Contaminated by: antipersonnel mines (extent unknown), antivehicle mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). May be contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

Article 5 Deadline: 1 March 2012
(Needs to request extension)

Recommendations for action

• The Federal Republic of Nigeria should urgently clear any antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated IEDs on its territory on the basis of humanitarian needs and priorities. It should also take immediate steps to minimize harm to civilian populations, including the provision of risk education.
• Nigeria should inform Mine Ban Treaty States Parties of the discovery of any contamination from antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated IEDs, and report on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programs for their destruction.
• As soon as security conditions permit, non-technical survey should commence in Nigeria’s three most conflict-affected provinces, Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states.
• Where appropriate, Nigeria should encourage and facilitate the provision of assistance and expertise from humanitarian demining organizations.

Contamination

In 2016–2017, numerous incidents involving both civilian and military casualties from “landmines” and a range of IEDs planted by Boko Haram continued to be reported in the northeast of Nigeria. The majority of the reports appear to describe victim-activated IEDs, which function as either antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines.

The extent of contamination from mines and other explosive devices is not known. Incidents involving mines and IEDs have been reported in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, with Borno state the most heavily affected. According to the Nigerian military, the Sambisa forest in Borno state, Boko Haram’s stronghold, has been heavily mined, along with “extensive” mine use by Boko Haram around military positions.[1]

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) carried out a scoping mission to the three northeastern states in April 2017 to assess the extent of the threat from munitions, including IEDs, ERW, and found “unconfirmed but credible reports of landmines.” It received reports of the use of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines around defensive positions, emphasizing that Boko Haram’s use of victim-activated pressure-plate-operated IEDs functioned as landmines.[2]

UNMAS confirmed that use of explosive devices by Boko Haram was extensive, including body-borne IEDs, vehicle-borne IEDs, pressure-plate-activated IEDs, and to a lesser extent, command wire and radio-controlled IEDs. In particular, Boko Haram had made significant use of simple pressure-plate-activated IEDs “effectively as very large de facto landmines” on main supply routes, primarily to attack military convoys, it said.[3]

A November 2015 assessment carried out in Adamawa and Borno states by international demining organization Danish Demining Group (DDG) had noted local community reports of a number of local government areas in Borno state they thought needed clearance, including: Dikwa, Marte, Kukawa, Ngala, Bama, Gwoza, and Kala-Balge.[4] Interviewees identified contamination including antipersonnel and antivehicle mines resembling Chinese No. 4 antipersonnel mines and Type 72 antivehicle mines; a variety of body-borne, vehicle-borne, and remotely controlled IEDs; as well as cluster munition remnants, mortars, rockets, and rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, and Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS).[5]

In 2015, the Nigerian army warned civilians of the threat of IEDs using adapted submunitions. Caches of French-made air-delivered BLG-66 “Beluga” cluster munitions were reportedly found in Adamawa state, alleged to have been taken from stockpiles of the Nigerian armed forces or smuggled in from Libya.[6]

Contamination from mines and IEDs has had a serious humanitarian impact, preventing the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and exacerbating the crisis in the region.[7] In October 2016, the governor of Adamawa state confirmed that many IDPs continued to be unable to return to their farms due to a fear of landmines.[8] Roads were closed to civilian traffic by the military due to the presence of mines or IEDs and there were numerous reports of civilian casualties and farmers who feared returning to work their fields, contributing to sharply worsening food shortages.[9] According to UNMAS, as of April 2017, Borno state hosted 80%—1.5 million—of Nigeria’s IDP population, and 400,000 returnees were living in areas affected by the conflict.[10] It reported that the security situation in Adamawa and Yobe states had improved gradually, but remained volatile, especially in the northeastern part of Yobe.[11](For details of casualties see the Nigeria 2017 casualty profile.)

