Mali

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 19 June 2019

Summary: State Party Mali ratified the convention on 30 June 2010. It has participated several meetings of the convention, but not since 2014. Mali voted in favor of a key UN resolution promoting the convention in December 2018.

Mali provided an initial transparency report for the convention in May 2016, which confirms it never produced cluster munitions and possesses no stockpiles, including for research or training. Mali states that it has never used or transferred cluster munitions.

Policy

The Republic of Malisigned the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 30 June 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 December 2010.

Mali has not enacted specific national implementation legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions. [1]

Mali provided its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 May 2016, covering calendar year 2015. It has not submitted annual updated reports, which are due by 30 April.

Mali actively participated in the Oslo Process that created the convention and advocated for a total ban on cluster munitions without exception and with immediate effect. [2]

Mali attended several meetings of the convention, but not since 2014. [3]

In December 2018, Mali voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. [4] It has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

During the treaty negotiations, Mali argued against including Article 21 on interoperability (relations with states not party). [5] It has not elaborated its views on other important issues regarding interpretation and implementation of the convention, such as the prohibition on foreign stockpiling and transit of cluster munitions, and the prohibition on investment in cluster munition production.

Mali is party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In May 2016, Mali confirmed that it has never produced cluster munitions and does not possess any stocks, including for research and training. [6] Mali has stated on several occasions that it has never transferred or used cluster munitions. [7]



 [1] Mali did not complete Form A (national implementation measures) in the Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report submitted on 3 May 2016. In 2011, Mali expressed an interest in pursuing implementing legislation for the convention, but it has not taken any steps towards this goal since then. Statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Victim Assistance, Geneva, 28 June 2011. Notes by the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

 [2] For details on Mali’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 115–116.

 [3] Mali participated in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties until 2014 and the intersessional meetings in 2011. It did not attend the First Review Conference in September 2015. It has participated regional workshops, most recently in Lome, Togo in May 2013.

 [4]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018.

 [5] Statement of Mali, Committee of the Whole on Article 1, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 27 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.

 [7] Statement of Mali, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV); statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 12 September 2012; and statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.


Impact

Last updated: 15 March 2024

COUNTRY SUMMARY

Mali is contaminated by improvised mines—or victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—used by non-state-armed groups (NSAGs) and by explosive remnants of war (ERW). Since 2017, Mali has seen a significant rise in incidents due to improvised mines in the north (Kidal and Gao regions) and center (Ségou and Mopti regions) of the country.[1] In 2022, armed conflict spread in the south (Sikasso and Koulikoro regions), resulting in new contamination.[2]

Mali is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions. Mali has reported no cluster munition remnants contamination. Insecurity has largely prevented survey, mapping, and active landmine clearance, with operators focusing on spot tasks.[3] The presence of mines/ERW has hindered humanitarian assistance and limited access to basic services.[4]

International operators implemented risk education in Mali with local partners in 2022, often combining these activities with victim assistance.[5] Access for mine/ERW survivors to victim assistance services continued to be disrupted due to ongoing armed conflict.[6]

ASSESSING THE IMPACT

Contamination

 Extent of contamination

 

Antipersonnel landmine

Cluster munition remnant

ERW

Extent of contamination

Unknown

 

None

 

Unknown

Reported contamination

 Unknown

N/A

Unknown

 Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war; N/A=not applicable.

Landmine contamination

The extent of mine and ERW contamination in Mali is unknown. Mine contamination includes scattered vehicle- and victim-activated roadside IEDs, primarily targeting military forces but indiscriminately injuring and killing civilians. In 2009 and 2010, the presence of 80 “mined” areas in the regions of Kidal and Tombouctou, particularly along the roads between Abubaza and Tinza, was reported.[7] An upsurge in conflict in 2012 resulted in additional laying of IEDs, including improvised mines, in the north. [8] Since 2015, in central Mali, the Ségou and Mopti regions have been worst affected by the threat of IEDs, including improvised mines.[9] In 2022, contamination was reportedly present further south, in the regions of Sikasso, Koulikoro, and Mopti, particularly in the areas of Bankass, Bandiagara, and Djenné.[10]

