LANDMINE MONITOR

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24TH ANNUAL EDITION

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines • DanChurchAid • Danish Refugee Council
Human Rights Watch • Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada
Research team members • ICBL-CMC staff experts
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or "Ottawa Convention") as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- More efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW);
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.
PREFACE

LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Antipersonnel mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised landmines, also known as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with those same victim-activated characteristics. Antivehicle mines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person. Landmines are victim-activated and indiscriminate; whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, becomes its victim.

Mines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

ERW refer to ordnance left behind after a conflict. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) are explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and cluster munition remnants. Under the international legal definition, ERW consist of UXO and AXO, but not mines.

Both landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads, footpaths, farmers’ fields, forests, deserts, along borders, in and surrounding houses and schools, and in other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. They deny access to food, water, and other basic needs, and inhibit freedom of movement. They endanger the initial flight and prevent the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities, whose citizens often know they are walking in mined areas, but have no possibility to farm other land, or take another route to school. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to mine/ERW casualties, and when countries must spend money clearing mines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering,
but that they are also a lethal barrier to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global mine and ERW problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel mines. Governments who join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in all mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, and support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent mine incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the ICBL and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines, cluster munitions, and ERW, where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine, children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy, communities don’t bear the social and economic impact of mines or ERW presence for decades to come, and the rights of survivors and persons with similar needs are protected.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network in more than 100 countries, working for the full universalization and implementation of the treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty. The campaign includes national and international organizations, as well as multisectoral expertise from the human rights, development, refugee, medical, and humanitarian relief fields. The ICBL works in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance. The campaign calls as well on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to abide by the norm.

This year marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the ICBL, which created a decisive and effective model of a civil society-led campaign for disarmament and peace. The ICBL’s effort to ban landmines led to a whole new approach known as humanitarian disarmament, and has spawned four international treaties and two Nobel Peace Prizes to date.

The ICBL was launched in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International (now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These organizations witnessed the horrendous effects of mines on the communities in which they were working in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, and how mines hampered and prevented development efforts in these countries. The solution, they realized, was a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign a multisectoral perspective and practical experience on the impact of landmines. These core members mobilized in short time a global network of NGOs engaged on this issue. Conferences and outreach events were soon organized worldwide to raise awareness on the landmine problem and the need for a ban, as well as providing training to partners for effective advocacy efforts. Quickly, the call for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines spread throughout the world, and among diverse partners.

Through sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL and effective partnership with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments, the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada.
Once the goal of developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines was achieved, ICBL attention shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

In line with the 2014 Maputo Declaration and the 2019 Oslo Action Plan agreed by states, the ICBL urges States Parties to make all efforts at completing major treaty obligations by 2025.

The ICBL's success over its 30-year history speaks to the campaign's ability to evolve with changing circumstances. In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the CMC to become the ICBL-CMC.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL and the CMC and is formally a program of the ICBL-CMC. It is the de facto monitoring regime for the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It monitors and reports on States Parties' implementation of, and compliance with, the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more generally, it assesses the international community's response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other ERW.

The ICBL created Landmine Monitor in June 1998, for the first time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law or disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and challenges. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as "the Monitor") to reflect its increased reporting on the cluster munition issue. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

The Monitor system features a global reporting network, country profiles, and annual reports. A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of all the ICBL-CMC's research and monitoring, including the Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The Monitor Editorial Manager, under the ICBL-CMC, is responsible for the coordination and management of research, editing, and production of all the Monitor research products. To prepare this report, an Editorial Team gathered information with the aid of a network comprised of more than a dozen researchers with the assistance of ICBL-CMC campaigners. Unless otherwise specified, all translations were done by the Monitor.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information on all aspects of mine action. Although in some cases it does entail investigative missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting.

The Monitor complements transparency reporting required of states under the treaties. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

The Monitor aims to promote and advance discussion on mine-, cluster munition-, and ERW-related issues, and to seek clarifications to help reach the goal of a world free of mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about issues it is monitoring, in order to benefit the international community as a whole.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from
governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information on an important subject.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 24th annual Landmine Monitor report. It is the sister publication to the Cluster Munition Monitor report, first published in November 2010.

Landmine Monitor 2022 covers mine ban policy, use, production, trade, and stockpiling globally; assesses the impact of mine contamination and casualties and progress made in clearance, risk education, and victim assistance; and documents international assistance and national resources to support mine action efforts. This report focuses on calendar year 2021, with information included up to October 2022 where possible.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A broad-based network of individuals, campaigns, and organizations from around the world contributed to this report. It was assembled by a dedicated team of researchers and editors, with the support of a significant number of donors. Country-specific contributions were received from a network of at least 20 Monitor researchers covering more than 30 countries. Researchers are cited separately on the Monitor website.

The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed research to this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for all their crucial assistance in the production, release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee. The committee’s members include:

- **Representatives from six ICBL-CMC member organizations**: the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), the Danish Refugee Council (Richard MacCormac), Human Rights Watch (Stephen Goose), Humanity & Inclusion (Alma Taslidžan), and Mines Action Canada (Paul Hannon);

- **Monitor Editorial Team members**: Stephen Goose (ban policy), Loren Persi Vicentic (impact), and Marion Loddo (support for mine action); and

- **Senior ICBL-CMC staff**: Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer (Policy and Government Liaison Manager), Hector Guerra (Executive Director), and Marion Loddo (Monitor Editorial Manager).

From January to October 2022, the Monitor’s Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and drafted thematic overviews for Landmine Monitor 2022. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban policy**: Mark Hiznay, Susan Aboeid, Stephen Goose, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham;
- **Impact**: Loren Persi Vicentic, Ruth Bottomley, and Audrey Torrecilla; and
- **Support for mine action**: Marion Loddo.

Marion Loddo provided final editing in October and November 2022 with assistance from Michael Hart (Publications Consultant).

Report formatting and cover design was undertaken by Michael Sherwin. Maps were created by Maria Angela Torri. PCL Presses Centrales SA printed the report in Switzerland.

The front cover photograph was provided by Jared Bloch/ICBL-CMC, and the back cover photographs were provided by Sean Sutton/MAG and Basile Barbey/HI. Additional photographs found within Landmine Monitor 2022 were provided by multiple photographers, cited with each photograph.
We extend our gratitude to Monitor contributors. In 2022, this work was made possible with funding from (list accurate as of 1 November 2022):

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- Government of Luxembourg
- Government of New Zealand
- Government of Norway
- Government of Switzerland
- Government of the United States of America*
- Holy See

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The Monitor’s supporters are in no way responsible for, and do not necessarily endorse, the material contained in this report. We also thank the donors who have contributed to the organizational members of the Monitoring and Research Committee and other participating organizations.

* Specifically, for research on impact (contamination, casualties, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance) and support for mine action.
# ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AXO</td>
<td>abandoned explosive ordnance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>battle area clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCW</td>
<td>1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHA</td>
<td>confirmed hazardous area</td>
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<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cluster Munition Coalition</td>
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<td>CRPD</td>
<td>Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
<td>DanChurchAid</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPO</td>
<td>disabled persons' organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<tr>
<td>EORE</td>
<td>explosive ordnance risk education</td>
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<td>ERW</td>
<td>explosive remnants of war</td>
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<td>GICHD</td>
<td>Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining</td>
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<tr>
<td>HI</td>
<td>Humanity &amp; Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>ICBL</td>
<td>International Campaign to Ban Landmines</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
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<td>IMAS</td>
<td>International Mine Action Standards</td>
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<td>IMSMA</td>
<td>Information Management System for Mine Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>Implementation Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAG</td>
<td>Mines Advisory Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Norwegian People's Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSAG</td>
<td>non-state armed group</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHA</td>
<td>suspected hazardous area</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMAS</td>
<td>United Nations Mine Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UXO</td>
<td>unexploded ordnance</td>
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</tbody>
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GLOSSARY

**Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO)** – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict, and which is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of explosive remnants of war.

**Accession** – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

**Adherence** – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

**Antihandling device** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

**Antipersonnel mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

**Antivehicle mine** – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

**Area cancellation** – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

**Area reduction** – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

**Battle area clearance (BAC)** – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

**Casualty** – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

**Clearance** – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

**Cleared land** – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or destruction of all specified mine and ERW hazards to a specified depth.

**Cluster munition** – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is a “conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.
Confirmed hazardous area (CHA) – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mine and ERW hazards, including survey, mapping, clearance, marking, and the handover of cleared land.

Diversity – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person's social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordinance.

Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) – Activities which seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive ordnance by raising awareness of women, girls, boys, and men in accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordinance. Mines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Gender – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

Humanitarian mine action (HMA) – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of landmines and ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes: survey and assessment, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

Improvised explosive device (IED) – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An IED may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detoned IEDs are not.

Improvised mine, also improvised landmine and improvised antipersonnel landmine – An IED acting as a mine, landmine, or antipersonnel landmine.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles and, in some cases, defining international requirements and specifications.

Intersectionality – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to create layers of inequality.

Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with the minimum possible risk involving the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of land with actual mine/ERW contamination.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

Non-state armed group (NSAG) – For Landmine Monitor purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.
Non-technical survey (NTS) – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Persons with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, the term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivors – People who have been directly injured by an explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and have survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey (TS) – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to define better where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victims – People who have, either individually or collectively, suffered physical, emotional and psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights through acts or omissions related to mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. Victims include people injured and killed (casualties), their families, and communities affected by mines, cluster munitions, and ERW.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support and social inclusion, economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full and equal integration and participation of survivors, their families, and communities in society.
# 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

## Table Key

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 November 2022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Signatory: Signed, but not yet ratified as of 1 November 2022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-signatories: Not yet acceded as of 1 November 2022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### The Americas

- Antigua & Barbuda
- Argentina
- Bahamas
- Barbados
- Belize
- Bolivia
- Brazil
- Canada
- Chile
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Dominica
- Dominican Rep.
- Ecuador
- El Salvador
- Grenada
- Guatemala
- Guyana
- Haiti
- Honduras
- Jamaica
- Mexico
- Nicaragua
- Panama
- Paraguay
- Peru
- St. Kitts & Nevis
- Saint Lucia
- St. Vincent & the Grenadines
- Suriname
- Trinidad & Tobago
- Uruguay
- Venezuela

### East & South Asia & the Pacific

- Afghanistan
- Australia
- Bangladesh
- Bhutan
- Brunei Darussalam
- Cambodia
- Cook Islands
- Fiji
- Indonesia
- Japan
- Kiribati
- Malaysia
- Maldives
- Marshall Islands
- China
- India
- Korea, North
- Korea, South
- Lao PDR
- Micronesia, Fed States of

### Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

- Albania
- Andorra
- Austria
- Belarus
- Belgium
- Bosnia & Herzegovina
- Bulgaria
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Czech Republic
- Denmark
- Estonia
- Finland
- France
- Germany
- Armenia
- Azerbaijan
- Georgia
- Greece
- Holy See
- Hungary
- Iceland
- Ireland
- Italy
- Latvia
- Liechtenstein
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Malta
- Moldova
- Monaco
- Montenegro
- Netherlands
- North Macedonia
- Kazakhstan
- Kyrgyzstan
- Russia

### Middle East & North Africa

- Algeria
- Iraq
- Jordan
- Kuwait
- Oman
- Palestine
- Bahrain
- Egypt
- Iran
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Morocco
- Saudi Arabia
- Syria
- United Arab Emirates

### Sub-Saharan Africa

- Angola
- Benin
- Botswana
- Burkina Faso
- Burundi
- Cabo Verde
- Cameroon
- Chad
- Comoros
- Congo, Rep.
- Côte d’Ivoire
- Djibouti
- Equatorial Guinea
- Eritrea
- Eswatini
- Ethiopia
- Gabon
- Gambia
- Ghana
- Guinea
- Guinea-Bissau
- Kenya
- Lesotho
- Liberia
- Madagascar
- Malawi
- Mali
- Mauritania
- Mauritius
- Mozambique
- Namibia

### East & South Asia & the Pacific

- Nauru
- New Zealand
- Niue
- Palau
- Papua New Guinea
- Philippines
- Samoa
- Solomon Islands
- Sri Lanka
- Thailand
- Timor-Leste
- Tuvalu
- Vanuatu

### Sub-Saharan Africa

- Niger
- Nigeria
- Rwanda
- São Tomé & Príncipe
- Senegal
- Seychelles
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- South Africa
- South Sudan
- Sudan
- Tanzania
- Togo
- Uganda
- Zambia
- Zimbabwe
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## MAJOR FINDINGS

### BAN POLICY

- 7 Banning Antipersonnel Mines
- 8 Use of Antipersonnel Mines
- 20 Universalizing the Landmine Ban
- 22 Production of Antipersonnel Mines
- 24 Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines
- 24 Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines
- 28 Transparency Reporting
- 30 Appendix: Map
  - 30 Status of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty

## THE IMPACT

- 33 Introduction
- 34 Assessing the Impact
  - 34 Antipersonnel mine contamination
  - 48 Mine/ERW casualties
- 54 Addressing the Impact
  - 54 Antipersonnel mine clearance
  - 64 Risk education
  - 75 Victim assistance
- 87 Appendix
  - 87 Summary of Mine Action Management and Coordination
  - 91 Antipersonnel Mine Contamination
  - 92 Landmine, Explosive Remnant of War (ERW), and Cluster Submunition Casualties in 2021

## SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

- 95 Introduction
- 97 International Contributions in 2021
  - 97 Donors
  - 101 Funding paths
  - 102 Recipients
  - 104 Funding by thematic sector
- 108 National Contributions in 2021
- 109 Oslo Action Plan and Support for Mine Action
- 110 Five-Year Support to Mine Action 2017–2021
- 113 Appendix: Maps
  - 113 International and National Support for Mine Action in 2021
  - 114 Recipients of International Mine Action Support in 2021

## STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

- 117 Treaty Status
- 120 Mine Ban Treaty
A woman deminer working in difficult jungle terrain in Colombia.
© Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines, April 2022
The year 2022 marks 25 years since the adoption and the opening for signature of the Mine Ban Treaty and 30 years since the creation of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). Since then, the treaty has established a strong international framework for the elimination of antipersonnel landmines and has contributed to remarkable results in protecting lives and livelihoods. Landmine Monitor 2022 tracks the progress made and remaining challenges in achieving the treaty’s ultimate objective of a mine-free world.

Despite no states joining in the past five years, 164 countries are bound by and are working towards the implementation of the treaty’s obligations, with most of the 33 countries that are not yet party nonetheless abiding by its key provisions.

One of the greatest challenges to the norm against antipersonnel landmines is new use of the weapon. During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use by states not party Myanmar and Russia, as well as by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in at least five countries.

Casualties from landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) have been disturbingly high for the past seven years, following more than a decade of historic reductions. The year 2021 was no exception. This trend is largely the result of increased conflict and contamination by improvised mines observed since 2015. Civilians represented most of the victims recorded, half of whom were children.

As efforts continue to clear mine-contaminated land, much remains to be done, in particular in addressing slow or lack of clearance in many States Parties, as well as in guaranteeing that the needs of landmine survivors and affected communities are adequately met.

In the past two decades, countries both within and outside the treaty have contributed significant resources toward mine action activities. This demonstrates the strong transformational power of partnership that this humanitarian disarmament treaty embodies. Yet, the ever-growing number of global crises and rising demand for other expenditures make the situation more precarious. This has led to decreased mine action support in recent years. Addressing this reality will require greater coordination among donors and substantial investment to fill the gaps in national capacities.
BAN POLICY

USE

From mid-2021 through October 2022, Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by Myanmar and Russia, which are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

- At least seven types of antipersonnel mines have been used by Russian forces in Ukraine since Russia invaded the country on 24 February 2022.
- Government forces in Myanmar have extensively used antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period, including around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and pipelines.

NSAGs used antipersonnel mines in at least five countries during the reporting period: the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), India, and Myanmar.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND MINES RETAINED

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

- Sri Lanka is the last State Party to have completed destruction of its landmine stockpile, in 2021, bringing the total number of countries to have declared completion of stockpile destruction to 94.
- States Parties Ukraine and Greece possess a combined total of approximately 3.6 million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed. Both countries are in violation of the treaty, as both have missed their deadlines to complete destruction of their stockpiles.
- No declared stockpiled mines were destroyed by either Greece or Ukraine during 2021.

A total of 69 States Parties have reported that they retain a combined total of more than 130,000 antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 28 retain more than 1,000 mines each.

PRODUCTION

The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

- This is one country fewer than reported in Landmine Monitor 2021, following the change in United States (US) policy which realigned it with most of the core provisions of the treaty, including the prohibition of the production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.
- The most likely states to be actively producing antipersonnel mines are India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia.
- Russia has developed and produced new antipersonnel mines, with markings indicating their manufacture in 2019 and 2021.
- The first of 700,000 of a new type of antipersonnel blast mines were delivered to the military in India in December 2021.
THE IMPACT

CASUALTIES
In 2021, at least 5,544 casualties of mines/ERW were recorded: 2,182 people were killed and 3,355 people were injured, while the survival status was unknown for seven casualties.

- More than three-quarters of recorded mine/ERW casualties were civilians where their status was known (4,200).
- Children accounted for half of all civilian casualties where the age was known (1,696).
- As in previous years, men and boys made up the majority (81%) of all casualties for which the sex was known (2,675).

Casualties in 2021 were identified in 50 states and other areas, of which 36 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

- Non-signatory Syria recorded the highest number of annual casualties (1,227) for the second year in a row; closely followed by State Party Afghanistan (1,074) which has had over a thousand annual casualties for more than a decade.
- Other States Parties with over 100 recorded casualties in 2021 were: Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, and Yemen.

CONTAMINATION
At least 60 states and other areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines.

- This includes 33 States Parties that have declared clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, 22 states not party, and five other areas.
- An additional seven States Parties need to provide information regarding suspected or known contamination by improvised mines: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the CAR, Mali, the Philippines, Tunisia, and Venezuela.

CLEARANCE
States Parties reported clearance of at least 132.52km² of contaminated land and the destruction of more than 117,000 antipersonnel mines in 2021.

- In comparison, 146.04km² was reported cleared and some 135,000 mines were destroyed in 2020.
- Cambodia and Croatia reported the largest total clearance of mined areas in 2021, clearing a combined total of more than 78km² and destroying more than 7,500 antipersonnel mines.
- Land release progress has been negligible in many States Parties in 2021, with 11 clearing less than 1km² and eight reporting no antipersonnel landmine clearance.

Twenty-three States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 clearance obligations before or no later than 2025, while nine States Parties have deadlines after 2025. Very few appear on track to meet these deadlines.

- Only Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe appear to be on target to meet their clearance deadlines.
- Eritrea remains in violation of the treaty by virtue of its failure to meet its clearance deadline and submit an extension request.
RISK EDUCATION

Risk education to populations affected by antipersonnel mine contamination was conducted in at least 30 States Parties in 2021.

- Thirteen States Parties reported having a prioritization mechanism in place in 2021, for targeting risk education activities.
- Only two of the eight States Parties that submitted a request to extend their clearance deadlines in 2022 included costed and detailed multiyear plans for risk education.

The provision of risk education continued to be impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic in some States Parties, as restrictions limited in-person activities and schools remained closed. Mass media and digital methods were used in more than half of States Parties to deliver risk education messages.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

In 2021, healthcare and rehabilitation activities remained under-funded and faced increasing and numerous challenges in many countries including in accessibility, coordination, expertise, and supply of materials.

- Only 14 of the 34 States Parties with a recognized responsibility for mine/ERW victims had victim assistance or relevant disability plans in place to address needs and gaps in assistance. At least 10 still need to create or adopt a draft national strategy relevant to the implementation of victim assistance.
- At least 22 of the States Parties had ‘active’ coordination mechanisms, while survivors’ representatives participated in coordination processes in two-thirds of those States Parties. However, COVID-19 measures disrupted such processes and restricted their level of participation.
- In several States Parties, healthcare systems were stretched to the verge of collapse due to crises and conflict, while rehabilitation systems often required greater support than before the pandemic.
- Significant gaps remain in access to economic opportunities for survivors and other persons with disabilities in many of the affected States Parties, particularly in remote areas where livelihood opportunities were most needed.

SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

In 2021, global support for mine action decreased by 7% (US$44.6 million), with donors and affected states contributing a total of $598.9 million in international and national support for mine action.

- Thirteen affected states provided a combined total of $55.4 million in national support.
- Thirty-two donors contributed a total of $543.5 million in international support to mine action (a 4% decrease from 2020).

The donor base and the group of countries receiving the most international mine action assistance has remained largely unchanged over the past two decades, with no shift towards greater diversification.

- The 15 largest donors accounted for a majority of all international support in 2021, providing a combined total of $524.5 million (97%). The reliance on a small number of donors represents a serious risk to the sustainability of mine action activities.
- International support for victim assistance reached its lowest level recorded since 2016 ($25.6 million). In 2021, 27 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors did not receive any direct victim assistance funding.
- States Parties with smaller landmine contamination continue to receive less financial support. Nine mine-affected States Parties did not receive external support to carry out clearance and/or risk education projects in 2021.
A warning sign for a minefield near Hostomel in Kyiv oblast, Ukraine.
© Sean Sutton/MAG, April 2022
BAN POLICY

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

The year 2022 marks 25 years since the international treaty prohibiting antipersonnel landmines was adopted on 18 September 1997. The Mine Ban Treaty has succeeded in establishing a robust and inclusive international framework to eliminate these weapons. Although challenges remain, the treaty’s States Parties and its supporters are charting a clear course for achieving its ultimate objective of putting an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines.

During the reporting period, from mid-2021 to mid-October 2022, there was no evidence to indicate that any of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty had violated its core obligations banning any use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines.

The greatest challenge to the emerging norm against these weapons can be seen in new use. Russia has used antipersonnel mines numerous times in Ukraine since it invaded the country on 24 February 2022. This has resulted in an unprecedented situation, in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

As in every year since it was first published in 1999, Landmine Monitor 2022 documents new, and now greatly expanded, use of antipersonnel landmines by government forces in Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) used antipersonnel mines in at least five countries during the reporting period, including in States Parties the Central African Republic (CAR), Colombia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), as well as in states not party India and Myanmar. This new use mostly involved improvised antipersonnel mines; in other words, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) made from locally-available materials.¹

¹ The Mine Ban Treaty defines an antipersonnel landmine as “a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” IEDs or booby-traps that are victim-activated fall under this definition, regardless of how they were manufactured. The Monitor frequently uses the term “improvised landmine” to refer to victim-activated IEDs.
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka completed the destruction of its last stockpiled antipersonnel mines in October 2021. Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of their stockpile destruction obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, having missed their respective deadlines. No declared stockpiled mines were destroyed by either Greece or Ukraine during 2021.

Universalization of the Mine Ban Treaty remains stalled. The last accessions were five years ago.

The spirit of partnership and inclusion that characterized the negotiation of the treaty remains strong, as shown by its dedicated community of states, United Nations (UN) agencies, international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL).

**USE OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES**

The Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by states not party Myanmar and Russia during the reporting period, while NSAGs in five countries also used antipersonnel mines.

**Locations of antipersonnel mine use (mid-2021–October 2022)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use by states</th>
<th>Use by NSAGs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

New landmine use during the reporting period, confirmed by the Monitor, is detailed below.

**LANDMINE USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES**

Russia

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its invasion began on 24 February 2022. There were also numerous allegations from Russian officials, and Russian-oriented media outlets, that Ukrainian forces have used antipersonnel landmines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

At least seven types of antipersonnel mines have been used by Russian forces in Ukraine since February 2022. There is also confirmed evidence that Russian forces have emplaced victim-activated booby-traps and IEDs in Ukraine since February 2022 at numerous locations prior to retreating and abandoning their positions.

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2 In its initial Article 7 report, submitted on 28 November 2018, Sri Lanka declared a total stockpile of 77,865 antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, June 2021, Section 3, Table 2. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.


Antipersonnel mine types used by Russia in Ukraine since February 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Initiation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOB</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MON-50</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MON-100</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OZM-72</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire/command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMN-4</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Blast</td>
<td>Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM-2/POM-2R</td>
<td>USSR/Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Tripwire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POM-3</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Seismic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Additionally, PFM-type “scatterable mines” appear to have been used in several regions, many of which were under the control of Russian forces for an extended period of time. Since there is no independent confirmation of these allegations as of yet, a final assessment and attribution of the use of PFM-series mines in Ukraine by either party is not possible at this time.

All antipersonnel mine types listed in the table above were manufactured in Russia or its predecessor state, the Soviet Union (or Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR). Some landmines used in Ukraine in 2022 were manufactured as recently as 2021, including the POM-3 antipersonnel mine, delivered by the ISDM Zemledelie-I mine-laying rocket launcher from a range of 5–15km away. The POM-3 mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. Another antipersonnel mine used in Ukraine is the PMN-4 blast mine developed and produced by Russia in the early 1990s, after Ukraine achieved independence.

Other types of landmines used in Ukraine can be used in a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, and older MON-series and OZM-72 mines. The POM-2 landmine is delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other remote means such as vehicles, while its variant the POM-2R is designed to be hand-emplaced. If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze or other means then such munitions are considered antipersonnel mines, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

Belarus has provided various forms of military support to Russia related to its invasion of Ukraine, which has seen Russian forces use antipersonnel landmines. This is an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party, with the possible assistance of a neighboring State Party.

The Monitor is not aware of Belarus providing such assistance, either directly or indirectly, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022. However, Belarus should address these concerns with States Parties at a formal annual meeting or in its updated transparency report.

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6 Such types are also labeled “remotely-delivered” and Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) defines them as a “Remotely-delivered mine,” meaning a mine that is not directly emplaced but delivered by artillery, missile, rocket, mortar, or similar means, or dropped from an aircraft. Mines delivered from a land-based system from less than 500 meters away are not considered to be “remotely delivered,” provided that they are used in accordance with Article 5 and other relevant Articles of Amended Protocol II. See, ICRC, “Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 CCW Convention as amended on 3 May 1996),” undated, bit.ly/ICRCCCWProtocolII.


As a State Party to the treaty, Belarus must ensure that its joint military operations with Russia do not violate the prohibition on assisting, encouraging, or inducing a state not party to engage in activities prohibited by the treaty. This means that it is prohibited for Belarus to:

- Provide security, storage, transportation, or transit for antipersonnel mines;
- Participate in planning for the use of antipersonnel mines;
- Commit to rules of engagement that permit the use of antipersonnel mines;
- Accept orders to use, request others to use, or train others to use antipersonnel mines; and
- Knowingly derive military benefit from use of antipersonnel mines by others.

Since March 2022, Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine has been strongly condemned, including by the Mine Ban Treaty president of the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Colombia, as well as Austria, Belgium, Italy, New Zealand, Poland, and the United States (US). This new use has also been condemned by the treaty’s special envoy for universalization, Prince Mired Ben Raad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, as well as by US congressional representatives including Senator Patrick Leahy.

Use of PFM-series mines in Ukraine

There have been numerous allegations and counter-allegations that both Russia and Ukraine have used PFM-series antipersonnel mines in Ukraine in 2022. The claims began during the first days of the invasion and have continued to emerge with greater frequency. The Monitor has reviewed approximately 30 such allegations, most of which related to territory under the control of Russian forces at the time the claim was made. After Ukrainian forces re-captured territory, particularly in eastern parts of the Kharkiv region and the city of Izium in September 2022, and former Russian-controlled territory became accessible to independent researchers, more information on the scale and method of PFM-series mine use has become available.

Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile PFM-series mines, which are delivered by a variety of dispersal systems including hand-carried ground launchers, vehicle-mounted launchers, jets and helicopters, and ground-fired 122mm and 220mm rockets. The size of Russia’s stockpile of PFM-series mines is unknown.

Ukraine declared possessing 3.3 million PFM-series mines in 2020, which are all earmarked for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty. Ukraine has already destroyed more than three million PFM-series mines contained in cartridges used in the KMGU aerial dispenser and other types of “cassettes” carrying PFM-series mines used to load different types of delivery systems. The vast majority of Ukraine’s remaining antipersonnel landmine stocks


11 Of the states of the former USSR, Belarus and Turkmenistan joined the Mine Ban Treaty and destroyed their significant stockpiles (5.4 million and 5.4 million respectively). North Macedonia found a residual stockpile of banned antipersonnel mines in May 2012, including a small number of PFM-series mines, after it completed the destruction of its stockpile.

