# 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

## The Americas
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- Mauritius
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Rwanda
- Sao Tome & Principe
- Seychelles
- Sierra Leone
- South Africa
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- Uganda
- Zambia
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- Maldives
- Nauru
- New Zealand
- Niue
- Philippines
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Thailand
- Brunei
- Cook Islands
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- Burma/Myanmar
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- East Timor
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- Korea, North
- Korea, South
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- Micronesia
- Mongolia
- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Singapore
- Sri Lanka
- Tonga
- Tuvalu
- Vietnam
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction
INTRODUCTION

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) considers the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and On Their Destruction (“Mine Ban Treaty”) the only viable comprehensive framework for achieving a mine-free world. The ICBL believes that the only real measure of the Mine Ban Treaty’s success will be the concrete impact that it has on the global antipersonnel mine problem. As with the three previous annual reports, Landmine Monitor Report 2002 provides a means of measuring that impact. The five-year anniversary this year of the negotiation of the Mine Ban Treaty in Oslo and its signing in Ottawa also give added impetus and meaning to an assessment of progress made and challenges remaining.

It is abundantly clear that the treaty, and the ban movement more generally, are making a significant difference in eradicating the weapon and saving lives and limbs of civilians in every region of the world. A growing number of governments are joining the Mine Ban Treaty, and as detailed below, there is decreased use of antipersonnel mines, a dramatic drop in production, an almost complete halt to trade, rapid destruction of stockpiled mines, fewer new mine victims in key affected countries, and more land demined. These positive trends have continued in this most recent Landmine Monitor reporting period.2

But the challenges that remain are daunting. It is increasingly evident that at current levels of mine action funding and demining, many mine-affected States Parties will not meet the ten-year deadline for completion of mine clearance. Antipersonnel mines continue to be laid by governments and rebel groups, and in this reporting period India and Pakistan embarked on what appears to be the largest mine-laying operations in many years. While headed in the right direction, the world is nowhere close to the objective of Zero New Mine Victims. The mine problem is far from solved, and will not be solved without sustained and increased commitment from governments and non-governmental organizations.

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997. After achieving the required 40 ratifications in September 1998, the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, becoming binding international law. This is believed to be the fastest entry-into-force of any major multilateral treaty ever. Since 1 March 1999, states must accede and cannot simply sign the treaty with intent to ratify at a later date. For a state that ratifies or accedes now, the treaty enters into force for it on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that state deposited its instrument of ratification. That state is then required to make its transparency report to the UN Secretary-General within 180 days (and annually thereafter), destroy stockpiled mines within four years, and destroy mines in the ground within 10 years. It is also required to take appropriate domestic implementation measures, including imposition of penal sanctions.

Universalization

A total of 125 countries are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, as of 31 July 2002.3 Another 18 countries have signed, but not yet ratified the treaty.4 Thus, a total of 143 countries

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1 The ICBL generally uses the short title, Mine Ban Treaty, although other short titles are common as well, including Ottawa Treaty, Ottawa Convention and Mine Ban Convention.
2 The reporting period for Landmine Monitor Report 2002 is May 2001 to May 2002. Editors have where possible added important information that arrived in June and July 2002.
3 For the purposes of this report, Landmine Monitor identifies as a State Party any country that has given its consent to be bound by the Mine Ban Treaty. Some of these countries have not completed the six-month waiting period for formal entry-into-force mandated by the treaty. Also, in this report the term ratification is used as a shorthand for “consent to be bound.” The treaty allows governments to give consent to be bound in a
have legally committed to the core obligations of the treaty, including no use of antipersonnel mines.\(^5\)

Since the publication of *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, eight more countries have become States Parties. Three countries have acceded: Eritrea (27 August 2001), Nigeria (27 September 2001), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (2 May 2002). Five countries have ratified: St. Vincent and the Grenadines (1 August 2001), Algeria (9 October 2001), Chile (10 September 2001), Suriname (23 May 2002), and Angola (5 July 2002).

It is noteworthy that three of these countries have used antipersonnel mines extensively in recent years, but with the emergence of peace initiatives have decided to foreswear any future use: Angola, DR Congo, and Eritrea. In addition to those three countries, new States Parties Algeria and Chile are also mine-affected.

Considering the relatively short time that this issue has been before the international community, the number of States Parties and signatories -- three-quarters of the world’s nations -- is exceptional. This is a clear indication of the widespread international rejection of any use or possession of antipersonnel mines.

Every country in the Western Hemisphere is a State Party or signatory except the U.S. and Cuba, every member of the European Union except Finland, every member of NATO except the U.S. and Turkey, 45 of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and such Asia-Pacific nations as Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and Thailand.

Several of the most heavily mine-affected states are States Parties: Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Croatia, and Mozambique. Major past producers and exporters are now States Parties, including Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Many developments during the reporting period in countries not yet party to the Mine Ban Treaty are encouraging. The cabinet of the new transitional government of Afghanistan approved accession to the treaty on 29 July 2002. It is anticipated that the instrument of accession will be deposited with the UN soon. Greece and Turkey are in the final stages of fulfilling their joint commitment to deposit their instruments of ratification and accession, respectively, at the same time. In January 2002, the government of Cyprus introduced a bill to Parliament calling for early approval and ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has initiated the process to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty; as of April 2002, the legislative proposal had been approved by the Federal Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Justice.

Cameroon, the Central African Republic, and the Gambia have already completed the domestic process necessary for ratification, but have not yet formally submitted an instrument of ratification to the UN. Burundi’s Foreign Minister and other officials have indicated that Burundi is likely to ratify in 2002. Indonesia has drafted its ratification document; an Indonesian official said in May 2002 there were no major obstacles to ratification and that it was simply a matter of legislative priorities. The newly independent East Timor has stated its intention to accede to the treaty. The Cook Islands and São Tomé e Príncipe report that ratification procedures are nearly complete. In Guyana, a parliamentary motion for ratification of the treaty has been submitted to the National Assembly.

Many States Parties are putting a high priority on promoting universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. A Universalization Contact Group continues its work, coordinated by Canada, with participation by a number of States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. In addition to many bilateral efforts to promote adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty, there have been important regional conferences aimed at universalization. (See ICBL chapter in this *Landmine Monitor Report*).

\(^4\) The states that have signed but not ratified the Mine Ban Treaty (as of 31 July 2002) are: Brunei, Burundi, Cameroon, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Gambia, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Indonesia, Lithuania, Marshall Islands, Poland, São Tomé e Príncipe, Sudan, Ukraine, and Vanuatu.

\(^5\) Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, when a State has signed a treaty, it “is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose” of that treaty.
Introduction

Virtually all of the non-signatories have endorsed the notion of a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines at some point in time, and many have already at least partially embraced the Mine Ban Treaty. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/24M calling for universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted on 29 November 2001 by a vote of 138 in favor, none opposed, and 19 abstentions. Twenty non-signatories voted for the resolution: Afghanistan, Armenia, Bahrain, Belarus, Bhutan, Comoros, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Latvia, Mongolia, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yugoslavia. The 19 abstentions were three fewer than on a similar resolution last year.

Despite the large and growing number of States Parties, there is concern that the pace of new ratifications and accessions has slowed. There were three ratifications in December 1997 at the time of the treaty signing conference, then 55 ratifications/accessions in 1998, 32 in 1999, 19 in 2000, 13 in 2001, and three from January to July 2002. The eight new States Parties in this Landmine Monitor reporting period compares with seventeen States that joined the treaty in the previous reporting period (May 2000 to May 2001).

An increasingly curious situation is developing regarding the status of State Party Tajikistan. Although the United Nations records that Tajikistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 October 2000, it is not clear that Tajikistan considers itself a State Party formally bound by the treaty.

Fifty-one countries have not yet joined the treaty. This includes three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, Russia, and the U.S. It includes most of the Middle East, most of the former Soviet republics, and many Asian states. Major antipersonnel mine producers and stockpilers like China, India, Pakistan, Russia, and the U.S. are not part of the treaty. Moreover, there has been little or no positive change in the ban policies of some states in the past year, including the U.S., Russia, and China. Universalization clearly remains the biggest challenge facing ban supporters.

Implementation – The Intersessional Work Program

During 2001-2002, the intersessional work program continued to demonstrate its success, to date, in helping to maintain international attention on the global antipersonnel mine problem, to consolidate global mine action efforts, to provide a global picture of priorities, and to contribute to the full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. The ICBL remained a full and active participant in the intersessional process, clearly demonstrating the strong partnership with governments, which has been critical to the success of the mine ban movement from the beginning. The intersessional Standing Committees provide a unique forum where all relevant government, NGO and IO actors gather in January and May each year to mark, measure, and stimulate progress toward achieving the goal of a mine-free world.

The dynamic and flexible nature of the Ottawa Process and its ability to adjust to changing needs has been demonstrated at each annual Meeting of States Parties with the establishment of the intersessional work program in Maputo (1999), the creation of the Coordinating Committee in Geneva (2000), and the establishment of an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in Managua (2001).

During 2001-2002, the Coordinating Committee, together with ICBL and ICRC, undertook consideration of “enhancements” to the program, and recommendations were subsequently discussed at the Standing Committees. It was widely agreed that the original objectives of the intersessional work program remain as relevant today as they were in 1999 and the importance of maintaining its informal and inclusive nature was emphasized. The main developments and changes in the intersessional program during 2001-2002 included a stronger focus on the core humanitarian objectives of the Mine Ban Treaty aiming for more concrete results in victim assistance, mine clearance and stockpile destruction; better preparations by States Parties, resulting in a more cohesive and comprehensive approach, including an additional half-day being allotted to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention; and initial thinking about the Review Conference process.
With regard to the core humanitarian objectives, a major goal of the intersessional program is to provide a clear picture of needs, gaps and available resources, particularly with the rapidly approaching first deadlines for stockpile destruction in 2003 and for clearance of mined areas in 2009. During 2001-2002, it was widely recognized that there is a need to have a better picture of how much has been achieved to date, of existing needs, and of what remains to be done to fully implement the treaty. The Standing Committees on Victim Assistance, Mine Clearance, and Stockpile Destruction worked on concrete ways to achieve this, in conjunction with the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, where overall issues of full implementation of and compliance with the key obligations of the treaty were addressed. This ongoing work will become increasingly important in the lead-up to the first Review Conference in 2004.

The Implementation Support Unit began operating in January 2002 and contributed significantly to ensuring better preparations and follow-up, thereby enabling States Parties, ICBL and others the possibility to increase focus on achieving concrete results. The ISU was established because of a demonstrated need for support to States Parties, given the intensity of the workload, in order to ensure the sustainability and continuity of the intersessional work program. This is particularly true for the 17 countries serving on the Coordinating Committee of Co-Chairs and Co-Rapporteurs of the Standing Committees. The ISU helps to enable full participation in the intersessional program of mine-affected countries with limited resources.

Participation in the intersessional Standing Committees in January and May 2002 reached record levels, with approximately 450 persons in attendance representing more than 100 countries (73 States Parties and approximately 30 States not Parties), dozens of members of the ICBL, Landmine Monitor researchers, the ICRC, international and regional organizations, UN agencies, and academic institutions.

**Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW)**

The ICBL continued to monitor developments at the CCW and its Amended Protocol II with a small presence during the Third Annual Conference of States Parties to Amended Protocol II and the Second CCW Review Conference, both held in December 2001. Most NGOs who attended, though ICBL members, were there to further their individual NGO’s work on matters other than antipersonnel mines.

At the Second Review Conference in 2001, the States Parties agreed to expand the scope of the Convention to cover internal as well as international armed conflicts, and to form a Group of Governmental Experts to work in the year 2002 on the explosive remnants of war and antivehicle mine issues. As of 31 July 2002, the umbrella CCW convention has 88 States Parties and there are 65 States Parties of Amended Protocol II.

**Global Use of Antipersonnel Mines**

Since the antipersonnel mine ban movement began to take hold in the mid-1990s, there has been a marked drop in global use of antipersonnel mines. In recent years, antipersonnel mines have been used by fewer countries and in lesser numbers than seen from the 1960s through the early 1990s, when the global landmine crisis was created. There have been notable aberrations from the general pattern of decreased use, but the overall trend has been positive, even with respect to non-States Parties, as the international norm against the antipersonnel mine has spread.

In this reporting period, since May 2001, Landmine Monitor has confirmed or has compelling evidence that nine governments have used antipersonnel mines, including eight non-States Parties and one signatory. This compares to use by at least 13 governments in the previous reporting period. There have been other instances of allegations of mine use by governments, which Landmine Monitor has not been able to confirm or repudiate.

Use of antipersonnel mines has halted, at least temporarily, in some key locations, including Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Sri Lanka, but the massive new mine-laying operations by India and Pakistan likely mean that more mines went into the ground than in the previous reporting period.
Mine Ban Treaty States Parties

In this reporting period, Landmine Monitor has found no concrete evidence of use of antipersonnel mines by any State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. *Landmine Monitor Report 2001* cited serious allegations that the armed forces of Uganda, a State Party, had used antipersonnel mines in the DR Congo in June 2000. Uganda has repeatedly denied these allegations, and has also reported that it is conducting an investigation, in the spirit of openness and cooperation called for in the Mine Ban Treaty.

Mine Ban Treaty Signatories

Angola, as a signatory, acknowledged continued use of antipersonnel mines in 2001 and early 2002, before halting use and ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 July 2002. Landmine Monitor continues to receive troubling accounts of ongoing use of antipersonnel mines inside Burundi by both rebel and government forces, and of ongoing use in the DR Congo by the Burundi Army. The government strongly denies these allegations, and Landmine Monitor has been unable to independently establish the facts. Also, government and rebel forces in Sudan exchanged accusations of mine use.

Mine Ban Treaty Non-Signatories

In this reporting period, the following countries which have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty have acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines: Burma (Myanmar), India, Pakistan, Russia, and Sri Lanka. Other non-signatories who are credibly reported to have used antipersonnel mines include Georgia, Nepal, and Somalia. Georgia has denied use.

Armed Non-State Actors

Opposition groups are reported to have used antipersonnel mines in at least 14 countries. These include in Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Burundi, Colombia, DR Congo, Georgia (in Abkhazia), India, India/Pakistan (in Kashmir), Nepal, Philippines, Russia (in Chechnya), Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. This compares to reports of use by non-state actors in at least eighteen countries in the previous reporting period.

Key Developments Since Landmine Monitor Report 2001

Cessation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines. For a number of governments and rebel groups that used antipersonnel mines in the previous reporting period (May 2000-May 2001), Landmine Monitor has not found compelling evidence of new use since that time. Ethiopia and Eritrea stopped use with the end of their border conflict in June 2000, and Eritrea has acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. There have been no credible reports of use by Israel and Kyrgyzstan in the reporting period, or by Uzbekistan since June 2001. There have been no allegations of use by Sri Lankan or LTTE forces since the December 2001 cease-fires, or by Angola or UNITA since the April 2002 peace agreement. There were no serious allegations or evidence of use by DR Congo government forces in the reporting period, and the government acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty in May 2002.

With regard to other non-state actors previously cited as using antipersonnel mines, Landmine Monitor has not received any specific allegations of use by MDFC rebels in Senegal or the Lord’s Resistance Army (based in Uganda) in this reporting period, though concerns remain about possible use in the future by both. The NLA insurgents in the Macedonia FYR are not reported to have used mines since the peace accord in August 2001. Mine incidents in southern Serbia have continued, but it is unclear if these result from new use; in any event, the frequency of mine incidents appears to have reduced since May 2001, as has the general level of violence.

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6 As reported in Landmine Monitor Report 2001, Uzbekistan may have been using antipersonnel mines as late as June 2001, but there have been no allegations since that time.

