China

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 08 July 2019

Summary: Non-signatory China acknowledges the humanitarian concerns over cluster munitions but has taken no steps to join the convention. It has participated as an observer in the convention’s meetings but abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution on the convention in December 2018. China has acknowledged that it produces, exports, and stockpiles cluster munitions, but says it has never used them.

Policy

The People’s Republic of China has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

China participated as an observer in the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2018, where it made a statement praising the convention as “an important humanitarian achievement” that it has “made significant progress over the previous eight years leading to decreased production, transfer and use.” [1]

Since 2014, China has stated that it “ascribes to the goal and principles” of the convention. [2] At the same time it states that it “cannot join the convention at the moment…due to our national defence needs.” [3]

China has regularly reiterated its desire to establish the principle that “the users of cluster munitions, particularly those who massively used cluster munitions on other countries’ territory, shall effectively shoulder the responsibility for their clearance.” [4] It has long objected to how the convention was negotiated outside of UN auspices. [5]

China did not participate in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions. [6] When the convention opened for signature in Oslo in December 2008, China issued a statement committing to work for an “early and proper solution on the humanitarian problems arising from cluster bombs.” [7]

China has participated as an observer in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, the First Review Conference in 2015, and intersessional meetings Geneva in 2011–2014. Its representatives have readily met with Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) representatives and Monitor researchers to discuss China’s views on cluster munitions and position on joining the convention.

In December 2018, China abstained from the vote on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.” [8] China has never explained why it has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

China voted in favor of a 2015 UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use by Sudan. [9] China voted in favor of a 2014 UNSC resolution expressing concern at the use of cluster munitions in South Sudan. [10]

China is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

China is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). China used to view existing international humanitarian law as sufficient to deal with the harm associated with cluster munitions, but in 2008, it supported efforts to create a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions. China has not proposed any new CCW work on cluster munitions since 2011, when states failed to agree to a draft CCW protocol on cluster munitions. Thus effectively ending CCW deliberations on the topic and leaves the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole instrument dedicated to ending human suffering caused by these weapons.

Use

China has repeatedly stated that it has never used cluster munitions anywhere in the world. [11] In September 2018, China told States Parties that it “never uses” cluster munitions. [12] Previously, in 2017, China said it “has never used cluster munitions outside its territory.” [13]

Production and stockpiling

China has acknowledged to the Monitor that it produces, stockpiles, and exports cluster munitions.

State-owned company China Northern Industries (NORINCO) produces a range of conventional air-dropped and ground-launched cluster munitions including bombs, artillery projectiles, and rockets. The Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corporation, a subsidiary of state-owned China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASIC), produces and markets 302mm (WS-1, WS-1B, and WS-1E) and 320mm (WS-2) unguided multiple-launch surface-to-surface artillery rockets. Among the warheads available for these rockets are “armor-defeating and killing double use cluster,” “comprehensive effect cluster,” and “sensor fused cluster.” [14] In 2012, China’s Baicheng Weapon Test Center provided information on a terminal sensing sub-projectile cluster munition rocket. [15] Additionally, several of China’s ballistic missile systems are reported to have warheads that contain conventional explosive submunitions, but few details are available. [16]

Cluster munitions produced in China [17]

Type

Caliber

Carrier Name

Number

Submunition Type

Projectiles

120mm

Type W01

30

DPICM

122mm

Type-83

30

Type-81 DPICM

130mm

Type-59

35

Type-81 DPICM

152mm

Type-62

63

Type-81 DPICM

152mm

Type-66

63

Type-81 DPICM

155mm

Unknown

72

Type-81 DPICM

203mm

Unknown

100

DPICM

Bombs

 

Anti-runway

12

Unknown

Antitank

16

Unknown

BL-755 clone

340 Kg

147

189

Unknown

Unknown

Type 2

Type 2

Type 2

42

26

28

AP bomblets

AT bomblets

APAM

Rockets

107mm

122mm

122mm

273mm

302mm

320mm

Type-63

Type-81

Type-90A

WM-80

WS-1, -1B, -1E

WS-2

16

39

39

320

Type-81 DPICM

Type-90 DPICM

DPICM

DPICM

DPICM, CEM, SFW

DPICM, CEM, SFW

Note: DPICM = dual-purpose improved conventional munitions; AP = antipersonnel; AT = antitank; APAM = antipersonnel/antimateriel; CEM = combined effects munition; SFW = sensor fuzed weapon.

