LANDMINE MONITOR 2020
LANDMINE MONITOR

2020

22ND ANNUAL EDITION

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
DanChurchAid • Danish Demining Group • Human Rights Watch
   Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada
Research team leaders • ICBL-CMC staff experts
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or "Ottawa Convention") as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW);
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
PREFACE

LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim.

Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to landmine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human
suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global landmine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come, and the rights of survivors and persons with similar needs are protected.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network in some 100 countries, working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate antipersonnel mines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty.

The campaign is a loose, flexible network whose members share the common goal of working to eliminate antipersonnel landmines.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International (now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These founding organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities they were working within Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and saw how mines hampered and even prevented their development efforts in these countries. They realized that a comprehensive solution was needed to address the crisis caused by landmines, and that the solution was a complete ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign practical experience of the impact of landmines. They also brought the perspective of the different sectors they represented: human rights, children’s rights, development issues, refugee issues, and medical and humanitarian relief. ICBL member campaigns contacted other NGOs, who spread the word through their networks; news of this new coalition and the need for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines soon stretched throughout the world. The ICBL organized conferences and campaigning events in many countries to raise awareness of the landmine problem and the need for a ban, and to provide training to new campaigners to enable them to be effective advocates in their respective countries.

Campaign members worked at the local, national, regional, and global level to encourage their governments to support the mine ban. The ICBL’s membership grew rapidly, and today there are campaigns in some 100 countries.

The Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada. It was due to the sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL that the Mine Ban Treaty became a reality.
Part of the ICBL's success is its ability to evolve with changing circumstances. The early days of the campaign were focused on developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines. Once this goal was achieved, attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations. Today, the campaign also encourages States Parties to complete their major treaty obligations by 2025, a target agreed in the 2014 Maputo Declaration and reiterated in the 2019 Oslo Action Plan.

The ICBL works to promote the global norm against mine use and advocates for countries who have not joined the treaty to take steps to do so. The campaign also urges non-state armed groups to abide by the spirit of the treaty.

Much of the ICBL's work is focused on promoting implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. This includes working in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance.

The campaign has been successful in part because it has a clear campaign message and goal; a non-bureaucratic campaign structure and flexible strategy; and an effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments.

The ICBL's efforts to ban landmines have led to a whole new approach called humanitarian disarmament, which is spearheaded by civil society campaigns and has led to four international treaties and, to date, two Nobel Peace Prizes.

In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) to become the ICBL-CMC, but the CMC and the ICBL remain two distinct and strong campaigns.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties’ implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community’s response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other ERW.

In June 1998, the ICBL created Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative, for the first time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and challenges. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as “the Monitor”) to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The ICBL-CMC produces and publishes Landmine Monitor and Cluster Munition Monitor as separate publications.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information on all aspects of mine action. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm’s way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

Monitor reporting complements transparency reporting required of states under international treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.
The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network, country profiles, and an annual report. A network of more than two-dozen researchers and an Editorial Team gathered information to prepare this report. The researchers come from the ICBL-CMC campaigning coalitions and from other elements of civil society, including journalists, academics, and research institutions.

Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 22nd annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010.

Landmine Monitor 2020 provides a global overview of the landmine situation. Chapters on developments in specific countries and other areas are available in online Country Profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.

Landmine Monitor covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling; includes information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of mine contamination and casualties through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance; and documents international and national support for mine action. This report focuses on calendar year 2019, with information included up to October 2020 where possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world produced this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of research coordinators and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors.

Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website at www.the-monitor.org. The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for all their crucial assistance.

Responsibility for the coordination of the Monitor lies with the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board comprised of five NGOs as well as Monitor research team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. The committee’s members include: DanChurchAid (Dennis Solberg Kjeldsen), Danish Demining Group (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan Al-Osta), Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon), Loren Persi Vicentic (Impact Research team coordinator), Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer (ICBL-CMC Government Liaison and Policy manager), Diana Carolina Prado Mosquera (Advocacy and Campaigns manager), Marion Loddo (Monitor Editorial manager), and ex officio member Hector Guerra (ICBL-CMC director).

Morgan McKenna served as interim Monitor Program manager from September 2019 to April 2020, and provided advisory support during the management transition in the Monitor.
From January to October 2020, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and produced thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2020. The Editorial Team included:

- Ban policy: Mark Hiznay, Stephen Goose, Jacquelyn Kantack, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham;
- Impact (contamination, clearance, casualties, risk education, and victim assistance): Loren Persi Vicentic, Ruth Bottomley, Farzana Mursal Alizada, Éléa Boureux, Mariana Díaz García, Alžbeta Djurbová, Sarah Edgcumbe, Marianne Schulze, and Clémentine Tavernier; and
- Support for mine action: Marion Loddo.

Final editing was provided by Marion Loddo in October and November 2020 with assistance from Michael Hart (publications consultant).

Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Lixar I.T Inc. Pole Communication printed the report in Switzerland. This report was also published digitally at www.the-monitor.org.

The front cover photograph was provided by Sean Sutton/MAG and back cover photographs provided by Dieter Telemans/HI and CCCM. Additional photographs found within Landmine Monitor 2020 were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.

We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors:

- Government of Australia
- Government of Austria
- Government of Canada
- Government of Germany
- Government of Luxembourg
- Government of Norway
- Government of Switzerland
- Government of the United States of America**
- Holy See

The Monitor is also grateful for the support received from private donors.

The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating organizations.

** Specifically for research on mine action, support for mine action, casualties, and victim assistance.
# Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>battle area clearance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>confirmed hazardous area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cluster Munition Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRPD</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDG</td>
<td>Danish Demining Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>disabled persons' organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EORE</td>
<td>explosive ordnance risk education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Humanity &amp; Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>suspected hazardous area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY

**Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO)** – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

**Accession** – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

**Adherence** – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

**Antihandling device** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

**Antipersonnel mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

**Antivehicle mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

**Area cancellation** – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

**Area reduction** – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

**Battle area clearance (BAC)** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Casualty** – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

**Clearance** – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Cleared land** – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a cluster munition is a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.
**Confirmed hazardous area** – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

**Demining** – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

**Explosive remnants of war (ERW)** – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

**Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)** – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

**Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE)** – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive ordnance by raising awareness of women, girls, boys, and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

**Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA)** – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of landmines and ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes: survey and assessment, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

**Improvised explosive device (IED)** – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An improvised explosive device (IED) may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

**Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine** – An IED acting as a mine, landmine or antipersonnel landmine.

**International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)** – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

**Land release** – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

**Mine action center** – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

**Non-state armed groups (NSAG)** – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

**Non-technical survey (NTS)** – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

**Person with disabilities** – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.
Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Unexploded ordnance (UXO) refers to munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victims – Individuals killed or injured by a mine/ERW explosion (casualty), their family, and community.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.
1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

**Table Key**
- States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 31 October 2020
- Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 31 October 2020
- Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 31 October 2020

### The Americas

- Antigua & Barbuda
- Argentina
- Bahamas
- Barbados
- Belize
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Canada
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Dominica
- Dominican Rep.
- Ecuador
- El Salvador
- Grenada
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Jamaica
- Mexico
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- Paraguay
- Peru
- Saint Kitts & Nevis
- Saint Lucia
- Suriname
- Trinidad & Tobago
- Uruguay
- Venezuela
- Cuba
- United States

### Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

- Albania
- Andorra
- Austria
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Bosnia & Herzegovina
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Greece
- Holy See
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Latvia
- Liechtenstein
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Macedonia, North
- Malta
- Moldova
- Monaco
- Montenegro
- Netherlands
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Georgia
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Russia
- Uzbekistan

### Middle East & North Africa

- Algeria
- Iraq
- Jordan
- Kuwait
- Oman
- Palestine
- Qatar
- Tunisia
- Yemen
- Bahrain
- Egypt
- Iran
- Israel
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Morocco
- Saudi Arabia
- Syria
- United Arab Emirates

### Sub-Saharan Africa

- Angola
- Benin
- Botswana
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cameroon
- Cape Verde
- Chad
- Comoros
- Congo, Rep.
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Djibouti
- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Eswatini
- Ethiopia
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Kenya
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mozambique
- Namibia
- Niger
- Nigeria
- Rwanda
- São Tomé & Príncipe
- Senegal
- Seychelles
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- South Africa
- South Sudan
- Sudan
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Uganda
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## MAJOR FINDINGS

1

## BAN POLICY

7  
7 Banning Antipersonnel Mines  
8 Use of Antipersonnel Mines  
14 Universalizing the Landmine Ban  
17 Production of Antipersonnel Mines  
18 Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines  
19 Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines  
22 Transparency Reporting  
23 Appendix: Map  
23 1997 Mine Ban Treaty: Status 2020

## THE IMPACT

25  
26 Contamination  
34 Casualties  
42 Addressing the Impact  
42 Coordination  
53 Antipersonnel Mine Clearance  
64 Risk Education  
75 Victim assistance and the Oslo Action Plan  
81 Appendices: Maps  
81 Mine Contamination: Status 2020  
82 Landmine, Explosive Remnant of War (ERW), and Cluster Submunition Casualties in 2019

## SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

85  
85 Introduction  
86 2019 Figures and Developments  
87 International Contributions in 2019  
97 National Contributions in 2019  
97 Five-Year Support to Mine Action 2015–2019  
100 Appendix: Map  
100 Support for Mine Action: 2019

## STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

103  
103 Treaty Status  
106 Mine Ban Treaty
Ten-year old Novdol riding his bicycle past a suspected minefield where he lives in Phnum Rai village, Cambodia.

© Sean Sutton/MAG, December 2019
MAJOR FINDINGS

Landmine Monitor 2020, continues to document progress toward a mine-free world, but also highlights challenges such as non-state armed groups (NSAGs) using antipersonnel mines, particularly of an improvised nature. The use of improvised mines has again resulted in a high number of casualties in 2019, with the majority of victims being civilians. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 also generated a new set of unanticipated challenges to which the mine action community had to adapt in order to stay focused on the treaty’s ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering caused by landmines.

Currently, 164 countries are bound by the Mine Ban Treaty. Despite no states joining the treaty in the reporting period, most of the 33 countries that remain outside continue to act in compliance with the international normative framework. However, the United States (US) new landmine policy announced in January 2020 reversed a previous directive banning production and limiting the use of antipersonnel mines. The decision was met with condemnation in the US and internationally as an unjustified step backwards, at odds with both the global recognition of the ban norm and the impact of this indiscriminate weapon on civilians.

As countries continue to work to clear mine-contaminated land and provide risk education to affected communities, the Monitor identifies much that remains to be done, including to support the needs of landmine survivors and their communities as well as to ensure the sustainability of resources as global funding to mine action fell for the second consecutive year.

USE

From mid-2019 through October 2020, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of one country—Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during the reporting period: Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Libya, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

- There were as yet unconfirmed allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, the Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen.
CASUALTIES

2019 was the fifth year in a row with high numbers of recorded casualties due to the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines, including improvised types, as well as cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). The continuing high total recorded since 2014 is mostly the result of a large number of casualties recorded in countries facing intensive armed conflict and involving the large-scale use of improvised mines.

- In 2019, at least 5,554 casualties of mines/ERW were recorded: 2,170 people were killed, 3,357 people were injured, and for 27 casualties the survival status was unknown.
- Although the 2019 total indicated a decline from the 6,897 casualties of mines/ERW recorded in 2018, it was still 60% higher than the lowest determined annual number of 3,457 casualties in 2013.
- The States Parties with over 100 casualties were: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

Casualties in 2019 were identified in 55 states and other areas, of which 36 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

- The vast majority of recorded landmine/ERW casualties were civilians (80%) where their status was known.
- In 2019, children accounted for 43% of all civilian casualties where the age was known.
- Men and boys represented 85% of all casualties for which the sex was known.

CONTAMINATION

Sixty states and other areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines as of October 2020. This includes 33 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 22 states not party, and five other areas.

- Three States Parties need to clarify the extent of residual contamination (Algeria, Kuwait, and Nicaragua) and five States Parties need to provide information regarding suspected or known contamination by improvised mines (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria, and Tunisia).
- Mauritania which declared itself free of mines in 2018, reported finding new contamination dating from the 1970s Western Sahara conflict in 2019 and needed to confirm whether this contamination was actually on its territory.

Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by the Monitor as more than 100km²) is believed to exist in 10 States Parties: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2019, donors and affected states contributed approximately US$650.7 million in combined international and national support for mine action, a decrease of $48.8 million compared to 2018, and the second year in a row of declining support.

In 2019, 35 donors contributed a total of $561.3 million in international support for mine action in 41 affected states and other areas. This represents a decline of $81.3 million compared to 2018 and the first time since 2016 that international support fell below $600 million.

- The 15 largest donors accounted for $78.2 million of the global decline. Despite this drop, they continued to provide the majority of international funding (96%).
In 2019, 27 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2018, including 15 recipients receiving less support. In addition, seven countries did not receive new support.

International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (56% of all funding), victim assistance (8%), capacity-building (1%), and advocacy (1%). The remaining 34% was either not disaggregated by the donors or unearmarked.

The Monitor identified 10 affected states that reported providing $89.4 million in national support for their own mine action programs: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, and Zimbabwe. This represents an increase of $32.5 million from 2018.

**RISK EDUCATION**

Risk education is a core pillar of mine action, but one that has received little attention or acknowledgement by the broader mine action community in the last decade and, as a result, has frequently been under-funded. 2019 marked a significant and positive turning point for risk education, also known as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE).

- An international advisory group was established in 2019 to steer efforts related to EORE.
- The Oslo Action Plan adopted at the Fourth Review Conference included a distinct set of actions specifically dedicated to mine risk education and risk reduction.
- Twenty-eight States Parties were known to have conducted risk education to populations affected by antipersonnel mine contamination in 2019.

In 2020, risk education has been greatly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic as face-to-face sessions are often the most appropriate way to reach affected communities and to promote behavioral change. However, operators have shown innovation to address the challenges in terms of using digital methods and combining risk education and COVID-19 messaging.

**CLEARANCE**

At least 156km² of land was reported cleared of landmines in 2019 and more than 123,000 antipersonnel mines were cleared and destroyed. This represents an increase from the estimated 146km² cleared and nearly 98,000 landmines destroyed in 2018.

- The largest total clearance of mined areas in 2019 was achieved in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Croatia, and Iraq, which together accounted for 86% or all recorded clearance.
- In 2019, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen have all continued landmine clearance despite ongoing conflict or insecurity.
- In 2020, mine clearance was temporarily suspended due to COVID-19 related restrictions in Armenia, BiH, Chad, Colombia, Lebanon, Peru, Senegal, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe, in other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara, as well as in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.

Thirty States Parties, one state not party, and one other area have completed clearance of all mined areas on their territory since the treaty’s entry into force.

- Chile became the most recent State Party to declare completion of clearance of all mine areas in early 2020. No State Party declared completion of clearance in 2019.
- As of 15 October 2020, 25 States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations, before and no later than 2025. Four States Parties have deadlines after 2025: Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), and Sri Lanka (2028), and three have requested an extension of their current deadline after 2025: BiH (2027), Senegal (2026), and South Sudan (2026).
• Eight countries requested extensions to their Article 5 obligations in 2020: BiH, Colombia, DRC, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, South Sudan, and Ukraine. These requests will be considered at the Eighteen Meeting of States Parties in November 2020.

• Eritrea and Nigeria were expected to submit an Article 5 extension request in 2020, but have yet to do so as of 15 October 2020.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

The following findings relate to 34 States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims. In 2019–2020, many states indicated improvements in the accessibility, quality, or quantity of services for victims. However, important challenges remained in all countries.

• Only 14 of the 34 States Parties had victim assistance or relevant disability plans in place to address recognized needs and gaps in assistance. Another nine still need to complete the revision or adoption of a draft national disability strategy relevant to the implementation of victim assistance.

• Approximately two-thirds of the States Parties had active coordination mechanisms, and survivors’ representatives participated in the coordinating processes in 18 of those States Parties. However, there was little evidence that their input was considered or acted upon.

• Significant gaps remain in access to economic opportunities for survivors and other persons with disabilities in many of the States Parties where opportunities for livelihoods were most needed.

In 2020, victim assistance activities and services were strongly impacted by COVID-19 related restrictions and prevented survivors and other persons with disability to access services and to exercise their rights on an equal basis in a number of mine-affected countries. The impact of the pandemic was compounded by years of under-resourcing for victim assistance activities in many countries. Mine victims, especially in remote areas, often already struggled to reach or lacked access to adequate services.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND MINES RETAINED

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 269,000 destroyed in 2019.

• Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of the treaty as both have missed successive deadlines to complete destruction of their stockpiles.

• Three States Parties possess approximately four million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (3.3 million), Greece (343,413), and Sri Lanka (62,510).

A total of 64 States Parties have reported that they retain a combined total of more than 145,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 32 retain more than 1,000 mines each.

• Botswana, Brazil, and Uruguay reported the destruction of their remaining retained mines in 2019.

• Seven States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Nigeria, Oman, Senegal, and Togo.
PRODUCTION

The Monitor lists 12 states as landmine producers because they have yet to disavow future production: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

- This is an increase of one country from the previous report, following the change in US landmine policy which rolls back the 2014 policy pledge to not produce antipersonnel mines.

NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Yemen in the reporting period.
In February 2020 Humanity & Inclusion (HI) organized an event in Geneva under the Broken Chair, symbol of the campaign against landmines, to call on States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty to urge the United States to reverse its landmine policy shift.

© Basile Barbey/Hi, February 2020
BAN POLICY

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

Since it was adopted in September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty has stigmatized antipersonnel mines through its comprehensive prohibition on use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of the weapon.

A total of 164 States Parties are applying this binding international humanitarian law treaty to ensure the clearance of mined areas within 10 years, provision of risk education for as long as the threat remains, destruction of stockpiled mines within four years, and provision of victim assistance for a lifetime.

Most of the 33 countries that remain outside of the treaty nonetheless abide by its key provisions and thus act in compliance with the international normative framework. During this reporting period, Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in only one country, Myanmar, which engages with, but has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty.

Efforts to ensure the treaty’s provisions are implemented have been hindered by use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), particularly improvised mines. 1 NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least six countries during this reporting period, including in States Parties Afghanistan and Colombia, and states not party India, Libya, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

The new United States (US) policy rolling back its prohibitions on landmine production and use is one of the most significant and regrettable developments of 2020. Issued by the administration of President Donald Trump on 31 January 2020, the policy has taken the US off the path toward joining the Mine Ban Treaty, a goal most recently set during the Obama administration in 2014. 2

1 The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as “a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term “improvised landmine” to refer to victim-activated IEDs.

In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and compliance challenges continue to be addressed in a cooperative manner. However, some States Parties could do much more to implement key provisions of the treaty, particularly mine clearance and victim assistance, as detailed in this report and in online country profiles.

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 has seen the community of States Parties, United Nations (UN) agencies, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), adapt their work supporting the Mine Ban Treaty. They remain strong and focused on the treaty’s ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines.

**USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES**

There have been no allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty during the reporting period, from mid-2019 through October 2020. However, Landmine Monitor documented new use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in state not party Myanmar. Previously, Landmine Monitor 2018 and Landmine Monitor 2019 also found that government forces in Myanmar used antipersonnel mines.

Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel landmines by NSAGs in six countries during the reporting period, as listed in the table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locations of antipersonnel mine use mid-2019–October 2020³</th>
<th>Use by state(s)</th>
<th>Use by NSAGs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

Landmine Monitor has not documented or confirmed, during this reporting period, any use of antipersonnel mines by Syrian government forces or Russian forces participating in joint military operations in Syria. NSAGs in Syria likely continued to use improvised landmines as in previous years, but limited access by independent sources to territory under NSAG control made it difficult to confirm new use.

Landmine Monitor was also unable to document or confirm allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, the Philippines, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, or Yemen. In many cases, a lack of available information, or means to verify it, meant that it was not possible to determine if mine incidents and casualties were the result of new use of antipersonnel mines in the preceding 12-month period, due to legacy or remaining contamination of mines, including improvised mines laid in previous years, or involved some other kind of explosive device.

LANDMINE USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES

Myanmar

Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has every year documented the use of antipersonnel mines in Myanmar by government forces, known as the Tatmadaw, and by various NSAGs.

However, the government of Myanmar continues to deny its use of antipersonnel mines.

Since mid-2018, fighting between the Tatmadaw and the NSAG Arakan Army in Rakhine state has intensified. The Arakan Army has regularly published photographs online of antipersonnel mines produced by the Ka Pa Sa, the state-owned military industries, including MM2, MM5, and MM6 antipersonnel mines, among other seized weaponry. While these photographs do not specifically identify new landmine use, they do indicate that antipersonnel mines are part of the weaponry of frontline units.

Claims of new mine use by government forces during the reporting period include:

- In September 2020, a villager from Hpo Kaung Chaung village in Buthidaung township, Rakhine state, stepped on a landmine while collecting firewood from the site of a temporary Tatmadaw camp which had been vacated earlier in 2020.
- In June 2020, a villager in western Hpaung township, Kayin state, was killed by a landmine laid by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) near a Tatmadaw post. The mine had been laid due to an increase in tensions between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw.
- In May 2020, villagers in northern Hpaung township, Kayin state, alleged that Tatmadaw soldiers from Infantry Battalion 19 and Light Infantry Battalions 434, 341, and 340, operating under the Hpaung Operations Command, emplaced mines at the eastern part of their battalion's base along a major road.
- On 7 January 2020, near Teik Tu Pauk village in Kyauk Yan village tract, in Rakhine state's Buthidaung township, several children and an adult were killed or injured by mines the villagers indicated had been laid by the Tatmadaw. Previously, the Tatmadaw had made a temporary camp and left chopped dried bushes from the area they cleared. A teacher and his students went to the area to find firewood. The villagers stated that soldiers did not warn them that mines had been laid by government forces around the temporary camp. Once they began to collect branches they stepped on mines, killing four and injuring three.
- In November 2019, the Shan State Army-South (SSA-S) published photographs of MM2 antipersonnel mines which they claimed had been laid by the Tatmadaw's Brigade 99 near Wan Wah village of the Murng Mu region of Namtu township, in northern Shan state. They alleged that after clashes between the Tatmadaw and other ethnic armed groups, the Tatmadaw began to emplace landmines on farmland outside the villages and near the woods where they thought rebel groups would be injured by them.

5 Monitor interview with villagers who requested anonymity.
6 ‘Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,’ August 2020, unpublished. The villager who eventually died from his injuries stated that he knew the placement of the mines as he had been informed by the KNLA, however forgot about them on his return to the area.
7 ‘Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,’ August 2020, unpublished. The villagers stated that the Tatmadaw had issued verbal warnings to avoid the area.
8 Monitor interview with villagers who requested anonymity. Families of each of the injured were required to pay MMK20,000 (US$20) per day to the hospital so that the injured would be cared for by the doctors and nurses.
9 Allegation and photographs published on a Facebook page associated with the RCSS, 3 December 2019, bit.ly/FacebookRCSS3Dec2019.
It is often difficult to ascribe specific responsibility for incidents to a particular combatant group in Myanmar, however in every month during early 2020 villagers reported landmine casualties in areas where armed conflict had only recently occurred. Examples of such incidents include:

- On 29 February, 11 March, and 5 May 2020, landmine incidents caused injuries to villagers in areas near Ah Lae Sakhan village in Ye Phyu township, in the Tanintharyi region.  
- On 19 January 2020, a villager was injured in an area where Tatmadaw and Arakan Army forces had clashed in Ponnagyun township, Rakhine state, but the perpetrator could not be determined.