7 Insurgents in Macedonia FYR may have used antipersonnel mines in the early part of this reporting period, but this is not confirmed.
Initiation of Use of Antipersonnel Mines. Apart from continued use in ongoing conflicts, there are several cases of new use by governments and rebels in this reporting period. Perhaps the most disturbing development in this reporting period has been the massive mine laying operations undertaken by India and Pakistan. Since late December 2001, both India and Pakistan have emplaced large numbers of antipersonnel mines along their common border. This is one of the largest scale mine laying operations anywhere in the world since 1997, though details are scant due to military secrecy and lack of access to the areas. Numerous reports of civilian casualties on both sides of the border call into question the effectiveness of the measures taken to protect the civilians of India and Pakistan from the effects of mines.

In addition, a Georgian Defense Ministry official told Landmine Monitor that Georgian Armed Forces laid antipersonnel mines in several passes in the Kodori gorge in 2001. This was also reported in the media. Georgia has had a formal moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since 1996. In a response to Landmine Monitor, the government denied any use of antipersonnel mines.

With regard to non-state actors, the authorities in separatist Abkhazia (Georgia) for the first time acknowledged use of antipersonnel mines by Abkhazian soldiers, Landmine Monitor also received an admission of on-going use of antipersonnel mines by the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The RCD is closely aligned with the military forces of State Party Rwanda based in the DR Congo. In Burma (Myanmar), three rebel groups, not previously identified as mine users, were discovered using landmines: Pao People’s Liberation Front, All Burma Muslim Union, and Wa National Army. Thirteen rebel groups are now using mines in Burma.

In Afghanistan, in the fighting following 11 September 2001, there were reports of limited use of mines and booby-traps by Taliban and Al-Qaeda fighters, as well as the Northern Alliance. The Taliban previously claimed to have stopped use in 1998, though some allegations persisted. The Northern Alliance admitted to use in 1999 and 2000, but said it stopped in 2001, notwithstanding evidence to the contrary. There were no instances of use of antipersonnel mines by the United States or coalition forces.

Ongoing Use of Antipersonnel Mines. Mine use by governments and/or rebels continued in a number of conflicts, sometimes at increased levels, sometimes with less intensity. Use continued, at least at some point in the reporting period, in Angola, Burundi, DR Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, Burma, India, Kashmir, Nepal, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Georgia (in Abkhaizia), and Russia (in Chechnya), and Colombia. There were notable expansions of use of antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices by the FARC and ELN combatants in Colombia, and by the Maoist United People’s Front in Nepal. In Sudan, the accusations of new use by the government and by the SPLA/M were less frequent and the evidence less compelling.

Use of Antipersonnel Mines Since May 2001 (Confirmed Use or Compelling Evidence)

Africa
- Angola: government and rebels (UNITA)
- Burundi: unknown (allegations of rebels and government)
- Democratic Republic of Congo: rebels (RCD)
- Somalia: various factions

Americas
- Colombia: rebels (FARC-EP, UC-ELN) and paramilitaries (AUC)

Asia-Pacific
- Afghanistan: Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and Northern Alliance
- Burma (Myanmar): government and 13 rebel groups
- India: government and rebels
- India/Pakistan (Kashmir): militants
Nepal: government and rebels (Maoists)  
Pakistan: government  
Philippines: rebels (Abu Sayaff, NPA)  
Sri Lanka: government and rebels (LTTE)

**Europe/Central Asia**  
Georgia: government and non-state actors (use in Abkhazia)  
Russia: government and rebels (Chechnya)

### Global Production of Antipersonnel Mines

In its first two annual reports, Landmine Monitor identified sixteen producers of antipersonnel landmines. Last year, Landmine Monitor decided to remove two of those nations, Turkey and FR Yugoslavia, from the list. The list of countries that produce antipersonnel mines remains unchanged from that published in *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*.

#### ANTIPERSONNEL MINE PRODUCERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Producers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the Americas:</td>
<td>Cuba, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Europe:</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Middle East:</td>
<td>Egypt, Iran, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Asia:</td>
<td>Burma, China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those 14 countries represent known producers of antipersonnel mines that have not formally declared a halt to production. However, in several cases it is not known if production lines were active in 2001 or 2002. And, as noted in last year’s report, the United States has not produced antipersonnel mines since 1997, South Korea produced only Claymore mines in 1998-2000 and no mines since then, and Egypt has unofficially stated that it no longer produces. India and Pakistan are engaged in new production of antipersonnel mines that are compliant with Amended Protocol II of the CCW.

Uganda reported that it invited foreign military attaches to inspect an alleged mine production facility, and that they concluded no production existed.

Forty-one nations have ceased production of antipersonnel mines. These include a majority of the big producers in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Eight of the twelve biggest producers and exporters over the past thirty years are now States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and have stopped all production and export: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (former Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, Czech Republic (former Czechoslovakia), France, Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are also required to report on the status of efforts to convert former production facilities. Albania, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have done so in annual transparency reports.

### Global Trade in Antipersonnel Mines

Landmine Monitor did not find any evidence of antipersonnel mine exports or imports by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties or signatories. In recent years, Landmine Monitor findings indicate that antipersonnel mine trade has dwindled to a very low level of illicit trafficking and unacknowledged trade.

However, there is fresh evidence of transfers of antipersonnel mines by Iran, which ostensibly instituted an export moratorium in 1997. Landmine Monitor has received information that a mine clearance organization in Afghanistan is encountering many hundreds of Iranian-manufactured YM-1 and YM-1-B antipersonnel mines, dated 1999 and 2000, presumably laid by the Northern Alliance forces in the last few years. Additionally, on 3 January 2002, Israel seized
the ship Karine-A about 300 miles south of the Israeli port of Eilat; it claimed the ship originated from Iran and was destined for Palestine via the Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to a manifest released by the Israeli military, the weapons on the ship included 311 YM-I antipersonnel mines.

In April 2002, a senior representative of the UK company, PW Defence Ltd., was recorded offering to supply 500 landmines to a BBC journalist, in contravention of national legislation (the Landmines Act 1998) and the Mine Ban Treaty. Researchers from the UK NGO Landmine Action found PW Defence Ltd (formerly Paines Wessex) promoting the mines at arms fairs in Greece and South Africa. UK authorities launched an investigation, but by the end of June 2002 had not announced any decision to instigate a prosecution.

In April 2002, Pakistan Ordnance Factories allegedly offered two types of antipersonnel mines for sale in the United Kingdom to a journalist from Channel 4 TV, who posed as a representative of a private company seeking to purchase a variety of weapons. The mines appeared in a brochure, which the POF Director of Exports later claimed was out of date.

Thirty-four countries are known to have exported antipersonnel landmines in the past. Today, all of those nations with the exception of Iraq have at the least made a formal statement that they are no longer exporting.

Twenty-two of these 34 countries are party to the Mine Ban Treaty and thus stopped exporting. Among non-signatories, one has an export ban in place (U.S.), four have a moratorium in place (Israel, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore), and six have made declaratory statements that they no longer export (China, Cuba, Egypt, Iran, Yugoslavia, Vietnam). Iran’s commitment would appear to no longer be valid. Russia’s moratorium and China’s declaratory policy only apply to export of non-detectable and non-self-destruct mines, in keeping with CCW restrictions. However, neither nation is known to have made a significant export since 1995.

Global Stockpiles of Antipersonnel Mines

Landmine Monitor estimates that there are 230 million antipersonnel mines stockpiled by about 94 countries. A total of 41 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties account for an estimated 6 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. The number held by States Parties changes rapidly with robust stockpile destruction programs, but may also increase as new States Parties like Angola, DR Congo, and Eritrea declare their stockpiles within the next year. Eighty-four States Parties have either completed stockpile destruction or never possessed antipersonnel mines. Signatories to the Mine Ban Treaty hold an estimated 10 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines; Ukraine has declared a stock of 6.35 million, and Ethiopia, Poland, and Greece are also likely to hold large stockpiles.

Countries that remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile an estimated 215 million antipersonnel mines. Landmine Monitor estimates that the largest stockpiles belong to: China (110 million), Russia (60-70 million), United States (11.2 million), Pakistan (6 million) India (4-5 million), and Belarus (4.5 million). Other non-signatories believed to have large stockpiles are Egypt, Finland, Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia.

In addition to governments, many rebel groups also have stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, including those in Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, DR Congo, Kashmir, Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda.

Stockpile Developments Since May 2001

Africa

- Burundi for the first time stated that it has a stockpile of 1,200 antipersonnel mines.
- Central African Republic disclosed it has a “very limited quantity” of antipersonnel mines in stockpile, kept for training purposes only.
- Chad for the first time revealed that it has a stockpile of 2,803 mines.
- Guinea-Bissau in March 2002 conducted an inventory of antipersonnel mines, which revealed a stockpile of 4,997 antipersonnel mines.
Kenya declared a stockpile of 38,774 antipersonnel mines and will retain 3,000 of these under Article 3.

Mauritania declared its stockpile had been reduced to 5,728 antipersonnel mines, which will be retained under Article 3.

Niger reported that it does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, contrary to previous information provided to Landmine Monitor.

Rwanda officially declared having no stockpile of antipersonnel mines. It had imported mines from several sources in the past and it is not clear when Rwanda destroyed these mines.

Uganda declared a stockpile of 6,782 antipersonnel mines of which 2,400 will be retained.

Zambia declared a stockpile of 6,691 antipersonnel mines, all of which will be retained.

**Americas**

- Argentina revealed that the Army will keep 1,160 FMK-1 antipersonnel mines to use as fuzes for antivehicle mines, apparently for training purposes.
- The Bahamas, Costa Rica, and Dominican Republic officially confirmed that they do not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.
- Colombia declared a stockpile of 20,312 landmines.
- Suriname has acknowledged a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines, believed to number 296 as of July 2002, but the Ministry of Defense is still conducting an inventory.

**Europe and Central Asia**

- Iceland and Malta officially confirmed that they do not possess stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.
- Lithuania has reported a stockpile of 8,091 antipersonnel mines, for training purposes.
- Moldova declared a stockpile of 12,121 antipersonnel mines and will retain 849.
- Romania initially declared a stockpile of 1,076,839 antipersonnel mines and will retain 4,000 of these as permitted by Article 3. This stockpile number was reduced in April 2002 to 918,920 antipersonnel mines as stockpile destruction activities continue.
- Turkmenistan declared in its initial transparency report having a stockpile of 761,782 antipersonnel mines, including PFM-1 and PFM-1S type mines.

**Asia and the Pacific**

- Indonesia for the first time reported that it has a stockpile of 16,000 antipersonnel mines.
- Samoa confirmed that it does not have a stockpile of antipersonnel mines.

**Stockpile Destruction**

Landmine Monitor estimates that in the past decade, 61 countries have destroyed some 34 million antipersonnel mines. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed about 27 million of these antipersonnel mines. Nearly eighty percent of the global total destroyed so far has been destroyed to comply with the Mine Ban Treaty. Approximately 7 million antipersonnel mines were destroyed in the reporting period.

Thirty-three States Parties have completed the destruction of their antipersonnel mine stockpiles. Six completed destruction in this reporting period: Czech Republic (June 2001), Ecuador and Peru (September 2001), Sweden (December 2001), and Albania and Yemen (April 2002).
Another 22 States Parties are in the process of destroying their stockpiles: Argentina, Brazil, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Moldova, Mozambique, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, and Uruguay.

A total of 17 States Parties have not begun the destruction process. These include Bangladesh, Congo-Brazzaville, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Macedonia FYR, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, and Venezuela, as well as more recent States Parties due to declare the amount of stockpiles possessed and announce destruction plans: Algeria, Angola, DR Congo, Eritrea, Nigeria, and Suriname. Djibouti and Macedonia FYR have their treaty-mandated deadline for completion of stockpile destruction on 1 March 2003.

A total of 34 States Parties have officially declared never having a stockpile of antipersonnel mines. Another 18 States Parties, while not officially declaring the presence or absence of stockpiles, are not believed to stockpile antipersonnel mines.

Stockpile Destruction Developments Since May 2001

**Africa**
- Chad announced at the Third Meeting of States Parties that it had initiated its stockpile destruction program, and reported having destroyed 1,210 mines by April 2002.

**Americas**
- Brazil reports that it destroyed 13,649 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in 2001.
- Chile, marking its ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty, destroyed 14,000 antipersonnel mines in September 2001.
- Ecuador completed stockpile destruction on 11 September 2001. It destroyed a total of 260,302 antipersonnel mines. It revised the number of mines retained for training purposes from 16,000 to 4,000.
- In September 2001, Perú completed destruction of its stockpiled antipersonnel mines. It reduced the number of mines retained for training to 4,024, and destroyed a total of 322,892 mines.

**Asia-Pacific**
- In Afghanistan, French troops participating in the international peacekeeping force reportedly destroyed 70,000 antipersonnel mines stored near the Kabul airport in early February.
- Cambodia destroyed another 3,405 antipersonnel mines discovered after the announced completion of stockpile destruction.

**Europe and Central Asia**
- Albania completed destruction of its stockpile of 1,683,860 antipersonnel mines on 4 April 2002 and will not retain any mines under Article 3.
- The Czech Republic completed the destruction of its stockpile of more than 360,000 antipersonnel mines in June 2001.
- Italy reported the destruction of an additional 757,680 antipersonnel mines and expects to complete destruction by the Fourth Meeting of States Parties in September 2002.
- Germany reports that 78,144 foreign antipersonnel mines were transferred to Germany for the purposes of destruction and duly destroyed, including U.S. scatterable mines.
- Portugal reported that its destruction program is underway and 36,654 antipersonnel mines had been destroyed.
Romania began its stockpile destruction in August 2001 and by April 2002 reported the destruction of 130,474 antipersonnel mines. Sweden completed the destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in December 2001. Sweden is retaining 13,948 antipersonnel mines for permitted purposes, the second highest number of any State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Turkmenistan reported destroying 412,601 antipersonnel mines between December 1997 and October 2001. It requested a seven-year extension of its deadline for stockpile destruction, but such an extension is not permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty. Turkmenistan subsequently indicated it intended to meet the deadline of 1 March 2003. Ukraine and the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency signed a memorandum of understanding in December 2001 to establish a trust fund to finance the destruction of 400,000 antipersonnel mines. This is in addition to a similar agreement between Canada and Ukraine signed in March 2001.

Middle East North Africa

- Tunisia destroyed 1,000 antipersonnel mines in January 2002 to mark a conference promoting the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty in North Africa.
- Yemen completed the destruction of its antipersonnel mine stockpile on 27 April 2002 and will retain 4,000 mines.

Mines Retained for Training and Development

Of the current 125 States Parties, 51 have exercised the option to retain antipersonnel mines for training and development purposes under Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Of these states, only ten intend to keep more than 5,000 mines. Brazil (16,550), Sweden (13,948), and Japan (12,513) are keeping the most antipersonnel mines. Twenty-seven States Parties intend to keep between 1,000 and 5,000 antipersonnel mines. Eleven are retaining less than 1,000 mines. Three States Parties have declared possessing mines under Article 3 but have yet to disclose the number they hold. El Salvador and Hungary have reversed previous positions and now intend to retain mines.

Fifty-one States Parties have chosen not to retain any antipersonnel mines; eleven of these states once stockpiled mines but have destroyed them or are in the process of destroying them. Twenty-three States Parties have not yet declared whether they intend to retain any antipersonnel mines under Article 3.

Article 3 states that the amount of retained mines “shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary.” In its report to the Third Meeting of States Parties in Managua in September 2001, the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation recommended that States Parties should reaffirm the understanding reached during Mine Ban Treaty negotiations in 1997 that the number of retained mines should be “in the hundreds or thousands, and not in the tens of thousands.”

After the ICBL repeatedly raised this issue, 11 States Parties have decided to significantly decrease the number of mines kept, including Argentina, Australia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Peru, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Thailand. Six of these States Parties had intended to keep 10,000 mines or more, but decided to greatly reduce that number; for example, Croatia went from 17,500 to 7,000 and Thailand went from 15,600 to 5,000.

Disturbingly, one State Party, Zambia, has chosen to retain its entire stockpile of 6,691 antipersonnel mines under Article 3. Treaty signatory Lithuania, in a voluntarily submitted transparency report, seems poised to do the same by retaining 8,091 antipersonnel mines.