12 The requirement to destroy almost six million PFM-series antipersonnel mines was a key obstacle that prevented Ukraine from rapidly ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty. For years, Ukraine repeated at nearly every formal and informal Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it would depend on international support for the destruction of its stockpile. Ukraine missed its 1 June 2010 treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines.
consist of PFM-1S self-destructing mines contained in 220mm 9M27K3 rockets fired by the Uragan multi-barrel rocket launchers.\textsuperscript{13}

Ukrainian Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series landmines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022.\textsuperscript{14} Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.\textsuperscript{15} Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft scattered PFM mines in the Sumi region in mid-March 2022.\textsuperscript{16} Similar reports surfaced in early April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.\textsuperscript{17}

Russian officials have alleged that Ukrainian forces used PFM-series antipersonnel mines, while photographs and videos shared by Russians on social media showed PFM-series mines lying in place after attacks in areas that were under Russian control at the time.\textsuperscript{18} Ukraine has denied the allegations and blamed Russian forces for PFM-series mine use.\textsuperscript{19} The United Kingdom (UK) and the US have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.\textsuperscript{20}

Initially, most claims of use made by Russian sources consisted of a close-up photograph of a mine posted to social media with no further context.\textsuperscript{21} This trend culminated in July 2022, as Russian media sources in the city of Donetsk claimed that PFM-series mines had been scattered at several locations in the city center.

\textsuperscript{13} Submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 18 June 2014, bit.ly/UkraineSubmission18June2014; statement of Ukraine, Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 26 June 2015, bit.ly/UkraineStatement26June2015; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019, bit.ly/UkraineStatement22May2019. In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by the Armed Forces of Ukraine or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions. The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-15 antipersonnel mines were not operational, but rather destined for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.

\textsuperscript{14} Facebook post by Irina Venediktova, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 26 February 2022, bit.ly/Venediktova26Feb2022.


\textsuperscript{16} Daria Skuba, "In Sumy, during a night raid, the invaders scattered anti-personnel mines: what they look like," Obozrevatel, 17 March 2022, bit.ly/Obozrevatel17March2022.

\textsuperscript{17} Necro Mancer (666_mancer), "Russians fill residential areas of the city with mines-petals," 4 April 2022, 17:36 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TweetNecroMancer4April2022.


\textsuperscript{19} Facebook post by Irina Venediktova, Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 26 February 2022, bit.ly/Venediktova26Feb2022.

\textsuperscript{20} “Russia highly likely deploying anti-personnel mines in Donbas, UK says,” Reuters, 8 August 2022, www.reut.rs/3SbXntb.

\textsuperscript{21} Alikantes, Marina (Marianna9110), “The Armed Forces of Ukraine “littered” the territory of the Orphanage in Makivka, a satellite city of Donetsk, with prohibited anti-personnel mines PFM-1 "Lepestok", as well as in other cities of the DPR. These mines are prohibited by international conventions.” 2 August 2022, 18:51 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TweetMarinaAlikantes2Aug2022.
These allegations were accompanied by images of mine clearance;\(^{22}\) of individual PFM mines in isolation;\(^{23}\) of civilians handling presumably live mines;\(^{24}\) and claims of civilian casualties.\(^{25}\) Russian diplomatic posts globally shared and quickly amplified the story.\(^{26}\)

One of the more notable Russian claims of PFM-series mine use by Ukrainian forces originated from an attack in late May 2022 on Russian positions in Novovoskresenske, in the Kherson region. Evidence of the attack included photographs of mines in place, remnants of detonated mines, and remnants of the 220mm 9M27K3 Uragan mine-laying rocket, which opens in flight and scatters a payload of 312 PFM-type mines.\(^{27}\) Ukrainian officials cited in a Ukrainian media report about this attack on 25 May 2022 counter-attributed responsibility to Russian forces.\(^{28}\)

As of October 2022, there was significant visual evidence of PFM-type mine use and the remnants of the distinctive carrier equipment necessary to deploy these mines. For example, there have been sightings of the KPFM-1M cassette assembly used by 9M27K3 220mm Uragan mine-laying rockets.\(^{29}\) Both elements were present in images accompanying the Russian claim that Ukrainian troops had mined the approaches to Bakhmut and Soledar, in the Donetsk region, in early August 2022.\(^{30}\) There have been no sightings of KSF-1 series canisters or the BKF-PFM cartridges necessary to deploy these mines from other launch modalities, such as trucks or helicopters.

Since there is no independent confirmation of the allegations, a final assessment and attribution of use of PFM-type mines in Ukraine is not possible at this time.

\(^{22}\) Nikolai (Nikolai1449196), "A Russia tank drives through Donetsk setting off PFM-1 'petal' anti-personnel mines. Ukraine firing these mines into a civilian area is a war crime." 31 July 2022, 08:26 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TweetNikolai31July2022; Bob in NZ (BobInNZ1), "A novel manner of demining the PFM-1 'Petal' anti-personnel mines spread by the UAF over Donetsk. These mines are small and disguised, and can easily kill a child or main an adult. Ukraine committed to destroying 10 million of these weapons in 1999, but failed to do so." 31 July 2022, 11:18 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TweetBobInNZ231July2022; Chronology (Chronology22), "Local residents of #Donetsk help the sappers in clearing Ukrainian anti-personnel mines PFM-1 #Lepestok (#Petal) with simple improvised methods, a tire and a rope. How many did you demine today?, correspondent asked. About 20, replied the local resident. #Ukrainewar #Ukraine." 2 August 2022, 09:20 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/ChronologyTweet2Aug2022.

\(^{23}\) Glosm Eusec (glosmeusec), "On use of mines inside civilian areas. #Ukraine - 20220813 - unknown place, #Donetsk Oblast - Reported around 17:00 pm, video showing box with PFM-1 anti-personnel mines being described as on Marshak Street, Kyivs'kyi district, Donetsk." 13 August 2022, 16:46 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/GlosmEusecTweet13Aug2022.

\(^{24}\) NEXTA (nexta_tv), "In occupied #Donetsk, a woman picked up a petal mine and put it in her bag to show her colleagues at work. Due to the small size of the mine, she thought it was a shell fragment." 31 July 2022, 12:34 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/NEXTATweet31July2022.

\(^{25}\) Dubovikova, Maria (politblogme), "Ukrainian 'petal' mines were found in the following streets, avenues and lanes of Donetsk: Mira, Universitetskay, Oreshkova, Vatutina, Chelyuskintsev, Lubavina, Shchorsa, Bogdan Khmelnitsky. These are residential areas. No military infrastructure." 30 July 2022, 23:25 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/MariaDubovikovaTweet30July2022.

\(^{26}\) See, for example, Russia in Canada (RussianEmbassyC), "The retreating Ukrainian troops heavily the territories in Donbass with anti-personnel landmines PFM-1 "Lepestok" prohibited by the OttawaConvention." 7 July 2022, 16:17 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/RussiaEmbassyCanadaTweet7July2022.


\(^{28}\) "In the Kherson region, the Russian military shelled the villages of Novovoskresenske and Dudchany," Suspine Media, 26 May 2022, bit.ly/SuspineMedia26May2022.

\(^{29}\) Chronology (Chronology22), "Ukrainian troops continue scattering mines PFM-1 #Lepestok (#Petal) in Donetsk using cluster munition of MLRS Uragan. The cluster shell is also sighted (photo no. 1). Citizens! Be careful! #Ukrainewar #Ukraine #Civilians #Donetsk #Cluster #HRW #AmnestyInternational." 12 August 2022, 09:07 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/ChronologyTweet12Aug2022.

\(^{30}\) Chronology (Chronology22), "Ukrainian troops have mined the approaches to Bakhmut and Soledar with anti-personnel mines PFM-1 Lepestok (#Petal). For the mining they use cluster munition from Uragan MLRS. The clusters are also seen in the footage #Ukraine #Ukrainewar #Soledar #Bakhmut #Artyomovsk #Lepestok." 1 August 2022, 16:56 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/Chronology3Aug2022Tweet.
Myanmar

Myanmar’s armed forces have extensively used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. The Monitor has previously documented new use by Myanmar every year since the publication of its first annual report in 1999. Yet 2021–2022 marked a significant increase in new use, including around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that antipersonnel mines were captured by NSAGs from the military every month during January–September 2022, from virtually every part of the country. In August 2022, antipersonnel mines manufactured by the Myanmar Army and in the possession of Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers were captured in the northwest and southwest of Myanmar, indicating extensive mine use by the military.

Myanmar military officials have acknowledged ongoing mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces. Previously, in July 2019, an official at the Union Minister Office for Defence told the Monitor that landmines were still used by Myanmar’s armed forces in border areas and around infrastructure. Earlier, in September 2016, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Major General Myint Nwe, told the Myanmar parliament that the armed forces continued to use mines in internal armed conflicts.

Specific reports and allegations of new antipersonnel landmine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period were recorded in Bago, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi regions, and in Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states. Examples of such reports and allegations are detailed below.

In September 2022, a local NSAG claimed that Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers had laid antipersonnel mines around a church in Moybe, in Pekon township, Shan state. While, in August 2022, a local militia group discovered MM6 antipersonnel mines laid around the perimeter of Letpadaung Copper Mine in Salingyi township,

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31 The Monitor found, between January and September 2022, in a non-exhaustive survey of media photographs, over 25 instances, amounting to hundreds of antipersonnel landmines of types MM1, MM2, MM5, and MM6 in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states and in the Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions. The mines were captured by Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) or National Unity Government (NUG)-affiliated People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) in those areas after overrunning Myanmar Army outposts or after capturing or ambushing a military patrol.


33 The official said, “In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure such as microwave towers. If these are near villages, we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp.” Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defence, Ministry of Defence, Naypyidaw, 5 July 2019.

34 “Pyithu Hluttaw hears answers to questions by relevant ministries,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 13 September 2016, bit.ly/GNLM13Sept2016. The deputy defense minister stated that the military used landmines to protect state-owned factories, bridges, electricity towers, and its outposts during military operations; adding that landmines were removed when outposts were abandoned by troops, or warning signs were placed to mark where mines were laid.

35 The Mobye PDF warned returning local people that they should avoid the grounds of the church as it had been mined. “Junta weapons seized from Catholic church in Shan State’s Mobye Township,” Mizzima, 15 September 2022, bit.ly/Mizzima15Sept2022.
Sagaing region. The copper mine is a joint venture by the Myanmar military’s Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd. and China’s state-owned Norinco Industries.  

In July 2022, there were multiple incidents of people being injured by landmines near the perimeter of Myanmar Armed Forces camps in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state. Other incidents reported that month included:

- Two villagers returning to Kawlin township, Sagaing region, after fleeing the previous day were injured by a mine allegedly emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces.
- Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers accompanied a villager to recover the body of his son, who had stepped on a mine in Zu Kaing village, in Ann township, Rakhine state. They removed two mines on the way which they said had been laid by a unit of the Myanmar Armed Forces.
- Myanmar Armed Forces troops allegedly closed a ferry service in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, and emplaced mines to prevent the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) from using it.

In June 2022, a humanitarian group found three mines in a church compound in Daw Nye Ku, in Demoso township, Kayah state, that the Myanmar Armed Forces had left earlier that day, while a fourth mine injured a boy. Still in Kayah state, landmine use attributed to the Myanmar Armed Forces the previous month caused casualties among attacking anti-military militias.

In May 2022, Myanmar Armed Forces troops allegedly laid mines at a Buddhist monastery that they had occupied in Puandge township, Bago region.

A police officer who defected to the anti-military resistance stated in April 2022 that the Myanmar Army was laying directional and other antipersonnel mines at police posts. That same month, two more incidents, which resulted in civilian casualties, were recorded. The first incident occurred in Mahlaing township, Mandalay region, where a landmine allegedly laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces at the base of a mobile phone tower injured a 15-year-old.

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39 The man’s 14-year-old son had been killed the day before and he wished to retrieve the body. After removing the two mines, which the soldiers said had been laid by the 66th Division of the Myanmar Armed Forces, they prevented the man from going further. See, “Six killed, 11 injured by landmines amid renewed tensions in Myanmar’s Rakhine state,” Radio Free Asia (RFA), 12 July 2022, bit.ly/RFAMyanmar12July2022.
40 On different dates, one child was killed and another person injured by these mines. See, “Locals worry about junta’s landmines in Kyaukgyi,” Than Lwin Times, 27 July 2022, bit.ly/ThanLwinTimes27July2022.
41 Monitor interview with David Eubank, founder, Free Burma Rangers, 15 July 2022. According to Eubank, when Myanmar Armed Forces troops left an area after conflict with the Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF), the Free Burma Rangers discovered three mines in the church compound, another four mines and one that a 16-year-old boy stepped on. He noted that bags or baskets left by departing soldiers each had between one and six landmines in them, still in their factory packaging.
43 The Paungde PDF said that they had found the mines after the Myanmar Armed Forces departed. Aung Aung, “The junta soldiers stationed at the monastery planted mines after they retreated,” Tha Din News and Radio, 10 May 2022, bit.ly/ThaDinNews10May2022.
44 The officer stated that the military council ordered the installation of landmines at police station entrances and exits to prevent PDFs from easily raiding them. “Claymore and anti-personal mines planted at police stations,” Than Lwin Times, 23 April 2022, bit.ly/ThanLwinTimes23April2022.
During the second, civilians were injured by landmines as they were returning to their village in Loikaw township, Kayah state after the departure of the Myanmar Armed Forces. During the second, civilians were injured by landmines as they were returning to their village in Loikaw township, Kayah state after the departure of the Myanmar Armed Forces. In March 2022, villagers in Mhan Taw, in Khin Oo township, Sagaing region, reported that the Myanmar Armed Forces had left mines around bodies of people killed during a raid. Also that month, locals alleged that Myanmar Armed Forces troops had emplaced mines at a checkpoint near the entrance to a bridge in Dawei township, Tanintharyi region.

In February 2022, a civilian returning to Kinsanpya, in Kani township, Sagaing region, was killed by a mine which locals said was laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces during a raid. While, a youth was injured by a mine laid by Myanmar Armed Forces Infantry Brigade 284 in Kyat Ka Chaung village tract, in Kyainseikgyi township, Kayin state.

In January 2022, a man was injured after stepping on a landmine near Nang Khing village, in Demoso township, Kayah state. The Karenni National Defence Force (KNDF) said that the Myanmar Armed Forces had laid mines in the area. Previously, in December 2021, two villagers were injured by a landmine after their village in Mingin township, Sagaing region, was occupied by the Myanmar Armed Forces.

In November 2021, Myanmar Armed Forces troops allegedly laid antipersonnel mines near the base of mobile phone towers in 48 townships, causing casualties among engineers. That same month, residents in Hsipaw township, Shan state, were warned of mines being laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces around a pumping station for an energy pipeline.

During 2021 and 2022, civilians continued to be injured due to antipersonnel mines along the...
border with Bangladesh. In October 2020, Myanmar rejected reports that it had emplaced mines on that border. Bangladesh had expressed concern at ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by Myanmar on its border, and said “unfortunately, outright denial to such a fact-based report remains the only response from Myanmar.”

LANDMINE USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in the CAR, Colombia, the DRC, India, and Myanmar. The Monitor also received reports of sporadic mine use by NSAGs in Egypt, the Philippines, Thailand, Tunisia, and Venezuela. A lack of available information or means of independent verification meant that it was not possible to determine if the reported incidents were the result of new use of antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period, or due to legacy contamination from mines laid previously.

The Monitor has not documented or confirmed, during the reporting period, any new use of antipersonnel mines in several countries which previously had significant use. No use was reported in Afghanistan for the first time since 2007. No use was reported in Pakistan for the first time since 1999, though the Pakistan Army recovered antipersonnel mines from an NSAG in 2022, and many groups which previously used them remain active.

No incidents of antipersonnel mine use by NSAGs in Nigeria were reported, for the first time since 2014, although groups previously involved in mine use remain active.

NSAGs in these countries may still use improvised mines, as in previous years, but limited access by independent sources to territory under NSAG control makes it difficult to confirm new use.


56 Statement of Myanmar, General Debate, First Committee, 75th Session, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 19 October 2020.


59 Sporadic use of improvised antipersonnel mines has occurred in the Philippines. In January 2022, an army soldier and an auxiliary member were injured by an antipersonnel landmine in Pinabacdao, in Samar, while setting up a new detachment. The mine use was attributed to the New People's Army. See, “Army soldier, CAFGU auxiliary member wounded in Samar explosion – military,” GMA News, 26 January 2022, bit.ly/GMANews26Jan2022.


Central African Republic

Since early 2021, there have been reports of new antipersonnel landmine use in the CAR. In April 2022, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) destroyed antipersonnel mines found in the country.\(^{63}\) In 2021–2022, reports of the UN Panel of Experts on the CAR referred to incidents of antipersonnel mine use, documenting that in 2020 and 2021, “in several locations visited by the Panel including Grimari, Ippy, Boali and Nana-Bakassa, the Panel gathered testimonies from local communities regarding incidents where civilians were injured by small explosive devices often triggered by a trip wire in areas where the CPC [Coalition of Patriots for Change], FACA [Central African Armed Forces] soldiers and Russian instructors had been or were present.”\(^{64}\)

Previously, several types of landmines, including NR442 antipersonnel landmines, were photographed by researchers from Human Rights Watch (HRW) and a journalist from France 24 in February 2014, among weapons seized from armed groups by French forces near Mpoko.\(^{65}\)

Colombia

Colombia reported that improvised antipersonnel mines were used by NSAGs in 2021, as well as by criminal enterprises involved in the manufacture of narcotics and illegal mineral extraction.\(^{66}\) Colombia attributed responsibility for 216 antipersonnel mine events in January–December 2021 to residual or dissident forces of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), and for 77 events to the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).\(^{67}\) Twenty events were attributed to other NSAGs, while for 54 events the group responsible was unknown. In total, 367 new events were reported in Colombia in 2021. From 1 January to 31 July 2022, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace registered 232 events (58 attributed to the ELN, 139 to residual FARC elements, 14 to other actors, and 21 unknown).\(^{68}\) Landmine seizure incidents were reported in late 2021 and early 2022.\(^{69}\)

Democratic Republic of the Congo

NSAGs are active in the DRC.\(^{70}\) Sporadic use of antipersonnel landmines has been reported by the Monitor in the past.\(^{71}\) In December 2021, a woman escaping an Allied Democratic

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\(^{65}\) Email from Peter Bouckaert, Emergencies Director, HRW, 20 February 2014.

\(^{66}\) Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), pp. 66–68. The bodies of the improvised antipersonnel mines are primarily non-metallic, using both commercial high explosives and improvised explosives from agricultural chemicals, and are activated by either electronic or chemical detonators. The Article 7 report notes that most are activated by pressure, but some by tension wires.

\(^{67}\) "Mine event" refers to instances of casualties and other events such as reported presence of mines.

\(^{68}\) Updated information according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, sourced from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights database of events by MAP/MUSE. Provided to the Monitor by CCCM.

\(^{69}\) In May 2022, Colombia’s armed forces discovered a stockpile containing 1,984 improvised antipersonnel mines in Puerto Concordia, Meta department. It is not known which NSAG had produced the mines. Colombian Armed Forces, “Fuerza de Tarea Conjunta ‘Omega’ ubico deposito ilegal con casi dos mil minas antipersonales” (“Joint Task Force ‘Omega’ located illegal deposit with almost two thousand antipersonnel mines”), 10 May 2022.

\(^{70}\) These include the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Cooperative for the Development of Congo (CODECO) and the March 23 Movement (M23) among other smaller armed groups.

\(^{71}\) Previously, in August 2009, a military officer reportedly stated that 25 soldiers had been killed by antipersonnel landmines laid by the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda, FDLR), Rwandan Hutu rebels, and noted, “We are not aware of other antipersonnel mines planted in the area.” See, “350 Rwandan Hutu militiamen killed during Operation Kimia II in South Kivu province,” Radio Okapi, 29 August 2009, bit.ly/RadioOkapi29Aug2009.
Forces (ADF) camp was injured by an antipersonnel mine laid on the camp's perimeter. Other incidents of mine use attributed to the ADF occurred from August to November 2021, when at least four farmers were killed in North Kivu province by mines. In July 2021, two children in Ituri province were killed by an explosive device allegedly laid by the ADF. The Monitor had previously reported on mine use by the ADF in November 2005.

India

An increasing number of incidents involving pressure-plate mines, attributed to recent use by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) or its People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) have been reported in the past few years. In February 2022, in Kalanhandi district, Odisha state, a journalist was killed by a pressure-plate mine placed under a banner that had just been raised by the CPI-M. Five days later, a herder in the same area was killed by a pressure-plate mine and CPI-M banners were found nearby. In June and December 2021, in Lohardaga district, Jharkhand state, villagers died after stepping on pressure-plate mines, which police said were laid by the CPI-M or PLGA. Further landmine casualties in this area were reported in 2022.

Myanmar

NSAGs have used antipersonnel landmines in Myanmar since 1999. In late 2021 and early 2022, there were allegations of new use by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the KNLA, and other groups.

Since the military coup in February 2021, several local militia groups have been established, some of which identify as People's Defense Forces (PDFs). Local media often report use of landmines by such groups. Most devices are actually command-detonated roadside bombs, though some are victim-activated mines. PDF groups often declare allegiance to the National Unity Government (NUG). Pro-military militias, such as Pyusawhti, also operate in several areas of Myanmar.

77 There were also allegations of use by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-N), and the Restoration Council of Shan State/Shan State Army-South (RCSS/SSA-S) in their operations against the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period.
79 It is often difficult to attribute responsibility for each mine incident in Myanmar to a specific armed group. In northern Shan state, the Tatmadaw are engaged in armed conflict with three members of the Northern Alliance: the Arakan Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDDA), and the TNLA. Armed conflict among NSAGs has also occurred in the area between the SSA-S, the TNLA, and the SSA-N. Casualties have occurred near to sites of conflict involving all of these groups, although locals were unsure which group(s) had laid the mines.
Between August and May 2022, mine-laying by PDFs resulted in several casualties among the Myanmar Armed Forces in Bago, Magway, and Sagaing regions, as well as in Kachin state.\(^{80}\)

Civilian casualties were also reported in 2021 and 2022. For example, in January 2022, a villager was killed by a landmine emplaced by the KNLA in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region.\(^{81}\) While armed conflict between the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), and members of the Northern Alliance including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in Kyaukme township, Shan state, reportedly resulted in mine-laying that caused civilian injuries in February and March 2022.\(^{82}\) Also in March, mines laid by the KNLA caused casualties in Meh Klaw village tract, in Hpapun township, Kayin state.\(^{83}\) In December 2021, locals blamed the Border Guard Force for a mine that caused civilian casualties near Kyaw Kayt Kee village, in Hpaan township, Kayin state.\(^{84}\)

### ALLEGATIONS OF LANDMINE USE BY STATES

#### Landmines in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

Azerbaijan accused Armenian forces of laying mines in 2020 and 2021 in Nagorno-Karabakh, and in adjoining areas.\(^{85}\) It has not been possible to independently verify these claims.\(^{86}\) At the Mine Ban Treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2021, Armenia denied using antipersonnel mines in the 2020 conflict and stated that during withdrawal, Armenian forces lacked the time possible to mine areas that subsequently came under Azerbaijan’s control.\(^{87}\)

Yet in May 2021, Armenia’s acting prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, told a government meeting that Armenian soldiers had emplaced mines along sections of the border to strengthen security, and had installed warning signs.\(^{88}\) Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on 12 June 2021 that 15 detained Armenians had been handed over to Armenia, in exchange for maps from Armenia showing the location of around 97,000 mines laid in the Aghdam region—one of seven territories outside Nagorno-Karabakh that Azerbaijan regained control over in 2020.\(^{89}\) It is unclear if the maps show the location of newly laid minefields, mines emplaced before 2020, or both.

#### Landmines in Syria

The Monitor has not independently documented or confirmed any new use of antipersonnel landmines by Syrian government forces or by Russian forces participating in joint military operations in Syria. The last concrete indication of possible new use was an undated photograph circulated on social media in May 2019, where a Syrian Army soldier is shown

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\(^{81}\) Ibid. Villagers stated that the mine was laid by KNLA soldiers but did not indicate when.


\(^{83}\) KHRG, “KHRG Submission to Landmine Monitor,” September 2022. It is uncertain when the mines were laid.


\(^{86}\) It has also not been possible to distinguish between the actions of Armenian-supported separatist forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Armed Forces of Armenia, or whether this seemingly joint force used landmines.


\(^{88}\) “Armenian military carried out mining work with the installation of warning signs, the purpose of sabotage was not – Pashinyan,” Novosti NK, 27 May 2021, bit.ly/NovostINK27May2021.

emplacing stake-mounted POMZ-2 fragmentation mines and tripwires on farmland near Kernaz, in northern Hama. 90

UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN

There are a total of 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; of which 132 signed and ratified it, while 32 acceded. 91

The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory. No states acceded to the treaty during the reporting period. The last to do so were Palestine and Sri Lanka, both in December 2017. Nonetheless, there are reasons to be hopeful when it comes to efforts to universalize the treaty.

President Joe Biden realigned US policy with most core provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty on 21 June 2022, and again set the goal of ultimately joining the treaty. 92 The new policy prohibits US development, production, and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines. It also commits the US to not use antipersonnel mines anywhere in the world except on the Korean Peninsula, and to destroy antipersonnel mine stockpiles that are "not required for the defense of the Korean Peninsula."

Mongolia told the Monitor in December 2021 that it stockpiles antipersonnel mines, but "does not produce, sell or transfer" them and "does not utilize mines to defend its borders during peace and war." 93 The statement shows how Mongolia has largely aligned its policies and practice with the Mine Ban Treaty, though it does not address the government’s position on accession to the treaty.

The lack of new accessions over the past five years demonstrates the intransigence of certain states who have ignored repeated calls to revisit and review their policy on not acceding to the treaty. During the reporting period, several states not party acknowledged the Mine Ban Treaty’s humanitarian rationale while reiterating their long-held positions on not joining it.

Cuba decried the indiscriminate and irresponsible use of antipersonnel landmines and said that it is "committed to the application of a strict policy to guarantee responsible use of antipersonnel mines with an exclusively defensive character and for the security of the Cuban nation." 94

90 See, Waters, Gregory (GregoryPWaters), "Engineer in the 33rd Brigade (formerly 9th Div, now part of Hama-based 8th Div) planting POMZ anti-personnel mines in #Kernaz #Hama before his death earlier this year. Farmland in north Hama will be incredibly dangerous for years to come due to all the mines. (ID from @obretix)’ 3 May 2019, 00:00 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/WatersTweet3May2019.

91 Since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must instead accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. The 32 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the treaty’s 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.


94 Explanation of Vote by Cuba on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.
Egypt said that antipersonnel mines are a key means for securing its borders and repeated its criticism that the treaty does not, in its view, assign responsibility for mine clearance to those who laid the mines in the past.⁹⁵

India expressed its commitment to the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines, but cautioned that its position on achieving that goal was contingent upon “the availability of militarily effective technologies that can perform cost effectively the legitimate defensive role of antipersonnel landmines.”⁹⁶

Iran repeated its long list of objections to the Mine Ban Treaty, arguing that the treaty “does not adequately take into account the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, for their responsible and limited use of mines to defend their territory.”⁹⁷

Pakistan repeated its long-held position that landmines “play a significant role in meeting military needs,” and stated that its “security concerns and the need to guard long borders” meant that “reliance on landmines is an integral part of Pakistan's defence.”⁹⁸

South Korea stated that the “unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula” prevents it from acceding.⁹⁹ It remains to be seen if South Korea will heed calls to revisit its position on joining now that the US has realigned its policy with most provisions of the treaty.

