Syria

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 04 August 2017

Summary: Non-signatory Syria has shown minimal interest in the convention and ignored calls to join it, which have multiplied since Syrian government forces began to use cluster munitions against their own population in mid-2012. Syria abstained from voting on a key UN resolution on the convention in December 2016. It participated in a meeting of the convention once, in 2011.

Syria is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. It has denied possessing or using cluster munitions, but over 600 cluster munition attacks have been recorded in 12 of Syria’s 14 governorates in the five-year period to July 2017. At least 13 types of air-dropped and ground-launched cluster munitions have been used in Syria as well as an unknown type of rocket-fired submunition. There were least 238 separate attacks using cluster munitions in Syria between August 2016 and July 2017, a significant increase from the number of cluster munition attacks recorded before Russia began its joint military operation with Syrian government forces in September 2015. Since 2014, states have adopted 10 Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including four since June 2016.

Policy 

The Syrian Arab Republic has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Syrian government has commented publicly once on the question of whether it will accede to the convention. In September 2011, its representative informed a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions that Syria views cluster munitions as “criminalized by humanity” and said, “We appreciate the international effort to ban these weapons, but cannot sign due to Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights.”[1]

Syria abstained from the vote on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in December 2016 that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[2] It abstained from the vote on the first UNGA resolution on the convention in December 2015.[3]

Syria did not participate in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Syria participated as an observer in the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon, in September 2011. This marks its first and only attendance at a meeting of the convention.

Syria is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production and transfer

Syria is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Stockpiling 

Based on evidence of cluster munition use since 2012, Syria has imported or otherwise received at least 13 types of cluster munitions, as listed in the following table. All cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union/Russia with two exceptions.[4] When and how the Syrian government obtained these cluster munitions, and in what quantities remains unknown.[5]

Types of cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012

Type

Cluster munition name

Number of submunitions

Country produced

Bomb

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

42

USSR

RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh

150

USSR

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM

108

Russia/USSR

RBK-500 PTAB-1M

268

USSR

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5

565

USSR

RBK-500 SPBE

15

Russia

Rocket

Uragan (9M27K-series)

30

Russia

Smerch (9M55K)

72

Russia

SAKR

56 or 72

Egypt

Missiles

9M79 Tochka with 9N123K warhead

50

Russia/USSR

Projectile

3-O-8

14

Russia/USSR

Dispenser

BKF AO-2.5RT

96

USSR

BKF PTAB-2.5KO

12

USSR

 

Use

Evidence recorded by local activists, journalists, first responders, medical personnel, and others points to least 238 separate attacks using cluster munitions in Syria between August 2016 and July 2017.[6] Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2016 reported at least 360 cluster munition attacks between July 2012 and July 2016 in multiple locations across all except two of the country’s 14 governorates.[7] From July 2016 to July 2017, there has been a more than 200% increase in the use of cluster munition in Syria, which corresponds with an apparent increase that began when Russia began its joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015.[8] 

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia City, and that it is using cluster munitions in Syria. At a minimum, Russia is directly participating together with Syrian government forces in attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas of governorates such as Aleppo, Homs, and Idlib, and on armed opposition groups.

Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out offensives together. However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets used to deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used.[9] The Russian Ministry of Defense appeared to acknowledge responsibility for a June 2016 attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq. The United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US) said the attack used RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munitions.[10]

In a December 2016 response to HRW, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov did not explicitly deny or admit to Russia’s involvement in the use of cluster munitions in Syria. He attached a position paper that contains a general claim that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately in Syria.[11] Previously, in December 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[12]

The three-page paper, entitled “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” states that, “no cases of indiscriminate use of air weapons have been registered so far in the course of the counter-terrorist operation in Syria,” and concludes that “given all these elements we consider the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs use in Syria mentioned in your letter totally inappropriate.”[13]

There has been no evidence to indicate that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition operation against the non-state armed group Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq that began in August 2014.[14] In July 2016, a spokesperson for the US Air Force’s Central Command told The Washington Post that “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”[15]

Earlier use of cluster munitions 

Initial reports of the use of RBK-series air-dropped cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5M bomblets emerged in mid-2012, when the government began its air campaign on rebel-held areas.[16] It has used air-dropped cluster bombs since then, including RBK-500 cluster bombs containing ShOAB-0.5 submunitions and AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions.[17] More advanced RBK-500 SPBE bombs containing SPBE sensor fuzed submunitions and a ground-fired 240mm 3-O-8 rocket-assisted mortar projectile have only been used since Russia entered into its joint operation with Syrian government forces at the end of September 2015.[18] In 2012, markings on cluster munitions indicated they were produced in the 1970s and 1980s; while since September 2015, most bear production dates from 1989 into the early 1990s.[19]

Government forces first used ground-launched cluster munitions at the end of 2012, deploying multi-barrel rocket launchers to fire 122mm SAKR cluster munition rockets containing DPICM submunitions.[20] In early 2014, Syrian government forces began to use Smerch 9M55K and Uragan 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions fitted with self-destruct mechanisms.[21] The first use of cluster munitions by IS was documented in July 2014, when it used an unknown type of rocket-fired cluster munition that dispersed DPICM-like submunition with a distinctive red nylon ribbon called “ZP-39.”[22] Syrian government forces have also used Tochka 9M79-series ballistic missiles.

As the Syria conflict continues to deepen, it is not possible to determine with confidence if armed groups other than IS have used cluster munitions.[23] However, there is evidence that opposition forces have repurposed unexploded submunitions for use in air-delivered and ground-emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs). When activated by their victim such devices are considered antipersonnel landmines prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[24]

Responses to the use of cluster munitions 

The Syrian military has denied possessing or using cluster munitions, but rarely responds to or comments on new use of cluster munitions.[25] IS has not responded to its reported use of cluster munitions.

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 140 states.[26] Of these countries, more than 40 have made national statements condemning the use in Syria, including by the foreign ministers of Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK.[27] At a 12 April 2017 press briefing in Moscow with the Russian foreign minister, US Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson condemned the Syrian government’s use of “cluster bombs and other types of weapons that are intended to maim and kill in the most horrific ways.”[28]

In September 2016, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions issued a joint declaration stating that they “condemn any use by any actor” and expressing deep concern at “any and all allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions, most notably in Syria and Yemen in the past year.”[29]

All of the convention’s presidents have issued statements since 2013 have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Germany’s Ambassador Michael Biontino, who is president-designate of the Seventh Meeting of States Parties to be held in Geneva in September 2017.

At the UNGA Third Committee on Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Affairs in November 2016, Slovakia made a statement on behalf of the European Union that strongly condemned the Syrian government for “what may be war crimes,” including the use of cluster munitions.[30] The CMC has condemned the continued use of cluster munitions in Syria, for example, in its statement to the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2016.[31]

The previous UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki-moon has described “the carnage caused by cluster munitions in Syria” as “a direct violation” of international humanitarian law.[32]

States have adopted five UNGA resolutions since May 2013 condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 71/203 adopted on 19 December 2016 by a vote of 116 states in favor with 16 against and 52 abstentions, which expresses outrage at the continued use of cluster munitions.[33]

Since 2014, states have adopted 10 Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including four since June 2016:

  • Resolution 34/26 adopted on 24 March 2017 by a vote of 27 states in favor and seven opposed, with 13 abstentions, which “condemns the indiscriminate use of weapons against civilian areas, such as…cluster munitions.”[34]
  • Resolution S-25/1 adopted on 21 October 2016 by a vote of 24 states in favor and seven states opposed, with 16 abstentions, which strongly condemns “the indiscriminate use of weapons, including…cluster bombs.”[35]
  • Resolution 33/23 adopted on 30 September 2016 by a vote of 26 states in favor and seven states opposed, with 14 abstentions, which “condemns the Syrian authorities’ indiscriminate use of heavy weapons and aerial bombardments, including cluster munitions.”[36]
  • Resolution 32/25 adopted on 1 July 2016 by a vote of 27 states in favor and six states opposed, with 14 abstentions, which “condemns the Syrian authorities’ use of…cluster munitions.”[37]

The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which reports to the Human Rights Council, has reported on cluster munition use several times, most recently in March 2017.[38]



[1] Statement of Syria, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011.

[2]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016.

[3]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015. It also abstained during the first round of voting on the draft resolution in UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security on 4 November 2015. “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution AC.1/70/L.49/Rev.1, 4 November 2015.

[4] Cluster munition rockets manufactured in Egypt have also been used in Syria, while Islamic State (IS) has used cluster munitions rockets of unknown origin containing a DPICM-type submunition called “ZP-39” in Syria.

[5] In 2004, Jane’s Information Group listed Syria as possessing some of the RBK-series air-dropped bombs as well as the KMGU dispensers, indicating that the stocks used after 2012 were not newly-acquired. Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 846.

[6] Since 2012, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has researched and reported cluster munition use in Syria as part of its responsibility as chair of the CMC and ban policy editor for the campaign’s Cluster Munition Monitor reporting initiative. The information contained in this Monitor profile summarizes and updates information published in HRW reports and monitored by HRW, drawing on reporting by local media and activists—including videos—and witness accounts. HRW generally only records cluster munition attacks if the attack and/or remnants were filmed to ensure visual confirmation and for which at least one other source has confirmed the use of cluster munitions. The actual number of attacks is probably much higher, as local activists reported many more incidents of what appear to be cluster munition use.

[7] As of July 2017, the Monitor has yet to see any evidence of cluster munition use in the governorates of Tartus or As-Suwayda.

[8] Previously, there were at least 76 cluster munition attacks by the Russian-Syrian joint operation on opposition-controlled territory between 30 September 2015 and 20 July 2016.