Some States Parties are retaining mines for training and research purposes, but have reported no such activities, or consumption of the retained mines, since 1999. For the most part, it appears that few of the mines being retained by States Parties are being used (that is, consumed, destroyed, expended) each year.
Several States Parties reported in their annual transparency reports the number of antipersonnel mines used in training and for research and development purposes in 2001: Australia (119), Belgium (334), Brazil (5), Bulgaria (326), Canada (59), Czech Republic (10), Denmark (15), Germany (179), France (47), and South Africa (50). Some countries, while not providing a yearly total, have reported on the number of mines consumed between 1999 and 2001 including Japan (3,777) and Yemen (120).

Several States Parties have evaluated the types of antipersonnel mines retained and reduced the number based on a technical examination. For example, Italy, due to the requirements of its national implementing legislation declares that it retains 8,000 mines. However, Italy reports that 2,500 of these units are mine components incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine.\(^9\)

The ICBL continues to question the need for live mines for training, and calls on States Parties to continue to evaluate the necessity for this exception. The ICBL believes that it is important to have complete transparency on mines retained for training, and strongly supports the recommendation of the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention that States Parties should in their Article 7 reports “include information on the intended purpose and actual use” of retained mines. Belgium, Canada, and Sweden have commendably provided substantial detail on the anticipated purpose and then actual use of the retained mines in their Article 7 reports submitted in 2002.

**Transfers of Mines for Training and Development**

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows transfers of antipersonnel mines for research and development of demining technologies and for training, as well as for the purpose of destruction. Several States Parties have reported these activities in their Article 7 reports:

- Canada received, between 6 February 2001 to 1 March 2002, transfers of 180 M-14 antipersonnel mines from the U.S. and 110 antipersonnel mines (102 PMA-2 and 8 PMR-2A) from the former Yugoslavia.
- Ecuador transferred 1,644 antipersonnel mines (1,000 T-AB-1, 200 PRB M-409, 20 P-4-B, 20 PRB M-35, 400 VS.50, 4 PMD-6M) to the United States sometime between March 2001 and April 2002.
- The United Kingdom’s declared stock of “foreign” antipersonnel mines increased by 946 between 1 August 1999 and 31 December 2001, but the types and origins of these presumably transferred mines has not been reported.

**Transparency Reporting**

As of 31 July 2002, the UN had received initial Article 7 transparency reports from 89 States Parties. Thirty States Parties are late submitting initial reports.\(^{10}\) Two treaty signatories, Cameroon and Lithuania, have voluntarily submitted reports even though they have yet to ratify. The overall rate of States Parties submitting initial transparency reports is 75 percent, which is significantly higher than the 63 percent noted in the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*.

The rate of compliance in submitted annual updates by 30 April 2002 for the previous calendar year is equally impressive. As of 31 July 2002, 57 States Parties have submitted their annual update. Twenty States Parties have not.\(^{11}\) This equates to a compliance rate of 74 percent.

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10. States Parties that are late in submitting their initial reports (as of 31 July 2002) to the UN are: Bangladesh, Barbados, Cape Verde, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Malawi, Maldives, Namibia, Nauru, Niger, Qatar, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.
11. States Parties that are late in submitting their annual updates (as of 31 July 2002) to the UN are: Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Botswana, Fiji, Grenada, Kiribati, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Paraguay, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Swaziland, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
The Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, and the Article 7 Contact Group (coordinated by Belgium), have worked to strengthen the implementation of this area of the treaty. In May 2002, Ambassador Lint of Belgium presented a paper with suggestions for improving Article 7 reporting that was well received by other States Parties and the ICBL. The NGO VERTIC, in cooperation with the ICBL and ICRC, developed the Guide to Reporting under Article 7 of the Ottawa Convention, which was presented at the Third Meeting of States Parties.

Voluntary Form J, which was created primarily to encourage and facilitate better reporting on victim assistance programs, has been increasingly utilized by States Parties. For annual transparency reports due by 30 April 2002, 34 States Parties used Form J, a vast improvement over the 17 who used Form J last year.12

As noted above, some States Parties have responded to the ICBL’s call to expand their reporting on mines retained for training and development purposes. The ICBL remains concerned that States Parties have not used Article 7 to report on special issues of concern like foreign stockpiles, prohibited antivehicle mines with antihandling devices, and Claymore-type directional fragmentation munitions. Sweden is the only country so far to report on the measures taken to modify its stockpile of Claymore mines.

National Implementation Measures

Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty states, “Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited” by the treaty. However, only 35 of the 125 countries that have ratified or acceded to the treaty have passed domestic laws implementing the treaty, including six in this reporting period: Brazil, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Costa Rica, Iceland, and Malta. Twenty States Parties report that formal steps to enact legislation are underway. Landmine Monitor is unaware of any progress to enact domestic legislation implementing the Mine Ban Treaty in 50 States Parties. In some of these 50 states, the issue is “under study.”

A total of 20 governments have indicated that they do not believe a new implementation law is required. In some cases, these governments believe existing laws are sufficient, or have adapted existing laws, or have enacted domestic measures short of full implementation legislation. In other cases, governments believe no steps are necessary because they have never possessed antipersonnel mines and are not mine-affected. The ICBL is concerned, however, about the need for all states to pass legislation that would impose penal sanctions for any potential future violations of the treaty, and would provide for full implementation of all aspects of the convention.

The ICRC, in cooperation with the ICBL and the government of Belgium, has produced an “Information Kit on the Development of National Legislation to Implement the Convention of the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines.” At the May 2002 intersessional Standing Committee meetings, the Article 7 Contact Group was expanded to include efforts related to Article 9.

SPECIAL ISSUES OF CONCERN

Antivehicle Mines with Antihandling Devices

Since the conclusion of the negotiations for the Mine Ban Treaty, the ICBL has emphasized that, according to the treaty’s definitions, antivehicle mines (AVM) with antihandling devices (AHD) that explode from an unintentional or innocent act of a person are considered antipersonnel mines and therefore prohibited. Likewise, antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzing mechanisms, such as tripwires, breakwires or tilt rods, which will explode from the presence, proximity or contact of a person should clearly be considered banned. These munitions are in fact antipersonnel mines by the definitions in the Mine Ban Treaty, not antivehicle mines.

12 The 34 total includes Croatia, Nicaragua and Yemen, who used Form I to report victim assistance information instead of Form J.
No uniform common understanding or practice has been established by States Parties since entry-into-force of the treaty on these matters. It is regrettable that limited progress has been made in clarifying which specific types of AVM and AHD are permissible and which are prohibited under the treaty. The universalization of the treaty and the international norm are being hindered by the lack of action on the part of States Parties.

At the Standing Committee meetings in January 2002, Human Rights Watch distributed a detailed memorandum that illustrated the current status of state practice on this issue, using as examples the specific AVM and fuze types possessed by States Parties. The ICRC also distributed an information paper titled “Understanding the Ottawa Treaty definition of an antipersonnel mine under basic rules of treaty interpretation” at this meeting.

It appears that a consensus is beginning to build on the matter of sensitive fuzes, and the desirability of “best practices,” including the avoidance of use of mines with such things as tripwires and tilt rods. The President’s Action Program that emerged from the Third Meeting of States Parties encourages review of AVM inventories and consideration of best practices. It states, “The [Standing Committee] Co-chairs and other interested parties will promote such best practices and encourage reporting on State practice in this regard.” Several States Parties have destroyed or prohibited use of antivehicle mines with tilt rods and tripwires. But, there are still some States Parties who view such sensitive fuzes as acceptable, and a large number of States Parties that have not spoken on the issue.

With regard to antihandling devices and antivehicle mines, more than one dozen countries have publicly stated their agreement with the view that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices that explode from an unintentional act of a person are prohibited, including the key framers of the Mine Ban Treaty such as Austria, Canada, Norway, and South Africa. The vast majority of States Parties, however, have not made their views known.

A total of five States Parties have publicly stated that they disagree with this view: France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and most recently, Denmark. These countries have also expressed the view that AVM should be considered in the context of the CCW and not the Mine Ban Treaty. Others, including Austria, Czech Republic, and Spain have subsequently stated their support for this stance, though there may be differences about what constitutes an AVM or an APM.

At the Second Review Conference of CCW in December 2001, states agreed to form a Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) with a broad mandate to study issues concerning AVM (so-called “mines other than antipersonnel mines”). This group was formed after consensus could not be reached to adopt a new protocol on AVM initially submitted by the United States in December 2000 and cosponsored by Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom. However, this AVM proposal did not address the matter of sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices on antivehicle mines. No discussion on those issues was held at the Review Conference in December 2001 or at the first meeting of the GGE in May 2002; at the GGE meeting in July 2002, Germany and Romania tabled papers addressing antivehicle mines with sensitive fuzes.

During the reporting period, officials of a number of States Parties made policy statements on the issue of AVM with sensitive fuzes or antihandling devices in various domestic and international venues or in communications with Landmine Monitor researchers. (See individual country reports for details).

- Austria has supported the establishment of best practices regarding the design and use of certain fuzing mechanisms on antivehicle mines. Austria also supported the recommendation that States Parties review their inventories of antivehicle mines to ensure that the risk to

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13 The Landmine Monitor Report 2001 noted statements or developments on the issue of AVM with AHD or sensitive fuzes from the following States Parties: Bolivia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain, and the United Kingdom
civilians is minimized. At the May 2002 Standing Committee meeting, Austria declared, “We think that the development of best practices would be a suitable way to address the humanitarian problems of such mines. In this respect, we would again like to invite States Parties to consider adopting the best practices for AV mines with sensitive fuses like these that were identified in the report of the Expert Meeting hosted by the ICRC in March 2001.”15 At the May 2002 Standing Committee meeting, Austria also gave its legal analysis of the treaty definitions of antipersonnel mine and antihandling device, which among other things stated, “If a device were designed to activate through conduct not aimed at disturbing the mine, we would not consider it to be a legitimate AHD [antihandling device].”16

- At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, Belgium stated that the army had reviewed its AVM mines and concluded that all types in the inventory are “in compliance with both the spirit and letter” of the treaty. However, questions have been raised about the sensitivity of the French-produced HPD series AVM.

- A representative from Brazil said at the 1 February 2002 Standing Committee meeting that Brazil favored a ban on AVM with AHD, and repudiated the use of AHD on humanitarian grounds. Brazil said that “the wording of Article 2 Paragraph 3 does make clear that AVMs equipped with AHDs which may be detonated by the unintentional act of a person constitute, for all practical purposes, anti-personnel mines, and are therefore banned by the Convention.”17

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria has provided Landmine Monitor with a detailed accounting of its inventory of AVM and reports stockpiling a TM-46 AVM capable of having an AHD; it reports these are compliant with the treaty, but will be “deactivated” by the end of 2002.

- According to authorities in the Czech Republic, they do not possess any AVM with AHD so sensitive that they can explode from an unintentional act of a person. Additionally, in a January 2002 response to Landmine Monitor’s concern about a Czech company offering for sale an AVM that uses a tripwire as its activation means, an official said they did not consider the use of tripwires a violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

- The Mine Action Ambassador of France stated in September 2001 that “this subject belongs within the CCW…. Anti-vehicle mines are very important for some of the countries we want to join the Treaty.” The National Commission for the Elimination of Antipersonnel Mines (CNEMA) has identified several AVM in the French inventory that may function as antipersonnel mines, and recommends further study of these mines.18 The French military is considering a new activation mechanism to replace the breakwire fuzes used for the MIACAH F1 and MIACAH F2 AVMs. According to a French military engineering manual, it is prohibited to try to locate the HPD F2 and HPD F3 AVMs with a metal detector, because the magnetic influence fuze may function if the magnetic field around the mine is disturbed.

- Germany is among the States Parties that has stated its support for work on AVM within the CCW and has associated itself with the view that the AVM issue negatively impacts the universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty. According to research by the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, the German military has replaced the detonator of the DM-21 to avoid unintentional ignition, because the old, corroded detonators caused the pressure fuze to set off the mine below the standard pressure of 180 kilograms.

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16 Statement of Austria to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002. These remarks are reprinted in full in the Austria country report.
17 Statement by Brazil on Issues Concerning Article 2 (Definitions) of the Mine Ban Convention, to the Standing Committee on General Status and Operations of the Convention, Geneva, 1 February 2002.
• A representative from Italy emphasized at the Standing Committee meeting on 1 February 2002 that Italian national law does not permit AVM with AHD, and recommended that States Parties “should explore all possibilities available, through the avenue of a best practices approach, as suggested by the ICRC and Belgium as a means of moving forward.”

• In March 2002, the Ministry of Defense of Slovakia stated that an inventory has been made of antivehicle mines in stock and in development to identify which may be considered prohibited or permissible by the Mine Ban Treaty, and will consider any measures necessary to prevent antivehicle mines with antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes from functioning as antipersonnel mines.

• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Spain stated that AVM with AHD, as well as cluster bombs and UXO, should be regulated in the CCW, not the Mine Ban Treaty. However, at the same time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs acknowledged that the Mine Ban Treaty “uses an approach based on the effects which characterize antipersonnel mines…. For that reason it is already possible to include in the framework of the [Mine Ban Treaty] those weapons designed to have similar effects. This is the interpretation made by the Spanish Parliament in approving Law 33/1998 on the total prohibition of landmines and weapons with similar effects.”

• The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden stated in Parliament in February 2002 that “the Swedish government is of the opinion that generally you can’t say that antivehicle and antitank mines with antihandling devices are comparable to antipersonnel mines.” The Foreign Ministry has stated, “The government considers those antitank mines with antihandling devices possessed by Sweden to be compliant with the Ottawa Convention.” Defense Minister Björn von Sydow stated, “The government does not have the intention to do a specific inventory of antivehicle and antitank mines with antihandling devices for reporting to the parties to the Convention.” An order issued on 2 March 2001 to the Swedish military states, “It is now prohibited to take the [Fordonsmina 13 and Fordonsmina 013R] out from the storage without removing the tripwires, furthermore, it is also prohibited to train soldiers using any kind of tripwires for these mines.”

• Regarding an AVM stockpiled by Switzerland that uses a magnetic influence fuze, the Swiss General Staff said, “The electronics of the fuze of the Panzerabwehrmine 88 [HPD-F2] are programmed that an actuation under only certain categories of vehicle is possible…. The mine is optimized to military, heavy vehicles.”

• At the Standing Committee meetings in May 2002, the United Kingdom reiterated that “antivehicle mines and antivehicle mines with antihandling devices do not fall within the Ottawa Convention.” The UK view is that antivehicle mines with antihandling devices do not become antipersonnel mines “if unintentionally, they are detonated by the presence of a person. For us, it is the design of the mine that is the key…. The definition of what constitutes

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19 Italy’s Statement on Article 2 of Ottawa Convention, AVMs Equipped with Anti-Handling Devices Which Could Be Assimilated to APLs, to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 31 May 2002.
21 Letter from Raimundo Robredo Rubio, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 6 March 2002.
23 Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, written answer to question (2001/02:621) in parliament, 11 February 2002 (Translated by the Landmine Monitor researcher).
24 Anna Lindh, Minister of Foreign Affairs, written answer to question (2001/02:835) in parliament, 14 March 2002.
27 Letter from the Defense General Staff, 12 July 2001; Landmine Monitor researcher’s translation.
an antipersonnel mine in the Ottawa Convention does not turn on any unintended effects the mine might have when deployed.28

Joint Military Operations and “Assist”

The ICBL has consistently raised concerns about the possible participation of States Parties in joint military operations with non-States Parties that retain the right to use antipersonnel landmines. These concerns were heightened as several States Parties joined coalition military operations in Afghanistan. There is serious concern about the consistency of joint operations with the treaty’s Article 1 obligation for a State Party “never under any circumstance ... [t]o assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.” In particular, the question has been raised as to what “assist” means in the treaty’s Article 1. A number of governments have interpreted this to mean “active” or “direct” assistance in actual laying of mines, and not other types of assistance in joint operations, such as provision of fuel or security. Such joint operations at the least would go against the spirit of a treaty aimed at an end to all possession and use of antipersonnel mines.