ANNUAL UNGA RESOLUTION

Over the past 25 years, a key annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to demonstrate their support for its humanitarian approach and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.¹⁰⁰

On 6 December 2021, a total of 169 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 76/26, which urged full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁰¹ No state voted against the resolution, while 19 abstained.

This marked the fourth consecutive year when 169 votes in favor were recorded. There was a slight rise in abstentions, up from 17 in 2020.¹⁰² States Parties Serbia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe abstained from the vote, but did not explain their reason for doing so. Seven states not party made statements explaining their votes.¹⁰³

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⁹⁵ Explanation of Vote by Egypt on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.


⁹⁷ Explanation of Vote by Iran on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.

⁹⁸ Explanation of Vote by Pakistan on Resolution L.5, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 2 November 2021.


¹⁰⁰ This includes Belarus, Bhutan, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Türkiye.


¹⁰² The 17 states that abstained on the 2020 resolution were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Palau, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, US, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. In 2021, all but Palau abstained. Other states abstaining in 2021 were: Serbia, Uzbekistan, and Zambia.

¹⁰³ Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, and South Korea.
A core of 14 states not party have consistently abstained from consecutive resolutions on the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.  

NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

Some NSAGs have committed to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, reflecting the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of these weapons. However, there were no new declarations by NSAGs during late 2021 or 2022.

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines. The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.

PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

More than 50 states have produced antipersonnel landmines at some point in the past. As many as 40 states have ceased production, including three states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.

The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel landmines: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. The Monitor has again removed the US from the list of producers after its June 2022 prohibition of the production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.

Most of the countries listed as producers are not believed to be actively producing, but have yet to disavow ever doing so. The most likely to be actively producing antipersonnel mines are India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia.

In December 2021, the first of 700,000 of a new design of antipersonnel blast mines were delivered to the military in India. The Nipun mine is designated as a replacement for the M-14 antipersonnel mine. Three further types of mines are under development in India, but it is uncertain if any of these are antipersonnel mines. An August 2020 government procurement announcement called for the domestic manufacture of an antipersonnel fragmentation
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mine. Previously, the Ordnance Factory Board sent out a tender to local manufacturers for one million M-14 mines to be delivered at a rate of 200,000 per year.\textsuperscript{111}

Production of antipersonnel mines appeared to have been ongoing in India from 2016–2022. India also produces the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers, with warheads that can lay antipersonnel landmines. In September 2022, it was reported that Armenia had ordered the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launchers from private companies in India; it is not known if this included the antipersonnel mine laying variant of the system.\textsuperscript{112}

Russia debuted new “smart” landmine systems during annual military exercises in 2021, including mines delivered by rockets and scattered from truck-mounted launchers.\textsuperscript{113} It introduced the POM-3 or “Medallion” antipersonnel mine—a self-destructing bounding fragmentation mine equipped with inherent antihandling/anti-disturbance capability, which had been in development since at least 2015.\textsuperscript{114} Russia has also deployed new MOB fragmentation mines in Ukraine with production markings indicating they were manufactured in 2019.\textsuperscript{115}

On 17 September 2022, Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense released a video and statement claiming to have found 100 Armenian-made PMN-E antipersonnel mines,\textsuperscript{116} eight PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, and 10 antitank mines in territories and supply roads between the positions of Azerbaijani army units.\textsuperscript{117} The claim that Armenia is producing antipersonnel mines is a recent development and has not been confirmed by non-Azerbaijani sources. Armenia denied these claims, and stated in a letter to the Security Council on 13 September 2022 that Azerbaijan was “disseminating false information...in preparation for launching armed aggression.”\textsuperscript{118}

NSAGs have produced improvised mines in Colombia, Egypt, India, Myanmar, and Thailand.\textsuperscript{119}


\textsuperscript{114} In 2015, the POM-3 mine’s design engineers claimed the seismically-activated POM-3 mine would be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians as it is activated by a sensor that detects the footfall of an individual, characterizes it against known signatures, and fires its warhead into the air. See, Igor Smirnov and Mikhail Zhukov, Directors of the Scientific Research Institute of the Engineering Department of Munitions, Mining, and Demining, interviewed on Zvezda TV, 20 November 2015, cited in “Russia Develops Landmine With ‘Electronic Brain,’” Defense World, 20 November 2015, bit.ly/DefenseWorld20Nov2015; and “Perspective Anti-Personnel Mine POM-3 ‘Medallion,’” Military Review, 30 November 2015, bit.ly/MilitaryReview30Nov2015.

\textsuperscript{115} Gibson, Neil (blueboy1969), “The new Russian modular munition (fragmentation mine), the MOB (MOB), was seen by Fenix Insight in mid-September 2022, but could not be passed on due to various reasons.” 3 October 2022, 12:13 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/NeilGibsonTweet3Oct2022.

\textsuperscript{116} The mine name “PMN-E” is a non-standard nomenclature used by Azerbaijan to refer to PMN-1 blast mines they claim are produced by Armenia. Further investigation is warranted to establish the provenance of these mines.


\textsuperscript{118} Letter on behalf of Ararat Mirzoyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the UN, to the President of the Security Council, 13 September 2022, bit.ly/ArmeniaLetter13Sept2022.

\textsuperscript{119} Previous lists of states with NSAG producers have included Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. Low level production of victim-activated explosive devices in some other countries is suspected.
Antipersonnel landmines are prohibited regardless of whether they were assembled in a factory or improvised from locally-available materials.

**TRANSFERS OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES**

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing its annual report in 1999.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted a formal moratorium on exports of antipersonnel landmines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements that declared they have stopped exporting mines. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting mines in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.\(^{120}\)

**STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES**

**STATES NOT PARTY**

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.\(^{121}\) In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the global collective total may be less than 50 million.\(^{122}\)

It is unclear if all 30 states not party thought to have stockpiled antipersonnel mines are current stockpilers. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

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\(^{120}\) The Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to the Monitor and the ICBL by the HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

\(^{121}\) Three states not party, all in the Asia-Pacific, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: signatory the Marshall Islands, in addition to non-signatories Micronesia and Tonga.

\(^{122}\) In 2014, China informed the Monitor that its stockpile was “less than” five million, but there is a degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual landmines. Previously, China was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.
STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY STATES PARTIES

At least 161 of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 94 states which have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, and 67 states which declared that they never possessed antipersonnel landmines (except in some cases for training in detection and clearance techniques).

Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. States Parties possess a collective total of 3.6 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3.3 million) and Greece (343,413).

Sri Lanka announced in October 2021 that it had completed its obligation to destroy its stockpile. Sri Lanka's remaining stockpile of 11,841 antipersonnel landmines was destroyed in Kilinochchi district, Northern province, in advance of its 1 June 2022 deadline.

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines. Greece had a deadline for stockpile destruction of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010. Neither State Party has indicated when the obligation to destroy their remaining stockpiles will be completed.

Greece did not destroy any stockpiled mines in 2020 or 2021. One of the reported barriers to the completion of its Article 4 obligations was a “legal dispute” with Hellenic Defence Systems (HDS), which halted the destruction process due to environmental compliance issues. In a statement in June 2022, Greece shared that they have overcome these contractual and regulatory hurdles and that “the draft contract between HDS and their new subcontractor, has already been submitted to the Court of Auditors for a pre-contractual review and assessment.”

The ICBL has repeatedly expressed concern over Greece’s failure to begin the destruction process early enough to meet its deadline. It has urged Greece to set a firm deadline, to devote the necessary resources for stockpile destruction, and to report progress to States Parties on a monthly basis.

Ukraine remains unable to articulate a timeframe for stockpile destruction. A previous agreement reached by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, the Support and Procurement Agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for destruction of stocks of PFM-series antipersonnel mines was terminated in 2020. The parties were in the process of tendering a new agreement.

Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 transparency report for the treaty, to formally confirm that it does not possess stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

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123 In its initial Article 7 report, submitted on 28 November 2018, Sri Lanka declared a total stockpile of 77,865 antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Section 3, Table 2. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.


130 Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.
Some NSAGs possess stockpiles of improvised antipersonnel mines. In May 2022, Colombia’s armed forces discovered a stockpile containing 1,984 improvised antipersonnel mines in Puerto Concordia, Meta department. It is not known which armed group had produced the mines. 131

MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows States Parties to retain or transfer “a number of antipersonnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 69 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes; of which 28 each retain more than 1,000 mines, and three (Finland, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) each retain more than 12,000 mines. Belgium, Denmark, and Spain collectively used a total of 2,901 retained mines during 2021, decreasing their retained mines to under 1,000 respectively. 132 Another 94 States Parties do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 41 states that stockpiled or retained landmines in the past. Chile joined this latter group of States Parties in 2020, decades after initially retaining over 28,000 antipersonnel mines when the treaty entered into force for the country. 133

In addition to those listed in the table, another 41 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines, and collectively possess a combined total of 14,888 retained mines. 134 Ten of these states used a combined total of 3,673 retained mines in 2021. 135 Another 13 did not report any use. 136 Seventeen States Parties that retain under 1,000 antipersonnel mines have not submitted an updated Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2021. 137

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used.


132 According to their Article 7 transparency reports for 2021, Spain retains 976 mines, Belgium retains 967 mines, and Denmark retains 28 mines.

133 Botswana, Brazil, and Uruguay all reported in 2020 that they destroyed their remaining retained mines (1,002; 364; and 260 respectively) during 2019. In 2018, Argentina and Ethiopia destroyed the entirety of their stockpiled mines retained for training and research, and the UK announced that its stockpile was comprised of inert munitions that do not fall under the scope of the treaty. Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report, which was originally due in 2012.

134 States Parties retaining under 1,000 mines for research and training: Spain (976), Belgium (967), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), BiH (834), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), Japan (663), Slovakia (650), Italy (563), South Africa (545), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Cyprus (410), Portugal (383), Guyana (360), Republic of the Congo (322), Sudan (298), Côte d’Ivoire (290), Germany (279), Netherlands (270), Slovenia (229), Bhutan (211), Suriname (150), Tajikistan (138), Cabo Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Ecuador (100), The Gambia (100), Jordan (100), Rwanda (65), Ireland (51), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Denmark (28), Guinea-Bissau (9), South Sudan (8), Burundi (4), and DRC (2).

135 States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines and reported use of retained mines in 2021: Denmark (1,702), Belgium (1,054), Sudan (230), Slovakia (224), Germany (186), Spain (145), Japan (56), South Africa (51), Cyprus (25), and Slovenia (20).

136 States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines but did not report using any in 2021: Bhutan, Burundi, DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Mozambique, Netherlands, Senegal, Tajikistan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

137 States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines that did not submit an Article 7 report for 2021: Benin, BiH, Cabo Verde, Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Mali, Mauritania, Portugal, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Suriname, and Togo.
Seven States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:

- Djibouti, Nigeria, and Oman (each retaining more than 1,000 mines); and
- Burundi, Cabo Verde, Senegal, and Togo (each retaining less than 1,000 mines).

The Oslo Action Plan requires each State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under Article 3 to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes,” and to “destroy all antipersonnel mines that exceed that number.”

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**States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Last declared total (for year)</th>
<th>Initial declaration</th>
<th>Consumed during 2021</th>
<th>Year of last declared consumption</th>
<th>Total quantity reduced as excess to need</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>15,771 (2021)</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>14,489 (2021)</td>
<td>21,153</td>
<td>2,229</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>12,050 (2016)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>6,357 (2021)</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>5,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5,948 (2021)</td>
<td>13,948</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>5,547 (2021)</td>
<td>7,224</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4,874 (2011)</td>
<td>4,960</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>4,492 (2021)</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>1,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>4,341 (2021)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>3,858 (2021)</td>
<td>17,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>3,760 (2020)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3,485 (2021)</td>
<td>10,466</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>6,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,364 (2011)</td>
<td>3,364</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>3,134 (2021)</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>1,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2,996 (2004)</td>
<td>2,996</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2,050 (2020)</td>
<td>4,978</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2,020 (2020)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>2,000 (2020)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None ever</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>1,780 (2008)</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,771 (2021)</td>
<td>4,539</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1,764 (2011)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1,634 (2009)</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1,330 (2021)</td>
<td>9,526</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>7,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1,491 (2021)</td>
<td>1,781</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1,304 (2021)</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1,213 (2021)</td>
<td>2,035</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,020 (2007)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>115,981</strong></td>
<td><strong>202,364</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,988</strong></td>
<td>–</td>
<td><strong>25,570</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/R=not reported.
States Parties agreed to Action 49, whereby the president of the Mine Ban Treaty is given a new role in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an "early warning mechanism." The Action states that "If no information on implementing the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned."\textsuperscript{139}

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel landmine. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.\textsuperscript{140}

TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party "report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party" regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.

As of 15 October 2022, 81 States Parties (49\%) had submitted their annual Article 7 reports for calendar year 2021.\textsuperscript{141} A total of 83 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2021, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or more years.\textsuperscript{142} The submission rate of reports for calendar year 2021 was slightly greater than that of 2020.

Morocco, a state not party, has submitted 12 voluntary transparency reports since 2006.\textsuperscript{143} States not party Azerbaijan (2008–2009), Lao PDR (2011), and Mongolia (2007) have also previously submitted voluntary reports. Palestine (2012–2013) and Sri Lanka (2005) provided voluntary reports prior to acceding to the treaty.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid., Action 49.

\textsuperscript{140} States Parties retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine: Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, The Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, and UK.

\textsuperscript{141} The 81 States Parties that submitted an Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2021 (as of 15 October 2022): Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bhutan, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, DRC, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Holy See, Hungary, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Norway, Peru, Poland, Qatar, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Sudan, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Türkiye, UK, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{142} The 83 States Parties that have not submitted Article 7 reports for calendar year 2021 (as of 15 October 2022); those that have not submitted reports for two or more years are noted in italics: Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, BiH, Bulgaria, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, CAR, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Namibia, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia, Oman, Palau, Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.

In 2019, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, covering the period from June 2014 to November 2019, which included information on contamination, clearance, casualties, and victim assistance in Western Sahara.\footnote{The sovereignty of Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario). Polisario’s Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union (AU) but is not universally recognized. It has no official representation in the UN, which prevents formal accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.}
STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY

MAP KEY
- States Parties (164)
- Signatories (1)
- Non-signatories (32)

DISCLAIMER
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
MAG staff deliver vital explosive ordnance risk education messages to women in a refugee/IDP camp in Somaliland, close to the border with Ethiopia.

© Sean Sutton/MAG, February 2022
THE IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter highlights developments and challenges in assessing and addressing the impact of antipersonnel mines. It documents progress toward the half-way mark of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Oslo Action Plan, which was adopted in November 2019. The plan is consistent with the fulfillment of the objectives of the treaty, whereby States Parties declare that they are:

“Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenseless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.”

The first part of this overview covers contamination and casualties, while the second part focuses on addressing the impact through clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. These make up three of the five core components or “pillars” of mine action.

According to available data, at least 5,544 people were killed or injured by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) globally in 2021. This represents a significant decrease from the 7,073 casualties recorded in 2020, but remains high compared to 2013, the year when the fewest reported casualties occurred.

In 2021, casualties were recorded in 47 states, of which 36 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and also in three other areas. States Parties accounted for almost two-thirds of all annual casualties. The majority of casualties during 2021 occurred in conflict-affected countries which have contamination by mines of an improvised nature.

Positive progress was observed in 2021 as just over 276km² of land known or suspected to be contaminated by antipersonnel landmines was released by States Parties and returned to local communities. Of this, 132.52km² was cleared, 26.15km² was reduced via technical survey, and 117.33km² was canceled through non-technical survey. More than 117,800 antipersonnel mines were cleared and destroyed. While the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic lingered in some States Parties, the majority were able to resume near-to-normal operations.

Despite this progress, the outlook for meeting the aspirational goal “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025,” looks less than optimistic. No State Party reported completion of clearance during 2021. Eight States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations undertook no clearance in 2021, six of which have conducted no clearance for two years. While some States Parties are making every effort to meet their deadlines, in other States Parties progress has been negligible. Twenty-three States Parties have deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations either before or during 2025, but very few appear on track to meet these deadlines.

Ongoing armed conflict in some States Parties and the increasing use of improvised landmines is compounding the complexity and slowing the pace of survey and clearance. Seven States Parties with improvised mine contamination need to clarify their status with regard to their clearance obligations. Three States Parties with residual contamination have not reported on progress to clear this contamination, in line with their treaty obligations.

Mine/ERW risk education remained a crucial intervention as people continued to live and work in contaminated areas and in states suffering ongoing conflict, including Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Yemen, and in 2022, Ukraine. The Oslo Action Plan outlines commitments to improve the prioritization and provision of context-specific risk education, to build national capacity, and to integrate risk education with humanitarian, protection, and development interventions.

Risk education was conducted in at least 30 States Parties during 2021, with many examples of improved prioritization and targeting of at-risk groups. Risk education was incorporated into the United Nations (UN) Protection Cluster and humanitarian response plans for some States Parties, while efforts continued to build capacity of local actors and networks to deliver risk education. The use of mass and digital media to expand coverage of risk education continued, and in some cases helped reach people in inaccessible and conflict-affected areas.

Victim assistance is an enduring obligation that requires sustained efforts, including by States Parties that remain mine-affected as well as those that have been declared mine-free. At least 34 States Parties have responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims.

The Oslo Action Plan includes commitments to enhance the core victim assistance components of emergency medical response, ongoing healthcare, rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and socio-economic inclusion. It also includes a commitment on protection of landmine victims in situations of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies. New developments in enhancing victim assistance were reported as activities began to recover after the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet in several states, progress was hampered by a lack of funding and resources, inadequate or barely functioning healthcare and social systems, and ongoing armed conflict.

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES

States Parties with Article 5 obligations

As of October 2022, a total of 67 states and other areas were either known or suspected to be contaminated with antipersonnel mines. Of these, 33 States Parties had declared an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination on territory under their jurisdiction or control, and have obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. This includes Argentina.

The 2025 goal for clearance was agreed by States Parties at the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in June 2014, and reaffirmed at the Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in 2019.
which has yet to acknowledge the completion of mine clearance by the United Kingdom (UK) on the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. Eritrea has been in a state of non-compliance since its Article 5 clearance deadline expired on 31 December 2020.

Seven States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), Mali, the Philippines, Tunisia, and Venezuela—are known or believed to have contamination by improvised mines, but have not provided information or recognized having clearance obligations under Article 5.

Twenty-two states not party to the treaty and five other areas have, or are believed to have, land contaminated by antipersonnel mines on their territory.

States Parties that have declared Article 5 obligations as of October 2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus**</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory and completed clearance in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

**Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

States Parties that have completed clearance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty.

No States Parties reported completion of clearance of antipersonnel mines in 2021. Since the treaty came into force in 1999, a total of 30 States Parties have reported clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory.³ State Party El Salvador completed mine clearance in 1994, before the treaty came into force.

States Parties that have declared fulfillment of clearance obligations since 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Nicaragua*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Gambia,* Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Bhutan, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Venezuela**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Algeria*, Mozambique*</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Chile, UK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Algeria, Mozambique, and Nicaragua have reported, or are suspected to have, residual contamination.

**Tunisia and Venezuela are suspected to have improvised mine contamination. Tunisia also has residual contamination.

³ Three additional States Parties reported completion of clearance: Guinea-Bissau (in 2012), Mauritania (in 2018), and Nigeria (in 2011). All have reported newly discovered mined areas under their jurisdiction or control and have been removed from this list.
Several States Parties that had declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines later discovered previously unknown mine contamination, or were required to verify that areas had been cleared to humanitarian standards.\textsuperscript{4} Burundi, Germany, Greece, Hungary, and Jordan each declared the fulfillment of their obligations under Article 5 several years after their initial declarations.

Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Nigeria all reported the discovery of further contamination and submitted extension requests in 2020–2021.

**Extent of contamination in States Parties**

Nine States Parties—Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Yemen—have all reported massive antipersonnel landmine contamination (more than 100km\(^2\)). The extent of contamination in both Ethiopia and Ukraine cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted. Both countries have ongoing conflict which is adding to the overall contamination by explosive ordnance.\textsuperscript{5}

Large contamination by antipersonnel landmines (20–99km\(^2\)) is reported in five States Parties: Angola, Chad, Eritrea, Thailand, and Zimbabwe.

Medium contamination (5–19km\(^2\)) is reported in six States Parties: Mauritania, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan.

Eleven States Parties have reported less than 5km\(^2\) of contamination: Colombia, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, and Serbia.

The extent of contamination in Nigeria is not known.

**Estimated antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Massive (more than 100km(^2))</th>
<th>Large (20–99km(^2))</th>
<th>Medium (5–19km(^2))</th>
<th>Small (less than 5km(^2))</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan BiH</td>
<td>Angola, Chad, Eritrea</td>
<td>Mauritania, Somalia</td>
<td>Colombia, Cyprus(^**)</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Thailan, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>South Sudan, Sri Lanka</td>
<td>DRC, Ecuador</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau, Niger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia(^*)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oman, Palestine, Peru</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Senegal, Serbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine(^*)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\)Ethiopia and Ukraine have reported massive contamination; this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted.

\(^**\)Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control.

**Americas**

As of the end of 2021, Colombia reported 2.96km\(^2\) of antipersonnel landmine contamination, across 66 municipalities and 12 departments. The contamination, mostly by improvised mines, covered 219 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling 1.63km\(^2\) and 188 suspected

\textsuperscript{4} Previously unknown mined areas are often identified through reports of incidents and casualties, or after reports of possible contamination from civilians living close to the areas.

\textsuperscript{5} In Ethiopia, it is expected that the estimate will be significantly reduced after survey. In Ukraine, the estimate included all contamination, including antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and other ERW. More mine contamination has been reported in Ukraine since the conflict with Russia began in February 2022.
The Impact

hazardous areas (SHAs) totaling 1.33km². Colombia reported that 80 new SHAs totaling 0.74km² and 93 CHAs totaling 0.61km² were identified in 2021.  Sixteen municipalities were declared mine-free in 2021. A further 185 municipalities were known to be affected by antipersonnel mines, though the extent of their contamination remained unknown. This included 111 municipalities that were not accessible for security reasons.  

Ecuador and Peru each have a very small amount of remaining landmine contamination. As of the end of 2021, Ecuador had 0.04km² of contaminated land (0.03km² CHA and 0.01km² SHA), containing around 2,941 mines.  Peru’s contamination totaled 0.36km², across 102 CHAs.

East and South Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan reported antipersonnel mine contamination totaling 188.26km² (144.6km² CHA and 43.66km² SHA) as of the end of July 2022. This included 43.9km² of improvised mine contamination.  Prior to the Taliban taking control of Afghanistan in August 2021, new mine contamination resulting from fighting between the government and non-state armed groups (NSAGs) added to the extent of contamination in the country.  

As of the end of 2021, Cambodia reported landmine contamination totaling 715.9km². This land is not differentiated as CHA or SHA in the national database. The northwest region bordering Thailand is heavily affected, while other parts of the country in the east and northeast are primarily affected by ERW. Much of the remaining contamination in Cambodia and Thailand is along their shared border, where access has been problematic due to a lack of border demarcation.  

Contamination in Sri Lanka remains in the Northern, Eastern, and North Central provinces. In total, 11.89km² of contaminated land covered 336 CHAs (10.93km²) and 24 SHAs (0.96km²), as of December 2021. The most significant mine contamination (11.52km²) is found in five districts of Northern province, which were the site of intense fighting during the civil war.

6 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Yessika Sahad Morales Peña, Coordinator, Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines Group (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, AICMA), 19 April 2022.  
7 Ibid. This included nine areas that were prioritized but not yet assigned to operators, totaling 0.58km² (0.27km² CHA and 0.31km² SHA). Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form D, pp. 31 – 52, 37, 41 – 43, and 48 – 49, and Annex II, pp. 98 – 103. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.  
9 Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form C, p. 5.  
12 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), pp. 4 – 5; Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) database, as of 23 February 2022; and response to Monitor questionnaire by H.E. Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA, 18 April 2022.  
15 The five districts are Jaffna, Kilinochi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya.
Thailand had some 40km² of contaminated land across 18 districts in seven provinces. Of this, 21.78km² was classified as CHA and 4.2km² as SHA. A total of 14.04km² across 31 areas was on land yet to be demarcated on the border with Cambodia. Thailand has also seen use of improvised mines by insurgents in the south, but the extent of contamination by these mines is unknown and has not been recorded by the Thailand Mine Action Center (TMAC).

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

BiH reported extensive contamination totaling 922.37km² as of the end of 2021. BiH did not provide a breakdown in terms of CHA and SHA. However, at the end of 2020, BiH had reported contamination of 956.36km², with 95km² classified as CHA and 861.36km² as SHA. This marked a significant increase in the amount of land classified as CHA compared to May 2020, when just 20.75km² was classified as CHA.

As of the end of 2021, Croatia reported mine contamination totaling 204.4km² (136.8km² CHA and 67.6km² SHA) across seven of its 21 counties. In addition, 29.5km² of contaminated land is under military control. According to minefield records, the land outside of military control is thought to contain around 13,856 antipersonnel mines and 921 antivehicle mines. Most of the remaining contaminated land in Croatia is reported to be in forested areas, where clearance projects are aligned with conservation and nature protection regulations.

Cyprus is believed to have 1.24km² of antipersonnel and antivehicle landmine contamination (0.43km² CHA and 0.81km² SHA) across 29 areas. Yet the contamination is reported to be only in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone, and not in territory under the effective control of Cyprus.

Serbia reported 0.56km² of mine contamination across three areas in Bujanovac municipality, all classified as SHA. New areas of suspected contamination in Bujanovac were identified after explosions caused by forest fires in 2019 and 2021, but have not yet been surveyed.

Tajikistan reported 11.82km² of antipersonnel mine contamination (7.34km² CHA and 4.48km² SHA) as of the end of 2021. The majority of the SHA is located on the Tajikistan-Uzbekistan border, covering 3.25km² across 54 areas.

Türkiye reported contamination of 140.59km² across 3,804 areas. Most contaminated areas are found along its borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Syria; whilst 919 areas are not in border regions. Türkiye began conducting non-technical survey in June 2021.
and aims to survey all contaminated areas by 2023 to provide a more accurate picture of contamination. In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces, the contamination also includes improvised mines and other explosive devices laid by NSAGs.

In 2018, Ukraine provided an estimate of 7,000km² of undifferentiated contamination, including antipersonnel landmines, in government-controlled areas within the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and an estimated 14,000km² in areas not controlled by the government. Ukraine had planned to conduct survey to provide a more accurate baseline of contamination in accessible areas, but the outbreak of conflict following Russia’s invasion in February 2022 stalled progress and has significantly added to overall contamination, including antipersonnel mines. In July 2022, the National Mine Action Authority (NMMA) of Ukraine reported that 160,000km² of Ukrainian territory had been exposed to conflict and would require survey, with around 120,000km² of that territory under the control of Russian forces at the time.

Middle East and North Africa

Iraq is dealing with contamination by improvised landmines in areas liberated from the Islamic State, in addition to legacy mine contamination from the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by a United States (US)-led coalition. As of the end of 2021, Iraq reported 1,208.85km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, and an additional 527.15km² of contamination from improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised landmines. Most of the contamination is located in territory under the government of Federal Iraq.

Oman reported that all of its hazardous areas had been cleared before it joined the Mine Ban Treaty, but were in the process of being “re-inspected” to deal with residual risk. As of the end of 2020, Oman reported that remaining suspected contamination totaled 0.68km², and that it planned to re-clear seven areas totaling 0.51km² between February 2021 and April 2024. As of October 2021, Oman had not submitted an Article 7 report to update on progress.

