


LANDMINE MONITOR 2025



INTERNATIONAL
CAMPAIGN TO **BAN**
LANDMINES

1997 Nobel Peace Prize Co-Laureate

LANDMINE MONITOR

2025

27TH ANNUAL EDITION

Monitoring and Research Committee, ICBL-CMC Governance Board
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Human Rights Watch • Humanity & Inclusion • Mines Action Canada
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Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

For more information visit www.the-monitor.org or email monitor@icblcmc.org.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor makes every effort to limit the environmental footprint of reports by publishing all of our research products online. This report and detailed country profiles are available online at www.the-monitor.org.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) is committed to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (or “Ottawa Convention”) as the best framework for ending the use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel mines and for destroying stockpiles, clearing mined areas, and assisting affected communities.

The ICBL calls for universal adherence to the Mine Ban Treaty and its full implementation by all, including:

- No more use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines by any actor under any circumstances;
- Rapid destruction of all remaining stockpiles of antipersonnel landmines;
- Efficient clearance and destruction of all emplaced landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW); and
- Fulfillment of the rights and needs of all landmine and ERW victims.

PREFACE

LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR

Peace agreements may be signed, and hostilities may cease, but landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are an enduring legacy of conflict.

Landmines are inherently indiscriminate weapons, meaning that, by design, it is not possible for the mine to be deployed to target a specific person. Hence, casualties can occur among whoever triggers the mine, whether a child or a soldier, as well as anyone nearby. Landmines emplaced during a conflict against enemy forces can still kill or injure civilians decades later.

Antipersonnel landmines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a person. This includes improvised antipersonnel landmines, which constitute improvised explosive devices (IEDs) with those same human-activated characteristics. Antivehicle landmines are munitions designed to explode from the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.

ERW refers to ordnance that either failed to explode or was abandoned, remaining a danger to anyone who may encounter it. Explosive weapons that for some reason fail to detonate as intended become unexploded ordnance (UXO). These unstable explosive items are left behind during and after conflicts and pose dangers similar to landmines. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) refers to explosive weapons that have not been used during armed conflict but have been left behind and are no longer effectively controlled. Under the international legal definition, ERW consists of UXO and AXO, but not mines. ERW can include artillery shells, grenades, mortars, rockets, air-dropped bombs, and also applies to cluster munition remnants. Cluster munitions are defined by the Convention on Cluster Munitions and are subject to a specific set of legal obligations under that convention.

Landmines and ERW pose a serious and ongoing threat to civilians. These weapons can be found on roads and footpaths, in farmers' fields, in forests and deserts, along territorial borders, in and around critical infrastructure, in houses and schools, as well as other places where people are carrying out their daily activities. Landmines and ERW impede access to food, water, and other basic needs, and restrict freedom of movement. They endanger transit and prevent the safe return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as hamper the delivery of humanitarian aid.

These weapons instill fear in communities. In many cases, residents are unaware of the contamination and its hazards. However, even when aware of potentially mined areas, residents are often forced to take risks just to go on with their lives, having no alternative land to farm for their livelihood or safer routes to access schools. When land cannot be cultivated, when medical systems are drained by the cost of attending to mine/ERW casualties, and

when countries must spend money clearing landmines rather than paying for education, it is clear that these weapons not only cause appalling human suffering, but that they are also a lethal barrier to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and post-conflict reconstruction.

There are solutions to the global mine problem. The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty (officially the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction) provides the best framework for governments to alleviate the suffering of civilians living in areas affected by antipersonnel landmines.¹ Governments that join this treaty must stop the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines immediately. They must destroy all stockpiled antipersonnel mines within four years and clear all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within 10 years. In addition, States Parties in a position to do so must provide assistance for the care and treatment of landmine survivors, their families and communities, as well as support for mine/ERW risk education programs to help prevent future incidents.

This legal instrument provides a framework for taking action, but it is up to governments to implement treaty obligations; and it is the task of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to work together with governments to ensure they uphold their treaty obligations.

The ultimate goal of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its sister campaign, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), is a world free of landmines and cluster munitions—a world where civilians can walk freely without the fear of stepping on a mine; where children can play without mistaking an unexploded submunition for a toy; where communities are no longer burdened with the long-term socio-economic impacts of living on or near contaminated land; and where the rights of mine/ERW survivors and persons with similar needs are protected.

INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES

The ICBL is a global network of organizations active in more than 100 countries, working for the full universalization and implementation of the treaty banning antipersonnel landmines. It received the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with its founding coordinator Jody Williams, in recognition of its efforts to bring about the Mine Ban Treaty. The campaign includes national and international organizations, as well as multisectoral expertise from the human rights, development, refugee, medical, and humanitarian relief fields. The ICBL works in partnership with governments and international organizations on all aspects of treaty implementation, from stockpile destruction to mine clearance to victim assistance. The campaign calls additionally on non-state armed groups (NSAGs) to abide by the norm against mine use.

The ICBL was founded in October 1992 by a group of six NGOs: Handicap International (now Humanity & Inclusion), Human Rights Watch, Medico International, Mines Advisory Group, Physicians for Human Rights, and Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation. These organizations witnessed the horrendous impact of landmines on the communities in which they were working—across Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East—and how mines hampered and prevented development efforts. The solution, they realized, was a comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines. More than 30 years on from its founding, the ICBL continues to serve as a decisive and effective model of a civil society-led campaign for disarmament and peace. Its effort to ban landmines led to a whole new approach known as humanitarian disarmament.

The founding organizations brought to the international campaign a multisectoral perspective and practical experience on the impact of landmines. In a short time, these

¹ This report uses “Mine Ban Treaty” to refer to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (1997). The term has been consistently used by civil society in reference to this convention since it was adopted. The treaty is also often referred to as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), including by its Implementation Support Unit (ISU), which serves as the convention’s secretariat. The Monitor makes reference to the APMBC in footnotes that refer to documents and statements held and published by the ISU.

core members mobilized a global network of NGOs engaged on this issue. Conferences and outreach events were initially organized worldwide to raise awareness on the global landmine problem and the need for a ban, as well as to provide training to partners for effective advocacy efforts. The call for a treaty banning antipersonnel landmines quickly spread throughout the world, and among diverse partners.

Through sustained and coordinated action by the ICBL and effective partnerships with other NGOs, international organizations, and governments, the Mine Ban Treaty was opened for signature on 3 December 1997 in Ottawa, Canada.

Once the goal of developing a comprehensive treaty banning antipersonnel mines was achieved, the attention of the ICBL shifted to ensuring that all countries join the treaty and that all States Parties fully implement their treaty obligations.

The ICBL's success over three decades speaks to the campaign's ability to evolve with changing circumstances. In January 2011, the ICBL merged with the CMC to become the ICBL-CMC.

LANDMINE AND CLUSTER MUNITION MONITOR

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor provides research and monitoring for the ICBL-CMC on the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has become the *de facto* monitoring regime for both treaties, reporting on States Parties' implementation and compliance, and more generally assessing the international community's response to the humanitarian problems caused by landmines, cluster munitions, and other ERW.

The ICBL created Landmine Monitor in June 1998, for the first time bringing NGOs together in a coordinated, systematic, and sustained way to monitor humanitarian law and disarmament treaties and to regularly document progress and challenges. In 2008, Landmine Monitor also functionally became the research and monitoring arm of the CMC. In 2010, the initiative changed its name from Landmine Monitor to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor (known as "the Monitor") to reflect its new reporting on cluster munitions and the merger of the ICBL with the CMC. The Monitor successfully puts into practice the concept of civil society-based verification that is now employed in many similar contexts.

The Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. This is done through extensive collection, analysis, and distribution of publicly available information, covering all aspects of mine action. Although in some cases it does entail field missions, the Monitor does not send researchers into harm's way and does not include war-zone reporting. The Monitor works in good faith to provide factual information about the issues it is monitoring to benefit the international community as a whole. It aims to promote and advance discussion in support of the goal of a world free of landmines and cluster munitions.

The Monitor is supported by a global reporting network. Key outputs include country profiles and annual reports.² A Monitoring and Research Committee provides oversight of the plans and outputs of the ICBL-CMC's research and monitoring, including all Monitor publication content, and acts as a standing committee of the ICBL-CMC Governance Board. The Monitor Project Manager, under the ICBL-CMC, is responsible for the coordination and management of research, editing, and production of all Monitor research products.

The Monitor complements transparency reporting required of States Parties under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It reflects the shared view that transparency, trust, and mutual collaboration are crucial elements for the successful eradication of antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions. The Monitor was also established in recognition of the need for independent reporting and evaluation.

² Reports, briefing papers, factsheets, maps, detailed country profiles, and other resources produced by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor are available online at www.the-monitor.org.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This is the 27th annual *Landmine Monitor*. It is the sister publication to the annual *Cluster Munition Monitor*, first published in 2010.

Landmine Monitor 2025 covers mine ban policy, use, production, transfers, and stockpiling globally. It assesses the impact of mine contamination and casualties; and outlines progress made and challenges faced in efforts to clear contaminated land, provide risk education to affected communities, and assist mine/ERW victims. It also reviews international financial assistance and national resources allocated toward mine action efforts. The report focuses on calendar year 2024, with information included up to October 2025 where possible. Unless otherwise specified, all translations in this report were carried out by the Monitor.

As was the case in previous years, the Monitor acknowledges that this report is limited by the time, resources, and information sources available. The Monitor is a system that is continuously updated, corrected, and improved. Comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and others are sought, in the spirit of dialogue, and in the common search for accurate and reliable information.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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The Monitor is grateful to everyone who contributed to the research for this report. We wish to thank the scores of individuals, campaigns, NGOs, international organizations, field practitioners, and governments who provided us with essential information. We are grateful to ICBL-CMC staff for their crucial assistance in the production, release, distribution, and promotion of Monitor reports.

Content produced by the Monitor was reviewed by members of the Monitoring and Research Committee comprised of five NGOs, as well as Monitor Editorial Team leaders and ICBL-CMC staff. At the time of publication, the committee's members were: Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Camilo Serna), DanChurchAid (Lene Rasmussen), Human Rights Watch (Mark Hiznay), Humanity & Inclusion (Eva Maria Fischer and Alma Taslidžan), Mines Action Canada (Erin Hunt), Monitor Editorial Team leaders (Ban Policy: Mary Wareham; Impact: Loren Persi Vicentic; and Mine Action Funding: Ruth Bottomley), relevant senior ICBL-CMC staff (Éléa Boureux and Kasia Derlicka-Rosenbauer), and *ex officio* member Tamar Gabelnick (ICBL-CMC director).

From January to October 2025, the Monitor's Editorial Team undertook research, updated country profiles, and drafted thematic overviews for *Landmine Monitor 2025*. The Editorial Team included:

- **Ban Policy:** Mark Hiznay, Mennah Abdelwahab, Camila Levey, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, and Mary Wareham;
- **Impact:** Loren Persi Vicentic, Katrin Atkins, Michael Hart, Valérie Nugues, Asees Puri, and Clémentine Tavernier; and
- **Mine Action Funding:** Ruth Bottomley.

Anna Lim (Editorial Consultant) provided final editing in October and November 2025 with support from Éléa Boureux (Monitor Project Manager) and from Stefania Plougarli and Satya Sawh (interns).

Report formatting and cover design were undertaken by Michael Sherwin. Maps were produced by Loreta Marcellino. Héliographie Girard printed the report in Switzerland.

³ See, Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/who-are-we.

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- Government of Norway
- Government of Switzerland
- Government of the United States of America*
- Holy See

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**Specifically for research on contamination, casualties, clearance, risk education, victim assistance, and funding for mine action.*

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AXO	abandoned explosive ordnance	IDP	internally displaced person
BAC	battle area clearance	IED	improvised explosive device
CCW	1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons	IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
CHA	confirmed hazardous area	IMSMA	Information Management System for Mine Action
CMC	Cluster Munition Coalition	ISU	Implementation Support Unit
CRPD	Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities	MAG	Mines Advisory Group
DCA	DanChurchAid	NGO	non-governmental organization
DPO	disabled persons' organization	NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal	NSAG	non-state armed group
EORE	explosive ordnance risk education	SHA	suspected hazardous area
ERW	explosive remnants of war	UN	United Nations
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining	UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
HI	Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International)	UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
HRW	Human Rights Watch	UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines	UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
		UXO	unexploded ordnance

1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction

Table Key

States Parties: Ratified or acceded as of 1 November 2025

States not party: Not yet acceded as of 1 November 2025

The Americas

Antigua & Barbuda	Guyana
Argentina	Haiti
Bahamas	Honduras
Barbados	Jamaica
Belize	Mexico
Bolivia	Nicaragua
Brazil	Panama
Canada	Paraguay
Chile	Peru
Colombia	Saint Kitts & Nevis
Costa Rica	Saint Lucia
Dominica	Saint Vincent & the Grenadines
Dominican Rep.	Suriname
Ecuador	Trinidad & Tobago
El Salvador	Uruguay
Grenada	Venezuela
Guatemala	
Cuba	United States

East & South Asia & the Pacific

Afghanistan	Nauru
Australia	New Zealand
Bangladesh	Niue
Bhutan	Palau
Brunei Darussalam	Papua New Guinea
Cambodia	Philippines
Cook Islands	Samoa
Fiji	Solomon Islands
Indonesia	Sri Lanka
Japan	Thailand
Kiribati	Timor-Leste
Malaysia	Tonga
Maldives	Tuvalu
Marshall Islands	Vanuatu
China	Mongolia
India	Myanmar
Korea, North	Nepal
Korea, South	Pakistan
Lao PDR	Singapore
Micronesia	Vietnam

Europe, the Caucasus & Central Asia

Albania	Greece	Norway
Andorra	Holy See	Poland
Austria	Hungary	Portugal
Belarus	Iceland	Romania
Belgium	Ireland	San Marino
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Italy	Serbia
Bulgaria	Latvia	Slovakia
Croatia	Liechtenstein	Slovenia
Cyprus	Lithuania	Spain
Czech Republic	Luxembourg	Sweden
Denmark	Malta	Switzerland
Estonia	Moldova	Tajikistan
Finland	Monaco	Turkmenistan
France	Montenegro	Türkiye
Germany	Netherlands	Ukraine
	North Macedonia	United Kingdom
Armenia	Kazakhstan	Russia
Azerbaijan	Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan
Georgia		

Middle East & North Africa

Algeria	Kuwait	Qatar
Iraq	Oman	Tunisia
Jordan	Palestine	Yemen
Bahrain	Lebanon	Syria
Egypt	Libya	United Arab Emirates
Iran	Morocco	
Israel	Saudi Arabia	

Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola	Eswatini	Niger
Benin	Ethiopia	Nigeria
Botswana	Gabon	Rwanda
Burkina Faso	Gambia	Sao Tome & Principe
Burundi	Ghana	Senegal
Cabo Verde	Guinea	Seychelles
Cameroon	Guinea-Bissau	Sierra Leone
Central African Rep.	Kenya	Somalia
Chad	Lesotho	South Africa
Comoros	Liberia	South Sudan
Congo, Dem. Rep.	Madagascar	Sudan
Congo, Rep.	Malawi	Tanzania
Côte d'Ivoire	Mali	Togo
Djibouti	Mauritania	Uganda
Equatorial Guinea	Mauritius	Zambia
Eritrea	Mozambique	Zimbabwe
	Namibia	

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**LANDMINES
DON'T CHOOSE THEIR TARGETS
85% OF VICTIMS ARE CIVILIANS**

**ESTONIA
FINLAND
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
POLAND:**



**STAY
IN THE
MINE BAN TREATY**

A banner on Broken Chair in front of the United Nations Office at Geneva, calling on Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to stay in the Mine Ban Treaty after these countries announced their intention to withdraw from the treaty.

© Vidya Vanniasingam/HI, June 2025

MAJOR FINDINGS

BAN POLICY

STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY

- Two countries joined the Mine Ban Treaty in 2025. A total of 166 countries are now bound by the treaty, while 31 have not yet joined.
- The last signatory—the Marshall Islands—ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on 12 March 2025, while Tonga acceded on 25 June 2025.
- State Party Ukraine is attempting to “suspend the operation” of the Mine Ban Treaty while engaged in an international armed conflict, which is unlawful under the treaty.
- Five States Parties—Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—are in the process of legally withdrawing from the treaty.

MINE USE

- Antipersonnel landmines were used extensively in conflict by states not party—Myanmar and Russia—as well as by Iran and North Korea along their respective borders, during the reporting period (mid-2024 through October 2025).
 - Russia has used antipersonnel mines extensively in Ukraine since invading the country in February 2022.
 - In Myanmar, the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces has increased in the past two years.
 - Reports indicated antipersonnel mine use by Iran along its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and by North Korea along its borders with South Korea and China.
- In July 2025, State Party Thailand accused neighboring State Party Cambodia of using antipersonnel mines along their disputed border in several instances. Cambodia has denied the allegations.
- There have been increasing indications of antipersonnel mine use by Ukraine in 2024–2025, though the scale of this use is unclear.

- Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) also used antipersonnel mines in 10 States Parties—Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo—as well as in states not party India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

PRODUCTION

- A total of 12 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty remain on the Monitor's list of countries that develop, produce, or acquire antipersonnel mines: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.
 - India, Myanmar, Russia, and South Korea appear to be actively producing or developing antipersonnel mines.
 - The remaining states listed are not known to be actively producing but have yet to commit to never do so in the future.
- Information from Ukrainian social media sources suggests that antipersonnel mines are being fabricated by companies and individuals in State Party Ukraine.
- NSAGs have, in recent years, produced improvised mines that are victim-activated in Colombia, Egypt, Palestine (Gaza), India, Myanmar, and Yemen.

TRANSFERS

- The US announced two transfers of antipersonnel landmines to Ukraine, in November and December 2024, seemingly reversing its 1992 moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines.
- Iran advertised antipersonnel fragmentation mines available for export in the past year.

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION AND MINES RETAINED

- Of the 166 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 94 states have officially completed destruction of their stocks of antipersonnel mines, destroying a combined total of over 55 million antipersonnel landmines.
- States Parties Greece and Ukraine both still possess stocks of antipersonnel landmines. They remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines: Greece (1 March 2008) and Ukraine (1 June 2010).
 - In 2024, Greece started transferring antipersonnel landmines to Croatia for destruction, but the process was paused in 2025.
- A total of 62 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes. Bangladesh and Finland each retain more than 12,000 mines, while another 21 states retain more than 1,000 mines each.
 - In 2024, Angola disposed of all remaining 511 retained mines.

THE IMPACT

CONTAMINATION

- At least 57 states and other areas are contaminated by antipersonnel mines. This includes 32 States Parties with current clearance obligation deadlines under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, in addition to 22 states not party and three other areas.
- At least 25 States Parties are believed or known to have contamination arising from improvised mines.
- More than half of the affected States Parties succeeded in decreasing the extent of their contamination through land release activities in 2024, while the extent of

contamination increased in seven States Parties due to the identification of land previously not known to be contaminated.

CLEARANCE AND LAND RELEASE

- States Parties reported releasing a total of 1,114.82km² of contaminated land in 2024, resulting in the destruction of at least 105,640 antipersonnel mines. The majority of land release (80%) occurred through non-technical survey.
 - Overall, States Parties released more land in 2024 than they did in 2023. The annual amount of land released through clearance, however, decreased significantly compared to the last two years, with no satisfactory explanation provided for the substantial decrease.
- States Parties' aspirational goal of completing all clearance by 2025, adopted at the Maputo Review Conference in 2014, has fallen short. Only five States Parties have completed clearance since 2014, while 26 of the 32 countries with current clearance obligation deadlines have been working towards completion for 20 years or more.
- In 2024, States Parties Cambodia, Croatia, and Yemen reported the largest clearance totals. Nine States Parties—Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen—each released more than 10km² in 2024.
- Nine States Parties with Article 5 obligation deadlines did not release any land or did not report on their land release activities in 2024: Argentina, Chad, Cyprus, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, and Sudan.
- As of October 2025, 13 States Parties had submitted an Article 5 clearance deadline extension request in 2025: Angola, Argentina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe. All included a multi-year work plan in their request except Argentina.
 - On 3 November 2025, as this report was going to print, Senegal submitted a request to extend its clearance deadline of 1 March 2026 by an additional three years.

RISK EDUCATION

- In 2024, risk education was conducted in nearly all States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines.
- Men and boys were deemed the most exposed to the danger of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), primarily due to livelihood activities and intentional risk-taking driven by economic necessity.
- Populations at risk included those who move regularly between different locations, such as nomads, agricultural and forest workers, herders, people collecting natural resources, and scrap metal collectors. Internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and migrants face similar threats and thus continued to be targeted for risk education.
- Nineteen States Parties that reported on risk education activities in 2024 included beneficiary data disaggregated by gender and age in their annual Article 7 reporting—a positive trend compared to 2019, when only eight provided disaggregated data.
- Of the States Parties that submitted an Article 5 extension request in 2024 and 2025, only seven—Angola, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, and Serbia—provided a multi-year plan for risk education.

CASUALTIES

- At least 6,279 casualties of landmines and ERW were recorded (1,945 killed and 4,325 injured) for 2024. The survival status was unknown for nine casualties. The number of mine/ERW casualties recorded in 2024 is the highest annual casualty figure since 2020.

- In 2024, mine/ERW casualties were identified in 52 countries and areas. Of these, 36 are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.
- Civilians made up 90% (5,385) of all recorded casualties, where the military or civilian status was known. Children accounted for 46% (1,701) of civilian casualties, where the age group was recorded.
- State not party Myanmar recorded the highest number of annual casualties (2,029) for the second consecutive year—and double the total reported for 2023.
- Syria had the next highest number of casualties (1,015), followed by States Parties Afghanistan (624) and Ukraine (293).
- In 2024, as in previous years, victim-activated improvised landmines continued to cause the most casualties (2,077).
- The number of casualties from manufactured antipersonnel mines tripled between 2020 and 2024—reaching 1,540 casualties, the highest annual number recorded since 2011.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

- At least 40 States Parties are recognized as having responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims. In 2024, victim assistance progress was hindered by conflict, insecurity, and limited national capacity. The availability and quality of assistance for survivors was often reported as insufficient to meet identified needs.
- Healthcare systems in Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Palestine, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen experienced severe setbacks and disruptions, and in some cases damage and destruction to facilities.
- States Parties continued their efforts to ensure and improve access to comprehensive rehabilitation and assistive technology; however, sustained care for survivors remained limited in many affected States Parties.
 - In Tajikistan, survivors benefitted from increased access to assistive products through the establishment of community-level “one-stop shop” centers in several districts.
 - A massive rise in amputees in several countries experiencing conflict, including Palestine and Ukraine, placed further strain on rehabilitation services.
 - Rehabilitation sectors in affected countries continued to be dependent on international organizations for materials, technical assistance, and coverage of the costs of services for vulnerable persons.
- Although psychological and psychosocial support remained limited, a growing number of countries—including Afghanistan, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Peru, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Tajikistan—integrated psychological support into existing practices. Support services decreased, however, in South Sudan.
- In 2024, mine survivors were represented—either directly or through development partners—in relevant coordination activities in States Parties Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Thailand.

FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS

- In 2024, global funding for mine action totaled US\$1.07 billion. This is the second time that annual funding for mine action has surpassed one billion—and marked a 4% increase from the \$1.03 billion provided in 2023 due to an increase in reported national funding to mine action programs.
- Twenty-six affected states contributed a combined total of \$306.3 million to their own national mine action programs, representing over 30% of global funding.

- International funding to mine action decreased by 5% compared to 2023, with donors providing a combined total of \$761 million in 2024.
 - The US, Germany, and the European Union (EU) remained the three largest donors toward mine action in 2024.
 - The five largest donors provided 62% (\$468.8 million) of all international mine action funding in 2024.
- The majority of international funding was provided through international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), accounting for 67% of total funding during 2024, while only 2% was provided directly to national NGOs.

FUNDING BY SECTOR

- Of the total international contributions in 2024, clearance, including clearance programs that integrated other mine action activities, received 75% (\$571.3 million) of all international funding, with just over half of that funding going to six States Parties with massive contamination.
- Capacity-building programs received \$66.3 million (9% of total contributions), with nearly half (\$32.8 million) provided by the EU for capacity-building activities in Ukraine.
- International funding earmarked for victim assistance totaled \$36.4 million, a 23% decrease from 2023, representing only 5% of total mine action funding. Germany was the largest contributor to victim assistance.
 - Of the funds directed toward victim assistance, 66% went to just four states: Afghanistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.

RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

- A total of 47 states and two other areas received \$689.9 million from 40 donors in 2024. The top 10 recipient countries received \$550.3 million, which accounted for 72% of all international assistance.
 - Ukraine remained the top recipient of international funding for the third year in a row. Ukraine received \$252.4 million, representing 33% of all international donor funds, followed by Iraq (\$60.8 million) and Yemen (\$47.1 million), all States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.
- As in past years, several affected States Parties—particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa—continued to struggle to obtain international funds. Persistent funding shortfalls can impact states' ability to meet their Article 5 clearance obligations "as soon as possible" and may undermine States Parties' "right to seek and receive assistance" as set out in Article 6 of the treaty.
 - States Parties Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Niger received minimal or no international assistance in 2024.
- States Parties with smaller amounts of mine contamination often fail to receive sufficient international support. Of the 12 States Parties with less than 5km² of contamination, only seven—Colombia, the DRC, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, and South Sudan—received funds for clearance in 2024.
- A working group, chaired by Norway, was set up in 2025 to study the feasibility of establishing a voluntary trust fund to better support States Parties in fulfilling their clearance obligations.

A woman with glasses and a blue blazer is speaking at a podium. The podium has a blue and white striped light on the left and a microphone on the right. The CICG logo is visible on the top right of the podium. A large screen to the right of the podium displays the text "Intersessional Meetings of the AP Mine Ban Convention" and an image of two people in wheelchairs. The image shows a man in a blue and white striped shirt and a woman in a purple headscarf. The background is a red wall.

The Marshall Islands announce ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty during the intersessional meetings in June 2025.

© AP Mine Ban Convention ISU, June 2025

BAN POLICY

BANNING ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty is one of five core multilateral humanitarian disarmament instruments that each comprehensively prohibit an entire class of weapons.¹ As with its sister treaties, the Mine Ban Treaty's adoption was driven by humanitarian concerns, in this case, over the casualties and human suffering caused by antipersonnel landmines.

The Mine Ban Treaty was adopted on 18 September 1997, signed by 122 countries on 3 December 1997, and entered into force on 1 March 1999. Its membership reached a total of 165 countries following the ratification of the treaty by the Marshall Islands on 12 March 2025, and then reached 166 members following the accession of Tonga on 25 June 2025.²

States Parties convened in November 2024 in Siem Reap, Cambodia, at the treaty's Fifth Review Conference and took stock of the 25 years of actions taken to universalize and implement the Mine Ban Treaty. As expressed in the Siem Reap-Angkor Declaration, States Parties "condemn[ed] the use of anti-personnel mines by any actor, urgently call[ed] on all States and parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, and on all States Parties to comply with the obligations of the Convention."³

At the same time, unprecedented challenges concretely threaten the continued health of the treaty and the norm it represents. Among these:

- State Party Ukraine is attempting to "suspend the operation" of the Mine Ban Treaty while engaged in an international armed conflict, and alongside evidence that it acquired stockpiles via transfers from state not party the United States (US) and indications of domestic production.⁴

¹ The five humanitarian disarmament treaties are the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.

² The Marshall Islands was the last remaining country to have signed but not ratified the Mine Ban Treaty.

³ Siem Reap-Angkor Declaration, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, docs.un.org/APLC/CONF/2024/15/Add.1.

⁴ United Nations (UN), "Ukraine: Communication. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.385.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 21 July 2025, bit.ly/UkraineSuspension21July2025.

- States Parties Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are in the process of withdrawing from the treaty, citing existential security concerns; and
- State Party Thailand has accused neighboring State Party Cambodia of using antipersonnel mines along their disputed border in several instances.

Such disturbing developments demonstrate there is no room for complacency, yet the public reaction to these developments by other States Parties and key stakeholders has been relatively muted.

The norm that the Mine Ban Treaty seeks to achieve against any use of antipersonnel mines at any time by any actor or under any circumstances also seems to be coming under threat from new use by major military powers who remain outside the treaty, as well as by non-state armed groups (NSAGs).

Russia has used antipersonnel mines extensively in Ukraine since its invasion of the country in February 2022, causing hundreds of casualties and contaminating vast tracts of land.

Myanmar Armed Forces continued their use of antipersonnel mines in 2024 and into 2025, as they have done every year since the first *Landmine Monitor* report was published in 1999.

There were several reports of antipersonnel mine use by the Iranian government's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the second half of 2024 and first half of 2025.

North Korea used antipersonnel mines in its own territory at locations along its borders with South Korea and China according to media reports and South Korean authorities.

NSAGs also used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period in States Parties Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo, as well as in states not party India, Myanmar, and Pakistan.

The continuing new use of antipersonnel mines in states not party shows the importance of universalizing the Mine Ban Treaty. While the treaty welcomed two new States Parties recently (the Marshall Islands and Tonga), the remaining 31 states not party made little progress toward joining the treaty in the reporting period.

The use of antipersonnel mines in States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty highlights the importance of putting appropriate national implementation measures in place, especially legislation, to enforce the treaty's provisions through penal sanctions and fines. With more than 50 States Parties failing to enact appropriate national implementation, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has continued to call on States Parties to implement new, standalone national legislation in line with the Mine Ban Treaty as the best way to meet the requirements of Article 9.⁵

Greece, along with Ukraine, are the only remaining States Parties with stockpile destruction obligations left to complete under the Mine Ban Treaty.⁶ Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines.⁷ Since their deadlines, they have made little progress, and there is no clear indication that significant progress will be made soon.

5 Statement of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Mine Ban Treaty Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2022, bit.ly/ICBLStatement24Nov2022.

6 Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 transparency report for the treaty to formally confirm that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines. Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.

7 Greece had an initial deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine's deadline was 1 June 2010. The Oslo Action Plan urges states that have failed to meet their Article 4 deadlines to "present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner." Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019.

UNIVERSALIZING THE LANDMINE BAN

ICBL continues its work to ensure the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, working in close partnership with its dedicated community of states, United Nations (UN) agencies, and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

There are a total of 166 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, of which 133 signed and ratified the treaty, while 33 acceded.⁸

There are 31 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Two countries joined the Mine Ban Treaty in the reporting period: the Marshall Islands and Tonga. Prior to their joining the treaty, no states had acceded to the treaty since December 2017, with the last accessions being that of the State of Palestine and Sri Lanka.

Mine Ban Treaty membership by regional or security body⁹

Regional/security body	Support (%)	Support (number of member states)	States not party to the convention
African Union (AU)	94%	51 of 55	Egypt, Libya, Morocco, <i>Western Sahara</i>
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	60%	6 of 10	Lao PDR, Myanmar, Singapore, Vietnam
European Union (EU)	100%	27 of 27	
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	97%	31 of 32	US
Organization of American States (OAS)	94%	32 of 34	Cuba, US
Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)	94%	17 of 18	Micronesia

- The Republic of the Marshall Islands signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 12 March 2025. The treaty entered into force on 1 September 2025.¹⁰ In June 2025, the Marshall Islands stated, “To our Pacific neighbors: let us join hands in realizing a shared vision of a region free of landmines. Pacific peoples have always stood tall in the face of global crises. We can do so again and unite against the scourge of indiscriminate weapons.”¹¹
- The Kingdom of Tonga acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 25 June 2025. The treaty enters into force on 1 December 2025.¹² In November 2024, Tonga told States Parties

⁸ Since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states wishing to join can no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must instead accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. The 33 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the treaty’s 133 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 89 ratified afterward.

⁹ The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union (AU), but Western Sahara’s lack of official representation at the UN prevents it from joining the Mine Ban Treaty.

¹⁰ UN, “Marshall Islands: Ratification. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” depositary notification C.N.125.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 12 March 2025, bit.ly/MIRatification12March2025.

¹¹ Statement of Marshall Islands, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/MISStatement20June2025.

¹² UN, “Tonga: Accession. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” depositary notification C.N.352.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 25 June 2025, bit.ly/TongaAccession25June2025.

that it was “committed to promoting the treaty’s universalization across the Pacific, where some countries have yet to join.”¹³

- The Deputy Foreign Minister of Lao PDR, a state not party, announced in November 2024 that it will submit a national voluntary transparency report to the treaty before the Meeting of States Parties.¹⁴ Voluntary submission of a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report is a positive step toward joining the treaty.
- On 20 November 2024, the administration of US President Joe Biden announced the transfer of antipersonnel landmines to Ukraine, seemingly reversing a longstanding US moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines, in force since October 1992. An additional transfer of antipersonnel mines was announced on 2 December 2024. Neither of the announcements disclosed the types and quantities of antipersonnel mines transferred. The US Department of State spokesperson confirmed the transfer at a news briefing, stating, “We have been providing [Ukraine] with anti-tank landmines for some time, but this is the first time we are providing them with anti-personnel landmines.”¹⁵ This decision contradicted the Biden administration’s landmine policy, announced in June 2022, which stated that the US would not export or transfer antipersonnel landmines and would “not assist, encourage, or induce anyone, outside of the context of the Korean Peninsula, to engage in any activity that would be prohibited by the Ottawa Convention.”¹⁶

STATES PARTIES WITHDRAWING FROM THE MINE BAN TREATY

On 18 March 2025, the defense ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland issued a joint statement stating they “unanimously recommend withdrawing” from the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁷ According to the statement, “the security situation in our region has fundamentally deteriorated” and “[m]ilitary threats to NATO Member States bordering Russia and Belarus have significantly increased.” The four ministers added, “We believe that in the current security environment it is of paramount importance to provide our defence forces with flexibility and freedom of choice of potential use of new weapon systems and solutions to bolster the defence of the Alliance’s vulnerable Eastern Flank.”

Yet, the armed forces of both Estonia and Latvia had previously concluded—within a year of this decision—that they actually did not need to or desire to leave the Mine Ban Treaty.¹⁸ In January 2024, Latvia’s National Armed Forces carried out an assessment of Latvia’s continued adhesion to the Mine Ban Treaty and concluded that a withdrawal should not be supported. The Commander of the Armed Forces, Lieutenant General Leonīds Kalniņš, told Latvian Television that Latvia was not using antipersonnel mines as “[t]here are far more efficient and modern weapon systems than landmines - with direct or indirect firepower that allows the same or even more powerful effect to be achieved. We have been

13 Statement of Tonga, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 27 November 2024, bit.ly/TongaStatement27Nov2024.

14 Lao PDR last submitted a voluntary transparency report in 2011. Statement of Lao PDR, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/LaoPDRStatement20June2025.

15 Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Q&A: US Antipersonnel Landmine Transfers,” 13 December 2024, bit.ly/HRW13Dec2024.

16 Ibid.

17 Ministries of Defence of the Republic of Estonia, of the Republic of Latvia, of the Republic of Lithuania, and of the Republic of Poland, “Statement by the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Polish Ministers of Defence on the Withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention,” 18 March 2025, bit.ly/StatementWithdrawal18March2025.

18 “Defense Minister: Latvia should not withdraw from anti-mine convention,” LSM, 22 January 2024, bit.ly/LSM22Jan2024; “Latvian army opposes possible withdrawal from Ottawa Convention,” LSM, 22 January 2024, bit.ly/LSMLatvianArmy22Jan2024; and Madis Hindre, “EDF commander: Estonia does not need to leave the Ottawa Convention right now,” ERR News, 16 December 2024, bit.ly/ERRNews16Dec2024.



International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) campaigner approaches the delegate from Poland during the 2025 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings to discuss Poland's decision to withdraw from the treaty.

© SWI swissinfo.ch/Rachel Barbara Häubi, June 2025

working purposefully in this direction in recent years.¹⁹ Similarly, in December 2024, Estonian Defense Forces Commander Major General Andrus Merilo told a parliamentary committee that an assessment undertaken in collaboration with experts "concluded that in order to achieve our military objectives and successfully defend the country, there is currently no need for us to withdraw" from the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁰

On 1 April 2025, Finland's prime minister announced that his government was also preparing to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty, stating, "Finland is not currently facing an immediate military threat. Withdrawing from the Ottawa Convention will give us the possibility to prepare for the changes in the security environment in a more versatile way."²¹ The announcement came after a group of Finnish lawmakers and former defense and foreign affairs officials launched an initiative urging Finland to leave the treaty.²² A governmental review to assess whether

Finland should leave the treaty was concluded in March 2025 but not made public.²³ Yet in 2022, the Finnish Defence Forces noted, "In the Finnish Defence Forces, anti-personnel mines are not seen as a critical and necessary capability. The Finnish Defence Forces have been able to adapt their operations to existing agreements and restrictions. In addition, the Finnish Defence Forces actively researches and monitors solutions related to capability development."²⁴

Following these announcements, each state began a parliamentary process to withdraw from the treaty. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, deposited their instrument of withdrawal on 27 June 2025. Unless they reconsider the move or enter into armed conflict, their withdrawal will take effect on 27 December 2025.²⁵ Finland deposited its instrument of withdrawal on 10 July 2025, and Poland deposited its instrument of withdrawal on 20 August 2025. Their withdrawals will take effect on 10 January 2026 and 20 February 2026, respectively.²⁶

- 19 Lieutenant General Leonīds Kalniņš also said, "First, landmines are just a small reinforcing element of anti-mobility barriers. Secondly, landmines are not effective against mechanized infantry and heavily armed units. Thirdly, constant monitoring of minefields 24 hours a day seven days a week would also require large human resources in peacetime." See, "Latvian army opposes possible withdrawal from Ottawa Convention," *LSM*, 22 January 2024, bit.ly/LSMLatvianArmy22Jan2024.
- 20 Madis Hindre, "EDF commander: Estonia does not need to leave the Ottawa Convention right now," *ERR News*, 16 December 2024, bit.ly/ERRNews16Dec2024.
- 21 Government of Finland press release, "Government to begin preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention and to increase national defence expenditure," 1 April 2025, bit.ly/FinlandPR1April2025.
- 22 Aleksi Teivainen, "Finland urged to opt out of anti-personnel landmine ban in citizens' initiative," *Helsinki Times*, 29 November 2024, bit.ly/HelsinkiTimes29Nov2024.
- 23 Government of Finland press release, "Government to begin preparations to withdraw from the Ottawa Convention and to increase national defence expenditure," 1 April 2025, bit.ly/FinlandPR1April2025; and Government of Finland, "Finland and the Ottawa Convention," undated, bit.ly/FinlandOttawaConvention.
- 24 Finnish Defence Forces, "Withdrawal from the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban and Allowing the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines," 8 June 2022, bit.ly/FinlandMoD8June2022.
- 25 UN, "Lithuania: Notification of Withdrawal. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.362.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 3 July 2025, bit.ly/LithuaniaWithdrawal3July2025; UN, "Latvia: Notification of Withdrawal. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.361.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 3 July 2025, bit.ly/LatviaWithdrawal3July2025; and UN, "Estonia: Notification of Withdrawal. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.360.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 3 July 2025, bit.ly/EstoniaWithdrawal3July2025.
- 26 UN, "Finland: Notification of Withdrawal. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.372.2025. TREATIES-XXVI.5, 11 July 2025, bit.ly/FinlandWithdrawal11July2025; and UN, "Poland: Notification of Withdrawal. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," depositary notification C.N.421.2025.TREATIES-XXVI.5, 26 August 2025, bit.ly/PolandWithdrawal26Aug2025.

Withdrawals from the Mine Ban Treaty in 2025

State Party	Notification of withdrawal	Effective date
Estonia	27 June 2025	27 December 2025
Latvia	27 June 2025	27 December 2025
Lithuania	27 June 2025	27 December 2025
Finland	10 July 2025	10 January 2026
Poland	20 August 2025	20 February 2026

Until their withdrawals take effect, these states must still comply with the Mine Ban Treaty. Finland, Lithuania, and Poland have indicated that they will begin producing antipersonnel mines following their withdrawals.²⁷

Prior to withdrawing from the treaty, all five States Parties engaged regularly in Mine Ban Treaty meetings, voted in favor of the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the treaty, and condemned Russia's use of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres, at least 22 States Parties, the African Group, the ICRC, and the ICBL have expressed deep concern at these five countries' decision to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty.²⁸

Ahead of the treaty's intersessional meetings in June 2025, the UN Secretary-General said he was "gravely concerned" by the withdrawals, which he considered "particularly troubling, as it risks weakening civilian protection and undermining two decades of a normative framework that has saved countless lives." As a result, he launched a new global campaign to "uphold the norms of humanitarian disarmament, accelerate mine action as an enabler of human rights and sustainable development, and drive forward the vision of a mine-free world."²⁹

Similarly, Mirjana Spoljaric, president of the ICRC, issued a statement on the withdrawals stressing that the "global consensus that once made anti-personnel mines a symbol of inhumanity is starting to fracture. After decades of progress, we are witnessing a dangerous shift." Spoljaric also noted the treaty's effectiveness in reducing civilian casualties and the fallacy of "safe" mines.³⁰

At the treaty's intersessional meetings, the African Group stated that they "believe that the strength of the Convention lies in its collective ability to address emerging threats within the framework of cooperation and solidarity. Withdrawal from the Convention risks eroding hard-won gains and undermines the confidence of the international community in the effectiveness and endurance of this vital instrument."³¹

Similarly, Austria stated that it "regrets that five European States have initiated and advanced their procedures for withdrawal from the Convention. We are concerned about the implications of such decisions on our joint goal of achieving a mine-free world and

27 Andrius Sytas and Anne Kauranen, "Exclusive: Finland and Lithuania set to produce anti-personnel mines, officials say," *Reuters*, 9 July 2025, bit.ly/Reuters9July2025; and Jaroslaw Adamowski, "Poland eyes 1 million landmines for borders with Belarus, Russia," *Defense One*, 20 March 2025, bit.ly/DefenseOne20March2025.

28 The 22 States Parties include: Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Germany, the Holy See, Ireland, Mauritania, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, the United Kingdom (UK), and Zambia. To read their statements, see, Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), "Statements," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/APMBCStatementsJune2025.

29 "Statement by the Secretary-General - on the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention," New York, 16 June 2025, bit.ly/UNSGStatement16June2025.

30 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) press release, "ICRC president: Civilians will pay the price if global commitment to ban landmines allowed to fracture," 16 June 2025, bit.ly/ICRC16June2025.

31 Statement of the African Group, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/AfricanGroupStatement20June2025.

beyond this Convention on IHL [international humanitarian law], the protection of civilians and the humanitarian principles in general. We express our strong hope that these States will recommit to never use, produce or transfer anti-personnel mines.”³²

The president of the treaty’s Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties, Ms. Ichikawa Tomiko, also expressed “deep regret” at these states’ decision to withdraw, noting, “While I am fully aware of the security concerns of those States, prompted by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the wide-spread use of mines by Russia in the conflict, their withdrawal would represent a marked setback in our efforts to universalize the Convention prohibiting anti-personnel mines.” She further noted that “we need to redouble our efforts to uphold the Convention and to extend the reach of its norms.”³³

At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2025, the ICBL expressed that it was “profoundly saddened and deeply disturbed by the planned withdrawals of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland.”³⁴ It also presented to the treaty’s president and the five withdrawing states a petition signed by over 80,000 individuals from across Europe urging these states not to withdraw.³⁵ In October 2025, the ICBL condemned these decisions and urged the withdrawing states to reverse course, and not to engage in production or use of antipersonnel mines.³⁶

ICBL ambassador and Cambodian landmine survivor Tun Channareth also presented the treaty’s president with a joint statement from 21 eminent people, including former Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who led the “Ottawa Process” that created the treaty. The joint appeal urged the withdrawing states to reconsider, asserting that “[u]pholding [the Mine Ban Treaty] is not only a legal and moral obligation—it is a strategic imperative for all who seek to limit suffering in war.”³⁷

Additionally, on 30 May 2025, 101 Nobel laureates issued a joint statement stating that they “are deeply concerned by disturbing developments that are again putting civilians at greater risk of harm from antipersonnel landmines and explosive remnants of war, notably cluster munitions.”³⁸

UKRAINE’S DECLARATION OF SUSPENSION

On 18 July 2025, Ukraine notified the UN that it had decided to “suspend the operation” of the Mine Ban Treaty.³⁹ However, the treaty does not permit States Parties to suspend its operation. The treaty also does not allow States Parties to withdraw if they are engaged in armed conflict.⁴⁰

32 Statement of Austria, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/AustriaStatement20June2025.

33 APMBpress release, “Statement by the 22MSP President,” 28 June 2025, bit.ly/JapanStatement28June2025.

34 Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/ICBLUniversalizationStatement20June2025.

35 WeMove Europe and ICBL, “Don’t Let Europe Bring Back Landmines,” undated [2025], bit.ly/WeMoveICBLPetition2025.

36 Statement of ICBL, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 17 October 2025, bit.ly/ICBLStatement17Oct2025.

37 ICBL, “Joint Appeal to Uphold the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-personnel Landmines and the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” 16 June 2025, bit.ly/ICBL16June2025.

38 ICBL, “Statement from Nobel Laureates on Landmines,” 30 May 2025, bit.ly/NobelLaureates30May2025.

39 UN, “Ukraine: Communication. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” depositary notification C.N.385.2025. TREATIES-XXVI.5, 21 July 2025, bit.ly/UkraineSuspension21July2025. See also, national legislation adopting the suspension: *Draft Law on the Suspension of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction for Ukraine*, 4519-IX, 15 July 2025, bit.ly/UkraineDraftLaw15July2025.

40 See, HRW, “Challenging Ukraine’s Mine Ban Treaty ‘Suspension’: A Humanitarian and Legal Imperative,” 22 September 2025, bit.ly/HRW22Sept2025.

A July 2025 draft national implementation law elaborated on the intent and reasoning behind Ukraine's action.⁴¹ The bill explained that Ukraine plans to suspend its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty until the end of its war with Russia and provided a list of criteria for determining when that could occur. The bill also offered a justification for suspension, although its arguments are flawed on several grounds.

First, the Mine Ban Treaty is clearly intended to apply during armed conflict. It does not permit withdrawals during armed conflict and prohibits use, production, stockpiling, and transfer of antipersonnel landmines "under any circumstances," which includes times of armed conflict as well as peacetime. The Mine Ban Treaty also prohibits reservations to its provisions and thus does not allow for unilateral exceptions to compliance with its obligations during armed conflict or as the result of an act of aggression.⁴²

Second, the draft law claims that Ukraine's suspension is lawful under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which generally permits the suspension or withdrawal of a state from certain treaties if there is a "fundamental change of circumstances." It argues that Ukraine relied on the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, a set of security assurances in which Russia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US committed not to use force against Ukraine when it signed the Mine Ban Treaty, and, therefore, Russia's invasion of Ukraine constitutes a fundamental change of circumstance.⁴³

According to Article 73 of the Vienna Convention, however, the provision regarding a "fundamental change of circumstances" does not apply during armed conflict.

In addition, while Ukraine may not have envisioned a conflict of the nature and scale it is engaged in now, it was well aware at the time of its signature and ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty that it was consenting to be bound by a treaty without the possibility of reservations and that the treaty applies to all armed conflicts, regardless of who started them, when they occurred, or the nature or gravity of the conflicts. Therefore, Russia's invasion of Ukraine does not amount to a fundamental change of circumstance. Instead, it constitutes the kind of circumstance, foreseen by the Mine Ban Treaty, when the treaty is most needed and relevant.⁴⁴ Seeking to temporarily avoid the treaty's obligations at a time when they are most critical is contrary to both its operative provisions and its humanitarian object and purpose.

ANNUAL UNGA RESOLUTION

Since 1997, the annual UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty has provided states outside the treaty with a way to demonstrate their support for its humanitarian rationale and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.⁴⁵



Mine Ban Treaty President (Cambodia) and President-Designate (Japan) with Sister Denise Coghlan and International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) Ambassador Tun Channareth during the Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap, Cambodia.

© ICBL, November 2024

⁴¹ *Draft Law on the Suspension of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction for Ukraine*, 0329, Explanatory note, 11 July 2025, bit.ly/UkraineSuspensionLawDraft11July2025. See also, HRW, "Challenging Ukraine's Mine Ban Treaty 'Suspension': A Humanitarian and Legal Imperative," 22 September 2025, bit.ly/HRW22Sept2025.

⁴² HRW, "Challenging Ukraine's Mine Ban Treaty 'Suspension': A Humanitarian and Legal Imperative," 22 September 2025, bit.ly/HRW22Sept2025.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ This includes Belarus, Bhutan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, and Türkiye.

On 2 December 2024 a total of 173 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 79/34, which urged full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁴⁶ Russia was the only country to vote no, while 14 countries abstained.⁴⁷

UNGA Resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty⁴⁸

Year	Resolution	In Favor	Against	Abstained
1997	52/38	142	0	18
1998	53/77	147	0	21
1999	54/54 B	139	0	20
2000	55/33 V	143	0	22
2001	56/24 M	138	0	19
2002	57/74	143	0	23
2003	58/53	153	0	23
2004	59/84	157	0	22
2005	60/80	158	0	17
2006	61/84	161	0	17
2007	62/41	164	0	18
2008	63/42	163	0	18
2009	64/56	160	0	18
2010	65/48	165	0	17
2011	66/29	162	0	18
2012	67/32	165	0	19
2013	68/30	165	0	19
2014	69/34	164	0	17
2015	70/55	168	0	17
2016	71/34	164	0	20
2017	72/53	168	0	16
2018	73/61	169	0	16
2019	74/61	169	0	18
2020	75/52	169	0	17
2021	76/26	169	0	19
2022	77/63	167	0	17
2023	78/45	170	1	16
2024	79/34	173	1	14

⁴⁶ “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” UNGA Resolution 79/34, 2 December 2024, docs.un.org/en/A/RES/79/34; and voting data for “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction: resolution,” UNGA Resolution 79/34, 2 December 2024, bit.ly/UNGAResolution79-34VotingData2024.

⁴⁷ The 14 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the United States (US), Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.

⁴⁸ See, UN Voting Data on annual resolution titled “Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction,” bit.ly/UNGAResolutionVotingDataMBT.

Seven states not party provided explanations of their vote: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan, Singapore, and South Korea. Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea repeated previous explanations for their vote, stating that they supported the humanitarian aims of the treaty but could not join due to their unique security needs.⁴⁹ Egypt and Iran reiterated their concern that the treaty was negotiated outside the framework of the UN.⁵⁰

Though not a State Party, Singapore explained its vote in favor of the resolution as it “supports all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of antipersonnel landmines.” It further explained that it has not joined the treaty as it believes that “states have the sovereign right to acquire arms for legitimate self-defense and responsible law-enforcement. In that regard, a blanket ban on all types of cluster munitions and anti-personnel landmines may be counterproductive.”⁵¹

A core of 13 states not party have consistently abstained from voting on consecutive UNGA resolutions on the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.⁵² In 2024, Nepal and Saudi Arabia also abstained from the vote, while Russia voted against the resolution.

During the debate, Canada and Ireland requested that all states uphold the Mine Ban Treaty; and Canada, Norway, the Philippines, and Portugal condemned any use of antipersonnel mines by any actor in any circumstances. Bangladesh specifically condemned continued landmine use in Myanmar. Croatia noted its concern about the irreparable harm caused by the use of landmines. Mexico prioritized the Mine Ban Treaty amid increasing justifications for their use in contemporary times. Cambodia welcomed commitments to putting an end to the suffering caused by antipersonnel mines.⁵³

Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden delivered a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to the treaty and encouraged all states to join the convention without delay.⁵⁴

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) deplored the use of antipersonnel mines in conflict situations.⁵⁵

49 Statement of Cuba, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record, 5 November 2024, 02:05:59, bit.ly/CubaStatement5Nov2024; statement of India, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record, 6 November 2024, 00:27:50, bit.ly/IndiaStatement6Nov2024; statement of Iran, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 6 November 2024, bit.ly/IranStatement6Nov2024; statement of Pakistan, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 6 November 2024, bit.ly/PakistanStatement6Nov2024; and statement of South Korea, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 6 November 2024, bit.ly/SouthKoreaStatement6Nov2024.

50 Statement of Egypt, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record, 6 November 2024, 00:31:59, bit.ly/EgyptStatement6Nov2024; and statement of Iran, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 6 November 2024, bit.ly/IranStatement6Nov2024.

51 Explanation of Vote by Singapore on Resolution A/C.1/79/L.30, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, video record, 6 November 2024, 00:05:14, bit.ly/SingaporeVoteExplanation6Nov2024.

52 Of these states, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and the US are party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II on landmines; Cuba and Uzbekistan are party to CCW Protocol II; and Egypt and Vietnam have signed the CCW but are not party to any of its protocols. Iran, North Korea, and Syria remain outside of any treaty-based prohibition or regulation on antipersonnel mines.

53 Notes by the Monitor during the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meetings, New York, October 2024. See also, Reaching Critical Will, “Statements from First Committee 2024,” bit.ly/RCWFirstCommittee2024.

54 Statement of Nordic Countries, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 7 October 2024, bit.ly/NordicStatement7Oct2024.

55 Statement of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 23 October 2024, bit.ly/NAMStatement23Oct2024.

Overall, delegates made 31 statements that mentioned antipersonnel mines at UNGA First Committee meetings held between 7 October and 8 November 2024. Several, including those from Bulgaria, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Thailand, stressed their commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty.⁵⁶

USE OF ANTI PERSONNEL MINES

Landmine Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines during the reporting period by State Party Ukraine and states not party Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, and Russia, as detailed below. Additionally, state party Thailand alleged in July 2025 that armed forces from state party Cambodia emplaced PMN-2 antipersonnel mines at multiple locations along their border during recent tensions between the two countries. Cambodia has denied the allegations.

Antipersonnel mines were also used by NSAGs in State Party Colombia, and states not party India, Myanmar, and Pakistan, and by some groups in or bordering the Sahel region of Africa during the reporting period.⁵⁷

USE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES

CAMBODIA-THAILAND BORDER

Thailand alleged in July 2025 that Cambodian military forces recently emplaced PMN-2 antipersonnel mines at multiple locations along the Thai-Cambodian border, leading to several casualties, with the first incident taking place on 16 July 2025. According to Thailand's Foreign Ministry:

On 16 July 2025, near Chong Bok, Ubon Ratchathani Province, three soldiers from Thailand's Infantry Company 6021, while conducting a routine patrol along an established route within Thai territory, stepped on a landmine. The Royal Thai Government has since received reports from the responsible security agencies that after their subsequent investigations, the evidence collected confirm that the landmines were a type of anti-personnel mine not employed or stockpiled by the Kingdom of Thailand and were also recently laid.⁵⁸

After this initial incident, further casualties among the Thai military were reported and attributed to use of antipersonnel mines by Cambodia:

- On 23 July 2025, one Thai soldier lost a leg after stepping on a landmine near the Chong An Ma border crossing in Ubon Ratchathani province, while four others were also injured.⁵⁹ Four days of intense armed conflict occurred after this incident, ending with a ceasefire on 28 July 2025.

⁵⁶ Notes by the Monitor during the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security meetings, New York, October 2024. See also, Reaching Critical Will, "Statements from First Committee 2024," bit.ly/RCWFirstCommittee2024.

⁵⁷ In Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. The Monitor has chosen to group reported mine use in the Sahel region collectively due to a lack of reporting, the apparent sporadic nature of the incidents, and access issues for independent verification.

