Nagorno-Karabakh

Mine Action

Last updated: 13 December 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (extent unknown), cluster munition contamination (medium contamination), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Nagorno-Karabakh cannot accede to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions due to its political status

Mines in 2016: The size of confirmed mined areas in Nagorno-Karabakh decreased to 4.41km2 in 2016, compared with 5.14km2 at the end of 2015. In 2016, over 0.12km2 of mined area was cleared, a decrease compared with 2015. A total of 117 antipersonnel mines were destroyed through mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks.

Cluster munitions in 2016: The exact extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants is not known, but it is significant and widespread. As of the end of 2016, cluster munition contamination (both surface and subsurface) across the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh was estimated to be almost 72km2. In 2016, 3.28km2 of cluster munition-contaminated land was cleared, and 355 submunitions destroyed with 7.6km2 of land was confirmed as cluster munition contaminated.

Recommendations for action

  • The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should formally commit to respect and implement the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions and clear all antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants.
  • The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities should provide funding for survey and clearance of antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants.

Contamination

In 1988, a decision by the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia resulted in armed conflict in 1988–1994 between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991, but this has not been internationally recognized. All regions of Nagorno-Karabakh have been affected by mines and submunitions as a result of the 1988–1994 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and new mine contamination was added in 2013.

Mine contamination

Mines were laid by both the Azeri and pro-Karabakh forces during the war, with a relatively high proportion of antivehicle mines being used in some regions, as well as antipersonnel mines throughout.[1] The mines were of Soviet design and manufacture, and due to the nature of the conflict certain areas were mined several times.[2]

New contamination was added in 2013. In July 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s military chief, General Movses Hakobian, reportedly stated that “his forces have placed more anti-personnel landmines this year along the Armenian-Azerbaijani ‘line of contact’ east and north of the disputed territory.”[3] (See the Mine Ban profile for further details.)

As of the end of 2016, antipersonnel mine contamination throughout the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh, including both within the Soviet-era boundaries and in the adjacent territories, was estimated to cover 4.41km2 across 75 mined areas (see table below). This is down from 5.14km2 across 82 mined areas as at the end of 2015.[4]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province (as at end 2016)[5]

Region

Total CHAs containing mines

CHAs with AP mines

CHAs with AP and AV mines

Area (km2)

Askeran

6

4

2

0.22

Hadrut

23

17

6

2.49

Lachin

22

20

2

0.72

Martakert

16

13

3

0.57

Martuni

6

3

3

0.32

Shaumyan

2

2

0

0.09

Total

75

59

16

4.41

Note: CHAs = confirmed hazardous area; AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

To date, 88% of mined areas across the whole of Nagorno-Karabakh have been cleared, including 97% of all known minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh.[6] Of the remaining mined area, 82% is in “green areas” (areas between the traditional Soviet boundary of the autonomous oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, the militarized line of contact with Azerbaijan, and other international borders), and the remaining 18% is within the traditional Soviet-era boundaries.[7] Mined areas remain along the line of contact with Azerbaijan, but are inaccessible for clearance as this remains a conflict zone.[8]

Minefields in Nagorno-Karabakh are prioritized by two main factors: the density and type of minelaying, and their impact (including proximity to population and economic impact). Where possible, HALO Trust develops its operational strategy based on clearance of identified “high” priority minefields first, before addressing “medium” and “low” priority areas. The vast majority of designated high-priority minefields have now been cleared.[9]

Most people living in mine-affected areas in Nagorno-Karabakh are dependent on the land for their livelihoods.[10] Mines impede use of land, roads, and other areas, and affect the rural population in particular, whose main income is from herding animals and farming.[11] Mined areas cleared by HALO Trust in 2016 were all affecting grazing or agricultural land, and indirectly benefitted 793 people.[12]

Cluster munition contamination

The exact extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Nagorno-Karabakh is not known, but it is significant and widespread.[13] As of the end 2016, cluster munition contamination (both surface and subsurface) was estimated to be almost 72km2 across 212 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs), in seven of a total of eight districts (see table below).[14]

Cluster munition contamination by district as at end 2016[15]

District

CHAs

Area (km2)

Askeran

54

20.61

Hadrut

28

10.54

Lachin

17

8.50

Martakert

46

12.18

Martuni

58

15.59

Shushi

8

4.00

Stepanakert

1

0.50

Total

212

71.92

 

This represents a significant increase on the 67km2 across 202 CHAs in six districts, as of the end of 2015,[16] and results from cluster munition survey confirming 7.59km2 of cluster munition contamination, including in Stepanakert district, which was not previously reported as cluster munition contaminated. The contamination in Stepanakert district was discovered by HALO Trust during survey in 2016.[17]

In 1988, a decision by the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia resulted in armed conflict from 1988 to 1994 between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Large numbers of cluster munitions were dropped from the air during the conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh declared independence in 1991 but this has not been internationally recognized.

