Summary: Non-signatory Russia acknowledges the humanitarian risks associated with cluster munitions, but insists on their military utility and remains critical of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Russia rarely comments publicly on the question of its accession, but elaborated its view of the convention in November 2015 upon voting against a UN resolution on the convention. It also voted no on a follow-up UN resolution on the convention in December 2016. Russia has participated as an observer in two meetings of the convention.

Russia—and the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russia has participated in a joint military operation with the Syrian government since September 2015 that has used cluster munitions. In December 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov did not explicitly deny or admit to Russia’s involvement in the use of cluster munitions in Syria, but made a general claim that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately in Syria. Russian-backed armed opposition groups used cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine in 2014–2015.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In December 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov responded to a letter from Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[1] He also provided a three-page paper entitled, “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria” that states:

“As a responsible party to a number of multilateral arrangements on the control and prohibition of conventional arms, our country strictly complies with its commitments, including with regard to cluster munitions (CMs) that Russia views as a legal means of warfare.”[2]

Russian government officials—from high-level political leaders to diplomatic representatives—rarely comment publicly on the matter of Russia’s accession to the convention. However, in November 2015, Russia elaborated its views in its explanation of its negative vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[3]

In the statement, Russia expressed “concern about the humanitarian impact of the arbitrary use of cluster munitions,” but said, “the Oslo Convention is a very poor example of how to reach agreement on arms control,” and maintained that it does not agree with the convention’s approach.[4] Russia alleged that “the Oslo Convention merely declares a ban on cluster munitions but in actual fact is a cynical attempt to repartition [sic] the market for cluster munitions,” and claimed, “What is happening now regarding the Oslo Convention is the result of extremely unconstructive actions by a group of States resolved to undermine it.”[5]

Russia voted against a similar UNGA resolution in December 2016, but did not make another statement.[6]

Russia did not participate in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[7] When the convention opened for signature in December 2008, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “We are against unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions.” It described cluster munitions as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[8]

Russia has shown little interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010 and 2011, as well as an intersessional meeting in 2012. Russia did not make any statements at these meetings and has not participated in any meetings of the convention since then.

Russia has been selective in the concern it has expressed at new use of cluster munitions. Russia made several statements criticizing the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine in 2014, when its Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement accusing the government of Ukraine of using cluster munitions in civilian areas.[9] At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2014, Russia expressed its “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population,” in reference to Ukraine.[10] The next day Russia told a UN Security Council debate on the situation in Ukraine that “there is an alarming and growing number of civilian victims, including children, as the result of…prohibited munitions, including cluster bombs.”[11] Russia has also expressed concern over the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and asked OSCE monitors to investigate.[12]

Yet Russia has not acknowledged or taken any measures to address the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine (see Use section below).

Russia voted in favor of a June 2015 UN Security Council resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[13] It also voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution in May 2014 that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[14]

Russia has not condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria or Yemen.

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[15] That initiative failed in November 2011, effectively ending the CCW’s deliberations on cluster munitions and leaving the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions. Russia has not proposed any CCW work on cluster munitions since then.

Production and transfer

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union dissolved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[16]

According to international technical reference materials, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

• Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
• Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
• Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).[17]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have been reported in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including 20 that are not yet States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions:[18] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia,[19] India,[20] Iran, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait,[21] Libya,[22] Mongolia, Poland,[23] Romania, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,[24] Uzbekistan, and Yemen.[25] Russian cluster munitions have been used in Sudan, although the government of Sudan has denied having a stockpile.[26] RBK series bombs containing a variety of submunition types appear to account for the vast majority of cluster munitions used in Syria by the Syrian government and possibly by Russian forces.[27]

The States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks, providing types and quantities, as listed in the following table.[28]

The types of cluster munitions produced in the USSR or Russia that have been declared by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are detailed in the following table:

Stockpiled Soviet/Russian cluster munitions declared by States Parties[29]