In 2021, Palestine reported 0.18km² of landmine contamination, of which 0.08km² was antipersonnel mines and 0.1km² was antivehicle mines. Sixteen confirmed minefields are

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28 Ibid., p. 9.
34 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form C, pp. 18–19; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), 3 April 2022; and by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information, Directorate for Mine Action (DMA), 10 March 2022.
located within the West Bank and an additional 65 minefields are located on the border with Jordan. No clearance was conducted in 2021 due to a lack of financial support. 38

Yemen does not possess a clear understanding of its level of mine contamination, as ongoing armed conflict adds to the extent and complexity of contamination, which includes improvised mines. 39 The Sarawat mountains and surrounding coastal areas are particularly impacted. 40 The scale and impact of conflict has prevented implementation of effective nationwide survey. 41 The most recent contamination estimate was 323km², as of March 2017. 42 In June 2021, non-technical survey began, with the aim of calculating a national baseline of contamination. 43

Sub-Saharan Africa

As of the end of 2021, Angola reported total antipersonnel mine contamination of 71.49km², across 16 provinces and 1,097 areas. The provinces of Cuando Cubango and Moçico were the most heavily contaminated, with 17.3km² and 13.13km² respectively. 44 Angola did not report how much of its remaining contaminated land was classified as CHA. 45

As of the end of 2021, Chad had identified a total of 126 hazardous areas, with 73 classified as CHA, located in the provinces of Borkou, Ennedi, and Tibesti. 46 Contamination was reported to be mixed, and covered a total area of 78.33km² (56.59km² CHA and 21.74km² SHA). 47 Over half of Chad’s mine contamination (43.24km²) was located in Tibesti province. 48 Lake province was reported to be contaminated with improvised mines. 49

The remaining mine contamination in the DRC is small. In June 2021, contamination totaled 0.12km² (0.09km² CHA and 0.03km² SHA) across 33 areas, affecting nine of the 25 provinces in the DRC. 50 In March 2022, the DRC reported new contamination after a national survey and clean-up of the national database, resulting in total contamination of

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38 Email from Najwa Jarrar, National Capacity Development Analyst Officer, UNMAS, on behalf of PMAC, 8 July 2022.
42 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017), Form D, pp. 4 and 9.
44 Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form C, p. 4.
45 In 2020, Angola reported that about 95% of all remaining contaminated areas were CHA (81.58km² CHA, with total contamination of 85.42km²). See, Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form C, pp. 3–4.
46 Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), p. 3. Chad reported slightly different contamination figures in its demining workplan, with a total of 77.62km², including 72 CHAs totaling 55.94km² and 48 SHAs totaling 21.68km². Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Workplan, 4 May 2022, pp. 8–9, bit.ly/ChadArt5WorkplanMay2022.
47 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 10 May 2022; and Chad Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Workplan, 4 May 2022, pp. 8–9, bit.ly/ChadArt5WorkplanMay2022.
48 Ibid.
0.4km² across 37 CHAs. Improvised mine contamination has been identified in Ituri and North-Kivu provinces. These mines were reportedly planted in agricultural land to prevent farmers working in their fields.

Eritrea has not reported on the extent of its contamination since 2014, when it was estimated at 33.5km². Eritrea remains in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty by virtue of its failure to meet its clearance deadline and submit an extension request.

In June 2022, Ethiopia reported remaining contamination of 726.07km², across 152 areas in six provinces; the same contamination figure reported in April 2020. Of this, 29 areas were classified as CHA (3.52km²), while 123 areas were SHA (722.55km²). Most SHAs are located in the Somali region. It is believed that the baseline figure is an overestimate, and that only 2% of these areas contain landmines.

The conflict in northern Ethiopia since November 2020 has left significant contamination with explosive ordnance, though the extent and type of contamination there is yet to be fully established. Separate armed conflicts are ongoing in other regions of Ethiopia, particularly in Oromia and Benishangul Gumuz.

Guinea-Bissau had declared fulfillment of its clearance obligations in December 2012, but in June 2021 reported further mine/ERW contamination. As of the end of 2021, Guinea-
Guinea-Bissau reported 1.09km² of CHA in North province (0.49km² of antipersonnel mine and 0.6km² of antivehicle mine contamination). In addition, another 43 areas across North, East, and South provinces were suspected to contain both mines and ERW. Guinea-Bissau planned to undertake a national survey to determine the extent of remaining contamination.

Mauritania declared clearance of all known contamination in 2018 but later identified new mined areas. As of the end of 2021, Mauritania reported 14.93km² of mine contamination, with 14.39km² affected by antipersonnel mines and 0.54km² by antivehicle mines.

In 2021, Niger reported 0.18km² of CHA, adjacent to a military post in Madama, in the Agadez region. This figure has not changed since its Article 5 extension request was granted in 2020. The estimate of remaining contamination is unclear in part due to contamination and casualties from mines and improvised devices in western Niger. In 2022, Niger reported that it could not guarantee clearance would be completed by its 2024 deadline due to several challenges, including weather conditions, lack of funding, and the threat posed by NSAGs. Niger has provided no further information on the extent of contamination by improvised mines.

In 2019, Nigeria reported improvised mine contamination. Nigeria is impacted by improvised mines, IEDs, and ERW, mainly in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in the northeast. Nigeria was granted a second extension to its clearance deadline in 2021. It reported that due to insecurity, the extent of contamination had not yet been determined.

Senegal reported that following non-technical survey in 2020, a total of 37 hazardous areas had been identified, covering 0.49km². As of the end of 2021, Senegal reported nine other areas with possible contamination and 118 localities still to be surveyed.

In its Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in September 2021, Somalia reported 6.1km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, out of a total of 161.8km² of mixed contamination which included antivehicle mines. Somalia also reported increased use of improvised mines. Since 2017, the Somali Explosives Management Authority (SEMA) has been synchronizing and verifying data in its national database, which may lead to adjustments to overall contamination figures. This process was ongoing in 2021.
October 2022, Somalia had not provided an update on the extent of contamination, though some clearance was conducted in 2021.

South Sudan reported 7.4km² of contamination as of the end of 2021, with 2.99km² CHA and 4.41km² SHA across 25 counties in eight states.\textsuperscript{76}

The largest SHA, in Jonglei state, totaled 1.98km², but it is thought that its size will be reduced through survey.

As of the end of 2021, Sudan reported 13.28km² of antipersonnel landmine contamination, with 3.32km² CHA and 9.96km² SHA across the states of Blue Nile, South Kordofan, and West Kordofan.\textsuperscript{77}

In 2021, 1.08km² of contaminated land was newly identified in Sudan.\textsuperscript{78}

As of the end of 2021, contamination in Zimbabwe totaled 23.51km². This contamination is all classified as CHA and is mostly located along the border with Mozambique in four provinces, with one inland minefield in Matabeleland North province.\textsuperscript{79}

Suspected improvised antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties

Improvised devices designed to detonate—or which due to their design, can be detonated—by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.\textsuperscript{80}

Available information indicates that the fusing of most improvised landmines allows them to be activated by a person, though there may be exceptions.

Improvised mines are noted as a concern in the Oslo Action Plan, recognizing that "new use of antipersonnel mines in recent conflicts, including those of an improvised nature, has added to the remaining challenge of some States Parties in fulfilling their commitments under Article 5."

Action 21 of the Oslo Action Plan lays out the commitments of States Parties affected by improvised mines, whereby all provisions and obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty apply to such contamination. This includes the obligation to clear these devices under Article 5, and to provide regular information on the extent of contamination, disaggregated by type of mines, in annual transparency reporting under Article 7.

At least 20 States Parties are believed or known to have improvised mine contamination.\textsuperscript{81}

Seven of these States Parties have not declared clearance obligations under Article 5 and

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{76} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, South Sudan National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 27 May 2022; and South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), p. 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{77} Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Forms C and F, pp. 8 and 13; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Majeed, Chief of Operations, Sudan National Mine Action Center (SNMAC), 20 April 2022.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Maeeid, Chief of Operations, SNMAC, 20 April 2022.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), pp. 2–3.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} In Monitor reporting, improvised mines are synonymous with victim-activated IEDs. IEDs are "homemade" explosive weapons that are designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. These are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines or victim-operated IEDs, or are referred to by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate IEDs or crush wire IEDs.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} Afghanistan, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Somalia, Thailand, Tunisia, Türkiye, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Yemen.
\end{itemize}
have not submitted regular Article 7 transparency reports: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the CAR, Mali, the Philippines, Tunisia, and Venezuela. These States Parties must clarify their status with regards to their Article 5 obligations and may need to request new clearance deadlines.

In Burkina Faso, IED use by NSAGs has been recorded since 2016. Pressure-plate improvised antivehicle mines have been increasingly used since 2018, due to the introduction of measures which block signals to command-detonated IEDs. Casualties of improvised mines have been recorded in 2020 and 2021, although most incidents involved vehicles, including cars, carts, and bicycles. However, a few incidents appear to have involved people walking. All 35 casualties in 2021 were civilians.

Cameroon originally declared that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, and its Article 5 clearance deadline expired in 2013. However, since 2014, improvised mines have caused casualties, particularly in the north on the border with Nigeria, as Boko Haram’s activities have escalated. The extent of contamination is unknown but thought to be small. Most casualties in past years were traveling by vehicle. In 2021, of the 14 improvised mine casualties recorded in Cameroon, all civilians, only one incident occurred when the person stepped on the mine.

In the CAR, the conflict between government forces and rebel groups has escalated since 2020, with an increase in the use of mines, including improvised mines, and other IEDs, particularly in the west. In April 2021, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that antipersonnel mines had been found for the first time in the country. The CAR has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2004.

Mali has confirmed antivehicle landmine contamination, and since 2017 has seen a significant rise in incidents caused by IEDs, including improvised mines, in the center of the country. All casualties to date were traveling by vehicle. The Monitor recorded 195 improvised mine casualties in Mali in 2021. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has reported that improvised mines in Mali are victim-activated by pressure tray or wire trap.

The Philippines has reported that it has no remaining mined areas, although risk education is still conducted due to ERW contamination. Yet casualties from improvised mines continue to be reported in the Bangsa moro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) in the south. In November 2019, at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, the Philippines reported that the New People’s Army had continued to use weapons causing injuries, and that their use of “improvised explosive devices with anti-personnel characteristics is well-documented.” The use of improvised mines by other NSAGs has also

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83 Based on incident notes documented within the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) compilation of media coverage for conflict incidents in Cameroon during 2021.
87 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS Mali, 5 October 2020.
88 Philippines Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Forms C and I.
been documented. In 2021, the Monitor recorded two improvised mine casualties in the Philippines.

Tunisia declared completion of its clearance obligations in 2009. However, there is known to be residual contamination and there have been reports of both civilian and military casualties from mines—including improvised mines—in the last five years. In 2021, of the 10 casualties recorded in Tunisia, half were civilians.

Venezuela reported meeting its Article 5 obligations in 2013. Yet in August 2018, local media reports said that Venezuelan military personnel suffered an antipersonnel landmine incident in Catatumbo municipality, in Zulia state, along the border with Colombia. Colombian NSAGs were believed to be using improvised mines to protect strategic positions in the area. After a confrontation in March 2021 between Venezuelan troops and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) in Victoria, Apure state, a Venezuelan non-governmental organization (NGO) stated that mines "similar to those used in Colombia" were found in the area. Contamination was later confirmed by a member of parliament and the Ministry of Defense. Venezuela reported that the military would clear the area, but has also requested UN support to clear mines from the border.

States Parties with residual contamination

Five States Parties were known or suspected to have residual contamination in 2021.

Algeria declared fulfillment of its Article 5 obligations in December 2016, but continues to find and destroy antipersonnel mines along its southwestern borders. In 2021, Algeria reported that 1,725 antipersonnel mines were found and destroyed; a decrease from 8,813 in 2020. Algeria has stated that mines are immediately reported and destroyed, in accordance with the treaty.

91 Tunisia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 9.
92 The Monitor recorded a total of 60 casualties in Tunisia between 2017–2021.
93 Based on ACLED incident notes on media reporting for conflict incidents in Tunisia during 2021.
95 “Un militar venezolano muerto por mina antipersonal en frontera con Colombia” (“Venezuelan military killed by antipersonnel mine at the border with Colombia”), France 24, 6 August 2018, bit.ly/France24-6Aug2018.
97 “Venezuela to request UN aid to clear mines from Colombia border,” France 24, 5 April 2021, bit.ly/France24-5April2021; and “Enfrentamiento entre Fuerzas Armadas venezolanas y disidentes de las FARC en Apure: denunciaron que en la zona del enfrentamiento se hallaron minas antipersona” (“Clash between Venezuelan Armed Forces and FARC dissidents in Apure: they denounced that antipersonal mines were found in the conflict area”), NTN24, 21 March 2021, bit.ly/NTN24-21March2021.
101 Email from Col. Djelliel, Executive Secretary, Algerian Interministerial Committee on Implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, 20 April 2021.
Mine and ERW casualties have been reported in Kuwait since 1990, including in 2021. In 2018, there were reports of torrential rain having unearthed landmines, presumed to be remnants of the 1991 Gulf War. Landmines are believed to be present mainly on Kuwait’s borders with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in areas used by shepherds for grazing animals. Kuwait has not made a formal declaration of contamination in line with its Article 5 obligations.

Mozambique was declared mine-free in 2015, but reported that it is dealing with some residual and isolated mine contamination throughout the country. Four small suspected mined areas totaling 1,881m² were reported in 2018 to be located underwater in Inhambane province. Mozambique stated that it would address these areas once the water level had receded, allowing access. Mozambique has provided no further updates on these areas since 2019.

Nicaragua declared completion of clearance under Article 5 in April 2010, but has since found residual contamination. Fifteen reports of explosive ordnance from the public in 2021 resulted in the clearance of 4,190m² and the destruction of one antipersonnel landmine and 544 ERW. Nicaragua confirmed that these contingency operations would continue through 2022.

Tunisia reported the clearance of all minefields laid in 1976 and 1980 along its borders with Algeria and Libya. Yet, since declaring completion of clearance in 2009, Tunisia has reported a residual mine/ERW threat remaining from World War II in El Hamma, Mareth, and Matmata in the south; Faiedh and Kasserine in the center; Cap-Bon in the north; and in the northwest. Tunisia has not provided updates on efforts to clear this residual contamination.

**ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS**

Twenty-two states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, and five other areas have, or are believed to have, land contaminated by antipersonnel landmines on their territory.

States not party and other areas with antipersonnel mine contamination

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<tr>
<th>Abkhazia</th>
<th>Armenia</th>
<th>Azerbaijan</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
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<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: other areas are indicated in *italics*.

State not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since the Mine Ban Treaty came into existence in 1999.

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104 Statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/StatementMozambiqueJune2018; and Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 20 April 2017–1 April 2018), Form F. Mozambique erroneously reported that the total of the areas was "18,888 square meters" in its statement at the intersessional meetings, and "1.118m²" across four tasks in its 2019 Article 7 transparency report. See, Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2018–31 March 2019) Form C, p. 4.


106 Tunisia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form C, p. 5.
States not party

The extent of contamination is unknown in most states not party.

Landmines are known or suspected to be located along the borders of several states not party, including Armenia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, North Korea, South Korea, and Uzbekistan.

Ongoing conflict, insecurity, and the impact of improvised mines affect states not party Egypt, India, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.

The extent of contamination in Azerbaijan is not known. After the conflict with Armenia ended in September 2020, Azerbaijan gained control of areas along the former line of contact between Armenia and Azerbaijan—an area heavily contaminated with mines/ERW. The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) was cooperating with the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Border Services Command, and the Turkish military to clear these areas.

In Georgia, five landmine contaminated areas remain in Tbilisi-administered territory, totaling 2.29km² (0.12km² contaminated with antipersonnel mines and 2.17km² with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines). Yet the full extent of contamination in these areas was unknown due to lack of survey.

Israel reported some 90km² of contamination in 2017 (41.58km² CHA and 48.51km² SHA), including areas in the West Bank. This did not include mined areas "deemed essential to Israel’s security." No updates on contamination have been provided since 2017—although Israel reported progress in re-surveying mine-affected areas and clearance of 0.18km² in 2020, and 0.56km² in 2021. A total of 140 mines/ERW were reported cleared in 2021, with 2.7km² of land released in the Negev desert, in the border area with Egypt.

As of the end of 2021, Lebanon reported 17.87km² of CHA, including 0.37km² contaminated by improvised mines. In 2021, Lebanon reported 0.03km² of newly discovered antipersonnel landmine contamination and 0.02km² of newly discovered improvised mine contamination.

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107 After the end of the conflict in 2020, the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) reported that there were "obvious minefields" and that the entire region "will be surveyed to register the mine and ERW affected regions." Due to changes in the affected territories, strategic and operational plans were also under review in 2021. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Elnur Gasimov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 7 March 2021.


109 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Montafi, Partnerships and Programme Support Manager, HALO Trust, 8 April 2022.

110 Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMMA), 26 May 2018.


112 Israel CCW Amended Protocol II Article 15 Report, Form B, January 2022. In December 2021, a clearance operation saw 2.7km² released in the Negev desert. The duration of the operation was not provided, while it was not specified how much land was cleared and how much was released through survey. See, “Israel Defense Ministry completes demining operation near Egypt border,” *Jewish News Syndicate*, 16 December 2021, bit.ly/JewishNewsSyndicate16Dec2021.

113 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Fadi Wazen, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 15 February 2022.

114 Ibid.
Other areas

Five other areas, unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to their political status, are known to be contaminated.

As of the end of 2021, Kosovo’s mine-affected areas totaled 0.76km², with an additional 0.42km² of mixed contamination.\textsuperscript{115} Abkhazia reported 0.01km² of antipersonnel mine contamination and 0.04km² of mixed contamination.\textsuperscript{116}

Before the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in September 2020, Nagorno-Karabakh was reported to have 6.75km² of contamination. This included 5.62km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, 0.23km² of antivehicle mine contamination, and 0.9km² of mixed contamination.\textsuperscript{117} After the conflict and changes in territorial control, the extent of contamination is not known. The only mine action operator in Nagorno-Karabakh, the HALO Trust, reported that its operational area had reduced by 60% following the conflict and that the presence of Russian peacekeepers had resulted in access constraints. The clearance of cluster munition remnants in urban settings was prioritized in 2021 by the HALO Trust over landmine clearance in rural areas.\textsuperscript{118}

Contamination in Somaliland totaled 5.43km²; this included 0.64km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, 1.81km² of antivehicle mine contamination, 0.04km² of ERW contamination, and 2.94km² of mixed contamination.\textsuperscript{119} Most of the remaining contaminated areas in Somaliland are barrier minefields or perimeter minefields around military bases.\textsuperscript{120}

Western Sahara has minefields east of the Berm,\textsuperscript{121} covering an area of 211.72km² (86.06km² CHA and 125.66km² SHA).\textsuperscript{122} According to UNMAS, these minefields are contaminated with antivehicle mines, although small numbers of antipersonnel mines have also been found.\textsuperscript{123}

\section*{MINE/ERW CASUALTIES}

Landmines of all types, as well as cluster munition remnants and ERW,\textsuperscript{124} remain a significant threat and continue to cause indiscriminate harm globally.

At least 5,544 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW in 2021. Of that total, at least 2,182 were killed while 3,355 were injured. In the case of seven casualties, the survival outcome was unknown.\textsuperscript{125} Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 47 countries and three other areas in 2021.

\textsuperscript{115} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmet Sallova, Director, Kosovo Mine Action Center (KMAC), 11 May 2022.
\textsuperscript{116} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Michael Montafi, Partnerships and Programme Support Manager, HALO Trust, 21 March 2022.
\textsuperscript{117} Email from Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 20 July 2021.
\textsuperscript{119} Email from Lucia Puytigoso Vargas, Somaliland Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 26 March 2022.
\textsuperscript{120} Email from Chris Pym, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.
\textsuperscript{121} A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm was built during the 1975–1991 conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco in the west, and the Polisario Front in the east.
\textsuperscript{122} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Edwin Faigmane, Acting Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 12 April 2022.
\textsuperscript{123} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leon Louw, Western Sahara Programme Manager, UNMAS, 4 March 2021.
\textsuperscript{124} Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor's global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more detail on cluster munition casualties, see ICBL-CMC, \textit{Cluster Munition Monitor 2022} (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, August 2022), bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitor2022.
\textsuperscript{125} As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the number of people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties, and this information was not included in the Monitor’s casualty database.
States and areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Americas</th>
<th>East and South Asia and the Pacific</th>
<th>Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia</th>
<th>Middle East and North Africa</th>
<th>Sub-Saharan Africa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lao PDR</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Chad</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>DRC</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Mali</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Niger</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td>Somaliland</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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<td>Western Sahara</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**. Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

Annual casualties rose sharply in 2015–2016 due to increased conflict and contamination. While the total number of casualties decreased from 2017 to 2019, it increased again in 2020, when 7,073 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW. Annual casualties in 2021 were close to the level recorded in 2019.  

In the period 2001–2021, data collected by the Monitor shows that 2013 was the year with the fewest mine/ERW casualties on record (3,456). The notable rise in annual casualties since then is primarily due to intensive armed conflicts involving the use of improvised mines.

Annual mine/ERW casualties (2001–2021)  

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126 Landmine Monitor 2020 reported that at least 5,554 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW in calendar year 2019. That figure was subsequently revised with new data to 5,853 casualties in 2019.

127 The number of casualties initially recorded for past years has since been adjusted with newly available data.
Syria had the most recorded casualties of any country or area in 2021; as was the case in 2020. For the previous two decades, Afghanistan and Colombia had alternated in recording the most annual casualties. Mine/ERW casualties in Colombia spiked in 2005–2007, while Afghanistan recorded the most casualties in 2008–2019, except for 2016, which witnessed a peak in Yemen.

Since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, the number of casualties in Syria has risen massively. Beginning in 2014, Syria recorded the second highest number of casualties after Afghanistan, which accounted for over a quarter of global mine/ERW casualties in the period 2011–2021.

Countries recording the most annual mine/ERW casualties (2001–2021)

In the past decade, the majority of all casualties (82%) were recorded in just 12 countries which have recorded more than 1,000 casualties over the period. All but one state with more than 1,000 casualties since 2011 have experienced mine/ERW contamination due to recent conflict and have reported casualties resulting from the use of improvised mine types. Cambodia represents a notable exception, where casualties from legacy contamination decreased from 211 in 2011 to 44 in 2021.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Number of casualties</th>
<th>% of total casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>17,057</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>11,104</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>5,339</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3,457</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>2,978</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2,862</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2,288</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1,639</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1,487</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties are indicated in bold.
From the Russian invasion on 24 February through mid-September 2022, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded 277 civilian mine/ERW casualties in Ukraine, compared to 58 in 2021. This already represents a fivefold increase. The HALO Trust recorded 169 civilian casualties from explosive devices in Ukraine from 25 February to 12 July 2022, noting it was considered as “a significant under-representation of actual statistics.” The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) reported that during the first seven weeks of the conflict, there were 102 casualties (29 killed and 73 injured) among deminers.

**CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS**

The long-recognized trend of civilian harm caused by mines/ERW continued to be apparent in 2021, with civilians accounting for the vast majority of casualties. In 2021, 76% of all casualties were civilians, where their status was known; while the Monitor identified 27 casualties among deminers in seven countries and one other area.

The country with the most civilian casualties was Afghanistan (1,073), followed by Syria (760), Yemen (455), Myanmar (344), Nigeria (206), and Iraq (180); together representing 72% of the total civilian casualties recorded in 2021.

Military personnel or other combatants represented 23% of all casualties. The country with the most military casualties was Syria (465), followed by Nigeria (256) and Mali (175); together making up 69% of the total military casualties recorded in 2021.

At least 1,696 child casualties were recorded in 2021. Children made up half (50%) of civilian casualties where the age group was known (3,418), accounting for 40% of all casualties where the age group was known (4,275). Children were killed (636) or injured (1,057) by mines/ERW in 33 states and two other areas. The survival outcome for three children was not reported. In 2021, as in previous years, the vast majority of child casualties were recorded in Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, BiH, Iran, Iraq, Türkiye, Zimbabwe, and other area Nagorno-Karabakh.

In 2021, military casualties of mines/ERW were recorded in 27 states—Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, CAR, Colombia, DRC, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Türkiye, Venezuela, and Yemen—and in other areas Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.

Child mine/ERW casualties are recorded when the age of the victim is less than 18 years at the time of the explosion, or when the casualty was reported by the source (such as a media report) as being a child. Child casualties of mines/ERW were recorded in 33 states—Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, Colombia, DRC, India, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, and Yemen—and the other areas Somaliland and Western Sahara.
were boys (77%). ERW remained the item causing most child casualties (741, or 44%), followed by improvised mines (372, or 22%), and unspecified mine types (331, or 20%).

As in previous years, men and boys made up the majority of recorded casualties in 2021, accounting for 2,675 (or 81%) of casualties where the sex was known (3,292). Women and girls accounted for 617 (or 19%).

CASUALTIES BY DEVICE TYPE

In 2021, improvised mines, most of which are believed to act as antipersonnel mines, accounted for the highest number of casualties for the sixth consecutive year.

Collectively, landmines of all types caused the vast majority of recorded casualties (3,855, or 70%) in 2021—including factory-made antipersonnel mines (414, or 7%), victim-activated improvised mines (1,741, or 31%), antivehicle mines (106, or 2%), and unspecified landmine types (1,594, or 29%). Most casualties attributed to unspecified mine types in 2021 were reported in Syria (925) and Yemen (384), which both have significant numbers of casualties due to improvised mine use. Together, Syria and Yemen accounted for 82% of casualties due to unspecified mine types in 2021.

Cluster munition remnants caused 149 casualties, while other ERW caused 1,258 casualties in 2021. A total of 282 casualties resulted from mines/ERW that were not disaggregated.

Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2021

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; and ERW=explosive remnants of war.

CASUALTIES AND MINE BAN TREATY STATUS IN 2021

Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 36 States Parties in 2021, representing over two-thirds (62%, or 3,454) of annual casualties. Six States Parties each recorded more than 100 casualties.

The trend of declining annual casualties in most States Parties since the entry into force of the treaty continued, aside from those experiencing conflict and substantial improvised mine use.

137 There were 900 boys and 264 girls recorded as casualties in 2021, while the sex of 532 child casualties was not recorded.

138 Other device types causing child casualties included: antipersonnel mines (54 casualties, 3%), antivehicle mines (15 casualties, 1%), cluster munition remnants (90 casualties, 5%), and undifferentiated mines/ERW (91 casualties, 5%).
During 2021, the Monitor recorded a total of 2,034 mine/ERW casualties in 11 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, with some 60% of those casualties recorded in Syria (1,227).\textsuperscript{139} For the fourth year running, Myanmar accounted for the next highest casualty total among states yet to join the treaty, with 368 casualties; an increase on the 280 recorded in 2020.

In three other areas—Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, and Western Sahara—a combined total of 56 casualties were reported in 2021.\textsuperscript{140}

RECORDING CASUALTIES

Many mine/ERW casualties go unrecorded each year globally, and therefore are not captured in the Monitor data. Some countries do not have functional casualty surveillance systems in place, while other forms of reporting are often inadequate or lack disaggregation.

States Parties

In Afghanistan, data collection was constrained amid ongoing conflict. The existing system records only civilian casualties, with no reliable data on military casualties since 2019.

In Ethiopia, no disaggregated casualty data was available for 2021. In October 2021, the Global Protection Cluster reported 71 casualties caused by explosive ordnance in Ethiopia “in recent months.”\textsuperscript{141}

Data on casualties of IEDs that are command-detontated (and therefore not landmines) is often included in generalized reporting and estimates, which can lead to discrepancies in the number of mine/ERW casualties reported. For example, the Monitor recorded 55 mine/ERW casualties in Somalia for 2021, while SEMA similarly reported 48 casualties. Yet the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNISOM) stated that there had been 669 casualties of “improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war” in the country during 2021.\textsuperscript{142}

Yemen reported that it has no nationwide casualty surveillance system. Casualties have been recorded in an ad hoc manner amid ongoing fighting.\textsuperscript{143} The Monitor recorded 528 mine/ERW casualties in the country in 2021, while Yemen reported 558 casualties for 2021 in its Article 7 report.\textsuperscript{144} In 2022, it was reported that violence had reduced sharply in Yemen since a truce in October 2021, but that “the number of people injured or killed by landmines and unexploded ordnance remained the same or higher, highlighting the dangers of these remnants of war even in peace time.”\textsuperscript{145}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
State Party & Casualties \\
\hline
Afghanistan & 1,074 \\
Yemen & 528 \\
Nigeria & 462 \\
Mali & 252 \\
Iraq & 224 \\
Colombia & 152 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{States Parties with over 100 casualties in 2021}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{139} Not including the occupied Golan Heights.

