Georgia

Mine Action

Last updated: 29 November 2015

Not a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Not a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Contamination

Georgia is contaminated by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as explosive remnants of war (ERW), possibly including cluster munition remnants.

Mine contamination

Georgia has some 2.7km2 of mined area across six minefields, as set out in the table below.[1] This includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri District, which is in a military zone, and where the size of mined and battle area is unknown. Contamination comprises both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. 

Contamination as of end 2014[2]

Region & District

Village

Type of contamination

Mined areas

Area (m2)

Kvemo Kartli
(Marneuli District)

Kachagani (Red Bridge)

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines

1

2,579,593

Mtskheta-Mtianeti
(Dusheti District)

Barisakho 1, Barisakho 2

Antipersonnel mines

2

4,275

Mtskheta-Mtianeti (Dusheti District)

Kadoeti

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines

1

23,783

Imereti
(Terjola District)

Chognari (Military restricted area)

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and unexploded ordnance

1

87,664

Shida Kartli
(Kashuri District)

Osiauri (Military zone)

Antipersonnel mines

1

Unknown

Total

 

 

6

2,695,315


Georgia has mined areas around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia. 

Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the mine problem has not been reported publicly. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, in 2009, suspected mined areas were located at Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Firing Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.[3]

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted a General Mine Action Assessment (GMAA) for Georgia from October 2009 to January 2010, which identified eight suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and seven confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in 13 districts, the latter of which totaled more than 4.5km2 in estimated area.[4] Of the 15 SHAs and CHAs in total, 10 contained mines and five contained unexploded ordnance (UXO).[5] Between 2009 and the end of 2012, HALO Trust cleared five of the minefields that had a humanitarian impact and identified one additional small minefield in a military restricted area.[6]

At the end of 2014, six mined areas remained in Georgia.[7] This includes an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.[8] 

There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia. Since the 1990–1992 Georgian-Ossetian war, and more recently the 2008 conflict with Russia, South Ossetia has been difficult to access. 

Cluster munition contamination 

Georgia, including Abkhazia, is now believed to be free of contamination from cluster munition remnants with the possible exception of South Ossetia, a breakaway region of Georgia which is occupied by Russia, and inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and NGO clearance operators.[9] HALO Trust believes unexploded submunitions may remain in South Ossetia but until it is able to conduct a survey, it cannot be certain.[10]

Cluster munition contamination resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008 in which Georgian and Russian forces both used cluster munitions. After the conflict, HALO cleared some 37km2 of area in Georgian-controlled territory contaminated with submunitions and other ERW by December 2009.[11] NPA completed clearance of its tasked areas in May 2010.[12] Despite fears of cluster munition remnants in Poti military harbor, none were found during demining operations by NPA in 2009.[13] In 2014, HALO Trust cleared 1.3km2 of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants in Shida Kartli region, with the destruction of 68 submunitions.[14] 

Other explosive remnants of war

Georgia remains contaminated by other UXO. Georgia’s ERW problem is a result of armed conflict with Russia in August 2008. Following the conflict, there was evidence of a problem with UXO in South Ossetia, although its precise extent remains unclear. In addition, UXO contamination in Georgia still persists in former firing ranges.[15]

Program Management

In 2008, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Georgian Ministry of Defense and international NGO Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP) to establish the Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC).[16] On 30 December 2010, the Ministry of Defense issued a decree instructing that mine action be included as part of the State Military Scientific Technical Center, or “DELTA,” an entity within the ministry. The agreement with iMMAP ended on 31 March 2011 and the ERWCC took ownership of the mine action program.[17]

Standards

Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) have been drafted and are awaiting completion in coordination with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[18] iMMAP has conducted training on the IMAS for ERWCC staff, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and DELTA.

Operators

At the request of the government of Georgia, the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict. In 2012, a NATO Trust Fund project planned to provide support to establish long-term local capability and capacity for the ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.[19] As part of the project, 66 members of the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade were trained in demining, battle area clearance (BAC), and explosive ordnance disposal.[20] No updated information has been received on the implementation of the project.

