Zimbabwe

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 17 July 2017

Summary: Non-signatory Zimbabwe has expressed interest in the convention, but has not taken any steps to accede and was the only country to join Russia in voting against a UN resolution promoting the convention in 2015 and December 2016. Zimbabwe has participated as an observer in most of the convention’s meetings, most recently in 2015. Zimbabwe produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions in the past and is believed to stockpile them, but it is not clear if it ever used cluster munitions.

Policy

The Republic of Zimbabwe has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Zimbabwe has expressed interest in joining the convention and conducted stakeholder consultations on the matter in the past, but it has not taken any steps towards accession.[1] In October 2016, a government representative told the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) that Zimbabwe may participate in the work of the convention but that does not necessarily mean it intends to join it.[2]

In December 2016, Zimbabwe was the only country to join Russia in voting against a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to join “as soon as possible.”[3] Zimbabwe has not explained why it voted no on the non-binding resolution or on the first UNGA resolution on the convention in December 2015.[4]

Zimbabwe participated in two regional meetings held during the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and expressed its support for a comprehensive ban without exceptions.[5] It was absent from the Dublin negotiations in May 2008 and the Oslo signing conference in December 2008.

Zimbabwe participated as an observer in the convention’s annual Meetings of States Parties in 2010–2013 and attended intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2012–2015. It has participated in regional workshops on the convention, most recently in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in August 2016.[6]

Zimbabwe is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

It is unclear if Zimbabwe has ever used cluster munitions.[7]

Zimbabwe is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions since it gained independence in 1980, but it likely has a stockpile.

Jane’s Information Group has reported that the Alpha bomblet developed for the South African CB-470 cluster bomb was produced in Rhodesia and that “Zimbabwe may have quantities of the Alpha bomblet.”[8] In 2010, an official informed the CMC that Zimbabwe still possessed cluster munitions that remained from the former Rhodesia’s arsenal.[9]

Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paolo reported in 2012 on declassified Ministry of Defense documents showing that Brazil transferred 104 BLG-250K and four BLG-60K cluster bombs and various components for BLG-500K, BLG-250K, and BLG-60k cluster bombs to Zimbabwe between January 2001 and May 2002.[10]

Zimbabwe also possesses RM-70 122mm surface-to-surface rocket systems, but it is not known if these include versions with submunition payloads.[11]



[1] In May 2013, a government representative told a regional meeting that Zimbabwe is “seriously considering” accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but acknowledged the process toward joining the convention has been slow. Statement of Zimbabwe, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 22 May 2013. The representative informed the CMC that consultations are continuing, but no decision has yet been made. CMC meeting with Mucheka Chameso, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Zimbabwe to the UN in Geneva, in Lomé, 22 May 2013. In May 2012, a government representative said Zimbabwe was conducting “consultations with relevant stakeholders on the country’s accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions” that it hoped to soon conclude. Statement of Zimbabwe, Accra Regional Conference on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Accra, May 2012. In March 2010, Zimbabwe stated that “discussions are underway on the matter” of joining the convention. See, statement of Zimbabwe, Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Pretoria, 25 March 2010. Notes by Action on Armed Violence.

[2] ICBL-CMC meeting with Tonderai N. Mutarsi, Counsellor to the Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, New York, October 2016.

[3]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016.

[4]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[5] For details on Zimbabwe’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 262–263.

[6]The Addis Ababa Commitment on Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Africa Regional Workshop on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 5 August 2016.

[7] Zimbabwe has not made a statement regarding possible past use. One source has said Zimbabwean and/or Congolese aircraft dropped cluster bombs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998. Tom Cooper and Pit Weinert, “Zaire/DR Congo since 1980,” Air Combat Information Group, 2 September 2003.

[8] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 440.

[9] CMC meeting with Mucheka Chameso, Permanent Mission of Zimbabwe to the UN in Geneva, Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, in Pretoria, 25–26 March 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[10] Rubens Valente, “Brasil vendeu bombas condenadas a ditador do Zimbábue,” Folha de São Paolo, 22 July 2012.

[11] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 449.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 02 November 2011

Policy

The Republic of Zimbabwe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 18 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. In January 2001, Zimbabwe enacted the Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act 2000, which incorporates the treaty into Zimbabwe’s domestic law.[1]

Zimbabwe has provided its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3. In May 2006, it stated that in joint military operations Zimbabwean forces will not assist or participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines. It said that the Mine Ban Treaty “clearly bans” foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, and also prohibits antivehicle mines with sensitive antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes that can function as antipersonnel mines. Finally, it said that the number of mines States Parties chose to retain should only be in the hundreds or thousands and not tens of thousands.[2]

Zimbabwe submitted its 10th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in December 2010, covering calendar year 2010.[3]

Zimbabwe attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2011.

Zimbabwe is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.  