\textsuperscript{140} As noted previously, greater clarity is needed on the number of mine/ERW casualties reported as having occurred in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh and in state not party Azerbaijan in 2021. Recorded casualties in each of the three “other areas” are as follows: Nagorno-Karabakh (30), Western Sahara (23), and Somaliland (3).


\textsuperscript{144} Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form G.

\textsuperscript{145} Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), “Yemen: Civilian casualties halved since the start of the truce,” 10 May 2022, bit.ly/NRCYemen10May2022.
States not party and other areas

Determining total casualties in state not party Azerbaijan and in other area Nagorno-Karabakh, in 2021, was complicated by changes in the territorial control of mine/ERW affected areas. The Monitor recorded 61 casualties in Azerbaijan and 30 in Nagorno-Karabakh (including civilians, Armenian deminers, Azerbaijani military personnel, and Russian peacekeepers). In December 2021, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Azerbaijan reported that there had been 189 casualties since the end of the conflict on 10 November 2020, in the “liberated territories” of Azerbaijan (in Nagorno-Karabakh and Zangezur). It reported that 36 people were killed (29 civilians and seven military personnel) and 153 injured (44 civilians and 109 military personnel). 146

In state not party Libya, despite a lack of casualty surveillance, 51 casualties were recorded in 2021. In Tripoli, it was reported that casualties were caused by mines, including manufactured and improvised antipersonnel landmines left by forces that withdrew from the city in mid-2020. Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Libyan media reported some 90 casualties from May 2021–March 2022. Five of the casualties were reported to be involved in clearance activities. 147

Since the Syrian Civil War began in 2011, annual casualty totals for state not party Syria have fluctuated due to inconsistent availability of data and sources, and a lack of access to affected areas. Annual totals for Syria are likely a considerable undercount. Ambiguity in media reports often leaves it unclear if mines involved in incidents were of an improvised nature. The Monitor’s casualty data for Syria is adjusted as new surveys and historical data become available.

ADDRESSING THE IMPACT

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CLEARANCE

MINE CLEARANCE IN 2021

The Mine Ban Treaty obligates each State Party to destroy—or ensure the destruction of—all antipersonnel landmines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that State Party.

Among States Parties, total reported clearance during 2021 was 132.52km². 148 This represents a decrease from the reported 146km² cleared in 2020. At least 117,863 landmines were cleared and destroyed in 2021.

Monitor data on clearance in States Parties is based on analysis of multiple sources, including reporting by national mine action programs, Article 7 reports, and Article 5 extension requests. In cases where varying annual clearance data is reported by States Parties, details are provided in footnotes and more information can be found in country profiles on the Monitor website.

Non-technical and technical survey also contribute to the overall amount of land that is released and returned to local populations for productive use. During 2021, some 276km²

146 “Since November 10, 2020, 36 people, including 29 civilians, have died in Karabakh and Eastern Zangezur as a result of a mine explosion,” Interfax Azerbaijan, 9 December 2021, www.interfax.az/view/852528.

147 The Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) reported that 93 people were killed and 143 injured between May 2020 and March 2021. See, “236 individuals have been victims of mines since last May, statistics show,” Libya Observer, 28 March 2021, bit.ly/LibyaObserver28March2021. LibMAC informed HRW that between May 2020 and March 2022, 130 people were killed and 196 were injured by mines and explosive devices across Libya, mostly in southern Tripoli. See, HRW, “Libya: Landmines, Other War Hazards, Killing Civilians,” 27 April 2022, bit.ly/HRWLibya27April2022.

148 This refers to land cleared, and does not include land released or canceled through survey. The figures should be taken with caution due to the difficulty in obtaining accurate and consistent data. States Parties have sometimes provided conflicting data regarding clearance and have not always disaggregated clearance from the amount of land reduced through technical survey or canceled via non-technical survey. Not all States Parties have provided annual Article 7 transparency reports. Clearance by actors such as state armed forces, the police, and commercial operators may not be systematically reported.
of land was released by States Parties, about half of which was released by clearance operations. A total of 26.15 km² was reduced through technical survey and 117.33 km² canceled via non-technical survey.

Based on reported data, Cambodia cleared the most land during 2021 (43.73 km²), followed by Croatia (34.49 km²). Sri Lanka cleared and destroyed the most landmines in 2021, with 26,804 cleared from 4.1 km² of land. Thailand, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe all cleared a large number of antipersonnel mines from relatively small areas, indicating the density of mine-laying in their contaminated border areas.

Eleven States Parties cleared under 1 km² in 2021: BiH, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mauritania, Peru, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Türkiye. Most of these states have contamination classified as small or medium and should be able to complete clearance within the next few years if clearance and land release outputs are increased.  

Nigeria’s Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Mine Ban Treaty has announced its intention to establish a national mine action center and humanitarian mine action program, and has requested UNMAS support.  

Improvised mines were reported cleared in 2021 in States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Yemen.

Afghanistan released a total of 14.29 km² of land contaminated with improvised mines, clearing 352 improvised mines.  

Iraq cleared 9.75 km² of land contaminated with IEDs and destroyed 1,057 improvised mines. Only one improvised mine was cleared in Tajikistan in 2021, close to the border with Afghanistan. Türkiye cleared 103 improvised mines as part of security operations by military counter-IED teams. Yemen cleared 2,439 IEDs, though it was not specified how many of these were improvised mines. The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported the clearance of 16 improvised mines in Mali and seven improvised mines in Niger.
## Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2020–2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2020 Clearance (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
<th>2021 Clearance (km²)</th>
<th>APM destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>24.24</td>
<td>5,379</td>
<td>17.69</td>
<td>7,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>3,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1,357</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>46.42</td>
<td>10,085</td>
<td>43.73</td>
<td>6,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>12,526</td>
<td><strong>Clearance completed in 2020</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

157 Clearance figures for 2021 are from Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports (for calendar year 2021) unless otherwise stated. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT. **Afghanistan:** clearance data includes 16.67km² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land and 1.02km² of land cleared of improvised mines. 7,300 antipersonnel mines and 352 improvised mines were cleared. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Paul Heslop, Head of Mission and Chief Technical Advisor, UNMAS Afghanistan, 21 September 2022. **Angola:** data includes mines cleared and destroyed during clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) callouts and recorded on IMSMA (5,104 antipersonnel mines) and an additional 513 antipersonnel mines reported cleared by the Executive Demining Commission. **BiH:** response to Monitor questionnaire by Miodrag Gajic, Analysis and Reporting Officer, BHMAC, 28 April 2022 **Cambodia:** data provided by Ros Sophal, Database Manager, on behalf of Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA, 18 April 2022. According to Cambodia’s Article 7 report, at least 2,809 mines were destroyed following reports after risk education activities. **Chad:** data provided by Brahim Djibrin Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 10 May 2022. **Colombia:** data provided by Yessika Sahad Morales Peña, Coordinator, AICMA, 19 April 2022. **Croatia:** clearance figure includes 34.11km² cleared by humanitarian operators and 0.38km² cleared by the military. Antipersonnel mines cleared include 1,214 during clearance, 230 during EOD operations, and 18 by the military. **DRC:** clearance data from response to Monitor questionnaire by Cyprien Kasembe Okenge, Head of Program and Victim Assistance coordinator, CCLAM, 24 March 2022. **Iraq:** clearance figures include 1.32km² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land and 9.75km² of IED contaminated land. 3,755 antipersonnel mines and 1,076 improvised mines were cleared. **Mali:** data on ordnance cleared provided in responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS Mali, 6 April 2022. The mines cleared in 2021 were all improvised mines. **Mauritania:** clearance data provided by Lt.-Col. Moustapha ouuld Cheikhna, Head of Operations, PNDHD/MIDEC, 21 March 2022; and Col. Mohamedou Baham, PNDHD Coordinator, ‘Mauritania presentation,’ Mine Action Support Group meeting, 27 April 2022, bit.ly/MauritaniaPresentation27April2022. **Niger:** the mines destroyed in 2021 were all improvised mines. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 12 September 2022. **Palestine:** email from Najwa Jarrar, National Capacity Development Analyst, UNMAS, on behalf of PMAC, 8 July 2022. **Serbia:** data provided by Sladana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, SMAC, 1 March 2022. **Somalia:** email from Dahir Abdirahman Abdulle, National Director General, SEMA, 11 August 2022. **South Sudan:** response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMMA, 27 May 2022. **Sri Lanka:** email by Rohana Jayalath, IMSMA Officer, NMAC, 30 August 2022. **Sudan:** in addition, five antipersonnel mines were cleared by EOD spot tasks in Blue Nile. **Tajikistan:** one improvised mine was reported cleared. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ilboshimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 20 April 2021. **Thailand:** data provided by Fit.-Lt. Chotibon Anukulvanich, Interpreter and Coordinator, TMAC, 27 May 2022. **Türkiye:** a total of 14,022 antipersonnel mines were destroyed during clearance operations and an additional 103 improvised mines were cleared by military counter-IED teams as part of security operations. **Ukraine:** CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 report for 2021, pp. 4 and 9. Ukraine reported that international organizations, the Danish Refugee Council, FSD, and the HALO Trust cleared and destroyed a total of 808 explosive items; but it was not specified how many of these items were antipersonnel mines. An additional 22.53km² was "inspected" and 57,625 explosive items were "indicated and destroyed," while 464km of roads and 31km of railways were "cleared." These figures have not been included in the table as it is not clear whether the land was surveyed or cleared and if the operations were in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). **Yemen:** clearance data from UNDP dashboard and via an email from Marie Dahan, Reporting and Coordination Analyst, UNDP Yemen, 6 July 2022. In Yemen’s Article 7 report, the Massam Project was reported to have cleared 10.64km² as part of the emergency response, although it is not known whether this clearance was conducted in line with IMAS. Data on ordnance cleared differed between the Article 7 report (3,365 antipersonnel mines cleared) and the UNDP dashboard (1,204 antipersonnel mines cleared).
## The Impact

The following table provides the data on landmine clearance and antipersonnel mine (APM) destruction for various state parties. The clearance figures are for the years 2020 and 2021, and the data includes both clearance completed and clearance ongoing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Clearance (km²)</td>
<td>APM destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>49.66</td>
<td>4,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>7.66</td>
<td>4,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>N/R</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td><strong>0.77</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>43,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>5,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>9,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>9,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>N/R</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td><strong>2.80</strong></td>
<td>1,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>26,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>146.04</td>
<td>135,583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; and N/R=not reported.
*Cyprus states that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.
**Clearance of mixed/undifferentiated contamination that included antipersonnel mines.
***Reported as cleared and reduced.
Explosive ordnance cleared and destroyed by States Parties in 2021

A number of States Parties with Article 5 obligations did not undertake clearance in 2021: Cyprus, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Palestine, and Senegal.

Cyprus reported that it did not undertake clearance as no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remained under its control. Ecuador reported that clearance was suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2021. Guinea-Bissau had not yet re-started operations following the discovery of new contamination in 2021, and was working to re-build the capacity required to resume survey and clearance operations.

Ethiopia has not provided any new figures for antipersonnel mine clearance since its Article 7 report for January 2019–April 2020, when it reported 1.75km² cleared and 128 antipersonnel mines destroyed. As of March 2021, Ethiopia reported that it had cleared 0.05m² in Fiq district in the Somali region, and 46 antivehicle mines were cleared, but no antipersonnel mines were cleared and destroyed.

Eritrea has not reported any clearance since it last submitted an updated Article 7 transparency report in 2014.

Niger was granted an Article 5 extension in 2020, but undertook no clearance or survey in 2021, citing a lack of resources and external support, climatic conditions, and insecurity.

Palestine reported no clearance or survey during 2021 and destroyed no antipersonnel mines.

No clearance has taken place in Senegal since 2017, though non-technical survey was carried out in February–March 2020, releasing 26 areas in Bignona department. It was

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

158 The chart does not include one mine cleared in Nicaragua and 1,725 mines cleared in Algeria as residual tasks. Yemen reported clearance of 2,439 IEDs but these are not included in the chart as it was not specified how many were improvised mines.

159 Four of these states have not conducted any clearance for at least two years: Cyprus, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal.


167 Email from Najwa Jarrar, National Capacity Development Analyst, UNMAS, on behalf of PMAC, 8 July 2022.

reported that no contamination was found. The COVID-19 pandemic, security concerns, and limited funding resulted in the suspension of non-technical survey in the country.\textsuperscript{169}

As of October 2022, eight States Parties with Article 5 obligations had not submitted updated Article 7 reports to outline their progress on clearance.\textsuperscript{170} In addition, three States Parties suspected to have improvised mine contamination—Cameroon, Mali, and Venezuela—have not provided an updated Article 7 report for two or more consecutive years.

\section*{ARTICLE 5 DEADLINES AND EXTENSION REQUESTS}

If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy all antipersonnel landmines contaminating its territory within 10 years after entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty for the country, it is able to request an extension under Article 5 for a period of up to 10 years.

\subsection*{Progress to 2025}

At the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo, in June 2014, States Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.” This included a commitment “to clear all mined areas as soon as possible, to the fullest extent by 2025.”

As of October 2022, a total of 23 States Parties had deadlines to meet their Article 5 obligations before or no later than 2025. Nine States Parties have Article 5 deadlines later than 2025.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Clearance deadline & States Parties \tabularnewline \hline
2026 & Croatia, Mauritania, Senegal, South Sudan \tabularnewline
2027 & BiH, Somalia \tabularnewline
2028 & Iraq, Palestine, Sri Lanka \tabularnewline
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

In 2022, four States Parties—Afghanistan, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, and Serbia—requested extensions to their clearance deadlines up to 2025; while four—Argentina, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen—requested extensions beyond 2025.

It appears that few of the States Parties with deadlines in 2025 or earlier will be able to complete clearance within their deadlines. Only Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe appear to be on track to meet their Article 5 deadlines. In 2022, Sri Lanka drafted a new mine action strategy and set a new completion date of 2027.\textsuperscript{171} Zimbabwe reported that it is on target to meet its 2025 clearance deadline, with only 38\% of known contamination left to clear, and half the extension period remaining.\textsuperscript{172}

It was expected that Oman was on track to complete clearance with a plan to re-clear seven areas from February 2021 to April 2024.\textsuperscript{173} Yet as of October 2022, Oman had not submitted an Article 7 report to update States Parties on its progress.

\textsuperscript{169} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management Division, CNAMS, 30 March 2021; and email from Catherine Gillet, Program Director, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 1 June 2021.

\textsuperscript{170} Afghanistan, BiH, Eritrea, Nigeria, Oman, Palestine, Somalia, and Ukraine. Those that have not submitted an Article 7 report for two or more years are noted in italics.

\textsuperscript{171} Email from Rohana Jayalath, Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Officer, Sri Lanka National Mine Action Center (NMAC), Ministry of Urban Development and Housing, 30 August 2022.

\textsuperscript{172} Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Annex A, p. 3; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Maj. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Officer, Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC), 8 February 2022.

Angola’s annual land release since 2019 has been below the projected annual land release of 17 km² in its 2019–2025 workplan.\(^{174}\) Angola, and clearance operators working in the country, have said that additional investment is required to complete clearance.\(^{175}\)

Cambodia and Croatia are not on track to meet their Article 5 deadlines unless they can increase clearance capacity. Cambodia has said that it will meet its Article 5 deadline and has launched an appeal for public and private funding to contribute to this effort.\(^{176}\) Yet agreeing demarcation of border areas with Thailand remains a challenge that could delay progress.

The DRC and South Sudan both report that they are on track to meet their clearance deadlines, but ongoing insecurity is a concern in both countries.\(^{177}\) The DRC’s clearance output has been limited and some areas remain to be surveyed.

Clearance output in States Parties BiH, Chad, Niger, and Peru has been small, while no clearance has taken place in Senegal since 2017. The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and a lack of financing are cited as key reasons for this lack of progress.\(^{178}\) Chad, Niger, Peru, and Senegal all have relatively small areas left to clear and should be able to complete clearance within their deadlines if the pace of clearance is accelerated. BiH has massive contamination but has only cleared 2.56 km² since 2017.

Iraq is unlikely to meet its Article 5 deadline due to the extent of contamination and its priority to clear improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in areas liberated from the Islamic State group.\(^{179}\) Mauritania has reported a lack of funding as being the main barrier to meeting its deadline.\(^{180}\) Tajikistan reported that current capacity would need to be increased to meet its deadline.\(^{181}\) It is unclear if Somalia, which was granted an extension in 2021, will meet its Article 5 deadline.

Ongoing conflict and insecurity are likely to impact the ability of Colombia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Ukraine to meet their deadlines. Colombia reported that it will not meet its deadline due to ongoing use of improvised mines by non-state armed groups (NSAGs).\(^{182}\) In Ethiopia, there has been little progress on clearance and survey over the last


\(^{175}\) Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form J, p. 14; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Dan Richards, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 19 June 2022; and by Naem Jaafar, Operations Manager, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 6 April 2022.


\(^{177}\) Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Cyprien Kasembe Okenge, Head of Program and Victim Assistance Coordinator, CCLAM, 24 March 2022; and by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, 27 May 2022.

\(^{178}\) Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Miodrag Gagic, Analysis and Reporting Officer, BHMAC, 28 April 2022; by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 10 May 2022; and by Cyprien Kasembe Okenge, Head of Program and Victim Assistance coordinator, CCLAM, 24 March 2022; Niger Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), p. 10; and Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form F, p. 10.

\(^{179}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMB, DMA, 15 April 2021.


\(^{181}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 20 April 2022.

\(^{182}\) Response to Monitor questionnaire by Yessika Sahad Morales Peña, Coordinator, AICMA, 19 April 2022.
two years. In Nigeria, conflict in the northeast has hindered the mapping of contamination and restricted survey and clearance activities.\footnote{Response to Monitor questionnaire by Tomoko Nakayama, Programme Officer, UNMAS Nigeria, 22 April 2022.} Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukraine did not have control of parts of the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhans, impeding its ability to clear contaminated areas in these territories.\footnote{Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 June 2020, bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2020.} Ongoing hostilities in 2022 have added to the extent of contamination and prevented access for clearance.

### Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Original deadline</th>
<th>Extension period (No. of request)</th>
<th>Current deadline</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1 March 2013</td>
<td>10 years (1\textsuperscript{st})</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Requested extension until 1 March 2025 (2 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>1 January 2013</td>
<td>8 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina*</td>
<td>1 March 2010</td>
<td>3 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Requested extension until 1 March 2026 (3 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>6 years (3\textsuperscript{rd})</td>
<td>1 March 2027</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 January 2010</td>
<td>6 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 November 2009</td>
<td>3 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>1 January 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 March 2011</td>
<td>10 years (1\textsuperscript{st})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Expected to request another extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>7 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1 July 2013</td>
<td>3 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>1 July 2025</td>
<td>Expected to request another extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1 November 2012</td>
<td>6 years (2\textsuperscript{nd})</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Party</td>
<td>Original deadline</td>
<td>Extension period (No. of request)</td>
<td>Current deadline</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>1 October 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 3 months (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2022</td>
<td>Requested extension until 31 December 2025 (3 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>1 February 2012</td>
<td>3 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 11 months (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2020</td>
<td>In violation of the treaty by not requesting a new extension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>1 June 2015</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years and 7 months (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1 November 2011</td>
<td>2 months (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 1 year (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2022</td>
<td>Requested extension until 31 December 2024 (2 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 February 2018</td>
<td>10 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 February 2028</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>1 January 2011</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 1 year (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2026</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>1 September 2009</td>
<td>2 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 1 year (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;) 4 years (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1 March 2012</td>
<td>1 year (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 4 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2025</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 February 2025</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>8 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 7 years and 10 months (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>31 December 2024</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1 March 2009</td>
<td>7 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;) 5 years (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2026</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1 March 2014</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;) 4 years (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 March 2023</td>
<td>Requested an extension until 1 December 2024 (1 year and 9 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1 October 2022</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1 October 2027</td>
<td>Behind target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>9 July 2021</td>
<td>5 years (1&lt;sup&gt;st&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>9 July 2026</td>
<td>Progress to target uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1 June 2028</td>
<td>On target</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK completed mine clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in 2020, but Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

Extension requests submitted in 2021 and 2022

In 2021, seven States Parties were granted an extension to their Article 5 clearance deadlines: Cyprus, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Nigeria, Somalia, and Türkiye. For two of these—Mauritania and Somalia—the extended deadline goes beyond 2025.

In 2022, eight States Parties submitted requests to extend their Article 5 clearance deadlines: Afghanistan, Argentina, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Serbia, Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen. Decisions on these requests will be made at the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties in November 2022.

On 4 July 2022, the Permanent Mission of Afghanistan to the United Nations (UN) in Geneva submitted a request to extend Afghanistan’s clearance deadline for two years until March 2025. It was expected that a further detailed request for an extension would be submitted in March 2024. Due to the complexity of the political situation in the country, details on the remaining challenge or an accompanying workplan could not be included in the request.  

Argentina submitted an extension request for three years until 1 March 2026. Argentina has cited the need to verify clearance of the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas completed by the United Kingdom (UK) in 2020 to comply with its obligations under the treaty.186

Ecuador has requested an extension of three years until 31 December 2025 to clear remaining contamination of 0.04km². This is Ecuador’s fourth extension request. However, little progress has been made, with no clearance taking place in 2020 and 2021. The remaining contaminated areas are in high altitude locations with challenging climatic conditions.

Guinea-Bissau reported the discovery of new mined areas in 2021 and was given an extension until 31 December 2022, with the objective to mobilize resources to carry out survey and develop an evidence-based action plan. Yet little progress was made due to lack of resources.187 In 2022, Guinea-Bissau requested a further extension to 31 December 2024 to conduct survey, and to enable a request to be submitted in March 2024 outlining a clearance plan.188

Serbia submitted a third extension request in 2022, requesting 21 additional months until 1 December 2025 to clear 0.56km² and to survey and clear newly discovered suspected mined areas in Bujanovac municipality. Serbia stated that it would be able to provide an updated workplan by the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023.189

Sudan also submitted a third extension request in 2022, for four additional years until 1 April 2027.190 As of December 2021, Sudan had identified 102 hazardous areas totaling 13.28km².191 As a result of the Juba peace talks, Sudan’s mine action program had access to previously inaccessible areas and expected to identify new hazardous areas close to the frontlines.

Thailand submitted a third extension request in 2022, for three years and two months until 31 December 2026.192 While on target in terms of its survey and clearance plan, a primary reason given for the delay was a lack of access to 14.31km² of contaminated land on the border with Cambodia which had not yet been demarcated.193 The COVID-19 pandemic had also prevented face-to-face bilateral meetings to negotiate border clearance. Thailand asserted that it would be able to complete all clearance by its October 2023 deadline if access was not an obstacle.194

Yemen has requested a fourth extension, for five years until March 2028, to continue with its baseline survey to determine the extent and impact of new mine contamination. Yet it appears unlikely that five years will be sufficient for Yemen to meet its Article 5 clearance obligations. It is hoped that the baseline survey can be expanded if the security situation improves.

RISK EDUCATION

Risk education is a core pillar of humanitarian mine action and a key aspect of the legal obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. The treaty requires States Parties to
“provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” in all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.

Risk education has often been under-reported in transparency reports or at the treaty’s meetings in lieu of updates on clearance and survey. Yet delivery of risk education to affected populations is a primary and often cost-effective means of preventing injuries and saving lives.

Adopted by States Parties in 2019, the Oslo Action Plan includes a dedicated section on risk education and contains five action points for States Parties on risk education. This has contributed to renewed attention for this pillar in recent years. These actions include:

- Integrating risk education within wider humanitarian, development, protection, and education efforts, and with other mine action activities;
- Providing context-specific risk education to all affected populations and at-risk groups;
- Prioritizing people most at risk through analysis of available casualty and contamination data, and through an understanding of people’s behavior and movements;
- Building national capacity to deliver risk education, which can adapt to changing needs and contexts; and
- Reporting on risk education in annual Article 7 transparency reports.

In addition, the Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide detailed, costed, and multiyear plans for context-specific mine risk education and reduction in affected communities.

PROVISION OF RISK EDUCATION IN 2021

In 2021, 30 States Parties were known to have provided risk education to populations at risk due to antipersonnel landmine contamination. States Parties Cameroon, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Oman, and Peru reported no risk education in 2021.

States Parties which provided risk education in 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Eritrea</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Türkiye</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk education continued to be disrupted in some states due to the COVID-19 pandemic during 2021. For the second year running, a joint risk education campaign carried out by Ecuador and Peru in contaminated border areas was not held, with funding diverted to other priorities.

In Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe, in-person risk education sessions continued in 2021, but with restrictions on the number of people who

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195 There is no separate agenda item on risk education at Meetings of States Parties.
could attend. In Angola, physical distancing and masks were still used. In Cambodia, Iraq, and Zimbabwe, schools remained closed for much of the year, preventing risk education in those settings. South Sudan stopped distributing leaflets, to prevent the spread of the virus.

Thailand and Zimbabwe reported fewer risk education beneficiaries in 2021 compared to 2020, as large events were canceled amid the COVID-19 pandemic.

**RISK EDUCATION REPORTING AND PLANNING**

In 2021, only eight of the 22 States Parties which provided updates on risk education in their Article 7 reports, included full details on risk education activities conducted, with beneficiary data disaggregated by sex and age: Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Guinea-Bissau conducted no risk education in 2021, but reported on plans for 2022. The remaining 13 states provided less detailed information in their transparency reports.

Of the States Parties that had submitted updated Article 7 reports for activities in 2021, Burkina Faso, Cyprus, Niger, and Tajikistan did not report on risk education. However, risk education was conducted in all four countries.

In Burkina Faso, UNMAS provided risk education to affected communities and military personnel on the threat from improvised mines. In Cyprus, UNMAS delivered risk awareness training to the police and military contingents of the UN peacekeeping mission during their induction training. In Tajikistan, risk education was carried out by the Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC), the Red Crescent Society of Tajikistan, and by the Union of Sappers. Niger has not provided any updates on risk education since 2012, but UNMAS provided risk education to humanitarian personnel working in areas contaminated by improvised mines.

As of October 2022, Afghanistan, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Eritrea, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, and Ukraine had not submitted Article 7 reports for 2021; though risk education was conducted in each of these states, with the exception of Cameroon.

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198 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Katie Nelson, Community Liaison Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) Somalia, 27 April 2022; by Kenyi Emmanuel and Clara Ajio, Community Liaison Supervisors, MAG South Sudan, 1 April 2022; by Miroslav Pisarevic, Country Director, NPA Angola, 22 March 2021; by Dan Richards, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Angola, 9 March 2021; by Eliana Lucia Herrera Aguirre, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Technical Advisor, Danish Refugee Council Iraq, 8 April 2022; and by Tim Marsella and Andrea Lazaro, Programme Officers, HALO Trust Iraq, 7 April 2022.

199 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dan Richards, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Angola, 7 April 2022.

200 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by John McKellar, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Cambodia, 22 March 2022; by Eliana Lucia Herrera Aguirre, EORE Technical Advisor, Danish Refugee Council Iraq, 8 April 2022; by Tim Marsella and Andrea Lazaro, Programme Officers, HALO Trust Iraq, 7 April 2022; by Nokutenda Masiyanise, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Zimbabwe, 5 April 2022; and by Phillip Mwatsera, Community Liaison Team Leader, MAG Zimbabwe, 17 March 2022.

201 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kenyi Emmanuel and Clara Ajio, Community Liaison Supervisors, MAG South Sudan, 1 April 2022; and South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Oslo Action Plan questionnaire, pp. 17–18.


203 Chad, Croatia, DRC, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Oman, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Türkiye, and Yemen


206 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 20 April 2022.

Of the Article 5 extension requests submitted in 2022, only those submitted by Guinea-Bissau and Sudan contained detailed, costed, and multiyear plans for context-specific risk education. Ecuador, Serbia, Thailand, and Yemen confirmed that risk education would be conducted, but did not provide a budget or workplan for implementation. Afghanistan did not submit a detailed extension request. Risk education was not relevant to the extension request of Argentina, which requested time to verify clearance completed by the UK in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas.

