidation and resource planning prior to acceptance and approval by the National Steering Committee.26

In 2002, one of the goals is to work toward the creation of a National Authority for UXO action. The National Authority is expected to ensure a proper regulation of every UXO-related activity in the country and to coordinate with concerned ministries on overlapping interests and responsibilities. It will also be a focal point for the international mine action community.27

Mine/UXO Risk Education

UXO LAO Community Awareness (CA) teams continue to provide mine/UXO risk education. Using a participatory approach the CA teams deliver their messages through school presentations, question and answer sessions, radio quiz shows, drama, puppet shows, games and group discussion. The CA teams coordinate and cooperate with implementing partners including UNICEF, Lao Women’s Union, Lao Youth Union, Ministry of Education, the Lao National Drama

21 See country report on Belgium.
23 Ibid., 14-15.
26 Ibid.
and Puppet Troupes and national and local radio and television. \(^{28}\) UNICEF funds many of the UXO awareness projects.

During 2001, the CA teams visited 766 villages and presented Mine/UXO Community Awareness activities to an estimated 182,000 persons, including 75,000 children. In 2002, UXO LAO plans 753 visits to villages. \(^{29}\)

In 2001, UXO LAO, with support from UNICEF, conducted three small-scale studies into Behavior/Attitudes/Knowledge of communities related to CA team visits. The results overall showed that there was a high level of understanding and awareness of UXO issues in villages where CA teams have visited. However, this knowledge does not necessarily translate into behavior change, particularly among young boys and men who gain social status from the perception that people who handle UXO are brave. Economic, social-cultural, physical and technical factors interact in determining unsafe behavior. The studies were limited to 12 villages in three different provinces. \(^{30}\) As follow up to the study, UXO LAO plans to undertake an in-depth study on UXO awareness and the numerous interlocking factors related to UXO incidents. \(^{31}\)

**Mine Action Funding**

Total mine action funding for Laos in 2001 amounted to an estimated US$7.5 million, including about US$4.1 million for UXO LAO and about US$3.4 million provided directly to NGO partners. \(^{32}\)

Total expenditures for UXO LAO in 2001 were $4,089,348. Most of this came from the UXO LAO Trust Fund: $3,406,307.00. Additional funds from UNICEF ($235,076), the UXO LAO revolving fund ($418,514) and the US State Department ($29,451). \(^{33}\)

In 2001, the Trust Fund received funds from Canada (US$95,074), Denmark ($586,581), Finland ($290,957), Luxembourg ($532,712), New Zealand ($173,581), Norway ($279,230), and the United States ($879,643). \(^{34}\)

Contributions to implementing partners in 2001 include: \(^{35}\)

- Australia provided World Vision Australia with US$593,154 for mine/UXO clearance in Khammouane province.
- Belgium provided $496,074 and an in-kind contribution (no estimated value available) of EOD advisors for Champassak province.
- The European Union provided €700,000 ($670,264) to Handicap International Belgium for its operations in Savannakhet. \(^{36}\)
- Germany provided $868,900 to Laos for Gerbera’s operations in Houaphan and Luang Prabang provinces.
- Norway provided NOK 3.5 million ($388,888) to Norwegian People’s Aid for assistance in Attepeu and Sekong provinces.

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28 UXO LAO, “Work Plan 2001,” Vientiane, March 2001, p.14. The radio quiz shows have been very popular and successful, with villagers often writing to the radio station to request their village host a quiz show.


30 Email from Amanda Bissex, Child Protection Officer, UNICEF, Vientiane, 12 April 2002.


32 The UNDP Trust Fund Manager estimated direct funding to partners at US$900,000, largely from Belgium and Germany. Email, Justin Shone UNDP Trust Fund Manager, Vientiane, Lao PDR, 3 July 2002.


34 Ibid.


36 HIB reports that this figure is the entire 2001 budget for the Handicap International Belgium program, which included the contribution of Handicap International Belgium and Handicap International Luxembourg. Luc Delneuville, Handicap International Belgium, Country Director, Landmine Monitor Mine Action Questionnaire, Vientiane, 27 February 2002.
The United Kingdom aid agency DFID provided $302,455 to MAG in Saravane province for part of 2001.\textsuperscript{37} The United Nations Volunteers, through the United Nations Voluntary Special Fund, supported the Provincial Staff Capacity Building Project with $112,500.

In addition to the above information provided by UXO LAO, Denmark reports that it provided $1,965,783 to the Mines Advisory Group in 2001.\textsuperscript{38} Canada reports that it provided US$228,621, including $96,873 for UXO LAO and $131,748 for a Garneau International victim assistance program.\textsuperscript{39}

The United States has been the largest donor to the Lao mine and UXO clearance program, having contributed almost US$18 million since the fiscal year 1996. It supported training programs and capacity building to the Lao National Demining Office and National Training Center. The US reports that in 2001 it provided US$520,000 to the UXO LAO Trust Fund, and US$293,000 for demining equipment.\textsuperscript{40} UXO LAO reports that in 2001, US in-kind donations included: Equipment Support for US$682,000; Truck Procurement for US$360,000; Advanced Training for US$700,000.\textsuperscript{41} The United States has confirmed its intention to continue supporting LAO UXO through the UNDP Trust Fund in 2002.\textsuperscript{42}

The UXO LAO operational budget for 2002 is US$4.9 million, plus a 3 percent Trust Fund administration charge to UNDP.\textsuperscript{43} As of March 2002, UXO LAO had received or had a commitment for US$3.2 million from the United States, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Japan, and New Zealand. Additional funding was pledged by the Republic of Korea (US$50,000), The Netherlands (US$500,000), Canada (US$100,000), and UNDP (UNMAS Voluntary Trust Fund, US$100,000), plus estimated interest from 2000 and 2001 (US$150,000) for a total of US$900,000.\textsuperscript{44}

As of March 2002, UXO LAO had a US$844,028 funding shortfall for 2002. UXO LAO stated this lack of funding threatens closure of activities at some time during the year.\textsuperscript{45} Landmine Monitor was informed that as of 15 July 2002, work would be reduced in all provinces, except Xieng Khouang, due to funding constraints.\textsuperscript{46} It was expected that the situation would be temporary.

**UXO/Landmine Casualties**

In 2001, 122 new UXO/mine casualties were reported in Laos; 35 people were killed and 87 injured. Of these, 92 were males and 30 were females. Children make up 42 percent of the reported casualties. Precise information is not available on whether the casualties were caused by UXO or landmines, though most if not all were caused by UXO.\textsuperscript{47} Data collection on mine/UXO casualties could be improved and it is very possible that the number of incidents is under-reported.\textsuperscript{48} Reported casualties increased in 2001; in 2000, 39 people were killed and 63 injured by UXO.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{37} MAG reports £210,210 for July 2001-June 2002 and notes that further funding is not expected from DFID. Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG, 30 July 2002.

\textsuperscript{38} See Landmine Monitor country report for Denmark.

\textsuperscript{39} See Landmine Monitor country report for Canada.

\textsuperscript{40} The US Department of State, “To Walk The Earth In Safety,” November 2001, p. 19.


\textsuperscript{42} Interview with Justin Shone, UNDP Trust Fund Manager, Vientiane, 8 February 2002.


\textsuperscript{44} UXO LAO, Funding 2002 Report presented at the UXO LAO National Steering Committee Meeting and Donor Fundraising Appeal. Vientiane, 7 February 2002.


\textsuperscript{46} Email, Justin Shone UNDP Trust Fund Manager, Vientiane, Lao PDR, 3 July 2002.


\textsuperscript{49} See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 554.
Non-Signatories

UXO/Landmine Casualties 2001

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<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>92</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Casualties continue to be reported in 2002. In the period 1 January to 19 March 2002, ten people were killed and twelve injured in reported UXO/mine incidents. In one incident, three people were killed and five injured.50 On 15 March 2002, two members of a UXO LAO clearance team were killed in a UXO explosion in Xieng Khouang province.51

Survivor Assistance

UXO incidents frequently produce upper body injuries, including blindness, loss of upper limbs, and lacerations. In Lao PDR, medical and surgical facilities with the capacity to adequately assist mine/UXO casualties are limited. UXO incidents frequently produce upper body injuries, including blindness, loss of upper limbs, and lacerations. Health care is unavailable to persons who cannot afford to pay for it, and some services are only available in the capital, to which few of the rural poor have access.52 The cost of treatment is often beyond the means of the victims. In Khammouane Province, World Vision Australia assists mine/UXO casualties by paying for transportation to a medical facility.

The War Victims Assistance Project, supported by the US Leahy War Victims Fund and administered by Consortium Laos, was started in September 1995 to upgrade the medical, surgical, and emergency services of district and provincial Lao medical personnel and institutions in Xieng Khouang Province. As of May 2002, one provincial and five district hospital have received medical equipment, supplies, and assistance in emergency ward rehabilitation/renovation, and more than 300 medical staff received training in emergency rehabilitation or laboratory services. Under the War Victims Medical Assistance Fund, 79 UXO casualties had access to free medical treatment.53

The Ministry of Public Health’s National Rehabilitation Centre (NRC) and the Cooperative Orthotic and Prosthetic Enterprise (COPE) continues to provide prostheses, orthoses, and other assistive devices, to persons with disabilities, including mine/UXO survivors. The work of COPE is governed by a National Plan of Action. COPE’s services are delivered through the NRC in Vientiane, and four provincial centers in Luang Prabang, Xieng Khouang, Savannakhet and

51 Ibid.
Champassak provinces. The National Plan of Action includes: advancing prosthetic services; introducing or upgrading other medical rehabilitation services such as physiotherapy, occupational therapy, orthopedic surgery, and wheelchairs; the promotion of social and economic reintegration services by developing athletics and improving access to vocational training; and developing the capacity of the Lao Disabled People’s Association. COPE provides travel expenses for patients who need to come to the Vientiane center. The Provincial branches outside of Vientiane still suffer from a lack of equipment, and under skilled staff. The Provincial branches cannot produce prostheses. At the NRC in Vientiane, with the assistance of COPE, activities are run at inpatient clinics, and a school for the deaf and blind. The center provides accommodation for patients and their family. COPE activities are funded by World Vision Australia/Laos and a small grant from a Japanese charity; new sources of funding are being sought.

In December 2000, AAR commenced a three-year wheelchair production project at the NCR. Following training in wheelchair production by AAR there are now six technicians and six disabled persons working on the project. In December 2001, the construction of a new wheelchair production workshop at the NCR was completed. The project is fully funded by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency.

A Canadian NGO, Garneau International, collaborates with Laotian partners in the sector of landmine/UXO survivor rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration. The Canadian funded project works closely with survivors, their families and communities, and the Xieng Khouang Province Rehabilitation Center and includes analysis of the survivors situation, assistance in the area of socio-economic reintegration, and assistance to Lao government institutions in developing viable community-based rehabilitation programs.

In January 2001, a Vocational School for the Disabled opened in Ban Sikeud in Vientiane Prefecture, built and operated by the St Paul Foundation. It enrolled 102 students with a variety of mobility disabilities in a three-year vocational training program.

The Lao army has its own hospital and rehabilitation center but many military veterans are treated at the NRC as the army hospital often lacks supplies and equipment.

UXO LAO is not involved in mine/UXO survivor assistance programs, and it has been reported that there is a lack of communication between UXO LAO and COPE, which is compounded by the fact that two different ministries are involved. Although the Trust Fund founding document makes provision for the support of survivor assistance programs, currently COPE and the NRC do not have any access to Trust Fund support.

**Disability Policy and Practice**

There are currently no disability laws in Laos. There is a move to develop national plans on comprehensive rehabilitation and prevention of disabilities, including protection of legal rights of disabled persons at the national level.
In July 2001, the constitution of the Lao Disabled People's Association (LPDA) was formally approved by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, having first submitted its proposal in 1996. Activities of the LPDA include organizing vocational training courses for disabled people and workshops and conferences on disability issues. In 2001, the LPDA was supported by the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund.66

A National Workshop on Mine/UXO Victim Assistance took place in Vientiane on 11-12 October 2001, organized by the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare and supported by Handicap International. Phetdouangchanh Ekbanland, Director of the International Cooperation division of the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, opened the National Workshop. In his opening speech he stated, “It is the first time and therefore a very important moment for Lao PDR to organize a workshop on Mine/UXO Victims Assistance…. It is quite evident that victims should receive medical treatment. However it is also important to provide physical and mental rehabilitation as well as to assist the victims and their families in socio-economic development. Finally the country needs to develop a better policy and protection to ensure the rights of the People With Disability (PWD) to have a normal life. The Lao government is considering with great attention any proposition to strengthen the policy of the party and the government to assist people who are affected by mine/UXO.”67

Sixteen persons representing Lao PDR attended the Regional Victim Assistance Conference in Bangkok, 6-8 November 2001, including the Director of UXO LAO, and the Director of Social Welfare Department, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.

LATVIA

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Latvia has not signed the Mine Ban Treaty. On 31 January 2002, Latvia reported, “Today, although having not yet signed the Ottawa Mine Ban Convention, the Government of Latvia is fully aware of the global humanitarian problem caused by the anti-personnel landmines (APM), it does meet the requirements of the Convention and it welcomes the efforts of the international community to stop the use of this weapon and, eventually, to eliminate all planted and stockpiled APMs. Concerning the issue of APLs, the regional context is very important to Latvia. The actual position of Latvia over this issue is highly determined by positions of its neighboring countries.”61

On 28 March 2002, the Baltic International Center of Human Education wrote to the Minister of Defense encouraging Latvia to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as it joins the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).2 On 26 April 2002, the Baltic Center received the following response:

The Ministry of Defense in general supports human goals of the Ottawa Convention. At this moment most suitable alternatives to antipersonnel mines are searched and analyzed (e.g. antitank mines, controllable mines, antitank missiles, mines of the distance mining systems, etc.) in order to secure self-defense of the country.

When analyzing the readiness of Latvia to join the Convention, external aspect also should be taken into consideration. At this moment, several neighboring countries

2 It is expected that Latvia, together with a number of other Eastern European States, will be admitted to NATO in November 2002.
also have not joined the Convention, Russia among them with its large stockpile of anti-personnel mines, Belarus, Estonia and Finland. Acceding to the Convention should be done in coordination with our neighboring countries in the same geopolitical situation. Finland will consider its eventual joining the Convention in 2006 (and ratifying in 2010) has calculated that replacement of antipersonnel mines with alternative types of arms will require significant financial investments.

As the gesture of a goodwill of Latvia in support of human ideas I would like to mention the decision to ratify the Protocol II of the CCW... I would like to emphasize that the Ministry of Defense continues to analyze military-strategic and political aspects and also follows the international developments. Joining the Ottawa Convention could be reconsidered after the NATO summit in Prague in November this year.3

In February 2002, Lieutenant-Colonel Guntis Aizporietis, Chief of the Engineering Branch of the Latvian National Armed Forces, told Landmine Monitor that there would have to be a "thorough investigation" of the consequences of Latvia’s joining the Mine Ban Treaty, with the involvement of foreign and defense ministry representatives and also NGOs and economic institutions involved.4 He subsequently informed Landmine Monitor in May that a study has been initiated of the implications for national defense of adherence.5

Latvia did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. However, Latvia associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union, which called for "worldwide application of the Convention." Latvia did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002 or May 2002.

On 29 November 2001, Latvia voted in favor of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. Latvia has supported similar resolutions in previous years.

In December 2001, Latvia participated, as an observer, in the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and also attended the Second CCW Review Conference. On 20 June 2002, Latvia’s Parliament ratified Amended Protocol II,6 but Latvia has not yet formally consented to be bound by the protocol. Latvia is a State Party to the CCW and its original Protocol II on landmines.

On 20-21 February 2002, a Canadian delegation visited Latvia to discuss with Colonel Raimonds Graube, Commander, National Armed Forces, possible accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Landmine Monitor researcher was invited to participate at an informal session of the meeting.7

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Latvia has often stated that it has never produced antipersonnel mines, and export has been prohibited since 1995 by several different regulations and laws.8 New legislation on weapons was adopted by Parliament in June 2002. Article 7 of the Law on the Circulation of Arms prohibits the movement of weapons, in accordance with international treaties and conventions binding on Latvia,

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3 Letter from Janis Sarts, Deputy Secretary of State, Latvian Ministry of Defense, Riga, 26 April 2002.
6 Information provided by Gunta Iļjuconoka, Attaché, Security Policy Department, Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, 10 July 2002.
7 Interview with Edgars Svarenieks, Head of Section, Multilateral Relations and International Organisations, Ministry of Defence, Riga, 28 March 2002, and with representatives of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Riga, 21 February 2002.
except for their movement for destruction. It also prohibits the export and transit of antipersonnel mines. The law does not contain penal sanctions for violations.\(^9\)

Latvia inherited a small stockpile of Soviet antipersonnel mines.\(^10\) The Ministry of Defense has told Parliament that it would take two to three months to destroy the stockpile.\(^11\)

No new use of mines in Latvia has been reported, but criminal use of explosives continues, albeit at a reduced rate.\(^12\) According to the Latvian State Police, “There were 16 cases in Latvia in 2001 when explosives were applied to commit crimes, which led to 10 explosions, among those eight were in Riga. There is a clear tendency to replace explosions by other types of criminal action.”\(^13\)

**Landmine/UXO Problem**

Latvia states that it “maintains no active mine fields at the borders or elsewhere,” but acknowledges that there are still “some 100,000 hectares of land (one billion square meters) contaminated during World War II and post-war Soviet operations with mines and other types of ammunition. Latvian Armed Forces detect and destroy about 3,000 pieces of this ordnance every year.”\(^14\)

A newspaper report in November 2001 reviewed the mine/unexploded ordnance (UXO) contamination in Latvia. Some 3,000-5,000 items of explosive ordnance are destroyed each year, mostly in the rural areas most affected during the war (e.g. Blidene, Kursisi, Pampali, Zirni, and Zvarde). In 2001, in Saldus district, 692 explosive items were collected and destroyed; these included German and Russian shells from World War II, and Soviet shells found in the ex-Soviet aviation target site in Zvarde. Explosives and an incendiary bomb were found during construction work in Saldus, and three Russian shells and one German shell were found in the yard of the Saldus local newspaper.\(^15\)

On 28 June 2001, a scrap metal shipment received at the premises of the Liepajas Metalurgs steel producer was found to contain 51 artillery shells, antivehicle mines and deep penetration bombs. Specialists from the 44th Homeguard Battalion were called in and they removed the explosives and destroyed them at the former military site at Barta in Liepajas district.\(^16\)

On 28 August 2001, Leopolds Ozolins, a former member of parliament, found seven antipersonnel mines and an aerial bomb while swimming in the Salaca river. Local units of the armed forces removed and destroyed them.\(^17\) On 8 December 2001, the discovery was reported of one ton of explosives from World War I and II in forests in Ogre district, close to the Kegums-Sigulda road.\(^18\)

Despite the contamination, there have been no reports of casualties resulting from mines/UXO in 2001 or 2002.

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\(^10\) Officials have previously indicated a figure around 4,500, although the number may be lower now. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 830.

\(^11\) Interview with Lt.-Col. Aizporietis, Latvian National Armed Forces 7 February 2002.

\(^12\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 893.

\(^13\) Information provided by Iveta Gruberte, Press Center of the Latvian State Police, Riga, 8 July 2002.

\(^14\) Report to the OSCE, 31 January 2002, p. 3.


Mine Action Funding and Assistance
The joint Norwegian-Latvian project for an Explosive Ordnance Training Center has progressed, with building construction having started in 2001. The center is now due to open in 2005,19 a year later than was originally envisaged.20

The Latvian Ministry of Defense claimed that following the pre-mission training of an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit in Norway in 2000-2001, it was planned to deploy Latvian EOD and demining specialists to Kosovo in July 2002.21

LEBANON

Key developments since May 2001: The Lebanese Army reported that the number of identified mined areas was 2,146 as of February 2002, nearly double the number reported in May 2001. In November 2001, an International Support Group was established to coordinate mine action donor support in Lebanon. The United Arab Emirates has begun awarding mine action contracts with the $50 million pledged to Lebanon in May 2001. Other donors contributed more than $12 million to mine action in 2001. In 2001, the Lebanese Army cleared more than 1.5 million square meters of land; NGOs and foreign armies cleared additional land. UNIFIL completed a technical survey in South Lebanon in 2002. Mines Advisory Group began a national Landmine Impact Survey in March 2002. In 2001, 90 new mine/UXO casualties were recorded, a decrease from 113 casualties in 2000.

Mine Ban Policy
Lebanon has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty and has indicated it will not until Israel has done so.1 Many government officials are supportive of the ban, and one has told Landmine Monitor, “No one believes that antipersonnel mines are vital to the defense or security of the state. They were abrasively used during the Lebanese war with no control.”2 In March 2001, a joint mission by Canada and Norway declared that Lebanon is in principle abiding by the treaty without formally joining it.3

Lebanon did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Nicaragua in September 2001. It did not participate in either the January or May 2002 meetings of the intersessional Standing Committees, though its Geneva-based representatives registered for May. Lebanon did not attend any of the meetings related to the Convention on Conventional Weapons or Amended Protocol II (on landmines) in 2001.

Lebanon was one of 19 countries that abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, which called for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use
Lebanon is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. The Lebanese Army stockpiles an unknown number of antipersonnel mines. It is likely that Syrian forces based in Lebanon stockpile antipersonnel mines. After the Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, Lebanese media documented the presence of large numbers of landmines, bombs, and shells in the abandoned South Lebanon Army bases.

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21 Interview with Lt.-Col. Aizporietis, Latvian National Armed Forces, 7 February 2002.
2 Interview with official at Documentary Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beirut, 4 January 2001.
3 Declaration of the Canada-Norway joint mission after their visit to the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2001.
There have been no confirmed reports of antipersonnel mine use in Lebanon since May 2001, by any party including non-state actors such as Hezbollah.

**Landmine Problem**

There is no single, agreed-on estimate of the area of mined land in Lebanon. The Lebanese Army reported that the number of identified mined areas was 2,146 as of February 2002. This represented more than twice the 1,019 mined areas reported by the Army in May 2001. In South Lebanon alone, the number of reported mined areas rose from 508 to 1,617. While the Army has not offered an official explanation for the increase, it apparently at least in part reflects the ongoing information-gathering efforts. According to the Army’s statistics, the number of cleared areas increased from 369 in May 2001 to 445 in February 2002.

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4 Presentation by the Engineering Regiment of the Lebanese Army, to a symposium by the Norwegian Demining Consortium/Minecat Demonstration, Nabatieh (South Lebanon), 8 February 2002.
6 Presentation by the Engineering Regiment of the Lebanese Army, to a symposium by the Norwegian Demining Consortium/Minecat Demonstration, Nabatieh (South Lebanon), 8 February 2002; *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 1024; Presentation of the NDO at the UN House, 13 December 2001.
### Lebanon’s Mined Areas (as of February 2002)<sup>7</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mohafazat (Province)</th>
<th>Cadaa (District)</th>
<th>Cleared</th>
<th>Uncleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>Baabda</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Metn</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Lebanon &amp; Nabatieh</td>
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<td>Saida</td>
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<td>Nabatieh</td>
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<td>Rashayya</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>445</td>
<td>2,146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On 4 February 2002, the commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in south Lebanon stated that Israel had, in May 2000 and December 2001, provided information on location of 389,000 mines and 343 booby-traps. He said 95% of the mines are located along the blue line [demarcation line between Israel and Lebanon] to a depth of few kilometers, and that initial estimates indicate that these minefields could possibly affect 28 groups of villages with an estimated population of more than 90,000 along and close to the blue line. He said phase one of the humanitarian demining effort could involve clearance of as many as 140,000 mines, including 118,000 mines close to the blue line which endanger the people, and 22,000 mines in the “depth areas.”<sup>8</sup>

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7 Lebanon is divided into six “mohafazat” or provinces (the South was recently divided into two—South and Nabatieh) and 26 “cadaas” or districts. Presentation by the Engineering Regiment of the Lebanese Army, to a symposium by the Norwegian Demining Consortium/Minecat Demonstration, Nabatieh (South Lebanon), 8 February 2002.

Survey and Assessment

UNIFIL completed a technical Level 2 survey of border minefields in South Lebanon in mid-2002. The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) is conducting a technical survey in the UNIFIL area of operation. Field operations had been delayed due to the security situation, poor weather, and the terrain. MAG is tasked with assessing marking and fencing requirements as part of this technical survey. If required, MAG technical survey teams also clear small areas. For example, in Bint Jbeil, MAG cleared an area to give villagers safe access to their fields.

A nationwide Landmine Impact Survey, implemented by MAG in collaboration with the National Demining Office, began in March 2002. Technical support and advice for the survey is coming from the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF). The survey will gather comprehensive information on the socio-economic impact of landmines by carrying out community interviews nationwide. This process will result in a country-wide description of the landmine problem, including complete lists of affected communities. In addition, this information will facilitate the planning, prioritization and implementation of mine action programs in Lebanon. The data will be entered into the NDO’s Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. A major part of the survey will be the support and development of the information management systems located at the NDO. The survey is funded by the European Union (€1.6 million, or US$1,436,800). Senior field staff training started in July 2002, with recruitment and training of data collectors to start in August. The first fieldwork will start in early September. Data entry, analysis and a final national report should be completed by April 2003.

Coordination and Planning

The National Demining Office (NDO) of the Lebanese Army is the official body in charge of the national mine action plan and it undertakes coordination and planning efforts. The NDO has two committees, one for mine risk education and the other for survivor assistance (see following sections). The NDO works with the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Cell (UN-MACC) in Tyre. In January 2002, UN-MACC started holding weekly meetings with the demining NGOs and companies working in the South.

Questions have been raised about priority setting and the degree to which clearance operations are aimed at meeting the needs of local communities. In 2001 and 2002, the focus of mine action in Lebanon was in the South and west Bekaa despite formal requests and complaints filed numerous times by municipalities and communities of the North and Mountain Lebanon governorates. One source noted, “In Lebanon, the lack of coordination in humanitarian demining operations is explained by the lack of institutional capacity and resources necessary in decision-making.”

Efforts are underway to improve the situation. Many donor countries are offering training to officers of the Lebanese Army to establish a better understanding of the humanitarian mine action process. For example, in December 2001 the Information Management System for Mine Action database was installed at the NDO to standardize information collected on the mine problem and

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9 UNIFIL statement at MACC SL meeting, 6 June 2002.
10 Statement by Steve Priestley, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), at International Support Group meeting, 7 February 2002; Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director of Policy, MAG, 22 July 2002. The survey is funded by Norway and the UN Voluntary Trust Fund.
11 Email from Kim Spurway, MAG, Lebanon, 22 July 2002; email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 22 July 2002.
12 Reported in Annahar, Al Safir, Al Diyar, Al Mustaqbal (all daily newspapers), 7 August 2001, 12 December 2001, and 3 January 2002. Such requests are usually directed to the high command office of the Lebanese Army through a bureaucratic channel of commands that starts with the Army base nearest to the community. Sometimes the requests are sent directly to the NDO or a higher commander office.
mine action results. The NDO IMSMA system became operational 20 March 2002, at a cost of approximately $75,000, with funds provided by the US. The UN Mine Action Coordination Cell also has an IMSMA system which is intended for the South only, while the NDO system will cover the whole country.

In November 2001, an International Support Group for Mine Action in Lebanon (ISG) was established to coordinate mine action donor support. The Minister of National Defense is the chair; donors and potential donors form the membership of the ISG. As of May 2002, there were 27 donor members, as well as Lebanese government representatives and the UN agencies operating in the country. The ISG has met on 29 November 2001, 13 December 2001, 7 February 2002, 24 April 2002 and 28 May 2002. Concerned local NGOs were invited to the February meeting. The ISG has established four working groups on: Mine Awareness, Victim Assistance, Humanitarian and Operational Demining (including data collection and surveys), and Socio-economic Development and Rehabilitation. These working groups are tasked with identifying needs and developing funding proposals for consideration by the ISG.

In January 2002, the Mine Action Coordination Cell of UNIFIL ceased to exist and the Mine Action Coordination Center for South Lebanon (MACC-SL) was established, with components from Lebanon, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United Nations. It employs 46 staff, with plans to expand to 56. As of June 2002, seven international staff members and fourteen Lebanese made up the UN component. There are also fifteen Lebanese Army Officers and five military from the UAE. In addition, the Landmines Resource Center (a Lebanese NGO at the Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of Balamand) maintains an office at the MACC-SL that includes a community liaison team of five members.

Mine Action Funding

On 21 May 2001, the United Arab Emirates formally announced that it would engage in a demining project in South Lebanon with a grant up to $50 million. Lebanon and the UAE signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 25 October 2001. The total area to be cleared by the UAE demining project in South Lebanon is approximately 472 square kilometers containing 306 known minefields and a large number of unknown mined areas. On 4-5 March 2002 the UAE organized a briefing for commercial companies interested in contracts for this program named “Operation Emirates Solidarity in South Lebanon.” On 2 April 2002 the tender was opened in Abu Dhabi, UAE. Two commercial companies were awarded contracts to execute “Operation Emirates Solidarity:” Zimbabwe-based MineTech and UK-based BACTEC. The amount of the contracts is not known. The first phase of the project (18 December 2001–8 May 2002) was awarded to BACTEC. BACTEC should be responsible for clearance of an area covering 227 square kilometers and including 136 minefields, while MineTech should be responsible for clearance of an area covering 245 square kilometers and including 170 minefields.

The UAE funding also covers the expenses of MACC SL, including all its components. The UAE also awarded a grant of $200,000 to the Landmines Resource Center at the Faculty of Health Sciences of the University of Balamand to execute an integrated mine awareness and risk reduction education program in South Lebanon and community liaison work.

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14 The Danish NGO DanChurchAid provided support to NDO’s IMSMA operators and supplied one IT consultant for the NDO in Beirut for two months. Email to Landmine Monitor (NPA) from Sam Christensen, DanChurchAid, 3 July 2002.

15 Statements by operational officers at MACC SL and NDO at weekly coordination meetings.


17 Presentation by the Operation Officer, MACC SL, Tyre, 4 July 2002.

18 Ibid.


20 Presentation by the Operation Officer, MACC SL, Tyre, 4 July 2002.
In addition to the UAE project, Landmine Monitor estimates that approximately $12.6 million was allocated to mine action projects in Lebanon in 2001, by the following donors:

- **United States**: $4.6 million in FY 2001. In 2001, this funding was used to procure eighteen mine detecting dogs, support the NDO, validate a mechanical vegetation removal and area reduction system, and for equipment (including six field ambulances and five trauma kits, five transportation vehicles, 35 mine detectors, five EOD protective suits, and five EOD reconnaissance suits). The United States also provided $3 million to the World Rehabilitation Fund for an income-generating program for landmine victims in Jezzine area.\(^{21}\) In FY 2000, the U.S. provided $1.3 million in mine action assistance to Lebanon, not including victim assistance funds.

- **Greece**: $2.35 million (€2.4 million). For a three-year demining project by a Greek NGO in South Lebanon.\(^{22}\)

- **European Union**: $2.07 million. This includes $1.57 million (€1.6 million) for the Landmine Impact Survey and $500,000 to MAG for a demining project in Nabatieh, South Lebanon in mid-2001, which included training of fifteen civilian deminers.\(^{23}\)

- **Norway**: $910,000. This includes $250,000 to MAG for the technical survey in South Lebanon, $10,000 to UNDP for NDO capacity building, and $320,000 to the ICRC Beirut office that has yet to be allocated.\(^{24}\) A $330,000 victim assistance program by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) ended in December 2001, and NPA has submitted a new proposal for 2002.

- **United Kingdom**: $687,579. This includes a $38,315 (£25,000) “bridging grant” to MAG, $450,000 to UNIFIL/MACC and $199,264 (€130,000) to UNICEF-Lebanon.\(^{25}\)

- **Japan**: $593,000. This consists of $250,000 to UNMAS for mine action in Lebanon, $250,000 for the technical survey and $93,000 to MAG for equipment in support of its operations.

- **Italy**: $566,620. This includes $125,000 in equipment (23 mine detectors and 18 protective suits), $250,000 awarded in mid-2001 to an Italian NGO, Assobon, and $191,620 to an Italian company named Sogelma for another 30-day demining project that started in Khyam on 26 February 2002.\(^{26}\)

- **Spain**: $332,000 for demining training by Russia and Spain of 22 Lebanese deminers.