These are among the latest in a string of casualties which began in October 2018 in an area under dispute between the Karen National Union and the New Mon State Party, both NSAG signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, signed in 2015 between the government and eight NSAGs. Two more NSAGs signed in 2018. Both parties have denied using landmines but have accused each other of doing so. Local activists have informed the Monitor that the following incidents also involved improvised mines, but were unable to attribute responsibility for use:

- On 30 July 2020, one child was killed and five were injured in Kho Tin village, Kutkai township, Shan state, after finding a landmine and playing with it. Villagers said that Tatmadaw soldiers had previously stayed in the house where the incident occurred.
- On 14 July 2020, an abbot of a Buddhist monastery in Namkham township, Shan state, was killed when he triggered an antipersonnel landmine while cleaning the grounds. Villagers said Tatmadaw soldiers had frequently stayed in the monastery grounds but that the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) also was based in the area. Villagers called on both groups to remove their mines from the area.
- On 24 May 2020, one villager was injured by a mine, and a second was injured while coming to his aid in an area where conflict between the Tatmadaw and Arakan Army had occurred in Ponnagyun township, Rakhine state, but villagers did not know who laid the mine.
- On 5 April 2020, a villager in Motesoe Chaung village in Rathedaung township, Rakhine state, was killed by a landmine in an area where clashes between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army were a frequent occurrence.
- In March 2020, two villagers were killed by a landmine near Kham Sar village in Kyaukme township, northern Shan state. Armed conflict between the Tatmadaw, the SSA-S and the TNLA had previously occurred in the area and it is uncertain which group may have been responsible.

---


At the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2019, which was attended by delegations from both Myanmar and neighbor Bangladesh, Myanmar’s representative neither confirmed nor denied mine use, but stated, “Building lasting peace is the most fundamental and important task in the process of stopping future use of anti-personnel mines.”

Bangladesh called on Myanmar to impose a moratorium on the use, production and transfer of antipersonnel mines. Bangladesh reiterated its "deep concern" over Myanmar’s continued mine use and said that its “border management authorities recorded anti-personnel mine related accidents within Myanmar territory along our borders even as recently as in September and November 2019, leading to several civilian fatalities and injuries.”

Myanmar’s observer delegation made no comment on Bangladesh’s offer of assistance or its suggestion of a moratorium on use, as Myanmar’s delegation had left the room by the time the statement was made.

Landmine casualties continue to be reported in Rakhine state, on the Myanmar side of the border with Bangladesh. On 16 March 2020, a Rohingya refugee living in a refugee camp on the border was killed while collecting firewood in the "no man's land" between Maungdaw township adjacent to Bandarban district.

LANDMINE USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

In the reporting period, Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, India, Libya, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

Afghanistan


Colombia

The Colombian government reported landmine use in 2019 and 2020 by residual or dissident forces of both the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).

20 Afghanistan stated that new use of improvised mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) was responsible for killing approximately 1,451 civilians between June 2019 and May 2020. Presentation by Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings (virtual), 1 July 2020, bit.ly/AfghanistanPresentation2020.
Colombia reported 508 new mine incidents in 2019. Local media has reported numerous landmine seizure incidents in late 2019 and early 2020.

India

Maoist insurgents in India have made sporadic use of improvised landmines. In August 2020, two Adivasis (tribal people) were killed after they stepped on a mine laid by the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) in Visakhapatnam district, in Andhra Pradesh. The CPI-M admitted responsibility for the incident to the family and by audio press note to the village where it occurred, claiming that they had laid the booby-trap for pursuing police forces. Prior to that, in December 2019, a Central Reserve Police Force officer was injured when he stepped on a mine allegedly laid by the CPI-M near Lohardaga in Jharkhand state. In the same area the previous day, a girl was killed by a landmine and five others were injured while visiting a waterfall. In August 2019, in Kanker, Chhattisgarh state, a villager herding cattle was killed after stepping on a landmine allegedly laid by the CPI-M. Previously, in July 2017, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in Chhattisgarh state told the state news agency, "Pressure IEDs planted randomly inside the forests in unpredictable places, where frequent de-mining operations are not feasible, remain a challenge."

Libya

In May 2020, the United Nations-recognized Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) discovered significant mine contamination in areas of Tripoli vacated by rebels that month. The departing rebels were from a Russian government-linked military company, the Wagner group, which was fighting on behalf of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported, "GNA-aligned forces shared the figures were collated by Descontamina, the Colombian government agency responsible for humanitarian demining activities, which is part of the High Commission for Peace. Information provided by Maicol Velasquez, Office of the High Commissioner for Peace Information Management Team, from the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, 31 August 2020.

See, for example, antipersonnel landmines seized from the ELN in April 2020, "En El Tambo, Cauca, un muerto y un capturado del ElN dejan operaciones militares,” (“In El Tambo, Cauca, one dead and one captured during military operations against ELN”), Extra, 28 April 2020, bit.ly/Extra28April2020. In March 2020, the army captured 120 antipersonnel landmines from a warehouse belonging to a dissident FARC faction, "Hallan depósito ilegal con material explosivo en Guaviare,” (“Illegal deposit with explosive material found in Guaviare”), RCRN Radio, 17 March 2020, bit.ly/RCRNRadio17March2020. In February 2020, the army found a cache of 117 antipersonnel landmines belonging to the ELN, "Hallan minas antipersonal y bandera del ELN en Guática Risaralda, zona límite con Caldas” ("Antipersonnel mines and ELN flag found in Guática Risaralda, border area with Caldas”), W Radio, 7 February 2020, bit.ly/WRadio7February2020. In October 2019, the army reportedly discovered 100 antipersonnel landmines belonging to a dissident faction of the FARC, "Hallaron 100 minas antipersona y material explosivo de las disidencias de las Farc valuado en $50 millones,” ("100 antipersonnel mines and explosive material from FARC dissidents and valued at $50 million were found"), Minuto 30, 16 October 2019, bit.ly/Minuto16October2019.


photographs on Twitter on May 29 showing four types of antipersonnel landmines manufactured in the Soviet Union or Russia and claiming they were ‘laid by the Wagner mercenaries,’ in the Ain Zara, Al-Khilila, Salahuddin, Sidra, and Wadi al-Rabi districts of Tripoli. Other photographs shared on social media show mines equipped with tripwires and mines used as triggers to detonate larger improvised explosive devices. Video footage shows various explosive charges used to booby trap homes, including antivehicle mines, paired with various types of fuzes and a mix of electronic timers, circuit boards, and modified cell phones.28

The new use was condemned by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL),29 by the President of the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty Ambassador Osman Abufatima Adam Mohammed,30 and by the ICBL.31 The mines, both standard and improvised, caused casualties among civilians returning to the area. By early July 2020, UNSMIL reported 138 casualties including from clearance of the newly laid explosive devices.32

The antipersonnel mines discovered in Tripoli in May were of Soviet and Russian origin and included POM-2, PMN-2, and olive drab-colored MON-50 mines that were not previously recorded in Libya, suggesting these landmines may have been transferred into the country in recent years.33

Myanmar

Many NSAGs have used antipersonnel mines in Myanmar since 1999. In late 2019 and early 2020, there were allegations of new use by the Arakan Army, the KNLA and other groups.34 It is often difficult to ascribe responsibility for each mine incident to a specific armed group. For example, in August 2019, in northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw engaged in armed conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance—the TNLA, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and the Arakan Army—near Maw Harn village in Kutkai township. Subsequently, a resident of Maw Harn was injured by a landmine. The villagers said there had been no landmines in the area prior to the conflict, but did not know which group was responsible for using them.35

Several allegations of recent use were also reported in Kayin state:

- In March–April 2020, the KNLA’s Third Company used mines in Hpapun township during armed conflict with the Tatmadaw, which led to the injury of a villager in May 2020.36
- In late 2019, soldiers of KNLA Headquarters emplaced mines in Hpapun township to halt work on the controversial Hatgyi Dam on the Salween River, resulting in injury of a local villager in February 2020.37

34 There are also allegations of use by the TNLA, the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N) and the RCSS/SSA-S in their operations against the Tatmadaw during the reporting period.
36 “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2020, unpublished. The villager who was injured while collecting thatch near the area stated he was aware that the KNLA had laid landmines but thought it was safe as he had collected thatch there before.
37 “Karen Human Rights Group Submission to Landmine Monitor,” August 2020, unpublished. The villager who was injured while hunting near the area stated he was aware of verbal warnings issued by the KNLA prior to laying the landmines, but felt it was safe as he had been hunting in the area previously.
• In July 2019, in Hpapun township, the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) laid mines in the Bu Ah Der village tract reportedly to defend against attack by the Tatmadaw.38
• In May 2019, in Hlaingbwe township, a Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) officer from Meh Pru village tract ordered his soldiers to plant more landmines in seven nearby mountainous villages to protect their area.39

Pakistan

NSAGs in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa used improvised antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period. Use is attributed to a variety of militant groups, frequently referred to as “miscreants” in local media reports, but generally accepted to be constituent groups of the Tehrik-i-Taliban in Pakistan (TTP) and Balochi insurgent groups.40 In April 2020, a spokesman for the Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility for mines laid near a Pakistani Army post in the Kalgari mountains in Kohistan Marri, causing death and injury to two soldiers.41 As in previous years, many military personnel and some civilians were killed or injured in incidents of new mine use, however, from available information it is difficult to attribute specific responsibility in each case.42 Landmine Monitor has recorded numerous antipersonnel mine incidents in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, although in some cases the precise date of mine use cannot be ascertained.

**UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN**

Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must instead accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 164 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 32 acceded.43

No states joined the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period. The last states to accede to the treaty were Sri Lanka and the State of Palestine, both in December 2017.

The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory yet to ratify.

**ANNUAL UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION**

Since 1997, an annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to demonstrate their support for the humanitarian rationale of the treaty and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.44

39 Ibid.
43 The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.
44 This includes Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.
On 12 December 2019, UNGA Resolution 74/61, calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, was adopted by a vote of 169 in favor, none against, and 18 abstentions. This marked the second consecutive year of 169 votes in favor, and represented a slight increase in the number of abstentions (up from 16 in 2018). States not party Egypt, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, Singapore, and South Korea made statements explaining their votes.

A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

CHANGE IN US LANDMINE POLICY

The US landmine policy announced on 31 January 2020 allows the US to develop, produce, and use landmines as long as they are “non-persistent,” that is, equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features. The policy abandons the previous constraint on using antipersonnel mines only on the Korean Peninsula, and instead permits the US to use them anywhere in the world.

A Department of Defense fact sheet issued with the policy, entitled “Strategic Advantages of Landmines,” asserts that landmines are “a vital tool in conventional warfare” that provide “a necessary warfighting capability...while reducing the risk of unintended harm to non-combatants.” Frequently Asked Questions prepared by the Department of Defense for the policy announcement assert that the US needs landmines now, because “the strategic environment has changed” since 2014 with “the return of Great Power Competition and a focus on near-peer competitors” or adversaries. Defense officials announcing the policy told media they could envision the US using landmines in a variety of theaters against a range of adversaries, such as Russia and China.

The Trump administration’s decision to reverse US prohibitions and limits on landmines has been widely condemned and criticized, including by the US Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL). Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont said it “reverses the gains we have made and weakens our global leadership.” On 6 May 2020, Senator Leahy, Representative Jim McGovern and more than 100 other members of Congress wrote to Secretary of Defense Mark Esper expressing disappointment at the policy reversal, regret at the lack of consultation,

---

45 The 18 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Palau, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
46 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997 and did not vote on the resolution in 2018.
47 Of these states: India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea and the US are party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II on landmines; Cuba and Uzbekistan are party to CCW Protocol II; Egypt and Vietnam have signed the CCW but are not party to any of its protocols. Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria remain outside any treaty-based prohibition or regulation of antipersonnel mines.
48 The policy makes no distinction between antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, but the White House spokesperson stated that antipersonnel landmines are the focus of the new policy.
50 Previous US president Barack Obama issued a new landmine policy in 2014 banning production and acquisition of antipersonnel mines as well as halting their use by the US anywhere except the Korean Peninsula. The Obama administration brought US policy further in line with the Mine Ban Treaty, but did not take any measures towards US accession. Under the 2014 policy, the US committed not to use antipersonnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and not to assist, encourage, or induce other nations to use, stockpile, produce, or transfer antipersonnel mines outside of the peninsula. It also committed to no future US production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.
and providing three pages of questions regarding future plans for development and use of antipersonnel mines.\textsuperscript{53} The Department of Defense provided a detailed 12-page response in September 2020.

Department of Defense officials have said the US does not intend to pressure partners and allies to change their landmine policies, nor will the new US policy prevent it from conducting future operations in coalition with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other partners.

Mine Ban Treaty President, Ambassador Osman Abufatima Adam Mohammed of Sudan, issued a statement asserting that the policy "goes against" the "long-standing commitment" made by the US to help eradicate the suffering caused by landmines. States Parties including Austria, Belgium,\textsuperscript{14} France, Germany,\textsuperscript{11} the Netherlands,\textsuperscript{55} Norway,\textsuperscript{57} and Switzerland\textsuperscript{58} expressed their concern and disappointment over the new US policy, as did the European Union.\textsuperscript{59} In addition to the ICBL and the ICRC, other civil society actors that decried the policy change included several US Senators, Lloyd Axworthy (former Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) USA, and the US Conference of Catholic Bishops.

### NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the weapon. In September 2019, the Central Division, a faction of the Syrian National Army, and in July 2019, the Southern Transitional Council in Yemen, agreed to a ban on use of landmines by signing the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment.\textsuperscript{60} At least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt using antipersonnel

---

\textsuperscript{53} Letter to Mark Esper, US Secretary of State, from Senator Patrick Leahy and more than 100 other Congressional representatives, 6 May 2020, bit.ly/LeahyLetterMay2020.

\textsuperscript{54} MFA, Belgium (BelgiumMFA), "Anti-personnel mines do not make countries safe. Their use has been drastically reduced thanks to #MineBanTreaty, a cornerstone of humanitarian disarmament. We regret the new US landmine policy which is out of sync with global progress towards a mine-free world." 4 February 2020, 18:43 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/BelgiumMFA Tweet4Feb2020.

\textsuperscript{55} Annen, Niels (NielsAnnen), "Präsident Trumps Entscheidung, das Verbot zum Einsatz von Landminen zu ignorieren, ist ein schwerer Rückschlag für die langjährigen internationalen Bemühungen, diese tödliche Waffe zu ächten. @AuswaertigesAmt @GermanyUN." ("President Trump's decision to ignore the landmine ban is a severe blow to longstanding international efforts to outlaw this deadly weapon"). 3 February 2020, 08:34 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/NielsAnnenTweet3Feb2020.

\textsuperscript{56} Disarmament, NL-Amb (RobGabrielse), "The Netherlands is disheartened by the US' decision to lift its 2014 policy on anti-personnel landmines. See also the statement by the Spokesperson of HR/VP Borrell Fontelles regarding this decision." 4 February 2020, 19:38 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/RobGabrielseTweet4Feb2020.

\textsuperscript{57} MFA, Norway (NorwayMFA), "#LandMines kill and mutilate thousands of civilians every year, most of them children. Norway is a strong supporter of the @MineBanTreaty. We call upon the US to respect the ban on anti-personnel mines, and to continue to support survey and clearance of mines - FM #EriksenSoreide." 5 February 2020, 08:34 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/NorwayMFA Tweet5Feb2020.

\textsuperscript{58} EDA-DFEA (EDA_DFAE), "La Suisse poursuit l'objectif d'un monde exempt de mines anti-personnel. C'est pourquoi le DFAE regrette l'annonce du président des États-Unis d'y recourir à nouveau." ("Switzerland pursues the goal of a world free of anti-personnel mines. This is why the FDFA regrets the announcement of the President of the United States to use it again"). 7 February 2020, 14:15 UTC. Tweet. bit.ly/EDA-DFAETweet7Feb2020.


mines since 1997. The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have no permanence, frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

**PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES**

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past. Forty states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including three that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.

The Monitor identifies 12 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, an increase of one from last year’s report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing mines but have yet to disavow ever doing so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Iran, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

The new US landmine policy returns the US to the list of countries worldwide that either actively produce antipersonnel landmines or reserve the right to do so. According to the Department of Defense, the 2020 policy “encourages the Military Departments to explore acquiring landmines…that could further reduce the risk of unintended harm to non-combatants.” Yet, US defense officials commenting on the new policy told media that as the US has a sufficient inventory of so-called smart landmines, there is no need to restart production immediately. No antipersonnel mines or other victim-activated munitions are being funded in the fiscal year 2021 ammunition procurement budgets of the US Armed Services or Defense Department.

As of August 2020, Iran’s Ministry of Defence Export Center advertised the availability of the YM-IV, a bounding, fragmentation antipersonnel mine, and the YM-I-S, a self-neutralizing antipersonnel blast mine.

---


62 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.

63 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zimbabwe.


65 The 2020 policy rolls back the 2014 policy pledge to “not produce or otherwise acquire any anti-personnel munitions that are not compliant with the Ottawa Convention in the future, including to replace such munitions as they expire in the coming years.”


67 The last time the US produced antipersonnel mines was in 1997, when it manufactured 450,000 ADAM and 13,200 CBU-89/B Gator self-destructing/self-deactivating antipersonnel mines for US$120 million. The last non-self-destruct antipersonnel mines were procured in 1990, when the US Army bought nearly 80,000 M16A1 antipersonnel mines for US$1.9 million.

In August 2019, South Korea informed the ICBL that it had not produced any antipersonnel landmines in the previous five years. Until South Korea renounces future production, it remains listed as a producer of antipersonnel mines.

Production of antipersonnel mines by India appears to be ongoing into 2020. Purchase order records retrieved from a publicly accessible online government procurement database list private companies providing component parts for APER-1B antipersonnel mines to Indian Ordnance Factories, a state-owned enterprise, into June 2020. Previously, in September 2018, Indian military officials told the Monitor that the final assembly of complete mines remains under the exclusive control of Indian Ordnance Factories. In the previous two years, components were produced under these contracts and supplied to the Ammunition Factory Khadki, in Maharashtra state.

NSAGs have produced improvised landmines in Afghanistan, Colombia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Yemen. Antipersonnel mines are prohibited regardless of whether they were assembled in a factory or improvised from locally available materials.

**TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES**

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. Landmine Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting, including Cuba and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.

---

69 Email to the ICBL, from Soonhee Choi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations, 22 August 2019.

70 Components for M-14 mines were tendered for Dum Dum Ordnance Factory in February and June 2020. Components for M-14 mines and AP 1B mines were tendered in June 2020 and during 2019.


73 Previous lists of NSAGs producing antipersonnel mines have included Iraq, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, and Yemen.

74 Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

STATES NOT PARTY

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile antipersonnel landmines. In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global collective total may be less than 50 million.

It is unclear if all 30 states are currently stockpiling antipersonnel mines. Officials from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles which are used solely for training purposes in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

Largest stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Mines stockpiled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>26.5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>estimated 6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>estimated 4–5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>“less than” 5 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>approximately 45 million</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

States not party that have stockpiled antipersonnel mines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>Bahrain</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Georgia</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Iran</th>
<th>Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Korea, North</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY MINE BAN TREATY STATES PARTIES

At least 160 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 93 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 67 states that have declared they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training in detection and clearance techniques).

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 269,000 destroyed in 2019 (Greece destroyed 53,039 and Ukraine destroyed 216,291).

Three States Parties possess a collective total of almost four million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3.3 million), Greece (343,413), and Sri Lanka (62,510).

Sri Lanka declared a significant stockpile of antipersonnel mines in November 2018 when it submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report. Its deadline for completion of destruction is 1 June 2029, but Sri Lanka has stated its intent to complete stockpile destruction by

---

75 Three states not party, all in the Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: signatory the Marshall Islands, in addition to non-signatories Micronesia and Tonga.

76 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million, but there is a degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.
the end of 2020. Sri Lanka reported that the destruction of 57,033 antipersonnel mines had occurred prior to November 2018, for a total stockpile prior to destruction of 134,898 antipersonnel mines. In its May 2019 Article 7 report, Sri Lanka declared the destruction of 15,355 antipersonnel mines since its initial report. As of 15 October 2020, Sri Lanka had not submitted an updated Article 7 report for calendar year 2019.

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline. Neither state has indicated when the obligation to destroy its remaining stockpiles will be completed. The Oslo Action Plan adopted at the Mine Ban Treaty’s Fourth Review Conference in 2020 urges states that have failed to meet their stockpile destruction deadlines to “present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner.”

State Party Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 transparency report for the treaty, to formally confirm that it does not possess stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

**MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH (ARTICLE 3)**

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 64 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 29 retain more than 1,000 mines and three (Sri Lanka, Finland, and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Ninety-eight States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 40 states that had stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.

In addition to those listed above, another 32 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines and together possess a total of 13,758 retained mines.

Botswana, Brazil, and Uruguay all reported in 2020 that they destroyed their remaining retained mines (1,002, 364, and 260, respectively) during calendar year 2019.

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have been provided about how the mines are being used. A total of seven States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Djibouti, Nigeria, and Oman (which each retain more than 1,000 mines).

---

79 Greece had a deadline for stockpile destruction of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
81 Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.
82 In 2018, Argentina, Cambodia, and Ethiopia destroyed the entirety of their stockpiles retained for training and research, and the UK announced that its stockpile was comprised of inert munitions that do not fall under the scope of the treaty. Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report, which was originally due in 2012.
83 Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), the Netherlands (868), BiH (834), Honduras (826), Japan (803), Mauritania (728), Cambodia (720), Italy (617), Germany (583), South Africa (576), Sudan (528), Cyprus (500), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Portugal (383), Republic of the Congo (322), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Slovenia (272), Bhutan (211), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Gambia (100), Jordan (100), Ecuador (90), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), and Burundi (4).
The Oslo Action Plan calls for any State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under Article 3 to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes” and to “destroy all antipersonnel mines that exceed that number.”[^84]


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Last declared total (for year)</th>
<th>Initial declaration</th>
<th>Consumed during 2019</th>
<th>Year of last declared consumption</th>
<th>Total quantity reduced as excess to need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>21,153 (2018)</td>
<td>21,153</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>15,982 (2019)</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,050 (2016)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>6,552 (2019)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>2,707</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>5,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>6,009 (2019)</td>
<td>13,948</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4,921 (2019)</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4,875 (2011)</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>4,505 (2019)</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4,375 (2019)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3,760 (2016)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,364 (2011)</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3,318 (2018)</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3,134 (2018)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,996 (2004)</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,452 (2015)</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2,249 (2019)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2,044 (2019)</td>
<td>5,980</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2,015 (2019)</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2,000 (2017)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,842 (2019)</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,780 (2008)</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,764 (2011)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1,736 (2019)</td>
<td>4,991</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,649 (2019)</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>2019</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,634 (2009)</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1,547 (2017)</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,304 (2019)</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1,192 (2019)</td>
<td>28,647</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>23,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1,035 (2019)</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>5,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,020 (2007)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>131,999</strong></td>
<td><strong>256,947</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,581</strong></td>
<td><strong>64,664</strong></td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported.
Additionally, States Parties agreed to Action #49, wherein the treaty’s president is given a new role to play in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an “early warning mechanism.” The action point states, “If no information on implementing the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned...”

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.

**TRANSPARENCY REPORTING**

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.

Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.

As of 15 October 2020, 46% of States Parties had submitted their annual Article 7 reports for calendar year 2019. A total of 89 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2019, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or more years.

Nigeria, Yemen, and other states with recent allegations or confirmed reports of use of improvised landmines by NSAGs have failed to provide information on new contamination in their annually updated Article 7 reports.


In 2019, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, covering the period from June 2014 to November 2019, and which included information on contamination and clearance as well as casualties and victim assistance in Western Sahara.
A MAG team marking off a known dangerous area in Canage village, Angola.

© Sean Sutton/MAG, October 2019
THE IMPACT

This summary highlights developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of mines. The first part of this overview covers contamination and casualties, while the second section focuses on land release through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. These make up three of the five core components or “pillars” of mine action.

Reporting in this overview contributes to a baseline for developments under the Oslo Action Plan, the five-year action plan of the Mine Ban Treaty adopted in November 2019. These actions remain consistent with the fulfillment of the objectives of the treaty, whereby States Parties declare that they are:

“Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.”

There are 33 States Parties that have declared having obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty to clear contaminated land. Most of them reported undertaking clearance in areas under their jurisdiction and control in 2019. Three States Parties need to clarify the extent of residual contamination while five States Parties need to provide information regarding suspected or known contamination by improvised mines. Overall, high numbers of casualties due to landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) continued to be recorded in 2019, following a sharp rise in casualties due to increased conflict and contamination in 2015. The majority of new casualties were reported in States Parties to the treaty that also experience contamination by mines of an improvised nature. In 2019, 28 States Parties were known to have provided risk education to populations affected by antipersonnel mine contamination. At least 34 States Parties have responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims—these States Parties have “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.” Many indicated improvements in the accessibility, quality, or quantity of services for victims, but significant challenges remained in all states.
CONTAMINATION

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty.