[9] Amnesty International, “Syria: Russia’s shameful failure to acknowledge civilian killings,” 23 December 2015; and HRW, “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016.

[10] Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, “On June 18 Russia and US held teleconference on implementing the Memorandum on preventing aerial incidents in Syria,” 19 June 2016. See also, The New Syrian Army (@NSyA_Official), “Russians are lying with E-conference & more updates on our FB page. http://facebook.com/The.NSAy.Official/posts/255901281444601…#NSyA #RuAF #لسنا_وحدنا,” 1:18pm, 19 June 2016, Tweet.

[11]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016.

[12] Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Russian Defence Ministry commented on briefing of Amnesty International,” 23 December 2015.

[13]Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” Position Paper annexed to letter to HRW from Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 9 December 2016. In the cover letter Lavrov states, “I expect our paper to be taken into account during the preparation of future Human Rights Watch reports on the activities of the Russian military personnel in the fight against terrorism in Syria.”

[14] In September 2015, the US Department of Defense listed eight Operation Inherent Resolve coalition members conducting US-led airstrikes in Iraq: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatory Jordan and States Parties Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and the UK. It listed nine coalition nations participating in US-led airstrikes in Syria: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatories Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and UAE, as well as States Parties Australia, Canada, and France. Department of Defense, “Airstrikes Hit ISIL Terrorists in Syria, Iraq,” 30 September 2015.

[15] Email from Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Writer, The Washington Post, 27 July 2016. See also, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Despite denial, ‘growing evidence’ Russia is using cluster bombs in Syria, report says,” The Washington Post, 28 July 2016.

[16] The 250-kilogram class RBK-series cluster bombs can be delivered by jet aircraft as well as rotary wing aircraft, such as Mi-24 and Mi-8 series helicopters. Brown Moses Blog, “Evidence of cluster bombs being deployed in Syria,” 10 July 2012; and HRW press release, “Syria: Evidence of Cluster Munitions Use by Syrian Forces,” 12 July 2012.

[17] AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions are capable of being loaded into BKF cartridges and dispersed by KMG-U dispensers. The AO-2.5RT submunition can also be delivered by the RBK-500 cluster bomb.

[19] Most RBK-500 SPBE cluster bombs were manufactured in 1990 and 1991.

[20] It is not known if the 122mm rockets are SAKR-18 or SAKR-36 variants, which contain 72 and 98 submunitions respectively. The design of the fuze system in this type of submunition makes it very sensitive and submunitions that fail to explode on initial impact are liable to detonate if disturbed. HRW press release, “Syria: Army Using New Type of Cluster Munition,” 14 January 2013.

[21] Armament Research Services, “9M27K Series Cargo Rockets in Syria,” 22 February 2014. HRW attributed responsibility for the use to Syrian government forces, stating, “It is highly unlikely that rebel forces could acquire the eight-wheeled, 43,700 kilogram launch vehicle or operate its sophisticated fire control system without significant training or time to conduct practice drills. There is no video evidence or written claims that any rebel group controls any BM-30 launchers, its similarly sized re-supply vehicle, or any 300mm surface-to-surface rockets like the 9M55K rocket.” HRW press release, “Syria: New Deadly Cluster Munition Attacks,” 19 February 2014.

[22] HRW, “Syria: Evidence of Islamic State Cluster Munition Use,” 1 September 2014. Markings on some of the submunitions indicate they were manufactured in 1993. Brown Moses Blog, “The markings on what’s assumed to be a Sakr submunition suggests the designation is ZP39, made in 1993,” 4 April 2014.

[24] A video uploaded to YouTube on 26 March 2014 reportedly of arms captured by government forces from rebel groups shows submunitions prepared for use as IEDs.

[25] According to the state-run Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), “the General Command of the Army and the Armed Forces stressed on [15 October 2012] that the misleading media outlets have recently published untrue news claiming the Syrian Arab Army has been using cluster bombs against terrorists.” According to SANA, “the General [in] Command said the Syrian Army does not possess such bombs.” “Syria denies using cluster bombs,” CNN, 16 October 2012. In March 2013, Syrian diplomatic representatives denied the evidence of Syrian cluster bomb use. Letter from Firas al Rashidi, Charge d’affairs ad interim, Embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic to Japan, to the Japanese Campaign to Ban Landmines, 7 March 2013.

[26] A total of 143 countries have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria via national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements. They include 93 States Parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the UK, and Uruguay) and 51 non-signatories (Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, South Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the US, Vanuatu, and Yemen).

[27] National statements condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria have been made by Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo, Turkey, and the US.

[28] US Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, “Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a Press Availability,” Moscow, 12 April 2017.

[29] See the political declaration annexed to the “Final report of the Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5–7 September 2016,” CCM/MSP/2016/9, 30 September 2016.

[30] Statement of Slovakia, UNGA Third Committee on Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Affairs, New York, 15 November 2016.

[31] Statement of the CMC, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and Security, October 2016.

[32] Statement by the UN Secretary General, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of State Parties, San José, 3 September 2014; and statement by the UN Secretary-General, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.

[33]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 71/203, 19 December 2016.

[34]The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 34/26, 24 March 2017.

[36]The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 33/23, 30 September 2016.

[37] This resolution vote is not reflected in ban country profiles for Cluster Munition Monitor 2016 as it occurred after the reporting period deadline of 30 June 2016. “The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 32/25, 1 July 2016.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 27 October 2017

Policy

The Syrian Arab Republic has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Syria has articulated the same position on the ban treaty for years without change: it is concerned with the plight of mine victims, but views antipersonnel mines as necessary weapons as shown by its use of the weapons since 2011. Syria also considers Israel’s continued annexation/occupation of part of the Golan Heights as a key reason for not joining the treaty.[1]

Syria last participated as an observer in a Mine Ban Treaty meeting in 2006.[2] It has rarely made any public statements on its landmine policy or participated in treaty meetings as an observer.

Since 1996, Syria has abstained from voting on every annual pro-ban UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on landmines, including UNGA Resolution 71/34 on 5 December 2016.

Syria is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions or the Convention on Conventional Weapons. It acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention on 14 September 2013.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Syria is not known to have produced or exported antipersonnel mines.

The size and origin of Syria’s mine stockpile is not known, but it is believed to be significant and comprised mainly of Soviet/Russian-manufactured mines including PMN-2, PMN-4, and OZM-72 antipersonnel mines, as well as TMN-46 and TM-62 antivehicle mines. Photographs and a video posted online by the Syrian Center for Demining Rehabilitation on 28 September 2015, allegedly filmed west of Daraa in southern Syria, show up to 20 PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being removed from the ground.[3] This is the first evidence of use of the PMN-4 in the Syria conflict, but it is unclear who laid them or when. Markings on the mines indicate they were manufactured in Russia in 1995.

Use

Prior to the current armed conflict that began in 2011, Syria was last believed to have used landmines in 1982 during the conflict with Israel in Lebanon. Little was known about the extent of its landmine problem, but the most significantly mined areas were in the Syrian-controlled Golan Heights, in the southwest of the country, in addition to its borders.

In late 2011, the first reports emerged of Syrian government use of antipersonnel mines in the country’s border areas.[4] A Syrian official acknowledged the government had “undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.”[5]

In 2016, reports of mine use by the so-called Islamic State (IS) and Syrian government forces increased. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reported several incidents from mines that IS fighters likely laid as the group controlled the territory for prolonged periods of time. For example, in Aleppo governorate alone, SNHR reported civilian casualties in August, September, and October 2016 from landmines that IS apparently laid in the villages of Najm,[6] Abu Qalqal,[7] Al Humar,[8] and Al Dadat.[9]

The landmine use continued in 2017, with SNHR reporting 12 casualties in Raqqa governorate in just August and September, from incidents in Kasrat Srour,[10] Raqqa City,[11] and Hneida.[12] Syria’s state-run news agency reported in October that a photographer with Syrian state TV had been killed in the central Homs province when a land mine left behind by IS militants exploded.[13]

IS is retreating from former strongholds, but leaves improvised landmines and booby traps behind in a last effort to kill civilians and opposition forces. In October 2017, a British soldier fighting with the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) was killed while clearing landmines in the abandoned city of Raqqa.[14] Between September 2015 and January 2017, Mines Advisory Groups (MAG) successfully cleared 7,500 improvised mines and other improvised devices from Iraq and Syria.[15]

In January 2016, Doctors Without Borders (Medecins sans Frontieres, MSF) reported that Syrian government forces laid landmines around the town of Madaya in Rif Dimashq governorate, some 10 kilometers from the Lebanon border. According to MSF, civilians trying to flee the city have been killed and injured by “bullets and landmines.”[16] In October 2016, residents of Madaya claimed that the Lebanese armed group, Hezbollah, operating together with government forces, laid mines around the town.

In March 2016, Syrian government forces in the city of Palmyra reported that they were finding landmines planted by IS fighters.[17]

During a five-day investigation in Manbij in early October 2016, Human Rights Watch (HRW) collected the names of 69 civilians, including 19 children, killed by improvised mines, including booby-traps, which were laid in schools, homes, and on roads during and after the fighting over control of the city, involving IS and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and other forces supported by the United States government.[18] Nearly all the incidents documented by HRW appeared to have been caused by victim-activated improvised explosive devices, rather than by explosives detonated by a vehicle or by remote-control.



[1] Telephone interview with Milad Atieh, Director, Department of International Organizations and Conventions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 January 2008; and interview with Mohd Haj Khaleel, Department of International Organizations and Conventions, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Damascus, 25 February 2007. See also, statement of Syria, Seminar on Military and Humanitarian Issues Surrounding the Mine Ban Treaty, Amman, 19–21 April 2004.