 

State-owned CASIC has developed the SY300 and SY400, 300mm and 400mm munitions, respectively, with dual-purpose submunitions and blast fragmentation warhead options. [18] The China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation promoted the SY300, SY400, and P12 systems at the IDEX 2015 fair in Abu Dhabi. [19] In 2016, China’s military TV channel reportedly broadcast footage of a CASIC DF-16B medium-range ballistic missile capable of delivering a cluster munition warhead over 800–1,000 kilometers. [20]

Transfers

There is no transparency on China’s experts and transfers of cluster munitions. However, cluster munition remnants of Chinese origin have been found in countries including Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, and Sudan:

  • Deminers in Iraq cleared a DPICM submunition of Chinese origin called Type-81 in 2003. [21] The United States (US) military’s unexploded ordnance identification guide also identifies the Chinese 250kg Type-2 dispenser as being present in Iraq. [22]
  • Hezbollah fired more than 100 Chinese Type-81 122mm rockets containing Type-90 (also called MZD-2) dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions into northern Israel in July/August 2006. [23]
  • Deminers in southern Lebanon have also found DPICM submunitions fired from 122mm rockets.
  • A Rockeye-type cluster bomb with Chinese language external markings was documented in Yei, Sudan in 2006.

In September 2017, China told States Parties that it has “a prudent and responsible attitude” regarding exports of cluster munitions, stating “We do not export military products to countries under Security Council embargoes and sanctions and do not provide weapons to non-state actors or individuals.” [24] In 2012, a government official said that China’s “strict policy on exporting weapons” applies to cluster munition transfers. [25]



 [1] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

 [2] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, Costa Rica, 2 September 2014.

 [3] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017; and statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

 [4] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017.

 [5] Ibid.; statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013; and statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

 [6] For details on China’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 195–196.

 [7] Wang Hongjiang, “Ministry: China supports int’l efforts to ban cluster bombs,” Chinese Government’s Official Web Portal, 2 December 2008.

 [8]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018.

 [9] In the resolution’s preamble, the Security Council expresses “concern at evidence, collected by AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), of two air-delivered cluster bombs near Kirigiyati, North Darfur, taking note that UNAMID disposed of them safely, and reiterating the Secretary-General’s call on the Government of Sudan to immediately investigate the use of cluster munitions.” UN Security Council Resolution 2228 (2015), Renewing Mandate of Darfur Mission until 30 June 2016, 29 June 2015.

 [10] The resolution noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and called for “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.” UN Security Council, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), Extends Mandate of Mission In South Sudan, Bolstering Its Strength to Quell Surging Violence,” SC11414, 27 May 2014. 

 [11] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 7 September 2015; statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 13 September 2011; and statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC. At the CCW in April 2010 and February 2011, China stated that it has “never used cluster munitions outside its territories.” Statement by Amb. Wang Qun, CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 12 April 2010; and statement of China, CCW GGE on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 21 February 2011. Notes by the CMC.

 [12] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

 [13] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017; and statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

 [14] Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corporation, “Our Products,” undated.

 [15] “Significant breakthrough made in PLA’s terminal sensing ammunition technology,” PLA Daily, 9 April 2012.

 [16] Chinese ballistic missile systems reported to be capable of delivering conventional explosive submunitions among the warhead options include the DF-11, DF-15, DF-21, and M-7 (Project 8610). For details see Duncan Lennox, Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 46 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, January 2007).

 [17] The primary sources for information on China’s cluster munitions are: Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 837; and Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008, 15 January 2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007). This table is supplemented with information from United States (US) Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected) DST-1160S-020-90,” 8 June 1990, partially declassified and made available to HRW under a Freedom of Information Act request.

 [18] The larger SY-400 mod version carries a 300kg payload capable of delivering a 660 cluster-bomblet warhead. The company’s short-range P-12 missile is also capable of carrying an anti-armour submunitions warhead.

 [20] R.D. Fisher Jr., “PLA flaunts strategic missiles of its Rocket Force,” IHS Janes Defence Weekly, 16 February 2016. See also, J. Lin and Peter W. Singer, “New Chinese Ballistic Missile Crashes the Battlefield Party With Cluster Munitions,” Popular Science, 19 February 2016.

 [21] Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008, CD-edition, 15 January 2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008).

 [22] US Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technical Division, “Iraq Ordnance Identification Guide, Dispenser, Cluster and Launcher-2,” undated.

 [24] Statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017; and statement of China, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 September 2018.

 [25] The officials said that the “Export of such weapons should not go against China’s relevant laws and regulations, and that without export license issued by the competent authorities [sic] is also not allowed.” Email from Lai Haiyang, Attaché, Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 March 2012.