- **Denmark**: $127,000 (DKK1 million) to UNIFIL/MACC via UNMAS (Voluntary Trust Fund).\(^{27}\)

- **Germany**: $60,500 (€61,500) in equipment, including ten Vallon VMH1 metal detectors, twelve protective suits including visors, two trauma kits, ten demining tool kits and 100 mine makers.\(^{28}\)

- **Australia**: $57,000 (Aus$100,000) for a quality assurance training program.\(^{29}\)

- **UNESCO**: $30,000 for mine risk education from its own budget.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{22}\) Conversion to US dollars made by Landmine Monitor on 2 July 2002.

\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Statement by a representative of Norway to the National Demining Office, 28 January 2002.

\(^{25}\) Conversion to US dollars made by Landmine Monitor on 2 July 2002.

\(^{26}\) Letter to Landmine Monitor from the Embassy of Italy to Lebanon, 8 April 2002; Documents distributed during ISG meeting, 13 December 2001.

\(^{27}\) Email to Landmine Monitor from Walid Hajjaj, Embassy of Denmark to Syria, 2 April 2002.


\(^{29}\) As reported by Harald Wie, Mine Action Advisor, UNDP Lebanon. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor during ISG meeting, 13 December 2001.

\(^{30}\) Documents distributed during ISG meeting, 13 December 2001.
• France: Seven metal detectors and one EOD set as well as a five-year training program for twenty deminers annually.
• Ukraine: twenty metal detectors.
• Saudi Arabia: Demining equipment.

Mine Clearance

In the reporting period (May 2001 to end May 2002), mine clearance operations in Lebanon were conducted by: the Engineering Corps of the Lebanese Army; a group from the Syrian Army; a Ukrainian battalion of UNIFIL; Mines Advisory Group; Assobon Italia; BACTEC; and MineTech. All international NGOs sign a memorandum of understanding with the NDO to undertake mine clearance in the country. The commercial firms MineTech and BACTEC signed directly with the UAE, following the bilateral agreement reached between Lebanon and the UAE.

The Army’s Engineering Corps has 280 deminers operating in four troops, as well as one Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team consisting of 25 persons. It works in West Bekaa, Jezzine, and Nabatieh and the fourth troop is divided between Batroun (in North Lebanon) and Souk El Gharb (in Mount Lebanon). From May 2001-March 2002, the Army cleared 11,474 antipersonnel mines, 1,425 antivehicle mines, 4,173 UXO and 1,422 cluster bombs from South Lebanon and West Bekaa, as well as other ordnance.31 The NDO reported clearing 672,415 square meters of land in 2000, and 1.5 million square meters of land in 2001, as of 2 November.32

The Syrian Army contributes a demining team of 16 officers and 146 soldiers with manual equipment and four mechanical rollers (two in West Bekaa, one each in Jezzine and Nabatieh). In 2001, the Syrian Army cleared 1,422 antipersonnel mines, 10,295 antivehicle mines, and 1,125 cluster bombs in addition to UXO.33

A Ukrainian Army Engineering Battalion consisting of 76 people in three demining platoons and three reconnaissance platoons conducts mine clearance in the UNIFIL area of operations in South Lebanon around UN positions and patrol routes, as well as surveying of mined areas within two kilometers of UN positions and the Blue Line, and emergency mine clearance. In 2001, it reportedly cleared 320,171 square meters of mine-affected territory, including 3,673 antipersonnel mines, 24 antivehicle mines and 668 UXO.34

The Mines Advisory Group employed one team of 12 deminers and in 2001 cleared an area of 2,080 square meters, including 173 antipersonnel mines and 27 items of UXO.35

In May and June 2001, Assobon Italia employed two teams of ten deminers each on a 33-day demining project in Tayr Harfa, south of Tyre. They cleared 200 antipersonnel mines.36

In 2001, BACTEC employed eleven EOD specialists who cleared booby-traps from areas south of the Litani river. In 2002, the MACC and the NDO assigned BACTEC to work in Bayt Yaho, and in a village in Bint Jbeil where BACTEC cleared 288 booby-traps, 58 antipersonnel mines, eight antivehicle mines and 240 UXO. Some 89 booby-trap locations still need to be checked north of the Litani river.37 BACTEC has 62 international staff and 48 national staff deployed in four manual clearance teams, two Mine Detection Dog teams, three Level 1 survey teams as well as in mechanical Demining teams using an armored dozer 977 L, two Bozena, and three flails (MMCM).

MineTech has 214 employees in Lebanon, including 152 international staff, 40 Lebanese and 22 Lebanese deminers in training deployed in ten manual clearance teams, ten Mine Detection Dog teams (using a total of twenty dogs), one training and quality assurance team, one EOD Team, one

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31 NDO presentation to Landmines Survivors Network, Beirut, 19 March 2002.
32 NDO presentation at the UN House, Beirut, 13 December 2001.
35 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 22 July 2002.
36 Interview with Fabrizio Gensini, Program Manager, Assobon, Beirut, 28 June 2001.
37 Presentation by the Operation Officer, MACC SL, Tyre, 4 July 2002.
survey team and two mechanical demining teams. From 6 May to 3 July 2002, MineTech cleared the following: 4,762 antipersonnel mines, three antivehicle mines and 81 UXO, in an area of 438,992 square meters.

Mine Risk Education

In April 2001, the NDO established a National Mine Risk Education Committee which includes the major actors in mine risk education in Lebanon. The committee is headed by the officer in charge of the mine awareness section at the NDO. Between 11 April 2001 and 21 February 2002, mine risk education was conducted by NGO volunteers (trained by Landmine Resource Center) in 150 schools (out of a total of 548) in South Lebanon. They reached an estimated 50,000 students (out of 180,000 total) in 140 villages (out of 602 total) in South Lebanon. Funding for these activities was provided by UNICEF Lebanon, which also donated materials to be used in the mine awareness sessions.

The ICRC continues to support the mine awareness program run by the Lebanese Red Cross, including in the production of new mine risk education materials. Twelve instructors gave 216 mine awareness presentations and distributed information in schools in the south, organized a two-day workshop, with ICRC support, for students from the Public Health Faculty of the Lebanese University, and introduced mine/UXO awareness into the program of three summer camps in southern Lebanon for 390 children.

UNIFIL is producing 3,500 mine awareness booklets for UNIFIL personnel.

Mine risk education operators do not generate clearance requests in Lebanon and no systematic evaluations of the effectiveness of the programs have taken place. A joint UN Mine Action Service/UNIFIL visit took place in February 2002 and a Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining evaluation mission took place in March 2002. Both missions were done at the request of the MACC. One major result was an emphasis on the need to stop producing mine awareness literature and start to introduce interactive and participatory mine risk education.

Landmine Casualties

The Landmine Resource Center (LMRC) at the University of Balamand continues to record landmine casualties in Lebanon through its network of NGO contacts and focal points in the villages of the South. In 2001, LMRC recorded 90 new mine/UXO casualties; 18 were killed and 72 injured. This is a decrease from 113 mine casualties for the year 2000, which included 14 killed and 99 injured. In the first ten days following the Israeli withdrawal there were seventeen mine injuries, but the casualty trend later decreased as emergency mine risk education and mine clearance programs were initiated. In the first half of 2002, LMRC recorded three people killed and 21 injured in landmine/UXO incidents.

In 2001, the majority of landmine incidents occurred in South Lebanon, where people are often injured in areas already known or suspected to be mined, but not fenced or marked. All casualties were male. Fifteen survivors required amputations, while some others suffered serious

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38 Members include: Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand, ICRC, Lebanese Red Cross, UNICEF, Radda Barnen (Save the Children Sweden), World Rehabilitation Fund, Islamic Health Council, Islamic Al Rissala Scouts Association, Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped, Welfare Association for the Handicap in Nabatieh, Vision Association for Development, Rehabilitation and Care in Bekaa, NPA, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Education.


40 See ICRC chapter in the Appendices section of this report.

41 Statement by Ukraine representative on behalf of UNIFIL during a coordination meeting at the MACC, 6 April 2002. Notes taken by Landmine Monitor.


43 LMRC has a month-by-month breakdown of casualties from January 2001-June 2002. The worst month was August 2001, with 21 casualties; the following month, there were none. In the most recent month, June 2002, there were nine injuries and zero deaths.
head or abdominal injuries. Landmines were the cause of the majority of casualties, followed by cluster bombs and UXO. Twenty children (aged under 18 years) were injured and eight killed, often while playing. Adults were injured while engaged in agricultural work or while traveling in a vehicle.

Previously, the LMRC undertook a survey of casualties in South Lebanon in July 2000, which identified 600 casualties in addition to 2,493 casualties reported in a previous survey in 1998–1999. On 20 July 2002, a British deminer lost his leg in a landmine incident in southern Lebanon.

Survivor Assistance

On 21 October 2001, the NDO established a National Mine Victim Assistance Committee, which includes the major actors in survivor assistance in Lebanon. In the South, the existing first aid structure is used for the evacuation of landmine casualties, including ambulances and first aid care provided by the Lebanese Red Cross, the Islamic Health Council and the Al Rissala First Aid Service. Landmine casualties are driven to the nearest emergency room, usually hospitals in Saida as the other four hospitals in the south are unable to provide the necessary assistance. This initial hospital care is usually paid for by the government, either through the Ministry of Health, the National Social Security Fund, the Council of the South or the Military Hospital (for military personnel only). Funding of long-term hospital care is not available. In certain cases, landmine survivors are obliged to leave the hospital.

In addition to services provided by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Social Affairs, rehabilitation services are also provided through NGOs. Usually, military casualties receive services from the Military Hospital. Three NGOs service landmine survivors in the south and during the last quarter of 2001, a Beirut-based rehabilitation NGO established a new branch in Marjayoun. In February 2002, a West Bekaa-based rehabilitation NGO opened a branch in Hashaya. In 2002, the Ministry of Health again started providing prosthetic services on a limited scale.

Norwegian People’s Aid continued to provide physical and psychological rehabilitation services to the physically disabled, including landmine survivors. At the beginning of 2001, NPA launched a new landmine survivor assistance program in the south in cooperation with three local partners and in consultation with the NDO. In 2001, 73 people received new prostheses and a further 51 had their artificial limbs repaired. Renovations, to improve access for disabled persons, were carried out in five schools, thirteen homes and two public places. A number of patients also received prosthetic eyes, hearing aids, splints and silicon socks, and psychological support. Forty health workers received first aid training. NPA also provided rehabilitation equipment and therapeutic and technical tools to the physiotherapy departments and prosthetic workshops of their local partners. The annual budget for the program is NOK3,000,000 (US$333,333) with funding provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The World Rehabilitation Fund (WRF) continues its program of socio-economic reintegration of landmine survivors. Components of the program include: designing and implementing an approach to community based rehabilitation (CBR) that meets the needs of

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44 The 1998–1999 survey excluded the occupied territories at the time.
46 Members include: WHO, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Council of the South, the Landmine Resource Center at the University of Balamand, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Lebanese Red Cross, UNICEF, the World Rehabilitation Fund, the Islamic Health Council, the Islamic Al Rissala Scouts Association, the Lebanese Welfare Association for the Disabled, the Welfare Association for the Disabled in Nabatieh, the Vision Association for Development, Rehabilitation & Care in Bekaa, the Welfare Association for the Care of the Injured and Disabled of War in Lebanon and Norwegian People’s Aid.
48 Interview with Ketil Volden, Advisor for Middle East, Norwegian People’s Aid, Oslo, 4 July 2002.
persons residing in mine-affected areas; a project to address the problems of war-related stress among young women through the development of a mentoring program; creating sustainable income-generating activities; and creating a mechanism in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Health to standardize service for the provision of prostheses and orthoses for landmine survivors, and other persons with disabilities. Approximately 50 people have benefited from the program. The WRF also supports the Landmine Resource Center. The programs are funded by UNDP, USAID and the US Leahy War Victims Fund.49

In December 2001, WHO joined the victim assistance committee and invited NGOs to submit victim assistance funding proposals in a trial to find appropriate funders.

The LMRC was contracted by the WRF-UNDP program to hold a training workshop on 19-20 December 2001 on landmine victim assistance materials (documents translated from English) as part of a mine awareness package. The workshop examined translations of material in the Lebanese context and came up with definitions for “landmine victim,” “landmine survivor,” “victim assistance,” and “survivor assistance.” These definitions fell within the definitions of the ICBL.

Disability Policy and Practice

After a campaign by the National Council of the Disabled and other concerned NGOs, the Parliament approved the “Access and Rights of the Disabled” law on 25 May 2000. The law consists of 143 decrees asserting the rights of the disabled with respect to health care, education, employment, recreational activities, independent life, transportation, and exemption from taxation. Landmine survivors are included in the disabled population protected by this law. The law is not yet in effect, but Nabih Berri, the head of Lebanon’s parliamentary Council of Deputies, has promised to activate it as soon as possible.50

LIBYA

Mine Ban Policy

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. While stating its support for the humanitarian goals of the treaty,1 Libya continues to object that the Mine Ban Treaty “does not distinguish between the legitimate use of landmines for legal self-defense purposes against powerful aggressive countries, and the irresponsible use of landmines by other warring countries.”2 Libya has also said the treaty should be amended to rectify the “non-inclusion of any provisions relating to the determination of the legal responsibility of states that have planted mines in the territories of other states, and the right of the affected states to compensation.”3 In November 2001, Libya was among the 19 countries that abstained in voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Libya participated in the regional seminar on the Mine Ban Treaty held in Tunisia from 15-16 January 2002. However, Libya did not participate in the Third Meeting of State Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, nor the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January or May 2002. Libya is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and did not attend the

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49 Email from Jack Victor, WRF, to Landmine Monitor, June 2002.
1 “We support the efforts made by the international community to eradicate the problem of land mines.... The whole world has underlined its concern at this hidden enemy which, in addition to threatening the lives of thousands of children and women, causes tremendous economic, social and environmental losses in affected countries.” Statement by Isa Baba, Deputy Permanent Representative of Libya, UN General Assembly First Committee Debate, New York, 8 October 2001.
2 Statement by Libya, UN General Assembly First Committee Debate, 8 October 2001.
3 Ibid.
second review conference or the third annual meeting of States Parties of Amended Protocol II, both in December 2001.

Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use

Libya is not known to have either produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but it imported and used antipersonnel mines in the past. According to Libyan representatives at the Tunis seminar, Libya did not import or use antipersonnel landmines in 2001. They told Landmine Monitor that possessing, using, or transferring explosives, including antipersonnel mines, is forbidden by and punishable under the Libyan penal code.4

Landmine Problem

Libya’s landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) problem dates to World War II, and is also the result of later conflicts with Egypt and Chad. Libya has planted mines in its border areas with Egypt and Chad. According to Libyan officials, minefields are marked.5 Mines and UXO continue to be an obstacle for infrastructure projects, cultivation, and planning of national projects.

Previously, Libya has claimed that some 10,000 square kilometers of land are mined, representing 27% of the agricultural land in the country.6 Libyan officials have estimated that there are between 1.5 and 3 million mines in their territory; unexploded ordnance appears to be a more significant problem than mines.7

Mine Action, Casualties, Survivor Assistance

There is no national budget for mine clearance and no national civilian body to oversee mine action in Libya. Landmine Monitor has not received any new information about mine awareness activities in Libya or the mine clearance operations of private companies in support of economic efforts like oil and gas exploration.

In 2001, Italy allocated €1,265,320 (approximately US$1.1 million) to Libya for demining and rehabilitation of agricultural areas mined during World War II. But the terms of the agreement have not been finalized and the funds have not been disbursed yet.8 Libya has called on other states to follow Italy’s example.9

There were no reports of mine or UXO victims in 2001. The government provides a medical and social care system for disabled persons, including mine and UXO victims. The system offers free medical care, social reintegration, and job opportunities for disabled. It also provides special transportation benefits, including free private special cars in some cases.10

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA

The Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) has still not acceded to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. There does not appear to have been any progress toward accession during the reporting period. FSM was one of 19 countries that abstained from voting on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. One possible reason could be that the Federation is linked through its Compact of Free Association with the U.S. (a non-signatory), which gives full authority and responsibility to the U.S. government for the

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4 Interview with members of Libyan delegation to Tunis regional seminar, 16 January 2002.
5 Ibid.
8 “Italy - 2001. Mine Clearance, Rehabilitation and Victim Assistance Programmes,” distributed at Standing Committee meetings, January 2002; and, phone interviews with Counsellor Vincenzo Celeste, Italy’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March and April 2002.
9 Statement by Libya, UN General Assembly First Committee Debate, 8 October 2001.
Federation's security and defence matters. FSM has never used, produced or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

MONGOLIA

Key developments since May 2001: The President of Mongolia expressed support for the process to join the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mine Ban Policy

Mongolia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. According to an official press release, during a meeting with the new Canadian Ambassador in January 2002, the President of Mongolia spoke of “a research process to join the Ottawa Convention and noted that Mongolia would support Canadian efforts and international joint societies to ban landmines.” The President’s statement represents the highest-level expression of support for accession made to date.

Also in early 2002, a Ministry of Defense official stated that Mongolia “pursues a step-by-step approach towards the prohibition of APL use, stockpiling and their destruction and fully supports the global movement on banning landmines around the world.” A Ministry of Foreign Affairs official confirmed that Mongolia continues to fully share the aspirations to ban antipersonnel landmines and welcomes the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty.


Mongolia is a State Party to the original Protocol II on landmines of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but it has not yet ratified the 1996 Amended Protocol II. Mongolia participated in the Second Review Conference of the CCW, but not the Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, both in Geneva in December 2001.

On 27-28 June 2001, the government of Mongolia, with the support of the Canadian government and the Landmine Monitor research team in Mongolia, organized the conference on “Sharing our Future in a Mine Free World.” The conference was the first event in Mongolia specifically addressing the issue of landmines. At the conference, Colonel L. Gantumur, Head of the Ministry of Defense’s Engineering Department, stated that while Mongolia’s military supports joining the Mine Ban Treaty eventually, accession will not be possible until alternatives to antipersonnel mines are found. He said that Mongolia has to consider the position of its neighbors, particularly China and Russia, on the Mine Ban Treaty, and has to consider the continued use of landmines in situations of domestic unrest and terrorism within the region. He also stated that

3 Meeting with G. Nemuun, Attaché, Department of Multilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 March 2002.
4 Meeting with Col. Y. Chiojamts, Ulaanbaatar, 7 February 2002.
5 For more details on the conference, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 559.
Mongolia’s economic constraints limit availability of resources to purchase modern military arms and machinery, and that the destruction of landmine stockpiles would not be possible at present due to budgetary constraints.\(^6\)

Since the conference, the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense have held informal exchanges of views on the Mine Ban Treaty and landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) issues.\(^7\)

A Seminar on International Humanitarian Law was held in October 2001, financed by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and hosted by the Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Defense, Parliamentarians, the Department of Law at the Mongolian State University, and the School of Humanities participated in the seminar. Among other subjects, participants briefly discussed the matter of antipersonnel landmines in Mongolia.\(^8\)

**Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use**

Mongolia states that it has not and does not produce or transfer antipersonnel mines.\(^9\) There is no specific domestic regulation prohibiting production, import, export, or transportation of antipersonnel mines through Mongolian territory. A Ministry of Defense official told Landmine Monitor that it is possible for the Mongolian Armed Forces to adopt certain resolutions concerning non-transfer and/or non-manufacture of antipersonnel mines.\(^10\) Colonel L. Gantumur echoed this possibility in a later meeting.\(^11\)

Mongolian defense officials have acknowledged that Mongolia has a large operational stockpile of antipersonnel mines.\(^12\) The number of antipersonnel mines in stockpile is confidential. Mongolia has revealed that it has eleven types of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines, all purchased from the former USSR between 1960 and 1985; 73.2 percent of the total are antipersonnel mines.\(^13\) The mines include models PMN, OZM-3, and POMZ.\(^14\)

Defense officials state that Mongolia has never deployed and will never deploy antipersonnel mines on its territory except for self-defense purposes, and that in the event of armed conflict, landmines would be used only to protect borders and strategic state assets.\(^15\)

**Landmine/UXO Problem, Survey, and Clearance**

In 1998, a team from the United States Defense Department and their Mongolian counterparts from the Ministry of Defense concluded that Mongolia is not a mine-affected country, though other UXO are present.\(^16\) Ministry of Defense officials have advised Landmine Monitor researchers that eighteen areas in the country contain UXO resulting from World War II and the presence of the former Soviet Army bases in Mongolia between 1960 and 1992.\(^17\) One official has stated that clearance operations are still not complete because Mongolian authorities do not possess detailed

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\(^7\) Meeting with Col. Y. Chojjams, Ministry of Defense, 7 February 2002.

\(^8\) Meeting with Ms. Altansetseg, Red Cross Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, 8 January 2002.


\(^10\) Meeting with Col. Y. Chojjams, Ministry of Defense, 7 February 2002.


\(^12\) Meeting with Col. Y. Chojjams, Ministry of Defense, 7 February 2002.

\(^13\) Handout provided by Col. Gantumur Lhagva at meeting between Mongolian delegation, Canada’s DFAIT Mine Action Team, and the NGO Mines Action Canada, Ottawa, 17 May 2001. The mines were described as two types: fougasse and fragmentation antipersonnel mines.


data on the former Soviet Army bases. No signs or fences demarcating contaminated areas have
been placed to protect local residents and animals. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
there is no intention to conduct additional mine/UXO surveys. To date, no research or other
related initiatives have been planned to ascertain the degree of danger at the areas, or on necessary
clearance technology.

Casualties and Survivor Assistance

No new landmine or UXO casualties were reported in 2001. Incidents related to landmines
and UXO around the country are to be reported to the police department of the relevant province,
and it is then the responsibility of the police to report the incident to the Ministry of Defense’s
Engineering Department. But, the police department often fails to report to the Engineering
Department, and this precludes accurate data collection on people injured or killed by landmines
and UXO.

On average the Engineering Department receives three calls a year related to suspected
UXO/landmine issues. In 2001, in Baganuur, Tov aimag, the Engineering Department destroyed
explosives, including three TM-52 antivehicle mines, which were found in the basement of a
building used by the former Soviet Army prior to 1991. A 100 square kilometer radius was
searched for landmines and UXO.

Emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, other types of social services
and assistance to people injured by UXO is provided in accordance with legislation such as the
“Mongolian Law on Social Welfare” and the “Law on Social Assistance for People with
Disabilities.” These laws do not include specific provisions for people with disabilities caused by
landmines or UXO.

There are thirty-six non-governmental and six state organizations working with and providing
services for people with disabilities in Mongolia today. Some of these organizations collect data on
people with disabilities. However, neither the State Statistical Office nor independent research
units have any data on people disabled as the result of UXO or landmine incidents.

Two cases have been reported. In 1999, in Tov aimag province, a seven-year-old boy was
killed by a piece of unexploded ordnance. No compensation or any other support was given to the
family by military or state authorities. Also in 1999 in Tov aimag, a man lost one eye from an
explosion while he separated scrap metal at a recycling plant. The Ministry of Defense provided no
assistance.

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22 Ibid.
23 Meeting with Colonel L. Gantumur, General Staff of Armed Forces of Mongolia, Ulaanbaatar, 7
24 1998 Mongolian Law on Social Welfare; 1998 Amended Mongolian Law on Social Assistance for
People with Disabilities.
25 Meetings with the following NGOs: B. Zinaamider, National Committee of People with Disabilities,
Ulaanbaatar, 21 January 2002; Z. Boldsaikhan, Mongolian Association of Blind People, Ulaanbaatar, 30
January 2002; D. Adilibsh, Mongolian Society of Invalids with Orthopedic Disabilities, Ulaanbaatar, 31
January 2002; S. Sainbayar, Mongolian Association of Disabled, Ulaanbaatar, 1 February 2002; O. Selenge,
Mongolian Association of Disabled Women, Ulaanbaatar, 4 February 2002.
MOROCCO

Key developments since May 2001: In January 2002, Morocco stated that it is complying with the Mine Ban Treaty “de facto.” Morocco ratified CCW Amended Protocol II on 19 March 2002.

Mine Ban Policy


In response to a request for an update on the Landmine Monitor 2001 report, the government stated, “The position of Morocco has not changed since the previous report.”1 According to the final report of the Regional Seminar on the Ottawa Convention [Mine Ban Treaty] in North Africa, held in Tunis, Tunisia, on 15-16 January 2002, “The Moroccan representative stated that his country is complying with the Convention de facto, since it is not producing, importing or exporting anti-personnel mines…. Morocco is only postponing its accession to the Ottawa Convention on account of the security imperatives in its southern provinces.”2 The statement made no explicit mention of possible use or stockpiling by Morocco.


On 12 December 2001, six Nobel Peace Prize Laureates issued an appeal to the UN Secretary-General expressing their “grave concern about the overwhelming presence of Moroccan troops and civilian settlers in occupied Western Sahara, the massive use of antipersonnel landmines…”3 On 1 October 2001, sixteen Norwegian human rights NGOs wrote to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, urging the government to lobby for Moroccan adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty.4 In a letter to the Australian government on 25 January 2002, thirteen Australian community organizations expressed the same demands.5

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Morocco is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. It has stated since 2000 that it no longer imports antipersonnel mines, and repeated that again in 2002.6 However, it remains unclear if Morocco has a formal policy against future importation of antipersonnel mines, or it simply has not done so for a number of years.

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1 Fax to Landmine Monitor from Omar Hilale, Ambassador, Permanent Representative for Morocco at the UN in Geneva, Ref: No 166/F/38, 16 April 2002.
At the regional seminar in January 2002, Morocco’s representative told Landmine Monitor that the country does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Morocco first made this claim in a meeting with Landmine Monitor in February 2001 and in a formal, written response to Landmine Monitor in March 2001. Morocco has not indicated at what date it no longer maintained a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, or whether the stockpile was purposefully destroyed or depleted through use.

Morocco has acknowledged extensive use of mines in the past. In February 2001, Moroccan officials for the first and only time stated explicitly that the country no longer uses antipersonnel mines. The issue of use was not explicitly mentioned in the statement to the Tunis seminar in January 2002, nor in the written response to Landmine Monitor in March 2001. It is not clear if Morocco now has a policy prohibiting use of antipersonnel mines, or perhaps simply is stating that it has not used them in recent years.

The Polisario in Western Sahara claim that Morocco continues to use antipersonnel mines. In January 2002, Polisario stated that Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) troops deployed in Western Sahara “refurbish and upgrade their minefields on a daily basis.” Later in 2002, Polisario told Landmine Monitor that it is appealing to others to help “stop laying anti-personnel mines along the Marocain [sic] Defensive Wall by Marocain Army. Many accidents did happen because [of] these Marocain activities… [Polisario] believes also that Morocco has big stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. The Moroccan Army had used antipersonnel mines in the past and is continuing to do so… It is clear that FAR [Moroccan Army] laid new antipersonnel mines, it is also continuing to maintain and refurbish existing minefields during the last year.” It provided casualty information on seven mine incidents from June 2001 to April 2002 to support its claim. Polisario said that on 7 May 2002, a Moroccan solder defected from one of the Moroccan bases in Smara sector and confirmed that since July 2001 Moroccan forces have continued to lay, maintain and refurbish mines along the berm.

Landmine Monitor could not find any independent evidence of any new mine use by Morocco, and is unaware of any reports from MINURSO regarding possible new mine use.

**Landmine Problem and Mine Action**

Morocco is not considered mine-affected except for the territory it controls in Western Sahara (see the separate Western Sahara report). Under bilateral military agreements signed by Morocco and Polisario in early 1999, both parties committed to cooperate with the UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in the exchange of mine-related information, marking of mined areas, and clearance and destruction of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the presence of MINURSO observers. In the period from May 2001 to May 2002, no antipersonnel mines are known to have been cleared and destroyed by the Royal Moroccan Army under this agreement, but between 22 May and 25 October 2001 MINURSO monitored the destruction, by the RMA, of two antivehicle mines and other munitions and UXO in the areas of Ankesh, Laayoune.

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9 See past editions of *Landmine Monitor Report*. Since the 1991 UN-monitored ceasefire, the UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) apparently has not documented any instances of landmine use by Morocco. Review of UN Secretary-General reports on Western Sahara; Landmine Monitor review of MINURSO records.

10 Meeting with four representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rabat, 28 February 2001.


13 Ibid.
and Dakhla during six destruction operations. A June 2001 UN report states that from 7-22 May 2001, MINURSO confirmed the destruction by the RMA of about 37,000 antipersonnel mines and 3,000 antivehicle mines in the Ankeshe area.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Landmine Monitor could not obtain any updated information on Moroccan landmine casualties during the reporting period. Landmine Monitor previously reported that between March 2000 and March 2001, Moroccan authorities registered 51 military casualties of antivehicle mines and UXO explosions in Western Sahara.

Mine survivors are treated the same as other persons with disabilities in Morocco. Moroccan officials state, “In general, assistance to the handicapped and their insertion into the socio-economic fabric constitutes one of the principal priorities of the Moroccan government.”

NEPAL

Key developments since May 2001: The use of mines by the Maoist United People’s Front has increased with the escalation of the conflict. Mine incidents have now been reported in 71 of 75 districts, compared to reported incidents in 37 districts last year. According to information collected by the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines, in 2001, 214 people were killed and 210 injured in 148 landmine and IED incidents. There continue to be serious indicators that government forces, both the police and the army, are using antipersonnel mines.

Mine Ban Policy

Nepal has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. At the national seminar, “Emergency and Landmines,” held on 7 February 2002, Minister of Foreign Affairs Arjun Jung Bahadur Singh stated, “We are in the final stage of the study [of the Mine Ban Treaty] and we are inching closer to the Treaty.” Various political party leaders and Members of Parliament expressed their commitment to ban landmines at the national seminar.

In an interview, a Foreign Affairs Ministry official stressed that most of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty, including India, and stated, “Nepal alone cannot do this.” Several other officials expressed a more positive attitude toward the Mine Ban Treaty. A Ministry of Defence official said, “The Ottawa Treaty needs to be ratified so that it could control the use of landmines.” An official from the Ministry of Home Affairs said, “If signing of the treaty by Nepal stops the use of landmines, it should be done immediately.” A Police Deputy Inspector General said, “I personally believe that Nepal should sign the Ottawa Treaty.”

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17 Ibid.
20 Interview with Ram Bhakta P.V. Thakur, Under Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sital Niwas, 9 January 2002.
23 Interview with Govinda Prasad Shah, Deputy Inspector General, Police Academy, Maharajgung, 15 January 2002.
On 8 April 2002, the Parliament passed a bill that added the term “landmines” to the definition of “bomb” contained in the Terrorist and Destructive Act. The practical effect of this is that it becomes illegal for citizens, other than the police or army, to obtain or use landmines without a license.

Nepal voted in favor of pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, as it had on similar resolutions in the past. Unlike previous years, Nepal did not participate as an observer to the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Managua in September 2001. It also did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. Nepal is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, and did not participate in the CCW Second Review Conference process in 2001.

Use

Use by Rebels

The use of homemade mines by the Maoist United People’s Front has increased with the failure of peace talks and the escalation of the conflict. According to the Nepal Campaign to Ban Landmines (NCBL), mine incidents have now been reported in 71 of 75 districts. This compares to reported incidents in 37 districts last year.

A parliamentarian has stated that since 2001, the Maoists have established Mining Groups, trained to use mines in every district. He noted in particular the incident on 25 November 2001, when a rebel battalion attacked in Dang district and used mines extensively.

Maoists have used mines to ambush army and police personnel; they have also targeted the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and other representatives, Nepal Red Cross Society members, parliamentarians, teachers, and representatives of other sectors. In addition to these offensive uses, in areas under their control the rebels use mines in a defensive mode to prevent government forces from entering.

According to a police official, the rebels use both victim-activated and command-detonated mines. The victim-activated devices include both pressure mines and tripwire mines. One source has noted that many of the mines are similar to those of the People’s War Group in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, with whom the Maoists reportedly have close relations; they utilize a steel container (either pressure cooker or metal pipes), gelatin as the explosive, and a basic triggering device.
Use by Government

There continue to be serious indicators that government forces, both the police and the army, are using antipersonnel mines. Indeed, an Army spokesperson acknowledged to Landmine Monitor that the Army is trained to use landmines, and that it instructs the police on mine use. Last year, several Parliamentarians stated that the Army maintained a stockpile of landmines, and provided some to the police.

On 11 February 2002, a Parliamentarian from a mine-affected area told Landmine Monitor, “One can even see today the hole left behind by the explosion of landmines planted by the police in Sindhupalchowk district. The landmines planted by the police have killed the police themselves.” A news report of a mine explosion in February 2002 in Achham District that killed two children and wounded six children stated that it was suspected that the police planted the mine. However, one police official said, “We police do not kill others by trick and we do not use ambush and landmines.”