NSAGs in Mali used command-detonated IEDs from 2017–2018 but have used pressure-plate IEDs increasingly since 2019.[11] Victim-activated tripwires have also been reported in relation to some devices.[12] UNMAS reported that victim-activated IEDs represented at least half of all IED incidents in Mali in 2019, and over 60% from January–October 2020.[13] In 2022, UNMAS reported that the proportion of civilian IED casualties had risen sharply, from 28% in 2021 to 43% in 2022. Mopti accounted for 38% of IED incidents and 62% of casualties in 2022.[14] 

IEDs and improvised mines impeded use of roads in central and northern Mali. Contamination continued to restrict access to land, education, healthcare, and other essential services.[15]

In 2019–2021, the United Nations (UN) reported on “indications of the transfer of components and methodologies for the usage of improvised explosive devices across borders and regions, especially in the Liptako-Gourma region,” bordering Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.[16]

Other types of contamination

Airstrikes, artillery attacks, and ongoing armed conflict have resulted in extensive unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) in northern, central, and southern Mali, including grenades, mortars, rockets, shells, and aircraft bombs. In 2020–2022, air and drone strikes were conducted by the Malian Armed Forces and its allies, while NSAGs fired rockets and mortar shells, adding to contamination in Gao, Kidal, Koulikoro, Ménaka, Mopti, Ségou, Sikasso, and Timbuktu. The extent of ERW contamination in Mali is not known.

Casualties

From 2007–2022, the Monitor has recorded a total of 2,165 mine/ERW casualties in Mali (671 killed and 1,494 injured).

5-year casualties total: 2018–2022[17]

Year

Injured

Killed

Unknown

Total

2022

102

80

0

182

2021

171

81

0

252

2020

290

78

0

368

2019

219

127

0

346

2018

172

131

0

303

 

     Casualties in 2022[18]

Injured

Killed

Unknown

Total

Change from previous year

102

80

0

182

Decrease from 252 in 2021

 

Casualty demographics in 2022*

Adult

Men

Women

Unknown

117

74

10

33

Children

Boys

Girls

Unknown

24

5

1

18

*For another 41 casualties, the age was unknown. Of these, one casualty was recorded as male.

 

     Casualties by civilian status in 2022

Civilian

Military

Deminer

Unknown

93

87

2

0

 

Casualties by device type in 2022

APM

AVM

Improvised mines

Unspecified mine type

CMR

ERW

Unknown

0

0

131

23

0

28

0

Note: APM=antipersonnel mines; AVM=antivehicle mines; CMR=cluster munition remnants; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

During 2022, a total of 182 casualties were recorded by the Monitor, including two deminers in the course of clearance work. Another two casualties were members of a military explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team which hit an improvised mine while travelling by vehicle.

COORDINATION

Summary table[19]

Mine action

Main Coordination Body    

Coordination Mechanism

Strategy/plan

National Mine Action Standards      

SP-CNLP

 

GT-LAMH

 

Counter-IED Working Group

None

None*

Risk education

Main Coordination Body    

Coordination Mechanism

Strategy/plan

National Mine Action Standards

SP-CNLP

GT-LAMH

None

None*

Victim assistance

Main Coordination Body    

Coordination Mechanism

Strategy/plan

National Mine Action Standards      

SP-CNLP

GT-LAMH

None

None*

Note: SP-CNLP=Secrétariat permanent de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre (Permanent Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons); GT-LAMH=Groupe de travail de lutte antimines humanitaire (Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group); IED=improvised explosive device.

*In the absence of national standards, operators followed the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).