Production, Transfer, Stockpile Destruction, and Retention

The government maintains that there has been no mine production since independence.[4] Previously, government and other sources indicated that Zimbabwe was a past producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines, but not on a significant scale.[5] On 15 November 2000, Zimbabwe destroyed its stockpile of 4,092 antipersonnel mines.[6]  At the time, it decided to retain 700 mines for training and development purposes (500 PMD-6 and 200 R2M2).[7]

In its Article 7 report for 2010, Zimbabwe reported 550 mines retained for training purposes (400 PMD-6 and 150 R2M2).[8] During calendar year 2010, Zimbabwe destroyed 20 R2M2 during “training of deminers.”[9] However, it appears that the number of mines retained for Zimbabwe should be 530 mines, since it reported 550 mines retained for training in its report covering calendar year 2008.[10]

Zimbabwe has acknowledged that it also stockpiles Claymore-type devices, but without tripwire fuzes because Zimbabwe considers these illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty.[11]

 



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 December 2003. The ICBL expressed concern about a provision in the act relating to joint military operations with a country not party to the Mine Ban Treaty; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 176.

[2] “Response to LM Draft Report for Zimbabwe,” from Col. J. Munongwa, former Director, ZIMAC, 30 May 2006; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 810–811, for more details.

[3] Zimbabwe previously submitted Article 7 reports in December 2008, December 2007, on 5 December 2006, 5 December 2005, 8 July 2005, 1 December 2003, 13 February 2003, 4 April 2001, and 11 January 2000.

[4] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form E, December 2006.

[5] Earlier statements by Zimbabwe government sources and others indicated that production of two types of Claymore mines, the Z1 and ZAPS, ended when Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, while production of PloughShare mines was stopped between 1990 and 1993. For more information on past production and export, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 97–99.

[6] Zimbabwe destroyed 3,846 PMD-6 mines and 246 R2M2 mines. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 8 July 2005.

[7] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 4 April 2001.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for period January 2010 to December 2010), Form D.

[9] Ibid, Form B.

[10] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, December 2008.

[11] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, in Geneva, 4 February 2003.


Mine Action

Last updated: 11 December 2017

Contaminated by: antipersonnel mines (heavy contamination), antivehicle mines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Article 5 deadline: 1 January 2018
(Eight-year extension requested)

As of July 2017, the Republic of Zimbabwe had confirmed mine contamination of just over 62km2. Nearly 9.5km2 of land was released in 2016; 6.3km2 was canceled by non-technical survey, 1.5km2 reduced through technical survey, and 1.7km2 cleared. This was more than double the amount released in 2015, by both survey and clearance, and was in part attributable to an increased operational capacity.

Recommendations for action

  • Continued efforts should be made to ensure that all operators are using appropriate land-release methodologies and standards.
  • Zimbabwe should develop a resource mobilization plan and clarify how financial resources will be used to meet its extension request targets.

Contamination

At the end of 2016, Zimbabwe had a total of 66.2km2 of confirmed mined area remaining.[1] This is a significant drop from the nearly 75km2 remaining at the end of 2015,[2] and is due to cancelation of close to 6.3km2 in the Rusitu to Muzite mined area and more than doubled clearance output from operators in 2016 compared to the previous year.

Mined areas (as of end 2016)[3]

Location

Confirmed mined area (m2)

Musengezi to Rwenya

25,716,432

Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner

24,473,736

Rusitu to Muzite Mission

8,702,023

Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest

7,281,912

Lusulu

56,000

Total

66,230,103

 

Zimbabwe’s contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is of antipersonnel mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a conflict of decolonization. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with six distinct major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, laid by the Rhodesian army.[4] Initially, antipersonnel mines were laid in very dense belts (reportedly 5,500 mines per kilometer of frontage) to form a “cordon sanitaire.” Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” directional fragmentation mines protected by antipersonnel mines was laid “inland” of the cordon sanitaire.[5] Antivehicle mines were used extensively by insurgents but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.[6]

At the end of 2016, remaining contamination comprised five minefields, referred to as: Musengezi to Rwenya, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner, Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest, and Lusulu. The Burma Valley minefield was completed in 2015 and a former suspected hazardous area (SHA) at Kariba was cleared of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in 2013.[7]

Remaining mined areas are located close to populated areas and have considerable humanitarian, social, and economic impacts on local communities, most severely affecting poor, rural populations living along heavily mined border areas. Mines continued to prevent free movement of people, deny use of agricultural land, kill and injure livestock and impede access for grazing, halt the productivity of areas of commercial farming, and impel some poor communities to take unacceptable risks to use contaminated land. The threat to livestock is particularly severe and results in a heavy socio-economic impact as livestock is a major investment commodity in rural Zimbabwe.[8]

Accordingly, clearance of mined areas will generate opportunities for local farmers, commercial agriculture, business, and tourism, allow for the construction of schools and clinics, and enable the safe return of those displaced as a result of the mine threat.[9]

Program Management

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC) was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defense as the focal point and coordination center of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NAMAAZ.[10]