⁵⁸ Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement on the Protest Against the Use of Anti-Personnel Mines," 20 July 2025, bit.ly/ThailandStatement20July2025. See also, Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Thailand's Responses under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) to the Landmine Incidents involving Thai Military Personnel," 10 August 2025, bit.ly/ThailandPR10Aug2025.

⁵⁹ "New Mine Blast Inflames Border Tensions," *Bangkok Post*, 23 July 2025, bit.ly/BangkokPost23July2025; and Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Thailand's Responses under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) to the Landmine Incidents involving Thai Military Personnel," 10 August 2025, bit.ly/ThailandPR10Aug2025.

- On 9 August 2025, a soldier lost his foot after stepping on a landmine at the Chong Don Ao-Krissana border area in Si Sa Ket province, while two others were also injured.⁶⁰
- On 12 August 2025, a Thai soldier lost his leg after stepping on a mine near the Ta Muen Thom ancient temple in Phanom Dong Rak district of Surin province.⁶¹
- On 27 August 2025, three Thai soldiers were injured while patrolling between two Thai military bases west of the Ta Kwai temple in Surin province.⁶²

Additionally, after the ceasefire went into force, the Thai military recovered 18 antipersonnel mines on 4 August 2025 from a position occupied by the Cambodian military during the four-day conflict, two of which had been placed in the ground with the other 16 in a sack among other abandoned munitions.⁶³ On 20 September 2025, four PMN-2 mines, which Thailand alleges were recently laid, were recovered on a patrol route near Phu Makua hill in Kantharalak district of Si Sa Ket province.⁶⁴

Cambodia has responded to these allegations by stating that no credible independent investigation of the allegations has been made, and that the mines were old and in Cambodia, not Thailand.⁶⁵

A UK-based mine expert who had previously worked in Cambodia stated that the condition of the PMN-2s in the visuals taken by the Thai military and Reuters indicates they had been in the ground for no longer than a few months. Responding to Cambodia's claims that soil erosion, flooding and shifting vegetation could lead old mines to appear newer than they are, he added, "Ignoring the absence of other signs of ageing, it is not credible that floodwater could clean these mines and then bury them tidily again."⁶⁶

On 24 July 2025, Thailand submitted a letter to the UN Secretary-General "requesting clarification from Cambodia" regarding the alleged use.⁶⁷ The letter was submitted pursuant to Article 8.2 of the treaty, which allows states to submit requests for clarification if they wish to "clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party." Per the request of the UN Secretary-General, Thailand submitted further information of its allegations on 22 August 2025.⁶⁸ On 28 August 2025, H.E. Mr. Cherdchai Chaivaivid, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand to

60 "Three Thai soldiers Injured by Landmine Near Cambodia Amid Fragile Ceasefire," *Channel News Asia*, 9 August 2025, bit.ly/ChanelNewsAsia9Aug2025; and Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Thailand's Responses under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) to the Landmine Incidents involving Thai Military Personnel," 10 August 2025, bit.ly/ThailandPR10Aug2025.

61 Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Summary of Press Briefing on the Thailand-Cambodia Border Situation on 13 August 2025," 13 August 2025, bit.ly/ThailandMFA13Aug2025; and "Thai soldier loses leg in latest landmine blast on Thai-Cambodian border in Surin," *Thai PBS*, 12 August 2025, bit.ly/ThaiPBS12Aug2025.

62 "Three Thai Soldiers Injured in Border Landmine Attack," *The Nation*, 27 August 2025, bit.ly/TheNation27Aug2025.

63 "Thai Army: Latest landmine explosion shows Cambodia violating Ottawa Convention," *Thai PBS*, 9 August 2025, bit.ly/ThaiPBS9Aug2025.

64 "Four more mines found near Phu Makua in Si Sa Ket," *Bangkok Post*, 20 September 2025, bit.ly/BangkokPost20Sept2025.

65 C. Nika, "Cambodia Refutes Thailand's Allegation over Recent Landmine Incident," *Agence Kampuchea Presse*, 18 July 2025, bit.ly/AgenceKampucheaPresse18July2025. See also, May Kunmakara, "Cambodia: Thailand Aware of Minefield, Still Crossed Border," *Kampuchea Thmey Daily*, 13 August 2025, bit.ly/KampucheaThmeyDaily13Aug2025.

66 Panu Wongcha-um and Devyot Ghoshal, "Landmines that sparked Thai-Cambodia clash were likely newly-laid, experts say," *Reuters*, 16 October 2025, bit.ly/Reuters16Oct2025.

67 Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Thailand's Response under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (Ottawa Convention) to the Landmine Incidents Involving Thai Military Personnel on 16 and 23 July 2025," 29 July 2025, bit.ly/ThailandMFA29July2025.

68 Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Thailand Submits Follow-Up Communication to United Nations Secretary-General on Cambodia's Use of Landmines," 27 August 2025, bit.ly/ThailandMFA27Aug2025.

the UN, met with the Secretary-General to discuss the request for clarification.⁶⁹ In October 2025, Cambodia replied to the Secretary-General's request for clarification, which was then delivered by the Secretary-General's office to Thailand.⁷⁰

On 15 August 2025, Thailand also hosted a meeting in Geneva for 40 diplomats from States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty at which it presented its information.⁷¹ Thailand provided to the ICBL a copy of its submission to the convention's Committee on Cooperative Compliance on 18 August 2025.⁷²

On 10 September, at a General Border Committee (GBC) meeting co-chaired by the Defence Ministers of Cambodia and Thailand, the two countries agreed to coordinate the planning and implementation of humanitarian demining and to promote confidence-building measures in order to de-escalate the border confrontation.⁷³ As of mid-October 2025, the border between the two countries remained closed, with Thailand citing lack of cooperation by Cambodia on mine clearance and removal of heavy weapons.⁷⁴

UKRAINE

Ukraine is massively contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from the armed conflict that began in 2014 and escalated with Russia's full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.⁷⁵ Presently, it is not possible to systematically document, survey, and attribute the continuing use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine given available evidence and lack of access to areas where there are active hostilities. However, available data indicates that the use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine by Russia is extensive, with at least 13 types of antipersonnel mines being deployed.

Social media posts published by the combatants themselves indicate that State Party Ukraine has also used antipersonnel mines, though the scale of this use is unclear (see below).

Ukraine is still investigating reports that its forces used rocket-delivered PFM-1 antipersonnel mines in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when it was occupied by Russian forces.

⁶⁹ Permanent Mission of Thailand to the UN press release, "Thailand Presents Evidence on Cambodia's Landmine Use to UN Secretary-General, Reaffirms Commitment to Peaceful Resolution," 28 August 2025, bit.ly/ThailandMission28Aug2025.

⁷⁰ Interview with Cherdchai Chaivaivid, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Thailand, New York, 15 October 2025.

⁷¹ "Thailand condemns Cambodian use of mines before international envoys," *Bangkok Post*, 15 August 2025, bit.ly/BangkokPost15Aug2025.

⁷² Sent by the Permanent Mission of Thailand to the UN, to ICBL, 18 August 2025.

⁷³ Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs press release, "Joint Press Statement: Special General Border Committee (GBC) Meeting, Koh Kong, Cambodia," 10 September 2025, bit.ly/CambodiaThailandStatement10Sept2025. The press release stated: "7a. Both sides reaffirmed the importance of advancing humanitarian demining with the purpose of contributing to socio-economic development and the protection of civilian lives. To this end, both sides agreed to establish, within one week after this meeting, a Joint Coordinating Task Force led by the GBC Secretariats of both sides, with the participation of CMAC [Cambodian Mine Action Centre] and TMAC [Thailand Mine Action Centre], to determine and agree on priority areas and to coordinate the planning and implementation of humanitarian demining. Both sides will discuss and establish the Standard Operating Procedures necessary to complete this task. Taking into account each side's respective criteria, conditions, and positions, the Task Force will begin identifying pilot border areas for action within one month."

⁷⁴ "Thailand refuses Cambodia's border reopening request, insists on four preconditions," *Asia News Network*, 16 October 2025, bit.ly/AsiaNewsNetwork16Oct2025.

⁷⁵ Explosive remnants of war (ERW) is defined as unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) by Protocol V of the CCW. Ukraine is also affected by mine/ERW contamination remaining from World War I and World War II.

In June 2024, Ukraine stated that it is in compliance with its international obligations, including the Mine Ban Treaty, and is investigating the possible use of antipersonnel mines by its military personnel.⁷⁶ Ukraine made a similar statement at the treaty's intersessional meetings in June 2025.⁷⁷

Use by Russian forces

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines extensively in Ukraine since it invaded the country on 24 February 2022.

The scale of landmine and ERW contamination in Ukraine represents the most widespread use of antipersonnel landmines in decades. Russian forces have used at least 13 types of antipersonnel mines since 24 February 2022. Factory markings on some of the landmines used by Russia show that they were manufactured in the Soviet era and subsequently in Russia; some antipersonnel mines were also produced by Russia as recently as 2021.

Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine by Russia since February 2022⁷⁸

Name	Origin	Type	Initiation	Notes
MOB	Russia	Fragmentation	Multiple options	Hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mine that can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

76 Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2024, bit.ly/UkraineStatement19June2024.

77 Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025. Notes by ICBL.

78 The numbers associated with each model of the MON family indicate the range, from 50 to 200 meters. According to Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance (2008), each model contains a specific number of pre-formed fragments that are projected horizontally. The MON-50 contains 540 ball bearings or 485 pieces of 5mm chopped steel rod, and the MON-100 contains 400 pieces of 10mm chopped steel rod. Colin King, *Jane's Mines and Mine Clearance 2008-2009* (Croydon: Jane's Information Group, 2008); Trevor Kirton (TJK_EOD), "Today the @OfficialSOLI EOD team was able to remote pull a live OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mine from a marsh located close to a farming community. This will be destroyed so it no longer presents a danger." 21 April 2023, 14:08 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TrevorKirtonTweet21April2023; Maksim (kms_d4k), "In this footage, you can see why it is important not to touch any mines. These mines are set with a trap underneath. It is very dangerous to demine them, so the only way is to destroy them right away." 6 February 2023, 13:32 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/MaksimTweet6Feb2023; Mark Hiznay (MarkHiznay), "More PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being cleared. Since Ukraine never stockpiled this type, it doesn't take much to figure out who did it. Now where? @minefreeworld" 20 April 2023, 17:42 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/MarkHiznayTweet20April2023; Stu M (SM_EOD), "More anti-personnel mines out of a field today. We have also come across more evidence of POM-2 use which adds another level of complexity to our work. #onemineatatime #minefreeukraine #eod #demining #StandWithUkraine." 21 April 2023, 09:58 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/StuMEODTweet21April2023; International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), "Country Profile: Russia: Mine Ban Policy," last updated 7 November 2024, bit.ly/RussiaMonitorCountryProfile; and Armament Research Services has produced a detailed technical reference for POM-3 antipersonnel mines. See, Mick F. and N. R. Jenzen-Jones, "Russian POM-3 antipersonnel landmines documented in Ukraine (2022)," Armament Research Services, 15 April 2022.

Name	Origin	Type	Initiation	Notes
MON-50	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	
MON-90	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	
MON-100	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	
MON-200	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	MON-series hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mines can be used either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
OZM-72	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/ command	A multipurpose bounding munition emplaced either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
PFM-1/ PFM-1S	USSR	Blast	Pressure/ self-destruct	Uniquely shaped and constructed, this plastic-cased mine can be scattered by mine-laying rockets and dispensers mounted on trucks, helicopters, or drones. It contains 37 grams of a liquid high explosive. Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile this type.
PMN-2	USSR/Russia	Blast	Pressure	A circular, plastic-cased mine. Ukraine destroyed its stockpile of this type in 2003.
PMN-4	Russia	Blast	Pressure	A modern circular, plastic-cased mine produced by Russia. First publicly displayed by Russia in 1993, it has never been stockpiled by Ukraine.
POM-2/ POM-2R	USSR/Russia	Fragmentation	Tripwire/self-destruct	A metal-case bounding mine delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other means. POM-2 and POM-2R mines are stockpiled by Russia. Ukraine destroyed its stocks of this mine in 2018.

Name	Origin	Type	Initiation	Notes
POM-3	Russia	Fragmentation	Seismic	Used only by Russia, POM-3 mines were first publicly displayed during annual military exercises in 2021. The POM-3 is scattered by rockets or truck-mounted launchers. Ukraine does not possess the POM-3 mine or its delivery system. Markings on an expended delivery canister photographed with POM-3 mines that failed to deploy properly indicate that it was produced in 2021.

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps around positions they have taken, occupied, or fortified. Deminers told Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2022 that they have cleared and destroyed multiple victim-activated booby-traps from areas that were formerly under Russian control. The booby-traps were constructed using various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades. Booby-traps can function as antipersonnel landmines when the fuze that is used is activated unintentionally by a person.

Russian forces posting on social media in late 2023 and into 2025 confirm that they are using drones to emplace several different types of landmines including PFM-1, POM-2, and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines and PTM-3 and PTM-4 antivehicle mines.⁷⁹

In June 2025, HRW reported on Russia's use of armed quadcopter drones to terrorize civilians in Kherson, Ukraine.⁸⁰ HRW verified drone footage from Russian military-affiliated Telegram channels showing drones dropping PFM-1 antipersonnel mines in residential areas, resulting in several injuries.⁸¹ HRW also spoke to several civilians who had been injured by mines, including one resident of Antonivka who noted that some drones dropped PFM mines in plastic bags in a possible effort to disguise the mines.⁸²

Some landmines used by Russia in Ukraine can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, MON-series, and OZM-72 mines.⁸³

79 Rob Lee (RALee85), "Video about engineers from Russia's 1st Tank Army who are using UAVs to emplace POM, PMN-4, PTM-3, and PTM-4 mines." 12 December 2023, 20:33 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetRobLee12Dec2023; Roy (GrandpaRoy2), "Both sides drop mines by drones to interdict logistics. Near dusk, a Russian drone drops a cassette of 26 PFM-1 anti-personnel mines on a Ukrainian road. That night a truck loses tires when it hits the mines, and is abandoned. It is destroyed the next day by drone bombing." 27 September 2024, 16:31 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetRoy27Sept2024; HRW, "Hunted from Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine," 3 June 2025, bit.ly/HRW3June2025; Tetiana Herasimova, "Part of city market in Kherson in ruins due to Russian attack. Regional Military Administration shows footage," *Ukrainian News*, 9 September 2025, bit.ly/UkrainianNews9Sept2025; and UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, "They are hunting us": systematic drone attacks targeting civilians in Kherson," 28 May 2025, p. 12, bit.ly/HRCUkraine28May2025.

80 HRW, "Hunted from Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine," 3 June 2025, bit.ly/HRW3June2025.

81 Frontline Business | FPV (suetabpla), "We don't hit civilians! We don't hit ambulances. Ukrainian medical personnel abandoned a civilian to his fate... Editing 'ZONE'." 9 October 2024, 13:09 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/FrontlineBusinessFPVTelegram9Oct2024.

82 HRW, "Hunted from Above: Russia's Use of Drones to Attack Civilians in Kherson, Ukraine," 3 June 2025, bit.ly/HRW3June2025.

83 CollectiveAwarenessUXO, "OZM-72 Landmine:Description," undated, bit.ly/OZM-72LandmineDescription.

If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then these mines are considered to be antipersonnel mines, prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸⁴

Indications of new use by Ukrainian forces

Since 2022, there have been increasing indications that Ukraine has also used antipersonnel mines, though the scale of this use is unclear. Ukraine inherited a substantial stockpile of antipersonnel mines after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Although Ukraine destroyed more than 3.4 million antipersonnel mines between 1999 and 2020, including PFM mines, it last reported a stockpile of close to 3.4 million antipersonnel mines, which are thus available for use.⁸⁵ It is also known that Ukraine requested and successfully acquired artillery delivered mines from the US in November 2024.⁸⁶

In addition to well-documented allegations that Ukrainian forces used rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines in 2022 (see *Use of Antipersonnel mines by Ukrainian forces in 2022 in Izium section*), there is now public information from several sources, including combatants from both sides, that point to the use of drone-delivered and artillery-delivered antipersonnel mines by Ukrainian forces in 2024–2025. Some of these mines may be improvised antipersonnel mines fabricated by Ukraine (see also *Production of Antipersonnel Mines section*). In the examples listed below, it was not possible to verify the exact locations at which they were dropped.

- Ukrainian and Russian sources show a local variant of a 3D-printed Ukrainian improvised blast antipersonnel landmine that has several names. It is called “Wing” (Крило) by Ukrainians, while the Russians have used “Soap Dish” (мыльницу), “Vape” (мыльницу), or “Glasses Case” (футляр для очков).⁸⁷
- A video from 13 May 2025 features a Russian combatant who explains the operation of a drone-delivered OZM-72 antipersonnel mine “with a ‘Drop-2’ (Крапля-2) Doppler microwave motion detector fuze” allegedly dropped by Ukrainian forces.⁸⁸
- A video from 11 May 2025 shows a Ukrainian soldier describing the “K2” improvised antipersonnel landmine derived from the POM-2 landmine. The device is dropped by drones and deploys four tripwires.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ HRW, “Backgrounder on Antivehicle Landmines,” 8 April 2022, bit.ly/HRWAntivehicleMines8April2022.

⁸⁵ See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Ukraine: Mine Ban Policy,” last updated 13 November 2024, bit.ly/UkraineMonitorCountryProfile; and Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form B. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT.

⁸⁶ HRW, “Q&A: US Antipersonnel Landmine Transfers,” 13 December 2024, bit.ly/HRW13Dec2024.

⁸⁷ One foot here, one there! (combat_engineer), “Several people sent a new antipersonnel mine dropped by the enemy from drones. In the combat position, the striker is held by the brown element, but when pressed on the case, it moves and the striker ignites the MD-5 (MD-2, in the photo homemade MD), an explosion occurs. Thanks to my chat friends for the photo.” 14 May 2025, 17:11 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/CombatEngineerTelegram14May2025; Engineering Support Brigade (VIUKSIDV), “It caught my eye: VUSushniks call their homemade antipersonnel mines: ‘Donut’ – ‘gingerbread’, and ‘Vape’ – ‘soap dish’. Want to share a photo or video? Here you go: @BrigadaIP_bot.” 15 May 2025, 1:32 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/EngineeringSupportBrigadeTelegram15May2025. See also, Black Sea Fleet Engineers (Vlad_Kulman), 20 February 2025, 15:13 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/TelegramBlackSeaFleetEngineers20Feb2025.

⁸⁸ Roy (GrandpaRoy2), “Another Ukrainian use of an OZM-72 anti-personnel landmine with a ‘Drop-2’ (Крапля-2) Doppler microwave motion detector fuze. The fuze has a range of about 15m, and connects to a firing device in the fuze well of an OZM-72 bounding anti-personnel landmine.” 13 May 2025, 10:45 UTC. X post, bit.ly/RoyXPost13May2025.

⁸⁹ Roy (GrandpaRoy2), “A Ukrainian soldier describes the ‘K2’ improvised anti-personnel landmine derived from the POM-2 landmine. The printed device is dropped by drones and deploys 4 tripwires, with a notched coil of steel wire wound around a pipe filled with explosive to yield fragmentation pieces.” 12 May 2025, 16:10 UTC. X post, bit.ly/RoyXPost12May2025; One foot here, one there! (combat_engineer), “The enemy’s 152 Orr workshop for the production and equipment of Ukrainian ersatz POM-2 mines (in my opinion, the old version is K-2). And the interviewed TTX KPOM-2 does not know, and floats in theory, but they hope that he does not need to collect mines like hell...” 11 May 2025, 9:53 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/CombatEngineerTelegram11May2025.

- In an in-depth 18 April 2025 print media feature of a Ukrainian unit on the Zaporizhzhia front that produces landmines for use by drones, a Ukrainian commander talks about using homemade antipersonnel mines called “ginger cookies.” The deputy director of the Humanitarian Demining Center also stated that he sees no reason to stop mining even though the country ratified the Ottawa Convention, and emphasized that “[m]oral considerations have no place when defending oneself.”⁹⁰
- A social media post from 5 April 2025 shows a Ukrainian military unit apparently using drones to drop antipersonnel landmines to counter infiltration of their positions by Russian forces.⁹¹
- A video posted on 25 February 2025 to an account associated with the Ukrainian 413th Separate Unmanned Systems Battalion appears to show antipersonnel mines being dropped from drones on Russian trenches.⁹²
- On 25 January 2025, social media posts from another Ukrainian military unit show the handling of 155mm M692 artillery shells that carry 36 M74/M67 Artillery Delivered Antipersonnel Mines (ADAM) supplied by the US in late 2024.⁹³ Social media posts from Russian-language channels later show the same type of mines on the ground in Kursk and Kharkiv, though it was not possible to independently verify the precise location of these mines.⁹⁴
- A video by the Ukrainian 414th Separate Brigade from 3 January 2025 shows interviews with combatants discussing using drones to drop different munitions including landmines. In the video they state, “We will do anti-personnel.”⁹⁵
- A video from 26 March 2024 shows numerous antipersonnel mines (including PMD-6M for TNT blocks of 250 grams) that are available for purchase. The caption reads: “A charge of 250 grams of TNT and a metal case reduces the chances of survival drastically of the person, which are already small when one leg is torn off at the

90 Jacques Follorou, “Ukraine intensifies use of land mines against Russia,” *Le Monde*, 18 April 2025, bit.ly/LeMonde18April2025.

91 MPB “Edelweiss” (MPBEdelweiss), “Remote mining that sends the orcs to hell when they make a sneaky attempt to approach our position. Everything will be Ukraine!” 5 April 2025, 13:38 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/MPBEdelweissTelegram5April2025.

92 In Factum (in_factum), “An interesting video of remote mining of enemy trenches by dropping antipersonnel mines from the ‘Nachtigall’ unit of the 413th SBS ‘Raid’ battalion.” 25 February 2025, 22:19 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/InFactumTelegram25Feb25; and Nachtigall (ptah_ngl), “It moves to tears...They couldn’t calmly watch these Russians freeze. That’s why they designed a trench candle for their brother, made in Baton’s workshop. Do good – warm your fellow countrymen.” 25 February 2025, 15:42 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/NachtigallTelegram25Feb2025.

93 “Ukraine Uses US-Supplied ADAM Anti-Personnel Landmines,” *Kyiv Post*, 28 January 2025, bit.ly/KyivPost28Jan2025.

94 North Wind (warriorofnorth), “!! American antipersonnel mines in the Kharkiv region. The footage shows an American antipersonnel mine ‘M-67’ (‘M-72’, visually identical, differing in self-destruction time). A few days ago, we reported that this type of ammunition was actively used by the enemy in the Sudzhansky border area. However, our servicemen clarified that the mines, nicknamed ‘cheese’ or ‘curd’, are also actively used by the enemy in the Kharkiv region and other parts of the front [...].” 20 June 2025, 18:25 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/NorthWindTelegram20June2025; and North Wind (warriorofnorth), “!! American antipersonnel mines in the Sudzhansky border area. Servicemen of the 1427th Separate Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment ‘North’, participating in the demining of the liberated territories of the Kursk region, shared photos of the combat mission. The footage shows an American antipersonnel mine ‘M-67’ (‘M-72’, visually identical, differing in self-destruction time). The system was developed by 1975. It was intended for combined use with M70 (M73) anti-tank mines, which are also delivered by 155 mm shells. Submunitions (mines) from one shell scatter within a radius of up to 600 m from the aiming point. Discovering one mine of this type means you can be sure that within a radius of one kilometer there are several dozen similar explosive devices.” 18 June 2025, 11:55 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/NorthWindTelegram18June2025.

95 “Night Horror of the occupiers - the work of the Night Doctor crew 414 Birds of the Magyar,” 414 Birds of the Magyar, YouTube.com, 3 January 2025, bit.ly/YouTube3January2025.

knee. Price 100 hryvnia (~US\$ 2,50) per piece, when ordering 1000 pieces. They can be installed manually or drone dropped.”⁹⁶

Use of antipersonnel mines by Ukrainian forces in 2022 in Izium

There is credible information that Ukrainian government forces used antipersonnel mines in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when the city was under Russian control.⁹⁷ In January 2023, HRW issued a report detailing how 9M27K3 Uragan rockets carrying PFM-series antipersonnel mines were fired into Russian-occupied areas near Russian military facilities in and around Izium during 2022, causing at least 11 civilian casualties.⁹⁸

In a March 2023 report to the Human Rights Council, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine said that the commission had found instances where Ukrainian Armed Forces likely used cluster munitions and rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines to carry out attacks in Izium city, Kharkiv region, from March to September 2022, when it was controlled by Russian Armed Forces.⁹⁹

In June 2023, HRW reported additional evidence of Ukrainian use of PFM-1 antipersonnel mines.¹⁰⁰ According to HRW, in May 2023, photographs posted online by an individual conducting clearance operations in Kharkivska region—where the Ukrainian government had restored control after Russian forces left—show the remnants of artillery rockets, including two 9N128K3 warhead sections of 9M27K3 Uragan 220mm rockets, which each contain 9N223 “blocks,” or stacks, of 9N212 PFM-1S antipersonnel blast mines.¹⁰¹

In January 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that HRW’s findings “will be duly studied by the competent authorities of Ukraine.”¹⁰² In June 2023, Ukraine promised to examine reports that its forces had used antipersonnel mines.¹⁰³ At the Mine Ban Treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2024, States Parties received a report from the

96 PS01 (PStyleOne1), “Production of anti-personnel mines PMD-6m for TNT blocks of 250 grams (also available in 75, 100, and 200 gram) A charge of 250 grams of TNT and a metal case reduces the chances of survival drastically of the person, which are already small when one leg is torn off at the knee. Price 100 hryvnia (~US\$ 2,50) per piece, when ordering 1000 pieces. They can be installed manually or drone dropped.” 26 March 2024, 10:05 UTC. X post, bit.ly/PSO1XPost26Mar2024.

97 The Russian military seized Izium and surrounding areas by 1 April 2022 and exercised full control there until 10 September 2022 when Ukrainian forces began a counteroffensive.

98 HRW conducted research in the Izium district from 19 September to 9 October 2022, interviewing over 100 people, including witnesses to mine use, victims of landmines, first responders, doctors, and Ukrainian deminers. Everyone interviewed said they had seen mines on the ground, knew someone who was injured by one, or had been warned about their presence during Russia’s occupation of Izium. See, HRW, “Ukraine: Banned Landmines Harm Civilians,” 31 January 2023, bit.ly/HRWUkraineLandmines31Jan2023.

99 Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine,” A/HRC/52/62, 15 March 2023, pp. 6–7, docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/52/62.

100 HRW, “Ukraine Promises Inquiry into Banned Landmine Use,” 30 June 2023, bit.ly/HRWUkraineInquiry30June2023.

101 The GRAU Index numbers matched the warheads used to carry PFM-1S antipersonnel mines. Analysis of handwriting on the side of one warhead section showed that a first word, in Ukrainian, translates as “from,” while a second word, written in Latin script, relates to an organization based in Kyiv. Each Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket is designed exclusively to carry and disperse 312 PFM-1S antipersonnel mines. The markings on all the images of rockets examined show that they were produced in 1986 (from batch numbers 14 and 16) at the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) munitions factory designated #912. As further reported by HRW, a photograph posted on social media in August 2022 that bears the watermark of a Kyiv-based non-governmental organization (NGO)—posted by the individual thought to run the NGO, which made a monetary donation to Ukraine’s war effort—shows the same warhead section of a Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket recovered from agricultural land. Markings specifying the batch, year, and factory, and the same handwriting and phrases, match those in the photographs assessed by HRW. The post also showed the warhead sections of two other Uragan 9M27K3 rockets with phrases written on them. At least 15 photographs have been posted online of the Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rockets.

102 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, “Comment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding Report of the Human Rights Watch,” 31 January 2023, bit.ly/UkraineMoFA31Jan2023.

103 Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2024, bit.ly/UkraineStatement19June2024.

treaty's Committee on Cooperative Compliance, which stated that it "appreciates Ukraine's engagement with the Committee since the allegations surfaced and looks forward to engaging further with Ukraine over the course of this year in the lead up to the Fifth Review Conference to resolve this matter as soon as possible."¹⁰⁴

At the 2024 intersessional meetings, Ukraine reiterated that it "continues to fully comply with its international obligations," including the Mine Ban Treaty, and announced that its security service has opened "a pre-trial investigation" into "the use of anti-personnel mines by unidentified military personnel."¹⁰⁵ Ukraine's delegation told ICBL that a categorical determination about who was responsible for the mine use would not be possible until the investigation concludes.¹⁰⁶ Ukraine has not provided an update on the investigation in subsequent Mine Ban Treaty meetings.

International reaction

All parties to the conflict in Ukraine are bound by treaties that prohibit or regulate landmines in addition to the general laws of war. The Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of the technical features and the predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (improvised or factory-made). While only Ukraine is party to the Mine Ban Treaty, both Russia and Ukraine are party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which regulates the use of landmines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices.

In the Siem Reap-Angkor Declaration, which was adopted at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, States Parties "condemn[ed] the use of anti-personnel mines by any actor, urgently call[ed] on all States and parties to armed conflict to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law, and on all States Parties to comply with the obligations of the Convention."¹⁰⁷

Since March 2022, Ukraine and at least 46 other countries have condemned or expressed concern at Russia's use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, in addition to the European Union (EU).

At the CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties in November 2024, Ukraine submitted a working paper on behalf of 45 other delegations that said,

We continue to remain gravely concerned about reports of Russia's failure to comply with its obligations under the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocols during the ongoing aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine....Over six million people in Ukraine continue to be at risk due to Russia's use of dangerous explosive devices—including mines, *inter alia* those of an improvised nature, IEDs [improvised explosive devices] and booby-traps—inflicting casualties, terrorizing the population and

¹⁰⁴ Committee on Cooperative Compliance, "Draft Preliminary Observations," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, 18–20 June 2024, p. 4, bit.ly/PreliminaryObservationsComplianceJune2024.

¹⁰⁵ Ukraine shared the case number provided for the investigation (4-2023-000000000245), which indicates that the case was launched by the military prosecutor (as indicated by 4), that the year of investigation is 2023, and that the case is under the SBU (a.k.a. security services). Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2024, bit.ly/UkraineStatement19June2024.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with the Ukrainian delegation, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18–20 June 2024.

¹⁰⁷ Siem Reap-Angkor Declaration, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, docs.un.org/APLC/CONF/2024/15/Add.1.

restricting the free movement of people....We are alarmed by reports that Russia's forces are using drones to airdrop deadly PFM-1 anti-personnel mines in areas densely populated by civilians.¹⁰⁸

Landmine use in Ukraine has also been condemned by successive Mine Ban Treaty presidents and the Special Envoy on the Universalization of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention.¹⁰⁹

The ICBL has regularly condemned Russia's massive use of mines, encouraged Ukraine to investigate reported use by its armed forces, and called on all parties to the conflict in Ukraine to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor. It has also called on Ukraine to ensure stockpiles under its control are secured, to remind soldiers of their legal obligations, to reject any transfers, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.¹¹⁰

IRAN

Since 2023, there have been reports of new use of antipersonnel landmines in the east of the country by the Iranian government's IRGC. In July 2024, HRW reported that some border couriers believed that Iranian security forces had laid mines in recent years along their routes.¹¹¹ This activity has continued into 2025, but it is difficult to know precisely when the mines were laid. Most casualties involve civilians engaged in agriculture in Iran, near the Iran-Pakistan border, refugees crossing the borders with Pakistan or Afghanistan, and people engaged in the portering or transport of fuel across the border. Communities on both sides of the border have reported regular activity by the IRGC, after which mine incidents occur. According to allegations by a locally focused human rights organization, the mines have been placed and are moved sporadically by the IRGC within Sistan-Balochistan province, primarily along the borders with neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also in internal areas of the province. Mined areas are said to be unmarked.¹¹²

The mine victims of this new alleged use of antipersonnel mines were engaged in ordinary activities such as agriculture or portering in or between their communities, indicating possible recent placement of the mines.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸ Working paper submitted by Ukraine on behalf of Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the UK, the US, and the EU. See, Working Paper, CCW/MSP/2024/WP.11, CCW Meeting of High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 15 November 2024, docs.un.org/CCW/MSP/2024/WP.11.

¹⁰⁹ APMBC, "President of the Convention that bans landmines calls for immediate cease of use of this insidious weapon in Ukraine," 5 April 2022, bit.ly/APMBCUkraine5Apr2022; and statement by Dr. Ly Thuch, Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 24 November 2023, bit.ly/DrLyThuchStatement24Nov2023.

¹¹⁰ ICBL, "Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Mines in Ukraine: ICBL-CMC Calls for International Condemnation and Immediate End to Use," 30 March 2022, bit.ly/ICBLUkraine30Mar2022; and statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025, bit.ly/ICBLStatementJune2025.

¹¹¹ HRW, "Iran: Security Forces Killing Kurdish Border Couriers," 8 July 2024, bit.ly/HRWIran8July2024.

¹¹² Email from Shirahmad Shirani, Editor-in-Chief, Haalvsh Human Rights Organization, 18 August 2025.

¹¹³ For example, an agricultural worker in a border province was killed by a landmine locals allege was placed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, "Baloch man killed in landmine explosion in Mirjaveh," 26 January 2025, bit.ly/Hengaw26Jan2025. In another incident, an 18-year-old porter (fuel carrier) was killed by an antipersonnel mine allegedly planted by the IRGC. Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, "Golshan – IRGC landmine kills 18-year-old Baloch Sukhtbar, injures another," 12 August 2025, bit.ly/Hengaw12Aug2025.

MYANMAR

Myanmar continues to use antipersonnel landmines, despite voting in favor of an annual UNGA resolution promoting the treaty since 2022.¹¹⁴ The use of mines appeared to significantly increase in 2024–2025, and the Monitor has documented use of antipersonnel landmines by both the Myanmar Armed Forces and various NSAGs operating in Myanmar. (See also *Use by non-state armed groups in Myanmar* section.)

Use by the Myanmar Armed Forces

Myanmar's Armed Forces have regularly used antipersonnel mines since 1999 but have increased their use due to increased armed conflict following the coup in February 2021. The antipersonnel mines are primarily used around military bases and outposts, but also around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.¹¹⁵

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that antipersonnel mines manufactured by Myanmar were captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces by NSAGs every month between January 2022 and August 2025, in virtually every part of the country, indicating extensive landmine use.¹¹⁶ Myanmar Armed Forces were also reported to have increased the destructive power of antipersonnel landmines by placing a mortar projectile underneath them.¹¹⁷

Attributing the new use of antipersonnel mines is made difficult by the complex conflict situation and the partisan nature of some media sources.¹¹⁸ While many areas were already heavily contaminated by landmines, given the increase in use since the military coup, many of the casualties reported during 2024 and 2025 appear to be from antipersonnel mines recently emplaced.¹¹⁹

Numerous news reports state that people are victimized by antipersonnel landmines while undertaking ordinary activities such as foraging or travel near abandoned military



A Burmese landmine survivor in a refugee camp in Thailand.

© M-E. Bugnet/HI, February 2025

¹¹⁴ See, UN Voting Data on annual resolution titled "Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction," bit.ly/UNGAResolutionVotingDataMBT.

¹¹⁵ In February 2025, in Ann township of Rakhine state, one youth was killed and another injured by a landmine near the base of a cellular phone tower. It is unknown when this tower may have been mined. Saw Shin May, "Young Man Killed, Another Wounded After Treading on Landmine Near Tat Taung Town in Ann," *Narinjara News*, 17 February 2025, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews17Feb2025.

¹¹⁶ "More antipersonnel landmines captured by anti-military groups," *Mine Free Myanmar*, 21 August 2025, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar21Aug2025.

¹¹⁷ As the Myanmar Armed Forces withdrew from Thaung Salone village, Shan state, in June 2023, an MM6 mine—placed on top of the fuze and body of a mortar projectile—was reportedly emplaced by departing troops on a path behind the village medical clinic. It was later found by returnees. Free Burma Rangers, "Doctors as Targets: Many Killed In Burma Army's Attacks On Medical Facilities," 21 June 2023, bit.ly/FreeBurmaRangers21June2023; and email from David Eubanks, Free Burma Rangers, 5 September 2023.

¹¹⁸ Media and data sources tied to the military tend to publish incidents ascribed to anti-military groups. Media and data sources tied to ethnic armed groups or the National Unity Government (NUG) publish incidents ascribed to the Myanmar Armed Forces. Very few publish the same incidents.

¹¹⁹ These are mostly identified by villagers after being newly injured in areas that were recently safe for engaging in livelihood activities. For example, in May 2025, in Toungup town, Rakhine state, an elderly couple were injured by a landmine while walking to their farm; in April 2025, in Man Kan village in Shan state, a father died and his son was injured by a landmine while looking for their cow near the village; in March 2025, near Nan San Khan village, Kayah state, a 40-year-old woman was severely injured by a landmine while collecting garlic in her field. Online database of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), citing *Narinjara News*, *Kantarawaddy Times*, and *Shwe Phee Myay News Agency*. See, ACLED website, www.acleddata.com.

bases.¹²⁰ Villagers have complained about denial of access to resources, especially firewood needed for survival, due to landmines laid by the military to combat armed opponents.¹²¹

There are also reports of people being injured by landmines while near checkpoints constructed by the military.¹²² Some military outposts have marked areas near them that they have mined.¹²³

The Myanmar Armed Forces acknowledged to the Monitor in 2019 that they use antipersonnel mines in areas where they are under attack.¹²⁴

On previous occasions, the Myanmar Armed Forces have reportedly threatened that farmers must pay for antipersonnel mines detonated by their livestock. On 1 January 2024, near Let We Det village, close to Buthidaung town, Myanmar Army soldiers reportedly demanded 1.5 million kyats (US\$707) from an owner of a cow maimed by an antipersonnel mine. The owner could not pay so the soldiers butchered the cow.¹²⁵ On 16 May 2023, livestock owned by farmers in Pyint Taw village in Rathedaung township, Rakhine state, were killed by landmines planted by the Myanmar Army near their camp in Ma Nyin Taung village. Subsequently, Myanmar Army officials from the camp summoned villagers and warned that they would have to pay compensation if cattle stepped on mines and caused the mines to explode.¹²⁶

Atrocity crimes/forced labor in mine clearance

The Monitor found evidence that in 2024 and 2025, as well as previous years, the Myanmar Armed Forces forced civilians to serve as “guides” to walk in front of its units in mine-affected areas, effectively to detonate landmines. The military also required civilians to conduct forced labor in mine clearance. This is a grave violation of international humanitarian and human rights law.¹²⁷ Incidents include:

- In September 2025, five civilians were reported killed after being forced to walk through a minefield in Pwintbyu township of Magway region by the Myanmar Armed Forces.¹²⁸

¹²⁰ Maung Sar Ga, “Landmine victim dies, another civilian wounded in Taungup explosion,” *Narinjara News*, 1 July 2025, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews1July2025. The article states that on different dates two people received serious injuries near a former military base of the Myanmar Armed Forces Operation Command No. 5 in Taungup township, and another near the former military installation of the 543rd Infantry Battalion in Kyauk Phyu township, both in Rakhine state.

¹²¹ “Junta forces plant landmines in areas where residents have to rely for livelihood,” *Narinjara News*, 11 April 2024, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews11April2024.

¹²² See, for example, Human Rights Foundation of Monland, “Man steps on a landmine and loses his leg in Tha Yet Chaung,” 14 March 2024, bit.ly/HURFOM14March2024.

¹²³ “Locals in junta-held Sittwe fear landmines planted by military,” *Development Media Group*, 18 May 2024, bit.ly/DMG18May2024; and Human Rights Foundation of Monland, “Battalions Plant Landmines alongside Thanbyuzayat-Ye Highway: Danger created for plantation workers,” 8 January 2024, bit.ly/HURFOM8Jan2024.

¹²⁴ “In border areas, if the number of Tatmadaw [Myanmar Armed Forces] is small, they will lay mines around where they reside, but only if their numbers are small. Mines are also laid around infrastructure, such as microwave towers. If these are near villages, we warn them. If there is a Tatmadaw camp in an area controlled by an ethnic armed group where they are sniped at and harassed, they will lay mines around the camp.” Monitor meeting with U Min Htike Hein, Assistant Secretary, Union Minister Office for Defense, Myanmar Ministry of Defense, Naypyitaw, 5 July 2019.

¹²⁵ In the incident, two Rohingya farmers had stepped on an antipersonnel mine, one received serious injuries, but the other farmer and the cow were mildly injured. Online database of ACLED. Exchange rate for 1 January 2024: MMK1,000=US\$0.4715. Oanda, bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter.

¹²⁶ “Army warns that owners must pay if planted landmines are exploded by cattle,” *Narinjara News*, 7 June 2023, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews7June2023.

¹²⁷ For more than two decades, the Monitor has reported disturbing evidence that the Myanmar military has forced civilians to clear antipersonnel mines without training or protective equipment or has forced them to guide or carry equipment for the military in mined areas. Such activities constitute a threat to the right to life, liberty, and security of person. See, Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, Tenth Session, “Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15(c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1,” 18 October 2010, bit.ly/UPRMyanmar18Oct2010.

¹²⁸ “Myanmar junta troops kill at least nine civilians, including human shields, in Magway Region,” *Myanmar Now*, 8 September 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarNow8Sept2025.

- In June 2025, a local human rights organization claimed that use of civilians to clear mines was required by the Myanmar Armed Forces in Dawei, Launglon, Thayetchaung, and Yebyu townships of the Tanintharyi region.¹²⁹
- In February 2025, two women from Myaing township, Magway region, who were forcibly taken by a military supply column, were killed after stepping on landmines.¹³⁰
- In January 2025, Myanmar Armed Forces reportedly forced civilians in Chang U township of Sagaing region to clear mines planted by an unknown armed group, leading to at least one dead and several injured.¹³¹
- In July 2024, the Myanmar Army allegedly forced local villagers to walk in front of them as they cleared command-detonated mines placed by the local People's Defence Force (PDF) on the Monywa-Mandalay road. The same report states that in June, the Myanmar Armed Forces also made villagers walk ahead of them while removing mines between Myay Hne village in Monywa township and Khin Mon village in Chaung-U township, Sagaing region.¹³²
- On 6 June 2024, a group of locals from Ahr Lar Kat Pa village, Myinmu township in Sagaing region, were seized by the Myanmar Armed Forces, who forced them to clear landmines planted by local PDF troops near the Shwe Gu Gyi monastery. One villager died and two were severely injured by mines in the process.¹³³
- On 2 June 2024, a Rohingya youth, who was forcibly conscripted by the military, escaped from the Thone Maing Border Guard Police in Maungdaw town, Rakhine state, and then was severely injured by a mine.¹³⁴

Armed groups in northern Shan state have also been reported to seize villagers for forced labor as porters in mine-affected areas.¹³⁵ Likewise, ethnic armed groups in Kachin state have been reported to conscript forced labor in mine-affected areas.¹³⁶

Use on the Bangladesh border

The beginning of 2025 saw an increase in the number of mine victims, particularly near the border, in part due to the movements of people attempting to return to their villages following armed conflict. This has led some Rohingya in the refugee camps to believe landmines have been laid to prevent their return.¹³⁷ As in previous years, cross-border cattle traders were at high risk of landmine injuries and death as they crossed into Myanmar for

129 Myanmar Peace Monitor, "An interview with Nai Aue Mon, Director of the Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM)," 11 June 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarPeaceMonitor11June2025.

130 The military column reportedly seized six civilians from Htan Bu Taw village, Myaing township. Two other women were injured by a landmine explosion during the incident. "Two Women Forced to Serve as Human Shields Killed by Landmines in Myaing Township," *Myanmar Press Photo Agency*, 18 February 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarPressPhotoAgency18Feb2025.

131 For example, on 20 January 2025, between Ngar Shan and Gway Pin Taw in Chaung-U township, Sagaing region, a mine exploded and killed a man and injured four other people when the Myanmar military forced travelers on the Monywa-Mandalay road to clear mines planted by an unknown armed group. See, online database of ACLED.

132 "Myanmar junta troops use human shields to clear landmines on Monywa-Mandalay Road," *Mizzima*, 7 July 2024, bit.ly/Mizzima7July2024.

133 Online database of ACLED.

134 Ibid.

135 Naw Theresa, "Myanmar Ethnic Armed Groups Draw Allegations of Forced Recruitment," *The Diplomat*, 3 January 2024, bit.ly/TheDiplomat3Jan2024.

136 Healthcare workers in Kachin State, where four different ethnic armed groups operate, state that internally displaced persons (IDPs) face forced recruitment as porters by the armed groups in the area. Back Pack Health Worker Team (BPHWT), "BPHWT 2024 Annual Report," 3 June 2025, p. 17.

137 See, for example, "Bangladesh-Myanmar border: Landmine-related injuries on the rise," *The Daily Star*, 18 August 2025, bit.ly/TheDailyStar18Aug2025. Most news regarding landmine casualties among the Rohingya are solely published in Bangladeshi newspapers.

their livelihood, as were others engaged in activities around the border.¹³⁸ The border area is heavily mined, but it is unclear how recently the mines were laid.

Previously, villagers attributed newly laid mines to Myanmar Army border patrols. As conflict shifted to southern Buthidaung in Rakhine state, the Myanmar Army also began laying new mines near the town, resulting in multiple casualties in 2024.¹³⁹

Other reports include:

- Through mid-2025, cattle smugglers continued to be killed or injured by landmines at this border.¹⁴⁰
- In August 2024, Rohingya villagers who were collecting forest products were injured by mines laid near an Arakan Army (AA) camp.¹⁴¹
- In July 2024, one person was killed and two others injured, all residents of Bangladesh, while foraging for crabs in the Naf river after having crossed the borderline dividing Bangladesh and Myanmar that cuts through the river. It is not clear who laid the mines.¹⁴²
- In May 2024, the AA took control of the Myanmar border with Bangladesh and created routes through border minefields and, subsequently, were requiring that people pay in order to be guided across.¹⁴³

¹³⁸ A youth tending cattle was seriously injured by antipersonnel landmines near border pillar 48. S Bashu Das, "Bangladeshi man's leg severed as landmine explodes along Bandarban border," *Dhaka Tribune*, 3 February 2025, bit.ly/DhakaTribune3Feb2025. A Bangladeshi man was injured by an antipersonnel mine on the Myanmar side of the Bangladesh border after he had crossed to collect firewood. "Man loses leg as landmine explodes on Myanmar side of border," *The Daily Star*, 29 March 2025, bit.ly/DailyStar29March2025. A fisherman in the Naf River was seriously injured by an antipersonnel mine when he crossed to the Myanmar side. "Bangladeshi fisherman loses leg in mine explosion along Myanmar border," *New Age*, 6 April 2025, bit.ly/NewAge6April2025. A man smuggling cattle was injured by an antipersonnel landmine allegedly laid by the Arakan Army (AA) between border pillars 46–47. "Bangladeshi man loses leg in landmine blast near Bandarban border," *Dhaka Tribune*, 8 April 2025, bit.ly/DhakaTribune8April2025. A 16-year-old boy from Maungdaw town stepped on a mine near the border fence at the Naf river. Naung Min Thu, "Muslim youth lost leg due to mine in Maungdaw," *Narinjara News*, 3 May 2025, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews3May2025. A young woman was seriously injured by a landmine on the Myanmar side of the border when she went for a bath in a creek near border posts 42–43. Khaing Lu Hla (Yoma Myay), "A young woman lost her leg due to a mine explosion at the Bengal-Rakhine border," *Narinjara News*, 8 August 2025, bit.ly/NarinjaraNews8Aug2025.

¹³⁹ On 1 January 2024, two Rohingya farmers detonated an antipersonnel mine in Let We Det village tract on the west side of Buthidaung town in Buthidaung township. One of them lost his right leg and the other received a minor injury. On 10 January 2024, a resident of Hpon Nyo Leik village of south Buthidaung, stepped on a mine at the foot of the Kyauk Yant hill. It was allegedly laid by the 22nd Brigade of the Myanmar Army, which has a camp on the top of the hill. See, online database of ACLED.

¹⁴⁰ On 4 May 2024, one cattle smuggler was seriously injured and two others lightly injured by a mine while crossing the border. They left the cattle behind. On the following day they sent two other persons to bring the cattle, who also stepped on a mine. All five were treated in Cox's Bazar hospital. Information provided by informants to the Monitor. See also, S Bashu Das, "Bangladeshi man's leg severed as landmine explodes along Bandarban border," *Dhaka Tribune*, 3 February 2025, bit.ly/DhakaTribune3Feb2025; and "Bangladeshi man loses leg in landmine blast near Bandarban border," *Dhaka Tribune*, 8 April 2025, bit.ly/DhakaTribune8April2025.

¹⁴¹ Residents of Kyar Nyo Pyin in Buthidaung township believe landmines laid by the AA were responsible for injury and deaths in their village. They informed the Monitor that on 22 August 2024, seven Rohingya went to a hill to collect bamboo shoots and other vegetables. The hill had been occupied by the AA for the past 4–5 years. When they did not return by noon, their family went to find them. On the hill, two were found, one boy and one man. Both were badly injured by an antipersonnel mine and they had lost their eyes. As they were blind, they couldn't return. No one knows what became of the other five.

¹⁴² "Rohingya man killed, 2 Injured in landmine explosion during crab harvest in Naf River," *The Business Standard*, 8 July 2024, bit.ly/TheBusinessStandard8July2024.

¹⁴³ As of May 2024, the AA guide anyone wishing to traverse the border if they pay tax to the AA soldiers controlling the border post. A Rohingya woman, who traveled from north Buthidaung for medical treatment, told the Monitor, "My brother and I paid 20,000MMK (10,000MMK each) [US\$9.42 (\$4.71)] to the AA office near the border. They gave us a pass for one month. The AA soldiers also took us to the border point. They showed us safe passage. We reached Lambochari of Naikongchari [in Bangladesh] easily." Exchange rate for 31 May 2024: MMK1,000=US\$0.4708. Oanda, bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter.

Elephants and other animals have also been maimed by mines emplaced along this border.¹⁴⁴

NORTH KOREA

During 2023 and through to mid-2025, North Korea used antipersonnel mines inside its own territory at locations along its borders with South Korea and China, according to media reports and South Korean authorities. Such reports include:

- In June 2025, it was reported that North Korea continued to deploy troops near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) within the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to emplace mines, as well as install barriers and fencing. The construction efforts reportedly halted last winter but resumed again in the spring.¹⁴⁵
- In March 2025, the South Korean military reported multiple North Korean casualties as a result of a landmine explosion that occurred while North Korean troops were enhancing front-line fortifications.¹⁴⁶ Reports indicate that mines were laid not only along the main traffic axes but also in mountainous areas and fields, including on Arrowhead Hill where joint demining operations previously took place.¹⁴⁷
- In June 2024, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff stated during a media briefing that several explosions occurred during mine laying operations in the DMZ by North Korea, resulting in multiple casualties, but the mine laying continued despite such incidents.¹⁴⁸
- In April 2024, North Korean soldiers were observed laying landmines on the three roads through the DMZ; and, in May 2024, it was reported that North Korea was emplacing mines not only along the anticipated invasion route but also in adjacent mountains and fields along the northern edge of the MDL.¹⁴⁹
- In January 2024, it was reported that North Korean soldiers were observed emplacing landmines around guard posts adjacent to the cross-border rail line since early December 2023.¹⁵⁰

In July 2024, South Korea's Minister of Defense Shin Won-sik warned that antipersonnel mines laid by North Korean forces would flow into South Korea due to heavy rain.¹⁵¹ The South Korean military also stated that some of the antipersonnel mines laid by North Korea had already been swept away from their original placement by monsoon rains.¹⁵² On 21 July 2024, South Korea recommenced loudspeaker broadcasts near the border, calling attention to North Korea's new use of antipersonnel mines in frontline areas.¹⁵³ South Korean television

144 "Wild elephant's ankle blown off by Arakan Army landmine in Naikyangchhari," *BD Digest*, 12 August 2025, bit.ly/BDDigest12Aug2025.

145 Chae Yun-hwan, "S. Korea says N. Korea notified U.N. Command of fortification plans inside DMZ," *Yonhap News Agency*, 30 June 2025, bit.ly/YonhapNewsAgency30June2025.

146 Jooheon Kim and Joon Ha Park, "North Korean troops suffer multiple casualties in border landmine explosion: ROK," *NK News*, 27 March 2025, bit.ly/NKNews27March2025.

147 Emails from Soohong Eum, Peace Sharing Association (PSA), 29 April and 18 May 2024.

148 Kim Arin, "Landmines kill, hurt North Korean soldiers deployed for 'barren border' project," *The Korea Herald*, 18 June 2024, bit.ly/KoreaHerald18June2024.

149 "Official: N. Korea Has Been Laying Landmines North of MDL since April," *KBS World*, 17 May 2024, bit.ly/KBSWorld17May2024.

150 "North Korea redeploys landmine near Gyeongui Line," *The Dong-A Ilbo*, 5 January 2024, bit.ly/DongA5Jan2024.

151 Lee Minji, "Military warns against N. Korean land mines washing into South amid heavy downpours," *Yonhap News Agency*, 17 July 2024, bit.ly/YonhapNewsAgency17July2024. Of specific concern is a North Korean-made plastic antipersonnel landmine that is camouflaged into the shape of a leaf and roughly the size of a mobile phone.

152 "Military Calls for Caution after N. Korea's Land Mines Swept Away in Monsoon Rain," *KBS World*, 17 July 2024, bit.ly/KBSWorld17July2024.

153 "S. Korea Conducts Full-Scale Propaganda Broadcasts for Second Day," *KBS World*, 22 July 2024, bit.ly/KBSWorld22July2024.

broadcasts warned the public of the danger and showed images of two types of North Korean-made antipersonnel mines.¹⁵⁴

Antipersonnel mines have also been reportedly laid by North Korean forces since 2023 along the country's border with China. In 2024, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines shared information about North Korea laying new mines along North Korea's border with China to prevent defections and smuggling.¹⁵⁵ In August 2024, authorities in Changbai in China's Jilin province, which borders North Korea's Ryanggang province, warned residents to "not go near the river and report immediately if you see any suspicious objects." A Chinese border patrol official told the media about the potential danger posed by landmines shifting from their original locations.¹⁵⁶

USE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in at least four states—State Party Colombia and states not party India, Myanmar, and Pakistan—and by groups in or bordering the Sahel region, including in States Parties Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo.

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.¹⁵⁷ The exact number is difficult to determine as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. However, there were no new declarations to not use antipersonnel mines by NSAGs from January 2024 through October 2025.

COLOMBIA

Dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP or FARC), National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), Popular Liberation Army (El Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL), and other NSAGs in Colombia continued to use antipersonnel landmines in the reporting period.

According to the official government database, in 2024, a total of 1,007 incidents of mine use were recorded in Colombia, a 13% increase from 2023. The vast majority of mine use incidents, 708, were attributed to FARC dissidents, 164 incidents to the ELN, 48 to unidentified organized armed groups (grupos armados organizados, GAOs), eight to criminal groups, and two incidents to organized armed group Clan del Golfo. There was insufficient evidence to attribute the remaining 77 incidents.¹⁵⁸

During the first seven months of 2025, a total of 788 mine incidents were recorded: 529 were attributed to FARC dissidents, 157 to the ELN, 53 to unidentified GAOs, five to criminal groups, five to another unidentified group, three to Clan del Golfo, one incident to GAO Comuneros del Sur, and one to another guerrilla group. There was insufficient information to attribute responsibility to a specific group for 34 incidents.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁴ "S. Korea warns of potential N. Korean mines flowing into south amid heavy rain," *Arirang TV News*, YouTube. com, 17 July 2024, bit.ly/ArirangTVNews17July2024.

