Ten-Year Review: Non-signatory Syria has shown little interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions and abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2019.

Syria is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. It has denied possessing or using cluster munitions, but its government forces have used cluster munitions repeatedly since 2012, with Russia’s support. The use of cluster munitions in Syria has caused widespread harm that has been met with strong international condemnation.

Policy

The Syrian Arab Republic has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Syria has shown little interest in the convention and has taken no steps to join it. The Syrian government commented publicly once on the convention, in 2011. It expressed appreciation for the convention and described cluster munitions as “criminalized by humanity,” but said Syria “cannot sign” the convention “due to Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights.”[1]

Syria did not engage in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Syria attended the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011 as an observer. This remains Syria’s first and, to date, only participation in a meeting of the convention.

In December 2019, Syria abstained from the vote on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[2] Syria has not explained why it has abstained from the vote on this annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced was 2015.

Syria is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production and transfer

Syria is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but has imported and stockpiled them.

Stockpiling

There is no publicly available information on the types and quantities of cluster munitions stockpiled by the Syrian government. Syria possesses at least 13 types of cluster munitions, as listed in the following table. When and how the Syrian government obtained these cluster munitions remains unknown.[3]

Types of cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012[4]

Use

Research continues to show that Syrian government forces are primarily responsible for using cluster munitions in the country. There have been at least 686 cluster munition attacks in Syria since July 2012, including at least 11 cluster munition attacks between 1 August 2019 and 31 July 2020. The Monitor reviewed evidence, but could not independently confirm at least two dozen other possible cluster munition attacks in the same period.

Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2019 recorded 38 attacks between July 2018 and July 2019.

The extent of cluster munition use was certainly much higher, as many attacks likely went unrecorded.

During 2019 and the first half of 2020, most cluster munition attacks were recorded in the governorate of Idlib, while a few were recorded in Aleppo governorate. The Syrian Network for Human Rights identified four cluster munition attacks in Hama governorate as well in Idlib during the first half of 2020.[5] All 14 of the country’s governorates except Tartus have experienced the use of cluster munitions since 2012.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) investigated a cluster munition attack with a ballistic missile using 9N24 submunitions on 1 January 2020 that hit a school in Sarmin, Idlib, killing 12 civilians, including five children.[6] HRW also documented attacks on two schools in Idlib city on 25 February 2020 involving the use of 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan cluster munition rockets.[7]

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions in Syria at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city. There is also evidence that Russia has used cluster munitions in Syria since October 2015. At minimum, Russia has directly participated in supporting Syrian government attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.[8] Russia has not explicitly denied its involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but claims that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[9]

There is no evidence to indicate that the United States (US) or its partners have used cluster munitions during Operation Inherent Resolve, an international coalition formed in 2014 to target the Islamic State militant group in Iraq and Syria.[10]

The Islamic State used cluster munition rockets in Syria in 2014 and may have used them since then.[11] As the Syrian conflict continues, it is not possible to determine with confidence whether other non-state armed groups have used cluster munitions. There is evidence that opposition forces have repurposed unexploded submunitions for use in air-delivered and ground-emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs). When activated by a victim, such devices are considered antipersonnel landmines prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[12]

All apart from two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union or its successor state, Russia.[13] Syrian government forces have used an array of RBK-series cluster bombs in their air campaign.[14] More advanced RBK-500 SPBE bombs containing SPBE sensor-fuzed submunitions and a ground-fired 240mm 3-O-8 rocket-assisted mortar projectile have been used in Syria since Russia began its joint operation in the country in September 2015.[15]

Syrian government forces have used use ground-launched cluster munitions since the end of 2012, deploying multi-barrel rocket launchers to fire 122mm SAKR cluster munition rockets containing DPICM submunitions.[16] Since 2014, Syrian government forces have used Smerch 9M55K and Uragan 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions fitted with self-destruct mechanisms.[17] Syrian government forces have also used Tochka 9M79-series ballistic missiles.