The national media has carried allegations that the army has also used landmines against the Maoists. It is believed that the army plants mines in areas around checkpoints and barracks. In one widely reported incident, on 7 March 2002, Bagabati Gautam stepped on a mine when she left the main road waiting to pass through an army checkpoint in Sankha Village, Rukum District.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

It is not known whether the government produces antipersonnel landmines. In the previous edition, Landmine Monitor cited an unconfirmed report from a police surgeon that the government has two small factories that produce antipersonnel mines, as well as grenades and ammunition. This year, a spokesperson of the Ministry of Defence said, “The explosives that are produced at Swoyambhu, Sundarijal, and Gatthaghar are not original mines, but rather explosives used in blasting for various purposes. The Department of Roads and other construction companies purchase them after getting permission from the government.”

As noted above, the Army apparently has a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. While the supplier of the mines is not known, one official told Landmine Monitor that according to an Army Major, they are factory-produced (not improvised) mines, and are designed to explode with the pressure of five to nine kilograms.

The Maoist rebels have demonstrated the ability to produce significant quantities of victim-activated homemade mines (also known as Improvised Explosive Devices). The government alleges that the rebels get detonators and explosives from sources outside the country. Indian police raided two shops at Gorakhpur, India for providing arms and explosives to the Maoists.

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16 Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 563, cited testimony from a number of Parliamentarians and others regarding police use, and cited several alleged cases of such use.
19 Interview with Subas Karmacharya, House of Representatives, Singh Durbar, 11 February 2002.
20 Dristi (Vernacular Weekly), 13 February 2002.
22 See for example, “Seven people died by the army’s react,” Rajdhani Daily, 31 December 2001.
23 Interview with Khem Man Khadka, chairperson of District Development Committee, Kathmandu, 11 March 2002, citing information provided by an Army Major.
27 Interview with Khem Man Khadka, chairperson of District Development Committee, Kathmandu, 11 March 2002.
India and Nepal agreed that their various security forces would conduct inspections in a coordinated manner to prevent illegal transfer of weaponry. 29

Landmine Problem

The landmine problem has spread from a small number of districts in the far western part of the country, to the eastern districts and all across the country, even in the capital. The NCBL has collected reports of mine incidents in 71 out of the 75 districts. This compares to the 37 mine-affected districts identified in Landmine Monitor Report 2001. 30

Mine Action

The Army has established a Mine Disposal Team to destroy the mines planted by the Maoists. 31 One police official claimed, “Mines are disposed of by shooting at them from long range, as there is no other way of disposing of them.” 32 The police do not have the capacity to clear mines, and call on the Army team when needed.

To raise public awareness of the threat of mines, the NCBL produced a documentary video, which has been shown in different places. A police official offered to collaborate with the NCBL in generating public awareness. 33

Landmine Casualties

According to information collected by the NCBL, in 2001, 214 people were killed and 210 injured in 148 landmine and IED incidents: 33 were children (aged between one and 15 years); 19 were women and 372 were men. Of the 424 casualties, 71 were civilians. In 2000, 178 casualties were recorded, of which 94 were killed and 84 injured: 59 were civilians. The NCBL report was based on information from parliamentarians, leaders of various political parties, the special Monitoring Committees set up to monitor the activities of the army and Maoist rebels after the declaration of a state of emergency, the media, and personal interviews. Information is provided to the various sources by the army, the police, or from people living in the affected areas. Although there is no official data collection mechanism on mine casualties, a Ministry of Home Affairs representative said, “There is no data on death caused solely by landmines, but the number of people killed in mine explosions is not small.” 34

Survivor Assistance

Nepal has taken special measures to aid casualties of the conflict with the Maoists, however, no special provisions are designed for mine survivors. A Ministry of Home Affairs official stated, “The government has provided treatment to all those wounded in terrorist attacks, be it from landmines or from any other weapons. There is no separate budget for landmine victims and the cost is borne by the budget set aside for terrorist attacks.” 35 Hospitals providing assistance to mine/IED casualties include Bheri Zonal Hospital, Bir Hospital, Tribhuvan Teaching Hospital, Dinekendra Police Hospital, and the Birendra Police Hospital. There are no known programs offering physiotherapy, prosthetics, or psychological support to mine survivors.

The government provides financial assistance of Rs.750,000 (US$9,740) to security personnel and Rs.150,000 (US$1,299) to civilians if killed in Maoist attacks; if hospitalized, it will

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29 Chetan Panta, 7 December 2001.
33 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
pay the entire bill and provide an Rs.75 (US$0.75) per diem for food.\textsuperscript{36} However, survivors claimed that they do not receive money in time for medical care and other expenses. The government spent a total of US$15,264 in the period from 16 July 2000 to 15 July 2001 and US$31,438 from 16 July 2001 to 1 February 2002 to provide helicopter evacuation for people injured in Maoists attacks.\textsuperscript{37}

A report from the Medical Director of the Birendra Police Hospital revealed that the hospital requested a total of US$119,474 for the treatment of people wounded in Maoist attacks in the past two years, but the government provided only US$43,984. The shortfall of US$75,490 created difficulties in providing treatment to the injured. The equipment needed for the treatment of casualties costs about US$219,922, but to January 2002, the government had provided only US$23,286.\textsuperscript{38}

OMAN

Mine Ban Policy

Oman has not acceded the Mine Ban Treaty. Oman attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001 and for the first time participated in the weeklong intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2002, but made no statement in either forum. In November 2001, Oman voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting the universalization and implementation of the treaty.

Oman is not party to Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but it attended the Second CCW Review Conference and the third annual meeting of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001 as observer.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, Use

Oman has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines, but it has imported and used them in the past. In 2001 Oman stated that it has a limited number of stockpiled mines for training purposes.\textsuperscript{1} In addition, the United States stockpiles at least 6,248 antipersonnel mines at airbases in Oman.\textsuperscript{2}

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

Oman has a mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) problem as a legacy of an internal conflict with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Gulf (PFLOG). The great majority of mines and UXO are located in Dhofar region in southern Oman. The Royal Oman Army (ROA) has stated that it marked, mapped, and cleared some of its minefields after the conflict ended, but that PFLOG did not.\textsuperscript{3} Climatic conditions have caused some of the mines to move from their original locations. The ROA is reported to have plotted suspected mined areas and established seven zones of suspected mined areas based on historical records of battlefield areas, unit positions, and landmine incident reports.\textsuperscript{4}

The United States allocated US$1.19 million in demining assistance to Oman in 2000 for survey and information management capabilities, training deminers and medical personnel to international standards, and demining and protective equipment. In 2001, another US$1.02 million was allocated as follows: a demining training program (US$750,000), demining equipment

\textsuperscript{36} Press conference of Devendra Raj Kandel, Minister of Home Affairs, Singh Durbar, 1 February 2002.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Statement of Dr. Kashi Ram Kunwar, Medical Director, Birendra Police Hospital, 22 January 2002.
Non-Signatories

(OSS161,200), personal protection gear (OSS78,500), logistic support (OSS21,100), and mine disposal technologies (OSS11,750). From January-April 2001, U.S. Special Operation Forces trained 75 ROA personnel in minefield survey, detection and marking, information management, mine awareness, quality assurance, and first aid. The U.S. Department of State also provided the ROA with five mine detecting dogs and trained eight handlers between January and November 2001.³

Oman reportedly allocated an estimated OSS1.6 million annually to demining since 1984, before doubling the contribution to an estimated OSS3.2 million in recent years. In May 2001, ROA deployed its deminers to the Safrait area in the Dhofar region.⁴

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

According to the Omani government, landmines and UXO have killed twelve people and wounded 84 since the end of the Dhofar conflict in 1975. Almost 50 head of livestock have become landmine casualties. In March 2001, two people received serious injuries in an UXO incident but no further information is available on the area where the incident occurred or the victims.⁵

The government claims that the Armed Forces and other State authorities provide assistance and rehabilitation to mine and UXO victims.⁶

PAKISTAN

Key developments since May 2001: As part of the military buildup since December 2001, both Pakistan and India have emplaced large numbers of antipersonnel mines along their common border. Reports of civilian casualties in Pakistan following the recent mine-laying call into question the effectiveness of the measures taken to protect civilians. In April 2002, Pakistan Ordnance Factories is alleged to have offered two types of antipersonnel mines for sale in the United Kingdom. Pakistan has now acknowledged that it has started producing both new detectable hand-emplaced antipersonnel mines and new remotely-delivered mines. In 2001, there were 92 new mine casualties recorded, including 36 children, in Pakistan.

Mine Ban Policy

Pakistan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In a letter to the Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines (PCBL) in February 2002, the Joint Staff Headquarters stated, “Although Pakistan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty of 1997, yet we fully subscribe to the goal of eventual elimination of APL [antipersonnel landmines]. However, unless viable alternative of the APL is developed/made available, Pakistan would find it difficult to join the Ottawa Convention.”¹ In a second letter to the PCBL in April 2002, Pakistan stated, “Although our regional security environment and our military requirements to check any aggressive incursions, have constrained us from joining the Ottawa Treaty. Pakistan scrupulously adheres to a policy, including no exports, which ensures that the mines in our military inventory will never become a cause for the civilian casualties anywhere. This position is consistent with the basic objective of the Ottawa Treaty.”²

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¹ Letter to Coordinator, Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines, from Joint Staff Headquarters, Strategic Plans Division, ACDA Directorate, Chaklala Cantonment, dated 14 February 2002.
² Letter to Coordinator, Pakistan Campaign to Ban Landmines, from Joint Staff Headquarters, Strategic Plans Division, ACDA Directorate, Chaklala Cantonment, dated 4 April 2002.
Pakistan abstained from voting on the pro-Mine Ban Treaty UN General Assembly Resolution in November 2001, as it had in previous years. Pakistan did not attend as an observer the Third Meeting of States Parties in Nicaragua in September 2001 and did not participate in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, but did attend the meetings in May 2002 in Geneva.

Pakistan is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and attended the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001. Pakistan submitted its annual report as required under Article 13 of Amended Protocol II. In its letters to the PCBL, Pakistan noted with respect to Amended Protocol II that it “fully complies with its provisions,”3 and “ensures its full implementation, true to its letter and spirit.”4

At the Second Review Conference of States Parties to the CCW, Pakistan expressed its view on the proposal on mines other than antipersonnel mines: “We understand the problems caused by anti-vehicle mines for peacekeeping and peace-building operations. The proposal is still being carefully studied by our authorities, especially its implications for our national security. We should get rid of all mines, but without undermining the legitimate security requirements of High Contracting Parties. This will require above all, fuller international cooperation in particular to identify and develop viable alternatives that evolve equal security for the States concerned.”5 With regard to the proposal on Explosive Remnants of War, Pakistan said it “does not believe that this area is ripe for negotiations. We must first be clear about the facts and problems relating to explosive remnants of war. Only then can we formulate an appropriate legal instrument.”6

Production

The state-owned Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) in the past produced six types of antipersonnel mines: minimum-metal blast mines P2 Mk2 and P4 Mk2; bounding fragmentation mines P3 Mk2 and P7 Mk2; and directional fragmentation/Claymore mines P5 Mk1 and P5 Mk2.7 The private sector is not allowed to produce or purchase landmines.8

Pakistan has now acknowledged that it has started producing both new detectable hand-emplaced antipersonnel mines and new remotely delivered mines with self-destruct and self-deactivating mechanisms. It states the new mines are “absolutely in line with the requirements” of Amended Protocol II.9 New production of detectable versions of the P2 Mk2 and P4 Mk2 mines started after 1 January 1997.10 In December 2001 Pakistan reported that all technical requirements of Amended Protocol II have been appropriately included at the development, production, and user levels.11

Stockpiling

There is no official information on the size of Pakistan’s stockpile. Landmine Monitor has, since 2000, estimated that Pakistan holds at least six million antipersonnel mines in stockpile, based on information provided by a senior Pakistani official.12 This constitutes the fifth largest stockpile in the world. The government has neither confirmed nor denied the number.

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3 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 4 April 2002.
4 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 14 February 2002.
6 Ibid.
7 See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 496.
9 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 14 February 2002.
10 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 4 April 2002.
Pakistan has said that “conversion of the existing stocks of the Anti-personnel mines to detectable ones is in hand and progressing as per plans.” Pakistan opted to utilize the nine-year deferral period available under Amended Protocol II, meaning that conversion must be completed within nine years of entry into force (by 3 December 2007).

Transfer
Pakistan declared a complete moratorium on export of antipersonnel mines in 1997, but has stated that in practice it has not exported “since early 1992.” The moratorium became a legally binding ban through Statutory Regulatory Order No.123 (1) of 25 February 1999, and “its effective implementation is being ensured through well laid down Export Control Procedures.”

In April 2002, Pakistan Ordnance Factories allegedly offered two types of antipersonnel mines for sale in the United Kingdom to a journalist from Channel 4 TV, who posed as a representative of a private company seeking to purchase a variety of weapons. The mines appeared in a brochure, which the POF Director of Exports later claimed was out of date. He stated that “all our current brochures do not at all have any data/reference to mines of any sort.” A similar incident involving POF occurred in 1999.

There were allegations of Pakistani-manufactured antipersonnel mines being supplied to armed groups fighting in the Kargil region of India-administered Kashmir in 1999. In its February 2002 letter to the PCBL, the Joint Staff Headquarters strongly denied this, calling it a “concocted story” and stating, “The Indian allegation of having recovered POF manufactured mines from Indian Held Kashmir is nothing but an effort to malign Pakistan unnecessarily…. Because, for their proximity and presence of permanently laid mines along the LoC [line of control] in Kashmir, both countries are likely to hold some stocks/samples of each other’s APL, acquired consequent to the de-mining actions during de-escalation following the heightened periods of tensions/war.” Pakistan has also said that “use of mines by the Kashmiri freedom fighters or any other entity cannot/should not in any way be linked to Pakistan. Since the freedom struggle in Kashmir is an indigenous movement and Pakistan only provides political and moral support to these freedom fighters, hence, Indian rhetoric notwithstanding, use of landmines by Kashmiri, if any, should not be construed as having been provided by Pakistan or necessarily of Pakistani origin.”

Recent Use
As part of the military buildup following the 13 December 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, both Pakistan and India have emplaced large numbers of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines along their common border. Pakistan has been reluctant to acknowledge its mine-laying. In response to a letter from the ICBL expressing concerns regarding new use of antipersonnel mines, the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C. stated, “Pakistan has been obliged to take precautionary defensive measures,” and noted its obligations as a party to Amended Protocol II and its “unique record of clearing all minefields after the three wars in South Asia.”

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13 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 4 April 2002.
14 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 14 February 2002. Previously it has said no export since 1991.
16 Letter from Pakistan Ordnance Factory to Channel 4 (television company), 1 May 2002.
18 Ibid., p. 525, and Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 568. In January 2000, Indian military officials in Kashmir showed a Landmine Monitor researcher mines with the seal of the Pakistan Ordnance Factory on them, claiming the mines had been recovered from militants.
19 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 14 February 2002.
20 Ibid.
A deputy superintendent of police in Toba Chacu said that Pakistani troops had planted “a large number” of mines in areas of the Cholistan desert, near the Indian border. There have been reports of accidents occurring when Pakistani soldiers were planting mines. In two separate incidents in January 2002, thirteen Pakistani soldiers were killed and several injured while laying mines on the Indo-Pakistani border.

There have been recent landmine incidents in different districts and the tribal areas of Pakistan, including Sibi District of Baluchistan Province, Bahawalpur and Sialkot districts of Punjab Province and South Waziristan Tribal Area. The incidents along the border with India are likely due to recent landmine use by the Pakistan Army.

In January 2002, one man was killed and another injured when the bicycle they were riding hit a mine near the border village of Bajwat, near the Sialkot working boundary. The media report cited police sources attributing the emplacement of the mine to the Pakistani Army. In February 2002, seven members of one family, including three women, were killed in Cholistan when their jeep ran over a landmine. The news article said, “The area has become a killing field as Pakistani troops have laid a large number of landmines in the desert following a suicide attack on the Indian parliament and the ensuing tension on the borders. The landmines, though implanted with the defense point of view, are causing casualties of civilians as well as the army personnel and the livestock grazing in the area.”

As a State Party to Amended Protocol II, Pakistan must provide effective exclusion of civilians from areas containing antipersonnel mines. Reports of civilian casualties in Pakistan following the recent mine laying call into question the effectiveness of the measures taken to protect Pakistani civilians from the effects of mines.

Past Use

As noted above, Pakistan used landmines during its three wars with India in 1947, 1965, and 1971. Pakistan also acknowledges using mines in Kashmir. The Joint Staff Headquarters stated in April 2002, “There are no permanently laid landmines (antitank or antipersonnel) along the international border between India and Pakistan. However, situation is somewhat different along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, where for regular deployment of troops both India and Pakistan maintain permanently laid minefields along certain portions of the LOC. However, these minefields are properly fenced and marked as per requirements of the Amended Protocol II.” There were also reports of use of mines by Pakistani troops in Kashmir during the Kargil crisis in 1999.

Landmine Problem and Survey

In its December 2001 Article 13 report, Pakistan once again claimed that it “is not a mine-affected country,” and stated, “There are, therefore, no mine clearance problems or casualties.” However, it went on to acknowledge, “certain problems, in this regard, are faced in the areas bordering Afghanistan. This is a legacy of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, which is one of the most mine-affected countries and continues to remain in state of turmoil.”

22 “Pakistan: Landmine Blast kills seven of a family in remote area of Punjab,” The News (Islamabad), 14 February 2002.
24 PCBL Data Base of Landmine Victims.
25 Landmine Monitor had not recorded incidents in these locations in the past, but incidents occurred shortly after the escalation of tensions.
28 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 4 April 2002.
31 Ibid.
Headquarters reaffirmed, “The landmine casualties, reported in Pakistan’s Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan, are well known to be a legacy of Russian occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-89. Though, possibility of locating Pakistan made APL in these areas is very remote, nevertheless, even if few such mines are located, those too may be attributed to the period of freedom struggle by the Afghan Mujahideen against Russian occupation of their country, when they were provided arms/ammunition by the USA & Pakistan etc.”

The landmine problem is serious in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, especially in Bajaur and Kurram tribal areas. It is difficult to estimate the mine-affected land in square meters as no technical or landmine impact survey has been carried out. In addition, the landmines were not regularly deployed nor the mined areas marked.

According to the ongoing household survey initiated by the NGO Human Survival and Development (HSD) in August 2000, mines have the most frequent impact on agriculture and grazing land, non-agricultural land used for collecting firewood, irrigation, and roads and paths. In Bajaur Agency, the most mine-affected region, landmine casualties predominantly have occurred while farming, the main local economic activity. As of 31 August 2001, HSD had interviewed 650 landmine victims and their family members.

Human Survival and Development carried out a one-month landmine assessment survey for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in December 2001, collecting information in a ten kilometers radius from the seven newly established Afghan refugee camps in FATA and Baluchistan Province. All areas surveyed except Mohmand Agency registered landmine and UXO casualties. Landmines have caused considerable loss to the local communities.

Mine Clearance

At the Third Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II in December 2001, Pakistan released a 4-page “Fact Sheet on Pakistan’s Contribution Towards Mine Clearance Activity World Wide.” It provided details on operations in Afghanistan (1989-91), Cambodia (1992-93), Kuwait (post-1991 Gulf War), and Angola (1995-98), as well as in Eastern Slovenia and Western Sahara as part of UN peacekeeping contingents. Activities have included clearance, survey, mine risk education, training, and supervision.

Pakistan has also accepted the request of Lebanon for demining assistance to Lebanon. A contingent of the Army’s Corps of Engineers is expected to begin operations in 2002.

In the mine-affected areas of Pakistan, no mine clearance activities have taken place. In its April 2002 letter to the PCBL, the Joint Staff Headquarters makes reference to Landmine Monitor’s citation of landmine incidents in “Bajaur Agency, Kurram Agency, Malakand Agency, etc,” and then states, “Pakistan supports de-mining and victim rehabilitation programmes wherever needed…. This problem can be effectively addressed through the provision of resources and assistance to the affected areas.”

32 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 14 February 2002.
33 For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 569 – 570.
34 In May 2002, HSD merged with the Peshawar-based Community Motivation and Development Organization (CMDO). All of its activities are now being implemented under the name of CMDO. Emails from Faiz Fayyaz, Chief Executive, CMDO, 11 and 15 July 2002.
35 Refugee camps included Kotkai Campsite in Bajaur Agency FATA; Asgharo Campsite, Bassu Campsite, and Ubakzai Campsite in Kurram Agency FATA; Malkana Campsite in Khyber Agency FATA; Khanzadgan Campsite in Mohmand Agency FATA; and Roghani Campsite in District Qila Abdullah Baluchistan.
39 Joint Staff Headquarters letter to PCBL, 4 April 2002.
According to the data collected by the PCBL and HSD, demining support is not available in surveyed areas. In a few cases the local population have bought mine detectors to check paths and places suspected of mine contamination. They eventually demine, although they have no mine clearance skills.

**Mine Risk Education**

The Human Survival and Development household survey revealed that the local community is unaware of proper procedures to follow when encountering landmines: 50 percent of people surveyed will shoot to defuse a mine; 26 percent will throw stones at landmines; and 15 percent will light a fire. Only 8 percent report the mines to the administration, military or elders and only one percent mark landmines with stones.40

HSD, which since May 2002 operates as the Community Motivation and Development Organization (CMDO), is providing Basic Mine Awareness and Risk Avoidance (BMA & RA) Education to the local population in Bajaur Agency. In 2001, HSD trained 18,059 participants: 6,450 were trained in 42 schools, 7,556 in 120 public places, and 4,553 in 62 mosques. Since it started its operation in August 2000, HSD has trained 42,435 participants.41

HSD/CMDO uses direct education and a community-based approach relying on the support of volunteers. HSD/CMDO mine risk education is focused on children and it has employed children as resource agents to disseminate the message widely. The children are expected to pass the message to women whom HSD cannot approach directly due to cultural barriers. The program is financed by the Swiss Foundation for Landmines Victims Aid, which provides US$89,700 annually.

The Italian NGO Intersos provided mine risk education in refugee camps in Pakistan from January 2001 through June 2002, with $11,000 in funding from UNHCR.42 It employed six Afghan trainers.43

Handicap International Belgium provided mine risk education to Afghan refugees in three camps in Baluchistan from October 2001 to March 2002. This was part of an emergency project supported by UNHCR and Luxembourg. The project was extended to four other refugee camps in Chaman and Dingar from April to June 2002.

**Landmine Casualties**44

In 2001, there were 92 new mine casualties recorded, including 36 children, in Pakistan. A total of 28 people were killed and 64 injured, of which 21 required an amputation as a consequence of their injuries. Most of the incidents occurred in Kurram Agency, Baluchistan Province, and North West Frontier Province. This represents an increase over the 62 new casualties identified in 2000. However, this increase may be due to improved data collection mechanisms in the mine-affected areas. In the first five months of 2002, 49 new mine casualties were recorded.

Since September 1997, the PCBL has been collecting data on landmine casualties in Pakistan from various sources including newspapers, the HSD database on the Bajaur tribal area, and field visits to mine-affected areas. The first recorded landmine casualty occurred in 1980; from 1980 to December 2001, 842 landmine casualties have been identified. The PCBL believes that the number of mine casualties would be higher if a comprehensive survey was carried out, especially in the provinces of Baluchistan and Azad Kashmir.

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41 HSD Interim Progress Report, as of August 31, 2001.
42 Pia Cantini, MRE Officer, Intersos, 31 July 2002.
43 Presentation by Pia Cantini, MRE Officer, Intersos, to the Mine Risk Education Working Group, Geneva, 30 May 2002.
44 The information that follows comes from the PCBL Data Base of Landmine Victims and the HSD Household Survey in Bajaur Tribal Area. More detailed information is available in the full draft version of the Pakistan country report for Landmine Monitor. It is available to the public.
Landmine and UXOs Casualties in Pakistan to December 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/Area</th>
<th>Number of Casualties</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWFP</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baluchistan</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azad Kashmir</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 842 recorded mine casualties, 69 percent were male and 31 percent female, 41 percent were killed, and 38 percent required an amputation as a consequence of their injuries. Of the total mine casualties, 755 have been recorded in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, including 685 casualties in Bajaur Agency alone.

In Bajaur Agency, where nearly all the survivors, or the families of those killed, have been interviewed, 29 percent of the casualties were children aged under 18 years old, 61 percent were aged 19-50, and 10 percent were more than 50 years old. Most of the landmine incidents took place in agricultural fields and remote villages where no emergency assistance is available.

The Director General of the Disarmament and Strategic Plan Division did not respond to a request for information on military casualties caused by landmines on the India-Pakistan border, or in demining operations abroad. However, as previously reported, in two separate incidents in January 2002, thirteen Pakistani soldiers were killed and several injured by landmines in the border area.45

Survivor Assistance

There are no specialized/specific medical, surgical or first aid facilities available to landmine casualties close to the mine-affected areas. Casualties are transferred to hospitals in large cities, mostly by private vehicles or, in some cases, by ambulances. Patients must pay for medicines, treatment, and transport. Military personnel have access to services free of charge, and are treated in Combined Military Hospitals (CMH) located in the big cities. Afghan mine survivors residing in Pakistan also use the Pakistani medical infrastructure, which adds an additional strain in an already overpopulated country.

In Bajaur Agency, the district hospital is only capable of providing basic first aid, and in some cases there is a problem arranging transport for the mine casualty. According to the survey conducted by HSD, organizing transport to the hospital took 15 minutes in 11 percent of cases, 16-30 minutes in 57 percent of cases, and more then one hour in 32 percent of cases. The injured person reached the hospital in less than three hours in about 57 percent of cases, in three to six hours in 41 percent of cases, and in more then six hours in two percent of cases.46 HSD now provides an ambulance in Bajaur Agency to transport landmine casualties to a suitably equipped medical facility for first aid, proper treatment, and surgery. The service, which is free of charge, includes first aid, medicines, and the assistance of a trained paramedic during the evacuation. In 2001, the Swiss Foundation for Landmine Victim’s Aid (SFLVA) donated US$17,000 for this service. In late 2001, the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted an assessment in partnership

46 HSD Household Survey in Bajaur Tribal Area.
with HSD/CMDO and in 2002, Oxfam UK granted MAG funds to enable CMDO to purchase two emergency evacuation vehicles.\textsuperscript{47}

There are no rehabilitation programs for landmine survivors supported by the government in the mine-affected areas. Prosthetic facilities are available but mine survivors have to cover the costs, and many do not have adequate resources.

Since June 2001, HSD/CMDO provides support for the physical rehabilitation of two landmine survivors per month from Bajaur Agency. HSD/CMDO identifies the amputees and covers all costs including transport, accommodation, and other costs related to their stay as well as the prosthesis. Pakistan Prosthetic and Orthotic Services (PIPOS) provides the rehabilitation service. The HSD/CMDO program receives US$1,480 per month from the SFLVA. PIPOS is based in Peshawar and is linked with three workshops in Karachi, Lahore, and Quetta. In addition to prosthetic and orthotic services, PIPOS runs a four year B.Sc degree program in prosthetics for students from all over the country, as well as from abroad.

A local NGO, Rehabilitation Center for the Physically Disabled (RCPD), which is supported by Action for Disability UK, provides rehabilitation and vocational training to landmine survivors in the border areas. In 2001, 759 landmine survivors were assisted and 126 prostheses, 126 crutches, and 68 walking sticks provided. The program was funded by the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund.\textsuperscript{48}

Mercy Corps started the Baluchistan Community Rehabilitation Program in November 2000. Mercy Corps, together with the Christian Hospital Quetta, have set up an orthopedic workshop to assist disabled Afghan refugees. The workshop also provides training in physiotherapy for the families of disabled patients. In 2001, 4,583 people were assisted, including 529 landmine survivors who received 74 prostheses, 14 wheelchairs, 46 crutches and 295 other assistive devices. The program is funded by the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund.\textsuperscript{49}

Handicap International Belgium also has a rehabilitation program for disabled Afghan refugees in camps in Baluchistan province. Activities focused on physiotherapy visits and the production of 82 walking aids and 20 pairs of crutches.\textsuperscript{50}

There are no known psychological support services accessible to landmine survivors in the mine-affected areas.

\textbf{PALAU}

While UNICEF reported in March 2000 that legislation to accede to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty had been introduced in the Republic of Palau's House of Representatives, no developments are believed to have taken place on accession since that time.\textsuperscript{1} Palau was absent from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, as it was on similar pro-ban resolutions in previous years. One possible reason for the lack of accession could be the close economic, political and military dependence between Palau and the United States, a non-signatory, as defined by the Compact of Free Association. It is believed that Palau has never produced, transferred, stockpiled, or used antipersonnel landmines. While the islands were the scene of fierce fighting during World War II, Palau is not believed to be mine-affected.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Policy Director, Mines Advisory Group, 1 August 2002.
  \item Tracey Mole, Director, Action for Disability, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 25 June 2002.
  \item Cathy Ratcliff, Programmes Director, Aid International/Mercy Corps Scotland, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 15 July 2002.
  \item Handicap International Belgium Activity Report 2001.
\end{itemize}
PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Papua New Guinea has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty and the status of accession efforts continues to remain uncertain. In June 2001, a government representative told Landmine Monitor that it "supports the aim of this treaty" and "is already in the process of formalising documents" for accession.\(^1\)

In May 2002, for the first time, a representative of Papua New Guinea attended the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva. He stated that Papua New Guinea was in the process of considering accession, and would join "very soon." He said that Papua New Guinea had no problem with mines and had no stockpiles; the only reason it had not yet acceded was a matter of prioritization.\(^2\)

Papua New Guinea voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it had done on similar pro-ban resolutions in previous years. In March 2001, a government representative told Landmine Monitor that Papua New Guinea has never used, produced, transferred or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.\(^3\) Yet in October 2001, the Commander of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, Colonel Peter Ilau, told a small arms researcher that the country does maintain a stockpile of mines, which he described as not "major" and "probably very small amounts in the inventory for training and there if we ever need it."\(^4\) These are likely to be the command-detonated Claymore mines imported from Australia twenty years ago.\(^5\)

Papua New Guinea has a problem with unexploded ordnance dating from World War II. While the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) may have manufactured and used improvised explosive devices during the armed insurgency of the 1990s, the island of Bougainville is not believed to be mine affected.

RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Key developments since May 2001: Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya. Russia is increasing its participation in international mine action programs.

Mine Ban Policy

The Russian Federation (RF) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Russian military still considers the antipersonnel mine a necessary weapon. While Russian officials have made positive statements about a mine ban in the past and the government has taken some steps, the policy focus for dealing with the landmine issue remains the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).\(^1\) In December 2001, Russia stated, "We are steadily advancing towards our common goal,

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\(^{1}\) Letter from Joseph K. Assaigo, Director Multilateral, Legal and Treaties Branch, Department of Foreign Affairs, Papua New Guinea, to Neil Mander, Convenor, New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines, 2 June 2000.


\(^{4}\) Interview by David Capie, small arms researcher, with Colonel Peter Ilau, Papua New Guinea Defence Force, Port Moresby, 9 October 2001. Capie provided the information in email to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 12 December 2001.


towards a world free from mines. However, as we have pointed out more than once, it can be only a phased-out advance, which takes into account all circumstances pertaining to this matter, and provides for a necessary level of military stability.”

In April 2001, the Federal Working Group for Mine Action, under the Chief of the Russian Federal Agency on Munitions, was created as a national focal point on landmine issues. Russia attended the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, and participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 in Geneva. Russia abstained from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on 29 November 2001, which called for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is a party to the CCW and its original 1980 Protocol II, but not the Amended Protocol II of 1996. Russia attended the third annual conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference, both held in December 2001 in Geneva. President Putin submitted CCW Amended Protocol II to the State Duma for ratification in early May 2000, and it was expected that hearings on the ratification would take place shortly thereafter. However, in March 2001 the ratification package was called back for further interdepartmental consultations on legal, political, military, technical, and economic matters.

In December 2001, Russian officials at the Second CCW Review Conference said ratification of Amended Protocol II would take place in the near future. Russia also said that it is “already taking measures to comply with the main provisions of this document,” and noted that in the past year, the “Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, in particular, issued a directive which set the task of studying the requirements of Amended Protocol II and taking them into account during peacetime and operational training of troops and headquarters.”

As of July 2002, there still had been no ratification hearings in the State Duma. Russian officials have previously indicated that when ratification does take place, Russia will exercise the optional nine-year deferral period for implementation of key provisions.