¹⁵⁵ Emails from Soohong Eum, PSA, 29 April, 18 May, 27 May, 18 June, and 17 July 2024.

¹⁵⁶ "Chinese authorities warn of possible North Korean landmine displacement due to floods, notify residents 'Do not go to the riverbank,'" *Asia Press*, 13 August 2024, bit.ly/AsiaPress13Aug2024.

¹⁵⁷ Of these, 48 non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have committed not to use mines through signing the Geneva Call *Deed of Commitment for Adherence to a total Ban on Anti-personnel Mines and for Cooperation in Mine Action*; 20 by self-declaration; four by the Rebel Declaration (two have signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Geneva Call *Deed of Commitment*); and two through a peace accord (in Colombia and Nepal).

¹⁵⁸ Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, sourced from the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) database of events by MAP/MUSE, bit.ly/ColombiaDatabaseAPM, accessed 5 October 2025.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

In August 2024, the Colombian Army reported that it had destroyed 3,958 antipersonnel mines since January 2024, and that FARC dissidents were responsible for laying 91% of the mines that had been destroyed.¹⁶⁰

INDIA

NSAGs affiliated with the Maoist insurgency in India continue to use improvised antipersonnel landmines. There were continuing reports of use of pressure plate improvised antipersonnel mines in 2024 through mid-2025 by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M) and its People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). The CPI-M had previously issued warnings of mined areas and admitted responsibility for a landmine that killed a villager.¹⁶¹ In prior years, most casualties had occurred in the Indian state of Chhattisgarh, however, in late 2024 and early 2025, casualties attributed to CPI-M improvised antipersonnel mine use were also reported in Jharkhand, Odisha, and Telangana.¹⁶² The Monitor has attributed civilian casualties to CPI-M improvised antipersonnel mine use every year since 2009.

Between May and July 2024, landmines attributed to Burmese insurgents laid on the India-Myanmar border have claimed victims in some villages in Manipur state.¹⁶³ In July 2024, an officer of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (IM faction) was killed and two others injured by an improvised antipersonnel landmine near the India-Myanmar border at new pillars 89, 90, and 91, allegedly laid by the Kuki National Army (Burma), an NSAG in the Sagaing region of Myanmar.¹⁶⁴

MYANMAR

Ethnic armed groups have engaged in conflict with the central authorities in Myanmar for decades and Landmine Monitor has documented mine use by such groups for more than 25 years. Several militias sanctioned by the Myanmar Armed Forces, including Pyusawhti, the People's Militia Forces (PMF), and the Border Guard Forces (BGF), act under the military's direction and sometimes independently.

Since the military coup in February 2021, more local anti-military resistance groups have been established, some of which identify as PDF. PDF groups often declare allegiance to the National Unity Government (NUG).¹⁶⁵ Local media often report the use of "landmines" by such groups. Many of these devices are command-detonated roadside bombs, but some are victim-activated landmines.

160 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP or FARC) dissidents are reported to be responsible for 91% of the antipersonnel mines installed in Colombia during 2024, highlighting the ongoing threat posed by these groups to civilian safety and security. Lina Muñoz Medina, "Dissidents of the FARC would be responsible for 91% of antipersonnel mines installed during 2024 in Colombia," *Infobae*, 13 August 2024, bit.ly/Infobae13Aug2024; and General Command of the Colombian Military Forces press release, "6,942 terrorist actions have been neutralized by the National Army," 13 August 2024, bit.ly/ColombiaMilitary13Aug2024.

161 "Maoists regret death of villager in landmine explosion," *Telangana Today*, 6 June 2024, bit.ly/TelanganaToday6June2024; and "Maoists 'impose' 12 hr curfew in Jharkhand's Kolhan," *WebIndia123*, 18 January 2023, bit.ly/WebIndia18January2023.

162 Swati, "Landmine explodes in Saranda of Sundargarh, 1 villager killed," *Kalinga TV*, 1 June 2025, bit.ly/KalingaTV1June2025; "Narrow Escape For Tribal Man As Maoists Trigger Blast In Telangana," *ETV Bharat*, 6 January 2025, bit.ly/ETVBharat6Jan2025; and Amit Bhelari, "Naxal bomb kills seven-year-old girl in Jharkhand's Chaibasa," *The Hindu*, 7 January 2025, bit.ly/TheHindu7Jan2025.

163 "Landmines kill, maim many on Indo-Myanmar border," *The Sangai Express*, 2 August 2024, bit.ly/SangaiExpress2Aug2024. See also, online database of ACLED.

164 "Another Naga Armyman loses life as NSCN (IM) – KNA (B) tension intensifies," *Mokokchung Times*, 25 July 2024, bit.ly/MokokchungTimes25July2024; and "NSCN (IM) man killed at border," *The Sangai Express*, 25 July 2024, bit.ly/TheSangaiExpress25July2024.

165 As of May 2023, the NUG claimed that there were over 300 People's Defence Forces (PDF) groups organized in 250 townships across Myanmar. The exact figure is difficult to verify. See, "The PDF has established 300 battalions and columns in 2 years," *People's Spring*, 5 May 2023, bit.ly/PeoplesSpring5May2023.

Given the number and variety of NSAGs operating in Myanmar, it is often difficult to assign responsibility for use to a specific NSAG. Yet many have used mines since the Monitor started reporting in 1999.¹⁶⁶ The military frequently claims civilians have been killed or injured by mines laid by anti-military groups.¹⁶⁷

The Monitor has reviewed the following incidents attributed to NSAGs in the second half of 2024 and through August 2025:

- In June 2025, use of antipersonnel landmines by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army led to a civilian casualty in Hpa-an township in Kayin state.¹⁶⁸
- On 15 April 2025, in Salin township, Magway region, several soldiers were injured in a minefield emplaced by an NSAG.¹⁶⁹
- Between April–June 2025, local villagers reported that mines had been laid in the area by the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Karen National Defense Organization.¹⁷⁰
- In January 2025, the KNLA laid mines on the Ler Kwel road in Hpapun township in Kayin state that resulted in the death of one Buddhist monk and injury of another. The KNLA had previously issued verbal warnings to local villagers.¹⁷¹
- In November 2024, local groups alleged that the AA planted new mines on paths near the border between Bangladesh and Myanmar.¹⁷²
- On 29 August 2024, one villager was injured and another died from landmines that locals said were laid by the PDF in Yay Pya village tract, Kyaukkyi township, Bago region.¹⁷³

An increasing number of incidents involving explosive devices planted on berms of roadways, and then triggered by motor scooters, were attributed to resistance groups. The devices were likely antipersonnel mines, as these incidents almost always involved injury rather than death.¹⁷⁴

¹⁶⁶ On 15 October 2015, eight ethnic armed groups signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) with the national government, committing to “end planting of mines” and “cooperate on the process of clearing all landmines.” Since the February 2021 military coup, this commitment no longer appears to be operational.

¹⁶⁷ See, for example, “Innocent Civilian Injured After Stepping on Land Mine Planted by Terrorist Group in Hsihseng Township of Shan State,” *Myanmar National News*, 30 August 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarNationalNews30Aug2025, in which authorities attributed an injury of a woman foraging in the forest to an NSAG; and “Innocent Civilian Injured After Stepping on Land Mine Planted by So-Called PDF Terrorist Group in Salin Township, Magway Region,” *Myanmar National News*, 13 July 2025, bit.ly/MyanmarNationalNews13July2025. In January 2025 the Myanmar Police Force stated that a man was injured by a mine left by a PDF in Kyauktaga township in Bago region. “Explosion near Zeegone Village injures local man in Kyauktaga,” *Eleven News*, 7 January 2025, bit.ly/ElevenNews7Jan2025.

¹⁶⁸ Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG), “KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2024–August 2025,” 12 September 2025.

¹⁶⁹ On 15 April 2025, in Salin township, Magway region, a military column from the IB-235 stepped on mines planted by the Peacock Brother Urban Guerrilla. See, online database of ACLED.

¹⁷⁰ KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2024–August 2025,” 12 September 2025. For personal security, villagers did not detail the exact communities in which the mines were laid.

¹⁷¹ KHRG, “Mu Traw District Short Update: A landmine explosion killed one monk and left another injured in Bu Tho Township (January 2025),” 25 April 2025, bit.ly/KHRG25April2025.

¹⁷² “Elderly man loses leg in landmine explosion near Bangladesh-Myanmar border,” *Dhaka Tribune*, 8 November 2024, bit.ly/DhakaTribune8Nov2024.

¹⁷³ KHRG, “KHRG Submission to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), August 2023–August 2024,” 22 September 2024.

¹⁷⁴ The Monitor recorded 91 incidents in Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, and Thanintharyi regions, as well as in Chin, Kachin, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan states.

The Monitor continued to record incidents in 2024 and early 2025 involving the use of victim-activated booby-traps or explosive devices in urban areas. Most of these mine victims were engaged in trash collection or searching rubbish for something to sell.¹⁷⁵

PAKISTAN

ICBL local campaign partner, the Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO), stated that from mid-2024 to mid-2025 there was a significant increase in landmines and IED-related incidents compared to previous years due to a rise in insurgent activities.¹⁷⁶ In 2024 and early 2025, as in previous years, military personnel and civilians were killed or injured in incidents resulting from new landmine use, but media articles consistently failed to identify which groups laid these mines. In the first half of 2025, local media reported incidents in which civilians became landmine victims while going about ordinary tasks in areas they regularly frequent in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan provinces.¹⁷⁷

In early 2025 and 2024, several people were killed by landmines allegedly laid by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in KPK or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).¹⁷⁸ But most incidents involving mines remain unclear as to when and by whom these explosives were laid.¹⁷⁹

IMPROVISED ANTI PERSONNEL MINE USE IN THE SAHEL REGION

NSAGs have used victim-activated improvised explosive devices in 2024 and 2025 in States Parties located in and around Africa's Sahel region, but it is challenging to document such use and confirm if the devices were victim-activated. Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin



Cambodian Floating Lantern Ceremony (Bandaet Prateep) during the Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap, Cambodia. The ceremony aims to drive away sorrow and misfortune.

© ICBL, November 2024

¹⁷⁵ The Monitor recorded at least 31 injuries or deaths among trash collectors or scavengers in towns in the Sagaing, Tanintharyi, and Yangon regions and in Shan state between January and December 2024.

¹⁷⁶ Email from Raza Shah Khan, Chief Executive, Sustainable Peace and Development Organization (SPADO), 12 September 2025. A total of 43 incidents were attributed to antipersonnel landmines in 2024, compared to 22 in 2023 and five in 2022.

¹⁷⁷ These media reports do not state when the explosive device was placed there, but as the people were undertaking activities in areas they were known to frequent, use appeared recent. See, for example, "Four killed in Kurram landmine explosions," *Dawn*, 26 June 2025, bit.ly/Dawn26June2025; "Landmine kills shepherd in Waziristan," *The News International*, 14 May 2025, bit.ly/TheNewsInternational14May2025; Mohammad Zafar Baloch, "One killed in Kohlu landmine blast," *The News International*, 16 April 2025, bit.ly/TheNewsInternational16April2025; and "Man, daughter injured in Kurram 'landmine' blast," *The News International*, 15 February 2025, bit.ly/TheNewsInternational15Feb2025.

¹⁷⁸ All the following incidents were attributed to the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). On 22 April 2025, in the Jamalkhel Nullah area of Dossali tehsil (Dossali, North Waziristan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)), a child was critically injured when he picked up an object resembling a toy, which then exploded. On 26 March 2025, a landmine in Karam Girrai village of Ladha tehsil (Ladha, South Waziristan) exploded, killing a 1-year-old boy. The child was playing near his home when the explosion occurred. On 13 November 2024, a tribal man was killed when he stepped on an explosive device near his residence in Gabari area of Mamund tehsil, Bajaur, KPK. On 20 September 2024, a boy was wounded in a landmine blast while grazing cattle in the mountainous area of Saidan village in Upper South Waziristan district, KPK. See, online database of ACLED.

¹⁷⁹ An unidentified group left a landmine in a forested area of Khurram district of KPK that caused casualties after one of them stepped on the device in June 2025. Both Sunni and Shia armed groups had clashed in the area. "Landmine blast kills four in restive northwest Pakistan," *Arab News*, 25 June 2025, bit.ly/ArabNews25June2025.

(JNIM) reportedly used improvised mines in Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Togo.¹⁸⁰ Islamic State West African Province/Boko Haram (ISWAP/BH) used the devices in both Niger and Nigeria.¹⁸¹ In both the Central African Republic and Mali, deaths and injuries were attributed to victim-activated explosive devices by the Wagner Group.¹⁸² Other possible use was recorded in Cameroon and the DRC.¹⁸³ (For more information on improvised mine casualties in the Sahel region, see *Casualties* section in *The Impact chapter*.)

PRODUCTION OF ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

More than 50 states produced antipersonnel landmines at some point in the past.¹⁸⁴ As many as 40 states have ceased production, including four states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.¹⁸⁵ The Monitor removed the US from the list of producers after its June 2022 prohibition of the production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁰ **Benin:** One man was killed and a child injured in Kandi, in Alibori department in eastern Benin, on 17 April 2025, by an explosive reportedly placed alongside a road by presumed Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) militants. An explosive device attributed to JNIM killed a farmer in Materi, in Atacora department in northwestern Benin, as the farmer was returning to his field. **Burkina Faso:** A woman and a child were killed and another injured while riding a bicycle when they hit an explosive device allegedly left by the JNIM on the outskirts of Gayeri in Komandjari province on 2 May 2024. Two children were killed by an explosive device attributed to the JNIM in Tikare, Ban province of Burkina Faso, on 7 October 2024. A civilian was killed and two were injured when their three-wheeler hit an explosive device allegedly placed by JNIM in the area of Tougouri, Namentenga province, on 15 June 2025. An elephant stepped on an explosive device allegedly placed by JNIM in the village of Nohao in Boulgou province on 15 March 2025. Two civilians on motorcycles were killed by an explosive device allegedly placed by JNIM near Ouorowe town in Boucle du Mouhoun province on 8 July 2025. **Mali:** A man was killed after being hit by an explosive device allegedly placed by JNIM in the village of Sokoro-Kanda in Mopti region on 7 September 2024. A civilian aboard a cart on his way to collect wood was killed by an explosive device allegedly planted by JNIM in the village of Yawakanda, Bandiagara region, on 6 August 2025. **Togo:** All five members of a Burkinabe refugee family were killed by an explosive device allegedly planted by JNIM while traveling in a donkey cart in Tonloni, Savanes region, on 14 September 2025. See, online database of ACLED.

¹⁸¹ **Niger:** A boy died after stepping on an explosive device attributed to Islamic State West African Province/Boko Haram (ISWAP/BH) in Barwa, in Diffa region, on 24 June 2025. **Nigeria:** Two children were injured after stepping on an explosive device attributed to ISWAP/BH on a farm in the Ngirbuwa community, in Yobe state, on 24 July 2024. Three farmers were killed when one of them stepped on an explosive device attributed to ISWAP/BH in Monguno in Borno state on 10 August 2024. An IDP was injured after stepping on an explosive device attributed to ISWAP/BH while collecting firewood in Dikwa, in Borno state, on 29 November 2024. Three children were injured after stepping on an explosive device attributed to Boko Haram while going to their farm near Bassa, in Niger state, on 19 December 2024. One girl was killed and another injured after stepping on an explosive device attributed to ISWAP/BH on 29 June 2025. They lived in the Government Girls Secondary School (GGSS) IDP camp in Monguno, in Borno state. See, online database of ACLED.

¹⁸² **Central African Republic:** Two civilians were killed as they were travelling to their fields by an explosive device allegedly planted by the Wagner Group in Koumboli, in Haut-Mbomou prefecture, on 3 July 2025. One refugee was killed and two children injured while working in their fields by an explosive device attributed to the Wagner Group in Birao, Vakaga prefecture, on 15 July 2025. **Mali:** A civilian was killed by an IED planted by Wagner mercenaries in the village of Tekenkent, in Kidal region, on 13 April 2025.

¹⁸³ **Cameroon:** A woman died from injuries after stepping on an explosive device allegedly planted by Restoration Forces (Ambazonia) in Nveh, in the Lebialem division of the Southwest region, on 27 November 2024. **DRC:** A farmer died from injuries after stepping on a landmine attributed to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Eringeti in North Kivu province on 18 February 2025. Three civilians returning from their fields were injured after stepping on an explosive device attributed to the ADF near Kambau, in North Kivu province, on 5 May 2025. See, online database of ACLED.

¹⁸⁴ There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included within that list are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, the Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear whether Syria produced antipersonnel mines.

¹⁸⁵ Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are: Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Türkiye, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁸⁶ The US was previously removed from the list of producers in 2014, only to be added back on to the list in 2020 following a decision by the administration of President Donald Trump to roll back the ban on US mine production.

A total of 12 countries—all states not party—are considered producers of antipersonnel mines: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

Of these states, India, Myanmar, Russia, and South Korea appear to be actively producing or developing antipersonnel mines, including the procurement of components or other long-lead time actions. The rest are not known to be actively producing but have yet to commit to never do so in the future.¹⁸⁷

Ukraine has long stated that it “has not made and does not produce antipersonnel mines.”¹⁸⁸ Its April 2025 transparency report states that, “Ukraine did not and does not produce anti-personnel mines.”¹⁸⁹ In another section, the report states: “ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES ARE NOT PRODUCED IN UKRAINE.”¹⁹⁰

Disturbingly, information continues to emerge from Ukrainian social media sources that indicate antipersonnel mines are being fabricated by companies and individuals in Ukraine for placement by drones. There are numerous examples posted on social media illustrating that entities in Ukraine have apparently constructed drone-dropped antipersonnel mines.¹⁹¹ Social media posts by Ukrainians and pro-Ukrainian groups also suggest that at least one Ukrainian organization, which claims to receive production requests directly from the military, has mass produced antipersonnel landmines since at least January 2025.¹⁹² Another organization stated in a social media post that the US had already provided Ukraine with “anti-personnel mines for remote area mining” and that, even before the US’s decision, they had “started making anti-personnel mines themselves in their own workshop using 3D printers.” The organization further stated, “We are collecting components/ingredients to

¹⁸⁷ For example, Singapore’s only known producer, Singapore Technologies Engineering, a government-linked corporation, said in November 2015 that it “is now no longer in the business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines.” See, PAX, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 19 November 2015, bit.ly/PAXSingapore19Nov2015.

¹⁸⁸ For example, in May 2009, Ukraine said that it “did not produce APL [antipersonnel landmines] in the past, doesn’t produce at present, and will not produce them in the future.” Presentation of Ukraine, Standing Committee on Stockpile Destruction, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 25 May 2009. See also, Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), Form E.

¹⁸⁹ Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., Form F.

¹⁹¹ Roy (GrandpaRoy2), “The Russians complain that this printed Ukrainian mine dropped by drones is almost impossible to see in the grass. The lid is designed to collapse when stepped on, allowing the bolt to contact the battery to complete a circuit. An electric detonator explodes the TNT filling.” 16 September 2024, 18:30 UTC. X post, bit.ly/RoyXPost16Sept2024; and HUNGARIANua (robert_magyar), “...Miniatures from the media group of the 414th Separate Assault Brigade. Each crew of strike bombers performs typical tasks: remote mining with anti-tank and antipersonnel candies, working on planned and operational targets, delivering humanitarian cargo to friendly units, escorting deblocking and assault actions, etc.” 3 January 2025, 17:31 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/HUNGARIANuaTelegram3Jan2025.

¹⁹² PrintArmy (drukarmy), “Wing – DrukArmy’s largest initiative to help the military. Load the plastic, print – and bring victory closer! drukarmy.org.” 22 June 2025, 10:09 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/PrintArmyTelegram22June2025; In Factum (in_factum), “Remember our collection for components for 3D printing 10,000 antipersonnel mine blanks to sow the area trampled by the enemy from drones? The guys are working. The collection was originally for the pilots of ‘Aidar’, but the capacity of local production allows sharing the product with allies. Probably one of the most effective collections we have been involved in, considering the amount raised and the final product.” 9 March 2025, 12:21 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/InFactTelegram9Mar2025; In Factum (in_factum), “Bazookas, there are 20 thousand left to collect here. The amount needed for the armor plates has been withdrawn from the bank. They are already with our fighter. The report will be out soon. Currently, we are collecting strictly for 100 kg of shrapnel, which will be wrapped around charges for dropping on the Russians. To give you an idea, 100 kg is enough for almost two hundred damn antipersonnel mines, which Russian assault groups will definitely appreciate. Throw in 10 hryvnias each, gentlemen.” 13 April 2024, 22:29 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/InFactTelegram13April2024; and In Factum (in_factum), “Gentlemen, I remind you that we are raising funds for a large-scale project to produce 10,000 antipersonnel mines. This is even more than what some countries participating in the ‘Ramstein’ format have supplied us. We need to collect another 63 thousand hryvnias! After which the project will go into practical implementation. 3D printers will work at full capacity, and the area will be mined on an unprecedented scale.” 5 December 2024, 14:10 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/InFactTelegram5Dec2024.

produce 10,000 anti-personnel mines for drone drops,” adding that “these mines are not equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.”¹⁹³

Additionally, some politicians and officials from States Parties presently in the process of withdrawing from the Mine Ban Treaty have made public statements of their intent to restart their production, particularly in past-producers Finland and Poland. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania also stated their intent to acquire new stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.¹⁹⁴

Russia continues to research, develop, and produce both antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines.¹⁹⁵ Some of the new landmine types were first seen publicly during annual military exercises in 2021, including POM-3 rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines, which had been in development since at least 2015.¹⁹⁶ Russia also tested newly developed antivehicle mines in 2021, such as the PTKM-1R mine.¹⁹⁷ Russian forces are also modifying landmines for deployment by drones.¹⁹⁸

Markings on some of the landmines used by Russia in Ukraine since February 2022 indicate that they were manufactured as recently as 2021, including POM-3 antipersonnel mines.¹⁹⁹ Another antipersonnel mine used in Ukraine by Russia is the PMN-4 blast mine,

¹⁹³ In Factum (in_factum), “While the US dared to give us antipersonnel mines for remote mining of the area, I remind you that the ‘Aydarites’ did not wait for the White House’s decision. And they began to rivet antipersonnel mines themselves in their own workshop on 3D printers in order to sow all approaches to our infantry positions. We are collecting components/ingredients from which 10,000 antipersonnel mines for dropping from drones will be made. It is important that the mine looks small, and therefore inconspicuous. But if a Russian steps on it, the Russian will no longer be able to walk. Because there will be nothing to do. And we also do not listen to the ‘important’ opinions of Greta and all kinds of activists from Greenpeace to Amnesty International, and therefore these mines are not equipped with a self-destruct mechanism.” 3 December 2024, 12:04 UTC. Telegram, bit.ly/lnFactTelegram3Dec2024.

¹⁹⁴ Andrius Sytas and Anne Kauranen, “Exclusive: Finland and Lithuania set to produce anti-personnel mines, officials say,” *Reuters*, 9 July 2025, bit.ly/Reuters9July2025; and Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Poland eyes 1 million landmines for borders with Belarus, Russia,” *Defense News*, 20 March 2025, bit.ly/DefenseNews20March2025.

¹⁹⁵ In 2004, Russia said that it had spent or planned to spend RUB3.33 billion (US\$115.62 million) on research, development, and production of newly engineered munitions, including alternatives to antipersonnel mines. Statement by Sergei Ivanov, Russian Minister of Defense, Parliamentary hearings on ratification of CCW Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004. Average exchange rate for 2004: RUB1=US\$0.03472. Oanda, bit.ly/OandaCurrencyConverter.

¹⁹⁶ Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” *Izvestia*, 6 September 2021, bit.ly/Izvestia6Sept2021. In 2015, the POM-3 mine’s design engineers claimed that the seismically activated POM-3 would be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians as it is activated by a sensor that detects the footfall of an individual, characterizes it against known signatures, and fires its warhead into the air. Directors Igor Smirnov and Mikhail Zhukov of the Scientific Research Institute of Engineering’s Department of Munitions, Mining, and Demining, interviewed on *Zvezda TV*, 20 November 2015, cited in “Russia Develops Landmine With ‘Electronic Brain,” *Defense World*, 20 November 2015, bit.ly/DefenseWorld20November2015. See also, “Perspective Anti-Personnel Mine POM-3 ‘Medallion,” *Military Review*, 30 November 2015, bit.ly/MilitaryReview30Nov2015.

¹⁹⁷ Landmine delivery systems Zemledeliye and UMZ-K Klesh-G, as well as antivehicle mine PTKM-1R. See, Rob Lee (RALee85), “UMZ-K Klesh-G and Zemledeliye minelayers at the Mulino training area.” 31 July 2021, 20:53 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/RobLeeTweet31July2021; and Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” *Izvestia*, 6 September 2021, bit.ly/Izvestia6Sept2021.

¹⁹⁸ Frederic Gras (fredgrs), “Remote mining with a drone. It is made on the basis of a POM-2 mine (without a cup), a rotating mechanism and a stabilizer printed on a 3D printer.” 4 November 2023, 16:12 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetFredericGras4Nov2023; Frederic Gras (fredgrs), “In the locally made series, PTM 3 launched using PG motor Rocket.” 24 September 2023, 13:37 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetFredericGras24Sept2023; and Rob Lee (RALee85), “Video about engineers from Russia’s 1st Tank Army who are using UAVs to emplace POM, PMN-4, PTM-3, and PTM-4 mines.” 12 December 2023, 20:33 UTC. X post, bit.ly/TweetRobLee12Dec2023.

¹⁹⁹ The POM-3 mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. Collective Awareness to UXO, “POM-3 Landmine: Description,” undated, bit.ly/POM-3Landmine; and HRW, “Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines,” 29 March 2022, bit.ly/HRWRussia29March2022.

developed and produced in the early 1990s, after Ukraine achieved its independence.²⁰⁰ Ukrainian forces also displayed a new directional fragmentation Claymore-type mine, called MOB, in October 2022, which they claimed to have captured from Russian forces.²⁰¹

In August 2020, India announced plans to increase domestic production of antipersonnel mines and end their importation.²⁰² The Indian Armed Forces reportedly received the first of 700,000 domestically produced “Nipun” antipersonnel blast mines at the end of 2021, which were designed to replace the M-14 antipersonnel mine.²⁰³ At least two other mines are reportedly under development, including “Ulka,” a bounding fragmentation antipersonnel mine and “Parth,” a directional antipersonnel landmine.²⁰⁴

Munitions India Limited has produced the M-14 and M-16 antipersonnel mines, which are copies of earlier US designs.²⁰⁵ Tender records retrieved from a publicly accessible online government procurement database from 2016–2023 show that Munitions India Limited has listed tenders for components of M-14, M-16, and APER-1B antipersonnel landmines.²⁰⁶ Components produced under these contracts have previously been supplied to Ammunition Factory Khadki and Ordnance Factory Chandrapur in Maharashtra state, and to Ordnance Factory Dum Dum in West Bengal state.²⁰⁷ However new production tenders for late 2024 and early 2025 did not indicate long-lead time items to supply further production activity.²⁰⁸

200 Collective Awareness to UXO, “PMN-4 Landmine: Description,” undated, bit.ly/PMN-4LandmineDescription.

201 Polymarket Intel (PolymarketIntel), “#Ukraine: A previously unseen Russian MOB AP directional mine was captured by the AFU [Armed Forces of Ukraine]. Apparently, this type is modular - up to 3 units can be connected to each other. They can also be fitted with additional preformed fragmentation blocks and various aiming and mounting devices.” 3 October 2022, 12:19 UTC. Tweet, bit.ly/TweetPolymarketIntel3Oct2022.

202 Rajat Pandit, “India announces progressive arms embargo list in a bid to boost domestic defense production,” *The Times of India*, 10 August 2020, bit.ly/TimesOfIndia10Aug2020.

203 Shankhyaneel Sarkar, “Nipun anti-personnel mines: Army gets weapons boost for Pakistan, China borders,” *Hindustan Times*, 21 December 2021, bit.ly/HindustanTimes21Dec2021.

204 “New Family of Munitions (NFM),” *Bharat Rakshak*, 19 January 2020, bit.ly/BharatRakshak19Jan2020. Also detailed are three new models of antivehicle mines.

205 Email reply from Ordnance Factory Board, India Ministry of Defence, to Right to Information Request made by Control Arms Foundation of India, 5 May 2011.

206 The Monitor has reviewed annually the listing on Munitions India Limited/Indian Ordnance Factories BidAssist website (previously the e-Procurement website, titled “current contracts”). BidAssist provides a tender number, opening and closing dates, and a detailed description of the item to be manufactured. Contracts have been concluded with Ordnance Factories in Maharashtra or West Bengal, where mines are assembled with components from private companies. The site shows a tender awarded to Munitions India Limited for components for M-14 mines in September 2023, which was to run until March 2024. See, BidAssist website, bit.ly/IndiaBidAssistTenders.

207 The following companies were previously listed as having contracts listed for production of components of antipersonnel mines on the Indian Ordnance Factories Purchase Orders webpage, between October 2016 and November 2017: Sheth & Co., Supreme Industries Ltd., Pratap Brothers, Brahm Steel Industries, M/s Lords Vanjya Pvt. Ltd., Sandeep Metalkraft Pvt Ltd., Milan Steel, Prakash Machine Tools, Sewa Enterprises, Naveen Tools Mfg. Co. Pvt. Ltd., Shyam Udyog, and Dhruv Containers Pvt. Ltd. See, Indian Ordnance Factories website, bit.ly/IndianOrdnanceFactoriesPurchaseOrders. In addition, the following companies had established contracts for the manufacture of mine components: Ashoka Industries, Alcast, Nityanand Udyog Pvt. Ltd., Miltech Industries, Asha Industries, and Sneh Engineering Works. Mine types indicated were either M-14, M-16, APERS 1B, or “APM” [antipersonnel] mines. Information obtained from searching Indian Ordnance Factories webpage, “List of Registered Vendors,” undated, bit.ly/IndianOrdnanceFactoriesPortal2020.

208 The Monitor reviewed the tender listings from June 2024–June 2025 on the Indian government’s BidAssist website (previously the e-Procurement website, titled “current contracts”). BidAssist provides a tender number, opening and closing dates, and a detailed description of the item to be manufactured. Since mid-2024 there have been several tenders for dummy mines, including Pakistani and Chinese antipersonnel landmine models.

According to the Ministry of National Defense of South Korea, no defense company in South Korea produced antipersonnel landmines in 2020–2023.²⁰⁹ In 2019, South Korea informed the ICBL that it had not produced any antipersonnel landmines in the previous five years.²¹⁰ However, when asked the same question in 2025, Ministry of Defense officials did not reply, unlike in previous years.²¹¹

In October 2024, a display of Area Denial Artillery Munition (ADAM) antipersonnel mines by Korea Defense Industry (KDI) was seen at the Korea Army International Defense Industry Exhibition.²¹² According to the budget of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA), this antipersonnel mine is currently under exploratory development and is slated to go into mass production in 2030–2031.²¹³ KDI is a company that opened in 2020. On its website, it advertises “155mm FASCAM (Family of Scatterable Mines),” which it describes as “a weapon system that fires 155mm shells loaded with anti-personnel [munitions] to maximize the area denial.”²¹⁴ It is unclear if any orders for this weapon have been received.

The last known production of antipersonnel landmines in South Korea was in 2011, when a South Korean company, Hanwha Corporation, manufactured 4,000 KM74 antipersonnel mines.²¹⁵ In 2007, Hanwha Corporation produced about 10,000 self-destructing antipersonnel mines, as well as an unknown quantity of Claymore directional fragmentation mines.²¹⁶

NSAGs have produced improvised mines that are victim-activated in Colombia, Egypt, Palestine (Gaza), India, Myanmar, and Yemen.²¹⁷

In Gaza, the Al-Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, have manufactured and used an antipersonnel mine called Al-Qaffaza, which translates to “the glove.”²¹⁸ Upon activation, an expelling charge propels the mine roughly one meter into the air before it detonates, with a reported casualty-producing radius of 100 meters.²¹⁹ The mine can be victim-activated or command-detonated.

²⁰⁹ Response from Yoon Dong-han, Ammunition Program Team, Firepower Program Department, Current Capabilities Program Agency, Defense Acquisition Program Administration, South Korea Ministry of National Defense, to an Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, 1 May 2024; and previous responses to Official Information Disclosure Requests from Yoon Hwa-sook, Ammunition Program Team, Firepower Program Department, Current Capabilities Program Agency, Defense Acquisition Program Administration, South Korea Ministry of National Defense, 31 May 2023; from Yoo Ji-hyun, Arms Control Division, North Korea Policy Bureau, South Korea Ministry of National Defense, 26 May 2022; and from Choi Kyeong-yeon, Senior Manager, Firepower Program Department, Defense Acquisition Program Administration, South Korea Ministry of National Defense, 31 March 2021.

²¹⁰ Email from Soonhee Choi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in Geneva, 22 August 2019.

²¹¹ Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, May 2025.

²¹² Email from Jeewoo Yeo, Researcher, World Without War, 25 June 2025. Some sources call this type Artillery Delivered Antipersonnel Mine (ADAM).

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ See, Korea Defense Industry (KDI) website, bit.ly/KDInd155mmFASCAM.

²¹⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Il Jae Lee, Second Secretary, Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division, South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 4 April 2012. The KM74 mine is a copy of the US-made M74 self-destructing mine.

²¹⁶ ICBL, *Landmine Monitor Report 2008: Toward a Mine-Free World* (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2008), p. 876, bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports. South Korea began producing remotely delivered self-destructing antipersonnel mines in 2006. South Korea has produced two types of Claymore mines, designated KM18A1 and K440. South Korean officials have stated that the country only produces the devices in command-detonated mode, which is lawful under the Mine Ban Treaty, and not with tripwires, which would be prohibited.

²¹⁷ Previous lists of states with NSAG producers have included Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, and Tunisia. Low-level production of victim-activated IEDs by Islamist groups in the Sahel, and in some other regions, is suspected.

²¹⁸ “Exclusive Report of Qassam Brigades [Hamas] members Booby-Trapping A Tunnel in Gaza,” *Al Jazeera*, 29 April 2024, bit.ly/AlJazeera29Apr2024.

²¹⁹ Email from Steve Cox, Fenix Insight, 3 July 2024; and Fenix Insight, “Al-Qaffaza,” undated, bit.ly/FenixInsightAl-Qaffaza.

TRANSFERS OF ANTIPEOPLE MINES

A *de facto* global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel landmines has been in effect since the mid-1990s, which was attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty.

However, as requested by State Party Ukraine, the US announced the transfer of antipersonnel landmines to Ukraine on 24 November 2024.²²⁰ A second transfer was announced on 2 December 2024.²²¹ The types and quantities of mines transferred have not been disclosed. This transaction superseded the 23 October 1992 export moratorium by which the US prohibited the export of antipersonnel landmines—a policy that was extended multiple times.²²²

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy welcomed the transfers stating, “The United States has announced a new support package worth \$275 million. It includes drones, ammunition for HIMARS [high mobility artillery rocket systems] and artillery, and—critically—essential mines to stop Russian assaults. This will significantly strengthen our troops on the front lines.”²²³

At least 29 countries and the EU have expressed concern about the US transfers of antipersonnel landmines to Ukraine.²²⁴ The US decision came five days before the opening of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap, Cambodia, on 25–29 November 2024. During the conference, more than two dozen states made a joint statement expressing “deep concern” over “recent announcements regarding the transfer of anti-personnel mines.”²²⁵

The ICBL has condemned the US decision to transfer antipersonnel mines as has the US Campaign to Ban Landmines and more than a dozen member organizations, including mine clearance operators Danish Refugee Council, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Humanity & Inclusion (HI), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).²²⁶ The ICBL also held a “silent protest” against the transfers on 26 November 2024 at the Mine Ban Treaty’s Fifth Review Conference.²²⁷

²²⁰ US Department of State press release, “The United States Announces Significant New Military Assistance for Ukraine,” 20 November 2024, bit.ly/USDOS-Ukraine20Nov2024. See also, US Secretary of Defense Austin’s response to the question “Why is the US providing anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine now? And is it part of the PDA today?” during a press briefing in Lao PDR. “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Holds an On-Camera, On-the-Record Press Briefing in Laos,” 20 November 2024, bit.ly/USPressBriefing20Nov2024.

²²¹ US Department of Defense press release, “Biden Administration Announces Additional Security Assistance for Ukraine,” 2 December 2024, bit.ly/USPressRelease2Dec2024.

²²² See, HRW, “Q&A: US Antipersonnel Landmine Transfers,” 13 December 2024, bit.ly/HRW13Dec2024.

²²³ Volodymyr Zelenskyy (ZelenskyyUa), “The United States has announced a new support package worth \$275 million. It includes drones, ammunition for HIMARS and artillery, and—critically—essential mines to stop Russian assaults. This will significantly strengthen our troops on the front lines. This marks the 70th defense package from the United States. Ukraine deeply values the bipartisan support from America and the decision of President Biden. We are grateful for standing with us.” 20 November 2024, 19:09 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostVolodymyrZelenskyy20Nov2024.

²²⁴ Algeria, Angola, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, The Gambia, Germany, France, Holy See, Ireland, Jordan, Lesotho, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, and Switzerland.

²²⁵ Statement delivered by New Zealand on behalf of Algeria, Angola, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, The Gambia, Holy See, Ireland, Jordan, Lesotho, Mexico, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Palestine, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, and Switzerland, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 29 November 2024, bit.ly/JointStatement29Nov2024.

²²⁶ ICBL, “International Campaign to Ban Landmines Condemns US Decision to Transfer Antipersonnel Landmines to Ukraine,” 20 November 2024, bit.ly/ICBL20Nov2024; Danish Refugee Council, “DRC condemns the USA’s approval of transfer of anti-personnel mines to Ukraine,” 25 November 2024, bit.ly/DanishRefugeeCouncil25Nov2024; Mines Advisory Group (MAG), “MAG statement on the decision by the US Government to provide anti-personnel landmines to Ukraine,” 20 November 2024, bit.ly/MAGStatement20Nov2024; Humanity & Inclusion (HI), “Transfer of U.S. antipersonnel landmines to Ukraine puts civilians at risk,” 20 November 2024, bit.ly/HI-USTransfer20Nov2024; and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), “American transfer of anti-personnel mines to Ukraine is illegal and must be reversed,” 20 November 2024, bit.ly/NPA-USTransfer20Nov2024.

²²⁷ “Landmine victims gather to protest US decision to supply Ukraine,” France24, 26 November 2024, bit.ly/France24-26Nov2024.

In previous years, at least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted a formal moratorium on exports of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting antipersonnel mines. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting mines in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.²²⁸ As of August 2025, Iran's Ministry of Defense Export Center advertises two types of bounding fragmentation antipersonnel landmines available for export.²²⁹

Prior to the US-Ukraine transfer, the Monitor had never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing the annual Landmine Monitor report in 1999.

STOCKPILED ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

STATES NOT PARTY

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 31 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.²³⁰ In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the collective total in the stocks of states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty may be less than 50 million.²³¹

It is unclear whether all 30 states not party thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines are currently doing so. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles, which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as part of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent

Largest stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

State	Mines stockpiled
Russia	26.5 million
Pakistan	6 million (estimated)
India	4–5 million (estimated)
China	“less than” 5 million
US	3 million
Total	approximately 45 million

States not party that have stockpiled antipersonnel mines

Armenia	Kazakhstan	Nepal
Azerbaijan	Korea, North	Pakistan
Bahrain	Korea, South	Russia
China	Kyrgyzstan	Saudi Arabia
Cuba	Lao PDR	Singapore
Egypt	Lebanon	Syria
Georgia	Libya	UAE
India	Mongolia	US
Iran	Morocco	Uzbekistan
Israel	Myanmar	Vietnam

²²⁸ The Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that deminers in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-1 and YM-1-B antipersonnel mines, date-stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to the Monitor by The HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and other demining operators working in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.

²²⁹ Ministry of Defense Export Center (MINDEX), “Products,” accessed 25 August 2025, [bit.ly/MINDEXIranProducts](https://mindexiran.com/en/products).

²³⁰ State not party Micronesia has said that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.

²³¹ In 2014, China informed the Monitor that its stockpile was “less than” five million, though there is a degree of uncertainty about the method China used to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, an estimate by the Monitor indicated that China had 110 million antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.

years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

Some NSAGs possess stockpiles of improvised antipersonnel mines. NSAGs in Myanmar now possess a very large quantity of antipersonnel landmines seized through military operations since the 2021 military coup.²³²

STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION BY STATES PARTIES

Of the 166 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 161 do not stockpile antipersonnel mines.²³³ This includes 94 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, collectively destroying more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. Sri Lanka was the last State Party to complete its obligation to destroy its stocks in October 2021.²³⁴

Another 67 States Parties have confirmed that they never possessed antipersonnel mines, except for, in some cases, training in detection and clearance techniques. While not thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines, the Marshall Islands and Tonga will need to confirm their status in their initial transparency report. Tuvalu is also not expected to have stocks of antipersonnel mines, but it has not yet provided its initial Article 7 report—due by 28 August 2012—to formally confirm that it has no stockpile.²³⁵

Two States Parties presently possess a combined total of 3.6 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3,364,433) and Greece (261,347).

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines. Greece had an initial deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine's deadline was 1 June 2010.²³⁶

Greece initially reported a stockpile of 1,568,167 mines in 2013 that it has been progressively destroying despite numerous challenges and setbacks. In May 2023, Greece signed an agreement with a Croatian company to destroy the remaining stocks. It transferred 8,475 mines to Croatia for destruction in 2023.²³⁷ In its Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2024, Greece reported that it had 261,347 antipersonnel mines

²³² In 2023, 2024, and early 2025, multiple NSAGs seized or captured antipersonnel mines from the Myanmar Armed Forces in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states, and in the Magway, Sagaing, and Tanintharyi regions. Between January 2022 and September 2025—through a non-exhaustive survey of media reports and photographs—Mine Free Myanmar found more than 60 instances of mines being captured from the Myanmar Armed Forces, amounting to hundreds of antipersonnel mines of types MM1, MM2, MM5, and MM6. See, Mine Free Myanmar, “More antipersonnel landmines captured by anti-military groups,” 21 August 2025, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar21Aug2025; Mine Free Myanmar, “More antipersonnel landmines seized by armed groups during first 3 months of 2024,” 1 June 2024, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar1June2024; and Mine Free Myanmar, “Myanmar Armed Forces consistently using antipersonnel landmines over the past 18 months,” 9 June 2023, bit.ly/MineFreeMyanmar9June2023.

²³³ Data on stockpiles, retention for training and research, and destruction is based primarily on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports. The treaty's newest members, Marshall Islands and Tonga, have previously stated that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines, but have not been included in this figure as they must confirm that they have no stockpiles in their initial Article 7 report.

²³⁴ In its initial Article 7 report, submitted on 28 November 2018, Sri Lanka declared a total stockpile of 77,865 antipersonnel mines. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2020), section 3, table 2.

²³⁵ Tuvalu has not made an official declaration but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines.

²³⁶ The Oslo Action Plan urges states that have failed to meet their Article 4 deadlines to “present a time-bound plan for completion and urgently proceed with implementation as soon as possible in a transparent manner.” Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019.

²³⁷ Greece Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023); and statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, bit.ly/GreeceStatement21Jun2023.

remaining in stockpile. Greece also reported transferring 85,841 M2 mines and 20,232 M16 mines to Croatia for destruction.²³⁸ In June 2025, Greece informed States Parties that the transportation and destruction of its stockpile had been paused since the beginning of 2025 due to improvements at the Croatian company's facilities. It expected destruction to resume within a few weeks.²³⁹

Ukraine has reported destroying 3,438,948 antipersonnel landmines to date, constituting more than half of its total stocks. In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report covering calendar year 2024, Ukraine declared a stockpile of 3,364,433 antipersonnel mines, comprised of 3,363,828 PFM-series mines and 605 OZM-4 mines.²⁴⁰ This is the same quantity of antipersonnel mines that Ukraine has reported stockpiling since 2020.

The OZM-4 mines were stored in Crimea, which was seized by Russia in 2014. In June 2024, Ukraine told States Parties at the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty that “conducting an inventory and determining the actual remains of PFM-1C is not considered possible until the complete and unconditional withdrawal of all military forces of the Russian Federation from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.”²⁴¹ Ukraine has reported since April 2023 that the stockpiled antipersonnel mines stored in military warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine “will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” However, Ukraine further noted that, “if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and [after] carrying out relevant inspections.”²⁴²

MINES RETAINED FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows States Parties to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques...The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 62 States Parties retain antipersonnel landmines for training and research purposes. Finland tops the list with more than 15,000 mines, followed by Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Twenty-one more States Parties retain between 1,000 mines and 6,000 mines each.²⁴³

Thirty-eight States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines. Another 100 States Parties do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 45 states that stockpiled or retained landmines in the past.²⁴⁴ Angola reported that in 2024 it disposed of all 511 mines it was retaining due to “the weather and the poor state of conservation.”²⁴⁵

²³⁸ Greece Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Forms B and D.

²³⁹ Statement of Greece, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2025, bit.ly/GreeceStatement20June2025.

²⁴⁰ Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form B.

²⁴¹ Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 20 June 2024, bit.ly/UkraineStatement20June2024.

²⁴² Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form B; Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form B; and Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form B.

²⁴³ States retaining between 1,000 to 6,000 mines: Türkiye (5,719), Greece (5,497), Sweden (5,041), Venezuela (4,874), Belarus (4,492), Tunisia (4,282), Yemen (3,760), Croatia (3,564), Bulgaria (3,416), Serbia (3,134), Djibouti (2,996), Indonesia (2,050), Oman (1,970), Romania (1,836), Tanzania (1,780), France (1,774), Uganda (1,660), Namibia (1,634), Canada (1,474), Cambodia (1,056), and Kenya (1,020).

²⁴⁴ Tuvalu has not submitted an initial Article 7 report so is not reflected in these figures.

²⁴⁵ Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D.

In addition to those listed in the following table, the 38 States Parties each retaining fewer than 1,000 mines collectively possess a total of 13,453 mines.²⁴⁶ Ten of these states consumed a combined total of 1,714 retained antipersonnel mines in 2024.²⁴⁷ Fifteen States Parties that retain under 1,000 mines had not submitted an updated Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2024 as of August 2025.²⁴⁸

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that retain mines but are apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these states, the number of retained mines has stayed the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used. The ICBL has noted that mines retained for long periods without use for permitted purposes could amount to stockpiling, which is not permitted under the treaty.

This concern is especially pertinent given Finland's imminent withdrawal, its large remaining number of retained mines, and its expressed intention to lay mines along its border with Russia.²⁴⁹

Four States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:

- Oman (retaining more than 1,000 mines); and
- Burundi, Cabo Verde, and Togo (each retaining less than 1,000 mines).

Similar to the Oslo Action Plan (2020–2024), the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (2025–2029) requires that each State Party “annually review the number of anti-personnel mines retained for permitted purposes under Article 3 to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary, destroy as soon as possible all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number, report annually on their use and planned use and on their destruction.”²⁵⁰

States Parties agreed to Action 47, whereby the president of the Mine Ban Treaty is given a new role in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an “early warning mechanism.” Action 47 states that “should no information on implementation be submitted for two consecutive years, the President will assist and engage with the State Party concerned in cooperation with the relevant Committee.”²⁵¹

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives,

²⁴⁶ States Parties retaining under 1,000 mines for research and training: Spain (923), Belgium (911), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Mozambique (900), Honduras (826), BiH (803), Czech Republic (761), Mauritania (658), Italy (563), Japan (547), South Africa (545), Peru (482), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Guyana (360), Cyprus (357), Republic of the Congo (322), Côte d'Ivoire (290), Slovenia (199), the Netherlands (170), Suriname (150), Cabo Verde (120), Tajikistan (113), Eritrea (101), The Gambia (100), Jordan (100), Germany (81), Bhutan (66), Rwanda (65), Denmark (55), Senegal (50), Sudan (50), Ireland (41), Ecuador (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), South Sudan (8), and Burundi (4).

²⁴⁷ States Parties which retained under 1,000 mines and reported consumption of retained mines in 2024: Czech Republic (979), Angola (511), Denmark (37), the Netherlands (34), Germany (32), Ecuador (30), Mauritania (26), Belgium (23), Slovenia (20), BiH (14), and Ireland (8).

²⁴⁸ States Parties retaining less than 1,000 mines that did not submit an Article 7 report for 2024 (or where the report was not publicly available), as of August 2025: Burundi, Cabo Verde, Republic of the Congo, Cyprus, Eritrea, The Gambia, Guyana, Honduras, Italy, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Suriname, Togo, and Zambia.

²⁴⁹ “Finland to reintroduce landmines in January,” *YLE News*, 27 August 2025, bit.ly/YLENews27Aug2025; and Office of the President of the Republic of Finland, “Statement by President of the Republic of Finland Alexander Stubb on withdrawal from the Ottawa Convention,” 4 July 2025, bit.ly/AlexanderStubbStatement4July2025.

²⁵⁰ Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 28 November 2024, Action 16, bit.ly/SRAAPdraft28Nov2024; and Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, Action 16, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019.

²⁵¹ Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 28 November 2024, Action 47, bit.ly/SRAAPdraft28Nov2024.

or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel landmine. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.²⁵²

States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines²⁵³

State	Last declared total (for year)	Initial declaration	Consumed during 2024	Year of last declared consumption	Total quantity reduced as excess to need
Finland	15,509 (2024)	16,500	82	2024	-
Bangladesh	12,050 (2024)	15,000	0	2013	-
Sri Lanka	6,121 (2024)	21,153	2,304	2024	-
Türkiye	5,719 (2024)	16,000	0	2023	5,159
Greece	5,497 (2023)	7,224	10	2024	-
Sweden	5,041 (2024)	13,948	120	2024	-
Venezuela	4,874 (2011)	4,960	N/R	2010	-
Belarus	4,492 (2023)	7,530	0	2022	1,484
Tunisia	4,282 (2024)	5,000	17	2024	-
Yemen	3,760 (2023)	4,000	0	2008	-
Croatia	3,564 (2023)	17,500	72	2024	-
Bulgaria	3,416 (2024)	10,466	21	2024	6,446
Serbia	3,134 (2024)	5,000	0	2017	1,970
Djibouti	2,996 (2004)	2,996	N/R	Unclear	-
Indonesia	2,050 (2020)	4,978	N/R	2009	2,524
Oman	1,970 (2024)	2,000	30	2024	-
Romania	1,836 (2023)	4,000	0	2022	1,500
Tanzania	1,780 (2008)	1,146	N/R	2007	-
France	1,774 (2024)	4,539	7	2024	-
Uganda	1,660 (2023)	2,400	0	2022	-
Namibia	1,634 (2009)	9,999	N/R	2009	-
Canada	1,474 (2024)	1,781	1	2024	-
Cambodia	1,056 (2024)	2,035	408	2024	-
Kenya	1,020 (2007)	3,000	N/R	2007	-
Total	96,709	183,155	3,072	-	19,083

Note: N/R=not reported.

²⁵² States Parties retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine: Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, The Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, Serbia, and the UK.

²⁵³ France reported acquiring four additional antipersonnel landmines in 2024 for training purposes. France Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D. Sri Lanka may have also acquired additional antipersonnel landmines in 2024 but did not report doing so. Its reported retention in 2024 is higher than what should have remained from its 7,339 stockpile reported in 2023 after reportedly consuming 2,304 mines in the reporting period. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C. For Tunisia, there are 21 retained mines unaccounted for, which may have been consumed during April 2023–April 2024, though the Monitor could not confirm this.


TRANSPARENCY REPORTING

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

The Marshall Islands and Tonga are required to submit an initial report by 28 February 2026 and by 30 May 2026, respectively. Only one State Party has an outstanding deadline for submitting its initial report: Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012).

The UN serves as the official depositary of Article 7 transparency reports. Due to technical issues with the UN’s online depositary database beginning in September 2025, Article 7 reports for calendar year 2024 were not publicly available to adequately update this section.

STATUS OF THE 1997 MINE BAN TREATY



MAP KEY

- States Parties (166)
- States not party (31)

DISCLAIMER

This map is for illustrative purposes. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used in this map do not imply any opinion or endorsement by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.



A member of Humanity & Inclusion (HI) risk education team speaks with a resident of Velyka Komyshuvakha, Kharkiv oblast, outside of her home. The HI team travels door-to-door up to three times a week in villages located in heavily contaminated areas of eastern Ukraine.

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THE IMPACT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an overview of the achievements and challenges in assessing and addressing the devastating impact caused by antipersonnel landmines. It covers landmine contamination and the efforts to address its impacts through clearance and risk education, while also reporting on global casualties from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and the efforts of States Parties to assist the victims. It considers the progress made towards meeting the Mine Ban Treaty's obligations and towards fulfilling the commitments laid out in the Oslo Action Plan (2020–2024) during the plan's final year. It also reflects on the new objectives outlined in the five-year Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (2025–2029), adopted in November 2024 at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference.

This report presents data on the situation in 2024 and, where relevant, includes updates up to October 2025.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

As of October 2025, at least 57 states and other areas were contaminated by antipersonnel mines, of which 32 are States Parties with current clearance obligation deadlines under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty.¹

More than half of the affected States Parties succeeded in decreasing the known mine contamination in 2024. However, in seven States Parties, the reported extent of mine contaminated areas increased in 2024 because land previously not known to be affected was newly identified.² These decreases in the reported extent of contamination were the

- 1 As of the end of 2024, 33 States Parties still had clearance obligations under Article 5. Oman completed clearance in accordance with its deadline of 1 February 2025.
- 2 Contamination decreased in States Parties Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Peru, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe. The reported extent increased in Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Yemen.

result of land release activities. Land release aims to remove the presence and suspicion of mines and ERW from land through non-technical survey (cancellation), technical survey (reduction), and clearance. These methodologies are utilized to gain a better understanding of the location and extent of contamination, to identify boundaries of contaminated areas, and to effectively clear areas in which the presence of contamination has been confirmed.

Significant progress in land release was observed in 2024: 1,114.82km² of land known or suspected to be contaminated by antipersonnel landmines was released by States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines—an increase of more than 420km² of released land compared to 2023.³ A total of at least 105,640 antipersonnel mines were cleared and destroyed during land release activities in 2024, significantly less than the 160,566 destroyed in 2023. Four States Parties with current clearance obligation deadlines did not undertake any land release activities in 2024, while another five did not formally report on their Article 5 obligations, or provided insufficient information regarding their land release activities.⁴

In 2024, almost 80% of the land reported as released was achieved through cancellation using non-technical survey, based solely on the gathering of information that does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools. Its classification as contaminated land was scrutinized and canceled, meaning that it was effectively assessed not to be contaminated, and subsequently removed from the list of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). The process of cancellation shows that States Parties are actively reviewing previously recorded danger zones and updating outdated or incomplete information.

However, the annual clearance of mine contamination by States Parties decreased significantly compared with the last two years. In 2024, 40% less area was cleared than in 2023, and 23% less than in 2022. The clearance conducted in 2024 only exceeds the land cleared during the COVID-19 years of 2020 and 2021 by around 30km².