Stockpiling

Russia has acknowledged possessing a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state,” and has stated that disposing of a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions would be time-consuming and “a significant financial expenditure.”[30] At the CCW in November 2011, Russia stated that the size of its cluster munitions stockpile is similar to that of the US, which had reported 5.5 million cluster munitions.[31]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[32] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by the Russian Federation[33]

Note: FAE = fuel air explosive; HE/AT = high explosive antitank; SFW = sensor-fuzed weapon

Use

Use in Syria

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia City, and that it is using cluster munitions in Syria. At a minimum, Russia is directly participating together with Syrian government forces in attacks that have used cluster munitions on opposition-held areas of governorates such as Aleppo, Homs, and Idlib, and on armed opposition groups.

According to publicly available information obtained from multiple sources, the past reporting period has seen more than a 250% increase in the use of cluster munition in Syria, which corresponds with the apparent increase that started when Russia began its joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015.[34] There were least 238 separate attacks using cluster munitions in Syria between August 2016 and July 2017.

In June 2016, the Russian Ministry of Defense appeared to acknowledge responsibility for an attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq that the United Kingdom (UK) and US said used RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munitions.[35]

In June 2016, Russian footage broadcast from Hmeymim airbase showed RBK-500 ZAB 2.5SM cluster bombs loaded on a SU-34 plane. The footage was quickly censored and Russia’s Ministry of Defense has not commented on the validity of the video.[36] Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out offensives together. However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets used to deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. HRW, Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used.[37]

The December 2016 position paper from Lavrov does not explicitly deny or admit to Russia’s involvement in the use of cluster munitions in Syria. Rather, it makes a general claim that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately in Syria.[38] Previously, in December 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[39]

The December 2016 paper lists measures that Russia says it is taking in Syria to prevent “humanitarian implications of hostilities,” including the provision of medical assistance for sick and wounded residents as well as drinking water and other essential items, clearance of “explosive hazards” by the mine action center of the Russian Armed Forces, and regular briefings that ensure “a high level of transparency” of its operation in Syria. To avoid civilian casualties in the air campaign, Russia states that “all operational flights are planned on thoroughly checked intelligence and are conducted exclusively with a view to destroy members and facilities of illegal armed formations.”

In the position paper, Russia further claims that “no cases of indiscriminate use of air weapons have been registered so far in the course of the counter-terrorist operation in Syria,” and concludes that “given all these elements we consider the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs use in Syria mentioned in your letter totally inappropriate.” The civilian harm caused by cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 140 states.[40] Of these countries, more than 40 have made national statements condemning the use in Syria.[41] In remarks at a 12 April 2017 press briefing in Moscow with the Russian foreign minister, US Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson condemned the Syrian government’s use of “cluster bombs and other types of weapons that are intended to maim and kill in the most horrific ways.”[42]

In September 2016, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions issued a joint declaration stating that they “condemn any use by any actor” and expressing deep concern at “any and all allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions, most notably in Syria and Yemen in the past year.”[43]

Previous use

Russia used cluster munitions in an August 2008 conflict with Georgia, including AO-2.5RTM and 9N210 submunitions, delivered by RBK-series bombs and Uragan ground-fired rockets, respectively. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[44] Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[45] The Netherlands has sought accountability and an investigation into the death of Dutch journalist Stan Storimans, who was killed by a Russian cluster munition strike in Georgia in August 2008.[46]

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions in 1943 against German armed forces during World War II and from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan.[47] Russian forces also used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[48]

In eastern Ukraine, Russian-backed separatists used cluster munition rockets in 2014 and 2015, hitting villages in government-controlled areas.[49] Ukrainian government forces were also responsible for several cluster munition rocket attacks.[50] Russia expressed concern at Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but has not commented on cluster munition attacks by opposition forces.[51]

In the December 2016 position paper, Russia draws attention to laws of war violations, such as “in southeastern Ukraine where the governmental forces and other defense agencies continue to employ CMs against the civilian population in Donbass.” Yet there has been no evidence or allegations of new use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine by any party since a February 2015 ceasefire went into effect.[52]