Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 27 July 2019

Summary: Palestine acceded to the convention on 2 January 2015 after participating in meetings of the convention.

In November 2017, Palestine provided an initial transparency report that confirms it has never produced cluster munitions and possesses no stockpiles, including for research and training purposes. Palestine reports that cluster munitions have never been used on its territories.


The State of Palestine acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 2 January 2015 and became a State Party on 1 July 2015.

Palestine has not adopted national legislation. It has listed a 1998 law on arms and explosives under national implementation measures and reports that a consultative committee attached to the Palestinian Mine Action Center is considering if specific implementing legislation is needed for the convention.[1]

Palestine submitted its initial Article 7 report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 15 November 2017 and provided a third annual updated report on 29 April 2019.[2]

Palestine did not participate in any meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The first time it attended a meeting of the convention was in Santiago, Chile in June 2010.

Palestine has participated in most of the convention’s meetings, most recently the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in September 2018.[3] Palestine acceded after repeatedly expressing its support for the convention’s objectives during earlier meetings of the convention.

Palestine has not elaborated its views on certain important issues relating to its interpretation and implementation of the convention, such as the prohibitions on transit, assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions, foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions, investment in the production of cluster munitions, and on the retention of cluster munitions for training and development purposes.

Palestine acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 December 2017. Palestine is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In its transparency reports, Palestine declared that it has never produced cluster munitions and possesses no stockpiles, including for research and training purposes. It, however, warned that it is not in a position to verify if Palestinian territories occupied by Israel, such as Israeli military bases, hold cluster munition stocks.[4]

Previously in 2010, a Palestinian official told the Monitor that Palestine did not possess any cluster munitions and that Israeli forces have never used cluster munitions in the occupied Palestinian territories.[5]

[1] Law 2/1998 prohibits and punishes anyone, except for the state, from producing, stockpiling, transferring, and receiving arms or explosives in the Palestinian territories. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 March 2018; and statement of State of Palestine, Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 September 2016.

[2] The report was submitted 29 April 2019 and covers calendar year 2018, but was dated 29 April 2019. The initial report was for the period from 6 January 2015 until 15 November 2017, while the annual updates submitted since then have covered activities in the previous calendar year.

[3] Palestine participated in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010, 2011, 2013, and 2016, as well as the First Review Conference in 2015 and intersessional meetings in 2013 and 2014.

[4] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms B and E, 15 November 2017.

[5] Meeting with Col. Mohammad A.M. Ghanayiem, Palestinian Ministry of Interior, Vientiane, 9 November 2010.

Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 15 October 2020


The State of Palestine acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 December 2017,[1] and the treaty came into force for Palestine on 1 June 2018.

As a State Party, Palestine submitted its initial Article 7 report in November 2018, which stated that Palestine was working to pass a draft law to implement the treaty, though it did not provide any details on whether such a law has been introduced in the Legislative Council.[2] Palestine submitted a second Article 7 report in April 2019.[3]

Previously, in September 2012, Palestine submitted a voluntary Article 7 report. The report stated that a Higher Committee for Mine Action, within the Ministry of Interior, was established in 2012 as an interministerial body, which is currently developing and adapting legislation with regard to mine action. In February 2012, the committee mandated and allocated resources to the Palestinian Mine Action Center (PMAC) to coordinate all mine action-related activities in the West Bank.[4] The PMAC was established in April 2012.[5] Palestine submitted an additional voluntary Article 7 report in 2013.

Palestine did not attend the convention’s Fourth Review Conference in Oslo in November 2019.

