Nagorno-Karabakh

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 03 August 2016

Summary: Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized by any UN member state and thus is not eligible to accede to, or attend meetings of, the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In 2012, an official expressed support for the convention’s objectives and said Nagorno-Karabakh does not produce, export, stockpile, or use cluster munitions and does not intend to do so.

Policy

Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province voted in 1988 to secede from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and join the Armenian SSR, which resulted in armed conflict from 1988 to 1994. The region declared independence as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 1991. The governing authority’s last comment on banning cluster munitions was in May 2012, when acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasiliy Atajanyan declared the government’s support for the ban on cluster munitions: “Realizing what a deadly [sic] to civilians are cluster munitions, and assuming that the suffering of civilians caused by cluster munitions outweigh the potential military benefits of using this weapon, the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic fully support the Convention on Cluster Munitions.” However, he said, “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic is not in a position to join the Convention, in view of the fact the conflict with Azerbaijan is not yet resolved.”[1]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Atajanyan stated in 2012 that “the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic does not produce, export, stockpile or use cluster munitions and does not intend to do so.”

Unknown quantities of air-dropped RBK series cluster bombs were used in Nagorno-Karabakh during the 1988–1994 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory. In June 2016, the HALO Trust destroyed an unexploded PTAB-1M submunition found by a farmer on agricultural land near the village of Mugalny.[2]

Use in April 2016

There is visual evidence that two types of ground-fired cluster munition rockets were used in Nagorno-Karabakh during the first week of April 2016, during fighting across the line of contact separating local Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces. Ground fighting was confined to areas close to the line of contact, but Azerbaijan launched artillery and rockets more than 10 kilometers into Nagorno-Karabakh from 1 April until 5 April 2016, when a ceasefire went into effect at 12:00 local time.[3]

On 8 April 2016, HALO began emergency clearance operation in cooperation with Nagorno-Karabakh’s Emergency Situations Service and within 10 days reported the clearance and destruction of close to 200 unexploded M095 DPICM-type submunitions from near the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh, close to the town of Martakert in northeast Nagorno-Karabakh.[4] HALO also found remnants of Israeli-produced LAR-140 surfaced-fired rockets, which deliver the M095 DPICM submunitions.[5] The cluster munitions were reportedly fired from Azerbaijan.[6]

Media documented the remnants of the cargo section of 9M55K 300mm Smerch rockets in the southeast of Hardut district near the borders with Azerbaijan and Iran.[7] Correspondents from Russian media outlet Sputnik photographed remnants of the cargo section of 9M55K Smerch rockets in a cemetery outside the village of Shukyurbeyli in Hadrut region. According to the report filed on 6 April 2016, Azerbaijan fired the Smerch rockets on the night of 4 April.[8]

Azerbaijan and Armenia have both denied using cluster munitions in the brief conflict and accused the other side of using the weapon against civilians.

On 28 April 2016, a spokesperson from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that “Cluster munitions used by the Armenian troops against the civilian Azerbaijani population living densely along the line of contact aimed at intentional destruction of manpower, do not bear any military goal and serve solely to perpetrate mass killings among the civilians. Unexploded cluster ordinances are source of threat for the lives and property of civilians for a long period of time.”[9] Azerbaijan media published a photograph on 27 April 2016 showing an item it alleged was a “POM-1” cluster munition used by Armenia.[10] However, the photographs do not depict weapons, but rather the coolant bottle for a thermal site used on an anti-tank guided missile system.

On 6 April 2016, a spokesperson from Armenia’s Ministry of Defense issued photographs showing the remnants of Smerch rockets that he claimed Azerbaijan fired into Nagorno-Karabakh. The article stated that Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh “do not possess weaponry of this kind.”[11]



[1] Letter from Vasiliy Atajanyan, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Ministry of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, in response to Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor inquiry, 12 May 2012.

[2] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Thanks to Aleksey Saradjanov for reporting this PTAB cluster munition found on his farm near Mugalny vil. #Karabakh,” 1 June 2016, 5:40am. Tweet.

[3] HALO Trust, “HALO Begins Emergency Clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016; and HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “NK’s Emergency Situations Service & HALO have destroyed 200+ #clustermunitions since clearance resumed in #Karabakh,” 20 April 2016, 9:14am. Tweet.

[4] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO's assessment of new #clustermunition contamination is underway near Mokhratagh village, Martakert, #Karabakh,” 14 April 2016, 6:39am.Tweet; and HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Rapid assessment of new #clustermunition strikes in #Karabakh has allowed HALO to establish the footprint (extent),” 6 May 2016, 8:19am. Tweet.