RISK EDUCATION PRIORITIZATION

Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) victim data informed national risk education prioritization and planning in all States Parties where IMSMA was used in 2021. Thirteen States Parties reported having a prioritization mechanism in place in 2021, for targeting risk education activities.208

The majority of States Parties prioritized risk education according to criteria which included the number of casualties in an area, the extent of contamination, proximity of populations to the contamination, and the location of operators.209 Cambodia targeted at-risk groups within prioritized villages, including children, foragers, and farmers.210 Croatia’s prioritization system was tailored to population movements, occupations, coping mechanisms, and risk behaviors.211 South Sudan used needs assessments for prioritization and focused on at-risk groups.212 In Colombia and South Sudan, the needs and vulnerabilities of communities in affected areas were assessed to prioritize risk education activities.213

In several States Parties, there was a need to improve data collection and targeting processes. In Angola, risk education focused on communities close to known contamination.214 In BiH, data was collected in over 250,000 households to identify those exposed to the direct risk of mines.215 Yet BiH did not explain how the data was used for prioritization. In Iraq, the victim database was incomplete and not publically available, and operators relied on their own analysis of victim data to target risk

208 Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Türkiye.
210 Response to Monitor questionnaire by H.E Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA, 18 April 2022.
213 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leidy Vargas, Mine Risk Education Coordinator, Danish Refugee Council Colombia, 7 April 2022; and by Daniela Enciso González, Junior Programme Officer, HALO Trust Colombia, 23 March 2022; and Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form 1, p. 33.
214 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Naem Jaafar, Operations Manager, NPA Angola, 6 April 2022; and by Dan Richards, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Angola, 7 April 2022.
215 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Miodrag Gajic, Analysis and Reporting Officer, BHMAC, 28 April 2022.
In Somalia and Zimbabwe, national level victim data was not comprehensive. In Palestine, there was a need for better targeting of risk education, and a strategy to support this was developed in 2021. In Ukraine and Yemen, there was no standardized approach to data collection and analysis. Operators used open-source data, media reports, and data collected by survey teams to inform targeting and prioritization.

In 2021, several studies conducted in States Parties aimed to enhance understanding of at-risk populations, prioritization, and monitoring. In Iraq, the Danish Refugee Council conducted a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices survey in Basra and Nineawa governorates that underlined the socio-economic factors driving risk behavior. Men, teenage boys, and children were found to be the most at-risk groups. In Ethiopia, UNMAS carried out two missions to the Tigray region, to assess the impact of contamination and document casualties. In Somalia, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) conducted a survey to measure the results of a digital risk education campaign on Facebook. A local partner supported MAG South Sudan to conduct a risk education needs assessment among refugees in camps in Uganda prior to their return to South Sudan.

TARGET AREAS AND RISK GROUPS

Risk education must be sensitive to gender, age, and disability, and take the diverse needs and experiences of people living in affected communities into account. The consideration of target areas, high-risk groups, and the activities and behaviors that place people at risk, is crucial to the design and implementation of effective risk education programs.

Target areas

In Afghanistan, Angola, the DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, Somaliland, South Sudan, and Yemen, and also along the Thailand-Myanmar border, refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs) were reached for risk education in camps and in host communities.

Risk education targeted at border regions was conducted in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand, and Zimbabwe during 2021. In Afghanistan, returnees and IDPs were provided with risk education at border crossings, transit centers, and encashment centers. In Somalia, communities along the border with Ethiopia and refugees returning to Somalia were targeted for risk education. In South Sudan, a radio program and talk show in Magwi county targeted South Sudanese refugees and returnees in South Sudan.

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216 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form I, p. 46; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Eliana Lucia Herrera Aguirre, EORE Technical Advisor, Danish Refugee Council, 8 April 2022; by Tim Marsella and Andrea Lazzaro, Programme Officers, HALO Trust Iraq, 7 April 2022; by Sofia Cogollos, Armed Violence Reduction Specialist, HI Iraq, 8 April 2022; and by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG Iraq, 14 March 2021.

217 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Aislinn Redbond, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Somalia, 22 March 2022; and by Katie Wellington, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Zimbabwe, 22 April 2020.


219 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Nick Vovk, Project Manager, Danish Refugee Council Ukraine, 24 March 2022; by Mario Quinones, Project Manager, Danish Refugee Council Yemen, 4 April 2022; and by Matthew Walker, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Yemen, 7 April 2022.

220 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Eliana Lucia Herrera Aguirre, EORE Technical Advisor, Danish Refugee Council Iraq, 8 April 2022.


222 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Katie Nelson, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Somalia, 27 April 2022.

223 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kenyi Emmanuel and Ajio Clara, Community Liaison Supervisors, MAG South Sudan, 1 April 2022.

224 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Akbar Oriakhil, Head of Planning and Programmes, DMAC, 21 February 2021; and by Mahboob Rahman, Risk Education Specialist, Danish Refugee Council Afghanistan, 6 April 2022.

225 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Katie Nelson, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Somalia, 27 April 2022.
and Uganda. In Thailand, risk education was provided in areas bordering Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Myanmar. Cambodia also provided risk education to communities and labor migrants living near to or crossing the border into Thailand. Humanity & Inclusion (HI) delivered risk education for refugees from Myanmar in nine refugee camps in Thailand. In Zimbabwe, risk education was conducted on the border with Mozambique.

In Colombia, risk education was provided in indigenous reserves in mountainous areas during 2021. Indigenous communities were affected by ongoing conflict and extreme poverty, and were often hard for operators to reach due to frequent displacement from their communities.

Risk education beneficiaries by age, gender, and disability

Children, often growing up in contaminated areas but lacking knowledge of the risks, remained a key target group for risk education in 2021. Children were targeted for risk education in most States Parties. Beneficiary data, provided to the Monitor by 57 risk education operators across 23 States Parties, showed that children comprised 45% of all beneficiaries reached in 2021.

Angola, Palestine, Somalia, South Sudan, and Ukraine all reported that children were more affected by explosive remnants of war (ERW) than landmines. Boys and adolescent males were considered to be particularly prone to picking up and playing with explosive items.

In Colombia, children were at risk from mines and ERW due to the long distances they had to travel by foot to reach regional schools. Paths to schools were often mined during the conflict, when schools were used as camps by NSAGs and military forces. In Iraq, schools were also reopened in former conflict-affected areas, putting children at risk from mines/ERW.

Working-age adult men were cited by the majority of States Parties and operators as a high-risk group, primarily due to their economic responsibilities. Men were at risk due to livelihood activities in rural areas, including cultivation, the collection of forest products, hunting, fishing, foraging, and tending animals. Men were also reported to be more likely than

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226 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kenyi Emmanuel and Clara Ajio, Community Liaison Supervisors, MAG South Sudan, 1 April 2022.
230 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Daniela Enciso González, Junior Programme Officer, HALO Trust Colombia, 23 March 2022; and by Leidy Vargas, Mine Risk Education Coordinator, Danish Refugee Council Colombia, 7 April 2022.
232 Including in Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
233 Data was received from Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This data includes all beneficiary data provided by national mine action authorities and operators that was disaggregated by sex and age. It includes beneficiaries of interpersonal risk education, as well as persons who received risk education via digital/mass media and through training of trainers programs.
234 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Daniela Enciso González, Junior Programme Officer, HALO Trust Colombia, 23 March 2022.
235 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Tim Marsella and Andrea Lazzaro, Programme Officers, HALO Trust Iraq, 7 April 2022.
236 Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, DRC, Iraq, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe all targeted men for risk education.
other groups to take intentional risks due to economic necessity. Adults, particularly men, were found to be hard to reach for risk education due to taking part in seasonal livelihood activities which took them away from villages.\textsuperscript{237}

Operators noted that women and girls were less likely to engage in unsafe behaviors or to travel as far from home as men and boys. Yet women and girls remain an important target group as they can help promote safer behavior among children and men.\textsuperscript{238}

In the DRC and South Sudan, women were exposed to risk as their daily activities included traveling and searching for food and household materials.\textsuperscript{239} In Colombia, women taking part in agricultural production spent proportionally less time in the fields than men, reducing their exposure to potential contamination.\textsuperscript{240} In Gaza, women received risk education because of their ability to pass information on to others.\textsuperscript{241} Similarly, in Ukraine, women were considered important to reach as they could pass messages to at-risk groups such as men and boys, particularly in areas not controlled by the government.\textsuperscript{242} In Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Iraq, it was challenging for risk education teams to reach women and female adolescents due to conservative cultural values, particularly in rural areas. Girls were also hard to reach in areas where they did not attend school. Deploying gender-balanced teams helped to mitigate some of these challenges.\textsuperscript{243}

Risk education beneficiaries by gender and age (in States Parties)\textsuperscript{244}

\begin{table}[h]
\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
Gender & Number of Beneficiaries (Percentage) \\
\hline
Women & 627,849 (18\%) \\
Men & 1,311,513 (37\%) \\
Girls & 627,065 (19\%) \\
Boys & 909,816 (26\%) \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{237} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Dan Richards, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Angola, 7 April 2022; by Eliana Lucia Herrera Aguirre, EORE Technical Advisor, DRC Iraq, 8 April 2022; and by John McKellar, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Cambodia, 22 March 2022.
\textsuperscript{238} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Rebecca Letven, Country Programme Manager, MAG Cambodia, 2 June 2020; and by Aurelie Fabry, Senior Programme Officer, UNMAS DRC, 11 May 2020.
\textsuperscript{239} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Sudi Alimasi Kimputu, National Coordinator, CCLAM, 24 February 2021; and by Kenyi Emmanuel and Clara Ajio, Community Liaison Supervisors, MAG South Sudan, 1 April 2022.
\textsuperscript{240} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Daniela Enciso González, Junior Programme Officer, HALO Trust Colombia, 23 March 2022.
\textsuperscript{241} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hana Albayoumi, Senior EORE Advisor, UNMAS Palestine, 22 June 2022.
\textsuperscript{242} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nick Vovk, Project Manager, Danish Refugee Council Ukraine, 24 March 2022.
\textsuperscript{243} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammed Daud Raufi, Head of Survey and Information Department, HALO Trust Afghanistan, 7 April 2022; by Tim Marsella and Andrea Lazzaro, Programme Officers, HALO Trust Iraq, 7 April 2022; by Eliana Lucia Herrera Aguirre, EORE Technical Advisor, Danish Refugee Council Iraq, 8 April 2022; and by Mohammed Jassim, Information Manager, Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO), 30 June 2022; and UNMAS, “Annual Report 2021,” 25 August 2022, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2021.
\textsuperscript{244} Beneficiary data for 2021 provided to the Monitor by 57 risk education operators across 23 States Parties.
While there have been efforts to better reach persons with disabilities with risk education, data is not systematically collected. Only 12 of the 57 risk education operators working across 23 States Parties collected data on beneficiaries with disabilities, and just eight provided data disaggregated by disability. Persons with disabilities represented less than 1% of all beneficiaries reached through interpersonal risk education in States Parties in 2021.

At-risk groups
In 2021, risk education was targeted to specific at-risk groups. This included but was not limited to humanitarian aid staff; migrants, itinerant workers, and pastoral and nomadic communities; and people living in poverty and lacking reliable livelihood alternatives.

In Afghanistan, risk education was provided to healthcare workers in contaminated areas, and to scrap metal dealers. Travelers and drivers were targeted for risk education at bus stations, to sensitize them to the dangers of overtaking and using shortcut roads.

In Cambodia, risk education was provided to laborers, construction workers, and agricultural workers. In Iraq, municipality workers and street cleaners were targeted in cities, including Mosul. Cash-for-work employees hired by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Iraq also received risk education. In Gaza and Yemen, risk education messages were provided to construction workers and those clearing rubble. In Ukraine, railway workers and power company staff received risk education if their employment took them to contaminated areas.

In Chad and Ethiopia, herders were a high-risk group. In the western Afar region of Ethiopia, ongoing drought meant people had to take risks with mines/ERW to find food for their animals and to collect water. In Chad, nomads, animal herders, goldminers, traditional guides, and trackers were at high risk due to their mobility in contaminated desert areas. Accident data from Ninewa governorate, Iraq, showed that shepherds were one of the most at-risk groups. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the main at-risk groups included herb collectors, picnickers, nomads, and shepherds.

In South Sudan, women and children living in army barracks were seen to be at high risk from contamination surrounding the barracks, or from ordnance brought into the home.

The economic crisis in Sri Lanka saw a rise in the number of people collecting scrap metal and collecting firewood in forest areas, to cope with fuel and cooking gas shortages.

245 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mahboob Rahman, Risk Education Specialist, Danish Refugee Council Afghanistan, 6 April 2022.
246 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Abdul Hamid Ibrahimi, Acting Head of EORE Department, DMAC, 20 February 2021; and by Zareen Khan Mayar, Armed Violence Reduction Technical Advisor, HI Iraq, 17 March 2021.
247 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Josh Ridley, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Cambodia, 4 March 2021.
248 Response to Monitor questionnaire by India McGrath, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Iraq, 15 March 2021.
252 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Chad, 8 May 2020; and by Jason Lufuluabo Mudingay, Chief of Operations, HI Chad, 13 March 2021.
253 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager Team Leader, MAG Iraq, 6 April 2022.
254 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mudhafar Aziz Hamad, EORE Director, IKMAA, 1 April 2022.
255 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kenyi Emmanuel and Clara Ajio, Community Liaison Supervisors, MAG South Sudan, 1 April 2022.
Sri Lanka’s National Mine Action Center (NMAC) planned to establish a new organization specifically to address the rise in risk-taking behavior.\textsuperscript{257} The country also targeted people involved in sand mining and illegal explosives harvesting in cooperation with the national police and security forces.\textsuperscript{258}

Refugees and IDPs remained an important target group for risk education operators in 2021 in States Parties Afghanistan, the DRC, Iraq, Somalia, South Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen. For instance, in Iraq, since 2019, areas liberated from the Islamic State group have been prioritized for risk education, to ensure that returning IDPs had greater awareness of the risk.\textsuperscript{259} The HALO Trust provided risk education to IDPs in Anbar and Salah al-Din governorates in 2021.\textsuperscript{260}

### RISK EDUCATION DELIVERY METHODS

All States Parties implementing risk education provided interpersonal risk education sessions in 2021. Printed materials, such as leaflets and posters, were also distributed. Many operators reported using mixed-gender teams to ensure that all age and gender groups were reached. Risk education was often integrated with survey and clearance.\textsuperscript{261}

Integration with humanitarian, development, and protection sectors

The Oslo Action Plan recommends that States Parties integrate mine/ERW risk education with wider humanitarian, development, and protection efforts.

In 2021, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Ukraine all reported that risk education was integrated with other interventions.

In Iraq, risk education was provided to journalists and non-governmental organization (NGO) staff, and to staff working for the government and other institutions in contaminated areas.\textsuperscript{262} Staff of international NGOs working on water pipelines in suspected contaminated areas of Cambodia benefited from risk education sessions.\textsuperscript{263} UNMAS provided risk education to humanitarian personnel working in Niger, South Sudan, and Sudan.\textsuperscript{264} In Thailand, HI risk education activities are combined with physical rehabilitation and social inclusion projects for mine/ERW survivors.\textsuperscript{265}

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., p. 34; and Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), p. 33.
\textsuperscript{259} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information and Focal Point for APMB, DMA, 13 April 2021 and 10 March 2022.
\textsuperscript{260} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Tim Marsella and Andrea Lazzaro, Programme Officers, HALO Trust Iraq, 7 April 2022.
\textsuperscript{261} This was the case in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
\textsuperscript{262} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Alexandra Letcher, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Iraq, 21 May 2020 and 14 March 2021; by Goran Knezevic, Risk Education Technical Coordinator, HI Iraq, 7 April 2020; by Madeline Achurch, Program Officer, HALO Trust Iraq, 30 April 2020; and by Celine Cheng, Risk Education Team Leader, UNMAS Iraq, 11 May 2020.
\textsuperscript{263} Response to Monitor questionnaire by John McKellar, Programme Officer, HALO Trust Cambodia, 22 March 2022.
\textsuperscript{265} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hser Htee Praikammasit, EORE Project Manager, HI Thailand, 22 May 2020.
Mine action and risk education were integrated into the UN Protection Cluster and humanitarian response plans in 15 States Parties.\textsuperscript{266} Risk education operators have also supported the delivery of COVID-19 safety messaging. In Afghanistan, in 2020–2021, the HALO Trust combined risk education with information about COVID-19 prevention, designed with the World Health Organization (WHO).\textsuperscript{267} Radio spots produced by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Senegal addressed both risk education and COVID-19 prevention.\textsuperscript{268} All UNMAS risk education materials in 2021 also included a COVID-19 awareness component.\textsuperscript{269}

Risk education in schools

Delivery of risk education to children in school settings is an important part of risk education programs in many States Parties. In 2021, six States Parties had risk education integrated into the school curriculum: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. Risk education was also being incorporated into the primary school curriculum in Iraq and Nigeria.\textsuperscript{270} Zimbabwe reported that its plan to integrate risk education into the school curriculum was not implemented in 2021 due to the small number of schools in affected areas.\textsuperscript{271} In 2022, a risk education course was to be incorporated into the school curriculum in Ukraine by the Ministry of Education.\textsuperscript{272}

Risk education was also provided in schools, outside of the curriculum, in many States Parties.\textsuperscript{273}

Building national capacity

The Oslo Action Plan refers to the need to build national capacity to deliver risk education, to respond to changing needs and contexts. Training of trainers programs, and working with local volunteer networks and the police to deliver messages, are among the activities implemented in States Parties to build local capacity in risk education.

In Chad, committees were established to provide risk education orally in local languages.\textsuperscript{274} Community focal points were trained in Somalia and South Sudan by MAG in 2021.\textsuperscript{275} The trainees included doctors, leaders of women’s groups, youths, teachers, and local officials. Thailand supported local risk education networks to disseminate messages and to inform

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{267} Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammed Daud Raufi, Head of Survey and Information Department, HALO Trust Afghanistan, 7 April 2022.
\bibitem{270} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Valentina Ciri, EORE Specialist, UNMAS Nigeria, 8 March 2021; and by Mohammed Jassim, Information Manager, IHSCO, 30 June 2022; and Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I, p. 51.
\bibitem{273} Risk education was reported to be conducted in schools outside the curriculum in States Parties Angola, BiH, Chad, Croatia, DRC, Eritrea, Iraq, Mauritania, Palestine, Somalia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.
\bibitem{274} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021 and 10 May 2022.
\bibitem{275} Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Katie Nelson, Community Liaison Manager, MAG Somalia, 27 April 2022; and by Kenyi Emmanuel and Clara Ajo, Community Liaison Supervisors, MAG South Sudan, 1 April 2022; and South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Oslo Action Plan questionnaire, p. 17.
\end{thebibliography}
local authorities if mines/ERW were found. In Ukraine, social workers and educators were trained to provide risk education.

Some States Parties worked with local police or security services to deliver risk education and to facilitate reporting of mines/ERW in 2021. In Angola, the HALO Trust partnered with local police to provide advice about the potential danger of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines to oxcarts. The Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) worked with commune police posts to implement risk education sessions. In Sri Lanka, following a number of accidents due to the illegal harvesting of explosives for sand mining, the Regional Mine Action Office (RMAO) cooperated with the police and security forces to regulate the activity, as a complement to risk education programs. Türkiye trained 170 Gendarmerie personnel to conduct risk education in 2021, and planned to deliver training of trainers programs in six more provinces in 2022.

Mass media and digital risk education

During the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 and 2021, operators accelerated the provision of risk education via mass and digital media to ensure that people still received safety messages when interpersonal risk education sessions could not be held. Mass media and digital methods were used in more than half of States Parties in 2021.

In Afghanistan, UNMAS partnered with BBC Media Action in 2021 to tailor public service announcements targeting parents and children, particularly young boys. An educational radio program also focused on nomadic communities. In Angola, MAG adapted its risk education radio messaging to focus on people returning to work after COVID-19 lockdowns, providing information on how to report explosive ordnance. Amid hostilities in Gaza, risk education messages for IDPs were delivered remotely via text messages, social media, and radio.

The Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO) launched a mobile phone application during 2021 with risk education videos, pictures, awareness messages, and games; while MAG organized two digital risk education workshops to build the capacity of Iraqi National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) staff to create digital risk education materials. In South Sudan, community radio broadcasts were used for risk education, which also reached South Sudanese refugees across the border. In Ukraine, following the invasion by Russia...
in February 2022, digital approaches were employed to quickly reach people with safety messages. As of June 2022, three million people affected by the conflict had been reached via digital messaging on the mine/ERW risk, illustrating the utility of digital methods in emergency situations.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

The Mine Ban Treaty is the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty through which States Parties have committed to provide assistance to people harmed by a specific type of weapon. The components of victim assistance include, but are not restricted to: data collection and needs assessments; referral to emergency and ongoing medical care; physical rehabilitation including prosthetics and other assistive devices; psychological support; socio-economic inclusion; and the enactment of relevant laws and public policies.

Article 6 of the treaty requires that each State Party “in a position to do so” should provide such assistance. It also affirms the right of States Parties to seek and receive assistance to the extent required for victims. Since the entry into force of the Mine Ban Treaty, this has been understood to imply a responsibility of the international community to support victim assistance in mine-affected countries with limited resources. Victim assistance is an ongoing responsibility in all States Parties with victims, including those that have fulfilled their Article 5 obligations.

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) provides an overarching mechanism for amending national laws and policies related to persons with disabilities, and is legally binding. It also pertains to victims of indiscriminate weapons. Although not all injuries result in long-term impairments, mine/ERW survivors often become persons with disabilities, and therefore are protected by the CRPD. All States Parties with responsibilities for significant numbers of mine victims are also party to the CRPD, with the exceptions of South Sudan and Tajikistan. Yet both of these countries regularly report on their efforts to adopt the CRPD, and to implement its principles and provisions in the context of victim assistance.

In 2019, at the Fourth Review Conference, States Parties recognized that victim assistance must be integrated into wider national policies, plans, and legal frameworks on the rights of persons with disabilities, and support the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is complementary to the aims of the Mine Ban Treaty, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the CRPD, and therefore offers opportunities to bridge relevant frameworks in relation to mine/ERW victim assistance. The second Global Disability Summit, hosted by Ghana and Norway in February 2022, discussed disability inclusion and inclusive development. It offered another platform for states to present commitments relevant to victim assistance in the context of disability rights and the SDGs.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND THE OSLO ACTION PLAN

The Oslo Action Plan reaffirms the commitment of States Parties to “ensuring the full, equal and effective participation of mine victims in society, based on respect for human rights, gender equality and non-discrimination.” It commits States Parties to enhancing their implementation of victim assistance measures through providing the following:

- An effective and efficient emergency medical response and ongoing medical care;
- A national referral mechanism;
- Comprehensive rehabilitation and healthcare;

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- Comprehensive psychological and psychosocial support services;
- Social and economic inclusion;
- Protection in situations of risk, including armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters; and
- Inclusion and participation of mine victims and their representative organizations.  

 STATES PARTIES WHICH HAVE A REPORTED AND RECOGNIZED RESPONSIBILITY FOR ASSISTING VICTIMS

At the First Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, held in Nairobi in 2004, States Parties “indicated there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors,” and that states with victims had the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest need and expectations for assistance. The Monitor’s reporting on victim assistance focuses primarily on the States Parties in which there are significant numbers of victims.

A definition of “landmine victim” was agreed by States Parties at the First Review Conference, as “those who either individually or collectively have suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights through acts or omissions related to mine utilization.” According to the widely accepted understanding of this term, victims of landmines include survivors, as well as affected families and communities.

The victim assistance action points in the Oslo Action Plan are designated to States Parties with a significant number of victims. However, it notes that, more broadly, all States Parties with victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control must “endeavour to do their utmost to provide appropriate, affordable and accessible services to mine victims, on an equal basis with others.”

The list of States Parties that indicate having significant numbers of mine/ERW survivors does not encompass all of the States Parties with responsibility for survivors. States Parties where the number of survivors recorded or estimated is more than 100 are detailed in the following table.

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293 ICBL-CMC uses the definitions of victim and survivor as follows: the term 'victim' refers to all persons who have, either individually or collectively, suffered physical, emotional and psychological injury, economic loss or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights through acts or omissions related to mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. Victims include people injured and killed, their families, and communities affected by mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. The term 'survivor' refers to a person who has been injured as a result of an accident caused by a landmine, cluster munition, or ERW, and has survived.

294 The Monitor lists 34 States Parties as having reported and recognized a responsibility for survivors. This list includes States Parties that have indicated to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit (ISU) that they have significant numbers of victims for which they must provide care. It also includes Algeria and Türkiye, which have both reported hundreds or thousands of victims in their Article 5 deadline extension requests, as well as Palestine and Ukraine, which both indicated having significant numbers of victims and needs, but have not yet comprehensively reported them.
## States Parties with more than 100 mine/ERW survivors

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<tr>
<th>More than 20,000 survivors</th>
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Note: States Parties recognized as having a significant number of victims are in **bold**.

### EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE AND ONGOING MEDICAL CARE

The Oslo Action Plan requires States Parties to provide timely first-aid and emergency medical services. The initial response to casualties must include field trauma, emergency evacuation, transport, and immediate medical care. The provision of such services, involving assessment and communication of critical information ahead of transferring a patient to hospital, improves survival outcomes, speeds recovery, and can reduce the severity of injuries and impairments.

Healthcare systems in many States Parties with responsibility for mine/ERW victims remained under-funded in 2021 and lacked adequate infrastructure, materials, medicines, and expertise. Cambodia reported a decrease in available healthcare services for survivors. Several countries, including Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, and Yemen, experienced massive strain on their healthcare systems in 2021–2022, which in some cases were on the brink of collapse.

In Afghanistan in early 2021, services at six health centers in Kandahar were suspended due to IED contamination blocking access routes for staff and patients. From August 2021, a pause in international funding saw more than 2,000 (or 90%) of supported health facilities at risk of closure. In last quarter of 2021, the number of patients admitted to an ITF

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Enhancing Human Security-supported hospital in Kabul increased, “because numerous other hospitals in Kabul were closing down their activities due to lack of funds.”  

Yemen has reported that the number of mine victims in areas of conflict is significant, making it difficult for the mine action program to reach them. In 2021, Yemen’s health system was reported to have “collapsed” amid the impacts of armed conflict and the added challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, HI reported that delays in reaching health services in Yemen could lead to life-long complications, particularly for survivors with complex injuries.

In June 2022, the WHO issued an urgent appeal for access to people injured during the war in Ukraine, including “hundreds” of mine and ERW victims. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) found that humanitarian access in Ukraine was blocked or remained too dangerous in many areas.

In countries such as Chad, the DRC, Iraq, South Sudan, and Yemen, mine/ERW incidents often occurred in remote areas far from healthcare facilities.

NATIONAL REFERRAL MECHANISMS

The Oslo Action Plan advises States Parties to have a national referral mechanism and directory of services, and calls for increased access to rehabilitation services, including via outreach. According to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), victim assistance should be provided through an integrated approach, as all its components are interrelated. Some survivors may also need to be referred to specialized services, from one health facility to another or for travel and treatment abroad.

International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) 13.10 on Victim Assistance, as adopted in October 2021, states that national mine action authorities are well placed to gather data on victims and their needs, provide information on services, and refer victims for support. National mine action centers that reported referring survivors to services included those in BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Tajikistan, Thailand, and Yemen. For example, the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) oversees survivor surveys and referrals, through 25 volunteer survivor networks across three provinces. In 2021, the CMAA updated its form for mapping operators providing services for persons with disabilities. In BiH, a coordinating body for victim assistance referred mine victims to available projects.

Referrals are sometimes made via reparation mechanisms, or through broader mechanisms for veterans and victims of conflict. This is the case in BiH, Colombia, Chile, Croatia, El Salvador, Jordan, Nicaragua, and Serbia.

National government ministries and bodies provided referrals as victim assistance focal points in Algeria, Angola, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Nicaragua, and Peru in 2021. This was also the case in Serbia in 2022. Although there is no national referral mechanism in Iraq, the Ministry of Health provided information on rehabilitation centers and workshops. Local health councils in villages in Afghanistan passed on information to those in need.