In early 2020, Chile became the latest State Party to declare completion of clearance of all mined areas in its territory, an achievement that will be formally announced at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020. Jordan, which had originally declared completion in 2012, completed verification and clearance of areas that had not been cleared to a humanitarian standard in 2018.

No State Party declared completion of clearance in 2019. Since the Mine Ban Treaty came into force in 1999, of the 63 States Parties that reported mined areas under their jurisdiction and control, 32 States Parties have reported clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory.

State Party El Salvador completed clearance in 1994, before the treaty came into force.

States Parties that have declared fulfilment of clearance obligations since 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Djibouti, Honduras, Suriname</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Eswatini (formerly Swaziland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>France, Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Albania, Rwanda, Tunisia†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Nigeria*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Bhutan, Germany***, Greece***, Hungary***, Venezuela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Burundi***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Algeria*, Mozambique***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>Jordan***, Mauritania**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Algeria and Tunisia are suspected of having residual or new contamination.
** Mauritania and Nigeria have since reported finding new contamination.
*** Declared fulfilment after verification of contaminated areas found after initial declaration of completion.

Several States Parties that have declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines later discovered previously unknown mine contamination, or were required to verify that areas had been cleared to humanitarian standards. Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Jordan, and Mozambique all finally declared fulfilment of Article 5 obligations several years after their initial declarations.

Mauritania, which declared itself free of mines in 2018, reported finding new contamination in 2019 and submitted a request for an extension of its Article 5 deadline in 2020. Nigeria announced it had fulfilled its obligation under Article 5 in 2011, but indicated newly-mined areas in 2019. It was expected to submit an Article 7 report and an Article 5 extension request in 2020.

3 Previously unknown mined areas are often identified through reports of incidents and casualties, or after reports of possible contamination from civilians living close to the areas.
States Parties that verified contaminated areas after declaration of clearance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Initial declaration of clearance completion</th>
<th>Second declaration of clearance completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

States Parties with Article 5 obligations

As of 15 October 2020, a total of 33 States Parties have declared an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination on territory under their jurisdiction or control and therefore have obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty.

States Parties that have declared Article 5 obligations as of October 2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>Argentina*</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Chad</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria***</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>United Kingdom (UK)*</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty over the islands and exercises control over them.

** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

*** Nigeria has stated its intention to submit an Article 7 transparency report and to develop an Article 5 extension request to provide detail on its mine contamination.

States Parties suspected of having contamination

Several States Parties that have not declared obligations under Article 5, may have residual or newly discovered mine contamination which needs to be reported and clarified.

Residual contamination

Algeria declared fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations in 2017, but continues to find and destroy antipersonnel mines. In 2019, Algeria reported that 4,499 “isolated” mines were cleared and destroyed, a huge increase from the 188 mines found in 2018. In total, 5,150 mines were reported cleared and destroyed during 2016–2019. Given the large number of mines found in 2019, Algeria needs to provide clarification to States Parties on whether the mines being found constitute contaminated areas rather than isolated residual contamination.

There have been several mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties reported in Kuwait since 1990. In 2018, there were reports of torrential rain having unearthed landmines in the country, presumed to be remnants of the 1991 Gulf War. The mines are believed to be present mainly on the borders between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq; areas used by

---


shepherds for grazing animals. Kuwait has not made a formal declaration of contamination in line with its Article 5 obligations.

Nicaragua declared completion of clearance in April 2010, but has since faced a problem of residual mine/ERW contamination throughout the country. During 2018, Nicaragua reported that its contingency operations answered 13 reports made by the population, resulting in the clearance of 2,849m² and removal and destruction of 29 items of unexploded ordnance. Nicaragua confirmed that the contingency operations would continue through 2019, but no updated information has been shared. In May 2020, two landmines exploded in El Bayuncun, San Fernando, in the border region with Honduras, injuring one person in the first incident and four people from a rescue party in the second.

**Improvised mine contamination**

Several States Parties that have not declared clearance obligations under Article 5 or which do not provide regular Article 7 transparency reports, are suspected of having contamination by improvised mines. Improvised devices designed to detonate, or able to be detonated, by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. States Parties with improvised mines have obligations under Article 5 to clear these devices and, under Article 7, to provide annual reporting on contamination and clearance.

The following States Parties need to clarify their status with regards to their Article 5 obligations.

In Burkina Faso, use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) has been recorded since 2016. Pressure-operated improvised antivehicle mines have been increasingly used since 2018. In 2019, 21 civilians died and 14 were wounded by these devices. Improvised mines using pressure plates have also been recorded, with persistent armed attacks in northern and eastern regions since 2018.

Cameroon originally declared that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction and control, and its Article 5 deadline expired in 2013. However, since 2014, mines of an improvised nature have caused casualties, particularly in Cameroon’s northern districts along

---


8 In Monitor reporting, improvised mines are synonymous with victim-activated IEDs. IEDs are “homemade” explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. These are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or are referred to by type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate IEDs (PP-IEDs) and crush wire IEDs.

9 United Nations (UN), “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices: report of the Secretary-General,” 17 July 2020, p. 4. Produced for the 75th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA).
the border with Nigeria, as Boko Haram’s military activities have escalated. The extent of contamination is not known but is believed to be small.

Mali has confirmed antivehicle mine contamination and since 2017 has experienced a significant increase in incidents caused by IEDs, including improvised mines, in the center of the country. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported to the Monitor that improvised mines in Mali are victim-activated by pressure tray or wire trap (see section on casualties).

Nigeria declared at the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, in November 2011, that it had cleared all known antipersonnel mines from its territory. However, since 2017, there have been reports of incidents involving both civilian and military casualties from landmines and a range of other locally produced explosive devices planted by Boko Haram in the northeast of the country, particularly in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states. In November 2019, at the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo, Nigeria stated that it intended to submit an Article 7 transparency report and an Article 5 deadline extension request in order to comply with its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, although it has yet to do this as of 15 October 2020.

Tunisia declared completion of clearance in 2009, but there have been reports of both civilian and military casualties from landmines and improvised mines in the last five years. The improvised mines causing casualties, particularly to shepherds walking their herds, are predominantly found in the mountainous areas of Tunisia’s northwest and southwest regions, where militants are present and laying mines as an insurgency tactic.

**Extent of contamination in States Parties**

Massive antipersonnel mine contamination (defined by the ICBL-CMC as more than 100km²) is believed to exist in 10 States Parties: Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. Large contamination (20–99km²) exists in five States Parties: Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. Medium contamination (5–19km²) exists in six States Parties: Colombia, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan. Less than 5km² of contamination is thought to exist in 11 States Parties: Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, and in the United Kingdom (UK) and Argentina due to their claim of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.

---


12 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, UNMAS Mali, 5 October 2020.

13 Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 29 November 2011. In January 2017, a civil war-era landmine was found in Ebonyi state, which villagers thought was an IED. Police forensics concluded it was a landmine left over from the conflict which ended 47 years previously, that had washed up in a river. A bomb squad destroyed the device, and according to the police, the area was searched and no evidence of other contamination was found. James Eze, “Nigeria: Civil War Explosive Found in Ebonyi Community – Police,” AllAfrica, 17 January 2017, bit.ly/AllAfrica17Jan2017.


16 In 2016, the Monitor reported the highest number of casualties of mines and victim-activated IEDs in Tunisia since monitoring began in 1999. There were 65 casualties in 2016, up from 20 in 2015. Since 2016, there have been between 17–20 casualties in Tunisia each year. ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Tunisia: Casualties,” last updated 23 January 2018, bit.ly/TunisiaProfileCasualties2018.


Estimated area of antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Over 100km²</th>
<th>20–99km²</th>
<th>5–19km²</th>
<th>Less than 5km²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>Ethiopia*</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and South Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Cyprus****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>UK*****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* While Ethiopia’s estimated contamination is massive, it is expected that this will be significantly reduced through survey.
** Ukraine estimates around 7,000 km² of contaminated land, but this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted.
*** Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.
**** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen have significantly over 100km² of contamination, comprising both legacy contamination and new contamination, including improvised mines.

Iraq is dealing with contamination by improvised mines in areas liberated from the Islamic State. Iraq reported 1,239.17km² of antipersonnel mine contamination at the end of 2019, and an additional 627.58km² of contamination by improvised mines.

Yemen currently has no clear understanding of the size of its contamination as the ongoing conflict continues to add to the extent and complexity of contamination. Landmines that were not part of Yemeni stockpiles have reportedly been laid recently, while previously cleared areas, such as Aden, have been re-contaminated. The most recent estimate of contamination, from March 2017, was 323km².

---

Afghanistan reported contamination of 191km² at the end of 2019, of which 136km² is classified as confirmed hazardous area (CHA) and 55km² as suspected hazardous area (SHA). Afghanistan told the Monitor that new contamination resulting from fighting between the government and NSAGs is adding to the extent of contamination to be addressed.

Cambodia and Thailand still need to verify the extent of contamination along border areas where access has been problematic due to a lack of border demarcation. Cambodia estimates 817km², which includes both CHA and SHA which are not yet differentiated on the database of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA). Thailand reports 218.19km², of which 14.55km² are CHA and 203.64km² are SHA.

Turkey’s contamination of 150.41km² is found along its borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Turkey also has responsibility for the clearance of landmines in areas under its control in Northern Cyprus; although its most recent Article 5 extension request, submitted in 2013, did not include a timeline for clearance of mines there.

BiH has also not defined the full extent of contamination although it has been undertaking a country assessment project since 2018, funded by the European Union (EU). In its revised Article 5 extension request, submitted in August 2020, BiH reports contamination of 966.68km².

At the end of 2019, eight of Croatia’s 21 counties were still mine-affected. Croatia reported to the Monitor that more than 98% of the remaining contaminated land is in forest areas.

Ukraine has reported 7,000km² of contaminated land, but this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted.

Ethiopia, in its Article 7 report for calendar year 2019, reported that 330.28km² had been released through technical survey and non-technical survey (NTS). It is expected that the current figure of remaining contamination (over 10,000km²) will be significantly reduced through survey.

---

25 Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form C, p. 10, bit.ly/AfghanistanArticle7Report2020. In April 2020, it was reported that antipersonnel mine contamination in Afghanistan is 171km² (CHA: 120km² and SHA: 51km²), while contamination from improvised mines is 37km² (CHA: 16km² and SHA: 21km²). Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.


27 Improved relationships between Thailand and Cambodia have led to cooperation to survey and clear border areas. See, Khouth Sophak Chakrya, “CMAC, Thais join forces to clear mines at border provinces,” The Phnom Penh Post, 24 September 2019, bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost24Sept2019.


Sub-Saharan Africa has a number of States Parties with heavy contamination of between 20–99km². These are Angola, Chad, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe. Sri Lanka also has less than 100km² of reported contamination.

In 2019, Angola completed non-technical survey in all 18 provinces of the country, defining 1,073 confirmed minefields, and 94 suspected minefields which are estimated at 90km² in total.\(^{39}\)

Chad has about 93.3km² of contamination, of which 93.27km² are CHA and 0.05km² SHA.\(^{40}\) This includes 2.93km² of improvised mine contamination.

Eritrea has not reported on the extent of its contamination since 2013, when it was estimated at 33.5km².\(^{41}\)

Zimbabwe’s minefields on its border with Mozambique, and an inland minefield in Matebeleland North province, were reported to cover a combined total area of 42.69km² at the end of 2019.\(^{42}\)

Sri Lanka reported 24km² of contaminated land as of April 2019.\(^{43}\) The majority of this area was confirmed as minefields (22.42 km²).

Colombia, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan are each believed to have less than 19km² of mine contamination.

Colombia’s mine contamination comprises 8.2km², of which 3.3km² are in the process of being cleared, and a projected 4.9km² of suspected contamination which has not yet been surveyed.\(^{44}\) However, this does not include 166 municipalities that are inaccessible due to insecurity, where no survey or clearance has been able to take place. Contamination in Colombia also includes improvised mines.

Mauritania had previously declared clearance of all known contaminated areas in 2018, but has since identified further contaminated areas, approximately 8km², a legacy of the 1976–1978 Western Sahara conflict.\(^{45}\) However, Mauritania needs to confirm whether this contamination is actually on its territory.

Somalia reported that at the end of 2019 it had 6.09km² of contaminated land,\(^{46}\) but it has also reported an increase in the use of improvised mines.\(^{47}\)

South Sudan, Sudan, and Tajikistan all have a relatively clear understanding of the extent of their remaining contamination, at 13.27km², 7.37km², and 11.95km² respectively.\(^{48}\)

---


\(^{40}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrin Brahim, Coordinator, National High Commission for Demining (HCND), 20 April 2020.


\(^{44}\) Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Clarifications to the Committee, 31 July 2020, pp. 10–11.


States Parties Cyprus, the DRC, Ecuador, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Oman, Palestine, Peru, and the UK all have less than 5km² of contamination. However, some of the contamination is in areas that are contentious or difficult to access, as follows.

Cyprus reports no antipersonnel mines remaining in minefields laid by the National Guard that are on territory under its effective control. Remaining contamination is in the buffer zone and areas of Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus.

The contamination in the DRC is small, but partly located in Ituri and North-Kivu provinces which are difficult to access due to the presence of NSAGs and the Ebola epidemic.

In Palestine, clearance in the West Bank is constrained by political factors, including the lack of authorization granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct mine clearance operations.

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS

In addition to the 33 States Parties contaminated by antipersonnel mines, there are also 22 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and five other areas that have, or are believed to have, land contaminated by antipersonnel mines on their territories.

### States not party and other areas with antipersonnel mine contamination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Korea (North)</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Korea (South)</td>
<td>Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: other areas are indicated in italics.

State not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999.

Extent of contamination in states not party and other areas

Mines are known or suspected to be located along the borders of several states not party, including Armenia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, North Korea, South Korea, and Uzbekistan, although the extent of contamination is not known.

The extent of contamination is known in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Israel, and Lebanon; although in Azerbaijan significant contamination also exists in the areas that are not under government control, particularly in the regions of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhchivan. The outbreak of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh in late September 2020 had added further complexity to the political dynamics in the region, and is resulting in new ERW contamination, including cluster munitions.

Ongoing conflict, insecurity, and the impact of improvised mines affect states not party Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.

States not party Lao PDR and Lebanon are both party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and have prioritized clearance of cluster munition remnants. The mine contamination in Lao PDR has had little human impact, although clearance operators reported mine contamination in their areas of operation in 2019. In Vietnam, the mine problem is also small compared to its ERW problem, although the full extent of mine contamination is not known.

The extent of mine contamination in China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia is unknown.

Five other areas unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to their political status are known to have mine contamination.

In Abkhazia, which had been declared free of landmine contamination in 2011, the HALO Trust identified five previously unknown minefields from June–December 2019, amounting to approximately 9,600m².

Kosovo, which completed a socioeconomic baseline of the impact of ERW in 2018 to support the prioritization of remaining contamination, has 35 affected areas totaling 1.35km².

The HALO Trust, the only operator in Nagorno-Karabakh, has been undertaking a baseline survey of the territory to establish the extent of contamination. A total of 9km² has been identified. Further progress will be dependent on the outcome of hostilities which erupted in September 2020.

As of August 2020, Somaliland had 6.71km² of CHA across ten districts. In Western Sahara, there are 15 known remaining minefields east of the Berm, covering a total area of 95.8km².

CASUALTIES

Landmines of all types, including antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and improvised mines, as well as cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war (ERW)—henceforth mines/ERW—remain a significant threat and continue to cause indiscriminate harm.

MINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN 2019

At least 5,554 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW in calendar year 2019. Of that total, at least 2,170 were killed, and another 3,357 were injured, while in the case of 27

---

54 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Julien Kempeneers, Armed Violence Reduction/Humanitarian Mine Action (AVR/HMA) Coordinator, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 20 May 2020; and by Tamsin Haigh, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020.
56 Email from Michael Montafi, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 31 July 2020.
57 Email from Ahmet Sallova, Director, Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC), 10 July 2020; and Mine Action Review questionnaire completed by KMAC on antipersonnel landmine contamination, survey, and clearance in Kosovo in 2019, received in 2020 and responses shared with Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
58 Email from Alina Aslanian, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 30 July 2020.
59 Email from Eilidh French, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 29 August 2020.
60 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm, was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12 times the length of the Berlin Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China.
62 Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more information on casualties caused by cluster munitions, see, ICBL-CMC, Cluster Munition Monitor 2020 (to be launched on 23 November 2020).
Casualties it was not known if the victim survived. Casualties were recorded in 50 countries and five other areas. The 2019 total represents a decline from 6,897 casualties of mines/ERW in 2018, and a reduction in casualties over the past three years. Previously, a sharp rise in casualties was recorded due to increased conflict and contamination in 2015, peaking in 2016, when 9,439 casualties were recorded. The significant upsurge in recorded casualties since 2014 is primarily due to large numbers of casualties in relatively few countries with intensive armed conflicts, involving the large-scale use of improvised mines.

In 2019, more than two-thirds of all casualties (3,647, or 66%) were reported in States Parties. Thus, the impact in terms of casualties caused by mines/ERW in States Parties alone was still greater in 2019 than globally in 2013—the year with the lowest annual number of casualties recorded since 1999, when 3,457 people were killed and injured in all countries and areas.

Civilians represented the majority of mine/ERW casualties compared to military and security forces, continuing the well-established trend of civilian harm that influenced the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty: 80% of casualties were civilians in 2019, where the status was known.

Child casualties are recorded where the age of the victim is less than 18 years at the time of the mine/ERW explosion, or when the casualty was reported by the source (such as media) as being a child. There were at least 1,562 child casualties in 2019, accounting for 35% of all casualties for whom the age group was known (4,508); this made up 43% of civilian casualties for whom the age group was known (3,598). Children were killed (580) or injured (979) by mines/ERW in 34 states and one other area in 2019. As in previous years, in 2019, the vast majority of child casualties where the sex was known were boys (82%). ERW was the device type that caused the most child casualties (758, or 49%), followed by improvised mines (576, 37%).

In 2019, men and boys made up the majority of casualties, accounting for 85% of all casualties for whom the sex was known (3,190 of 3,759). Women and girls made up 15% of all casualties for whom the sex was known (569).

In 2019, the Monitor identified 23 casualties among deminers in nine countries (including 17 men and two women, and four for whom the sex was not recorded). Another eight casualties were state military, police or other security personnel who were killed or injured while clearing, disarming, or dismantling mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). There were two informal village deminer casualties in Cambodia in 2019. These were not included in the annual total of deminer casualties.

63 As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the numbers of people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties and this information was not included in the Monitor’s mine/ERW casualty database.
64 The revised 2016 casualty number as reported by Landmine Monitor 2019.
65 The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat as well as members of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law, whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers,” 2 June 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFAQ.
66 The survival outcome for three children was not reported. In 2019, child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe, as well as other area Somaliland.
67 There were 921 boys and 204 girls recorded as casualties in 2019, while the sex of 437 child casualties was not recorded.
68 In 2019, casualties among humanitarian deminers were reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Ukraine.
69 These casualties occurred in Pakistan and Ukraine.
Countries with high and increasing numbers of casualties are mostly those with improvised mine casualties. For the fourth successive year, in 2019, the highest number of annual casualties was caused by improvised mines (2,994). However, the number of recorded improvised mine casualties declined significantly from 2018, which saw an all-time high of 3,789 improvised mine casualties.

CASUALTIES IN STATES PARTIES IN 2019

Casualties occurred in 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2019. The States Parties with over 100 recorded casualties were: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

States Parties with high and increasing numbers of casualties were those with improvised mine casualties. Collectively, States Parties recorded only 26% of the commercially-manufactured antipersonnel mine casualties reported in 2019 (124). States Parties accounted for 62% (1,853) of improvised mine casualties and 74% (316) of casualties from undefined landmine types that, in the context of media reporting terminology, are also likely to be mines of an improvised nature.

There is a clear overall trend of declining annual casualties in most States Parties over the 20 years since the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence. This trend is particularly evident in most of the countries which reported the highest casualty figures after the treaty entered into force in 1999 (see the graphic on the opposite page).

Declining casualty rates have also been recorded over time in Colombia, from a peak of 1,228 casualties in 2006 to 111 casualties in 2019. However, casualties in 2018 and 2019 increased, having dropped below 100 in the preceding two years after the peace agreement took effect. Relatively new State Party Sri Lanka had 223 mine/ERW casualties in 2000 and two in 2019.

It is certain that there are additional casualties each year that are not captured in the Monitor’s global mine/ERW casualty statistics, with most occurring in severely affected countries and those experiencing conflict. In some states and areas, many casualties go unrecorded, meaning the true casualty figure is likely significantly higher in those countries.

In Afghanistan, data collection was affected by ongoing conflict. The existing data collection system records only civilians, and the reporting of military casualties was generally rare. Since May 2017, the Afghan military has stopped releasing its conflict casualty figures entirely.

In Iraq, as in previous years, it is certain that there were many more mine/ERW casualties that occurred in 2019 that were not identified. However, United Nations (UN) reporting indicates that there has been a significant overall reduction in conflict-related casualties of all types since 2018 and decided to stop releasing civilian casualty updates on a monthly basis, but rather based on the circumstances.

70 Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Poland, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

71 In December 2018, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported that its ‘monitoring in recent months has shown a steady reduction in civilian casualties.’ UNAMI, "UN Casualty Figures for Iraq for the Month of December 2018," 3 January 2019, bit.ly/UNAMI3Jan2019.
Data collection in Iraq remains a challenge. In 2019 and 2020, the Information Management and Mine Action Program (iMMAP) provided regular updates on explosive hazards. However, mine/ERW incident casualties were almost never reported among the victims recorded.

In 2019, a detailed report on data in Iraq by Humanity & Inclusion (HI) found that “there is limited to no coordination between the actors involved in victim and accident reporting and data management processes.” The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) reportedly suffer from insufficient staff, lack of technical expertise, inconsistent and mismatched reporting forms and a lack of formalized guidelines on roles and responsibilities for the many different actors involved in data collection and management.

In Mali in 2019, as was the case in recent years, only vehicles were involved in mine incidents and no casualty occurred while individuals were on foot. The same was true for Burkina Faso in 2019. Five of the 233 civilian casualties recorded for Mali in 2019 occurred in incidents where they were on an animal-drawn cart, compared to 25 in 2018. Those improvised mines causing casualties in Mali and Burkina Faso were believed to have acted as de facto antivehicle mines. However, in some incidents, reporting may be unclear as to whether the improvised device involved was an unused command-detonated IED—and thus in effect an explosive remnant rather than a mine—or if it was a victim-activated improvised mine. The impact in terms of casualties is largely indistinguishable.

The ongoing conflict in Yemen prevented the effective operation of a national casualty surveillance mechanism. Yemen reported that the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) information management system has become outdated and is currently not usable. Furthermore, the conflict has presented new mines and mine technologies (improvised mines), with which YEMAC has had no previous experience. This is compounded by the scale of the conflict and its extensive impact across the country.

72 As reported in the iMMAP-IHF Humanitarian Access Response Weekly Explosive Incidents Flash News. iMMAP began in 2001 as an independent unit under the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and has supported the establishment of the UN’s Humanitarian Information Management Centre in Iraq, Mine Action Coordination Centre and National Mine Action Authority since 2003.


In Yemen, the Monitor recorded 248 casualties for 2019. The Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) recorded 233 landmine casualties in Yemen, with just under half due to incidents involving civilian vehicles: “Landmines accounted for highest number of casualties in incidents impacting on civilian vehicles, with 36 landmine incidents resulting in 114 casualties; 41% of the total.” In May 2019, Yemen reported having collected data on 820 victims and injured persons since the beginning of 2019. In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2019, Yemen reported 1,050 victims surveyed in 2019. Previous data indicates that aggregate annual casualty figures reported by Yemen include casualties for all time surveyed during that year, rather than casualties which occurred in the calendar year itself.

The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recorded casualty data in Nigeria for calendar year 2019. From 2016–2019, data for Nigeria was initially and regularly recorded by Mines Advisory Group (MAG), which significantly heightened understanding and awareness of the extent of the impact of mines/ERW (especially improvised mines) in the country. Subsequently, Nigeria’s acknowledgement of its obligation to clear improvised mines under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty further indicated that the improvised mine casualties included those from antipersonnel types.

