Niger

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 26 June 2017

Summary: State Party Niger was among the first 30 ratifications to trigger the convention’s entry into force on 1 August 2010. Niger has expressed its intent to adopt national implementation legislation. Niger has participated in almost every meeting of the convention and has elaborated its views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. It submitted an initial transparency report for the convention in June 2017, confirming that it has never produced and does not stockpile cluster munitions. Niger says it has never used or transferred cluster munitions.

Policy

The Republic of Niger signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 2 June 2009. It was among the first 30 ratifications that triggered the convention’s entry into force on 1 August 2010.

On 8 June 2017, Niger submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, covering the period from 1 January 2011 to 31 May 2017. It states “not yet established” in the section for reporting national implementation measures for the convention.[1] Since 2010, government officials have indicated that Niger is in the process of preparing implementing legislation for the convention, but none has been enacted yet.[2]

Niger participated in the Oslo Process that produced the convention and supported a comprehensive treaty without exception.[3]

Niger has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2016. Niger attended the convention’s First Review Conference and participated in every intersessional meeting in 2012–2015. Niger has also attended regional workshops on the convention, most recently in Lomé, Togo, in May 2013.

Niger voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on promoting implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2016.[4]

In September 2014, Niger expressed regret at recent use of cluster munitions and pledged to do “all we can to promote humanitarian disarmament.”[5] It has voted in favor of a UNGA Resolution that expresses outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[6]

Niger has elaborated its views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention. An official informed the Monitor in 2013 that Niger considered transit and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions on the territory of a State Party to be prohibited under the convention. Similarly, Niger considers assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions and investment in the production of cluster munitions to be banned by the convention.[7]

Niger is party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In its initial Article 7 transparency report for the convention, Niger confirms that it has never produced or transferred cluster munitions and does not stockpile any cluster munitions, including for training purposes.[8]

Previously, Niger stated in a 2009 letter that it has never used, produced, transferred, or stockpiled cluster munitions.[9]



[1] “Pas encore établi.” The report was originally due by 28 January 2011; and Niger Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 8 June 2017.

[2] See Monitor meeting with Mamadou Youssoufa Maiga, Chair, Arms Control and Counter Proliferation, National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 25 June 2015; CMC meeting with Abdou Seydou Sayni, Vice-President, CNCCAI, Lao PDR, 9–12 November 2010; and statement of Niger, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 22 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).

[3] For details on Niger’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 133–134.

[4]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016. It voted for a similar resolution in 2015. See, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[5] Statement of Niger, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, 3 September 2014. Notes by Human Rights Watch.

[6]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 70/234, 23 December 2015.

[7] Monitor meeting with Allassan Fousseini, CNCCAI, Geneva, 28 May 2013.

[8] The Article 7 report contains the following statements: “Le Niger n a pas de stock d’armes à sous munitions,” and “Niger ne produit pas des armes à sous munitions.” Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Forms B, C, D, and E, 8 June 2017.

[9] Letter No. 001581 from Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cooperation and African Integration, 3 March 2009.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 19 October 2017

Policy

The Republic of Niger signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 23 March 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 September 1999. National implementation legislation (Law 2004-044) entered into force on 15 September 2004.[1]

Niger had not submitted an annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report since 15 November 2012.

Niger has attended every annual Meeting of States Parties since 2011. A delegation attended the June 2017 intersessional meetings, where it submitted a request to extend its deadline to complete Article 5 requirements by five years.

Niger is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but not CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and use

At the June 2017 intersessional meetings, Niger announced it had cleared over 39,000m2, and destroyed 1,075 mines, since 2014.[2] However, it also announced the discovery of a second minefield adjacent to the first, covering 196,523m2, explaining the request for an extension.