Since 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has provided assistance to the government of Zimbabwe to train ZIMAC personnel and to supply metal detectors, protective equipment, and trauma kits, under a joint cooperation agreement.[11]

In its Fifth Article 5 deadline extension request in 2017, Zimbabwe again pledged to relocate ZIMAC outside of military installations once the Ministry of Defense has secured the necessary funds.[12] In 2016, ZIMAC was still housed within military premises, reportedly owing to budgetary constraints.[13]

Operators

The Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS), HALO Trust, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) conducted land release in Zimbabwe in 2016. APOPO and Mines Advisory Group (MAG) joined in 2017. In 2013, ZIMAC tasked HALO to survey and clear the Musengezi to Rwenya, Rushinga, and Mukumbura mined areas; NPA was assigned survey and clearance of the Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest, and Burma Valley mined areas; and the NMCS are responsible for survey and clearance of the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner and Lusulu mined areas.[14]

In 2016, HALO Trust’s capacity more than doubled from 13 to 30 manual demining sections as a result of additional funding.[15] NPA reached its maximum operating capacity at the end of 2016 with a total of 56 deminers, up from 48 at the start of the year, also benefitting from additional funding.[16] ZIMAC reported that the capacity of the NMCS increased from 120 deminers to 150 during the year.[17]

In 2016, ZIMAC began accrediting two further international demining operators, MAG and APOPO, both of which were scheduled to begin operations in 2017.[18] APOPO reported it had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with ZIMAC and that the Ministry of Defense had granted permission for the organization to begin operating in Zimbabwe.[19] In September 2017, MAG had also signed a MoU with ZIMAC and established an office in Harare ready to support the start of clearance operations later in the year.[20] MAG said it had been provided with a tasking profile in Mashonaland East incorporating a mined area that is 130km in length with a total area of more than 11.8km2.[21]

Strategic planning

Zimbabwe has developed a National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025, its first ever mine action strategy, which is expected to be formally approved by the government by 2018. It was developed in consultation with stakeholders with the support of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The strategy time-line corresponds to Zimbabwe’s fifth Article 5 extension request with the overall goal of completing Article 5 obligations in 2025.[22]

Standards

ZIMAC reported that national mine action standards would be revised in the second half of 2017, with input from all mine action stakeholders. Once disseminated, ZIMAC quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) officers will monitor their implementation.[23] HALO Trust confirmed that standards for mechanical clearance would be updated, as it was introducing mechanical clearance operations during the year, and NPA confirmed that revisions would also include standards for mine detection dogs (MDDs).[24]

Information management

ZIMAC’s information management capacity showed significant signs of progress in 2016.[25] ZIMAC reported that the national Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was markedly improved during the year and that work was continuing in 2017 with GICHD assistance to input and improve historic operator data.[26] The GICHD reported it conducted an information management baseline assessment in May 2017 and drafted a corresponding workplan. A key objective is to update the national database to ensure it includes all the information from the various operators, including historical data.[27] Inflated and outdated baseline contamination estimates were eliminated from the database and erroneous reporting, such as for the total area released in the Burma Valley minefield, was corrected, as evidenced in Zimbabwe’s revised Article 5 extension request. NPA reported continuing to use a digital recording and mapping system, the DEDUCT Observer application in 2016, and that it was sending ZIMAC daily electronic updates on survey and clearance outputs through the DEDUCT system.[28]

Land Release

A total of nearly 9.5km2 of land was released by HALO Trust and NPA in 2016, including just under 3.2km2 of mined area released by clearance and technical survey and 6.3km2 canceled by non-technical survey.[29] This is more than double the total area released in 2015 (just under 4.1km2).[30] The significant increase in output in 2016 was the result of cancelation of nearly 6.3km2 at the Muzite to Rusitu mined area by NPA and ZIMAC survey teams and a doubling in total clearance output by the three operators.[31]

Survey in 2016

Close to 7.8km2 of land was released by survey in 2016, including just under 6.3km2 canceled through non-technical survey and 1.5km2 reduced through technical survey, with a further 9.8km2 confirmed as mined.[32] This is more than twice the amount released by survey in 2015, when just over 3.4km2 of land was released.[33]

In 2016, NPA reported that comprehensive combined non-technical and technical survey was carried out within the Leacon Hill to Sheba Forrest and Muzite to Rusitu mined areas as a joint exercise by ZIMAC officials and NPA teams. A total of nearly 6.3km2 was canceled within the Muzite to Rusitu mined area and more than 8.7km2 confirmed, changing the status of the mined area from suspected to confirmed contamination. The survey also identified the time and capacity needed for completion of clearance of the minefield, as well as defining the direct and indirect beneficiaries and expected land use upon completion.[34]

Mined area survey in 2016[35]

Operator

SHAs canceled

Area canceled (m²)

Areas confirmed

Area confirmed (m²)

Area reduced by TS (m2)

HALO

0

0

9

1,075,167

1,127,597

NPA (Muzite to Rusitu)

0

6,297,997

1

8,702,023

376,068

NMCS

0

0

0

0

0

Total

0

6,297,997

10

9,777,190

1,503,665

Note: TS = technical survey.

