Contaminated by: landmines (extent of contamination unknown), cluster munitions (extent of contamination unknown), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) (heavy, but extent unknown). 

Article 5 Deadline: 1 October 2022
(Unclear whether on track to meet deadline) 

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline: 1 March 2026
(Too soon to assess likelihood of compliance) 

(See separate mine action profile for Somaliland). 

New survey activities commenced along the Somali-Ethiopia border. However, further efforts are still needed to establish a baseline of remaining antipersonnel mine contamination. No land release of mined or cluster munition-contaminated areas was conducted in 2015. Approximately 42.4km² of land contaminated by other UXO was released through battle area clearance (BAC). 

Recommendations for action

• Greater priority should be accorded to survey, demining, and cluster munition clearance by the Somali Republic.
• The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database should be transferred to full national ownership under the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) and efforts made to ensure transparency and accessibility of all mine action data for operators and other relevant stakeholders. Information management and coordination of mine action activities could also be improved through more effective dissemination of information electronically.
• Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
• Somalia should develop a resource-mobilization strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.

Mines and ERW Contamination (except cluster munition remnants, see below)

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–1978 (also known as the Ogaden war), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia’s three major regions: southcentral Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; the Federal State of Puntland, a semi-autonomous administration in the northeast; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognized, state that operates autonomously in the northwest. (See separate mine action profile for Somaliland.)

Southcentral Somalia: No comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination.[1] However, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in 10 was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.[2] Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.[3] Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mine contamination and 74 of 191 communities surveyed as impacted by mines and ERW, of which 13 reported an antipersonnel mine threat.[4] 

Puntland State Administration: Mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) implemented in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug in 2005.[5] The LIS identified 35 affected communities in 47 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). It estimated that about 151,000 people—around 6% of the population of some 2.5 million—live in mine-affected communities.[6] Very little mine clearance has been conducted since the LIS was completed. According to Mines Advisory Group (MAG), the impact from mines is still unclear and further non-technical and technical survey is required to ensure the cost effectiveness and positive impact of future clearance.[7]

Insecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by non-state armed groups have a serious humanitarian impact in Somalia. The extent of the threat is not well known, except in Puntland, where a range of surveys have been carried out over the past decade.[8]

In 2015, the vast majority of deaths and injuries from explosive hazards in southcentral Somalia were caused by IEDs[9] (for further details, see the Casualties and victim assistance profile). 

The humanitarian imperative to address ERW contamination in Somalia is heightened significantly by the movement of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to ongoing conflict in the country. In March 2015, it was estimated that 1.1 million Somalis, or one tenth of the population, were IDPs.[10] Contamination from mines and ERW in southcentral Somalia remains a particular threat.[11]

Cluster Munition Contamination

The extent of cluster munition contamination in Somalia is unknown, although cluster munition remnants have been found in southcentral Somalia and Puntland. In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several AO-1SCh submunitions were found within a 30km radius of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border, in the southern Gedo region of southcentral Somalia. Cluster munition remnants were also identified around the town of Galdogob (also spelled Goldogob) in the Mudug province of Puntland. More contamination was expected to be found in southcentral Somalia’s Lower and Upper Juba regions. In June 2016, SEMA reported that two areas of an unknown size were suspected to contain cluster munition remnants in the Bakool region of southwest Somalia.

According to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the Ethiopian National Defense Forces used cluster munitions in clashes with Somali armed forces along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–1978 Ogaden War. The Soviet Union supplied both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict. PTAB-2.5 and AO-1Sch submunitions were produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale.

While the extent of cluster munition contamination along the Somali border with Ethiopia is not known, in 2014, Somalia claimed it posed an ongoing threat to the lives of nomadic people and their animals. 

Program Management

According to SEMA as of October 2016, mine action management in Somalia is “temporarily” divided into two geographical regions: Somalia (including Puntland) and Somaliland.[12] (See the separate mine action profile on Somaliland for further details.) SEMA is responsible for mine action in southcentral Somalia and Puntland.