Niger has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines. In April 2003, Niger reported that it had destroyed its entire stock of 48 antipersonnel mines.[3] It did not retain any antipersonnel mines for training or research purposes.[4]

From 2007 to 2009 an armed insurgency took place in the north of the country with the Touareg non-state armed group (NSAG), the Niger Justice Movement (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice, MNJ). In late 2009, the MNJ suffered a major split, with many of its leaders forming a new armed group, the Nigerian Patriotic Front (Front Patriotique Nigérien, FPN), which negotiated an end to conflict with the government. Niger stated on several occasions that the insurgents had not used antipersonnel mines.[5] MNJ representatives also denied any use of antipersonnel mines.[6] A media report in October 2009 stated that the FPN, a splinter faction of the MNJ, handed over some antivehicle mines during official ceremonies to reaffirm their commitment to the peace process.[7]

Niger did collect and destroy antipersonnel mines belonging to other armed groups in 2008 and 2009.[8] In March 2010, a representative of the national mine action authority in Niger told the Monitor that there were no new recoveries or surrenders of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in 2009. He also confirmed that all antipersonnel and antivehicle mines previously seized or discovered had been destroyed.[9]



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 26 May 2005. According to Article 13 of Law 2004-044, use, production, stockpiling, or transfer of antipersonnel mines can be punished with a prison term of between 10 and 20 years, as well as a fine of XOF1million–3 million (US$2,170–$6,510). Average exchange rate for 2009: XOF1=US$0.00217. OANDA.com. Article 16 of the law directs that the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI) is responsible for ensuring the law’s application.

[2] See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Extension Request, 4 October 2016, p. 2.

[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form G, 4 April 2003. Previously, Niger reported that it had no stockpile of antipersonnel mines, including for training purposes. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2002, pp. 384–385.

[4] In its earlier Article 7 reports, Niger indicated that it was retaining for training purposes 949 antivehicle mines and 146 French “éclairant” (flare) mines. None are considered antipersonnel mines under the Mine Ban Treaty. In its Article 7 report submitted on 26 May 2009, Niger reported only the 146 flare mines as retained, and reported that none of the flares contained explosives. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, Form D, 29 June 2006; and, 26 May 2009.

[5] In November 2008, Niger told the Ninth Meeting of States Parties that insurgents had not used antipersonnel mines, but have used antivehicle mines, causing both military and civilian casualties. It noted that while a previous Article 7 report had listed some suspected mined areas, subsequent investigations by the authorities found no use of antipersonnel mines. Niger confirmed again in May 2009 that no antipersonnel mines had been used by the rebels, but said it cannot guarantee that they will not be used as the conflict has not ended. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2009, p. 589.

[6] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 559; and Geneva Call, “Annual Report 2008,” Geneva, undated, p. 13.

[7] Mohamed Madou and Addine Ag Algalass, “Cérémonie officielle de remise d’armes à Agadez: D’importantes quantités d’armes et de munitions remises aux autorités” (“Official ceremony of handing over of weapons in Agadez: Large quantities of arms and ammunition handed over to authorities”), Le Sahel, 13 October 2009.

[8] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2009, pp. 588–589; and Landmine Monitor Report 2010. The mines reportedly came from two sources. Media reports said that in July 2008 Niger had discovered more than 1,000 abandoned mines on the Niger-Chad border. The mines were believed to have been lifted from minefields by smugglers for resale. Others were recovered through a government-initiated program to buy mines and other weapons from traffickers to prevent them from falling into the hands of rebels. Niger said in May 2009 that the program had recovered many mines, all of which had been destroyed, but the program was halted as it actually increased the flow of arms into the country. The head of the national mine action authority (CNCCAI) told the Monitor in May 2009 that the mines acquired were old mines that had been removed from the ground, and were believed to have come from Chad. Interview with Col. Maï Moctar Kassouma, President, CNCCAI, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Allassan Fousseini, Consultant, CNCCAI/UNDP, Niger, 10 March 2010.