Clearance in 2016

In 2016, HALO Trust, NPA, and the NMCS cleared a total of just under 1.7km2 of mined area, destroying 23,193 antipersonnel mines, four antivehicle mines, and 14 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO). This is more than twice the amount cleared in 2015, when the three entities cleared a total of almost 0.71m2 of mined area.[36]

HALO Trust attributed the large increase in its clearance output in 2016 to a nearly doubling of its manual demining capacity thanks to increased funding.[37] NPA reported that its increase in mine clearance in 2016 was due in part to the deployment of additional teams in January and October, but was primarily the result of a 50% reduction in the amount of fadeout required during clearance, from 10 meters to five meters, after a change in methodology approved by ZIMAC. Both NPA and HALO Trust emphasized the importance and positive impact of a supportive host government and ZIMAC’s willingness to accept innovation in clearance methodologies as key reasons behind the increase in clearance output.[38]

Mine clearance in 2016[39]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

HALO (all areas of operations)

30

1,027,704

16,699

0

14

NPA (Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest)

5

511,616

6,410

4

0

NMCS

1

131,995

84

0

0

Total

36

1,671,315

23,193

4

14

Note: AP = antipersonnel AV = antivehicle.

Progress in 2017

As of May 2017, APOPO had been tasked to survey and clear a 37km-long stretch of minefield along the border with Mozambique, running southwest from the Sango Border Post to the Mwenezi river, in cooperation with the NMCS. It stated that, as of May 2017, a task assessment had been carried out.[40]

MAG reported that in September 2017 it had been provided with a tasking profile in Mashonaland East incorporating a mined area that is 130km in length with a total area of more than 11.8km2.[41]

Deminer safety

HALO Trust reported that five of its staff were involved in accidents during mine clearance operations involving R2M2 mines in 2016. Two deminers were injured in the accidents, while three were unharmed.[42] NPA reported no accidents or injuries involving its mine action personnel since the start of its operations in 2013.[43]

Article 5 Compliance

In June 2014, Zimbabwe was granted an Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension of three years until 1 January 2018. Since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, it has submitted four subsequent extension requests. The current extension until 1 January 2018 is to enable further survey and clearance, but Zimbabwe is not committing itself to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period, nor will it manage to do so.[44]

Zimbabwe submitted its fifth extension request in March 2017, which it revised in August, for a period of eight years through to 31 December 2025, setting a deadline for the completion of clearance for the first time. According to its extension request workplan, a total of more 6.3km2 would be addressed in 2017, followed by close to 8km2 in 2018; 8.5km2 in 2019; 9.1km2 in 2020; 7.7km2 in 2021; 7.8km2 in 2022; 7.9km2 in 2023; 6.7km2 in 2024; and 4.2km2 in 2025, for a total of just over 66.2km2 of remaining contamination released.[45]

In August 2017, it submitted a revised version of the request, correcting errors in reporting and deleting outdated contamination estimates. The revised request sets for the first time an end-date for completion of clearance. It also establishes a realistic estimate of remaining contamination, and sets attainable annual clearance targets, provided sufficient funding is secured.[46]

Operators commended the cooperative and inclusive process behind the preparation of the extension request and the national mine action strategic plan, as well as efforts to accurately define the amount of contamination remaining, enabled by the application of solid survey methodology in earlier years.[47]

In the request, Zimbabwe lists three primary factors that have prevented it from completing its Article 5 obligations thus far since becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty: the extent of the contamination, inadequate national funding for demining, and a lack of demining equipment. Positively, however, Zimbabwe reported that the impact of these factors was ameliorated by the completion of re-survey, allowing efforts to focus on clearance; increasing partnerships between international operators and the government to build capacity; and continued assistance from the ICRC for better demining equipment.[48] In the request, Zimbabwe also enumerated possible risks and assumptions that could impede it from completing clearance in due time, including heavy rain, difficult terrain, significant metal contamination in ploughshare minefields, political instability, and lack of funding.[49]

In its 2017 extension request, Zimbabwe estimated that activities planned for the eight-year extension period through to completion of clearance will cost a total of almost US$130 million, with $12.7 million to be provided by the government of Zimbabwe, including $0.6 million in 2017.[50] The request states that resource mobilization will be an ongoing effort, and that Zimbabwe will continue to seek support from the international community. To complement efforts, ZIMAC was also developing a website to increase the visibility of the mine action program.[51]

NPA reported receiving in-kind support during joint risk education activities carried out by NPA and the NMCS teams, along with assistance for the renewal of work permits.[52] HALO Trust did not report receiving in-kind support from the government in 2016, but noted the contributions of the NMCS to the national demining program and the overall supportive operational environment, while raising some concerns about an increase in import bureaucracy and subsequent increases in costs and delays during the year.[53]