ADDRESSING THE IMPACT

Clearance

Management and coordination

Management and coordination overview

In May 2021, the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection formed the National Commission to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, active under the Permanent Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Secrétariat permanent de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre, SP-CNLP). The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides capacity-building support.[20]

Mali’s Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (Groupe de travail de lutte antimines humanitaire, GT-LAMH) serves as the coordination platform for mine action activities.[21] Its members include representatives of SP-CNLP, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Security and Civil Protection, along with international and national operators.[22]

In 2022, UNMAS provided EOD training and capacity-building support to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the Malian Armed Forces.[23] UNMAS also formed a Counter-IED Working Group in 2022 to produce analysis and provide support to MINUSMA’s Counter-IED Steering Committee.[24] In 2021, UNMAS had established a regional mine action program covering Burkina Faso and Niger, in response to cross-border IED contamination in the Liptako-Gourma region.[25]

Strategies and policies

There was no specific national mine action strategy and policy in Mali. In 2022, the SP-CNLP reported to have developed a decree project to include officially mine action in its responsibilities.[26]

Information management

Mali has used the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) since 2019. It is coordinated by UNMAS and used by members of GT-LAMH.[27]

Clearance operators

Clearance operators in Mali in 2022 included EOD Engineers from the Malian Armed Forces, and MINUSMA teams specialized in neutralizing explosives and munitions.[28] Between 2013 and July 2023, UNMAS reported training 1,469 Malian Armed Forces personnel in EOD, and in IED threat mitigation.[29] 

From 2019–2021, Malian instructors trained by UNMAS and MINUSMA delivered more than 50 EOD courses to national security force personnel, “signaling an increasingly self-sufficient national capacity.”[30]

Land release: antipersonnel landmines 

In Mali, contamination, including improvised mines and other IEDs, was destroyed by sappers during miliary operations. In 2022, Mali destroyed 45 antipersonnel mines and 82 improvised mines.[31] This represents an increase from 2021, when spot tasks resulted in the destruction of 16 improvised mines and 59 other IEDs.[32] In 2021, non-technical survey took place in Mali, but no data was provided on areas surveyed.[33]

UNMAS reported that between 2013 and July 2023, a total of 4.4km² of land was released.[34]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Mali was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009.[35] Mali has not requested an extension to its Article 5 clearance deadline.

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 clearance deadline

Mali is party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has reported that it does not have any cluster munition remnants contamination on its territory.[36]

Land release: other ordnance

Mali reported that two antivehicle mines and four ERW were destroyed through spot tasks during 2022, compared to 37 in 2021 and 36 in 2020.[37]

Risk education

Management and coordination

Management and coordination overview

GT-LAMH coordinates risk education, including activities, data collection, capacity-building, and messaging.[38] UNMAS accredits risk education operators in Mali.[39] UNMAS also reported conducting quality control from field offices in Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Tessalit, and Timbuktu.[40]

Legislation and standards

UNMAS reported that operators conducted risk education in compliance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[41]

Information management

Mali uses IMSMA to collect data on risk education beneficiaries. IMSMA accident and victim data was used to prioritize risk education activities and tailor safety messages.[42]

Risk education operators

In 2022, five national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) carried out risk education, as well as three international operators: DanChurchAid (DCA), the Danish Refugee Council, and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Activities were implemented in 19 of the 27 districts impacted by mines and ERW.[43] Risk education resources were reportedly insufficient to meet needs.[44]

DCA and MAG implemented risk education in Mali through national NGO partners.[45]

Beneficiary data

Beneficiary data in 2022[46]

Operator

Men

Boys

Women

Girls

Persons with disabilities

AAPPOR

618

463

623

399

N/R

AMSS

563

611

554

494

N/R

ASDAP

9,883

7,556

7,138

7,065

N/R

DCA

6,850

4,659

5,608

4,746

3,847

Danish Refugee Council

212

64

138

73

N/R

MAG

1,684

1,498

1,812

1,454

N/R

Malian Red Cross

2,417

1,240

1,392

942

N/R

Tassaght

695

576

733

672

N/R

Note: AAPPOR=Association d’appui pour les populations rurales du Mali (Association for support to Rural Populations in Mali); AMSS=Association malienne pour la survie au Sahel (Malian Association for Survival in the Sahel); ASDAP=Association de soutien au développement des activités des populations (Association to Support the Development of Populations’ Activities); DCA=DanChurchAid; MAG=Mines Advisory Group; N/R=not reported.