IPPNW-Russia continues its work to build public awareness in Russia about the landmine issue. In November 2001, a 26-minute landmine documentary it produced with “Peliken” TV production studio was accepted for nationally televised broadcast. “Seeds of Death” is based on the experiences of an ex-engineer-combatant of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict who lost both arms during a demining operation.

In 2001, a new public foundation – The Mine Action and Ammunition Destruction Center (also known as Mine Action Center Foundation) – was established by a group of Russian researchers and experts as a self-sufficient, non-state, and non-commercial organization. Created at the initiative of the Federal Working Group on Mine Action in the Russian Federation, the foundation will conduct scientific research into various aspects of the mine problem in Russia, including humanitarian demining, stockpile destruction, mine risk education, and survivor assistance.

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3 For more information on the Working Group, its composition, and aims, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 894-895.
4 Interview with Counselor Andrei Malov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 April 2001.
Production and Transfer

The former Soviet Union was one of the world’s largest producers and exporters of antipersonnel mines. Since 1992, Russia has produced at least ten types of antipersonnel mines. In May 1998, officials of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the Russian Federation had stopped producing blast antipersonnel mines, and in December 2000, Russia said that it was decommissioning production facilities for blast mines. Russia noted in December 2001 that “anti-personnel fougasse [blast] mines have not been manufactured in the Russian Federation for more than four years.” Rather than new antipersonnel mine production, Russia is increasingly focusing on research and development of landmine alternatives.

On 1 December 1994, Russia announced a three-year moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruction devices. This moratorium was extended for five years on 1 December 1997. It is expected to be extended in December 2002.

Research and Development of Landmine Alternatives

At the International Exhibition of Defense and Protection Means in Nizhny Taghil from 3-6 July 2001, the Scientific Research Machine Building Institute (NIMI) presented the prototype of a new command-detonated antipersonnel/antivehicle mine: the M-225 Engineer Munition with Cluster Warhead. The mine can be laid by hand or mechanically. The mine is operated by wire at distances up to four kilometers by a remote control unit (PU-404P) or to distances of 10 kilometers by wireless remote control (PU-404R). One remote control unit may control up to 100 mines.

The mine is equipped with a combined target selector including a seismic detector with a selecting target option for identifying vehicles and human beings. With a simultaneous entry of humans and vehicles into the mined zone, the selecting error rate may reach 15-18 percent. The mine can be programmed for self-destruction after a set period, or by command for self-destruction from the remote control unit. The mine can be equipped with devices suppressing metal detectors, and can be produced in a simplified version without complex detectors.

Although this engineer munition is in its essence an antipersonnel/antivehicle landmine, its developers contend it complies with both CCW Amended Protocol II and the Mine Ban Treaty. According to other specialists, however, the mine can be easily modified to make it non-command detonated.

Stockpiling and Destruction

Official information on the number of antipersonnel mines stockpiled by Russia is not publicly available. Landmine Monitor has previously reported an estimate of 60-70 million.

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12 Interview with Counselor Andrei Malov, 13 May 2000.
14 NIMI’s stand at the RDE-2001 in Nizhny Taghil, 3-6 July 2001. All the information in the section on alternatives comes from this source.
stockpiled antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{16} Russia is believed to have the world’s second largest stockpile of landmines. Russian officials have acknowledged that in certain CIS states, there are antipersonnel mine stockpiles that remain at the disposal of Russian military units and contingents located there. This is likely to be the case in Tajikistan, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In December 2001, Russia declared, “To date, all in all more than 1 million antipersonnel mines were destroyed and over 1 million antitank mines and about 1 million antipersonnel engineering munitions were disposed.”\textsuperscript{17}

Information provided to Landmine Monitor by the Ministry of Defense for the period 1996-2000 indicates that 1,054,094 antipersonnel mines were destroyed, including PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, OZM-72, MON-100, MON-200, and POMZ-2M, as well as KSF-1 clusters with PFM-1 mines and KSF-1S clusters with PFM-1S mines.

Figures for stockpile destruction in 2001 and 2002 have not been made available.

| Antipersonnel mine destruction in Russia 1996-2000\textsuperscript{18} |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Type of munition                | 1996            | 1997            | 1998            | 1999            | 2000            |
| PMN                            | 7,900           | 9,098           | 61,400          | -               | 40,771          |
| PMN-2                          | -               | -               | 65,100          | -               | 65,100          |
| PMN-4                          | -               | -               | 50,000          | -               | 50,000          |
| OZM-72                         | -               | -               | 25,700          | -               | 25,700          |
| MON-100                        | 22,200          | 8,000           | 22,500          | -               | 7,799           |
| MON-200                        | 11,100          | 5,369           | 12,000          | -               | 9,036           |
| POMZ-2M                        | -               | -               | 197,000         | -               | 547,000         |
| PFM-1 in KSF-1                 | -               | -               | -               | 22,440          | 43,300          |
| PFM-1S in KSF-1S               | -               | -               | -               | 43,567          | 39,814          |
| Total                          | 41,200          | 22,467          | 433,700         | 416,007         | 140,720         |

Landmine Monitor notes that there has been much discussion in the international community about the difficulties of destroying PFM mines, particularly the safety risks posed by their specific construction and toxic gases resulting from their explosion.\textsuperscript{19} Russia is estimated to have some 17 million PFM mines, most or all of which have reached the end of their shelf life, increasing the risk of explosive degradation of the mines.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{16} ICBL interviews with Russian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials, as well as knowledgeable officials from other governments, indicate that Russia likely has some 60-70 million antipersonnel mines in stock. One news article cites a stockpile of 60 million. Andrei Korbut, “Prisoedinenie Rossii k Konvenzii o Zaprete Protivopechotnich min znachitelno podorvalo by ee oboronosposobnost” (The Signing by Russia of MBT to a Substantial Degree Could Undermine its Defense),” Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, No. 39, p. 6. For information on types and locations of stocks, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 805-806, 809.

\textsuperscript{17} Statement by the Russian Federation to the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II, 10 December 2001.

\textsuperscript{18} Official response #335/1/556 to IPPNW/ICBL-Russia from Lieutenant-General Anatoly Mazurkevich, Head of the Chief Division for International Military Cooperation, RF Ministry of Defense, based on information provided by the Chief Division of Engineer Forces, RF Ministry of Defense, 27 July 2001.


An August 2001 “Appeal for a Credit: Emergency Humanitarian Project” from the Russian Research and Production Association “Ecodem,” which is involved in PFM destruction, stated that the Russian government has adopted a federal program of demilitarization of PFM-1 stocks that requires an initial $20 million investment. It noted, “there are several possible methods of elimination of these mines. However, none of them is perfect and safe,” and referred to a new “grouting method” developed by Russia that had been tested on “200 live cluster bombs.”

Use

Prior to publication of Landmine Monitor Report 2001, the Russian Federation was asked to comment on allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces during the Landmine Monitor reporting period (May 2001-July 2002) in Chechnya, Tajikistan, and Abkhazia.

In a response received in August 2001, Russian officials acknowledged to Landmine Monitor that, “From May 2000 to date the Russian Federation has employed anti-personnel mines (hereinafter ‘APMs’) in the Chechen Republic and on the Tajik-Afghan border but APMs have not been emplaced in Abkhazia (Georgia).” Russia described its mine use in Chechnya and Tajikistan: “Mine barriers have been laid to blockade specific base areas used by [rebels] units and to close movement routes and convoy paths across the state border, using fragmentation-action antipersonnel mines with self-destruction mechanisms and control options that comply with requirements in [Amended Protocol II]…. Mines are emplaced primarily on sectors of the border where difficult physical and geographical conditions do not permit other forces or methods to be employed effectively, where there are virtually no local inhabitants and to protect and guard positions and places where border divisions are stationed.”

At the third annual conference of States Parties to CCW Amended Protocol II, Russia stated, “The requirements of Amended Protocol II are taken into account when minefields are put in place in the course of counter-terrorist operations in Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, and when service and combat objectives are implemented to safeguard the Tajik-Afghani border.”

The August 2001 Foreign Ministry letter states, “Mines are emplaced in observance of requirements to prohibit or restrict the use of anti-personnel mines…as set forth in the supplemented ‘mine’ Protocol II, with the exception of requirements in point 2a of Article 5 Restrictions on the use of anti-personnel mines other than remotely-delivered mines in that part relating to perimeter-marked areas; anti-personnel mines are marked and fenced along the entire perimeter of the area except the part of the perimeter on the side of the state border.”

Russian officials admit the large-scale use of mines in Chechnya, but have repeatedly rejected allegations of the indiscriminate use of mines. In early 2001, a Russian military official...
reportedly said at a press conference that Russian forces had sown more than 500,000 landmines in Chechnya.\(^\text{27}\) In July 2002, a Chechen official claimed that Russia had sharply increased its use of mines in 2002, planting as many as one million mines in the past five to six months; he claimed Russia has planted a total of approximately three million mines during the second Chechen war.\(^\text{28}\)

In early 2002, Russian officials again asserted that in Chechnya all minefields are fenced and marked to prevent civilian casualties, and that once active military operations are over, minefields are cleared.\(^\text{29}\) Neither past nor current reports coming out of Chechnya substantiate these claims.\(^\text{30}\)

Details regarding ongoing use of mines and improvised explosive devices by Chechen rebel forces are detailed in the Landmine Monitor entry for Chechnya. During a June 2002 trip to Chechnya, Olara Otunnu, the United Nations special representative for children and armed conflict, said that “insurgent groups continued to enlist children, paying them to plant landmines and other explosives, and to target civilians perceived to be cooperating with the government administration.”\(^\text{31}\)

In Tajikistan, Russian border guards and Russian peacekeepers have used antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan, on the border with Afghanistan.\(^\text{32}\) It is unclear if there was new use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces in Tajikistan in the most recent Landmine Monitor reporting period. While the Foreign Ministry letter to Landmine Monitor indicated that mines had been laid since May 2000, another Russian official said that information was incorrect. In December 2001, a senior official in the Russian Federal Border Service confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Russian troops had laid antipersonnel mines inside Tajikistan. He said that the mine-laying operations had been carried out with the full knowledge and consent of the Tajikistan government, and in accordance with a military cooperation agreement signed in 1993. After Landmine Monitor pointed out that this could constitute a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty by Tajikistan, he said that the mines were laid prior to October 1999 when Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.\(^\text{33}\)

### Landmine/UXO Problem and Clearance

The USSR was heavily affected by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) after World War II and there are still problems in some areas. There are requests for mine/UXO clearance from ten territories in Russia where World War II battles took place.\(^\text{34}\) For details on ongoing mine clearance programs inside Russia, see past Landmine Monitor reports.\(^\text{35}\)

There are no humanitarian mine clearance operations underway in Chechnya, but Russian engineering troops conduct military mine clearance operations on a daily basis, to support the safe

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\(^{28}\) “Russia Admits: Land Mines all over Chechnya,” Agency Caucasus, 10 January 2001. Lyoma Usamov, Chechen representative in Washington, DC, in a letter to Jody Williams, ICBL, dated 19 June 2001, stated that “the Russian command, several months after the beginning of war, ‘boasted’ about its ‘achievements,’ declaring that they planted half a million mines against ‘the Chechen terrorists.’”

\(^{29}\) Interviews with officials from the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs during January-March 2002.


\(^{32}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 903, for details.


\(^{34}\) For more detail, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 811-812.

movement of Russian troops along the roads and railroads, and the safe operation of field water supply points. In December 2001, Russia reported that in Chechnya and Dagestan, Russian mine engineers had cleared over 600 square kilometers of land, about 2,000 buildings and structures, 200 square kilometers of agricultural fields, and 700 kilometers of electric power transmission lines. More than 170,000 explosive objects had been detected and destroyed. From January to mid-June 2002, Russian engineers reportedly defused 417 landmines and 944 explosive devices in Chechnya.

Russia is increasing its participation in international mine action programs. Russia began mine clearance in Afghanistan and announced it would begin work in Croatia. Russia also completed its mine clearance mission in Kosovo, discussed possible demining activities with Iraq, and continued demining in Tajikistan, Georgia and Abkhazia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in other countries. In recent years, Russians have neutralized 18,000 pieces of ordnance in Tajikistan, 23,000 in Georgia and Abkhazia, and 13,500 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In late November 2001, Russia sent demining experts to Afghanistan to establish a humanitarian center in Kabul, as well as reopen the Russian Embassy. Russian engineers have reportedly destroyed 8,000 explosives in Afghanistan since they began work in late 2001. In April 2002, specialists from Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations began a three-month training course for 50 Afghan sappers in Madrid, Spain. All costs were paid by Spain. Russia reportedly will open a similar training center in Kabul.

Russia announced in May 2002 that engineers from Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations will help with mine clearance operations in Croatia. In return, Croatia will forgive a portion of the debt it is owed by the former Soviet Union. Croatian authorities suggested that Russian engineers commence their operation in the settlements of Sisak and Karlovets. According to Russia’s Emergencies Minister, Russia has been preparing for mine clearance operations in Croatia since August 2001.

A team of 28 deminers and 11 mine detecting dogs from the Ministry of Emergency Situations finished its mission in Kosovo on 6 December 2001. During its nine-month mission, the team surveyed 324,213 square meters of territory and cleared 467 antipersonnel mines, 17 antivehicle mines, and 109 UXO.

The creation of a “joint training center for humanitarian demining” was discussed during March 2002 talks between Iraqi Vice-Prime Minister Tariq Aziz and Minister for Emergency Situations Sergei Shoigu.

Mine Risk Education

Currently there are no federal-level mine risk education activities in the areas of ongoing conflict in Chechnya and neighboring territories. International aid organizations such as UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are responsible for the bulk of mine risk

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36 Landmine Monitor researchers prepared a 30-page list of these efforts in Chechnya during 2001, using Russian media reports and other sources.
38 “Over 1,000 Explosive Devices Said Defused In Chechnya This Year Moscow,” (in English), ITAR-TASS, 18 June 2002.
41 “Russian specialists to train Afghan sappers,” ITAR-TASS, Moscow, Russia, 22 April 2002.
43 “Russian sappers to clear mines in Croatia,” ITAR-TASS, Moscow, Russia, 14 June 2002.
education activities in affected areas in Russia. IPPNW/CBL-Russia also made a number of contributions to mine awareness efforts during the reporting period. (For details of UNICEF’s program, see the report on Chechnya.)

ICRC mine risk education efforts were focused on Ingushetia, Dagestan, and the region including North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, and other areas. Internally displaced people (IDPs) from Chechnya were the main target group in Ingushetia.46 (For details of this ICRC program targeting Chechens, see the Landmine Monitor entry on Chechnya.)

After a needs assessment that revealed a low level of awareness in Dagestan, the ICRC launched a mine risk education program in January 2002 in the Botlikh and Novolak regions of the republic, targeting resident and IDP children.47 As of March 2002, over 3,000 children in Dagestan had attended ICRC presentations.48 At least 110 children participated in the child-to-child program.49 Children are directly involved in the creation of mine leaflets and posters.50 Mine awareness materials for adults, such as leaflets, posters, and comic books, were also distributed during the reporting period. Mine presentations were given to at least 226 adults.51

The Mine Action Center Foundation, in cooperation with specialists of the RF Engineer Forces, medical experts, and IPPNW/CBL-Russia produced a mine awareness lecture course for 12- to 16-year-old students. The course was based on informational materials from IPPNW/RFPNNW, ICRC, ICBL, and Handicap International. The lecture course incorporates video, CD-based visuals as well as mock-ups of the most common landmines and UXO.

During the Soviet era, district military recruiting offices carried out dissemination of mine awareness information in mine-affected areas.52 Also, the compulsory secondary education program included a course of primary military training providing information on mine danger to students living in mine-affected areas. After the disintegration of the USSR and the ensuing economic crisis, these activities halted, although the secondary school courses have been reinstated.53 However, since 2000, instead of the Soviet-era primary military training, a new compulsory course has been introduced in the RF secondary education entitled “Basics of Life Safety.”

Landmine Casualties

There have been a significant number of mine casualties in parts of the Russian Federation, particularly in Chechnya since 1994 and Dagestan since 1999.54 There is no complete official data on mine casualties or incidents among the Russian soldiers fighting in Chechnya, or for civilians.

In 2001, based on various sources, 279 Russian armed forces (including army, police and interior ministry) were reported killed in landmine incidents; 684 were reported injured. In 2000, approximately 300 Russian servicemen were reported killed in landmine incidents and over 1,000 servicemen were reported injured.55 It is not certain whether casualties are actually decreasing, or whether fewer casualties are being reported.

No ministry of the Russian government was able to provide any information on civilian casualties of the current war. (See Chechnya report for more information on civilian mine casualties).

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49 Ibid., March 2002.
50 Ibid., April-May 2002.
51 Ibid., March 2002.
52 This was the so-called “District Military Committee” (“raivoenkomat”).
53 V. Vasiliev, Lieutenant-General (Rt.), Ministry of Disaster Resources, 10 November 1998.
54 For casualties post-WW II see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 814.
55 Data collated by Landmine Monitor from media reports, human rights reports, RF MoESDC, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry of Health.
Two major landmine blasts in Dagestan claimed close to 50 lives in the first half of 2002. The first blast came on 18 January 2002, when a car carrying servicemen set off a landmine in Makhachkala, Dagestan’s capital, killing seven of the servicemen. The second, more deadly blast, came during Victory Day celebrations in Kaspiysk, near the border with Chechnya on 9 May 2002. Dagestani pro-Chechen rebels reportedly detonated a MON-90 mine via remote control, killing 43 people.

On 8 June 2002, one Russian peacekeeper was killed and another wounded by a landmine in the Kodori gorge of Georgia’s separatist Abkhazia region. The peacekeepers were patrolling the gorge near the village of Zemno-Lata when the mine exploded.

Survivor Assistance

Russian military medical practice has accumulated enormous experience in the treatment of blast injuries. Medical, surgical, prosthetic, rehabilitation, and reintegration services are available for landmine survivors in Russia.

Several international agencies and local and international NGOs support the health infrastructure in Ingushetia with medicines, hospital supplies, expertise, and training for local staff through hospitals, health posts, and mobile clinics in four towns and 40 villages. These organizations include WHO, UNICEF, UNHCR, ICRC, Medecins du Monde, Medecins Sans Frontieres, Islamic Relief, International Medical Corps, Hammer Forum, VESTA, and People in Need Foundation.

There are about seventy specialized federal prosthetic enterprises operating in the Russian Federation. Some mine survivors receive assistance in Moscow and others travel to Baku (Azerbaijan) within the framework of a joint program of the Ministries of Social Insurance of both republics; details on the number of mine survivors benefiting from this program was not available.

RKK “Energia” has developed standardized prosthetic workshops, including mobile units. Eight experimental mobile workshops (based on PAZ-3205 bus) have been produced to provide operative prosthetic aid in remote areas. According to the Federal State Institution “Glavorgpomosch” Russia manufactures about 600 types of prosthetic devices. Lower limbs devices comprise 90 percent of all prostheses.

The International Institute for the Prosthetic Rehabilitation of Landmine Survivors (IPRLS) and its Russian partner, the St. Petersburg Institute of Prosthetics, have been assisting mine survivors with surgical and rehabilitation assistance and vocational training since 1998.

In August 2000, UNICEF commenced its Mine Action Program in the North Caucasus with survivor assistance being one of the main components. The program, which focuses on mine-injured children and women from Chechnya, includes physical rehabilitation, the fitting of prostheses, psychosocial counseling, and vocational training. The program also established two amputee football clubs for about 120 child mine survivors in Grozny and the IDP camps in Ingushetia.

Disability Policy and Practice

Since 1995, mine survivors in Russia have been under the protection of the Federal Law “On Social Security of Disabled/Handicapped.”

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58 For more information see Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p 845.
59 UN OCHA website; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 907.
62 ICBL Portfolio of Landmine Victim Assistance Programs.
63 For more details see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 908.
The All-Russian Public National Military Foundation is focusing its efforts on the support of military personnel injured in Chechnya. On 21 February 2002, at a session of the Foundation Charity Council attended by RF President Vladimir Putin, two major directions for the Foundation's efforts were identified: the purchase of flats for the families of the servicemen killed in Chechnya; and ensuring medical aid to servicemen wounded in Chechnya, especially to those who need prosthetic aid. According to the Chairman of the Council, state agencies including the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Internal Affairs will provide the Foundation with verified lists of persons needing medical or other aid. The Foundation will then arrange and finance the necessary aid.\(^{64}\)

On 31 May 2001, the “International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of War Veterans, Participants of Local Conflicts and Victims of Terrorism for 2001-2005” was approved by a resolution of the Council of the Heads of Government of the CIS countries.\(^{65}\) Among the CIS countries taking part in the realization and financing of the program are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine. The budget for 2001 was 35,738,000 Roubles (about US$1.2 million).\(^{66}\) In 2001, prioritized targets of Section I on “Medico-Social Aid” included: facilitating the work of rehabilitation centers in ensuring qualified and effective medical, social, psychological, and professional rehabilitation of war-wounded; medical examinations, consultations of specialists, verification of medical diagnosis, hospitalization, elaboration of individual rehabilitation programs; provision of prostheses, wheelchairs, rehabilitation means and medicine; and, medical and psychological rehabilitation and treatment in specialized sanatoria.\(^{67}\)

Within the framework of the Program, support was provided to 45 veterans’ organizations. In addition, direct support was provided to 15,896 people, mostly from the Russian Federation and Belarus. Altogether, in 2001, 37,009 people benefited from the program: 36,281 received medicines, 42 were provided with wheelchairs, 440 with prostheses and other assistive devices, 140 received hospital and outpatient treatment, and 106 received specialized treatment and rehabilitation in sanatoriums.\(^{68}\)

SAUDI ARABIA

**Key developments since May 2001:** Saudi officials confirmed for the first time that the country stockpiles antipersonnel mines. They also confirmed that the United States also stockpiles mines in Saudi Arabia, but stated that the U.S. cannot use them on Saudi territory.

**Mine Ban Policy**

Saudi Arabia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. While it did not attend the Third Meeting of State Parties in September 2001, Saudi military officials participated in the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. During the May meeting, the Saudi representatives told Landmine Monitor that their country is interested in the Mine Ban Treaty and its progress, and also in new demining technology.\(^{1}\) They confirmed the previously stated policy of support for the humanitarian spirit and purpose of the Mine Ban Treaty, while insisting on the need for antipersonnel mines due to long land borders and unstable neighbors.\(^{2}\) In a 1 July 2001 letter to the UN Secretary-General, the King of Saudi Arabia wrote that “the Kingdom

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\(^{64}\) RIA NOVOSTI, 21 February 2002.


\(^{67}\) Ibid.

\(^{68}\) Ibid.

\(^{1}\) Interview with Brigadier General Hamad Alrumaih, Geneva, 1 February 2002.

\(^{2}\) This policy was outlined in a December 2000 letter to the UN Secretary General. See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 1039-1040.
of Saudi Arabia accords the greatest attention to the issue of the prohibition of proscribed and highly injurious weapons, including landmines.³


Lebanon to assess what kind of mine action assistance could be provided. In May 2002, Saudi Arabia donated 40 complete protective suits with helmets and 50 AN/19-2 mine detectors to Lebanon upon request from the Lebanese government.

SINGAPORE

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Singapore has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has, however, voted in favor of every pro-ban UN General Assembly resolution since 1996, including UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001 calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. In July 2002, Singapore’s Ambassador to the United States stated, “Singapore is against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines (APLs), especially against civilians. However, we believe that the legitimate security concerns and right to self-defence of states should not be disregarded.” The Ministry of Defense has told Landmine Monitor that Singapore is reserving the right to use antipersonnel mines until an alternative is found.

Singapore did not attend the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 or the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002. Singapore is not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), however, it attended as an observer the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second Review Conference in December 2001 in Geneva.

Singapore and Burma were the only ASEAN countries that did not participate in the “Landmines in Southeast Asia” regional seminar held in Bangkok on 13-15 May 2002. The meeting, hosted by Thailand, focused on the regional responses to the landmine problem. Singapore also did not attend the regional seminar on stockpile destruction hosted by Malaysia in August 2001.

A Campaign to Ban Landmines was launched in Singapore on 16 June 2001, with a week of activities organized by The Think Centre in cooperation with the Bangkok-based Nonviolence International. The Think Centre participated in the August 2001 Malaysia stockpile destruction meeting and the May 2002 regional landmine meeting in Thailand. They issued a press release criticizing Singapore’s failure to attend the meetings.

Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Singapore Technologies Kinetics Ltd. continues to produce antipersonnel landmines. The Ambassador of Singapore to the United States told Landmine Monitor in July 2002, “Production of landmines in Singapore is strictly controlled. ST Kinetics is the only company that manufactures landmines. The APLs produced are solely for the use by our armed forces for self-defence purposes. Singapore has, since February 1998, declared an indefinite moratorium on the export of all types of APLs.”

In December 2000, a Ministry of Defense representative stated that Singapore stockpiles antipersonnel mines for “training and defensive purposes only.” He noted, “Such training for APLs...”
and removal techniques is done in Singapore." The number of mines in stockpile is not known. Singapore Technologies Kinetics Limited is carrying out ongoing destruction of expired antipersonnel mines by demolition, on behalf of the Ministry of Defense.

Mine Action
Singapore is not mine-affected. Singapore has not contributed to international humanitarian mine action programs.

SOMALIA

Key developments since May 2001: Landmines apparently continue to be used during the fighting among the many militias. Instability and conflict have impeded the establishment of a Mine Action Program and the start of mine action activities.

Mine Ban Policy
Somalia’s Transitional National Government (TNG) formed in July 2000 has yet to be recognized by the world community, and therefore cannot accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. The TNG, a product of a conference of clan elders described by UN officials as the most serious attempt in a decade to restore order to Somalia, controls only parts of Mogadishu and slivers of territory elsewhere. Since its establishment, Somalia’s interim government has not attended international meetings promoting the Mine Ban Treaty.

A few days after it was formed, the Parliament of the TNG passed a resolution putting “the disarming of militias and mine clearance” on the top of the agenda of the interim government. In March 2002, senior government officials indicated that the TNG is willing to discuss the issue of landmines in the context of disarmament and reconciliation between the factions, which would lead to the exchange of maps and information of mined zones.

Production, Stockpiling and Transfer
Although Somalia does not produce landmines, large stocks are in the hands of TNG forces, as well as militias and private individuals. On several occasions, the TNG has accused neighboring Ethiopia of supplying armed factions with arms, including landmines. The Somali interim President was quoted as saying, “We want Ethiopia to desist from destabilizing Somalia by training militias against the TNG and certain regions, sending mines, ammunition and weapons into Somalia. They are doing it right now.”

Use
There have been reports of landmines being used in the lower Juba region where militias of the Somalia Reconstruction and Reconciliation Council (SSRC) and the Juba Valley Alliance are

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6 Letter from Eric Chong, Ministry of Defense, 15 December 2000. The language would imply training in both how to use mines and how to clear them.
1 IRIN, 19 July 2000. In Aorta, Djibouti, the TNG parliament adapted five resolutions on 19 July 2000, including one calling on the interim government to make “disarming militia’s and the lifting of landmines” top priorities in its agenda.
3 In particular, the TNG has said Ethiopian arms are going to a faction led by Col. Abdillahi Yusuf, the former President of Puntland, who is trying to wrest control of Puntland from an opposing group. The TNG issued a press release on 28 February 2002 accusing Ethiopia of training and arming militias in Bay and Bakool regions. BBC Somali Service interview with Prime Minister Hassan Abshir, 2 March 2002; “Ethiopian Troops Deploy in Somalia,” BBC, 7 January 2002.
fighting for control of the town of Bardhere and the port city of Kismayo. Residents fleeing from the fighting and travelers in the area report mine accidents on area roads south of Barava and between Jilib and Kismayo.5

In July 2001, it was reported that Somali camel herders were using landmines to try to stop widespread cutting of trees by charcoal smugglers; the trees are a source of food for the nomads.6

The Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) admits to mining the road between Baidoa and Mogadishu, but claims to use only antivehicle mines. However, other sources said the RRA used antipersonnel mines too, resulting in several deaths and injuries in 2001.7 The report claimed RRA laid numerous landmines in the Lower Shabelle and Middle and Lower Juba regions. The faction led by Muse Sudi Yahow is also said to reserve the right to use landmines against militias or forces of the TNG.8

Landmine Problem

Central and southern Somalia is heavily contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). Galguduud, Bakool, Bay, Hiran and the Lower Juba region are the most affected. Although no surveys have been conducted in these regions, travelers indicate that the threat of landmines is high throughout these regions. In the lower Juba region, people are often forced to travel in convoys lead by guides with local knowledge of mined zones.9

All factions are thought to have used landmines around strategically important towns, military installations and airports. Mines have been used extensively for route denial in Galkayo, Beletweyne, Baidoa, and Mogadishu. In northeastern Somalia (Puntland) mines were laid at the border with Ethiopia during the Somalia-Ethiopian war of 1977/78. Islamic El-Iihad fighters have laid additional landmines along a “clan separation line” in Galkacayo town during inter-clan conflicts there and between Bosasso and Elayo during 1998-1999.

There are at least 28 known mined roads, 63 known minefields, and 17 suspected minefields in the country.10

Mine Action

In 1999, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), under its Somali Civil Protection Program (SCPP), helped establish the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC), based in Hargeisa (Somaliland). According to the UNDP, the SCPP has issued a Preparatory Assistance Document that summarizes a three-year mine action project, from January 2002 to December 2004 for all of Somalia. This is under consideration by the TNG.11 The aim of the project is to “establish and maintain a sustainable National Mine Action capacity” by strengthening management, conducting minefield surveys, mine clearance, and mine awareness and providing victim assistance.

UNDP has proposed a budget for this Somalia Mine Action Program of $10.1 million in 2002 and $8.8 million in 2003. In 2002, this includes funds for: mine clearance in NW Somalia (Somaliland) at $4.5 million, NE Somalia (Puntland) at $500,000, and Central/South Somalia at

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5 “Forty-five killed and 70 injured in Bardhere,” Xogogaal Online (in Somali), 19 February 2002. The Jubba Valley Alliance is nominally allied with the TNG.
8 Interview with a senior UN Mine Action Officer, 13 March 2002.
9 The Peace and Human Rights Network is a coalition of 32 organizations throughout Somalia. Landmine Monitor held a meeting with members of the network in Hargeisa in February 2002.
Non-Signatories

$500,000; demining equipment and training at $1.317 million; mine awareness at $300,000; and, victim assistance at $200,000.\(^{12}\)

In 2001, SCPP helped Puntland establish a Puntland Mine Action Center to work with the Department of Demobilization and Reintegration. SCPP also established two Mine Action Offices in Baidoa and Mogadishu. The UNDP had hoped to turn both of these offices to full-fledged Mine Action Centers by September 2001, but had to scale back plans due to continued conflict in the regions.\(^{13}\)

It appears that mine clearance is only occurring in northwest Somalia, in the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. See the separate Landmine Monitor entry for Somaliland for details on clearance and mine action funding. Landmine Monitor recorded little or no mine risk education or survivor assistance activity in Somalia.

**Landmine Casualties**

Landmine casualties continue, though often unreported. In 2001, there have been a total of six reported landmine incidents and twenty UXO incidents in Mogadishu alone, in which 60 people were killed and 61 injured, according to the UNDP-supported mine action office.\(^{14}\) In Puntland, there were 103 reported incidents resulting in human casualties.\(^{15}\)

According to the US Department of State, reporting on events in 2001, “On 1 February 2001, in Burhakaba, Bay region, four nomads were killed by a landmine explosion. On 10 May 2001, a landmine explosion near Ballidogle airstrip killed a man. On 2 June 2001, a truck hit a mine in Saragoble, which exploded and killed one person and injured four others. On 24 July 2001, four cars hit landmines on the road linking the Lower Juba and Middle Juba regions. The cars exploded and killed several persons and injured some others;”\(^{16}\) Incidents are also reported in the media. In the Gedo region, four people were killed and two others injured in two separate incidents in April.\(^{17}\) In August, more than ten people were killed and several injured in the Kurtun Waarey and Baraawa areas of the Middle Juba Region when their vehicles hit landmines.\(^{18}\) On 5 September 2001, a landmine in southern Somalia killed three people. There had been at least five other mine incidents in the same area in previous two months.\(^{19}\) It is believed that many such incidents in southern Somalia are unreported.