[5] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO starts emergency clearance of #clustermunition(s) in Nerkin Horatagh village, Martakert, #Karabakh,” 12 April 2016, 6:19am.Tweet.

[6] Roberto Travan, “Nagorno-Karabakh, A 25-Year Border War Reignites With Religion,” La Stampa, republished in English by World Crunch, 11 June 2016.

[7] Murad Gazdiev (@MuradoRT), “@MarkHiznay South-East of Hardut. Right where NKR, Azerbaijan and Iran borders cross. Exact coordinates in pic,” 5 April 2016, 1:37am. Tweet; and Alexandru Cociorvel (@AlexandruC4), “Azerbaijani "cluster bomb" that fell on NKR last night. Patches of burned ground all around  http://caucasus.liveuamap.com/en/2016/5-april-azerbaijani-cluster-bomb-that-fell-on-nkr-last-night …,” 5 April 2016, 11:22am. Tweet.

[8]Traces of war in Karabakh,” Sputnik, 4 April 2016.

[11] “Armenian MOD provides factual proof of prohibited cluster missile use by Azerbaijani army,” ArmenPress, 6 April 2016.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 28 November 2013

Policy

Nagorno-Karabakh is not recognized by any UN member state. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province voted in 1988 to secede from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and join the Armenian SSR, which resulted in armed conflict from 1988 to 1994. The region declared independence as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in 1991.

Authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Nagorno-Karabakh’s political and military leaders have stated their support for an eventual ban on antipersonnel mines but have indicated that, even if eligible to do so, Nagorno-Karabakh would not join the Mine Ban Treaty until the conflict with Azerbaijan is resolved and all states in the region support a ban on antipersonnel mines.[1]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Nagorno-Karabakh has stated that it has never produced or exported mines, and has not purchased new mines since 1995. Its antipersonnel mine stockpile consists of mines left over from the Soviet Union (OZM-72, PMN-2, and POMZ-2 mines).

In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief, General Movses Hakobian, was reported by the media to state that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.”[2] General Hakobian said the use was aimed at preventing sabotage attacks by Azerbaijani troops.

In a 4 September 2013 response to a letter by the ICBL to authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh seeking clarification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh did not deny the allegations and confirmed that “due to the ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan…today we are not in a position to refrain from using AP [antipersonnel] mines for defensive purposes along the line of contact.” He also wrote, “these mines are neither aimed at the civilian population nor at the extermination of the adversary but for limiting its advances and ceasing any possible military aggression against us.”[3]

 



[1] Meetings between Naira Melkoumian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Masis Mailian, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Nagorno-Karabakh Committee of the ICBL, Stepanakert, 1–2 February 2002; and interview with Irina Beglaryan, Head of Political Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Stepanakert, 3 February 2006.

[2]  Lusine Musayelian, “Karabakh Enhances Defense Capabilities,” Asbarez (Stepanakert), 26 July 2013, asbarez.com/112014/karabakh-enhances-defense-capabilities/.

[3] “ICBL gravely concerned about use of antipersonnel mines by Nagorno-Karabakh,” ICBL (Geneva), 20 September 2013, www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Library/News/Nagorno-Karabakh.


Mine Action

Last updated: 25 November 2016

Contaminated by: landmines (extent unknown), cluster munition contamination (medium contamination), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Nagorno-Karabakh cannot accede to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions due to its political status

The size of confirmed mined areas in Nagorno-Karabakh increased to 5.14km2 in 2015, as previous data did not include areas outside the Soviet-era boundaries. The exact extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants is not known, but it is significant and widespread. As of the end of 2015, cluster munition contamination (both surface and subsurface) across the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh was estimated to be 67km2

HALO Trust is the only mine action operator. In 2015, almost 0.21km2 of mined area was cleared, 4km2 of cluster munition contaminated land was released by clearance and technical survey, and 3.5km2 was confirmed as cluster munition-contaminated.

Recommendations for action

  • The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should formally commit to respect and implement the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions and clear all antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants.
  • The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should provide funding for survey and clearance of antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants. 

Contamination

In 1988, a decision by the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia resulted in armed conflict in 1988–1994 between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991 but this has not been internationally recognized. All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by mines and unexploded submunitions as a result of the 1988–1994 conflict, and new mine contamination was added in 2013.