In meetings of the Standing Committee on the General Status of the Convention, the ICBL has emphasized the need for States Parties to reach a common understanding of the term “assist,” especially as it applies to joint military operations, foreign stockpiling of antipersonnel mines, and foreign transit of mines across the territory of a State Party. Full and effective implementation of the treaty will be enhanced if States Parties are clear and consistent with regard to what acts are permitted and what acts are prohibited.

Some States Parties have made statements on this issue that uniformly reject the use of antipersonnel mines by their forces in joint operations. Denmark, France, and the Netherlands have in the past made particularly strong statements expressing the view that involvement in activities related to antipersonnel mines during joint military operations with non-signatory countries are prohibited.

Some States Parties appear to permit participation in joint operations as long as their national forces are not the ones actually emplacing antipersonnel mines, and would reject orders to do so by commanders who are nationals of a non-State Party. Canada and France have stated that they would not approve rules of engagement that permit the use of antipersonnel mines.29

Though often discussed in terms of potential U.S. use of antipersonnel mines in NATO operations, this is by no means a problem limited to the NATO alliance. There are increasingly serious questions regarding the position of Tajikistan, a State Party, toward the use of antipersonnel mines by Russian forces stationed in Tajikistan. In addition, it appears that a number of States Parties in Africa have engaged in military operations with (or in support of) armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines. This would include Namibia (with Angola against UNITA before the peace agreement in April 2002), as well as Rwanda and Zimbabwe with various forces in the DR Congo. Namibia and Zimbabwe have denied any involvement by their forces in emplacing antipersonnel mines while engaged in joint operations. There is particular concern about Rwanda because of its close military cooperation, including joint combat operations, with the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD-Goma). In 2002, several RCD-Goma military officers admitted to Landmine Monitor past and ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by RCD-Goma soldiers.

With regard to U.S.-led coalition military operations in Afghanistan, States Parties Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom each contributed ground forces that engaged in combat operations. Other States Parties participated in an International Security Assistance Force, at first commanded by the United Kingdom, but now commanded by non-State Party Turkey. States Parties participating in this peacekeeping effort

29 States Parties that provided information on their national position on the issue of joint operations for the Landmine Monitor Report 2001 include: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
include: Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

There is no evidence that any Coalition troops or peacekeepers, including those of non-States Parties, have used antipersonnel mines in Afghanistan. This situation did provide an opportunity for several States Parties to make public their operational understanding of their obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty in joint operations with non-States Parties:

- According to officials in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Canada, “All Canadian Forces in Afghanistan are instructed to act in accordance with the provisions of the Ottawa Convention.”

- The Ministry of Defense of Germany stated that during military operations in Afghanistan, the Federal Armed Forces would in all military operations act in compliance with the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty.

- The Ministry of Defense of Norway noted, “as Norwegian personnel are under US command, there is a written agreement that the precondition for Norway’s participation is that the soldiers are under Norwegian jurisdiction and can under no circumstances be ordered to conduct any activities that will violate Norwegian law or international treaty commitments.”

While not in the context of the conflict in Afghanistan, other States Parties have made statements since May 2001 at international meetings or in their communications with Landmine Monitor researchers.

- In Parliament, the Defense Minister of Belgium confirmed that he has informed partners and allies on the restrictions which national legislation imposes during joint military operations, and that Belgian military forces in joint military operations fall under national legislation.

- At a Standing Committee meeting in February 2002, Brazil stated that Article 1(c) “clearly bans joint operations with non-States Parties that may involve the use of anti-personnel mines. Even if the States Parties involved in such operations do not participate directly and actively in the laying of anti-personnel mines, the operations should be considered illegal if the use of landmines by a non-State Party is of direct military benefit to those States Parties. In the absence of such a broad interpretation of the term ‘assist,’ Article 1 would contain a serious and unfortunate loophole. All States Parties should commit strictly to observe the provisions of Article 1, which would include giving the term ‘assist’ as broad an interpretation as possible.”

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark confirmed that during joint military operations Denmark would not involve itself in the planning or in the implementation of activities that are related to the laying of antipersonnel mines.

- At a Standing Committee meeting in May 2002, Germany stated that “as a State Party to the Ottawa Convention [it] will not support planning or use of antipersonnel mines in a joint operation. Germany prohibits the planned or actual use of antipersonnel mines in any military operation whatsoever by her military personnel. With this in mind, all German Armed Forces personnel receive detailed information outlining their obligations with respect to the Convention.”


31 Letter from the Ministry of Defense to the German Initiative to Ban Landmines, 8 January 2002.


34 Brazilian Intervention, January 2002 intersessional Standing Committee meetings.

35 Interview with Emil Paulsen, Head of Section, Foreign and Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Copenhagen, 15 May 2002.

• The Ministry of Defense of France provided Landmine Monitor with the Army Chief of Staff directive of 12 November 1998. Although French soldiers may participate in a multinational operation with a non-State Party, they must not at any time participate in planning or training activities involving use of antipersonnel mines, accept rules of engagement that include use of antipersonnel mines, or “transfer, stockpile, or authorize antipersonnel mines on national territory.”

• Italy declared at a Standing Committee meeting in May 2002 that joint military operations with non-States Parties are permitted by its national legislation only if such operations are compatible with the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty. Italian troops deployed to Afghanistan were given written instructions to abstain from any participation in actions “contrary to the letter and the spirit” of the Mine Ban Treaty.

• A Ministry of Defense official from Malaysia stated, “Malaysia Armed Forces may participate in joint operations with armed forces of non-signatory states, but will not participate in joint operations that involve the use of [antipersonnel mines].”

• In a letter to Landmine Monitor, Namibia said, “Since the ratification of the [Mine Ban Treaty], the Namibian Defence Force has never used anti-personnel mines or assisted any other forces in the use thereof, both in its internal and international military operations…. The Government of the Republic of Namibia … denies any use or assistance to use anti-personnel mines by its forces.”

• In an interview during the January 2002 Standing Committee meetings, a military official stated that Senegal would refuse to participate in joint military operations where antipersonnel mines might be used by militaries of another state.

• Sweden produced a policy document in September 2001 that states that Article 1(c) is intended “to prevent active participation in activities prohibited by the Convention.” The Foreign Minister has stated, “Our cooperation in a joint military operation in which one of the participating states uses antipersonnel mines could be considered a violation of the spirit of the convention if we not in all ways counteracted the use of antipersonnel mines.”

• Uruguay stated in April 2002 that it “does not participate, nor does it plan to participate, in military exercises in which antipersonnel mines are used.”

• At a Standing Committee meeting in May 2002, the Zimbabwe delegation made a detailed statement on its understanding on joint operations and “assist:”

Our troops will therefore not in any way be directly or otherwise be involved in any activity banned by the Convention wherever they are operating. We therefore in our view, believe that the term assist should be interpreted, relating directly to the activity in question and should not be applied liberally or given too wide a definition…. Active participation also means actively participating.
in the carrying, laying and training in the use, manufacture, distribution, encouraging or inducing someone in the use of [antipersonnel mines]. It is therefore our humble submission that the terms assist and active participation in the context of Article 1 mean **knowingly and intentionally** participating directly or rendering assistance on the use, transfer and/or production of [antipersonnel] mines.\(^{45}\)

The ICBL continues to believe that the legality of State Party participation in joint operations with an armed force that uses antipersonnel mines is an open question, and that participation in such operations is contrary to the spirit of the treaty. The ICBL calls on States Parties to insist that any non-signatories do not use antipersonnel mines in joint operations, and to refuse to take part in joint operations that involve use of antipersonnel mines. All States Parties should make clear the nature of their support for other armed forces that may be using antipersonnel mines, and make clear their views with regard to the legality under the Mine Ban Treaty of their military operations with these armed forces.

**Transit of Foreign Antipersonnel Mines**

It appears that States Parties also have differing views about whether the Mine Ban Treaty’s prohibition on “transfer” of antipersonnel mines also applies to “transit.”\(^{46}\) The main issue is whether a non-State Party’s aircraft, ships, or vehicles carrying antipersonnel mines can pass through (and presumably depart from, refuel in, restock in) a State Party on their way to a conflict in which those mines would be used. The ICBL believes that if a State Party willfully permits transit of antipersonnel mines which are destined for use in combat, that government is certainly violating the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty, is likely violating the Article 1 ban on assistance to an act prohibited by the treaty, and possibly violating the Article 1 prohibition on transfer. The ICRC has also expressed its view that the treaty prohibits transiting of mines.

In this reporting period, several States Parties made their position on transit of antipersonnel mines known to Landmine Monitor.

- At a Standing Committee meeting on 1 February 2002, Brazil stated that “Article 1, however, does set forth a broad obligation to never ‘stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines.’ Brazil is of the view that the latter obligation applies to foreign-owned landmines. Brazil has no foreign anti-personnel mines on its territory and will never, under any circumstances, allow any transiting of anti-personnel mines on its national territory for purposes that are banned by the Convention.”\(^{47}\)

- A 13 February 2002 statement by Canada’s Department of National Defense reiterated, “The Convention does not prohibit the transit of anti-personnel mines, which is defined as the movement of anti-personnel mines within a state, or from a state, to its forces abroad. Canada, however, discourages the use of Canadian territory, equipment or personnel for the purpose of transit of anti-personnel mines.”\(^{48}\)

- At a May 2002 Standing Committee meeting, Germany noted that it, “considers the Ottawa Treaty – per se – not applicable to allied forces, which in accordance with the 1954 Convention on the Presence of Foreign Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany are permanently stationed in Germany, unless a sending state itself is party to the Treaty.

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\(^{46}\) In the *Landmine Monitor Report 2001*, the following States Parties have stated that transit of antipersonnel mines is prohibited: Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Guinea, Italy, Namibia, New Zealand, Portugal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, and Switzerland. Canada, Germany, Japan, and Norway have indicated that they believe transit of antipersonnel mines is permitted.

\(^{47}\) Brazilian Intervention to Standing Committee on General Status and Operation, Geneva, 1 February 2002.

Therefore any weaponry of allied stationed forces covered by this Convention is not under German jurisdiction or control within the meaning of Art. 1 of the Ottawa Treaty. Therefore, Germany will not comment on transit or storage of weaponry belonging to and for the equipment of such allied stationed forces nor will she report on stockpiles of Non-Signatories on her territory.\(^4\)

- On 3 October 2001, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan stated, “The government of Japan (GOJ) does not bear any responsibility to prevent or prohibit the transportation of landmines by US military forces.”\(^5\)
- In March 2002, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Samoa stated that Samoa does export, import, or stockpile antipersonnel mines, nor does it allow for their transfer through Samoa.\(^6\)
- According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia, transit of antipersonnel mines through Slovenia is subject to national legislation, which incorporates the Mine Ban Treaty and CCW prohibitions.\(^7\)
- The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated in March 2002 that U.S. antipersonnel mines were not transited, stockpiled or maintained on British Indian Ocean Territory during the conduct of operations in Afghanistan.\(^8\) Secondary legislation under the Landmines Act extended its provisions in 2001 to British Overseas Territories.\(^9\) Regarding transit across UK territory of antipersonnel mines by States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office reported to Parliament in March 2002 that it had received legal advice that such transit would be contrary to the UK’s obligations under the Treaty.\(^10\)

Logistical support measures for Coalition military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere necessitates urgent consideration of this issue by States Parties. States Parties should insure that munitions destined for Afghanistan or elsewhere transiting their territory do not contain antipersonnel mines. Prior events demonstrate that this issue is not theoretical. In 1999 U.S. Army engineer units deployed to Albania with antipersonnel mines and their delivery systems (MOPMS and Volcano mixed mine systems) as part of Task Force Hawk to support operations in Kosovo. Most of the U.S. Army units deployed from bases in Germany. At the time of this deployment, Albania was a signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty and Germany was a State Party.

**Stockpiling of Foreign Antipersonnel Mines**

The ICBL believes that it would violate the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty for a State Party to permit any government or entity to stockpile antipersonnel mines on its territory, and would violate the letter of the treaty if those stocks are under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party.

The United States stores antipersonnel mines in at least five countries that are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: Norway (123,000), Japan (115,000), Germany (112,000), Qatar (11,000), and United Kingdom at Diego Garcia (10,000), as well as treaty signatory Greece (1,100). U.S. antipersonnel mine stockpiles have been removed from States Parties Italy and Spain. Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom do not consider the U.S. mine stockpiles to be under their jurisdiction or control, and thus not subject to the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty or

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50 Written response to ICBL by Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 September 2001.
51 Letter to Neil Mander, Convenor, NZ Campaign Against Landmines, from Perina J Sila on behalf of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Samoa, 11 March 2002.
52 Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire from Irina Gorsic, Department of Political Multilateral Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 March 2002.
53 Hansard, 15 March 2002, col. 1298W.
54 Hansard, 26 February 2002, col. 1155W. British Overseas Territories were listed in Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 818.
55 Hansard, 26 March 2002, col. 812W.
their national implementation measures. The United Kingdom reiterated this view in May 2001, “We wish to affirm that US stocks do not fall under our national jurisdiction or control and we do not therefore have any obligations under Article 4 ... in respect of them. We have fully complied with our obligations in respect of stocks that were under our jurisdiction and control.” 56

Norway, through a bilateral agreement with the U.S., has stipulated the mines must be removed by 1 March 2003, which is the deadline for Norway to comply with its Mine Ban Treaty Article 4 obligation for destruction of antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control. Norway has not publicly disclosed the status or progress of the efforts to remove the U.S. mines.

For the first time, Qatar responded to requests by the ICBL for clarification on this issue stating, “As for the legality of the joint operations with non-signatories relating to stock-pile, use of antipersonnel mines or transporting or transiting them, we assure you that the Qatari Armed Forces never practice any of these acts.” 57 It is not known if this policy equally applies to Qatari nationals employed in the operation or maintenance of the storage facilities.

There is also concern about Russian stockpiles of antipersonnel mines. Russian forces stationed in State Party Tajikistan are likely to stockpile antipersonnel mines there, given the recent use by Russian forces on the Tajik-Afghan border. It is not known whether Russian peacekeeping forces possess antipersonnel mines in the Pridnistrovie Moldavian Republic, a breakaway region of State Party Moldova.

### Claymore Mines

The Mine Ban Treaty permits Claymore mines (directional fragmentation munitions) used in a command-detonated mode. However, their use in a victim-activated tripwire mode is prohibited. Though not legally obligated, the ICBL believes that States Parties should include information in Article 7 reports on stockpiled Claymore mines and steps taken to ensure their use in command detonated mode only. This will contribute to effective and uniform state practice regarding use of Claymore mines.

The Landmine Monitor Report 2001 stated that 15 States Parties are known to have decided to retain operational stocks of Claymore mines: Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Hungary, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In this reporting period, since May 2001, this list has expanded to 22 States Parties with the inclusion of Croatia, Ecuador, Germany, Malaysia, Moldova, the Philippines, and Slovenia. As with Honduras and Thailand in previous years, Croatia and Ecuador reversed their initial plans to destroy their stockpiled Claymore mines and decided to keep them. Germany reported in its annual Article 7 report that it received a transfer for the purpose of destruction 38,959 M18A1 Claymore mines in 2001 but did not note the source of these mines.

Representatives of several States Parties have stated that measures have been taken to insure that their Claymore mines cannot be used in the victim-activated mode or that they have destroyed the tripwire assemblies and mechanical fuzes. These include: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. Only Sweden has reported on the measures taken to modify its Claymore mines in its Article 7 report, although Norway gave a detailed technical presentation on this matter last year during an intersessional meeting.

A total of 10 States Parties have signaled their intention to destroy their stocks of Claymore mines, aside from those retained under Article 3 for training or research purposes, or to not retain any Claymore mines: Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, El Salvador, Italy, Jordan, Nicaragua, Peru, and Turkmenistan. France, Romania, and Yemen have confirmed to Landmine Monitor in this reporting period that they do not possess Claymore-type mines.