ZIMAC reported that with the commencement of MAG and APOPO’s operations in late 2017 a marked increase in land release output was expected. In addition, it emphasized that the introduction of MDD teams by NPA would increase the speed of technical survey while the deployment of mechanical assets by HALO Trust would reduce the time needed to remove deeply buried mines in manual demining.[54] ZIMAC stated that the development of a new national mine action strategy had given the national program a new impetus to complete clearance by 2025 and would help to ensure the full support of other relevant government departments to mine action.[55]

In its revised 2017 Article 5 extension request, Zimbabwe reported that during its previous extension period, from December 2014 to December 2016, almost 143km2 (some two-thirds) of all recorded mined areas had been addressed, from a total of close to 209km2 remaining as of December 2014.[56]

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC), 4 July 2017.

[2] Ibid., 14 October 2016. Previously Zimbabwe reported mine contamination of 73.18km6 at the end of 2015. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), pp. 5, 13–15, and 23. In the report, Zimbabwe also stated that “as of 31 December 2015, there were 8 areas in Zimbabwe known to contain antipersonnel mines totalling 73,177,991m2.” In a separate table in Annex I to the report, ZIMAC reported a different set of figures stated to be “based on NTS reports 2015” and “further edited after the 2016 further survey report.” It again reported a total of 73,177,991m2 of contamination remaining, however the breakdown of figures provided in the table appeared to contain errors and add up to 69,698,602m2. An additional set of figures for contamination and estimated dates of completion was also included, which indicated a total of 74,068,412m2 remained to be addressed.

[3] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 5.

[4] Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary (received 31 December 2013), p. 1.

[5] HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying,” undated; Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary; and Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 3.

[6] HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying,” undated.

[7] Email from Learnfirst Musiza, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 October 2015; and Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6.

[9] Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, pp. 2–4. 


[10] Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7. 
|

[11] ICRC, “Zimbabwe: Living with the dread of an invisible enemy,” 29 November 2013; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” pp. 227–228.

[12] Mine Ban Treaty Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 39.

[13] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

[14] Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 4; and Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 27.

[15] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.

[16] Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[17] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.

[18] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), p. 7; and interviews with Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, in Harare, 30 June 2016; and with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[19] Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, Grant and Regional Manager, APOPO, 29 May 2017.

[20] Email from Adam Komorowski, Regional Director, MAG, 29 September 2017.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Statement of Zimbabwe, 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and email from Åsa Massleberg, Advisor, Strategic Management, GICHD, 27 September 2017.

[23] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.

[24] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March and 23 September 2017.

[25] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.

[26] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.

[27] Email from Åsa Massleberg, GICHD, 27 September 2017.

[28] Emails Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March and 21 September 2017.

[29] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[30] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 11 July 2016; interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, Information Management Officer, NPA, in Mutare, 29 June 2016; and email from Capt. Tamanikwa ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

[31] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; and Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[32] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[33] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 11 July 2016; interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, in Mutare, 29 June 2016; and email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

[34] Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[35] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017; and Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017. HALO reported debate within the local community as to whether commercial clearance had taken place in the nine areas it confirmed over 1km2, during 1998–2000.

[36] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 11 July 2016; interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, in Mutare, 29 June 2016; and email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

[37] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.

[38] Ibid.; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[39] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April and 29 September 2017; from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017; and Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.

[40] Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, APOPO, 29 May 2017.

[41] Email from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 29 September 2017.

[42] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April and 29 September 2017.

[43] Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[44] Under its three-year extension until January 2018, Zimbabwe undertook “to clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit
a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations.” The purpose of the extension period is also to complete survey of all remaining areas and to clear approximately 4km2 of mined area. Under the extension, Zimbabwe intended to meet the following milestones: clearance of 1.23km2 and the development of a national strategic plan on the basis of survey results in 2015; clearance of 1.28km2 in 2016; and clearance of 1.51km2 and the submission of a new clearance plan in 2017. Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 5–6.

[45] Mine Ban Treaty Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, pp. 8–9.

[46] Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 21 September 2017.

[47] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[48] Mine Ban Treaty Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, pp. 14–15.

[49] Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7.

[50] Mine Ban Treaty Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 10.

[51] Ibid., p. 47.

[52] Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[53] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017.

[54] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Mine Ban Treaty Revised Fifth Article 5 Extension Request, received 9 August 2017, p. 5.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 11 December 2017

In 2016, four donors contributed US$4.9 million toward clearance operations in the Republic of Zimbabwe, $1.7 million more than in 2015.[1] All funds were allocated to clearance and risk education activities.

International contributions: 2016[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount (national currency)

Amount (US$)

United Kingdom

Clearance and risk education

£1,850,150

2,507,878

United States

Clearance and risk education

$1,000,000

1,000,000

Norway

Clearance

NOK8,000,000

953,107

Ireland

Clearance and risk education

€400,000

442,880

Total

 

 

4,903,865

 

In 2012–2016, the government of Zimbabwe contributed more than $3 million to its mine action program, or 16% of its total mine action budget.[3]

Since 2012, when Zimbabwe received international assistance for mine action for the first time, international contributions have totaled more than $16 million.