Palestine is State Party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but not its Amended Protocol II on landmines or Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

The Monitor has not found any allegations of use of antipersonnel mines or mine-like devices by any Palestinian entity in recent years.[6]

In its 2012 voluntary Article 7 report, Palestine stated that it does not possess a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, would not retain any mines for training purposes, and would only transfer mines for destruction. The report also stated that Palestine has never had production facilities for antipersonnel landmines. The report listed mined areas and provided information on the status of Palestine’s risk education and victim assistance programs.[7]

Clearance efforts in Palestine are ongoing. In May 2016, the HALO Trust began clearing landmines around Christian holy sites in the West Bank.[8]

In February 2012, the Israeli armed forces seized and surrounded land belonging to a Palestinian family in the southern West Bank town of Surif by placing yellow warning signs, claiming that the land was mined and that the area was a closed military zone. The owner claimed that the area had been cleared of mines by the Palestinian Authority more than 20 years previously, adding that the mines had initially been laid by the Israeli army when the area was used for military training.[9]

In June 2012, the United Nations conducted training on landmine removal for three weeks. The training was held in Jericho under the auspices of the PMAC, and trained members of the public security forces.[10]

Israel does not coordinate with the Palestinian Authority on mine clearance, but has been involved in mine clearance around Israel’s illegal settlements in order to expand them.[11]

[1] State of Palestine, Instrument of Accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, Depository Notification, United Nations, 29 December 2017.

[5]The Palestinian Mine Action Center (PMAC),” On the Record, 26 June 2012.

[6] Palestinian militias have produced and used command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits use of victim-activated IEDs and booby-traps, which function as antipersonnel mines, but does not prohibit use of command-detonated IEDs. Media and other reports are not always clear whether devices involved in explosive incidents in Palestine are victim-activated or command-detonated, and reports often use a number of terms interchangeably, citing the use of bombs, landmines, booby-traps, and IEDs.

[9]Israeli Land Mines Still Pose Problems for Palestinian Communities,” Palestinian Solidarity Project, 29 February 2012.

[10]UN experts train Palestinian security to remove land mines,” TV News Report, Palestine TV (Ramallah), 25 June 2012. An English language translation was re-broadcast on Mosaic News.

[11] Jacob Magid, “Defense Ministry clears minefield near settlement, pledges new housing on site,” The Times of Israel, 3 April 2018. The settlements are generally agreed to be illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits countries from moving populations into territories occupied during a war.

Mine Action

Last updated: 07 November 2018

Treaty status

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party
Article 5 deadline: 1 March 2028
Unclear whether on track

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

Higher Committee for Mine Action—an interministerial body
Palestine Mine Action Center (PMAC)
Clearance operations must be coordinated with the Israeli authorities

United Nations

UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

Mine action strategic plan

Strategic Plan for 2017–2020

Operators in 2017

HALO Trust
4M, clearance on behalf of the Israeli Ministry of Defense in the West Bank
4CI Security, conducts quality management
UNMAS, standby bomb clearance team in Gaza

Extent of contamination as of end 2017


0.4km2 CHA (excluding the Jordan Valley). Total number of minefields in Palestine is approximately 90
Extent of contamination: light

Cluster munition remnants


Other ERW contamination

Extent not reported

Land release in 2017


0.04km2 cleared. 86 antipersonnel mines and 8 antivehicle mines destroyed

Other ERW

2 UXO destroyed during mine clearance operations



Palestine is required to submit an Article 7 transparency report by 28 November 2018, including formally reporting on any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control

Notes: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; ERW = explosive remnants of war; UXO = unexploded ordnance.


In the State of Palestine, in the West Bank, hazards encompass minefields, military training zones, and areas of confrontation where many explosive devices remain. A 2013 survey by the Palestine Mine Action Center (PMAC) found that Palestine has mined areas covering a total of 19.9km2, marginally less than its previous estimate of 20.4km2.[1] A HALO Trust survey of the West Bank in 2012 identified 90 minefields, 13 of which were laid by the Jordanian military in 1948–1967, while the remaining 77 were laid by the Israeli military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war.[2] All minefields, including those laid by the Jordanian military, are under Israeli military control.[3]

According to HALO Trust, as of the end of 2017, more than 0.4km2 of confirmed mined area exists (excluding the Jordan Valley) across six minefields in Palestine and two minefields in no-man’s-land between the West Bank and Israel. All eight minefields (see table below) were laid by the Jordanian army.[4]

Confirmed mine contamination as of end 2017 (excluding the Jordan Valley)*[5]


Minefield Task



Area (m2)



AV and AP mines




AV and AP mines




AV and AP mines



Tul Kareem

Nur a-Shams

AV and AP mines




Karne Shomron

AV and AP mines




AP mines




No Man’s Land–Yalo

AV and AP mines



No Man’s Land–Canada Park

AV and AP mines







Note: AV = antivehicle; AP = antipersonnel.