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57 Letter from Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Qatar to ICBL Coordinator Elizabeth Bernstein (Ref., Qw/1/3-187/2002), 3 July 2002 (translated by the Embassy of Qatar, Washington, DC).
No indication has been received from the following States Parties that are known to have at one time produced, imported, or stockpiled Claymore mines on their interpretation of this issue: Eritrea, Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.
The Evolution of Humanitarian Mine Action

With the approaching five-year anniversary of the negotiation and signing of the Mine Ban Treaty, it is useful to note the broad developments that have occurred in the field of humanitarian mine action. Indeed, mine clearance has evolved over the past decade from a strictly military activity to a more sophisticated and systematic humanitarian and developmental initiative. This has occurred in the wake of the establishment of pioneering humanitarian mine action (HMA) programs in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan). Survey and assessment, mine risk education, and survivor assistance activities are becoming more integrated with humanitarian mine clearance programs as HMA’s focus has progressively become more community-oriented. Greater emphasis is now placed on alleviating the impact of the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) on communities. Socio-economic factors are increasingly taken into consideration during the processes that allocate resources, plan, and implement mine action operations.58

Some key developments in the evolution of HMA over the past decade include:

- More non-profit HMA operators in the field, including indigenous/national entities;
- More commercial practitioners operating in accordance with humanitarian priorities;
- Increased coordination between mine action practitioners, donors and governments of mine-affected countries;
- A recognition of the need for timely and appropriate HMA assistance in emergency situations;
- Increasing attention paid to management skills and professional development of mine action practitioners;
- An increasingly broad and diverse range of tools are now available to mine action practitioners;
- The development of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS);
- Tasking priorities are increasingly based on impact, and program output is increasingly measured in more qualitative terms;
- A growing understanding of the need to balance subsistence needs and priorities at the local level with the infrastructure needs and priorities at the regional and national levels;
- The gradual inclusion of systems to secure post-clearance plans and to ensure that cleared lands are used as intended.

The number of humanitarian NGOs engaged in HMA, originally just a handful, has more than tripled over the past decade. At the same time, more and more responsibility for HMA is being placed on national bodies, through the creation of national mine action centers (MACs). This shows a higher level of commitment and active involvement in the landmine issue. Increasingly, commercial practitioners are operating in accordance with humanitarian priorities as demanded by donors and the affected countries.

Increased coordination at the national, regional and global level has developed over the past decade. The Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action (IAGG) meets monthly as the coordinating mechanism for United Nations entities engaged in HMA, while this group of agencies together with key partners such as the ICBL forms the Steering Committee on Mine Action (SCMA). The Mine Action Support Group (MASG) brings together major donors to optimize existing tools for resource mobilization.

The biannual meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee for Mine Clearance, Mine Awareness, and Mine Clearance Technologies have increased opportunities for interaction among various HMA actors, especially government representatives of mine-affected countries. In 2002, the Standing Committee recognized that coordination among various actors and transparency

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58 Funding for mine action programs is not addressed in this overview. See the individual country studies in this report, and for an overview see the Executive Summary of the Landmine Monitor Report 2002.
of activities could be further enhanced by examining mine action programs in major mine-affected countries. The January 2002 meeting included a session on Afghanistan, which was followed by a session on Mozambique in May 2002. Many actors have taken advantage of regular Mine Ban Treaty meetings to hold informal discussions, using the facilities available at the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

Emergency mine action was required in 2001 and 2002 in a number of places, most notably Afghanistan. Concurrently, an Emergency Response Plan (ERP) is under development by the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in collaboration with other UN mine action partners. The ERP was developed as a response to two recent humanitarian emergencies – Kosovo in 1999 and Eritrea in 2000 -- and the goal is to develop a system that will allow the international community to respond “in a timely and affective manner to the mine action components of humanitarian and peacekeeping emergencies. The ERP will address the immediate mine action priorities of a humanitarian emergency and will not attempt to plan beyond this stage of an operation.” In addition, the U.S. has sponsored the creation of a “Quick Reaction Demining Force,” based in Mozambique.

As HMA expands and evolves, the need for more practitioners equipped with professional management skills becomes even more urgent. The UNDP is coordinating efforts in management training as well as establishing staff exchanges between the various national MACs, as part of its capacity-building mandate. At the same time, more attention is being paid to thematic research into new and developing areas of HMA, as recorded by recent GICHD studies into socio-economic aspects of HMA.

A positive development in the field application of mine action technologies is the increased use of the “toolbox” concept by mine action practitioners. The toolbox concept provides for the use of a range of methods such as manual, mechanical, and mine detection dogs in mine clearance activities, depending on what is most suitable in the area needing clearance. One example is area reduction where mechanical means and dogs are used in order to verify areas and set boundaries of the areas where manual deminers are required. An obvious result of this is the increased speed of mine clearance operations, which means more cost-effective clearance operations, and land handed over to the civilian population in shorter time.

The development of International Mine Action Standards has resulted in greater safety and efficiency by providing guidance, establishing principles, and also in some cases, by defining international requirements and specifications.

There is now an increased appreciation and acceptance among donors of key developments in HMA. This is demonstrated by higher demands and by more rigid and diversified requirements on the output and return of their financial contributions to mine action. More and more governments are increasingly concerned with and involved in the program design and objective setting of mine clearance. Both donor countries and mine-affected countries are reviewing and renewing strategies and policies for program support.

Over a decade of operational experience has stimulated the need to collect and evaluate activities to ensure that objectives are being met. Country program evaluations published in the past year include “Willing to Listen: An Evaluation of the United Nations Mine Action Program in Kosovo” by the Praxis Group, and the World Bank’s “Socio-economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan: a Cost-Benefit Analysis.” These types of evaluations are taking place along side internal assessments by NGOs like DanChurch Aid (in Kosovo), Handicap International (in Ethiopia), Handicap International Belgium (in Afghanistan), and Norwegian People’s Aid (in Angola and Mozambique).

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Meeting the Mine Ban Treaty Ten-Year Deadline

Despite these positive developments over the past decade, it remains to be seen whether the HMA community will be able to complete the task at hand and meet its goal of a mine-free world. This daunting challenge is perhaps even more difficult than that faced by the ban movement with respect to universalization of the treaty.

At the 2002 Standing Committee meetings the ICBL’s Mine Action Working Group (MAWG) drew the attention of States Parties to the capacity of mine-affected States Parties to meet the ten-year obligation to clear emplaced mines stipulated by Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. As of 31 July 2002, 47 of the 125 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty were mine-affected and would need to comply with Article 5. As the first deadline for some states of 2009 draws nearer, the MAWG said it was important to acknowledge this deadline and redouble efforts by addressing the need for: realistic and appropriate funding to mine action; more and appropriate information for decision-making, priority setting and tasking in humanitarian mine clearance operations; and, national strategic mine action plans.

An examination of statistical clearance outputs and funding levels over the past five years makes it quite evident that a number of States Parties will not be able to meet the Article 5 obligation to clear emplaced antipersonnel mines. An extension of up to ten years can be requested in cases where the clearance deadlines are not met, and Article 6 (International Cooperation and Assistance) stipulates the right of each State Party to seek cooperation and assistance from other States Parties “in a position to do so.” The request for an extension must contain a detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including: preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs; financial and technical means available to the State Party for clearance and destruction of all antipersonnel mines; and, circumstances that impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas. A request for an extension must be approved by a majority of States Parties present at the Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference at which the request is presented. An extension may be renewed.

The Landmine Problem

Landmine Monitor finds that 90 countries are affected with mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO).60 In addition, Landmine Monitor lists eleven other areas (noted in italics in the chart) that are not internationally recognized states, but which Landmine Monitor researches and reports on because of their particular mine-affected status. Antipersonnel mines are often found in combination with antivehicle mines and UXO in many of these countries. A handful of these countries suffer solely from the legacy of the explosive remnants of war (ERW) dating back to conflicts in the first half of the last century. The enduring threat of landmines and UXO in these countries still puts the civilian population at risk.

60 This is the same number as recorded last year. However, Hungary has been added because of increased information about the extent of contamination from World War II UXO and mines, and Tanzania has been dropped as evidence indicates the mine problem is limited to the Burundi side of the border.
Introduction

Landmine/UXO Problem in the World Today

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Survey and Assessment

The scope and knowledge of the mine problem varies greatly from country-to-country. Surveys and assessments are necessary tools in systematically establishing both the location of suspected mined areas and the impact mines have on civilians and their daily lives.

Landmine Impact Surveys (LIS) enable donors, national authorities, and clearance organizations to prioritize mine clearance based on humanitarian aspects and cost efficiency. The Survey Action Center (SAC) serves as a coordination organization for most LIS operations. SAC and its contracted implementing partners are currently engaged in or planning for LIS in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia (Somaliland). The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF) are engaged in an LIS in Lebanon, and VVAF is awaiting approval from the government of Vietnam to undertake an LIS there. In 2000 and 2001, Landmine Impact Surveys were completed in

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61 Landmine Impact Surveys were earlier described as Level One Impact Surveys. Level Two technical surveys verify the presence of mines and establish the outer perimeter of minefields to facilitate the marking of danger areas. These types of surveys also gather other relevant data for the technical planning of mine clearance operations.

62 See SAC contribution to the Appendices of this report.
Cambodia, Chad, Mozambique, Thailand, and Yemen, as well as a modified Level One Impact Survey in Kosovo.

Other general surveys and assessments are underway in several countries. These surveys are conducted by a number of actors including NGOs, international organizations, national demining offices, and military organizations, often in combination. Landmine Monitor Report 2001 counted some kind of survey or assessment activity in 30 countries in the year 2000. This total has increased to 34 in 2001 and the first half of 2002. Survey or assessment activities have taken place in the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Macedonia FYR, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Oman, Pakistan, Somalia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, Ukraine, Vietnam, FR Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe, as well as in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), and Somaliland.


The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) combines a relational database with a geographical information system (GIS) and provides mine action managers with up-to-date information on affected areas, sites of operation, mine casualties and other relevant information. In 2001, IMSMA was installed in twenty-two countries including: Albania, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Chad, Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Estonia, Lebanon, Macedonia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Thailand, and Yemen, as well as Kosovo, Northern Ossetia (Russia), andSomaliland. In the half of 2002, the GICHD established its first Regional Support Centre in Managua, Nicaragua in order to assist IMSMA users throughout Latin America.

In comparison, Landmine Monitor reported IMSMA installments in a total of thirteen mine action programs in 2000. Between January and April 2002 new IMSMA programs were installed in Colombia, DR Congo, Guatemala and Sudan.

In September 2001, UNMAS launched its E-MINE system (Electronic Mine Information Network), a website for up-to-date mine-related data developed as support to global mine action efforts. E-MINE was further developed throughout 2002, building on a large number of databases, information systems and websites.

A total of 31 of the 47 mine-affected States Parties had submitted transparency reports as required under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty as of 31 July 2002. Forms C, F and G of the Article 7 report format all relate to reporting on mine action. States Parties use Form C of the Article 7 reporting format to report on the location of mined areas in their territory. From a review of submitted reports, Landmine Monitor found that three countries (El Salvador, Kenya and Uganda) did not report important information on the location of mined areas. Several States Parties, including Yemen, have attached their LIS findings to Form C.

One reason for the inconsistent use of Form C could be the limited number of assessments and surveys undertaken. Only nine of the mine-affected countries have had any kind of assessment or survey carried out, which would shed some light on the extent and characteristics of the country’s landmine problem and facilitate reporting.

Mine Clearance

Some form of mine clearance was reported to have taken place in 2001 and the first half of 2002 in 74 countries and ten other areas. This includes mine clearance for humanitarian, economic, or military purposes. No mine clearance of any type was noted in 2001 in sixteen mine-affected countries: Armenia, China, Cuba, Iraq (excluding northern Iraq), Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, North Korea, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia (excluding Somaliland), Swaziland, and Uganda.

New information on mine clearance in FR Yugoslavia was received. Three countries that reportedly had clearance operations in 2000, reported no activities in 2001: Bangladesh, Namibia, and Pakistan.
In the case of Kosovo, the internationally coordinated Mine Action Center ceased operations at the end of 2001 after declaring that the clearance of known mine-affected areas was concluded to international accepted standards. Small-scale clearance continues and there is an indigenous capacity to clear any mines and UXO subsequently discovered.

In many cases, the only mine clearance recorded in this reporting period involved the military and other entities, such as explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units of national police, responding to emergencies necessitating the clearance of landmines or UXO. The military undertook mine clearance operations in Djibouti, Kenya, Senegal, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In Uzbekistan, there are unconfirmed reports of limited clearance by the Uzbek Army, however, there are no plans for clearance of its mines on the Tajik border. In Sri Lanka, the military and rebel forces conducted mine clearance with training from international NGOs and assistance from elements of the U.S. “Quick Reaction Demining Force” based in Mozambique. Some countries during this reporting period conducted mine clearance operations to facilitate military operations. Limited military mine clearance for tactical purposes was noted in Chechnya, Colombia, India, and the Philippines.

International or national NGOs are operating in twenty-four countries or regions: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Costa Rica, Croatia, DR Congo, Eritrea, Guatemala, Honduras, Laos, Lebanon, Macedonia FYR, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Vietnam, as well as Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), and Somaliland. New humanitarian mine clearance programs by NGOs commenced in Albania and Macedonia FYR.

While not the sole indicator of progress in humanitarian mine action, the amount of land cleared in 2001 in some key mine-affected countries includes the following:

- The UN Mine Action Program in Afghanistan reports that its implementing partners cleared nearly 15.6 million square meters of mined area and 81.2 million square meters of former battlefields.
- In Bosnia and Herzegovina, some 5.5 million square meters was cleared.
- Cambodia reports the clearance of 24.85 million square meters of land.
- In Chad, 645,663 square meters of land was demined.
- In Croatia some 13.6 million square meters of land was cleared in 2001.
- The total amount of cleared land in Kosovo was 8.1 million square meters.
- A total of 9,712 square meters was cleared in Rwanda.
- The Thailand Mine Action Center reported 4.4 million square meters of land cleared from July 2000 to June 2002.
- In Yemen a total of 2.2 million square meters were cleared between May 2001 to Feb 2002 by mine action teams which are deployed in four of the 14 highest priority areas based on results from the LIS conducted in 1999-2000.

In spite of the presence of national demining bodies with planning and coordinating mandates in other countries it proved difficult to obtain accurate numbers on both surveyed and cleared land in 2001. In several instances, the amount of cleared land reported by national mine action centers differed significantly from those provided by the various mine clearance organizations. In some cases, the statistics reported by the national body conflicted with other figures provided by the same body.

In Angola the national demining institute INAROEE reported three different figures, all taken from its annual report “Mine Accidents and Survey Report 2001,” which indicates the total amount of cleared land in 2001 was either 2.48 million square meters, 3.06 million square meters, or 6.5 million square meters. The total amount of cleared land in 2001 reported to Landmine Monitor by major operators in Angola was 6.8 million square meters.
In Mozambique, the National Institute for Demining reported clearance in 2001 of 12.41 million square meters in one instance, and 7.88 million square meters in another. This contrasts with the 8.88 million square meters total calculated by Landmine Monitor from reports by various field-based operators.

Article 7’s Form F is used to report on the status of any mine action program relevant to the mine-affected country. In the reporting period, eight mine-affected States Parties did not include any information on the status of mine action programs or activities (Denmark, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kenya, the Philippines, Rwanda, Tajikistan, and Uganda). Form G should contain information of the clearance of emplaced mines from mined areas after entry into force, but eleven of the 31 mine-affected States Parties reporting did not include information on clearance in their Article 7 reports (Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Kenya, Mauritania, the Philippines, Rwanda, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia).

In 2001 and the first half of 2002, incidents during clearance operations or in training exercises caused casualties among deminers in: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Eritrea, Estonia, Greece, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Yemen. There were unconfirmed reports of demining casualties in several other countries.