SEMA reported that it maintains a presence across Somalia through its recently formed Federal State Members, the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hiraan/Middle Shabelle State Office, SEMA South-West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office.[13] 

SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.[14] UNMAS reported that “significant steps” were made in late 2015 towards “the full transfer of responsibilities to a national authority” with Somalia’s Council of Ministers endorsing of SEMA’s legislative framework, policy, and budget, making it responsible for managing and coordinating all explosive hazards in Somalia.[15] 

SEMA developed a national mine action policy in 2015, aiming to develop state-level coordination mechanisms to support SEMA’s work and to create employment in local communities.[16] In June 2016, SEMA reported that its legislative framework, which had been endorsed by the Council of Ministers, was awaiting the approval of the Federal Parliament.[17] Due to the lack of parliamentary approval, however, SEMA did not receive funding from the government in 2016, nor did it receive any financial assistance from UNMAS since December 2015.[18]

In October 2016, SEMA reported that at the institutional level, SEMA had established consortiums in five of Somalia’s Federal Member states, which it said will work in partnership with NGOs operating in their areas of influence.[19] 

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, PMAC coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and MAG.[20] It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland State Administration, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance. In June 2015, it requested assistance to increase its capacity and deploy three EOD teams in Bosasso, Galkayo, and Garowe.[21]

In 2015, UNMAS continued to support, train, and equip national police in EOD in Somalia and Somaliland.[22] In 2016, UNMAS reported it was developing a four-year plan for comprehensive police EOD support.[23] 

Strategic planning 

Mine action in Somalia since 2013 has been increasingly tied to implementation of the Somali Compact, and its priorities for government stabilization and development, infrastructure initiatives, and humanitarian assistance.[24] Focus is placed on national ownership of mine action and training of national police EOD capacity, as a source of employment for local people and former fighters, and to contribute to stabilization.[25]

In 2015, the Federal Government of Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and SEMA developed the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management,” in coordination with Federal State members, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and UNMAS. The plan’s overarching objective over the next “two to three years” is to support the Federal Government in fulfilling its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, with a focus on national ownership through the institutional development of SEMA federal state entities, the training of national police EOD teams, and the creation of employment opportunities for local Somalis, including at-risk groups such as youths and former combatants, to undertake clearance operations in their own communities.[26] According to SEMA, the Badbaado Plan’s objectives for mine and ERW clearance in southcentral Somalia include areas “reported with cluster munition presence.”[27] A separate plan was developed for explosive hazard management by the police.[28] 

UNMAS’s Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework for Somalia for 2015–2019 (including Somaliland and Puntland), was also approved by SEMA and the Federal Government of Somalia in 2015.[29] The Framework specifically includes addressing the threat from cluster munition remnants through survey and clearance in its strategic objectives, alongside capacity building for SEMA.[30]

Standards 

UNMAS has developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia that were used by implementers in 2015.[31] The NTSGs do not include specific guidance for cluster munition survey or clearance and SEMA stated in June 2016 that it did not have the capacity to revise the existing NTSG to include provisions specific to cluster munition remnants.[32]

Operators  

In 2015, four international NGOs were operational in Somalia: DDG, HALO Trust, MAG, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), as well as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), UNMAS, and the Ukrainian commercial operator Ukroboronservice.

In 2015, DDG did not conduct any mine or BAC operations, focusing instead on EOD and risk education.[33]

In the first half of 2015, HALO opened a new program in southcentral Somalia and began surveying along the Somali border with Ethiopia. The program employed 34 operations staff, primarily survey teams, and 44 support staff.[34]

In 2015, MAG continued its arms management and destruction (AMD) program across Somalia. It also carried out risk education in Puntland.[35] 

In 2014, NPA initiated a program in southcentral Somalia for survey, BAC, and capacity-building assistance to SEMA.[36] In 2015, NPA was operating in Mogadishu and its outskirts, within Banadir. It deployed three eight-strong multi-task teams (MTT).[37]

