Five-Year Review: State Party the United Kingdom (UK) enacted implementation legislation for the convention before it ratified on 4 May 2010. It has participated in all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties and intersessional meetings. The UK promotes universalization of the convention and hosted an event toward this objective in London in March 2015. The UK has condemned the use of cluster munitions, including in Syria. It has elaborated its views on several important issues relating to the convention’s interpretation and implementation.
The UK produced, exported, imported, and used cluster munitions prior to joining the convention. In December 2013, the UK completed the destruction of a stockpile of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38.7 million submunitions. The UK initially retained cluster munitions for research and training purposes, but has not done so since 2013.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 4 May 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 November 2010.
The Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 serves as the UK’s implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, providing penal and financial sanctions for violations of its provisions. The UK has classified cluster munitions in the highest category of prohibited exports under its Export Control Order of 2008.
In March 2015, the UK government published a “Command Paper” prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that provides “post-legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010” to assess how the legislation has worked in practice. The Command Paper was presented to parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee as well as the Committees on Arms Export Controls. It concluded that there are “no outstanding legal issues” regarding the UK’s implementation of the Act.
The UK submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 28 April 2011 and has provided annual updated reports ever since, most recently on 29 April 2015.
The UK participated throughout the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Just before the conclusion of the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, the UK changed its position to support a ban on all cluster munitions, a decision that had significant impact in influencing support in other countries for the convention text.
The UK engages in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San José, Costa Rica in September 2014, where it confirmed the completion of the destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions in December 2013. The UK has also attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, most recently in June 2015.
Promotion of the convention
The UK promotes universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 2014 report on human rights and democracy states that in 2015, the UK “will continue to work diplomatically to pursue the goal of a world free of the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, by encouraging all states to refrain from the use of such weapons.”
In May 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office informed the Monitor that “the UK has raised the issue of accession to the Convention with a number of States not Party at various points throughout .” It reported that the Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister for Defence and International Security, Tobias Ellwood MP, hosted a reception in London on 25 March 2015 to encourage states to join the convention. According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a number of non-signatory states attended the reception, during which Ellwood encouraged their accession and “spoke about the UK’s decision to come down on the side of a prohibition, having weighed up the humanitarian and security factors.” The UK has responded to the new use of cluster munitions in 2014 and the first half of 2015.
On 10 February 2015, government spokesperson, Baroness Anelay of St Johns, expressed the UK’s concern at “recent reports of the use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine” and affirmed the need to “bring to book those responsible for human rights abuses.” In response to a parliamentary question later that month on the cluster munition rocket attacks in eastern Ukraine, Anelay noted the government of Ukraine’s denial that its armed forces used cluster munitions and affirmed that “cluster munitions should in no circumstances be used intentionally to target civilians.” Anelay called on the parties to the conflict in Ukraine to abide by international humanitarian law and called on Ukraine and Russia to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In April 2015, a Foreign and Commonwealth Office official also cited the Ukraine government’s denial of cluster munition use and repeated in a letter to CMC UK member Article 36 that “cluster munitions should in no circumstances be used to target civilians.”
The UK has vigorously and repeatedly condemned cluster munition use by the Syrian government since 2012. It has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 69/189 on 18 December 2014, which expressed “outrage” at the continued use. The UK has voted in favor of four Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently a UK-led resolution on 2 July 2015.
The UK also led a resolution adopted unanimously by the that UN Security Council on 29 June 2015, which expresses concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur and calls on the government of Sudan to “immediately investigate the use of cluster munitions.” On 27 May 2014, the UK voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” in Jonglei, South Sudan in February 2014 and urged “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”
On 15 March 2015, the UK’s representative to Libya, Ambassador Michael Aron, described evidence of new use of cluster bombs in Libya as “deeply disturbing.”
The UK has not commented on the use of cluster munitions in Yemen in April and May 2015 by the Saudi-led coalition.