Responses to the use of cluster munitions

The Syrian military has denied possessing or using cluster munitions, but rarely responds to or comments on allegations of new use of cluster munitions.[18] The Islamic State has not responded to its reported use of cluster munitions.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but in 2016 claimed that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[19]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, global public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[20] In September 2019, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted a report that “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.”[21] During the course of the meeting, at least 10 countries and the European Union publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[22]

Since May 2013, the UNGA has adopted eight resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 74/169 on 18 December 2019, for which 106 states voted in favor, 15 voted against and 57 abstained.[23] Since 2014, states have adopted more than 17 Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, while the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria has issued numerous reports detailing cluster munition attacks.[24]

Jump to a specific section of the profile:

Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country summary

The Syrian Arab Republic is contaminated by landmines left after successive Arab-Israeli wars since 1948, but particularly as a result of the conflict in Syria since 2011. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised mines, have also become increasingly prevalent in Syria in recent years, and have been used by multiple armed actors engaged in the conflict.[1] Non-state armed group (NSAG) the Islamic State planted IEDs in homes, public buildings and service provision facilities when its fighters retreated from areas previously held by the group.[2]

Cluster munitions have been used extensively in Syria in 13 of the country’s 14 governorates since 2012, with Tartus being the exception. Syrian government forces are primarily responsible for the use of cluster munitions.

The number of people estimated to be affected by mines/ERW in Syria increased from 10.2 million at the end of 2018 according to the 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview, to 11.5 million at the end of 2019 according to the draft 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview.[3] Correspondingly, the number of affected communities reported rose from 1,980 to 2,562.[4]

There is no national mine action program in Syria. Ongoing hostilities and reports of continuing use of mines by both pro- and anti-government forces has prevented systematic large-scale survey to determine the full extent of contamination. In government-controlled areas, some clearance has been undertaken by Russian and Syrian military engineers, civil defense forces, and by Armenian deminers. In northeastern governorates under the control of the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (KSDF), clearance has been undertaken by humanitarian demining organizations and commercial companies. The clearance response in 2019 was constrained due to access restrictions limiting the expansion of the response. However, contamination impact surveys were conducted which provided information on hazards, victim needs and risk behavior to communities and other humanitarian actors. In 2019, 605 contamination impact surveys were conducted (42 per cent of the Humanitarian Response Plan target).[5]

Risk education was the most widespread activity of the mine action area of responsibility in 2019 with over 3.3 million direct beneficiaries (representing 75% of the Humanitarian Response Plan target).[6] Risk education was conducted in both the northwest and northeast of Syria by the UN, humanitarian demining organizations and national organizations. Mine/ERW risk education is integrated with humanitarian protection activities undertaken by other sectors such as education, shelter, health, food security, and livelihoods. This enables operators to reach a larger number of at-risk people and to develop specific protection messages to inform internally displaced persons (IDPs) and communities about the risks.[7]

There is no national assistance program for victims of mines/ERW in Syria, however the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is establishing a program for coordinated victim assistance activities. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide services as and where they are able to operate. The total number of mine/ERW casualties and survivors in Syria is unknown. However, estimates place the number of those injured and killed at several thousand.[8]

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Humanitarian mine action commenced in Syria in 2015.[9] UNMAS operates in the country, but Syria has no national mine action authority.

Coordination

The UNMAS Syria Response established the Mine Action Sub-Cluster under the framework of the Whole of Syria approach in 2015. As a result, mine action is fully integrated into the humanitarian response. UNMAS is the lead organization for the mine action area of responsibility within the Global Protection Cluster for Syria, and has responsibility for ensuring an effective, accountable and coordinated mine action response.[10]

UNMAS has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Syrian government and has maintained a presence in the capital, Damascus, since 2018.[11] Activities have included risk education and contamination impact surveys.

Information management

UNMAS maintains an incident database in Amman, Jordan, making data on contamination available to humanitarian agencies.[12] Since September 2017, the Information Management and Mine Action Program (IMMAP) has provided information management services for northeastern Syria, coordinating data received from operators on hazard locations and results of non-technical survey, clearance, and risk education.[13] IMMAP also support the Information Management Resource Center (IMRC), which was launched to support the Whole of Syria structure with information management, coordination, and capacity-building services.[14]

Risk education management and coordination

UNMAS acts as the focal point for mine/ERW risk education in Syria, in its position as lead for the Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR). There is no government focal point. UNMAS and the Mine Action Sub-Cluster coordinates risk education in Syria, which in 2019 was tailored by age, gender, and specific localized threats.[15] The Mine Action Sub-Cluster established risk education standards for organizations operating within each geographic area.[16]

Coordination

Operators conducting risk education in northwest Syria coordinate through the Mine Action Sub-Cluster, and risk education activities are endorsed by UNMAS, the sub-cluster facilitator.[17] These operators also participate in the monthly Syria Protection Cluster meetings and the Mine Action Sub-Cluster meetings held in Gaziantep, Turkey. The meetings cover risk education, population movements, security situation developments, movement restrictions, Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) reporting, priorities, training, and materials.[18]

UNMAS collects data on the activities of risk education operators on a monthly basis, as well as collating IMSMA reporting and donor reports.[19] This information is used to inform risk education priorities for current and future projects.