In the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties committed to facilitating access to services for victims by disseminating a comprehensive directory of services. Algeria lists disability services, while

298 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form G.
Croatia has a specific directory for mine and ERW survivors. Colombia has a national online directory of services, along with specialized directories for mine/ERW survivors.

States Parties can improve accessibility for victims by ensuring that non-state service providers have the capacity to make referrals to appropriate healthcare and rehabilitation facilities.

NGOs provided referrals at national and local level in States Parties with victims. These groups included survivor networks and disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs), and both national and international NGOs. Some international operators had a direct role in the provision of victim assistance in 2021, including HI, the Polus Center for Social and Economic Development, the ICRC, national Red Cross and Red Crescent movements, and UN agencies. Others contributed to victim assistance efforts while working as part of multi-country rehabilitation projects.

REHABILITATION AND HEALTHCARE

Rehabilitation, including physiotherapy and the supply of assistive devices such as prostheses, orthoses, mobility aids, and wheelchairs, aims to help victims regain or improve mobility, and engage in everyday activities. Rehabilitation requires a comprehensive and multidisciplinary approach involving doctors, physiotherapists, prosthetists, social workers, and other specialists. Community-based rehabilitation is increasingly included in national rehabilitation programs.

Healthcare systems in many States Parties responsible for survivors are under-funded, lack adequate accessibility, and the necessary infrastructure and expertise. Integrating rehabilitation into national health systems, including by developing universal health coverage, is considered key to the sustainability of rehabilitation services. Monitor findings indicate that, to date, rehabilitation has not been a priority in many affected States Parties.

Progress in rehabilitation services for mine/ERW survivors was reported, but many challenges remain. Services began to return toward previous capacity following the COVID-19 pandemic. Rehabilitation programs and operators in some countries, such as Algeria, Cambodia, and Colombia, were reported not to have fully restarted services until part way into 2021.

After the government of Afghanistan was deposed by the Taliban in August 2021, HI steadily resumed activities. From August 2021, HI recorded a significant increase in patient numbers. After the fighting and strict security measures ended, more people were accessing the HI center in Kandahar. HI found that the majority of people with acquired disabilities were survivors of mines/ERW. In June 2022, HI opened a specialized unit at the Kandahar Rehabilitation Center to provide a transition from acute trauma care to rehabilitation services. The ICRC continued to operate seven centers. The largest, in Kabul, remained open but operated at reduced capacity. Around a quarter of patients in the center were amputees; most being mine/ERW survivors.

In Albania, the Kukes Regional Hospital prosthetics center, located near survivors and built for their use, remained open despite not having materials supplied for some three years. As a result, service levels were minimal. The Ministry of Health and Social Welfare is required to supply materials to the hospital and to the national prosthetics center in Tirana, where prostheses are of low quality and are sold to patients. Yet state support for the sector was not reported.

306 HI, “More than 130 people seen at the Kandahar Rehabilitation Centre each week,” undated, bit.ly/KandaharRehabCenterHI.
In Angola, there was an urgent need for equipment and capacity-building for the staff of its 11 rehabilitation centers. The HALO Trust facilitated delivery of prosthetics and medical items on behalf of a private donor to two rehabilitation clinics in Benguela and Huambo.

In Cambodia, physical rehabilitation was available from government agencies and NGOs. The Persons with Disabilities Foundation (PWDF) was created in 2011 as a public body to oversee the management of physical rehabilitation centers under relevant government ministries. Yet there has since been a reduction in available services, despite international assistance.

The ICRC supported two government-run rehabilitation centers providing more than half of all rehabilitation services in Cambodia. HI also provided remote rehabilitation and worked to update the management procedures of the Kampong Cham Physical Rehabilitation Center. In 2022, the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) provided equipment to the Battambang Physical Rehabilitation Center in cooperation with CMAA and the PWDF. The Australia–Cambodia Cooperation for Equitable Sustainable Services (ACCESS) project also provided training on physical accessibility and service provision at the Battambang center, as well as emergency items. The Siem Reap Rehabilitation Center, which relocated from the provincial hospital in 2020 to make way for COVID-19 patients, reopened at a new location in 2021 only providing minor repairs. It had returned to a functional level by mid-2022, but production of new prosthetics was limited due to a shortage of specialized technicians.

In Chad, 450 patients received services at the Kabalaye Limb-Fitting and Rehabilitation Center though HI via the four-year Demining and Economic Development Project (Projet de déminage et de développement économique, PRODECO). Yet Chad requires more national investment in physical rehabilitation. The center is the only one open in N’Djamena, and patients covered the cost of their treatment when not supported by HI. In 2021, the center was reported to be charging amputees for prosthetics services.

The first reference center for physiotherapy and orthopedic services in the DRC was built with ICRC support in Kinshasa and began providing services in 2021. HI worked to build capacity and improve services provided in rehabilitation centers in the DRC.

In Ethiopia, an ongoing challenge has been the lack of formal registration of the Prosthetic and Orthotic Center in Addis Ababa. The legal status of the center—as either a governmental or non-governmental entity—has been left undecided since 2010. As a result, it operates without financial support. In 2021, Ethiopia passed a regulation to merge the

310 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dan Richards, Programme Officer, HALO Trust, 19 June 2022.
320 Interview with Yohannes Beranu, Prosthetic and Orthotic Center, Addis Ababa, 13 May 2011.
center with the Gefersa Mental Rehabilitation Center under the Ethiopian Prosthetic Orthotic Service (EPOS)—this is a legal entity under the Ministry of Health, which will provide assistive technologies and other rehabilitation services. 321 The ICRC supported rehabilitation services in Mekelle, the regional capital of the conflict-affected Tigray region, in 2021. 322

The ICRC opened a physical rehabilitation center in Erbil, in Iraq, in March 2022, which will also serve refugees from Syria. 323 ICRC outreach teams provided assistive devices and referrals for rehabilitation. 324 HI provided physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support. Due to lack of funding, there was no progress on increasing access to services in rural areas of Iraq. 325

In Palestine, the ICRC supported physical rehabilitation through partnering the Artificial Limbs and Polio Center in Gaza, which has lacked the capacity to meet demand in recent years. 326

Senegalese mine survivors from Casamance have obtained prosthetic devices and repairs from an ICRC-supported rehabilitation center in Guinea-Bissau. 327 ICRC support to the center is due to end, with the ICRC stating that “finding new sources of funding remains a priority, as it is essential for sustaining service provision.” 328

Sri Lanka reported several initiatives to improve rehabilitation services in 2021. 329 Access to rehabilitation centers remained extremely limited in Mozambique, South Sudan, and Uganda. Yet in Uganda, the United States (US)-funded Learning, Acting and Building for Rehabilitation Systems (ReLAB-HS) project worked with the Ministry of Health to strengthen services, with initial target areas including formerly mine-impacted northern and eastern areas. 330

In Tajikistan, the national prosthetics center continued implementing a pilot project to provide mobile rehabilitation services in rural areas in 2021. 331

The need for rehabilitation services increased massively in Ukraine after the Russian invasion in 2022. HI worked in Ukrainian hospitals to support people with amputations and burns. 332 By June 2022, the WHO was providing assistive technology kits as part of emergency supplies to hospitals. 333 A ReLAB-HS project was launched in Ukraine in September 2021 with United States Agency for International Development (USAID) support. 334 During 2021, the Support and Procurement Agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) built the capacity of rehabilitation services through the NATO-Ukraine Medical Rehabilitation Trust Fund. 335

325 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmed Al-Jasim, Director of Planning and Information Department, DMA, 10 March 2022; and Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form J, p. 45.
330 Email from Lillian Asisimwe, Program Support and Inclusion Officer, ReLAB-HS Uganda, 13 July 2022.
331 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 20 April 2022.
Yemen lacked qualified rehabilitation specialists. HI built a new rehabilitation unit in Sana’a and provided technical support, assistive devices, and equipment to other facilities in Aden and Amanat Al Asimah. The ICRC supported five physical rehabilitation centers in Yemen. The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center also established prosthetics centers.

Zimbabwe reported a decline in assistance in 2021. It has three public national rehabilitation centers, but services are not available in mine-affected areas and survivors often cannot afford to travel. Since 2015, the HALO Trust had supported the provision of prosthetic limbs to 120 mine survivors in Zimbabwe in cooperation with Cassims Prosthetics.

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT

Psychological and psychosocial support activities include professional counselling, individual peer-to-peer counselling, community-based support groups, survivor networks, associations of persons with disabilities, and sport and recreational activities. Little progress has been reported in this area, and the issue received renewed attention internationally in 2021 and 2022.

In November 2021, the Netherlands, as President of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, hosted a side event on psychological and psychosocial support. Mexico organized an informal meeting of members of the Security Council in March 2022 on “ensuring access to mental health and psychosocial support in conflict, post-conflict, and humanitarian settings,” which received a detailed submission by three survivors’ representative groups.

Psychological support is one of the components of victim assistance with the greatest need for improvement. Where support does exist, it is often limited to major cities or specific regions, and is not always integrated into health and social welfare systems. Peer-to-peer activities help mine/ERW survivors manage stress, trauma, living with disabilities, and adhere to medical and rehabilitative therapies, enhancing their overall life-satisfaction.

In Afghanistan, psychosocial support was limited and peer-to-peer support was not adequately funded. HI provided psychosocial support to patients and caregivers at its rehabilitation center in Kandahar.

In BiH, across 15 local communities, there were 18 peer-to-peer support groups, of which seven were groups for women with disabilities. These groups conducted outreach activities in 2021.

Croatia has psychosocial rehabilitation centers in all 21 of its counties, including four regional centers and a main center in Zagreb.

342 HI, “More than 130 people seen at the Kandahar Rehabilitation Centre each week,” undated, bit.ly/HIKandaharRehabilitation.
In the DRC, psychological support for victims was only available in North-Kivu province.344

In Colombia, mental health care for mine/ERW survivors is provided via an insurance system. It did not report whether peer-to-peer activities could be compensated through this framework.

In Ethiopia, the Survivors Recovery and Rehabilitation Organization (SRARO) provides socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion. To help survivors overcome trauma, SRARO conducted several peer-to-peer support and psychological counselling sessions in 2021.345

In Iraq, every rehabilitation center is reported to have a psychological support unit.346

ITF Enhancing Human Security trained rehabilitation staff in Palestine to provide psychosocial support for amputees, including via an online training seminar.347

In Senegal, treatment at a psychiatric center, as well as transport and accommodation to access the center, were no longer free of charge for survivors after financial support ended in 2020.348

In South Sudan, survivors and others in rural areas are taken to prison for their own protection if they threaten, or attempt, to commit suicide. Yet in the prisons, survivors have no access to medication or psychological support.349 A number of suicides among mine survivors in South Sudan have been reported.350 HI runs a mental health and psychosocial support program.351

In Sri Lanka, most survivors were found to have experienced post-traumatic stress disorder.352 Mental health support was available at national hospitals and from NGOs in the north.353

Sudan reported an increase in the provision of psychological support to survivors and their families, including peer-to-peer support. Yet provision in remote or unsafe areas was scarce.354

As is the case in many States Parties, Tajikistan lacks capacity to provide psychological support in rural and remote mine/ERW-affected communities. Psychiatrists and psychologists are only available in larger cities. Yet support is available from the TNMAC Victim Assistance Officer, who is qualified to provide psychological support remotely via telephone calls and in-person.355

345 Email from Bekele Gonfa, Executive Director, SRARO, 5 September 2022.
346 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alaa Fadhil, Head of Victim Assistance Department, DMA, 13 April 2021.
355 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 20 April 2022.
**SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION**

Ensuring the socio-economic inclusion of mine/ERW victims through education, sports, leisure and cultural activities, vocational training, micro-credit schemes, income-generation activities, and employment programs remained a significant area for improvement in most States Parties. There is a recognized need to increase economic opportunities for survivors.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban revised the criteria for benefit payments to persons with disabilities, so that the highest rate is paid to Taliban fighters. It also widened the definition of beneficiaries beyond war victims to cover all persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Martyrs and Disabled Affairs attributed delayed payments to the lack of electronic registration of beneficiaries.356

In 2021, survivors from BiH and their family members attended an income-generation training course carried out by a professional team of beekeepers in Slovenia, and received supplies.357

In Cambodia, some patients undergoing rehabilitation received gender training, small business management training, job placements, and grants.358 Yet the Banteay Prieb vocational training center has not reopened after its land was reallocated and its building demolished in 2020.359

In Chad, HI supported victims to restart income-generating activities and to undertake technical and vocational training.360

In the DRC, the Polus Center established a new public-private partnership providing vocational training for survivors within the coffee industry. In 2021, a coffee tasting lab and training center was near completion.361

In Senegal, family security grants were provided to survivors.362 Educational and professional training was free of charge, but transport and accommodation costs made access difficult.363

In Tajikistan, survivors and their family members benefited from income-generation activities, including micro-credits and loans provided through TNMAC.364

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360 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Marie-Cécile Tournier, Country Director, HI, 11 June 2021; and by Brahim Djibrim Brahim, Coordinator, HCND, 18 June 2021.


363 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mamady Gassama, Monitor Country Researcher, 16 June 2021 and 28 July 2022; by Khady Badji Cissé, Head of Risk Education and Victim Assistance Unit, CNAMS, 30 March 2021; and interview with Yahya Diop, Director, Academic Center for Educational and Professional Orientation (Centre académique de l’orientation scolaire et professionnelle, CAOSP), Ziguinchor, 22 April 2019.

364 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 20 April 2022.
PROTECTION IN SITUATIONS OF RISK

In the Oslo Action Plan, States Parties committed to protect landmine victims and persons with disabilities in situations of risk including armed conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and natural disasters, “in line with relevant international humanitarian and human rights law and international guidelines.” States Parties to the CRPD also have a direct legal obligation to ensure the protection and safety of persons with disabilities in situations of risk, including situations of armed conflict and humanitarian emergencies.

In 2021, many States Parties with new mine/ERW casualties and victims were experiencing armed conflict, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Yemen. During situations of risk, mine/ERW victims often face extreme challenges and barriers to having their rights respected and fulfilled, as well as to accessing services.

A side event organized by the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Victim Assistance during the Global Disability Summit in February 2022 focused on the protection of victims in situations of risk and emergencies. During the event, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), also representing the Reference Group on Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in Humanitarian Action, invited participation in the work of the group by the mine action community, including survivors’ representative organizations.

In many countries, support available to mine and ERW survivors differs among those who were combatants from various parties during an armed conflict. In 2022, the module on disabilities in the revised Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) included references to mine/ERW victim assistance and peer-to-peer support activities.

Security Council Resolution 2475, on the Protection of Persons with Disabilities in Conflict, adopted in June 2019, marked the first UN resolution on such protections. It recognized the important contributions of persons with disabilities to conflict prevention, and called for their meaningful participation and representation in peace-building.

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367 Panelists included HI, the ICRC, ALSO, the Office of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General on Disability and Accessibility, and UNICEF. See, Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Victim Assistance “Victim Assistance: The Importance of Inclusion in Broader Frameworks Including in Situations of Risks, Crises and Humanitarian Emergencies,” Global Disability Summit, 17 February 2022, bit.ly/GDSSideEventsFeb2022.

368 The IDDRS were jointly formulated by 25 UN entities to be used for the first time outside the framework of comprehensive peace agreements, as well as within agreements as was the case for the previous standards. See, United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR), “5.80 Disability-Inclusive DDR,” 31 January 2022, bit.ly/UNDRR5.80Jan2022.

INCLUSION AND PARTICIPATION

Ensuring the inclusion and participation of victims is a core aim of the Oslo Action Plan. The ICBL has noted that landmine and ERW survivors should be actively consulted and participate meaningfully in all decision-making processes that affect them, including the planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of projects and programs. For effective responses, victims must be consulted and their views considered at all levels of decision-making.370

The Global Disability Summit held in 2022 noted that “meaningful participation” must include consultations with groups “that represent persons with disabilities in all their diversities including but not limited to women, older persons, children, those requiring high levels of support, [and] victims of landmines.”371

Victims were reported to be represented in coordination activities in Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Thailand. Victim participation was slow to regain momentum in 2021, having stalled in many countries due to COVID-19 restrictions that impeded meetings and travel.

Participation takes various forms ranging from attending meetings; to receiving direct support; to being consulted on funding and programs. For example, in Cambodia, mine/ERW survivors and their representative organizations are members of the two coordination bodies. In Sudan, victims and their representative organizations participated in coordination meetings and in the development of strategies and programs.372 In the DRC, survivor participation in coordination meetings was also reported.373 Colombia directly supported seven survivor organizations and worked to build their capacities in 2021.374 In early 2021, Colombia hosted a three-day meeting in Bogota, aimed at ensuring inclusion of victims from different backgrounds and regions.375

373 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Cyprien Kasembe Okenge, Head of Program and Victim Assistance Coordinator, CCLAM, 24 March 2022.
374 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Yessika Sahad Morales Peña, Coordinator, Descontamina Colombia, 19 April 2022.
### Appendix 1: Summary of Mine Action Management and Coordination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Party</th>
<th>Mine action strategy end date</th>
<th>Risk education coordination mechanisms</th>
<th>Risk education strategy/standard</th>
<th>Victim assistance coordination mechanisms</th>
<th>Victim assistance plan/strategy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Needs to be adopted/implemented</td>
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<td>Uganda</td>
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Note: MA AoR=Mine Action Area of Responsibility; NMAS=national mine action standards; N/A=not applicable; and N/R=not reported.
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.

MAP KEY
- Contaminated
- Residual contamination
- Suspected improvised mine contamination
- Clearance reported complete

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are italics.

*Algeria, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Tunisia, and Venezuela have declared themselves free of antipersonnel mines but are known or suspected to have residual and/or improvised mine contamination.

DISCLAIMER
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
LANDMINE, EXPLOSIVE REMNANT OF WAR (ERW), AND CLUSTER SUBMUNITION CASUALTIES IN 2021

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are italics.

DISCLAIMER
This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
Young mine survivor during a mirror therapy session at the rehabilitation center in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

INTRODUCTION

The right of each State Party to seek and receive assistance from other States Parties in order to fulfill its treaty obligations—often referred to as cooperation and assistance—has been pivotal in supporting the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty in the past 25 years.

Since 1997 and the adoption of the treaty, at least US$12.7 billion has been allocated to mine action efforts, with the majority of assistance provided by international donors (80%, or $10.5 billion).¹ This shows the strong spirit of solidarity and shared responsibility built over the years. Yet it is becoming apparent that growth in global mine action assistance has stalled in recent years and that available financial resources to achieve a mine-free world continue to shrink.

In 2021, global support for mine action decreased by 7% ($44.6 million), with 32 donors and 13 affected states contributing a total of $598.9 million in international and national support for mine action.² It is the fourth consecutive year that global mine action support decreased and the first time since 2016 that it dropped below $600 million.

Mine- and explosive remnants of war (ERW)-affected states are facing ever-growing challenges in allocating national resources to their own mine action budgets. In parallel, international donors are confronted with multiple and intersecting global crises to respond to, putting overall aid budgets under greater pressure. This was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, while the 2022 conflict in Ukraine has also added further needs to an already complex picture. In this context, investments in human security risk being

¹ All dollar values presented in this chapter are expressed in current United States (US) dollars. Annual contributions for the period from 1997 to 2006 may be conservative, due to variations in the level of detail provided by donors and/or time periods considered.

² Support for mine action includes funding specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions is varied in the level of detail and some utilize a fiscal year rather than the calendar year. In 2021, 13 of the 26 States Parties documented in this chapter reported disaggregated information on international funding for mine action in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseMBT.
deprioritized as demand for other expenditure is increasing; including military spending, which reached a new global peak of $2.1 trillion in 2021, rising for the seventh year in a row.¹

This chapter examines the financial response provided in 2021 by affected countries and international donors to support mine action efforts. The analysis focuses on financial contributions, but other forms of assistance can include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of experience and know-how, best-practice sharing, and South-to-South or other forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.⁴

In 2021, 32 donors contributed a total of $543.5 million in international support for mine action in 42 affected states and five other areas, as well as to global activities. This is a $21.7 million decrease from the $565.2 million provided in 2020.⁵

Overall, funding from international donors in 2021 was in line with trends observed in previous years, with the major donors and recipients remaining mostly the same. The majority of international mine action assistance came from a handful of donors, with the top five donors—the United States (US), Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the European Union (EU)—contributing a total of $377.6 million, or 70% of all international funding for the year. The top five recipient states—Iraq, Lao PDR, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Colombia—received a combined total of $267.5 million, representing half of all international contributions. Iraq received more funding than any other country for the seventh consecutive year.

As has been the case since the Monitor began reporting international support by sector in 2007, the majority of the funding provided by donors in 2021 went to clearance and risk education activities (58% of all funding), with more than $317 million provided. International support for victim assistance declined by $7.7 million, reaching its lowest level recorded since 2016. The $25.6 million total for 2021 represented 5% of all international funding. The Monitor includes only direct contributions to victim assistance activities, while some donors supported such activities via funding for other programs or disability activities. Yet the steep decline in victim assistance funding in 2021 is still indicative of the general trend of support for this sector.

A total of $20.5 million was allocated to capacity-building activities, representing 4% of all funding. Capacity-building covers efforts to develop and strengthen the expertise, skills, and resources of national and local organizations and communities in mine action. It comes in many forms, including the improvement of data collection and management, the strengthening of organizational sustainability, or the establishment of national standards. It is ultimately applicable to the whole range of mine action activities. Capacity-building has received growing support from international donors in recent years: from an average annual total of $9.4 million in 2010–2019 to $20 million in 2020 and 2021. This is indicative of the growing interest in investing beyond the immediate needs of mine action work and ensuring the long-term sustainability and longevity of national mine action capacities. The remaining 33% of overall funding ($180 million) was either not disaggregated by the donors, unearmarked, or used for advocacy purposes.

⁴ Two States Parties reported providing in-kind assistance in 2021. France provided demining equipment for operations in Azerbaijan (valued at €500,000/$591,500). Switzerland provided in-kind assistance to support mine action operations as part of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan, as well as in Western Sahara (valued at CHF2.8 million/$3.1 million). Email from Yves Marek, Ambassador, Secretary General, National commission for the elimination of antipersonnel mines (Commission nationale pour l’élimination des mines antipersonnel, CNAM), 6 October 2022; and Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Form I. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/Article7DatabaseCCM. Average exchange rate for 2021: €1=US$1.1830 and CHF0.9144=US$1. US Federal Reserve, "List of Exchange Rates (Annual)," 3 January 2022, bit.ly/USFedReserveExchangeRatesAnnual.
⁵ Data on international support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports, the ITF Enhancing Human Security and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) annual reports, media reporting, and answers from donors to Monitor questionnaires. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
The Monitor identified 13 affected states that provided $55.4 million in contributions to their own national mine action programs in 2021, representing 9% of global mine action funding. This marks a decrease of $22.9 million from 2020, when 14 affected countries reported contributing $78.3 million.

INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2021

International support to mine action has steadily declined since 2018. After increasing by more than $100 million each year in 2016 and 2017, assistance from international donors declined in 2018 (by 8%) and 2019 (by 13%), and essentially flatlined in 2020 (less than 1% change from the previous year). In 2021, spending on mine action totaled $543.5 million, representing a 4% decrease from 2020. This is the fourth consecutive reduction in annual mine action spending by international donors since the 2017 peak of $696.3 million.

In 2021, as has been the case for the past two decades, the donor base remained largely unchanged, with no shifts towards greater diversification of the pool of donors. The 15 largest donors continued to provide almost all international mine action funding, with a combined total of $524.5 million (97% of all support). Since 2017, support from the 15 largest donors has decreased by 23% or $154.1 million. The reliance on a small number of donors makes the implementation of mine action activities extremely precarious.

In line with findings from previous years, the list of countries receiving international mine action support changed little in 2021. The 10 largest recipients received $365.6 million and accounted for 67% of all international assistance. Three countries entered the list of the top 10 recipients in 2021—Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine—replacing Croatia, Türkiye, and Yemen. Since 2017, only 15 countries have appeared in this group of largest recipients, with six of them present every year over the five-year period: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Syria.

International support for mine action: 2012–2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US$ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>572.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>448.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>430.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>376.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>696.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>642.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>561.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>565.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>543.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Totals not adjusted for inflation.

DONORS

In 2021, 26 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, two states not party, the EU, and three other institutions contributed a total of $543.5 million to mine action.

6 The 15 largest donors in 2021 were: the US, Germany, Japan, the UK, the EU, Norway, the Netherlands, Canada, Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, New Zealand, France, Italy, and Australia. The same group of 15 states contributed combined totals of $617 million in 2018, $538.8 million in 2019, and $545.7 million in 2020.

7 The 15 countries appearing in the 10 largest recipients of international support in 2017–2021 were: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, Syria, Türkiye, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.
As in past years, a small group of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action support. The five largest donors—the US, Germany, Japan, the UK, and the EU—accounted for 70% of all international support, providing a combined total of $377.6 million.

Contributions by donors: 2017–2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>2021</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2019</th>
<th>2018</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td></td>
<td>194.5</td>
<td>204.8</td>
<td>177.4</td>
<td>201.7</td>
<td>320.6</td>
<td>1,099.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>284.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>188.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td></td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>227.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>108.1</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>379.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>202.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>87.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>41.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>48.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other donors*</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>48.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>543.5</td>
<td>565.2</td>
<td>561.3</td>
<td>642.6</td>
<td>696.3</td>
<td>3,008.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold.

*Other donors in 2021 included: Andorra, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, the United Nations Association-Sweden (UNA-Sweden), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

8 The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. This information is drawn from Support for Mine Action country profiles, which in turn use information provided by states in their Article 7 transparency reports as well as responses to Monitor questionnaires and other sources. In 2020, the total contributions of Denmark and the UK might have been slightly higher. Denmark support to Danish Refugee Council operations in Afghanistan, Myanmar, Somalia, and South Sudan was part of a multisectoral humanitarian and resilience assistance program, for which the specific amount going toward demining was not available, and as such could not be included in the Monitor support database. In the case of the UK, some contributions reported in its 2021 transparency report (for calendar year 2020)—to Afghanistan, Georgia, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen—were also included in its previous transparency report, which provided the total amounts for the financial year (April 2019 to March 2020) and were included in the Monitor support database for 2019. To avoid double reporting, those contributions were not included in the UK 2020 total by the Monitor.
In 2021, the US remained the largest mine action donor with a total contribution of $194.5 million, representing more than a third (36%) of all international support for the year. Germany ranked second with $64.8 million, which accounted for 12% of all contributions. Japan was third with a total contribution of $42.3 million, representing 8% of all support. The next two largest donors—the UK and the EU—provided more than $35 million each.

Despite variations in the level of support provided, the proportion of total assistance from the top five donors for each year has remained constant over time. From 2017–2021, the combined annual contributions from the five major donors accounted for 70–78% of all international support. Only five countries and the EU appeared in the group of five largest donors of international support in 2017–2021: the EU, Germany, Japan, Norway, the UK, and the US.

Support from States Parties in 2021 accounted for more than half of all donor funding (57%), with 26 countries providing $310 million. This represents a 16% increase from the $268 million contributed in 2020.

Overall, 17 donors contributed more in 2021 than they did in 2020, including a $10.5 million increase from Germany (19%), while the Netherlands and Canada increased their contributions by more than $7 million each. Seven donors increased their assistance by less than $1 million each.10

Two donors provided new funding in 2021: the United Nations Association-Sweden (UNA-Sweden) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

### Summary of changes in 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>Combined Total (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than 20%</td>
<td>Austria, Canada, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UNICEF</td>
<td>$25.1 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than 20%</td>
<td>Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Slovenia, UK</td>
<td>$22.1 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than 20%</td>
<td>Andorra, Australia, Belgium, EU, Slovakia, South Korea</td>
<td>$55.3 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than 20%</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, US</td>
<td>$12.4 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New donors in 2021</td>
<td>UNA-Sweden, UNDP</td>
<td>$0.9 million provided in 2021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors from 2020 that did not report new funding in 2021</td>
<td>Syrian Humanitarian Fund, UNCERF, UNTFHS</td>
<td>$2.1 million provided in 2020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

9 In July 2021, the UK parliament endorsed the decision to cut the UK’s foreign aid budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of its national income due to the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. In October 2021, media reports estimated that UK funding for mine clearance in 2022–2024 could be reduced by at least 75%. Larisa Brown, “Foreign Office cuts cash for mine clearing by 75%,” *The Times*, 7 October 2021, bit.ly/TheTimes7Oct2021; and Andrew Mitchell, “Cutting aid for landmine clearance is crazy,” *The Telegraph*, 10 October 2021, bit.ly/TheTelegraph10Oct2021.