Between 1995 and 2000, 4,357 landmine/UXO casualties were reported, including 2,626 killed and 1,731 injured.\(^{20}\)

In 2001, the ICRC-supported hospitals treated 7,352 surgical cases, of which 405 were mine/UXO casualties.\(^{21}\)

**Survivor Assistance**

According to the Peace and Human Rights Network, there are no special programs for landmine survivors in Somalia.\(^{22}\) The health infrastructure in the country is very poor and the few hospitals available are poorly staffed and ill equipped. The ICRC provides medicines, technical advice, training and financial support to four major surgical facilities in Somalia: Keysaney Hospital, run by the Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS), and Medina Hospital in Mogadishu,

\(^{13}\) Interviews with a number of UN Mine Action Officers, March 2002.
\(^{14}\) Report emailed to Landmine Monitor by the UN Mine Action Office in Mogadishu, 27 March 2002.
\(^{15}\) Puntland mine casualty report for 2001.
\(^{22}\) The Peace and Human Rights Network is a coalition of 32 organizations throughout Somalia. Landmine Monitor held a meeting with members of the network in Hargeisa in February 2002.
Baidoa Hospital in Bay and Mudug Regional Hospital in Galkayo. The ICRC also assists 26 SRCS health posts in southern and central Somalia.23 In 2001, the ICRC reported providing surgical treatment to 405 mine/UXO casualties.24

In 2001, the Norwegian Red Cross continued to support three rehabilitation centers, run by the SRCS, in Mogadishu, Galkayo, and Hargeisa. The centers provide physiotherapy, prostheses, orthoses, crutches, and a repair service. In 2001, a total of 909 prostheses were provided at the three centers, of which 95 were for landmine survivors.25

(See Landmine Monitor entry for Somaliland)

SRI LANKA

Key developments since May 2001: There have been no reports of new use of mines by either government or rebel forces since December 2001. A formal cease-fire agreement came into force on 23 February 2002. In January 2002, for the first time, a leader of the LTTE rebels expressed support for a ban on antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka’s Defense Secretary has estimated that there are some 700,000 mines in the ground. The cease-fire is finally enabling significant mine action activities, but there is great concern about mine dangers to displaced persons as they begin to return home. In March 2002, the World Bank committed US$1 million for a new UNDP-led mine action project. UNICEF has resumed mine risk education programs in Jaffna. It would appear that reported new mine casualties increased during 2001, to more than 300.

Mine Ban Policy


For the first time, a leader of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has expressed support for a ban on antipersonnel mines.2 Responding to an initiative launched by the Inter-Religious Peace Foundation (a Sri Lankan member of the ICBL), the LTTE’s eastern province leader Karikalan declared that “full support will be accorded to the people’s letter with two million signatures requesting the banning of landmines.”3

The Inter-Religious Peace Foundation started the signature campaign, aimed at getting two million signatures from people in both government and LTTE-controlled areas, in January 2002; it urges the government to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty and the LTTE to stop using antipersonnel landmines.

Use

In nearly two decades of conflict, both Sri Lankan government forces and the LTTE have used antipersonnel mines extensively. There was a significant reduction in the level of fighting during the latter part of 2001 and nearly a complete halt since December 2001, following the

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25 Norwegian Red Cross, Response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 6 May 2002.
1 Sri Lanka also voted in favor of similar pro-ban UNGA resolutions in the past.
2 The LTTE is an armed separatist group fighting for self-rule in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka.
Non-Signatories

unilateral cease-fires declared by each side. Commonsense cease-fire agreement came into force on 23 February 2002. There have been no reports of new laying of mines by either side since December 2001.

Sri Lankan forces have typically used antipersonnel mines as defensive barriers around army front line positions, as well as key installations and facilities, and to prevent the LTTE from re-occupying areas of Jaffna; the mines are reportedly usually laid in a specific pattern and in marked and mapped minefields. However, a senior Army officer told the UN in June 2001 that the Army probably lost more soldiers to its own minefields than LTTE. According to a UN report, the officer also said that the utility of antipersonnel mines was limited, because they were expensive and cumbersome to deploy, maintain and move.

The same June 2001 UN report states, “Landmines are being used by both parties, mainly in accordance with conventional military tactics…. Neither Government forces nor LTTE seem to use landmines to target civilian populations or to deny civilian population access to particular areas.” This contrasts with information given to Landmine Monitor in early 2000 that the LTTE sometimes has used mines and IEDs to deny people access to facilities, shelter, food, and water.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

There is no evidence that Sri Lanka has produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. Landmine Monitor has reported in the past that the LTTE is considered expert at making Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), but also produces the Jony mine (a small wooden box mine) in significant numbers, as well as a Claymore-type mine. Landmine Monitor now has photographic evidence that the LTTE has also produced a plastic antipersonnel landmine called “Rangan 99,” which resembles the Pakistani P4 mine, and an antivehicle mine called “Amman 2000 MK1.”

The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE will not disclose the number or types of antipersonnel mines they have stockpiled, but the United Nations Development Program has reported finding Pakistani P4, Chinese Type 72, and Italian VS/50 antipersonnel mines laid by government troops. Humanitarian aid workers report that it is mostly the Pakistani P4 that is being unearthed in demining operations carried out by the LTTE.

Landmine Problem

The use of antipersonnel mines has resulted in large areas of fertile agricultural land, urban areas, roads, water resources, and livestock in the northern and eastern parts of the country being seriously affected, particularly in Jaffna and the Vanni. Unfortunately, mines have been laid in some of the most heavily populated and most fertile areas.

Sri Lankan Defense Secretary Austin Fernando estimated that the peninsula’s roads and farmlands are riddled with around 700,000 mines planted by government forces and the LTTE. In

4 The LTTE unilaterally declared a month-long cease-fire commencing from 24 December 2001, and extended it until February 2002. The government reciprocated by also declaring a unilateral cease-fire.
10 Photographs available with Landmine Monitor Researcher for Sri Lanka. The number attached to the names may indicate the year of production. The antivehicle mine is used in conjunction with two or three antipersonnel mines.
the government had estimated that 25,000 mines were planted. The LTTE has estimated that there are now two million antipersonnel landmines in the areas under LTTE control.\footnote{Ranil Wijayapala, “A-9 demining on course,” \textit{Daily News}, 7 February 2002, p. 1; Frances Harrison, “The scars of Sri Lanka’s war,” \textit{BBC} (Kilinochchi), 23 January 2002.}

In April 2001, the UN reported that antipersonnel mines were threatening the resettlement of displaced persons in LTTE-held areas.\footnote{See \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2001}, p. 578.} The problem is only rising in scale with the cease-fire in place. The anticipation of imminent movement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) is creating serious concern regarding the need for mine clearance, minefield marking and mine risk education.\footnote{Email from Greg Crowther, Project Coordinator, Mines Advisory Group, 18 June 2002. This was a conclusion of MAG’s assessment mission in March 2002.} Indeed, it has already been reported that thousands of displaced people are spontaneously returning home before mine clearance has occurred.\footnote{Frances Harrison, “Trauma haunts Sri Lanka: Bombs and mines have killed thousands,” \textit{BBC} (Colombo), 31 May 2002.}

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) conducted a mission to Sri Lanka, from 4-22 June 2001, to assess the landmine and mine action situation. It found, among other things, that minefields are physically marked, but the marking is often decayed and insufficient.\footnote{UNMAS Mission Report, Sri Lanka, 4-22 June 2001, p. 6.}

\subsection*{Mine Action Funding}

Most mine action activities had halted in 2000 due to the escalation of fighting, and international donors were reluctant to support mine action as both the government and the rebels continued laying landmines.\footnote{Frances Harrison, “Trauma haunts Sri Lanka,” \textit{BBC}, 31 May 2002.} The cease-fire signed in February 2002 is finally enabling significant mine action activities in mine-affected areas.

On 26 March 2002, the World Bank announced that it had committed US$1 million for a UNDP-implemented Landmine Action Project, which includes strengthening of survey and mapping capacity, and training deminers in areas under the civil administration.\footnote{http://www.worldbank.org/developmentnews/stories/html/032602a.htm.} In addition, UNDP contributed US$300,000 and UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) US$58,000 to this project.\footnote{Telephone interview with Mitchell Carlson, Program Manager, UNDP, Colombo, 8 April 2002.}

In February 2002, the Australian government committed US$75,000 to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for mine action expert advise and mine risk education activities with the objective of facilitating the return of internally displaced persons in the northern and eastern parts of the country.\footnote{Email from Brian Agland, Australian High Commission in Colombo, 4 April 2002.} In June 2002, the Australian government signed an agreement with UNDP to provide A$500,000 (about US$285,000) for mine action.\footnote{Interview with Mitchell Carlson, Program Manager, UNDP, Colombo, 1 July 2002.}

The Sri Lankan Minister of Rehabilitation, Resettlement and Refugees estimated that the demining of one war-ravaged town, Chavakachcheri, and its environs in the northern region will cost 300 million rupees (about US$3.2 million).\footnote{Pramod de Silva, “De-mining in Chavakachcheri to cost Rs. 300m,” \textit{Daily News}, 16 January 2002, p.1.} UNICEF received US$75,000 during 2001 from the governments of the UK and Sweden for mine risk education activities.\footnote{Telephone interview with Jean-Luc Bories, Head of Program, Children Affected by Armed Conflict, UNICEF, Sri Lanka, 5 April 2002.} Some US$60,000 was spent on mine risk education programs in areas under the control of the government and US$15,000 in LTTE-controlled areas.\footnote{Ibid.}

\subsection*{Mine Action Coordination}

A new mine action project, to be led by UNDP with significant input from other UN agencies, is underway in Sri Lanka. UNDP has signed a Preparatory Assistance Document with the...
Sri Lanka government. A UN Interagency Mine Action Working Group (UNIMAWG) has been functioning since September 2001. In November 2001, the UNIMAWG made a feasibility assessment for a mine action program. As of June 2002, a UNDP technical team was in place in Sri Lanka. In the short-term, UNDP activities are being coordinated with UNICEF and UNHCR to support IDP resettlement. The new project will focus on collection of data on the mine problem, and building national and local capacities, including development of a national structure to coordinate mine action activities.

In December 2001, the non-governmental Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) established the Mine Action Resource Centre (MARC), with the objective of providing a facilitation and liaison body for Sri Lankan and international agencies involved in mine action or working in affected areas.

Mine Clearance and Assessment

The Engineering unit of the Sri Lankan Army, the LTTE, and the non-governmental Humanitarian Demining Unit (HDU) are engaged in mine clearance operations. The Army announced that it had removed 681 antipersonnel landmines in a demining operation to open the main highway to the north (the A9). The UN Mine Action Service found that the Army’s “equipment and procedures had not been adopted to meet specific requirements of humanitarian mine action…and several basic safety measures were not implemented.” It also noted, “Dismantling rather than destruction was the standard method of disposal. The mission was not able to ascertain whether cleared mines were recycled or destroyed.”

The LTTE was also involved in demining certain areas of the A9 highway, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reportedly coordinated information between the Army and LTTE. In 2001, Sri Lankan security forces reportedly removed 14,937 antipersonnel mines, 183 Claymore mines, and 268 IEDs in the northern and eastern parts of the country. The LTTE claims to have removed 82,000 antipersonnel landmines during the period 20 April 2000 to 31 December 2001. One news account says the LTTE is using garden rakes and prods to unearth mines; they water the earth to make it softer and then they prod it with bamboo spokes and metal forks.

The Humanitarian Demining Unit is operating in areas controlled by the LTTE. It is a non-governmental organization of about 125 persons. It works under and is funded by the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization, which is responsible for coordinating relief and rehabilitation efforts in LTTE areas. One expert has judged the Humanitarian Demining Unit’s clearance efforts as

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26 Email from Peter Isaacs, Mine Action Team Consultant, UNDP, 20 June 2002.
27 Interview with Mitchell Carlson, Program Manager, UNDP, Colombo, 1 July 2002.
29 Email from Peter Isaacs, Mine Action Team Consultant, UNDP, 19 June 2002.
30 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, Mines Advisory Group, 30 July 2002. MAG provided a specialist advisor to this body.
34 Ibid., p.12.
37 It is also called the Humanitarian Demining Bureau.
38 Email from Greg Crowther, Project Coordinator, MAG, 18 June 2002; email from Richard Moyes, Program Manager, MAG Sri Lanka, 4 April 2002.
“very impressive” and making “a tremendous impact on the ground.”

HDU told UNMAS that it had cleared more than 55,000 mines during 11 months of operations. UNMAS again noted that “dismantling rather than destruction was the standard method of disposal.”

From 21-27 March 2002, the UK-based Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a joint assessment mission to the Vanni region controlled by the LTTE. The mission assessed landmine contamination, conducted basic verification of clearance of the A9 road, and reviewed the ongoing clearance work of the Humanitarian Demining Unit. As of July 2002, MAG and NPA were working to build the landmine clearance capacity of the HDU.

In early April 2002, five members of the US State Department’s Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF) assessed the mine situation in order to undertake emergency demining in areas prioritized by the Sri Lankan government. The State Department said, “This deployment is in response to the Sri Lankan Government’s plan to resettle some 200,000 internally displaced persons, who will have to travel through heavily mined areas in the Vanni and Killinochchi regions, as well as the Jaffna Peninsula.” Full deployment of the QRDF took place on 20 April, and the mission will end in August. The US notes, “The work of the QRDF took place on behalf of both sides in the recent conflict.” The QRDF in Sri Lanka includes 20 Mozambican demining technicians and four specially trained dogs and their handlers.

In May 2002, MAG conducted an assessment of the mine problem in the government-controlled areas of Mannar District, at the request of ZOA, a Dutch NGO working with refugees and IDPs. MAG identified an urgent need for mine risk education for those about to return to mine-affected areas.

The Halo Trust and RONCO have established a presence in Sri Lanka. RONCO is undertaking clearance in Jaffna, coordinated by the Army, and funded by the United States.

Mine Risk Education

When the UN mine action project in Jaffna terminated in 2000, its mine awareness program also ceased to function. However, the UNDP provided funding to continue mine risk education activities through government structures. UNICEF has recommenced mine risk education programs in Jaffna. It funds programs conducted by government structures, the local NGO Refugee Rehabilitation Organization and Save

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39 Email from Greg Crowther, Project Coordinator, MAG, 18 June 2002. Crowther notes that despite lack of funds, equipment and qualified staff, and despite using primitive tools (rakes) and simple techniques, the clearance rate of 30-50 square meters per deminer per day is high, and the number of demining accidents is low (three serious accidents since April 2000).
41 Ibid.
42 Email from Greg Crowther, Project Coordinator, MAG, 18 June 2002; email from Richard Moyes, MAG, 4 April 2002.
43 Email from Richard Moyes, MAG, Colombo, 9 July 2002.
45 US State Department, “Media Note: Demining Assistance to Sri Lanka,” 2 April 2002.
46 US State Department, Fact Sheet, “Humanitarian Mine Action Subgroup Minutes of June 14, 2002 Meeting,” 10 July 2002. The US also notes that Sri Lanka was formerly off-limits to the US demining program, and that the engagement of the QRDF “was deemed critical to the pursuit of peace initiatives and US Government policy.”
47 Fax from Chulie de Silva, Information Specialist, US Embassy, Colombo, 8 July 2002. See also, Daily Mirror, 2 April 2002, p.4; “US demining experts arrive in Sri Lanka,” Associated Press (Colombo), 1 April 2002. The State Department indicated that the QRDF will be implemented by RONCO Consulting Corporation (a commercial demining firm), which would employ two teams, each with ten persons, with the support of mine detection dogs. US State Department, “Media Note: Demining Assistance to Sri Lanka,” 2 April 2002.
48 Email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG, 30 July 2002.
49 Email from Peter Isaacs, Mine Action Team Consultant, UNDP, 20 June 2002.
Non-Signatories

The Children-UK in the areas of the Jaffna peninsula under government control.\textsuperscript{30} Save The Children-UK started a mine risk education program in April 2002, due to run until March 2003. The program received funding from UNICEF, about US$20,000, and from Save the Children Fund, US$2,000. UNICEF also funds a mine awareness project conducted by White Pigeon, a local NGO based in the area controlled by the LTTE. Mine awareness programs include drama, educational material such as posters and handbooks, placement of warning signs, and marking of certain mined areas.

As part of its activities in Sri Lanka since July 2002, the Mines Advisory Group has deployed two Mine Awareness Support Teams.\textsuperscript{51} The Inter-Religious Peace Foundation incorporates basic mine awareness messages into its peace programs conducted in areas suspected to be contaminated with landmines. The Interfaith Fellowship for Peace and Development (IFPD) promoted two mine risk education initiatives in first half of 2002. On 14 May 2002, it held a one-day workshop on “Mine Risk Education” in Vavuniya district, Northern province. The workshop, financed by UNICEF, was directed at governmental organizations and NGOs concerned by mines and UXO problem. In June, IFPD organized a Posters Exhibition and Competition involving 500 school children from five schools in border areas.\textsuperscript{52}

Landmine Casualties

In 2001, there was no centralized agency recording landmine casualties in Sri Lanka. From the available information, it would appear that reported new casualties increased during 2001. Data, collected from various sources, indicates more than 300 new mine casualties. However, it is believed that mine casualties continue to be underreported. In 2000, at least 223 new mine casualties were reported.\textsuperscript{53}

For the period up to 23 May 2001, 34 civilian mine casualties had been reported in Jaffna, together with 17 civilian casualties registered by the ICRC in LTTE-controlled area.\textsuperscript{54} It was reported in the media that there were 86 civilian casualties on the Jaffna peninsula during the year 2001.\textsuperscript{55} In early April 2001, a military spokesperson stated that nearly 100 people had been killed or injured by landmines so far that year.\textsuperscript{56} The Jaipur Foot Center in Kundasale reported it had provided 96 prostheses to new landmine casualties during 2001.\textsuperscript{57} Save the Children Fund-UK recorded 50 people injured and three killed due to landmine explosions in 2001 in the areas controlled by the LTTE.\textsuperscript{58}

In 2001, landmines continued to inflict casualties on Sri Lankan military and LTTE personnel. In January 2001, an accident while demining on the Jaffna peninsula killed at least eleven Sri Lankan soldiers.\textsuperscript{59} UNMAS reported that in April 2001, during an offensive in Jaffna, government forces lost between 180 and 300 soldiers to landmines alone.\textsuperscript{60} In two separate incidents, in May and June 2001, 62 military personnel were killed or injured when the buses in which they were traveling hit antivehicle landmines.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{30} Telephone interview with Jean-Luc Bories, Head of Program, Children Affected by Armed Conflict, UNICEF, Sri Lanka, 5 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{31} See http://www.mag.org.uk.
\textsuperscript{52} Email from Wilbert A. Silva, Director, Landmines Project, Interfaith Fellowship for Peace and Development, 1 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{55} Frances Harrison, “Sri Lanka Landmine Deaths High,” BBC (Colombo), 4 April 2001.
\textsuperscript{56} Telephone interview with Ms. C.P. Ariyapala, Jaipur Foot Center, Kundasale, 4 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{57} Email from R. Kumara, SCF (UK) Colombo, 9 April 2002.
\textsuperscript{58} UNMAS Mission Report, Sri Lanka, 4-22 June 2001, p. 6.
Survivor Assistance

According to the UNMAS mission in June 2001, Sri Lanka has sufficient transport and medical infrastructure to provide the necessary medical care to civilian landmine casualties; however, this infrastructure is likely to be less effective in LTTE-controlled areas. In government-controlled Jaffna assistance is available at the Jaffna Teaching Hospital, the Manthikay Base Hospital, and other medical facilities. The ICRC, working with the Sri Lankan Red Cross Society, provided basic health services in remote areas through public health centers and mobile clinics. In June 2001, together with the Sri Lankan army's medical services, over 150 doctors attended a training seminar on war surgery.62 Medecins Sans Frontieres also provided support to medical facilities in the LTTE-controlled areas.63

Sri Lanka has several prosthetic clinics that are generally able to respond to the physical rehabilitation needs of civilian mine/UXO survivors in government-controlled areas. Three workshops are producing, adapting and renewing prostheses, with financial assistance from several national and international organizations, including the ICRC.64 The Colombo Friends-in-Need Society's Jaipur Foot Program, with headquarters in Colombo and branches in other parts of the country provide prostheses to all amputees who come to them, including landmine survivors. Civilian amputees are provided prostheses free of charge. Donors to the program include USAID.65 In 2001, the Colombo Friends-in-Need Society's Colombo facility provided prostheses to 343 security forces personnel and 17 civilians injured by landmines66 and its Jaffna and Kundasale facilities provided 12367 and 12168 prostheses, respectively, to civilian landmine survivors. The Rotary Club of Batticaloa provided 14 prostheses69 and the Rotary Club of Colombo East (at their facility in Mannar) provided 54 prostheses70 to civilian landmine survivors in 2001.

The ICRC stated that it finances the position of a full-time expatriate orthopedic technician at the Colombo Friends-in-Need Society’s Jaffna facility.71 In 2001, the ICRC reported that physical rehabilitation services were provided for patients who received 257 prostheses; 51 percent of the patients were mine survivors. Half of the prostheses were made with the traditional aluminum technology, and half with polypropylene. Two technicians received a one-month training in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as well as continuous on-the-job training in polypropylene technology for two prosthetic and two orthotic technicians.72 The ICRC also transports amputees to government-controlled areas for physical rehabilitation.73

The NGO White Pigeon operates in the areas controlled by the LTTE. It has two workshops that manufacture prostheses and in March 2001 reported that there were over 400 amputees on the waiting list for prostheses.74 In 2001, UNICEF provided White Pigeon with about US$20,000 for the production of prostheses for landmine survivors 75 and the ICRC reported that it had supplied material for the production of 83 prostheses.76

64 Ibid.
66 Fax from Rupa Jayasekera, Administrative Secretary, Colombo Friends-in-Need Society, 27 March 2002.
67 Telephone interview with Sivanathan, Administrative Officer, Jaffna Jaipur Foot Centre, 8 April 2002.
68 Telephone interview with Ms. C.P. Ariyapala, Jaipur Foot Centre, Kundasale, 4 April 2002.
69 Fax from A. Sivapragasam, Administrative Officer, Jaipur Foot Program (Rotary), Batticaloa, 27 March 2002.
70 Email from Rtn. S. Shanmuganathan, 8 April 2002.
71 Email from Arjuna Ranawana, ICRC Colombo, 7 March 2002.
76 Telephone interview with Jean-Luc Noverraz, ICRC Colombo, 5 April 2002.
UNICEF also supports psychosocial counseling and community based rehabilitation through the NGOs: Association for Rehabilitation of Displaced (AROD), Kilinochchi Association for Rehabilitation of Displaced (KAROD), and White Pigeons. AROD has three rehabilitation workers trained in physiotherapy and counseling. Support starts after admission to hospital and continues after discharge. Amputees are provided with physiotherapy and counseling at home and are assisted in the fitting of prostheses. Financial and other assistance is also provided. The budget for 2001/2002 is US$8,000.

A British NGO, Hope for Children, works in partnership with the Colombo Friends-in-Need society to assist child landmine survivors. Hope’s work extends beyond just the fitting of artificial limbs as each child receives a physical and psychological assessment. Assistance is also available to attend school or vocational training programs. In a major development in September 2001, Hope for Children introduced an artificial limb manufacturing and fitting vehicle, said to be a world first, which will be traveling to remote and isolated areas. The project is supported by the Diana, Princess of Wales Memorial Fund.

There are no social or economic reintegration programs specifically targeted at antipersonnel mine survivors. There are, however, various general rehabilitation projects underway in the country, including in Jaffna, implemented by a variety of organizations both local and international.

One of the short-term goals of the new UNDP Mine Action Project in Sri Lanka is the development of a coordinated national policy for victim assistance and rehabilitation.

SYRIA

Mine Ban Policy

Syria has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. While expressing concern about landmine victims in the world, officials from Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stand by their position that antipersonnel landmines are necessary defensive weapons, and until Israel relinquishes occupation of the Golan Heights and implements UN resolutions on Golan, Syria will be unable to join the treaty.

Syria was among 19 countries that abstained from the vote on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, as it has done on every similar pro-ban resolution since 1996.


On 3 December 2001, the fourth anniversary of the signing the Mine Ban Treaty and the International Day for the Disabled, a member of the Syrian Campaign to Ban Landmines called the Yarmouk Group campaigned on the risks of mines and circulated mine risk education materials in the Golan. Members of the Syrian campaign also visited the “Safe Gardens” program in the Syrian-controlled Golan and bordering areas. The campaigners circulated posters on landmines, produced by the Ministry of Health, at different public centers.

77 Telephone interview and email from Jean-Luc Bories, UNICEF, 5 April 2002.
79 Ibid., p. 110.
1 Meeting with the Director of the Foreign Ministry’s International Organizations and Conferences Department, Damascus, 24 January 2002.
Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

No new information on production, transfer, or stockpiling of antipersonnel mines was made available during the reporting period. Syria may have produced and exported antipersonnel mines at some point in the past, but it is not known if this activity took place in recent years. Syria has not taken any unilateral measures to prohibit future production or export of antipersonnel mines. Syria stockpiles antipersonnel mines, but the size and origin of the stockpile is not known.

Landmine Problem and Mine Action

The Golan is divided into three areas: Syrian-controlled, Israeli-controlled, and a buffer zone monitored by the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). Each contains mined areas. The minefields in Syrian-controlled areas hinder the development of agriculture and tourism and are often unmarked and unmapped. UNDOF, in cooperation with Syrian authorities, began a program in 2000 to identify and mark minefields within its area of operations. However, some villagers or children take the fences and the markers for their own use. According to members of the local community, the Syrian army has had to re-fence and re-mark the minefields several times. Community members also state that at least one village close to Quneitra was cleared by the Syrian military in 2001.  

A mine risk education component is included in a project called “Safe Gardens,” which aims to create safe and attractive places for children to play in the Golan. The government, in partnership with the local community, maintains eight Safe Gardens as permanent tools to raise awareness among a targeted group of more than 3,000 school children. UNICEF and the British Embassy in Damascus have provided support for this program. UNICEF is proposing a follow-on $77,000 mine risk education program using the techniques and materials developed for the Safe Gardens program for the period March-December 2002. While mine awareness education reaches many mine-affected areas in the Golan through programs like Safe Gardens and other programs at health centers, no evaluation of the effectiveness of mine awareness activities in the Golan has been conducted. 

The degree to which other parts of Syria are affected by mines is not clear. At least one of Syria’s neighbors, Jordan, deployed nearly 67,000 antipersonnel mines along its border with Syria prior to 1973. Turkey, as part of a bilateral agreement with Syria, began demining its border areas in 2001. It is not known if the Syrian side of the border is mined.

The Syrian Army is contributing a demining team of 16 officers and 146 soldiers with manual probing equipment and four mechanical rollers to assist with demining in Lebanon. They are working in the west Bekaa area, in Jezzine and Nabatieh.

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

Mine casualty data is not systematically collected in Syria. There are no records on mine casualties at local health care centers and some victims go directly to Damascus hospitals (some 40-50 kilometer distance) to get emergency services. On 4 January 2002, two 10-year-old boys were killed by a landmine according to the Director of Health in the Bordering Areas (Golan). There were no reports in the Syrian media of mine incidents in 2001, but on 19 March 2001, three Syrian workers were injured by a mine while working on a building site in Beirut, Lebanon. The only known incident in the Golan occurred on 6 June 2001, in the area of Ain Al-Hamra, when a 73-year-old shepherd was killed by a mine.

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2 Interviews with local population during a visit to the Safe Garden project, 3 December 2001.
3 UN Mine Action Service, “Portfolio of Mine-Related Projects,” February 2002, p. 120.
4 Interview with the assistant director of Quneitra Health Directorate, 7 February 2002.
6 Meeting with health officials in Khan Arnaba Health Center, 10 February 2002.
There have been few changes in the services for mine survivors in Syria during the reporting period. People in the mine-affected Golan must travel to Damascus to receive specialized medical care, surgery, physical rehabilitation, prosthetics, wheelchairs, and special education. To remedy this lack of facilities, the government health program opened a new physiotherapy center in Khan Arnaba on 8 March 2002. Also a new 120-bed hospital will be opened in 2003 in Khan Arnaba. There are no laws or decrees to aid landmine survivors or the disabled in Syria.

TONGA

The Kingdom of Tonga has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, but in March 2001 a government representative told Landmine Monitor, “The Prime Minister has initiated a process to accede to the treaty and fully supports the ban on antipersonnel mines.” It is not known if any steps have been taken toward accession since then. Tonga voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. In August 2001, a government representative confirmed to Landmine Monitor that Tonga has never produced, transferred, or stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

TURKEY

Key developments since May 2001: Turkey is in the final stages of domestic approval of accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. In March 2002, Turkey renewed its export moratorium indefinitely. Turkey reported that it had destroyed 10,638 mines from various border regions by the end of 2001. An agreement with Bulgaria on the non-use and removal of antipersonnel mines from common border areas entered into force on 1 May 2002. The government accused the PKK of ongoing use of antipersonnel mines. The PKK has denied the allegations and stated its willingness to ban antipersonnel mines. According to the Turkish Human Rights Foundation, landmines and UXO killed 16 people and injured 33 others in 2001.

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Turkey is not a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty. On 6 April 2001, it announced that it would start the process of accession and become a State Party at the same time as Greece. On 15 March 2002, a press release from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared, “After careful consideration, Turkey has now decided to accede to the Ottawa Convention.... Turkey has come to the stage of submitting the Convention to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for finalization of the accession procedures.” On 9 May 2002, the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee approved ratification of the treaty.
Turkey participated as an observer at the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001 in Managua, Nicaragua. Ambassador Ergun Pelit stated, “It’s a privilege for me to announce in this Conference once again my government’s decision to become a party to the Ottawa Convention… We have already completed the translation of the Convention into the Turkish language and hope to submit the Convention to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for ratification within a short period of time.”

Turkey also associated itself with the statement delivered by Belgium on behalf of the European Union, which called on States not yet members of the treaty to accede without delay.


Turkey continues to attend intersessional Standing Committee meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, including those in January and May 2002. At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, the delegation announced approval of the accession legislation by the Foreign Affairs Committee and said that within “a short period of time, Turkey hopes to be in the position to accede to the Convention…[and] form a good model for her neighbors which are not yet party to the Convention… Since the outset she has been implementing the measures of the Convention resolutely.”

Turkey is a signatory to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). In April 2002, it repeated assurances given in June 2000 that Turkey “continues with its efforts” to ratify the CCW and its Amended Protocol II. Turkey did not attend the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II or the Second CCW Review Conference in December 2001.

**NGO Activity**

The national mine ban campaign, Turkey Without Mines, published its first booklet in Turkish in August 2001, and an eight-minute video, with financial support from the Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines. This was sent to the media and politicians, and resulted in many press reports.

**Use**

Landmine Monitor has reported on past use of antipersonnel mines by both Turkish armed forces and forces of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). Turkey has stated that government forces have not laid antipersonnel mines on Turkish territory since December 1997/January 1998.

On 29 January 2002, Turkey’s Governor of the Emergency Region reportedly declared that the PKK had increased its mining of the border with Iraq during the last six months, and that as a result “there were 88 incidents which caused 5 deaths and 32 wounded in the armed forces.”

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4 The delegation included Ergun Pelit, Ambassador to Mexico, and Major Ihsan Caliskan, General Staff Planning and Policy Department.

5 “Statement by the Head of the Turkish Delegation Ambassador Ergun Pelit on Turkey’s Accession to the Ottawa Convention on APMs,” Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.


7 Presentation by Turkey to the Standing Committee on the General Status, 30 May 2002.

8 Email to Landmine Monitor from Ugur Dogan, Minister-Counselor, Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 12 April 2002.

9 The booklet is titled, “Mayinsiz Bir Turkiye Kampanyasi” (“Campaign for a Turkey Without Mines”), August 2001.


12 “PKK Mayin Dosuyor” (“PKK Is Laying Mines”), Hurriyet (daily newspaper), 29 January 2002; Anadolu Ajansi (semi-official news agency), 28 January 2002. Four predominantly Kurdish provinces of southeastern Turkey were classified by Turkey as an Emergency Region.
Following the report, the People’s Defense Force (the armed branch of the PKK) denied the alleged use of antipersonnel mines. On 25 January 2002, just a few days prior to the allegations, the PKK’s Presidential Council declared its readiness to commit itself to a total ban of antipersonnel mines, in a letter sent to Geneva Call, the Swiss-based NGO engaging non-state actors in the mine ban.