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination is said to “severely” impact upon rural communities, limiting the incomes of thousands of families.[1] There were six casualties in 2015, one accident caused by a cluster munition remnant, and five casualties resulting from mines and other UXO. (See the Casualties and Victim Assistance profile for further details.) 

Mine contamination

Mines were laid by both the Azeri and pro-Karabakh forces during the war, with a relatively high proportion of antivehicle mines being used in some regions, as well as antipersonnel mines throughout.[2] The mines were of Soviet design and manufacture, and due to the nature of the conflict certain areas were mined several times.[3]

New contamination was added in 2013. In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief, General Movses Hakobian, reportedly stated that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.”[4] (See the Mine Ban profile for further details.)

As at the end of 2015, antipersonnel mine contamination throughout the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh, including both within the Soviet-era boundaries and in the adjacent territories, was estimated to cover 5.14km2 across 82 mined areas (see table below).[5]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province as at end 2015

Region

Total CHAs containing mines

CHAs with AP mines

CHAs with AP and AV mines

Area (km2)

Askeran

6

4

2

 0.22

Hadrut

24

17

7

3.04

Lachin

26

21

5

 0.80

Martakert

17

14

3

0.66

Martuni

6

3

3

 0.32

Shaumyan

2

2

0

 0.09

Shushi

1

1

0

0.01

Total

82

62

20

5.14

Note: CHAs = confirmed hazardous areas; AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

Previously, in September 2013, mined area was estimated at 1.6km2, of which 0.88km2 across 34 areas contained antipersonnel mines and 0.73km2 across 15 areas contained antivehicle mines.[6] However, this only included contamination within the Soviet-era boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh, and not mined areas in adjacent territories.

To date, HALO Trust has cleared 95% of all known minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh.[7] While progress has been made, around 70% of remaining contamination—consisting mainly of antivehicle mines—is in areas occupied by the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Forces outside Soviet-era boundaries.[8] HALO Trust has operated there throughout its presence in Nagorno-Karabakh, but in recent years HALO’s activities have reduced due to difficulties in attracting funds to operate in these areas. In addition, mined areas remain along the line of contact, but are inaccessible for clearance as this remains a conflict zone.[9]

Mines impede use of land, roads, and other areas, and affect the rural population in particular, whose main income is from herding animals and farming.[10]

Cluster munition contamination 

The exact extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Nagorno-Karabakh is not known, but it is significant and widespread.[11] As at the end of 2015, cluster munition contamination (both surface and subsurface) across the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh was estimated to be 67km2 across 202 CHAs, in six of a total of eight districts (see the table below). As of the end of 2014, total cluster munition contamination was said to be 42.7km2, but only surface (i.e. not sub-surface) contamination was reported that year.[12]

Cluster munition contamination by district as of the end of 2015[13]

District

CHAs

Area (km2)

Askeran

51

19.1

Hadrut

24

8.6

Lachin

17

8.5

Martakert

45

11.7

Martuni

57

15.1

Shushi

8

4.0

Total

202

67.0

 

In addition, a further 2km2 of new cluster munition contamination was estimated to have resulted from use of cluster munitions in the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April 2016.[14]

Large quantities of cluster munitions were dropped from the air during the 1988 to 1994 conflict. On 1 April 2016, intense fighting broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh along the front line between Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces and the armed forces of Azerbaijan. While ground fighting was confined to areas close to the Line of Contact, artillery fire penetrated more than 10km into Nagorno-Karabakh, and included the use of cluster munitions. A ceasefire was agreed on 5 April 2016[15] (see Nagorno-Karabakh’s 2016 Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile).

Nagorno-Karabakh has cluster munition remnants in most regions, but particularly Askeran, Martakert, and Martuni, where more than three-quarters of remaining contamination is located. The presence of submunitions does not, in most instances, deny access to land, and many cluster munition-contaminated areas have been cultivated continuously for 20 years or more. Most accidents in Nagorno-Karabakh are due to mines, since 2010, of the 25 mine/UXO accidents, only two were reportedly due to cluster munition remnants.[16] 

Program Management 

A mine action coordination committee is responsible for liaising between the de facto government and HALO Trust.[17] Regular coordination committee meetings are held between the de facto authorities, HALO, and the ICRC.[18] 

In 2000, HALO established the Nagorno-Karabakh Mine Action Center (NKMAC), which consolidates all mine action-related information and responds to requests from the de facto government ministries, other NGOs, and local communities.[19] The NKMAC maintains maps and a database that cover: all suspect areas surveyed; all areas cleared of mines and UXO; locations of all mine- and UXO-related incidents; and a full record of all risk education given.[20]