Planning and Coordination

At best, in the absence of information, any national-level planning and coordination of mine action activities becomes ad hoc. Only in the cases of Croatia, Mozambique, and Yemen have survey information, other relevant landmine data and socio-economic information led to the development of a national strategic mine action plan, outlining the landmine problem, priorities, capacities, and needs. Efforts to integrate survey data into national plans are ongoing in Cambodia, Chad, and Thailand. SAC is developing a mechanism to integrate strategic planning with national bodies into all future socio-economic impact surveys.

In order to be able to report on both mined areas and on plans for destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas, there is a clear need for surveys and assessments to identify the scale and location of the problem. More and improved coordination by national authorities within the country is necessary, including the mandate to plan and prioritize mine clearance.

A total of 40 countries and areas reported a body for national-level coordination activities in 2001 and early 2002. That represents an increase of 5 countries since 2000. In some mine/UXO-affected countries the establishment of a mine action center (MAC) is announced, but it takes time for the MAC to become operational. In some cases the military dominate the MAC, for example in Egypt and Jordan.

A total of 27 countries and areas reported some kind of a mine action plan. This is an increase from the 20 countries and regions that reported last year. New plans were reported in Angola, DR Congo, and Guinea-Bissau, among others.

The UN Development Programme was active in supporting and developing national mine action coordination or planning capacities in the following mine-affected countries in 2001: Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Somalia (Somaliland), Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Yemen.

Demining Technology Research and Development (R&D)

The Standing Committee meetings in January and May 2002 recognized a growing understanding of the importance of establishing closer links between the research and development community and field practitioners. Landmine Monitor has identified various research and development projects in a number of countries, but has found it difficult to ascertain the use or results of these projects in the field by mine action practitioners. Various R&D projects are described in the country reports of the donor nations (as well as the EC), and in some cases in the country report where projects are being tested.
Regional Developments and Key Findings in HMA (excluding MRE)

Africa

• In Angola a peace agreement was signed in April 2002, and Angola subsequently ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 5 July 2002 leading to hopes that mine action funding will be restored as donors regain confidence that no more antipersonnel mines will be laid. On 28 July 2001, a new Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance was established in response to a lack of donor support for the existing national mine action institution. According to the mine action NGOs operating in Angola, 6.7 million square meters of land were cleared during 2001.

• In Chad, 645,663 square meters of land was cleared, and the recently completed LIS has led to the development of a national strategic mine action plan for the country.

• The DR Congo acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 2 May 2002 and a Mine Action Coordination Center was established in Kinshasa, with a regional office planned for Kisangani.

• In Guinea-Bissau, a National Commission for Humanitarian Demining was established on 10 September 2001.

• In Mozambique, the National Demining Institute produced its first Five Year National Mine Action Plan (2002-2006). The final conclusions of the LIS were published in September 2001, which identified some 791 communities affected by 1,374 suspected mined areas.

• In Rwanda, some 20 of the more than 35 mined areas in the country have been cleared, including a total of 9,712 square meters cleared in 2001.

• A comprehensive LIS began in Somaliland in May 2002, which is due for completion in February 2003.

Americas

• Chile ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 10 September 2001 and a National Demining Commission was established on 3 October 2001.63

• At least 256 of Colombia’s 1,097 municipalities in 28 of the 31 departments in the country are believed to be mine-affected. CINAMA, the first government agency responsible for overall coordination of mine action in Colombia, was established on 8 October 2001.64

• The demining program in Costa Rica has suffered a serious financial crisis since December 2001, which has resulted in a disruption and suspension of operations.

• As of June 2002, Nicaragua had cleared more than 2.5 million square meters of land, including 78,374 mines.

• In June 2002, the Peruvian Army completed mine clearance along 18 kilometers of the Zarumilla Canal on the border with Ecuador. Peru has a draft Mine Action Plan on clearance within the national army.

• The OAS has continued its coordination and supervision of the Assistance Program for Demining in Central America, in Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, despite challenges in raising the necessary funds.65

Asia-Pacific

• The UN Mine Action Program in Afghanistan reports that its implementing partners cleared nearly 15.6 million square meters of mined area and 81.2 million square meters of former battlefields.

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63 National Demining Commission (Comisión Nacional del Desminado, CNAD).
64 National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Nacional Intersectorial para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal).
65 Programa de Asistencia al Desminado en Centroamérica, (PADCA).
As part of a new plan to “fence the country,” the Burmese Army gave its troops orders to lay mines along the Thai-Burma border.

The Cambodia LIS was completed in April 2002 and revealed that nearly half of all villages are either known or suspected contaminated by mines or UXO. In 2001, a total of 21.8 million square meters of land was cleared, including 29,358 antipersonnel mines.

As part of the military buildup since December 2001, both Pakistan and India have emplaced large numbers of antipersonnel mines along their common border in what is apparently one of the largest mine-laying operations anywhere in the world in years.

In 2001, the Republic of Korea cleared 840 mines and 850,000 square meters of land in the inter-Korean transportation routes south of the demilitarized zone.

In Sri Lanka, a 23 February 2002 cease-fire may enable significant mine action activities to get underway.

The Thailand Mine Action Center reported that 4.4 million square meters of land has been cleared as of June 2002.

In Vietnam, mine action activities by NGOs continue to expand, including outside of Quang Tri province for the first time.

Europe/Central Asia

From 1998 through February 2002, HALO Trust cleared a total of 945,868 square meters of land in Abkhazia.

The Armenian National Mine Action Center was officially opened in March 2002 and two 80-person companies are being trained in HMA.

A general survey was carried out in 11 districts of Azerbaijan which found that 50 million square meters of land is affected by mines and UXO, and just 84 minefields were identified and marked.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina some 5.5 million square meters of mine-affected land was cleared in 2001, and 73.5 million square meters of land was surveyed.

In Croatia some 13.6 million square meters of land was cleared in 2001.

The government of Cyprus reported that it has cleared and destroyed more that 11,000 mines during the last two years and announced plans to clear the heavily mined buffer zone that divides the island, starting unilaterally if necessary.

Greece reported that clearance of all minefields on the Greek-Bulgarian border was completed in December 2001, which included the destruction of 25,000 antipersonnel and antitank mines.

In Hungary, an increasing amount of information has been reported on the considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance, including mines, from World War II and later Soviet occupation.

In December 2001, the United Nations Mine Action Coordination Center stated that the clearance of all known minefields and cluster munition strike sites in Kosovo had been completed and it handed over responsibility for mine action to UNMIK and local bodies. The total amount of land cleared in Kosovo was 8.1 million square meters.

In September 2001, UNMAS opened a Mine Action Office in Skopje, Macedonia FYR to coordinate mine action responses by various agencies and to develop a strategy for rapid implementation of mine action.

Russian forces continued to use antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, while at the same time Russia increased its participation in international mine action programs.

Middle East and Northern Africa

Egyptian deminers were trained by the United States in the period from May to August 2001.

Since the national demining program began in Jordan in 1993, 116 minefields containing 84,157 mines and covering 8 million square meters of land have been cleared.
• In 2001, the Lebanese Army cleared more than 1.5 million square meters of land; NGOs and foreign armies cleared additional land. UNIFIL completed a technical survey in South Lebanon in 2002 and MAG began a national LIS in March 2002.

• Iraqi government delays and refusals to grant visas for essential mine action personnel continued to hinder the UN mine clearance program in northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan). From 1998 to mid-2002, over 9.7 million square meters of land were cleared under the UN Mine Action Program. In 2001, MAG and NPA cleared more than one million square meters of mine-affected land.

• In Western Sahara there have been no HMA programs since May 2000.

• In Yemen a total of 2.2 million square meters were cleared between May 2001 to February 2002 by mine action teams deployed in four of the 14 highest priority areas, based on results from the LIS conducted in 1999-2000.
MINE RISK EDUCATION

The term mine risk education (MRE) is now used by most practitioners as the term to designate the “educational process aimed at ensuring that communities are not only aware of the risks from mines and UXO (mine awareness), but are encouraged to behave in a way which reduces the risk to people, property and the environment. The objective is to reduce the risk to a level where people can live safely; to create a situation where economic, social and health development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination.” The term mine risk education now replaces the previously used term “mine awareness.”

According to the latest draft of the mine risk education international mine action standards (IMAS), “MRE also fulfills a broader mine action function by assisting communities to share information on the impact of mine and UXO contamination on the lives and daily routine of the communities. This liaison function ensures that community needs and priorities are placed at the very center of mine action programs. Mine risk education also provides a system which enables individuals and groups to inform demining authorities on the location and extent of contaminated areas. This can greatly assist activities such as technical survey, marking and fencing. The existence of rapid response teams contributes to a reduction of the risk from mines and UXO by providing communities with access to a demining capability, thus reducing the temptation to clear the hazard themselves.” Originally developed in the mid-1990s by some mine action NGOs, this approach was adopted by most mine action practitioners, before eventually becoming part of the UN standards and policy.

In 2001 and the first half of 2002, two trends became more visible: more standardization of MRE, and increased integration of MRE with other humanitarian mine action programs and activities.

In addition, a growing number of mine risk education programs underwent evaluation during this period, including in Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Croatia, Laos, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen, as well as in Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Somaliland. UNICEF initiated a process to review its MRE activities in a dozen countries to examine lessons learned from their experience.

Various key operators reported difficulties in obtaining funding for their MRE activities, in particular in Angola, Chad, Ethiopia and Somaliland.

New programs were initiated in ten countries (Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Macedonia FYR, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and Vietnam), while MRE programs closed in Ethiopia and Yugoslavia, as well as Kosovo.

A need for more MRE was reported in Angola, Burma, Chad, Georgia, India, Iran, Nepal, and Somalia, as well as Palestine, while the humanitarian impact of landmines and UXO remained at an alarming level in these countries. Other mine or UXO-affected communities that were not known to receive any MRE programs included Burundi, Egypt, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, as well as Western Sahara.

Key Actors

Government agencies and NGOs in mine-affected countries reported a growing number of MRE programs in 2001 and in the first half of 2002. Internationally, the principal MRE actors remained the same: the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), Handicap International (HI), the International Save the Children Alliance (Save the Children Sweden, UK and U.S.), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Handicap International Belgium (HIB). In Central America, the Organization of American States (OAS) has been active in a number of affected countries.\textsuperscript{70}

UNICEF reported that it was "undertaking, supporting or planning mine action programs, mostly mine awareness education and advocacy in 25 countries."\textsuperscript{71} It views these activities as a part of integrated UN mine action programs and no longer as a stand-alone activity. UNICEF assisted UN mine action programs in Afghanistan, Albania, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Laos, and Sudan. The organization sees its main role as "to identify needs and to ensure – usually through working with implementing partners – that they are met in a timely and appropriate fashion."\textsuperscript{72}

In 2001, working directly through National Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies or other entities, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) conducted MRE programs in Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Ethiopia, Georgia (Abkhazia),\textsuperscript{73} Iraq, Lebanon, Macedonia FYR, Nicaragua, Tajikistan, and southern Serbia in FR Yugoslavia, as well as the northern Caucasus region of the Russian Federation (including Chechnya and Dagestan), Kosovo and Nagorno-Karabakh. The ICRC conducted assessment missions to assist the National Red Cross Societies in Colombia, Eritrea and Namibia to implement MRE programs. In 2002, new programs were planned or developed in Angola, Colombia, Namibia, and Peru, as well as Palestine. The ICRC generally applies a community-based approach, using existing structures rather than developing new networks and the ICRC’s MRE activities are increasingly integrated with other components of mine action (in particular, data collection and mines clearance).\textsuperscript{74}

In 2001, Handicap International (HI) implemented or supported MRE programs in six countries: Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Thailand.\textsuperscript{75} HI worked through local NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Guinea-Bissau. An MRE program in Ethiopia ended in June 2001. HI conducted needs assessment missions in Sri Lanka and FR Yugoslavia. HI launched KAP (knowledge, attitudes, practices) surveys in Angola, Ethiopia, Thailand, and Somaliland.\textsuperscript{76}

In 2001, the International Save the Children Alliance implemented MRE in five countries: Afghanistan (Save the Children US), Lebanon, Sri Lanka (Save the Children Fund UK), Sudan and Yemen (Save the Children Sweden), as well as Palestine. MRE programs developed and supported

\textsuperscript{70} Other agencies active in MRE included the Association for Aid and Relief-Japan, the BBC/Afghan Education Project, Canadian Physicians for Aid and Relief, CARE, Caritas, Catholic Relief Services, Danish Church Aid, the HALO Trust, HELP, HMD Response, HUMAID, INTERSOS, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), Islamic Relief Worldwide, the Landmine Survivors Network (LSN), Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), the Mines Awareness Trust, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Oxfam, Peace Trees Vietnam, UNDP, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation (VVAF), World Education, and World Vision. Some international private companies were also reported to be developing MRE programs including Defense Systems Limited and Mine Tech.

\textsuperscript{71} Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Russian Federation (North Caucasus), Panama, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria (Golan Heights) and Vietnam. Landmine Monitor also received reports of existing or planned MRE programs by UNICEF in FYR Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, and Senegal. See UNICEF contribution to the Appendices of this report.

\textsuperscript{72} See UNICEF contribution to the Appendices of this report.

\textsuperscript{73} In Georgia (Abkhazia), the ICRC supports the work of HALO (training and equipment). Email from Laurence Desvignes, ICRC Mine-Program Coordinator, 25 July 2002.

\textsuperscript{74} See ICRC contribution to the Appendices of this report; and Email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Laurence Desvignes, ICRC Mine-Program Coordinator, 4 July 2002.

\textsuperscript{75} Email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Cathy Badonnel, Mine Risk Education Coordinator, Handicap International, Lyon, 24 June 2002.

\textsuperscript{76} Telephone interview with Hugues Laurenge, Mine Risk Education Officer, Handicap International, Lyon, 24 June 2002.
by the different branches of the Alliance favor a community-based approach and promote children’s inputs in the design and dissemination of materials.77

In 2001, Mines Advisory Group provided MRE in Angola, Cambodia and northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), while in July 2002, it announced the establishment of two Mine Awareness Support Teams in the north of Sri Lanka for a six month period. MAG generally considers MRE an integral part of its mine action strategy and therefore does not distinguish its MRE work from other components of its programs. In practice, this means that MAG’s mine action teams are multi-skilled with capabilities including mine clearance, survey, marking, EOD, MRE and community liaison.

In 2001, Handicap International Belgium provided MRE in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and DR Congo. The HIB MRE programs are closely linked to other components of mine action (especially data collection and mine clearance). HIB chairs the ICBL’s Mine Risk Education Sub-Group of the Mine Action Working Group and moderates an informational egroup for MRE practitioners around the world.

In 2001, the Organization of American States (OAS) supported mine risk education programs in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. All three programs include radio campaigns, MRE classes and distribution of MRE materials.78

International Developments and Studies

At the Third Meeting of States Parties, in September 2001 in Managua, States Parties responded positively to a proposal originally made by the ICBL in 1999 to move mine awareness/mine risk education to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance and Related Technologies. At the first meeting of the reconstituted Standing Committee in January 2002, the co-chairs acknowledged that “mine awareness is closely interrelated with mine clearance and that its incorporation into this Standing Committee instead of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance was fully justified.”79

UNICEF remained the main UN focal point for MRE and was tasked with leading the development of the international standards (IMAS) for MRE. Between June 2001 and April 2002, UNICEF convened meetings of key MRE practitioners to enable them to comment on the draft standards produced by two consultants contracted by UNICEF. The drafts were also made available on the Internet at www.mrre.net. At a meeting in September 2001, participants agreed to change the term of “mine risk reduction education” to “mine risk education.”80 In July 2002, UNICEF was finalizing a “Guide for the Management of Mine Risk Education” as part of the IMAS.81 The standards are intended to replace existing guidelines and incorporate monitoring and evaluation. A second draft should be completed by the end of 2002.82

After a consultation process, in January 2002, UNMAS selected Handicap International as its implementing partner for a Landmine Safety Project (LSP).83 According to UNMAS, the purpose of the LSP “is to provide general landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) awareness and safety information to organizations and individuals working in the vicinity of areas affected by these weapons, and to help them.”84

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77 Presentation by Christina Nelke, Landmines Focal Point, Save the Children Sweden, to the Mine Risk Education Working Group, Geneva, 30 May 2002.
78 See OAS contribution to the Appendices of this report.
80 Minutes of the meeting of the Mine Risk Education Working Group held in Geneva, 30 May 2002.
82 See UNICEF contribution to the Appendices of this report.
83 Email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Hugues Laurenge, Mine Risk Education Officer, Handicap International, Lyon, 19 June 2002.
84 See the UNMAS website, www.mineaction.org.
In 2002, UNICEF established a Mine Risk Education Working Group (MREWG), co-convened by UNICEF and the ICBL, and made up of non-profit organizations and agencies engaged in MRE. It brings together MRE practitioners to better coordinate activities, share lessons learned, and to identify and find ways to meet field support needs. The MREWG is overseeing the development of the MRE components of the IMAS, and will steer the development of the MRE implementation manual for the IMAS standards.