CASUALTIES IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS

The Monitor identified 1,834 mine/ERW casualties in 2019 in 14 states not party. More than a thousand of the casualties were recorded in Syria (1,125), which represents a continuing decrease from 1,465 in 2018, and 40% less than the 1,906 casualties recorded in 2017. However, since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, annual totals of recorded mine/ERW casualties in the country are thought to be an undercount. Casualty totals have fluctuated in part due to inconsistent availability of data and sources.

For Syria, ambiguity in the way that casualties and explosive incidents are reported in the media often leaves it unclear whether an explosive device was command-detonated or victim-activated. Many casualties, including civilian casualties in Syria that were reported to be from mines, booby-traps, roadside bombs, or IEDs, and which were not explicitly reported as ‘targeted’, were excluded from the Monitor annual casualty dataset if the cause of activation was not adequately defined. Due to the preference for conflict fatality reporting systems in situations of armed conflict, there are many more people recorded as dead compared to those recorded injured. The Monitor recorded 636 people killed and 489 people injured in Syria in 2019, whereas generally only just over a quarter of all mine/ERW casualties will be fatalities. Therefore, it is certain, based on the probable proportion of fatalities to survivors, that the actual number of casualties occurring in Syria was substantially higher than the annual total recorded.

The next highest numbers of casualties among the countries yet to join the Mine Ban Treaty were recorded in Myanmar, with 358 casualties, followed by Pakistan with 136.

77 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, India, Iran, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Myanmar, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, and Vietnam.
78 Not including the occupied Golan Heights.
79 If these casualties were included, the annual casualty total for Syria would be 1,492 (804 killed and 688 injured).
Seventy-three casualties were reported in five other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, Taiwan, and Western Sahara.

CASUALTY RECORDING

It is certain that numerous casualties go unrecorded each year. Some of the most mine/ERW-affected countries, especially conflict-affected states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, do not have functional national casualty surveillance systems in place, nor do other forms of adequate reporting exist.

The need to improve the adequacy and efficacy of data collection in mine action and conflict situations, as well as the demand for progress in related systems and mechanisms, was a key theme during the reporting period. A thematic panel discussion during the May 2019 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings highlighted the need to strengthen injury surveillance systems to monitor "the physical impact of explosive ordnance" and to identify risk groups and factors. This was reflected in the text of the Oslo Action Plan.80

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) undertook a process to define a set of minimum data requirements for mine action that could accompany the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core Geographic Information System (GIS) data. In March 2020, the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) adopted the summary of minimum data requirements, including entries for mine/ERW incidents and casualties.81

In September 2020, the first ever joint statement on casualty recording was delivered at the 45th session of the Human Rights Council, presented by Afghanistan, a country consistently among those with the most mine/ERW casualties in recent years. It was co-signed by 49 other states.

In 2019, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) released the first UN publication on casualty recording methodology, after several years of the need being highlighted by civil society.82 The OHCHR Guidance on Casualty Recording notes that "casualty recording has received increasing recognition as an important and effective means of enhancing the protection of civilians in armed conflict situations and elsewhere."83

However, the new UN casualty reporting system does not differentiate casualties caused by antipersonnel mines or any specific explosive device type as defined by disarmament regulation contexts. According to the OHCHR standards in place to monitor the Sustainable Development Goal indicator on conflict-related deaths (16.1.2), disaggregation for the cause of death includes the broader category of "planted explosives and unexploded ordnance."84

The Monitor’s casualty records include only mine/ERW casualties: people killed or injured in incidents involving explosive items detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.85 Casualties from incidents caused or reasonably suspected to have been caused by remotely detonated mines or IEDs—those that were not victim-activated—are not

84 OHCHR, “Technical Guidance Note on SDG Indicator 16.1.2: Number of conflict-related deaths per 100,000 population, by sex, age and cause,” undated, bit.ly/GuidanceNoteOHCHR.
85 Such as all antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), unexploded ordnance (UXO), and improvised mines (victim-activated IEDs) AXO and UXO are collectively referred to as ERW. Cluster munition casualties are disaggregated and reported as distinct from ERW casualties. Not included in the totals are estimates of casualties where exact numbers were not given.
included. Mines/ERW therefore differs from the IMAS classification of explosive ordnance. That is because the IMAS definition of explosive ordnance additionally includes devices that are activated manually or by remote control.

In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic has represented an additional challenge to mine action program activities in most affected countries, including data collection.

**COVID-19 pandemic impacts on clearance, risk education and victim assistance**

Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020 was a challenging year for mine action and an unusual reporting period for the Landmine Monitor. Mine clearance in many countries was affected by restrictions imposed to curb the spread of the pandemic. It was reported to the Monitor that clearance operations were temporarily suspended in States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, Colombia, Peru, Senegal, and Zimbabwe; states not party Armenia, Lebanon, and Vietnam; and other areas Kosovo and Western Sahara, as well as the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.

In Cambodia, clearance teams received COVID-19 prevention training. It was reported that mine clearance programs in Cambodia and Thailand were not greatly affected by the pandemic, at least in part because operations are conducted in remote areas.

Other mine action activities affected by the pandemic included activities related to resources, survey, planning, and training.

BiH reallocated €10 million (US$10.9 million) of European Union (EU) funds for humanitarian demining projects to COVID-19 response and migration issues. Chile anticipated a possible need to reallocate mine action funding to respond to sanitary and social needs. A mission to Mauritania to collect additional information on contamination was delayed. Resource mobilization activities for mine action were suspended in Senegal.

In Ukraine, the adoption of amendments to the Law on Mine Action was delayed. In Yemen, the development of national mine action standards was postponed, and the training of information management personnel on the use of IMSMA Core was deferred.

Several national mine action centers anticipated delays in their operational calendars, including delays which may impact their clearance completion date. In some countries, mine action and risk education teams were repurposed to deliver hygiene products and

---


89 In the Falkland Islands, the UK’s aspiration to complete mine clearance by 30 December 2020 was under review in 2020 given the COVID-19 pandemic and related restrictions. Chad and other area Western Sahara also expected delays in completion of mine clearance due to the COVID-19 outbreak.
COVID-19 prevention messages. The HALO Trust mobilized its vehicle fleet and workforce in 21 countries and four other areas to deliver medical and sanitation supplies.90

Risk education programs have been greatly impacted by the pandemic and related restrictions, but have also been an area where efforts to combine mine action and a COVID-19 response are most significant. An important proportion of risk education programs are based on face-to-face sessions, which are often considered the most appropriate way to reach affected communities in remote areas and to promote behavior change.

Face-to-face risk education sessions were suspended in States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Eritrea, Senegal, and Yemen, as well as in states not party Armenia, Lebanon, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. In some countries, community-based risk education was generally not impeded by COVID-19 restrictions, for example in Lao PDR and Somalia. In Palestine, UNMAS was able to continue to disseminate risk education messages widely through its "informal street sessions."91 In Cambodia and Nigeria, risk education sessions were conducted for much smaller groups. In Thailand, small group sessions continued to be provided in nine refugee camps. In South Sudan, only emergency risk education was permitted.

However, due to the creativity of mine action centers, service providers, and the broader mine action community, in many countries risk education programs were adapted to constraints and restrictions imposed due to COVID-19. In some countries, risk education operators integrated COVID-19 prevention messages into their usual activities.92 In Iraq, the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) temporarily reassigned the risk education workforce to COVID-19 response efforts. In Senegal, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) reallocated unused mine action funding to COVID-19 prevention efforts. In Thailand, village health volunteers, tasked with disseminating COVID-19 messages, worked with the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) to provide mine risk education messages in affected areas.93

Risk education programs explored alternative means of disseminating messages electronically and remotely. In Vietnam, text and voice messages were used to pass on messages about risk education and COVID-19.94 In Afghanistan, TV and radio and vehicles with loudspeakers were used to continue risk education programs.95 The use of technology and social media was however not as effective in reaching affected communities in some remote areas of Cambodia and Lebanon, where use of social media is relatively low.

Victim assistance activities and services were strongly impacted by COVID-19 restrictions, including in Afghanistan, Armenia, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Georgia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Senegal, Syria, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, and Yemen. In Yemen, the healthcare system was “on the brink of collapse” in 2019.96 It “in effect collapsed” with the additional impact of COVID-19.97 Operators reported that during the pandemic

91 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Soula Kreitem, Palestine Programme and Support Officer, UNMAS, 30 April 2020.
92 Including in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Palestine, Syria, Thailand, and Vietnam.
94 Ibid.
95 Email from Zareen Khan Mayar, HI Afghanistan, to the International Mine Risk Education Working Group, 2 June 2020.
coordination was weak or non-existent in countries that had already experienced organization limitations, including Chad, Senegal, and Sierra Leone.

Mitigation strategies included assessments of mine victims’ needs or the socio-economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the provision of psychological support and follow-up rehabilitation services remotely, and the provision of hygiene kits and information on COVID-19 prevention measures to beneficiaries and technical personnel. In Colombia, only urgent services continued uninterrupted and follow-up services instead were provided by telephone. Coordination of victim assistance efforts was reportedly maintained in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Libya, and Myanmar.

Responses to Monitor questions on COVID-19 noted that survivors and other persons with disabilities were not able to access services and rights on an equal basis to others during the pandemic in a number of mine-affected countries, including in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tajikistan, and Yemen. This finding is consistent with a United Nations study that found persons with disabilities were at greater risk of discrimination in accessing healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic.

ADDRESSING THE IMPACT
COORDINATION

The Oslo Action Plan, agreed by States Parties in November 2019 at the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, highlights a number of best practices agreed by States Parties that contribute to the effective implementation of mine action programs. These include demonstrating high levels of national ownership; developing evidence-based, costed and time-bound national strategies and workplans; and keeping national mine action standards up to date in accordance with the latest International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

CLEARANCE COORDINATION

In 2019, clearance programs in the majority of States Parties with remaining contamination were managed and coordinated through national mine action centers. Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe all had national bodies in place responsible for their national mine action programs.

Croatia, in a move to form an integrated and widely functioning civil protection system, dissolved the Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) as a legal entity and integrated it into the Ministry of the Interior as a Civil Protection Directorate on 1 January 2019. The Civil Protection Directorate has taken on all roles previously undertaken by CROMAC.

Cyprus has no national mine action center, as the remaining contamination is reported to be in areas under Turkish control. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) coordinates mine action on behalf of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

98 In BiH and Vietnam.
99 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, persons with disabilities did not access services and rights on an equal basis to others in Cambodia. Email from Edith van Wijngaarden, Country Manager Cambodia, HI, 18 May 2020.
100 Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, persons with disabilities did not access services and rights on an equal basis to others in Sierra Leone. Email from Chloé Charpentier, West Africa Division, HI, 29 April 2020.
Eritrea has provided few updates on its mine action program, although noted in its Article 5 extension request submitted in 2019 that it was in the process of restructuring the Eritrean Demining Authority.\textsuperscript{105} It was stated that this restructuring had presented obstacles to Eritrea submitting its extension request and a workplan beyond its deadline of February 2020.\textsuperscript{106}

Ethiopia moved responsibility for its mine action program from the Ethiopian Mine Action Office (EMAO) to the Head Office of the Ministry of Defense. This was reportedly to allow the Defense Minister to manage mine action activities and resources directly, to ensure an adequate level of authority for dealing with the remaining contaminated areas on Ethiopia's borders, and to better communicate with donors.\textsuperscript{107}

Nigeria has no mine action authority, but the UN Humanitarian Response Program includes a mine action sub-sector that takes responsibility for planning, coordination, the mapping and marking of hazardous areas, risk education and referral of survivors.\textsuperscript{108} An Inter-Ministerial Committee was formed in 2019 and tasked with developing a national mine action strategy and a workplan for survey and clearance.\textsuperscript{109}

Oman's Article 7 transparency report for 2018 stated that it was working towards establishing a national mine action center.\textsuperscript{110}

Ukraine's mine action program is currently managed by the Ministry of Defense with support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).\textsuperscript{111} A Law on Mine Action in Ukraine, adopted in January 2019, which would enable the establishment of a mine action center, has not been implemented. An amendment to the law was submitted to parliament in February 2020.\textsuperscript{112}

In Yemen, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is supporting the establishment of a Yemen Mine Action Coordination Centre (YMACC) in Aden. It is anticipated that the YMACC will ensure better coordination among mine action entities, and will take the lead on national standards, longer-term plans for survey and clearance, staffing and procurement, and national support plans.\textsuperscript{113} The process has advanced significantly in the south of the country, but UNDP has little or no access in the north.\textsuperscript{114}

**National Mine Action Strategies**

Mine Action Strategies and the development of workplans are crucial for strengthening national ownership of a mine action program and to enable greater transparency and accountability through monitoring and reporting. It can also help states align their mine action efforts with broader humanitarian and development efforts and boost their ability to leverage international funding.


\textsuperscript{112} Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 27 August 2020, p. 6, bit.ly/UkraineAdditionalInformation.


\textsuperscript{114} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Emma Simons, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Technical Coordinator, HI Yemen.
Twenty States Parties had national mine action strategies in place in 2019, although Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Tajikistan all have strategies in place up to 2020 and need to update them. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has plans to support the update of strategies in Afghanistan and Somalia. Afghanistan intends to develop the next strategic plan in 2020–2021 and has a 10-year workplan in place for April 2013–2023.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy end date</th>
<th>States Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>South Sudan, Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Turkey, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td>Croatia, Senegal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chad, the DRC, and Sudan had strategies that expired in 2019 and need updating. Sudan and the DRC have reported that the development of their strategies is in process.

States Parties Cyprus, Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Serbia, and Ukraine do not have mine action strategies in place. The GICHD plans to work with Ukraine to develop a mine action strategy, with a workshop due to be held in 2022.

Iraq provided a strategic plan with its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2017, although this was outdated by the need to address the massive contamination resulting from the conflict with the Islamic State. The plan provides general priorities for implementation. In 2018, Iraq reported that it has formed a committee with the purpose of updating the plan so that it covers the period up to its Article 5 deadline of 2028.

Serbia has a workplan to completion provided in its Article 5 extension request, which was submitted in 2018.

Yemen’s original mine action strategy is now outdated and does not reflect the current situation in Yemen due to the ongoing conflict. UNDP plans to assist Yemen to update its strategy when there is a lasting cessation to hostilities.

Information management


The first goal of BiH’s National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 is to ensure sound information management standards, tools and processes. Through 2019, the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) was using its own information management system, the BiH Mine Action...
Information System (BHMAIS). UNDP is supporting a European Union (EU) funded project to improve information management through the development of a web-based database.

Croatia has an information management system that is compliant with IMAS and allows disaggregation of contamination by type and land release method.

It is not clear what information management systems are used by Eritrea, Niger, and Oman.

The UK does not use IMSMA but has an information management system in place.


National Mine Action Standards

In March 2019, the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) updated its national standards and introduced new standards for the clearance of improvised mines.

In Iraq, the challenge of contamination by improvised mines and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs), particularly in urban areas such as Mosul, led to the development of new standards on IED disposal, published in February 2019.

During 2019, national standards were being reviewed in Angola, while Sudan’s national standards were awaiting endorsement as of May 2019. UNMAS reported constant review of national technical standards and guidelines for South Sudan.

Turkey reported elaborating its national standards in 2019 with support from UNDP and the GICHD. A land release national mine action standard is under development in Colombia. Somalia’s revision of national standards was due to be completed in 2019. In April 2019, Ukraine adopted Mine Action, Management Processes, and Basic Provisions to IMAS, which were adapted to the specific situation in Ukraine. They are now being tested.

UNDP is planning to work with the GICHD to update and develop the Yemen National Standards, which are out of date and need to be revised.

Chad reported that it will revise its standards on land release, supervision of organizations, and inspection of contaminated land in 2020.

RISK EDUCATION COORDINATION

In 2019, 23 States Parties had national institutions in place for coordinating risk education. In most cases, risk education is coordinated by the mine action center, although for states with school-based programs, the Ministry of Education takes on a coordination role.

In Croatia, the Civil Protection Directorate was responsible for risk education. UNMAS is responsible for risk education in Cyprus, Palestine, and in Gaza, and UNDP coordinates risk education in Ukraine.

123 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 24 April 2019.
125 Senegal submitted a transparency report in October 2020, although the report is not in the correct Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 format.
130 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Tajana Čičak, Internal Supervisor for General Affairs, Civil Protection Directorate, 28 April 2020.
States Parties that did not report risk education coordination included Oman and the UK. Eritrea provided no information.

In 2019, risk education coordination meetings were reported in 10 States Parties: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, and Yemen. The main topics discussed at risk education coordination meetings are usually coordination, sharing information and innovation best practices, and developing or updating plans and strategies.

In Chad, Somalia, Thailand, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, risk education may be discussed as part of broader mine action meetings. In the DRC, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine, it was reported that risk education is discussed during mine action sub-cluster meetings.

No risk education working groups were reported for Angola, BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Niger, Peru, Serbia, Tajikistan, or Turkey.

In Afghanistan, it was reported that risk education technical working group meetings are led by the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC). The meetings take place every two months and also on an ad hoc basis as required.

In Colombia, coordination meetings for risk education are held three times a year, but there is currently no system for assigning municipalities to risk education operators. Operators must coordinate among themselves to avoid duplication.

In the DRC, the National Risk Education Program of the Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM) organizes meetings on a quarterly basis.

In Iraq, coordination meetings for risk education are supposed to be held every month, but only one meeting was reported during 2019. Risk education messages and materials are validated by the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).

Yemen has two risk education technical working groups, one based in the north of the country and another based in the south. Topics at group meetings include the signing of memoranda of understanding, aligning materials and messaging, coordination, tasking and advocacy.

In Senegal, there is no regular coordination meeting, although the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported meeting every two to three months with the Senegal National Mine Action Centre (CNMAS). Similarly, in BiH, there is no risk education coordination mechanism, but the ICRC reported meeting regularly with the regional offices and upon need with the BHMAC.

Risk education is reported to be included within the national mine action strategies of Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, the DRC, Somalia, and Tajikistan. In addition, Colombia, Ethiopia, and Turkey reported having national risk education workplans.

---

133 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zareen Khan Mayar, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education Technical Advisor, HI Afghanistan, 22 May 2020; by Angela Gosse, Programme Officer, UNMAS Afghanistan, 12 May 2020; and by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
134 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sean Tjaden, Program Officer, HALO Trust Colombia, 30 April 2020.
Not all States Parties have national standards to guide risk education operations at a national level, although operators implementing risk education reported working to IMAS and their own Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Risk education national standards were reported to be in place in Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. In Palestine, it was reported that there were risk education standards that were used in the West Bank, but not in Gaza.\textsuperscript{141}

Thailand was updating its risk education standards in 2019. In Angola and Somalia, standards were under review and awaiting approval,\textsuperscript{142} while in Cambodia they were under development.\textsuperscript{143} Chad reported that it would review its risk education national standards at the end of 2020.\textsuperscript{144}

In certain contexts, risk education, by necessity, needs to work across international borders to ensure that populations transiting mine-contaminated border areas are informed of the risks. On the Thailand-Myanmar border, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) is the sole risk education operator in the nine camps in Thailand for refugees from Myanmar, making it challenging to coordinate with risk education actors at a national level in either Thailand or Myanmar. In 2019, HI organized an information sharing workshop with risk education and mine action actors working along the border.\textsuperscript{145}

**VICTIM ASSISTANCE COORDINATION**

Participation of victims and their representative organizations\textsuperscript{146}

Victims were reported to be included through representation in coordination in Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. States Parties rarely reported on the actual process to include input from victims in decision-making or on the outcomes of victim participation. Therefore, there is little direct evidence that the input from victims is considered or acted upon. In some states, victims’ representative organizations and other service providers involved in coordination and planning reported that the concerns and contributions of victims were not genuinely taken into account, despite their attendance at relevant meetings.

A specific IMAS on victim assistance was developed in 2018–2019, and in May 2020, it was approved by the IMAS Review Board with the rationale that the mine action sector, under the governance of national mine action authorities, “is well placed, through its direct links with [explosive ordnance] EO-affected communities, to gather information about victims and their needs, to provide information on relevant services and to refer them to the government body.” The ICBL engaged in the process to facilitate groups of survivors to define by themselves what they may contribute, given their specific expertise. Although contributions from survivor organizations were not included in the final document, in responding to the Monitor, they have raised the following points about their work:

- Assess the needs of network members, disaggregated by sex, age, and disability, in order to inform the development of victim assistance national action plans and other policies relevant to the sectors that victim assistance is part of;

---

\textsuperscript{141} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Soula Kreitem, Palestine Programme and Support Officer, UNMAS, 30 April 2020.

\textsuperscript{142} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jeanette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG Angola, 13 May 2020.

\textsuperscript{143} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, and Jason Miller, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Cambodia, 7 April 2020.

\textsuperscript{144} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrine Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 15 April 2020.

\textsuperscript{145} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hser Htee Praikammasit, Country Director, HI Thailand, 22 May 2020.

\textsuperscript{146} Oslo Action Plan, Action #4; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) Article 1 – Purpose; and CRPD Article 29 – Participation in Political and Public life.
• Contribute to the development of relevant national strategic plans in other sectors;
• Enable survivors and other persons with disabilities at the community level to facilitate efforts for their rehabilitation and socioeconomic inclusion;
• Conduct peer support and serve as a role model for other organizations and institutions;
• Link and refer to services;
• Support the participation of survivors during initial data collection to identify victims, including survival outcomes, types of injuries, age, gender, pre-existing impairments, civilian or military status, and specific needs;
• Develop partnerships and facilitate networking;
• Collaborate with relevant government sectors, including national mine action offices and actors;
• Represent victims at national and international meetings, conferences and other events relevant to victims;
• Share experiences and good practice with other organizations;
• Map and compile detailed profiles of service providers and disseminate to the relevant sectors;
• Facilitate mine risk education sessions while raising awareness of the rights of victims at the local community level; and
• Conduct rights advocacy at the national level.

In 2020, the Monitor began a rolling survivor survey, engaging active survivors to ask other survivors about what has happened in relation to victim assistance over the last five years, the current situation, and what needs to happen next. The questions are based on the victim assistance actions of the Mine Ban Treaty action plans and the ICBL-CMC strategic plan. A snowballing format is applied, whereby survivors engage other mine-affected members of the population for the survey.

A relevant government agency to coordinate victim assistance⁴⁴⁷

Of the States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 21 reported victim assistance coordination linked to disability coordination mechanisms that considered issues related to the needs of mine/ERW victims. The States Parties with coordination mechanisms in 2019–2020 were: Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Turkey. Angola’s coordination mechanism is not interconnected with disability rights coordination. While Croatia has designated several ministries, which include those responsible for disability rights, they do not have inter-ministerial coordination nor demonstrate awareness of victim assistance. Serbia’s victim assistance coordination had also stalled.

Multi-sectoral efforts in line with the CRPD⁴⁴⁸

Adopting, and implementing, a comprehensive inter-ministerial plan of action that identifies gaps and aims to fulfill the rights and needs of victims and, or among, other persons with disabilities, is a key step toward ensuring a coordinated response to the needs of mine victims in each State Party.

Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand, all have a current plan that addresses national victim assistance activities, while Zimbabwe has a set of measurable objectives. Afghanistan, Algeria, Burundi, Cambodia, Croatia, Senegal, South Sudan, Uganda, and Yemen need to revise, finalize, or adopt a draft and implement their national disability

⁴⁴⁷ Oslo Action Plan, Action #32; and CRPD Article 33 – National Implementation and Monitoring.
⁴⁴⁸ Oslo Action Plan, Action #34; and CRPD Article 33 – National Implementation and Monitoring.
plan, policy, or strategy that includes objectives responding to the needs of victims and recognizing its victim assistance obligations and commitments, together with a monitoring structure. Mozambique still has to implement the Action Plan for Assistance to Victims through relevant government departments and ministries.

States Parties that need to develop a plan or strategy include the DRC, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, and Turkey. In the meantime, the DRC requires a sustainable planning and coordination mechanism, working at both national and local levels, to increase efforts to implement the victim assistance objectives of its national mine action strategy. Turkey, which now has coordination, must develop a plan for implementation of victim assistance. Newer States Parties, Palestine and Sri Lanka, are yet to create a strategic framework for victim assistance.