At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014, the UK expressed “concern” at “several reports” of the use of cluster munitions and urged “those states involved to cease the use of the weapons.” Unlike the majority of states that made statements, the UK did not express concern at new use of cluster munitions in any specific country.
Despite these statements and actions, the CMC is concerned at a lack of consistency in the UK’s approach to how states that are part of the Convention on Cluster Munitions collectively respond to new use of cluster munitions. At a preparatory meeting for the convention’s First Review Conference in Geneva on 24 June 2015, the UK proposed watering down language condemning the use of cluster munitions in draft documents prepared for the First Review Conference.
The UK is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
The UK elaborated its views on the interpretation and implementation of a number of key provisions in the convention during the process of preparing its national legislation and in the period since with respect to the prohibitions on foreign stockpiling, transit, investment in cluster munition producers, and assistance with prohibited acts in joint military operations. A number of ministerial statements are on record clarifying the meaning of the UK’s national legislation on these issues and recognizing the positive obligations under the convention. Additionally,in late 2010, several parliamentary questions were raised in response to reports in the British media based on United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks.
In June 2008, immediately after the adoption of the convention, the UK stated it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year period allowed for stockpile destruction in the convention. In December 2009, the government stated that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of ” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.” In 2010, the UK announced that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”
The March 2015 Command Paper finds that the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act “allows for the extension of its provisions to any of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and any British overseas territory” but states that its application has only been extended to include the Isle of Man to date. Therefore the UK has not applied its national legislation to the full extent possible, maintaining the possibility of acts being permitted in certain British overseas territories that would be prohibited on the mainland UK. This could represent a loophole by which foreign stocks of cluster munitions could return to the UK’s overseas territories in the future.
In March 2010, UK parliamentarians asked if “transit” of cluster munitions through UK territory is prohibited under the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010. The government stated that transit “would not in itself be prohibited, but a direct application would have to be made to the Secretary of State who would have to grant permission before it could happen. We would be reluctant to grant such permission.”
In December 2010, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence said that under Section 8 of the UK’s legislation, the Foreign Secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.” In 2011, a Minister of State clarified that this provision had been used only once, and that was to grant the US a temporary extension to keep cluster munitions on UK territory as it underwent the process of removing all remaining stockpiles.
A US Department of State cable dated 21 May 2009 and made public by Wikileaks in 2010 stated that the head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Security Policy Group had “reconfirmed” to US officials that “off-shore storage” of cluster munitions “on US ships would still be permitted” until 2013, and by temporary exception. In response to a parliamentary question on the cable, the previous Labour government minister responsible for the legislation said that “it was our complete intention that there would be no American cluster munitions on British territories anywhere in the world.”
According to the Command Paper, the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act has been extended to the overseas territory of the Isle of Man but not other overseas territories. Therefore it is technically possible that authorization by the Foreign Secretary would not be necessary for the transit or transfer of cluster munitions by visiting forces through other UK overseas territories, such as Diego Garcia.
The convention’s Article 21 provisions on interoperability, the issue of joint military operations with states not party that use cluster munitions, are addressed in Clause 9 of the UK’s national legislation. In 2011, the UK stated that its interpretation of Article 21 is that “notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 [prohibition on assistance], Article 21(3) allows States Parties to participate in military operations and cooperation with non-States Parties who may use cluster munitions. UK law and operational practice reflect this.”
During the development of the UK’s implementation legislation, parliamentarians expressed concern that this clause would provide a loophole that would undermine the purpose of the convention and of the UK’s legislation, which is the elimination of cluster munitions. When pushed by members of parliament to clarify just exactly what activities this clause would permit UK troops engaged in joint military operations to do, the government responded that UK troops “would not be allowed to request use of [cluster] munitions where the choice of munitions was within their exclusive control” but that “they could facilitate operations where [cluster munitions] might be used by a partner.”