In July 2002, the GICHD released a study entitled, “Communication in Mine Awareness Programmes,” and an operational handbook for practitioners, “Improving Communication in Mine Awareness Programmes.”


### Regional Developments and Key Findings in MRE

#### Africa

An urgent need for more mine risk education (MRE) was reported in Angola, Burundi, Chad and Somalia. No MRE was reported in Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia, despite the landmine and UXO problem affecting these countries. MRE programs were conducted in at least sixteen countries: Angola, DR Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Somaliland, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Basic MRE activities were conducted in Burundi, Chad and Mauritania. An increasing number of African government ministries, African NGOs and Red Cross societies are operating MRE programs, in countries including Angola, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

- In Angola, the Ministry of Education formally accepted MRE into the national curriculum. UNICEF funded seven local NGOs to provide MRE in seven highly mine-affected provinces. The ICRC conducted a needs assessment in July 2002.
- In Eritrea, the UNMEE MACC employed a consultant to develop a series of MRE workbooks and training packages. In late 2001, a comprehensive MRE education program for schoolteachers began in the high-risk Gash Barka and Deubub regions.
- In Ethiopia, the local NGO RaDO extended its MRE program to the largely rural community of Afar regional state in April 2001. In eastern Ethiopia HI ended its program for Somali refugees in June 2001.
- In Mozambique, the National Demining Institute (IND) took over MRE activities that HI had developed over the past decade.
- In Somalia, the UNDP had hoped to initiate MRE from its mine action offices in Baidoa and Mogadishu, but had to scale back plans due to continued conflict.
- In Zimbabwe, the National Demining Office (NDO) carried out MRE in coordination with the Police, and civilian population.

#### Americas

Mine risk education programs were carried out in Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, and, to a limited extent, in Chile and El Salvador. National Armies and government agencies conducted MRE in Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Peru, while local organizations were reported to conduct MRE in Colombia, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.

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85 Email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Hugues Laurenge, Mine Risk Education Officer, Handicap International, Lyon, 19 June 2002.
86 Email to Landmine Monitor (HIB) from Laurence Desvignes, Mine Program Coordinator, ICRC, 25 July 2002.
Asia-Pacific

Urgent needs for more MRE were reported in Burma (Myanmar), India, Nepal and Pakistan. Significant MRE programs continued in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam, while smaller scale activities were conducted in Bangladesh, India, South Korea, and Nepal. Community leaders, local NGOs or government agencies conducted MRE in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, South Korea, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.

- In Afghanistan, eleven organizations provided MRE to a total of 730,000 people in 2001, using a variety of approaches. In January 2002, HIB released the results of an external evaluation of its community-based MRE program, which concluded that HIB should engage in mine/UXO clearance in order to provide a better response to the high number of requests generated by its MRE program.
- In Burma (Myanmar), a three-day mine information workshop, including MRE, took place in Rangoon in February 2002.
- In Cambodia, CMAC launched a community-based mine/UXO risk reduction pilot project in October 2001.
- In South Korea, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines conducted MRE in primary schools near the demilitarized zone.
- In Sri Lanka, MAG launched an emergency mine action program in July 2002, including the deployment of two mine awareness support teams.
- In Vietnam RENEW, a project entirely managed by Vietnamese staff, was authorized in July 2001 to conduct an 18-month mine action pilot program in a district of Quang Tri province. The program includes MRE theatre, workshops and educational spots for television.

Europe/Central Asia

Needs for more MRE were reported in Georgia and Turkey. MRE programs were carried out in Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Yugoslavia as well as Abkhazia, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kosovo, and Nagorno-Karabakh. New programs were launched in Macedonia FYR and Tajikistan, as well as Dagestan (Russia). Government agencies and local organizations operated MRE programs and activities in Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia FYR, Poland, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as Abkhazia, Chechnya, and Kosovo.

- In Kosovo, an external evaluation concluded that “the mine awareness lessons learned over the past ten years still primarily rest with various pioneering NGOs…. [T]he MACC was not in a position to lead from day one as there was no mine awareness experience represented within the MACC. NGOs such as the Mines Advisory Group, Handicap International and the ICRC introduced their own community-based approaches, grounded in years of experience. These approaches were then adopted by the MACC and embodied in the mine action support team (MAST) concept.”
- In Macedonia FYR, the ICRC and the Macedonian Red Cross launched a community-based MRE program in September 2001.
- In Russia, the Mine Action Center Foundation, in cooperation with specialists of the Engineers Corps of the Russian Army, medical experts, and the NGO IPPNW/Russia produced a MRE lecture course for 12 to 16-year-old students.
- In Tajikistan, the ICRC, the Tajik Red Crescent and the Ministry of Emergency Situations and Civil Defense launched a pilot-project based on the principle that, “all activities start and finish in the community.” In practice, mine-affected communities are

involved in all stages of the project (survey, need assessment, design of materials, field-test, training, evaluation).

**Middle East and North Africa**

A need for more MRE was reported in Egypt, and Iran, as well as Palestine, and Western Sahara. Programs were implemented in Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria (including the Golan Heights), and Yemen, as well as northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan) and Palestine. Basic MRE is conducted in Kuwait, while government agencies and local NGOs are reported to run MRE programs in Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, as well as northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan) and Palestine.

- In Iraq, the ICRC conducted four MRE sessions in March 2001, together with the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.
- In Lebanon, a National Mine Risk Education Committee was established in April 2001, made up of the major actors in MRE in the country. The Landmines Resource Center is now developing community liaison as a part of its MRE work.
- In Palestine, the NGO Defense for Children continued its MRE work in 2001, primarily in mine-affected areas, military training zones and the areas of confrontation. Because of the current crisis, local media gave more attention to MRE messages.
- In Yemen, the Yemen Mine Awareness Association (YMAA) continued its MRE activities focused on communities living close to mined areas.
LANDMINE/UXO CASUALTIES AND SURVIVOR ASSISTANCE

New Casualties in 2001-2002

Landmine casualties continue to be reported in every region of the world. In 2001 and through June 2002, Landmine Monitor finds that there were new landmine/UXO casualties reported in 70 countries; down from 73 countries reported in the Landmine Monitor Report 2001. Landmine Monitor also registered mine casualties in eight regions it monitors because of their significant landmine/UXO problem. In calendar year 2001, new casualties were recorded in 69 countries and all eight regions. In early 2002, additional casualties were recorded in Algeria. The data sources used to identify new casualties includes official databases, government records, hospital records, media reports, surveys/assessments, and interviews.

Landmine Monitor has identified at least 7,987 new landmine/UXO casualties in calendar year 2001. About 70% of reported casualties are civilians. However, it is important to remember that this figure represents the reported casualties and does not include the thousands of casualties that are believed to go unreported as innocent civilians are killed or injured in remote areas away from any form of assistance or means of communication. There is no reliable reporting in some heavily affected countries such as Burma (Myanmar), Sudan, and Vietnam. Comprehensive data on landmine/UXO casualties is difficult to obtain, particularly in countries experiencing ongoing conflict, or with minefields in remote areas, or with limited resources to monitor public health services.

While acknowledging that it is impossible to arrive at an exact figure of casualties, it is likely that the number of new landmine casualties is between 15,000 and 20,000 per year.

Although there are three fewer countries with reported casualties in this year’s Landmine Monitor Report compared to last year’s, it should be noted this represents the addition of eight countries with new reported casualties (Republic of Congo, Czech Republic, Guatemala, Hungary, Oman, Poland, Syria and Tunisia), and the subtraction of eleven countries which had casualties previously, but not in this time period (Belgium, Bolivia, China, Djibouti, Indonesia, Israel, Latvia, Liberia, Malawi, Mongolia, and Morocco).

From January 2001 to the end of June 2002 landmine/UXO casualties were reported in:

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88 For the purposes of Landmine Monitor research, casualties include the individual killed or injured as a result of an incident involving antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance. From the information available in many countries it is not always possible to determine with certainty the type of weapon that caused the incident.

89 These include Abkhazia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan), Palestine, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

90 Landmine Monitor identified 8,064 casualties in 2000.
Introduction

Landmine and UXO Casualties in 2001-2002

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* Casualties identified as being caused by UXO only

Scale of the Problem

In 2001-2002, as shown in the preceding table, mine/UXO casualties are still occurring in every region of the world: in 20 countries in Europe and Central Asia, in 18 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 13 countries in Asia and the Pacific, in 11 countries in the Middle East and North Africa, and in 8 countries in the Americas. While ongoing conflict is a major problem in several mine-affected countries, Landmine Monitor has found that a majority (46) of the 70 countries that suffered new mine/UXO casualties in 2001-2002 had not experienced any active armed conflict during the research period. In many cases, the conflict had ended a decade or more ago.

There are twenty mine-affected countries that are not on the list of new mine/UXO casualties in 2001-2002. It is probable that there were new mine casualties in some of these; however, there was a lack of tangible evidence to confirm new casualties in 2001. In some other mine-affected countries, there was a clear statement of no new casualties, for example in Swaziland. It should be noted that although Tanzania is not mine-affected, the country does provide assistance to mine survivors coming over the border from Burundi and DR Congo.

For all eight countries added to the list, the reason for inclusion was that new incidents of mine/UXO casualties were reported, rather than the onset of a new conflict.

In several mine-affected countries, databases have been set up to collect information on landmine incidents and casualties. In others, international agencies and NGOs are carrying out surveys to assess the extent of the problem. Although Landmine Monitor considers that in some instances reported casualty figures are incomplete and understated, a sampling of the findings from
the Landmine Monitor Report 2002 country reports follows. These findings are for the calendar year 2001, unless otherwise stated.

In countries/regions with established mine casualty databases, there is no clear pattern of increasing or decreasing casualty rates:

- Afghanistan: 1,368 casualties recorded (ICRC), up from 1,114 casualties recorded in 2000 (ICRC);
- Albania: 9 casualties recorded, down from 35 in 2000;
- Angola: 660 casualties recorded, down from 840 in 2000;
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 87 casualties recorded, down from 100 in 2000;
- Cambodia: 813 casualties recorded, down from 847 in 2000;
- Croatia: 34 casualties recorded, up from 22 in 2000;
- Eritrea: 154 casualties recorded, in May/June 2000 49 casualties reported;
- Kosovo: 22 casualties recorded, down from 95 in 2000;
- Laos: 122 casualties recorded, up from 103 in 2000;
- Mozambique: 80 casualties recorded, up from 29 in 2000;
- Nagorno-Karabakh: 18 casualties recorded, up from 15 in 2000;
- Northern Iraq (Iraqi Kurdistan): 30 casualties a month, down from 48 per month in 2000.

In other countries, data on landmine/UXO casualties is collected from government ministries and agencies, international agencies and NGOs, hospitals, the media, and in some cases, databases that have been established by the country campaigns of the ICBL.

- Chechnya: 1,153 casualties reported, it is also reported that 30 to 50 civilians are injured each month in landmine incidents;
- Colombia: 201 casualties reported to October 2001, up from 83 reported for all of 2000;
- DR Congo: 135 casualties reported;
- Ethiopia: 71 casualties reported, down from 202 in 2000 (data is only available for the Tigray and Afar regions);
- Georgia: 98 casualties reported;
- India: 332 casualties reported;
- Lebanon: 90 casualties reported, down from 113 in 2000;
- Macedonia: 48 casualties reported;
- Namibia: 50 casualties reported, down from 140 in 2000;
- Nepal: 424 casualties reported, up from 182 in 2000;
- Pakistan: 92 casualties reported, up from 62 in 2000 (figures do not include incidents that may have occurred on the Pakistan-India border);
- Palestine: 20 casualties reported, up from 11 in 2000;
- Rwanda: 23 casualties reported, up from 20 in 2000;
- Senegal: 54 casualties reported, down from 65 in 2000;
- Somalia: 224 casualties reported, up from 147 in 2000;
- Sri Lanka: more than 300 casualties reported;
- Sudan: 123 casualties reported to June 2001;
- Tajikistan: 29 casualties reported;
- Turkey: 49 casualties reported, up from 5 in 2000;
- Uganda: 32 casualties reported, down from 38 in 2000;
- Yemen: 21 casualties reported, up from 12 in 2000.

In a number of mine-affected countries and areas the casualty rate increased in 2001-2002. In some countries and regions the increase appears to be due to a new or expanded conflict, or the movement of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs): Afghanistan, DR Congo, India, Palestine, and Sri Lanka. In other countries and regions the increase appears to be largely the result
of improved data collection, for example, Chechnya, Georgia, Pakistan, and Turkey. In Colombia, both factors contribute to a higher number of reported casualties.

Casualties continue to be reported in 2002, for example: in Afghanistan, 658 new casualties reported to 30 June; in Cambodia, 343 new casualties reported to 30 April; in Croatia, 13 new casualties reported to 30 June; and in Palestine, 45 new casualties reported to 15 May.

In this reporting period, landmine/UXO casualties also include nationals coming from mine-free countries, and in some cases from other mine-affected countries, killed or injured while abroad engaged in military or demining operations, peacekeeping, or other activities. These countries include Albania, Algeria, Australia, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Gambia, Germany, Honduras, India, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Morocco, Mozambique, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Syria, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

In 2001 and the first half of 2002, incidents during clearance operations or in training exercises caused casualties among deminers in: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Eritrea, Estonia, Greece, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Yemen. There were unconfirmed reports of demining casualties in several other countries.

In 2001, the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) released a revision of the “Database of Demining Incident Victims” (DDIV). The new version, called “Database of Demining Accidents” (DDAS), incorporates various software improvements. The current DDAS includes details of incidents involving a total of 466 deminer casualties and contains data from Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Eritrea, Iraq, Laos, Kosovo, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.

While progress has been made since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force, landmines and unexploded ordnance continue to claim too many new casualties in too many countries and in most cases these are civilians. Based on the information gathered for Landmine Monitor Report 2002, it is clear that:

- The vast majority of new landmine casualties (70% of reported casualties in 2001) continue to be civilians.
- It is not only mine-affected countries that have a problem with landmines. In addition to the countries reporting new casualties, nationals from 29 countries (including 13 mine-free countries) were killed or injured by landmines while outside their own borders.

### Landmine Casualties: Needs and Assistance

A landmine/UXO incident can cause various injuries to an individual including the loss of limbs, abdominal, chest and spinal injuries, blindness, deafness, and less visible, psychological trauma not only to the person injured in the incident, but to the families of those killed or injured.

The principal actors in landmine victim assistance generally agree that assistance includes the following components:

- Pre-hospital Care (first aid and management of injuries)
- Hospital Care (medical care, surgery, pain management)
- Rehabilitation (physiotherapy, prosthetic appliances and assistive devices, psychological support)
- Social and Economic Reintegration (associations of persons with disabilities, skills and vocational training, income generating projects, sports)
- Disability policy and practice (education and public awareness and disability laws)

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91 For further information see ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance, Guidelines for the Care and Rehabilitation of Survivors; see also Providing assistance to landmine victims: A collection of guidelines, best practices and methodologies, compiled by the Co-Chairs of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness, May 2001.
• Health and Social Welfare Surveillance and Research capacities (data collection, processing, analysis, and reporting)

Survivor/Victim Assistance

The Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration promotes a comprehensive integrated approach to victim assistance that rests on a three-tiered definition of a landmine victim. This means that a victim includes directly affected individuals, their families, and mine-affected communities. Consequently, victim assistance is viewed as a wide range of activities that benefit individuals, families and communities.