Coordinating their efforts from Damascus, UNMAS and humanitarian partners work in partnership with different Syrian government ministries to deliver risk education.[20]

The Explosive Hazards Risk Education Workstream, under the Regional Durable Solutions Working Group, is coordinated by UNMAS and supports a coordinated regional-level response to risk education messages, materials, and approaches for Syrian refugees.[21]

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination overview[22]

Laws and policies

During a briefing with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in April 2019, Syrian activist Nujeen Mustafa explained that persons with disabilities remained among the most vulnerable and neglected of all displaced persons in the country, particularly in areas of active conflict.[23]

The Syrian government ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2009, but offers little protection to persons with disabilities and has taken few, if any, measures to ensure accessibility or equality of access to services. Furthermore, government forces and their allies have destroyed many hospitals and healthcare facilities. [24]

Impact

Contamination

As of the end of 2019, the full extent of contamination in Syria from landmines, cluster munition remnants, and ERW was unknown.

Landmine contamination

Landmines, whether commercially-manufactured or improvised, affect all regions of Syria and vary in type according to the armed groups active there. Contamination is particularly dense in areas that were occupied by the Islamic State. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) explained in 2019 that ‘‘MAG is still clearing some areas liberated by IS [Islamic State] three years ago.’’ MAG has stated that it is difficult to estimate the number of mines laid by the Islamic State, but considers all areas formerly held by the group to be mine-contaminated territory.[25] The United States (US) has described Raqqa as one of the most heavily contaminated places globally.[26]

From Raqqa to Hassakeh governorate in the northeast, and south to Deir ez-Zor, retreating Islamic State forces left massive contamination by improvised mines and other IEDs.[27] The Islamic State rigged everyday items and domestic objects to trigger powerful explosions. Many devices operate through tiny crush wires that are extremely hard to identify.[28]

In the northwestern governorates of Idlib and Aleppo, it was reported that mines and other types of explosive devices were planted in agricultural fields, villages, next to roads, and around schools and hospitals.[29] Rebel forces that subjected the towns of Foua and Kfraya to years of siege are reported to have left hundreds of mines in surrounding fields as well as leaving explosive devices in many homes. Further south in the governorates of Hama and Homs, open-source reports of mine casualties, although unconfirmed, suggest significant contamination left by all sides during years of conflict.[30]

In parts of southern governorates bordering Israel and Jordan, fewer mines are reported than other types of explosive hazards,[31] but Syrian reports point to the presence of Russian PMN-2 and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines.[32] Remotely delivered T-84 antivehicle mines were reportedly used in the Golan Heights in the southwest of Syria, which is already heavily contaminated with antipersonnel mines.[33] There are also reports that T-84 mines have been remotely deployed in the southwestern governorate of Daraa.[34]

The Syrian government reportedly laid mines along its borders with Turkey and Lebanon in 2012, and the Turkish authorities have reportedly claimed that between 613,000 and 715,000 mines were planted along the Turkey-Syria border, while making clear they had not been emplaced by Turkish forces.[35] Heavy casualties that occurred in Manbij, close to the Turkish border, after Kurdish forces pushed out Islamic State militants in mid-August 2016, attest to massive contamination by mines and other improvised devices[36] that were still inflicting casualties in 2019.[37]

Cluster munition remnants contamination

Syria has widespread cluster munition remnants contamination resulting from the ongoing armed conflict, which began in 2011. Syrian and Russian government forces have used cluster munitions extensively, and the Islamic State has also reportedly used them in Syria in a number of instances, but the extent of contamination is not known.[38]

In February 2017, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria reported “an alarming number of incidents involving cluster munitions,” affirming that their use in densely populated areas such as eastern Aleppo “constitutes the war crime of indiscriminate attacks in a civilian populated area.”[39] Although the number of reported cluster munition attacks in Syria has decreased since mid-2017,[40] they were still in use throughout 2019.[41] (See Syria Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile for more details)