States Parties reported funding issues and other challenges hindering the maintenance of clearance rates and affecting their ability to meet clearance obligation deadlines. Limited access to contaminated areas due to ongoing border disputes and security concerns, as well as complex circumstances like difficult terrain and extreme weather events that affected the efficiency of clearance operations were the main reasons for States Parties to request extensions to their clearance deadlines. However, these are issues that have repeatedly been cited in previous years as impeding progress towards completion. More in-depth analysis and explanation from States Parties is required in the reporting process to better understand these significant declines in clearance rates.

Despite overall positive progress in addressing contaminated areas, the aspirational goal of completing clearance by 2025—adopted by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2014 and reaffirmed in 2019—remains far from being achieved. As of October 2025, 31 States Parties have completed clearance since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999; however, only five States Parties have done so since 2014 when the 2025 completion goal was announced, with Oman the only State Party to complete clearance in 2025. Of the 32 States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines at the time of this report, only two States Parties were still working towards their initial 10-year deadline, while all other States Parties have requested up to six extensions. Twenty-six of the 32 countries with current clearance obligation deadlines have by now been working towards completion for the last 20 years or more. This outcome falls far short of the aspirations set in 2014, signaling that the vision of a mine-free world by 2025 has not been matched by adequate resources and efforts on the ground.

As of October 2025, 17 of the 32 States Parties with current clearance deadlines were obligated to complete clearance in 2025 or 2026. However, 12 of them have requested an

³ The contamination and clearance figures presented in this report are rounded to the nearest hundredth. As such, some individual figures, for instance confirmed and suspected hazardous areas, or amount of released land, when combined after rounding may not equal the reported total.

⁴ Argentina, Chad, Niger, and Sudan did not undertake land release activities. Cyprus, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, and Palestine did not report or provided insufficient information regarding their land release activities.

extension, to be considered at the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in December 2025.⁵ Among the States Parties that requested an extension, three—Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Ecuador—each have less than 5km² of contaminated land remaining to be cleared. However, in Colombia, survey is still ongoing, which is likely to add to the extent of contamination to be addressed over the upcoming years, despite ongoing land release. The DRC and Ecuador submitted their fifth extension requests and reported little progress towards meeting their clearance obligation deadlines during their most recent extension periods.

Following the discovery of improvised mines on its territory, State Party Burkina Faso, which previously did not have a clearance obligation, submitted an extension request in 2025. This submission demonstrates Burkina Faso's commitment to address its clearance obligations under Article 5 regarding new contamination, as well as its resolve to undertake the difficult task of addressing this contamination.

While all States Parties—with the exception of Argentina—included a multi-year work plan for land release along with a budget in their extension requests submitted in 2025, the quality varied significantly. In general, these plans lacked sufficient details regarding the financial resources that had been secured to implement the plan. Only five States Parties—Angola, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, and Ethiopia—also provided a multi-year plan for risk education as required under the Oslo Action Plan and the Siem Reap Action Plan. However, some of the submitted plans still lacked sufficient details, as well as a comprehensive budget that included risk education activities.

Risk education was conducted in 2024 in nearly all States Parties with clearance obligations through the employment of diverse methods, including traditional formats and materials and the increasing use of digital platforms. Men and boys were deemed to be the most frequently at risk due to livelihood activities and intentional risk-taking driven by economic necessity. Other vulnerable groups included nomadic communities, agricultural and forest workers, herders, and scrap metal collectors. In many countries, risk education was conducted to specifically target internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and migrants. Several States Parties reported including risk education messaging to address the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised mines.

At least 6,279 people were killed or injured by mines and ERW in 2024, including 1,945 people killed and 4,325 injured, while the survival outcome was not known for nine casualties. Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 52 countries and areas, with the 2024 total representing the highest annual casualty figure since 2020. Civilians accounted for 86% of all recorded casualties, with children representing 46% of civilian casualties where the age was known. Men and boys made up the majority of casualties overall. Improvised landmines continued to cause the highest number of casualties globally, as they have for almost a decade. Annual casualties from manufactured antipersonnel mines effectively tripled during the 2020–2024 Oslo Action Plan period. Myanmar, a state not party, recorded the highest number of casualties for the second consecutive year; next was state not party Syria, where the annual recorded casualties have steadily increased since 2022. Following these in order of the highest annual casualty numbers were nine States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, with Afghanistan and Ukraine most affected.

Victim assistance efforts across relevant States Parties remained uneven, with progress hindered by conflict, insecurity, and limited national capacity. In many contexts, insufficient financial and human resources continued to impede the adequate provision of services. While States Parties reaffirmed their commitments under the Mine Ban Treaty through the provision of services, the availability and quality of assistance for survivors was often reported as insufficient to meet identified needs.

⁵ States Parties with clearance deadlines in 2025 and 2026 that have submitted an extension request in 2025 are: Angola, Argentina, Cambodia, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ecuador, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe. Senegal also indicated plans of requesting an extension to its deadline of 31 December 2025. However, as of October 2025, Senegal's request had not been submitted.

Several States Parties affected by armed conflict continued to experience severe disruptions to healthcare systems. Ongoing hostilities, insecurity, and deliberate or incidental damage to medical infrastructures significantly reduced trauma care capacity.

However, States Parties made ongoing efforts to ensure and improve access to comprehensive rehabilitation, assistive technology, and mental health support. They also worked to promote the social and economic inclusion of mine victims through education, vocational training, and employment opportunities.

While some States Parties integrated rehabilitation into broader health and social inclusion systems, persistent gaps in financing, coordination, and accessibility continued to limit survivors' access to sustained care. In mine-affected States Parties, rehabilitation and psychosocial services were often constrained by insecurity, limited national capacity, and dependence on international support. In many countries, international organizations continued to support rehabilitation centers with materials, technical assistance, and financial coverage for vulnerable persons, as well as the development of referral networks and outreach to remote areas.

Although overall support for victim assistance remained limited, there were a number of examples in 2024 of psychological, social, and economic inclusion initiatives being effectively integrated into existing systems, even in low-resource settings.

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION STATES PARTIES CONTAMINATED BY ANTIPERSONNEL MINES

STATES PARTIES WITH ARTICLE 5 OBLIGATION DEADLINES

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties with contamination are required to clear and destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the treaty for that country.

As of October 2025, a total of 32 States Parties had current Article 5 clearance obligation deadlines: Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, the DRC, Ecuador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

STATES PARTIES THAT HAVE COMPLETED CLEARANCE

In March 2025, Oman declared completion of clearance in accordance with its deadline of 1 February 2025.⁶ With Oman's declaration, 31 States Parties have completed clearance of all antipersonnel mines from their territory since the treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999.⁷

Three States Parties that previously reported completion—Nigeria in 2011, Guinea-Bissau in 2012, and Mauritania in 2018—no longer figure among the 31 States Parties that have completed clearance. All three have since reported newly discovered mined areas under their jurisdiction or control and were granted new deadlines under Article 5, following submission of extension requests.⁸

⁶ Statement of Oman, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/OmanStatement18June2025; and Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/ObservationsArt5CommitteeJune2025.

⁷ State Party El Salvador completed mine clearance in 1994, before the treaty entered into force, and thus is not included in the list of 31 States Parties.

⁸ Previously unknown mined areas are often identified through reports of incidents and casualties, or after reports of possible contamination are made by civilians living close to the areas.

States Parties that have declared fulfillment of clearance obligations since 1999⁹

1999	Bulgaria	2010	Nicaragua*
2002	Costa Rica	2012	Republic of the Congo, Denmark, The Gambia, Jordan, Uganda
2004	Djibouti, Honduras	2013	Bhutan, Germany, Hungary, Venezuela*
2005	Guatemala, Suriname	2014	Burundi
2006	North Macedonia	2015	Mozambique*
2007	Eswatini	2017	Algeria*
2008	France, Malawi	2020	Chile, United Kingdom (UK)**
2009	Albania, Greece, Rwanda, Tunisia,* Zambia	2025	Oman

*Algeria, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Tunisia have reported, or are suspected to have, residual contamination. Mozambique, Tunisia, and Venezuela are also suspected to have improvised mine contamination.

**The UK reported completion of mine clearance in 2020. However, Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion of clearance in the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas, over which both Argentina and the UK claim sovereignty. (See discussion of Argentina in States Parties individual progress towards clearance obligation deadlines in 2024 and previous years section.)

EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES WITH CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES

In 2024, seven States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty—Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Türkiye, and Ukraine—reported massive antipersonnel landmine contamination (more than 100km²). However, the extent of contamination in Ukraine remains a rough estimation while the conflict is ongoing, as access to the line of contact remains limited, and large-scale survey is ongoing.¹⁰

Large contamination by antipersonnel landmines (20–99km²) was reported in six States Parties: Angola, Chad, Croatia, Eritrea, Mauritania, and Sri Lanka.

Medium contamination (5–19km²) was reported in five States Parties: Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Thailand, which was listed as having large contamination in 2023, reported a medium extent as of the end of 2024 due to ongoing land release activities.

Twelve States Parties have reported small contamination of less than 5km²: Colombia, Cyprus, the DRC, Ecuador, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, and South Sudan. South Sudan, through land release activities, succeeded in decreasing its remaining contamination from medium in 2023 to small in 2024.

The extent of contamination in Nigeria—predominantly consisting of improvised mines—remains unknown.

Argentina is not known to have contamination but has a current clearance obligation deadline due to its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty over the territory and reported completion of mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has thus far not acknowledged the completion announced by the UK.

⁹ Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), “Clearing mined areas,” undated, bit.ly/MBTStatusA5Implementation.

¹⁰ Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Updated Workplan 2025, 30 April 2025, Annex 4, bit.ly/UkraineWorkplanMBTApr2025.

Estimated antipersonnel mine contamination in States Parties¹¹

Massive (more than 100km ²)	Large (20–99km ²)	Medium (5–19km ²)	Small (less than 5km ²)	Unknown
Afghanistan	Angola	Sudan	Colombia	Nigeria
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Chad	Tajikistan	Cyprus**	
Cambodia	Croatia	Thailand	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	
Ethiopia	Eritrea	Yemen	Ecuador	
Iraq	Mauritania	Zimbabwe	Guinea-Bissau	
Türkiye	Sri Lanka		Niger	
Ukraine*			Palestine***	
			Peru	
			Senegal	
			Serbia	
			Somalia	
			South Sudan	

*Ukraine has reported massive contamination, though this cannot be reliably verified until survey has been conducted.

**Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under its control but claims that there are 21 minefields of unknown size and contamination type in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone.

***While the remaining contamination in Palestine is believed to be small, the State Party also reported additional medium contamination in territory not under its control.

Americas

As of the end of 2024, **Colombia** reported 3.06km² of antipersonnel mine contamination mostly from improvised mines covering 214 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling 1.71km² and 281 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) totaling 1.35km².¹² This is a decrease from the 4.47km² reported as of the end of 2023, however survey is still ongoing.¹³ Colombia is currently actively working on clearance in 84 municipalities, while 102 municipalities with suspected mine contamination still remain to be addressed.¹⁴

Ecuador and **Peru** each have less than 1km² of mine contaminated land. While Ecuador had confirmed contamination of 7,009m² and SHAs amounting to 2,955m² left to be cleared in Zamora Chinchipe province as of September 2025, the remaining contamination to be

11 Two other State Parties—Burkina Faso and Mali—have acknowledged contamination but are not included in this table as they do not currently have a clearance obligation deadline. Burkina Faso submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request in April 2025 for new improvised mine contamination. Burkina Faso's extension request will be considered during the Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025. Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT; and Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, p. 21, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025. Mali has acknowledged the presence of improvised mines on its territory and announced that it aims to submit an Article 5 extension request by March 2026. Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Preliminary Observations,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/ObservationsArt5CommitteeJune2025. (For information on contamination in Burkina Faso and Mali, see the section on Contamination from improvised mines.)

12 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 24–31.

13 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Maicol Velásquez, Information Management Coordinator, Comprehensive Action Group Against Antipersonnel Mines (Grupo de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, Grupo AICMA), 20 April 2024; Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D; and Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 22.

14 Presentation of Colombia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, p. 4, bit.ly/ColombiaPresentation18June2025.



A deminer from the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM) uses a metal detector to locate landmines in the Cumaribo municipality of Vichada department, in Colombia.

© CCCM, April 2025

addressed in Peru as of the end of 2024 consisted of 46 areas totaling 0.28km².¹⁵ Despite the small extent of contamination, both countries requested an extension to their clearance deadlines, with Peru (in 2024) requesting an additional five years and Ecuador (in 2025) requesting an additional two years.

East and South Asia and the Pacific

Afghanistan reported antipersonnel mine contamination totaling 110.91km² as of the end of 2024 without specifying the exact extent of improvised mine contamination included in that figure. The figure included newly recorded contamination in 160 of the 5,522 resurveyed villages.¹⁶ Over 60% of the contamination is located in Afghanistan's Northeast and Central regions.¹⁷

As of March 2025, **Cambodia** reported 3,917 SHAs with landmine contamination totaling 424.24km². Due to land release activities, the total area of hazardous land decreased by almost 11km² from the figure reported as of the end of 2023, despite a significant number of newly identified hazardous areas in 2024.¹⁸ The northwest region bordering Thailand is heavily affected by landmines, while other parts of the country in the east and northeast are primarily affected by ERW, including cluster munition remnants. Much of the remaining mine contamination in Cambodia and Thailand lies along their shared border, where liaison and cooperation related to joint cross-border demining efforts were reported to continue despite the current conflict between Cambodia and Thailand.¹⁹

Landmine contamination in **Sri Lanka**, despite land release, has further increased due to newly identified mined areas during the ongoing National Mine Action Completion Survey that commenced in March 2023.²⁰ As of the end of 2024, Sri Lanka reported 23.2km²

15 Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 4 September 2025, pp. 5–6, bit.ly/EcuadorArt5ExtRequestSept2025; response to Monitor questionnaire by David Fernández Fernández, Victim Assistance Coordinator – Humanitarian Demining, Peruvian Mine Action Center (Centro Peruano de Acción Contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS), 13 March 2025; and Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

16 Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

17 The contamination figures provided in response to a recent Monitor questionnaire and in the Article 7 report differ significantly. However, the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) advised the Monitor to use the figures provided in the Article 7 report. The provided figure includes five areas covering 8.28km² contaminated with improvised mines discovered as part of the international Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project. Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C; and email from Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 30 June 2025.

18 In 2024, 466 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) accounting for 75.81km² were newly reported by operators based on evidence found by local people while expanding land use to areas inaccessible during previous surveys. Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 5; Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 5; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Monoketya Nguon, Deputy Director of the Social-Economic Planning and Database Department (SEPD), Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), 4 June 2025; and by Kimsin Hean, Director of the SEPD, CMAA, 22 August 2024.

19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand press release, “Joint Press Statement: Special General Border Committee (GBC) Meeting, Koh Kong, Cambodia,” 10 September 2025, bit.ly/GBCPressRelease10Sept2025.

20 Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 5–7.

of contaminated land covering 634 CHAs (17.65km²) and 206 SHAs (5.5km²).²¹ The most significant mine contamination (20.09km²) is found in four of the five districts of the Northern province that were sites of intense fighting during the civil war.²²

Thailand reported 17.04km² of contamination in six provinces (9.59km² CHA and 7.45km² SHA) as of the end of December 2024.²³ In June 2025, the delegation of Thailand informed States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that the contamination had further decreased to 13.2km²—despite newly identified contaminated areas—due to land release activities. This represents a clear decrease from the almost 22km² of contamination reported as of the end of 2023.²⁴ Thailand also continued to have casualties from improvised mine contamination as a result of use by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in the south, but these were not included in national mine action reporting.²⁵

Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

As of the end of 2024, **BiH** reported antipersonnel mine contamination totaling 822.6km² (164.52km² CHA and 658.08km² SHA), a decrease of 15.69km² from the 838.29km² reported in 2023, and a decrease of 47.01km² from the 869.61km² reported in 2022.²⁶ The contamination is spread across 112 municipalities and 459 mine suspected areas—a classification used by BiH to group individual contaminated areas in preparation for the land release and prioritization process.²⁷ As of May 2025, BiH updated its figures for the remaining contamination to 804km², which covers around 1.5% of the total area of BiH.²⁸ BiH has also reported contamination from improvised antipersonnel mines in the Goraždanka and Čapljinka areas.²⁹

Croatia almost halved its remaining mine contaminated areas since 2023 and, as of the end of 2024, reported 49.34km² (43.13km² CHA and 6.2km² SHA) across 16 municipalities in three of its 21 counties.³⁰ However, additional land under military control is also contaminated and accounted for 10.1km² as of the end of 2024. This is nevertheless a significant decrease from the 18.9km² of contaminated land under military control reported as of the end of 2023.³¹

Since 2013, **Cyprus** has reported that there are no antipersonnel mines on the territory under its effective control, but claims there are 21 minefields of unknown size and

21 The figures reported in Sri Lanka's Article 7 report and in the questionnaire submitted to the Monitor differ significantly. The Monitor used the more detailed figures from the Article 7 report, in line with Sri Lanka's statement given during the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2025. Figures provided in the Monitor questionnaire: 34.52km² consisting of 634 CHAs (28.62km²) and 206 SHAs (6.26km²). Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 5–7; presentation of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, pp. 13–14, bit.ly/SriLankaPresentation18June2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dilhan Iddamalgoda, Mine Action Officer, Regional Mine Action Office, 27 March 2025.

22 The four districts are: Kilinochchi, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya.

23 The six provinces are: Buri Ram, Sa Kaeo, Si Sa Ket, Surin, Trat, and Ubon Ratchathani. Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 5.

24 Statement of Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/ThailandStatement18June2025.

25 "Southern bandits set up a bomb trap, but a ranger accidentally stepped on it, nearly losing his leg!" *Dailynews Online*, 26 March 2024, bit.ly/DailynewsOnline26March2024; and "Soldiers clearing a clash on a mountain in Sri Sakhon step on a landmine and lose their leg," *Thairath*, 5 July 2024, bit.ly/Thairath5July2024.

26 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 41; BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C; and BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form C.

27 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C.

28 Statement of BiH, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, pp. 1 and 5, bit.ly/BIHStatement18June2025.

29 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C.

30 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Damir Trut, Director General, Civil Protection Directorate (CPD), 7 March 2025.

31 Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C, p. 9; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Damir Trut, Director, CPD, 11 June 2024.



A deminer clears an antivehicle mine in Namirlı village, Aghdam region, Azerbaijan.

© AzCBL, August 2024

contamination type in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone.³² As of 1 October 2025, Cyprus had not provided an update on any progress made in gaining a better understanding of the remaining contamination. The latest information from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) indicated that 1.52km² across 29 SHAs may be contaminated with mines and/or ERW.³³ In April 2025, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots announced their intention for future cooperation in removing the remaining landmines.³⁴

Serbia reported 0.27km² of SHA in the village of Ravno Bučje in Bujanovac municipality.³⁵ The area suspected to be contaminated was first signaled by explosions that occurred during forest fires in 2019 and 2021 but has not yet been surveyed due to a lack of both funding and suitably trained personnel. However, a project plan is now in place and funding has been approved. Non-technical survey training is currently ongoing and once survey has been completed, a revised workplan to deal with the remaining contamination will be provided for the period 2025–2026.³⁶

Tajikistan reported 109 CHAs accounting for 6.13km² by the end of 2024 but expects to be left with 4.66km² by the end of its current extension period expiring on 31 December 2025. The remaining minefields are located in

the Central region of Tajikistan and along the Tajik-Afghan border.³⁷

Türkiye reported 219.9km² (93.19km² CHA and 126.71km² SHA) across 3,656 areas in 2024—around 5km² less contamination than reported in 2023.³⁸ Most contaminated areas are located on its borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, while only 837 areas are not in border regions.³⁹ In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces before joining the treaty, there is contamination from improvised mines. However, these mines are dealt with directly through explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks and are not accounted for in Türkiye's reported totals of remaining contamination.⁴⁰

Ukraine has experienced significant new contamination since Russia's full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.⁴¹ In an updated workplan, Ukraine reported 207 SHAs

32 Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C; and Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, "Preliminary Observations on the Implementation of Article 5 by Cyprus," 18 June 2024, bit.ly/PreliminaryObservationsCyprusJune2024.

33 United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), "Where We Work: Cyprus," updated March 2023, bit.ly/UNMASCyprusMarch2023.

34 "Rival Cypriot sides to work on removing landmines, other peace initiatives," *Reuters*, 2 April 2025, bit.ly/Reuters2Apr2025.

35 Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D.

36 Ibid.; response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integration, Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), 27 March 2025; and statement of Serbia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/SerbiaStatement18June2025.

37 Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 16 October 2025, pp. 32 and 78, bit.ly/TajikistanArt5ExtRequestOct2025; and presentation of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, p. 4, bit.ly/TajikistanPresentation18June2025.

38 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D.

39 Ibid.

40 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 30 July 2025, p. 1, bit.ly/TurkiyeArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

41 Human Rights Watch (HRW), "Background Briefing on Landmine Use in Ukraine," 15 June 2022, bit.ly/HRWUkraineBriefing15June2022.

located in nine regions (oblasts), accounting for 105,877km² as of the end of April 2025.⁴² Ukraine had previously identified 50km² of mine/ERW contamination in March 2023; it also reported 23.34km² of confirmed and 11.88km² of suspected antipersonnel mine contamination totaling 35.22km² as of the end of 2023.⁴³ Ukraine is also contaminated by improvised mines.⁴⁴

Middle East and North Africa

Iraq has legacy mine contamination from the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by a United States (US)-led coalition, as well as contamination from improvised mines used by the Islamic State (ISIS) armed group between 2014 and 2017. As of the end of 2024, Iraq—including the Kurdistan Region of Iraq—reported 1,312.27km² of antipersonnel mine contamination, and another 317.91km² of contamination from IEDs, including improvised mines.⁴⁵ As a result of ongoing survey and re-survey, this represents an increase from the antipersonnel mine contamination reported in 2023 (1,194.43km²), but a decline from the IED contamination reported in 2023 (441.28km²). Most contamination is reportedly located in territory controlled by the federal government of Iraq.⁴⁶

As of 1 October 2025, **Palestine** had not provided an update for 2024 with the remaining known legacy contamination in Jenin and the Jordan Valley, which accounted for less than 1km² according to the last update in 2023.⁴⁷ Palestine also last reported 65 SHAs covering 18.5km² in territory not under its control—contamination that is also mapped by the Israel National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) but without further information related to the possible extent of the contamination.⁴⁸

The baseline survey in **Yemen** that commenced in 2022 has continued throughout the ongoing internal conflict, despite challenging security conditions, and has led to an increase in reported contamination in 2024.⁴⁹ As of the end of 2024, areas contaminated with antipersonnel and improvised mines accounted for 7.98km² across 147 areas (5.9km² CHA and 2.07km² SHA) and were located in the governorates of Abyan, Aden, Al-Hodeida, Lahj, and Taiz.⁵⁰

Sub-Saharan Africa

As of the end of 2024, **Angola** reported a total antipersonnel mine contamination of 57.07km² across 965 areas in 17 provinces (54.88km² CHA and 2.19km² SHA), with Moxico remaining



Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) demining teams clear mine contaminated land in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

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42 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Updated Workplan, 30 April 2025, Annex 4, bit.ly/UkraineWorkplanMBTApr2025.

43 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2023, pp. 2–3, bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023; and Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D, pp. 5–21.

44 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 26.

45 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C.

46 Ibid.; and Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C.

47 Palestine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 42–45.

48 Ibid., pp. 16–19; and Israel National Mine Action Authority (INMAA), “Map of mined areas,” undated, bit.ly/INMAAMinedAreasMap.

49 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D.

50 Ibid.; and statement of Yemen, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/YemenStatement18June2025.

the most heavily contaminated province (12.82km²).⁵¹ More than half of the remaining contamination in Angola consists of complex minefields with mines hard to detect, slowing down the clearance process significantly.⁵²

As of the end of 2024, **Chad** reported contamination of 77.62km² distributed among 71 CHAs (55.94km²) and 48 SHAs (21.68km²) in the provinces of Borkou, Ennedi Est, and Tibesti.⁵³ In its most recent update, Chad also reported these hazardous areas as having mixed contamination that includes antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and ERW.⁵⁴

As of the end of 2024, the **DRC** reported 0.35km² of antipersonnel mine contamination across 35 CHAs (0.27km²) and 6 SHAs (0.08km²), with Dungu in Bas-Uélé province the only territory left to be surveyed.⁵⁵ The presence of improvised mines had previously been reported for Ituri and North-Kivu provinces.⁵⁶ However, according to an update from the Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), no evidence of such contamination has been found within the remaining 0.35km².⁵⁷

Eritrea last reported on the extent of its contamination in 2014, when it was estimated to have 33.43km² of contaminated land.⁵⁸ After missing its 2020 clearance deadline, Eritrea submitted a fourth request on 16 November 2023 to extend its mine clearance deadline to 31 December 2024.⁵⁹ This was followed by the submission of a fifth extension request that was granted during the Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, setting a new deadline of 31 December 2027.⁶⁰ As of 1 October 2025, Eritrea had not provided an update on the extent of its contamination.

As of May 2025, **Ethiopia** reported contamination of 125.18km² across 147 areas—a massive decrease from the 726.07km² reported in 2024—demonstrating a more realistic understanding of the remaining contamination.⁶¹ Of the hazardous areas, 27 were classified

51 Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C.

52 Presentation of Angola, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, pp. 5–6, bit.ly/AngolaPresentation18June2025.

53 Statement of Chad, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/ChadStatement18June2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations, National High Commission for Demining (Haut-Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND), 22 April 2025.

54 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations, HCND, 22 April 2025.

55 Figures for the remaining contamination, including the number of CHAs and SHAs as of the end of 2024, differ in the various documentation provided by the DRC in 2025. The Monitor has used the most comprehensive figures from a 2025 Monitor questionnaire. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Joseph Lukongola, Chief of Operations, Congolese Mine Action Center (Centre Congolais de Lutte Antimines, CCLAM), 1 April 2025.

56 “DRC-Beni: for fear of artisanal bombs, farmers hesitate to work in their fields,” *Actualite CD*, 16 November 2021, bit.ly/ActualiteCD16Nov2021; “DRC-ADF: the Army alerts on the presence of explosive ordnance in Kainama, Beni,” *Actualite CD*, 1 March 2021, bit.ly/ActualiteCD1March2021; response to Monitor questionnaire by Christophe Wembelumbe Lomani, Head of Quality Management Department, CCLAM, 14 June 2024; UNMAS, “Annual Report 2023,” 26 April 2024, p. 48, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023; and statement of DRC, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, 13 February 2024, p. 2, bit.ly/DRCStatement13Feb2024.

57 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Joseph Lukongola, Chief of Operations, CCLAM, 1 April 2025.

58 Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 23 January 2014, p. 8, bit.ly/EritreaSecondArt5ExtRequest2014.

59 Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 November 2023, bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2023; and Final Report, Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 30 November 2023, pp. 7–8, undocs.org/APLC/MSP.21/2023/18.

60 Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 November 2024, bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2024; and Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, “Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” 26 November 2024, bit.ly/DecisionEritreaArt5ExtRequest2024.

61 Presentation of Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, p. 5, bit.ly/EthiopiaPresentation18June2025; statement of Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, bit.ly/EthiopiaStatement18June2024; and Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period January–March 2022), Form C.

as CHA (3.45km²) and 114 as SHA (121.73km²), leading Ethiopia to acknowledge the need for re-survey of identified hazardous areas that are predominantly located in the Somali region, and for survey of the conflict-affected regions Afar, Amhara, and Tigray.⁶²

Guinea-Bissau declared the completion of its clearance obligations in December 2012. However, in 2021, it reported the presence of “previously unknown mined areas” containing antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and ERW. A total of nine CHAs were reported across the northern provinces of Cacheu and Oio, and the southern provinces of Quebo and Tombali. An additional 43 areas were suspected to contain both mines and ERW.⁶³ For calendar year 2024, Guinea-Bissau reported nine CHAs totaling 1.05km² and 15 newly identified SHAs in Cacheu and Oio sized 0.19km², while five of the previously identified 43 SHAs were re-surveyed and subsequently canceled. The other 38 previously identified SHAs of unknown size remain subject to future re-survey.⁶⁴ Guinea-Bissau may also be contaminated by improvised mines.⁶⁵

Mauritania declared clearance of all known contamination in 2018 but later identified new mined areas.⁶⁶ As of the end of 2024, Mauritania reported 22.31km² of confirmed antipersonnel and antivehicle mine contamination in the Adrar, Dakhlet Nouadhibou, and Tiris Zemmour regions—indicating a slight decrease from the 22.37km² reported in 2023 as a result of land release.⁶⁷ Mauritania also reported that it had identified new SHAs through non-technical survey in the Dakhlet Nouadhibou region. However, as of 1 October 2025, the results of this survey were still undergoing validation.⁶⁸

Niger presented its fifth Article 5 extension request on 30 March 2024 to allow it to clear 0.18km² of CHA adjacent to a military post in Madama in the Agadez region.⁶⁹ This figure has not changed since Niger’s third Article 5 extension request was granted in 2020.⁷⁰ Niger is also contaminated by improvised mines.⁷¹

62 Presentation of Ethiopia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, pp. 4–5, bit.ly/EthiopiaPresentation18June2025.

63 Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 May 2021, pp. 7 and 9–11, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2021; Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 April 2022, pp. 3 and 29–31, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Nautan Mancabu, Director, National Mine Action Coordination Center (Centro Nacional de Coordenação da Ação Anti-Minas, CAAMI), 24 March 2021.

64 Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D.

65 Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 April 2022, p. 6, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022.

66 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 January 2020, pp. 2–3, bit.ly/MauritaniaThirdArt5ExtRequest2020.

67 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports (for calendar years 2023 and 2024), pp. 3–4; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Houssein Neya, Database Manager, National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 1 April 2025 and 14 June 2024.

68 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Houssein Neya, Database Manager, PNDHD, 1 April 2025.

69 Niger Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 8–9; and Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 March 2024, p. 8, bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2024.

70 Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 March 2020, p. 5, bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2020; and statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/NigerStatement18June2025.

71 The Monitor recorded 48 casualties of improvised mines in Niger in 2024, and has recorded such casualties each year since 2018. Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict and Location Event Data Project (ACLED) data for Niger for 2018–2023. See, ACLED website, www.acleddata.com. See also, United Nations Department of Peace Operations (UNDPO) and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), “Weapons and Ammunition Dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin,” 11 October 2022, pp. 19 and 32, bit.ly/UNLakeChadBasinOct2022; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Niger: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023,” February 2023, pp. 11 and 41, bit.ly/UNOCHANigerFeb2023; Protection Cluster Niger, “Advocacy Note: A Crucial Need to Reinforce Actions Against the Growing Threat of Explosive Devices (ED) in Niger,” July 2023, pp. 3–6, bit.ly/ProtectionClusterNiger3Aug2023; and UNMAS, “Niger,” updated October 2022, bit.ly/UNMASNigerProgramme.

Nigeria has continuously reported improvised mine contamination since 2019, affecting predominantly the three northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.⁷² Nigeria was granted a second extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline in 2021, and submitted a third extension request, for three years, in May 2025 with the aim of gaining a better understanding of the extent of contamination and improving information sharing with the security forces in charge of responding to reports of IEDs.⁷³

Following baseline assessments and non-technical survey, **Senegal** gained a better understanding of its remaining contamination and reported 1.28km² of mixed contamination that includes antipersonnel mines. As of the end of 2024, there are 62 CHAs totaling 1.17km² and 8 SHAs totaling 0.11km² located in Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye, and Ziguinchor departments in the Casamance region.⁷⁴ Senegal also reported that additional locations may have potential hazardous areas, but have not yet been surveyed because either they were abandoned at the time of survey teams' visits or access routes were blocked due to reforestation.⁷⁵

In previous years, **Somalia** reported mixed contamination of more than 100km² with less than 10% suspected to be from antipersonnel mines.⁷⁶ As of the end of 2024, Somalia reported antipersonnel mine contamination across 230 CHAs (110.72km²) and 232 SHAs (12.18km²) totaling 122.9km².⁷⁷ However, it is believed that these areas also contain mixed contamination, with antipersonnel mines accounting for only a small portion.⁷⁸

South Sudan reported 114 landmine contaminated areas totaling 4.94km² (2.66km² CHA and 2.28km² SHA) in eight states as of the end of 2024. Due to land release activities conducted in 2024, this marks a decrease from the 5.32km² reported as of the end of 2023.⁷⁹

With the submission of its Article 7 report for calendar year 2024, **Sudan** provided its first comprehensive update since 2021 on the extent of remaining contamination.⁸⁰ Sudan reported 13.33km² of landmine contamination (3.37km² CHA and 9.96km² SHA) as of the

⁷² Statement of Nigeria, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 27 November 2019, bit.ly/StatementNigeriaNovember2019; Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, p. 4, bit.ly/NigeriaRevisedArt5ExtRequest2021; response to Monitor questionnaire by Edwin Faigmane, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 30 May 2023; and presentation of Nigeria, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, Accra, 13 February 2024, pp. 4 and 7, bit.ly/PresentationNigeria13Feb2024.

⁷³ Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, bit.ly/NigeriaRevisedArt5ExtRequest2021; and Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2025, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequestMarch2025.

⁷⁴ Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D; response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamadou Diallo, Head of Operations, National Mine Action Center in Senegal (Centre National d'Action Antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS), 29 July 2025.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Somalia Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 8 September 2021, p. 9, bit.ly/SomaliaArt5RevisedExtRequest2021; Somalia, "The Federal Republic of Somalia Work Plan for the period from October 2022 to October 2027," 30 April 2023, pp. 18–19, bit.ly/SomaliaMBTArt5Workplan2023.

⁷⁷ Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 7.

⁷⁸ UNMAS reported 0.91km² of antipersonnel mine contamination and 4.5km² of mixed contamination, totaling 5.41km². In addition, it reported another 30.23km² of contamination that includes antivehicle mines, cluster munitions, and explosive remnants of war (ERW). Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mustafa Bawar, Senior Information Management (IM) Officer, UNMAS, 26 May 2025.

⁷⁹ Presentation of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, p. 4, bit.ly/SouthSudanPresentation18June2025; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 24 April 2024 and 4 April 2025; and South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 6–9.

⁸⁰ Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Forms C and F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Majeed, Chief of Operations, Sudan National Mine Action Center (SNMAC), 20 April 2022.

end of 2024—an increase of 50,000m² compared to past reports due to previously unknown and newly identified mined areas.⁸¹

In **Zimbabwe**, contamination totaled 12km² as of the end of December 2024, a decrease of 4.16km² compared to the extent of contamination reported in 2023.⁸² All of the contamination is classified as CHA, with most located along Zimbabwe's border with Mozambique in three provinces, though one inland minefield exists in Matabeleland North province.⁸³

CONTAMINATION FROM IMPROVISED MINES

Victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person are considered to be improvised mines that fall under the prohibition and clearance obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty.⁸⁴

SUSPECTED OR CONFIRMED IMPROVISED (ANTIPERSONNEL) MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES PARTIES WITHOUT CURRENT CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES

Since 2023, **Benin** has been regarded as a state with emerging IED threats due to reports of civilians being injured or killed by improvised mines while fishing and riding tricycles or motorcycles, as well as reports of corpses being booby-trapped.⁸⁵ In October 2024, Benin submitted its first Article 7 report since 2008 (covering the years 2008–2023), but did not report any contamination with improvised mines.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, in preparation for its participation in the Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap in November 2024, Benin held a workshop with the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) to align regional understandings of the threat of landmines and related obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. The workshop was attended by the national mine action authorities of Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, and Togo.⁸⁷ As of August 2025, Benin had not submitted an Article 7 report for calendar year 2024.

In **Burkina Faso**, pressure-plate improvised mines have been used since 2018 due to the introduction of measures that block signals to command-detonated IEDs. Civilian casualties from improvised mines have been recorded by Burkina Faso since 2017. To date, IEDs and improvised mines have caused more than 1,600 casualties according to assessments.⁸⁸ The State Party first reported the presence of "anti-personnel mines of an improvised nature" in its Article 7 transparency report for 2023, and subsequently submitted an Article 5 deadline

81 Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C; response to Monitor questionnaire by Asaad Ibrahim, Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Department Manager, SNMAC, 11 March 2025; and email from Asaad Ibrahim, IMSMA Department Manager, SNMAC, 23 September 2025.

82 Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 7–8; response to Monitor questionnaire by Godwish Machemedze, Acting Operations Officer, Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC), 5 March 2025; Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 2–4; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Patson Mandaba, Operations Officer, ZIMAC, 5 March 2024.

83 The three provinces are Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, and Masvingo. Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 7.

84 Improvised mines are sometimes also referred to as artisanal mines, or by the type of construction or initiation system, such as pressure-plate or crush-wire improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

85 Small Arms Survey, "Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa," November 2023, pp. 47–48, bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023; and Monitor analysis of ACLED data for the period 2022–2024.

86 Benin Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar years 2008–2023), Form D.

87 Ibid., Form I; and email from François Fall, Humanitarian Mine Action Advisor, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 24 September 2025.

88 Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3; and Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, p. 21, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

extension request in April 2025, demonstrating its willingness to address the problem.⁸⁹ The extension request included a plan for 2025–2028 to conduct a contamination baseline assessment, followed by non-technical and technical survey aimed at gaining a better understanding of the extent of contamination.⁹⁰ Burkina Faso's deadline for clearance obligations would officially enter into force following the consideration and approval of its Article 5 request during the Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.⁹¹

Cameroon originally declared in 2009 that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.⁹² However, in January 2025, Cameroon submitted an Article 7 report for calendar year 2023 acknowledging the presence of IEDs including victim-activated devices.⁹³ Since 2014, such devices used by NSAGs have caused casualties, particularly in the north along the border with Nigeria.⁹⁴

The **Central African Republic** last submitted an Article 7 report in 2004 announcing that it has no areas under its jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.⁹⁵ However, in 2025, the State Party acknowledged that the gradual deterioration of the security context over the last 13 years has led to increasing contamination with antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, IEDs, and ERW, particularly since 2020.⁹⁶ The first two antipersonnel mines officially reported were neutralized in 2022 in the region of Bambari in Ouaka prefecture, followed by another conventional mine found in 2023, and two victim-activated explosive devices in 2024.⁹⁷ For 2024, one improvised mine was found and destroyed.⁹⁸ The conflict between government forces and armed groups has escalated since 2020 with a corresponding increase in the use of improvised mines and IEDs.⁹⁹ The regions most affected over the past four years have been in the western part of the country, notably the prefectures of Mambéré-Kadei, Nana-Mambéré, Ouham, and Ouham-

89 Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3; Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, p. 14, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025; and Small Arms Survey, “Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa,” November 2023, pp. 35–36, bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023.

90 Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, pp. 39–41, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

91 Mine Ban Treaty, “Article 5 Extensions,” undated, bit.ly/MBTArticle5Extensions.

92 Cameroon Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2009), p. 4.

93 Cameroon Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 3, 7–8, and 21; and statement of Cameroon, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/CamerounStatement18June2025. Prior to its submission in 2025, Cameroon last submitted an Article 7 report in 2009.

94 UNOCHA, “Cameroon : North-West and South-West regions - Overview of the Humanitarian Access, January - June 2025,” 18 July 2025, bit.ly/OCHA18July2025; UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs Overview: Cameroon,” 31 January 2025, p. 31, bit.ly/OCHA31Jan2025; CGTN Africa (cgtناfrica), “At least two children were killed early Monday in Cameroon’s Far North region after stepping on an improvised explosive device (IED) along the Bargaram-Abasouni Road in Logone-et-Chari, according to local and security sources.” 21 July 2025, 15:22 UTC. X post, bit.ly/XPostCGTNAfrica21July2025; Small Arms Survey, “Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa,” November 2023, pp. 36–39, bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023; Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Cameroon Military Says Rebels Turning to IEDs as Numbers Fall,” *Voice of America*, 11 May 2021, bit.ly/VOACameroun11May2021; and “Cameroon: Improvised explosive kills seven-year-old in Anglophone region,” *Journal du Cameroun*, 26 March 2021.

95 Central African Republic Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2003), p. 2.

96 Statement of the Central African Republic, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/CARStatement18June2025.

97 Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Claude Kodjo, Operations/Quality Assurance (QA) Officer, UNMAS, 27 May 2025.

98 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Claude Kodjo, Operations/QA Officer, UNMAS, 27 May 2025.

99 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), “Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2536,” S/2021/569, 25 June 2021, bit.ly/SecurityCouncilCARReportJune2021; Jack Losh, “Central African Republic War: No-go zones and Russian meddling,” *BBC News*, 23 September 2021, bbc.in/3RZnXWj; and “CAR violence grows with addition of Russian landmines,” *Africa Defense Forum*, 13 October 2021, bit.ly/AfriceDefenseForum13Oct2021.

Pendé.¹⁰⁰ The Central African Republic emphasized that non-technical survey is required to gain a better understanding of the contamination, yet no funding is available to conduct a nationwide survey.¹⁰¹

Mali has seen a significant rise in incidents caused by IEDs in the center of the country since 2017.¹⁰² It was also reported that the explosive threat has expanded towards the south and west of the country, which is attributed to the movement and operations of the Malian Armed Forces and related intensified clashes with NSAGs.¹⁰³ Within the data on casualties for 2024, numerous incidents involving improvised mines were recorded.¹⁰⁴ In 2025, for the second consecutive year, Mali acknowledged the presence of contamination that was “not easy to provide the exact dimensions of, or to state with accuracy the number or type of mines it contains,” particularly in the Bandiagara, Bankass, Koro, Menaka, Mopti, Nara, and Sikasso regions.¹⁰⁵ Following the acknowledgement of the presence of mines of an improvised nature, Mali announced that it aims to submit an Article 5 extension request by March 2026 to present a plan on how to address the problem.¹⁰⁶

Mexico used its 2022 Article 7 report to detail the use of IEDs and “artisanal mines” by cartels in the state of Michoacán de Ocampo during 2022, but reported that the exact nature of these devices was not known.¹⁰⁷ In its Article 7 report for 2023, Mexico noted that the “artifacts” reported by the media—by their nature—do not fall under the remit of Mine Ban Treaty obligations.¹⁰⁸ A media report from March 2024 described the “widespread use of improvised landmines” by cartels with some devices having “tripwires sensitive enough to be set off by pedestrians.”¹⁰⁹ Media also repeatedly published articles related to the state’s clearance plans, and reported that troops had destroyed IEDs, including improvised mines.¹¹⁰ As of August 2025, Mexico had not provided an update on the situation.

Mozambique was declared mine-free in 2015. However, it faces an increasing threat of IEDs that may include improvised mines from ongoing conflicts between NSAGs in the

¹⁰⁰ UNOCHA, “The threat of explosive devices,” updated March 2025, bit.ly/OCHAExplosiveDevicesCAR.

¹⁰¹ Statement of the Central African Republic, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/CARStatement18June2025.

¹⁰² Small Arms Survey, “Out of Control – The Trafficking of Improvised Explosive Device Components and Commercial Explosives in West Africa,” November 2023, pp. 39–41, bit.ly/SmallArmsSurveyNov2023.

¹⁰³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Iveta Havlickova, Head of Program, UNMAS/Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (Groupe de travail de lutte antimines humanitaire, GT-LAMH), 19 March 2025.

¹⁰⁴ Monitor analysis of ACLED data for Mali for calendar year 2024.

¹⁰⁵ Mali Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period May 2023–April 2024), Form C; Mali Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period May 2024–April 2025), Form C; and presentation of Mali, Regional Conference on Addressing the Humanitarian Impact of Improvised Anti-Personnel Mines within the Framework of the Convention, Accra, 13 February 2024, bit.ly/MaliPresentation13Feb2024.

¹⁰⁶ Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Preliminary Observations,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/ObservationsArt5CommitteeJune2025.

¹⁰⁷ Mexico Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Mexico Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Keegan Hamilton and Kate Linthicum, “Soldiers and civilians are dying as Mexican cartels embrace a terrifying new weapon: Land mines,” *Los Angeles Times*, 9 March 2024, bit.ly/LosAngelesTimes9Mar2024.

¹¹⁰ Juan Pablo Reyes, “Army destroyed 621 mines in Michoacán planted by drug traffickers; 6 soldiers died after explosion,” *El Sol de México*, 28 May 2025, bit.ly/ElSolDeMexico28May2025; Juan Pablo Reyes, “Judge’s order to implement plan to remove drug mines is challenged,” *El Sol de México*, 9 April 2025, bit.ly/ElSolDeMexico9April2025; “Mexican army sends anti-mine squads to cartel turf war zone,” *Associated Press*, 19 February 2022, bit.ly/AssociatedPressMexico19Feb2022; and John P. Sullivan, Robert J. Bunker, and David A. Kuhn, “Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use,” *Homeland Security Today*, 8 November 2022, bit.ly/MexicoAVM8Nov2022.

northern province of Cabo Delgado.¹¹¹ In its Article 7 report for 2024, Mozambique reported the situation to be unchanged from previous years without referring to any incidents with IEDs or improvised mines.¹¹² As of October 2025, Mozambique had not submitted an update on its potential contamination with IEDs or improvised mines.

Although the **Philippines** reported in 2020 that it has no remaining mined areas, risk education is still carried out because of incidents caused by ERW, primarily where “government forces have exchanged fires [sic] with the NSAGs.”¹¹³ In November 2022, the Philippines reported that landmines are used in “sporadic attacks” by NSAGs including the New People’s Army.¹¹⁴ This indicates that the devices are command-detonated mines, which are covered by the Mine Ban Treaty, and thus permitted. However, the use of improvised mines by other NSAGs has been documented on the southern island of Mindanao.¹¹⁵

Togo last submitted an Article 7 report in 2003. It has not reported any mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Yet improvised mine use by NSAGs has been reported since 2022 and incidents have caused military and civilian casualties, including among children traveling by cart.¹¹⁶

Tunisia declared completion of mine clearance in 2009 but acknowledged in 2023 that there is residual contamination.¹¹⁷ There have also been reports of civilian and military casualties from new use of improvised antipersonnel mines continually since 2013, including reports in 2024.¹¹⁸

Venezuela reported the completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations in 2013.¹¹⁹ In August 2018, local media reports said that Venezuelan military personnel were wounded by an antipersonnel mine in Catatumbo municipality, Zulia state, along the border with Colombia.¹²⁰ Colombian NSAGs were reported to be using improvised mines in the area

¹¹¹ UNOCHA, “Mozambique: Access Snapshot - Cabo Delgado Province, as of 31 July 2025,” 31 July 2025, bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique31July2025; UNOCHA, “Mozambique Access Snapshot - Cabo Delgado Province - April 2024,” 31 May 2024, bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique31May2024; UNOCHA, “Mozambique Access Snapshot - Cabo Delgado Province - as of 31 July 2024,” 13 September 2024, bit.ly/UNOCHAMozambique13Sept2024; ACLED, Zitamar News, and Mediacoop, “Mozambique Conflict Monitor - Cabo Ligado,” undated, www.caboligado.com/reports; Omardine Omar, “Terrorists say they used explosive devices to destroy a military vehicle in Cabo Delgado,” *Integrity Magazine*, 16 January 2023, bit.ly/IntegrityMagazine16Jan2023; and World Health Organization (WHO), “Mozambique: Cabo Delgado Humanitarian Response, Health Cluster Bulletin No. 03,” 31 March 2023, bit.ly/WHOCaboDelgado31March2023.

¹¹² Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 1.

¹¹³ Philippines Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2019), Form I; and Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD), “Philippines,” undated, bit.ly/FSDPhilippines.

¹¹⁴ Statement of the Philippines, Mine Ban Treaty Twentieth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2022, bit.ly/PhilippinesStatement25Nov2022.

¹¹⁵ Henrique Garbino, “Rebels against Mines? Legitimacy and Restraint on Landmine Use in the Philippines,” *Security Studies*, Volume 32, Issue 3, 23 June 2023, bit.ly/Garbino23June2023; Barnaby Papadopoulos, “Abu Sayyaf and suicide bombings in the Philippines: an analysis,” Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), 9 March 2021, bit.ly/AOAV9March2021; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Paul Davies, Country Director, FSD France, 20 April 2020.

¹¹⁶ “Terror Attacks Increase in Togo as Sahel Extremists Encroach,” *Africa Defense Forum*, 25 July 2024, bit.ly/AfricaDefenseForum25July2024; “Togo: Over 30 dead in ‘terrorist attacks’ in 2023,” *Africanews*, undated, bit.ly/AfricanewsTogo2023; incident notes documented within ACLED data for conflict incidents in Togo between January 2022 and December 2023; and Kars de Bruijne, “Conflict in the Penta-Border Area: Benin’s Northern Jihad from the Perspective of its Neighbours,” Clingendael, December 2022, p. 9, bit.ly/BeninBorderConflictDec2022.

¹¹⁷ Tunisia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period April 2022–April 2023), Forms C and F.

¹¹⁸ The exception is 2022, when no new use of improvised antipersonnel mines was recorded. Monitor media monitoring and analysis of ACLED data for Tunisia for 2013–2024.

¹¹⁹ International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC), “Country Profile: Venezuela: Mine Action,” updated 9 October 2014, bit.ly/VenezuelaMineAction2014.

¹²⁰ “Venezuelan military killed by antipersonnel mine at the border with Colombia,” *France 24*, 6 August 2018, bit.ly/France24-6Aug2018.

in 2020 and 2021.¹²¹ After a confrontation in March 2021 between Venezuelan troops and dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC) in Victoria, Apure state, a Venezuelan non-governmental organization (NGO) stated that mines “similar to those used in Colombia” were found in the area.¹²² Mine contamination was later alleged by a member of parliament and the Venezuelan Ministry of Defense; and the Monitor reported eight casualties caused by improvised mines in this area in 2022.¹²³ Venezuela reported that the military would clear the area, but also requested UN support to clear mines from the border.¹²⁴ As of October 2025, no update was available on the progress of clearance in this area.

STATES PARTIES WITH RESIDUAL CONTAMINATION

Within the Mine Ban Treaty, “residual contamination” is understood as unknown antipersonnel mine contamination under a State Party’s jurisdiction or control after all known or suspected mined areas have been processed and considered fit for normal human use.¹²⁵ Five States Parties are known or suspected to have residual mine contamination as of the end of 2024.

Algeria declared the completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations in December 2016.¹²⁶ However, it has continued to find and destroy a significant number of antipersonnel mines each year since 2016. This includes mines along the southern Algerian–Moroccan border and mines that moved (due to wind and other natural factors) from areas where they were originally laid along the Challe and Morice Lines in the 1950s.¹²⁷ For 2024, Algeria reported the discovery and destruction of 700 antipersonnel mines in both areas. Since 2017, Algeria has destroyed a total of 24,438 of these “scattered and isolated” antipersonnel mines.¹²⁸

Kuwait last provided an Article 7 transparency report in 2010, stating that there are “no mined areas left in Kuwait recently and formally.”¹²⁹ Kuwait has however had mine/ERW casualties with injuries consistent with antipersonnel mines every year since 2000, including two casualties in 2024.¹³⁰ Landmines are believed to be present mainly on Kuwait’s borders with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, in areas where temporary foreign workers act as shepherds who graze animals. In June 2025, Kuwait reported that the government declared the clearance of 28.86km² of land, including over 95% of the land that was contaminated with landmines following the Gulf War. It also reported that, so far, it has destroyed 1,127,686 antipersonnel mines.¹³¹ Kuwait has, however, never made a formal declaration of contamination in line with its Article 5 obligations.

121 Jan Philip Klever, “Antipersonnel mines in Colombia, silent weapons preventing development,” *El Espectador*, 4 April 2021, bit.ly/ElEspectador4April2021; and Owen Boed, “Colombia’s Doubtful Progress Against Landmines,” *InSight Crime*, 20 October 2020, bit.ly/InsightCrime20Oct2020.

122 “Clash between Venezuelan Armed Forces and FARC dissidents in Apure,” *NTN24*, 21 March 2021, bit.ly/NTN24-21March2021.

123 “Chavist member of Parliament confirmed FARC dissidents found antipersonnel mines in Apure,” *El Nacional*, 24 March 2021, bit.ly/ElNacional24March2021; and Monitor media monitoring of improvised mine incidents in Venezuela during 2022; and “Venezuela reports 8 deaths from landmines placed by armed groups,” *Agencia EFE*, 11 February 2022, bit.ly/EFE11Feb2022.

124 “Venezuela to request UN aid to clear mines from Colombia border,” *France 24*, 5 April 2021, bit.ly/France24-5April2021; and “Venezuelan Army to Begin Clearing Mines in Apure State near Colombian Border,” *Orinoco Tribune*, 16 April 2021, bit.ly/OrinocoTribune16Apr2021.

125 Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Reflections and understandings on the implementation and completion of Article 5 mine clearance obligations,” 22 October 2018, p. 6, bit.ly/MBTArt5Committee22Oct2018.

126 Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 22 December 2017, p. 4, docs.un.org/aplc/msp.16/2017/11.

127 Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D.

128 Ibid.

129 Kuwait Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period April 2009–March 2010), p. 5.

130 “Death of an Egyptian in Kuwait Due to Mine Explosion,” *Waradana*, 12 September 2024, bit.ly/Waradana12Sept2024; and “Tragic Mine Blast Claims Life of Bangladeshi Guard,” *Arab Times*, 28 May 2024, bit.ly/ArabTimes28May2024.

131 Statement of Kuwait, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19 June 2025, bit.ly/KuwaitStatement19June2025.

Mozambique completed its Article 5 clearance obligations in 2015 but has since reported residual and isolated mine contamination throughout the country.¹³² Four small suspected mined areas, totaling 1,881m², were reported in 2018 to be located underwater in Inhambane province. Mozambique stated at the time that it would address this contamination once the water level had receded, allowing access.¹³³ Mozambique provided an Article 7 report for 2024, but it has not provided updates on progress in these areas since 2019.¹³⁴

Nicaragua declared the completion of clearance under Article 5 in April 2010. However, it has since found residual contamination.¹³⁵ Since 2020, reports from the public resulted in the clearance of 63,331m² and the destruction of 155 mines and 20,439 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The last mines were found in 2022.¹³⁶

Tunisia reported in 2009 the clearance of all minefields laid in 1976 and 1980 along its borders with Algeria and Libya.¹³⁷ Yet, since then, it has reported a residual mine/ERW threat dating from World War II in El Hamma, Mareth, and Matmata in the south; Faiedh and Kasserine in the center of the country; Cap-Bon in the north; and other areas in the northwest.¹³⁸ As of October 2025, Tunisia had not provided updates on efforts to clear this residual contamination.

ANTIPERSONNEL MINE CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS

Twenty-two states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and three other areas are, or are believed to be, contaminated by antipersonnel mines.

States not party and other areas with confirmed or suspected antipersonnel mine contamination¹³⁹

Armenia	Kyrgyzstan	South Korea
Azerbaijan	Lao PDR	Syria
China	Lebanon	Uzbekistan
Cuba	Libya	Vietnam
Egypt	Morocco	<i>Kosovo</i>
Georgia	Myanmar	<i>Somaliland</i>
India	North Korea	<i>Western Sahara</i>
Iran	Pakistan	
Israel	Russia	

Note: Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

¹³² Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), p. 1.

¹³³ Statement of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018, bit.ly/StatementMozambiqueJune2018; and Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 20 April 2017–1 April 2018), Form F. Mozambique erroneously reported that the total of the areas was “18.888 square meters” in its statement at the intersessional meetings in 2019, and “1.118m²” across four tasks in its 2019 Article 7 transparency report. See, Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 1 April 2018–31 March 2019), Form C.