In December 2013, Zimbabwe submitted its fourth Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, in which it estimated a total of $12,965,125 would be needed to clear some 4km2 between 2015 and January 2018, of which $2.9 million would be provided by Zimbabwe. The remaining $10 million would need to be sought from other sources, which implies that Zimbabwe’s capacity to address its mine contamination largely depends on adequate and steady international funding.[4]

Summary of contributions: 2012–2016[5]

Year

National contributions (US$)

International contributions (US$)

Total  contributions (US$)

2016

500,000

4,903,865

5,403,865

2015

500,000

3,194,625

3,694,625

2014

500,000

4,209,173

4,709,173

2013

800,000

2,261,847

3,061,847

2012

800,000

1,668,362

2,468,362

Total

3,100,000

16,237,872

19,337,872

 



[1] Ireland, Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol II Annual Report, Form E, and Annex 1, 30 March 2017; email from Ingrid Schoyen, Senior Adviser, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2017; United Kingdom, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2017; and email from Steve Costner, Deputy Office Director, Weapons Removal and Abatement, United States (US) Department of State, 30 October 2017.

[2] Average exchange rate for 2016: €1=US$1.1072; NOK8.3936=US$1; £1.3555=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2017.

 [3] Zimbabwe, Fourth Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, December 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, April 2017, p. 4.

[4] Zimbabwe’s Fourth Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, December 2013.

[5] See previous Monitor reports. Total for 2014 has been rectified as a result of revised US funding data.


Casualties

Last updated: 04 January 2017

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2016

1,615 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties

Casualties in 2016

5 (2015: 8)

2016 casualties by outcome

4 injured; 1 unknown (2015: 1 killed; 7 injured)

2016 casualties by device type

Unknown

 

In 2016, the Monitor identified five landmine/ERW casualties in the Republic of Zimbabwe. Two were boys, both injured, a third was an adult male whose survival outcome was unknown, and two were deminers injured in the course of their work. The boys were injured while tampering or playing with an explosive resulting in the loss of one’s hand and fragmentation injuries to the other. The adult was injured while herding cattle. Of the two deminers, one suffered only minor injuries while the other lost a finger and sustained other injuries to his arms.[1]

Five casualties represent the lowest number reported since the Monitor began casualty tracking. The Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) attributes this reduction to the success of mine risk education activities and minefield marking programs.[2] However, the only casualty reporting mechanism in Zimbabwe comes from the two international operators, the HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which are working in a limited area along the northeastern border of Zimbabwe. No casualties were reported from the Rushitu to Muzite Mission minefield on the eastern border or the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner Minefield on the southern border. Had casualties occurred in either of those minefields, it is not clear if those casualties would have been reported to ZIMAC.

Since 1980, 1,615 casualties have been reported in Zimbabwe.

Cluster munition casualties

There have been at least three cluster munition casualties in Zimbabwe, dating to the period of the 1970s liberation war. In an incident documented by a former Rhodesian soldier in his memoirs, two children were killed and a third injured when they found an unexploded bomblet and threw it against a large rock.[3]



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for calendar year 2016, Form J; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Col. Ncube, ZIMAC, 4 October 2017.

[2] Ibid.

[3] PJH Petter-Bowyer, Winds of Destruction: The autobiography of a Rhodesian born pilot covering the Rhodesian bush war of 1967–1980 (Trafford Publishing: 2003).


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 09 October 2017

Action points based on findings

  • Expand casualty data collection to all areas affected by landmines and all organizations working in mine action.
  • Disability policies should be updated and aligned with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
  • Ensure sustainability of prosthetic and orthotic services.
  • Provide economic inclusion opportunities for survivors and persons with disabilities.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Zimbabwe is responsible for a significant number of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors who are in need. Zimbabwe has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Victim assistance since 2015

In 2015, support from the Norwegian government concluded but other stakeholders have stepped in to deliver wheelchairs and other mobility devices to support the Local Rehabilitation Workshop (LOREWO) based near the Mpilo referral hospital in Bulawayo.[1] The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) provided support to the Parirenyatwa group of hospitals until 2013 when the SFD ended support, as expected, as part of the ICRC SFD phase out, believing that they had reached a satisfactory level of autonomy.[2] ICRC SFD assistance to the Bulawayo Rehabilitation Center had been phased out by the end of 2012, as planned.[3]

Disability issues are coordinated by the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, while emergency assistance is led by the Victim Friendly Unit. Responsibility for surveying survivors needs and other assistance to mine/ERW survivors is centralized through the national mine action center, ZIMAC.[4]

Victim assistance in 2016

Assessing victim assistance needs

No systematic victim assistance needs assessment was conducted in 2016. Casualty data and the individual needs of survivors are collected and reported to ZIMAC by the international operators, HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). HALO and NPA, with the support of the United States (US) Department of State, identify survivors in their working areas, and conduct individual assessments.[5] In 2016, HALO assessed the needs of fewer survivors than in 2015.[6]

ZIMAC communicates all reported landmine casualties to the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare for inclusion in the database of all persons with disabilities maintained by the ministry, instead of creating a parallel data management system.[7]

Victim assistance coordination[8]

Government coordinating body/focal point

Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

Coordinating mechanism

N/A

Plan

No active victim assistance plan

Note: N/A = not applicable.