Mine Action

Last updated: 16 November 2017

Contaminated by: antipersonnel and antivehicle mines (light contamination). May also be contaminated by victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Article 5 Deadline: 31 December 2020
(Not clear if on track to meet deadline)

At the end of 2016, the Republic of Niger reported one suspected hazardous area (SHA) remained, with an estimated size of almost 0.2km2. In 2016, Niger reported the completion of clearance of a mined area that had covered just over 39,000m2, with the destruction of 1,075 mines, for which clearance had commenced in November 2014. Approximately 22,300m2 of this was cleared during 2016. In 2015–2016, there were a number of reports of casualties and incidents involving the use of “landmines” and victim-activated IEDs.

Recommendations for action

  • Niger should provide a detailed workplan to accompany its revised second Article 5 extension request, with benchmarks against which progress can be assessed.
  • Niger should provide regular updates on progress in clearance and the extent of contamination remaining. It should also inform Mine Ban Treaty States Parties of the discovery of any new contamination from antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated IEDs, and report on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control.
  • Niger should accept offers of assistance in a timely manner, which would improve the speed and efficiency of clearance and enable completion far earlier than 2020.
  • Niger should develop a resource mobilization plan to meet funding needs beyond expected national contributions.

Contamination

At the end of 2016, Niger reported that only one SHA remained, with an estimated size of 196,253m2 and believed to contain both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.[1] This mined area had been discovered during survey of the mined area nearby that had been the subject of Niger’s extension request in 2016.

Previously, at the end of 2015, Niger had approximately 22,300m2 of antipersonnel mine contamination remaining from a mined area identified in 2014, covering 39,000m2.[2] The area, located
at Madama military post, was identified during an assessment mission in June 2011 and initially estimated to cover 2,400m2.[3] Technical survey in 2014 concluded that the extent of contamination was considerably larger than the earlier estimate.[4] Niger deployed a team of 60 deminers to the area in November 2014, and reported that, as of November 2015, more than 17,000m2 had been cleared with 750 mines destroyed.[5] On 25 October 2016, Niger confirmed that 39,304m2 had been demined, with the destruction of 1,075 mines.[6] It is not known if the area as a whole has yet been formally released.

Five additional SHAs were also identified in Agadez region (in Achouloulouma, Blaka, Enneri, Orida, and Zouzoudinga) but they were believed to contain only antivehicle mines.[7] Niger reported that non-technical and technical survey in May 2014 had removed the suspicion of the presence of antipersonnel mines.[8]

The areas are all located in Niger’s Agadez region, in the north in a remote desert area, 450km from the rural community of Dirkou in Bilma department and reported to contain French MI AP ID 51 mines, which date back to the French colonial era.[9]

Niger’s contamination includes other areas that contain only antivehicle mines, which are the result of rebellion in 1990–2000 as well as fighting in 2007 between the Nigerien army and a non-state armed group, the Nigerien Justice Movement (Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice), and some splinter factions.

In 2015–2016, there were a number of reports of casualties and incidents involving the use of “landmines” and victim-activated IEDs by Boko Haram, primarily in the southeastern Diffa region along the border with Nigeria, as Niger increased its participation in joint military offensives against Boko Haram as part of a Multi-National Joint Task Force launched in 2015.[10] Most reports appear to describe the use of victim-activated IEDs made by Boko Haram, which were either antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines.[11] (See Niger’s casualty profile for further details.)

Program Management

The national mine action program is managed by the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), which reports directly to the president. All demining has been carried out by the Nigerien army.

Niger’s first extension request in 2013 included a workplan for 2014–2015 requiring clearance of the Madama mined area, technical survey in the northern Kawar (Kaouar) department (Agadez region), and verification of other suspected mined areas. Niger’s third extension request submitted in 2016 contains a vague workplan for 2016–2020, but does not contain details of annual clearance outputs or milestones.[12]

Niger reported that, as of November 2015, it had drafted national mine action standards in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and was in the process of training deminers and eight community liaison officers for deployment in Kawar. It has reportedly had between 60 and 90 deminers operating at Madama since November 2014; in mid-2015, however, it acknowledged that due to lack of adequate equipment, it was not possible for all deminers to work at the same time.[13]

In May 2015, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted an evaluation mission in Niger and subsequently offered to provide assistance to national demining efforts by donating equipment to enable the deployment of more deminers and short-term technical support to improve Niger’s clearance productivity.[14] Niger has not accepted NPA’s offer of support.