[2] A Geneva-based Syrian diplomat attended as an observer the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2006.

[4] ICBL Press Release, “ICBL publicly condemns reports of Syrian forces laying mines,” 2 November 2011.

[5]Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border,” The Associated Press, 1 November 2011.

[13]IS land mine kills Syrian state TV photographer,” Associated Press (Beirut), 17 October 2017.

[14] Lizzie Dearden, “Jac Holmes: British man who volunteered to fight against Isis killed in Syria,” The Independent, 24 October 2017.

[15] Chris Loughran and Sean Sutton, “MAG: Clearing Improvised Landmines in Iraq,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue, 21.1, April 2017.

[16] MSF, “Syria: Siege and Starvation in Madaya,” 7 January 2016.

[17] Raf Sanchez, “Syrian regime troops struggle to clear explosive booby traps in Palmyra,” The Telegraph, 28 March 2016.

[18] HRW Press Release, “Syria: Improvised Mines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Manbij,” 26 October 2016.


Mine Action

Last updated: 13 December 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (extent unknown), cluster munition remnants (extent unknown), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Contamination

The Syrian Arab Republic is contaminated by landmines, IEDs, and explosive remnants of war (ERW) including cluster munition remnants that, according to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “endanger the lives and livelihoods of civilians, impede humanitarian aid, restrict freedom of movement, and hinder socio-economic recovery.”[1]

In November 2016, during a rapid assessment conducted by UNMAS in all 14 governorates, over 20% of total communities within Syria reported the presence of explosive weapons, with 3.6 million people living in contaminated areas. Almost half (47%) of the contaminated communities were located in Aleppo governorate. Of affected communities, 91% reported agricultural land was contaminated; 700 communities (57%) reported the presence of landmines, 400 reported the presence of ERW, and 150 communities reported the presence of air-dropped bombs.[2] The survey captured the communities’ perception of mine/ERW contamination and did not definitively determine the presence or absence of mines/ERW. The results are therefore subject to direct confirmation through non-technical and technical survey by trained mine action personnel in the future.[3] In mid-2017, UNMAS increased its estimate of the number of people living in contaminated areas to 6.5 million.[4]

Mine contamination

Mine contamination in Syria is a legacy of Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 and a consequence of the ongoing armed conflicts. No credible estimate of the extent of contamination across Syria exists, though it is believed to be very extensive.[5]

There has been continued use of mines by pro- and anti-government forces across the country. Turkish authorities have reportedly claimed that between 613,000 and 715,000 mines had been planted along the Turkish-Syrian border, making clear they were not emplaced by Turkish forces.[6] At the end of January 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry criticized the Syrian government for having laid mines around Madaya and other besieged towns in Syria.[7] Soviet/Russian-made PMN-4 antipersonnel mines have been cleared from Madaya. Syrian government use of these mines was first reported in 2012.[8]

In Kobani and the surrounding villages, which were captured from non-state armed group (NASG) Islamic State forces in 2015, humanitarian demining operators found a significant quantity of improvised antipersonnel mines.[9] To the east, Islamic State are said to have surrounded government-controlled areas in the city of Deir ez-Zor with thousands of landmines. According to one witness from Deir ez-Zor’s besieged al-Jura neighborhood who was cited in the media in March 2016, “After a year of living under siege, some inhabitants tried to flee driven by famine and disease. They were either killed by ISIS sharpshooters or exploding mines. Some torn corpses are still lying in the minefields.”[10] Mine casualties are reported to have occurred in areas of Hassakeh province in the far northeast contested by Islamic State and Kurdish forces.[11]

Remotely delivered T-84 antivehicle mines were reportedly used in the Golan Heights in the southwest of Syria (already heavily contaminated with antipersonnel mines).[12] There have also been reports that T-84s have been remotely deployed in Daraa governorate in the southwest of the country.[13]

In March 2017, a report by the International Commission of Inquiry on Syria noted the indiscriminate presence of antipersonnel mines, IEDs, and booby-traps in civilian areas captured from Islamic State by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) or the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Improvised mines “continue to be laid” by Islamic State “with devastating effect.”[14]

Cluster munition contamination

Cluster munition contamination in Syria is the consequence of the ongoing armed conflict since 2012. Syrian government forces have used cluster munitions extensively while Islamic State has reportedly used them in a number of instances. The extent of contamination is not known, as ongoing conflict prevents survey of the contaminated areas.

Up to mid-July 2017, there have been more than 600 cluster munition attacks recorded in 12 of Syria’s 14 governorates. (For details of cluster munition use, see the Syria cluster munition ban profile.) During the UNMAS rapid assessment in late 2016, communities in Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Rural Damascus governorates reported the presence of cluster munition remnants.[15]

Unexploded submunitions caused at least 23 casualties in 2016, though this figure is certainly underreported. (See the casualties profile for further details, including on the reported 837 casualties caused by cluster munition attacks in Syria.)

The Syrian Civil Defense (SCD, also known as the White Helmets) report that unexploded submunitions are the type of ERW that are having the greatest impact in Idlib, Hama, Daraa and Quneitra—the areas where they operate.[16]

Program Management

There is no national mine action program in Syria, no national mine action authority, and no mine action center.

On the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2165 (2014), UNMAS was asked to provide assistance for mine action in Syria. In 2015, at the request of the UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator, UNMAS established an office in Gaziantep, Turkey, to coordinate the international mine action response in Syria.[17] In 2017, UNMAS also established a coordination desk in Jordan.[18] In addition to coordinating humanitarian mine action operations, UNMAS reports that it has supported risk education and survey of the impact of contamination.[19]

Within the Humanitarian Response Plan for Syria, the proposed 2017 Mine Action response includes risk education and victim assistance, in cooperation with the government of Syria when feasible. Humanitarian actors are encouraged to explore avenues of cooperation with the Syrian government on all components of humanitarian mine action.[20] The extent to which most mine action actors cooperate with the Syrian government is not known. As SCD only conducts operations in opposition held areas, it does not liaise with the Syrian government.[21]

According to a 2016 report by the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), the response by the international community to the mine/ERW threat has been slow. This is due in part to restrictions on transferring explosive materials necessary for disposal to local demining groups in Syria, and the lack of access to contaminated areas in Syria by international demining groups.[22] CIVIC also reports that the Turkish authorities and some international NGOs are concerned that training on explosive ordnance disposal could give trainees the knowledge and equipment to make IEDs. In addition, civilian clearance teams could be targeted by armed groups or criminals for their explosives and explosive accessories.[23]

According to a media report, in late August 2017, the Russian Defense Ministry was working on establishing an international coalition for demining Syria, with Armenia and Serbia willing to become members.[24]

Information management

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) has been established for Syria.[25] The SCD provides spot ERW in IMSMA format, however, as of September 2017, they had not been uploaded to IMSMA.[26] It was not possible for the SCD to generate polygons, mainly due to the inability to conduct quality control.[27]

Operators

The SCD established its first explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) operational capacity in April 2016.[28] As of September 2017, the SCD had UXO clearance teams in Daraa (three teams), Quneitra (one team), Hama (one team), and Idlib (one team). The SCD personnel are volunteers.[29] Forty-one SCD personnel were trained in 2016 by Mayday Rescue, and 64 between March and April 2017.[30] The training was conducted in Jordan.[31] The training covered explosive ordnance recognition, task management, protective works, surface battle area clearance (BAC) search, and single item disposal using a thermite flare.[32] Due to the risks associated with using explosives, in 2015 the SCD launched a project to use non-explosive methods to dispose of UXO.[33] As there is no accreditation body in Syria and technical experts cannot deploy on the ground, a degree of quality management is provided via remote methods.[34]

In October 2016, Tetra Tech commenced training with PCM/MAT Kosovo of Syrian nationals through a training center established within Syria. Training included UXO Searcher/IMAS EOD level one and two courses. As of August 2017, two groups of 65 have been trained in the Manbij and Tabqa areas.[35]

A demining organization called Rojava Mine Cleaning Organization (RMCO) was established in 2016 with technical support from the YPG. It is based in Ras al Ain/Sara Kani city, in Hasakah governorate.[36]

Additional local groups conduct clearance in various capacities.[37] UNMAS reported in early 2016 that the extent and impact of contamination has resulted in Syrians without formal training conducting “ad hoc clearance without the technical ability to do so. The capacity of some local teams conducting clearance has been reduced by half as a result of casualties occurring during operations.”[38]

The main international NGO demining operator in Syria in 2016 was Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Handicap International (HI) did not conduct land release in 2016.[39] The Danish Demining Group (DDG) has been working only within government-held areas, conducting training of trainers for risk education.[40]

Russian deminers arrived in Syria in March 2016. In April, the Russian military reported completing demining of the ancient part of the city of Palmyra, recaptured by Syrian and Russian forces in late March from Islamic State militants.[41] In December 2016, an advanced demining unit of the Russian Mine Action Center was deployed to Syria’s Hmeimim airbase to conduct mine clearance operations in Aleppo. Subsequently, a diplomatic source told a news agency that Moscow was calling on the UN and other international organizations to provide the Russian military with assistance in demining Aleppo.[42] The former commander of the Russian engineering troops, Colonel-General Nikolai Serdtsev, described the bomb disposal mission in Aleppo as much more “complicated” than the one carried out in Palmyra city.[43]

Land Release

Syria does not have a comprehensive civilian program for survey or clearance.

There is no reliable data on the amount of land surveyed and cleared, or quantity of items destroyed in Syria in 2016.