Victim assistance coordination has been the responsibility of ZIMAC, a section within the Zimbabwean army. Coordination for disability programming nationally is the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. ZIMAC has provided information on survivors to the Ministry to enable the survivors to access services available through the ministry. In 2017, the victim assistance focal point changed from ZIMAC to the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare.[9]

In 2016 the ICRC hosted a study tour for ZIMAC officials to visit Lebanon and observe the mine action program there, including victim assistance programming.[10]

ZIMAC, with the support of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU), is developing a National Mine Action Strategic Plan, which may be published in 2017. It is unclear how victim assistance will be included in that plan.[11]

A draft national disability policy was pending an endorsement by the cabinet as of September 2017.[12]

Participation and inclusion in victim assistance

In the absence of a coordinating mechanism for victim assistance or a formal plan for victim assistance activities, survivors are unable to participate in the formulation of victim assistance strategies. However, a strong disability community exists in Zimbabwe, including disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) and service providers, which could contribute to a future coordinating mechanism. DPOs and their representatives, including the Federation of Organizations of Disabled People in Zimbabwe (FODPZ), were consulted on the development of the policy. The government of Zimbabwe recognized FODPZ as the “voice of the disability movement” in Zimbabwe.[13] Survivors and persons with disabilities are employed by Local Rehabilitation Workshop (LOREWO) and Jairos Jiri in the manufacture of wheelchairs and assistive devices.[14]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[15]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2016

National Rehabilitation Hospitals

Government

Seven rehabilitation centers with mobile workshops, includes limited psychological counseling

Ongoing

Ministry of Public Service,  Labour and Social Welfare

Government

Financial support to war victims, and management of disability benefits programs

Ongoing

Jairos Jiri

NGO

Prosthetic and orthotic devices, wheelchairs; community-based rehabilitation; inclusive education; vocational training

Ongoing; with support from Christian Blind Mission, provided emergency relief to persons with disability affected by drought. Orthopedic workshop’s output is limited by availability of raw materials

Leonard Cheshire Disability Zimbabwe Trust

NGO

Advocacy; programs for children with disabilities

Three-year vocational training and economic inclusion project came to an end in December 2015

Cassim’s Prosthetics

Commercial company

Prosthetic and orthotic devices

Delivery of prosthetics to survivors living along the Mozambican border

Local Rehabilitation Workshop (LOREWO)

NGO

Wheelchairs

International support declining; introducing physical and occupational therapy

Disabled Women in Africa

NGO

Advocacy

Publications and meetings to address accessibility of health care for persons with disabilities. Discussions around organizing community for localization of CRPD

National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe

NGO

Advocacy

Discussions around organizing community for localization of CRPD

Disabled Women Support Organization

NGO

Advocacy

Educate parliamentarians about CRPD; produced DVD about voter education for persons with disabilities

Christian Blind Mission

NGO

Advocacy, coordination of services, support to Jairos Jiri Association

Ongoing

 

Emergency and continuing medical care

Emergency medical and surgical services are available at the national referral hospitals, which are not near the mine-affected regions. Survivors and others in need of services often must travel long distances to obtain necessary medical treatments, usually at cost to the individuals.[16] In case of an incident, HALO sends its staff to the Karanda Mission Hospital, a private facility about two hours’ drive from the minefields.[17] NPA uses the Mutare Provincial Hospital, one of the national referral hospitals, for this purpose.[18]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

Physical rehabilitation and orthopedic services are limited to the major cities.[19] Jairos Jiri maintains a community-based rehabilitation program that covers several, but not all, provinces of Zimbabwe.[20] Jairos Jiri, with the support of Christian Blind Mission, continues to operate its orthopedic workshop in Harare to produce and repair wheelchairs and prosthetics, but output is limited due to a lack of raw materials.[21]

The Leonard Cheshire Trust purchased and provided mobility appliances and prosthetics to several children with disabilities as part of its physical rehabilitation program.[22]

HALO has contracted with commercial prosthetic company, Cassim’s Prosthetics in Bulawayo to provide fittings and orthopedic devices for survivors in HALO’s working area. Due to funding constraints, no survivors received prosthetics from HALO in 2016, though several were fitted for devices that were delivered in 2017.[23]

In 2016, the Zimbabwe National Army supported some 50 survivors with artificial limbs in its working areas along Zimbabwe’s southern borders.[24]

Economic inclusion

With only 15% of the population engaged in formal employment, few opportunities for meaningful work exist for Zimbabweans. LOREWO and the Jairos Jiri Prosthetic Workshop operate as sheltered workshops for persons with disabilities.