Standards and quality management

No national standards exist in Nagorno-Karabakh, and HALO follows its own standard operating procedures (SOPs). Similarly, HALO uses its own quality management systems, with quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) applied by four levels of management.[21] 

Operators

Since 2000, HALO has been the sole organization conducting land release in Nagorno-Karabakh. HALO’s Nagorno-Karabakh operations cover both cluster munition clearance and mine clearance, and HALO does not field separate teams dedicated solely to mine clearance or cluster munition clearance. Operational staff are trained and experienced in working in both capacities.[22] After the April 2016 conflict, HALO’s survey teams collaborated with the de facto authority’s Service of Emergency Situations to survey new contamination rapidly, and destroy submunitions close to populated areas.[23]

In 2015, HALO employed an average of 120 local staff, and its overall operational capacity for mine and cluster munition operations comprised 11 manual clearance teams, two mechanical teams, and two explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/survey teams.[24] 

Land Release (Mines)

Almost 0.21km2 of mined area was cleared in 2015,[25] compared with 0.54km2 in 2014.[26]

Survey in 2015 (mines) 

No antipersonnel mined areas were surveyed in 2015, but four new antivehicle minefields were surveyed.[27]

Clearance in 2015 (mines)

In 2015, a total of 18 mined areas covering 209,221m2 were released by clearance. Operations destroyed 65 antipersonnel mines, two antivehicle mines, and 32 items of UXO.[28]

HALO Trust was also called out to 199 EOD tasks in 2015, during which a further 46 antipersonnel mines and 19 antivehicle mines were destroyed, along with 179 submunitions and 907 other items of UXO.[29]

Where possible, clearance is conducted on CHAs, but areas remain that still require technical investigation, in addition to area where technical survey did not produce evidence of mines, but where mine-laying remains strongly suspected.[30]

The ratio of mines found to area cleared is now relatively low, due to the absence of reliable mapping by former combatants; the sporadic nature of antivehicle mine laying in low areas and on former road networks; and the fact that most heavily mined areas have been cleared.[31]

Progress in 2016 (mines) 

As of October 2016, HALO was trialing the use of special detection dogs, provided by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), for reduction of SHAs and CHAs in Nagorno-Karabakh.[32]

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

A total of 2.9km2 of area contaminated with cluster munition remnants was released by clearance in 2015,[33] compared with 13km2 in 2014.[34] During battle area clearance (BAC) and EOD operations, 284 submunitions were destroyed. In addition, almost 3.5km2 of land was reduced during clearance operations in 2015 as a result of overly large polygons having been drawn.[35] Just over 1.14km2 was reduced by technical survey. 

Survey in 2015 (cluster munition remnants)

Just over 1.14km2 was reduced by technical survey in 2015. Furthermore, HALO confirmed seven suspected areas totaling 3.5km2 as cluster munition contaminated. No area suspected to contain cluster munition remnants was canceled by non-technical survey.[36] 

In order to determine whether a strike requires further clearance, HALO Trust initially surveys a 500,000m2 area around evidence of submunitions. Clearance is started from the center of the area and extended outwards. If no further evidence of cluster munition remnants is found, the remaining area is reduced.[37]

Clearance in 2015 (cluster munition remnants) 

Just over 2.9km2 of land across nine areas in the Askeran, Hadrut, Martakert, Martuni, and Shushi regions, was released by clearance by HALO in 2015. During manual BAC, 105 submunitions were destroyed, along with eight other items of UXO.[38] The decrease from 13km2 of cluster munition-contaminated land cleared in 2014 was partly the result of reduced operational capacity, following the 25% reduction in United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding in 2015.

Furthermore, HALO was called out to 199 EOD tasks in 2015, during which 179 submunitions were destroyed along with 907 other items of UXO and stray ammunition, 46 antipersonnel mines, and 19 antivehicle mines, in addition to the UXO destroyed during planned clearance operations as detailed above.[39] 

HALO’s cluster munition clearance operations continue to remain a “secondary” activity, as per the donors’ request to prioritize mine clearance.[40] Since most reported accidents in Nagorno-Karabakh are the result of mines/UXO, and not cluster munition remnants, HALO believes this prioritization is justified.[41] Most submunition clearance is conducted on days when minefields cannot be accessed safely due to the adverse weather during the winter months.[42] 