National referral mechanisms

States Parties can improve accessibility to services for mine victims by ensuring that existing data collection, needs assessments, and service providers have the capacity to make referrals to the appropriate health and rehabilitation facilities. Some victims may require referral to specialized services, referral from one health facility to another, or referrals for travel and treatment abroad. Referral mechanisms can involve national level mechanisms as well as local referral networks, including through community-based rehabilitation systems.

National governmental bodies providing referrals included a range of both mine action centers and government ministries, such as: Albania’s Mines and Munitions Coordination Office; Algeria’s Ministry of National Solidarity, Family and the Status of Women; Angola’s Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration; the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority’s data department; Colombia’s Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Descontamina Colombia) and the broader government-run reparations program at the Victims’ Unit; the Rehabilitation and Integration Division within Eritrea’s Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare; Iraq’s Directorate for Mine Action; and the Tajikistan Mine Action Center. In Thailand, although victim assistance is primarily implemented by the social security and health ministries, the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC) conducted follow-up trips to visit mine victims in clearance operation areas. Yemen reported referrals as part of an ongoing victim survey and referral mechanism.

Many more non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided referrals at a national or local level in the States Parties with victims, including a range of survivor networks, national NGOs, disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs), and international NGOs—notably HI—as well as the ICRC and national Red Cross and Red Crescent movements.

However, in States Parties where survivors are not aware of their rights due to a lack of survivor assistance coordination, as reported in the DRC, existing measures benefiting mine/ERW survivors, such as free medical care and prostheses, may remain inaccessible.

Centralized database with needs and challenges

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty commit to assess the needs of victims. This commitment includes assessing availability and gaps in services and support, and assessing existing or new activities that are required to meet the needs of victims in the frameworks of disability, health, education, employment, development, and poverty reduction. Assessment also provides an initial opportunity to refer victims to existing services.

The Oslo Action Plan calls for States Parties to use a centralized database that includes information on persons killed and injured, and the needs and challenges of mine survivors. In 2013, new updates to the IMSMA NG (Next Generation) included a victim assistance

---

149 Oslo Action Plan, Action #37; and CRPD Article 4 – General Obligations.
151 Oslo Action Plan, Action #35; and CRPD Article 31 – Statistics and Data Collection.
module, which will facilitate the monitoring and tracking of victims’ access to their rights and the accountability of victim assistance processes.\textsuperscript{153} However, some data management systems based on more modern technologies may not be centralized.

Survey activities and assessments were often ongoing. Afghanistan’s National Disability Database was under development and planned to be installed in 2020. These statistics on persons with disabilities and the families of those killed will be used to coordinate with the Ministry of Finance, Pension Department, and Population Registration Department to provide the necessary services. In Cambodia, village level quality of life assessments for victims and other persons with disabilities continued through 2019. Data collection on the needs of mine/ERW victims was ongoing in Colombia and new data management systems were put into use during the period.

Croatia’s development of a unified database on the needs of mine/ERW victims has stalled since 2017. Thailand reported that mine survivors are included in disability assessments. In Ukraine, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Danish Demining Group (DDG) conducted a joint needs assessment of child mine/ERW survivors in 2019 in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, with support from the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF).\textsuperscript{154} In Yemen, mine/ERW victims were registered with the national mine action center through ongoing survey. Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen needed to significantly improve the collection of data and create a usable database of victims’ needs. Iraq needed to establish a unified and coordinated system of data collection and analysis for survivors and other persons with disabilities.

According to Action #35 of the Oslo Action Plan, data should be disaggregated by gender, age and disability, and this information should be made available to relevant stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive response.

\textbf{Gender mainstreaming}

The Oslo Action Plan highlights the importance of gender and ensuring that the different needs and perspectives of women, girls, men, and boys are considered and inform all areas of Mine Ban Treaty implementation and national mine action programs, in order to deliver an inclusive approach. States Parties are encouraged to remove barriers to full, equal and gender-balanced participation in mine action and treaty meetings. The Oslo Action Plan has some 37 references to gender.\textsuperscript{155} Moreover, after significant input on the theme, each committee of the Mine Ban Treaty, including those for Article 5 and Victim Assistance, adopted a gender focal point.\textsuperscript{156}

The previous five-year plan of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Maputo Action Plan adopted in 2014, had just seven references about gender. However, under that previous plan States Parties did already commit to implementation in an inclusive and gender-sensitive manner.


The increased focus on gender in mine action coincides with the 20-year anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), which was adopted unanimously in October 2000. Resolution 1325 emphasizes a gender-based approach to mine action among its provisions, specifying “the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls.” Resolution 1325 provided a basis for future developments.157

In 2019, the third revision of the UN’s Gender Guidelines for Mine Action Programmes was produced.158 The guidelines were first released in February 2005, with a second revision in 2010. In March 2019, the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP) integrated into the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), gaining a stronger institutional placement although no longer having an advocacy role as it did previously. That role was taken up by ICBL members and other civil society organizations and is reflected in the Oslo Review Conference Working Group on Gender, which was established in the lead up to the Fourth Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Intersectionality became a strong contextual focus of gender considerations in mine action as the Oslo Action Plan period commenced.159 This was concurrent with a broader trend in international law and policy. For example, UN Women also highlighted the need for this approach: “Injustices must not go unnamed or unchallenged now different communities are battling various, interconnected issues, all at once. Standing in solidarity with one another, questioning power structures, and speaking out against the root causes of inequalities are critical actions for building a future that leaves no one behind.”160

States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, the DRC, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe have all included gender as a component of their national mine action strategies. GMAP has supported several States Parties to integrate gender into their strategies and workplans.

In Afghanistan, gender and diversity mainstreaming is one of the goals of their national mine action strategy, and the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan has a gender and diversity strategy.161 Within the framework of this strategy, proposals to conduct mine action activities are evaluated based on their technical approach, budget and consideration of gender.

The BiH Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 sets five key strategic goals, including gender-sensitive awareness raising.162

Cambodia is implementing a Gender Mainstreaming in Mine Action Plan for 2018–2022, which includes the development of gender mainstreaming guidelines.163 Cambodia also reports promotion of the equal participation of women in mine action processes, services for survivors, risk education, and advocacy activities by updating report formats through inclusion of age, sex, and disability.

In Chad, government policy exists to ensure the integration of gender-based considerations at all levels of mine action. In 2020, the National High Commission for

---

Demining (HCND) reported that its staff included women, while it is noted that the Deputy Coordinator of the HCND is a woman. 164

Croatia also has national legislation on gender, which is mainstreamed through the mine action sector, and in particular in its risk education activities.165

Colombia continued to receive technical support from the GICHD for the development of Gender Guidelines for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA).166

In the DRC, the Congolese Mine Action Center (CCLAM) reported that its gender unit sits within the advocacy department and aims to ensure the mobilization and inclusion of women in mine action.167 The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) in Iraq has also had a Gender Unit in place since 2017.168

Many states now have greater numbers of women working in the sector, including in mine clearance teams. Mixed or all-women clearance teams have been reported in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Senegal, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, as well as other area Nagorno-Karabakh.

Serbia reported that there is equal access to employment in the fields of survey and clearance for qualified women and men.169 Sudan reported that women are included in all aspects of mine action, from key departments at the national mine action center, to field operations.170 In Ukraine, around 20% of deminers are women,171 while Zimbabwe reported that 30% of the staff at its national mine action center are women.172

In both Thailand and Turkey, military regulations are reported to prevent women from working in demining teams.173 In 2019, the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) reported that 40% of its staff were women, although they were mainly in administrative positions. The Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) reported that 45% of its staff were women.174

While men and boys represent the majority of reported mine casualties, women and girls are likely to be disproportionately disadvantaged as a result of mine/ERW incidents. They often suffer multiple forms of discrimination as survivors. Gender is a key consideration in victim assistance programming, but reporting was often limited to statistical disaggregation of casualties and service beneficiaries.

In Cambodia in 2019, the Ministry of Women's Affairs, with the support of the Australia-Cambodia Cooperation for Equitable Sustainable Services (ACCESS) Program, conducted the first consultative workshop involving women with disabilities under the National Action Plan to Prevent Violence Against Women.175

---

172 Response to Monitor questionnaire by the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC), 14 May 2020.
Guidance on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse was published by GMAP in 2019. The publication consultation process, with partners both in Geneva and in mine-affected countries, was conducted by the GICHD in collaboration with the Monitor’s victim assistance gender focal point from the ICBL-CMC, with financial support and leadership from Canada.176

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CLEARANCE

MINE CLEARANCE IN 2019

The Mine Ban Treaty obligates each State Party to undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that State Party.

Among States Parties, total clearance of landmines in 2019 was at least 156km².177 This represents an increase from the estimated 146km² cleared in 2018. At least 123,375 landmines were cleared and destroyed in 2019.

Based on the reported data, Iraq has cleared the most land in 2019 at 46.56km². Of this, 40.24km² was clearance of improvised mines in Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) managed areas and 3.17km² in areas managed by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA).178 In the past, reporting of clearance of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has not been consistently included in clearance figures, but in its Article 7 transparency report for 2019, Iraq recorded all abandoned IED areas as antipersonnel mine contamination until cleared.


177 This refers to land cleared and does not include land released or cancelled through survey. The figures should be taken with caution due to the difficulty in obtaining accurate and consistent data. States Parties have sometimes provided conflicting data regarding clearance and have not always disaggregated mine clearance figures from the amount of land reduced through technical survey or canceled through non-technical survey. Not all States Parties have provided annual Article 7 transparency reports. Clearance by actors such as the armed forces, the police or commercial operators may not be systematically reported. For further details of land release results for 2019, see individual country profiles on the Monitor website: www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/our-research/country-profiles.

### Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2018–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearance (km²)</td>
<td>APM destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>30.04</td>
<td>8,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>See clearance figures under UK</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>2,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>36.66</td>
<td>10,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>48.82</td>
<td>1,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus**</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>7,944</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

179 Figures are from Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar year 2019) unless otherwise stated. For Cambodia clearance data in 2019: the figures of mines destroyed include 4,111 antipersonnel mines cleared during minefield clearance and 11,314 cleared through EOD callouts. Email from Ros Sophal, Database Unit Manager, CMAA, 27 July 2020. Cambodia’s CCW Article 13 Report (for calendar year 2019) gives a total of 15,808 antipersonnel mines destroyed, 342 antivehicle mines and 55,306 items of ERW. For Chad clearance data in 2019: HCND reported no land released in 2019, although HI reported to the Monitor 0.29km² cleared and 998 antipersonnel mines cleared. MAG reported 10km² released, although it is not clear if this was through clearance or survey. See, MAG, "Where we work: Chad," undated, bit.ly/ChadProfileMAG. For Colombia clearance data in 2019: the figures include 268 APMs and 43 improvised mines. Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/ColombiaArticle7Report2020. For DRC clearance data in 2018: a figure of 422,461m² is also given for the period 1 January 2018–March 2019. DRC Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2018), p. 6, bit.ly/DRCArticle7Report2019; in 2019: the figure includes 21 antipersonnel mines and five improvised mines. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 18 August 2020. For Iraq clearance data in 2019: this figure includes 3.15km² antipersonnel mine clearance and 45.41km² IED clearance. Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), pp. 24–28, bit.ly/IraqArticle7Report2020. For Palestine clearance data in 2018: US Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and CISR, "To Walk the Earth in Safety: January–December 2018," 2019, p. 46, bit.ly/ToWalkTheEarthInSafety2019. For Somalia clearance data in 2018: Somalia did not report how much land was cleared in its Article 7 report for 2018 but noted clearance of 52 mines. However, Mine Action Review reported that 1.6km² was cleared in 2018 and 297 mines cleared and destroyed; in 2019: Somalia reported clearing 15.4km² of which 0.12km² was mixed antipersonnel mines and antivehicle mines, and 6.86km² was explosive ordnance. However, it does not provide any information on the device type included under explosive ordnance, and whether improvised mines were included. Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/SomaliaArticle7Report2020. For Yemen clearance data in 2019: in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request Additional Information, submitted on 27 August 2020, Yemen noted that 24 areas measuring 170 hectares (1.7km²) had been handed over to representatives and 460,000 explosive devices identified and destroyed. It was not specified whether the land had been cleared or released through other methods, and how many antipersonnel mines were identified and destroyed, bit.ly/YemenAdditionalInformation. For UK clearance data in 2019: the UK records the number of antipersonnel mines cleared annually in its Article 7 reports and the amount of land released, but it is not disaggregated into land cleared or released through survey. Clearance figures for the UK are from Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), "Falklands Demining Programme Workplan Under Article 7;" 30 April 2020, pp. 8–9, annexed to the UK Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), bit.ly/UKArticle7Report2020. For Yemen clearance data in 2019: UNDP, "Republic of Yemen: Emergency Mine Action Programme. Annual Progress Report 2019," 20 January 2020, p. 14.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearance (km²)</td>
<td>APM destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>8.53</td>
<td>1,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>4,998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>7,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>22,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK*</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>22,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>146.82</td>
<td>97,996</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/R=not reported; APM=antipersonnel mines.
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.
** Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

Afghanistan cleared 28.01 km² despite ongoing conflict in some areas. This is a reduction from the 30.04 km² cleared in 2018. The Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) reported to the Monitor that it had only been able to secure about 50% of the funding required, and thus could only achieve half of the planned clearance. 180

Yemen was able to clear 3.1 km² and destroy 1,536 antipersonnel mines in 2019, despite the ongoing conflict and insecurity. A total of 66,701 explosive remnants of war (ERW) were cleared and destroyed in 2019. 181 Clearance operations in Yemen are focused on high-threat and high-impact spot tasks with the aim to allocate resources where they will have a more significant impact for local communities. 182

Zimbabwe cleared and destroyed the largest number of landmines in 2019, reporting 39,031 devices cleared from 2.75 km².

Chile announced the completion of its clearance obligations in March 2020, with the last mines removed on 27 February 2020. Chile reports having cleared 159 areas over the last 18 years, clearing and destroying a total of 177,725 mines. 183 During 2019, Chile reported the release of 1.74 km² of land (0.55 km² through clearance), and the clearance of 4,093 antipersonnel mines and 1,187 antivehicle mines. In the first two months of 2020, Chile

182 Ibid.
released a further 2.69 km² of land, including 0.60 km² which was cleared. A total of 12,526 antipersonnel mines and 10,170 antivehicle mines were reportedly cleared during this two-month period.¹⁸⁴

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand and Turkey all cleared under 1 km² in 2019. However, despite clearing only 0.67 km², Turkey cleared and destroyed 25,959 landmines.

Three States Parties reported no clearance in 2019. Senegal has not reported any clearance since 2017. Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.¹⁸⁵ Argentina reports that it is mine-affected as a result of its claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, but that it is unable to meet its Article 5 obligations because it has not had access to the islands due to the “illegal occupation” by the United Kingdom (UK).¹⁸⁶

Niger reported clearance of 0.01 km² in 2019 and the destruction of 323 antipersonnel mines. This is the first time that Niger has reported clearance since 2017.¹⁸⁷

Oman, which has reported no clearance in recent years, reported 0.13 km² cleared in Al Mughsail in 2019, but no landmines were cleared and destroyed while one 81 mm mortar was found and destroyed.¹⁸⁸ Oman reported that this related to clearance of seven zones of suspected mined areas, which had been identified based on historical records of battlefield areas, unit positions and incident reports.¹⁸⁹

Sri Lanka has not provided an annual update for clearance in 2019, but in 2018 projected that by the end of 2020, 271 areas totaling 22.42 km² would be cleared of antipersonnel mines, and that nine areas totaling 1.39 km² suspected to contain antipersonnel mines would be released in Northern, Eastern and North Central provinces.¹⁹⁰ Sri Lanka had an “ambitious plan to return mine contaminated lands to its people by 2020.”¹⁹¹ However, this goal has not been realized. Media reporting highlighted the lack of available information and data sharing in 2019, noting that “[t]he National Mine Action Center, the operational body that executes the policies of the National Steering Committee for Mine Action and the focal point for coordinating all mine action activities on the ground, could not be reached for comment.”¹⁹²

CROSS-BORDER CLEARANCE ACTIVITIES

Areas with antipersonnel mine contamination are suspected along Croatia’s borders with BiH, Hungary, and Serbia. Croatia reported that mutual cooperation and exchange with BiH on hazardous border areas, as well as the exchange of technology and equipment, continued in 2019.¹⁹³

Afghanistan has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Tajikistan, requiring Tajikistan’s government to provide support to Afghanistan for cross-border mine action activities in the border area of Badakhshan province, which is more easily accessible from the Tajikistan side. In 2019, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de Démìnage, FSD) continued demining operations and risk education activities in the Afghan province of Badakhshan, accessing the area from Tajikistan.\(^{194}\)

Cambodia and Thailand have extensive mine contamination along their shared border. Both countries are working towards the completion of a baseline survey to provide a more accurate picture of contamination,\(^{195}\) although lack of agreement regarding demarcation of the border between the two countries has delayed survey and clearance of those areas. In its 2019 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Cambodia indicated that the Cambodia-Thailand General Border Committee meeting held in March 2017 agreed to support demining cooperation between the Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) and the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) in border areas.\(^{196}\) It was reported in September 2019 that an agreement was signed between CMAC and TMAC regarding survey and clearance along the border.\(^{197}\)

**ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES AND EXTENSION REQUESTS**

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines contaminating its territory within 10 years after the entry into force of the convention for the State Party, it is able to request an extension for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines, for a period of up to 10 years.

At the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, Mozambique, in June 2014, States Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.” This included a commitment “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025.”

As of 15 October 2020, 25 States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations before and no later than 2025. Seven States Parties have, or have requested, deadlines after 2025: BiH (2027), Croatia (2026), Iraq (2028), Palestine (2028), Senegal (2026), South Sudan (2026) and Sri Lanka (2028).

Palestine and Sri Lanka became States Parties in 2018 and are within their first 10-year deadline for completion of their Article 5 obligations. Oman is also within its first 10-year deadline. While Croatia has requested an extended deadline of 1 March 2026, it foresees that survey and clearance operations will be completed by the end of 2025, leaving only administrative and paperwork issues to be settled at the beginning of 2026.\(^{198}\)

Afghanistan reported to the Monitor that it will not be able to meet its deadline of 2023 due to decreased funding, which has meant that it has only been able to achieve about 50% of the planned clearance in 2019.\(^{199}\) Afghanistan noted that ongoing survey of legacy contamination and new contamination by improvised mines has added to the contamination. It is expecting to have to submit an extension request for at least five additional years, from 2024–2028.

---

194 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
196 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 8 August 2019, p. 4.
198 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018. Additional Information in relation to its extension request was submitted by Croatia on 21 June 2018, p. 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period (No. of request)</th>
<th>Current deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2013</td>
<td>10 years (1st)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Behind target. Expects to submit a request for an extension until 2028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>5 years (1st) 8 years (2nd)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Progress to target not known. A strategy and national demining workplan from 2020–2025 have been developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>1 March 2010</td>
<td>10 years (1st) 3 years (2nd)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>See UK obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years (1st) 2 years (2nd)</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Behind target. Requested extension until March 2027</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
<td>10 years (1st) 6 years (2nd)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Progress to target not known. A strategy has been developed until 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 November 2009</td>
<td>14 months (1st) 3 years (2nd) 6 years (3rd) 4 years (4th)</td>
<td>1 January 2025</td>
<td>Behind target. Reported the deadline is realistic if they have technical and financial resources in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
<td>10 years (1st)</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Behind target. Extension request submitted until December 2025</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period (No. of request)</th>
<th>Current deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 7 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>On target. Croatia hopes to have finished clearance by the end of 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1 July 2013</td>
<td>3 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 July 2022</td>
<td>Progress to target not known. Cyprus claims all mined areas under its control have been cleared</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1 November 2012</td>
<td>26 months (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 6 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 January 2021</td>
<td>Behind target. Requested extension until June 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 months (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2022</td>
<td>Behind target. A workplan is in place for their extension, but the clearance targets were not met in 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
<td>3 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 11 months (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
<td>Behind target. Expected to submit an extension request</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2015</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>On target. Has a workplan for survey and clearance of all areas by 2025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2018</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 February 2028</td>
<td>Progress to target not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2011</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 January 2021</td>
<td>Requested extension until January 2022 due to finding new contamination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1 September 2009</td>
<td>2 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 1 year (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
<td>Behind target. Requested extension until December 2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>On target (in Palestinian-controlled areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 7 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Progress to target not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>7 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2021</td>
<td>Behind target. Requested extension until 2026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 4 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Progress to target not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party</td>
<td>Original deadline</td>
<td>Extension period (No. of request)</td>
<td>Current deadline</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2021</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>9 July 2021</td>
<td>Behind target. Requested extension until July 2026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>Progress to target not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1 April 2014</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 4 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 April 2023</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1 April 2010</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 6 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 April 2025</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1 May 2009</td>
<td>9 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 October 2023</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>8 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2022</td>
<td>Progress to target not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>1 June 2016</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 June 2021</td>
<td>Behind target. Requested extension until December 2023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK&lt;sup&gt;*&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2024</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>6 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>22 months (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 2 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 2 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 years (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;) 8 years (5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable.
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, which still contain mined areas.

In response to a Monitor questionnaire, Chad reported that it felt uncertain whether it would meet its deadline of 1 January 2024 due to not being able to mobilize resources until September 2021. Chad also noted that the COVID-19 pandemic had compromised its progress.<sup>201</sup>

It is unlikely that Iraq will meet its deadline of 2028 due to the extent of existing and new contamination in the country.

Yemen, which has a current deadline of March 2023, requested an interim extension in 2019 to enable it to better define the extent of contamination through the re-survey of areas where the security situation allows. This would allow Yemen to establish a new baseline and a realistic plan to address new contamination as a result of the conflict.<sup>202</sup> It is expected that Yemen will submit a further extension request in March 2022.

Ethiopia, in its Article 7 transparency report for 2019, reported that it is likely to complete clearance by its deadline of 31 December 2025.<sup>203</sup> Oman, in its Article 7 transparency report

---

201 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrine Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 15 April 2020.
Zimbabwe, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999, has requested the most extensions to its Article 5 deadlines. Its fifth extension request has a deadline of 31 December 2025. In the past, Zimbabwe’s demining program was constrained by economic sanctions, a shortage of equipment, and a lack of international assistance. However, Zimbabwe is now likely to meet its Article 5 deadline obligations.

EXTENSION REQUESTS IN 2019 AND 2020

In 2019, seven countries submitted extension requests: Argentina (until 2023); Cambodia (until 2025); Chad (until 2025); Ethiopia (until 2025); Eritrea (an interim extension until December 2020 to prepare a comprehensive request); Tajikistan (until 2025); and Yemen (an interim extension until March 2023).

In 2020, 10 countries were expected to request extensions to their Article 5 deadlines: BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Eritrea, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Sudan, and Ukraine. However, by 15 October 2020, Eritrea and Nigeria were yet to submit their requests.

The decision on approval of these extension requests will take place at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2020.

BiH has requested a third extension, following an interim extension from March 2018 to March 2021. The request is for a period of six years up until March 2027. The interim period was intended to gain a better understanding of contamination, but due to delays, the projected targets for cancellation and clearance were only partially met.

Colombia’s second request for an extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline asks for four years and 10 months, until 31 December 2025. The extension request presents a plan based on 156 municipalities that are currently accessible and where demining operations are ongoing. However, a further 166 municipalities with contamination are in areas that are currently not accessible due to insecurity. No survey or clearance has taken place in these municipalities and the extension request reports that in 2024–2025, efforts will be made to establish an estimate of contamination in these areas, suggesting that any clearance in the additional municipalities will not take place until after the current requested deadline.

The DRC has submitted an extension request for a period of 18 months until July 2022 to clear 33 remaining mined areas, totaling 0.13km². This
includes 0.019 km² left from the previous nationwide survey, and 22 newly discovered areas covering 0.1 km². The DRC reported to the Monitor that it will be on track to meet this deadline if sufficient funding is available, and if security issues and the situation in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic improves.211

Eritrea has a deadline to meet its Article 5 obligations on or before 31 December 2020, but as of 15 October 2020, it has yet to submit an extension request.

In November 2018, Mauritania declared it had completed clearance of all known mined areas.212 However, in its Article 7 report for the calendar year 2019, it reported the discovery of previously unknown mined areas and requested in 2020 a year-long extension until 31 January 2022 to clarify the situation regarding the contaminated areas and whether these areas are in the territory of Mauritania.213

Niger submitted its fourth Article 5 extension request in May 2020, despite having done little clearance in the last few years. It is requesting four years until 31 December 2024.214 Niger’s remaining contamination is relatively small, totaling 0.17 km²,215 but the request lacks a detailed workplan or annual clearance projections.