On 1 April 2016, intense fighting broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh along the front line between Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces and the armed forces of Azerbaijan. While ground fighting was confined to areas close to the Line of Contact, artillery fire penetrated more than 10km into Nagorno-Karabakh, and included the use of cluster munitions. A ceasefire was agreed on 5 April 2016.[18] HALO estimated that the four days of hostilities added 2km2 of new cluster munition contamination;[19] the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities put the figure at 3.14km2.[20]

Nagorno-Karabakh has cluster munition remnants in most regions, but particularly Askeran, Martakert, and Martuni, where more than three-quarters of remaining contamination is located. The presence of submunitions does not, in most instances, deny access to land, and many cluster munition-contaminated areas have been cultivated continuously for 20 years or more. Between 1996 and 2016, HALO recorded 17 incidents from submunitions (approximately 6% of all recorded incidents), including seven fatalities. The last recorded incident involving an unexploded submunition was in November 2015, which resulted in a farmer suffering fragmentation injuries.[21]

Program Management

A mine action coordination committee is responsible for liaising between the local authorities and HALO.[22] Regular coordination committee meetings are held between the local authorities, HALO, and the ICRC.[23]

In 2000, HALO Trust established the Nagorno-Karabakh Mine Action Center (NKMAC), which consolidates all mine-action-related information and responds to requests from the de facto government ministries, other NGOs, and local communities.[24] The NKMAC maintains maps and a database of all suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) surveyed, all areas cleared of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), locations of all mine- and ERW-related incidents, and a record of all risk education given.[25]

Standards and quality management

No national standards exist in Nagorno-Karabakh and HALO follows its own standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Operators

Since 2000, HALO Trust has been the sole organization conducting land release in Nagorno-Karabakh. HALO Trust’s Nagorno-Karabakh operations cover both mine and cluster munition clearance, and HALO does not field separate teams dedicated solely to either. Operational staff are trained and experienced for both.[26]

In 2016, HALO Trust employed an average of 142 personnel, an increase compared to the 123 average over the previous year, but still an overall decrease in capacity compared to the 167 personnel employed in 2014.[27] Between January and December 2016, its total capacity for mine and cluster munition operations grew from nine operational teams to 15.[28] HALO increased its capacity in April and May 2017, from 15 manual teams to 20.[29]

HALO Trust deployed two Volvo armored front loaders in 2016, as it did in previous years. Machines are predominantly deployed in clearance of roads with a plastic TM62P antivehicle mine threat, and on ground where it is more cost effective for antipersonnel and antivehicle mine clearance due, in most cases, to high levels of metal contamination.[30]

After the April 2016 conflict, HALO’s survey teams collaborated with the local authorities’ Service of Emergency Situations to survey new contamination rapidly, and destroy submunitions close to populated areas.[31] Over the course of 2016, HALO battle area clearance (BAC) teams were employed for 209 days, compared to 162 the previous year. This reflected the increased time spent in 2016 conducting subsurface clearance of contamination resulting from the April 2016 combat.[32]

Land Release (mines)

More than 0.12km2 of mined area was cleared in 2016, 0.28km2 was reduced by technical survey and 0.36km2 was canceled through non-technical survey.[33] In 2015, 0.21 km2 was cleared.[34]

Survey in 2016 (mines)

More than 0.28km2 of mined area was reduced through technical survey, and a further 0.36km2 was canceled in two SHAs through non-technical survey. Six areas were confirmed as mined, totaling almost 0.18km2.[35]

In 2016, HALO Trust trialed the use of special detection dogs, provided by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), for reduction of the size of SHAs and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) in Nagorno-Karabakh.[36] As of September 2017, the trial was ongoing.[37]

Clearance in 2016 (mines)

In 2016, a total of 10 mined areas covering 122,448m2 were released by clearance. Operations destroyed 27 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine, and 150 items of UXO.[38]

In addition to planned clearance, HALO Trust was called out to 170 EOD tasks in 2016, during which 90 antipersonnel mines, 21 antivehicle mines, and 85 submunitions were destroyed along with 510 other items of UXO, stray ammunition, and air-dropped bombs.[39]

Where possible, clearance is conducted only on CHAs, but areas remain that still require technical investigation, in addition to area where technical survey did not produce evidence of mines, but where mine-laying remains strongly suspected.[40]

The ratio of mines found to area cleared is now relatively low, due in part to the absence of reliable mapping by former combatants; the sporadic nature of antivehicle mine-laying in low areas and on former road networks; and the fact that most heavily mined areas have been cleared.[41]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

A total of almost 3.3km2 of area contaminated with cluster munition remnants was released by clearance in 2015,[42] compared with 2.9km2 in 2015.[43] No land was reported to have been reduced by technical survey.