Land Release

According to Niger, as of 25 October 2016, all 39,304m2 of the confirmed mined area at Madama had been cleared, with the destruction of 1,075 mines.[15] Previously, Niger reported that from the initiation of operations at Madama in November 2014 to November 2015, a total of 17,000m2 had been cleared and 750 mines destroyed.[16]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the four-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2016), Niger is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2020.

States Parties decided to grant this second request while noting, as with its previous extension request, that Niger had failed to provide a detailed annual workplan for clearance and benchmarks against which to assess progress. As such, Niger was requested by States Parties to provide a revised detailed workplan with a list of all areas known or suspected to contain antipersonnel mines, along with monthly and annual projections of which areas would be addressed during the extension period. The importance of submitting an updated Article 7 report on an annual basis was further emphasized.[17]

Niger failed to submit a revised workplan by 30 April 2017, but at the convention’s intersessional meetings in June 2017, Niger informed States Parties of monthly and annual demining projections, beginning in July 2017 through to July 2020, including a total of 25,000m2 to be addressed in 2017; 68,500m2 in 2018; 69,247m2 in 2019; and 35,000m2 in 2020, for a total of 197,747m2 to be addressed.[18]

At the intersessional meetings, Niger stated it was unable to submit an updated Article 7 report for calendar year 2016 as requested and that it was waiting for assistance from France, which was to be provided in the summer of 2017, to conduct a field evaluation in order to better refine its planning and inform the report.[19]

Niger’s Article 5 clearance deadline under its first extension request expired on 31 December 2015. It stated that due to greater than expected contamination at Madama and the identification of the other area of suspected mine contamination, it would not meet this deadline. On 12 November 2015, just a few weeks before the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Niger submitted a second request for a five-year extension until 31 December 2020.

Instead, States Parties decided to grant Niger a one-year extension only, noting that Niger had failed to submit its request within the agreed timeline prior to the meeting and thus had not permitted time for sufficient analysis or discussion. The decision “noted that Niger and the Convention as a whole would benefit from a full extension process taking place” and requested that, as such, Niger “submit a request, in accordance with the established process, by 31 March 2016.”[20] The decision also observed that the plan presented by Niger in the request was “workable but lacks ambition” and requested that Niger provide, in its revised submission, an updated workplan with an up-to-date list of all areas known or suspected to contain antipersonnel mines and annual clearance projections during the period covered by the request.[21]

In April 2016, Niger re-submitted its extension request for a period of four years, until 31 December 2020.[22] The revised submission includes geo-coordinates for the Madama mined area, but fails to include a detailed annual workplan or any specific annual projections for the clearance of the remaining mined areas, despite this being an essential part of any extension request, and it having been explicitly requested to do so by States Parties.[23]

In its extension requests, Niger has noted the desert environment, insecurity, and lack of funding as challenges for the implementation of its clearance obligations, along with the remote location of contamination and the need for a weekly military escort to carry out demining.[24]

Niger funded all mine action activities in 2014–2015.[25] Under its latest extension request, Niger has said that more than US$3.2 million in funding is needed to fulfil its remaining Article 5 obligations, including $1 million for the CNCCAI from the national budget over the five-year period, and $2.2 million to be mobilized from external donors.[26]

Niger has made repeated appeals for international assistance for mine action and claimed it received no external support for its activities, save for assistance from France for medical evacuation in the case of demining accidents.[27] However, as noted above, following an assessment mission to Niger in May 2015, NPA submitted an offer to provide Niger with assistance, including the provision of personal protective equipment, so that more deminers could work simultaneously, as well as a technical advisor to evaluate current methodology and trial equipment, which it believed could significantly increase speed and productivity.[28] Danish Demining Group also offered to help Niger to complete clearance, but Niger did not respond to either organization’s offer.[29]