¹³⁴ Mozambique Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024).

¹³⁵ See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Nicaragua: Mine Action,” last updated 17 September 2012, bit.ly/NicaraguaMineAction2012.

¹³⁶ Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar years 2022–2024), p. 4.

¹³⁷ APMBC, “Tunisia: Article 5 (Mine Clearance),” undated, bit.ly/MBTMembershipTunisia.

¹³⁸ Tunisia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period April 2024–April 2025), Form C. See also, Tunisia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period April 2011–April 2012), Form C.

¹³⁹ Nagorno-Karabakh—formerly listed as an “other area”—is now considered part of the territory of Azerbaijan, as it ceased to exist as of January 2024. See, Piotr Sauer, “Nagorno-Karabakh’s breakaway government says it will dissolve itself,” *The Guardian*, 28 September 2023, bit.ly/TheGuardian28Sept2023; and Laurence Broers, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic: The life and death of an unrecognized state,” *Eurasianet*, 2 January 2024, bit.ly/Eurasianet2Jan2024.

EXTENT OF CONTAMINATION IN STATES NOT PARTY

Armenia reported 114 CHAs and 22 SHAs contaminated with mines and explosive ordnance totaling 43.54km² as of the end of December 2024.¹⁴⁰ This is an increase from the contaminated area reported as of the end of December 2023 (42.17km²), with Gegharkunik and Syunik still the most affected regions.¹⁴¹

In recent years, **Azerbaijan** gained control of two territories known to be severely contaminated.¹⁴² As of April 2025, Azerbaijan reported a total of 9,878.17km² (1,745.26km² CHA and 8,132.91km² SHA) of mixed contamination including antipersonnel and improvised mines in territory under its control.¹⁴³

For **Georgia**, as of May 2023, five landmine contaminated areas were reported in the Tbilisi-administered territory, totaling 2.25km² (0.02km² contaminated by antipersonnel mines and 2.23km² of mixed contamination, including antivehicle mines). The largest minefield (2.2km²) is known as the “Red Bridge”—a seven-kilometer-long mine belt along Georgia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Armenia. However, the full extent of contamination in these areas remains to be confirmed.¹⁴⁴ As of the end of 2024, the same extent of contamination was reported.¹⁴⁵

Israel reported 90.09km² of contamination in 2017 (41.58km² CHA and 48.51km² SHA), including in areas in the West Bank.¹⁴⁶ No updated figures on contamination have been provided since 2017, although Israel has reported re-surveying and clearing mine-affected areas, and destroying 56,513 mines and ERW between 2017 and 2023.¹⁴⁷ The INMAA also provides an online map of registered mined areas, however, without specifying the extent and size of the areas.¹⁴⁸

Lebanon reported a total of 15.79km² (12.66 km² CHA and 3.13km² SHA) of land contaminated with antipersonnel mines in the Beqaa, Mount Lebanon, and South governorates, as of the end of 2024.¹⁴⁹ Despite the ongoing conflict that required a shift of land release priorities, this represents a decrease from the 16.17km² reported as of the end of 2023.¹⁵⁰

Libya has gained a better understanding of the extent of antipersonnel mine contamination compared to previous years. The Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC) reported antipersonnel

¹⁴⁰ Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise (CHDE), “National Mine Action Authority the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise sums up the activities implemented in 2024,” 8 January 2025, bit.ly/CHDE8Jan2025.

¹⁴¹ CHDE, “National Mine Action Authority the Center for Humanitarian Demining and Expertise sums up the activities carried out in 2023,” 29 December 2023, bit.ly/CHDE29Dec2023.

¹⁴² After the end of the conflict in 2020, the Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA) reported that there were “obvious minefields” and that the entire region “will be surveyed to register the mine and ERW affected regions.” Due to changes in the affected territories, strategic and operational plans were under review in 2021. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Elnur Gasimov, Operations Manager, ANAMA, 7 March 2021; and Burç Eruygur, “Azerbaijan says Armenia presented 8 new maps on minefields in Karabakh,” *Anadolu Agency*, 12 February 2024, bit.ly/AnadoluAgency12Feb2024.

¹⁴³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Yagizarov Shamil, Head of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Division of the Information Management Department, ANAMA, 15 September 2025.

¹⁴⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Rachael Rosenberg, Partnerships and Programme Support Manager, The HALO Trust, 15 May 2023.

¹⁴⁵ ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2024,” undated [2025], p. 62, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2024.

¹⁴⁶ Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, INMAA, 26 May 2018.

¹⁴⁷ Israel Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Article 13 Reports (for calendar years 2017–2023), Form B. See, CCW Amended Protocol II Database, bit.ly/CCWAmendedProtocol2Database.

¹⁴⁸ Palestine Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 16–19; and INMAA, “Map of mined areas,” undated, bit.ly/INMAAMinedAreasMap.

¹⁴⁹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC), 14 March 2025; and LMAC, “Annual Report 2024,” undated, p. 19.

¹⁵⁰ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lt.-Col. Charbel Njeim, Operations Section Head, LMAC, 8 April 2024.

mine contamination of 280.42km² (56.21km² CHA and 224.21km² SHA) and another 20.86km² of mixed contamination, as of the end of 2024.¹⁵¹ Furthermore, in July 2025, it was announced that the Libya National Mine Action Strategy, which outlines how to best address the contamination, was currently under development.¹⁵²

In **Myanmar**, the extent of landmine contamination is not known, but expected to be extensive given the ongoing use and production of mines by both Myanmar Armed Forces and NSAGs, with reports of increased use and production since the military coup in February 2021.¹⁵³ As of October 2025, suspected mine/ERW contamination was reported in 211 of Myanmar's townships—amounting to 64% of all townships—which is an increase from the 190 suspected contaminated townships in October 2023.¹⁵⁴

North Korea has laid more than one million mines in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that separates the country from South Korea, but the full extent of contamination is not known.¹⁵⁵ In 2024, the Korean Campaign to Ban Landmines shared information about North Korea laying new mines in the DMZ and along North Korea's border with China to prevent defections and smuggling.¹⁵⁶ In March 2025, the South Korean military reported multiple North Korean casualties as a result of a landmine explosion that occurred while North Korean troops were reportedly enhancing front-line fortifications.¹⁵⁷ Reports indicate that mines are laid not only along the main traffic axes but also in mountainous areas and fields, including on Arrowhead Hill where joint demining operations previously took place.¹⁵⁸

South Korea has also laid mines in the DMZ but has reported not to have done so in recent years.¹⁵⁹ In June 2025, South Korea warned of the possibility of antipersonnel mines being displaced from the DMZ after heavy rains.¹⁶⁰ Such displacements are known to have taken place previously.¹⁶¹

151 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Abdullatif Abujarida, Head of Information Management Department, Libyan Mine Action Centre (LibMAC), 18 March 2025.

152 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), "Charting a mine-free future: UNSMIL and Italy convene Libya's first Mine Action Support Group," 31 July 2025, bit.ly/UNSMIL31July2025.

153 The Monitor has documented extensive use of antipersonnel landmines by the Myanmar Armed Forces and by various non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in Myanmar since the first annual Landmine Monitor report was published in 1999. See, ICBL-CMC, "Country Profile: Myanmar/Burma: Mine Ban Policy," bit.ly/MyanmarCountryProfile.

154 Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), "Myanmar's Landmine Contamination and Casualties Map and Infographics," undated, bit.ly/MIMUMineAction. The MIMU infographic uses data collected by the Monitor.

155 Joe He-rim, "Tall order to transform DMZ minefield into peace zone," *The Korea Herald*, 28 October 2019, bit.ly/KoreaHerald28Oct2019; and Guy Rhodes, "Confidence-Building through Mine Action on the Korean Peninsula," *The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction*, Vol. 24, Issue 1, July 2020, p. 11, bit.ly/GuyRhodesJul2020.

156 Emails from Soohong Eum, Peace Sharing Association (PSA), 29 April, 18 May, 27 May, 18 June, and 17 July 2024.

157 Jooheon Kim and Joon Ha Park, "North Korean troops suffer multiple casualties in border landmine explosion: ROK," *NK News*, 27 March 2025, bit.ly/NKNews27March2025.

158 Emails from Soohong Eum, PSA, 29 April and 18 May 2024.

159 Response from Jung Ji-yoon, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Policy Division, Policy Planning Bureau, Office of National Defense Policy, South Korea Ministry of National Defense, to an Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, 19 June 2023. Previously, Ministry of National Defense officials stated that no new non-self-destructing mines had been laid in 2020. Response from Lee Yoo-jung, Deputy Director, Arms Control Division, North Korea Policy Bureau, Office of National Defense Policy, South Korea Ministry of National Defense, to an Official Information Disclosure Request by World Without War, 22 April 2021.

160 "Military warns of North Korean land mines washing into South," *Korea JoongAng Daily*, 23 June 2025, bit.ly/KoreaJoonAngDaily23June2025.

161 "Military Calls for Caution after N. Korea's Land Mines Swept Away in Monsoon Rain," *KBS World*, 17 July 2024, bit.ly/KBSWorld17July2024; Hyung-Jin Kim, "North Korean land mines could float into South Korea, South warns," *Associated Press*, 17 July 2024, bit.ly/AP17July2024; email from Soohong Eum, PSA, 17 July 2024; "Parts of North Korean land mines washing up in South," *Associated Press*, 29 July 2011, bit.ly/AssociatedPress29July2011; and "North Korea Wooden Land Mine Swept into South Korea," *Sputnik International*, 28 July 2017, bit.ly/SputnikInternational28July2017.

In **Syria**, contamination from landmines, including improvised mines and/or ERW, has been recorded across the country; however, a country-wide survey to determine the full extent of the contamination is still pending.¹⁶² In June 2025, UNMAS reported that, since January 2025, operators had identified 141 minefields and 450 CHAs in Northwest Syria alone, while survey was ongoing in Central and South Syria, and emergency responses in the form of EOD spot tasks remained the priority for Northeast Syria.¹⁶³

Landmines are also known or suspected to be located along the borders of several other states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including China, Cuba, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Morocco, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. Ongoing armed conflict, insecurity, and improvised mine contamination also affects states not party Egypt, India, and Pakistan.

OTHER AREAS

Three other areas, unable to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty due to their political status, are known to be contaminated: Kosovo, Somaliland, and Western Sahara.

The latest official update from **Kosovo** reported the remaining mine contamination to total 0.58km² (0.21km² CHA and 0.37km² SHA) as of the end of 2023, with an additional 0.42km² classified as mixed contamination, containing antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants.¹⁶⁴

Somaliland's contaminated areas totaled 3.4km² (1.1km² of antipersonnel mine contamination and 2.3km² of mixed contamination) as of the end of 2021.¹⁶⁵ Most of the mined areas in Somaliland are barrier or perimeter minefields around military bases.¹⁶⁶ In September 2023, The HALO Trust reported that it was conducting a baseline assessment to obtain a more accurate estimate of contamination.¹⁶⁷ No update on contamination was provided in 2024, but The HALO Trust reported that it had continued its land release operations within Somaliland and expanded its ongoing program into the Sanaag, Sool, and Cayn (SSC)-Khatumo region.¹⁶⁸

Western Sahara's minefields lie east of the Berm, a 2,700km-long wall built during the 1975–1991 conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco in the west and the Polisario Front in the east. These minefields are contaminated with antivehicle mines, but occasionally antipersonnel mines are also found.¹⁶⁹ As of the end of 2024, the contaminated area in Western Sahara covered 210km² (10 CHAs totaling 84.09km² and 14 SHAs totaling 125.91km²).¹⁷⁰ This represents a decrease from the 213.11km² reported in 2023.¹⁷¹

162 UNMAS, "Syria," updated June 2025, bit.ly/UNMASSyria.

163 Ibid.

164 As of July 2024, the European Union (EU) Office in Kosovo reported the remaining mine contamination to be more than 0.4km² without providing the source for this information. See, Europe House, "Kosovo Demining Action – Ensuring safety and opening tourism development paths," 11 July 2024, bit.ly/EuropeHouseKosovo11July2024. For this report, the Monitor used the figures provided by: Republic of Kosovo, "Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025–2030," 18 June 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/KosovoStrategy2025-2030; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Ahmet Sallova, Director, Kosovo Mine Action Center (KMAC), 24 April 2023.

165 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Lucia Pantigoso Vargas, Somaliland Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 26 March 2022.

166 Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Aislinn Redbond, Somaliland Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 31 July 2023 and 26 March 2022.

167 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Aislinn Redbond, Somaliland Programme Officer, The HALO Trust, 20 September 2023.

168 The HALO Trust, "The HALO Trust, Annual Report and Financial Statements: 31 March 2024," 31 March 2024, p. 11, bit.ly/HALOTrustAnnualReport2024.

169 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kebe Elhadji, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 22 April 2024.

170 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kebe Elhadji, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 28 March 2025.

171 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kebe Elhadji, Chief of Mine Action Program, UNMAS, 22 April 2024.

STATES PARTIES PROGRESS TOWARDS CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES

Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty obligates each State Party to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel landmines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after entry into force of the treaty for that State Party.

An Article 5 extension request is a formal submission by a State Party seeking additional time beyond its current treaty-mandated clearance deadline in order to complete its obligations to clear all known or suspected mined areas. Article 5 extension requests are considered and decided upon by the States Parties at the treaty's Meetings of States Parties and Review Conferences.

If a State Party discovers new or previously unknown mined areas after its Article 5 deadline has expired, or if new contamination occurs where there was previously none, or if no previous clearance deadline exists, the State Party must promptly notify all States Parties and destroy the mines as soon as possible. If it is not able to complete clearance before the next formal meeting of the treaty (Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference), it should submit a request for an extended Article 5 deadline.

STATES PARTIES PROGRESS TOWARDS CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES: 2024 OVERVIEW

In 2024, 24 of the 33 States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines released a combined total of 1,114.82km² of hazardous area and destroyed at least 105,640 antipersonnel landmines. The land release totals for 2024 represent an increase from the 693.91km² released in 2023 but a decrease from the at least 160,566 antipersonnel mines destroyed that same year.

Of the 24 States Parties that reported releasing mine contaminated land in 2024, 10 released less and 14 released more than in 2023.¹⁷² With the exception of Oman and Serbia, all 24 states released land using more than one method (clearance, technical survey, and/or non-technical survey).

In 2024, Cambodia, Croatia, and Yemen were the States Parties that released the most land through clearance, while Ethiopia, Iraq, and Somalia were the States Parties that released the most land through technical survey or non-technical survey. Ethiopia, Iraq, and Cambodia released the most land in total through either of the land release methodologies.

Nine States Parties released more than 10km² in 2024: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Croatia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Somalia, Ukraine, and Yemen.


Angola, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe all released between 1km² and 10 km², while the DRC, Ecuador, Mauritania, Oman, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, and South Sudan released less than 1km².

Three States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines reported clearing improvised mines in 2024: Afghanistan, Colombia, and Iraq.


Four States Parties with Article 5 obligation deadlines did not report releasing areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines in 2024: Argentina, Chad, Niger, and Sudan.

¹⁷² The 10 States Parties that released less land in 2024 than in 2023 are: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mauritania, Peru, Thailand, and Türkiye. The 14 States Parties that released more land in 2024 than in 2023 are: Croatia, DRC, Ethiopia, Iraq, Oman, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Land release by States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines in 2024¹⁷³



Explosive ordnance including mines cleared and destroyed by States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines in 2024¹⁷⁴



Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

¹⁷³ The chart does not include land cleared or reduced through technical survey by Afghanistan (10.04km²) and land reduced or canceled by Croatia (9.21km²) as the provided data was not sufficiently disaggregated by land release methodology. The high figure for canceled land in 2024 is largely due to database cleanup followed by on-site assessments undertaken by Ethiopia, which resulted in the removal of close to 600km² of land previously suspected to be contaminated from Ethiopia's national contamination database.

¹⁷⁴ In addition to antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, improvised mines, and cluster munition remnants, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq reported unexploded ordnance (UXO), while the Republic of Iraq reported "other explosive items." These have been counted as ERW. Iraq, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, and Yemen all also reported the clearance and destruction of 805 IEDs without providing sufficient information about whether they should be classified as improvised mines. These are not included in the chart. The 1,550,499 destroyed ERW reported by the DRC were not included in the chart as the high number seems unrealistic and the DRC did not provide any further information (e.g., if this number contains small arms ammunition destroyed). Guinea-Bissau reported the destruction of 227 explosive devices without further disaggregating the devices by type, and thus are not included in the chart. Three antipersonnel mines and two antivehicle mines destroyed on the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas are also included in the chart, even though not reported in Argentina's Article 7 report. The chart does not include data from the following States Parties with clearance obligations as they did not report on destroyed ordnance or did not destroy any ordnance in 2024: Argentina, Chad, Cyprus, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Palestine.

Release of antipersonnel contaminated land in States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines in 2024 compared with 2023¹⁷⁵

State Party	2024		2023	
	Land Release (km ²)	APM destroyed	Land Release (km ²)	APM destroyed
Afghanistan	49.15	5,417	77.72	4,168

¹⁷⁵ Total figures reported for antipersonnel mines destroyed include improvised mines, where applicable and available. Clearance figures for 2024 are from Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports for calendar year 2024, unless otherwise stated. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT. Clearance figures for 2023 are from 2024 Monitor reporting. It is acknowledged that States Parties sometimes update their land release figures for previous years. For its reporting, the Monitor relies on figures provided during the relevant reporting period. **Afghanistan:** The figure reported in the table includes land release of antipersonnel mine and improvised mine contamination. During the reported land release activities, 695 antipersonnel mines and 4,722 improvised mines were destroyed. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025; and emails from Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 10 June, 30 June, and 9 July 2025. **Angola:** The 4,586 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2023 include 14 destroyed during battle area clearance (BAC) and 122 destroyed during land clearance activities in support of development projects in areas not registered in the IMSMA database. **BiH:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ivan Dunder, Deputy Director of Operations, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 15 March 2025. **Cambodia:** The figure for antipersonnel mines destroyed provided in the Article 7 report for calendar year 2024 is 4,849. For its reporting, the Monitor relies on figures provided by the CMAA as they include antipersonnel mines destroyed during explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Chansideth Chim, Director of Regulation and Monitoring Department, CMAA, 4 June 2025. **Chad:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations, HCND, 22 April 2025. **Colombia:** In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2024, Colombia reported the destruction of 193 antipersonnel mines. The Monitor considers these to be improvised mines. **Croatia:** The total number of antipersonnel mines destroyed reported by Croatia in its Article 7 report and through the Monitor questionnaire is 1,395. However, the breakdown of antipersonnel mines destroyed by the Civil Protection Directorate/Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC) (1,102) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) (295) on p. 9 of the Article 7 report accounts for 1,397. The figures shown in the table are extracted from p. 9 of the Article 7 report. **DRC:** Figures for land release as of the end of 2024 differ in the various documentation provided by the DRC in 2025. The Monitor has used the more detailed figures from the response to the Monitor questionnaire by Joseph Lukongola, Chief of Operations, CCLAM, 1 April 2025. **Ethiopia:** Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 7 August 2025, p. 26, bit.ly/EthiopiaArt5ExtRequestAug2025. Ethiopia's high land release figure for 2024 is largely due to database cleanup followed by on-site assessments, which resulted in the removal from its national contamination database of 599.67km² of land that was previously suspected to be contaminated. **Guinea-Bissau:** Guinea-Bissau reported the destruction of 227 explosive devices and the release of 427,114m² during BAC and EOD spot tasks in 2024. These figures have not been added to the table as they are not sufficiently disaggregated to specify any mined areas cleared or antipersonnel mines destroyed. **Iraq:** The released land contained mixed contamination. The figure of destroyed mines includes 8,519 antipersonnel mines and 6,169 improvised mines. The land release figure includes canceled land that has been reported by the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) as "electronically cleared." IKMAA further reported 0.44km² of "visually checked" land and 0.12km² of "prepared" land in 2024. These figures have not been included in the table. **Mauritania:** Mauritania reported the release of 0.04km² through technical survey and 0.02km² through clearance but did not report on any explosive ordnance destroyed. HAMAP-Humanitaire reported releasing 0.12km² through technical survey and destroying 17 antipersonnel mines. The Monitor has taken the land release figures from Mauritania's Article 7 report but added the 17 mines destroyed reported by HAMAP-Humanitaire. Email from Julien Kempeneers, Project Manager, HAMAP-Humanitaire, 6 October 2025. **Senegal:** Figures for land release and destroyed antipersonnel mines as of the end of 2024 differ slightly in the various documentation provided by Senegal in 2025. The Monitor has used the most recent figures from the statement of Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/SenegalStatement18June2025. **South Sudan:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025. **Sri Lanka:** The figures reported in Sri Lanka's Article 7 report and through the Monitor questionnaire differ. The Monitor used the more detailed figures from the Article 7 report. Figures provided in the Monitor questionnaire: 6.75km² released and 68,834 antipersonnel mines destroyed. Compared with 2023, the figures reported in the Article 7 report for 2024 appear to be significantly underestimated, while the figures reported in the Monitor questionnaire are likely overestimated. In addition, the release of 1.73km² of land contaminated with IEDs was reported, including 237 IEDs destroyed. The IEDs were not categorized as improvised mines. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dilhan Iddamalgoda, Mine Action Officer, Regional Mine Action Office Sri Lanka, 27 March 2025. **Sudan:** Sudan reported the release of 3.4km² of mixed contamination. However, the land released is not part of the identified mine contamination; and during clearance, only UXO were found. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Asaad Ibrahim, IMSMA Department Manager, SNMAC, 11 March 2025; and email from Asaad Ibrahim, IMSMA Department Manager, SNMAC, 23 September 2025. **Tajikistan:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC), 3 April 2024; and Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 16 October 2025, pp. 30 and 36, bit.ly/TajikistanArt5ExtRequestOct2025. **Ukraine:** It was reported that, since the invasion by Russian troops up until the end of December 2023, 1,135.06km² had been surveyed and demined. The figures were not included in the table figures for 2023, as neither the type of contamination nor the items destroyed were specified. Furthermore, the data was not disaggregated by year. Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Updated Workplan, 30 April 2025, Annex 2, p. 10, bit.ly/UkraineWorkplanMBTApr2025. **Yemen:** Yemen reported the destruction of 563 IEDs that are assumed to include improvised mines. However, as Yemen did not provide any further details about the findings, these items have not been included in the table.

State Party	2024		2023	
	Land Release (km ²)	APM destroyed	Land Release (km ²)	APM destroyed
Angola	5.55	5,680	10.6	4,586
Argentina*	0	0	0	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	15.46	574	31.50	786
Cambodia	100.08	7,751	328.02	23,946
Chad	0	0	1.69	5
Colombia	1.47	193	1.88	339
Croatia	51.72	1,397	47.1	797
Cyprus**	N/R	N/R	0	0
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.1	31	0.02	4
Ecuador	0.01	367	0.01	8
Eritrea	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
Ethiopia	600.11	17	N/R	N/R
Guinea-Bissau	Unclear	Unclear	0	1
Iraq	148.76	14,688	145.77	16,756
Mauritania	0.06	17	0.13	133
Niger	0	0	0	0
Nigeria	N/R	N/R	N/R	N/R
Oman	0.09	0	N/R	N/R
Palestine	N/R	N/R	0.01	33
Peru	0.02	746	0.05	2,136
Senegal	0.11	17	0.07	13
Serbia	0.12	0	0	0
Somalia***	67.18	4	2.53	11
South Sudan	0.77	168	0.6	86
Sri Lanka	6.05	1,407	5.63	19,212
Sudan	0	0	N/R	N/R
Tajikistan	1.7	2,777	1.26	1,127
Thailand	5.22	17,600	8.76	15,085
Türkiye	5.74	179	5.96	33,443
Ukraine	28.37	14,142	Not available	Not available
Yemen***	22.59	793	22.38	561
Zimbabwe	4.39	31,672	2.31	37,330
Total****	1,114.82	105,640	693.91	160,566

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; N/R=not reported.

*Argentina was mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory and reported completion of mine clearance in 2020. Argentina has not yet acknowledged completion.

**Cyprus has stated that no areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines remain under Cypriot control.

***Clearance of mixed/undifferentiated contamination that included antipersonnel mines.

****Three antipersonnel mines discovered on the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas in late 2023 have been added to the destroyed antipersonnel mines in 2024 following the official reporting of completion of follow-up clearance of the concerned area (where no further mines were discovered).

STATUS OF ARTICLE 5 COMPLETION (AS OF 1 OCTOBER 2025)

Summary of Article 5 deadline extension requests¹⁷⁶

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
Afghanistan	1 March 2013	10 years (1 st) 2 years (2 nd) 5 years (3 rd)	1 March 2030	On target
Angola	1 January 2013	5 years (1 st) 8 years (2 nd)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2030 (5 years)
Argentina	1 March 2010	10 years (1 st) 3 years (2 nd) 3 years (3 rd)	1 March 2026	Requested extension until 1 March 2029 (3 years)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	1 March 2009	10 years (1 st) 2 years (2 nd) 6 years (3 rd)	1 March 2027	Behind target
Burkina Faso*	1 March 2009	N/A	1 March 2009 (expired)	Requested extension until 31 December 2028 (3 years)
Cambodia	1 January 2010	10 years (1 st) 6 years (2 nd)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2030 (5 years)
Chad	1 November 2009	1 year and 2 months (1 st) 3 years (2 nd) 6 years (3 rd) 5 years (4 th) 5 years (5 th)	1 January 2030	Progress to target uncertain
Colombia	1 March 2011	10 years (1 st) 4 years and 10 months (2 nd)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2030 (5 years)
Croatia	1 March 2009	10 years (1 st) 7 years (2 nd)	1 March 2026	On target

¹⁷⁶ Where the status is reported to be “behind target,” it indicates that the relevant State Party will not be able to fulfill its current Article 5 clearance deadline if it maintains the clearance pace reported for 2024.

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
Cyprus	1 July 2013	3 years (1 st) 3 years (2 nd) 3 years (3 rd) 3 years (4 th) 3 years (5 th)	1 July 2028	Progress to target uncertain
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	1 November 2012	2 years and 2 months (1 st) 6 years (2 nd) 1 year and 6 months (3 rd) 3 years and 6 months (4 th)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2028 (3 years)
Ecuador	1 October 2009	8 years (1 st) 3 months (2 nd) 5 years (3 rd) 3 years (4 th)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2027 (2 years)
Eritrea	1 February 2012	3 years (1 st) 5 years (2 nd) 11 months (3 rd) 2 years (4 th) 3 years (5 th)	31 December 2027	Progress to target uncertain
Ethiopia	1 June 2015	5 years (1 st) 5 years and 7 months (2 nd)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2030 (5 years)
Guinea-Bissau	1 November 2011	2 months (1 st) 1 year (2 nd) 2 years (3 rd) 3 years (4 th)	31 December 2027	Progress to target uncertain
Iraq	1 February 2018	10 years (1 st)	1 February 2028	Behind target
Mauritania	1 January 2011	5 years (1 st) 5 years (2 nd) 1 year (3 rd) 5 years (4 th)	31 December 2026	Behind target
Niger**	1 September 2009	2 years (1 st) 1 year (2 nd) 4 years (3 rd) 4 years (4 th) 5 years (5 th)	31 December 2029	Progress to target uncertain
Nigeria***	1 March 2012	1 year (1 st) 4 years (2 nd)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2028 (3 years)
Palestine	1 June 2028	N/A	1 June 2028	Progress to target uncertain

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
Peru	1 March 2009	8 years (1 st) 7 years and 10 months (2 nd) 5 years (3 rd)	31 December 2029	Behind target
Senegal	1 March 2009	7 years (1 st) 5 years (2 nd) 5 years (3 rd)	1 March 2026	Request announced but not yet submitted
Serbia	1 March 2014	5 years (1 st) 4 years (2 nd) 1 year and 10 months (3 rd) 2 years (4 th)	31 December 2026	On target
Somalia	1 October 2022	5 years (1 st)	1 October 2027	Progress to target uncertain
South Sudan	9 July 2021	5 years (1 st)	9 July 2026	Requested extension until 9 July 2030 (4 years)
Sri Lanka	1 June 2028	N/A	1 June 2028	Behind target
Sudan	1 April 2014	5 years (1 st) 4 years (2 nd) 4 years (3 rd)	1 April 2027	Progress to target uncertain
Tajikistan	1 April 2010	10 years (1 st) 5 years and 9 months (2 nd)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2032 (7 years)
Thailand	1 May 2009	9 years and 6 months (1 st) 5 years (2 nd) 3 years and 2 months (3 rd)	31 December 2026	Behind target
Türkiye	1 March 2014	8 years (1 st) 3 years and 10 months (2 nd)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2030 (5 years)
Ukraine	1 June 2016	5 years (1 st) 2 years and 6 months (2 nd) 10 years (3 rd)	1 December 2033	Progress to target uncertain
Yemen	1 March 2009	6 years (1 st) 5 years (2 nd) 3 years (3 rd) 5 years (4 th)	1 March 2028	On target

State Party	Original deadline	Extension period (Number of requests)	Current deadline	Status
Zimbabwe	1 March 2009	1 year and 10 months (1 st) 2 years (2 nd) 2 years (3 rd) 3 years (4 th) 8 years (5 th)	31 December 2025	Requested extension until 31 December 2030 (5 years)

Note: N/A=not applicable.

*In 2008, Burkina Faso declared that there were no areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control. In 2024, Burkina Faso informed States Parties of the presence of improvised mines, and submitted its first extension request in April 2025.

**In 2008, Niger declared that there were no remaining areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. In May 2012, Niger informed States Parties of suspected and confirmed mined areas. Not until July 2013 did Niger request its first extension to the deadline that had already expired in 2009.

***In 2019, seven years after its initial deadline, Nigeria declared newly mined areas and, in 2020, submitted a first extension request to its initial, already-expired deadline.

Of the 32 States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines as of October 2025, only four—Afghanistan, Croatia, Serbia, and Yemen—were on target to meet their respective current deadlines. Six States Parties—BiH, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Thailand—were not on target to meet their deadlines given their current annual land release rate. The progress to target was uncertain for all other States Parties that did not submit an extension request, or did not yet indicate plans to do so.

Only States Parties Palestine and Sri Lanka were still working towards their initial 10-year clearance deadline of 1 June 2028. All other States Parties have requested up to six extensions. Twenty-six of the 32 countries with current clearance obligation deadlines have by now been working towards completion for the last 20 years or more, with BiH, Chad, Croatia, Ecuador, Niger, Peru, Senegal, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe all having not yet fulfilled clearance obligations since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force in 1999.

As of October 2025, 13 States Parties had submitted an Article 5 clearance deadline extension request in 2025, suggestive of a collective failure to meet the aspirational goal of a mine-free world by 2025—a goal adopted by States Parties in 2014 and reaffirmed in 2019. As of 1 October 2025, 10 States Parties with a current deadline of 2025 submitted an extension request to be considered during the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025: Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe.¹⁷⁷ Two States Parties with a current deadline in 2026 have also submitted an extension request in 2025: Argentina and South Sudan.¹⁷⁸

In addition, in accordance with the decision of the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties concerning cases in which States Parties discover previously unknown mined areas, Burkina Faso submitted an extension request in 2025 to gain a better understanding of the extent of its contamination with improvised mines.¹⁷⁹

Senegal has also expressed its intention of asking for an extension but has not provided further details.¹⁸⁰ As of 1 October 2025, Senegal had not yet submitted a formal request. If the request is not submitted by the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025, Senegal may find itself in non-compliance with its obligations under Article 5 given its current clearance deadline of 1 March 2026.

¹⁷⁷ Mine Ban Treaty, “Article 5 Extensions,” undated, bit.ly/MBTArticle5Extensions.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

¹⁸⁰ Statement of Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/SenegalStatement18June2025.

With the exception of Argentina, all States Parties that requested an extension in 2025 included a multi-year workplan for land release accompanied by a budget. However, the quality and details included in the provided workplans have varied significantly, with Burkina Faso, Cambodia, South Sudan, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe submitting the most complete and detailed plans. Nevertheless, all extension requests submitted in 2025 lacked sufficient details, predominantly with regard to the percentage of projected costs that had already been secured, the additional resources required, and a clear mobilization plan for raising those resources.

States Parties individual progress towards clearance obligation deadlines in 2024 and previous years

In 2024, **Afghanistan** released 49.15km² of land contaminated with antipersonnel mines and improvised mines, clearing a total of 695 antipersonnel and 4,722 improvised mines.¹⁸¹ The decrease in the total land released and antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2024 compared to 2023 is due to reduced funding and, consequently, decreased demining capacity. However, Afghanistan destroyed almost 2.5 times more improvised mines in 2024 than in the previous year.¹⁸² If Afghanistan succeeds in maintaining its current land release rate over the next five years, it is on track to meet its deadline of 1 March 2030, under its third extension request period.¹⁸³ Afghanistan had previously submitted an extension request in July 2022 for two years to gain additional time to understand how the demining sector in the country would develop.¹⁸⁴ Based on the information gained, the Taliban government (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan), submitted a new extension request that was granted during the Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap in November 2024.¹⁸⁵

As anticipated, **Angola** submitted its third Article 5 deadline extension request, for five years, in March 2025—Angola’s annual land release rate had consistently fallen behind the projection made in its 2019–2025 workplan.¹⁸⁶ Angola emphasized that more than half of the remaining contamination consists of complex minefields, slowing down the clearance process significantly, while decreased funding has also negatively affected the availability of demining capacities.¹⁸⁷ The slow progress was evident in the land release rate for 2024, which had almost halved compared with 2023.¹⁸⁸ Angola will still have to increase its annual land release rate to comply with its newly requested deadline of 31 December 2030.

Argentina is mine-affected by virtue of its assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas. The UK also claims sovereignty and exercises control over the territory. While the UK reported completion of mine clearance in 2020, three antipersonnel mines were destroyed in November 2023 in an area bordering previously cleared land at the beach of Hell’s Kitchen on the Murrell Peninsula. The discovery led to subsequent clearance

¹⁸¹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025; emails from Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 10 June, 30 June, and 9 July 2025; and Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

¹⁸² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Hamid Wardak, Operations/EOD Manager, DMAC, April 2024.

¹⁸³ Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] (for calendar year 2024), Form C; and email from Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 30 June 2025.

¹⁸⁴ Afghanistan Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 July 2022, bit.ly/AfghanistanMBT2ndArt5ExtRequestJul2022.

¹⁸⁵ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 5 November 2024, bit.ly/AfghanistanArt5ExtRequest2024.

¹⁸⁶ National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), “Detailed Work Plan for the Implementation of Article 5 of the Convention (2019–2025),” November 2018, Annex 1, p. 13, bit.ly/CNIDAH2019-2025Workplan; and Angola Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2025, bit.ly/AngolaArt5ExtRequestMarch2025.

¹⁸⁷ Presentation of Angola, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, pp. 4 and 6, bit.ly/AngolaPresentation18June2025.

¹⁸⁸ Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and Angola Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F.

activities for several weeks during which no further mines were discovered.¹⁸⁹ In addition, two antivehicle mines were found in August and December 2024 in Cape Pembroke and Yorkey Bay and subsequently destroyed.¹⁹⁰ Argentina has thus far not acknowledged the completion announced by the UK and submitted a fourth Article 5 deadline extension request in 2025, to extend its clearance deadline by three years until March 2029.¹⁹¹

BiH's land release progress in 2024 more than halved compared with 2023.¹⁹² Despite its plan to release almost five times as much land in 2025 and 2026 than in 2024, it will not be able to fulfill its clearance obligations according to its deadline of 1 March 2027.¹⁹³ BiH plans to submit an extension request and has indicated that the reasons for failing to comply with its current obligations were related to insufficient funding, human resources, technical equipment, and material, as well as a lack of adequate legislation. The Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC) stated that it has developed a plan for the completion of clearance in BiH. The plan considers different scenarios with new completion dates proposed for 2031, 2036, and 2043, depending on whether the conditions to speed up current clearance operations can be met.¹⁹⁴ As of June 2025, BiH aimed to submit the plan to the Council of Ministers for adoption.

Cambodia initially re-emphasized its commitment to meet its Article 5 deadline of 2025 and started to raise additional funds to facilitate an increase in demining capacity.¹⁹⁵ According to its revised workplan submitted in May 2023, it projected the release of 345.3km² of mined areas in 2023, and 168km² annually in both 2024 and 2025.¹⁹⁶ While it was close to achieving its 2023 target with the release of 328km² that year, Cambodia only released 100.08km² in 2024, clearly falling behind its annual projection due to the discovery of previously unknown mined areas, which added to the overall contamination remaining to be cleared.¹⁹⁷ Consequently, Cambodia submitted its third extension request, for an additional five years, in 2025. It includes a projection to release 130km² in 2026 and 78.5km² annually from 2027 to 2030.¹⁹⁸

¹⁸⁹ Falkland Islands Association, "Falkland Islands Newsletter," No 127, October 2024, p. 7, bit.ly/FalklandIslandsAssociationOct2024; "Falklands: mines discovered on a beach in Murrell Peninsula, north of Stanley," *MercoPress*, 29 November 2023, bit.ly/MercoPress29Nov2023; and Evelina Mezennaja, "Hell's Kitchen on the Murrell Peninsula is mine free," *Falkland Islands Television*, 13 April 2024, bit.ly/FITV13Apr2024.

¹⁹⁰ "Falklands: Explosive Disposal team locate and destroy a live anti vehicle landmine," *MercoPress*, 9 September 2024, bit.ly/MercoPress9Sept2024; and "Controlled mine explosion in the Falklands: the threat persists after the 2020 declaration," *El Observador*, 13 December 2024, bit.ly/ElObservador13Dec2024.

¹⁹¹ Argentina Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 March 2025, bit.ly/ArgentinaArt5ExtRequestMarch2025.

¹⁹² BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ivan Dunder, Deputy Director of Operations, BHMAC, 15 March 2025; and by Enis Horozović, Acting Director, BHMAC, 19 April 2024.

¹⁹³ BiH, "Mine Action Strategy in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Revised document for the period 2025-2027," 2024, p. 71, bit.ly/BiHStrategy2025-2027.

¹⁹⁴ Statement of BiH, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, pp. 4 and 7, bit.ly/BiHStatement18June2025.

¹⁹⁵ Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties, The Hague, 15–19 November 2021, bit.ly/CambodiaStatementNov2021; APMBC, "Revised Workplan Cambodia," 10 May 2023, p. 5, bit.ly/CambodiaRevisedWorkplan10May2023; and Lay Samean, "Mine-Free Kingdom 2025 goal gets big funding boost via new sub-decree," *The Phnom Penh Post*, 5 December 2022, bit.ly/PhnomPenhPost5Dec2022.

¹⁹⁶ APMBC, "Revised Workplan Cambodia," 10 May 2023, p. 4, bit.ly/CambodiaRevisedWorkplan10May2023.

¹⁹⁷ Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 7–8; response to Monitor questionnaire by Chansideth Chim, Director of Regulation and Monitoring Department, CMAA, 4 June 2025; and presentation of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, pp. 1–2, bit.ly/CambodiaPresentation18June2025.

¹⁹⁸ Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 30 September 2025, pp. 9, 25, and 31, bit.ly/CambodiaArt5ExtRequestSept2025.

Chad has not reported any land release activities for 2024. Its fifth extension request, for another five years until 1 January 2030, was granted in November 2024.¹⁹⁹

Colombia's land release rate of less than 2km² annually since 2022 has made it impossible to complete clearance of the remaining contamination according to its current deadline of 31 December 2025. Ongoing survey is also likely to add to the extent of contamination that needs to be addressed. Colombia therefore submitted its third extension request, for an additional 5 years, in March 2024, referring to a number of factors that negatively affected progress, including a decline in the availability of capacities due to decreased funding, challenges in accessing certain municipalities, and recontamination of areas.²⁰⁰

Croatia reported the release of 51.72 km², including contaminated land under military control, marking an increase from the land released in 2023.²⁰¹ With a total of 59.44km² of mine contaminated areas left to be cleared as of 1 January 2025, Croatia is currently expected to meet its current clearance deadline of 1 March 2026.²⁰²

In 2024, **Cyprus** reported that it had not undertaken any clearance in 2023 as no areas contaminated with antipersonnel mines are under its control, claiming that the contamination lies in minefields in Turkish-controlled Northern Cyprus and in the buffer zone.²⁰³ As a result, it submitted its fifth Article 5 deadline extension request in 2024, for three years until 1 July 2028, which was granted during the Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap.²⁰⁴ As of October 2025, Cyprus had not provided any updates or delivered a statement to inform of progress made in addressing the remaining landmine contamination in conjunction with **Türkiye**.²⁰⁵

Despite having less than 0.5km² of mined areas remaining, and slightly increased land release in 2024 compared with 2023, the **DRC** submitted its fifth deadline extension request, for another three years, on 10 June 2025.²⁰⁶ The DRC requested an extension due to a significant decrease in funding that resulted in reduced demining capacity, the discovery of previously unknown mined areas, and other humanitarian emergencies that had to be addressed.²⁰⁷ However, if the request is accepted during the Twenty-Second Meeting of States Parties in December 2025, the DRC will have to further increase its annual land release output to meet the new deadline of 31 December 2028.

Ecuador's land release rate has been slow over the past five years, including in 2024, despite the small extent of remaining contamination.²⁰⁸ This has resulted in insufficient progress towards meeting its Article 5 deadline in December 2025. Consequently, in July 2025, Ecuador submitted a fifth extension request, for an additional two years.²⁰⁹ Ecuador stated that this request is of an "extraordinary nature" and necessary due to the state's

¹⁹⁹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations, HCND, 22 April 2025.

²⁰⁰ Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2025, pp. 26–30, bit.ly/ColombiaArt5ExtRequestMarch2025; and presentation of Colombia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, pp. 3–5, bit.ly/ColombiaPresentation18June2025.

²⁰¹ Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Damir Trut, Director, CPD, 11 June 2024.

²⁰² Croatia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Damir Trut, Director General, CPD, 7 March 2025.

²⁰³ Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C.

²⁰⁴ Cyprus Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 8 March 2024, bit.ly/CyprusArt5ExtRequest8Mar2024.

²⁰⁵ "Rival Cypriot sides to work on removing landmines, other peace initiatives," *Reuters*, 2 April 2025, bit.ly/Reuters2Apr2025.

²⁰⁶ DRC Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 10 June 2025, bit.ly/DRCArt5ExtRequestJune2025.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, p. 9.

²⁰⁸ Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Forms C and G; and Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 4 September 2025, pp. 1 and 6–7, bit.ly/EcuadorArt5ExtRequestSept2025.

²⁰⁹ Ecuador Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 7 July 2025, bit.ly/EcuadorArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

readjustment of financial resources to prioritize security and mitigation measures related to the internal armed conflict and recent emergencies caused by natural disasters.²¹⁰

In 2024, **Ethiopia** released 0.44km² through clearance and technical survey and another 599.67km² of land through cancellation—more specifically through database cleanup followed by on-site assessments, whereby land previously suspected to be contaminated was deemed not to be contaminated and removed from the national database.²¹¹ Despite this significant database cleanup, the remaining contamination to be addressed remains massive (more than 100km²). Ethiopia therefore submitted its third Article 5 deadline extension request, for five years until 31 December 2030, with the aim of conducting further survey and re-survey, as well as starting to address legacy minefields in the Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Oromia, Somali, and Tigray regions, along with any newly identified mine contamination.²¹²

In November 2023, **Eritrea** was granted an extension to its missed Article 5 deadline of 2020.²¹³ Eritrea then submitted its fifth request, for an extension of three years, which was granted during the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024.²¹⁴ Eritrea explained that it aims to utilize the time until 31 December 2027 to finalize the restructuring and transitioning of the Eritrean Demining Authority and to prepare and submit a detailed workplan by 31 March 2027.²¹⁵ As of 1 October 2025, Eritrea had not provided an update on this process.

In 2024, **Guinea-Bissau** was granted its fourth extension, for three years until 31 December 2027, to conduct survey that did not take place during the previous extension period due to insufficient financial resources and an overly ambitious workplan presented with the third request.²¹⁶ For calendar year 2024, Guinea-Bissau reported newly identified hazardous areas from the ongoing survey, but also land released through EOD spot tasks and battle area clearance (BAC), along with the destruction of 227 explosive devices. However, it did not specify whether this included the release of land contaminated with antipersonnel mines, or the destruction of antipersonnel mines.²¹⁷

Iraq's release of land predominantly contaminated with antipersonnel mines and improvised mines in 2024 slightly increased compared to 2023.²¹⁸ However, given the massive remaining contamination, Iraq is not expected to be able to fulfill its obligations by its current deadline of 1 February 2028.

In 2024, **Mauritania** released 57,678m² of contaminated land that was part of one minefield known as "Leweij 2."²¹⁹ However, due to a lack of financial means, the work had to be stopped before the demining efforts were completed.²²⁰ With over 20km² of mine contamination left to be addressed by 31 December 2026, Mauritania is not on track to meet its clearance obligation deadline.

210 Ibid., p. 5.

211 Ethiopia Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 7 August 2025, p. 26, bit.ly/EthiopiaArt5ExtRequestAug2025.

212 Ibid., pp. 40–41.

213 Mine Ban Treaty Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties, "Decisions on the request submitted by Eritrea for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention," 23 November 2023, bit.ly/DecisionEritreaArt5ExtRequestNov2023.

214 Eritrea Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 17 November 2024, bit.ly/EritreaArt5ExtRequest2024.

215 Ibid.

216 Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 April 2024, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024; and Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 22 April 2022, p. 19, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauMBTArt5ExRequest2022.

217 Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D.

218 Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C; and Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form C.

219 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 4.

220 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Houssein Neya, Database Manager, PNDHD, 1 April 2025.

Niger was granted a fifth extension in November 2024 with a new clearance deadline of 31 December 2029 to address its small remaining contamination (0.18km²).²²¹ Although Niger implemented some activities according to the plan presented in its recent extension request, no land release activities took place in 2024, reportedly due to a persisting lack of financial, technical, and human resources, along with new challenges related to the threat of IEDs used by NSAGs.²²²

Nigeria was granted a second extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline in 2021 and submitted a third extension request, for three years, in May 2025 with the aim of better understanding the extent of improvised mine contamination and improving information sharing with security forces.²²³ In its request, Nigeria explained that undertaking a comprehensive survey had not been possible during the current extension period due to the active conflict in northeastern Nigeria and related access restrictions and security concerns.²²⁴ In the workplan provided with the request, Nigeria projected the start of survey and clearance activities in 2025 or early 2026.²²⁵



Oman announces completion of clearance during the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2025.

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In March 2025, **Oman** submitted a voluntary declaration of completion of its clearance obligations in line with its deadline of 1 February 2025.²²⁶ In 2024, Oman released seven areas accounting for 85,600m² in Dhofar governorate, corresponding with the extent of remaining contamination reported for the same time period.²²⁷

As of 1 October 2025, **Palestine** had not provided an update for any land release conducted in 2024. The progress towards completion according to Palestine's current clearance deadline of 1 June 2028 is uncertain, particularly in light of the conflict that was ongoing as of October 2025.

In 2024, **Peru** reported the release of 22,625m² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land—a significant decrease from the amount released in 2023—and the destruction of only around a third of the antipersonnel mines compared with 2023.²²⁸ Peru reported that it is on track to meet the clearance deadline of 31 December 2029 under its third extension.²²⁹ Although Peru has less than 1km² of contamination remaining to be addressed, it will have to increase its land release rates in the upcoming years to meet this target and complete clearance.

²²¹ Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 March 2024, p. 8, bit.ly/NigerArt5ExtRequestMar2024.

²²² Ibid., pp. 12–13; and statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/NigerStatement18June2025.

²²³ Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 13 August 2021, bit.ly/NigeriaRevisedArt5ExtRequest2021; and Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2025, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequestMarch2025.

²²⁴ Nigeria Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2025, p. 8, bit.ly/NigeriaArt5ExtRequestMarch2025.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

²²⁶ Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Article 5 Implementation, “Preliminary Observations,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17 June 2025, p. 2, bit.ly/ObservationsArt5CommitteeJune2025.

²²⁷ Oman Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 5–6.

²²⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by David Fernández Fernández, Victim Assistance Coordinator – Humanitarian Demining, Peruvian Mine Action Center (CONTRAMINAS), 13 March 2025; Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; and Peru Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form F.

²²⁹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by David Fernández Fernández, Victim Assistance Coordinator – Humanitarian Demining, Peruvian Mine Action Center (CONTRAMINAS), 13 March 2025.

Senegal is not on track to meet its clearance deadline of 1 March 2026, despite increased land release in 2024 compared to 2023.²³⁰ In 2025, it announced that it will submit a fourth extension request and reported that completion was not possible within its current deadline due to political instability, delayed state funding, limited (national) demining capacity, and difficulty accessing border areas, all of which have affected the efficiency of Senegal's efforts during the current extension period.²³¹ However, as of 1 October 2025, Senegal had not yet submitted the request in line with its obligations under Article 5 and may be facing compliance issues if it does not submit the request by the Meeting of States Parties in December 2025.

Serbia is currently working towards its fourth clearance deadline of 31 December 2026. It reduced 0.12km² in the contaminated village of Ravno Bučje in Bujanovac municipality in 2024, however, the released land was not part of Serbia's registered SHAs.²³²

Of the mixed contamination land released in **Somalia** in 2024, over 93% was canceled through non-technical survey (62.93km² of a total 67.18km²). Somalia reported destroying four antipersonnel mines, found during the clearance of 0.68km² in Galmadug and Puntland states.²³³ Somalia's progress towards its clearance deadline of 1 October 2027 is uncertain as it is not clear how much of the reported remaining contamination concerns antipersonnel mines.²³⁴

In 2024, **South Sudan** increased the release of land contaminated with antipersonnel mines compared to 2023.²³⁵ Nevertheless, South Sudan will not be able to meet its clearance obligations by the current deadline of 9 July 2026, and in May 2025, asked for a second extension, for an additional four years.²³⁶ South Sudan's reasons for the extension request included: limited access to contaminated areas due to insecurity, the new discovery of previously unknown hazardous areas adding to the extent of the contamination, and slow progress due to difficult terrain and a lack of road networks and infrastructure.²³⁷ South Sudan reported that it now has a better understanding of the extent of contamination and of clearance requirements, and therefore believes completion by 2030 is possible if the current level of international funding can be maintained.²³⁸

230 Statement of Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/SenegalStatement18June2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamadou Diallo, Head of Operations, CNAMS, 12 July 2024.

231 Statement of Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/SenegalStatement18June2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Diop Papa Magueye, Director, CNAMS, 29 July 2025.

232 In its Article 7 report for 2024, Serbia indicated that it cleared 0.12km² of contaminated land. However, in its recent Article 5 deadline extension request and in its responses submitted to a Monitor questionnaire, Serbia reported that this area was released through technical survey. Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Annex III, p. 10; response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Košutić, Senior Advisor for Planning, International Cooperation and European Integrations, SMAC, 27 March 2025; and Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2024, bit.ly/SerbiaArt5ExtRequestMar2024.

233 In its Article 7 report for 2024, Somalia reported the release of 67.18km² of mixed contamination. The response to a recent Monitor questionnaire reported 62.99km² including 60.34km² of land contaminated with antipersonnel mines. The Monitor has taken the total figure from the Article 7 report because in the questionnaire response, only one antipersonnel mine destroyed was reported for 2024. Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 8; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mustafa Bawar, Senior IM Officer, UNMAS, 26 May 2025.

234 In its Article 7 report for 2024, Somalia reported antipersonnel mine contamination of 122.9km². However, in response to a Monitor questionnaire, Somalia reported 0.91km² of antipersonnel mine and 4.5km² of mixed contamination. Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 7; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mustafa Bawar, Senior IM Officer, UNMAS, 26 May 2025.

235 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025.

236 South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 May 2025, bit.ly/SouthSudanArt5ExtRequestMay2025.

237 Presentation of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, p. 13, bit.ly/SouthSudanPresentation18June2025.

238 South Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 7 August 2025, pp. 55 and 82, bit.ly/SouthSudanArt5ExtRequestAug2025.

Sri Lanka increased land release in 2024 compared to 2023, including through non-technical and technical survey.²³⁹ Nevertheless, this still accounts for only around half of the area Sri Lanka released in 2022 through clearance alone.²⁴⁰ With newly identified contamination and decreased funding limiting the availability of demining capacities, it is unlikely that Sri Lanka will be able to meet its current clearance deadline of 1 June 2028. Sri Lanka reported that, based on the progress made and available resources, the government will consider submitting its first extension request by 2027.²⁴¹

Despite ongoing conflict, **Sudan** provided its first comprehensive update on land release conducted since 2021.²⁴² While it reported the clearance of 3.4km² of mixed contamination in Khartoum with 7,793 UXO found, Sudan did not release any of the identified SHAs or CHAs containing antipersonnel mines in Blue Nile, South, or West Kordofan states in 2024.²⁴³ The updated workplan presented to achieve Sudan's current clearance deadline projects the release of more than 8km² of mine contaminated land on average, between 2025 and 1 April 2027.²⁴⁴ This is an ambitious plan that foresees more mined square meters released than currently identified, and requires the land release rate to more than double from 2025 onwards.



A Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD) demining team uses a large loop detector to scan for explosive remnants of war during clearance operations in Shurob, Tajikistan.

© FSD, October 2024

Tajikistan released less land in 2024 than in 2023 but destroyed more antipersonnel mines, indicating that the density of the contamination is high in the remaining mined areas—many of which are remote and located in difficult terrain, slowing down progress.²⁴⁵ The slow progress is also related to climate change and extreme weather events that shorten demining seasons and enforce longer standdown times. Tajikistan's decision to submit a third extension request, for seven years until 31 December 2032, is also due to a larger contamination baseline—as a result of newly identified CHAs—and a need to re-survey existing hazardous areas.²⁴⁶

In 2024, **Thailand** released less land but cleared more antipersonnel mines than in 2023, and reported that demining teams increasingly face high-density contamination in difficult terrain, which slows down the clearance process.²⁴⁷ Considering the decreased land release rate, along with newly discovered contaminated areas that

will have to be addressed, Thailand is behind target to meet its clearance deadline of 31 December 2026.

²³⁹ Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 7; and Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 6.

²⁴⁰ For 2022, Sri Lanka only reported all-time figures for clearance and ordnance destroyed. Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), pp. 11–12.

²⁴¹ Presentation of Sri Lanka, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, p. 15, bit.ly/SriLankaPresentation18June2025.

²⁴² Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2021), Forms C and F; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Abd El Majed, Chief of Operations, SNMAC, 20 April 2022.

²⁴³ Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; response to Monitor questionnaire by Asaad Ibrahim, IMSMA Department Manager, SNMAC, 11 March 2025; and email from Asaad Ibrahim, IMSMA Department Manager, SNMAC, 23 September 2025.

²⁴⁴ Sudan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F.

²⁴⁵ Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form F; Tajikistan Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Additional Information, 16 October 2025, pp. 30 and 36, bit.ly/TajikistanArt5ExtRequestOct2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Gurezov Murtazo, Quality Management (QM) Specialist, TNMAC, 13 March 2025.

²⁴⁶ Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, bit.ly/TajikistanStatement18June2024.

²⁴⁷ Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 4; and statement of Thailand, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, bit.ly/ThailandStatement18June2025.