Survey

In an attempt to better define the type and extent of contamination, impact surveys were conducted by UNMAS and NGO partners in 121 communities between October 2016 and July 2017, but results were not made public.[44]

Clearance

The SCD started conducting emergency clearance in 2016, using standard operating procedures adapted to the conflict context.[45] The SCD has the capacity to conduct clearance of single item, surface UXO. In Idlib and Hama, following the reduction of hostilities, the SCD were working full time from April 2016 to reduce the ERW threat to the returning population.[46] By mid 2017, the SCD’s clearance operations had extended to the southern governorates of Daraa and Quneitra.[47] Daraa is located in a “de-escalation zone” agreed by the United States, Russia, and Jordan, which has protected it and the surrounding areas from new bombardment, enabling the SCD to focus on EOD.[48]

In 2016, the SCD destroyed a total of 5,568 submunitions and 82 items of other UXO.[49]

ERW clearance by the SCD[50]

Governorate

No. of unexploded submunitions destroyed

No. of other UXO destroyed

Time period

Daraa[51]

43

11

July–31 August 2017

Hama

3661

31

April 2016–31 August 2017

Idlib

6982

177

April 2016–31 August 2017

Quneitra

1

0

August 2017

 

As of August 2017, RMCO, with technical support from YPG, had reportedly destroyed more than 90,000 antipersonnel mines, booby traps, and other ERW during clearance operations in the area under the control of the YPG in northern Syria and in the area retaken by the SDF from Islamic State.[52] RMCO reportedly marks and clears contaminated areas to facilitate the return of displaced populations.[53]

SDF forces began demining areas throughout Minbij, to the west of the Euphrates River, shortly after capturing the town in mid-August 2016.[54]

Russian forces have been demining in areas recovered by the government of Syria. Russia has reported that in March to June 2016 its forces cleared the historical complex of Palmyra, destroying in the process 17,456 items of ERW, “including” 432 IEDs. Subsequently, in December 2016, 157 military deminers, 29 machines, and nine mine detection dogs (MDDs) were involved in demining in Aleppo city. During this process, 34,886 items of ERW were destroyed, “including 19,834 IEDs.”[55]

The ongoing conflict poses numerous challenges to mine action implementation. Operators face difficulties in gaining access, safety and security, and therefore regularly have to suspend operations. Operators are also limited in the use of equipment for the accurate recording of contaminated locations, such as detectors, cameras, and GPS. In some locations, operators also had difficulty in gaining community acceptance to conduct activities.[56] As many Syrians do not have passports, this presents a challenge when organizing training in other countries.[57]

Deminer safety

One SCD EOD operator was killed in an attack during an EOD operation in October 2016.[58]

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] UNMAS, “Programmes: Syria,” last updated July 2017.

[2] Email from Mika Toivonen, Operations and QA Officer, UNMAS Syria Response, 29 August 2017.

[3] UNMAS/NPM, “Rapid Assessment on Mine Action,” November 2016, p. 4.

[4] UNMAS, “Programmes: Syria,” last updated July 2017.

[5] See, for example, E. Sauvage, Handicap International USA, “30+ Years Needed to Clear Syria of Explosive Remnants of War,” 2016.

[6]Thousands of landmines planted along Turkish-Syrian border,” Middle East Monitor, 21 November 2013.

[7] US Campaign to Ban Landmines, “Presidential support for Colombia’s mine clearance,” 6 February 2016; see also John Kerry’s Twitter account.

[8] Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Army Planting Banned Landmines,” 13 March 2012.

[9] Handicap International, “Kobani: A city of rubble and unexploded devices,” Factsheet, May 2015, pp. 3, 4, 5.

[10] A. Ramadan, “Land mines, the silent killers in Syria war,” Arab Weekly, 18 March 2016.

[11] Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Landmines kill 8 in Hama and al-Hassakah,” 2 May 2015.

[12] M. Hiznay, Human Rights Watch, “Remotely delivered antivehicle mines spotted in Syria,” 25 April 2014.

[13] Telephone interview with Luke Irving, Specialist Training and EOD Manager, Mayday Rescue, 16 October 2017.

[14] “Human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations in the Syrian Arab Republic, 21 July 2016–28 February 2017,” Conference room paper of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UN doc. A/HRC/34/CRP.3, 10 March 2017, §90.

[15] UNMAS/NPM, “Rapid Assessment on Mine Action,” November 2016, pp. 6–7.

[16] Interview with Luke Irving, Specialist Training and EOD Manager, Mayday Rescue, Majid Khalaf, EOD Liaison Officer, SCD, and Nour Saleh, Project Officer, Mayday Rescue, in Geneva, 5 September 2017.

[17] UNMAS, “Programmes: Syria,” updated March 2016.

[18] Email from Mika Toivonen, UNMAS Syria Response, 29 August 2017.

[19] Email from Dandan Xu, Associate Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 12 July 2017.

[20] Email from Mika Toivonen, UNMAS Syria Response, 29 August 2017; and “Syrian Arab Republic, Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP),” March 2017, p. 25. The HRP was developed by the humanitarian community working in Syria, under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Syria (HC) and the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis (RHC) and with support from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

[21] Interview with Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, Majid Khalaf, SCD, and Nour Saleh, Mayday Rescue, in Geneva, 5 September 2017.

[22] Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), “Waiting for No One: Civilian Survival Strategies in Syria,” 2016, p. 42.

[23] Ibid.

[25] Email from Mika Toivonen, UNMAS Syria Response, 29 August 2017.

[26] Interview with Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, Majid Khalaf, SCD, and Nour Saleh, Mayday Rescue, in Geneva, 5 September 2017.

[27] Email from Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, 28 August 2017.

[28] SCD/Mayday Rescue, “Explosive hazard clearance,” 30 August 2017.

[29] Interview with Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, Majid Khalaf, SCD, and Nour Saleh, Mayday Rescue, in Geneva, 5 September 2017.

[30] Emails from Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, 28 August and 3 October 2017.

[31] Interview with Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, Majid Khalaf, SCD, and Nour Saleh, Mayday Rescue, in Geneva, 5 September 2017.

[32] Email from Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, 28 August 2017.

[33] CIVIC, “Waiting for No One: Civilian Survival Strategies in Syria,” 2016, p. 43.

[34] Email from Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, 28 August 2017.

[35] Email from Ben Remfrey, Managing Director, PCM ERW Risk Management & MAT Kosovo, 15 August 2017.

[36] See the RMCO website for more details.

[37] Email from Natasha Hall, Mayday Rescue, 27 September 2017.

[38] UNMAS, “Programmes: Syria,” updated March 2016.

[39] Email from Catherine Smith, Mine Action Desk Officer, Handicap International, 14 March 2017.

[40] Email from Lene Rasmussen, DDG Regional Manager MENA, 15 March 2017.

[42] M. Al Mounes (AFP), “Russian Defense Minister Hails Demining Work in Syria’s Palmyra, Aleppo,” Sputnik, 21 January 2017.

[44] Email from Mika Toivonen, UNMAS Syria Response, 29 August 2017.

[45] Interview with Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, Geneva, 5 September 2017.

[46] Interview with Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, Majid Khalaf, SCD, and Nour Saleh, Mayday Rescue, in Geneva, 5 September 2017.

[47] SCD/Mayday Rescue, “Explosive hazard clearance,” 30 August 2017.

[49] Email from Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, 3 October 2017.

[50] SCD/Mayday Rescue, “Explosive hazard clearance,” 30 August 2017.

[51] According to a media report in mid-2017, in one week in July, the SCD in Daraa dealt with about 100 submunitions in Deraa and nearby villages. “Amid ceasefire, rescuers clear unexploded bombs in Syria's Deraa,Reuters, 28 July 2017.

[52] Email from Carla Ruta, Thematic Legal Advisor, Geneva Call, 23 August 2017.

[53] Ibid.

[54] “Human rights abuses and international humanitarian law violations in the Syrian Arab Republic, 21 July 2016–28 February 2017,” §90.

[55] Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2016), Form E.

[56] Emails from Mika Toivonen, UNMAS Syria Response, 29 August 2017; and from Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, 28 August 2017.

[57] Interview with Luke Irving, Mayday Rescue, Majid Khalaf, SCD, and Nour Saleh, Mayday Rescue, in Geneva, 5 September 2017.

[58] Ibid.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 11 December 2017

In 2016, 10 donors reported contributing US$19.2 million to mine action activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, 30% more than in 2015 when international funding totaled $14.8 million.[1]

The United States (US) provided the largest contribution with $9.5 million, which represents half of the total international mine action assistance in Syria for 2016. In addition, three donors provided more than $1 million each: the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), New Zealand, and Norway.

International contributions: 2016[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount (national currency)

Amount (US$)

US

Various

$9,510,000

9,510,000

OCHA

Various

N/A

3,174,353

New Zealand

Victim assistance

NZ$3,500,000

2,441,600

Norway

Clearance

NOK14,397,577

1,715,304

Japan

Various

¥98,407,929

905,650

EU

Various

€498,793

552,264

Denmark

Risk education

DKK3,000,000

445,924

Luxembourg

Victim assistance

€215,700

238,823

Germany

Risk education

€89,691

99,306

Netherlands

Clearance and risk education

€71,587

79,261

Total

 

 

19,162,485

Note: N/A = not applicable.

Since 2012, international contributions to mine action in Syria jumped from just $1 million in 2012 to more than $19 million in 2016, and totaled nearly $40 million.