At the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2016, France announced that it would provide support to contribute to the clearance of the area around Madama fort, set to begin in 2017.[30] In June 2017, Niger confirmed that it had accepted France’s offer for technical support for an evaluation of the terrain around Madama, which it stated would better inform its planning and allow it to prepare an updated Article 7 transparency report.[31]

 


The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

 


[1] Executive Summary of Niger’s Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 4 October 2016. (The Executive Summary reports contamination as both 196,523m2 and 196,253m2); Statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 June 2017.

[2] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, pp. 6 and 8.

[3] Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015; and statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014. 


[4] Statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 25 June 2015; and interview with Youssouf Maïga, Chair, National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale pour la Collecte et le Contrôle es Armes Illicites, CNCCAI), in Geneva, 25 June 2015.

[5] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 6 November 2015, pp. 8 and 9; and Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 2. Niger’s extension request stated that 17,000m2 had been cleared and 628 mines destroyed.

[6] Analysis of Niger’s Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 25 October 2016, p. 3.

[7] Observations on the extension request submitted by Niger by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 27 November 2015, p. 4; and statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 11 April 2014.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, p. 6.

[9] Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015; and statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014. 


[10] See, M. P. Moore, “This Month in Mines, February 2015,” Landmines in Africa blog, 12 March 2015; and “Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF),” GlobalSecurity.org, undated.

[11] M. P. Moore, “This Month in Mines, February 2015,” Landmines in Africa blog, 12 March 2015.

[12] Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received 15 April 2016.

[13] Niger stated that in addition to the 60 deminers active at Madama since November 2014, 40 were trained in February 2015, 30 of whom were said to have been deployed by April 2015. Statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 25 June 2015; and interview with Chris Natale, Mine Action Advisor, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), in Geneva, 26 June 2015. 


[14] Interview with Chris Natale, NPA, in Geneva, 26 June 2015. 


[15] Analysis of Niger’s Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 25 October 2016, p. 3. In its revised second extension request, Niger gave new, but conflicting reports that as of March 2016, “more than 39,304m2 had been demined and close to 1,075 mines removed”; but then also stated that “93,042m2” had been demined, and a total of 1,075 mines destroyed. It clarified to the Committee on Article 5 Implementation on 25 October 2016 that 39,304m2 had been cleared and 1,075 mines destroyed.

[16] Observations on the extension request submitted by Niger by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 27 November 2015, p. 4.

[17] Additionally, States Parties stipulated four areas on which Niger should report, including progress made in accordance to its forthcoming 2016–2020 workplan; any negative or positive impacts on implementation deriving from changes in the security situation; efforts to mobilize necessary financial and technical support; and any external finance and assistance received along with resources made available by the government of Niger. “Decision on the request submitted by Niger for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 1 December 2016.

[18] It erroneously reported, though, that this total was 196,253m2. Statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 June 2017.

[19] Ibid.

[20] “Decision on the request submitted by Niger for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2015.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, received 15 April 2016.

[23] Historically, from 2002–2006, Niger consistently reported the existence of mined areas in the country. However, at the 2008 intersessional meetings, Niger declared that no areas on its territory were suspected to contain antipersonnel mines, stating it had evidence only of the presence of antivehicle mines. Nonetheless, in May 2012, more than two years after the expiry of its Article 5 clearance deadline, Niger reported to States Parties that at least one mined area contained antipersonnel mines. In July 2013, more than four years after its original deadline expired, Niger submitted its first extension request, following the discovery of one known and five suspected mined areas in the Agadez region in June 2011. In granting the request, States Parties regretted the delay between the discovery of contamination and the beginning of demining. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports for 2002–2006; statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 5 June 2008, and 28 May 2012; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Decision, 5 December 2013.