In 2022, SP-CNLP reported that a total of 73,432 beneficiaries were reached via interpersonal risk education, including 22,922 men (31%), 17,998 women (25%), 16,667 boys (23%), and 15,845 girls (21%).[47] MAG and DCA reported 24,316 and 65,880 beneficiaries respectively. DCA reported reaching 3,847 beneficiaries with disabilities in 2022.[48]

Target groups

People travelling along roads affected by improvised mines, particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs), were at risk. Transhumant pastoralists were also at risk due to contamination in their areas of movement. Men and teenage boys from rural communities were exposed to mines/ERW due to their economic activities, such as trade and agricultural work. Women and children were also affected during household tasks, and during activities such as searching for water and firewood, travelling along rivers and streams to wash clothes, or playing outside.[49]

Talibé children, moving from town to town in northern Mali, often engaged in risky activities such as collecting and selling scrap metal, and foraging for food.[50]

MAG included blacksmiths and metal collectors among its target groups, due to their potential exposure to mine/ERW risk during their work.[51]

Delivery methods

In 2022, interpersonal risk education was delivered by volunteers and community focal points. Risk education messages were also broadcast via television and local radio.[52]

DCA combined risk education with localized victim assistance activities. DCA also delivered emergency risk education in response to incidents, reaching survivors and witnesses.[53] 

MAG developed interactive radio programs to engage audiences. These broadcasts reportedly helped to counter misinformation about explosive devices circulating in communities.

In 2023, a specific chatbot feature was developed for WhatsApp users in Mali, teaching them to recognize explosive devices and encouraging the adoption of safer behavior.[54]

Victim assistance

Highlights from 2022

In 2022, operators reported 422 victim assistance beneficiaries in Mali, up significantly from 127 reported in 2021.[55] However, operators could not reach the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan target to reach 1,100 beneficiaries in Mali, due to a lack of capacity and resources.[56]

In July 2022, Humanity & Inclusion (HI) launched a physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support project, which aims to reach 130 mine/ERW survivors over a two-year period.[57]

Management and coordination 

Management and coordination overview 

There was no specific national victim assistance program in Mali. UNMAS coordinated victim assistance activities through GT-LAMH. The Malian Federation of Persons with Disabilities (Fédération malienne des associations de personnes handicapées, FEMAPH) is consulted on victim assistance projects.[58] 

The physical rehabilitation sector is overseen by the Ministry of Solidarity and Humanitarian Action and the Ministry of Health and Social Development, which coordinated activities with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and FEMAPH.[59]

Legislation and standards

Mine action operators followed IMAS 13.10 on Victim Assistance during their activities.[60]

Information management

Data was collected by operators on survivors, referrals, and access to services.[61]

Legal frameworks or policies on disability inclusion

In September 2021, Mali adopted a decree to implement 2018 legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.[62] Yet in 2022, mine/ERW survivors continued to face challenges in accessing employment, education, buildings, and public transportation.[63]

Victim assistance providers

Several risk education providers have participated in the identification of mine/ERW survivors and referrals.[64] The Malian Red Cross was supported by the ICRC in 2022.[65]

Physical rehabilitation is provided by the National Center for Orthopedic Appliances (Centre National d’Appareillage Orthopédique, CNAOM) in Bamako, the Father Bernard Verspieren Rehabilitation Center in Bamako, and at the Regional Centers for Orthopedic Appliances and Functional Rehabilitation(Centres régionaux d’appareillage orthopédiques et de rééducation fonctionnelle, CRAORF) in Mopti, Gao, Timbuktu, Segou, and Kayes. CNAOM and the five regional centers provided prosthetics and socio-economic inclusion services, while covering transport and accommodation costs. Psychosocial support was limited to regional hospitals and referral centers.[66]

Needs assessment

Casualty data analysis showed higher mortality rates for civilians (64%) compared to military personnel (34%).[67] Operators reported that low survival rates for civilians highlighted gaps in the provision of first-aid and emergency healthcare services, especially in remote areas.[68]

Medical care and rehabilitation

In 2023, victim assistance operators provided capacity-building support to regional hospitals in immediate trauma care, and to community workers in first-aid, identification of emergency transport, and use of stretchers.[69] Of the victim assistance beneficiaries reported in 2022, only 46% were reported to have received initial emergency support after their mine/ERW incident. Referral health centers were available for the emergency care of survivors, while those in need of trauma care or specialized services were referred to regional hospitals. [70]