Land released from cluster munition remnants in 2015 assisted 192 direct beneficiaries, and 6,315 indirect beneficiaries. The released land will mainly be used for agriculture, grazing, and woodcutting.[43] 

Progress in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

HALO’s main priority in 2016 was surface and sub-surface clearance of 2km2 of new cluster munition contamination resulting from the April 2016 conflict.[44] Emergency clearance was ongoing as of May 2016 in the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh, close to the town of Martakert in northeast Nagorno-Karabakh.[45] These areas were struck with LAR-160 rockets, containing M-095 submunitions. The emergency clearance operations are funded by USAID, using clearance capacity diverted from HALO’s original workplan.[46] In May 2016, HALO reported that it expected that clearance of the new contamination would be completed within six months.[47] 

In addition, in 2016, USAID-funded teams were also continuing surface clearance of eight legacy cluster munitions strikes, resulting from the conflict in the 1990s.[48] As stated previously, this activity is secondary to mine clearance operations.

Progress in mine and cluster munition clearance

Progress in mine and cluster munition clearance has fluctuated over the last five years, as shown in the tables below.

Mine clearance in 2011–2015[49]

Year

Area cleared (km2)*

2015

0.21

2014

0.54

2013

0.31

2012

1.00

2011

5.31

Total

7.37

Note: * Includes antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.

Five-year summary of cluster munition clearance[50]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2015

2.91

2014

13.01

2013

4.65

2012

7.6

2011

8.5

Total

36.67

 

Despite the clear humanitarian need to clear mines and ERW, Nagorno-Karabakh’s unrecognized status prevents many governments from funding humanitarian activities in the territory and HALO receives no funding from Armenia or the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities.[51]

In 2008–2010, HALO cleared an average of between 5km2 and 6km2 of mined area annually and averaged more than 30km2 of BAC. In 2011, however, the United Kingdom interrupted its funding and HALO lost 37% of its capacity; consequently, clearance rates declined.[52]

In 2014, HALO Trust reported that full clearance of minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh could be achieved within three years if sufficient funding were available.[53] While 95% of mine contamination in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh has been addressed, reduced capacity means that full mine clearance of that area may take longer than expected.[54]

USAID has instructed that its funding be used for clearance within the Soviet-era boundary of Nagorno-Karabakh oblast, and that HALO focus on mine clearance.[55] However, significant contamination remains in adjacent territories. As bilateral funding is often restricted to the traditional border of the Soviet oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, funding of clearance of surrounding territories is left to private foundations.[56] (See the Support to Mine Action profile for further details.)


 

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] HALO, “Nagorno-Karabakh,” undated.

[2] USAID, “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. 2.

[3] HALO Trust, “Nagorno-Karabakh: The Problem,” undated.

[4] L. Musayelian, “Karabakh Enhances Defense Capabilities,” Asbarez (Stepanakert), 26 July 2013.

[5] Email from Andrew Moore, Balkans and Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

[6] USAID, “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. 13.

[7] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.

[8] Ibid., 19 March 2014.

[9] Ibid., 1 October 2016.

[10] USAID, “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. 3.

[11] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 29 May 2015.

[13] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.

[14] HALO Trust, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.

[17] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.

[18] Ibid., 26 May 2016.

[19] Ibid., 28 June 2013.

[20] United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. vii.

[21] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.

[22] Ibid., 22 May 2015.

[23] Ibid., 26 May 2016.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., 1 October 2016.

[26] Ibid., 22 May 2015.

[27] Ibid., 1 October 2016.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., 7 June 2016.

[30] Ibid., 1 October 2016.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.; and email from Darvin Lisica, NPA Regional Programme Manager, 2 October 2016.

[33] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

[34] Ibid., 23 June 2015.

[35] Ibid., 26 May 2016.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid., and 7 June 2016.

[39] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 7 June 2016.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.; and HALO Trust, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016.

[46] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.

[47] Ibid.

[48] Ibid.

[49] See Landmine Monitor and Mine Action reports on Nagorno-Karabakh covering 2011–2014.

[50] See Cluster Munition Monitor reports on Nagorno-Karabakh covering the period 2011–2014.

[51] HALO Trust, “Where we work - Nagorno-Karabakh,” undated; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

[52] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.

[53] Ibid., 19 March 2014, and 11 June 2015.

[54] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.

[55] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015, and 11 June 2015.