 Summary of international contributions: 2012–2016[3]

Year

International contributions (US$)

2016

19,162,485

2015

14,751,538

2014

1,366,000

2013

3,618,767

2012

1,072,046

Total

39,970,836

 



[1] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ditte Bjerregaard, Head of Section, Stabilization and Security Policy, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 June 2017; Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCW) Amended Protocol II Annual Report, Form E, 31 March 2017; Japan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2017; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Frank Braun, Desk Disarmament, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, 13 March 2017, and by Olivia Douwes, Policy Officer, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 June 2017; New Zealand, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 27 April 2017; email from Ingrid Schoyen, Senior Adviser, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2017; UNMAS, “Annual Report 2016,” March 2017, p. 30; response to Monitor questionnaire by Frank Meeussen, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control, European External Action Service, 30 September 2017; and email from Steve Costner, Deputy Office Director, Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 30 October 2017.

[2] Average exchange rate for 2016: DKK6.7276=US$1; €1=US$1.1072; NOK8.3936=US$1; ¥108.66=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2017.

[3] See previous Monitor reports. 


Casualties

Last updated: 13 July 2017

Casualties Overview

All known mine/ERW casualties by end 2016

2,677 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) and unexploded cluster submunitions casualties (mine/ERW)  (1,214 killed; 1,449 injured; 14 unknown)

Mine/ERW casualties occurring in 2016

435 (2015: 924)

2016 mine/ERW casualties by survival outcome

302 killed; 131 injured; 2 unknown survival outcomes (2015: 294 killed; 630 injured)

2016 mine/ERW casualties by device type

217 unspecified mine types; 155 improvised mines; 33 antivehicle mines; 23 unexploded submunitions; 2 ERW; 5 undifferentiated mines/ERW

Cluster munition casualties since 2012

At least 3,075 (860 in 2016)

Including casualties of both direct use (which are not included in other mine/ERW casualty totals) and unexploded submunitions, which are included (see below for more details on these cluster munition casualties, including those occurring during direct use.)

 

The Monitor identified 435 mine/ERW casualties in the Syrian Arabic Republic (not including the occupied Golan Heights) from multiple sources for 2016. However, since the conflict began in 2011, annual recorded totals of mine/ERW casualties are thought to be an undercount. It is expected that the actual number of casualties in Syria in 2016, as in past years, was significantly higher than recorded.

Due to the various actors’ differing reasons for the recording of casualty data, some datasets only include fatalities, while others only record people who were injured. Consequently, the ratio of killed to injured in 2016 cannot be considered indicative of the actual totals of survival outcomes as among the 435 recorded casualties, only 128 injured people were recorded compared to 302 people killed (for two casualties it was not reported if they survived). In contrast, 2015 was the first time since the beginning of the conflict a substantial dataset on persons injured by mines/ERW in Syria was available from Handicap International (HI) for that year.[1]

The 86 survivors of mines and ERW reported by HI for 2016 was a significant decrease from the 607 injured mine/ERW casualties recorded by HI for 2015.[2] The vast majority of the 2015 HI data on persons injured was gathered through a large-scale survey that took place between June 2013 and December 2015.[3] Although this specific survey was completed, HI continued to collect data on mine/ERW survivors from Syria among its beneficiaries in 2016, although significantly fewer were recorded than for 2015.[4]

The 435 mine/ERW casualties recorded in 2016 represented a decrease from the 990 mines/ERW casualties recorded in 2015. However, as noted above, this is not necessarily representative of a trend, due to the limitations in data collection more broadly, and in particular the completion of the HI survey among displaced persons and refugees in December 2015. As was the case in 2014, the data available for 2016 was mostly for fatalities, making it certain that persons injured were massively unreported. Persons injured were also severely underreported in 2013 and 2012. Since the conflict began in 2011, until 2015, the numbers of casualties identified annually in Syria increased significantly from previous years. In 2010, no casualties were identified in Syria, and in 2009, a single antivehicle mine casualty was reported.[5]

Of the recorded casualties in 2016, 247 were male, 51 were female and 137 were of unknown gender. Adults made up 292 of the total (189 men, 38 women, 65 of unknown sex), while 112 were children (56 boys, 13 girls, and 43 of unknown age group), and 31 were of unknown age group and gender. This was a similar ratio of male to female as in 2015. Of the casualties of known age group, the percentage of children had risen from 13% in 2015 to 28% in 2016. The civil status of the majority (312) of casualties was not known, 111 were identified as civilians, and 12 as military/combatants.

There is no comprehensive, country-wide mine/ERW casualty data collection mechanism in place and the ongoing conflict hampers the recording of casualties by the various actors that capture such information. Nevertheless, several organizations have maintained efforts to record casualties of conflict, including those resulting from mines/ERW. The Monitor has extracted, analyzed, and compiled relevant mine/ERW casualty information for 2016 in a unified dataset using publicly available data from the Violations Documentation Center (VDC), the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), the Syrian Civil Defence, Human Rights Watch (HRW), Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF), and the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), specific data from HI, as well as data from anonymous sources.[6] Notably, most data reported by these diverse actors for 2016 was unique, as Monitor analysis showed little duplication of mine/ERW casualties reported.

Reporting indicated that the number of casualties in 2016 was likely significantly higher than could be recorded. In addition to the casualties identified for inclusion in the annual total by the Monitor, there are reports of hundreds of mine/ERW casualties for which insufficient detail was available to be included in the annual casualty total. For example, an MSF report provides anecdotal accounts from medical staff of numerous casualties from mines/ERW in 2015 and 2016. MSF reported that in the summer of 2016—over the course of just four weeks—in the Manbij area of Aleppo governorate, hospital staff received more than 190 people injured by blasts from explosive devices.[7] A total of 270 patients with injuries related to mine/ERW blasts from Manbij were received in hospitals in Kobane in the three-month period from 16 June to 16 Sept 2016.[8]

Similarly, HRW noted that there were hundreds of civilian casualties from improvised mines (victim-activated IEDs), including dozens of children, in Manbij, Aleppo governorate, according to the accounts of hospital staff interviewed. The head of a hospital in Kobane reported that 840 injured people from Manbij were treated in July and August, and he estimated that 80% of the injures were from IEDs.[9] Survivors and their families reported that “civilians returning to their homes after the fighting had been injured or killed by explosive devices placed in doorways and windows, under mattresses and piles of shoes, in refrigerators and bags of clothes, and in television sets and kitchen sink taps.”[10] Due to a lack of detail and disaggregation between improvised mines and command-detonated IEDs—which are excluded from Monitor reporting—these casualties could not be included in the total for 2016.

Most of the mine/ERW casualties identified by the Monitor were caused by mines of unspecified type (216), followed by improvised mines—also called victim-activated IEDs (155)—, unexploded submunitions (23), antivehicle mines (33), other ERW (two), and undifferentiated mines/ERW (three).

Casualties recorded by the Monitor resulted from mine/ERW incidents in 11 governorates: the majority (42%, or 182) were in Aleppo, and the others were in Daara, Damascus suburbs, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Hasakeh, Homs, Idlib, Madaya, and Raqqa. Correspondingly, a mine action rapid assessment conducted by UNMAS in November 2016, and covering practically the entire territory of Syria, found that a total of 397 communities in 12 governorates reported mine/ERW casualties, the majority also being in Aleppo. The survey did not aim to capture the total number of casualties from explosive hazards, but to ask whether the respondents knew of casualties occurring in their area. The governorates with the highest number of casualties were Aleppo, Raqqa, and Idleb.[11]

Siege-type minefields continued to cause civilians casualties into 2016, as had been the case in 2015. In April, three boys died of landmine-inflicted injures in Manbij. The siege minefields also prevented access to emergency medical assistance for those people injured.[12] There are also reports of at least eight other casualties that occurred while civilians tried to flee from the non-state armed group Islamic State (IS) in Manbij during July and August 2016.[13]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties identified by the Monitor in Syria between 1967 and the end of 2016 was at least 2,677 casualties (1,214 killed; 1,449 injured; 14 unknown). The total includes 660 mine casualties (220 killed; 440 injured) as of May 2011,[14] and 2,017 mine/ERW casualties between June 2011 and the end of 2016 (994 killed; 1,009 injured; and 14 unknown survival outcome).[15]

Due to the absence of a national casualty data collection mechanism, it is probable that there were also unrecorded casualties before the beginning of internal armed conflict in 2011.

Cluster munition casualties

The Monitor identified at least 860 cluster munition casualties in 2016 (221 killed; 639 injured). As in previous years, the overwhelming majority of recorded casualties (837) were caused by cluster munition attacks, while 23 casualties caused by unexploded submunitions were recorded. Data on cluster munition casualties was compiled from the following sources: the Syrian Civil Defence, the SNHR, the VDC, and HRW.[16]

As with mines and other ERW, due to the challenges of collecting data, including the security situation and ongoing conflict, the number of cluster munition casualties caused by both attacks and unexploded submunitions is likely to be underreported. It is possible that some persons recorded as injured by other mine and remnant types were actually unexploded submunition casualties. In addition, a further 83 casualties occurred when cluster munitions were used with other weapons. In these cases, it was not possible to determine how many casualties were due to cluster munitions and how many to other weapons.[17] Therefore, the Monitor has not included these casualties in the annual cluster munition casualty total.

The 860 cluster munition casualties in 2016 were recorded in seven governorates: Aleppo, Daara, Damascus suburbs, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Homs, and Idlib. For 62% of the 2016 cluster munition casualties the age was not recorded.

Where information was available, 214 were adults (98 men, 57 women, 59 unknown) and 117 were children (28 boys, 14 girls, and 75 unknown).  For 75% of the casualties, the gender was not recorded. Of those for whom it -was recorded, 67% (143, which includes 17 casualties of unknown age) were male, and 33% (71) were female.  The majority (595 or 99% where the civil status was known), were reported to be civilian, only six were reported to be military, while 259 were of unknown civil status. The 860 cluster munition casualties recorded in 2016 is a significant increase on the 248 cluster munition casualties recorded in 2015 (231 from strikes).[18] In 2014, 383 casualties were recorded (329 from strikes); in 2013, 1,001; and in 2012, 583 (see previous Monitor casualty reports for further details).