The ICRC provided first-aid and referrals training to the Malian Red Cross, and to community volunteers. It also supported regional hospitals in Gao, Kidal, and Mopti. The ICRC provided physical rehabilitation to 70 mine or ERW survivors in 2022, and supported five rehabilitation centers, including CNAOM, through the provision of equipment, supplies, and training.[71]

There were just 13 ortho-prosthetic specialists in Mali in 2022, and CNAOM launched a new training course in 2023 to increase national capacity.[72] Training of staff at community health centers was needed, to better identify patients with complications for early referral to CNAOM or one the regional centers.[73]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

In 2022, 67% of reported victim assistance beneficiaries received psychosocial support, while 26% received support for socio-economic reintegration.[74]

Regional hospitals supported by the ICRC in Gao, Kidal, and Mopti provided mental health and psychosocial support to those referred by the Malian Red Cross or other operators.[75] The ICRC partnered with disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) in 2022 to support educational, livelihood, and sports activities for mine/ERW survivors.[76]



[1] United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023.

[2] United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Mali: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023,” 19 July 2023, p. 29; and Mali INGO Forum and Humanitarian Mine Action Working Group (Groupe de travail de lutte antimines humanitaire, GT-LAMH), “The urgent need to limit the impact of explosive devices on civilians in Mali - April 2023,” 12 April 2023, p. 1.

[3] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, Permanent Secretariat to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (Secrétariat permanent de lutte contre la prolifération des armes légères et de petit calibre, SP-CNLP), 26 April 2023.

[4] UNOCHA, “Mali: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022,” February 2022, p. 40; UNOCHA, “Mali: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023,” 19 July 2023, p. 29; and Mali INGO Forum and GT-LAMH, “The urgent need to limit the impact of explosive devices on civilians in Mali - April 2023,” 12 April 2023, pp. 1–2.

[6] ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 29 June 2023, p. 141.

[7] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Second African Francophone Seminar on Mine/ERW Action, Dakar, 2–4 November 2009; and GICHD, “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Third African Francophone Seminar on Mine/ERW Action, Nouakchott, 27–30 September 2010.

[8] United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), “Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices: Report of the Secretary-General,” 17 July 2020, p. 4.

[9] UNGA, “Countering the Threat Posed by Improvised Explosive Devices: Report of the Secretary-General,” 17 July 2020, p. 4; and Yeonju Jung and Ursign Hofmann, “Anti-vehicle mines risk sliding off UN agenda despite increasing humanitarian impact: The case of Mali,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 16 November 2018.

[10] Mali INGO Forum and GT-LAMH, “The urgent need to limit the impact of explosive devices on civilians in Mali - April 2023,” 12 April 2023, p. 1; and UNMAS, “Annual Report 2022,” April 2023, p. 75.

[11]In Sahel, French troops hunt jihadist landmines,” Middle East Online, 4 December 2019.

[12] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 3 May 2021 and 6 April 2022; and “Improvised explosive devices: the technique used by jihadist groups in the Sahel to assassinate security forces,”Atalayar, 20 February 2021.

[13] Presentation by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, Twenty-Third International Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and United Nations (UN) Advisors, Geneva, 11–14 February 2020.

[14] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2022,” April 2023, p. 75; and Mali INGO Forum and GT-LAMH, “The urgent need to limit the impact of explosive devices on civilians in Mali - April 2023,” 12 April 2023, p. 1.

[15] UNOCHA, “Mali: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021,” February 2021, p. 27; UNOCHA, “Mali: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022,” February 2022, p. 40; and UNOCHA, “Mali: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2023,” 19 July 2023, p. 29.

[16] UNGA, “Assistance in mine action: Report of the Secretary-General,” A/76/283, 10 August 2021, p. 2.

[17] Monitor media monitoring and analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) data for calendar years 2018–2022. See, Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, Issue 5, 28 September 2010, pp. 651–660.

[18] Monitor media monitoring and analysis of ACLED data for calendar years 2018–2022.