At the Fourth Review Conference in November 2019, Nigeria stated it had been experiencing “the tragic consequences of the production and use of antipersonnel mines of an improvised nature,” declaring newly mined areas in the northeastern region of the country.216 It noted that it would prepare an updated Article 7 transparency report and an Article 5 extension request with the aim to meet the 2025 deadline. Yet by 15 October 2020, neither had been submitted.

Senegal has requested a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until 2026, although the estimated remaining contamination is relatively small at 0.49 km² of confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) and an estimated 1.1 km² requiring non-technical survey (NTS).217 Senegal has asserted that clearance activities must be approved by the non-state armed group (NSAG) Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance, MFDC), and that this approval is closely tied to the overall peace negotiations.218 Senegal also has landmines placed around active national military installations. According to Senegal’s own Article 7 transparency reporting, the last clearance operations took place in 2017.

South Sudan has submitted a request for a five-year extension to 9 July 2026.219 While it will not have completed clearance by 2025, it hopes to have cleared all contamination, including landmines, antivehicle mines, cluster munitions and other ERW by the 2026 deadline.220

---

217 Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 June 2020, pp. 8 and 53. On p. 53, it states that remaining contamination is 1.59 km² including the 0.49 km² of CHA; bit.ly/SenegalExtRequest2020.
Ukraine is requesting a two-year extension to its Article 5 deadline until December 2023. The request suggests that clearance can be completed within this timeframe, but notes that this is dependent on the cessation of hostilities in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine has not provided information in its extension request regarding any progress since the original estimate of 7,000km² of suspected hazardous areas (SHA). The request also does not give a clear understanding of the workplan for the requested extension period.

In Monitor reporting, the term “improvised mines” is synonymous with victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs are “homemade” explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. These are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs) and booby-traps. They are also sometimes described by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate IEDs (PP-IEDs) or crush wire IEDs. Improvised antipersonnel mines—being those types that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person—are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty and must be addressed accordingly by States Parties, in fulfillment of treaty obligations and commitments. For the entire period since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999, the greatest number of improvised mine casualties have been recorded in Colombia (10,532), closely followed by Afghanistan (9,272).

Improvised mines have been used well before the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence. They were used in Cambodia during the 1990s, with the Khmer Rouge deploying “primitive mines using sticks of T.N.T.” among other booby-trap devices. In BiH, a wide variety of mines were also used, “from high tech mines all the way to crude, hastily fabricated mines.”

Yet, while not a new issue, the scale of use of improvised mines has increased the scale of mine contamination and the number of casualties dramatically. Action #21 of the Oslo Action Plan addresses this issue, committing that “States Parties affected by anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature will ensure that they apply all provisions and obligations under the Convention to such contamination as they do for all other types of anti-personnel mines, including during survey and clearance in fulfillment of Article 5 and disaggregate by types of mines when reporting in fulfilment of Article 7 obligations.”

Improvised mines are being found in the Americas, South and Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. States Parties with extensive antipersonnel mine contamination, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, are seeing the scale of their overall contamination increase. Other States Parties suspected or known to have contamination by improvised mines

---

include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Ukraine.

States not party Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria also have contamination by improvised mines.

Clearance and the provision of risk education about improvised mines can be sensitive in some contexts, such as Afghanistan, because they are used by parties actively engaged in conflict.

Improvised mines are also frequently found in urban and peri-urban areas in addition to rural areas. In urban areas, the threat can be more complex, and the boundaries between safe and unsafe areas are often less clear. Improvised devices can be found above ground in buildings, and in and around homes, and device types may vary from area to area. In risk education, this creates challenges in terms of developing clear messaging regarding recognition of devices and unsafe areas. An International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) technical note (12.10/1) for IED risk education was drafted in 2018 to help address these challenges.

States Parties that have reported to the Monitor risk education messaging including improvised mines are Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, the Philippines, Somalia, Thailand (on the Thai-Myanmar border), Ukraine, and Yemen. Risk education including improvised mines has also been conducted in states not party Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.

In 2019, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) contributed to protecting civilians from the effects of IEDs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Chad, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, through integrated programs that included risk education, child-focused victim assistance and injury surveillance.224

RISK EDUCATION

Risk education is a core pillar of mine action,225 but one that has received little attention or acknowledgement by the broader mine action community in the last decade and, as a result, has frequently been under-funded. However, 2019 marked a turning point for risk education, also known as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE).

A new international advisory group was formed in 2019 to steer efforts related to risk education. The EORE Advisory Group, consisting of international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and United Nations (UN) bodies based in Europe and North America, has a mandate to ensure standards, guidelines, methods and approaches are relevant, effective and adapted to emerging threats and requirements; that risk education is well integrated in mine action programs; that synergies are increased with other humanitarian and development sectors; that guidance on priority setting is provided to support the prioritizing of resources for groups of highest risk and need; and that donors are aware of gaps and mechanisms to address them.226

During 2019, the advisory group has supported the review and update of the International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 12.10 on risk education, which was expected to be approved by the IMAS review board during the final quarter of 2020.227 The EORE Advisory Group also commissioned a number of studies in 2019 to provide models and methodological guidance to the sector. This included a study on the use of new technologies and methodologies for

The international Mine Risk Education Working Group (MREWG), hosted by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), continued to actively provide information and a platform to share methodologies and materials among over 400 registered members. In 2020, the group instigated some in-depth discussion on COVID-19 and risk education messaging.


OBLIGATIONS REGARDING RISK EDUCATION

The Mine Ban Treaty requires States Parties to “provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” in relation to all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.

The Oslo Action Plan further recognizes the importance of mine risk education in helping to prevent mine incidents and save lives, providing five actions for States Parties with regard to risk education. These are to integrate risk education with wider humanitarian, development, protection, and education efforts, and with mine action activities; to provide context-specific risk education to all affected populations and groups at risk; to prioritize people most at risk through analysis of available casualty and contamination data and an understanding of people’s behavior and movements; to build national capacity to deliver risk education that can adapt to changing needs and contexts; and to report on risk education in annual Article 7 reports.

REPORTING

Action #32 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to report on mine risk education and other risk reduction programs in their Article 7 reports, including the methodologies used, the challenges faced and the results achieved, with information disaggregated by gender and age.

Of the 28 mine-affected States Parties that submitted Article 7 reports for 2019, reporting on risk education was provided by 20 states, although the extent of detail was varied. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen provided risk education beneficiary data that was disaggregated by age and sex. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, and Thailand provided detailed narrative information regarding risk education activities conducted in 2019. Afghanistan also included challenges faced and how they were addressed. Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH), Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Mauritania, Serbia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe provided no disaggregated beneficiary data and only a brief description of risk education activities.

Argentina, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Oman, Palestine, Peru, and the United Kingdom (UK) provided no information on risk education.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sri Lanka did not submit Article 7 transparency reports for 2019, as of 15 October 2020.

Including a plan for risk education in Article 5 deadline extension requests is important from the perspective of ensuring that risk education programs are planned, budgeted for, and integrated within the overall obligations of States Parties.


230 Senegal submitted a transparency report in October 2020, although the report is not in the correct Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 format.
In 2019, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Tajikistan, and Yemen all included risk education within their Article 5 deadline extension requests. In 2020, BiH, Colombia, the DRC, Mauritania, Senegal, and South Sudan included risk education within their extension requests. Niger and Ukraine did not.

However, the extent to which risk education is included in extension requests is often lacking, with only a description of activities rather than a costed and detailed multi-year plan. While South Sudan provided a clear explanation of risk education plans and budget, Mauritania and Senegal only provided brief statements about risk education conducted in previous years rather than for the extension period.

PROVISION OF RISK EDUCATION

In 2019, 28 States Parties are known to have provided risk education to populations who may be at risk due to antipersonnel mine contamination.

The DRC, Eritrea, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sri Lanka did not submit Article 7 reports in 2019 and so did not report on risk education activities. Palestine and Peru did submit an updated Article 7 report, but did not report on risk education. However, it is known that risk education took place in most of these countries. UNICEF supported risk education activities in Eritrea (training 100 community-based rehabilitation volunteers), Niger, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka, while other operators reported to the Monitor on risk education activities in the DRC and Senegal. Ecuador, in its Article 7 report, provided information on a cross-border risk education activity with Peru. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported on risk education activities in Gaza.

Argentina, Cyprus, Oman, and the UK are not believed to have conducted any risk education in 2019.

Of the 22 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and five other areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines, the majority had some risk education conducted during 2019. Only China, Cuba, Egypt, India, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and Uzbekistan did not conduct any risk education.

RISK EDUCATION PRIORITIZATION

The Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to prioritize people most at risk by linking mine risk education and risk reduction programs and messages to an analysis of available casualty and contamination data. In 2019, it was reported that national level Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) victim data is used to inform the prioritization and planning of risk education in all States Parties where IMSMA data is available.

Afghanistan conducted a nationwide knowledge, attitudes and practices survey in 2018 and maintains a priority scoring matrix to enable it to prioritize the most affected populations in terms of their proximity to the hazards, the number of recent casualties, and incidences of armed conflict.

The Cambodian Mine Victim Information System (CMVIS)—which incorporates information related to all types of explosive remnants of war (ERW)—operated by the Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), is used by risk education operators to plan and target their activities.

---

234 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 16 April 2020.
in Cambodia.\textsuperscript{235} Cambodia also reported that an evaluation of the risk education program in the country, coordinated by the CMAA and supported by UNICEF, started in 2019, with the evaluation report expected to be released in December 2020.\textsuperscript{236}

In Chad, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted a situational analysis carried out with local authorities, community and opinion leaders, leaders of civil society associations, young people and women, to determine more closely the risks at the local level and those most exposed.\textsuperscript{237}

In Turkey, the Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) conducted analysis through its database to target and prioritize villages for risk education, while South Sudan reported the conduct of a needs analysis survey to better understand and respond to at-risk groups.

In several States Parties, victim information is not comprehensive or publicly available. In BiH and Iraq, it was reported that victim databases are incomplete, and in the case of Iraq, not openly available for interrogation.\textsuperscript{238} In Ukraine, victim casualty data was available but was not considered to be comprehensive. The HALO Trust reported to the Monitor that it follows open source media, news websites and reports from other organizations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to collect information on risk behaviors and mine incidents across eastern Ukraine.\textsuperscript{239} In Yemen, it was reported to the Monitor that the lack of a functioning IMSMA database makes it difficult to identify risk groups, highly contaminated areas or risk-taking behaviors.\textsuperscript{240} In Zimbabwe, it was reported that there is data available for both human and animal related mine casualties, and a national database on civilian accidents, although it is not routinely updated.\textsuperscript{241}

**TARGET AREAS AND RISK GROUPS**

Action \#29 of the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide context-specific risk education that is tailored to the threat encountered by the population; sensitive to gender, age and disability; and takes the diverse needs and experiences of people in affected communities into account. Consideration of target areas, risk groups and the activities and behaviors that put people at risk is crucial to the design and implementation of effective risk education programs.

**Target areas**

During 2019, risk education was conducted in both rural and urban areas in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine. In Croatia, risk education was conducted in 2019 through public campaigns at city and municipal level concerning contamination in remote areas. Risk education was conducted only in rural areas in States Parties Cambodia, Chad, Senegal, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.

In Afghanistan, Angola, the DRC, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen and on the Thailand-Myanmar border, risk education was conducted in camps for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In some situations, IDPs were also reached in host communities. BiH reported conducting risk education in camps for migrants.

\textsuperscript{235} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 7 April 2020; by Jason Miller, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Cambodia, 7 April 2020; and by Josh Ridley, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 21 April 2020.

\textsuperscript{236} Email from Chhaya Plong, UNICEF Cambodia, 9 July 2020.

\textsuperscript{237} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kouassi Ludovic, MAG Chad, 29 May 2020.

\textsuperscript{238} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zorica Lucic, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 29 April 2020; by Goran Knezevic, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 7 April 2020; and by Madeline Achurch, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020.

\textsuperscript{239} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ronan Shenhav, HALO Trust Ukraine, 11 May 2020.

\textsuperscript{240} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Emma Simons, EORE Technical Coordinator, HI Yemen, 22 May 2020.

\textsuperscript{241} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Katie Wellington, HALO Trust Zimbabwe, 22 April 2020.
Both Afghanistan and BiH reported risk education targeted at people on the move, with Afghanistan targeting drivers at bus stations, and BiH targeting migrants as they travelled.

Risk education was also reported to have been conducted across borders in 2019. The Peruvian Mine Action Center (Centro Peruano de Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS) and Ecuador’s National Center for Humanitarian Demining (Centro de Desminado del Ecuador, CENDESMI) have collaborated in the development of cross-national risk education campaigns to ensure communities along the Ecuador-Peru border are aware of the danger posed by antipersonnel mines. The campaigns are bilingual and multisectoral, involving ministries of health, education, defense and interior. Five campaigns have been conducted, with the sixth campaign carried out in 2019. In Afghanistan, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de Déminage, FSD) provides risk education to communities who undertake livelihood activities in the Panji valley—a past confrontation line between the former Soviet Union and the Mujahedeen. The area is accessed from across the border in Tajikistan.

Risk groups

Children are a key risk group with regard to antipersonnel mines in many States Parties because they are often growing up in contaminated areas, lack knowledge of the risks, and are prone to picking up and playing with items.

In Angola, it was reported that children are at greater risk of accidents due to their lack of exposure to the war, which ended 18 years ago. In BiH, children are seen as a major risk group because of their lack of awareness of the threat and their curiosity. In Croatia, schoolchildren and college students were the primary risk education target group in 2019.

In some countries, such as Angola, children are often responsible for looking after animals and undertaking household chores, such as collecting firewood, which may take them into mined areas.

However, in several countries it was noted that children are often more at risk from ERW rather than from landmines. In Angola, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine, it was reported that children are more affected by ERW because they pick up and play with items. In Angola, it was also reported that children were at more risk of finding ERW when going out to collect natural resources. In Palestine, most of the accidents recorded among children were the result of curiosity, a lack of awareness of the dangers, and the tendency to play in open and contaminated areas.

Adult men were cited by the majority of States Parties and risk education operators to be the primary risk group in relation to antipersonnel mines. BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, the DRC, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, among others, all noted men as a high-risk group. Adult men are seen to be most at risk because of their roles and responsibilities.

244 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Carlota Moura, Project Officer, HALO Trust Angola, 23 April 2020.
246 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Civil Protection Directorate Croatia, 28 April 2020.
which often involve partaking in higher risk activities such as agriculture, fishing, hunting and animal herding. Men are more likely to move further away from home in search of work and livelihood opportunities, increasing their chance of exposure to mine risk.

In Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, and Ukraine, men were at risk from mines due to their work in rural areas, including cultivation, the collection of forest products, hunting, fishing, foraging, and tending animals. In BiH, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted that men often entered mined areas consciously out of economic necessity. This included farmers, hunters, fishermen and firemen. In Croatia, target groups included members of hunting associations, the Croatian Mountain Rescue Service, firefighters, forestry workers, hikers, farmers and tourists. In Ukraine, working age men are the largest affected group due to their traditional gender roles working in farming, cattle herding, fishing and firewood collection. It was also reported that farmers and people in isolated villages who had to use unpaved roads were at high risk from antivehicle mines.

Fewer reported mine incidents involve women and girls, and risk education operators noted that they were often less likely to engage in unsafe behaviors or to travel as far from the home as men. However, women and girls are often an important group to target in risk education as they can help promote safer behavior among men and among children and peers. In contexts where female social and economic roles are limited, women and girls are sometimes harder to reach for risk education.

Poverty and a lack of viable livelihood alternatives often force people to take risks on contaminated land. Risk education operators reported to the Monitor that it is often the rural poor and economically disadvantaged that are at greatest risk from landmines.

In Cambodia, significant numbers of villagers will knowingly access contaminated land due to a lack of viable livelihood options. Landless farmers were forced to access vacant or forest land which has a higher likelihood of being contaminated. In eastern Ukraine, the 15km buffer zone from the “line of contact” had disproportionately affected a large number of elderly people. Insufficient pensions forced them to continue to cultivate plots of land, pick mushrooms and collect firewood in areas contaminated with mines and ERW. FSD in Ukraine reported providing risk education sessions at employment centers along the contact line.

Equally, economic development can also increase pressure on the land and the risk from mines. In Cambodia, one of Southeast Asia’s fastest growing economies, economic development and population in-migration to the northwest and northeast has increased the demand for land and the threat from contamination in these formerly remote areas. The greater mechanization of farming has also led to an increased incidence of accidents caused by antivehicle mines.

---

252 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 2 June 2020; and by Aurelie Fabry, UNMAS DRC, 11 May 2020.
253 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jessica Rice, HALO Trust Somalia, 4 May 2020.
254 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 2 June 2020.
258 Casualty data received by email from Nguon Monoketya, Deputy Director, Socio-Economic Planning and Database Management Department, CMAA, 17 February 2017.
Migrant and itinerant workers are a high-risk group in BiH, Cambodia, and Thailand.\textsuperscript{260} In Cambodia, internal and cross-border migration into Thailand in search of employment in agriculture or construction is common, and these itinerant workers are at risk due to working in unfamiliar areas and crossing the border, often at informal crossing points. The Thailand Mine Action Centre (TMAC) reported that mobile risk education teams are dispatched to mine-affected areas along the commuting routes during the long holidays to ensure people use safe paths.\textsuperscript{261} In BiH, due to in-migration, the BiH Mine Action Center (BHMAC) organized a number of meetings in 2019 with actors such as the border police, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the Red Cross Society, and the ICRC, to ensure that migrants are warned about the threats of contamination.\textsuperscript{262}

Drivers were a key target group due to the danger of contamination on roads, including from improvised mines, in Afghanistan, Mali, and Ukraine. Drivers are sensitized to the dangers of overtaking and using short-cuts on roads in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{263} In Mali, UNMAS developed an improvised explosive device (IED) risk awareness course on devices planted on main roads for drivers from humanitarian organizations and private sector companies.

Nomadic and pastoral communities were target groups for risk education in States Parties Afghanistan, Chad, Iraq, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. In South Sudan, cattle herders, particularly from the two main tribes, the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya, constantly move looking for grazing areas and water for their cattle, which puts them at risk from landmines.\textsuperscript{264} Pastoralists in Somalia and nomadic communities and shepherds in Iraq are also at risk because of their movement patterns across contaminated areas.\textsuperscript{265} Iraq conducted intensive awareness campaigns during the grazing season due to increased mine casualties.\textsuperscript{266} Nomads, travelers, traditional guides and trackers were at risk from mines in contaminated desert areas in Chad. Guides and trackers were trained to pass on risk education messages to those they guide across the desert, supported by MAG.\textsuperscript{267} A memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the Independent Directorate of Kuchie [Nomad] Affairs in Afghanistan was signed with the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) to support the risk education program.\textsuperscript{268} In Zimbabwe, due to high numbers of mine accidents involving animals, animal herders are targeted for risk education.\textsuperscript{269}

Indigenous reserves in high mountainous areas of Colombia were often mined as strategic posts by non-state armed groups (NSAGs), exposing the most vulnerable indigenous ethnic groups to the risk of mines. The HALO Trust reported to the Monitor that providing risk education to indigenous populations can pose a significant challenge based on their semi-autonomous nature and cultural sensitivities. Separate permissions must be secured with each of the indigenous authorities to access the areas. Messages and delivery methodology must also comply with the cultural complexities of indigenous populations.\textsuperscript{270}

In urban areas, particularly in Iraq, high-risk activities include construction work and street cleaning. Afghanistan also cited scrap metal collection as a high-risk activity. Ukraine targets workers who are exposed to risk from day-to-day activities such as repairing electrical lines.\textsuperscript{271}

\textsuperscript{260} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Josh Ridley, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 21 April 2020.
\textsuperscript{263} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
\textsuperscript{264} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angelo Lawrence, MAG South Sudan, 12 May 2020.
\textsuperscript{265} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Madeline Achurch, Program Officer, HALO Trust Iraq, 30 April 2020.
\textsuperscript{267} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, MAG Chad, 8 May 2020.
\textsuperscript{268} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.
\textsuperscript{269} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Katie Welllington, HALO Trust Zimbabwe, 22 April 2020.
\textsuperscript{270} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sean Tjaden, HALO Trust Colombia, 30 April 2020.
\textsuperscript{271} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Olena Kryvova, FSD Ukraine, 9 June 2020.
IDPs, refugees and returnees are often particularly vulnerable to the threat posed by mines due to being displaced by war and living or returning to areas where they may be unfamiliar with the contamination. A lack of occupation and livelihood security may also force them to engage in intentional risk-taking activities.

Risk education for IDPs and returnees was undertaken in 2019 in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, the DRC, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, and Thailand. In Afghanistan, Afghans returning from Iran and Pakistan were provided risk education on the border. Risk education campaigns were also provided in Iraq in liberated areas for communities who, following the cessation of hostilities, were keen to return home. In Angola, MAG reported providing risk education to refugees in Luanda Norte as part of the response to a refugee crisis. On the Thailand-Myanmar border, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) provided risk education in nine refugee camps during 2019. In South Sudan, UNMAS provided risk education to IDPs and refugees being hosted in United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 'Protection of Civilians' sites as an integrated part of the humanitarian intervention.

Reaching people with disabilities has not always been well addressed by risk education, but in 2019 there were some positive examples of risk education involving people with disabilities.

HI conducted risk education projects targeting people with disabilities, or risk education was integrated into victim assistance projects. In Afghanistan, since mid-2018, the HI Mobile Team Project incorporated physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support and risk education for IDPs, returnees and host communities. Risk education teams provided sessions in rehabilitation centers for victims of explosive ordnance and other people with disabilities. MAG in Angola and HI in Thailand both recruited landmine survivors to support risk education efforts. In Iraq, risk education campaigns were combined with sports activities for people with disabilities. FSD in Ukraine implemented a small project in specialized education institutions for children with disabilities. This included risk education using a sign language trainer. HI in Iraq produced risk education videos with sign language and subtitles, and plans to produce a risk education “talking book” for children in Afghanistan. HI in Colombia used braille for risk education messages while in Yemen, UNICEF supported a risk education program for hearing-impaired children.

Emergency risk education was reported by most operators as being delivered in response to landmine/ERW accidents. The HALO Trust in Somalia reported providing risk education to communities displaced by flash floods in Hiradale State in October 2019. In Yemen, the Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) continued to conduct risk education sessions as part of its emergency response.

---


274 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hser Htee Praikammasit, HI Thailand, 22 May 2020.

275 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Itta Betty Oliver Lowela, UNMAS South Sudan, 8 May 2020.

276 The HI Comprehensive Approach to Humanitarian Mine Action encompasses integrated programs with advocacy, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. Such programs are implemented by HI in States Parties Afghanistan and Iraq.


280 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Johana Huertas, AVR Field Specialist, HI Colombia, 19 May 2020.


282 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jessica Rice, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 4 May 2020.


---
Several organizations in States Parties Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia, and Ukraine, reported providing risk education to the staff of NGOs or service providers. In Afghanistan, a landmine safety program was implemented for aid workers, while in Iraq, risk education was provided to international NGOs, local NGOs and staff of commercial organizations working in contaminated areas. This included factory staff, quarry and construction workers, municipality cleaners and journalists. In Somalia, UNMAS provided risk education to partners working to implement humanitarian and stabilization activities in the country. Risk education was also integrated into other humanitarian activities such as through support to IDPs and returnees. In Cambodia, risk education was provided to NGOs working in contaminated areas and to companies and construction workers. UNMAS in South Sudan provided risk education to UN peacekeepers.

**RISK EDUCATION DELIVERY METHODS**

Action #28 of the Oslo Action Plan recommends integrating risk education activities with wider humanitarian, development and protection efforts, and as part of survey, clearance and victim assistance activities. Action #31 refers to the need to build national capacity to deliver risk education.

Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all reported that risk education was carried out as an integrated part of survey and clearance activities in 2019. This was often crucial to generating reports of potentially contaminated areas and landmine or ERW accidents. Several countries, including Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Iraq, have hotline numbers for communities to report ordnance, and this is disseminated through risk education sessions.