[24] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 July 2013; Executive summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 2; and Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, p. 14.

[25] Interview with Youssouf Maïga, CNCCAI, Geneva, 25 June 2015.

[26] Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, pp. 11–13; and Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 3.

[27] Statement of Niger, Intersessional meetings (Committee on Article 5 Implementation), Geneva, 19–20 May 2016; statement of Niger, 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 15 March 2016, p. 13; and Executive Summary of Niger’s Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 November 2015, p. 3.

[28] Email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 July 2016.

[29] Statement of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 28 November 2016.

[30] Statement of France, Mine Ban Treaty 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 30 November 2016.

[31] Statement of Niger, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 June 2017.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 19 September 2012

Support for Mine Action

Niger is contaminated with both antivehicle and antipersonnel mines. The extent of contamination from antivehicle mines is unknown but there is at least one mined area containing antipersonnel mines, located near a former French military base, now a Niger frontier post with Libya.[1]

Niger received international assistance in 2010 and 2011 from Switzerland. In 2010, Switzerland contributed US$124,617 towards mine action, and in 2011 it contributed CHF183,468 (US$207,208) to Handicap International and UNDP/National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale Pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI) for mine action.[2]

Summary of international contributions in 2010–2011

Year

Amount (US$)

2011

207,208

2010

124,617

Total

331,825

 

 



[1] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Niger: Mine Action,” updated 2012.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Claudia Moser, Section for Multilateral Peace Policy, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland, 31 May 2011.


Casualties

Last updated: 06 October 2017

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2016

426 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (116 killed; 293 injured; 17 unknown outcome)

Casualties in 2016

15 (2015: 8)

2016 casualties by outcome

8 killed; 7 injured (2015: 4 killed; 4 injured)

2016 casualties by device type

11 unspecified mine; 4 improvised mine (victim-activated improvised explosive device, IED)

 

In 2016, the Monitor identified 15 mine casualties in the Republic of Niger, in two separate incidents.[1] This represented a sharp increase from the eight casualties in 2015 and two casualties in 2014.[2] Mine casualties recorded in 2015 and 2016 were associated with intensifying Boko Haram insurgent activities in southeast Niger, in the region bordering Nigeria. Reports indicated mines or improvised mines (victim-activated improvised explosive devices, IEDs) having been the cause. In January, six military personnel were killed and another five injured when their vehicle hit a mine near the border with Nigeria.[3] In September, two military personnel were killed and two were injured when their vehicle hit an IED in the same area.[4]

The Monitor has recorded 426 mine/ERW casualties (116 killed; 293 injured; 17 unknown outcome) from 1999 to 2016. As last reported in April 2014, the National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale Pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI) had reported a total of 400 (108 killed; 287 injured; 5 unknown outcome) mine/ERW casualties in Niger between 2007 and April 2014.[5]



[1] Monitor media scanning for calendar year 2016.

[2]Niger: une mine explose sur la route du festival de l’Aïr,” Algaita Info, 24 February 2014.

[3]Landmine Explosion Kills 6 Soilders at Niger-Nigerian Border,” Africanews, 18 January 2016; “Niger: Six soldats tués par l'explosion d'une mine à la frontière du Nigeria” (“Niger: the explosion of a mine killed six soldiers on the border with Nigeria”), Koaci Info, 18 January 2016; and “Niger: six soldats tués par une mine” (“Niger: six soldiers killed by a mine”), Le Figaro, 18 January 2016.