[19] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 26 April 2023; and by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 19 September 2022; UNMAS, “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023; and UNMAS, “Annual Report 2022,” April 2023, p. 76.

[20] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 3 May 2021 and 6 April 2022; UNMAS, “Annual Report 2020,” April 2021, p. 39; and “Mali: the National Commission to Counter the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons was created,” MaliActu.net, 17 May 2021.    

[22] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Organizational Chart: Protection Cluster in Mali,” undated; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 23 March and 3 May 2021.

[23] UNMAS, “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023; and UNMAS, “Annual Report 2022,” April 2023, p. 76.

[24] UNMAS, “Annual Report 2022,” April 2023, p. 76.

[25] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 19 September 2022.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 26 April 2023.

[27] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 3 May 2021 and 6 April 2022.

[28] MINUSMA press release, “Improvised explosive devices: how MINUSMA is addressing this threat,” 23 May 2022; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 26 April 2023.

[29] UNMAS, “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023.

[30] UNGA, “Assistance in mine action: Report of the Secretary-General,” A/76/283, 10 August 2021, p. 7.

[31]  Response to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 26 April 2023.

[32] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 6 April 2022.

[33] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 6 April 2022.

[34] UNMAS, “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023.

[35] Mali Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 1 May 2004–1 May 2005). See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database.

[36] Mali Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form F, p. 15. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database.

[37] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 3 May 2021 and 6 April 2022; and by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 26 April 2023.

[38] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Glenn Derrien, Programme Officer, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 5 June 2020; by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 23 March 2021; and by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 3 May 2021 and 6 April 2022.

[39] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 3 May 2021.

[40] UNMAS, “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023.

[41] UNMAS, “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023.

[42] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), 13 July 2023; and by David Wasolu Djuma, Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE) and Non-Technical Survey Advisor, DanChurchAid (DCA), 19 July 2023.

[45] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 13 July 2023; and by David Wasolu Djuma, EORE and Non-Technical Survey Advisor, DCA, 19 July 2023.

[46] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 26 April 2023.

[47] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 26 April 2023.

[48] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 13 July 2023; and by David Wasolu Djuma, EORE and Non-Technical Survey Advisor, DCA, 19 July 2023.

[49] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 13 July 2023; and by David Wasolu Djuma, EORE and Non-Technical Survey Advisor, DCA, 19 July 2023.

[50] Talibé children are entrusted by their families to Quranic teachers to learn the Quran. They are often forced to travel from town to town beg for their own upkeep and that of their Quranic master, especially in urban areas. See, Human Rights Watch (HRW), “These Children Don’t Belong in the Streets: a Roadmap for Ending Exploitation, Abuse of Talibés in Senegal,” 16 December 2019; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 13 July 2023; and by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 26 April 2023.

[51] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 13 July 2023.

[52] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Adama Diarra, Permanent Secretary, SP-CNLP, 26 April 2023; by Ludovic Kouassi, Community Liaison Manager, MAG, 13 July 2023; and by David Wasolu Djuma, EORE and Non-Technical Survey Advisor, DCA, 19 July 2023.

[53] DCA, “Emergency support to survivors of explosive ordnance related accidents in the Centre,” undated; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by David Wasolu Djuma, EORE and Non-Technical Survey Advisor, DCA, 19 July 2023; and by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 6 April 2022.

[55] Mali INGO Forum and GT-LAMH, “The urgent need to limit the impact of explosive devices on civilians in Mali - April 2023,” 12 April 2023, p. 4; response to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 6 April 2022; and UNMAS, “Annual Report 2021,” August 2022, p. 76.  

[57] HI, “Country sheet: Mali,” updated in September 2022, p. 12.

[58] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 23 March 2021; and by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 6 April 2022.

[59] ICRC, “Annual Report 2021,” 27 July 2022, p. 163; ICRC, “Annual Report 2020,” 1 July 2021, p. 192; and ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2019 Annual Report,” 3 July 2020, p. 22.

[60] UNMAS, “Where We Work: Mali,” updated 31 July 2023.