Psychological support and social inclusion

Few, if any, psychological services are available for survivors and persons with disabilities in Zimbabwe, and what services do exist are inadequate for the needs.[25] The government of Zimbabwe reported significant efforts to implement inclusive education programming. The subsidies for children with disabilities under the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM), which provided US$600 per student per year have been restored with 10% of the BEAM allocation reserved for children with disabilities. An inclusive education manual has been developed and Disability Resource Centers were established at many institutions to provide educational and psychosocial support to learners with disabilities.[26]

Laws and policies

Zimbabwe has several national policies, including the Disabled Persons Act, the War Victims Compensation Act, the Social Welfare Assistance Act, and the State Service (Disabled Benefits) Act, related to victim assistance and disability. The Disabled Persons Act was hailed as a major milestone when it was passed in 1992, but has since been superseded in international policy by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution recognizes the rights of persons with disabilities and requires the government to provide mechanisms for the realization of those rights with an important and disastrous caveat: government action is contingent upon available resources.[27]

Several policy changes and programs are awaiting final approval by the government. The government of Zimbabwe and the Africa Disability Alliance have drafted a memorandum of understanding to develop a national disability mainstreaming plan but the memorandum of understanding has not been approved by the Cabinet. A draft National Disability Policy, which was drafted by and has the support of the disability community in Zimbabwe has yet to be validated by the Cabinet.[28]

Zimbabwe ratified the CRPD on 23 September 2013, but has yet to domesticate the law and revise existing legislation in accordance with the convention.[29]



[1] Interviews with Anywhere Chimbambaira, Local Rehabilitation Workshop, 22 June 2015; and with Isaac Nyathi, National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe, 22 June 2015; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Michele Angeletti, Christian Blind Mission (CBM), 8 April 2016.

[2] ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 19.

[3] ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013, pp. 13, 20.

[4] Presentation of Zimbabwe, “ICRC-AU Workshop to Advance the Implementation of Victim Assistance Obligations Arising from Various Weapons Treaties,” Addis Ababa, 6 March 2014.

[5] Interview with Dennis Hadrick, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US State Department, 15 February 2017.

[6] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 17 September 2017.

[7] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Email from Amir Musanovic, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 19 September 2017; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 17 September 2017.

[10] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 229.

[11] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J.

[12] Republic of Zimbabwe, Statement delivered to the 9th Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, 14 June 2016; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[13] Republic of Zimbabwe, Statement delivered to the 9th Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, 14 June 2016; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[14] Interviews with Anywhere Chimbambaira, Local Rehabilitation Workshop, 22 June 2015; and with Jairos Jiri Prosthetic Workshop, 17 June 2015.

[15] Interviews with Tendayi Sengwe, ICRC, 16 June 2015; with Sneddon Soko, Ministry of Labor & Social Welfare, 16 June 2015; with Jairos Jiri Prosthetic Workshop, 17 June 2015; with Rejoice Timire, Disabled Women Support Organization, 17 June 2015; with Don Chauke, Independent Consultant, 17 June 2015; with Anywhere Chimbambaira, Local Rehabilitation Workshop, 22 June 2015; with Isaac Nyathi, National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe, 22 June 2015; with Tione Mzila, Disabled Women in Africa, 22 June 2015; and with Dawood Cassim and Noordan Cassim, Cassim’s Prosthetics, 22 June 2015; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J; Jairos Jiri Association, “Community Based Rehabilitation,” undated; Leonard Cheshire Disability Zimbabwe, “Annual Report: 1 April 2015–31 March 2016,” undated; and responses to Landmine Monitor ruestionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 17 September 2017; and by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[16] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the calendar year 2016), Form J.

[17] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 9 December 2014.

[18] Email from Sheila Mweemba, NPA, 19 March 2015.

[19] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the calendar year 2016), Form J.

[20] Jairos Jiri Association, “Community Based Rehabilitation,” undated.

[21] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[22] Leonard Cheshire Disability Zimbabwe, “Annual Report: 1 April 2015–31 March 2016,” undated.

[23] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 17 September 2017.

[24] “Sanctions won’t stop de-mining,” The Herald, 3 August 2017.

[25] US Department of State, “2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zimbabwe,” Washington, DC, 3 March 2017.

[26] Republic of Zimbabwe, Statement delivered to the 9th Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, 14 June 2016.

[27] Proceed Manatsa, “Are disability laws in Zimbabwe compatible with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)?” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, Vol. 4, Issue 4, April 2015, pp. 25–34.

[28] Republic of Zimbabwe, Statement delivered to the 9th Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, 14 June 2016; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[29] Interview with Tione Mzila, Disabled Women in Africa, 22 June 2015.