Survey in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

No area was reduced by technical survey or canceled by non-technical survey in 2016. HALO did however, confirm 14 areas totaling almost 7.6km2 as cluster munition contaminated.[44]

In order to determine whether a strike requires further clearance, HALO initially surveys a 500,000m2 area around evidence of submunitions. Clearance starts from the center of the area of known evidence and extends outwards, employing a buffer. If no further evidence of cluster munition remnants is found, the remaining area is reduced.[45]

Clearance in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Just over 3.28km2 of land across two completed tasks was cleared by HALO in 2016, during which 83 submunitions were destroyed, along with one other item of UXO.[46] Of this, 2.73km2 was released by surface BAC and 0.55km2 by subsurface BAC.[47]

The total clearance for the year included clearance of cluster munition contamination in the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh in the northeast Martakert region, which resulted from the April 2016 fighting.[48] Surface contamination clearance of these two tasks was completed in 2016. Subsurface cluster munition clearance of the agricultural land in the two tasks was completed in February 2017. In total, 79 M095 submunitions were destroyed during surface and subsurface clearance in these two tasks in the Martakert area.[49] The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities reported that the State Service of Emergency Situations destroyed a further 187 submunitions, during joint clearance operations with HALO in the Martakert region.[50] HALO began addressing the new contamination in the two villages as soon as the April 2016 fighting stopped, both because of the sensitivity of the M095 submunitions and their proximity to people’s homes as well as the impact on their livelihoods.[51]

In addition to planned clearance, HALO was called out to 170 EOD tasks in 2016, during which 85 submunitions were destroyed along with 510 other items of UXO, stray ammunition and air-dropped bombs, 90 antipersonnel mines, and 21 antivehicle mines.[52]

The 2016 clearance output was a slight increase over the previous year, when HALO cleared 2.9km2 of land.[53] The main reason for the increase was the emergency clearance of the April 2016 contamination, but overall HALO’s cluster munition clearance operations continue to remain a “secondary” activity, as per the donors’ request to prioritize mine clearance.[54] Since most reported accidents in Nagorno-Karabakh are the result of mines/UXO, and not cluster munition remnants, HALO continues to believe this prioritization is justified.[55] Most submunition clearance is conducted on days when minefields cannot be accessed safely due to the adverse weather during the winter months.[56]

Progress in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

As of April 2017, HALO was investigating cluster munition contamination resulting from the April 2016 conflict, in the Jabrail (also spelt Jabrayil) region of Hadrut province, in the southeast of Nagorno-Karabakh.[57] The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities reported that in the Hadrut region, the State Service for Emergency Situations and HALO jointly surveyed almost 1.42km2 and destroyed five unexploded submunitions (9N210 and 9N235).[58]

Deminer safety

HALO Trust recorded one demining accident in December 2016, but no injuries were sustained.[59]

Progress towards completion of mine and cluster munition clearance

Despite the clear humanitarian need to clear mines
and ERW, Nagorno-Karabakh’s unrecognized status prevents many governments from funding humanitarian activities in the territory. HALO Trust receives no funding from Armenia or the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities.[60] Progress in mine clearance has fluctuated over the last five years, as shown in the table below, but with clearance output averaging below 0.5km2 annually.

Mine clearance in 2012–2016[61]

Year

Area cleared (km2)*

2016

0.12

2015

0.21

2014

0.54

2013

0.31

2012

1.00

Total

2.18

* Includes antivehicle and antipersonnel mines.

In 2008–2010, HALO Trust cleared an average of between 5km2 and 6km2 of mined area annually and averaged more than 30km2 of BAC. In 2011, however, the United Kingdom (UK) interrupted its funding and HALO Trust lost 37% of its capacity; consequently, clearance rates declined.[62]

In 2017, HALO Trust reported that full clearance of minefields in Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh could be achieved by 2019.[63]

Furthermore, significant contamination remains in adjacent territories. Bilateral funding is often restricted to the traditional border of the Soviet oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh, leaving clearance of surrounding territories to private foundations.[64] HALO Trust increased its capacity in April and May 2017, principally as a result of an anonymous donor committing funding for manual clearance teams and matched-funding for clearance of “green areas” outside of the traditional Soviet oblast boundary.[65]

The majority of remaining mined areas are only accessible during the dry summer months of May to October, and HALO Trust planned to expand its clearance capacity through training and to deploy more teams over this period. As of April 2017, clearance in the “green areas” was focused on high- and medium-priority tasks in the Lachin corridor and Martuni region, with private funding; with clearance of the remaining minefields within the traditional Soviet oblast boundary, conducted with USAID funding.[66]

No target date has been set to complete clearance of cluster munition remnants.