Parliamentarians argued that there would likely be situations that, while not illegal under the bill, would clearly be against the spirit and intention of the legislation and pressed the government on the need to develop proper guidelines and briefings for the UK military. The government responded that “States Parties have to make sure that any other state with which they are working understands the basis on which their personnel will be engaged,” and added, “We have to make sure there is clear guidance for personnel, so they know exactly what they can and cannot do. That is already in hand.” A significant result of the parliamentary debates on interoperability and Clause 9 was the recognition by the government of the need to promote universal adherence to the convention.
While there has been no evidence to indicate that the US is using cluster munitions in the “Operation Inherent Resolve” military action against forces of Islamic State (IS) (or Islamic State of Iraq the Levant, ISIL) that began last year in Syria and Iraq, the CMC has warned the US against using cluster munitions. The Monitor requested information from the UK on how it is engaging in the Iraq portion of the joint operation with the US and other states that have not banned cluster munitions. In May 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office responded:
The prohibition on the UK’s use of cluster munitions is reflected in our operational targeting policy documents which outline how UK armed forces will operate, including with coalition partners. Restrictions on the use of weapons and national caveats imposed during coalition operations are a normal part of coalition operations. These directives include the national, operationally-specific, rules of engagement profiles and national caveats which will ensure that any action is within the parameters of UK law. Furthermore, a Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive is issued to all UK personnel embedded with coalition forces explaining the UK legal position and how this affects their individual responsibilities in all matters including targeting.
During the 2011 NATO military operation in Libya, Foreign Secretary William Hague informed the UK parliament that “we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies do not use cluster munitions.” NATO confirmed that its forces did not use cluster munitions during the Libya operation in its formal response to a UN Commission of Inquiry.
Advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs
The 2010 Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act makes it an offense for a person to “make arrangements under which another person acquires a prohibited munition,” “to make arrangements under which another person transfers a prohibited munition,” or to “assist, encourage or induce” any other person to engage in prohibited acts.
Concerns have been raised in the past about the promotion of cluster munitions by exhibitors at the annual Defence Systems and Equipment International Exhibitions (DSEi) in London. In 2009 and 2011, the Pakistan Ordnance Factory stand and Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organization pavilion at the DSEi in London displayed promotional materials advertising their cluster munitions. Exhibitor information regarding “compliance” for the exhibition in September 2013 emphasized that it is prohibited to exhibit “non-unitary munitions” except those excluded from prohibition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. No advertisement of cluster munitions was reported at the 2013 exhibition.
The 2015 Command Paper does not include any reference to the advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs in 2009 and 2011.
While direct investment in cluster munitions is considered prohibited by Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act under the prohibition on assistance, the issue of indirect investments is not addressed. In 2011, the UK government recognized the need for further work to address “the problem of remote financing” and said that it had set up a working group to look into the matter. The working group is not believed to have met as of July 2015.
In 2011, Under Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Alistair Burt stated that “indirect financing, including investments in companies that may produce cluster munitions alongside a range of other items and services, is an issue for individual institutions to consider under their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.” There have been no parliamentary statements since that would suggest further action by the government to address investment in cluster munition manufacturers.
The 2015 Command Paper specifically highlights that the 2010 implementing legislation “did not prohibit indirect financing of cluster munitions production.”
In March 2015, an opposition member asked the government a series of parliamentary questions about investment in cluster munition producers, including the adequacy of existing legislation, the possibility of enacting specific legislation to ban such investment, the ability of pension schemes to invest indirectly in cluster munition manufacture, and whether guidance could be issued to help pension schemes avoid such investment. The government responded that there were no plans to review this specific area of pensions investments.
Financial institutions have responded to public pressure and campaigning actions by NGOs calling for disinvestment from cluster munition manufacturers. A 2014 report on worldwide investment in cluster munitions published by CMC member PAX, identified US$1.4 billion invested by UK financial institutions in companies that manufacture cluster munitions between June 2011 and September 2014. It listed seven UK financial institutions as implicated in investing in companies that produce cluster munitions.