Despite increased demining capacity, the land released by **Türkiye** slightly decreased in 2024 compared to 2023.²⁴⁸ Given the massive extent of contamination left, Türkiye submitted a third Article 5 extension request in March 2025, requesting a new deadline of 31 December 2030.²⁴⁹ While Türkiye believes it has gained a better understanding of the extent of contamination and clearance requirements during the current extension period, it aims to release another 8km² or so through the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project (EBMCP), though the funding for the implementation of the project is not yet secured.²⁵⁰ In addition, military demining units are projected to clear 4km² of contaminated land, and plans have been made to conduct technical and non-technical survey of 28km² of land to better identify and define the boundaries of suspected contamination.²⁵¹

Ukraine reported releasing 28.37km² of antipersonnel mine contaminated land in 2024.²⁵² Ukraine is currently working under its third extension period that was approved in November 2023 for a clearance deadline of 1 December 2033.²⁵³ In its updated workplan submitted in April 2025, Ukraine projected the release of 204.7km² in 2025 alone, and 233.3km² between 2026 and 2032.²⁵⁴ However, Ukraine also highlighted a number of challenges in complying with its Article 5 obligations. These include a high need for training and equipment to improve demining capacity, contamination that is likely to further increase due to the ongoing conflict, the high density of mined areas, and the continuous need to update laws, regulations, and standards to accommodate the rapidly changing circumstances in the field.²⁵⁵

Yemen managed to slightly increase its land release output and the number of antipersonnel and improvised mines cleared compared with 2023, predominantly due to emergency responses and activities implemented by the Saudi Arabia-based King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center's Masam project.²⁵⁶ If Yemen succeeds in maintaining the current land release rate, and the new discovery of mine contaminated areas remains limited, it is on track to meet its 1 March 2028 clearance deadline.

Zimbabwe stated in early 2023 that it would meet its deadline of December 2025 but acknowledged in June 2024 that the 2025 deadline seemed "unattainable."²⁵⁷ Consequently, in March 2025 it submitted its sixth extension request, for another five years, despite its land release rate having doubled in 2024 compared with 2023.²⁵⁸ Zimbabwe justified the

248 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D; and Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form D.

249 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2025, bit.ly/TurkiyeArt5ExtRequestMarch2025.

250 Ibid.; and statement of Türkiye, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 28 November 2024, p. 1, bit.ly/TurkiyeStatement28Nov2024.

251 Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2025, p. 5, bit.ly/TurkiyeArt5ExtRequestMarch2025.

252 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Updated Workplan, 30 April 2025, Annex 2, bit.ly/UkraineWorkplanMBTApr2025.

253 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2023, bit.ly/UkraineMBTArt5ExtRequest2023.

254 Ukraine Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Updated Workplan, 30 April 2025, Annex 2, bit.ly/UkraineWorkplanMBTApr2025.

255 Presentation of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2025, p. 8, bit.ly/UkrainePresentation18June2025.

256 Yemen Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D.

257 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Capt. Patson Mandaba, Operations Officer, ZIMAC, 24 April 2023; statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 21 June 2023, p. 1, bit.ly/ZimbabweStatement21June2023; and presentation of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 18 June 2024, p. 2, bit.ly/ZimbabwePresentation18June2024.

258 Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 8; response to Monitor questionnaire by Godwish Machemedze, Operations Officer, ZIMAC, 13 March 2025; Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 2–4; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Patson Mandaba, Operations Officer, ZIMAC, 5 March 2024.

requested time period for the extension by citing projections of reduced funding and a decline in the availability of demining capacities from 2026 onwards.²⁵⁹

RISK EDUCATION

Informing and educating affected populations about mine threat is a key legal obligation under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. It requires States Parties to “provide an immediate and effective warning to the population” in all areas under their jurisdiction or control in which antipersonnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced.

The delivery of risk education to affected populations is a primary and often cost-effective means of preventing injuries and saving lives. Through the new five-year Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan and the previous Oslo Action Plan, States Parties committed to provide detailed, costed, and multi-year plans for context-specific mine risk education and reduction in affected communities.²⁶⁰

PROVISION OF RISK EDUCATION IN 2024

RISK EDUCATION IN STATES PARTIES WITH CURRENT CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES

In 2024, risk education was provided to populations at risk from antipersonnel mine contamination including in States Parties that had clearance obligation deadlines in 2024.²⁶¹

States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines where risk education was reported for 2024²⁶²

Afghanistan	Ethiopia	South Sudan
Angola	Guinea-Bissau	Sri Lanka
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	Iraq	Sudan
Cambodia	Mauritania	Tajikistan
Chad	Nigeria	Thailand
Colombia	Palestine	Türkiye
Croatia	Peru	Ukraine
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	Senegal	Yemen
Ecuador	Serbia	Zimbabwe
	Somalia	

RISK EDUCATION IN STATES PARTIES WITHOUT CURRENT CLEARANCE OBLIGATION DEADLINES

Among the States Parties without current clearance obligation deadlines but that are known or suspected to be contaminated with improvised mines, risk education activities

²⁵⁹ Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Sixth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 6 August 2025, p. 8, bit.ly/ZimbabweArt5ExtRequestAug2025.

²⁶⁰ Oslo Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Review Conference, Oslo, 29 November 2019, p. 8, bit.ly/OsloActionPlan2019; and Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 28 November 2025, p. 7, docs.un.org/en/APLC/CONF/2024/WP.23/Rev.1.

²⁶¹ Argentina, Cyprus, Eritrea, Niger, and Oman did not report risk education activities.

²⁶² All except six States Parties listed in the table provided data on risk education in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports. Chad, the DRC, South Sudan, Peru, and Tajikistan reported data in response to Monitor questionnaires. As of August 2025, Palestine had not submitted an Article 7 report for calendar year 2024, but UNMAS reported conducting risk education in Palestine during the reporting period. See, UNMAS, “Where We Work: occupied Palestinian territory,” undated, bit.ly/UNMASPalestine; and UNMAS, “Occupied Palestinian Territory: December 2024 Newsletter,” undated, bit.ly/UNMASPalestineDec2024.

were reported for 2024 by Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, and Mali.²⁶³ In the Philippines, risk education is integrated in the broader disaster risk reduction mechanisms.²⁶⁴

Algeria declared the completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations in December 2016 but continues to provide risk education to the population in areas affected by residual contamination, partly organized and delivered by mine/ERW victim associations.²⁶⁵

Nicaragua, equally known to have residual contamination, previously reported that it maintains risk education “contingency operations” delivered ad hoc by the Armed Forces whenever the public reports new explosive ordnance items found.²⁶⁶

RISK EDUCATION IN STATES NOT PARTY AND OTHER AREAS WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECTED MINE CONTAMINATION

Contaminated states not party Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Syria, and Vietnam, along with other areas Somaliland and Western Sahara, are all known to provide risk education addressing the threat of explosive ordnance including antipersonnel mines.²⁶⁷

RISK EDUCATION REPORTING AND PLANNING

Of the States Parties with clearance obligation deadlines that provided updates on risk education for 2024, 19 included beneficiary data disaggregated by gender and age in their annual Article 7 reporting: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Mauritania, Peru, Senegal, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. This reflects a positive trend since 2019 when only eight affected States Parties submitted sufficiently disaggregated risk education data in their Article 7 reports.²⁶⁸

263 **Benin:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Magaly Chavez Bazzani, Project Manager, Armed Violence Reduction, MAG, 12 August 2025. **Burkina Faso:** AOAV, “Saving lives in the golden hour: a new model for risk education and first aid in areas with high risk of explosive weapon harm,” 3 May 2025, bit.ly/AOAVRiskEducation3May2025. **Cameroon:** Cameroon Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form E. **Central African Republic:** Central African Republic Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I. **Mali:** Mali Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I.


264 Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education: Sector mapping and needs analysis,” 14 October 2024, p. 55, bit.ly/GICHDRiskEducation14Oct2024.

265 Algeria Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form E.

266 Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form I.

267 For most countries, several sources are available, however, only one source per country is listed here. **Armenia:** CHDE, “Explosive Ordnance Risk Education,” undated, bit.ly/CHDEArmeniaRE. **Azerbaijan:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ramil Azizov, Head of the Risk Education and Victim Assistance Department, ANAMA, 18 April 2025. **Georgia:** Georgia CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form C. **Lao PDR:** Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form G. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7CCM. **Lebanon:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Makki, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) Section Head, LMAC, 14 March 2025. **Libya:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Khaled Alwadawi, Head of Risk Education Department, LibMAC, February 2025. **Myanmar:** United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), “Myanmar: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 10,” 21 February 2025, p. 4, bit.ly/UNICEFMyanmar21Feb2025. **Somaliland:** The HALO Trust, “Where we work: Somalia and Somaliland,” undated, bit.ly/HALOTrustSomaliaSomaliland. **Syria:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fatima Abdi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 15 August 2025. **Vietnam:** Quang Tri Mine Action Center (QTMAC), “Data & Statistics: Risk Education,” updated daily, bit.ly/QuangTriRiskEducation. **Western Sahara:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kebe Elhadji, Chief of Mine Action Programme, UNMAS, 28 March 2025.

268 ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2020* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2020), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.



Humanity & Inclusion (HI) conducts a risk education session at a local library near Mykolaiv, Ukraine. The sessions include images of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as cluster munitions, and are presented weekly in an effort to reduce the number of mine/ERW casualties.

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Among these States Parties, five reported data disaggregated by beneficiaries with disabilities: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mali, Peru, and Somalia. UNMAS also provided disaggregated data of beneficiaries with disabilities for South Sudan.²⁶⁹

In data that was provided to the Monitor, five States Parties also identified casualties who had received risk education prior to an accident: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Iraq, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. This demonstrates increased efforts in understanding behavior change and what risk education methods and approaches work best.

Less progress has been seen regarding the submission of detailed, costed multi-year plans for risk education as part of States Parties' extension requests. Of the 21 States Parties that submitted an Article 5 extension request in 2024 and 2025, only seven—Angola, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, and

Serbia—provided a multi-year plan for risk education as required under the Oslo Action Plan and the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, with some of the submitted plans still lacking sufficient details, including a comprehensive budget for risk education activities.²⁷⁰

RISK EDUCATION BENEFICIARIES: AGE AND GENDER

Children living in contaminated areas often lack knowledge of the risks of mines and ERW, and therefore have been a key target group of risk education for the last few years.

Working-age adult men were also cited by most States Parties and operators as a high-risk group, primarily due to their economic responsibilities. Men are at risk due to livelihood activities in rural areas, including agricultural cultivation, the collection of forest products, hunting, fishing, foraging, and tending livestock. Men, as well as boys, were also reported to be more likely than other groups to take intentional risks due to economic necessity. Operators noted that, in general, women and girls are less likely to engage in unsafe behaviors or to travel as far from home as men and boys. Nevertheless, they are also regarded as an important target group due to their engagement in livelihood activities and their ability to help promote safer behavior among men and boys.

INTEGRATING RISK EDUCATION INTO OTHER ACTIVITIES, BROADER INITIATIVES, AND NATIONAL MECHANISMS

In addition to being delivered as a standalone activity, risk education continued to be integrated into land release activities, delivered by survey and clearance teams themselves or through community liaison teams. Increasingly, risk education is also being integrated into victim assistance and vice versa.²⁷¹

International and national humanitarian actors have a tradition of integrating risk education into wider humanitarian, development, protection, health, and education efforts. In the last five years, such efforts have increased within the mine action community. This is partly due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which made it necessary for mine action operators

²⁶⁹ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jakob Donatz, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 4 April 2025.

²⁷⁰ Guinea-Bissau and Serbia did not provide a comprehensive budget for risk education. See, Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 April 2024, pp. 22–23 and 26, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024; and Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2024, pp. 46–47, bit.ly/SerbiaArt5ExtRequestMar2024.

²⁷¹ See, for example, Iraq Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 50.

and national authorities to find new ways of delivering risk education messages to at-risk groups in the face of restricted access. Many of these initiatives were successful and have lasted beyond the pandemic.²⁷²

To effectively integrate risk education into school curricula, disaster risk reduction and human security frameworks, and local political, health, and religious activities, training-of-trainers (ToT) programs are also necessary. Such programs have been provided by most agencies and operators involved in risk education for a number of years, including in 2024. National humanitarian and development organizations, emergency service personnel, security forces, civil society members, community focal points and volunteers, political parties, religious leaders, teachers, tourist guides, students, and other persons in a position of authority have benefitted from such programs and are delivering risk education.²⁷³ As a result, the risk education pillar has managed to build up local capacities over the past few years.

These efforts should continue and also include commitments by national authorities to establish the necessary legal and normative frameworks—where not yet in place—so as to ensure that the engagement of trained national and local personnel continues and is able to become truly sustainable.

CONTEXT-SPECIFIC RISK EDUCATION TO AFFECTED POPULATIONS AND AT-RISK GROUPS

To be effective, risk education must be sensitive to gender, age, and disability, and take the diverse needs and experiences of people living in affected communities into account. The consideration of target areas, high-risk groups, and the activities and behaviors that place people at risk is crucial to the design and implementation of effective risk education programs.

In 2024, the most vulnerable populations were identified as those that move regularly between different locations, such as: nomadic communities (in Afghanistan, Cambodia, the DRC, Iraq, Mali, and Mauritania); foresters (in Cambodia, Croatia, the DRC, Sri Lanka, and Yemen); herders (in Central African Republic, the DRC, Iraq, Tajikistan, and Türkiye); agricultural workers (in Angola, Chad, Peru, Senegal, and Somalia); people collecting natural resources (for example, herb collectors during spring season in Iraq, women collecting firewood, fruit, or shea in isolated areas in Benin, and cashew nut pickers in Senegal); and scrap metal collectors (in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and South Sudan).

Other specific groups considered at-risk in country-specific contexts in 2024 included peacekeepers in the DRC; traders and stallholders during their travel between markets in Benin, Mali, and Nigeria; and flood-affected populations in Afghanistan.

In 2024, as in previous years, risk education in many countries was conducted to specifically target IDPs, returnees, and migrants. In some cases, risk education activities were integrated into broader frameworks and actions concerning these groups, as they often lack knowledge of the dangers of explosive ordnance while moving through contaminated areas.²⁷⁴



A farmer's cow wanders past a confirmed hazardous area being cleared by Norwegian People's Aid (NPA). The site, near Novohryhorivka in Mykolaiv oblast, is home to countless farmers who have had to return to working the land despite the high level of contamination.

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²⁷² See, for example, GICHD, "Explosive Ordnance Risk Education in Residual Contamination Management," 12 December 2023, p. 9, bit.ly/GICHD12Dec2023.

²⁷³ See, for example, Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 22–24.

²⁷⁴ See, for example, response to Monitor questionnaire by Selemani Ngubo, EORE Manager, CCLAM, February 2025.

- **Afghanistan** provided key risk education messages through videos at entry points for returnees in response to the ongoing deportation and return of families and individuals from neighboring countries, particularly from Iran and Pakistan.²⁷⁵
- In **BiH**, where the migrant population, including children, was the priority for risk education, mine awareness messages were regularly delivered in refugee camps.²⁷⁶
- In **South Sudan**, risk education activities were integrated into House, Land and Property (HLP) initiatives in 2024, through collaboration between MAG and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).²⁷⁷
- In **Syria**, risk education messages were printed on the bread packaging of bakeries predominantly frequented by IDPs.²⁷⁸

In 2024, several States Parties reported delivering risk education to specifically address the threat posed by IEDs, including improvised mines.²⁷⁹

- **Cameroon** made efforts to incorporate the threat from IEDs into the curricula of defense and security forces, schools, and training centers, and provided more training in IED detection techniques and safeguarding measures.²⁸⁰
- **Colombia** strengthened prevention and protection for vulnerable communities on the risks associated with IEDs.²⁸¹
- **Iraq** adapted its messaging in all materials to highlight not only mines, but also cluster munition remnants, IEDs, and ERW, including unexploded shells.²⁸²
- In **Nigeria**, commercial drivers across four areas in Borno state were targeted with risk education in response to an alarming rise in incidents involving roadside IEDs, along both major and minor routes.²⁸³
- In **Somalia**, in an effort to reduce the number of casualties, UNMAS produced risk education materials focusing on IEDs to be disseminated among at-risk communities through various platforms; it also recently developed IED-related safety awareness messages.²⁸⁴

RISK EDUCATION METHODS AND APPROACHES

A variety of methods were used to reach target groups in 2024. This included printed materials such as leaflets, posters, and notebooks; mass media (predominantly radio broadcasting); and interactive risk education approaches, including theater performances, puppet shows, games, sports, and virtual reality. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, the delivery of digital risk education through the use of interactive websites and social media increased. This method has proven successful—even in challenging contexts—at reaching large audiences while also being cost-efficient.²⁸⁵

²⁷⁵ Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the calendar year 2024), p. 17.

²⁷⁶ BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the calendar year 2024), pp. 24–26.

²⁷⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Juan Fernando Pineda Arboleda, Senior Programme Officer, MAG, 7 August 2025.

²⁷⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Fatima Abdi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 15 August 2025.

²⁷⁹ See, for example, UNGA, “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices: Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/211),” 22 July 2024, p. 10, docs.un.org/en/A/79/211; UNOCHA, “Mozambique Access Snapshot - Cabo Delgado Province - June 2024,” 30 July 2024, bit.ly/OCHAMozambique30July2024; and Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), pp. 10–11.

²⁸⁰ Cameroon Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form E.

²⁸¹ Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 51–52.

²⁸² Response to Monitor questionnaire by Khatab Ahmed, Plan Manager, IKMAA, 27 April 2025.

²⁸³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Galtimari Shettima, Community Liaison Supervisor, MAG, 4 August 2025.

²⁸⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Hussein Ibrahim, Project Manager, UNMAS, 26 May 2025; and Somalia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 9.


²⁸⁵ See, for example, MAG, “Evaluation of MAG’s Mine Action Responses in Sinjar and Tel Afar district, Ninewa Governorate, Republic of Iraq,” August 2024, p. 17, bit.ly/MAGIraqAug2024; GICHD, “Review of new technologies and methodologies for explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) in challenging contexts,” August 2020, bit.ly/GICHD-EOREAug2020; and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “Digital communication in WEC programmes,” August 2020, bit.ly/ICRCDigitalCommunicationRE2020.

- **BiH** used social media platforms including Facebook and Instagram to help reach younger, urban populations through infographics, videos, and awareness posts.²⁸⁶
- **Croatia** created a specific web portal and developed a mobile application for smartphones to boost the mine risk awareness of the public. Its main purpose is to warn people of life-threatening danger when entering or approaching hazardous areas. The application works on the basis of distance, through GPS tracking, which alerts the user if they approach or are in the vicinity of a hazardous area. The application also has a “Call for Help” function and the option to report and take a photograph of potential ERW items.²⁸⁷
- In the Kurdistan region of **Iraq**, risk education campaigns using social media and SMS alerts were launched and used especially during farming seasons or when there is risk of unearthed buried explosives following seasonal rains.²⁸⁸
- **Mali** maintained a WhatsApp risk education chatbot to inform people of the risks of explosive ordnance and provide information on how to report suspected items in their communities.²⁸⁹
- **Thailand** maintained group chats (via the “LINE” application) managed by local leaders, which were set up and used as a channel for awareness-raising, as well as for reporting landmines and UXO found in the area.²⁹⁰

CASUALTIES

Since 1999, Monitor casualty records have included 165,724 people recorded as killed (47,904) or injured (113,595) or of unknown survival outcome (4,225) in incidents involving explosive devices and items detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle.²⁹¹

Mine/ERW casualties 1999–2024



Landmines of all types, as well as ERW including cluster munition remnants, remain a major threat as they continue to kill and injure thousands of civilians every year and cause

286 BiH Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 25–26.

287 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Damir Trut, Director General, CPD, 7 March 2025.

288 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Khatab Ahmed, Plan Manager, IKMAA, 27 April 2025.


289 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Giusfredy Auma Namsene, Humanitarian Mine Action Programme Manager, DanChurchAid (DCA), 4 August 2025.

290 Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 13–15.

291 Casualties recorded include people killed and injured, and those for whom survival status was not reported.

indiscriminate harm globally.²⁹² In the five-year period 2020–2024, an initial decline in casualties was upturned by an increase in new casualties from incidents caused by recent mine/ERW contamination, primarily as a result of conflict, especially in Myanmar, Syria, and Ukraine.


Mine/ERW casualties: 2020–2024



MINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN 2024

At least 6,279 people were killed or injured by mines/ERW in 2024. Of that total, at least 1,945 were killed, while another 4,325 were injured. For nine casualties, the survival outcome was not known.²⁹³ The annual total of recorded casualties for 2024 was higher than in any year since 2020.

Casualties by type of mine/ERW in 2024



Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

²⁹² Casualties from cluster munition remnants are included in the Monitor's global mine/ERW casualty data. Casualties occurring during a cluster munition attack are not included in this data; however, they are reported in the Impact chapter of the annual Cluster Munition Monitor report. For more detail on cluster munition casualties, see, ICBL-CMC, *Cluster Munition Monitor 2025* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2025), bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitorReports.

²⁹³ As in previous years, there was no substantial data available on the number of people indirectly impacted as a result of mine/ERW casualties, and this information was not included in the Monitor's casualty database.

CASUALTIES BY DEVICE TYPE

Landmine casualties

Collectively, landmines of all types caused the majority of all recorded casualties (4,535 or 72%) during 2024. This includes factory-made antipersonnel mines (1,540 or 25% of all casualties), improvised mines (2,077 or 33%), antivehicle mines (157 or 3%), and unspecified mine types (761 or 12%).

The number of casualties from manufactured antipersonnel mines recorded annually effectively tripled between 2020 and 2024 (during the five-year period of the Mine Ban Treaty Oslo Action Plan). The number of annual antipersonnel mine casualties increased from less than 500 in 2020 and 2021, to more than 1,500 in 2024 (from 439 in 2020 and 414 in 2021, to 628 in 2022, 833 in 2023, and 1,540 in 2024).

Most improvised mines are believed to act as banned antipersonnel mines, due to the nature of their designs, which makes it possible for them to be triggered by a person.²⁹⁴

In 2024, improvised mines continued to account for the highest number of annual casualties, as they have for nearly a decade. Improvised mines caused casualties throughout the five-year period 2020–2024 with a continuously devastating impact: 2,126 recorded in 2020, 1,741 in 2021, 1,517 in 2022, 2,071 in 2023, and 2,077 in 2024.

Casualties from cluster munition remnants and other ERW

Cluster munition remnants, primarily unexploded submunitions, caused 58 casualties in 2024, while other ERW caused 1,431 casualties.²⁹⁵

Undifferentiated mine/ERW casualties

A total of 255 casualties resulted from mine/ERW items detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle, where the type of device was either not identified initially, or was otherwise undifferentiated or unknown during casualty recording, or not disaggregated in data systems.

CASUALTY DEMOGRAPHICS

Civilian status

The devastating and disproportionate impact of mines and ERW on civilians was once again evident in the Monitor casualty statistics for 2024. Civilians made up 86% of all casualties recorded in 2024, and 90% of all casualties where the civilian, deminer, or military status of the casualty was known.

²⁹⁴ The Landmine Monitor uses the term “improvised mine” in casualty data to encompass any victim-activated IED. Most are likely to function as antipersonnel mines, rather than meeting the fusing sensitivity to be considered strictly antivehicle mines. The information that is available indicates that the fusing of most victim-activated IEDs causing casualties allows them to be activated by a person (as well as a vehicle), and therefore falls under the prohibitions and obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty. In most cases, it is not possible to distinguish *post factum* between casualties of antipersonnel improvised mines and those that could only be initiated by a vehicle because reporting does not provide a clear means of determining the sensitivity of fuzes after an explosion.

²⁹⁵ One additional cluster munition remnants casualty was recorded for 2024 following the publication of *Cluster Munition Monitor 2025*.



Waiga Akim, who lost his left leg and one eye in a landmine explosion, rides through Yumbe town, Uganda.

© ASNU, June 2024

Status of mine/ERW casualties in 2024²⁹⁶

Civilian	5,385	85.8%
Deminer	31	0.5%
Military	593	9.4%
Unknown	270	4.3%

Age and gender of mine/ERW casualties

Men and boys accounted for the majority of casualties in 2024, totaling 2,857 casualties (or 78%) for which the gender was known (3,683). Women and girls accounted for 826 casualties (or 22%).

Child casualties

Children are extremely vulnerable to the harm caused by antipersonnel landmines and improvised mines, as well as by ERW. Children in general are more likely to deliberately handle explosive items than adults, often unknowingly or out of curiosity, by mistaking them for toys or other objects for play, or due to high-risk actions or bravado. Children have made up over 40% of all civilian casualties recorded by the Monitor since 1999.

In 2024, at least 1,701 child casualties were recorded.²⁹⁷ Children made up 46% of civilian casualties in 2024, where the age group was known.²⁹⁸ Children were killed (494) or injured (1,205) by mines/ERW in 34 countries.²⁹⁹ The survival outcome for two children was not reported. In 2024, as in previous years, the majority of child casualties were boys (78%), where the gender was recorded.³⁰⁰

Compared to adults, children are disproportionately affected by ERW. In 2024, children made up 75% (945) of ERW casualties where the age group was known.³⁰¹ Consequently, ERW remained the item causing most child casualties (56%), followed by improvised mines (283 or 17%), and antipersonnel mines (238 or 14%).³⁰²

COUNTRIES WITH MINE/ERW CASUALTIES IN 2024

Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 51 countries and one other area during 2024. The country with the most recorded total mine/ERW casualties in 2024 was state not party Myanmar with more than 2,000 casualties, followed by state not party Syria with over 1,000 casualties. In 2024, nine States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty each recorded more than 100 casualties.

²⁹⁶ The category “military” includes police forces and private security forces when active in combat, as well as members of NSAGs and militias. Direct participation in armed conflict, also called direct participation in hostilities, distinguishes persons who are not civilians in accordance with international humanitarian law (IHL), whereby “those involved in the fighting must make a basic distinction between combatants, who may be lawfully attacked, and civilians, who are protected against attack unless and for such time as they directly participate in hostilities.” ICRC, “Direct participation in hostilities: questions & answers,” 6 February 2009, bit.ly/ICRCDirectParticipationFeb2009.

²⁹⁷ Child mine/ERW casualties are recorded when the age of the victim is less than 18 years at the time of the explosion, or when the casualty was reported by the source (such as a media report) as being a child.

²⁹⁸ For 2,208 casualties, the age group was not recorded.

²⁹⁹ For two child casualties, their survival was not recorded. Child casualties of mines/ERW were recorded in Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, the DRC, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, and Yemen.

³⁰⁰ There were 898 boys and 258 girls recorded as casualties in 2024, while the sex of 545 child casualties was not recorded.

³⁰¹ The age group was not recorded for 169 ERW casualties.

³⁰² Other device types causing child casualties included, of the total child casualties: unspecified mine types (142 casualties), antivehicle mines (8 casualties), cluster munition remnants (22 casualties), and undifferentiated mines/ERW (63 casualties).

Casualties in States Parties in 2024

Mine/ERW casualties were recorded in 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty during 2024, representing some 46% (2,899) of all annual casualties.

Afghanistan remained among the most impacted countries, with high casualty numbers continuing after the change in government and end to the active conflict. Significant numbers of casualties were also recorded in Ukraine, due to the extensive and ongoing contamination following the Russian invasion of 2022. The Sahel region—including Nigeria, Mali, and Burkina Faso—has been heavily impacted by improvised mines, which are the principal cause of casualties in those countries.

Many mine/ERW casualties, however, go unrecorded each year globally, including in States Parties, and therefore are not captured in sources that contribute to the combined totals of annual Monitor country casualty data. Some countries, especially those experiencing conflict, do not have functional casualty surveillance systems in place. Other forms of reporting that include casualty information are often inadequate in some way, or lack disaggregation.

As such, in some contexts, the number of recorded mine/ERW casualties could appear significantly lower than what would be expected given the recognized scale of contamination. However, this can be difficult to resolve when different datasets present similar findings. In the case of Ukraine and Yemen, Monitor figures—which used detailed data drawn chiefly from media reports and Monitor analysis of Armed Conflict and Location Event Data Project (ACLED) data—closely matched annual totals as reported by other recording mechanisms in 2024.

For Ukraine, where the Monitor recorded 293 casualties in 2024, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) recorded 283 casualties (74 killed and 209 injured) for calendar year 2024. Overall, OHCHR recorded 1,379 (413 killed and 966 injured) mine/ERW casualties since the Russian invasion of 2022 to the end of the year 2024.³⁰³

For Yemen, where the Monitor recorded 265 casualties in 2024, the Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP) annual report on the direct impact of armed violence on civilians found that, in 2024, mines and ERW were cumulatively responsible for 260 civilian casualties in the country.³⁰⁴

While the annual totals of these datasets are similar to Monitor findings, this congruence is indicative of a wider and persistent problem of limited data availability, unreliable surveillance systems, and inadequate reporting mechanisms, meaning that casualties in these countries are consistently under-reported each year across multiple recording mechanisms.

Casualties in states not party in 2024

For 2024, the Monitor recorded a total of 3,369 mine/ERW casualties in 15 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, with the majority (60%) of those casualties recorded in Myanmar (2,029).³⁰⁵

³⁰³ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Ukraine: protection of civilians in armed conflict – December 2023 update,” 15 January 2024, bit.ly/OHCHRUkraine15Jan2024; and OHCHR, “Ukraine: Protection of civilians in armed conflict – December 2024 update,” 9 January 2025, bit.ly/OHCHRUkraine9Jan2025.

³⁰⁴ Civilian Impact Monitoring Project (CIMP), “2024 Annual Report: 1 January - 31 December 2024,” January 2025, bit.ly/CIMPAnnualReport2024.

³⁰⁵ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, and Vietnam.

Countries with over 100 mine/ERW casualties in 2024

Country	Casualties in 2024
Myanmar	2,029
Syria	1,015
Afghanistan	624
Ukraine	293
Nigeria	275
Mali	268
Yemen	265
Burkina Faso	224
Iraq	166
Colombia	109
Sudan	107

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**.

Casualties increased for both Myanmar and Syria in 2024 compared to 2023.

In 2024, Myanmar recorded the highest number of new mine/ERW casualties, remaining the most-affected country for the second consecutive year. Myanmar experienced a sharp rise in casualties, increasing from 545 in 2022 to 1,003 in 2023 and 2,029 in 2024.

Syria had the second highest number of new casualties. Casualties in Syria have risen slightly each year since 2022, with 834 casualties in 2022, 933 in 2023, and 1,015 in 2024. There were also reports of a major spike in casualties occurring from the end of 2024 and into 2025. The number of people killed and injured increased drastically over a short period, as people returned from displacement after the end of the Assad regime and due to the subsequent political change in December 2024. UNOCHA reported that since December 2024 through the end of February 2025, 463 mine/ERW casualties occurred in Syria (158 killed and 305 injured). One-third of those casualties were children.³⁰⁶ UNICEF also reported that 116 children were killed or injured by ERW in December 2024.³⁰⁷

Casualties in other areas in 2024

In other area Western Sahara, 11 casualties were reported in 2024.

States and areas with mine/ERW casualties in 2024

Americas	East and South Asia and the Pacific	Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa
Chile	Afghanistan	Armenia	Egypt	Algeria
Colombia	Bangladesh	Azerbaijan	Iran	Angola
Mexico	Cambodia	Russia	Iraq	Benin
	India	Türkiye	Israel	Burkina Faso
	Lao PDR	Ukraine	Kuwait	Burundi
	Myanmar		Lebanon	Cameroon
	Nepal		Libya	Central African Republic
	Pakistan		Palestine	Chad
	Sri Lanka		Syria	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
	Thailand		Tunisia	Ethiopia
	Vietnam		Yemen	Mali
				Mauritania
				Mozambique
				Niger
				Nigeria
				Somalia
				South Sudan
				Sudan
				Togo
				Uganda
				Zimbabwe
				<i>Western Sahara</i>

Note: States Parties are indicated in **bold**. Other areas are indicated in *italics*.

³⁰⁶ UNOCHA, "Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2 (As of 27 February 2025)," 27 February 2025, bit.ly/UNOCHASyria27Feb2025.

³⁰⁷ UNICEF, "Syrian Arab Republic Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4," 5 January 2025, bit.ly/UNICEFSyria5Jan2025.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Victim assistance seeks to reduce fatalities, support the recovery and rehabilitation of mine/ERW survivors, improve psychological wellbeing, and promote the full inclusion and equal participation of victims in society. It is a long-term obligation requiring sustained efforts by all States Parties, those still affected by contamination, and also those that have completed clearance and been declared mine-free.

Key components, or pillars, of victim assistance include: data collection and needs assessment with referral to emergency and ongoing medical care; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and assistive devices; psychological and psychosocial support; social and economic inclusion, along with education; and the development or adjustment of relevant laws and policies.

As of October 2025, at least 40 States Parties are recognized as having responsibility for significant numbers of mine victims.³⁰⁸ At the Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference in Nairobi in 2004 an initial group of 24 States Parties had indicated that “there likely are hundreds, thousands or tens-of-thousands of landmine survivors” on their territory and, as such, further acknowledged that they have the greatest responsibility to act, and also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance.³⁰⁹

The Mine Ban Treaty was the first disarmament or humanitarian law treaty to commit States Parties to provide assistance to people harmed by a specific type of weapon.³¹⁰ It initiated the creation of a strong emerging norm, which became a core binding legal obligation of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 2008, a Plan of Action on Victim Assistance was adopted by the 2003 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V on ERW. A victim assistance standard was also adopted in the text of the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.³¹¹ The need for victim assistance was also included in the text of the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas, adopted in 2022.³¹²

EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE AND ONGOING MEDICAL CARE

Healthcare systems in many States Parties with mine victims required significant additional resources, and training for staff and first responders in 2024. Infrastructure, materials, and medicine were lacking in many countries, particularly those experiencing conflict and economic crises.

³⁰⁸ At the close of the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2025, 39 States Parties had “reported mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction or control”: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Victim Assistance, “General Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance,” Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, p. 4, bit.ly/GeneralObservationsVAJune2025. In addition, Burkina Faso recently reported hundreds of casualties on its territory. Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), p. 3; and Burkina Faso Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 25 July 2025, p. 21, bit.ly/BurkinaFasoArt5ExtRequestJuly2025.

³⁰⁹ Final Report, Mine Ban Treaty First Review Conference, Nairobi, 9 February 2005, pp. 33 and 99, bit.ly/MBT1RevConFinalReport. Of these countries, 23 reported responsibility at the First Review Conference in Nairobi, held from 29 November to 3 December 2004, and with Ethiopia’s ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty on 17 December 2004, the number increased to 24.

³¹⁰ Mine Ban Treaty, Article 6.3, bit.ly/MineBanTreatyText1997.

³¹¹ Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2017), Article 6.1.

³¹² Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs press release, “Conference adopts Declaration on protecting civilians from Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas,” 18 November 2022, bit.ly/IrelandPR18Nov2022; and International Network on Explosive Weapons (INEW), “Dublin Conference to Adopt the Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons,” 19 November 2022, bit.ly/INEW19Nov2022.

Several States Parties, including Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Palestine, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen, continued to experience massive setbacks, restrictions and disruptions—and in some cases damage and destruction—to their healthcare systems in 2024.

In **Afghanistan**, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) increased local first-aid skills and also supported hospital repairs to maintain emergency services.³¹³ EMERGENCY, an NGO working in Afghanistan, operated first-aid posts, primary healthcare centers, and an ambulance service for remote areas.³¹⁴ An extensive survey on access to emergency medical care published by EMERGENCY in 2025 demonstrated that Afghanistan's healthcare system remains critically under-resourced, with limited access to emergency, surgical, and trauma care services. Facilities lack staff and equipment; referral and transport are limited. Gaps in services are especially notable in rural areas.³¹⁵ Restrictive measures by Taliban ruling authorities have greatly affected women and girls, and have included limiting healthcare access and hindering the training of female healthcare workers.³¹⁶

Ukraine's emergency medical care system remains severely strained by the conflict. Thousands of health facilities have been damaged or destroyed, leading to reduced trauma care capacity, shortages of ambulances, medical supplies, and trained personnel, particularly in areas most affected by mines, the frontlines, and recently liberated areas. Attacks on healthcare infrastructure and electricity disruptions have hindered rapid response and evacuation.³¹⁷

In countries in the Sahel region with high numbers of improvised mine casualties, including **Burkina Faso** and **Mali**, emergency medical care was inadequate to meet the extent of need. Similarly, in the **Central African Republic**, a key challenge remained the shortage of medical expertise, infrastructure, and emergency transport needed for the adequate treatment of victims, particularly in regional areas. Although mine victims received free treatment in public hospitals, these facilities were generally severely under-equipped.³¹⁸

REHABILITATION

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to ensuring that all victims have access to comprehensive rehabilitation services and assistive technology, including in rural and remote areas. This includes the provision of outreach where necessary, the promotion of innovative rehabilitation approaches, and particular attention to meeting the needs of the most vulnerable.

While some States Parties integrated rehabilitation into broader health and social inclusion systems, persistent gaps in financing, coordination, and accessibility limited survivors' access to sustained care. Rehabilitation and psychosocial services in mine-affected States Parties were often constrained by insecurity, limited national capacity, and dependence on international support.

A massive rise in amputees caused by the use of mines/ERW in several countries experiencing conflict, including Palestine and Ukraine, placed heavy strain on rehabilitation

³¹³ ICRC, "Annual Report 2024," June 2025, pp. 219–220, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

³¹⁴ EMERGENCY, "Activity Report 1994–2023," undated, bit.ly/EMERGENCY1994-2023Report.

³¹⁵ EMERGENCY, "Access to Emergency, Critical, and Operative Care in Afghanistan: Perspectives from Afghan People and Healthcare Workers in 11 Provinces," June 2025, bit.ly/AfghanistanEMERGENCYJune2025.

³¹⁶ ACAPS, "Afghanistan: Third update on Taliban decrees and directives relevant to the humanitarian response (July–December 2024)," 24 December 2024, bit.ly/AfghanistanACAPS24Dec2024; and HRW, "A Disaster for the Foreseeable Future: Afghanistan's Healthcare Crisis," 12 February 2024, bit.ly/HRWAfghanistanHealthcare12Feb2024.

³¹⁷ Physicians for Human Rights and Truth Hounds, "Health Care in the Dark: The Impacts of Russian Attacks on Energy in Ukraine," 4 December 2024, bit.ly/PHRTruthHoundsUkraine4Dec2024.

³¹⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alioune Menane, Mine Action Capacity Building Advisor, UNMAS-MINUSCA [UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic], 27 May 2025.

services including the manufacture of prosthetic devices.³¹⁹ However, several areas benefitted from new rehabilitation centers and expanded services in an effort to meet growing needs and/or increase accessibility. For instance, in Tajikistan, community-level “one-stop” shops opened in several districts, with the goal of increasing access to assistive products. In many countries, international organizations continued to support rehabilitation centers with materials, technical assistance, and financial coverage for vulnerable persons, as well as the development of referral networks and outreach to remote areas.

EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Some improvements were reported in the provision of rehabilitation services in Southeast Asia. However, significant gaps persisted in some countries, particularly in Afghanistan, that were only partially filled by international organizations.

In **Afghanistan**, rehabilitation services remained concentrated in certain provinces and were strained due to a lack of financial resources. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), which had previously provided thousands of people with physiotherapy and orthopedic aids, was forced to end its activities following a decree from the ruling Taliban government banning aid from Sweden.³²⁰ Subsequently, the SCA handed over its centers and changed its name to the Solidarity Committee for Afghanistan.³²¹ The availability of services decreased due to the closing of SCA programs.³²² The ICRC supported seven rehabilitation centers despite funding instability and staffing shortages, as well as the closure of other rehabilitation centers, which increased demand on ICRC-supported services. Of note, 85% of the ICRC rehabilitation workforce were persons with disabilities. Despite restrictions on women’s participation, the ICRC worked to protect women’s access to rehabilitation services through ongoing dialogue and adapted service models.³²³ A prosthetics workshop was established in Nimroz with funding through ITF Enhancing Human Security. The ITF also responded to the rising humanitarian needs by deploying emergency mobile physical rehabilitation teams using a community-based approach.³²⁴

The mine action authority in **Cambodia** reported an increase in the provision of rehabilitation in 2024.³²⁵ Where possible, the mine action center in **Thailand** assisted recipients of prostheses by working closely with the local health authority.³²⁶

In **Sri Lanka**, the Ministry of Health published national rehabilitation guidelines in 2024 that directly reference landmine victims in order to improve the quality, accessibility, and effectiveness of rehabilitation services throughout the country, including in the mine-affected northern and eastern provinces.³²⁷

319 Humanity & Inclusion (HI) press release, “Amputation Crisis in Conflict Zones: Report Reveals Urgent Need for Rehabilitation Services in Gaza, Syria and Ukraine,” 2 April 2025, bit.ly/HIPressRelease2April2025.

320 Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), “Suspension of SCA leaves thousands without orthopedic aids,” 9 April 2024, bit.ly/SCA9Apr2024.

321 Hadia Ziae, “Swedish Committee for Afghanistan Stops Operations in Country,” *TOLOnews*, 23 January 2025, bit.ly/TOLOnews25Jan2025; and SCA, “Solidarity Committee hands over activities to Norwegian organisation,” 19 November 2024, bit.ly/SCA19Nov2024.

322 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025.

323 ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report,” July 2025, p. 28, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

324 ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2024,” undated [2025], p. 80, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2024.

325 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bunnhath Mao, Advisor and Director of Victim Assistance Department, CMAA, Cambodia, 4 June 2025.

326 Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J.

327 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nayeemudeen Meera Muhiadeen, National Director – Mine Action, National Mine Action Center, 27 March 2025.

AMERICAS

In the Americas, victim assistance involved rehabilitation and psychosocial services, with Colombia adopting inclusive approaches as part of its efforts. However, overall, services in the region remained limited by resource constraints, uneven coverage, and sustainability challenges.



A member of the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM) conducts a referral and psychosocial support visit with a landmine survivor in Tumaco municipality of Nariño department, in Colombia.

© Sebastian Caro/CCCM, March 2025

In **Colombia**, victim assistance pathways operating under the national victim assistance system covered rehabilitation and other forms of reparation. A gender- and ethnic-sensitive approach prioritized indigenous, afro-Colombian, and female mine victims. By 2024, 20 coordination mechanisms had been created, and measures were taken to ensure that all child and adolescent victims had been included in the reparation pathways system. However, challenges remained in ensuring adequate rural coverage and sustainable financing.³²⁸ Humanity & Inclusion (HI) provided accompaniment to improve access to rehabilitation and psychosocial services.³²⁹ The ICRC worked through private workshops and physiotherapy providers to support both civilians and non-civilians who lacked access to rehabilitation. Guidelines to assist people with disabilities in NSAGs or gangs were also developed.³³⁰

In **El Salvador**, all rehabilitation services are regulated through the Institute for the Administration of Benefits for Veterans and Ex-Combatants (Instituto Administrador de los Beneficios de los Veteranos y Excombatientes, INABVE), originally responsible for veterans and ex-combatants but later expanded to provide certain rehabilitation and support services to civilian victims of mines and explosive remnants of war.³³¹

In **Peru**, there was no change in the availability of services in 2024. The National Rehabilitation Institute provided specialized care for mine/ERW survivors, but faced limitations due to insufficient resources for infrastructure, equipment, and updated technology.³³² The mine action center conducted in-person follow-up visits with landmine survivors to assess their rehabilitation needs.³³³

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Rehabilitation services in many African States Parties remained heavily reliant on international support, with limited national capacity, geographic and financial barriers, and insecurity continuing to restrict access despite some new facilities and projects.

In the Sahel region, where improvised mines are a significant cause of casualties, the ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP) supported rehabilitation centers in **Benin**, **Mali**, **Niger**, **Nigeria**, and **Togo** with materials, technical assistance, and financial coverage for vulnerable groups. It also established referral networks and provided training and accreditation.³³⁴

³²⁸ Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 61.

³²⁹ HI, "Country Sheet: Colombia," last updated September 2024, p. 11, bit.ly/HICountrySheetColombia2024.

³³⁰ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, p. 24, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

³³¹ El Salvador Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024).

³³² Response to Monitor questionnaire by David Fernández Fernández, Victim Assistance Coordinator – Humanitarian Demining, Peruvian Mine Action Center (CONTRAMINAS), 13 March 2025.

³³³ Statement of Peru, Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference, Siem Reap, 28 November 2024, bit.ly/PeruStatement28Nov2024.

³³⁴ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, pp. 16–17, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

Chad had only two functional rehabilitation centers, which operated without state support in 2024. Survivors lacked access to rehabilitation services outside of the capital, N'Djamena.³³⁵ In the **DRC**, in the province of North Kivu, HI implemented two rapid health response projects in partnership, delivering mental health care to crisis-affected people while incorporating early rehabilitation into the projects. Rehabilitation services provided by HI included prostheses and other mobility devices. Technical support was also given to hospital rehabilitation services to strengthen quality of care.³³⁶ Following the escalation of conflict in the eastern provinces, the ICRC PRP increased its hospital response, though insecurity limited access to rehabilitation services and communities. The ICRC also continued support for rehabilitation centers.³³⁷

In **Ethiopia**, the ICRC supported rehabilitation centers and provided outreach to hard-to-reach areas and to detention centers.³³⁸ HI identified, assessed, and referred people with physical disabilities for support. Physiotherapy sessions and assistive devices were also provided, with training on their use.³³⁹

Mauritania has only one rehabilitation center, located in the capital, far from areas contaminated by antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions.³⁴⁰ An agreement between the national mine action center and the Ministry of Health was established for the provision of assistive devices.³⁴¹ National capacity for rehabilitation, however, remained inadequate.³⁴²

In **Senegal**, the Orthopedic Center at Ziguinchor Regional Hospital experienced difficulties with staffing, equipment, and raw materials. The recent construction and equipping of a new, operational center by the Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association Sénégalaïse des Victimes de Mines, ISAD-ASVM) has contributed to the need for prosthetics provision to mine survivors.³⁴³ In addition to landmine survivors, the center covers other amputees and persons with disabilities.³⁴⁴

In **Somalia**, physiotherapy and assistive devices were available at rehabilitation centers run by the Somali Red Crescent Society. The ICRC provided technical and material support, while the Norwegian Red Cross funded the centers' operations. Ongoing insecurity made it difficult to provide and access rehabilitation services, but some services were provided to remote areas through outreach.³⁴⁵ In 2024, Norwegian Red Cross funding was, after



Mozambican orthopedic technicians during a SwissABILITY training course on Monolimb technology at Provincial Hospital of Inhambane in Inhambane province, Mozambique.

© SwissABILITY, August 2024

³³⁵ Marie-Capucine Gaitte, "Chad: Spotlight on Two Centers Caring for Disabled Patients," Fondation Raoul Follereau, 3 January 2025, bit.ly/FondationFollereauChad3Jan2025.

³³⁶ HI, "Country sheet: Democratic Republic of Congo," last updated September 2024, p. 7, bit.ly/HICountrySheetDRC2024.

³³⁷ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, p. 20, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

³³⁹ HI, "Country sheet: Ethiopia," last updated 2024, p. 11, bit.ly/HICountrySheetEthiopia2024.

³⁴⁰ Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Vadel Saleck, Head of Victims' Unit, PNDHD, 20 May 2024.

³⁴¹ Committee on Victim Assistance, "Mauritania, Preliminary Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/MauritaniaVACCommitteeJune2025.

³⁴² Ibid.

³⁴³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Papa Maguèye Diop, Director, CNAMS, 29 July 2025.

³⁴⁴ "Ziguinchor gets a physical rehabilitation center in Boutoute," *Jumelages & Partenariats*, 1 May 2024, bit.ly/JumelagesPartenariats1May2024.

³⁴⁵ ICRC, "Annual Report 2024," June 2025, pp. 152–153, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

decades, reported to be ending, and thus efficiency measures were introduced to mitigate the impact.³⁴⁶

In **South Sudan**, physical rehabilitation services have decreased, and access has been constrained by geography, costs, and lack of funding to scale services. Many persons with disabilities in some states still lack access to these services.³⁴⁷ The ICRC supported three rehabilitation centers nationwide, and also provided outreach services to remote areas.³⁴⁸ In 2024, the ICRC also mounted an emergency response in order to accommodate the influx of refugees from Sudan.³⁴⁹ While some rehabilitation and assistive devices were available through the ICRC and HI, national capacity has remained insufficient.³⁵⁰ A draft disability bill and implementation plan were developed following South Sudan's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2025.

In **Sudan**, rehabilitation needs remain extensive due to the impact of widespread conflict. Following a 16-month suspension due to the conflict, ICRC physical rehabilitation activities resumed in September 2024 under a new agreement with the National Authority for Prosthetics and Orthotics, which outlined support—including material, financial, technical, and managerial support—to four physical rehabilitation centers in Damazine, Dongola, Gadaref, and Kassala.³⁵¹

In **Uganda**, access to rehabilitation services remained extremely limited. The Learning, Acting and Building for Rehabilitation Systems (ReLAB-HS) project worked alongside the Ministry of Health and aimed to integrate rehabilitation into Uganda's primary healthcare system, addressing limited access caused by staff shortages and urban-centered services, including in formerly mine-impacted northern and eastern regions.³⁵²

In **Zimbabwe**, there was limited availability of specialized care, rehabilitation services, and assistive devices in remote areas.³⁵³

MIDDLE EAST

In the Middle East, rehabilitation services expanded through new centers and partnerships, while handovers to state management occurred in Iraq. Demand continued to outpace available resources and longstanding barriers remained, while the impacts of conflict limited consistent access.

In **Iraq**, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) distributed mobility aids and assistive devices through the Ministry of Health, but local resources could not meet demand.³⁵⁴ ICRC support to the physical rehabilitation sector was reduced to three rehabilitation centers in Baghdad, Erbil, and Nasiriyah. The Erbil center continued to be directly operated by the ICRC, while the others were run by the Ministry of Health, with technical support from the ICRC.³⁵⁵

³⁴⁶ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, p. 12, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

³⁴⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 4 April 2025.

³⁴⁸ ICRC, "Annual Report 2024," June 2025, pp. 157–161, bit.ly/ICRCAnnualReport2024.

³⁴⁹ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, p. 12, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

³⁵⁰ Committee on Victim Assistance, "South Sudan, Preliminary Observations: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/SouthSudanVACommitteeJune2025.

³⁵¹ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, p. 12, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

³⁵² Valentina Pomatto, "Rehabilitation in Universal Health Coverage: The Need for Assistive Technology," International Injury Research Unit, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, 20 September 2024, bit.ly/PomattoAssistiveTechnology20Sept2024; and emails from Lillian Asimwe, Program Support and Inclusion Officer, ReLAB-HS Uganda, 13 July 2022 and 31 March 2023.

³⁵³ Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 20.

³⁵⁴ Iraq Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

³⁵⁵ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, p. 40, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

In **Jordan**, mine survivors received healthcare, prosthetics services, and rehabilitation through the Royal Medical Services, in hospitals in two governorates.³⁵⁶ The Paola Biocca Center in Amman continued operations and provided free daily orthotics to those in need.³⁵⁷

In **Palestine**, HI opened the Nahla Prosthetics & Orthotics Center in Khan Younis in January 2025, providing temporary prosthetic devices. Despite ongoing barriers and relocation challenges due to the conflict, the HI team continued to provide services.³⁵⁸ The Artificial Limbs and Polio Centre in Gaza City was able to resume operations in July 2024, and the ICRC PRP in Gaza continued to provide material, technical, and managerial support to the center.³⁵⁹

In **Yemen**, the ICRC PRP continued to support five health authority-run centers.³⁶⁰ The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSrelief) supported services for amputees at the Prosthetics and Rehabilitation Center in Hadhramaut governorate.³⁶¹ In 2024, KSrelief and the International Wars and Disasters Victims' Protection Association signed a cooperation agreement to establish a prosthetics and rehabilitation center in Marib Governorate.³⁶² UNICEF partnered with the Prosthetics and Rehabilitation center in Sana'a to provide prosthetics materials for an additional 500 children in 2024.³⁶³

EUROPE, THE CAUCASUS, AND CENTRAL ASIA

In Europe and Eurasia, rehabilitation services were generally integrated into broader health, social inclusion, and victim assistance sectors or strategies, but persistent gaps in financing, coordination, and accessibility remained. New initiatives and reforms were introduced, including efforts to expand access to assistive products and strengthen service delivery, particularly in Ukraine as a response to the impacts of ongoing conflict. Significant challenges such as fragmentation, bureaucratic barriers, and insufficient resources continued to hinder survivors' access to their rights throughout the region.

In **Albania**, rehabilitation was part of a broader social inclusion strategy, however, gaps in financial support were identified.³⁶⁴ BiH offered rehabilitation services but lacked a functioning coordination body for victim assistance to ensure survivors could overcome hurdles to accessing services, including gaps in availability of services and bureaucratic barriers to the fulfillment of their rights. No significant changes in the availability of services have been reported since 2022.³⁶⁵ **Croatia** has a rehabilitation framework that is supported by a complex array of legislation and national structures.³⁶⁶ In **Serbia**, the mine action center entered into an agreement with the Ministry of Labour, Employment, Veterans, and Social Affairs in December 2024 to enhance collaboration regarding victim assistance implementation within national legislation.³⁶⁷ In **Tajikistan**, a World Health Organization

356 Jordan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 5.

357 "Paola Biocca Center," undated, www.paolabioccacenter.eu.

358 HI, "Care Amid Crisis: How HI is still fitting prosthetics in Gaza," undated, bit.ly/HIGazaProsthetics; and HI press release, "More than 6 thousand prosthetic limbs needed in Gaza," 5 June 2025, bit.ly/HIGaza5June2025.

359 ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, p. 40, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

360 Ibid., p. 41.

361 "KSrelief-Supported Prosthetics Center in Yemen's Hadhramaut Serves 666 Beneficiaries in July," *Saudi Press Agency*, 9 August 2025, bit.ly/SaudiPressAgency9Aug2025; and "KSrelief delivers prosthetic services, food supplies in Yemen, Lebanon and Pakistan," *Arab News*, 19 January 2025, bit.ly/ArabNews19Jan2025.

362 "KSrelief Signs Agreement to Run Prosthetic and Rehabilitation Center in Marib, Yemen," *Saudi Press Agency*, 27 November 2024, bit.ly/SaudiPressAgency27Nov2024.

363 UNICEF, "Restoring Hope and Joy Through Prosthetics," 4 February 2025, bit.ly/UNICEFYemen4Feb2025.

364 Albania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J.

365 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Enis Horozović, Director, BHMAC, 14 March 2025.

366 Croatia Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form H.

367 Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J; and Committee on Victim Assistance, "Serbia, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/SerbiaVACCommitteeJune2025.

(WHO) and ATScale partnership continued to expand community-level “one-stop” shops in several districts, with the goal of increasing access to assistive products.³⁶⁸ Through these “one-stop” shops, assistive products are combined with a variety of services including assessment, fitting, user training and follow-up, all available at the same location.³⁶⁹

In **Ukraine**, the need for prosthetics and rehabilitation services has increased massively since the Russian invasion of the country in February 2022. There is a rapidly expanding range of physical rehabilitation and prosthetics services including new clinics, NGO programs, state programs, and WHO-led mapping of availability. In 2025, the first ICRC PRP services in Ukraine were launched with mobile container-based prosthetics in Kharkiv.³⁷⁰ The government of Ukraine has prioritized the development of rehabilitation services because the demand has been constantly growing. Detailed information is available on the dedicated online platform.³⁷¹

Since January 2025, a new legal mechanism has been introduced in Ukraine to change the way disability is assessed. The reforms have included the establishment of standard operating procedures, the adoption of international medical standards, and a hotline for injured veterans. The reform followed significant corruption scandals tied to the process of determining disability status.³⁷² Through these reforms, expert teams will henceforth operate within designated hospitals across all regions to minimize risks of corruption in service provision.³⁷³

PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT

States Parties have committed to ensuring mine victims’ access to mental health, peer-to-peer, and community support services, and to strengthening national capacity to provide these services, including in situations of emergency. Although support remained limited in 2024, a growing number of countries were able to integrate psychological support into existing practices, including in low-resource settings.