In 2019, in States Parties Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Somalia, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe, NPA undertook risk education in support of land release, either integrated within non-technical survey or technical survey operations, or by trained deminers while clearance was taking place. UNMAS in Afghanistan reported that deminers provide risk education to community members when conducting clearance, and quick response teams conduct risk education alongside explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).

The vast majority of risk education reported in States Parties is delivered through the primary means of face-to-face risk education sessions, often with specialized risk education or community liaison teams, and the distribution of small, printed materials such as leaflets and posters. Many of the organizations delivering risk education used mixed gender teams to ensure that all age and gender groups in the population were adequately reached.

However, despite this being the most popular means of risk education delivery, some States Parties reported challenges in delivery. In South Sudan and Colombia, the range of languages and dialects spoken poses a challenge for both team deployment and the

---

284 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Madeline Achurch, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020; and by Goran Knezevic, Risk Education Technical Coordinator, HI Iraq, 22 May 2020.
286 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Itta Betty Oliver Lowela, UNMAS South Sudan, 8 May 2020.
287 Email from Rasmus Sandvoll Weschke, Advisor, Conflict Preparedness and Protection, NPA, 5 June 2020.
288 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angela Gosse, Programme Officer, UNMAS Afghanistan, 12 May 2020.
development of risk education materials. In South Sudan, the remote and dispersed nature of populations combined with poor road infrastructure makes it challenging for teams to reach people. Limited literacy in South Sudan also reduces the effectiveness of written materials, and it was reported that leaflets are often thrown away.

In both Somalia and South Sudan, local communities often mistrust people from international organizations, and messages are better delivered by people from the community. Face-to-face delivery by mobile risk education teams was also challenging due to insecurity or ongoing conflict in States Parties Afghanistan, Mali, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen.

Despite being most at risk, men are regarded as the most difficult group to reach as they are often away when risk education teams visit communities. This suggests that more effort is required to prioritize and better target risk education for men. In Palestine (Gaza), risk education includes “street sessions” which are shorter face-to-face sessions held on the street with the aim of targeting men who are hard to reach via regular risk education sessions.

The use of mass media, including TV, radio and billboards, is commonly used for risk education, including in States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, and Thailand. Afghanistan aired two one-minute videos on popular TV channels in the national languages; one geared toward adults and the other specifically aimed at men. Afghanistan also used radio public service announcements in five provinces, with messages concerning travelling, protecting children from the risk of mines, and what to do after a conflict. The DRC also employed radio for the delivery of risk education, while BiH used billboards. Thailand used local press and community radio to deliver risk education.

The HALO Trust in Colombia implemented a ’Creating Safer Environments’ campaign in 2019 in the Chaparral, Planadas and Rio Blanco municipalities in the Tolima department. The campaign focused on disseminating risk education information to the largest audience possible through the distribution of printed materials and public service announcements on local radio stations and on TV. The campaign ensured that cultural diversity was reflected, having local people record the messages to ensure that regional dialects and accents were captured.

Delivery through interactive means such as theatre, puppet shows, and mobile cinema were reported in States Parties Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ukraine.

In the risk education sector, there has been increasing interest in the use of digital media and mobile phone applications for the delivery of risk education messages, particularly in more remote or challenging contexts where traditional risk education delivery methods are not feasible.

MAG in Iraq piloted a risk education project with Facebook, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and the United States (US) government in 2019 and had plans to roll this out on a

---

289 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angelo Lawrence, MAG South Sudan, 12 May 2020; and by Sean Tjaden, HALO Trust Colombia, 30 April 2020.
290 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angelo Lawrence, MAG South Sudan, 12 May 2020; and by Vivky Imergo Anzoa, UNICEF South Sudan, 12 May 2020.
291 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jessica Rice, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 4 May 2020.
294 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Angela Gosse, Programme Officer, UNMAS Afghanistan, 12 May 2020.
296 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sean Tjaden, Program Officer, HALO Trust, 30 April 2020.
larger scale in 2020.\textsuperscript{298} UNMAS in Iraq also developed mass media campaigns through radio, TV and social media platforms.\textsuperscript{299} Facebook is used by UNMAS in Afghanistan and HI in Iraq. Croatia developed an application, Minefields.info, for Android and iOS smartphones, which warns people if they are approaching a dangerous area. The application also includes a "call for help" option and allows reporting of ERW.\textsuperscript{300}

In Nigeria, UNMAS is exploring the use of a risk education technical device to disseminate risk education messages to hard-to-reach and inaccessible at-risk populations. It was hoped that the application might be used to deliver risk education messages and basic COVID-19 prevention awareness messages.\textsuperscript{301}

Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe all reported limited communication infrastructure such as mobile networks, and access to and use of social media.

Risk education in Afghanistan, BiH, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and South Sudan has been integrated into the humanitarian and protection sectors. In BiH, this is done through the work of the Red Cross, and in Afghanistan, risk education has been provided for returnees through the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and at International Organization for Migration (IOM) encashment and transit centers.\textsuperscript{302} In South Sudan, UNICEF funded partners integrate risk education with other thematic components such as psychosocial support, family tracing and reunification activities, and with other humanitarian activities such as water, sanitation, hygiene, health, nutrition and food security programs.\textsuperscript{303}

In Senegal and other countries where the ICRC works, the approach is to link risk education to the provision of community infrastructure, to avoid communities being exposed to mine contamination, in line with the ICRC ‘Risk Awareness and Safer Behavior’ approach.\textsuperscript{304}

Risk education was implemented into the school curriculum in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Mali, Sudan, and Thailand. In Afghanistan, key risk education messages are included in the curriculum for children in grades 2 to 12, while in Cambodia risk education is included in the curriculum for primary and lower secondary schools. In Sudan, mine risk education features in the curriculum for primary and secondary levels in Darfur state.

In BiH, Croatia, Iraq, Mauritania, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe risk education is provided in schools, but not as part of the formal curriculum.\textsuperscript{305} Iraq is currently coordinating with the Iraqi Ministry of Education on curriculum development for primary school level.\textsuperscript{306} South Sudan also reported the development of a risk education curriculum,\textsuperscript{307} and reported building the national capacity of nursery and primary level teachers to deliver risk education.\textsuperscript{308} Also in South Sudan, UNICEF worked with the Ministry of General Education and


\textsuperscript{302} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fazel Rahman, Project Manager Operations, DMAC, 16 April 2020.

\textsuperscript{303} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Vicky Imuro Anzoa, UNICEF South Sudan, 12 May 2020.


\textsuperscript{305} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Zareen Khan Mavar, EORE Technical Advisor, HI, 22 May 2020; by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Iraq, 21 May 2020; and by Goran Knezevic, Risk Education Technical Coordinator, HI Iraq, 22 May 2020. Risk education is integrated into the school curriculum in Somaliland.


\textsuperscript{307} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Itta Betty Oliver Lowela, UNMAS South Sudan, 8 May 2020.

Instruction and the national mine action authority to ensure risk education is implemented through life skills subjects in schools. In Afghanistan, DMAC has introduced child-focused risk education materials that have been piloted and will be used in field operations. DMAC sees this as a significant step towards employing content that will help to engage and change the behavior of children and young adults.

Training community volunteers or networks to provide risk education was reported in Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This mainly involved training representatives of affected communities to deliver basic risk education messages. This is seen as advantageous in terms of maintaining risk education in hard-to-reach areas, ensuring risk education is delivered through somebody who is trusted by the community, and in supporting sustainability. MAG and HI trained community focal points in many of the countries where they work to reinforce safety messages and to report items.

In some States Parties, risk education is being conducted in partnership with the national police. In Cambodia, a Village and Commune Safety policy, launched in 2010, includes a program to train the Cambodian National Police to implement risk education and awareness regarding the Law on Weapons, Explosives and Ammunitions Management. In Croatia, as part of the "Less Arms, Less Tragedies" campaign, the Croatian police educate civilians to hand in ERW. In Turkey, as part of its national mine risk education plan implementation, a protocol was planned to be signed with the Turkish Gendarmerie in 15 provinces to train them on risk education between 2020–2022. In Somalia, NPA also planned to implement a project in 2020 focusing on training the Puntland police in risk education and non-technical survey. In Zimbabwe, The HALO Trust partnered with local police stations in 2019 to provide safety advice. UNICEF planned to undertake risk education training with army officers in Chad in 2019, but the training was halted due to the deteriorating security situation.

**VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND THE OSLO ACTION PLAN**

Actions to address the impact of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in relation to victim assistance in the Oslo Action Plan include activities and services to implement the following:

- Effective and efficient emergency medical response and ongoing medical care;
- Comprehensive healthcare, rehabilitation support services, and psychological and psychosocial support services;

---

310 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Delia Sandra Maphosa, MAG Zimbabwe, 10 May 2020.
317 For coordination and process actions relevant to victim assistance, see the section on coordination.
• Social and economic inclusion; 320
• Protection in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters. 321

EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE AND ONGOING MEDICAL CARE 322

Timely first aid response for casualties and adequate pre-hospital trauma care includes interventions such as first aid and field trauma response, emergency evacuation, availability of transport, and immediate medical care that involves assessment and pre-hospital communication of critical information for patient handover. The provision of appropriate emergency medical services can considerably affect the chance of the survival and the speed of recovery of mine victims, as well as outcomes of injuries and the severity of impairments.

Improvements in medical care services to strengthen emergency response capacities for people injured by mines/ERW and others in affected communities were reported in Afghanistan, where immediate care packages are also distributed to civilian conflict causalities through the Conflict Mitigation Assistance for Civilians (COMAC) Programme, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In Croatia, all mine/ERW survivors are entitled to healthcare and social protection measures. 323 In Nigeria, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mobile surgical team operated on patients free of charge. Wounded people were referred, when necessary, for specialized care, physical rehabilitation and/or mental health and psychosocial support provided by ICRC-trained volunteers. There is a drastic problem of accessibility to immediate healthcare across the DRC, where in most cases people injured cannot receive appropriate assistance, resulting in death.

In South Sudan, incidents often occurred in remote areas far from access to health services. In eastern Ukraine, along the line of contact, primary healthcare centers and satellite services received the required equipment and medicines. As public health facilities in Ukraine’s conflict-affected regions gradually resumed services, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) began transferring patients to the Ministry of Health for treatment. By the end of 2019, all were provided with care through the public health system. 324

International organizations continued to provide much-needed assistance in conflict-affected areas. In Iraq, healthcare services for all persons with disabilities have decreased over time, in part due to the recent security situation. In Yemen, many medical facilities have been damaged, and ongoing conflict has further undermined the struggling health system, which has been in a precarious state for several years due to ongoing conflict. 325 In late 2019, Yemen’s healthcare system was reported to be “on the brink of collapse” (see section on COVID-19 Response). 326

322 Oslo Action Plan, Action #36; CRPD Article 25 – Health; CRPD Article 20 – Personal Mobility; and CRPD Article 26 – Habilitation and Rehabilitation.
REHABILITATION SUPPORT SERVICES, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT SERVICES

Rehabilitation, including physiotherapy and the supply of assistive devices such as prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs, aims to help the person regain or improve mobility, and to engage in everyday activities. Effective rehabilitation is aimed at improving personal autonomy and empowering people to have mobility and independence. Rehabilitation services with a comprehensive or multidisciplinary approach involve a team including a medical doctor, physiotherapist, prosthetist, and social worker, as well as other specialists as required. Psychosocial support is often also an integral aspect of rehabilitation, while it can also be a standalone service or combined with social integration, for example through peer support.

During the reporting period, all of the ICRC’s MoveAbility Foundation activities were being integrated into the ICRC’s Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), established in 1979. The MoveAbility Foundation was formerly called the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD). The SFD was created in 1983 from a resolution at the 1981 International Red Cross and Red Crescent Conference, which recommended that “a special fund be formed for the benefit of the disabled and to promote the implementation of durable projects to aid disabled persons.” It has been an independent foundation under Swiss law since 2001. The SFD marked a strategic shift from humanitarian assistance to development, to ensure continuity of the ICRC-PRP’s work. The 2017 change from the SFD to the MoveAbility Foundation was an ambitious strategy shift, planning activities for growth and development over five years, however integration of the SFD into the ICRC-PRP occurred before the plan ended.

States Parties can increase the sustainability of rehabilitation activities by allocating a specific budget line for the physical and functional rehabilitation needs of all persons with disabilities, including victims. In Afghanistan, authorities have acknowledged that it is unrealistic to consider the government capable of ensuring the required rehabilitation services. New physical rehabilitation centers were established in three provinces of Afghanistan, however at least seven more centers are still needed. Access to rehabilitation centers is also extremely limited in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Uganda.

In Iraq, the entire rehabilitation system lacked capacity to deliver enough services and devices to meet increased needs. In Cambodia, progress was made in the handover of rehabilitation centers to government management, while resources were secured for their sustainability. In Nigeria, construction began in August 2019 for a new physical rehabilitation center, under the ICRC’s Programme for Humanitarian Impact Investment and in partnership with a university teaching hospital. The government of Uganda has identified human resources for health as one of the core causes of financial inefficiency in the health system. The two main problems are significant rates of work absenteeism and the existence of “ghost workers” on the public payroll, which are attributed to weak personnel management and demotivation.

In Palestine, the main prosthetic unit in Gaza, the Artificial Limb and Polio Centre (ALPC), continued to face significant pressure on its limited resources while addressing an increase in

---

327 Oslo Action Plan, Action #39; CRPD Article 25 – Health; CRPD Article 20 – Personal Mobility; and CRPD Article 26 – Habilitation and Rehabilitation.
in patients with amputations, many of whom had been shot in the legs. A new prosthetic hospital and disability rehabilitation center—the Limb Reconstruction Center in Khan Younis, Gaza, built by the WHO—and a Hamas-run Health Ministry opened in 2020. A new Rehabilitation Center also opened in Bethlehem in October 2019. In 2019, mine/ERW victims from Senegal continued to receive prosthetic devices in Guinea-Bissau through an agreement between the ICRC, the Senegalese Survivor Network, and the mine action center, ongoing since 2015.

Improvement of the rehabilitation facility at the Ukrainian Research Institute for Prosthetics and Rehabilitation was reported. A USAID-funded project launched in 2019 in Ukraine and Tajikistan, Strengthening Rehabilitation Services within Health Systems (SRSHS), aimed to improve rehabilitation services and increase access to those services in the two countries.

Psychological and psychosocial support activities include professional counselling, individual peer-to-peer counselling, community-based peer support groups, networks of survivors and associations of persons with disabilities, as well as some types of sports and recreational activities.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), there was a program in 2019 to develop structured peer-to-peer psychological support, by victims for victims, in healthcare and rehabilitation facilities supported by the European Commission. In Eritrea, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) supports the Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare to provide mental health and psychosocial support to families and children with disabilities. In Senegal, mine victims supported other victims who received assistance in Guinea-Bissau. Mine/ERW victims in Kinshasa, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), hold monthly peer-to-peer support meetings. Survivor networks, which often provide peer-to-peer and collective psychosocial support, struggled to maintain their operations with decreasing resources available.

Many countries had improved sports and recreational activities for persons with disabilities, including families, such as wheelchair sports. However, access to cultural activities for victims and persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others was often lacking.

The following continuing needs for psychological and psychosocial support were identified in:

- Afghanistan: provide psychosocial and psychological support, including peer support, in particular to new victims as well as those who have been traumatized and live in isolation;
- Cambodia: improve the quality and availability of existing psychosocial support services;
- Colombia: include peer support services under the health insurance system;
- The DRC: improve the availability of psychosocial services significantly, especially outside Kinshasa;
- Mozambique: prioritize assistance based on psychological and socioeconomic needs;
- Nicaragua: dedicate resources to the implementation of psychosocial support programs; and
- Senegal: ensure the sustainability of psychosocial support in the Casamance region.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

Socio-economic inclusion projects for mine victims through education, sports, leisure and cultural activities, vocational training, micro-credit, income generation, and employment

was a reported priority need in all affected states. Employment, work training, livelihood incentives, and other economic opportunities continued to be areas with the greatest need for improvement.

There is a recognized need to increase economic opportunities for survivors and other persons with disabilities, as well as to develop education and training that are appropriate for victims and persons with disabilities who lack education and literacy, and have no work or land from which to make a living.

One of the last remaining vocational training centers in Cambodia—the long-established Banteay Prieb Center near Phnom Penh, run by Jesuit Service Cambodia, which served an increasing range of persons with disabilities—stopped running due to the premises being reconstructed without consultation by the relevant authorities.

A lack of awareness of disability rights and inclusion principles among teachers and fellow pupils can lead to discrimination, isolation, and prevent child victims from participating fully in educational activities. National programs to promote inclusive education at all levels, as part of national education plans, policies and programs can contribute to the inclusion of child survivors and indirect child victims. In Afghanistan, an inclusive education policy was drafted, translated into national languages, and shared with the Ministry of Education for review and approval by its scientific and academic council. However, a government-run national inclusive education program that increased the enrollment of children with disabilities in the country since 2008 lost core international funding in 2016, and Afghanistan reported that there were no continuing activities in 2019.

PROTECTION OF MINE VICTIMS AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN SITUATIONS OF RISK, INCLUDING SITUATIONS OF ARMED CONFLICTS, HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCIES, AND NATURAL DISASTERS

During times of armed conflict or occupation, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters, mine/ERW victims and other persons with disabilities can face extreme challenges and barriers to having their rights respected and fulfilled, as well as to accessing adequate and appropriate services. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to providing assistance to victims of these weapons, families of those killed or injured, and affected communities in accordance with relevant human rights laws. Those which are States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) also have an obligation, under Article 11, to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies.

In 2019–2020, several States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with new casualties and mine/ERW victims were in situations of armed conflict, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen. In June 2019, the UN Security Council adopted its first text on the protection of persons with disabilities in conflict, Resolution 2475. Armed conflict and attacks on healthcare providers were increasingly concerning and impacted the availability of services in the affected countries. The Charter on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action was adopted at the World Humanitarian Summit in Turkey in May 2016.

In November 2019, just prior to the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference in Oslo, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) released guidelines on the inclusion of persons with disabilities in humanitarian action, which include actions that humanitarian actors can take to effectively identify and respond to the needs and rights of persons with disabilities.

---

334 Oslo Action Plan, Action #40; and CRPD Article 11 – Situations of Risk and Humanitarian Emergencies.
336 See, Health Care in Danger (HCID) website, healthcareindanger.org; See also, Safeguarding Health in Conflict website, www.safeguardinghealth.org.
within humanitarian settings. 337 The IASC Task Team on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action was established in 2016 to develop and adopt implementation guidelines by the end of 2018. The deadline was later extended to the end of 2019. Some mine survivors and their representative organizations were involved in pilot testing and regional feedback discussions during the development process.

Armed violence and conflict also directly impact victim assistance efforts. The CRPD committee experts reviewing Iraq’s reporting in September 2019 found that the challenges and consequences of “18 years of war, armed conflict and terrorism…had ravaged Iraq and… had had a disproportionate impact on persons with disabilities.” 338 The conflict in Syria has caused a massive displacement crisis. Refugee host countries, principally Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq, as well as Lebanon (a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions), have received large numbers of persons fleeing Syria. Natural disasters during the period were also devastating. In 2019, floods in Mozambique severely affected persons with disabilities in remote and rural areas.

A number of international actors sought to improve the situation for children in humanitarian settings, citing Landmine Monitor casualty data and other sources on high numbers of child casualties resulting from mines/ERW. 339 In 2019, the UN’s interagency Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap) launched a deployment in response to the impact of mines/ERW on children. The objectives were to improve interagency collaboration; reduce the rate and number of children killed and injured; increase the survival rates of child casualties, especially those seriously injured and in a critical state after the incident; and provide medium-term healthcare services to improve physical and mental health for child survivors, as well as social inclusion, including access to education. 340


LANDMINE, EXPLOSIVE REMNANT OF WAR (ERW), AND CLUSTER SUBMUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2019

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold; OTHER AREAS are UPPERCASE ITALICS.
MAG demining team head to work in Tal Afar, Iraq.
© Sean Sutton/MAG, April 2019
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

INTRODUCTION

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty on international cooperation and assistance recognizes the right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to fulfill its treaty obligations.

At the Oslo Review Conference, in November 2019, States Parties committed to complete their respective time-bound obligations by 2025 and to ensure sustainable and integrated support for victims. The Oslo Action Plan contains six action points, along with a series of specific indicators, aimed at tracking progress toward enhancing international cooperation and assistance. These indicators include, among others: the level of national funding; the provision of assistance by States Parties; regular reporting on challenges and needs for assistance; the existence of coordinating mechanisms; and the facilitation of dialogue and information exchange among affected states, the donor community, and other relevant stakeholders. A number of these points have been tracked by the Monitor in the past.

Since 2010, international support totaled about US$5.2 billion, 10% of which was provided in 2019 with 35 donors contributing $561.3 million in support of mine action activities in 41 affected states and other areas. As regards the provision of assistance by and to States Parties, in the last decade, a total of 33 States Parties reported contributing some $1.7 billion in mine action support to 61 affected States Parties. In 2019 alone, 23 States Parties provided $207.7 million in mine action support to 29 States Parties, including $146.9 million to clearance and risk education activities (71% of the total) and $18.8 million to victim assistance (9%). This was the highest level of funding provided by and to States Parties in the 10-year period, and represented about two-fifths of total support provided in 2019.

1 This figure represents reported government contributions under bilateral and international programs for calendar year 2019, as of October 2020. All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current US dollars. Mine action support includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year rather than the calendar year.

2 The remaining 20% ($42 million) went to advocacy, capacity-building or stockpile destruction activities or was not disaggregated.
This is an indication of the shared commitment and collaborative spirit and partnership within the mine action community. However, cumulative numbers are just one aspect of the story. The distribution of support among affected states and territories, as well as the sustainability of the assistance, are also key factors.

Tracking national financial commitments by affected States Parties has proven more difficult as a result of under-reporting. Since 2010, the Monitor recorded a total of $1.4 billion provided by affected states to their own mine action efforts. In 2019, only eight out of the 33 States Parties that have declared an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination (24%) reported making such financial contributions. National support has more than doubled from the 2018 estimated level, but it has remained below $100 million for four consecutive years. All affected states do not provide the same level of information regarding national resources allocated to mine action activities and some have never done so.

This chapter focuses on financial support for mine action provided for calendar year 2019 by affected countries and international donors. While focused on financial contributions, it remains clear that cooperation and assistance is not only limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of experience, know-how, best-practice sharing, and South-to-South or other bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

### 2019 FIGURES AND DEVELOPMENTS

#### TOTAL SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION

Thirty-five donors and 10 affected states reported contributing $650.7 million in international and national support for mine action in 2019; this is $48.8 million less than the 2018 total (a 7% decrease).

International contributions accounted for 86% of overall support for mine action in 2019, while states’ contributions to their own national mine action programs accounted for the remaining 14% of global funding.

#### INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The level of international support for mine action provided by donors declined from $642.6 million in 2018 to $561.3 million in 2019; this is more than $81 million less (a 13% decrease) and continues the drop recorded in the preceding year when international support fell by 8%.

The majority of the funding came from just a few donors, with the top five donors—the United States (US), the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, and Germany—contributing a total of $406.7 million, or 72% of all international funding for 2019.

The top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lao PDR, and Colombia—received a combined total of $276.5 million, representing half of all international contributions (49%).

International funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education (56% of all funding), victim assistance (8%), capacity-building (1%), and advocacy (1%). The remaining 34% was either not disaggregated by the donors or unearmarked.

#### NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The Monitor identified 10 affected states that provided $89.4 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs, up $32.5 million (a 57% increase) from 2018 when eight affected countries reported contributing $56.9 million.

---

3 This figure includes support provided by affected States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and/or to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

4 In addition, two states not party, Lao PDR and Lebanon, reported contributing to their own mine action programs in 2019.
COVID-19 AND MINE ACTION INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT

The COVID-19 outbreak has presented the mine action community with a new set of unanticipated challenges in 2020. However, as of October 2020, it was too early for most donors to determine the impact of the pandemic on future mine action support levels and potential shifting of their budget priorities.

There were very few reported instances of diversion of mine action funding to address COVID-19 related issues.5

INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2019

In 2019, 35 donors contributed a total of $561.3 million in international support for mine action in 38 affected states and three other areas—a decline of $81.3 million from the $642.6 million reported in 2018.6

International support for mine action: 2010–2019*

![International support for mine action: 2010–2019*](image)

Note: Totals not adjusted for inflation.