Four of the 12 governorates in the West Bank contained mined areas, as of the end of 2017.[6] The governorate of Hebron is no longer considered contaminated, after clearance of the Surif minefield was completed on 1 June 2017.[7]

Most mined areas are located in Area C of the West Bank (see below), along the border with Jordan. Area C covers approximately 60% of the West Bank and is under full Israeli control for security, planning, and construction.[8]

According to the United Nations (UN), of the estimated total of 90 minefields in the West Bank, those in more “central areas”—the governorates of Jenin, Qalqiliya, and Tulkarm—are priorities for clearance.[9] In addition to posing a risk to civilians, mines affect the socio-economic development of Palestinian communities. Mined areas are located in, or close to, populated areas,[10] mostly on privately owned agricultural and grazing land or along roads used daily by communities, and are often either poorly marked or not marked at all.[11] They are accessible to the population, and in in the case of Yabad minefield, in Jenin governorate, local farmers cultivate parts of the polygon. In Nur a-Shams minefield, in Tul Kareem governorate, members of the community have dumped construction waste on part of the minefield.[12]

Other explosive remnants of war

Palestine is also contaminated with ERW though the precise nature and extent of the problem are not known. Hostilities between Israel and Gaza in 2008–2009, 2012, and 2014 resulted in significant ERW contamination.[13]

Program Management

PMAC was established in accordance with Palestinian Minister of Interior decision on 25 March 2012,[14] which appointed a director and created a Higher Committee for Mine Action as an interministerial body, with 27 members representing the ministries of education, foreign affairs, health, intelligence, interior, justice, and military liaison, as well as the police and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the national mine action authority, is tasked to develop mine action legislation and allocate resources for the sector.[15]

PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the West Bank. It receives technical advice from UNMAS.[16] The committee has established a number of sub-committees to deal with technical issues, risk education, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.[17]

PMAC currently has 10 employees[18] and is staffed with personnel from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, and Civil Defense. PMAC also has a team of 30 personnel who were trained by UNMAS for demining a few years ago, but, to date, have not been authorized or equipped to do so, and no agreement has been reached with Israel on this matter.[19] The Civil Police have an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit with 42 personnel in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarm, who conduct rapid response to locate and remove items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The EOD unit is only permitted to work in Area A of the West Bank.[20] A new director of PMAC was appointed in July 2017, following the previous director’s retirement.[21]

Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, commonly known as the Oslo II accord, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas: Area A is under full Palestinian civil and security control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C refers to areas where Israel has full civil and security control.[22] Clearance operations must be coordinated with the Israeli authorities,[23] in addition to PMAC.

UNMAS reports that its intervention in Gaza seeks to reduce the threat and impact of ERW and mitigates the impact of future conflicts on Gaza communities by addressing the following: (i) protection of civilians from current and future ERW threats; (ii) support to reconstruction through ERW risk mitigation measures and EOD support; and (iii) emergency preparedness measures.[24]

Strategic planning

PMAC has a Strategic Plan for 2017–2020, whose primary objectives are the clearance of the Araba, Deir Abu Daif, Nur a-Shams, Qabatiya, and Yabad minefields.[25] As of July 2018, clearance of Deir Abu Daif had been completed.

HALO Trust’s survey and clearance in the West Bank is prioritized by its international donors, in conjunction with the INMAA and PMAC.[26]

Legislation and standards

In November 2016, Palestine announced that it was seeking to adopt and enact a mine action law.[27] As of June 2018, the process was still ongoing.[28]

HALO Trust’s standing operating procedures (SOPs), which are based on its international standards and which also comply with national standards, are approved by the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA). Once a year, HALO Trust submits its SOPs, including any necessary amendments, to the INMAA for approval.[29]