[62] Republic of Mali, “Official Journal of the Republic of Mali,” 18 June 2018, pp. 863–865; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 3 May 2021; and by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 6 April 2022; and Facebook post by FEMAPH, 27 September 2021. 

[63] United States (US) Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali,” March 2023.

[64] Including AAPPOR, AMSS, DCA, Tassaght, and UNMAS. Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Leonie Evers, Programme Specialist, UNMAS, 5 October 2020 and 3 May 2021; and by Nora Achkar, Project Manager, UNMAS, 3 May 2021 and 6 April 2022.

[65] ICRC, “Annual Report 2021,” 27 July 2022, pp. 161–166; ICRC, “Annual Report 2020,” 1 July 2021, pp. 188–194; and ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2022 Annual Report,” 1 May 2023, p. 18.

[67] Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar year 2022.

[68] Mali INGO Forum and GT-LAMH, “The urgent need to limit the impact of explosive devices on civilians in Mali - April 2023,” 12 April 2023, pp. 1–4.

[69] Mali INGO Forum and GT-LAMH, “The urgent need to limit the impact of explosive devices on civilians in Mali - April 2023,” 12 April 2023, pp. 1–4.

[70] Mali INGO Forum and GT-LAMH, “The urgent need to limit the impact of explosive devices on civilians in Mali - April 2023,” 12 April 2023, pp. 1–4.

[71] ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 29 June 2023, pp. 143–144 and 146.

[75] ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 29 June 2023, pp. 143–144.

[76] ICRC, “Annual Report 2022,” 29 June 2023, pp. 143–144; and ICRC, “Physical Rehabilitation Programme: 2022 Annual Report,” 1 May 2023, p. 18.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 18 December 2019

Policy

The Republic of Mali signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 2 June 1998, and became a State Party on 1 March 1999. National implementation measures adopted in 2000 include penal sanctions and fines.[1]

Mali occasionally attends meetings of the treaty, most recently the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 and, prior to that, the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in Cambodia in November–December 2011. Mali last submitted an Article 7 transparency report in 2005.

Mali is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It is also party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Mali has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. Mali initially declared that it had possessed stockpiles of antipersonnel mines since 1974, the majority supplied by the former Soviet Union.[2] In 1998, it destroyed a stockpile of 7,127 antipersonnel mines, together with 5,131 antivehicle mines.[3] In 2003, Mali reported that it retained 600 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, but it has never reported any use of these mines.[4]

Use

Mali stated in 2001 that it had never used antipersonnel mines and that there had been no reports of use by government forces or Tuareg rebels.[5]

In January 2012, an armed conflict began in the north of the country between the Malian government and its allies versus armed opposition groups allied with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In January 2013, the French military began operations in cooperation with the government of Mali to help to re-take areas in the north of the country. Military personnel from African Union states deployed as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali, while the UN deployed the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

In 2013 and 2014, there were several reports indicating the use of either antivehicle mines or improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by armed opposition groups participating in the armed conflict. Between November 2013 and July 2014, there were several antivehicle mines incidents that caused civilian casualties, including aid workers and UN peacekeepers.[6] According to GICHD-SIPRI data, the number of antivehicle mine incidents that caused civilian casualties has increased significantly in recent years, due to mines laid by non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Mali.

In 2018, Mali topped the list of countries with the highest number of casualties from antivehicle mines, at 254. This shows a dramatic increase in casualties from 76 in 2015. GICHD-SIPRI also noted that the locations of the incidents were no longer contained to the northern regions of Mali; in 2018, 44% of antivehicle mine incidents occurred in the central regions.[7] In 2019, there were several antivehicle mine incidents resulting in UN peacekeeper casualties: on 25 January two UN peacekeepers were killed and six injured in Mopti region.[8] On 20 April, one peacekeeper was killed and four were wounded in Timbuktu.[9] On 5 October, one peacekeeper was killed and four wounded in northern Mali.[10]

In July 2012, a NSAGs called the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa claimed it had laid antipersonnel mines near the city of Gao. After several apparent landmine casualties near Gao in early 2013, Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs accused AQIM of using antipersonnel mines.[11] The ICBL described the reported landmine use as “disturbing.”[12] However, no antipersonnel mines were ever recovered from the area.