* The total amount of international support in 2016 was updated to include revised contributions from the Netherlands.

---

5 Denmark reassigned a United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) contribution for activities in Iraq to address COVID-19 issues while planned disbursement for Tetra Tech projects in Iraq and Syria were delayed. Email from Natascha Hassan Johns, Head of section, Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence, 26 June 2020. In April 2020, the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) Council of Ministers decided that EU funds initially allocated to mine action for 2018–2019 would be diverted to address COVID-19 and migration issues. As of June 2020, this was the only instance of diversion of EU funding identified. Email from Frank Meeussen, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control, European External Action Service (EEAS), 11 June 2020; and Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC), “Ten million EUR intended for humanitarian demining projects in BiH diverted to COVID-19 and migration issues,” 10 April 2020, www.bhmac.org/?p=6343. Finland proposed to its partner organizations to reallocate some mine action contributions to address COVID-19 issues. However as of July 2020, no such request had been made. Email from Anni Mäkeläinen, Desk Officer, Unit for Arms Control, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 13 July 2020. No US Agency for International Development (USAID) funding was diverted to address COVID-19, with the exception that a few programs were working with the Ministry of Health to support the development of accessible communications while remaining within the scope of the initial activity of the contributions. Email from Kirsten Lentz, Senior Technical Advisor, Rehabilitation, Technical Support Contract, USAID, Empowerment & Inclusion Division, 16 June 2020.

6 Data for 2019 on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports, the ITF Enhancing Human Security Annual Report 2019, the UNMAS Annual Report 2019, and answers from donors to questionnaires.
This is the second year running that donors decreased their international mine action assistance, and the first time since 2016 that international support dropped below $600 million. In 2019, international support fell more sharply (13%) than in 2018 (8%). However, it still represents the fourth-highest level of international support recorded by the Monitor.\(^7\)

In 2019, the level of international mine action funding collectively provided by the 15 largest donors decreased by $78.2 million.\(^8\) Despite this drop, they continued to provide most of international mine action funding ($538.8 million, 96% of all support).

**DONORS**

In 2019, 27 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, three states not party, the EU, and four other institutions\(^9\) contributed a total of $561.3 million to mine action.

In 2019, as in past years, a small group of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action support. The five largest donors—the US, the EU, the UK, Norway, and Germany—accounted for approximately three-quarters (72%) of all international support with a combined total of $406.7 million.

The US remained the largest mine action donor with $177.4 million and it alone provided more than a fifth (32%) of all international mine action support. The EU ranked second with $76 million, or 14% of all contributions. For the second consecutive year, the UK was the third largest donor with a total contribution of $71.7 million, representing 13% of all support. The next two donors—Norway and Germany—provided more than $35 million each.

Despite variations in the level of support provided, the proportion of total assistance from the top five donors has remained constant in recent years. Between 2015 and 2019, combined contributions from the five major donors ranged between 70–78% of all international support.

**Proportion of international mine action assistance by donors: 2018—2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>US</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Norway</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Other donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>$201.7</td>
<td>$108.1</td>
<td>$58.1</td>
<td>$47.7</td>
<td>$42.5</td>
<td>$184.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>$177.4</td>
<td>$76.0</td>
<td>$71.7</td>
<td>$43.0</td>
<td>$38.6</td>
<td>$35.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All figures are expressed in millions of US dollars.

Support from States Parties in 2019 accounted for more than half of all donor funding (54%), with 27 countries providing $301.4 million. This represents a 6% decrease from the $322 million contributed in 2018.

---

7 The Monitor maintains records of international support for mine action back to 1996, and national support back to 2002.

8 The 15 largest donors in 2018–2019 were: the US, the EU, the UK, Norway, Germany, Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France, and Italy. They contributed combined totals of $617 million in 2018 and $538.8 million in 2019.

9 The three states not party that reported contributions to mine action activities in 2019 were: Russia, South Korea, and the US. The four institutions were the Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali, the United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden, the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund, and the UN Foundation.
## Contributions by donors: 2015–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contribution (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>177.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France*</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland**</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN CERF</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Foundation</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors***</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>561.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**. UN CERF=United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund.
* France 2019 total reflects contributions for which disaggregated data was provided; its actual contribution was likely higher (approximately €7 million/$7.8 million).
** Whereas Finland budgeted funding for mine action in 2016, payments could not be disbursed due to changes in its administration and the prolongation of the tender processes. No mine action funding was reported for that year, and the 2017 total included some of the funding initially budgeted for 2016.
*** Other donors in 2019 included: Andorra, Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, the Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali, and the United Nations Association (UNA)-Sweden.

---

10 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The total amount of international support for 2016 was updated to include a contribution not previously reported by the Netherlands.
Overall, nine donors contributed more in 2019 than they did in 2018, including a $13.6 million increase from the UK (23%) and a $3 million increase from Australia (38%). The seven other donors increased their assistance by less than $1 million each.

Six donors reported new funding in 2019: Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, the Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali, the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (UN CERF), and the UN Foundation.

In contrast, 20 donors decreased their funding, led by the EU (down $32.1 million, a 30% decrease) and Sweden (down $9.8 million, a 52% decrease). Additionally, four donors from 2018 did not report any new contribution to mine action in 2019.

### Summary of changes in 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Combined Total (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than 20%</td>
<td>Australia, Belgium, Slovenia, Spain, and the UK</td>
<td>$18 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than 20%</td>
<td>Austria, Finland, Italy, and Poland</td>
<td>$1.2 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than 20%</td>
<td>Andorra, Canada, Czech Rep., Denmark, the EU, Estonia, France, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Sweden, and UNA-Sweden</td>
<td>$62.1 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than 20%</td>
<td>Germany, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the US</td>
<td>$34.3 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New donors in 2019</td>
<td>Russia, Slovakia, Turkey, Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali, UN CERF, and UN Foundation</td>
<td>$4.8 million provided in 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors from 2018 that did not report new funding in 2019</td>
<td>China, Cyprus, OCHA, and OPEC OFID</td>
<td>$8.9 million provided in 2018</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: OCHA=Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; OPEC OFID=Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for International Development.

The opposite table summarizes the changes in mine action funding from the top 15 donors, expressed in their respective national currencies and in US$ terms, and shows the impact of the exchange rates on the US dollar value of international contributions:

In US dollar terms, mine action international support rose in three countries: Australia, Italy, and the UK. In national currency terms, increases were recorded in the same three countries but were slightly more pronounced.

Consequently, whereas 12 states reported decreases in their mine action contributions in 2019, after conversion into US dollars, these reductions were greater in percentage terms for nine countries— with the exception of Japan and New Zealand, where the decreases were reduced as a result of exchange rate variation.
### Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US$ terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>In national currency terms</th>
<th>In US$ terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount of decrease/increase (in million)</td>
<td>% change from 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>+A$5.1</td>
<td>+48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>+£12.7</td>
<td>+29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>+€0.9</td>
<td>+25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-CHF0.008</td>
<td>-0.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>-¥88.8</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-NOK9.5</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-€1.5</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>-NZ$0.5</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>-US$24.3</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>-C$2.0</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>-€3.0</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>-DKK30.2</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>-€23.5</td>
<td>-26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>-SEK77.9</td>
<td>-48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-€6.0</td>
<td>-56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FUNDING PATHS

Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) administered by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and ITF Enhancing Human Security (established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known as the International Trust Fund).

In 2019, contributions through UNMAS totaled $72 million from 26 donors. Several small donors used the VTF to contribute to mine action. At least six donors allocated $4.1 million in 2019 through the ITF for mine action programs.

While donor funding is frequently used for national activities, implementation is often carried out by an array of partnering institutions, non-government organizations (NGOs), trust funds, and UN agencies. Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2019 included The HALO Trust ($54.1 million), Mines Advisory Group ($39.3 million), the International Committee of the Red Cross ($31.9 million), Norwegian People’s Aid ($26.1 million), DanChurchAid ($23.4 million), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ($12.8 million), Humanity & Inclusion ($12.4 million), and Danish Demining Group ($11.8 million).

---


12 In 2019, Switzerland reported in-kind contributions valued at about $387,000 through UNMAS to support operations in Libya and Mali, as well as global activities. Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 28 April 2020, bit.ly/SwitzerlandCCMArt7Report2020.

13 The small donors (total contribution under $1 million) included Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, the Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali, and UNA-Sweden.

14 The six donors were: Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, Turkey, and the US.
**RECIPIENTS**

A total of 38 states and three other areas received $522.6 million from 31 donors in 2019. An additional four donors only reported contributions to "global" activities (without a designated recipient state or area). These donors were: Andorra, Liechtenstein, UNA-Sweden, and UN Foundation.

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The top five recipient states—Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lao PDR, and Colombia—received $276.5 million, or half of all international support in 2019.

Since 2015, Iraq has been the largest recipient of mine action assistance. In 2019, the country received 17% of all international support from the largest number of donors (19). Ten states and one area, or 27% of all recipients, had only one donor.

More than two-fifths of international support (41%, or $231.4 million) went to eight States Parties with massive contamination. Most of this funding, $157.5 million, went to clearance and risk education projects.

List of international support recipients in 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>95.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>24.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic (CAR)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sub-total**  $522.6

**Global**  $38.7

**Total**  $561.3

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated by *italics*.

---

15 An additional four donors only reported contributions to "global" activities (without a designated recipient state or area). These donors were: Andorra, Liechtenstein, UNA-Sweden, and UN Foundation.

16 Of the 10 countries receiving the most mine action funding in 2019, nine were in the top 10 in 2018. Ukraine ranked the ninth largest recipient of mine action support in 2019, replacing Vietnam which became the eleventh largest recipient.

17 Recipients with one donor included: Albania, Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic (CAR), Croatia, Mauritania, Montenegro, Palau, Serbia, Turkey, and other area, Somaliland.

18 Massive contamination is defined by the Monitor as more than 100km². Recipients of international support with massive contamination included: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen.
In 2019, 27 states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2018, including 15 recipients receiving less support, and 12 recipients receiving more support. In addition, seven previous recipients received no new support: Guinea, the Marshall Islands, Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, the Solomon Islands, and Tunisia. These fluctuations may reflect shifts in donor priorities and changes in local situations.

Cambodia and Ukraine were the recipients with the largest increases, receiving respectively $11 million and $10 million more than in 2018. These were the results of changes in donors’ contributions, in particular the EU, Japan, the UK, and the US.

It is the second consecutive year that mine action funding channeled to Syria decreased, a fall of $24.2 million in 2019 (36%). The reduction in contribution to mine action activities in the country was the result of sharp decreases in funding from Germany and the US following their exceptional contributions in 2017 (combined increase of more than $67 million). The US has not reported providing new mine action funding to Syria since then, while funding from Germany fell from $13.9 million in 2017 to $4 million in 2019. Croatia was the recipient with the second largest drop in 2019, receiving $22.3 million less than in 2018 after the EU, its sole international donor, reduced its support to clearance activities by half. Both countries remained among the 10 largest recipients of mine action in 2019.

**Summary of changes in 2019**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Combined Total (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than 20%</td>
<td>Angola, Cambodia, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$55.1 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than 20%</td>
<td>Colombia and Montenegro</td>
<td>$4.2 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than 20%</td>
<td>Benin, CAR, Chad, Croatia, Georgia, Jordan, Palau, Palestine, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Kosovo, and Western Sahara, as well as “global”</td>
<td>$92.3 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than 20%</td>
<td>Afghanistan, BiH, DRC, Iraq, Lao PDR, Libya, Somalia, and Somaliland</td>
<td>$43.7 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients from 2018 that did not receive new support in 2019</td>
<td>Guinea, Marshall Islands, Nepal, Philippines, Senegal, Solomon Islands, and Tunisia</td>
<td>$5.3 million received in 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New recipients in 2019</td>
<td>Burkina Faso and Mauritania</td>
<td>$0.7 million received in 2019</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR**

In 2019, 56% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities, while support to victim assistance represented 8% of the total international support to mine action. “Various” funding represented 34% of all international support to mine action. This includes contributions not disaggregated by the donors, as well as funding not earmarked for any sectors.
Contributions by thematic sector in 2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>% of total contribution</th>
<th>No. of donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance and risk education</td>
<td>312.3</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>192.0</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim assistance</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockpile destruction*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>&lt; 1%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>561.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A = not applicable.

*It is the first time since 2015 that a donor reported new dedicated stockpile destruction funding.

Clearance and risk education

In 2019, $312.3 million, or more than half of all reported support for mine action, went toward clearance and risk education activities. This represents a decrease of $84.6 million from 2018 (21%). The five largest donors—the US, the EU, the UK, Norway, and Germany—provided more than three-quarters of all support to clearance and risk education ($238.9 million).

Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Nineteen donors did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a total of $79.3 million in 25 affected countries and two other areas.

Seventeen donors reported contributions totaling $13.3 million specifically for risk education projects in 16 countries. Syria and Iraq received the most risk education-specific funding with a combined total of $7.7 million, more than half of all risk education dedicated support.

Between 2015 and 2019, more than three-fifths of international support went to clearance and risk education activities (61%, or $1.7 billion). Risk education-specific funding represented just 3% of all dedicated support, totaling $43.3 million.

Support from States Parties represented 52% of all dedicated clearance and risk education funding between 2015 and 2019; with more than $883 million provided.

---

19 In 2018, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education ($396.9 million, or 62% of total international support), victim assistance ($44.7 million, or 7%), capacity-building ($14 million, or 2%), advocacy ($4.4 million, or 1%), stockpile destruction ($0 million, or 0%), and various activities ($182.6 million, or 28%).

20 States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Palau, Palestine, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States not party that received international assistance for clearance were: Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam. Other areas that received international assistance for clearance activities were: Kosovo and Somaliland.

21 Recipients of international assistance for risk education were: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Chad, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen.

22 In comparison, during the previous five-year period, from 2010–2014, support from States Parties to clearance and risk education activities totaled $966.8 million. This represented 56% of all clearance and risk education dedicated support.
Support for Mine Action

Clearance and risk education dedicated international support: 2015–2019

![Clearance and risk education dedicated international support graph]

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated clearance and risk education funding in US$ million and as a proportion of total international support.

Victim assistance

Based on information available as of October 2020, direct international support for victim assistance activities in 2019 totaled $43.1 million, a 4% decline from the 2018 level ($44.7 million).

Fifteen donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 11 States Parties, five states not party, and two other areas. Twelve States Parties contributed a combined total of $28.4 million, representing 66% of all victim assistance funding in 2019.

Victim assistance dedicated international support: 2015–2019

![Victim assistance dedicated international support graph]

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated victim assistance funding in US$ million and as a proportion of total international support.

23 Victim assistance donors included: Australia, Canada, the EU, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and the US.

24 States Parties recipients of international assistance for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. States not party that received international assistance for victim assistance were: Georgia, Lao PDR, Libya, Myanmar, and Syria. And the two other areas were: Kosovo and Western Sahara.
Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance. As observed in 2018, a large part of the contributions from donors to victim assistance activities in 2019 were the result of support within the context of emergency operations in conflict-affected countries in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In 2019, nearly half of all victim assistance support (49%) went to just four countries—Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen—receiving a combined total of $20.8 million.

Approximately $6.6 million, representing 15% of all victim assistance funding, was provided to global activities (without a designated recipient state or area). The remaining 36% went to victim assistance activities in 12 other countries and two other areas, including eight affected States Parties.

As in previous years, a large number of States Parties in which there are significant numbers of victims did not receive any victim assistance support, or very little, whereas needs remained great and available resources were lacking. In 2019, 24 States Parties with significant numbers of victims did not receive such funding,25 while three States Parties with landmine survivors received less than $500,000.26

Funding for victim assistance activities remains especially difficult to track because many donors report that they provide support for victims through more general programs for development and for the rights of persons with disabilities, or are not able to provide specific details on dedicated victim assistance funding. However, this annual estimate still provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding situation.

Advocacy and capacity-building

In 2019, just 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities ($6.5 million).27 Of the 35 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, 13 reported supporting advocacy activities.28

Advocacy and capacity-building dedicated international support: 2015–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Funding (US$ million)</th>
<th>Proportion of Total International Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>8.9 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>14.9 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>14.8 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>18.4 (3%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>13.9 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated advocacy and capacity-building funding in US$ million and as a proportion of total international support.

25 Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Chad, DRC, Croatia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
26 Cambodia, Jordan, and Mali.
27 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to: contributions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Units, the Gender Mine Action Programme (GMAP), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva Call, and the ICBL-CMC and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
28 Advocacy donors in 2019 included: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.
Ten donors collectively provided $7.4 million—1% of all international support—to support capacity-building activities in 16 countries.\(^{29}\)

**NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2019**

Overall national contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports. States Parties such as Iraq and Sri Lanka, as well as states not party India and Vietnam—all mine-affected states with significant contamination and major clearance operations, usually conducted by the army—have never reported annual expenditures.

In 2019, the Monitor identified that at least 10 affected states provided a combined total of $89.4 million in contributions to mine action from their national budget. This is $32.5 million more than the $56.9 million reported in 2018, and similar to the $98.3 million reported in 2017.

South Sudan and Yemen indicated that national support to their mine action programs has been limited to cover the running costs of their respective mine action authorities, but did not provide details on their levels of contribution.\(^{30}\) Senegal reported in its most recent Article 5 extension request that it contributed a total of $7.2 million between 2007–2019 to the operational costs of its mine action program.\(^{31}\)

### FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION 2015–2019

Over the past five years (2015–2019), total support to mine action amounted to $3.2 billion, an average of about $640 million per year. This is $88 million less than the total support provided in the previous five-year period from 2010–2014, constituting a 3% decrease.

Although data about national support remains incomplete, such support accounted for about 14% of total mine action funding between 2015–2019 and amounted to some $460 million. International support totaled $2.8 billion, an average of $560 million per year, and represented 86% of all support.

Three donors—the US ($1 billion), the EU ($352 million), and Germany ($218 million)—contributed $1.6 billion, or 57% of total international support. Four other donors—the UK, Japan, Norway, and the Netherlands—contributed more than $100 million each. Switzerland, Denmark, and Canada, also ranked among the top 10 mine action donors for the five-year period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Contribution (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>89.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. * Lao PDR and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

---

\(^{29}\) Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building activities were: Afghanistan, Benin, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine.


Support from States Parties accounted for exactly half of all international funding provided in 2015–2019, with a combined contribution of $1.4 billion.\(^{32}\)

### Summary of contributions: 2015–2019

The overall decrease in total support provided in 2015–2019 compared to the previous five-year period was mostly driven by a 50% reduction in national support, which fell from a combined total of $930.6 million reported in 2010–2014 to $460.8 million in 2015–2019. This drop was partly offset by the unusually large 2017 contributions from Germany and the US to support clearance efforts in Iraq and Syria (combined total increase of $204 million). There was also an apparent impact from the series of pledging conferences held in 2016 to secure funding for mine action in some heavily affected countries as well as one-off extraordinary pledges announced around that time.\(^{33}\) This contributed to significant increases in support received by Colombia (up $111.2 million), Iraq (up $374.3 million), and Lao PDR (up $45 million).

In 2015–2019, the 10 largest recipients of mine action assistance received the majority of available funding, approximately $1.9 billion; this represents on average more than two-thirds (68%) of total international contributions. Of these 10 recipients, four came from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, four from Asia-Pacific, one from the Americas, and one from Europe. The composition of this group of recipients remained relatively similar from one year to another, while there were some variations in the amount of contributions received by each of them from one year to the next.

---

\(^{32}\) Thirty-one States Parties reported support for mine action contributions in 2015–2019: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the UK.

## Summary of changes: top 10 recipients of mine action support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>2015–2019 contributions (US$ million)</th>
<th>2010–2014 contributions (US$ million)</th>
<th>% change from the previous five-year period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>549.1</td>
<td>174.8</td>
<td>+214%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>282.0</td>
<td>370.8</td>
<td>-24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>232.0</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>+3,642%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>200.0</td>
<td>155.0</td>
<td>+29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>178.2</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>+166%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>141.3</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>+136%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>113.3</td>
<td>140.7</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>+40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>+68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,924.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,159.4</strong></td>
<td>+66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

*Lao PDR and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.*
SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION: 2019

National contributions (amount in parenthesis)

Recipients
- More than $15 million
- $1-$15 million
- Less than $1 million

International donors
- More than $15 million
- $1-$15 million
- Less than $1 million

Notes:
The European Union as an entity provided $76 million in international support for mine action.
Other donors in 2019 included: the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund ($1.7 million), the UN Foundation ($1.2 million), the Trust Fund for Peace and Security in Mali ($0.9 million), and the United Nations Association (UNA) Sweden ($0.1 million).
International donors provided $38.7 million without designating a recipient state or area.
States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold. Signatory is italics. OTHER AREAS are UPPER CASE ITALICS.
ICBL Ambassador Tun Channareth calling on States Parties to stay committed to the 2025 completion goal during the Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Norway.
© Giovanni Diffidenti/ICBL, November 2019
# Status of the Convention


Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign; rather, they may become bound without signature through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 31 October 2020 there were 164 States Parties.

## States Parties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)</th>
<th>Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00</td>
<td>Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01</td>
<td>Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98</td>
<td>Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02</td>
<td>Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99</td>
<td>Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99</td>
<td>Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98</td>
<td>Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98</td>
<td>Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00</td>
<td>Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99</td>
<td>Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)</td>
<td>Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>First Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 14 May 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>8 Nov 02 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>6 Jul 98; 6 May 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>19 Sep 02 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 20 May 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem Rep of Congo</td>
<td>2 May 02 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 18 May 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>16 Sep 98 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>27 Aug 01 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>12 May 04 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>9 Jan 12 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 22 May 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holy See</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 5 May 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>15 Aug 07 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>7 Sep 00 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>30 Jul 07 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1 Jul 05 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>23 Dec 99 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>26 Feb 99; 12 May 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia, North</td>
<td>9 Sep 98 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 7 May 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monaco</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>23 Oct 06 (s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>7 Aug 00 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>27 Sep 01 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Macedonia</td>
<td>9 Sep 98 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>20 Aug 14 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>18 Nov 07 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>29 Dec 2017 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>28 Jun 04 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatär</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Ratification Dates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Marino</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé &amp; Príncipe</td>
<td>30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>18 Sep 03 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovak Republic</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>16 Apr 12 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>11 Nov 11 (s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>13 Dec 2017 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suriname</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 23 May 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>12 Oct 99 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timor-Leste</td>
<td>7 May 03 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>25 Sep 03 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>13 Sep 2011 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SIGNATORY**

Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

**NON-SIGNATORIES**

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
China
Cuba
Egypt
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Libya
Micronesia, Federated States of
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Syria
Tonga
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General obligations
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
   b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
   c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions
1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

ARTICLE 3

Exceptions
1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
ARTICLE 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

ARTICLE 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:
   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
   b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
   c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
   d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
   e) Assistance to mine victims;
   f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.
ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
   b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
   c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
   d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
   e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
   f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
   h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
   i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
   a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
   b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
   c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.
ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be
convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

ARTICLE 15
Signature
This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

ARTICLE 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

ARTICLE 21

Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Authentic texts
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Landmine Monitor 2020, the 22nd annual Landmine Monitor edition, provides a global overview of efforts in 2019, with information included up to October 2020 where possible, to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and more generally assesses the international community’s response to the global landmine situation. It covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling; includes information on developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of mine contamination and casualties through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance; and documents international and national support for mine action.

This report was prepared by Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has reported on the international community’s response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Cover: Yazidi women receiving life-saving mine risk education in Domiz internally displaced person camp, in Iraq. They come from Kanasour village in Sinjar which is currently being cleared by MAG teams. © Sean Sutton/MAG, April 2019

Top left: Landmine survivor in his garden in Yei, South Sudan. © Dieter Telemans/HI, December 2019

Top right: Injured by a landmine in 2012 in Puerto Asis, Colombia, this man is receiving recovery and rehabilitation support from the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM) © CCCM, September 2019

Cover Design: Lixar I.T. Inc.
Printed and bound in Switzerland

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor is coordinated by the Monitoring and Research Committee, a standing committee of the Governance Board of the ICBL-CMC.

Research team leaders, ICBL-CMC staff, and expert representatives of the following organizations comprise the committee: DanChurchAid, Danish Demining Group, Human Rights Watch, Humanity & Inclusion, and Mines Action Canada.