As a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK has foresworn any use of cluster munitions, but in the past the UK used cluster munitions extensively, including in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas in 1982, in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) in 1999, and in Iraq in 2003.
Production and transfer
The UK produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions in the past and has declared that it now has no facilities to produce cluster munitions.
The UK produced several variants of the BL-755 bomb with 147 submunitions and also produced the L20A1 artillery projectile with 49 M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions under license from Israel Military Industries.
BL-755 cluster bombs were exported to, or were otherwise finally possessed by, the following countries: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The UK also imported cluster munitions from the US: M483 155mm artillery projectiles, M26 rockets for the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition (MPSM) rocket warheads used with CRV-7 air-to-surface launchers, and CBU-87 cluster bombs.
Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 reported in detail on the ambiguous status of the “Starstreak” high-velocity missile, produced by Thales Air Defence Limited, with respect to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act.
The UK once stockpiled a total of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38,758,898 submunitions, as listed in the following table.
Cluster munitions formerly stockpiled by the UK
Quantity of cluster munitions
Quantity of submunitions
BL755 bomb, each containing 147 No2 Mk1 submunitions
IBL755 bomb, each containing 147 No2 Mk1 submunitions
RBL755 bomb, each containing 147 No2 Mk1 submunitions
M261 rocket, each containing 9 M73 submunitions
M483 projectile, each containing 88 M42/M46 submunitions
M26 rocket, each containing 644 M77 submunitions
L20A1 projectile, each containing 49 M85 submunitions
Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK was required to declare and destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 November 2018.
On 17 December 2013, the UK completed the destruction of the stockpile, five years in advance of the treaty-mandated deadline. The UK announced the completion at the convention’s intersessional meetings in April 2014 and the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014. It also declared the completion of the stockpile destruction in its April 2014 Article 7 report.
The stockpile was transferred and then destroyed at facilities in Germany, Italy, and Norway. In April 2014, the UK reported that the total cost of the stockpile destruction was “around £40 million,” or US$66 million.
Since 2013, the UK has reported that it does not have any cluster munitions or submunitions for training or research purposes and “has no immediate plans to acquire and retain sub-munitions for permitted purposes, but reserves the right to do so.”
Previously, in 2011 and 2012, the UK reported that it was retaining 956 explosive submunitions of four types. In 2013, it reported that the retained submunitions had been destroyed by demolition “because of concerns over condition, packaging and storage.”
 House of Lords, Hansard, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), 25 March 2010), Column 1057; and “Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, Chapter 11.” A person guilty of an offense under this section is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, or a fine, or both. For analysis of the legislation, see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 109–111. See also Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 28 April 2011.
 Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 12 November 2010. Notes by the CMC; and statement by Viscount Younger of Leckie (Conservative),House of Lords Debate (London: HMSO, 25 March 2014), Column 27WS.
 Statement by Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, House of Lords Debate (London: HMSO, 3 March 2015), Column WS.
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Command Paper Cm9021: Post–legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
 Various time periods are covered by the Article 7 report submitted on 28 April 2011 (for the period ending 31 March 2011), 30 April 2012 (1 April 2011–31 March 2012), 2013 (1 April 2012–31 March 2013), 30 April 2014 (1 April 2013–31 March 2014), and 29 April 2015 (calendar year 2014).
 Statement by Gordon Brown, Prime Minister, “Breakthrough on cluster bombs draws closer,” 28 May 2008. For more details on the UK’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 173–180.
 “Response to Cluster Munition Monitor” document attached to email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, Conventional Arms Policy Officer, Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 15 May 2015.
 Statement by Baroness Anelay of St Johns, House of Lords Debate (London: HMSO, 10 February 2015), Column 1117.
 Statement by Baroness Anelay of St Johns, House of Lords Debate, (London: HMSO, 24 February 2015), Column W.