[1] Two legal texts, an ordinance, and a decree prohibit the development, manufacturing, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, offer, import, export, transfer, and use of antipersonnel mines. Breach of the legislation is punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment and a fine of between CFA500,000 and CFA3 million (approximately US$1,150 to $6,900). Ordinance No. 049/P-RM on the Implementation of the Convention, adopted on 27 September 2000; and Decree No. 569/P-RM on the Application of the Ordinance, adopted on 15 November 2000. An interministerial National Commission for a Total Ban on Landmines was established in June 2002 to take responsibility for the mine issue. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 341.

[2] Anonymous Malian sources.

[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 17 May 2001.

[4] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 31 July 2003. Mali initially reported in 2001 that it retained 2,000 antipersonnel and 1,000 antivehicle mines for training purposes. In 2003, it reported having consumed 1,400 antipersonnel mines and 700 antivehicle mines during training activities.

[5] Statement by the Ministry of Defense, Seminar on the Universalization and Implementation of the Ottawa Convention in Africa, Bamako, 16 February 2001.

[6] See, for example: “Officials: 4 people killed in landmine explosion in northern Mali,” The Washington Post, 5 November 2013; “Land mine injures 5 Chadian peacekeepers patrolling in northern Mali,” Fox News, 20 January 2014; “Two aid workers injured in landmine explosion in Mali,” World Bulletin, 27 February 2014; and “Land mine kills UN peacekeeper in northern Mali,” Grand Island Independent, 1 July 2014.

[8] Joanne Stocker, “UN peacekeepers in Mali killed by mine near Douentza,” Defense Post, 25 January 2019.

[11] Jeffery Schaffer, “AP Interview: Mali Wants Help Against Land Mines,” Associated Press, 4 February 2013. For example, on 4 February 2013 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that two civilians had died in an explosion involving a landmine or an IED on the road between Kidal, Anefis, and North Darane. “UN: 2 civilians killed by land mines in north Mali,” Associated Press (Timbuktu), 4 February 2013.

[12] ICBL Press Release, “Landmine Use in Malian Conflict Disturbing,” 12 February 2013.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 22 February 2024

In 2022, Mali received a total of US$2.1 million in international mine action assistance from three donors.[1] This represents an increase of 75% from the $1.2 million received in 2021.

The contribution from Denmark in 2022 went to risk education activities implemented by DanChurchAid (DCA), while funds from Italy went to victim assistance activities implemented by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The contribution from the United States (US) was not disaggregated by sector.

Mali also received in-kind assistance during 2022 from Switzerland, valued at CHF200,000 (approximately $209,424), to support mine clearance operations through the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[2]

International contributions: 2022[3]

Donor

Sector

Amount

(national currency)

Amount

(US$)

Italy

Victim assistance

€1,000,000

1,053,400

United States

Various

US$1,000,000

1,000,000

Denmark

Risk education

DKK332,191

46,929

Total

 -

N/A

2,100,329

Note: N/A=not applicable.

Five-year support for mine action

In the five-year period from 2018–2022, international mine action assistance to Mali totaled approximately $5.9 million.

Summary of international contributions: 2018–2022[4]

Year

International contributions (US$)

2022

2,100,329

2021

1,200,000

2020

700,000

2019

1,500,000

2018

400,000

Total

5,900,329

 


[1] Denmark: response to Monitor questionnaire by Uffe Troensegaard, Head of Section, Denmark Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 September 2023. Italy: Italy Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form I. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Database. United States: US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), “To Walk the Earth in Safety: 1 October 2021–30 September 2022,” 4 April 2023.

[2] Switzerland Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2022), Form I. Annual exchange rate for 2022: CHF0.9550=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 9 January 2023.

[3] Average exchange rates for 2022: CHF0.9550=US$1; DKK7.0786=US$1; €1=US$1.0534. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 9 January 2023.

[4] See ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2022 (ICBL-CMC: Geneva, November 2022); ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2021 (ICBL-CMC: Geneva, November 2021); ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2020 (ICBL-CMC: Geneva, November 2020); and ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2019 (ICBL-CMC: Geneva, November 2019).