Quality management

HALO’s work in the West Bank complies with the Israeli Standard Institute for Standards, in particular ISO 9001, 14001, and 18001. HALO carries out its own internal quality control (QC), which is conducted by senior program staff, and which complies with the ISO standards and HALO Trust’s own SOPs.[30] In addition, as required by the INMAA, 4CI Security, an external INMAA-certified quality assurance (QA)/QC company, is contracted to monitor HALO Trust’s clearance in accordance with Israeli National Mine Action Standards.[31]

Information management

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, Level 1, is used by PMAC.[32]

HALO follows the INMAA’s national standards and provides daily and weekly reports as well as completion reports for every task. The information is shared with PMAC.[33] As a result, all three entities are in possession of HALO Trust survey and clearance data relating to demining operations in the West Bank.


To date, Israel has not authorized demining operations to be conducted by or on behalf of PMAC.[34] In September 2013, the INMAA gave formal authorization for HALO Trust to clear two minefields in the West Bank deemed high priority by PMAC. Following INMAA authorization, HALO began mine clearance in the West Bank in April 2014,[35] and has continued clearance operations in the West Bank to the present day.

HALO Trust works under the auspices of both the INMAA and PMAC.[36] HALO’s manual clearance team in the West Bank is composed of deminers from Georgia with capacity varying according to the task. For the Deir Abu Daif minefield task there were 22 deminers, while for the manual section of the Araba minefield task, up to 14 deminers were deployed. In addition, during 2017, HALO deployed three armored CASE721 wheeled medium loaders, one armored CAT320B tracked excavator, and one industrial rock crusher. The machines were operated by a Palestinian team.[37]

UNMAS maintains a bomb clearance team on standby in Gaza to remove and destroy existing contamination that poses a threat to Gaza communities.[38]

Land Release

The total mined area released by clearance in 2017 was 41,857m2, which is a slight increase compared to 34,057m2 in 2016.

Survey in 2017

No land was reduced by technical survey in 2017 or cancelled by non-technical survey.

HALO Trust performs survey as part of its clearance operations of the Jordanian-laid minefields in Area C of the West Bank, which includes joint site visits with PMAC and the INMAA, but it is part of pre-clearance task preparation, and is of CHAs already recorded in PMAC’s database and on maps.[39]

Clearance in 2017

In 2017, HALO cleared 41,857m2 of mined area, during which 86 antipersonnel mines, eight antivehicle mines, and two other items of UXO were destroyed.

This included completion of Surif minefield in Hebron governorate, from January to June 2017, during which eight antipersonnel mines were destroyed. Upon completion of Surif minefield HALO Trust immediately relocated to Jenin governorate, and commenced clearance of Deir Abu Daif minefield, which was declared free of mines on 1 October 2017. During clearance of Deir Abu Daif minefield, 76 Belgian PRB-M35 antipersonnel mines and three British MK5 antitank mines were destroyed.[40]

Following completion of Deir Abu Daif minefield, it was agreed with PMAC and the INMAA to scale down mechanical operations over the winter due to wet soil limiting machine use, and to prioritize clearance of the manual segments of Araba, Qabatiya, and Yabad minefields in Jenin governorate. Mechanical clearance recommenced in Spring 2018, as soon as the soil was sufficiently dry.[41]

HALO Trust mine clearance in the West Bank in 2017[42]


Minefield Task

Areas released

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed















Deir Abu Daif



















Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

In addition, from October 2017, Israel undertook Israeli-funded clearance of the Karne Shomron and Jinsafut minefields, in the Qalqiliya governorate of the West Bank. Israeli operator 4M was awarded the demining tender by the Israeli Ministry of Defense, and clearance of the two minefields was expected to be completed by May 2018.[43] The INMAA did not, however, report the area of land cleared in these two minefields in 2017.