However, throughout the Landmine Monitor Report 2002 the term Survivor Assistance is used in the country reports to describe activities aimed at the individuals directly affected in landmine incidents. The use of the term survivor is intended to emphasize this distinction.

Capacities of Affected States to Provide Assistance to Landmine Survivors

A detailed analysis of States’ efforts and capacities to address the needs of landmine survivors, and persons with disabilities in general, is beyond the scope of the research undertaken for this report.92 Nevertheless, since its first edition Landmine Monitor has gathered a great deal of information on the various categories of survivor assistance in 45 States Parties, 37 non-States Parties, and the eight regions covered in this report.93 Information has been collected on the activities of States through the public health system, and of international agencies and NGOs, that assist all persons with disabilities, including mine survivors. However, it is acknowledged that most information provided has come from international agencies and NGOs rather than from the relevant ministries in mine-affected countries. In many countries it is difficult to access official data. Landmine Monitor is assessing how to rectify this imbalance in future reports.

Based on a purely quantitative analysis of the information available it would appear that many countries have facilities to address some of the needs of landmine survivors, but in 2001/2002 Landmine Monitor has identified 42 mine-affected countries and six regions where one or more aspects of survivor assistance are inadequate. Furthermore, even when services exist, they are often inaccessible to most survivors, in being long distances from mine-affected areas, too expensive for survivors to afford, or bureaucratically off-limits to one group or another.

In most reports of mine-affected countries, data is available on the facilities that have been identified as providing assistance to landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities. These centers were asked to report on how many people were assisted in 2001, and how many of those were landmine survivors. Landmine Monitor was not always able to get this information and some facilities do not keep records on the cause of injury, as all persons with disabilities are treated equally. Nevertheless, while acknowledging that the data is far from complete, it does give an indication of where the focus is for landmine survivor assistance. It is also recognized that these figures do not represent the total number of individuals assisted as one person may have accessed several of the services recorded.

Hospital Care – 1,620 landmine casualties were identified in hospital records: Africa 709, Americas 6, Asia Pacific 456, Europe and Central Asia 330, and Middle East and North Africa 119.

Rehabilitation (patients assisted or prostheses supplied) – 104,173 assisted, including at least 21,617 landmine survivors: Africa 26,887 assisted, at least 5,433 survivors; Americas 1,274, at least 394 survivors; Asia Pacific 33,051, at least 10,193 survivors; Europe and Central Asia 39,376, at least 4,227 survivors; Middle East and North Africa 3,585, at least 1,370 survivors.

92 More detailed information on this important area is compiled by Handicap International in Landmine Victim Assistance: World Report 2001 which examines a wide range of indicators to determine a State’s capacity to adequately address the needs of the persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors.

Psychosocial Support – 12,763 assisted, including at least 4,662 survivors: Africa 4,060, at least 1,142 survivors; Americas 872, at least 58 survivors; Asia Pacific 5,885, at least 1,955 survivors; Europe and Central Asia 1,554, at least 1,351 survivors; Middle East and North Africa 392, at least 156 survivors.

Vocational Training and Economic Reintegration – 8,022 assisted, at least 2,937 survivors: Africa 986, at least 295 survivors; Americas 392, at least 92 survivors, Asia Pacific 6,469, at least 2,467 survivors; Europe and Central Asia 116, at least 24 survivors; Middle East and North Africa 59, all were mine survivors.

Capacity Building – training of local health care providers including surgeons, nurses, first aid providers, and prosthetic/orthotic technicians – at least 1,587 people received training in 2001: Africa 434, Americas 5, Asia Pacific 970, Europe and Central Asia 118, Middle East and North Africa 60.

Data Collection – an analysis of data collection capacities in 73 mine-affected countries revealed that only 12 have a comprehensive system in place; a further 28 countries have some capacity.\footnote{For details see “Progress in Implementing the Convention,” presentation by Sheree Bailey, Landmine Monitor Victim Assistance Research Coordinator, to the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, Geneva, 27 May 2002, available at www.gichd.ch.} Even with a data collection system in place it is believed that not all mine casualties are reported. IMSMA has the capacity to record mine casualty data; however a lack of resources sometimes prevents this facility from being used. In at least four countries where Landmine Impact Surveys have been completed it appears that there was no continuation of data gathering by the mine action centers to record new mine casualties: Chad, Mozambique, Thailand, and Yemen. In Kosovo it appears that there has been no data collection since the closure of the mine action center even though the ICRC trained data collectors to take over this function. The principal collectors of mine casualty data are the mine action centers, the ICRC, UNICEF, and some NGOs.

In summary, six key general observations can be made from the research collected in 2001/2002:\footnote{For more general observations see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 41.}

- In many of the countries reporting new casualties, the assistance provided to mine survivors continues to be inadequate to meet their needs;
- Most services continue to be located in urban centers whereas the majority of mine survivors can be found in rural areas where the concentration of mine pollution is greatest;
- The majority of resources continue to be directed towards medical and physical rehabilitation;
- Without accurate data on casualties it is not possible to ensure that survivor assistance programs and limited resources are directed to where the need is greatest;
- International organizations, international and local NGOs, and UN agencies continue to play a key role in the delivery of services to mine survivors; and
- The economic situation of many mine-affected countries remains an obstacle to the provision of adequate assistance to landmine survivors.

Sample of Regional Developments and Key Findings

Global

- In 2001, ICRC prosthetic/orthotic centers produced 16,501 prostheses, of which 9,779 were for landmine amputees, and 16,637 crutches and 1,163 wheelchairs.\footnote{Ibid., p. 10.} NGOs and other agencies working in mine-affected countries also produced or distributed at least 14,573 prostheses, 5,640 crutches, 2,253 wheelchairs, and 7,828 other assistive devices.
Form J, the voluntary reporting attachment to the Article 7 Report for 2001 was submitted by eight mine-affected States and 23 non-affected States up to the end of July 2002 to report on victim assistance and other mine action activities. The mine-affected States include Albania, Cambodia, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mozambique, Peru, and Thailand. The non-affected States include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain and Sweden. In addition, Croatia, Nicaragua, and Yemen provided victim assistance information as part of Article 7’s Form I.

Africa
- In Angola, in July 2001 a new Victim Assistance Subcommission of the National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance was established.
- In Chad, according to the Landmine Impact Survey, of 217 recent survivors none reported receiving physical rehabilitation or vocational training after their accident.
- In Eritrea, the ICRC and the Eritrean authorities signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of a physical rehabilitation program for persons with disabilities in the country.
- In Mozambique, the National Demining Institute (IND) has developed a draft policy for Survivor and Victim Assistance which attempts to define the role of the IND concerning mine survivor assistance.
- In Namibia, on 24 September 2001, the Disability Advisory Office, within the Prime Minister’s office, started operations.
- In Uganda, in September 2001 a new integrated mine awareness and survivor assistance program started in northern Uganda.

Americas
- In Colombia, the government launched the Antipersonnel Mine Observatory which collects data on landmine incidents and casualties.
- In El Salvador, the National Family Secretariat, headed by the First Lady of El Salvador, is implementing a Law of Equal Opportunities for Disabled Persons.
- In Honduras, a new orthopedic workshop commenced production in San Pedro Sula.
- Mexico, during the January 2002 Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, announced their initiative at the United Nations to create an international convention for the promotion and protection of the rights and dignity of persons with disabilities.
- In Nicaragua, efforts are being made to ensure that survivor assistance becomes an integral part of the public health system, and of other State institutions including the Ministry of the Family (MIFAMILIA), the Institute for Youth, and the National Technological Institute (INATEC).

Asia-Pacific
- In Afghanistan, according to the World Health Organization, 65 percent of Afghans do not have access to health facilities. Only 60 out of 330 districts have rehabilitation or socioeconomic reintegration facilities for persons with disabilities and even in those districts the needs are only partially met.
- In Burma, the ICRC reported that in 2001 the country ranked third out of their 14 prosthetic/orthotic programs worldwide for the highest number of mine survivors receiving prostheses, after Afghanistan and Angola.
- In India, in the mine-affected area of Jammu and Kashmir the State government has pledged to improve medical services in all health institutions in the State.
- In Laos, the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare formally approved the constitution of the Lao Disabled People’s Association, after five years.
• In Sri Lanka, the NGO Hope for Children introduced a mobile artificial limb manufacturing and fitting vehicle to provide assistance in remote areas.

• In Thailand, from 6-8 November 2001, representatives from Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam attended the South East Asia Regional Conference on Victim Assistance.

• In Vietnam, the Community-Based Rehabilitation program expanded from 40 to 45 provinces.

Europe/Central Asia

• In Armenia, in January 2002 the Yerevan Prosthetic-Orthopedic Enterprise stopped providing assistance because of a lack of State funding. This is a repeat of the situation reported previously when the center closed between October 2000 and February 2001. Operations were due to resume in August 2002.

• In Azerbaijan, in 2002 the ICRC is opening a new rehabilitation center in Ganja, the second largest city, and upgrading an existing facility in Nakhichevan.

• In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the average distance between amputees and a limb-fitting center is 100-150 kilometers.

• In CIS countries, on 31 May 2001, the “International Complex Program on the Rehabilitation of War Veterans, Participants of Local Conflicts and Victims of Terrorism for 2001-2005” was approved by a resolution of the Council of the Heads of Government of the CIS countries.

• In Croatia, the Orthopedics and Rehabilitation Department of the Martin Horvat hospital in Rovinj was renovated to provide rehabilitation and psychosocial support to young mine survivors.

• In Chechnya, many hospitals and clinics often function without running water, proper heating or sewage systems. The ICRC has signed an agreement with the Chechen Ministry of Health and the Chechen branch of the Russian Red Cross to assist the health facilities in Chechnya. To July 2002, there were no rehabilitation centers operating inside Chechnya.

• In Georgia, specialized medical rehabilitation and psychological support appears to remain inaccessible, or unavailable, for many mine survivors.

• In Kosovo, concerns have been raised that rather than seeking to establish sustainable rehabilitation programs in Kosovo some programs provide assistance by transporting those requiring rehabilitation or prosthetics to other countries.

• In Slovenia, on 1-2 July 2002, a workshop entitled “Defining Strategies for Success” was held at the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance center in Ig, to identify strategies for improving survivor assistance in the Balkans.

• In Turkey, a new center for prosthetics and rehabilitation was opened at Dicle University, near the mine-affected areas.

• In Ukraine, on 13 November 2001, the President accepted a new decree on the medical and social protection of persons with disabilities, including veterans and victims of war.

• In FR Yugoslavia, Handicap International signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Serbian Ministry of Social Affairs to assist in the process of reforms and creation of a new policy addressing the needs of persons with disabilities.

Middle East/North Africa

• In Algeria, the ICRC signed an agreement with the Ministry of Health to create a production unit at the Ben Aknoun prosthetic/orthotic center in northern Algiers.

• In Lebanon, the National Demining Office established a National Mine Victim Assistance Committee, which includes all the major actors in survivor assistance. The national disability legislation that was approved in May 2000 is not yet in effect.

• In Syria, a new physiotherapy center was opened in Khan Arnaba close to the mine-affected area.
• In Yemen, Presidential Law Number 2 establishing a care and rehabilitation fund for persons with disabilities came into effect.

Addressing the Needs of Survivors

The number of mine/UXO survivors requiring assistance continues to grow every year. Nevertheless, it has been noted that in many mine-affected countries, the assistance provided to mine survivors is inadequate to meet their needs. In addition to the new casualties registered in 2001-2002, Landmine Monitor has identified 38 other countries with, in medical terms, a “residual caseload” of landmine survivors from previous years. In other words, many countries with no new landmine casualties in 2001-2002, nevertheless have landmine survivors from prior years that continue to require assistance. Consequently, almost two-thirds of the countries in the world, 121 countries, are affected to some extent by the landmine/UXO problem and the issue of survivors.

A survey of 897 landmine/UXO survivors conducted by the Landmine Survivors Network in Bosnia and Herzegovina, found that only 22 percent, around 200 people, were psychologically and physically well, and self-sustaining. The other 78 percent of survivors needed continuous follow-up and support. Using this survey and based on earlier estimates of 300,000 landmine survivors in the world, it could be argued that at least 234,000 individuals require continuous follow-up and support.

As with all human services, landmine survivor assistance is a complex and long-term issue. Prostheses wear out, need repairs, and replacement. Medical problems can resurface years after the original incident. Someone who walked well with a prosthesis for years may need a wheelchair later in life. Likewise, socio-economic reintegration is not a result that is easily achievable or sustainable. Vocational training programs and other methods to facilitate economic reintegration struggle to succeed in economies where everyone is under-employed. And while very few survivors suffer from actual post-traumatic stress disorder, many have lingering psychological issues which when left un-addressed, can cause severe harm to the survivor and all those who are close to them.

Whether the disability is an amputation, a visual impairment, deafness, or something else, landmine survivors often face discrimination, barriers to the built environment and communication systems, social isolation, exclusion from educational opportunities, and segregation from formal and informal labor markets. To rectify this, two approaches need to happen simultaneously. First, assistance to landmine survivors should be viewed as a part of a country’s overall public health and social services system. Second, within those general systems, deliberate care must be built in to ensure that landmine survivors and other persons with disability receive the same opportunities in life – for health care, social services, a life-sustaining income, education, and participation in the community – as every other sector of a society. Striking a balance is crucial. Landmine survivors should not be viewed as a group separate from other war victims or persons with disabilities. The ultimate goal of survivor assistance programs should be survivors’ complete rehabilitation, and their reintegration into the wider community.

In many mine-affected countries this goal cannot be reached without financial assistance from the international community. The Mine Ban Treaty requires, in Article 6, Paragraph 3, that “Each State in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims.…”

The Intersessional Standing Committee

Since September 2001 the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration98 (SC-VA) has been co-chaired by Canada and Honduras, having taken over this role from Japan and Nicaragua. The co-rapporteurs are France and Colombia (who will become co-chairs in September 2002). The SC-VA continues to make progress in achieving its mandate to

98 The committee was previously known as the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance, Socio-Economic Reintegration and Mine Awareness.
identify practical means to assist States Parties in meeting their obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty in relation to the care and rehabilitation of landmine survivors.

In October 2001, Canada hosted a “Standing Committee Planning Workshop” in Ottawa, to promote discussion on establishing a framework for the SC-VA’s future activities and identifying key issues to be addressed. The workshop was attended by representatives of the governments of Canada, Honduras, France, Nicaragua and Japan, together with the Chair of the ICBL Working Group on Victim Assistance, and representatives from UNMAS, Landmine Monitor, the ICBL, and other NGOs.

Two intersessional meetings were held in January and May 2002, in Geneva, Switzerland. In January, the SC-VA welcomed eight participants from French/English-speaking African nations taking part in the second phase of the Raising the Voices of Landmine Survivors Initiative. The main themes of the meeting were: measuring progress in implementing the treaty; critical issues and advancements in medical care, in psychological and social rehabilitation, and in physical rehabilitation; and human rights and disability. One of the key outcomes of this meeting was the introduction of a consultative process, coordinated by UNMAS, to identify new opportunities for the Standing Committee.

In the May intersessional meetings, the main themes of the SC-VA were: overview and status of implementation; update on implementation plans and progress – prosthetics and orthotics, psychosocial rehabilitation, economic reintegration of persons with disabilities, and human rights and persons with disabilities. More participants in the second phase of the Raising the Voices Initiative, this time from Portuguese/English-speaking Africa, had an opportunity to address the meeting on the priorities for survivor assistance. UNMAS presented preliminary findings from the consultative process and four items were identified as desired areas of focus for future SC-VA meetings: national level planning and coordination of victim assistance by the governments of mine-affected countries; emergency medical care; prosthetics and orthotics; and economic reintegration.