In April 2002, the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations in Geneva supplied Landmine Monitor with detailed allegations of use by the PKK of mines (predominantly antipersonnel mines, but also antitank mines and improvised explosive devices). The Mission stated that a “nationwide study indicates that since the year 2000, there has been a decrease in mine use and mine related incidents. Nonetheless, undetected mines used… in the past continue to constitute a grave danger and threat.” The Mission stated that PKK mines were aimed at the security forces, but were also intended to demoralize the civilian population, and had been laid in fields, paths, roads, bridges and water sources; “due to these devastating activities the civilian population endures considerable human and economic loss.” According to the government, there were “1,669 land mine related incidents (some being activated by vehicles carrying passengers) recorded between 1 January 1993 and 1 March 2002.”

On 2 May 2002, the PKK was defined as a terrorist group by the European Union, after previously being outlawed by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as Turkey.

In 2001, the Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD) and Turkish Human Rights Foundation (THHF) started to publish data on landmine casualties in their monthly reports. In July 2001, IHD with other NGOs sent a delegation to Hakkari to examine allegations of human rights violations by Turkish troops following a mine incident in which a soldier was injured. Local villagers were accused by security forces of having laid the mine. This became an important issue between the government and human rights campaigners, and was reported in the media.

Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

Production of antipersonnel mines ceased concurrently with a national moratorium on the sale and transfer of antipersonnel mines in January 1996. On 15 March 2002, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced: “Turkey’s national moratorium on the export and transfer of antipersonnel land mines expired in January 2002. Turkey has decided to extend once again her moratorium on the export and transfer of antipersonnel landmines, this time indefinitely, as an expression of her sincere commitment to becoming party to the Ottawa Convention.”

The size and composition of Turkey’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines have not been revealed, but the stockpile is believed to be substantial. Landmine Monitor has previously reported that the US has a stockpile of 1,100 Air Force Gator antipersonnel mines in Turkey.
Landmine Problem

While no survey has been made of Turkey’s landmine problem, it appears that mine contamination is concentrated on Turkey’s borders with Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and in parts of the southeastern provinces.

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, the Turkish delegation declared that there are "nearly 900,000 planted mines in Turkey. These mined areas, which had been built to prevent the illegal border trespassing many years ago, are all marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians."21 In June 2002, the Turkish Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva stated that "there are nearly 935,000 laid mines in Turkey…established to prevent the illegal border trespassing between 1956-1959, are all marked, monitored and covered by fencing or other means to ensure the effective protection of civilians."22

The location of mine incidents indicates that, in addition to border areas, there are also mines in the southeastern provinces away from the borders. The extent of such mined areas is unknown, as is the degree to which such areas are adequately marked and fenced.

Mine Clearance

At the Third Meeting of States Parties, the Turkish delegation stated, "We have already demined some 8,000 mines and we are fervently continuing to do so… We established ‘The Mining and Co-ordination Centers,’ and formed ‘The Mining Teams’ as well as a working Group on ‘Methods for Mine Sweeping and Demining’… Efforts for ‘Marking’ minefields are still continuing."23

At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002 Turkey announced that “As proof of her determination to clean the anti-personnel mines from her borders, Turkey has begun a comprehensive clearing action on her own initiative in 1998... 9,851 mines were cleared as of the end of 2001.... Similar mine clearing activities are proceeding in full force."24 In June 2002, Turkey reported that “by the end of 2001, 10,638 mines from various border regions have been cleared and destroyed on site."25

During Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit’s visit to Bulgaria on 30-31 January 2002, a protocol on landmine clearance was signed, and instruments of ratification of a 1999 agreement on the non-use and removal of antipersonnel mines in the common border areas were exchanged. The agreement entered into effect on 1 May 2002.26 Bulgaria has already declared its side of the border clear of mines. In April 2001, Turkey stated that clearance on its side of the border would start “soon,” but no further information has been provided.27

A similar clearance agreement was signed with Georgia in January 2001, endorsed by the Commission on Foreign Affairs on 21 June 2001, and submitted to the National Assembly for approval, which is awaited.28 Another agreement with Azerbaijan has been in negotiations since 2000.29

Turkey has also decided to “clean all the mines along her border with Syria. Following completion of necessary activities concerning that project, mine clearing action will begin and these

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21 Presentation by Turkey to the Standing Committee on the General Status, 30 May 2002. It is not clear if all mined areas are marked and fenced. At the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001 it was stated that efforts to mark and fence minefields are continuing.
24 Presentation by Turkey to the Standing Committee on the General Status, 30 May 2002.
25 Email from Murat S. Esenli, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN, 27 June 2002.
27 Letter from Erdogan Iscan, Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, to Elisabeth Reusse-Decrey, Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines, undated but received 23 April 2001.
28 Statement by Turkey to the Third Meeting of States Parties, 18-21 September 2001; email from Murat S. Esenli., Permanent Mission of Turkey to the UN, 26 June 2002.
29 Email from Murat S. Esenli, Permanent Mission to the UN, 26 June 2002.
cleaned areas will be transformed for agricultural use in due time.” In February 2002, regional governor Gokhan Aydiner reportedly said that “preparation for the project will begin shortly.” The minefield, planted in 1956 to prevent smuggling along the 877-kilometer Syrian border, was described as 300-700 meters wide with an area of “3.5 million donums (a land measure of 1,000 square meters). This is twice as big as the island of Cyprus.” Local businessmen were described as enthusiastic about the scheme; returning the land to civilian use will reportedly give 20,000 families the means to support themselves, as well as reducing local unemployment.

Another media report added that the demining plan is part of “growing friendship between two countries that were once very uneasy neighbors.” The army requested about US$12 million to carry out the first stage of clearance, which could cost as much as $36 million in total. The whole operation is expected to take five years.

It does not appear that clearance has occurred in the southeastern provinces of Sirnak, Hakkari, Diyarbakir, Siirt, Mardin, Bingöl, Van and Tunceli, where clearance was reportedly due to start in mid-2000.

Mine Action Funding and Assistance

Turkey contributed $50,000 to mine clearance operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and $9,000 to the Albanian Mine Action Executive in 2001. Turkish forces with the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and with KFOR in Kosovo have also carried out mine clearance-related activities as part of their military duties.

Landmine/UXO Casualties

In 2001, according to the Turkish Human Rights Foundation, landmines killed 16 people, including five children, and injured 33 others, including 10 children. The US State Department reports that in 2001, “Landmine explosions in the southeast killed more than 15 persons, mainly children or military personnel; many more persons were maimed.”

Turkey stated via its Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva that mines laid by the PKK between 1 January 1993 and 1 March 2002 had killed 289 civilians and 299 security personnel, and injured 792 civilians and 1,524 security personnel.

The Turkish Human Rights Foundation continues to collect reports of mine casualties and issues monthly bulletins. In April 2002 it reported that three civilians had been killed and five injured in landmine incidents.

On 19 July 2002, a Turkish soldier serving with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan was reported injured while engaged in mine clearance at Kabul airport.
Survivor Assistance

In Turkey, mine survivors are first treated at public hospitals that are located in every small city. The seriously injured are transferred to the central public hospital or private hospitals if the survivor is able to pay for treatment. Cities in the west of the country have several facilities with the capacity to perform amputations, but in the mine-affected southeast the only facility is at Dicle University in Diyarbakir province.

A new prosthetic and rehabilitation center was opened at Dicle University on 28 June 2001, with the assistance of the US-based Physicians for Peace Foundation. The center provided 43 prostheses free-of-charge in 2001. An electronic system for designing and producing prostheses has been set up at the Center in Dicle, with the capacity to produce one prosthetic limb every 22 minutes. Three other universities will be connected to this new system, which will be able to supply prostheses throughout Turkey.

Military mine survivors are often treated at the Hospital Gulhane Askeri Tip Akademesi in Istanbul.

TUVALU

Tuvalu has not yet acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. In September 2001, the Attorney General, Afele Kitiona, said that he had recommended to the Cabinet that Tuvalu ratify the treaty and noted that ratification was being held up by concerns over the costs of implementation. In its April 2002 response to Landmine Monitor’s request for information, Bill Teo, a government official in the Office of the Prime Minister, stated that ratification will “most probably [take place] in the years to come, as it is not a priority area.” Tuvalu was absent during the vote on pro-ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001.

Teo confirmed that the country does not use, produce, export, import, or stockpile antipersonnel mines and their transfer through its territory is not allowed. While there is a problem with unexploded ordnance (UXO) left over from World War II, Teo told Landmine Monitor, “Since there hasn’t been any task to scan Tuvalu (land or sea) to determine the presence of mines, they could not confirm the absence of landmines. He indicated there have been no injuries or deaths in Tuvalu due to UXO or landmines.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has not articulated its position on the treaty or the mine issue in the past year. In 2000, the UAE stated that it “confirms its support for the international effort to ban antipersonnel landmines.” It did not attend any Mine Ban Treaty meetings in the reporting period, but did vote in support of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M on the universalization and implementation of the Mine Ban

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2 Letter from Bill P Teo on behalf of the Secretary to Government, Office of the Prime Minister of Tuvalu, to Neil Mander, Convenor New Zealand Campaign Against Landmines, 15 April 2002.

3 Ibid.

4 Letter from the UAE Foreign Ministry (translated by the UAE Embassy, Washington DC), to Landmine Monitor (HRW), 5 October 2000.
Treaty, as it had done on similar pro-ban resolutions in previous years. The UAE is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and did not attend any CCW meetings in 2001 or 2002.

The UAE has stated that it is not a landmine producer or exporter. The UAE remains one of just a handful of countries for which Landmine Monitor does not have a clear indication whether antipersonnel mines are stockpiled.

The UAE is not mine-affected. It has contributed to international mine action programs in Egypt, Kosovo and elsewhere. In March 2001, UAE announced its intention to donate up to $50 million to help redevelop South Lebanon, including demining activities. The project, “Operation Emirates Solidarity,” is a two-phase project that commenced on 25 October 2001, when a memorandum of understanding between UAE and Lebanon was signed by UAE’s Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Lebanon’s Minister of Defense, Khalil Hrawi (see the Lebanon report for details on the implementation of this program).

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Key developments since May 2001: The Bush Administration has been reviewing its landmine policy since June 2001. The Department of Defense recommended in November 2001 that the U.S. abandon its commitment to join the Mine Ban Treaty in 2006 and also abandon some parts of the program to develop alternatives to landmines. Funding for international humanitarian mine action programs for fiscal year 2001 was $81.8 million, the largest amount of any single country, but a significant decrease from the previous year. Mines killed one and wounded six U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan.

Mine Ban Policy

The United States is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. The Bush Administration has been engaged in a comprehensive review of U.S. landmine policy since June 2001. It is not known when a decision on a new policy will be made. Officials who have spoken publicly on the review have stressed that in terms of policy, “nothing is off the table and everything is subject to review.” The U.S. commitment to assist and fund international mine action programs is not at issue in the review.

Since 1998, U.S. policy has been based on Presidential Decision Directive 64, which states that the U.S. will join the Mine Ban Treaty in 2006 if alternatives have been identified and fielded. Human Rights Watch reported in late November 2001 that the Department of Defense had recommended, as its contribution to the review, that the U.S. abandon the objective of joining the Mine Ban Treaty. In addition to the Pentagon, the Department of State and the National Security Council (NSC) are participating in the policy review, prior to a decision by President Bush.
The U.S. did not attend any Mine Ban Treaty-related meetings in 2001 or 2002, in contrast to previous years. On 29 November 2001, the United States was one of just 19 countries to abstain on UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. The U.S. has abstained on similar resolutions every year since 1997. The Department of Defense and Organizations of American States (OAS) cosponsored a regional conference in Miami on “Mine Action in Latin America,” from 3-5 December 2001.5

The United States attended the third annual conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in December 2001. It submitted a national annual report as required by Article 13. The United States also participated in the Second Review Conference of CCW, where its proposal to expand the scope of the treaty to include internal conflicts was adopted. The conference did not adopt a joint proposal initially offered by the U.S. and Denmark for a new protocol on antivehicle mines, but chose to form a group of governmental experts to study issues and make recommendations on antivehicle mines in December 2002.

Aside from being referred to committees, no action has been taken by Congress on the “Landmine Elimination and Victim Assistance Act of 2001” (H.R. 948 and S.497) since its introduction on 8 March 2001 by Representative Lane Evans and Senator Patrick Leahy. As of July 2002, the bills had attracted 97 cosponsors in the House of Representatives and 30 cosponsors in the Senate. The legislation expresses the sense of the Congress that the U.S. already possesses alternative weapon systems and tactics to replace antipersonnel mines, and that the U.S. should join the Mine Ban Treaty as soon as possible, and increase its mine action and victim assistance efforts.

In order to affect the ongoing policy review, the U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL), coordinated by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) has engaged in numerous activities. In September 2001, the USCBL invited 30 war veterans and religious leaders from around the country to Washington, DC to meet with key Senators and urge them to write letters and call on the President to support a complete ban on antipersonnel mines. In November 2001, 124 members of the House of Representatives sent a letter to the President urging a positive outcome to the review, including continued support for the Mine Ban Treaty. On the 3 December 2001 Mine Ban Treaty anniversary, a national White House call-in day by campaigners reinforced this message. In March 2002, the USCBL convinced 80 major U.S.-based NGOs to sign onto a pro-ban letter to the President. Extensive media outreach by USCBL and PHR resulted in the publication of a number of pro-ban editorials in newspapers around the country. The Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), a USCBL member, launched a public information campaign on 25 February 2002 urging President Bush to ban landmines, which included two 30-second television advertisements for Washington, DC area television, as well as radio, print, internet, subway and outdoor ads.6 VVAF also sponsored benefit performances in 2001 and 2002 as part of its Concerts for a Landmine Free World initiative, which helped raise awareness of the mines issue across the country.7

Production and Alternatives

The United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997 but reserves the right to do so. It has not declared a unilateral moratorium on production and remains one of fourteen producers of antipersonnel mines in the world. Production of M87A1 Volcano antivehicle mines continues and is scheduled to end in December 2003.8 This system once contained antipersonnel

5 The Conference was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Defense and the Organization of American States (OAS). See http://hdic.jmu.edu/conferences/latinamerica/.
mines but since 1996 the U.S. has been manufacturing and exporting (to the United Kingdom) a version only containing antivehicle mines.

**Alternatives to Antipersonnel Landmines**

Although plans and funding levels for the three tracks of the landmine alternatives program were published in the February 2002 Presidential Budget request for fiscal year (FY) 2003, the outcome of the policy review and its impact on the alternatives program was not known as of July 2002.\(^9\) The available numbers, however, show decreasing emphasis on the program. A year ago, fiscal year 2001 expenditures were estimated at $101, but actual expenditures came in at $72 million; the request for fiscal year 2002 was $99 million a year ago, but it is now estimated at $63 million. The nine-year total for the entire alternatives program is now estimated at $608 million, which is a severe reduction from $820 million estimated last year. The request for funding of the landmine alternatives program is detailed in the following table (all figures in millions of U.S. dollars):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>FY 99 actual</th>
<th>FY 00 actual</th>
<th>FY 01 actual</th>
<th>FY 02 est.</th>
<th>FY 03 req.</th>
<th>FY 04</th>
<th>FY 05</th>
<th>FY 06</th>
<th>FY 07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Track 1 RADAM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.187</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>23.100</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 1 NSD-A</td>
<td>13.856</td>
<td>14.834</td>
<td>36.088</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>28.300</td>
<td>10.000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 2 Self Healing Minefield, Tags</td>
<td>6.971</td>
<td>6.971</td>
<td>10.522</td>
<td>9.281</td>
<td>2.000</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 3 Mixed Systems Alternative</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22.879</td>
<td>26.207</td>
<td>32.000</td>
<td>32.000</td>
<td>68.200</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>101.80</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track 3 Component Technologies</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19.054</td>
<td>2.292</td>
<td>2.934</td>
<td>4.867</td>
<td>7.753</td>
<td>7.949</td>
<td>8.062</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>20.827</td>
<td>49.046</td>
<td>71.879</td>
<td>62.518</td>
<td>65.234</td>
<td>44.934</td>
<td>75.953</td>
<td>107.95</td>
<td>109.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RADAM would be a new artillery-delivered projectile combining existing ADAM antipersonnel mines and existing RAAMS antivehicle mines. The total number of RADAM to be manufactured has been reduced from 337,000 to 48,000 in the FY 2003 budget request. There are reports in the military news media that the Army intends to cancel the RADAM program.\(^11\) It is unknown if initial production has gone forward in light of the ongoing landmine policy review.

NSD-A (Non-Self-Destructing antipersonnel mine Alternative) aims at replacement for so-called dumb mines. The decision whether to include a controversial “battlefield override” feature that allows NSD-A to function in a target (victim) activated mode is dependent on the landmine policy review. A $1.1 million contract was awarded to Textron Systems Corporation (Wilmington,

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\(^9\) U.S. government fiscal years (FY) begin on the first day of October in the previous calendar year and end on the last day of September of the current calendar year. Fiscal Year 2001 is 1 October 2000 to 30 September 2001.


Massachusetts) on 9 May 2002 and a $1.0 million contract was awarded to Alliant Techsystems (Plymouth Minnesota) on 13 May 2002 to continue “risk reduction efforts” for the NSD-A. 

Funding for Track 2, a longer-term search for innovative maneuver denial technologies, continues. An $816,179 development contract was awarded in September 2001 to the Foster-Miller Company (Waltham, Massachusetts) for a tactical self-healing munition. Three other contracts, each for amounts just under $100,000, were awarded in late June and early July 2002 to the Ensign-Bickford Aerospace and Defense Company (Simsbury, Connecticut), Quantum Mechanics (San Diego, California), and Ball Aerospace and Technologies (Bloomfield, Colorado).

In its November 2001 recommendations for the mine policy review the Pentagon also proposed abandoning Track 3 of the alternatives program – the search for alternatives for so-called mixed systems that contain both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

Transfer

The United States exported over 5.5 million antipersonnel mines to 38 countries between 1969 and 1992. Of this total, 4.14 million were non-self-destructing mines and approximately 80,000 were self-destructing mines. The remaining 1.36 million were Claymore mines. Antipersonnel mines manufactured by the United States are found in the ground in at least 28 countries.

U.S. law has prohibited the transfer of antipersonnel mines since 23 October 1992. The legislative mechanism for the export prohibition is scheduled to expire on 23 October 2003. The Clinton Administration announced in January 1997 that the U.S. “will observe a permanent ban on the export and transfer of APL.” The Bush Administration has made no comment about future antipersonnel mine export policy.

The United States transferred 180 U.S.-manufactured M-14 antipersonnel mines to Canada for use in development and testing of personal protective equipment for deminers. It is not known if an interpretation or understanding of the 1992 Mine Export Moratorium exists to permit the transfer of antipersonnel mines for research and development purposes. Inquires sent in May 2002 to Department of State and Department of Defense officials about this matter were not answered. Additionally, Ecuador transferred 1,644 antipersonnel mines to the United States Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division (Indian Head, Maryland).

16 Human Rights Watch obtained this information in August 1994 through a Freedom of Information Act request to the Defense Security Assistance Agency and U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command concerning U.S. landmine deliveries under the Foreign Military Sales Program and Military Assistance Program. These figures do not include direct commercial sales.
17 Mine Export Moratorium, Public Law 102-484, Section 1365; 22 United States Code, 2778 note.
New information that came to light in 2001 also raises a question about the legality of a potential transfer of U.S. mines to South Korea. In the event of renewed hostilities in Korea, the United States plans to transfer more than 560,000 M14 and M16 non-self-destructing (“dumb”) mines that are stockpiled in South Korea to the ROK Army, for their immediate deployment (see below).22

As published in July 2001 in the fiscal year 2000 “655 report” required under the Foreign Assistance Act, the Department of State approved a direct commercial sale of $218,339 (license value) of “Mines Anti-Personnel” to Israel. The State Department corrected this entry in September 2001 to read “Mine Anti-Tank.”23

Stockpiling

The United States has the third largest stockpile of antipersonnel mines in the world. The U.S. stockpiles approximately 11.2 million antipersonnel mines, including about 10 million self-destructing mines and 1.2 million “dumb” mines. This stockpile contains nine different types of antipersonnel mines: ADAM, 9,516,744; Gator (Air Force), 237,556; Gator (Navy), 49,845; M87 Volcano, 107,160; MOPMS, 9,184; PDM, 16,148; GEMSS, 76,071; M14, 670,000; M16, 553,537.24 In addition, over 970,000 Claymore mines are stockpiled. These numbers, first reported in 1999, may be somewhat smaller now since antipersonnel mines are routinely destroyed as they reach the end of their operational shelf life. For example, Germany reports destroying 36,351 U.S. GEMSS mines and 38,959 M18A1 Claymore mines in 2001.25

In December 2001, Human Rights Watch revealed that nearly half of the non self-destructing “dumb” antipersonnel mines retained by the United States for use in Korea are actually stored in the United States.26 According to information provided by the U.S. Army Material Command in response to a Freedom of Information Act request, 45 percent of the 1.2 million long-lasting “dumb” (non-self-destructing) antipersonnel mines retained for use in Korea are stored at depots in the continental U.S. Another 50 percent are in Korea, but at the onset of conflict will be handed over to South Korean troops for their use. The United States earmarks only the remaining five percent of the mines for immediate use by U.S. troops in South Korea. (See Landmine Monitor country entry for Republic of Korea for additional details).

Stockpiles outside the U.S.

The United States stores antipersonnel mines on the territory of 12 states: South Korea (1.67 million), Norway (123,000), Japan (115,000), Germany (112,000), Saudi Arabia (50,000), Qatar (11,000), United Kingdom at Diego Garcia (10,000), Kuwait (8,900), Oman (6,200), Bahrain (3,200), Greece (1,100), and Turkey (1,100).

Five nations with U.S. antipersonnel mines stockpiles are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: Germany, Japan, Norway, Qatar, and UK. Greece, a treaty signatory, and Turkey have jointly initiated the procedures to become States Parties. U.S. antipersonnel mine stockpiles have been removed from Italy and Spain. Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom do not consider the U.S. mine stockpiles to be under their jurisdiction or control, and thus not subject to the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty or their national implementation measures. Norway, through a bilateral
agreement with the U.S., has stipulated the mines must be removed by 1 March 2003, which is the
deadline for Norway to comply with its Mine Ban Treaty Article 4 obligation for destruction of
antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction and control.

For the first time, Qatar responded to requests for clarification on this issue stating, “As for
the legality of the joint operations with non-signatories relating to stock-pile, use of antipersonnel
mines or transporting or transiting them, we assure you the that the Qatari Armed Forces never practise [sic] any of these acts.”

It is not known if this policy equally applies to Qatari nationals employed in the operation or maintenance of the storage facilities as part of a joint venture formed with DynCorp (Reston, Virginia), the company that maintains U.S. munitions under contract in Qatar.

Use

There is no evidence that the United States has used antipersonnel mines in its combat
operations in Afghanistan or in its military operations in other states. It is not known whether U.S.
forces deployed to Afghanistan with antipersonnel mines or their delivery systems. An unidentified combat engineer unit of the 307th Engineer Battalion of the 82nd Airborne Division is reportedly deployed at Kandahar. In 1999, similar engineer units were deployed to Albania with antipersonnel mines and their delivery systems (MOPMS and Volcano mixed mine systems) as part of Task Force Hawk to support operations in Kosovo. Additionally, U.S. Special Operations Forces have one type of antipersonnel mine at their disposal: the Pursuit Deterrent Munition (PDM). According to the U.S. Army's Field Manual on mine warfare, “the PDM is used as a deterrent by special-operations forces (SOF) and in operations where units may be pursued by an enemy force.”

Mine Action Coordination

When the Bush Administration entered office, the policy coordination mechanism for
international mine action assistance changed as follows:

National Security Policy Directive 1 (NSPD 1), dated February 14, 2001, replaced the
previous Interagency working group (IWG) format with...the PCC [Policy Coordination Committee] Sub-Group on Humanitarian Mine Action. Chaired by the
NSC, it functions as a policy vetting and review body within a larger NSC PCC entitled Democracy, Human Rights, and International Operations. The PCC Sub-Group on Humanitarian Mine Action consists of representatives from the National Security Council (Chair), the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Central Intelligence Agency.
In another change, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr. was named the Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Mine Action on 30 November 2001. This includes responsibility for mine ban policy, as well as mine action. He replaces Ambassador Donald Steinberg who assumed the post of Deputy Director for Policy Planning in the State Department. The Office of Global Humanitarian Demining was renamed the Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships and is now located within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.\textsuperscript{32}

Mine Action Funding

In fiscal year 2001, the United States provided $81.8 million in funding to international mine action programs. The U.S. remains the largest country donor worldwide. The total for FY 2001 was significantly less than the previous year, which was $100.6 million. The decline reflects less DoD funding for its mine action activities (minus $12.3 million) and its demining research and development programs (minus $5.6 million). Contributions to the Slovenian International Trust Fund also decreased somewhat (minus $1.3 million), while State Department funding increased slightly (plus $0.3 million).

The estimated total budget for humanitarian mine action funding for FY 2002 is $92.7 million. The funding request for FY 2003 is $83.3 million.

The U.S. has provided approximately $468 million in mine action assistance between fiscal years 1993 and 2001, of which almost $94 million was for Defense Department demining research and development.\textsuperscript{33} These figures do not include funding for mine victim assistance programs because the U.S. government does not identify mine victim-specific funding as opposed to more general war victim assistance. But the Leahy War Victims Fund, which provides aid to mine victims, totaled $71 million from FY1989-2001, including $10 million in FY 2001.


\textsuperscript{33} Landmine Monitor calculates its cumulative total of U.S. humanitarian mine action funding using audited budget materials submitted to Congress. It does not include the estimate of the current fiscal year’s spending or the amount of funding requested by the President for the next fiscal years budget, which at the time of publication for fiscal year 2003 has not been appropriated by Congress, into the aggregate total. This total also does not include funding for survivor assistance programs. (See section on Survivor Assistance for further details). Landmine Monitor’s knowledge is limited regarding some programs within the U.S. Government, like those within the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), that have some element of mine action included within a larger international assistance program, but are not identified as such or receive specific mine action appropriations.
The number of countries receiving U.S. mine action funding has risen from seven in 1993 to 38 in 2001. During 2001, Guinea-Bissau was added to the program after completion of a policy assessment visit in March 2001. Chad’s “under review” status was removed.

**Assistance to Afghanistan**

The U.S. will increase mine action assistance to Afghanistan in FY 2002 by providing an additional $11.5 million in immediate assistance, including expertise in clearing new types of UXO resulting from the Coalition bombing. Between fiscal years 1989 and 2001, the U.S. provided approximately $28 million in mine action funding to Afghanistan through the UN Mine Action Program for Afghanistan (MAPA) and its implementing partners. All of the additional assistance has either been requested by or coordinated through the UN MAPA. The Department of State will provide $7 million, a combination of the annual NADR appropriation with the addition of emergency funding. The HALO Trust will receive $3.2 million to hire, train, equip, and employ 800 additional mine clearance and logistics personnel. A total of $30,000 will be used to provide an on-site technical advisor from the State Department’s Office of Humanitarian Demining to the UN MAPA in Islamabad. Another $3.1 million will be used to fund 15 personnel from the RONCO Consulting Corporation (a commercial demining firm) for a period of six months to train local deminers with training in unfamiliar ordnance that has not been previously encountered in Afghanistan. These technical advisors from RONCO will be attached to each of the five regional mine action centers in Afghanistan. These funds will also be used to provide equipment to local mine action organizations. A total of $700,000 will be granted to UNICEF to fund the mine risk education activities of Save the Children (U.S.) and local Afghan NGO. Additionally, the Department of Defense will transfer $3.7 million to the Department of State for contractors to clear mines and UXO around certain airfields and also provide $38,000 for mine risk education.

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37 The $3 million represents the emergency appropriation part of a $7 million FY 2002 increase for mine action in Afghanistan.
materials. The U.S. Center for Disease Control will also provide $800,000 for a post-conflict contamination assessment.\footnote{U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Humanitarian Demining Assistance to Afghanistan,” 30 July 2002.}

Though not formally part of the U.S. assistance program to Afghanistan, U.S. forces operating there are conducting “area clearance” of mines and UXO they encounter in their area of operations.\footnote{“Area clearance” is a military mission for explosive ordnance disposal by specially trained engineer units to protect troops by clearing explosive hazards in their immediate area of operations. It is not humanitarian mine action.} Military units from Denmark, France, Jordan, Norway, Poland, and the United Kingdom are also engaged in this type of mine and UXO clearance, which is different from humanitarian mine clearance.

\textbf{Department of State Programs}

Funding for most of the programs administered by the Department of State are provided annually by the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs (NADR) appropriation and can be used to support mine clearance programs of individual countries, international organizations, or can be transferred to other agencies. The State Department support to mine action is often used to augment training programs executed by the Department of Defense.

The countries/regions that received NADR mine action funding and the amount of assistance provided in FY 2001 are presented in the following table.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Recipients of State Department NADR Mine Action Funding (US$), FY 2001}\textsuperscript{42}
\end{center}

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{lll}
Afghanistan & 2,800,000 & Mauritania & 400,000 \\
Angola & 2,844,000 & Mozambique & 2,180,000 \\
Armenia & 850,000 & Namibia & 40,000 \\
Azerbaijan & 1,100,000 & OAS\textsuperscript{43} & 1,350,000 \\
Cambodia & 2,468,208 & Oman & 273,000 \\
Chad & 300,000 & Peru & 861,000 \\
Djibouti & 400,000 & Rwanda & 400,000 \\
Ecuador & 963,000 & Somalia & 1,400,000 \\
Eritrea & 1,050,000 & Thailand & 1,270,000 \\
Georgia & 1,000,000 & Vietnam & 1,650,000 \\
Guinea Bissau & 488,837 & Yemen & 1,022,895 \\
Jordan & 947,000 & Zambia & 700,000 \\
Laos & 993,000 & Zimbabwe & 594,901 \\
Lebanon & 1,000,000 & & \\
\end{tabular}
\end{center}

A proportion of NADR funding is channeled through an Integrated Mine Action Support (IMAS) contract to a team of companies led by the RONCO Consulting Corporation, while other funding is provided to international organizations (UN and OAS), NGOs, or, when local procurements are required, directly to the U.S. Embassy in the recipient state. NGOs conducting mine clearance and survey that receive U.S. funding include Asian Landmine Solutions, Golden West Humanitarian Foundation, HALO Trust, HUMAID, Humpty Dumpty Institute, James Madison University’s Mine Action Information Center, Marshall Legacy Institute, Menschen

\textsuperscript{41} “Area clearance” is a military mission for explosive ordnance disposal by specially trained engineer units to protect troops by clearing explosive hazards in their immediate area of operations. It is not humanitarian mine action.
\textsuperscript{43} Organization of American States (OAS) program includes efforts in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
In FY 2001, State Department NADR demining assistance was distributed to the following
types of activities in programs in these countries (see individual country reports for details): 44

- **Mine Detection and Clearance:** Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Ecuador, 
  Eritrea, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Mozambique, OAS, Peru, Somalia (Somaliland), 
  Thailand, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
- **Mine Detecting Dogs:** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Mozambique, OAS, and 
  Thailand.
- **Equipment and Supplies:** Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, Djibouti, Ecuador, 
  Ethiopia, Jordan, Laos, Mauritania, OAS, Oman, Peru, Rwanda, Thailand, Vietnam, 
  Yemen, Zimbabwe.
- **Support and Sustainment (including training) to National Demining Offices/Mine 
  Action Centers:** Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Ecuador, Lebanon, Mauritania, 
  Mozambique, Peru, Yemen, Zambia.
- **Mine Risk Education:** Angola, Armenia, Eritrea, Namibia, OAS, Rwanda.
- **Landmine Impact Surveys:** Afghanistan, Armenia, Eritrea, Vietnam.

**Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF)**

Funded from the NADR appropriation and established in 2001 by the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, the QRDF is intended to rapidly reply to emergency demining situations worldwide. This unit is based in Mozambique and conducts mine clearance there when not deployed. It consists of mine detecting dog and manual clearance teams trained by the RONCO Consulting Corporation. In early April 2002 part of the QRDF was sent to Sri Lanka to undertake short-term assessment, survey and clearance tasks.45 Later in April 2002, other elements of the QRDF were deployed to the Nuba Mountain region of Sudan to perform a similar short-term survey and clearance mission.46

**Slovenian International Trust Fund (ITF)**

While not funded through the NADR appropriation, the United States has provided funding for mine action activities for programs in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo), and Macedonia by providing funding and matching contributions to the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, based in Slovenia. Congress initially funded the program with $28 million in 1998 and stipulated that the U.S. contribution would be used to match contributions to the ITF by other governments and private donors.47 The Congress approved another $14 million matching contribution in March 2002. The Department of State’s Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs administers U.S. contributions to the ITF.

**Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships**

The State Department’s Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships (PM/MAIP), formerly known as the Office of Global Humanitarian Demining, develops a network of public-private partnerships to reinforce U.S. government mine action aims. Currently, nearly 30 (mostly

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45 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Demining Assistance to Sri Lanka,” 2 April 2002


U.S.) organizations (NGOs, international organizations, civic associations, academic institutions, and corporations) work in parallel with the U.S. government on various aspects of mine action. Some partnership groups have received financial support for mine action initiatives that further U.S. government humanitarian demining objectives and all receive publicity and benefit from PM/MAIP’s public support. PM/MAIP’s other functions are to strengthen internal U.S. government mechanisms for mine action through the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), UNMAS, and the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining, and to advocate promising demining technologies.

PM/MAIP estimates that at least 250,000 U.S. citizens have contributed to mine action, with about 170,000 of them donating directly to the mine action programs through nine of PM/MAIP’s partner organizations. Some of PM/MAIP’s public-private partners have been funded by the Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, including the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA) and its Adopt-A-Minefield program, Warner Brothers, the HALO Trust, the Polus Center for Social and Economic Development, and Global Care Unlimited. Grapes for Humanity, a Canadian NGO, is the program’s first foreign partner.48

**Department of Defense Programs**

The Department of Defense humanitarian mine action program is funded annually from the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) appropriation. The office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations (formerly Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs) provides funding guidance and oversight of the budget, while the Defense Security Cooperation Agency executes the funding according to policy guidance. The assistance is based on a “train-the-trainer” program, which also benefits U.S. Special Operations Forces and advances broader U.S. foreign policy interests.49 U.S. military forces are not permitted to engage in physically detecting, lifting, or destroying landmines, unless the member does so for the purpose of supporting a U.S. military operation, or provides such assistance as part of a military operation that does not involve the armed forces.50 The program must also comply with a law that requires human rights vetting of all foreign military personnel to be trained by the U.S.

According to the Department of Defense, the philosophy behind the program is three-fold: “(1) assist other countries in eliminating the danger posed by the indiscriminate use of landmines; (2) through training, provide host countries an indigenous capacity to demine areas critical to economic development, resettlement of refugees or internally displaced persons; and (3) through training, develop the host countries capacity to either demine or train other mine-affected countries in the region to demine critical areas.”51 U.S. policy is to train deminers in the techniques and practices for in-place demolition and destruction of the mines, which avoids the costs and risks of conducting “Render Safe” actions, and prevents the reintroduction of antipersonnel mines into the market or for other uses.52

During FY 2001, the Department of Defense conducted training missions in the following areas:

- **Southern Command (12 training weeks)**
  - Central America – One training mission training 40 deminers

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49 Information provided by the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, 14 February 2002.

50 Title 10, United States Code, Section 401.

51 Information provided by the office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, 14 February 2002.

52 Ibid.
- Ecuador – One training mission training 40 deminers
- Peru – One training mission training 35 deminers

Pacific Command (14 training weeks)
- Cambodia – One training mission training 30 deminers
- Thailand – One training mission training 20 deminers
- Vietnam – One training mission training 10 deminers

European Command (8 training weeks)
- Estonia – One training mission training 20 deminers
- Mauritania – One training mission training 30 deminers

Central Command (28 training weeks)
- Djibouti – One training mission training 40 deminers
- Egypt – One training mission training 50 deminers
- Eritrea – One training mission training 20 deminers
- Ethiopia – One training mission training 20 deminers
- Jordan – One training mission training 25 deminers
- Oman – One training mission training 40 deminers
- Yemen – One training mission training 5 deminers

In previous years, the Department of Defense conducted training in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, Namibia, Rwanda, Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Chad, Laos, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lebanon, and Mozambique. In the 32 countries in which the Department of Defense has deployed trainers since FY 94, over 4,000 deminers have been trained.

Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining Research and Development

The Department of Defense has been conducting humanitarian demining technology research and development activities since 1995. The amount spent on this activity between FY 1995 and FY 2001 totals almost $94 million, including $12.61 million spent in FY 2001. The estimated budget for FY 2002 is $13.5 million and $13.3 million has been requested for FY 2003. The program provides funding and program management for testing and modifying existing technology and equipment for immediate use in U.S. demining assistance programs. This includes “leveraging existing technology from the tactical countermine area.”

Assistance from this program has been provided to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, Chile, Croatia, Cuba (Guantanamo Bay), Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Israel, Jordan, Kosovo, Laos, Lebanon, Namibia, Nicaragua, and Thailand.

In FY 2001, efforts continued in protective gear for deminers, minefield marking and mapping systems and survey equipment, vegetation clearing devices, in-situ neutralization devices, mine awareness training materials, and mechanical clearance equipment for area clearance and quality assurance purposes. Site surveys and country assessments were conducted in FY 2001 in Croatia, Israel, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Oman, Thailand, and Yemen to provide advice on the use of items developed under this program.

The U.S. is part of the International Test and Evaluation Program and “completed all technical testing and field evaluations under the International Pilot Project Technology Cooperation Project and published the final report quantifying the performance of all commercially available handheld metal detectors.”

56 Ibid.
Landmine Casualties

In 2001, there were seven known mine casualties, none of them fatal, to U.S. military personnel. Three U.S. Marines were injured on 16 December 2001 at their base near Kandahar in Afghanistan when one of them stepped on a mine. One of the Marines had his foot amputated.\(^\text{57}\) A U.S. Army soldier lost a foot after stepping on a mine during demining operations at Bagram airport in Afghanistan on 18 December 2001.\(^\text{58}\) The explosion injured another soldier. As previously noted in \textit{Landmine Monitor Report 2001}, two U.S. Army soldiers, one in Kosovo and the other in South Korea, were wounded after stepping on antipersonnel mines in May and June 2001.\(^\text{59}\)

In the first half of 2002, \textit{Landmine Monitor} recorded two U.S. military mine casualties (as of 31 July 2002): A member of a naval special operations unit was killed and another injured after one of them stepped on a mine while on training mission near Kandahar.\(^\text{60}\)

Survivor Assistance

U.S. government funding for landmine survivor assistance is distributed through the Patrick J. Leahy War Victims Fund (WVF), administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development. The WVF provides prosthetic devices for victims who have lost limbs because of landmines and other war-related injuries. Between fiscal year 1989 and fiscal year 2001, the WVF has provided $71 million in support to eighteen projects for victims of war in fifteen countries: Angola, Cambodia, OAS (El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua), Ethiopia, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Vietnam.\(^\text{61}\) The WVF received $10 million in fiscal year 2001.

\textit{Landmine Monitor} has identified 14 private organizations in the U.S. that fund or operate survivor assistance programs in mine-affected countries: ADRA International, American Red Cross, American Refugee Committee, Clear Path International, Center for International Rehabilitation, Health Volunteers Overseas, International Rescue Committee, Landmine Survivors Network, Peace Trees Vietnam, Project RENEW (Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund), Refugee Relief International, Save the Children-USA, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, and the World Rehabilitation Fund. Some rely entirely on private charitable sources. Most are using a mix of private and public funds in their programs. The biggest source of public funds is USAID through the WVF. Some organizations in the U.S. raise funds and then pool resources at an international level to support programs that may or may not be administered from the original U.S. group.

In October 2001, the “International Disability and Victims of Landmines, Civil Strife and Warfare Assistance Act of 2001,” passed the House International Relations Committee by unanimous consent.\(^\text{62}\) The legislation, which as of July 2002 was awaiting action by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, seeks to expand the authority of USAID and the Department of Health and Human Services to provide assistance to individuals with disabilities, including victims of landmines and other civil strife and warfare.

\(^{57}\) “U.S. Marine Loses Foot in Blast,” \textit{Associated Press} (Kandahar), 17 December 2001.


\(^{62}\) On 26 October 2001, House Representatives Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Frank Wolf (R-VA) introduced H.R. 3169. On 5 December 2001, Senator Hillary Rodham-Clinton (D-NY) introduced S. 1777, together with Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and Arlen Specter (R-PA).
UZBEKISTAN

Key developments since May 2001: Uzbekistan continued laying mines on its border with Tajikistan at least until June 2001. Uzbekistan declared demining by Kyrgyzstan in disputed border areas illegal. Subsequently, Uzbek and Kyrgyz authorities agreed that new mine laying in certain regions would not be allowed. In 2001, there were at least 28 new landmine casualties in Uzbekistan.

Mine Ban Policy

Uzbekistan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It was absent during the vote in November 2001 on United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M supporting the Mine Ban Treaty, and previously abstained from voting on the corresponding resolutions in 2000 and 1999. Uzbekistan did not attend, as an observer, the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, nor did it attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in January or May 2002.

Uzbekistan is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its original Protocol II on mines, but has not ratified CCW Amended Protocol II.

Use

Uzbekistan has in recent years laid landmines on its borders with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan. There have been no confirmed instances of landmine use by Uzbekistan since June 2001, although a media report in March 2002 included a claim “by a government source” that Uzbekistan would “continue mining its borders.” Uzbekistan has justified use of antipersonnel mines on its borders as a defense against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) rebel group and to prevent drug traffickers and weapons traders from entering Uzbek territory.1

There has been criticism of Uzbekistan for its use of antipersonnel mines. In 2001, the head of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in Tajikistan publicly criticized Uzbekistan for laying mines in border areas, but following a strong reaction by Uzbekistan, the decision was taken to address the issue at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna.3 The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) raised the issue of the use of mines with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in early 2001, and while the government took note of concerns, the minister stressed Uzbekistan’s need to defend its borders.4 In June 2001 during a visit to Uzbekistan, the head of the United States Central Command, General Tommy Franks, reportedly indirectly admonished Uzbekistan for its use of mines, arguing that a State has the right to defense, but has to try to decrease the risk to civil society of military operations.5

Uzbekistan is reported to have used landmines in close proximity to, and, in some cases, within civilian areas. An assessment mission conducted on behalf of UNICEF in mid-2001 identified Uzbek-laid antipersonnel mines in unharvested crop land near the Tajik village of Tavokblok. The report of the mission, carried out by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), states that laying mines in unharvested fields “does not respect the principles of international humanitarian law.”6 A farmer was reportedly killed by a mine in his own wheat field.

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4 Ibid., p. 32.
Uzbekistan’s borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan remain in dispute; consequently, the location of the Uzbek landmines is also contested. Tajikistan claims that Uzbek antipersonnel mines have been laid up to 500 meters inside Tajik territory.\(^7\) An official in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken administration says Uzbekistan placed its mines 200-500 meters inside Kyrgyz territory.\(^8\)

Uzbekistan’s entire 130-mile border with Afghanistan is reportedly mined and protected by a 380-volt electric fence, according to journalists and residents who live near the border.\(^9\)

**Tajikistan Border**

Uzbekistan began to mine its border areas with Tajikistan, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, in 2000 and continued mining until at least the end of June 2001.\(^10\) One report has alleged that Uzbek border guards “rearranged” a number of mines along the border with Tajikistan in early 2002.\(^11\)

According to one press report, between 70 and 100 percent of the Tajik-Uzbek border is mined.\(^12\) Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Defense claims that all minefields are marked clearly and that it has informed the Tajik government of their location.\(^13\) However, the GICHD mission concluded that Uzbekistan has so far only sporadically marked minefields laid by its armed forces.\(^14\) The US State Department has reported that Uzbek mine-laying along the border with Tajikistan “included some populated areas and is not demarcated clearly in most places.”\(^15\)

**Kyrgyzstan Border**

Uzbek border guards reportedly began mining Kyrgyz border areas some time in 1999.\(^16\) Uzbek minefields are emplaced around the overwhelmingly Tajik enclave of Sokh in the southern Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, around the Shakhi-Mardan enclave, and along the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border areas in the Farghona valley.

The presence of two types of mines has been established so far: the PMN blast mine and the OZM-72 bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine.\(^17\) In addition, the Kyrgyz Army has claimed that in a number of instances, Uzbeks laid mines on top of other mines, thus acting as an anti-lift device to prevent demining.\(^18\)

The Uzbek Ministry of Defense claims, as in the case of Tajikistan, that minefields are clearly marked and that it told Kyrgyzstan of their locations.\(^19\) Kyrgyzstan asserts Uzbekistan did not inform it of the mine-laying, did not post signs to ensure visibility of the mines, and did not, as of January 2002, provide them with maps of the mined areas.\(^20\) The GICHD mission on behalf of UNICEF noted that “only limited efforts have been made [by Uzbekistan] to mark the mined

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\(^7\) Ibid., p. 17.
\(^12\) *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, (NGA No. 186), 5 October 2001, p. 5.
\(^18\) Ibid.
areas,” and that a Kyrgyz demining team reports only to have seen marking signs in a couple of places.21

The Kyrgyz Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs said that by January 2002, Kyrgyzstan had sent seven notes of protest “demanding that demining take place [by Uzbekistan] and that maps of minefields be granted.”22 The Press Secretary of the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Uzbekistan responded as follows: “The mined areas are erected against possible incursions by armed rebel groups and against threats to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan.”23

Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling

In a 31 July 2001 letter to Landmine Monitor, Uzbekistan’s Ambassador to the United States stated that Uzbekistan “neither produces nor does it intend to produce landmines...nor does it transfer landmines.”24 A stockpile of antipersonnel mines, size and composition unknown, was inherited upon the dissolution of the USSR. Uzbekistan is using former Soviet Union OZM-72 bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mines and PMN blast mines along its borders, and there are reports of use of POMZ fragmentation mines as well.25

Mine Clearance

According to media reports in 2002, Uzbek officials have no plans to clear mines laid along its borders with Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Kyrgyzstan.26 There have been some reports of limited clearance by the Uzbek Army.27

Kyrgyzstan began demining border areas with Uzbekistan in June 2001, and cleared a total of 32 hectares (320,000 square meters) of border territory.28 Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Defense subsequently claimed that the Kyrgyz mine clearance operations were illegal, arguing the land cleared was Uzbek territory. Two high-ranking military commanders from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan met in an attempt to resolve the dispute. They agreed that any additional mining of the Chon-Kara and Batken regions of the Kyrgyz Republic would not be allowed, and that mine clearing shall only occur after the agreement of the two commanders.29

(See Landmine Monitor country reports on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan for information on their mine clearance activities on the Uzbek border.)

Mine Risk Education

Uzbekistan is not believed to have any formal mine risk education programs. In 2001, Uzbek border guards reportedly had villagers from Vadigan sign statements that they would avoid the mountains and look out for mine warning signs.30

An association of Afghan war veterans, the Union of International Warriors, has conducted mine risk education for 120 children in summer camps in the Bostarlik region. The director of the

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23 Ibid.
26 See, for example, Malik Mansur, “Uzbekistan,” Institute For War and Peace Reporting, 22 March 2002.
28 Interview with Colonel Daniar Izbasarov, Head of the Engineers Unit, Ministry of Defense, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 9 February 2002.
29 Ibid.
The Union of International Warriors says it uses “professional deminers with pedagogical skills,” and the training lasts approximately three to four days. Children are taught to recognize mines using films, and are given practical training in what to do in case they encounter a mine. According to the GICHD, the program appears to include instruction on marking mines, which, according to international guidelines, should never be taught to children, and on retracing footsteps, which in most circumstances is not appropriate.32

Landmine Casualties and Survivor Assistance

There are no publicly available official statistics on landmine casualties in Uzbekistan, making an accurate assessment of new casualties impossible. However, data from various sources give an indication of the magnitude of the problem. In 2001, according to the US Department of State, at least twenty civilians were killed by landmines in Uzbekistan.33 According to the head of the Union of International Warriors, there were 28 new mine casualties, six of whom were children, in 2001.34 Of these casualties, it is not known how many people were killed in the incidents. In July 2001, the chief of a border guard’s outpost stated that there were sometimes “daily” casualties among the civilian population.35 In March 2002, it was reported that unofficial sources put the number of mine casualties in Uzbekistan at several dozen.36 Livestock and other animals have also been killed by landmines.37 The majority of Uzbek mine casualties occur along border areas with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

In April 2001, three young men were killed by a landmine while searching for a lost cow.38 Since July 2001, four Uzbek soldiers were reportedly killed and another 14 injured in landmine incidents in the Uzbek-Tajik border area, however, the President’s office denied any knowledge of these incidents.39 Landmine Monitor has not received any information on landmine casualties along Uzbekistan’s mined border with Afghanistan.

Little is known about health care facilities in Uzbekistan, but it is not believed to offer special assistance to mine survivors or their families. There is a national prosthetics center, which is reportedly not functioning efficiently, and a Korean organization, New Hope, which is fitting prostheses free of charge. The Union of International Warriors is said to be considering sending amputees to Moscow for artificial limb-fitting.40

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38 Beat up your own people so that others will be afraid? Uzbek villagers die in the time of peace because of landmines, PRIMA news agency, 2 July 2001.
VIETNAM

Key developments since May 2001: Mine action activities by non-governmental organizations continue to expand, including outside of Quang Tri province for the first time. The national Landmine/UXO Impact Survey has not yet begun.

Mine Ban Policy

Vietnam has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It abstained from voting on the pro-mine ban UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M in November 2001. Vietnam did not send an observer to the Third Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in September 2001, though it had the previous year. It did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.

Vietnam did, however, participate in a number of regional landmine meetings. It attended the Regional Seminar on Stockpile Destruction of Anti-Personnel Mines and Other Munitions, held in Malaysia on 8-9 August 2001. It also participated in the regional seminar, Landmines in Southeast Asia, hosted by Thailand from 13–15 May 2002. Vietnam’s delegate gave a presentation on mine clearance and technologies, and stated, “We are seriously studying the Ottawa Convention.” It also attended an informal ASEAN meeting on landmines held in Geneva on the margins of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in January 2002.


Production, Transfer, Stockpiling, and Use

Ministry of Defense (MoD) officials would not discuss production or stockpiling issues with Landmine Monitor. There has been no indication that the government has changed its policy not to export antipersonnel mines to other countries. There is no evidence of recent use of landmines in Vietnam, although MoD officials will not comment.

Landmine and UXO Problem

In 2002, the government re-stated its earlier estimate that around 16,478 million square meters of land remain contaminated by landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) leftover from the Vietnam War. This estimate, which equates to about five percent of Vietnam’s land, was first made in 1998; apparently no new aggregate figures have been compiled by the government since then. At the regional landmine seminar in Bangkok in May 2002, Vietnam gave a presentation estimating that US$4 to 5 billion will be required to clear all the mines and UXO and that the work will take several decades.

Surveys and Assessment

In November 2000, the US State Department signed an agreement with the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) to conduct a nationwide Landmine Impact Survey in Vietnam. The State Department has conditionally pledged US$6 million for the project, which is estimated to

1 Oral remarks. Notes taken by ICBL Coordinator Elizabeth Bernstein.
take three years once started.\(^7\) As of July 2002, VVAF was still involved in negotiations with Vietnam’s Ministry of Defense, the national implementing partner for the project, in order to agree on a final project document and implementation plan to be presented to, and approved by, the office of the Prime Minister.\(^8\) Once approved, a pilot survey will be carried out in three provinces, followed by a regional survey, and then expansion to a national level survey involving all 61 provinces.\(^9\)

According to Dr. Guy Rhodes, Landmine Impact Survey Project Manager at VVAF, the focus of the survey will be: (1) to record the location of mine and UXO contamination, and (2) to evaluate the socioeconomic impact of the contamination. Vietnam’s MoD has particularly emphasized the location element of the project as a principal objective of the survey, including density evaluations and ordnance types where appropriate.\(^10\) The field-collected survey data will be stored using the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) computer database. The survey data will be linked to archive data from the Vietnam War, generated by the Indochina Bomb Data Project.\(^11\)

The Vietnamese organization, RENEW, in conjunction with the People’s Committee of Quang Tri and the Youth Union, was granted permission in July 2001 by the office of the Prime Minister to conduct a baseline community impact survey in Trieu Phong district. RENEW is currently collaborating with researchers from the University of Hue to design a comprehensive community impact survey that will aim to collect data on a number of issues including landmine/UXO incident statistics and community development impact. RENEW is optimistic that it will begin implementing the survey before the end of the 2002 calendar year.\(^12\) RENEW will receive both technical and financial support for the implementation of this survey from some NGOs, including the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Asia Landmine Solutions, and OXFAM Hong Kong, as well as UNICEF.\(^13\)

**Mine/UXO Clearance**

According to information provided by various organizations to Landmine Monitor, about 3,835 million square meters of land were cleared in Vietnam from 1999-2001, not including clearance by the Vietnamese Army. The national priorities for clearance remain in support of major infrastructure and commercial development projects.\(^14\)

*The Vietnamese Army.* The Ministry of Defense engineer units continued active clearance efforts in association with construction or engineering projects such as bridges, dams, highways, and seaports, but little specific information is available. Notably, clearance continued related to the construction of the Ho Chi Minh (HCM) national highway.\(^15\) According to media reports, Vietnamese soldiers working on the project defused 18,513 individual items of ordnance, including

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\(^7\) As of March 2002, VVAF had received US$1.7 million from the State Department. Interview with Dr. Guy Rhodes, Landmine Impact Survey Project Manager, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Hanoi, 8 March 2002. See [http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2001/5820.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2001/5820.htm).

\(^8\) Interview with Dr. Guy Rhodes, Landmine Impact Survey Project Manager, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Hanoi, 8 March 2002; updated in June 2002.

\(^9\) Ibid.

\(^10\) Ibid.

\(^11\) The Indochina Bomb Data Project was undertaken by Federal Resources, a private US-based company, in conjunction with the US State Department; Interview with Dr. Guy Rhodes, Landmine Impact Survey Project Manager, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Hanoi, 8 March 2002.

\(^12\) Interview with Hoang Nam, Project Coordinator, Project RENEW, Quang Tri, 18 March 2002. The survey apparently got underway in Trieu Phong district in the second week of July 2002.

\(^13\) Interview with Chuck Searcy, Country Representative, Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund, Hanoi, 1 March 2002.


\(^15\) For more information about the clearance operations for the Ho Chi Minh Highway project see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 587.
84 heavy bombs, between May and October 2001. Partly because of the high level of mine/UXO contamination encountered along the route, the project is estimated to be 30 to 40 percent behind schedule.

**Mines Advisory Group (MAG).** MAG completed its first clearance project on the site of a former US Marines Fire Support Base in Quan Ngang, Truc Lam village in Gio Linh District of Quang Tri province. MAG-trained teams of local deminers began clearance in 1999 and cleared over 1.2 million square meters of land, including destruction of 2,019 landmines (mostly U.S. M14 mines) and 8,384 items of UXO. MAG has been working with Plan International, OXFAM Hong Kong, and local government partners on community development projects as part of a local resettlement program on the site. Families were selected to return to the cleared land through a community participatory process involving all local stakeholders. MAG has developed a local civilian clearance capacity of 69 men and women, plus a team of support staff in Quang Tri province.

In July 2001, MAG started implementation of the first mobile Mine Action Team pilot project in Vietnam in Gio Linh District. Between July 2001 and April 2002, the Mine Action Team removed all mine/UXO threats that were reported by the local population throughout 19 Communes, a total of 14,954 households were systematically visited, 1,502 EOD tasks were completed destroying a total of 101 landmines and 9,066 items of UXO. Commune leaders were also permitted to request the assistance of the Mine Action Team in clearance of public areas within their communes for the building of community facilities, such as schools, roads, wells, and water systems.

In May 2002, MAG moved its Mine Action Team resources to Hai Lang District of Quang Tri Province, another heavily contaminated area prioritized for clearance by the provincial authorities. MAG will conduct a similar, district-wide clearance and community support operation in Hai Lang. The Mine Action Team program has been budgeted to last through 2004 and will cover three districts of the province.

As of March 2002, MAG was waiting for government approval for an integrated community development and UXO clearance project to be carried out in coordination with Plan International in Quang Binh Province. It would involve clearance of 1.65 million square meters of heavily contaminated farmland in Le Thuy District, in what used to be a key section of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In Thua Thien Hue Province, MAG is providing technical advice and training support to Australian Volunteers International’s (AVI) Humanitarian Mine Action Project in Phong Dien District. This project, funded by the Australian government, is due to start in mid-2002 and end in 2005. It is only the second international project set up outside of Quang Tri. The project is aimed at clearing an estimated 1.2 million square meters of agricultural land that, when finished, would be followed up by a micro-credit poverty alleviation program to be managed by AVI.

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18 Interview with Nick Proudman, MAG Program Manager, Quang Tri, 19 March 2002. Proudman noted that the high concentration of mines and UXO made it difficult for local farmers to graze their cattle or plant a complete rice harvest. Between 1973 and 1998, 29 people were killed, 45 people injured, and 97 head of livestock lost on the site. Also, email to Landmine Monitor (HRW) from Tim Carstairs, Director for Policy, MAG, 30 July 2002.
19 Email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 30 July 2002.
20 For more details on this innovative approach using Vietnamese staff, see *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, p. 588.
21 Interview with Nick Proudman, MAG, Quang Tri, 19 March 2002; email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 30 July 2002.
22 Interview with Nick Proudman, MAG, Quang Tri, 19 March 2002.
23 Ibid.
24 Email from Tim Carstairs, MAG, 30 July 2002.
Gerbera/SODI/Potsdam. Gerbera is a German commercial demining company that is subcontracted by the SODI and Potsdam organizations to clear mine/UXO contaminated areas for resettlement and development projects. Between March 2001 and March 2002, Gerbera cleared an estimated 700,000 square meters of land, and destroyed over 13,000 UXO, in Quang Tri Province.25

In February 2002, in Thua Thien Hue Province, Gerbera began the first international clearance project permitted to operate outside of Quang Tri. As of March 2002, Gerbera had cleared 500,000 square meters of land and destroyed 2,500 UXO at a former US military base near the provincial airport of Phu Bai. Gerbera is contracted to clear 750,000 square meters of land in total on this site, after which its sponsoring organization for this project, Potsdam, will begin the resettlement of 60 local families into the area. Heinz Werther estimates completion of the clearance phase of this project by December 2002.

Following the completion of a separate clearance operation at a former US military base, Ai Tu, in Trieu Phong District of Quang Tri Province in March 2001, Gerbera’s sponsoring organization, SODI, began the resettlement of families into this area. As of March 2002, SODI had resettled 56 of the target 100 families into new homes and hoped to have the remaining 44 families resettled by the end of 2002.26 The resettled families are selected by the local People’s Committee based on economic need and ancestral proprietorship.

In December 2001, Gerbera completed clearance of 600,000 square meters of land on a former South Vietnamese military base in Cam Lo District, Quang Tri Province, Cua commune. The resettlement and integrated economic development phase of this project will be sponsored by SODI, but as of March 2002, it had yet to begin.

In January 2002, Gerbera also began clearance of a 780,000 square meters plot of land on the site of a former US military base named C2 in Cam Lo District.

In March 2002, Gerbera expanded the number of deminers it employs from 42 to 57 in Quang Tri Province and from 25 to 40 deminers in Thua Thien Hue Province.

Gerbera plans, in cooperation with the local Youth Union and Women’s Union, to conduct surveys to determine mine/UXO contamination levels in each commune in Cam Lo District, and also to disseminate mine awareness literature throughout the district. Once the presence of mines/UXO has been verified on a person’s property, a mobile clearance team will be dispatched to clear the ordnance.

Clear Path International. Since January 2001, Clear Path International (CPI) has funded a humanitarian mine clearance operation managed by the commercial demining group, Unexploded Bomb International (UXB), on a 435,000 square meter site at a former US military base in Quang Tri.27 As of March 2002, 424 pieces of ordnance had been removed from the area and destroyed. The clearance project is slated to finish by August 2002. CPI also sponsors an Emergency Ordnance Disposal Team project that responds to calls by residents of the Quang Tri provincial capital, Dong Ha, to remove ordnance from their property. This program began in November 2001, and through March 2002 they had received 38 emergency calls and removed 201 pieces of ordnance.

Peace Trees Vietnam. The American organization Peace Trees Vietnam (PTVN) has been building a village on a 400,000 square meter site in the Quang Tri provincial capital of Dong Ha, for the resettlement of 100 families.28 PTVN is conducting this project in cooperation with the

25 The following section came from an interview with Karl Heinz Werther, Gerbera Project Manager, Quang Tri, 20 March 2002.
28 Interview with Chuck Meadows, Executive Director, and Quang Le, Country Representative, Peace Trees Vietnam, 16 March 2002; see also Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 586.
Dong Ha People’s Committee and the Quang Tri Foreign Relations Department, who have contributed US$100,000 from the provincial budget to this program. The 400,000 square meters of land were cleared by the commercial demining company UXB in 2000. According to Quang Le, Director of Peace Trees Vietnam, as of March 2002, 30 houses were built, and an infrastructure development project to build roads and supply electricity and running water to this village is underway. This is a two-year program to be completed by September 2002.

Cooperation of Mine/UXO Action

For several years, the Vietnamese government has expressed interest in forming an inter-agency national mine action coordinating body, but there has been no significant movement toward its establishment. All government-sponsored mine/UXO clearance activities are controlled by the Ministry of Defense. If an NGO has a project proposal for mine action in Vietnam, it must first secure a sponsoring agency at the national level. This role is filled by the People’s Aid Coordination Committee (PACCOM), which, upon conditional approval of a project proposal, will then submit it to the People’s Committee and other relevant provincial authorities to work out project details. For project proposals that are budgeted for over US$500,000, PACCOM must secure final approval from concerned ministries in Hanoi.

Mine Action Funding

According to reports from donors, more than US$25 million has been provided or pledged for mine action in Vietnam in recent years. This includes the US$11.2 million donated in March 2002 by the Japanese government to the Ministry of Defense for mine clearance equipment to be used in infrastructure development projects, such as the HCM highway.

Vietnam. The Ministry of Defense has a budget for mine clearance, but the figures are not available. Most of the government funding comes through the Ministry of Planning and Investment in the form of infrastructure development projects. The government is currently allocating major resources to the Ho Chi Minh National Highway project; the estimated cost for completion of the mine/UXO clearance component of this project is US$500 million.

Australia. The Australian government’s international development agency, AusAID, has committed US$1.9 million to a three-year integrated mine/UXO clearance and development project in Thua Thien Hue province. The program will be managed by Australian Volunteers International (AVI). MAG will provide technical support.

Germany. The German government provided US$707,150 in 2001 to Sodi and Potsdam.

Ireland. The government of Ireland provided a grant to the Mines Advisory Group for £195,000 to support its Mine Action Team project in Quang Tri. The grant is budgeted to last for 18 months, from July 2001 to December 2002.

Japan. In March 2002, the Japanese government donated US$11.2 million to the Ministry of Defense for mine clearance equipment to be used in infrastructure development projects, such as

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30 Ibid., pp. 588-589.
32 Ibid.
34 Meeting with Shireen Sandhu, First Secretary of AusAid, Australian Embassy, Hanoi, 1 March 2002.
35 UNMAS Mine Action Investment Database.
36 Interview with Nick Proudman, MAG, Quang Tri, 5 April 2002. During fiscal year 2001, MAG used £33,000 of the grant.
the HCM highway.\textsuperscript{37} The Japanese government has also reportedly donated six Hitachi bulldozers to the Vietnamese military for demining purposes during this reporting period.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{United States of America.} From 1999-2002, the United States has provided about US$5.3 million to Vietnam for humanitarian demining assistance.\textsuperscript{39} This included $3.5 million in fiscal year 2001 for demining equipment, personal safety equipment, metal detectors, vehicles, and support for the Landmine Impact Survey. Other projects in FY 2001 included funding one computer system and database to identify location of mines and UXO, and another system to assist the government in managing its mine and UXO clearance programs.\textsuperscript{40} The expected funding for fiscal year 2002 is US$2.5 million dollars, including $1 million for the Landmine Impact Survey.\textsuperscript{41}

\textit{The Freeman Foundation.} The US-based Freeman Foundation continues to be one of the major financial donors to international humanitarian clearance operations in Vietnam. The Freeman Foundation has provided the Mines Advisory Group with a two-year US$1.5 million dollar grant to fund two large-site clearance operations in Quang Tri, as well as MAG’s Mine Action Team project in Gio Linh district. This grant was allocated to MAG in August 2000 and is scheduled to last through July 2002.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, the Freeman Foundation has pledged US$742,000 for Clear Path International’s clearance in Dong Ha, Quang Tri. CPI also uses this grant money to pay for their Emergency Ordnance Disposal project in Dong Ha.\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{Sodi and Potsdam Komunikation e.V.} Solidaritätsdienst-International e.V. (Sodi) and Potsdam Kommunikation e.V. (Potsdam) are the primary funders for Gerbera projects in Vietnam. Those two organizations receive funds for demining projects from the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including US$328,911 to Potsdam and US$378,239 to Sodi in 2001.\textsuperscript{44} In Cam Lo District, the “C2” former US military base project is funded at US$550,000.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{United Nations Association – USA.} In 2001, the UN Association-USA\textsuperscript{46} began sponsoring an “Adopt-A-Minefield” program in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{47} Individuals or organizations “adopt” a plot of land and raise the necessary funds for the clearance work. MAG is Adopt-A-Minefield’s implementing partner in Vietnam.