Prior to new use of cluster munitions in 2012, at least five casualties from unexploded cluster submunitions had been recorded in Syria, including four child casualties in 2007.[19]



[1] See, HI factsheet, “Syria: A mutilated future,” Brussels, 20 June 2016, pp. 1–2; and HI, “New Report: Syrians Maimed and Traumatized by Explosive Weapons,” 20 June 2016.

[2] This was an increase from the 551 injured casualties reported by HI for 2015 in 2016, with the addition of data recorded from survivors by HI in 2016.

[3] Data on injured persons was collected by HI and partners through interviews with displaced people and refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon between June 2013 and December 2015. The reporting is based on interviews with 68,049 people assessed by HI teams, of which 25,097 were injured: 14,471 in Syria, 7,823 in Jordan, and 2,803 in Lebanon. See, HI factsheet, “Syria: A mutilated future,” Brussels, 20 June 2016, pp. 1–2; and HI, “New Report: Syrians Maimed and Traumatized by Explosive Weapons,” 20 June 2016.

[4] Casualty data from Regional Emergency Response Office on the Syrian Crisis, HI, 11 May 2017.

[5] Email from Dr. Hosam Doughouz, Health Officer, Quneitra Health Directorate, 12 May 2010.

[6] See VDC website; SNHR, “Civilians died in ISIS landmine explosion Al Sukariya village in Aleppo governorate, December 3,” undated; MayDay Rescue, “White Helmets [Syrian Civil Defence] Daily Responses Report,” for the period October 2016 through December 2016; HRW, “Syria: Improvised Mines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Manbij,” 26 October, 2016; Medicins San Frontieres, “Set to explode: Impact of mines, booby traps and explosive remnants of war on civilians in northern Syria,” April 2017; casualty data from Regional Emergency Response Office on the Syrian Crisis, HI, 11 May 2017; and GICHD, “Anti-Vehicle Mine (AVM) Incidents map,” 2017.

[7] Medicins San Frontieres, “Set to explode: Impact of mines, booby traps and explosive remnants of war on civilians in northern Syria,” April 2017, p. 5.

[8] “Ibid., p. 19, and see graph “Patients with injuries related to ERW blasts from Manbij.”

[9] In October 2016, HRW collected the names of 69 civilians, including 19 children, killed by improvised mines. These casualties were included in the annual total for 2016. The total is likely to be much higher due to the constraints in data collection. HRW, “Syria: Improvised Mines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Manbij,” 26 October 2016.

[11] “Rapid Assessment on Mine Action,” UNMAS/NPM, November 2016, pp. 5, 11, and 12. Number of communities reporting contamination: Al Hasaken, 12; Aleppo, 177; Al Raqqa, 45; As Sweido, 2; Damascus, 5; Dor’a, 32; Deir ez Zor, 2; Hama, 33; Homs, 20; Idleb, 43; Lattakia, 0; Quneitra, 5; Rural Damascus, 21; and Tartous, 0.

[12] Samuel Oakford and Avi Asher-Schapiro, “Pawns in Syria’s Ceasefire, Three Boys Die in Landmine Explosion,” Vice News, 1 April 2016.

[13] HRW identified four people who were killed, and four who were injured, as they attempted to flee. HRW, “Syria: Improvised Mines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Manbij,” 26 October 2016.

[14]Citizen Injured from Israel Left-over Mine Explosion in Quneitra,” SANA (Quneitra), 6 May 2011. In the article, Omar al-Heibi, Head of the Board of the General Association for Rehabilitation of Mine-caused Injuries, states that there have been a total of 660 mine casualties (220 killed; 440 injured) as of May 2011, including a man injured in 2011.

[15] Monitor analysis of data from various sources from 2011–2016.

[16] SNHR, “Russian Forces are worse than the Syrian Regime in terms of cluster munition use,” 23 March 2017; HRW, “Russia/Syria: Widespread New Cluster Munition Use,” 28 July 2016; HRW, “Syria: Improvised Mines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Manbij,” 26 October 2016; data from VDC website; and MayDay Rescue, “White Helmets [Syrian Civil Defence] Daily Responses Report,” for the period October 2016 through December 2016.

[17] On 11 July 2016 three aircraft carried out multiple attacks near Termanin, a village in Idlib governorate, killing at least 10 people and injuring more than 30, all civilians. See, HRW, “Russia/Syria: Widespread New Cluster Munition Use,” July 28 2016. The Syrian Civil Defence reported four incidents in 2016 where cluster munitions were used along with other weapons, resulting in 43 casualties.

[18] An additional 54 fatalities reported by the VDC were attributed to the use of cluster munitions alongside other weapons, including thermobaric weapons. These casualties were not counted in the Monitor total of cluster munition casualties for 2015 because they did not exclusively identify the cause of fatality as cluster munitions.

[19] HI, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 132.


Casualties and Victim Assistance

Last updated: 09 October 2016

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2015

1,955 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (846 killed; 1,097 injured; 12 unknown)

Casualties in 2015

864 (2014: 174)

2015 casualties by outcome

290 killed; 574 injured (2014: 161 killed; 13 injured)

2015 casualties by item type

719 unspecified mine types including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs); 17 antipersonnel mine; 68 antivehicle mine; 16 victim-activated IED; 17 unexploded submunition; 26 unknown device; and 1 other ERW

Cluster munition casualties since 2012

There were at least 248 cluster munitions casualties in 2015, 383 in 2014, 1001 in 2013 and 583 in 2012
(see below for more details on these cluster munition casualties, including those occurring during attacks, which are not included in other mine/ERW casualty totals)

 

In 2015, the Monitor recorded 864 casualties (290 killed, 574 injured) attributed to mines, unexploded submunitions, and other ERW (mines/ERW) in Syria from multiple data sources. Of the total casualties, where reported, 100 were children, 133 were women and the majority, 569, were men.[1] However, since the conflict began in 2011, annual totals of mine/ERW casualties are thought to be an undercount. It is expected that the actual number of casualties in Syria in 2015, as in past years, was significantly higher than that recorded. Media reports indicated that there were over 300 casualties from landmines (100 killed; 200 injured) in the city of Kobane alone between January 2015 and April 2016.[2]

Overall, the intensity of the ongoing conflict and widespread persecution of human rights activists severely hampered civil society efforts to track casualties.[3] For example, in October 2015, the Violation Documentation Center in Syria (VDC) reported the death of one media activist who was contributing to the report and the destruction of another field researcher’s family home during airstrikes.[4]

Detailed data on fatalities was collected and disaggregated according to the weapons involved by the VDC and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). The SNHR also documented a number of people injured by cluster munitions, when that information was available.[5] The majority of mine/ERW casualties for 2015 (551) were persons injured, compiled and recorded as casualties of unspecified mines by Handicap International (HI) in data on the needs of conflict survivors.[6] This marked the first time since the beginning of the conflict that a substantial dataset on persons injured by mines/ERW in Syria was available.[7] HI reported that of some 25,000 people from Syria with injuries it assessed, 53% were of injured by explosive weapons, of which 14% were mine survivors.[8]

The 864 mine/ERW casualties recorded in 2015 represent a significant increase from the 174 casualties (123 killed; 51 injured) by mines/ERW reported for 2014.[9] However, this is not representative of a trend. The data available for 2014 was mostly for fatalities, making it certain that persons injured were massively unreported. Persons injured were also severely underreported in 2013 and 2012. Since conflict began in 2011, the numbers of casualties identified annually in Syria increased significantly from previous years. In 2010, no casualties were identified in Syria, and in 2009, a single antivehicle mine casualty was reported.[10]

The year 2015 saw an intense escalation in casualties from mines/ERW, including victim-activated IEDs, especially in areas liberated from Islamic State (IS, also called Daesh). In May 2015, HI estimated that there had been five to seven mine/ERW incidents weekly resulting in casualties.[11] Particularly high casualty rates among returnees and especially among the locally formed explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) teams were reported.

In the Monitor casualty data for Syria for 2015, the deaths of at least 16 people due to mines were recorded as specifically related to entering or leaving besieged areas.[12] It was reportedly that there was an increase in the use of “landmines” to surround besieged areas of the Damascus suburbs in 2015, preventing civilians from leaving those areas and from bringing food and supplies into the besieged towns. This resulted in a number of casualties and exacerbated the suffering and starvation of the civilian population.[13] According to a media report from 1 January 2016, 15 men and six children had lost limbs due to the landmines surrounding the besieged town of Madaya alone.[14] Civilians continued to become casualties of the siege minefields into 2016. In April, three boys died of landmine-inflicted injures. The siege minefields also prevented access to emergency medical assistance for those people injured.[15]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties recorded in Syria between 1967 and the end of 2015 was at least 1,955 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (846 killed; 1,097 injured; 12 unknown).[16] Due to the absence of a national casualty data collection mechanism, it is probable that there were also unrecorded casualties before the beginning of internal armed conflict in 2011.

Cluster munition casualties

In 2015, the Monitor compiled data on least 248 cluster munition casualties, both from attacks (the direct use of cluster munitions in air strikes and shelling) and unexploded submunitions, including 92 people killed. Of this total, 231 casualties occurred during cluster munition attacks: 75 people—all civilians—were killed and another 156 people injured. In addition, 17 people were recorded as killed by unexploded submunitions. Due to key disaggregated data sources specifically recording fatalities but not injuries, no casualties injured by unexploded submunitions were identified for 2015, although it is likely that some persons recorded as injured by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and undefined mines types were actually unexploded submunition casualties.[17]

An additional 54 fatalities reported by the Violation Documentation Center (VDC) were attributed to the use of cluster munitions alongside other weapons, including thermobaric weapons. These casualties were not counted in the Monitor total of cluster munition casualties for 2015 because they did not exclusively identify the cause of fatality as cluster munitions.