UNMAS reported that returning IDPs faced a threat from ERW, and that it expected ERW-related incidents to drastically increase with the planned mass return of more than one million refugees and IDPs.[12] It similarly expected a significant threat to UN and humanitarian agencies with the expansion of relief efforts and increased use of main supply routes.[13]

Program Management

Both Nigeria’s armed forces and police carry out explosive ordinance disposal (EOD). The state police have EOD units that support the army in clearing unexploded ordnance (UXO) and IEDs. The army’s ERW clearance is primarily focused on facilitating military operations and clearing roads and areas to facilitate access for troops to carry out attacks on Boko Haram and to keep military supply routes open.[14]

In March 2017, the United States (US) reported donating demining and EOD equipment to Nigeria and providing mine action training for Nigeria’s EOD teams at the Nigerian School of Military Engineering.[15] In December 2016, a media source published photos of a “newly-acquired” Slovak-made Bozena demining machine, which it said had been deployed on roads in Borno state.[16] In 2015, it was reported that Nigeria had ordered 10 demining machines from a Slovakian company, with five scheduled for delivery in 2015 and the remainder in 2016.[17] In 2015, 24 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) were said to have been given to the Nigerian army by the US.[18]

In April 2017, a senior Nigerian military commander informed UNMAS that the army lacked the capacity to undertake humanitarian demining, and he called for additional equipment ongoing support, and refresher training.[19]

UNMAS reported in April 2017 that manual render-safe procedures were the primary method used by the Nigerian military EOD teams, which could be contributing to a high number of casualties among EOD personnel.[20]

In 2016, DDG was providing risk education in IDP camps in the northeast states. It was seeking approval from the government of Nigeria for access to contaminated areas to carry out non-technical survey, prior to clearance.[21] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was also carrying out risk education in IDP camps through local partnerships. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) established an Arms Management and Destruction program in Nigeria, and was also seeking to commence community liaison and risk education activities in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states.[22]

Land Release

It is not known how much mine or EOD clearance has been carried out by the Nigerian military. In April 2017, the Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Tukur Buratai, reported that the army was carrying out limited clearance of routes in forested areas to enable troop movements, but said that humanitarian demining of the Sambisa forest as such had not begun. He called for assistance from the UN and NGO demining organizations.[23]

In October 2016, though, in response to returning local residents’ fears of landmine explosions in areas formerly held by Boko Haram, another senior Nigerian military commander had given assurances that freed communities in the northeast, once certified by the military, were safe from the threat of mines and IEDs. All efforts were being made to ensure that roads said to have been laid with IEDs were cleared, he said, noting that the army had received a large amount of demining equipment, which would be deployed following the training of personnel in their use.[24]

In February 2015, the military was said to have cleared more than 1,500 landmines laid by Boko Haram around the town of Baga and in the Sambisa forest, using armored personnel vehicles and armored tanks with mine-sweeping capabilities.[25] Other media reports in 2015 confirmed that the military was using mechanized demining equipment to clear roads and paths for military operations against Boko Haram in the Sambisa forest, but stated that the available machines were insufficient for the vast area concerned.[26] In another account in Adamawa state, it was reported that the military was working to clear mines from recaptured areas, focusing on roads, schools, and clinics, but farms were not considered a high priority despite many casualties having occurred when civilians returned to their fields.[27]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Nigeria was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2012. In December 2009, Nigeria informed the Second Mine Ban Treaty Review Conference that, “as soon as some limited numbers of anti-personnel landmines were discovered in some parts of Nigeria, we took prompt action to identify and to destroy these mines to protect civilian lives and community livelihoods”.[28] At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November 2011, Nigeria declared it had cleared all known antipersonnel mines from its territory.[29]

Under the treaty’s agreed framework, in the event a mined area is discovered after the expiry of a State Party’s Article 5 clearance deadline, it should immediately inform all other States Parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible. Nigeria has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2012.

Nigeria should request a new extended Article 5 deadline, which should be as short as possible and not more than 10 years. It must also continue to fulfil its reporting obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, including by reporting on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programs for the destruction of all antipersonnel mines therein.[30] As of September 2017, Nigeria had not made a public declaration of any newly discovered antipersonnel mine contamination to States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.