 Letter from the Private Secretary to the Rt Hon David Lidington, to Thomas Nash, Director, Article 36, 10 April 2015.
 Statement of the UK, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 23 October 2012; statement by Baroness Warsi, Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 19 December 2012), Column WA325; House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 20 May 2013), Column 903; and House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO 10 January 2013), Column 483. On 22 October 2013, the UK hosted a meeting of the “London 11” group of Friends on Syria that issued a communiqué calling on the Syrian regime to “end the siege of urban areas and the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, in particular through air bombardment and the use of ballistic missiles, cluster bombs and explosive barrels.” The London 11 Core Group of the Friends of Syria that met in London on 22 October 2013 to discuss Syria was comprised of 11 states: four States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (France, Germany, Italy, UK), and seven states not party (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States). London 11 Final Communiqué. In a February 2014 statement on Syria, the UK Foreign Secretary commented that “bombardment of civilian areas with barrel bombs continues unabated, and there are reports of attacks with cluster munitions as well.” See statement by William Hague, Foreign Secretary, “Foreign Secretary Statement to Parliament on Ukraine, Syria, and Iran,” Oral Statement to Parliament, 24 February 2014.
 “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/69/189, 18 December 2014. The UK voted in favor of similar resolutions on 15 May and 18 December 2013.
 See, “The grave and deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/29/L.4, 2 July 2015; “The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/28/20, 27 March 2015; “The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/23, 27 June 2014; and “The continuing grave deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/25/23, 28 March 2014.
 The five permanent members of the UN Security Council voted for the resolution in addition to non-permanent members Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, and Venezuela.
 Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Korea. See UN Security Council Press Statement, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), extends mandate of mission in South Sudan,” 27 May 2014.
 Michael Aron (@HMAMichaelAron), “Deeply disturbing report by @HRW with evidence of recent use of cluster bombs in #Libya: http://linkis.com/www.hrw.org/news/201/qrldg,” 05:02am, 15 March 2015, Tweet.
 Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2 September 2014.
 The UK requested that the drafts express “concern” rather than “deplore” or express “great distress” at new use of cluster munitions. It also stated that not all instances of cluster munition use have been “confirmed” and that the countries where cluster munitions have been used do not need to be named in the draft documents as it could deter states from joining the convention. Statement of the UK, Second Preparatory Meetings for the First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 24 June 2015. Notes by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and HRW. At a 9 July 2015 meeting to receive input on the revised draft documents, the UK continued to request that references to cluster munition use be qualified with the addition of “alleged” and “allegations” and also requested that countries where cluster munitions have been used not be named in the documents.
 See ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 109–111.
 Statement by Baroness Glenys Kinnock, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 8 December 2009), Column 1020; and statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.
 Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010.
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Command Paper Cm9021, “Post–legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
 Statement by Lord John Howell of Guildford, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Conservative, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 31 January 2011), Column 1186. Lord Howell stated that “the one exception was made very properly by the previous Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Miliband, allowing the US a temporary extension of its right to keep cluster munitions while it went through the process of getting rid of them as part of the running down of cluster munitions stores in UK territory and in the United Kingdom. That is the only exception that has ever been made. For the future, we will consider bringing to Parliament and recording any decisions that may be proposed for temporary extension, and we will do that on a case-by-case basis. I have to say that in a number of instances it could be governed and limited by security considerations.” Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox stated in 2010: “Neither I nor any other Secretary of State in this Government has issued any authorisation under Article 8 of the Act. Article 8 does not require such requests to be scrutinised by Parliament. However, in the event of a future request, we would consider on a case-by-case basis how best we can keep Parliament informed within the constraints of classification and operational planning.” Statement by Liam Fox, Secretary of State, Defence, House of Commons Debate, Hansard (London: HMSO, 9 December 2010), c427W. See also, statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 1 November 2011), Column 589W.