In 2015, AMISOM deployed 11 EOD teams. UNMAS deployed four MTTs in support of AMISOM to conduct survey, clearance, and risk education on three main supply routes connecting out of Mogadishu, along with nine community liaison officers to support AMISOM projects in nine regions in Somalia. Ten government police EOD teams were also deployed in Somalia.[38]

In 2015, UNMAS continued to contract the Ukroboronservice to undertake mine action-related tasks in southcentral Somalia. It deployed four survey teams in 2015 and in the first half of 2016.[39]

Quality management 

SEMA reported that it lacked the capacity to carry out external quality assurance (QA) or quality control (QC) activities in 2015. It stated that UNMAS’s QA/QC capacity was limited to ERW clearance activities and did not extend to mine clearance. It underlined as a matter of concern, that as of June 2016, mine clearance activities had been initiated under the Badbaado Plan but without a capacity for external quality management control for ongoing activities.[40]

HALO stated that while extensive QA was conducted by senior national operations staff on its survey teams’ activities in southcentral Somalia, international managers were unable to visit the field to conduct QA due to security concerns.[41] 

Information management 

SEMA has reported a number of improvements in mine action information management in 2015, including in staff training, data entry QA, and standardization of reporting forms. An upgraded version of IMSMA was installed, providing the opportunity for a review of historical data in the database and integrity and consistency checks. SEMA, though, has reported that it had not received training to use the IMSMA software.[42] As of October 2016, full responsibility for the management of the database had yet to be transferred from UNMAS to SEMA.[43]

NGO operators have noted that uncertainty as to who “owns” the IMSMA database is a significant concern. Despite plans to transfer data to SEMA for more than two years, SEMA and mine action operators still had only limited access to the database in 2015. Questions have also been raised in connection with the fact that, despite being a civilian asset, the IMSMA database was being used to record security-related data on IEDs; information that was deemed classified by AMISOM.[44]

Land Release (Mines)

Approximately 42.4km² was released through BAC in Somalia in 2015.

No areas containing mines were released in Somalia in 2015; however 6km² of area was confirmed as mined by survey. This compares to some 4.6km released by BAC in Somalia in 2014.[45]

No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2015; operations consisted only of risk education and EOD spot tasks.[46]

Survey in 2015 

No comprehensive overview of SHAs exists in Somalia, and as of 2016, no nationwide survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[47] 

Both HALO Trust and NPA initiated survey activities in southcentral Somalia in 2015.[48] As of 31 December 2015, HALO reported identifying 6,052,744m² of mine-contaminated areas in southern Somalia, including more than 75 minefields and one former battlefield, through non-technical survey.[49] It fielded nine non-technical survey teams along a 450km stretch of the Somali-Ethiopian border between Dhabad and Yeed in the second half of 2015 and the beginning of 2016.[50]

In the first half of 2015, NPA trained its MTTs to carry out survey activities in southcentral Somalia and began conducting systematic survey and clearance in the north of Banadir region, on the outskirts of Mogadishu, and along the Afgoye corridor.[51]

Clearance in 2015 

No antipersonnel mine clearance occurred in Somalia in 2015.

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

No survey or clearance of cluster munition remnants was conducted in 2015, and no cluster munition remnants were found.

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Somalia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022. 

In seeking to meet this deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not the least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland, which are managed by the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC) under the authority of the vice-president of Somaliland (see separate mine action profile for Somaliland).

In May 2016, HALO reported that it was not possible to accurately assess whether Somalia was on-track to meet its Article 5 deadline as insufficient non-technical survey had been carried out.[52] Likewise, NPA asserted it is too early to speculate on the likelihood of Somalia meeting its 2022 deadline, but noted that the Badbaado plan was an encouraging step forward, along with the increase in survey activities, which will provide greater clarity on the extent of the challenge remaining and the time required for completion of clearance.[53]

SEMA highlighted the need for international assistance, greater transparency on bilaterally funded projects, better coordination and information sharing between operators, SEMA, and its Federal State member offices, and ensuring sufficient capacity to conduct independent QA/QC activities as key areas of concern.[54]

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.