HALO did not conduct any survey or clearance of mines in Georgia in 2014, only clearance of cluster munition remnants and other ERW.[21] 

Land Release 

No mine clearance or survey took place in 2014.[22] However, Georgia reported that in 2015 it planned to start mine clearance of the Red Bridge minefield, the unfenced 7km-long minefield at the border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.[23] This is the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment.

In 2014, HALO Trust cleared 1.3km2 of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants. Four areas in the region of Shida Kartli were released during the operations, with the destruction of 68 submunitions, 39 other items of UXO, and one antivehicle mine.[24] Most of HALO’s work in Georgia in 2014 involved clearing former firing ranges contaminated with UXO other than submunitions.[25] No clearance took place in 2013. 

Relation to Mine Ban Treaty Article 5

Limited mine clearance has been conducted in the last few years. Between 2009 and the end of 2012, HALO cleared five minefields with humanitarian impact and identified a sixth.[26] It is not known if any of the military areas have been cleared.

HALO did not conduct any mine clearance in 2013 or 2014, instead focused on clearing cluster munition remnants and also conducting BAC of former firing ranges.[27]

Relation to Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4

Prior to 2014, very limited clearance of cluster munition remnants took place over the previous five years as contamination was thought to be only residual.



[1] Emails from Andrew Moore, Caucasus & Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 4 June 2015; and from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, State Military Scientific Technical Centre – DELTA, 19 October 2015.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

[4] Email from Jonathan (Gus) Guthrie, Programme Manager, NPA, 19 March 2010.

[5] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 4 June 2015.

[6] HALO, “Georgia, The Problem,” undated.

[7] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 4 June 2015.

[8] Interview with George Dolidze, Director, Department of Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[9] Response to NPA questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 29 May 2015; see also, ICBL, “Country Profile: Georgia: Mine Ban Policy,” 1 October 2012.

[10] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 30 August 2012.

[11] Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre, “Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC) in Facts and Figures,” November 2009, p. 17.

[12] Email from Jonathon “Gus” Guthrie, NPA, 27 May 2010.

[13] NPA, “Poti Harbour Survey Technical Report, 3rd to 24th of January 2009,” p. 5.

[14] Response to NPA questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 29 May 2015.

[15] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 23 June 2015.

[16] iMMAP Press Release, “Establishing the New Georgian Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC),” 25 February 2009; and E. M. Hasanov and P. Nevalainen, “Mine-action Challenges and Responses in Georgia,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011.

[17] iMMAP Press Release, “Establishing the New Georgian Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC),” 25 February 2009; E. M. Hasanov and P. Nevalainen, “Mine-action Challenges and Responses in Georgia,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3, Fall 2011; and Decree #897 issued by the Minister of Defense, 30 December 2010.

[18] Response to NPA questionnaire by Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015; and email, 6 July 2015.

[19] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[20] Estonia CCW Protocol V Article 10 Report, 2 April 2012; and NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia Fact Sheet,” January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[21] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 29 May 2015.

[22] Response to NPA questionnaire by Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015.

[23] Ibid., and interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[24] Response to NPA questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 29 May 2015.

[25] Ibid. Clearance data reported by ERWCC contained inconsistencies with the data reported by HALO. ERWCC reported clearance of four areas in 2014 totalling 230km2, destroying 82 submunitions, 113 other items of UXO, and one antipersonnel mine. Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015. According to HALO, the difference is likely due to ERWCC’s data including HALO clearance data for former firing ranges, which did not contain cluster munition remnants and which were therefore not reported by HALO. The 84 cluster munition remnants reported by ERWCC appears to contain the cumulative total for the number of cluster munition remnants destroyed by HALO for 2013, 2014, and 2015. Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 23 June 2015.

[26] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 30 August 2012.

[27] Ibid., 29 May 2014.