Progress in 2018

Clearance of the West Bank minefield at Qaser al-Yahud (the baptism site), in the Jordan Valley, commenced in March 2018.[44] The project aims to remove mines and explosive ordnance in the area of the baptism site, which covers a total estimated area of 870,000m².[45] Approximately 90,000m2 is thought to potentially contain antipersonnel mines, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[46] Israeli Defense Force (IDF) minefield records provided to HALO Trust separate the land for clearance outside of the church compounds into 11 areas, all of which contain a potential UXO threat. Six of the 11 areas are known to contain significant numbers of M15 antivehicle mines in multiple lines and over 2,600 antitank mines in total. The land and buildings inside the seven church compounds are suspected to contain mines and booby traps, but no official records exist regarding this contamination.[47]

The INMAA expected clearance of the baptism site to take between 12 and 16 months,[48] and as of August 2018, HALO expected that the site would be fully cleared by mid-2019.[49]

Article 5 Compliance

Palestine acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 29 December 2017, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2018. Palestine is required to submit an Article 7 transparency report by 28 November 2018, which includes formally reporting on the mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.

PMAC planned to complete clearance of mines areas by the end of 2020, if there are not obstacles from the other parties.[50] Clearance in the West Bank is, however, largely constrained by political factors, including the lack of authorization granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct mine clearance operations.

HALO Trust has completed survey of the Jordanian-laid minefields in the West Bank, and as of the end of 2017, four Jordanian-laid minefields in the governorates of Jenin and Tul Kareem, which fall within HALO’s donor agreement, remained to be cleared. Of these, HALO reported that it was well placed to complete the mechanical clearance of Araba, Qabatiya, and Yabad minefields in Jenin governorate during the course of 2018. After completion of the four priority Jordanian-laid minefields, HALO Trust planned to look into clearance of mined areas in the Jordan Valley, the majority of which are Israeli-laid.[51]

The two minefields in Qalqiliya governorate fall outside of HALO’s funding agreement with international donors, and these two minefields are being cleared by 4M, with Israeli funding, under an Israeli Ministry of Defense tender.[52]

Furthermore, the INMAA began survey of the Jordan Valley minefields in the West Bank in 2017, using an Israeli national budget and operating with Israeli companies. The INMAA sees significant potential for cancellation and reduction of suspected hazardous areas in the Jordan Valley, and is using various technologies and scientific tools to assess the likelihood of mine drift. The INMAA planned to invest around ILS 900,000 (approximately US$250,000) on this project in 2017–2019.[53]

Mine clearance in 2013–2017[54]


Area cleared (m2)














PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian authority only provides funding for the salary of PMAC employees and the PMAC office.[55] In 2017, UNMAS provided a grant of $20,000 to PMAC.[56]



The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (, which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

[1] Email from Brig. Joma Mousa, then Director, PMAC, 31 March 2014.

[2] HALO Trust, “Were we work: West Bank,” undated.

[3] Emails from Tom Meredith, then Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 24 June and 23 October 2015; and from Sonia Pezier, then Junior Programme Officer, UNMAS, 14 April 2015.

[4] Emails from Ronen Shimoni, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 22 April and 3 August 2017, and 14 May 2018.

[5] Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018. The first table above refers to Jordanian-laid minefields. The two minefields in no-man’s land are located west of the separation barrier in an Israeli-controlled area. There were inconsistencies between PMAC and HALO data regarding the size of the Araba, Nur a-Shams, and Qabatiya minefields, as of end of 2017. PMAC’s list appeared to contain inaccuracies and included mine contamination at Deir Abu Daif minefield, where clearance was completed in October 2017.

[6] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

[7] Ibid., and 26 July 2018.

[8] Email from Celine Francois, Programme Officer, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 July 2012; and UNMAS, “Annual Report,” 2013.

[9] Email from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 July 2012; UNMAS, “Annual Report,” 2013; and UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[10] Statement of Palestine, Mine Ban Treaty 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017.

[11] PMAC, “Strategic Plan 2017–2020,” undated.

[12] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 3 September 2018.

[13] UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[14] Minister of Interior Decision No. 69 (outgoing 1223), 25 March 2012.

[15] Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 19 July 2012; and from Imad Mohareb, Planning Department, PMAC, 31 March 2013.

[16] Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 and 19 July 2012; and UN, “2012 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, 2013.

[17] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

[18] Ibid., 26 June 2018.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., 30 August 2018.

[22] Email from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 July 2012.

[23] Email from Sonia Pezier, UNMAS, 14 April 2015; UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated; and email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015.

[24] UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” updated October 2018.