 The cable quoted a UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office official as telling US officials: “It would be better for the USG [US government] and HMG [Her Majesty’s Government—UK] not to reach final agreement on this temporary agreement understanding until after the CCM ratification process is completed in Parliament, so that they can tell parliamentarians that they have requested the USG to remove its cluster munitions by 2013, without complicating/muddying the debate by having to indicate that this request is open to exceptions.” According to the cable, the UK’s position was that “any U.S. cluster munitions currently stored on British territory (either UK territory proper, Diego Garcia, or elsewhere) would be permitted to stay until 2013, while any new cluster munitions the USG wanted to bring to those sites after the treaty’s entry into force for the UK - either before or after 2013 - would require the temporary exception. Any movement of cluster munitions from ships at Diego Garcia to planes there, temporary transit, or use from British territory also would require the temporary exception after entry into force.” “U.S.-UK Cluster Munitions Dialogue,” US Department of State cable 09STATE52368 dated 21 May 2009, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010.
 House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 15 December 2010), Column 913. In June 2008, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lord Malloch-Brown, stated that although the UK did not read the prohibition on foreign stockpiling as a legal requirement under the treaty, it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year period allowed for stockpile destruction in the convention. The government later told parliamentarians that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of ” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.” Statement by Lord George Mark Malloch-Brown, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 3 June 2008), Column 79; statement by Baroness Glenys Kinnock, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 8 December 2009), Column 1020; and statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.
 See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Command Paper Cm9021, “Post –legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
 The clause states: “It is a defence for a person charged with an offence specified in any of paragraphs 1 to 6 of Schedule 2 [the prohibitions of the convention] to show that the person’s conduct took place in the course of, or for the purposes of, an international military operation or an international military co-operation activity.” Members in the House of Commons went to great lengths to seek clarification on the scope of this clause.
 Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011.
 For example, see statement by William Cash, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2010), Column 160; statement by Jo Swinson, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 906; and statement by Martin Caton, House of Commons Debate, Hansard,(London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Columns 902–903.
 “Response to Cluster Munition Monitor,” document attached to email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, Conventional Arms Policy Officer, Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 15 May 2015.
 NATO letter to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 15 February 2011. Cited in UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A /HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, p. 168, para. 638.
 In September 2011, Green Party leader and Member of Parliament Caroline Lucas raised concern that the Pakistan Ordnance Factory stand and Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organization pavilion at the DSEi in London were displaying promotional materials advertising their cluster munitions. DSEi shut down both exhibits after the materials were found to “breach UK government export controls and our own contractual requirements.” In response, in 2011 the government said, “provided companies which produce cluster munitions do not engage in such promotional activities in the UK the Government have no plans to prohibit such companies from attending UK trade events.” The government placed responsibility with the event organizers, noting that “major UK defence exhibitions are commercial events and the admission of companies is a matter for the commercial organisers.” For details see ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: United Kingdom: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” 31 August 2012.
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Command Paper Cm9021, “Post –legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Command Paper Cm9021, “Post –legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
 Questions by Jim Cunningham, House of Commons Debate, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2015), Column W.
 Response by Rt Hon Steve Webb, House of Commons Debate, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2015), Column W.
 PAX, “Worldwide investment in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility, November 2014 update,” Utrecht, November 2014.
 Aberdeen Asset Management, Fidelity Worldwide Investment, Invesco, Old Mutual, Prudential, Schroders, and Standard Life were listed in the report’s “Hall of Shame.”
 HRW, “Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia,” Vol. 11, No. 6(D), June 1999; HRW, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,” Vol. 12, No. 1(D), February 2000; and HRW, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (New York: HRW, 2003).
 The initial Article 7 report declared “Nil” under the section on the status and progress of programs for conversion or de-commissioning of production facilities. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 28 April 2011.
 Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), pp. 468–470; Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008, CD-edition (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008), entries for: Iran, 10 January 2008; Italy, 10 January 2008; Netherlands, 10 January 2008; Oman, 10 January 2008; Pakistan, 10 January 2008; Saudi Arabia, 3 December 2007; Thailand, 10 January 2008; and United Arab Emirates, 10 January 2008; and Landmine Action, Explosive remnants of war: unexploded ordnance and post-conflict communities (London: Landmine Action, 2002). Croatia, Ecuador, Germany, Montenegro, Portugal, and Switzerland declared stockpiles of BL755 bombs, or the destruction thereof, in their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports submitted in 2011. BiH disclosed stockpiling BL755 in a statement to the intersessional meeting on stockpile destruction held in Geneva in June 2011.
 The US supplied the UK with 1,008 CBU-87 cluster bombs at some point between 1970 and 1995. US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, “Cluster Bomb Exports under FMS, FY1970–FY1995,” obtained by HRW in a Freedom of Information Act request, 28 November 1995. In June 2009, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) reported that it had contracted the destruction of 600 CBU-87 bombs for the UK. See presentation by Peter Courtney-Green, Chief of the Ammunition Support Branch, NAMSA, “Technical Aspects of Cluster Munitions Stockpile Destruction,” Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions, 25 June 2009, slide 15.
 Questions have been raised about the status of the “Starstreak” missile, manufactured by Thales Air Defence Limited in the UK, in relation to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UK’s Cluster Munition (Prohibitions) Act. Some literature produced by the manufacturer has asserted a utility for the weapon against ground-based targets, which would seem to contradict its exclusion from the Convention on Cluster Munitions on the basis that it has been “designed exclusively for an air defence role.” For a detailed discussion of the “Starstreak” missile, see Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), p. 177.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2015; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, 30 April 2014; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2012; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 April 2011.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Form B, 30 April 2013, 30 April 2012, and 28 April 2011. The April 2013 report listed 191,128 total munitions in overview text, 300 more than the Monitor’s calculations based on the more-detailed tables in the report.
 This task was completed on 17 December 2013 when the last Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) M26 bomblet was destroyed at Esplodenti Sabino’s facility, Casalbordino, Italy. See CMC Press Release, “UK Destroys Last Stockpiled Cluster Munition,” 19 December 2013.
 The BL-755 bombs, IBL755 bombs, and RBL755 bombs with their No2 Mk1 submunitions were destroyed by Spreewerk in Lubben, Germany. The M483 projectiles and M42/M46 submunitions were destroyed by July 2008 by Esplodenti Sabino in Casalbordino, Italy. The L20A1 were destroyed by NAMMO Buck in Pinnow, Germany. The stockpile of CRV-7 M261 rockets and M73 submunitions were destroyed by July 2009 by NAMMO Group Demil Division in Norway.
 Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 April 2014. Average exchange rate for 2014: £1=US$1.6484. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2015.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, 29 April 2015; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013.
 576 KB-1 (from the M87 Orkan), 244 M42 (from the M483), 96 M46 (from the M483), and 40 Alpha submunitions (from the CB470). Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 28 April 2011. The UK’s second Article 7 report (April 2012) lists the same 956 explosive submunitions of four different types retained for training. The report also notes that 12 M42 submunitions consumed in the reporting period, but the total retained was not adjusted as a result of the consumption. In July 2012, a UK official clarified to the Monitor that no submunitions were consumed by the UK in the second Article 7 report’s period and the report’s inclusion of 12 consumed submunitions was an error. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2012; and email from Graham Jessup, Conventional Disarmament Officer, Arms Trade Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 July 2012.
 According to the report, the UK destroyed 244 M42 submunitions and 96 M46 submunitions that had previously been held unfuzed after being removed from its M483 projectiles, 40 Alpha Bomblet submunitions (from a former South African CB470 cluster munition), and 576 KB-1 submunitions (from two former Yugoslav M87 Orkan cluster munitions). Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013.