Progress in clearance of cluster munition remnants has fluctuated over the last five years, as shown in the table below. HALO is currently prioritizing clearance of mine contamination, as part of its efforts to complete clearance of all accessible mined areas by 2020, and HALO deploys teams to conduct BAC only in a reserve capacity.[67]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2012–2016[68]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2016

3.28

2015

2.91

2014

13.01

2013

4.65

2012

7.6

Total

31.45

 

USAID has requested that its funds be used for clearance operations within the former Soviet-era Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), and that HALO focus on mine clearance.[69] USAID is, however, continuing to fund one HALO team to conduct survey of cluster munition contamination throughout 2017.[70] Overall, though, cluster munition surface clearance is funded by USAID as a secondary activity, to be conducted when access to minefields is limited during winter months.[71]

While surface clearance of legacy cluster munition contamination within the NKAO boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh could potentially be completed within a few years, this would still leave subsurface contamination within the NKAO boundaries of Nagorno-Karabakh, in addition to cluster munition contamination in areas outside the NKAO that are under the control of the Nagorno-Karabakh forces.[72]

The international isolation of Nagorno-Karabakh makes it difficult for HALO to raise funds to work in the region, and funds raised are often subject to territorial restrictions.[73] Almost no cluster munition clearance is conducted outside the NKAO.[74] Funding is needed to prevent Nagorno-Karabakh’s communities being blighted by mines and cluster munition remnants for decades to come.[75]

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] USAID, “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. 2.

[2] HALO Trust, “Nagorno-Karabakh: The Problem,” undated.

[3] L. Musayelian, “Karabakh Enhances Defense Capabilities,” Asbarez (Stepanakert), 26 July 2013.

[4] Email from Andrew Moore, Balkans and Caucasus Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

[5] Email from Ash Boddy, Regional Director Nagorno-Karabakh, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

[9] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[11] USAID, “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. 3.

[12] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[13] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 29 May 2015.

[14] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.

[17] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 27 April 2017.

[19] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.

[20] Email to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch (HRW), from Armine Aleksanyan, Nagorno-Karabakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 May 2017.

[21] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.

[22] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.

[23] Ibid., 26 May 2016.

[24] Ibid., 28 June 2013.

[25] USAID, “De-mining Needs Assessment in Nagorno-Karabakh,” September 2013, p. vii.

[26] Response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 22 May 2015.

[27] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[28] Ibid., 27 and 29 April 2017.

[29] Ibid., 28 September 2017.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.

[32] Ibid., 13 April 2017.

[33] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 28 September 2017.

[34] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.; and email from Darvin Lisica, NPA Regional Programme Manager, 2 October 2016.

[37] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 28 September 2017.

[38] Ibid., 3 April 2017.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

[41] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.; and from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.

[46] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.

[47] Ibid.

[48] HALO, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016; and email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.

[49] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017. The Nagorno-Karabakh authorities reported that 86 submunitions were destroyed by HALO. Email to Mary Wareham, HRW, from Armine Aleksanyan, Nagorno-Karabakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 May 2017. This comprises 79 submunitions destroyed during clearance and a further seven destroyed during EOD call-outs.

[50] Email to Mary Wareham, HRW, from Armine Aleksanyan, Nagorno-Karabakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 May 2017.

[51] Ibid.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May and 7 June 2016.

[54] Ibid., 7 June 2016.

[55] Ibid.; and from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.

[56] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 7 June 2016.

[57] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 27 April 2017.

[58] Email to Mary Wareham, HRW, from Armine Aleksanyan, Nagorno-Karabakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 May 2017.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid.

[61] See Landmine Monitor and Mine Action Review reports on Nagorno-Karabakh covering 2012–2015.

[62] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 28 June 2013.

[63] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 28 September 2017.

[64] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 October 2016.

[65] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 3 April 2017.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Ibid.

[68] See Cluster Munition Monitor reports on Nagorno-Karabakh covering 2012–2016.

[69] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016, and 11 June 2015.

[70] Email from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 13 April 2017.

[71] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.

[72] Ibid.; and from Ash Boddy, HALO Trust, 14 April 2017.

[73] HALO, “Where we Work,” undated.

[74] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 11 June 2015.

[75] HALO, “Where we Work,” undated.