10 Finland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain, and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).
In contrast, 12 donors decreased their funding, with the EU representing the largest fall (down $52 million, a 58% decrease). The decline in EU assistance to mine action was primarily the result of lower contributions to Croatia (from $27.4 million provided in 2020 to $6.5 million in 2021) and to Türkiye (from $21.2 million to $11.2 million). In addition, five countries which benefited from EU support in 2020 did not receive new support in 2021: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Myanmar, Palestine, Somalia, and Sri Lanka. The second largest decrease was seen for the US (down $10.3 million, a 5% decrease).

Additionally, Estonia provided the same contribution as in 2021, while three donors from 2020 did not report any new contribution to mine action in 2021.

The following table summarizes the changes in mine action funding from the top 15 donors, expressed in their respective national currencies and in US dollar terms, and shows the impact of exchange rates on the value of international contributions.

In both national currency and US dollar terms, international support for mine action increased in 10 countries. After conversion into US dollars, funding increases were slightly more pronounced in nine countries. In the case of Japan, the increase was lower after conversion.

Consequently, whereas a total of four states and the EU reported decreases in their mine action assistance in national currency terms in 2021, when converted into US dollars these reductions were lower in percentage terms for all.

Changes in mine action funding in national currency terms and US$ terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors</th>
<th>In national currency terms</th>
<th>In US$ terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Amount of decrease/increase (in millions)</td>
<td>% change from 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>+C$9.1</td>
<td>+81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>+€7.0</td>
<td>+63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>+SEK38.6</td>
<td>+46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>+€7.2</td>
<td>+15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>+NZ$1.5</td>
<td>+12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>+£2.6</td>
<td>+10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>+€0.4</td>
<td>+10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>+¥392.5</td>
<td>+9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>+€0.6</td>
<td>+8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>+DKK2.5</td>
<td>+3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>-CHF0.5</td>
<td>-3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>-US$10.3</td>
<td>-5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>-NOK47.3</td>
<td>-13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-A$3.6</td>
<td>-38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>-€46.7</td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FUNDING PATHS

Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), administered by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and ITF Enhancing Human Security, and established by the government of Slovenia and formerly known as the International Trust Fund.

In 2021, contributions through UNMAS totaled at least $50.6 million from 26 donors. Several small donors—providing total financial assistance of under $1 million each—used the VTF to contribute to mine action: Andorra, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Poland, Slovakia, South Korea, and Spain, as well as UNA-Sweden, the UNDP, and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Five donor states reported allocating a combined total of $6.2 million for mine action programs in 2021 through ITF Enhancing Human Security.12

While donor funding is frequently used for national activities, implementation is often carried out by an array of partnering institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trust funds, and United Nations (UN) agencies.

The implementing partners landscape has remained largely unchanged in recent years, with multilateral organizations, non-profit organizations, and UN agencies receiving most of the funding. Overall, international assistance to national and international non-profit organizations accounted for more than a third (38%) of total funding during 2021, with at least $209.9 million received.13

Organizations that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2021 included the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies ($26.1 million), the HALO Trust ($42.6 million), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) ($39.5 million), Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) ($25.9 million), Humanity & Inclusion (HI) ($18.1 million), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) ($15.5 million), and Danish Refugee Council ($11.6 million).

Allocation of mine action support across implementing partners in 2021 (in US$ million)

Note: Percentages in brackets reflect funding as a proportion of total international support.

12 The five donors were: Austria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Japan, and Slovenia.
13 In comparison, non-profit organizations received at least $210.1 million (37%) in 2020.
RECIPIENTS

A total of 42 states and five other areas received $487 million from 28 donors in 2021. Another $56.5 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area. Four donors—Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, and UNA-Sweden—only reported contributions to “global” activities.

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding. The top five recipient states—Iraq, Lao PDR, Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Colombia—received $267.5 million, or 49% of the total.

List of international support recipients in 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>Somaliland</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>Abkhazia</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>487.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>543.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; other areas are indicated in italics. *Lao PDR and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Of the 10 countries that received the most mine action funding in 2021, seven were in the top 10 in 2020: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Syria, and Vietnam.
Since 2015, Iraq has been the largest recipient of mine action assistance. In 2021, Iraq received 18% of all international support from the largest number of donors (15). Fourteen states and three other areas, or 36% of all recipients, had only one donor.\(^{15}\)

In 2021, a total of 21 recipient states and areas experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2020, including 12 that received less support and nine that received more support. In addition, four previous recipients received no new support: Albania, Cameroon, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Montenegro.

Cambodia was the recipient with the largest increase in funding in 2021, receiving $13.4 million more than in 2020. This was primarily due to a massive increase in Japan’s contribution toward clearance and victim assistance activities, including a socio-economic development project. Japan’s support to Cambodia in 2021 was more than 10 times larger than in 2020. Other affected countries with significant increases in international assistance received were Afghanistan, Lao PDR, and Ukraine, with approximately $7 million more each.

Croatia was the recipient with the largest decrease in 2021, receiving $20.9 million less than in 2020 (a 76% decrease). The decline was due to lower contributions from the EU, Croatia’s sole international donor. Despite the reduction, Croatia was the second largest recipient of EU support to mine action in 2021, and represented 17% of the EU’s total contribution for the year ($6.5 million out of $37.8 million). At the Mine Action National Directors and United Nations Advisers meeting in May 2021, Croatia said that “the stability of financing sources for mine action...is based on political will, high proportion of its own resources, extraordinary cross-sectorial cooperation and exceptional European Union contribution.”\(^{16}\) Since Croatia’s accession to the EU in 2013, the EU has contributed more than €130 million (more than $150 million) to demining efforts in the country.

In 2021, mine action funding channeled to Syria decreased for the fourth consecutive year. Syria received $1.9 million less than in 2020 (a 7% decrease). Previously, in 2020, support to mine action activities in Syria fell more steeply (by $16.4 million, a decrease of 39%) than in 2019 (by $24.2 million, a fall of 36%). The reduction in contributions observed since 2018 is the result of sharp decreases in funding from Germany and the US, following their exceptional contributions in 2017 which saw a combined increase of more than $67 million in support. The US has not reported providing new mine action funding to Syria since then, while funding from Germany fell from $13.9 million in 2017 to less than $5 million in 2021. Despite these decreases, Syria remained among the top five largest recipients of mine action funding in 2021.

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\(^{15}\) Recipients with one donor (in brackets) included: Armenia (EU), Chad (France), Croatia (EU), DRC (US), Georgia (Switzerland), Jordan (US), Mali (Italy), Nepal (US), Niger (France), Pakistan (UK), Serbia (US), Solomon Islands (Japan), Thailand (Norway), Türkiye (EU), and other areas Abkhazia (UK), Somaliland (Ireland), and Western Sahara (Spain).

Summary of changes in 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change</th>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Combined Total (US$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of more than 20%</td>
<td>Armenia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Global, Mali, Myanmar, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Ukraine</td>
<td>$41.7 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase of less than 20%</td>
<td>Afghanistan, BiH, DRC, Lao PDR, Palau, Sri Lanka, Thailand</td>
<td>$16.5 million increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of more than 20%</td>
<td>Angola, Chad, Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Libya, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Turkiye, Yemen</td>
<td>$68.3 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease of less than 20%</td>
<td>Iraq, Jordan, Somaliland, Syria, Vietnam, Western Sahara, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>$14.6 million decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recipients from 2020 that did not receive new support in 2021</td>
<td>Albania, Cameroon, CAR, Montenegro</td>
<td>$2.2 million received in 2020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New recipients in 2021</td>
<td>Abkhazia, Azerbaijan, Benin, Ethiopia, Niger, Senegal, Solomon Islands</td>
<td>$5.2 million received in 2021</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR

In 2021, 58% of mine action funding supported clearance and risk education activities, while support to victim assistance represented 5%. Advocacy and capacity-building also represented 5%. “Various” funding represented 32% of all international mine action support. This includes contributions not disaggregated by donors, as well as funding not earmarked for any sectors.

Contributions by thematic sector in 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Total contribution (US$ million)</th>
<th>% of total contribution</th>
<th>No. of donors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearance and risk education</td>
<td>317.4</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>175.3</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim assistance</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity-building</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>543.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N/A=not applicable.

CLEARANCE AND RISK EDUCATION

In 2021, $317.4 million, or more than half (58%) of all reported support for mine action, went toward clearance and risk education activities. This represents a decrease of nearly $70 million (or 18%) from 2020.

17 In 2020, international support was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and risk education ($387.1 million, or 68% of total international support), victim assistance ($33.3 million, or 6%), capacity-building ($19.6 million, or 4%), advocacy ($6.1 million, or 1%), and various activities ($119.1 million, or 21%).
Five donors—the US, the EU, Germany, Norway, and Canada—provided the majority (73%, or $232.2 million) of all support to clearance and risk education in 2021.

Many donors reported clearance and risk education as a combined figure. Twenty donors did, however, indicate contributions specifically for clearance activities, providing a total of $97.8 million across 23 affected countries and four other areas.\(^{18}\)

About two-fifths of international support ($239.5 million) was spent in nine States Parties with massive landmine contamination. Most of this funding, $145.3 million, went to clearance and risk education projects. As illustrated in the following graph, States Parties with smaller contamination have tended to receive less financial support to implement their clearance obligations.

Nine mine-affected States Parties did not receive new external support to carry out clearance and/or risk education projects in 2021, and for some of them it has been the case for years.\(^{19}\)

Clearance and risk education dedicated support by extent of mine contamination in States Parties: 2019–2021\(^{20}\)

Note: Figures above each bar indicate the combined total amount of clearance and risk education support.

Nine donors reported contributions totaling $6.7 million specifically for risk education projects across 10 countries, and globally.\(^{21}\) Myanmar, Iraq, and Syria received the most risk education-specific funding with a combined total of $4.5 million, about two-thirds (67%) of all risk education dedicated support.

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\(^{18}\) States Parties recipients of international assistance for clearance were: Afghanistan, Angola, BIH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Palau, Senegal, Solomon Islands (for unexploded ordnance), Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe. States not party that received international assistance for clearance were: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar (for survey activities), Syria, and Vietnam. Other areas that received international assistance for clearance activities were: Abkhazia, Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Somaliland.

\(^{19}\) DRC (last received international support for clearance and risk education in 2020), Ecuador (in 2012), Eritrea (in 2010), Ethiopia (in 2012), Guinea-Bissau (in 2010), Mauritania (in 2016), Niger (in 2011), Peru (in 2016), and Serbia (in 2020).

\(^{20}\) Recipients of international support with massive contamination (more than 100km\(^2\)) included: Afghanistan, BIH, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Yemen. Recipients with large contamination (20–99km\(^2\)) included: Angola, Chad, Thailand, and Zimbabwe. Recipients with medium contamination (5–19km\(^2\)) included: Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Tajikistan. Recipients with small contamination (less than 5km\(^2\)) included: Colombia, Palestine, and Senegal.

\(^{21}\) Donors of international assistance for risk education were: Canada, the EU, France, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, the UK, and UNICEF. In comparison, 13 donors reported contributing a total of $9.3 million for risk education projects in 2020.
Recipients of risk education dedicated support: 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipients</th>
<th>Amount (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon*</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>&lt; 0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. *Lao PDR and Lebanon are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Between 2017 and 2021, approximately two-thirds of international support went to clearance and risk education activities (60%, or $1.8 billion). Risk education-specific funding represented just 2% of all dedicated support, totaling $47.1 million. In comparison, a total of $30 million was recorded as specific risk education funding during the previous five-year period, from 2012–2016. This 57% increase reflects better disaggregation of funding data and demonstrates renewed focus on this life-saving pillar of mine action since 2019.

Clearance and risk education dedicated international support: 2017–2021

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated clearance and risk education funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

This table includes recipients of specific risk education funding only. In addition to the recipients listed in the table, 16 states and one other area received support for risk education combined with other mine action activities, such as clearance or victim assistance (the specific amount going to each sector could not be disaggregated): Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Colombia, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Vietnam, Yemen, Zimbabwe, and other area Nagorno-Karabakh.
VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Based on data available as of October 2022, direct international support for victim assistance activities in 2021 totaled $25.6 million, representing a 23% decline from the 2020 level ($33.3 million). Nine donors\(^{23}\) reported contributing to victim assistance projects in eight States Parties and six states not party.\(^{24}\) This is the lowest level of victim assistance dedicated funding recorded since 2016.

Victim assistance dedicated international support: 2017–2021

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated victim assistance funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

In 2021, most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international support for victim assistance. As observed in 2018–2020, a large proportion of the contributions from donors to victim assistance activities in 2021 were the result of support within the context of emergency operations in conflict-affected countries in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In 2021, more than half of all victim assistance support (55%) went to just five countries—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen—receiving a combined total of $14.1 million.

The remaining 45% ($11.5 million) went to victim assistance activities in nine other countries, including five affected States Parties.

As in previous years, a large number of States Parties in which there were significant numbers of mine/ERW victims received no, or very little, victim assistance support; whereas needs remained great and available resources were lacking.\(^{25}\) In 2021, 27 States Parties with significant numbers of survivors did not receive any direct victim assistance funding.\(^{26}\)

Funding for victim assistance remains especially difficult to track, as many donors report that they support victims via more general programs for development and the rights of persons with disabilities, and are not able to detail specific victim assistance funding. However, the Monitor’s annual estimate still provides an informative picture of the global victim assistance funding situation.

\(^{23}\) Victim assistance donors included: the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, and the US.

\(^{24}\) States Parties recipients of international funding for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. States not party that received international funding for victim assistance were: Armenia, Lao PDR, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, and Syria.

\(^{25}\) See Impact chapter for the list of States Parties with significant numbers of victims and needs.

\(^{26}\) Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.
ADVOCACY AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

In 2021, just 1% of all reported support for mine action went toward advocacy activities ($4.7 million).27 Of the 33 donors reporting international contributions to mine action, nine reported supporting advocacy activities.28

Fifteen donors collectively provided $20.5 million—4% of all international support in 2021—for capacity-building activities in 13 countries and one other area.29 This is a 5% increase from the level of funding for capacity-building reported in 2020 ($19.6 million) and more than double the 2019 level ($7.4 million). It is the highest annual total support allocated to this sector ever recorded by the Monitor. This could reflect a growing interest from donors in strengthening local capacities to create conditions for effective and sustainable mine action efforts.30

Advocacy and capacity-building dedicated international support: 2017–2021

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated advocacy and capacity-building funding in US$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international support.

NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2021

Overall national contributions to mine action continue to be under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 reports. As in previous years, a dozen affected states indicated contributing to their national mine action programs but details on their level of contribution are either unavailable or only partially available. In most of these states, national contributions were limited to covering the running costs of their respective mine action authorities.

27 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to: contributions to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty implementation support units, the Gender and Mine Action Programme (GMAP), GICHD, Geneva Call, the ICBL-CMC and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, and other operators and NGOs.

28 Advocacy donors in 2021 included: Australia, Canada, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

29 Capacity-building donors in 2021 included: Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the EU, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and UNDP. Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building activities were: Afghanistan, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, and other area Western Sahara.

In 2021, the Monitor identified that at least 13 affected states provided a combined total of $55.4 million in contributions to mine action from their national budgets.\(^{31}\)

Chile is one of the few affected states to have completely funded its own mine action program; it last received international support in 2007. Chile completed clearance of its mined areas in 2020, and provided more than $75 million in total toward completion of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations.\(^{32}\) Chile still has clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and estimated that $2 million would be needed to complete clearance of all areas contaminated with cluster munition remnants.\(^{33}\) In 2020–2022, the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted Chile’s ability to allocate financial resources to mine action.\(^{34}\) In 2021, the country covered the full cost of technical survey activities—estimated at some $30,000—from the state budget.\(^{35}\) No national resources were allocated to mine action work in 2022.\(^{36}\)

In previous years, Lebanon contributed to a large proportion of its mine action program, with an average of $9 million per year in 2017–2020. However, in 2021, Lebanon could not allocate national resources to conduct clearance operations as planned due to political instability and the economic crisis.\(^{37}\) Lebanon is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In 2020–2021, due to ongoing armed conflict and the COVID-19 pandemic, Yemen was not in a position to maintain its annual commitment of $3 million to its mine action program. Limited national support was provided to staff of the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) and for healthcare, though the amount was not reported.\(^{38}\) Yemen reported that while the majority of international support is directed toward the implementation of activities, there was still a need to support coordination mechanisms.\(^{39}\)

### National support: 2021

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Contribution (US$ million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Türkiye</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>55.35</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold. *Lao PDR is a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

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### OSLO ACTION PLAN AND SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

At the Oslo Review Conference in November 2019, States Parties reaffirmed their commitment to complete their respective time-bound obligations by 2025, and to ensure sustainable and integrated support for victims. The Oslo Action Plan contains six action points along with

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\(^{31}\) Data on national support to mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, and media reporting. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.


\(^{34}\) Ibid., pp. 2 – 3.

\(^{35}\) Chile, “Work plan to complete the technical surveys in the 4 military ranges which is suspected there may be cluster munition remnants [sic]” 26 August 2021, bit.ly/ChileWorkplanCCM2021.


\(^{39}\) Ibid.
a series of specific indicators, aimed at tracking progress toward enhancing international cooperation and assistance. These indicators include, among others: the level of national funding; the provision of assistance by States Parties; regular reporting on challenges and needs for assistance; the existence of coordinating mechanisms; and the facilitation of dialogue and information exchange among affected states, the donor community, and relevant stakeholders. A number of these points are tracked by the Monitor.

As regards the provision of assistance by and to States Parties, in the last decade, a total of 32 States Parties reported contributing some $1.7 billion in mine action support to 49 affected States Parties. In 2021 alone, 21 States Parties provided $196.3 million in mine action support to 26 States Parties. This is a 10% increase from the $176.6 million provided by and to States Parties in 2020, but remains similar as a proportion of overall international mine action assistance. This is the third year in a row that such funding has remained below $200 million. It is an important reminder of the need to secure adequate resources for the effective and timely implementation of the treaty’s obligations.

Cumulative figures remain just one aspect of the story. The distribution of support among affected states and territories, as well as the sustainability of assistance, are also key factors.


![Graph showing support from 2011 to 2021 with contributions in US$ million and percentage in brackets]

Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate contributions from States Parties to affected States Parties in US$ million, with the percentage in brackets as a proportion of total international support.

Tracking national financial commitments by affected States Parties has proven more difficult as a result of under-reporting. Since 2010, the Monitor has recorded a total of $1.5 billion provided by affected states to their own mine action efforts.40

National support has remained below $100 million annually for six consecutive years. Affected states do not all provide the same level of information regarding national resources allocated to mine action activities, and some have never done so.

FIVE-YEAR SUPPORT TO MINE ACTION
2017–2021

Over the past five years (2017–2021), total support to mine action amounted to $3.4 billion, an average of more than $670 million per year. This is $256 million more than the total support provided in the previous five-year period from 2012–2016, constituting an 8% increase.41

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40 This figure includes support provided by affected States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and/or to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

41 According to Monitor data, from 2012–2016, total support for mine action totaled $3.1 billion ($2.3 billion from international donors and $795 million provided by affected states to their own mine action activities).
Although data on national support for mine action remains incomplete, such support accounted for around 11% of total mine action funding from 2017–2021, and amounted to approximately $378 million. International support totaled $3 billion, an average of some $600 million per year, and represented 89% of all support.

Three donors—the US ($1.1 billion), the EU ($379.2 million), and Germany ($284.7 million)—contributed $1.8 billion, or more than half of total international support (52%). Three other donors—the UK, Japan, and Norway—contributed more than $185 million each; while Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland ranked among the top 10 mine action donors for the five-year period.

Support from States Parties accounted for half (49%) of all international funding provided in 2017–2021, with a combined contribution of $1.5 billion. In percentage terms, this is similar to States Parties support in 2012–2016, when $1.2 billion was provided, representing 53% of all international funding during the period.

This shows that historically, States Parties have been a stable and consistent contributor to mine action, despite variations in budget allocations and changes in situations or contexts observed in the past decade. One of the main challenges to improve efficiency in international support remains greater coordination among donors for a better geographical distribution of financial resources, in order to address both legacy and new contamination, as well as all sectors of mine action, from clearance to risk education and victim assistance.

Summary of contributions: 2017–2021

The overall increase in total support provided in 2017–2021 compared to the previous five-year period was mostly driven by the unusually large 2017 contributions from Germany and the US to support clearance efforts in Iraq and Syria, which represented a combined total increase of $204 million. There was also an apparent impact from the series of pledging conferences held in 2016 to secure funding for mine action in some heavily affected countries, as well as one-off extraordinary pledges announced around that time. This contributed to

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42 Thirty-one States Parties reported mine action contributions in 2017–2021: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, and UK.

significant increases in support for activities in Colombia (up $116.7 million), Iraq (up $381.4 million), and Lao PDR (up $43 million), as shown in the table below.

This increase was partially offset by a 55% reduction in national support, which fell from a combined total of $794.8 million reported in 2012–2016 to $354.1 million in 2017–2021.

Summary of changes: top 10 recipients of mine action support

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>615.4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>234.0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+163%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>265.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>310.2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>252.4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>+599%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lao PDR*</td>
<td>228.0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>185.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>201.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>84.8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+138%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>124.5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>102.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>+21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>114.0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>141.1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>+65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>+106%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+202%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,073.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,226.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>N/A</strong></td>
<td><strong>+69%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in bold; N/A = not applicable.

In 2017–2021, the 10 largest recipients of mine action support received the majority of available funding, totaling more than $2 billion; this represents, on average, more than two-thirds (68%) of total international contributions annually. Of these 10 recipients, four came from the Middle East and North Africa region, three from the Asia-Pacific, two from Europe, and one from the Americas. No country from the Sub-Saharan Africa region was among the largest 10 recipients.

Two affected states from Sub-Saharan Africa were among the 15 largest recipients of mine action assistance in 2017–2021: Somalia ranked fourteenth ($54.7 million received) and South Sudan fifteenth ($48.6 million). Both of these states were among the top 10 recipients in 2012–2016: Somalia ranked seventh ($80.3 million) and South Sudan tenth ($62.7 million).

From 2017 to 2021, the composition of this group of recipients remained relatively similar from one year to another, while there were some variations in the contributions received by each recipient from one year to the next. This illustrates changes in circumstances globally and/or nationally, as well as shifts in funding approaches, priorities, and focus.

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44 In 2012–2016, the top 10 largest country recipients were: Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Croatia, Colombia, Somalia, Lebanon, Angola, and South Sudan. These countries received 58% of all international support during the period: $1.3 billion out of the $2.3 billion.
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION IN 2021

**MAP KEY**

**International contributions (in US$)**
- More than $100 million
- Between $40−$100 million
- Between $10−$39.9 million
- Between $1−$9.9 million
- Less than $1 million

**National contributions (in US$)**
- More than $10 million
- Between $1−$10 million
- Less than $1 million

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are bold and non-signatories are plain text.

**DISCLAIMER**

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION SUPPORT IN 2021

MAP KEY

Total amount received (in US$)
- More than $30 million
- Between $10–29.9 million
- Between $5–9.9 million
- Between $1–4.9 million
- Less than $1 million

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are **bold**, non-signatories are plain text, other areas are *italics*.

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
Children taking part in an explosive ordnance risk education session delivered by local volunteers trained by HI, in Iraq.

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STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (1997 MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force, which was 1 March 1999. On the following list, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Now that the treaty has entered into force, states may no longer sign; rather, they may become bound without signature through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. Accession is indicated below with (a) and succession is indicated below with (s).

As of 1 November 2022 there were 164 States Parties.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)
Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Cabo Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
Congo, Rep 4 May 01 (a)
Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
Côte d'Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 20 May 98
Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
Democratic Republic of Congo 2 May 02 (a)
Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
Estonia 12 May 04 (a)
Eswatini 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
Finland 9 Jan 12 (a)
France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
Ghana 4 Dec 97; 50 Jun 00
Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03
Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98
Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98
Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a)
Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99
Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03
Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
Macedonia, North 9 Sep 98 (a)
Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
North Macedonia 9 Sep 98 (a)
Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
Palestine 29 Dec 2017 (a)
Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)
Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00
Status of the Convention

SIGNATORY
Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

NON-SIGNATORIES
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
China
Cuba
Egypt
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Libya
Micronesia, Federated States of
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Syria
Tonga
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam

Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98
São Tomé & Príncipe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01
Slovak Republic 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a)
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)
Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Sri Lanka 13 Dec 2017 (a)
Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Tuvalu 13 Sep 2011 (a)
Türkiye 25 Sep 03 (a)
Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

SIGNATORY

Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97

NON-SIGNATORIES

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
China
Cuba
Egypt
Georgia
India
Iran
Israel
Kazakhstan
Korea, North
Korea, South
Kyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Libya
Micronesia, Federated States of
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Syria
Tonga
United Arab Emirates
United States
Uzbekistan
Vietnam
MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, inter alia, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,
Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
   a) To use anti-personnel mines;
   b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
   c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions

1. "Anti-personnel mine" means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.

2. "Mine" means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.

3. "Anti-handling device" means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.

4. "Transfer" involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.

5. "Mined area" means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

ARTICLE 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.

2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.
ARTICLE 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

ARTICLE 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.

3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.

4. Each request shall contain:
   a) The duration of the proposed extension;
   b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
      (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
      (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
      (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
   c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
   d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.

5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.

6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.
ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.

2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.

3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.

4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.

5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.

6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.

7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, inter alia:

   a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
   b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
   c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
   d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
   e) Assistance to mine victims;
   f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.

8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.
ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
   a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
   b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
   c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
   d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
   e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
   f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
   g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
   h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
   i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.

2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.

3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfoundedRequests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.

3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.

4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.

5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.

6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.

7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.

8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.

9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.
10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:
   a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
   b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
   c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.
ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.

2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.

3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
   a) The operation and status of this Convention;
   b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
   c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
   d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
   e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
   f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.

2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.

3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.

4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties,
provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
   a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
   b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
   c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
   d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

ARTICLE 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

ARTICLE 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the
Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.

3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

ARTICLE 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
The year 2022 marks 25 years since the Mine Ban Treaty—also known as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention or Ottawa Treaty—was adopted and opened for signature. Since that time, the treaty has established a strong international framework for the elimination of these weapons and has contributed to remarkable results in protecting lives and livelihoods. Despite the progress made, challenges remain in achieving the treaty’s ultimate objective of a mine-free world.

Landmine Monitor 2022 provides a global overview of efforts by the international community to universalize and fully implement the treaty. The report documents recent use and covers mine ban policy, including the status of production, trade, and stockpiling globally. It assesses the impact of mine contamination and casualties, and progress made in clearance, risk education, and victim assistance. Lastly, it outlines global trends in international assistance to mine action as well as available national resources. This report focuses on calendar year 2021, with information included up to October 2022 where possible.

This report was prepared by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). The Monitor has reported on the international community’s response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Cover: Uganda victim assistance rehabilitation expert, Alex Munyambabazi, calling attention to gaps in services for landmine survivors at the “Broken Chair” at the United Nations in Geneva. The country completed mine clearance in 2012, yet there are still significant numbers of victims requiring ongoing support. © Jared Bloch/ICBL-CMC, June 2022

Top left: Standing in delicate balance on three legs, the Broken Chair has been a symbol of the campaign against landmines for 25 years. More generally it is a reminder of states’ obligations to protect civilians from the consequences of armed conflicts. © Basile Barbey/HI, September 2022

Top right: A destroyed shop in Irpin, Ukraine, with the word “mine” spray-painted. © Sean Sutton/MAG, April 2022

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