The actual number of casualties due to cluster munition attacks and unexploded submunitions is likely much higher than those recorded. In 2015, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) confirmed that it believed the number of cluster munition casualties, including persons injured, was far greater than what they had been able to report, noting that “the Syrian regime relies greatly on using cluster munitions during shelling.”[18] A representative of the VDC stated that the figures on their website are far less than those caused by the actual use of cluster munitions and that this is “due to the hardship of collecting data inside of the different geographic [areas] in Syria and the pursuit of human rights activists by all military parties.”[19]

Collection of data was ongoing and efforts to gather details on casualties were hampered by the intensity of the continuing conflict.[20] Both the SNHR and the VDC confirmed that difficulties persisted throughout 2015.[21] The SNHR reporting includes several detailed accounts of cluster munition use.[22]

For 2014, the Monitor reported 383 cluster munition casualties in Syria; at least 135 people were recorded as killed and some 248 people injured. Of these casualties, 329 (94 killed, 235 injured) were caused by cluster munition attacks; 51 casualties (38 killed; 13 injured) were recorded from incidents involving unexploded submunitions (including six people attempting to clear unexploded submunitions); and three fatalities were recorded as cluster munition casualties, without further details on use.[23] The Monitor received reports of at least 1,001 cluster munition casualties in 2013, including 151 killed.[24] In 2012, according to data from VDC and SNHR there were at least 583 cluster munitions casualties,[25] 113 people were reported as killed (including four due to unexploded submunitions) and some 470 people injured by cluster munitions.[26]

Cluster munition casualties continued to be reported into 2016. Preliminary Monitor analysis of reporting sources for the period from 1 January 2016 until the end of May 2016 indicated that there were at least some 270 cluster munition casualties during that period. Proportionally, a significant increase from the number and rate of cluster munition casualties recorded during 2015.[27]

Prior to new use of cluster munitions in 2012, at least five casualties from unexploded submunitions had been recorded in Syria, including four child casualties in 2007.[28]

Victim Assistance

There is no current estimate of the total number of survivors of mines, cluster munitions, and other ERW (mines/ERW) living in Syria. In March 2015, Handicap International (HI) estimated that at least one million people have been injured during the conflict, with tens of thousands needing prosthetics and rehabilitation services.[29]

Insecurity and conflict in Syria affected access to essential medical interventions and medical equipment. Emergency response and first aid was limited by the ongoing conflict. The Syrian Civil Defense organization, known as the White Helmets, provided search and rescue, first aid, and ambulance services in many areas affected by cluster munition strikes. This emergency assistance was often hindered by so-called double-tap strikes, whereby rescuers are targeted by a second airstrike.[30]

Throughout 2015 and into 2016, it became increasingly difficult for Syrians to cross the border to Turkey, including war-injured persons hoping receive medical care there.[31]

There were severe shortages of medicine and medical supplies, as well as the inability of many health workers to access their workplaces. These difficulties were exacerbated by overall disruptions to the health system. A lack of fuel, cuts in electricity, and water shortages forced many hospitals to operate at reduced capacity or cease operations altogether.[32] A continuously growing number of patients also strained the limited health resources available.[33]

Mine/ERW survivors in besieged areas were unable to access medical care due to a lack of medical supplies, personnel, and facilities. The UN reported that on the rare occasions that humanitarian aid reached besieged areas in 2015 and into 2016, surgical and trauma care equipment and other medical supplies needed for treatment of mine/ERW injuries had been removed from the aid convoys.[34] Medical evacuation from besieged areas was extremely limited. It was reported that civilians, including children injured by mines/ERW, were prevented from being evacuated out of besieged areas.[35]

Medical personnel and hospitals were deliberately targeted and access to medical services was denied. Increasing bombing and shelling of hospitals and clinics further reduced the provision of basic assistance to injured persons.[36] Physicians for Human Rights reports that 2015 was the worst year for bombing and shelling of medical facilities with 122 strikes documented. The organization documented 346 strikes on 246 different medical facilities from March 2011 until December 2015. In addition, at least 700 medical personnel have been killed and many more have fled since the conflict began.[37] In 2015, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) recorded 94 instances of bombing or shelling of MSF-supported health facilities, including 12 instances that completely destroyed the medical facility and another 16 attacks on MSF-supported ambulances.[38] At the end of 2014, only two hospitals and one referral center that provide specialized mental health services remained operational.[39]

The ICRC reported that health ministry hospitals and other health facilities, particularly the National Red Crescent Society’s mobile health units, provided emergency medical care, inpatient treatment, and primary healthcare to injured people using ICRC-donated medical supplies. The ICRC provided 12 prostheses to mine/ERW survivors in Syria in 2015 and the National Society helped distribute over one thousand wheelchairs and two thousand pairs of crutches. To support persons with disabilities, an ICRC-managed rehabilitation center opened in Aleppo; it provided services to almost one thousand people from June to December 2015.[40] However, supplies and support for casualty care reached areas under the control of armed groups only on a small number of occasions because of Syrian government restrictions as well the constant insecurity due to the conflict. The ICRC, the Syrian Red Crescent, and the UN evacuated hundreds of wounded people from besieged areas in December 2015, including some injured by mines/ERW. Four besieged areas received medical supplies in October 2015.[41]

Humanitarian organizations continued to support medical care and rehabilitation services throughout Syria. HI carried out some activities in Syria, in addition to supporting at least a dozen Syrian organizations and partners, to provide services directly to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, or to make referrals to other services.[42] HI’s Emergency Division has been implementing an emergency intervention in northern Syria, which addresses the needs of persons with injuries and/or disabilities from December 2012 through into 2016. By early 2016, HI was reported to be the only organization to address those needs through community outreach. HI’s physical rehabilitation activities in northern Syria started in January 2013 and continued in 2016.[43] Continuing into 2016, HI’s Syria program addressed the situation of the most vulnerable persons (including people with injuries) with interventions including: identification of persons with injuries and/or disabilities at hospitals, in care houses, camps, and communities; provision of rehabilitation for persons with injuries and/or disabilities and their caregiver (including training and counselling), distribution of assistive and mobility devices, and the provision of prostheses; and the direct provision of psychosocial support sessions at HI Rehabilitation centers and camps as well as at the community level.[44] HI noted “a patent lack of immediate rehabilitation and psychosocial relief,” despite the rising number of conflict-injured people within Syria and those fleeing to neighboring countries.[45] A HI assessment of 361 people injured due to explosive weapons between April 2015 and March 2016 found that 80% had indications of psychological distress. HI offered psychosocial support to Syrians affected by the conflict, including individual counselling and support groups.[46] Vulnerable families were also provided in-kind or financial assistance.[47]

MSF supported some 40 health facilities in the Damascus region and supported around 45 facilities in northern and western Syria during 2015. These services are often the primary emergency care available for mine/ERW or cluster munition casualties. Due to attacks on these health facilities, the number of supported facilities varied month-by-month as they were forced to close or stop services for a period to relocate.[48] 

Assistance to Syrian refugees

Several international organizations provided assistance to Syrian refugees, including mine survivors and other weapon-wounded people, in multiple host countries.

In Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, HI teams supplied aid to injured refugees, persons with disabilities, and vulnerable persons, including by providing orthopedic devices and psychosocial support, supporting medical and rehabilitation facilities and helping them access services.[49]

The influx of refugees from Syria into Lebanon put an increasing strain on scarce local resources. International assistance was “relatively insignificant compared to the size of the crisis.”[50] In 2015, the ICRC continued to provide emergency medical care to weapon-wounded people from Syria, including post-operative care and physical rehabilitation. A few were fitted with assistive devices.[51] Socio-economic integration programs are limited, with many displaced survivors and other persons with disabilities relying on the support of family members, friends, and acquaintances.[52]

In Jordan, the wounded from Syria were taken to nearby hospitals immediately upon arrival. The costs of medical care are sometimes covered by UN and humanitarian organizations.[53] In 2015, MSF opened its upgraded reconstructive surgery hospital in Amman, Jordan. The hospital provides comprehensive medical care to war-injured persons including Syrians. In addition to specialized surgical services, the hospital offers physiotherapy and psychosocial support.[54]

Turkey provided emergency medical care for Syrians but costs involving physical rehabilitation, mobility aids, and plastic surgery are not covered so refugees have to rely on donors and humanitarian organizations. Turkey reported 70,000 surgical operations for Syrian refugees in the public health system during the first six months of 2015.[55] In the refugee camps near Suruç, mine survivors could receive medical assistance from volunteer healthcare workers, but there were only two ambulances and both were also used for transporting goods.[56] Turkey received around 2,500 injured Syrians (including landmine, cluster munition, and ERW survivors) a month in 2014.[57] The World Health Organization, Gaziantep University, and the Turkish Ministry of Health started the Refugee Doctor Adaptation Training for 25 Syrian refugee doctors in 2014 to help integrate Syrian medical professionals into the Turkish health system and provide services to Syrians. The curriculum expanded to train more than 200 doctors and nurses.[58]

Media reports indicated that there are many persons with disabilities, including war-injured persons such as landmine and cluster munition survivors, among refugees that travelled through Europe in 2015. There is no information on how many persons with disabilities or landmine survivors were among the refugees. There appeared to be a lack of even basic services to refugees with disabilities seeking safety.[59] For example, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expressed concern that in Greece “refugees have to find themselves a place to sleep in the few shelters available creating conditions for the ‘strongest’ to find a shelter to the detriment of persons with specific needs.”[60] Difficulties in accessing basic necessities including sanitation services for refugees with disabilities continued into 2016.[61]

Syria ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 10 July 2009. In September 2013, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities made a statement with regard to Syria’s need to fulfill its obligations under the CRPD while calling for humanitarian agencies to be “allowed to operate without restrictions throughout Syria” to assist persons with disabilities, including “persons with disabilities among refugees and the internally displaced.”[62] From 2013 and continuing into 2016, HI was implementing a project to train Syrian refugees with disabilities to advocate for their rights in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.[63]



[1] All data for 2015 is derived from casualty data from the Violation Documentation Center in Syria (VDC) database; casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, Director, Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), 8 June 2016; Monitor analysis of casualty data from Regional Emergency Response Office on the Syrian Crisis – Handicap International (HI), 27 May 2016; Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents Map,” undated; and Monitor media scanning 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015. The data sets and the casualties included in the reports were analyzed by the Monitor and duplicate casualty data removed to create a unique data set.