In **Afghanistan**, although psychosocial assistance was limited and reduced by the closure of the SCA, it was reported that some new projects emerged in several locations in 2024. Rehabilitation providers also began including psychosocial support, and in some cases peer support, to beneficiaries.³⁷⁴ In **Sri Lanka**, psychological support for survivors experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder was reported to be available in 2024, and a referral system was being developed in 2025 to ensure that landmine victims receive comprehensive support across relevant sectors.³⁷⁵

³⁶⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 13 March 2025.

³⁶⁹ ATscale, “One-Stop-Shops in Tajikistan making large strides to integrate AT into national health systems,” 22 August 2025, bit.ly/ATscaleTajikistan22Aug2025.

³⁷⁰ ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report,” July 2025, p. 36, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024. See also, ICRC, “Ukraine: Bolstering Support for People with Disability in Kharkiv,” 16 September 2024, bit.ly/ICRCUkraine16Sept2024; and ICRC, “ICRC supports people with amputations in eastern Ukraine,” 3 December 2024, bit.ly/ICRCUkraine3Dec2024.

³⁷¹ The dedicated online prosthetics platform is: bit.ly/UkraineRehabilitationPlatform. See also, Ministry of Social Policy, Family and Unity of Ukraine, “Free Prosthetics in 2025: Over 56,000 Ukrainians Received 208,000 Rehabilitation Aids Under State Program,” 17 July 2025, bit.ly/UkraineProsthetics17July2025.

³⁷² Igor Kossov and Alexander Khrebet, “Abandon all hope: Ukraine’s wounded warriors compare military medical system to the Inferno,” *Kyiv Independent*, 13 March 2024, bit.ly/KyivIndependent13March2024.

³⁷³ “Ukraine Reforms Disability Assessment System,” *Kyiv Post*, 20 December 2024, bit.ly/KyivPost20Dec2024; and National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS), “The Reform of the Medical-social Expert Commissions System in Ukraine,” 17 February 2025, bit.ly/NISSUkraine17Feb2025.

³⁷⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, DMAC, 2 April 2025.

³⁷⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nayeemudeen Meera Muhiadeen, National Director – Mine Action, National Mine Action Center, 27 March 2025; and Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 11.

Croatia has psychosocial rehabilitation centers in all of its counties and in the capital, Zagreb.³⁷⁶ In **Tajikistan**, an annual rehabilitation camp allowed mine survivors to engage in physiotherapy, art therapy, and adaptive leisure activities.³⁷⁷

In **Chile**, **Colombia**, and **El Salvador**, psychological support was provided through broader state assistance schemes for war victims, while in **Nicaragua** and **Peru**, such support was provided through programs operating to ensure the rights of persons with disabilities.

In the **DRC**, **Ethiopia**, **Mozambique**, **Senegal**, and **Uganda**, survivor organizations provided vital peer support roles and, in some cases, referrals. **Mauritania** reported that psychological support was included in rehabilitation services.³⁷⁸ In **South Sudan**, psychological support services decreased and access remained very limited, with persons with disabilities in some states lacking services.³⁷⁹

Iraq reported efforts to integrate mental health services into primary healthcare, but noted shortages of trained staff, medicine, and referral systems. The newly established Ministry of Health mobile teams provided psychological support to victims in rural areas.³⁸⁰

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

There is a recognized need to increase economic opportunities for survivors. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty have committed to provide support for social and economic inclusion for mine victims, with special attention to those living in rural and remote areas. That commitment includes supporting access to education, vocational training, employment referrals, financial and business development services, rural development, and social protection programs.

In **Afghanistan**, the Taliban government had previously widened the definition of social security pension beneficiaries beyond war victims to cover all persons with disabilities.³⁸¹ However, in 2025, persons with disabilities and families of martyrs reported renewed complaints regarding pension allocations. Persons with disabilities, including war amputees, reported not receiving disability allowances since mid-2024, despite promises by the Taliban government. They also cited reductions in allowances, removal from eligibility lists, lack of employment opportunities, and ongoing social stigma as major challenges to social inclusion.³⁸²

In **Cambodia**, continued reliance on international donors made victim assistance programs susceptible to funding instability, while reduced funding for health and social affairs limited the expansion of essential services, particularly in rural and mine-affected areas. These challenges undermined consistent and comprehensive care delivery to mine victims.³⁸³

376 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Croatia, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/CroatiaVACCommitteeJune2025.

377 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, TNMAC, 3 April 2024.

378 Mauritania Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 5.

379 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, NMAA, South Sudan, 4 April 2025.

380 Committee on Victim Assistance, "Iraq, Preliminary Observation: Status of Implementation – Victim Assistance," Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/IraqVACCommitteeJune2025.

381 Afghanistan Landmine Survivors Organization (ALSO), "Persons with Disabilities' Access to Humanitarian Aids in Afghanistan," August 2022, p. 14; "Ministry: Payments for Disabled People Will Resume in 2 Months," *TOLOnews*, 27 July 2022, bit.ly/ToloNews27July2022; and "Afghans Complain About Lack of Disability Payments," *TOLOnews*, 3 June 2022, bit.ly/ToloNews3June2022.

382 "Afghanistan's Disabled Left Waiting: Fear Mounts as Taliban Withholds Payments," *Hasht-e Subh Daily*, 26 May 2025, bit.ly/Hasht-eSubhDaily26May2025.

383 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mao Bunnath, Advisor and Director of Victim Assistance Department, CMAA, 4 June 2025.

Sri Lanka's national *Aswesuma* cash grant program provided financial assistance to low-income individuals affected by the country's economic crisis. Persons with disabilities, including mine victims, who met the program's eligibility criteria received support under this scheme.³⁸⁴

Colombia and **Nicaragua** provided social outreach to survivors and persons with disabilities through dedicated programs linked to long-running state programs. Colombia provided social inclusion services through its Comprehensive Victim Care Program established in 2007 and its Health and Functional Rehabilitation Program.³⁸⁵ Services in Nicaragua were provided through a broader disability support program established in 2009.³⁸⁶

In **Benin, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo**, social inclusion initiatives included vocational training, microeconomic support, awareness-raising, and sports activities for people with disabilities.³⁸⁷

In **Ethiopia**, social inclusion initiatives supported education for girls with disabilities in Tigray, as well as income-generation and inclusive sport.³⁸⁸

Zimbabwe reported providing social protection services to mine victims, including cash transfers, food support, education, vocational training, livelihood initiatives, and empowerment loans.³⁸⁹

REPRESENTATION, INCLUSION, AND PARTICIPATION

In their successive five-year action plans, including the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty made commitments to include survivors and/or their representative organizations in matters that affect them, including in planning and implementation at the national and community levels. States Parties also committed to ensuring the full inclusion and participation of mine victims and their representative organizations by removing physical, social, cultural, political, attitudinal, and communication barriers, including in rural and remote areas.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has also stated that mine and ERW survivors should be actively consulted and participate meaningfully in all decision-making processes, including the planning, design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of projects and programs. The ICBL has stressed that, for effective responses, victims must be consulted and their views considered at all levels of decision-making.³⁹⁰

In 2024, mine survivors were represented in coordination activities in States Parties Algeria, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mozambique, Peru, South Sudan, Tajikistan, Türkiye, and Thailand, either directly through participation in coordination mechanisms or indirectly through development partners that engage survivors. States Parties generally demonstrated enthusiasm to report survivor participation, however, the reporting often lacked information on concrete outcomes.

³⁸⁴ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nayeemudeen Meera Muhiadeen, National Director – Mine Action, National Mine Action Center, 27 March 2025.

³⁸⁵ Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), pp. 67–69.

³⁸⁶ Nicaragua Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 11.

³⁸⁷ ICRC, "Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2024 Annual Report," July 2025, pp. 16–17, bit.ly/ICRC-PRPAnnualReport2024.

³⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

³⁸⁹ Presentation of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 17–20 June 2025, bit.ly/ZimbabwePresentation17June2025.

³⁹⁰ ICBL-CMC, "Guiding Principles for Victim Assistance," January 2021, bit.ly/VAGuidingPrinciplesICBL-CMC2021.

In April 2025, Germany co-hosted, together with Jordan, the third Global Disability Summit in Berlin. Some 800 new commitments to accelerate disability inclusion and ensure the rights of persons with disabilities, including those affected by war and conflict, were adopted. The Higher Council for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of Jordan, a champion of Mine Ban Treaty Victim Assistance work, chaired a high-level session on the rights of persons with disabilities in contexts of war and armed conflict.³⁹¹

The second Global Disability Summit, held in 2022, had previously noted that “meaningful participation” must involve consultation with groups “that represent persons with disabilities in all their diversities including...victims of landmines.”³⁹²

Mine/ERW types causing casualties

Category of mine/ERW	Term used in data	Description
Mines, including improvised mines*	Antipersonnel mines	Munitions designed to explode by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, and therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.
	Antivehicle mines	Antivehicle mines, also referred to as “antitank mines,” are designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a vehicle as opposed to that of a person, and tend to contain a larger explosive charge than antipersonnel mines. Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless they are fitted with fuzes that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person.
	Improvised mines	Improvised mines are types of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are “homemade” explosive weapons designed to cause death or injury. Improvised mines are victim-activated IEDs that are detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle. These are landmines and are sometimes referred to as artisanal mines, victim-operated IEDs (VO-IEDs), or by the type of construction, such as pressure plate IEDs (PP-IEDs). In Monitor casualty reporting, the terms “victim-activated improvised mine” and “improvised mines” are synonyms for victim-activated IEDs.
	<i>Antipersonnel improvised mines, including booby-traps</i>	<i>Antipersonnel improvised mines—including booby-traps that can be detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person—fit the definition of antipersonnel landmines and are therefore prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. A booby-trap is an antipersonnel explosive device deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed.</i>


³⁹¹ Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein, “Article by His Royal Highness Prince Mired Raad Zeid Al-Hussein on the Conclusion of the Global Disability Summit – Berlin 2025,” undated [2025], bit.ly/HRHPrinceMiredGDS2025.

³⁹² International Disability Alliance (IDA) and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), “Promoting Engagement of Organizations of Persons with Disabilities (OPDs) in Development and Humanitarian Action,” February 2022, p. 14, bit.ly/IDANORADDISabilitiesFeb2022.


Category of mine/ERW	Term used in data	Description
	Unspecified mine	Reported as a “mine” or “landmine” incident, but where the information to distinguish if it was an antipersonnel or antivehicle mine or a victim-activated IED is lacking.
Unexploded cluster submunitions and bomblets	Cluster munition remnants	Submunitions or bomblets dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster munition and failed to explode, or that have not been used and that have been left behind or dumped.
Other ERW	ERW	<p>Unexploded ordnance (UXO) Explosive weapons that have been primed, fuzed, armed, or otherwise prepared for use or used. They may have been fired, dropped, launched, or projected, yet remain unexploded.</p> <p>Abandoned ordnance (AXO) Explosive weapons that have not been used during an armed conflict or that have been left behind or dumped.</p>
Victim-activated explosive items, type unknown	Unknown mines/ERW	Unknown mines/ERW are explosive items causing casualties that were detonated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or a vehicle that were not attributed to a specific mine/ERW type either because it was not known what type of mine or ERW caused the casualty when information was recorded, or because of a lack of disaggregation within datasets between casualties caused by victim-activated explosives and those caused by ERW.

*The use, production, transfer, and stockpiling of victim-activated antipersonnel IEDs are prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the Mine Ban Treaty definition, a mine is “placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area” and an antipersonnel mine is a munition “designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person...” Antivehicle mines are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty unless the fusing allows them to be activated by a person.

ANTIPERSONNEL LANDMINE CONTAMINATION: 2024



LANDMINE/EXPLOSIVE REMNANT OF WAR CASUALTIES: 2024





A community liaison officer conducts a non-technical survey in South Lebanon.

© HAMAP-Humanitaire/Beeatoona, January 2025

MINE ACTION FUNDING

INTRODUCTION

Article 6 of the Mine Ban Treaty establishes the right of each State Party to request and receive assistance from other States Parties to fulfill its obligations under the treaty. Similarly, Article 6 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions affirms this right for its States Parties. These provisions regarding international cooperation and assistance are fundamental to the successful implementation of both treaties.

This chapter provides an overview of the financial contributions made in 2024 by both affected countries and international donors to advance mine action efforts globally, reflecting the collective efforts to address the challenges posed by landmines and cluster munitions.¹ It details the funding provided by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as well as contributions from states that are not party to either treaty. Such collective efforts appear to be increasingly eroding as several major international donors have reduced mine action budgets in 2025.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

In 2024, global funding for mine action increased by 4% (US\$41.7 million) from 2023, with 43 donors and 27 affected states and other areas having reported providing a total of \$1.07 billion in international and national funding for mine action.² International funding to mine

- 1 While this chapter focuses on financial support for mine action, the cooperation and assistance specified in Article 6 of the two treaties are not limited to financial assistance. Other forms of assistance include the provision of equipment, expertise, and personnel, as well as the exchange of experience and skills. The costs of in-kind assistance are not included in the figures in this chapter.
- 2 Mine action funding includes financing specifically related to landmines, cluster munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), but is rarely disaggregated as such. State reporting on contributions varies in the level of detail, and some states utilize the fiscal year rather than the calendar year. The figures in this report are presented in United States dollars (US\$), rounded to the nearest thousand, million, or billion. However, calculations of totals and percentages are made prior to rounding figures; as such, the rounded numbers presented in this document may not add up precisely to the totals listed, and percentages may not add up to 100%. In 2024, 14 of the 27 States Parties documented in this chapter reported disaggregated data on international funding for mine action in their Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports. One State Party (Japan) reported fiscal year funding. Nineteen States Parties reported disaggregated data on international funding in their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports. As of August 2025, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports had not been submitted or were not available for six States Parties—Andorra, Austria, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, and Portugal.

action decreased by 5% compared to 2023, totaling \$761 million in 2024.³ Reported national funding to mine action programs increased by 35% compared to 2023, with at least \$306.3 million reported in 2024.⁴

As in previous years, a small number of donors provided the majority of international mine action funding in 2024, with the United States (US) remaining the largest donor, followed by Germany, the European Union (EU), Norway, and Switzerland.⁵ These five donors accounted for 62% of all international support in 2024, providing a combined total of \$468.8 million.

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions and the EU provided \$499.5 million, or 66% of all international funding. Six states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions provided contributions to mine action in 2024. Two states not party, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, joined state not party the US among the group of the 15 largest donors for the first time.

Ukraine remained the top recipient of international funding in 2024, as the conflict continued for a third year following Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ukraine received \$252.4 million, representing 33% of all international donor funds. The top 10 recipient countries—Ukraine, Iraq, Yemen, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Colombia, Syria, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka—received \$550.3 million, which accounted for 72% of all international assistance in 2024.⁶ Some Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with Article 5 obligations—such as Ethiopia and Senegal—saw a welcome increase in funding compared to previous years. Conversely, others, such as Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, and Niger, continued to receive minimal or no international assistance. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have generally struggled to attract funding for mine action, with no representation among the top 10 recipients during the five-year period from 2020–2024.

As in previous years, most funding provided in 2024 by donors was spent on mine clearance activities and integrated clearance programs (\$571.3 million, or 75% of total contributions).⁷ A large proportion of clearance funding (\$290.1 million, or 51%) was spent in six Mine



In the municipality of Tierralta, in Colombia's Córdoba department, a schoolteacher uses virtual reality goggles to inform pupils of the risks posed by explosive devices.

Keren Calderín/Fundación Barco, October 2024

³ Data on international funding for mine action is based on reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports, the annual reports of ITF Enhancing Human Security and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), media reporting, and responses from donors to Monitor questionnaires. Data was also checked against relevant databases, including the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) database, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) Financial Tracking Service, and the European Union (EU) Team Europe Explorer. See, IATI, "Country Development Finance Data," bit.ly/IATIdata2024; UNOCHA, "Humanitarian aid contributions 2023," bit.ly/UNOCHADonors2024; and European Union, "Team Europe Explorer," bit.ly/TeamEuropeExplorer. See also the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.

⁴ Data on national funding for mine action is based on responses to Monitor questionnaires, reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, and media reporting. National funding is inconsistently reported, and it is difficult to draw conclusions on trends.

⁵ United States (US) funding data for 2024 was compiled from a variety of sources, including the IATI database, the UNOCHA financial tracker, and responses from mine action operators to Monitor questionnaires. It is possible that not all US funding data for 2024 was available from these sources.

⁶ Of the top 10 recipients, seven are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, and Yemen; five are States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Sri Lanka; and two are states not party to either treaty: Syria and Vietnam.

⁷ Integrated clearance programs included activities such as risk education, victim assistance, and capacity-building, although clearance accounted for the largest component of spending.

Ban Treaty States Parties with massive landmine contamination (more than 100km²), with Ukraine receiving 63% (\$182.9 million) of that support. Convention on Cluster Munitions State Party Lao PDR received \$30.6 million for the clearance of cluster munitions.

Capacity-building programs received \$66.3 million (9% of total contributions). The EU was the largest donor of capacity-building in 2024, providing \$32.8 million (49% of the total), all of which went to capacity-building activities in Ukraine. Programs focusing on advocacy, risk education, and victim assistance continued to receive a relatively small proportion of international donor funds (1%, 2%, and 5%, respectively). The majority of funding was provided through international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which received 67% (\$510.6 million) of total funding. Direct funding to national NGOs and national institutions such as mine action authorities remained a small proportion of overall funding at 2% (\$13.7 million) and 5% (\$35.1 million), respectively.

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions have served as dependable sources of funding over the period 2020–2024, collectively contributing over \$1.7 billion, and accounting for 50% of all international assistance. International donors, both States Parties and states not party, have demonstrated their ability to respond to the acute needs of States Parties experiencing conflict, most notably with increased funding provided for Ukraine since 2022, and for Gaza in Palestine in 2024. However, there is still a need to address the financial disparities that have hindered the ability of some States Parties to fulfill their Article 5 clearance deadlines.

Looking ahead to 2025, the first year of the implementation of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan (2025–2029), international cooperation and assistance look increasingly uncertain. The largest funder of mine action, the US, implemented a freeze of foreign assistance in the first quarter of the year, followed by the termination of some humanitarian programs and uncertainty surrounding the future of others.⁸ The reduction in US funding has coincided with indications that other major donors are also considering scaling back their support for mine action with mounting interest in increasing defense budgets. Although the full consequences of these funding decisions may not be immediately apparent, it is likely that the impact—including delays in clearance, increased risk to civilians, and decreased support for victims—will become more pronounced in the coming years as conflicts continue and mine action needs increase. To mitigate these challenges and ensure continued progress in mine clearance, risk education, and victim assistance, States Parties need to take timely action to address funding gaps and maintain robust international cooperation.


INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL FUNDING TO MINE ACTION: 2020–2024

Over the past five years (2020–2024), total funding to mine action (including international and national contributions) amounted to \$4.3 billion, an average of \$856.6 million per year. This is a 34% increase on the \$3.2 billion provided in the previous five-year period from 2015–2019.⁹

Although data on national funding for mine action remains incomplete, such support accounted for at least 19% of mine action funding from 2020–2024, totaling approximately \$816.7 million.¹⁰ International funding over the period totaled \$3.5 billion, averaging some \$693.3 million per year and representing 81% of all funding.

- 8 The White House, “Reevaluating and Realigning US Foreign Aid,” 20 January 2025, bit.ly/USWhiteHouse20Jan2025; Rebecca Root, “US halts global de-mining operations,” *The Telegraph*, 31 January 2025, bit.ly/TheTelegraph31Jan2025; and Michael Sheldrick, “Foreign Aid Is Shrinking: What Happens Next?” *Forbes*, 25 February 2025, bit.ly/Forbes25Feb2025.
- 9 According to Monitor data, from 2015–2019, total funding for mine action amounted to \$3.2 billion (\$2.8 billion from international donors and \$472 million provided by affected states to their own mine action activities).
- 10 Funding by affected States Parties amounts to at least \$564.4 million (69% of the total).


Summary of contributions: 2020–2024 (in US\$ million)



INTERNATIONAL FUNDING IN 2024

International donors provided \$761 million to mine action in 2024, a decrease of 5% from the \$798.3 million provided in 2023. International funding peaked at \$798.4 million in 2022 and remained at a similar level in 2023.

International funding for mine action: 2015–2024 (in US\$ million)



Note: Totals not adjusted for inflation.

INTERNATIONAL DONORS

In 2024, 33 states, one other area, one British crown dependency, the EU, three institutions, and four trust funds contributed a total of \$761 million to mine action.

DONORS IN 2024

Top five international donors in 2024

A small number of donors continued to provide the majority of international mine action funding in 2024. Five donors—the US, Germany, the EU, Norway, and Switzerland—accounted

for 62% of all international funding in 2024, providing a combined total of \$468.8 million.¹¹ Japan, which was consistently in the top five donors from 2019–2023, moved out of the top five in 2024, and Switzerland moved into the top five.

The US remained the largest mine action donor in 2024 with a total contribution of \$198.1 million, representing 26% of all international funding. However, the 2024 US contribution was a 36% decrease from its 2023 contribution of \$309.8 million (39% of international funding).¹² Germany provided the second largest contribution in 2024, with \$100.4 million, accounting for 13% of international contributions. The EU provided the third largest contribution, \$67 million, accounting for 9% of all international support. Norway provided \$57.9 million (8% of all international support), and Switzerland provided \$45.3 million (6% of all international support).

Contributions by donors: 2020–2024¹³

Donor	Contribution (US\$ million)					
	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	Total
US	198.1	309.8	310.2	194.5	204.8	1,217.4
Germany	100.4	80.3	78.8	64.8	54.3	378.7
EU	67.0	68.5	124.2	37.8	89.8	387.3
Norway	57.9	50.8	44.7	35.5	37.4	226.3
Switzerland	45.3	35.8	19.7	15.2	15.4	131.4
Saudi Arabia	44.8	6.6	33.3	0	0	84.7
Netherlands	43.6	24.6	25.0	21.5	12.7	127.4
Japan	37.4	67.5	45.3	42.3	39.8	232.3
Canada	27.6	40.7	22.6	16.3	8.4	115.6
UK	25.2	15.2	24.7	38.2	32.3	135.6
Denmark	19.1	8.3	10.3	14.8	13.8	66.3
France	18.0	22.0	10.9	9.6	8.5	69
Italy	11.9	11.7	8.1	5.4	4.8	41.9
Luxembourg	9.2	3.4	2.3	1.5	1.3	17.7
South Korea	6.8	3.5	1.6	0.3	0.5	12.7
New Zealand	6.4	7.9	4.7	9.9	8.1	37
Australia	5.5	5.4	3.1	4.4	6.5	24.9
Austria	5.4	7.6	3.3	3.5	2.3	22.1
Belgium	5.1	3.0	3.0	3.5	4.5	19.1

¹¹ From 2019–2023, the combined annual contributions from the top five donors each year accounted for between 70–77% of all international funding.

¹² Due to the US freeze of foreign assistance in early 2025, data sources such as the US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), and its annual report, “To Walk the Earth in Safety,” were not available. The US could not provide data on funding in response to the Monitor questionnaire due to the US government shutdown in September 2025. Data for US funding was therefore taken from available online sources and may not completely reflect the full amount provided in 2024.

¹³ The amount for each donor has been rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The totals are not adjusted to inflation. This data is drawn from information provided by donors in their Article 7 transparency reports, as well as responses to Monitor questionnaires and other sources. In 2022, the total contributions of New Zealand and South Korea may have been slightly higher. For more information see, International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), *Landmine Monitor 2023* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports. In 2020, the total contributions of Denmark and the United Kingdom (UK) might have been slightly higher. For more information see, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2021* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2021), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

Donor	Contribution (US\$ million)					
	2024	2023	2022	2021	2020	Total
United Arab Emirates (UAE)	5.0	0	0	0	0	5.0
Ireland	4.9	4.7	3.6	3.7	3.8	20.7
Sweden	4.0	11.7	12.5	14.3	9.1	51.6
Finland	3.1	3.3	3.2	3.7	3.3	16.6
Slovenia	1.8	2.6	1.6	0.3	0.7	7
India	1.2	0	0	0	0	1.2
Other donors*	6.2	3.4	1.7	2.5	3.1	16.9
Total	761.0	798.3	798.4	543.5	565.2	3,466.4

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

*Other donors included the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), which provided almost \$3 million to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Voluntary Trust Fund. Donors providing less than \$1 million each were: Mine Ban Treaty States Parties **Andorra**, the **Czech Republic**, **Estonia**, **Liechtenstein**, **Monaco**, **Poland**, **Portugal**, and **Spain**; other areas Jersey and Taiwan; state not party China; and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Multi-Partner Trust Fund (UNMPTF) Internal Displacement Solutions Fund, the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan, the Sudan Financing Platform, and the United Nations Ukraine Community Recovery Fund.

Contributions by States Parties in 2024

States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions provided over half (57%) of all international support in 2024 with 27 countries providing \$432.5 million, excluding EU funding.¹⁴ This represents a 6% increase from the \$407.8 million provided in 2023. With EU funding, the States Parties contribution in 2024 increased to \$499.5 million, or 66% of all international support.¹⁵ This represents a 5% increase from the \$476.3 million provided in 2023.

Contributions by states not party in 2024

Six states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty provided contributions to mine action in 2024: the US, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), India, and China. The reported contributions accounted for \$256 million (34% of all international donor funding). Two states not party, Saudi Arabia and South Korea, joined state not party the US among the group of the 15 largest donors for the first time. However, tracking funding from states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Cluster Munitions is challenging as contributions are not systematically reported.

Changes in donor contributions in 2024

In 2024, 18 donors contributed more than they did in 2023, including a \$20.1 million (25%) increase from Germany, a \$19 million (77%) increase from the Netherlands, a \$10.1 million (66%) increase from the UK, and a \$10.8 million (130%) increase from Denmark. Several European donors that increased their contributions in 2024 directed substantial proportions of their contributions towards Ukraine. Of their total contributions, Germany provided 23% (\$22.8 million) to Ukraine; the Netherlands provided 35% (\$15.2 million) to Ukraine; and Denmark allocated 76% (\$14.4 million) to Ukraine. However, Germany also provided three

¹⁴ Mine Ban Treaty States Parties providing funding in 2024 were: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. With the exception of Estonia, Finland, and Poland, all these countries are also States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

¹⁵ All EU member states are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.

other recipients—Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq—significantly larger contributions than in 2023 (an increase of 462%, 217%, and 149%, respectively). The Netherlands provided its largest contribution (\$28.4 million, 65%) to its Mine Action and Cluster Munitions Programme supporting mine action projects in 16 states.¹⁶ The UK provided its largest contribution (\$24.2 million, 96%) to its Global Mine Action Programme (GMAP 3), operating in 11 affected states.¹⁷



A dog handler from Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) and his dog survey a minefield in Mykolaiv region, Ukraine.

© NPA, November 2024

State not party Saudi Arabia increased its contribution to mine action by \$38.2 million (a 584% increase from its 2023 contribution), with the majority of the contribution, \$40 million (89%), going to clearance activities in Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Yemen. The remaining \$4.8 million (11%) went to victim assistance activities for Syrian survivors in Türkiye and for Ukrainian survivors in Poland, as well as general victim assistance in Yemen.¹⁸

Seven donors who did not provide contributions in 2023 provided contributions in 2024: States Parties Monaco, Portugal, and Spain; other area Taiwan; and states not party China, India, and the UAE. In 2024,

funds to mine action were also provided through several United Nations (UN)-managed funds that did not provide contributions in 2023: the Internal Displacement Solutions Fund, the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan, the Sudan Financing Platform, and the Ukraine Community Recovery Fund.

In 2024, funding from 14 donors decreased, including a \$111.6 million (36%) decrease from the US, a \$30.1 million (45%) decrease from Japan, and a \$7.7 million (66%) decrease from Sweden.¹⁹

Two donors from 2023—Slovakia and the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS)—did not report any funding contributions to mine action in 2024.²⁰

¹⁶ Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁷ Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe.

¹⁸ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nariman Gasimov, Deputy Head of the International Relations Department, Mine Action Agency of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ANAMA), 18 April 2025; IATI, “Country Development Finance Data,” undated, bit.ly/IATIdata2024; UNOCHA, “Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of 2024,” undated, bit.ly/UNOCHADonorsSaudiArabia2024; and “Saudi Arabia will support Azerbaijan in demining activities in liberated territories, says ambassador,” *Almedia News Portal*, 17 January 2024, bit.ly/Almedia17Jan2024.

¹⁹ Japan reported on its mine action contributions in US dollars for the fiscal year 1 April 2024–31 March 2025 in its 2024 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report. Japan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7MBT. The total funding reported by Japan for the 2024–2025 fiscal year was \$72.1 million. The figures reported by the Monitor are based on the calendar year 2024, as provided by the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japanese yen. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Akifumi Fukuoka, Deputy Director, Conventional Arms Division, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 2025.

²⁰ Slovakia provided various training exercises for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists in 2024, although it did not specify the recipient countries. See, Slovakia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form J.

Summary of changes in 2024

Change	Donors	Combined total (US\$)
Increase of more than 20%	Andorra, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Jersey, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Switzerland, UK, UNDP, UNOCHA	\$121.8 million increase
Increase of less than 20%	Australia, Ireland, Italy, Norway	\$7.6 million increase
Decrease of more than 20%	Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Japan, Liechtenstein, Slovenia, Sweden, US, UNICEF	\$166.6 million decrease
Decrease of less than 20%	EU, Finland, France, New Zealand	\$7.2 million decrease
New donors in 2024	China, India, Monaco, Portugal, Spain, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Internal Displacement Solutions Fund, Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan, Sudan Financing Platform, Ukraine Community Recovery Fund	\$8.1 million provided in 2024
Donors from 2023 that did not report new funding in 2024	Slovakia, UNTFHS	Close to \$1 million provided in 2023

Note: UNDP=United Nations Development Programme; UNICEF=United Nations Children's Fund; UNOCHA=United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; UNOPS=United Nations Office for Project Services; UNTFHS=United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security.

INTERNATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS: 2020–2024

International donors contributed a total of \$3.5 billion in the five-year period 2020–2024. This is a 25% increase from the \$2.8 billion contributed during the previous five-year period (2015–2019).²¹

In 2020–2021, international support remained within a range of \$543 million to \$565 million but jumped up to almost \$800 million in 2022 and 2023. The \$798.4 million reported in 2022 was the highest level of annual international funding recorded by the Monitor since it began reporting in 1999, though 2024 saw a decrease in funding to \$761 million. Ukraine received a large proportion of the international funding in 2022, 2023, and 2024 (20%, 39%, and 33%, respectively), following the full-scale invasion by Russia.

From 2020 to 2024, the US contributed \$1.2 billion, representing 35% of all international funding during the five-year period. Together with State Party Germany (\$378.7 million) and the EU (\$387.3 million), these three donors contributed almost \$2 billion, or more than half of total international funding (57%). Two other donors—States Parties Japan and Norway—contributed more than \$200 million each; while States Parties Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK) ranked among the top 10 mine action donors for the five-year period.


²¹ See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2020* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2020), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

CONTRIBUTIONS BY AND TO STATES PARTIES OF THE MINE BAN TREATY AND CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS: 2020–2024

Support from States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Mine Ban Treaty accounted for just over half (50%) of all international funding provided in 2020–2024, with a total of 28 States Parties reporting a combined contribution of \$1.7 billion (not including EU contributions).²² This is an increase from the support provided by States Parties in 2015–2019, when \$1.4 billion was provided, representing 49% of all international funding during the period.

Of this \$1.7 billion, \$1.2 billion was provided to affected States Parties. The increase in funding by States Parties to States Parties in 2023 and 2024 (see chart below) is largely explained by an increase in funding provided to Ukraine.

Funding by and to States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty: 2020–2024



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate contributions from States Parties to affected States Parties in US\$ million, with the percentage in brackets as a proportion of total international funding.

FUNDING PATHS

Donors contributed to mine action through several trust fund mechanisms, notably the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF), administered by the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and ITF Enhancing Human Security, established by the government of Slovenia.²³ The year 2024 also saw funding provided through other UN-managed funds: the Internal Displacement Solutions Fund, the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan, the Sudan Financing Platform, and the Ukraine Community Recovery Fund.

In 2024, UNMAS received approximately \$28.2 million from 26 donors, an increase from the \$19.9 million from 19 donors received in 2023.²⁴ Funds were received through the VTF, as well as the Internal Displacement Solutions Fund, the Special Trust Fund for Afghanistan, the Sudan Financing Platform, and the Ukraine Community Recovery Fund. Several donors providing financial assistance under \$1 million used the VTF to contribute to mine action,

²² Twenty-eight Mine Ban Treaty States Parties reported mine action contributions during the period 2020–2024: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Twenty-four of those States Parties (excluding Monaco, Portugal, Slovakia, and Spain) provided contributions each year in the five-year period.

²³ ITF Enhancing Human Security was formerly known as the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance.

²⁴ See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2024), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports. See also, UNMAS, “Annual Report 2024,” 18 June 2025, pp. 115–116, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2024.

including Andorra, Estonia, Liechtenstein, and Poland, as well as the UNDP and UNICEF. UNOCHA provided almost \$3 million to the VTF in 2024. Slovakia did not provide an annual contribution through the VTF in 2024, although it contributed funds annually from 2019 to 2023.²⁵ Recipient countries of the VTF were Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine.

Four donor states—the Czech Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, and the US—reported allocating a combined total of \$7.7 million for mine action programs in 2024 through ITF Enhancing Human Security. This was a reduction from the seven donors and \$8.6 million provided in 2023. Recipient countries were Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Serbia, Syria, and Ukraine.²⁶

Financial support to Ukraine was provided through several funding mechanisms including the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU), the Ukraine Community Recovery Fund, the Ukraine Comprehensive Assistance Package (U-CAP) for non-lethal assistance launched by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UNOCHA Ukraine Humanitarian Fund (UHF), which responds to the critical needs defined in the Ukraine Humanitarian Needs Response Plan.²⁷

Implementation of mine action activities is often carried out by government institutions, NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and UN agencies. International funding to UN agencies accounted for 11% of total funding in 2024, with \$84.5 million received. This was an increase of 51% from the \$56.1 million received in 2023.

International assistance to international NGOs increased by 40% in 2024, with at least \$510.6 million received (compared to \$363.5 million in 2023).²⁸ Support provided through international NGOs accounted for 67% of total funding in 2024. International NGOs that received a significant proportion of contributions in 2024 included The HALO Trust (\$106.2 million), Mines Advisory Group (MAG) (\$92.3 million), Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) (\$83.8 million), Fondation Suisse de Déminage (FSD) (\$32.5 million), Humanity & Inclusion (HI) (\$32.3 million), the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)

25 See, Slovakia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports (for calendar years 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023); UNMAS, "Annual Report 2019," April 2020, pp. 32–33, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2019; UNMAS, "Annual Report 2020," April 2021, p. 49, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2020; UNMAS, "Annual Report 2021," April 2022, p. 116, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2021; and UNMAS, "Annual Report 2023," 26 April 2024, pp. 106–107, bit.ly/UNMASAnnualReport2023.

26 ITF Enhancing Human Security, "Annual Report 2024," 14 March 2025, pp. 17–19, bit.ly/ITFAnnualReport2024.

27 The Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU) is a multi-donor program that enables Canada, Estonia, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US to provide funding to Ukraine, including for mine action. See, PFRU website, www.pfru.org.ua. Sweden reported providing a financial contribution to PFRU for clearance and risk education activities. Sweden Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2024), Form J. Denmark reported providing funding to the Ukraine Community Recovery Fund for mine action activities. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sofie Rosa Hviid Mønster, Head of Section, Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 June 2025.

28 The increase in funding for international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in 2024 may be partly explained by better reported disaggregation of recipient organization data.



A prosthетist/orthotist works at the Paola Biocca Center in Amman, Jordan. Co-founded by a landmine survivor, the center provides rehabilitation to mine/ERW survivors, along with others in need of rehabilitation services, including Syrian refugees.

Italian Campaign to Ban Landmines, May 2025


(\$22.2 million), the Danish Refugee Council (\$19.5 million), and DanChurchAid (DCA) (\$8.1 million). An additional \$23.4 million went to The HALO Trust and MAG, but figures were not disaggregated by operator.²⁹

The ICRC and National Societies saw a significant decrease in funds, with \$10.5 million received in 2024 compared to \$23.5 million received in 2023. While a similar number of donors provided funding to ICRC in both 2023 and 2024, the decrease in funds was largely due to an 89% decrease in the contribution from Germany (from \$12.2 million in 2023 to \$1.3 million in 2024).

International assistance provided directly to national NGOs accounted for only 2% (\$13.7 million) of all international contributions, a slight increase from the 1% (\$4 million) received by national organizations in 2023. Eight donors supported local organizations in BiH, Colombia, Lao PDR, Libya, Sri Lanka, Syria, Ukraine, and Vietnam.³⁰ National NGOs also received funding through mechanisms such as the UNOCHA-administered Humanitarian Fund in Myanmar, and through grants provided by international NGOs under partnership contracts.

Financial support provided directly to national institutions including national mine action authorities and national mine action centers decreased in 2024, with \$35.1 million provided (5% of total contributions), compared to \$80.6 million in 2023 (10% of total contributions). National agencies working in mine action in Azerbaijan, Benin, Cambodia, Croatia, Iraq, Jordan, Lao PDR, Serbia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Togo, and Ukraine, as well as in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region, benefited from the 2024 funding. Whereas in 2023, 83% of the funds to national institutions went to national demining agencies in Ukraine, only 59% was allocated to national demining agencies in Ukraine in 2024. However, funding for national institutions in Ukraine and other countries was also channeled through UNDP and UNMAS—approximately \$22.8 million was identified as funding for activities supporting national institutions in Armenia, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, the DRC, Lao PDR, and Ukraine in 2024.

Allocation of international mine action funding across implementing partners in 2024 (in US\$ million)³¹



Note: NGOs=non-governmental organizations. Percentages in brackets reflect funding as a proportion of total international funding.

²⁹ In Cambodia, a proportion of the \$2.6 million provided to The HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) by the UK also went to APOPO for an innovative financing project, “Minefields to Rice Fields.”

³⁰ Donors supporting national NGOs in 2024 were Canada, the EU, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the US. Switzerland supported NGOs in Colombia but did not disaggregate the figures for the amounts provided to national and international NGOs and therefore its contribution to national NGOs in Colombia is not included in the \$13.7 million.

³¹ Some donors did not disaggregate the type of implementing partner. This has been represented within the “various” category, and mainly includes multilateral organizations, international and national NGOs, and UN agencies.

RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

RECIPIENTS IN 2024

A total of 47 states and two other areas received \$689.9 million from 40 donors in 2024. Another \$6.7 million went to mine action activities in specific regions, including West Africa, East Africa, the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and the Caucasus.³² Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, and the US reported funding regional activities. Another \$64.4 million, designated as “global” in the table below, was provided to institutions, NGOs, trust funds, and UN agencies without a designated recipient state or area. Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco only reported contributions to “global” activities.³³

International funding recipients in 2024

Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)
Ukraine	252.4	Pakistan	1.9
Iraq*	60.8	Armenia	1.8
Yemen	47.1	Palau	1.8
Lao PDR*	32.6	Philippines	1.6
Cambodia	31.8	Jordan	1.3
Colombia	30.8	Nigeria	1.2
Syria	28.6	Türkiye	1.0
Afghanistan*	26.9	Kosovo	0.9
Vietnam	21.6	Cameroon	0.8
Sri Lanka	17.7	Mauritania*	0.7
Lebanon*	16.5	Thailand	0.6
Azerbaijan	13.8	Fiji	0.4
Zimbabwe	13.2	Chad*	0.4
Angola	9.8	Marshall Islands	0.3
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	9.3	Serbia	0.3
Somalia*	9.1	Togo	0.3
South Sudan*	8.4	Central African Republic	0.3
Palestine	7.1	Benin	0.2
Ethiopia	5.9	Croatia	0.1
Myanmar	5.7	Burkina Faso	0.1
Libya	5.3	Nauru	< 0.1
Sudan	4.5	<i>Western Sahara</i>	< 0.1
Senegal	4.2		
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	3.1	Sub-total	689.9
Tajikistan	3.0	Regional	6.7
Solomon Islands	2.6	Global	64.4
Mali	2.2	Total	761.0

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*.

*States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with cluster munition remnant contamination.

³² This includes regional programs and support to countries in the same region but where funds were not disaggregated by country.

³³ The Netherlands did not disaggregate some of its contributions to individual states and so those contributions were also categorized as global.

Top 10 recipients of international funding in 2024

As in previous years, a small number of countries received the majority of funding.³⁴ The top 10 recipients of international funding—Ukraine, Iraq, Yemen, Lao PDR, Cambodia, Colombia, Syria, Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka—received \$550.3 million combined, which accounted for 72% of all international assistance in 2024. Two of these recipient countries—Afghanistan and Iraq—are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions; five are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty; and one to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Two—Syria and Vietnam—are not party to either treaty.

Since 2020, only 14 countries have appeared in this group of 10 largest recipients, with seven of them present every year over the five-year period: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Syria, and Vietnam.³⁵

Changes in recipient funding in 2024

In 2024, a total of 35 recipients experienced a change of more than 20% in funding compared to 2023, of which 18 received more support and 17 received less support. Five recipients in 2024 did not receive international funding in 2023: Fiji, Nauru, Pakistan, Türkiye, and Western Sahara. Six recipients from 2023 received no international funding in 2024: Georgia, Kiribati, Mozambique, Niger, Peru, and Rwanda.³⁶

In 2024, Ukraine remained at the top of the list of countries receiving the most mine action assistance, as in 2023 and 2022. Ukraine received \$252.4 million for mine action from 22 donors, representing 33% of all international donor funds in 2024. However, this was an 18% decrease from the \$308.1 million that went to Ukraine in 2023.

Four other recipients in the top 10—Iraq, Lao PDR, Syria, and Vietnam—all experienced a decrease in mine action funding in 2024. Iraq, which was the largest recipient of mine action assistance from 2016 until 2021, received \$60.8 million in 2024 (8% of all international support, and a 11% decrease from the \$68.1 million received in 2023). Iraq has seen its funding decrease since 2021, although Iraq remains the second highest recipient of mine action support. Lao PDR, a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, received \$32.6 million in 2024 (4% of all international funding, and a 34% decrease from the \$49.3 million received in 2023). Nine donors contributed to mine action activities in Lao PDR in 2024, but the US was the largest donor providing \$23.6 million (or 72% of the total contribution received).

Yemen saw an increase in funding compared to 2023 contributions. Yemen received \$47.1 million—with the majority (84%) provided by Saudi Arabia for mine clearance—representing a 200% increase from the \$15.7 million received in 2023.³⁷

The State of Palestine saw a 299% increase in funding in 2024, receiving \$7.1 million. Contributions supported ongoing clearance and risk education activities in the West Bank and emergency operations in Gaza.

Afghanistan—which has struggled to attract funding since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, and received 60% less funding in 2023 compared to 2022—saw a welcome respite in 2024 with funding remaining relatively stable (\$26.9 million in 2024 compared to \$26.6 million in 2023).

³⁴ The same 10 countries received the most mine action funding in 2024 as in 2023. Of the 10 countries that received the most mine action funding in 2024 and 2023, nine were also in the top 10 in 2022: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen. Libya was included among the top 10 recipient countries in 2022, and Sri Lanka in 2023 and 2024.

³⁵ The 14 countries appearing in the list of the 10 largest recipients of international funding in 2020–2024 were: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Sri Lanka, Syria, Türkiye, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.

³⁶ Peru received funding in 2023 from Germany for the destruction of cluster munition stockpiles, which it completed in December 2023. See, Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), *Cluster Munition Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, September 2024), bit.ly/ClusterMunitionMonitorReports.

³⁷ In 2023, Saudi Arabia reported in-kind rather than financial assistance to mine clearance efforts in Yemen. See, UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service, “Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of 2023,” undated, bit.ly/UNOCHAFTS2023SaudiArabia.

Regional funding for Africa remained at a similar amount in 2024 as in 2023, with \$2.8 million provided by four donors to programs covering West Africa, East Africa, and the Sahara.

In West Africa, Mali and Nigeria both saw an increase in funding, receiving \$2.2 million and \$1.2 million, respectively, for a combined increase of \$2.8 million. Benin and Togo saw a decrease in funding (down \$0.2 million and \$0.1 million, respectively).

Two Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with Article 5 clearance obligations that have received little funding in the past saw an increase in funding in 2024. Ethiopia, which received \$2.7 million in 2023, received \$5.9 million in 2024, with six donors supporting clearance, risk education, and victim assistance activities. Senegal received \$4.2 million from three donors, a 156% increase from the \$1.6 million received in 2023.

France remained the only donor to Mauritania in 2024, providing \$0.7 million for clearance activities.³⁸ Mauritania is not on track to meet its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline of 31 December 2026, and in December 2024 requested a two-year extension until 1 August 2028 for its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline. Mauritania has cited the lack of funding as the reason for the delay in completion.³⁹

Five States Parties that received extensions to their Article 5 deadlines at the Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap in November 2024, received reduced or no funding in 2024: Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Niger, Peru, and Serbia. Chad saw a decrease of 26% in contributions in 2024, receiving only \$400,000 for an emergency response to an unplanned explosion at a military ammunition depot.⁴⁰ Niger received no international funding in 2024, though its five-year demining workplan (for the period until 31 December 2029) stated that Niger requires international support of \$2,370,500.⁴¹ Both Chad and Niger have cited insufficient financial resources as one of the reasons they have been unable to meet their clearance deadlines under Article 5 of the treaty.⁴² Both States Parties are on their fifth extension request.

Guinea-Bissau received no funding from states in 2024 and has not received funding in the five-year period since 2020, despite reporting the discovery of previously unknown mined areas in 2021 and submitting extension requests in 2021, 2022, and 2024. The 2024 extension request, granted at the Fifth Review Conference in November 2024, required a budget of \$7.6 million for a three-year period to 31 December 2027.⁴³

Ecuador and Peru also received no international funding in 2024. Both states have allocated funding for their mine clearance operations; however, in their recent extension requests, Ecuador and Peru indicated that national funding has been redirected to other priorities. In Peru's 2024 Article 5 deadline extension request for five years, until 31 December 2029, Peru stated that it would be able to achieve completion of its clearance within three years with the support of international resources.⁴⁴

38 France provided \$1.6 million to HAMAP-Humanitaire in Mauritania for the period 2022–2023. The contribution by France in 2024 also supported the work of HAMAP-Humanitaire.

39 Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Article 4 deadline Extension Request (revised), 19 March 2025, p. 15, bit.ly/MauritaniaArt4ExtRequest2025; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Houssein Neya, Database Manager, National Humanitarian Demining Program for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 1 April 2025.

40 IATI, "Country Development Finance Data," bit.ly/IATIdata2024; and "Chad: Fire in military ammunition depot kills several," *Le Monde*, 19 June 2024, bit.ly/LeMonde19June2024.

41 Niger reported an annual national contribution of \$100,000 over five years would be made. See, Niger Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 15 August 2024, p. 14, bit.ly/NigerRevisedArt5ExtRequest2024.

42 Ibid., p. 7; and Chad Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 June 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024.

43 This included \$1.7 million in 2024. See, Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 April 2024, pp. 25–26, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024.

44 Peru Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2024, pp. 42–43, bit.ly/PeruArt5ExtRequestMarch2024.

Serbia received a reported \$0.3 million in 2024, a decrease from the \$1.2 million received in 2023. Serbia also funds its own mine action program.⁴⁵

States Parties have recognized the need to consider how all affected States Parties can be supported to meet their clearance obligations under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty. Action 44 of the Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan refers to the possibility of establishing a voluntary trust fund for this purpose. A voluntary trust fund working group, chaired by Norway, was set up in 2025 to study the feasibility of setting up such a fund.⁴⁶

Summary of changes in 2024

Change	Recipients	Combined total (US\$)
Increase of more than 20%	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Palau, Palestine, Philippines, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Yemen, Zimbabwe	\$80 million increase
Increase of less than 20%	Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Sri Lanka	\$2.6 million increase
Decrease of more than 20%	Benin, BiH, Chad, Croatia, DRC, Kosovo, Lao PDR, Libya, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Vietnam	\$44.5 million decrease
Decrease of less than 20%	Angola, Burkina Faso, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine	\$66.5 million decrease
Recipients from 2023 that did not receive new funding in 2024	Georgia, Kiribati, Mozambique, Niger, Peru, Rwanda	\$2 million received in 2023
New recipients in 2024	Fiji, Nauru, Pakistan, Türkiye, Western Sahara	\$3.3 million received in 2024

RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION FUNDING: 2020–2024

In 2020–2024, the 10 largest recipients of mine action support received the majority of available funding, totaling almost \$2.4 billion. Of these 10 recipient states, one is in Europe, three are in the Middle East and North Africa region, five in the Asia-Pacific region, and one in the Americas.

Although four countries from Sub-Saharan Africa have massive or large mine contamination (Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Mauritania), no country from Sub-Saharan Africa was among the top 10 recipients during this five-year period. Three affected states from Sub-Saharan Africa were among the 15 largest recipients of mine action funding in 2020–2024: Somalia ranked 12th (\$59.4 million), Angola ranked 13th (\$57.7 million), and Zimbabwe ranked 15th (\$50.3 million).

⁴⁵ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sladana Kosutić, Senior Advisor, Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC), 27 March 2025.

⁴⁶ Mine Ban Treaty, “Draft Siem Reap-Angkor Action Plan 2025–2029,” 28 November 2024, p. 15, bit.ly/SRAAPDraft28Nov2024.

From 2020 to 2024, the composition of the top 10 group of recipients remained relatively similar compared to the previous five-year period, 2015–2019, with a few exceptions. Ukraine ranked first in the top 10 group for 2020–2024, but 11th in the list of recipients for 2015–2019. Yemen and Sri Lanka moved into the list of top 10 recipients for 2020–2024 compared to the previous five-year period when they were in the top 15.

Afghanistan has seen a noticeable decline in annual funding over the five-year period, 2020–2024, along with a 58% reduction in funding compared to the previous five-year period (2015–2019). Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Syria also saw a decrease in funding compared to the previous five-year period. The remaining five recipients—Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen—saw an increase in funding in 2020–2024 compared to the previous five-year period.

Summary of changes: top 10 recipients of mine action funding

Recipient	2020–2024 contributions (US\$ million)	2020–2024 ranking	2015–2019 contributions (US\$ million)	2015–2019 ranking	% change from the previous five-year period
Ukraine	758.5	1	62.9	11	+1,106%
Iraq*	418.5	2	548	1	-24%
Lao PDR*	233.8	3	403.1	3	-42%
Afghanistan*	211.9	4	500.3	2	-58%
Cambodia	162.1	5	117	7	+39%
Colombia	159.8	6	176.7	5	-10%
Yemen	155.4	7	44.6	13	+248%
Syria	143.3	8	232.6	4	-38%
Vietnam	114.6	9	67.8	10	+69%
Sri Lanka	85.1	10	41	15	+108%
Total	2,443	N/A	2,194	N/A	+11%

Note: N/A=not applicable; States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**.

*States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions with cluster munition remnant contamination.

The 10 smallest recipients of mine action funding changed each year from 2020 to 2024. Out of the 27 countries that were among the bottom 10 recipients during the five-year period, five appeared in the list for three or more years. Of those, three are from Sub-Saharan Africa (Burkina Faso, Chad, and other area Western Sahara); one from Europe and the Caucasus (Georgia); and one from the Middle East (Jordan). Chad, a State Party with Article 5 obligations, received a total contribution of \$2.1 million over the five-year period.

Other States Parties with Article 5 obligations and/or Article 4 obligations appearing once or twice in the group of 10 smallest recipients of mine action funding for 2020–2024 were: Croatia, Ethiopia, Niger, Serbia, and Thailand. Niger received a total contribution of \$1.3 million over the five-year period, with no contributions received in 2024 or 2020. While Mauritania only received a total of \$2.5 million over the five-year period, it did not appear in the group of 10 smallest recipients in any single year as funding was sporadic during that period. It received no funding in 2020–2021, and the entire \$2.5 million between 2022–2024.

INTERNATIONAL FUNDING BY THEMATIC SECTOR

In 2024, 75% of international mine action funding went to support clearance and integrated clearance programs. Capacity-building made up 9% of global mine action funding, victim assistance 5%, risk education 2%, and advocacy 1%. A small amount of funding was spent

on the destruction of stockpiles (less than 1%).⁴⁷ “Various” funding represented 8% of all international mine action support. This included contributions not disaggregated by donors, funding for activities such as coordination and core costs, as well as funding not earmarked for any particular sector.

Contributions by thematic sector in 2024⁴⁸

Sector	Total contribution (US\$ million)	% of total contribution	Number of donors
Clearance and integrated clearance programs	571.3	75%	28
Capacity-building	66.3	9%	11
Various	61.1	8%	25
Victim assistance	36.4	5%	18
Risk education	17.2	2%	13
Advocacy	6.3	1%	12
Stockpile destruction	2.4	<1%	1
Total	761.0	100%	N/A

Note: N/A=not applicable.

CLEARANCE AND INTEGRATED CLEARANCE PROGRAMS

In 2024, \$571.3 million, or 75% of all funding went to clearance and integrated clearance programs, which include clearance combined with risk education, victim assistance, capacity-building, and other activities such as information management and gender mainstreaming. This represented an increase of \$169.5 million from 2023, although the increased figures could be attributed to better disaggregation of funding by sector.⁴⁹

A total of 28 donors reported contributions to clearance and integrated clearance programs in 2024. Six donors—the EU, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Saudi Arabia, and the US—provided the majority (\$414.4 million, or 73%), with the US contributing 43% of this amount (\$179.2 million).

Many donors reported clearance programs integrated with other activities, particularly risk education, as a combined figure. Contributions for clearance and integrated clearance programs were provided across 36 affected countries and one other area.⁵⁰

47 The HALO Trust, funded by the US, cleared and destroyed stockpiles in Afghanistan that contained some landmines. Risk education was also provided. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Kim Feldewerth, Senior Policy and Advocacy Manager, The HALO Trust, 31 August 2025.

48 In 2023, international funding was distributed among the following sectors: clearance and integrated clearance programs (\$401.8 million, or 50% of total international support), capacity-building (\$96.5 million, or 12%), victim assistance (\$47 million, or 6%), risk education (\$11.7 million, or 1%), advocacy (\$4.2 million, or <1%), and various activities (\$236.7 million, or 30%). See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2024), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.


49 Whereas in 2023, \$236.7 million (30%) of all funding went to “various” contributions, in 2024, only \$61.1 million (8%) of all funding was attributed to “various.”

50 States Parties that were recipients of international assistance for clearance in 2024 were: Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Croatia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Fiji, Iraq, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, the Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. States not party that received international assistance for clearance in 2024 were: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Vietnam. The other area that received international assistance for clearance activities in 2024 was Kosovo.