\textbf{Mine/UXO Risk Education}

\textit{Project RENEW.} RENEW is the first integrated humanitarian mine action program managed and implemented entirely by local Vietnamese staff.\textsuperscript{48} RENEW, which operates in conjunction with the Quang Tri People’s Committee, was granted permission by the office of the Prime Minister to conduct an 18-month mine action pilot program in Trieu Phong District, Quang Tri Province, in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Interview with Yuji Okada, First Secretary, Economy Section, Embassy of Japan, Hanoi, 3 June 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Interview with Lt. Col. Frank Miller, Military Attaché, US Embassy, Hanoi, 13 March 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{39} US Department of State, Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs, Fact Sheet, “The US Humanitarian Demining Program and NADR Funding,” 5 April 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{40} US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “To Walk the Earth in Safety: The United States Commitment to Humanitarian Demining,” November 2001, p. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Interview with Nick Proudman, MAG, Quang Tri, 5 April 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Interview with Hugh Hosman, Clear Path International, Quang Tri, 19 March 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{44} UNMAS, Mine Action Investment Database.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Interview with Karl Heinz Werther, Project Manager, Gerbera, Quang Tri, 20 March 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{46} The UNA-USA is an NGO not formally affiliated with the United Nations.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Interview with Lt. Col. Frank Miller, US Embassy, Hanoi, 13 March 2002.
\item \textsuperscript{48} The following information was provided by Hoang Nam, Project Coordinator, Project RENEW, 18 March 2002.
\end{itemize}
July 2001. RENEW receives technical assistance from two sponsoring international organizations, Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund and Asian Landmine Solutions, for their activities in mine risk education, survivor assistance, survey, and the establishment of a region-wide mine action coordination office in Dong Ha.

RENEW has a mine risk education campaign that actively promotes the participation of children for spreading the message about landmine and UXO safety. RENEW has organized a number of talent shows in Trieu Phong District with participation by at-risk children; these attracted large audiences of community members, and were rebroadcast on television throughout Quang Tri. RENEW has also organized “Mine Awareness Marches” through various communes in Trieu Phong District led by children. Since July 2001, RENEW has hosted four public mine awareness workshops; these have also been broadcast on television in Quang Tri. RENEW has also produced two 30- and 60-second educational spots for television.

Peace Trees Vietnam. In the beginning of 2002, Peace Trees Vietnam expanded their mine risk education activities in Quang Tri to include teacher-training programs. PTVN started a program, conducted in cooperation with the provincial Youth Union and Women’s Union, to train local educators in a basic child-safety and accident prevention curriculum. PTVN plans to start a mobile mine education program that will involve educators from their Mine Awareness Center, driving to remote areas of the province to provide training and literature about mine safety to teachers and students. PTVN is working in coordination with the Quang Tri Women’s Union to sponsor the building of five libraries in five separate communes that have had little or no access to mine-safety information up to this point.

Catholic Relief Services. CRS began a mine risk education and safety training course for teachers in Trieu Phong district in November 2001. This training course was built around data gathered in a CRS survey that evaluated the existing level of mine awareness in the district. CRS is working in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Training to develop materials for a curriculum-based classroom teaching program about mine/UXO safety, to be introduced as part of the compulsory primary school curriculum in 2002.

UNICEF. UNICEF has proposed a baseline survey in Quang Tri to determine the level of knowledge of local people on issues relating to mine-safety practices. UNICEF hopes to implement the survey before the end of 2002. The survey will serve to determine the message and scope of UNICEF’s national mine risk education media campaign that will follow. The campaign will consist of television commercials, print ads, and radio spots aimed primarily at children. UNICEF mine risk education programs have been budgeted at US$280,000 for the year 2002.

Landmine/UXO Casualties

There is no comprehensive mechanism for collecting and recording data on mine/UXO casualties in Vietnam. However, there are frequent reports in newspapers of mine/UXO incidents that result in death or serious injury. Incidents causing the death of at least 46 people and injuring another 20, including 34 children, were reported in 2001 in several provinces including Quang Tri, Dak Lak, Lang Son, Khanh Hoa, Tay Ninh, Dong Nai, Quang Nam, and Phu Yen. According to Quang Le of PTVN, in 2001, 26 casualties were reported in Quang Tri province alone, with 14 people killed and 12 injured. He says the majority of the casualties are children who mistake pieces of ordnance for toys and men involved in the scrap metal trade.

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49 For additional information, see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 586.
50 Joint interview with Chuck Meadows and Quang Le, Peace Trees Vietnam, 16 March 2002.
51 Interview with Le Khanh, Project Assistant, Catholic Relief Services, Hanoi, 30 March 2002.
52 Interview with Jason Rush, Assistant Communication Officer, UNICEF, Hanoi, 8 March 2002.
53 Data on new casualties collated by Landmine Monitor from nine media reports.
54 Interview with Quang Le, Country Director, Peace Trees Vietnam, Quang Tri, 16 March 2002.
In October 2001, two military deminers were killed while engaged in site clearance on the Ho Chi Minh Highway project.\(^{55}\)

It is believed that many casualties occurring in remote areas are not reported. The US State Department has estimated that mines/UXO cause over 2,000 casualties a year.\(^{56}\) In a nationwide survey completed in May 1998, it was reported that since the end of the war, 38,248 people had been killed and 64,064 injured by landmines and UXO.\(^{57}\)

Casualties continue to be reported in 2002. In one incident, in March 2002, one construction worker was killed and seven others injured, including two passersby, when a piece of ordnance, accidentally mixed in with rocks dredged from the Red River for a construction project, exploded on a street in Hanoi.\(^{58}\)

### Survivor Assistance

In Vietnam, medical and health care services are provided by the national Ministry of Health at the province, district, and commune levels, and rehabilitation services are provided by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA). No distinction is made in treatment and rehabilitation services for landmine and UXO survivors.\(^{59}\) In practice, most international NGOs working on disability issues also do not make a distinction between landmine/UXO survivors and other disabled people.\(^{60}\)

In 2001, the Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) program expanded from 40 to 45 provinces, leaving 16 provinces nationwide that still do not benefit from access to the government-sponsored program. Budgetary constraints and a lack of teaching materials and experienced trainers are cited as the reasons that the program has not expanded to all provinces. The Ministry of Health estimates that 80 to 90 percent of persons with disabilities in the provinces with the CBR program have nominal access to the facilities. In addition to providing basic medical rehabilitation services, the CBR program also focuses on vocational training and social reintegration programs for persons with disabilities.\(^{61}\)

RENEW has a survivor assistance component to their mine action program in Quang Tri province. As part of the program, RENEW is upgrading facilities at nineteen nurse stations in communes around Trieu Phong, providing updated medical equipment and first aid training specific to mine/UXO casualties. Two hundred and forty-five community health care workers are being trained to deal with emergency medical procedures for landmine/UXO casualties. RENEW also works with mine/UXO survivors throughout Trieu Phong District to design creative programs to reintegrate survivors back into the workforce. In July 2001, RENEW implemented a program to train mine/UXO survivors whose injuries prevent them from plowing their fields, to grow edible mushrooms in their homes for sale to wholesale markets. As of March 2002, the program has been implemented in 30 communes of Trieu Phong District, with 50 families participating.\(^{62}\)

In May 2001, Clear Path International (CPI) signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Committee for Families and Children, to provide Emergency Outreach Services to landmine/UXO survivors in Quang Tri Province. The Emergency Outreach Services program addresses three distinct priorities: providing financial support for the emergency medical needs of casualties on a case-by-case basis, including funding special medical procedures; providing


\(^{60}\)Interview with Jo Nagels, Rehabilitation Program Manager, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, Hanoi, 11 March 2002.

\(^{61}\)Information provided by Tran Trong Hai, Director of Foreign Relations, Ministry of Health, Hanoi, 25 May 2002.

\(^{62}\)Information provided by Hoang Nam, Project Coordinator, Project RENEW, Quang Tri, 18 March 2002.
transportation, if necessary, to regional hospitals for special rehabilitation programs; and, offering financial assistance to families, with the objective of preventing economic collapse in the critical period following an incident. CPI is also committed to providing educational scholarships to children who have been injured by landmines/UXO, or to children of parents that have been injured, so that the children can continue their studies.63 In 2001, CPI assisted 323 individuals, including 254 mine/UXO survivors. Assistance also included the provision of fourteen prostheses, 150 hospital beds, 91 mattresses, two patient monitors, seven boxes of surgical supplies, and various other accessories and mobility devices. Since late 2001, CPI has the permission of the People’s Aid Coordinating Committee (PACCOM) to implement a comprehensive mine/UXO survivor assistance program in the six Central Region provinces on an emergency basis.64

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has operated an orthopedic program in Vietnam since 1989 at the Rehabilitation Center in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC Center) in cooperation with MOLISA. Since 1995, the program has been funded by the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD). The program covers the cost of the first prosthetic fitting of amputees considered “destitute.” Those coming from surrounding provinces are accommodated free of charge at the HCMC Center and have their travel and meal costs reimbursed. In 2001, the ICRC paid for 891 of the total 2,067 limbs that were produced in the workshops in Ho Chi Minh City, and also for another 337 limbs produced in Da Nang as part of a pilot program for training local prosthetic technicians.65 Landmine Monitor was unable to ascertain the number of mine/UXO survivors assisted. Other activities in 2001 included: the setting up of a quota system giving priority to women and children; continuing the introduction of the polypropylene prosthesis-manufacturing technique to five other MOLISA centers in Da Nang, Can Tho, Quy Nhon, Vinh, and Thanh Hoa; and the SFD funded a training course at the Vietnamese Training Center for Orthopedic Technologists (VIETCOT) in Hanoi for two students from the HCMC Center and one from the Kon Tum prosthetic-orthotic center. The Kon Tum center, in the central highlands, is supported by the Swiss NGO Nouvelle Planète.66

Handicap International Belgium operated a community based rehabilitation program for mine/UXO survivors in Quang Tri province until the end of 2001. The program is based on a community network of volunteers who identify and care for disabled persons in their neighborhoods. The program continues and is fully autonomous after the completion of training for 11 doctors and physiotherapists who are now qualified to train district supervisors and community agents. At least 4,924 disabled people benefit from the program.67

PTVN assists survivors with the cost of food and medicines, and provides transportation to provincial hospitals and regional rehabilitation clinics, on a case-by-case basis. PTVN is notified by the local Department of Labor, or the provincial hospital, when a new landmine/UXO casualty has been admitted. Through direct consultation with the survivor and his or her family, the patient’s immediate needs are determined and PTVN helps the family plan a long-term course of action to ease inevitable financial burdens. PTVN also provides long-term assistance to families if necessary, however, the goal is to help the families become self-sufficient.68

The US-based NGO Health Volunteers Overseas has operated in Vietnam since September 1992. The Vietnam Rehabilitation Project aims to improve the quality of rehabilitation services and care through the training of health care specialists throughout the country. Linkages have been developed between US and Vietnamese universities to strengthen the training of teachers in the rehabilitation field. National curricula have been developed in the fields of rehabilitation medicine

63 Interview with Hugh Hosman, Clear Path International, Quang Tri, 19 March 2002.
64 Martha Hathaway, Project Director, Clear Path International, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 13 March 2002.
65 Interview with Peter Poetsma, Director, ICRC Rehabilitation Program, Ho Chi Minh City, 1 June 2002.
68 Interview with Quang Le, Country Director, Peace Trees Vietnam, Quang Tri, 16 March 2002.
and nursing, and in physical therapy. The program is funded by USAID’s Leahy War Victims Fund.69

In 2001, there were nine local NGOs that functioned primarily as self-help associations for persons with disabilities. Most of these organizations, which are registered with the Disability Forum, are based in Hanoi.70

Disability Policy and Practice

The government’s Ordinance on Disabled Persons has been in effect since 10 July 1999. On 22 January 2001, MOLISA established a National Coordinating Council on Disabilities (NCCD).71 However, according to Hong Ha, Coordinator of the national Disability Forum, the implementation of the laws by the NCCD has been slow due to a lack of an efficient enforcement and monitoring system. A lack of sufficient resources and determination on the part of the concerned ministries is the most frequently given reason for the government’s failure to enforce the existing disability laws.72

Vietnam participated in the South East Asia Regional Conference on Victim Assistance in Bangkok from 6-8 November 2001.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA1

Key developments since May 2001: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has initiated the process to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty. FRY reported destruction of 90,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines from April 2001-May 2002, and has called for assistance to deal with future stockpile destruction and mine clearance. FRY established a mine action center in Belgrade in April 2002.

Mine Ban Policy

Following the Federal Government’s decision on 20 April 2001 to join the Mine Ban Treaty, preparations for accession were launched by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In April 2002, the Ministry said that the legislative proposal had been approved by the Federal Ministries of Justice and Defense, and was before the Ministry of Finance. The government will then adopt the proposal and forward it to the Federal Assembly for adoption.2

In February 2002, the visiting Canadian Ambassador for Mine Action, Daniel Livermore, was reported in a Belgrade newspaper as expressing the belief based on his official contacts that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) would join the treaty by the end of 2002.3 In March 2002, FRY’s report to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) stated that the “General Staff of the YA [Yugoslav Army] believes that FRY should sign and ratify the ‘Ottawa Convention.’” Yugoslavia “is planning in the next period to sign and ratify,” and is also “supporting all the efforts that are directed to the unique prohibition of antipersonnel mines and non-deviation of the highest standards consisted in the [treaty].”4

69 Linda James, Health Volunteers Overseas, response to Landmine Monitor Survivor Assistance Questionnaire, 25 February 2002.
70 Information provided by Hong Ha, Coordinator, Disability Forum, 31 May 2002.
71 For more detail see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 591.
72 Information provided by Hong Ha, Coordinator, Disability Forum, 27 March 2002.
1 In March 2002 it was announced that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) will be dissolved and replaced by the new nation of Serbia and Montenegro. The Serbian, Montenegrin and Yugoslav federal parliaments ratified this decision by the end of May 2002.
2 Interview with Dušanka Divjak-Tomić, Director, Department for Disarmament, Arms Control and Military Aspects of Security, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 13 April 2002.
The Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia has claimed that the accession process has been unnecessarily delayed. It organized a panel discussion on the Mine Ban Treaty on 6 June 2001, which resulted in national media calls for progress on accession.5

At the June 2001 panel discussion, two representatives of the Yugoslav Army said the Army would give up antipersonnel mines only if replacement weapons were found and asserted that antipersonnel mines remained an extremely important weapon in the defense system of small countries.6

A Stability Pact mission in September 2001 said the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was “very frank as to the reasons why they could not yet accede,” noting the need for donor assistance to meet the four-year limit on stockpile destruction, and the “internal sensitive political considerations to overcome in terms of public opinion about the usefulness of APM for the protection of their borders from incursion by non-state actors.”7

FRY attended the Third Meeting of States Parties in September 2001, in Managua, Nicaragua.8 In its statement, FRY noted that on 20 April 2001, it had decided in principle to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty and would do so as soon as possible. But it also said extremist groups were still using antipersonnel mines on Yugoslav territory and that after accession, FRY would implement the treaty on the territory under its control, but could not implement it on Yugoslav territory not within its control. It noted that it would be difficult and costly to complete stockpile destruction within the time limit specified by the treaty, and substantial international assistance would be needed for the clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), including cluster bombs. FRY saw itself as being at the start of a long process.9

On 29 November 2001, FRY co-sponsored and voted in favor of UN General Assembly Resolution 56/24M, calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. FRY attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002.10 During the May session, FRY also attended for the first time a meeting of the Reay Group on Mine Action, which is part of the Stability Pact for South East Europe.


8 It was represented by Dušanka Divjak-Tomić, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director, Department for International Military Organizations, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Lieutenant-Colonel Miodrag Popović, Ministry of Defense.

9 Speech by Dušanka Divjak-Tomić, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director, Department for International Military Organizations, Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, Nicaragua, 18-21 September 2001.

10 It was represented by Dušanka Divjak-Tomić, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Production, Transfer and Stockpiling

In March 2002, FRY reported that it “is not producing new mines, nor selling them to other countries and in the stockpiles there are mines produced before 1990.”\(^{11}\) Military officials have stated categorically that, since 1992, the Yugoslav military industry has not produced landmines.\(^{12}\) No information has been made publicly available about the size and make-up of the stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

In May 2002, FRY announced that since making the decision in April 2001 to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty, FRY has destroyed 90,000 antipersonnel mines, as an indication of its commitment.\(^{13}\)

On 27 September 2001, a Stability Pact mission visited Belgrade, as part of an assessment in several Balkan countries of “the technical options and future requirements for the destruction of APM stockpiles in order to move towards realistic programs in this area in keeping with international obligations.” The mission was conducted for the Reay Group on Mine Action, which forms part of Working Table III (Security Issues) of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe. The mission had expected that details of Yugoslav stockpiles would be given, but this did not occur. It reported that it believes Yugoslavia to possess the following types of antipersonnel mines: PMA 1, PMA 2, PMA 3, PMR 2A, PMR 3, PP Mi Sr and PROM 1, but in “unknown quantities.”\(^{14}\) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained later that the Ministry of Defense did not wish to provide the information because the FRY was still not a member of the Mine Ban Treaty and was, therefore, not obliged to do so.\(^{15}\)

The mission found that storage conditions for the antipersonnel mines were good, but general explosives safety fell below international standards.

Use

Landmine Monitor Report 2001 reported on use of antipersonnel mines in the former Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) established by NATO between Serbia and Kosovo.\(^{16}\) Before Yugoslav forces entered the buffer zone in late May 2001 in a NATO-approved operation, irregular forces based there deployed mines and other explosive devices against Serbian forces, including use in the municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo, Medveđa and Kuršumlija. An article in a military journal described the fear among farmers, and especially children, about mines planted on village roads in Preševo municipality, and casualties from antipersonnel mines.\(^{17}\)

Mine incidents in southern Serbia have continued in 2001 and 2002, but it is unclear if these result from earlier deployment or represent new use. The frequency of mine incidents appears to have reduced in late 2001 and in 2002, as has the general level of violence.\(^{18}\) Press accounts identify at least three antipersonnel mine incidents in 2001 (see Casualties section below).


\(^{12}\) Interviews with Col. Milomir Manojlović, Engineer Department, General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, 2 and 6 June 2001, with Col. Branko Bošković, Institute of Military Skills, General Staff, 6 June 2001, and with Lt.-Col. Miodrag Popović, Engineer Department, General Staff, 17 December 2001. The Stability Pact mission also reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that production had ceased in 1992.

\(^{13}\) Landmine Monitor notes, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, 30 May 2002.


\(^{15}\) Interview with Dusanka Divjak-Tomic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade, 13 April 2002.

\(^{16}\) See Landmine Monitor Report 2001, pp. 923-924.


\(^{18}\) UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “UN Interagency Progress Report and Recommendations on the Situation in Southern Serbia, FRY,” 29 January 2002, pp. 1-2. This report states that “the violence was brought to an end” in May-June 2001. However, it adds that: “At least six serious incidents occurred between August 2001 and January 2002 in which unknown persons attacked police targets or civilians…. Two new Albanian armed groups claimed to have organized in Southern Serbia or its hinterland in
The Ministry of Internal Affairs recorded a total of 34 incidents involving 109 mines and explosive devices in the southern Serbian municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo, Medveđa and Kuršumlija between 1 May 2001 and 5 March 2002. In 15 cases, a total of 84 antipersonnel mines were found, all in the municipality of Bujanovac. One mine exploded causing the death of one civilian and injury to another, while the other 83 were deactivated and removed.

In addition, between 1 May 2001 and 5 March 2002, six weapons caches were discovered in southern Serbia, which included 152 antipersonnel mines and 38 antitank mines. On 23 July 2002, Serbian police discovered a large cache of weapons including 150 mines in Dobrosin village.

**Landmine/UXO Problem**

Information on the mine/UXO problem in FRY remains incomplete. Different areas have been contaminated by mines and UXO in several different periods of time. Northwestern areas bordering Croatia, and the Montenegro/Croatia border, were mined in the early 1990s, by Serbian forces including the Yugoslav Army. Southern and other border areas were mined, to an unknown extent, by Serbian forces including the Yugoslav Army in 1998 and 1999, in anticipation of a NATO land invasion. Military and industrialized areas and communications centers were targeted (including with cluster bombs) in the NATO air bombardment of 1999, resulting in UXO. Irregular forces based in the GSZ used antipersonnel and antitank mines against Serbian forces, from 1999 until at least mid-2001.

The Army General Staff states that records exist of minefields placed by the Yugoslav Army, but not of minefields placed by paramilitary forces. However, the Engineer Department of the General Staff states that mined areas are known precisely, and that the areas are marked. The General Staff has not yet authorized publication of this information, although FRY’s OSCE report states that “FRY is ready to make an exchange of the information considering the laid mines and minefields…as the item of their destruction with countries that are interested in this matter…and international humanitarian organizations for mine actions.”

At a Stability Pact seminar in Croatia on 9-10 October 2001, two representatives from the Yugoslav Army described the problem as “primarily one of UXO clearance but there were some areas that would require the removal of mines.” According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, unexploded cluster bomblets and other UXO from the NATO bombardment in 1999 are scattered throughout inhabited areas, including Belgrade, and the responsible bodies are still not familiar with all the locations, and this represents a major threat to the civilian population.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs compiled a report which identifies six municipalities contaminated with unexploded cluster bomblets, 31 municipalities contaminated with large aerial bombs, and 26 municipalities contaminated with mines and UXO from armed conflicts prior to 1999. At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, the Yugoslav delegation presented this information, and added that the estimated cost of clearance was €1.2 million ($1,077,600).

Also in May, a representative of the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) announced that a PfP Trust Fund program for FRY was being planned, including projects to deal with antipersonnel
mines (sponsored by Canada), aerial UXO (sponsor undecided) and small arms/light weapons (sponsored by the Netherlands). A preliminary visit assessment was made in April 2002. A preliminary visit assessment was made in April 2002.27

From local sources it is known that, in Šid municipality bordering Croatia, most of the mined areas are forests and arable land, with the exception of Jamena village. Owners of arable land in this village have been unable to cultivate their fields since 1991.28

Mine Action Coordination

A Stability Pact seminar on 9-10 October 2001 concluded that “the humanitarian demining program in FRY is in its formative stages and the country could benefit considerably from the experience of other countries in the region and the mine action community as a whole.”29

According a report by UNOCHA in January 2002, in southern Serbia “coordinated action aimed at mine clearance is lacking. The JCB [Joint Coordinating Body of the Serbian and Federal governments] insisted on taking over the coordination of this activity, but have not initiated anything so far.”30

However, the Yugoslav Mine Action Center was founded on 7 March 2002, under the aegis of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It will invite open tendering by international and local organizations for the clearance of mines, large-caliber aerial bombs and cluster bomb units. International funding is required.31

Mine Assessment, Clearance, and Funding

In May 2001, representatives of the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) established by Slovenia visited Yugoslavia. They discussed possible cooperation in clearing contaminated areas on the Montenegro-Croatia border, Serbia-Croatia border, in southern Serbia bordering Kosovo, and more widespread UXO contamination resulting from the 1999 conflict. The ITF had already received funds from Luxembourg and the Czech Republic for operations in FRY.32

The ITF reports that in early May 2001 it funded the Italian NGO Intersos to carry out an assessment of which clearance projects could be conducted by Yugoslav authorities with ITF funding. This assessment was funded by donations of the Czech Republic and United States. The assessment prioritized clearance in the areas of Kopaonik, Niš, Merdare, Bujanovac, Kopaonik II, Čačak-Kraljevo, Sjenica and Vladimirovci, which are all described as UXO-contaminated, and clearance of mines on the border with Croatia. Intersos states that it carried out an ITF-funded general survey in June and July 2001 to assess the status and locations of mine and UXO contamination, especially cluster bomb units, in FRY, and identified 14 contaminated locations. It made a database from the information obtained.33

On 8 November 2001, FRY signed an agreement with the ITF for cooperation in mine/UXO clearance. The first project involves clearance of the Kopaonik area, for which training and equipping of Yugoslav personnel started at the ITF center in Ig, Slovenia, in January 2002. The


34 Interview with Stefano Calabretta, INTERSOS, Rome, 20 February 2001, and emailed questionnaire.
clearance operation was planned to start in April/May 2002. The ITF will provide funding of DM300,000 (US$134,700). A further project to be proposed for ITF funding is the clearing of air-dropped ordnance at five locations in Belgrade and the immediate vicinity. According to the Ministry for Internal Affairs, funds pledged via the ITF for mine-related action in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia total around $2,500,000, donated by the US, the European Union (EU) and others.36

On 14 November 2001, Serbian and Montenegrin representatives attended a meeting of the South Eastern Europe Mine Action Coordination Council in Tirana, Albania, and were accepted as full members of the Council. An initiative was proposed for a regional center for underwater demining based at Herceg Novi in Montenegro, financed by the ITF and the republican government of Montenegro. The center will offer its services to all interested countries in Southeastern Europe, on a commercial basis.37

As of April 2002, the Yugoslav Army and Serbian Interior Ministry had destroyed 727 pieces of UXO from the 1999 bombardment (missiles, aerial bombs, cluster bombs, mines, hand grenades and other unknown items of UXO). It is estimated that this operation has cost around €697,000 ($626,000). Additionally, 3,120 pieces of UXO have been located, which will require €1,962,000 ($1.76 million) for destruction.38 In April/May 2001, the Yugoslav Army started humanitarian mine clearance near Jamena (Šid municipality, near the Croatian border). The operation was stopped for lack of funds.39

Mine Risk Education
UNOCHA reported in January 2002 that some mine risk education activities had been run by the Joint Coordinating Body and by international NGOs in southern Serbia.40 The ICRC opened field offices in the towns of Presevo and Bujanovac in late 2000 and started mine risk education activities. With the easing of tensions in May 2001, local activities and travel increased so the ICRC increased its activities in order to reach more schoolchildren before the end of term. The ICRC reported that “workshops were organized for Red Cross staff from the municipalities bordering Kosovo, and new staff were employed to collect data and assess the situation in villages affected by mines.” To raise the awareness of children in particular, two theatre companies (one Serbian, one Albanian) were commissioned to perform a specially-adapted play based on the Little Red Riding Hood fairy tale. From October 2001 to January 2002, the play was performed for some 10,000 children. At the same time, mine awareness brochures were distributed to the audience and village populations, and local TV and radio stations broadcast mine awareness messages.41

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) devised a campaign focused on schoolchildren in Presevo municipality (including refugee children from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). All schools in the municipality were visited, and teachers were given pamphlets used by the ICRC in Kosovo, and a Belgian document on mines and UXO which was translated into Albanian and Serbian. MSF found that most of the children were already well-informed about the danger of mines and UXO. The campaign was extended to include schools in Bujanovac municipality. Pamphlets were also distributed to the municipality building, police, shops, and others to be made

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35 “Memorandum of Understanding Signed with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” ITF Newsletter, No. 7, December 2001, p. 7. It was signed by the ITF Director and Prvoslav Davinic, FRY National Coordinator of Table II of the Stability Pact for South East Europe.
36 Report from the Ministry for Internal Affairs, signed by Minister Dusan Mihailovic, 8 March 2002. Exchange rates at 1 December 2001: DM1 = US$0.449, and at 29 April 2002: €1 = US$0.898, used throughout this report.
38 Ibid.
39 Interview with Lt.-Col. Miodrag Popović, Engineer Department, General Staff, Yugoslav Army, 17 December 2001.
visible on the streets and to be given to the remote areas of the municipalities.\textsuperscript{42} The campaign, which had a budget of approximately $20,000, closed down at the end of 2001.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Landmine/UXO Casualties}

According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, landmines and UXO caused 32 casualties in southern Serbia in 2001. Mines and UXO killed 11 people (one Serb and four ethnic Albanian civilians including two children, four members of the Serbian paramilitary police, and two members of the Yugoslav Army) and injured 21 others (five ethnic Albanian civilians including four children, seven policemen, and nine soldiers). In 2000, five people were killed and 22 injured by landmines or UXO. No incidents for 2002 were recorded up to March. The Ministry of Internal Affairs report details each of these incidents, including the circumstances and identities of those involved.\textsuperscript{44}

In contrast, the ICRC records three people killed and four injured in 2001; in 2000, five killed and six injured; and in 1999, two people killed and two injured by mines.\textsuperscript{45}

The risk of casualties may have been increased by the return, in mid-2001, of some 5,300 people from Kosovo to southern Serbia; many of these found inadequate housing and returned to Kosovo later in 2001, with some returning to southern Serbia in 2002.\textsuperscript{46}

According to media reports on antipersonnel mine incidents: on 1 June 2001, a Serbian soldier stepped on an antipersonnel mine near Lučani village (Bujanovac municipality), sustaining a serious leg injury;\textsuperscript{47} on 20 August 2001, a ten year-old boy from Veliki Trnovac village (Bujanovac municipality) activated a directional fragmentation mine camouflaged in vegetation, sustaining serious injuries to the head and upper part of his body;\textsuperscript{48} and, on 13 October 2001, an Albanian farmer was killed by a directional fragmentation mine while collecting wood near Veliki Trnovac village. His 16-year-old son was seriously injured in the same incident.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{Survivor Assistance}

The FRY formerly had well-developed surgical and rehabilitation services for mine survivors, as well as reintegration programs.\textsuperscript{50} However, the economic situation has hurt the quality of health care services. People injured by mines or UXO receive immediate medical care in hospitals. During 2001, the ICRC donated emergency surgical kits to major hospital in the FRY, including Vranje, KBC Nis, Military Hospital Nis, Emergency Center Belgrade, and KBC Zvezdara Belgrade. The ICRC health program in southern Serbia included training for medical staff from mobile clinics and ambulance teams.\textsuperscript{51}

Handicap International (HI) assists persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors, in southern Serbia.\textsuperscript{52} HI supports partner organizations, including NGOs and associations for the disabled, with medical and orthopedic equipment and training. HI also provides psychosocial

\begin{footnotes}
\item[43] Telephone interview with Jean Pletinckx, MSF-Belgium, 1 August 2002.
\item[44] Report from the Ministry for Internal Affairs, signed by Minister Dusan Mihajlovic, 8 March 2002.
\item[52] Interview with Vladimir Čitaković, Handicap International, Belgrade, 17 December 2001.
\end{footnotes}
support and finances micro-credit programs for disabled persons. In February 2001, HI signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Serbian Ministry of Social Affairs, and is now an official partner of the State in the process of reforms and creation of a new policy addressing the needs of persons with disabilities.

Since receiving 40 mine survivors in 1999, the Institute for Orthopedics and Prosthetics in Belgrade has made no prostheses for members of the Yugoslav Army or Serbian police injured in southern Serbia due to a lack of funds, and has received no other patients injured by landmines or UXO. The Institute received no funds or other assistance in 2001 or early 2002.

Disability Policy and Practice

A study by the Institute of Public Health of Serbia, in cooperation with WHO and UNICEF, reported that 62.5 percent of participants surveyed could not afford expenses for health care and medication. In December 2001, the Serbian Ministry of Health facilitated an interagency health coordination meeting, which signaled its intent to lead international agencies in helping to improve the health status of the population. Monthly coordination meetings are planned for 2002.

On 3 December 2001, International Day of Disabled Persons, a series of events were held in FRY to focus public attention on disability issues. The events focused on bringing persons with disabilities into mainstream society and using community resources to improve the situation of individuals and families living with disabilities. A follow up seminar was held on 7 December and included topics such as equal opportunities for persons with disabilities, access to education and psychosocial support, and lower prices for orthopedic devices. On 17 December, it was announced by the Finance Minister that as from 1 January 2002, the 20 percent tax on medicine, blood, and devices for the physically disabled would be abolished.

55 Interview with Dr. Slavica Eremić, Director of the Institute for Orthopedics and Prosthetics, Belgrade, 11 April 2002.
58 Ibid.