[4]Niger: Deux militaires tués dans l'explosion d'une mine à Diffa” (“Niger: two soldiers killed when a mine exploded in Diffa”), Anadolu Ajansi, 9 September 2016; “Niger: sept soldats tués par Boko Haram dans deux embuscades” (“Niger: seven soldiers killed in two Boko Haram ambushes”), Jeune Afrique, 14 September 2016; “7 éléments des FDS tombés sur le champ d’honneur et 30 terroristes tués suite à deux attaques dans la Région de Diffa” (“7 members of the FDS fell on the battlefield and 30 terorrists were killed in two attacks in the Diffa region”), aNiamey.com, 15 September 2016; and “Communiqué du Ministère de la Défense Nationale: Sept éléments des FDS tombés sur le champ d’honneur et trente terroristes tués suite à deux attaques dans la région de Diffa” (“Ministry of Defence press release: 7 members of the FDS fell on the battlefield and 30 terorrists were killed in two attacks in the Diffa region”), Niger Inter, 14 September 2016.

[5] Interview with Mamadou Youssoufa Maiga, CNCCAI, and Issoufou Garba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, in Geneva, 1 April 2014; and email from Allassan Fousseini, CNCCAI, 7 June 2013.


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 16 October 2017

The Republic of Niger has made a commitment to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty. Niger ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 24 June 2008.

As of the end of 2016, the total number of mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors in Niger was at least 293.

National Commission for the Collection and Control of Illicit Weapons (Commission Nationale Pour la Collecte et le Contrôle des Armes Illicites, CNCCAI) is the government focal point for victim assistance, but due to a lack of funds its role has been largely limited to advocacy within the government on behalf of survivors.

Disability issues are the responsibility of the Ministry of Population, Gender and Child Protection; the Ministry of Health deals with physical rehabilitation services.[1]

Niger lacks a specific victim assistance plan, and victim assistance services were severely limited. Although the Ministry of Health had the National Health Development Plan (2011–2015), there was no mention of physical rehabilitation in the plan.[2]

Niger has not submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report since 2012. This report, for calendar year 2011, included information on victim assistance in Form J.

In 2016, emergency care and psychological support services increased in Diffa, while they remained at a stable level in the rest of the country.[3]

In Diffa, an ICRC surgical team treated weapon-wounded patients at the regional hospital and the Bosso health center. The ICRC also provided supplies, equipment, and infrastructure repairs.[4]

 In 2016, the ICRC continued to support two physical rehabilitation centers: one at the Niamey National Hospital (HNN) and another in Zinder, including materials and training for technicians. Sixty-eight mine/ERW survivors had food, transport, and accommodation costs related to rehabilitation covered by the ICRC. In all, some 1,000 persons with physical disabilities benefited from various services at the ICRC-assisted center (compared to 540 in 2015). The services included the provision of 126 prostheses (49, or 39% for mine survivors).[5]

The ICRC continued to encourage authorities and agencies to include physical rehabilitation services in a new national health plan, including by allocating more resources to physical rehabilitation centers and ensuring their sustainability. It also provided material and technical support to organizations helping persons with disabilities.[6]

Handicap International (HI) provided support to the Niger Disabled People’s Federation as well as local authorities in Niamey and Maradi to promote inclusive development processes. In 2016, this project was extended to the city Tahoua.[7] HI, also promoted the inclusion of children with disabilities in Niger’s education system, through a West African regional project that also includes Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.[8]

Persons with disabilities were eligible for free healthcare. The constitution and law prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, and access to healthcare and other services. These provisions were generally enforced. Legislation mandates new government buildings be accessible to persons with disabilities, but often architects and construction firms ignored this requirement and the law was not enforced. There were no specific regulations for physical accessibility for persons with disabilities to buildings, transportation, or education. Companies are required to hire a minimum of 5% of employees with disabilities or pay a penalty; however, implementation was lacking.[9]



[1] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, August 2015, p. 41. 

[2] Ibid.

[3] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Philippe Allard, Handicap International (HI), 18 April 2017.

[4] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, May 2016, p. 185; and ICRC, “Faits et chiffres: Diffa,” January 2017, p. 1.

[5] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 173.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Philippe Allard, HI, 18 April 2017.

[8] HI, “Niger,” August 2016.

[9] United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Niger,” Washington, DC, 2017.