[56] Ibid., 1 October 2016.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 07 October 2013

In 2012, the Armenia office of the United States Aid for International Development (USAID) provided US$940,000 to HALO Trust for mine clearance in Nagorno-Karabakh.[1]

Despite HALO’s report that there were 143 confirmed mined areas covering 7km2 and 241 cluster strike locations covering 88km2 remaining to be cleared as of 31 December 2012, funding has declined 65% since 2008 and 38% from 2011.[2]

Summary of contributions: 2008–2012[3]

Year

Donor

Amount ($)

2012

United States (US)

940,000

2011

US, private

1,523,000

2010

US, United Kingdom (UK), private

2,036,694

2009

US, UK, Netherlands, private

2,169,944

2008

US, UK, Netherlands, private

2,697,526

Total

 

9,367,164

 

 



[1] Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 31 August 2012.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO, 15 April 2013.


Casualties and Victim Assistance

Last updated: 23 July 2015

Casualties

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2014

At least 351 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (76 killed; 275injured)

Casualties in 2014

9 (2013: 3)

2014 casualties by outcome

2 killed; 7 injured (2013: 3 injured)

2014 casualties by device type

7 antivehicle mine; 2 antipersonnel mine

 

HALO Trust reported nine landmine casualties in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2014. All casualties were adults, one was a woman. Another two landmine detonations were reported when vehicles carrying out roadworks were struck, but in each case the occupants were not injured although the machines were damaged.[1] The casualty total for 2014 represented an increase from the three casualties HALO reported in Nagorno-Karabakh for 2013.[2] HALO reported five casualties in Nagorno-Karabakh for 2012.[3] In 2014, all mine incidents that occurred in Nagorno-Karabakh happened in areas outside the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Soviet period.[4]

HALO has reported 351 mine/ERW casualties (of which 76 people were killed) in Nagorno-Karabakh between 1995 and the end of 2014. Over a quarter of the total recorded casualties (90) were children, mostly boys. Most casualties were civilians; 37 were military and another nine were deminers. After 2002, antivehicle mines caused the majority of annual mine/ERW incidents.[5] HALO has noted that Nagorno-Karabakh region has an estimated population of less than 150,000, and therefore, that the annual casualty figure is likely to be one of the highest in the world rate per capita.

Cluster munition casualties

Unexploded submunitions caused at least 16 casualties between 1995 and 2014.[6] No new submunition casualties were reported for 2014, however a submunition casualty was reported in 2013.

Victim Assistance

In Nagorno-Karabakh, at least 268 people have been injured by mines and ERW, including cluster munition remnants, in addition to an unknown number of war veterans injured by mines during the conflict.[7] There is no specific victim assistance coordination body, plan, or focal point. Mine/ERW survivors received the same services as other persons with disabilities.[8] The Ministry of Social Welfare is responsible for coordinating and providing prosthetic, psychosocial, and employment services for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.[9]

In 2014, the ICRC collected data on the needs of mine/ERW survivors and family members and encouraged the Nagorno-Karabakh Ministry of Social Welfare to input the data into the Information Managment System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. In parallel with these activities, the ICRC provided support for economic inclusion of mine/ERW survivors.[10]



[1] Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus & Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 13 March 2015.

[2] Ibid., 8 July 2014.

[3] Ibid., 25 June 2013.

[4] Clearance is largely restricted to areas within the boundary of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Soviet period due to donor funding constraints and the casualties occurring in areas that HALO did not have resources to clear.

[5] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO, 8 July 2014, 25 June 2013, 6 April 2011, and 25 February 2010; from Nick Smart, HALO, 10 April 2012; from Matthew Hovell, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO, 8 July 2009; and from Valon Kumnova, Program Manager, HALO, 6 April 2007. In 2014, it was also reported that since the signing of the ceasefire, 365 civilians, including 91 children, had been casualties of mines/ERW. Caucasian Knot, “HALO Trust: at least 13 people fell victim to mine explosions in NKR in 2014,” 7 January 2015; and Landmine Free Artsakh, “Victims, 2014 Accidents.”

[6] Emails from Nick Smart, HALO, 10 April 2012; from Andrew Moore, HALO, 25 February 2010, and 6 April 2011; from Matthew Hovell, HALO, 8 July 2009; and from Valon Kumnova, HALO, 6 April 2007.

[7] Based on data provided in emails from HALO (see footnote 3); and email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 25 June 2013.

[8] ICBL-CMC, “Area Profile: Nagorno-Karabakh,” 21 July 2010.

[9] Government of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, “Statute of the Ministry of Social Welfare,” undated.

[10] Email from Herbi Elmazi, ICRC, 25 July 2014.