[25] PMAC, “Strategic Plan 2017–2020,” undated.

[26] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 22 April 2017.

[27] Statement of Palestine, Mine Ban Treaty 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016.

[28] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.

[29] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 30 August 2018.

[33] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 3 September 2018.

[34] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.

[35] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 11 May 2015.

[36] HALO Trust, “West Bank,” undated.

[37] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

[38] UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” updated October 2018.

[39] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016; and telephone interview with Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 3 August 2017.

[40] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Emails from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018; from Michael Heiman, formerly the Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, INMAA, 26 May 2018; and from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018. There was a minor discrepancy between HALO Trust data and that provided by INMAA, regarding the Araba minefield. INMAA reported HALO Trust clearance of 3,049m2, whereas HALO Trust reported 3,542m2. There were bigger unexplained discrepancies between HALO Trust clearance output data for 2017 and that provided by PMAC, which totaled 30,886m2, with the destruction of 86 antipersonnel mines, eight antivehicle mines, and seven items of UXO.

[43] Michael Heiman, INMAA, 26 May 2018; and “Israel to clear mines from over 15 acres to expand West Bank settlement,” The Jerusalem Post, 6 November 2017.

[44] Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 26 May 2018.

[45] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.

[46] Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 26 May 2018.

[47] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018; and telephone interview, 23 August 2018.

[48] Email from Michael Heiman, formerly INMAA, 26 May 2018.

[49] Telephone interview with Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 23 August 2018.

[50] Statement of Palestine, Mine Ban Treaty 16th Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 20 December 2017; and email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.

[51] Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 22 April 2017, and 14 May 2018; and telephone interview, 3 August 2017.

[52] Interview with Michael Heiman, INMAA, in Geneva, 15 February 2018; and email, 26 May 2018.

[53] Interview with Michael Heiman, INMAA, in Geneva, 15 February 2018; and emails, 23 July and 10 August 2017, and 26 May 2018.

[54] See Landmine Monitor and Mine Action Review reports on Palestine in 2013–2016. HALO Trust previously reported 12,226m2 of clearance in 2014, but it was subsequently found that this only included manual clearance and excluded 9,606m2 of mechanical clearance that also took place. The correct revised total for 2014 is 21,832m2. Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016.

[55] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.

[56] Ibid., 24 May 2017.

Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 16 November 2020

In 2019, six donors contributed a total of US$1.8 million to mine action in the State of Palestine; a 31% decrease from 2018.[1]

International contributions: 2019[2]




(national currency)




Risk education and victim assistance




Risk education



South Korea

Risk education












Risk education







Note: N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported.

In the five-year period from 2015–2019, Palestine received nearly $13 million in international assistance for mine action. International funding has declined from more than $10 million in 2014 to just under $2 million in 2019. No annual total has exceeded more than $5 million since then.

Summary of international contributions: 2015–2019[3]


Amount (US$)














[1] Italy Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 25 June 2020; Japan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 March 2020; Netherlands Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 2020; United Nations Mine Action Service, ‘‘Annual Report 2019,’’ 22 April 2020, pp. 32–33; and ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2019,” March 2020, pp. 17-18.

[2] Average exchange rates for 2019: €1=US$1.1194; and ¥109.02=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2020.

[3] See previous Monitor reports.


Last updated: 10 October 2018



All known casualties (between 1967 and 2017)

3,653 mine/unexploded remnants of war (ERW) casualties

Casualties in 2017[1]

Annual total


Increase from
15 in 2016

Survival outcome

1 killed; 27 injured

Device type causing casualties

28 ERW

Civilian status

28 civilians


Age and gender

13 adults:
2 women; 11 men

15 children:
13 boys; 2 girls


Of the 28 casualties in the State of Palestine in 2017, four occurred in the West Bank and 24 occurred in Gaza.

The Palestinian Mine Action Center (PMAC) managed casualty data for the West Bank, while the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Palestine collected and managed casualty data updates for the Gaza Strip.