Twenty donors earmarked some contributions specifically for clearance and survey activities, providing a total of \$196.6 million (34% of total clearance contributions).⁵¹

While few donors disaggregate clearance funding according to device type, available data indicates that, in 2024, \$220 million (39% of clearance funding) was spent on the removal of landmines including improvised mines, \$61 million (11%) on cluster munition clearance, and \$61 million (11%) on clearance of both landmines and cluster munitions. The remaining \$229 million (40%) was provided for the clearance of mixed contamination or where the device was not specified or could not be inferred.

Allocation of mine action clearance funding by device type in 2024 (in US\$ million)⁵²



Note: Percentages in brackets reflect funding as a proportion of total international clearance and integrated clearance funding.

Clearance funding to Mine Ban Treaty States Parties


About \$290.1 million (51%) of international funding for clearance and integrated clearance programs was spent in six Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with massive landmine contamination (more than 100km²): Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Ukraine. Ukraine received \$182.9 million (63%) of that support.

Five States Parties with large contamination (20–99km²)—Angola, Chad, Croatia, Mauritania, and Sri Lanka—received a combined total of \$28.4 million in clearance support. Five States Parties with medium contamination (5–19km²)—Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe—received a combined total of \$58.3 million in clearance support. Seven States Parties with small contamination (less than 5km²)—Colombia, the DRC, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, and South Sudan—received a combined total of \$55.2 million in clearance support.

51 This included mine, ERW, and cluster munition remnant clearance. The 20 donors were: Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, the EU, Finland, France, India, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, South Korea, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the UK, the US, and UNOCHA.

52 Information on device type was obtained from questionnaires sent to donors and Article 7 reports, as well as publicly available funding databases. This information was triangulated with operator websites, reports, and the Monitor Impact country profiles.

Clearance funding by extent of mine contamination in Mine Ban Treaty States Parties: 2022–2024 (in US\$ million)⁵³



Note: Figures above each bar indicate the combined total of clearance and integrated clearance program funding.

Clearance funding to Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties in 2024

In 2024, \$30.6 million was provided for the clearance of cluster munition remnants in State Party Lao PDR, the only State Party with massive contamination (more than 1,000km²).

In Iraq, which has large contamination (between 100–1,000km²), approximately \$17.5 million was reported to be provided for the clearance of cluster munition remnants in 2024 (37% of the total funding provided to Iraq for clearance).

State Party South Sudan, which has medium contamination (between 10–99km²), received approximately \$1.9 million in 2024 for the clearance of cluster munitions. In States Parties Chad and Mauritania, which also have medium contamination, no funding was reported specifically for the clearance of cluster munition remnants.

Of the four Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties with small contamination (less than 10km²)—Afghanistan, Germany, Lebanon, and Somalia—funding for cluster munition clearance in 2024 was only reported for Germany and Lebanon. Germany funded its own cluster munition clearance (see *National Contributions in 2024* section), and Lebanon received approximately \$8.7 million for the clearance of cluster munitions.


Clearance funding: 2020–2024

Between 2020 and 2024, approximately two-thirds of international funding went to clearance and integrated clearance projects (63%, or \$2.2 billion). This is similar to the previous five-year period from 2015–2019 when clearance represented 60% of international support.

⁵³ In 2024, recipients of international funding for clearance with massive contamination (more than 100km²) included: Afghanistan, BiH, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Ukraine. Recipients with large contamination (20–99km²) included: Angola, Chad, Croatia, Mauritania, and Sri Lanka. Recipients with medium contamination (5–19km²) included: Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. Recipients with small contamination (less than 5km²) included: Colombia, the DRC, Palestine, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, and South Sudan. Contamination levels changed for some countries over the three-year period: Croatia, Mauritania, South Sudan, Thailand, and Yemen. Other States Parties that received funding for clearance at some point during the three-year period included: Mali, Palau, the Philippines, the Solomon Islands, and Türkiye.

The proportion of international funds spent on clearance annually in 2020–2024 represented a wider range (50–75%) compared to the previous five years (a range of 56%–72%).

Clearance dedicated international funding: 2020–2024



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate clearance and integrated clearance funding in US\$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international funding.

RISK EDUCATION

In 2024, 13 donors reported contributions totaling \$17.2 million for risk education projects across 12 states and one other area, as well as for activities at a global level.⁵⁴ Some of the projects were combined with risk education, capacity-building, or gender mainstreaming.⁵⁵ Germany, Japan, the UK, and the US provided the largest contributions to risk education dedicated funding with a combined contribution of \$12.2 million (71% of the total).

In 2024, eight donors reported contributions totaling \$11.4 million for integrated victim assistance and risk education projects in 11 states. The amounts provided for risk education and victim assistance were not disaggregated, and the contributions were included under victim assistance.⁵⁶ Two-thirds of funding for integrated clearance projects (\$346.4 million or 61%) went to projects that included risk education.

Risk education funding: 2020–2024

Between 2020 and 2024, funding specifically for risk education represented 2% of all international support, totaling \$55 million. This represents an increase from the \$41.9 million for risk education recorded in the previous five-year period, 2015–2019. The increase may be due to better disaggregation of funding data and the renewed focus on risk education since 2019. It also reflects the increased need for risk education for populations in conflict-affected areas.

⁵⁴ Donors of international assistance for risk education in 2024 were: Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US. In comparison, 11 donors reported contributing a total of \$11.7 million for risk education projects in 2023. See, ICBL, *Landmine Monitor 2024* (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2024), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

⁵⁵ In cases where it was not clear if funding for capacity-building was related to the risk education activities, these contributions were not included within the risk education dedicated support.

⁵⁶ Donors of integrated risk education and victim assistance projects in 2024 were: Finland, Germany, Ireland, Japan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Switzerland, and the US. Projects were implemented in Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Myanmar, Senegal, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.

At the same time, annual contributions for dedicated risk education have remained within a 1–2% range of overall funding. It continues to be the case that the majority of risk education funding is not clearly disaggregated from funding for clearance.


Recipients of risk education dedicated funding in 2024⁵⁷

Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)	Recipient	Amount (US\$ million)
Iraq*	7.7	Vietnam	0.5
Myanmar	2.9	Syria	0.5
Ukraine	1.2	Colombia	0.4
Lao PDR*	0.9	Ethiopia	< 0.1
Sudan	0.8	<i>Western Sahara</i>	< 0.1
Palestine	0.8	Global	0.4
Afghanistan*	0.6	Total	17.2
Nigeria	0.6		

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*.

*States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Risk education dedicated international funding: 2020–2024



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated risk education funding in US\$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international funding.

VICTIM ASSISTANCE

Direct international funding for victim assistance activities in 2024 totaled \$36.4 million, a decrease of 23% from the 2023 figure of \$47 million. Eighteen donors reported contributing to victim assistance projects in 19 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty (of which 12 were also States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions), two States Parties to the

⁵⁷ This table only includes recipients of funding specifically earmarked for risk education. In addition to the recipients listed in the table, 20 states received funding in 2024 for risk education combined with other mine action activities, such as clearance or victim assistance (the specific amount going to each sector could not be disaggregated): Angola, Azerbaijan, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Central African Republic, the DRC, Lebanon, Libya, Palau, the Philippines, Senegal, the Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.

Convention on Cluster Munitions (Lao PDR and Lebanon), and four states not party to either treaty, as well as at a global level.⁵⁸

As in 2023, Germany was the largest contributor to victim assistance in 2024, providing \$15.2 million, or 42% of the total. Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, and Japan also provided significant contributions to victim assistance with a combined total of \$12.3 million, or 34% of the total.

It is likely that state not party South Korea contributed to victim assistance programs in Southeast Asia although the annual funding figures for 2024 were not recorded.⁵⁹

Most mine-affected countries did not receive any direct international funding for victim assistance. In 2024, 66% of all victim assistance funding went to just four countries—Afghanistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen—for a combined total of \$24 million. Syria received \$10.9 million (or 30% of all victim assistance funding), and Ukraine received \$5.5 million (or 15% of the total). The remaining \$12.4 million went to victim assistance activities in 21 other countries and to activities at a global level.

As in previous years, many States Parties with significant numbers of mine victims received little or no victim assistance funding despite needs remaining great and available resources being limited.⁶⁰

International funding for victim assistance remains difficult to track. Many donors claim to support victim assistance more broadly through contributions to programs for development and disability rights that do not specify the portion of funding that might contribute to victim assistance. There is, however, little evidence that such funding consistently reaches victims, or meets the specific needs of survivors, especially those people in rural and remote areas. Allocating earmarked victim assistance funding would help ensure that victims receive the necessary support, and that it could be effectively tracked. This aligns with sector standards, donor obligations and commitments, Article 6.3 of the Mine Ban Treaty, and Article 5 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Victim assistance funding: 2020–2024

Between 2020 and 2024, victim assistance dedicated funding, totaling \$179.9 million, represented 5% of the overall five-year contributions from international donors. This is

58 Victim assistance donors in 2024 were: Andorra, Austria, Canada, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the US. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty who received international funding for victim assistance were: Afghanistan, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Palestine, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Türkiye, Ukraine, and Yemen. The states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty were: Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, and Vietnam.


59 In 2021–2022, South Korea announced funding for clearance, risk education, and victim assistance activities in Cambodia (2021–2025), Lao PDR (2022–2026), and Vietnam (2022–2026). See, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Cambodia press release, “Korea Commits \$10 Million to Increase Cambodia’s Mine Clearance and Victim Assistance Efforts in 2021 and Beyond,” 15 March 2021, bit.ly/UNDPSouthKorea15March2021; “Laos, UNDP and KOICA sign USD11 million partnership to support UXO sector in the Lao PDR,” *Lao News Agency*, 10 May 2022, bit.ly/LaoNewsAgency10May2022; UNDP Vietnam press release, “KOICA and central provinces renewed cooperation in mine action and rural development,” 17 March 2022, bit.ly/UNDPVietnam17March2022; and Hannah Nguyen, “Three Provinces Benefited from Mine Action for Korea-Vietnam Peace Village Project,” *Vietnam Times*, 25 May 2024, bit.ly/VietnamTimes25May2024.

60 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty reporting mine victims in areas under their jurisdiction and control at the Twenty-First Meeting of States Parties in November 2023 were: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, BiH, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, the DRC, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Palestine, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Türkiye, Uganda, Ukraine, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. See, Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Victim Assistance, “General Observations, Status of Implementation: Victim Assistance,” 18–20 June 2024, p. 4, bit.ly/VACommitteeMBTJune2024. See also, “Draft Review of the operation and status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction: 2019–2024: Mine Risk Education and Reduction, Assisting the Victims, International Cooperation and Assistance,” 23 October 2024, p. 3, bit.ly/MBTDraftReviewPartIII23Oct2024.

slightly lower than the previous five-year period, 2015–2019, when victim assistance represented 6% of the overall five-year contributions from international donors (\$155.7 million out of a total contribution of \$2.8 billion).

In the last five years, annual victim assistance contributions have remained within a range of 5–6% of overall funding.

Victim assistance dedicated international funding: 2020–2024



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated victim assistance funding in US\$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international funding.

ADVOCACY AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

In 2024, 1% of all reported funding for mine action went toward advocacy activities (\$6.3 million).⁶¹ Twelve donors reported supporting advocacy activities.⁶²

Eleven donors collectively provided \$66.3 million—representing 9% of international funding in 2024—for capacity-building activities in 19 countries and at a regional and global level.⁶³ This is a 31% decrease from the \$96.5 million provided for capacity-building in 2023; however, capacity-building was also included as an element in many of the integrated clearance programs and risk education programs.

While the financial support allocated to capacity-building has increased since 2019, much of the capacity-building support in 2022, 2023, and 2024 was provided to Ukraine to enhance the mine action capabilities of Ukrainian authorities.⁶⁴ In 2024, Ukraine was the largest recipient of capacity-building support, receiving \$45.3 million (68% of the total). This was a slight decrease from 2023, when \$59.9 million (62% of the total) was provided

61 Advocacy activities generally include, but are not limited to, funding for the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Mine Ban Treaty implementation support units (ISUs), Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Geneva Call, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munition Coalition (ICBL-CMC) and its Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), Mine Action Review, and other operators and NGOs.

62 Advocacy donors in 2024 included: Andorra, Canada, Germany, Italy, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the US.

63 Capacity-building donors in 2024 included: Belgium, Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Ireland, Jersey, New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden, and the US. Recipients of international assistance for capacity-building were: Azerbaijan, Benin, BiH, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Ukraine, and Yemen.

64 Capacity-building was one of the three priorities of the Dutch presidency of the Nineteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. See, statement of the Netherlands, Mine Ban Treaty Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties, held virtually, 16–20 November 2020, bit.ly/NLStatement18MSP.

to capacity-building activities in Ukraine.⁶⁵ Global capacity-building activities received \$5.6 million (9% of the total).

The EU was the largest donor of capacity-building in 2024, providing \$32.8 million (49% of the total), all of which went to capacity-building activities in Ukraine. Canada, Germany, and the US also provided significant contributions to capacity-building in 2024 with a combined total of \$27 million (41% of the overall total).


Funding for advocacy and capacity-building: 2020–2024

Between 2020 and 2024, funding for mine action advocacy has remained consistently low, at around 1% or less of total annual international funding. When considered as a proportion of the overall five-year contribution, advocacy represents less than 1%, totaling \$26 million.

In contrast, funding for capacity-building support has fluctuated as a proportion of total international funding, representing less than 4% of overall funding in 2020 and 2021, 9% in 2022, 12% in 2023, and 9% in 2024. Funding increased over the five-year period, from a low of \$19.6 million in 2020 to a high of \$96.5 million in 2023.

Capacity-building represented 8% of total contributions for 2020–2024, which is an increase from the previous five-year period, 2015–2019, when it represented 2% of overall contributions.

Advocacy and capacity-building dedicated international funding: 2020–2024



Note: Figures at the top of each bar indicate dedicated advocacy and capacity-building funding in US\$ million, and the percentages in brackets reflect this funding as a proportion of total international funding.

NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS IN 2024

National contributions to mine action are often under-reported. Few States Parties report national funding in their annual Article 7 transparency reports. A total of 32 Mine Ban Treaty States Parties have Article 5 clearance obligations, but only six reported on their national financial contributions in their Article 7 transparency reports for 2024: Colombia, Croatia, Senegal, Thailand, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe. Of the 10 States Parties with Article 4 clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, only four reported on their financial contributions in their Article 7 transparency reports for 2024: Afghanistan, Germany, Lebanon, and Mauritania.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ In 2022, Ukraine received \$28 million (39% of the total contribution). See, ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2023 (Geneva: ICBL-CMC, November 2023), bit.ly/LandmineMonitorReports.

⁶⁶ Afghanistan and Mauritania also have Article 5 obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. Some Article 7 reports for calendar year 2024 that were submitted in 2025 (for both the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions) were not available for review at the time of drafting this report.

Several affected states indicated contributing to their own national mine action programs, but details on their annual level of contribution were either unavailable or only partially available. In many states, national contributions cover the running costs of their respective mine action authorities, but these are not reported.

In 2024, the Monitor identified 26 affected states and one other area that provided a combined total of \$306.3 million in contributions to mine action from their national budgets.⁶⁷

National funding in 2024

State	Contribution (US\$ million)	State	Contribution (US\$ million)
Azerbaijan	114.6	<i>Kosovo</i>	1.2
Ukraine	56.7	Serbia	0.9
Croatia	49.0	Peru	0.8
Germany*	27.1	Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)	0.6
Türkiye	11.2	Tajikistan	0.6
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)	9.9	Zimbabwe	0.5
Iraq*	9.0	Senegal	0.5
Thailand	7.6	Jordan	0.3
Lebanon*	7.0	Sri Lanka	0.2
Cambodia	2.0	Mauritania*	0.2
Colombia	1.6	Afghanistan*	0.04
South Sudan*	1.6	Guinea-Bissau	0.04
Chad*	1.5	Chile*	0.03
Sudan	1.4	Total	306.3

Note: States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty are indicated in **bold**; other areas are indicated in *italics*.
*Afghanistan, Chad, Chile, Germany, Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, and South Sudan have Article 4 obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Mine Ban Treaty States Parties BiH, Croatia, Serbia, and other area Kosovo, all reported national contributions to their demining programs. BiH provided \$9.9 million for staff and operations of the BiH Mine Action Centre (BHMAC), civil protection, and the BiH Armed Forces.⁶⁸ Croatia's national contribution in 2024 was about \$49 million, which was reported to be 68% of the total mine action budget for the country.⁶⁹ Serbia reported a national contribution of \$0.9 million to support the running of the Serbian Mine Action Centre (SMAC) and for demining operations in Bujanovac.⁷⁰ The government of Kosovo provided \$1.2 million to the Kosovo Mine Action Centre (KMAC) and Kosovo Security Forces (KSF).⁷¹

Several Mine Ban Treaty States Parties—Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Jordan, Mauritania, Senegal, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe—

- 67 Data on national funding to mine action is based on responses to Monitor questionnaires from mine action authorities, reviews of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline extension requests and Article 7 reports, and media reporting. See the relevant Monitor country profiles for further information, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
- 68 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ivan Dunder, Deputy Director of Operations, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC), 14 March 2025.
- 69 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Damir Trut, Director General, Civil Protection Directorate, Croatia Ministry of the Interior, 7 March 2025.
- 70 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Slađana Kosutić, Senior Advisor, SMAC, 27 March 2025; and Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form D. Note that figures in the Serbia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report differ from those provided via the Monitor questionnaire.
- 71 Republic of Kosovo, "Kosovo Mine Action Strategy 2025-2030," 18 June 2024, p. 16, bit.ly/KosovoStrategy2025-2030.

reported contributions covering the salaries and operational costs of their mine action authorities in 2024.⁷² Chad also reported that national funding was provided for the deployment of demining teams for emergency operations following flooding in the provinces of Tibesti, Ennedi, and Borkou and an explosion at an ammunition depot near N'Djamena.⁷³

Cambodia saw a decrease in national funding for its mine action program in 2024. Cambodia previously stated that it would contribute \$30 million towards its mine clearance efforts in 2023, and similar amounts annually in 2024 and 2025.⁷⁴ While a national contribution of \$30.4 million was provided in 2023—which included a contribution to the UNDP Clearing for Results program—in 2024, Cambodia's national contribution dropped to \$2 million.⁷⁵

Sri Lanka reported an increase in national funding to its mine action program, with around \$0.2 million allocated in 2024, of which 65% supported the Sri Lankan Army Humanitarian Demining Unit. Funds also went to the national and regional mine action centers.⁷⁶ Thailand continued to provide most of its own mine action budget, providing around \$7.6 million in 2024.⁷⁷

Colombia's 2024 contribution included approximately \$1.4 million for the operations of the Comprehensive Action Group Against Antipersonnel Mines (Grupo de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA), \$0.2 million for victim assistance, and \$0.04 million for the National Army Engineering Brigade.⁷⁸

Peru reported \$0.8 million was spent on operations in 2024, with an estimated 60% of the budget allocated to the travel time required to fly deminers to the remote work sites.⁷⁹

72 **Afghanistan [Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan]:** Afghanistan Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database, bit.ly/DatabaseArticle7CCM; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Dr. Aimal Safi, Senior Technical Advisor, Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 2 April 2025. **Central African Republic:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Edgar Ghazaka, National Focal Point for Mine Action, Ministry of National Defense, 27 May 2025. **Chad:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations, National High Commission for Demining (Haut-Commissariat National au Déminage, HCND), 22 April 2025. **Guinea-Bissau:** Guinea-Bissau Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 19 April 2024, bit.ly/Guinea-BissauArt5ExtRequestApr2024. **Jordan:** Jordan Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 9. **Mauritania:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamedou Baham, Coordinator, PNDHD, 31 March 2025; and Mauritania Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I. **Senegal:** Senegal Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 18. **South Sudan:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, Chairperson, National Mine Action Authority (NMAA), 4 April 2025. **Sudan:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Sulafa Adbelrazik, Programme Officer, National Mine Action Center (NMAC), 11 March 2025. **Tajikistan:** Response to Monitor questionnaire by Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, Director, Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre (TNMAC), 13 March 2025. **Zimbabwe:** Zimbabwe Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 20.

73 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Soultani Moussa, Director of Operations, HCND, 22 April 2025; and Chad Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 16 June 2024, bit.ly/ChadArt5ExtRequest2024.

74 Cambodia Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Revised Workplan, 10 May 2023, p. 5, bit.ly/MBTCambodiaWorkplan10May2023; and statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 19–21 June 2023, p. 2, bit.ly/CambodiaStatementJune2023.

75 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Tan Sara, Deputy Secretary General, Cambodian Mine Action Authority (CMAA), 4 June 2025.

76 Response to Monitor questionnaire by Premachanthiran Velauthapillai, Deputy Director, NMAC, 27 March 2025; Sri Lanka Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I; and Sri Lanka NMAC, Sri Lanka Ministry of Urban Development, Construction and Housing, and GICHD, "Sri Lanka National Mine Action Completion Strategy 2023-2027," July 2025, bit.ly/SriLankaStrategy2023-2027.

77 Thailand Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 10.

78 Colombia Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Nathalie Ochoa Niño, Coordinator, Comprehensive Action Group Against Antipersonnel Mines (Grupo de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA), 20 April 2024.

79 Response to Monitor questionnaire by David Fernández Fernández, Victim Assistance Coordinator – Humanitarian Demining, Peruvian Mine Action Center (Centro Peruano de Acción Contra las Minas Antipersonal, CONTRAMINAS), 13 March 2025; and Peru Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 28 March 2024, p. 23, bit.ly/PeruArt5ExtRequest2024.

The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA) of northern Iraq reported a government contribution in 2024 of \$7 million for land release, \$0.5 million for risk education, \$0.5 million for capacity-building, and \$1 million for administration.⁸⁰ Türkiye allocated around \$11.2 million for capacity development of military demining units, land release, and risk education in 2024 and reported a further \$14 million had been allocated in the national budget for humanitarian mine action in 2025.⁸¹



Omaid plays cricket with his friends in Dashte Archi district of Kunduz province in Afghanistan. Omaid was injured by a landmine when he was 5 years old.

© E. Blanchard/HI, June 2024

on Cluster Munitions—Germany and Lebanon—contributed national funds in 2024 towards their efforts to clear cluster munition remnants.

Germany has been funding the clearance of cluster munition remnants from a former military training area in Wittstock, spending a total of \$155.6 million since 2018. During 2024, Germany provided \$27.1 million to support clearance in Wittstock.⁸⁵

Lebanon has been unable to allocate national resources to conduct clearance since 2020 due to political instability and the national economic crisis. The government contribution of \$7 million in 2024 supported the operations of the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC).⁸⁶

Chile, which is party to both the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, did not receive national funds for clearance of cluster munitions in 2024 but reported a contribution of \$31,064 for victim assistance.⁸⁷

⁸⁰ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Khatab Omer Ahmed, Director of Planning, Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), 27 April 2025.

⁸¹ Türkiye Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), p. 7.

⁸² Presentation by Ihor Bezkaravainyi, Deputy Minister of Economy, “Plenary 1: Mine action and Food Security: Making the Investment Case,” 27th International Meeting of Mine Action Directors and United Nations Advisors, 29 April 2024, bit.ly/NDM-UN27.

⁸³ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Nariman Gasimov, Deputy Head of the International Relations Department, ANAMA, 18 April 2025.

⁸⁴ Samira Abdullayeva, “Over \$64M directed to demining of liberated territories in 2023,” *Report News Agency*, 23 May 2024, bit.ly/ReportNewsAgency23May2024; and Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Strengthening International Support to Azerbaijan in Demining,” August 2024.

⁸⁵ Germany Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I.

⁸⁶ Lebanon Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Jihad Al Bechelany, Director, Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC), 14 March 2025.

⁸⁷ Response to Monitor questionnaire by Valentin Segura, Head of International Cooperation Department, Chile Ministry of National Defense, 17 March 2025.

Ukraine has not disclosed its financial contributions to the state institutions responsible for humanitarian demining activities but reported that about \$70.9 million was budgeted for demining agricultural land in 2024, with 80% provided by the state and 20% by farmers.⁸²

The government of state not party Azerbaijan funded the majority of its mine action program in 2024, providing \$114.6 million to mine action activities. International donor funding amounted to around 9% of total spending.⁸³ In 2023, a reported \$64.8 million was allocated from the state budget for mine action activities in the territories regained after the 2020 conflict with Armenia, including parts of Nagorno-Karabakh.⁸⁴

Two States Parties to the Convention

on Cluster Munitions—Germany and Lebanon—contributed national funds in 2024 towards

their efforts to clear cluster munition remnants.

Lao PDR, which has previously reported an annual national contribution of \$5,000 for the offices of the National Regulatory Authority for UXO/Mine Action (NRA), only reported in-kind contributions in 2024, including salaries and accommodation for the Humanitarian Demining Unit of the Lao Army.⁸⁸

NATIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS: 2020–2024

Affected states do not all provide the same level of information regarding national resources allocated to mine action activities, so drawing conclusions on trends in national funding is difficult. Regular and comprehensive annual reporting of national contributions to mine action by affected States Parties would provide a clearer picture and demonstrate the commitment and ownership of affected states in dealing with their treaty obligations.

From 2020 to 2024, the combined amount contributed by national governments to their mine action programs on an annual basis has fluctuated from a low of \$76.8 million in 2021 to a high of \$306.3 million in 2024.⁸⁹ Most states reporting on their national contributions are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty with Article 5 clearance obligations. Several of these States Parties—BiH, Cambodia, Colombia, Croatia, Peru, Serbia, Thailand, Türkiye, and Zimbabwe—have reported reasonably consistently, although figures are not always found in annual Article 7 transparency reports. States Parties Chile, Germany, Lao PDR, and Lebanon, which have clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, have also frequently reported national contributions within their Article 7 reports. In the five-year period, only one state not party, Azerbaijan, has reported on its national contribution to its mine action program.

It is likely that affected states contributed more to their mine action programs than reported here, but this was not captured in reporting.


National contributions: 2020–2024

Year	Total national contributions (US\$ million)	% of total contribution (national + international)
2020	91.2	14%
2021	76.8	12%
2022	115.1	13%
2023	227.3	22%
2024	306.3	29%
Total	816.7	N/A


⁸⁸ Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2023), Form I; and Lao PDR Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2024), Form I.

⁸⁹ National contribution figures for 2020 and 2021 have been updated from previous Monitor reports to include Germany's contributions to its cluster munition clearance.

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION: 2024



RECIPIENTS OF INTERNATIONAL MINE ACTION FUNDING: 2024





A motorcyclist rides past signs warning people of the danger of unexploded ordnance and cluster munitions in Marea village in Syria's Aleppo governorate.

Giovanni Diffidenti/ICBL, August 2025

STATUS OF THE CONVENTION

1997 CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION (MINE BAN TREATY)

Under Article 15, the Mine Ban Treaty was open for signature from 3 December 1997 until its entry into force on 1 March 1999. Since the treaty entered into force, states can no longer sign it but can join through a one-step procedure known as accession. According to Article 16 (2), the Mine Ban Treaty is open for accession by any state that has not signed. In the following list of states, the first date is signature; the second date is ratification. Accession is indicated with (a) and succession is indicated with (s).

As of 1 November 2025, there were 166 States Parties.

STATES PARTIES

Afghanistan 11 Sep 02 (a)	Belgium 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Albania 8 Sep 98; 29 Feb 00	Belize 27 Feb 98; 23 Apr 98
Algeria 3 Dec 97; 9 Oct 01	Benin 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 98
Andorra 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98	Bhutan 18 Aug 05 (a)
Angola 4 Dec 97; 5 Jul 02	Bolivia 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
Antigua and Barbuda 3 Dec 97; 3 May 99	Bosnia and Herzegovina 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 98
Argentina 4 Dec 97; 14 Sep 99	Botswana 3 Dec 97; 1 Mar 00
Australia 3 Dec 97; 14 Jan 99	Brazil 3 Dec 97; 30 Apr 99
Austria 3 Dec 97; 29 Jun 98	Brunei Darussalam 4 Dec 97; 24 Apr 06
Bahamas 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98	Bulgaria 3 Dec 97; 4 Sep 98
Bangladesh 7 May 98; 6 Sep 00	Burkina Faso 3 Dec 97; 16 Sep 98
Barbados 3 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99	Burundi 3 Dec 97; 22 Oct 03
Belarus 3 Sep 03 (a)	

Cabo Verde 4 Dec 97; 14 May 01
 Cambodia 3 Dec 97; 28 Jul 99
 Cameroon 3 Dec 97; 19 Sep 02
 Canada 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
 Central African Republic 8 Nov 02 (a)
 Chad 6 Jul 98; 6 May 99
 Chile 3 Dec 97; 10 Sep 01
 Colombia 3 Dec 97; 6 Sep 00
 Comoros 19 Sep 02 (a)
 Congo, Dem. Rep. 2 May 02 (a)
 Congo, Rep. 4 May 01 (a)
 Cook Islands 3 Dec 97; 15 Mar 06
 Costa Rica 3 Dec 97; 17 Mar 99
 Côte d'Ivoire 3 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
 Croatia 4 Dec 97; 20 May 98
 Cyprus 4 Dec 97; 17 Jan 03
 Czech Republic 3 Dec 97; 26 Oct 99
 Denmark 4 Dec 97; 8 Jun 98
 Djibouti 3 Dec 97; 18 May 98
 Dominica 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
 Dominican Republic 3 Dec 97;
 30 Jun 00
 Ecuador 4 Dec 97; 29 Apr 99
 El Salvador 4 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
 Equatorial Guinea 16 Sep 98 (a)
 Eritrea 27 Aug 01 (a)
 Estonia 12 May 04 (a) [notification of
 withdrawal, 27 Jun 25]
 Eswatini 4 Dec 97; 22 Dec 98
 Ethiopia 3 Dec 97; 17 Dec 04
 Fiji 3 Dec 97; 10 Jun 98
 Finland 9 Jan 12 (a) [notification of
 withdrawal, 10 Jul 25]
 France 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
 Gabon 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
 Gambia 4 Dec 97; 23 Sep 02
 Germany 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98
 Ghana 4 Dec 97; 30 Jun 00
 Greece 3 Dec 97; 25 Sep 03
 Grenada 3 Dec 97; 19 Aug 98
 Guatemala 3 Dec 97; 26 Mar 99
 Guinea 4 Dec 97; 8 Oct 98
 Guinea-Bissau 3 Dec 97; 22 May 01
 Guyana 4 Dec 97; 5 Aug 03
 Haiti 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 06
 Holy See 4 Dec 97; 17 Feb 98
 Honduras 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98
 Hungary 3 Dec 97; 6 Apr 98
 Iceland 4 Dec 97; 5 May 99
 Indonesia 4 Dec 97; 16 Feb 07
 Iraq 15 Aug 07 (a)
 Ireland 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
 Italy 3 Dec 97; 23 Apr 99
 Jamaica 3 Dec 97; 17 Jul 98
 Japan 3 Dec 97; 30 Sep 98
 Jordan 11 Aug 98; 13 Nov 98
 Kenya 5 Dec 97; 23 Jan 01
 Kiribati 7 Sep 00 (a)
 Kuwait 30 Jul 07 (a)
 Latvia 1 Jul 05 (a) [notification of
 withdrawal, 27 Jun 25]
 Lesotho 4 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98
 Liberia 23 Dec 99 (a)
 Liechtenstein 3 Dec 97; 5 Oct 99
 Lithuania 26 Feb 99; 12 May 03
 [notification of withdrawal, 27 Jun 25]
 Luxembourg 4 Dec 97; 14 Jun 99
 Madagascar 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 99
 Malawi 4 Dec 97; 13 Aug 98
 Malaysia 3 Dec 97; 22 Apr 99
 Maldives 1 Oct 98; 7 Sep 00
 Mali 3 Dec 97; 2 Jun 98
 Malta 4 Dec 97; 7 May 01
 Marshall Islands 4 Dec 97; 12 Mar 25
 Mauritania 3 Dec 97; 21 Jul 00
 Mauritius 3 Dec 97; 3 Dec 97
 Mexico 3 Dec 97; 9 Jun 98
 Moldova 3 Dec 97; 8 Sep 00
 Monaco 4 Dec 97; 17 Nov 98
 Montenegro 23 Oct 06 (s)
 Mozambique 3 Dec 97; 25 Aug 98
 Namibia 3 Dec 97; 21 Sep 98
 Nauru 7 Aug 00 (a)
 Netherlands 3 Dec 97; 12 Apr 99
 New Zealand 3 Dec 97; 27 Jan 99
 Nicaragua 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
 Niger 4 Dec 97; 23 Mar 99
 Nigeria 27 Sep 01 (a)
 Niue 3 Dec 97; 15 Apr 98
 North Macedonia 9 Sep 98 (a)
 Norway 3 Dec 97; 9 Jul 98
 Oman 20 Aug 14 (a)
 Palau 18 Nov 07 (a)
 Palestine 29 Dec 17 (a)
 Panama 4 Dec 97; 7 Oct 98
 Papua New Guinea 28 Jun 04 (a)

Paraguay 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 98	Spain 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 99
Peru 3 Dec 97; 17 Jun 98	Sri Lanka 13 Dec 17 (a)
Philippines 3 Dec 97; 15 Feb 00	Sudan 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 03
Poland 4 Dec 97; 27 Dec 12 [notification of withdrawal, 20 Aug 25]	Suriname 4 Dec 97; 23 May 02
Portugal 3 Dec 97; 19 Feb 99	Sweden 4 Dec 97; 30 Nov 98
Qatar 4 Dec 97; 13 Oct 98	Switzerland 3 Dec 97; 24 Mar 98
Romania 3 Dec 97; 30 Nov 00	Tajikistan 12 Oct 99 (a)
Rwanda 3 Dec 97; 8 Jun 00	Tanzania 3 Dec 97; 13 Nov 00
Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 Dec 97; 2 Dec 98	Thailand 3 Dec 97; 27 Nov 98
Saint Lucia 3 Dec 97; 13 Apr 99	Timor-Leste 7 May 03 (a)
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 3 Dec 97; 1 Aug 01	Togo 4 Dec 97; 9 Mar 00
Samoa 3 Dec 97; 23 Jul 98	Tonga 25 Jun 25 (a)
San Marino 3 Dec 97; 18 Mar 98	Trinidad and Tobago 4 Dec 97; 27 Apr 98
Sao Tome and Principe 30 Apr 98; 31 Mar 03	Tunisia 4 Dec 97; 9 Jul 99
Senegal 3 Dec 97; 24 Sep 98	Türkiye 25 Sep 03 (a)
Serbia 18 Sep 03 (a)	Turkmenistan 3 Dec 97; 19 Jan 98
Seychelles 4 Dec 97; 2 Jun 00	Tuvalu 13 Sep 2011 (a)
Sierra Leone 29 Jul 98; 25 Apr 01	Uganda 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99
Slovakia 3 Dec 97; 25 Feb 99	Ukraine 24 Feb 99; 27 Dec 05
Slovenia 3 Dec 97; 27 Oct 98	United Kingdom 3 Dec 97; 31 Jul 98
Solomon Islands 4 Dec 97; 26 Jan 99	Uruguay 3 Dec 97; 7 Jun 01
Somalia 16 Apr 12 (a)	Vanuatu 4 Dec 97; 16 Sep 05
South Africa 3 Dec 97; 26 Jun 98	Venezuela 3 Dec 97; 14 Apr 99
South Sudan 11 Nov 11 (s)	Yemen 4 Dec 97; 1 Sep 98
	Zambia 12 Dec 97; 23 Feb 01
	Zimbabwe 3 Dec 97; 18 Jun 98

STATES NOT PARTY

Armenia	Libya
Azerbaijan	Micronesia
Bahrain	Mongolia
China	Morocco
Cuba	Myanmar
Egypt	Nepal
Georgia	Pakistan
India	Russia
Iran	Saudi Arabia
Israel	Singapore
Kazakhstan	Syria
Korea, North	United Arab Emirates
Korea, South	United States
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbekistan
Lao PDR	Vietnam
Lebanon	

MINE BAN TREATY

18 SEPTEMBER 1997

CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE USE, STOCKPILING, PRODUCTION AND TRANSFER OF ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION

PREAMBLE

The States Parties

Determined to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines, that kill or maim hundreds of people every week, mostly innocent and defenceless civilians and especially children, obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement,

Believing it necessary to do their utmost to contribute in an efficient and coordinated manner to face the challenge of removing anti-personnel mines placed throughout the world, and to assure their destruction,

Wishing to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic reintegration of mine victims,

Recognizing that a total ban of anti-personnel mines would also be an important confidence-building measure,

Welcoming the adoption of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and calling for the early ratification of this Protocol by all States which have not yet done so,

Welcoming also United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/45 S of 10 December 1996 urging all States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines,

Welcoming furthermore the measures taken over the past years, both unilaterally and multilaterally, aiming at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of anti-personnel mines and recognizing the efforts to that end undertaken by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non-governmental organizations around the world,

Recalling the Ottawa Declaration of 5 October 1996 and the Brussels Declaration of 27 June 1997 urging the international community to negotiate an international and legally binding agreement prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,

Emphasizing the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its universalization in all relevant fora including, *inter alia*, the United Nations, the Conference on Disarmament, regional organizations, and groupings, and review conferences of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects,

Basing themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction must be made between civilians and combatants,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

General obligations

1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances:
 - a) To use anti-personnel mines;
 - b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
 - c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE 2

Definitions

1. “Anti-personnel mine” means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons. Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so equipped.
2. “Mine” means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.
3. “Anti-handling device” means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.
4. “Transfer” involves, in addition to the physical movement of anti-personnel mines into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control over the mines, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing emplaced anti-personnel mines.
5. “Mined area” means an area which is dangerous due to the presence or suspected presence of mines.

ARTICLE 3

Exceptions

1. Notwithstanding the general obligations under Article 1, the retention or transfer of a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques is permitted. The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.
2. The transfer of anti-personnel mines for the purpose of destruction is permitted.

ARTICLE 4

Destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines

Except as provided for in Article 3, each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines it owns or possesses, or that are under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than four years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.

ARTICLE 5

Destruction of anti-personnel mines in mined areas

1. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party.
2. Each State Party shall make every effort to identify all areas under its jurisdiction or control in which anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be emplaced and shall ensure as soon as possible that all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, until all anti-personnel mines contained therein have been destroyed. The marking shall at least be to the standards set out in the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, as amended on 3 May 1996, annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years.
4. Each request shall contain:
 - a) The duration of the proposed extension;
 - b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, including:
 - (i) The preparation and status of work conducted under national demining programs;
 - (ii) The financial and technical means available to the State Party for the destruction of all the anti-personnel mines; and
 - (iii) Circumstances which impede the ability of the State Party to destroy all the anti-personnel mines in mined areas;
 - c) The humanitarian, social, economic, and environmental implications of the extension; and
 - d) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed extension.
5. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking into consideration the factors contained in paragraph 4, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension period.
6. Such an extension may be renewed upon the submission of a new request in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article. In requesting a further extension period a State Party shall submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken in the previous extension period pursuant to this Article.

ARTICLE 6

International cooperation and assistance

1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has the right to seek and receive assistance, where feasible, from other States Parties to the extent possible.
2. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information concerning the implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration, of mine victims and for mine awareness programs. Such assistance may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international, regional or national organizations or institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and their International Federation, non-governmental organizations, or on a bilateral basis.
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for mine clearance and related activities. Such assistance may be provided, *inter alia*, through the United Nations system, international or regional organizations or institutions, non-governmental organizations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis, or by contributing to the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, or other regional funds that deal with demining.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines.
6. Each State Party undertakes to provide information to the database on mine clearance established within the United Nations system, especially information concerning various means and technologies of mine clearance, and lists of experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on mine clearance.
7. States Parties may request the United Nations, regional organizations, other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or non-governmental fora to assist its authorities in the elaboration of a national demining program to determine, *inter alia*:
 - a) The extent and scope of the anti-personnel mine problem;
 - b) The financial, technological and human resources that are required for the implementation of the program;
 - c) The estimated number of years necessary to destroy all anti-personnel mines in mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the concerned State Party;
 - d) Mine awareness activities to reduce the incidence of mine-related injuries or deaths;
 - e) Assistance to mine victims;
 - f) The relationship between the Government of the concerned State Party and the relevant governmental, inter-governmental or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of the program.
8. Each State Party giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.

ARTICLE 7

Transparency measures

1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party on:
 - a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
 - b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
 - c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
 - d) The types, quantities and, if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
 - e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel mine production facilities;
 - f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
 - g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
 - h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine clearance; and
 - i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2. The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports received to the States Parties.

ARTICLE 8

Facilitation and clarification of compliance

1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention, and to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.

2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions relating to compliance with the provisions of this Convention by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all information which would assist in clarifying this matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the next Meeting of the States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.
4. Pending the convening of any meeting of the States Parties, any of the States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the clarification requested.
5. The requesting State Party may propose through the Secretary-General of the United Nations the convening of a Special Meeting of the States Parties to consider the matter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall thereupon communicate this proposal and all information submitted by the States Parties concerned, to all States Parties with a request that they indicate whether they favour a Special Meeting of the States Parties, for the purpose of considering the matter. In the event that within 14 days from the date of such communication, at least one-third of the States Parties favours such a Special Meeting, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene this Special Meeting of the States Parties within a further 14 days. A quorum for this Meeting shall consist of a majority of States Parties.
6. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties, as the case may be, shall first determine whether to consider the matter further, taking into account all information submitted by the States Parties concerned. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach a decision by consensus. If despite all efforts to that end no agreement has been reached, it shall take this decision by a majority of States Parties present and voting.
7. All States Parties shall cooperate fully with the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties in the fulfilment of its review of the matter, including any fact-finding missions that are authorized in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. If further clarification is required, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of States Parties present and voting. At any time the requested State Party may invite a fact-finding mission to its territory. Such a mission shall take place without a decision by a Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties to authorize such a mission. The mission, consisting of up to 9 experts, designated and approved in accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10, may collect additional information on the spot or in other places directly related to the alleged compliance issue under the jurisdiction or control of the requested State Party.
9. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall prepare and update a list of the names, nationalities and other relevant data of qualified experts provided by States Parties and communicate it to all States Parties. Any expert included on this list shall be regarded as designated for all fact-finding missions unless a State Party declares its non-acceptance in writing. In the event of non-acceptance, the expert shall not participate in fact-finding missions on the territory or any other place under the jurisdiction or control of the objecting State Party, if the non-acceptance was declared prior to the appointment of the expert to such missions.

10. Upon receiving a request from the Meeting of the States Parties or a Special Meeting of the States Parties, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, after consultations with the requested State Party, appoint the members of the mission, including its leader. Nationals of States Parties requesting the fact-finding mission or directly affected by it shall not be appointed to the mission. The members of the fact-finding mission shall enjoy privileges and immunities under Article VI of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, adopted on 13 February 1946.

11. Upon at least 72 hours notice, the members of the fact-finding mission shall arrive in the territory of the requested State Party at the earliest opportunity. The requested State Party shall take the necessary administrative measures to receive, transport and accommodate the mission, and shall be responsible for ensuring the security of the mission to the maximum extent possible while they are on territory under its control.

12. Without prejudice to the sovereignty of the requested State Party, the fact-finding mission may bring into the territory of the requested State Party the necessary equipment which shall be used exclusively for gathering information on the alleged compliance issue. Prior to its arrival, the mission will advise the requested State Party of the equipment that it intends to utilize in the course of its fact-finding mission.

13. The requested State Party shall make all efforts to ensure that the fact-finding mission is given the opportunity to speak with all relevant persons who may be able to provide information related to the alleged compliance issue.

14. The requested State Party shall grant access for the fact-finding mission to all areas and installations under its control where facts relevant to the compliance issue could be expected to be collected. This shall be subject to any arrangements that the requested State Party considers necessary for:

- a) The protection of sensitive equipment, information and areas;
- b) The protection of any constitutional obligations the requested State Party may have with regard to proprietary rights, searches and seizures, or other constitutional rights; or
- c) The physical protection and safety of the members of the fact-finding mission.

In the event that the requested State Party makes such arrangements, it shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate through alternative means its compliance with this Convention.

15. The fact-finding mission may remain in the territory of the State Party concerned for no more than 14 days, and at any particular site no more than 7 days, unless otherwise agreed.

16. All information provided in confidence and not related to the subject matter of the fact-finding mission shall be treated on a confidential basis.

17. The fact-finding mission shall report, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties the results of its findings.

18. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall consider all relevant information, including the report submitted by the fact-finding mission, and may request the requested State Party to take measures to address the compliance issue within a specified period of time. The requested State Party shall report on all measures taken in response to this request.

19. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may suggest to the States Parties concerned ways and means to further clarify or resolve the matter under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties may recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative measures referred to in Article 6.

20. The Meeting of the States Parties or the Special Meeting of the States Parties shall make every effort to reach its decisions referred to in paragraphs 18 and 19 by consensus, otherwise by a two-thirds majority of States Parties present and voting.

ARTICLE 9

National implementation measures

Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.

ARTICLE 10

Settlement of disputes

1. The States Parties shall consult and cooperate with each other to settle any dispute that may arise with regard to the application or the interpretation of this Convention. Each State Party may bring any such dispute before the Meeting of the States Parties.
2. The Meeting of the States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the States parties to a dispute to start the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for any agreed procedure.
3. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of this Convention on facilitation and clarification of compliance.

ARTICLE 11

Meetings of the States Parties

1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider any matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention, including:
 - a) The operation and status of this Convention;
 - b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of this Convention;
 - c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 6;
 - d) The development of technologies to clear anti-personnel mines;
 - e) Submissions of States Parties under Article 8; and
 - f) Decisions relating to submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5.
2. The First Meeting of the States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one year after the entry into force of this Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. Under the conditions set out in Article 8, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene a Special Meeting of the States Parties.
4. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend these meetings as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 12

Review Conferences

1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences shall in no case be less than five years.

All States Parties to this Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.

2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:

- a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
- b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings of the States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11;
- c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in Article 5; and
- d) To adopt, if necessary, in its final report conclusions related to the implementation of this Convention.

3. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

ARTICLE 13

Amendments

1. At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Depositary no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Depositary shall convene an Amendment Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.

2. States not parties to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other relevant international organizations or institutions, regional organizations, the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant non-governmental organizations may be invited to attend each Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed Rules of Procedure.

3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of the States Parties request that it be held earlier.

4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so adopted to the States Parties.

5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for all States Parties to this Convention which have accepted it, upon the deposit with the Depositary of instruments of acceptance by a majority of States Parties. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.

ARTICLE 14

Costs

1. The costs of the Meetings of the States Parties, the Special Meetings of the States Parties, the Review Conferences and the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and States not parties to this Convention participating therein, in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations under Articles 7 and 8 and the costs of any fact-finding mission shall be borne by the States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.

ARTICLE 15

Signature

This Convention, done at Oslo, Norway, on 18 September 1997, shall be open for signature at Ottawa, Canada, by all States from 3 December 1997 until 4 December 1997, and at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 5 December 1997 until its entry into force.

ARTICLE 16

Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession

1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State which has not signed the Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

ARTICLE 17

Entry into force

1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the month in which the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State which deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the 40th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

ARTICLE 18

Provisional application

Any State may at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, declare that it will apply provisionally paragraph 1 of Article 1 of this Convention pending its entry into force.

ARTICLE 19

Reservations

The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.

ARTICLE 20

Duration and withdrawal

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall include a full explanation of the reasons motivating this withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that six-month period, the

withdrawing State Party is engaged in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end of the armed conflict.

4. The withdrawal of a State Party from this Convention shall not in any way affect the duty of States to continue fulfilling the obligations assumed under any relevant rules of international law.

ARTICLE 21

Depositary

The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the Depositary of this Convention.

ARTICLE 22

Authentic texts

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

GLOSSARY

Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) – Explosive ordnance that has not been used during an armed conflict and that has been left behind or dumped by a party to an armed conflict and is no longer under its control. Abandoned explosive ordnance is included under the broader category of ERW.

Accession – Accession is the way for a state to become a party to an international treaty through a single instrument that constitutes both signature and ratification.

Adherence – The act of becoming a party to a treaty. This can be through signature and ratification, or through accession.

“All reasonable effort” – Describes what is considered a minimum acceptable level of effort to identify and document contaminated areas or to remove the presence or suspicion of mines/ERW. “All reasonable effort” has been applied when the commitment of additional resources is considered to be unreasonable in relation to the results expected.

Antihandling device – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antihandling device “means a device intended to protect a mine and which is part of, linked to, attached to or placed under the mine and which activates when an attempt is made to tamper with or otherwise intentionally disturb the mine.”

Antipersonnel mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antipersonnel mine “means a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.”

Antivehicle mine – According to the Mine Ban Treaty, an antivehicle mine is a mine designed “to be detonated by the presence, proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person.”

Area cancellation – Area cancellation describes the process by which a suspected hazardous area is released based solely on the gathering of information that indicates that the area is not, in fact, contaminated. It does not involve the application of any mine clearance tools.

Area reduction – Area reduction describes the process by which one or more mine clearance tools (e.g. mine detection dogs, manual deminers, or mechanical demining equipment) are used to gather information that locates the perimeter of a suspected hazardous area. Those areas falling outside this perimeter, or the entire area if deemed not to be mined, can be released.

Battle area clearance (BAC) – The systematic and controlled clearance of dangerous areas where the explosive hazards are known not to include landmines.

Casualty – The person injured or killed in a landmine, ERW, or IED incident, either through direct contact with the device or by being in its proximity.

Clearance – Tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mines/ERW from a specified area to a specified depth.

Cleared land – A defined area cleared through the removal and/or the destruction of all specified mines/ERW to a specified depth.

Cluster munition – According to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, a cluster munition is “a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.” Cluster munitions consist of containers and submunitions. Launched from the ground or air, the containers open and disperse submunitions (or bomblets, from fixed dispensers) over a wide area. Submunitions are typically designed to pierce armor, kill personnel, or both.

Confirmed hazardous area (CHA) – An area where the presence of mine/ERW contamination has been confirmed on the basis of direct evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Demining – The set of activities that lead to the removal of mines/ERW, including survey, mapping, marking, clearance, and the handover of cleared land.

Diversity – A term that refers to the different aspects that make up a person's social identity, for example: age, (dis)ability, faith, and ethnicity, among others.

Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) – The detection, identification, evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and disposal of explosive ordnance.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) – Under Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons, explosive remnants of war are defined as unexploded ordnance and abandoned explosive ordnance. Landmines are explicitly excluded from the definition.

Gender – A term that refers to the range of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and roles associated with women, men, girls, and boys, as well as relationships with each other, and that are socially constructed. As a social construct, gender varies according to socio-economic, political, and cultural contexts, and can change over time.

Humanitarian mine action (HMA) – All activities aimed at significantly reducing or completely eliminating the threat and impact of mines/ERW upon civilians and their livelihoods. This includes the survey, mapping and marking, and clearance of contaminated areas; capacity-building and coordination; risk education; victim assistance; stockpile destruction; and ban advocacy.

Improvised explosive device (IED) – A device placed or produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. An IED may be victim-activated or command-detonated. IEDs that can be activated by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person (victim-activated) are banned under the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated IEDs are not.

Improvised mine, improvised landmine, or improvised antipersonnel landmine – An IED acting as a mine, landmine, or antipersonnel landmine.

International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) – Standards issued by the UN to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, establishing principles, and in some cases defining international requirements and specifications.

Intersectionality – A concept that captures the consequences of two or more combined systems of discrimination, and addresses the manner in which they contribute to creating layers of inequality.

Land release – The process of applying all reasonable effort to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicion of mines/ERW with minimum possible risk. This involves the identification of hazardous areas, the cancellation of land through non-technical survey, the reduction of land through technical survey, and the clearance of mine/ERW contaminated areas.

Mine action center – A body charged with coordinating day-to-day mine action operations, normally under the supervision of a national mine action authority. Some mine action centers also implement mine action activities.

Non-state armed group (NSAG) – For the Monitor's purposes, non-state armed groups include organizations carrying out armed rebellion or insurrection, as well as a broader range of non-state entities, such as criminal gangs and state-supported proxy forces.

Non-technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, without the use of technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Non-technical survey activities typically include, but are not limited to, desk studies seeking information from central institutions and other relevant sources, as well as field studies of the suspected area.

Persons with disabilities – Those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual, or sensory impairments, which in interaction with various barriers, may hinder their full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.

Reduced land – A defined area concluded not to contain evidence of mine/ERW contamination following the technical survey of a suspected or confirmed hazardous area.

Residual risk – In the context of humanitarian demining, this term refers to the risk remaining following the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all mines/ERW from a specified area to a specified depth.

Risk education (also known as risk reduction education and awareness in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and more broadly as Explosive Ordnance Risk Education, EORE) – Activities that seek to reduce the risk of death and injury from explosive hazards by raising the awareness of women, girls, men, and boys in accordance with the nature of the risks and their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs and by promoting behavioral change. This includes public information dissemination, education and training, and community liaison.

Submunition – Any munition that, to perform its task, separates from a parent munition (cluster munition). All air-dropped submunitions are commonly referred to as “bomblets,” although the term bomblet has a specific meaning in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. When ground-launched, they are sometimes called “grenades.”

Survivor – A person who has been directly injured by the explosion of a landmine, submunition, or other ERW and has survived the incident.

Suspected hazardous area (SHA) – An area where there is reasonable suspicion of mine/ERW contamination on the basis of indirect evidence of the presence of mines/ERW.

Technical survey – The collection and analysis of data, using appropriate technical interventions, about the presence, type, distribution, and surrounding environment of mine/ERW contamination, in order to better define where mine/ERW contamination is present, and where it is not, and to support land release prioritization and decision-making processes through the provision of evidence. Technical survey activities may include visual search, instrument-aided surface search, and shallow- or full sub-surface search.

Unexploded cluster submunitions – Submunitions that have failed to explode as intended, becoming unexploded ordnance.

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) – Munitions that were designed to explode but for some reason failed to detonate.

Victim – A person who has suffered physical, emotional, or psychological injury; economic loss; or substantial impairment of the realization of their rights through acts or omissions related to mines, cluster munitions, and ERW. Victims include people injured and killed (casualties), their families, and broader communities affected by mines, cluster munitions, and ERW.

Victim assistance – Victim assistance includes, but is not limited to, data collection and needs assessment, emergency and continuing medical care, physical rehabilitation, psychological support, socio-economic inclusion, and laws and public policies to ensure the full inclusion and equal participation in society of mine/ERW survivors and affected families and communities.

LANDMINE MONITOR 2025



Landmine Monitor 2025 provides a global overview of efforts to universalize and fully implement the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Focusing on calendar year 2024 with information included up to October 2024 where possible, the report documents recent landmine use and covers mine ban policy, production, transfer, and stockpiling globally. The report also outlines developments and challenges in addressing the impact of mine contamination and casualties through clearance of mined areas, the delivery of risk education to affected communities, and the provision of assistance to victims of these weapons, before reviewing global trends in mine action funding.

This report was prepared by the **Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor**, the civil society initiative providing research and monitoring for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). The Monitor has reported on the international community's response to the global landmine problem and its solutions since 1999.

Cover: Landmine survivors from Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) during an International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) silent protest at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap, Cambodia. © ICBL, November 2024

Top left: International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) Ambassador, Margaret Arach Orech, during

an ICBL silent protest at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Review Conference in Siem Reap, Cambodia. © ICBL, November 2024

Top right: An inscription on a wall in Marea village, in Syria's Aleppo governorate, reads: "Warning: minefield behind the hill." © Giovanni Diffidenti/ICBL, August 2025

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