[2] Sirwan Kajjo, “IS leaves deadly trail of mines in Syria, Iraq,” VOA News, 16 April 2016.

[3] Emails from Amir Kazkaz, VDC, 8 March 2015; and from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 26 July 2015; and call with Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 11 February 2016.

[5] SNHR, “The Syrian Regime’s Cluster Munition Attacks in 2014,” 18 October 2014; and SNHR, “Four Years Harvest: The Use of Cluster Ammunition…That is Still Going,” 30 March 2015; email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 25 July 2014; and casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 8 June 2016.

[6] Casualty data from Regional Emergency Response Office on the Syrian Crisis – HI, 27 May 2016.

[7] Data on injured persons was collected by HI and partners through interviews with displaced people and refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon between June 2013 and December 2015. The reporting is based on interviews with 68,049 people assessed by HI teams, of which 25,097 were injured: 14,471 in Syria, 7,823 in Jordan, and 2,803 in Lebanon. See, HI factsheet, “Syria: A mutilated future,” Brussels, 20 June 2016, pp. 1–2; and HI, “New Report: Syrians Maimed and Traumatized by Explosive Weapons,” 20 June 2016.

[8] Data on injured persons was collected by HI and partners through interviews with displaced people and refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon between June 2013 and December 2015. The reporting is based on interviews with 68,049 people assessed by HI teams, of which 25,097 were injured: 14,471 in Syria, 7,823 in Jordan, and 2,803 in Lebanon. See, HI factsheet, “Syria: A mutilated future,” Brussels, 20 June 2016, pp. 1–2; and HI, “New Report: Syrians Maimed and Traumatized by Explosive Weapons,” 20 June 2016.

[9] All data for 2014 is derived from casualty data from the VDC database; SNHR, “The Syrian Regime’s Cluster Munition Attacks in 2014,” 18 October 2014; casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 28 April 2014; SNHR, “Four Years Harvest: The Use of Cluster Ammunition…That is Still Going,” 30 March 2015; and email from Amir Kazkaz, Database Management Division, VDC, 14 April 2014. The two data sets and the casualties included in the reports were analyzed by the Monitor and duplicate casualty data removed to create a unique data set. Email from Amir Kazkaz, VDC, 14 April 2014.

[10] Email from Dr. Hosam Doughouz, Health Officer, Quneitra Health Directorate, 12 May 2010.

[12] Data on casualties related to besieged areas came from the VDC database’s detailed notes on each fatality.

[13] Syrian American Medical Society, “Madaya: Starvation Under Siege,” 8 January 2016, p. 1; and Olivia Alabaster, “Survival in Madaya: ‘We are living on water and salt’,” Al Jazeera, 8 January 2016.

[15] Samuel Oakford and Avi Asher-Schapiro, “Pawns in Syria’s Ceasefire, Three Boys Die in Landmine Explosion,” Vice News, 1 April 2016.

[16]Citizen Injured from Israel Left-over Mine Explosion in Quneitra,” SANA (Quneitra), 6 May 2011. In the article, Omar al-Heibi, head of the board of the General Association for Rehabilitation of Mine-caused Injuries, states that there have been a total of 660 mine casualties (220 killed; 440 injured) as of May 2011, including a man injured in 2011.

[17] Cluster munition casualty data for 2015 is derived from casualty data from the Violation Documentation Center in Syria (VDC) database; casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, Director, Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), 8 June 2016; and Monitor media scanning 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2015. The data sets and the casualties included in the reports were analyzed by the Monitor and duplicate casualty data removed to create a unique data set.

[18] Email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 27 July 2015.

[19] Email from Amir Kazkaz, VDC, 8 March 2015.

[20] “Despite the great difficulty in even getting an approximate number of people injured by the use of cluster munitions by the government forces, the estimates of the team of SNHR refer to more than 1470 people injured.” SNHR, “Victims of Cluster Munitions in Syria,” 2 February 2014, p. 6; SNHR, “Three Year Harvest,” 31 March 2014; and casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 28 April 2014.

[21] Email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 26 July 2015; and email from Amir Kazkaz, VDC, 8 March 2015.

[22] SNHR, “The Syrian Regimes Cluster Attacks in 2014 (25 January–25 September 2014),” 18 October 2014; and SNHR, “Four Years Harvest: The Use of Cluster Ammunition…That is Still Going,” 30 March 2015.

[23] Email from Amir Kazkaz, VDC, 14 April 2014; casualty data from the VDC database; casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 28 April 2014; SNHR, “The Syrian Regime’s Cluster Munition Attacks in 2014,” 18 October 2014; and SNHR, “Four Years Harvest: The Use of Cluster Ammunition…That is Still Going,” 30 March 2015. The two data sets and the casualties included in the reports were analyzed by the Monitor and duplicate casualty data removed to create a unique data set.

[24] Email from Amir Kazkaz, VDC, 14 April 2014; casualty data from the VDC database; and casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 28 April 2014. The two data sets were analyzed by the Monitor and duplicate casualty data removed to create a unique data set.

[25] Email from Amir Kazkaz, VDC, 14 April 2014; casualty data from the VDC database; and casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 28 April 2014. The two data sets were analyzed by the Monitor and duplicate casualty data removed to create a unique data set.

[26] Previously, through media monitoring, the Monitor had identified 165 casualties from cluster munitions strikes for 2012.

[27] Casualty data from the VDC database; casualty data sent by email from Fadel Abdul Ghani, SNHR, 8 June 2016; and Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016. The two data sources and the casualties included in the report were analyzed by the Monitor and duplicate casualty data removed to create a unique data set.

[28] HI, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 132.

[30] Janine di Giovanni, “Syria’s White Helmets save civilians, soldiers and rebels alike,” Newsweek, 21 January 2016.

[32] Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/31/68, 11 February 2016, p. 12, para. 84.

[33] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Syrian Arab Republic: Health Sector Update (September 2013),” 9 September 2013; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, 2014, p. 506.

[35] Syrian-American Medical Society Foundation, “Press Release: Three boys killed by a landmine in Madaya,” 30 March 2016; and UN Security Council, “Implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and 2258 (2015),” S/2016/631, 20 July 2016.

[36] Human Rights Council, “Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/22/CRP.1, 11 March 2013, p. 3, para. 10; Human Rights Council, “9th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria,” 20 February 2015; and Human Rights Council, “Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” A/HRC/31/68, 11 February 2016, pp. 10–11 para. 58–68.

[37] Physicians for Human Rights, “Anatomy of a Crisis: A Map of Attacks on Health Care in Syria,” December 2015.

[39] Physicians for Human Rights, “Syria’s Medical Community Under Assault,” February 2015.

[40] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, pp. 517–520.

[41] Ibid.

[43] HI, “Consortium Coordinator (Kobané) - TURKEY,” employment posting information, 14 March 2016.

[44] HI, “Field Coordinator North Syria (based in Turkey),” employment posting information, 15 March 2016.

[45] HI, “Physical Rehabilitation Technical Advisor - North Syria,” employment posting information, 27 November 2014.

[46] HI, “Syria: A mutilated future,” 20 June 2016.

[47] Ibid.

[49] Email from Noura Khaled, Senior Project Officer, HI – Middle East Program, 28 June 2016.

[50] Statement of Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Forth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013.

[51] ICRC, “Annual report 2014,” Geneva, 12 May 2015, p. 501.

[52] Survivor presentations, “Oussama and Ayman,” HI Workshop on Victim Assistance and Explosive Weapons, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 11 May 2016; and email from Noura Khaled, HI, 28 June 2016.

[53] Syrian Network for Human Rights, “The Wounded in Syria: An Endless Pain,” 26 June 2014.

[55] World Health Organization (WHO), “Syria Crisis – Turkey 3PR Operations: Country brief and funding request,” January–June 2015.

[56] Kurdish Question, “Why the World Needs To Help Reconstruct Kobane,” 13 April 2015.

[57] Syrian Network for Human Rights, “The Wounded in Syria: An Endless Pain,” 26 June 2014.

[59] HRW, “Greece: Chaos, insecurity in registration center,” 12 October 2015; MSF, “Migration: Up to 3,000 people stranded at the border between Serbia and Croatia without shelter,” 19 October 2015; and “We WILL get to Europe…Disabled migrants in wheelchairs and helpers carrying prosthetic legs struggle to cross the Serbia-Croatia border as doctors warn refugees are already suffering in cold weather,” Daily Mail, 28 September 2015.

[60] UNHCR, “Some 3,300 people a day still arriving on Levos,” 13 November 2015.

[63] Email from Noura Khaled, HI – Middle East Program, 28 June 2016.