The 2017 data represented an increase from the 15 recorded for 2016. However, both years marked a significant decrease from the 74 recorded for 2015, and the 69 recorded for 2014. The annual casualty total for 2016 marked a point of departure from the spike in casualties that followed the destruction in Gaza caused by 50 days of conflict in mid-2014, also referred to as Operation Protective Edge. Forty-nine casualties were reported in 2013,[2] 35 in 2012,[3] 24 in 2010, and 46 casualties were reported for 2009, following Operation Cast Lead.[4]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Palestine is not known. Defense for Children International Palestine (DCI/PS) recorded more than 2,500 mine/ERW casualties occurring between 1967 and 1998.[5] Between 2000 and the end of 2017, the Monitor identified 1,153 casualties (173 killed; 967 injured; and 13 unknown).


[1] Unless otherwise indicated, casualty data for 2017 is based on: emails from Doran Bahadur Sunuwar, Officer in Charge, UNMAS, 5 April 2018; and from the Palestine Mine Action Center (PMAC), 28 June 2018.

[2] Emails from Planning Department, PMAC, 2 April 2015; and from Sonia Pezier, UNMAS Palestine, 7 April 2015.

[3] Email from Imab Mohareb, PMAC, 4 October 2012.

[4] Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS, 22 July 2011; from Ayed Abu Eqtaish, Program Manager, DCI/PS, 26 July 2011; and from Brig. Omran Sulaiman, PMAC, 25 September 2012. In addition to the 16 casualties reported by the Monitor for 2010, another eight mine/ERW casualties (one killed; seven injured) in the West Bank for 2010 were added to the previous 2010 total based on PMAC casualty data updates provided in 2012. The rise in casualties in Gaza in 2009 was attributed to contamination by explosive remnants during and following Operation Cast Lead, which ended on 18 January 2009.

[5] DCI/PS, “The Problem of Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance and Munitions Remnants in the Palestinian Territories: A Seminar Report,” 25–26 March 1998, p. 14.

Victim Assistance

Last updated: 28 March 2018

The State of Palestine is responsible for landmine survivors and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Palestine has commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and is a State Party to Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Palestine ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 2 April 2014.

There were at least 1,254 mine/ERW survivors recorded in Palestine.[1]

Victim Assistance in 2016 and 2017

The situation in Gaza remained tense and extremely challenging, with the ICRC reporting that “restrictions on the movement of people and goods were still in place; there were severe shortages of electrical power; and the failure to pay people’s salaries had become a chronic problem.”[2] According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in late 2017 power cuts of around 20-hour periods severely and increasingly disrupted services at health facilities in Gaza.[3]


In its first voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report of 2013, Palestine reported that there was no specific strategic framework for victim assistance in place in the country. Mine/ERW survivors received the same support as other persons with disabilities. This support is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs,[4] in partnership with the various ministries and institutions of civil society and with relevant authorities.[5]

The Ministry of Social Affairs is required to oversee the implementation of the Disability Law, in coordination with other ministries; but resources for this are lacking, which means that many disabled persons remain socially and economically excluded.[6] The Ministry of Health was responsible for the rehabilitation sector in Gaza.[7]

Persons with disabilities in Palestine were often overlooked and underrepresented in development and relief efforts. Since the 2014 conflict, the situation in Palestine has continued to deteriorate. Vulnerable Palestinians faced increasing difficulty in accessing electricity, education, and healthcare, and struggled to meet basic needs. Key infrastructure was destroyed and many hospitals were not equipped. Unemployment increased as did restrictions on the movement of goods and people.[8]

The ICRC strengthened local actors’ emergency response through training and urged Israeli security forces to ensure safe passage for emergency responders. With comprehensive ICRC support the Palestine Red Crescent provided emergency medical services across the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT)e. The ICRC supported the Gazan emergency-care system monitored the National Society’s patient transfers from Gaza to the West Bank and to Israel.[9]

Military operations in Gaza have caused a large, but unknown number of severe traumatic amputations according to a medical study at the key rehabilitation center in Gaza City, the Artificial Limb and Polio Centre (ALPC). Due to limited local resources the vast need for rehabilitation has been difficult to meet.[10] Existing rehabilitation services in Gaza did not meet the needs of amputees. The Palestinian Medical Relief Society estimated that all providers of rehabilitation services in the Gaza Strip combined were only able to address some 15% of the rehabilitation requirements of the population. Medical treatment available to amputees in the Gaza Strip was of poor quality. Hastily performed amputations often resulted in a stump that cannot fit a prosthesis.[11]

The ALPC, managed by the Municipality of Gaza, has been the only center of its kind in Gaza that provides prosthetic and orthotic services. Services are provided free of charge.[12] The ICRC continued to provide managerial support to the ALPC, especially in view of the impending launch of a Qatari rehabilitation project, the Khalifa Al-Thani Rehabilitation and Prosthetics Hospital. The ICRC planned to advise the municipality of Gaza and the ALPC as the Qatari rehabilitation project progressed in order to promote a strategy for sustainability. In 2016,some 2,332 people received rehabilitation services at the ALPC, including the provision of 26 upper-limb and 148 lower-limb prostheses. The ALPC continued improving its operations with technical/material support and training from the Norwegian Red Cross/ICRC. In the West Bank, meetings to discuss prosthetic and orthotic services and costs were held with most stakeholders. The ICRC reported that the head of the ALPC was unable to obtain a permit to enter Israel to take a course in physical rehabilitation for amputees and seven prosthetics students were not able to get permits to leave Gaza for the practical training, for which the trainer eventually came to Gaza. Another two students were unable to leave Gaza for an exam in Tanzania, that was thus postponed.[13]

From 2014 through 2016 Humanity and Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International) provided post-emergency operations to improve access to essential services for persons with disabilities in Gaza. HI also promoted the inclusion of isolated persons with disabilities, improved access to essential services, and gave support for disabled peoples’ organizations and multidisciplinary rehabilitation services, including rehabilitation and psychosocial support services.[14] Since the end of 2016, HI was no longer running a rehabilitation project, but provided referrals through the previous rehabilitation network.[15] HI carried out projects for strengthening of the resilience of the local population by support of inclusive medical care, reconstruction, and improved emergency preparedness.

ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) continued a school-based psychosocial program and a project promoting community-based rehabilitation in Gaza to respond to the need for quality rehabilitation services and psychosocial treatment for the victims of conflict in Gaza Strip and the West Bank, as well as the need for technical assistance and specialized training for rehabilitation professionals.[16]

The Palestine Trauma Center in Gaza offered support from psychologists, psychiatrists, and specialist trauma counselors for war affected victims, including through an annual project run throughout 2017.[17]

In Gaza, more than 90% of persons with disabilities were unemployed.[18]

The Palestinian Disability Law was ratified in 1999.

[1] Including 320 people injured before 2000 identified through a random sample survey and 934 people injured since 2000 in Monitor data. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2000, and previous country reports and profiles on Palestine.

[2] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, 2017, p. 478.

[3] WHO, “Occupied Palestinian Territory Situation Report,” October–November 2017.

[6] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, November 2017, p. 73.

[7] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, pp. 80–81.

[8] HI, “Palestine 2016,” August 2016; ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 481.

[9] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, 2017, p. 478.

[10] Heszlein-Lossius, Hanne et al. “Severe amputation injuries after Israeli military operations in Gaza: a retrospective, clinical follow-up study,” The Lancet, Vol. 390, S27, 1 August 2017.

[12] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, pp. 80–81.

[13] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 481; and ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, November 2017, p. 72.

[14] HI, “Palestine 2016,” August 2016.

[15] Email from Bruno Leclercq, HI, 5 February 2018.

[16] ITF, “ITF Supports Psychosocial Aid and Comprehensive Rehabilitation in Gaza Strip,” 18 October 2017; ITF, “Annual Report 2016,” Ljubljana, 2017, pp. 84–85; and ITF, “Activities: Gaza strip,” undated.

[17] The Palestine Trauma Center, “Psycho-Social Support,”2018; Palestine Trauma Centre (UK), “Annual Report 2016,” undated; and Palestine Trauma Centre (PTC-Gaza), “Muslim Aid Project,” undated.

[18] State of Palestine, Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics,“PCBS: Press Release, on the Occasion of International Disables Day,” 3 December 2014.