From the end of April until June 2019, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported attacks against opposition-controlled areas of Idlib, Hama, and Aleppo governorates on a daily basis.[42] Prior to that, cluster munition use, casualties, and contamination were reported in the governorates of Aleppo, Daraa, Deir ez-Zour, Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Quneitra, as well as in the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta.[43]

ERW contamination

The Syrian Civil War, ongoing since 2011, has resulted in heavy contamination from the use of a wide range of types of explosive ordnance, including landmines, IEDs, air-dropped and artillery-delivered ordnance. The HALO Trust reports that it considers the extent of contamination in Syria to be so large, that “the work required will be measured in decades, not years.”[44]

The number of people estimated to be affected by mines/ERW in Syria increased from 10.2 million at the end of 2018 according to the 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview, to 11.5 million at the end of 2019 according to the draft 2020 Humanitarian Needs Overview.[45] Correspondingly, the number of affected communities reported rose from 1,980 to 2,562.[46]

Casualties

Casualties overview[47]

Note: IED=Improvised explosive device; ERW=explosive remnants of war.

* This figure includes casualties from cluster munition remnants. In 2019, the Monitor also recorded 219 casualties due to cluster munition attacks.

Casualties in 2019: details

Ambiguity in media reporting of casualties and explosive incidents often leaves it unclear whether the explosive device in each case was command-detonated or victim-activated. Whilst classifying the data, many casualties, including civilian casualties in Syria that were reported to be from mines, booby-traps, roadside bombs, and IEDs were excluded from the annual casualty dataset wherever the cause of activation was not adequately defined. If they were included, the annual casualty total for Syria would rise to 1,492 (804 killed and 688 injured).

Cluster munition casualties

As has been the case for each year since 2012, the majority of global cluster munition casualties in 2019 occurred in Syria. Overall, since 2012, 81% of all global cluster munition casualties were recorded in Syria. In 2019, as in previous years, the overwhelming majority of the 232 recorded cluster munition casualties in Syria were the result of cluster munition attacks (219).

As with mines/ERW, due to challenges in data collection, including the security situation and ongoing conflict, the number of cluster munition casualties caused by both attacks and unexploded submunitions is likely to be under-reported. It is possible that some persons recorded as injured by other mine and ERW types were actually unexploded submunition casualties.

Prior to new use of cluster munitions in 2012, at least five casualties from unexploded cluster submunitions had been recorded in Syria, including four child casualties in 2007.[48]

Addressing the impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

The Mine Action Sub-Cluster has 27 active members.[49] The operators listed in the clearance and risk education sections of this profile do not represent all humanitarian actors, as several operate anonymously for security reasons.

Clearance operators[50]

Note: NGO=Non-governmental organization.

Clearance

The extent of clearance in Syria in 2019 is unknown. Due to the ongoing nature of conflict in Syria, all mine action activities in the country, particularly clearance, are severely inhibited.[51]

In government-held areas, Russian and Syrian military personnel have undertaken some clearance activities, although clearance figures are not publicly reported.[52] Russian deminers also provided training for Syrian Army engineers at training centers established in 2017 in Aleppo and Homs. By the start of January 2018, the Russian Armed Forces reported that they had trained 900 Syrian engineers.[53] In 2019, it was reported that Russia allocated US$1million to support UNMAS mine action activities in Syria.[54]

In February 2019, Armenia sent a demining team to Syria to work in Aleppo governorate.[55] It was reported in August 2019 that the Armenian team had cleared 48,967m².[56] Turkey claimed to have cleared mines and other ERW in areas of northern Syria following its October 2019 cross-border offensive.[57]

Teams from the White Helmets volunteer organization have also conducted clearance and survey in northwestern Syria.[58]

Since 2017, through to October 2020, 429 contaminated areas have been identified by mine action operators supported by UNMAS in northwest, northeast and southern Syria, while in August 2020 the first UNMAS explosive ordnance assessment intervention began in the governorate of Rural Damascus.[59]

The HALO Trust has recently partnered with the Humanitarian Mine Action Association Turkey (IMFAD); a Turkish NGO working in northwest Syria since 2019. Funded by the Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) project of the European Union (EU), The HALO Trust and IMFAD reported conducting clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in northwest Syria.[60]

UNMAS reported that while access for mine action activities has improved, still-limited access in most areas has restricted operational reach and adequate mentoring for mine action teams, and has also hampered quality assurance mechanisms.[61] The expansion of explosive ordnance survey and clearance operations remained a critical priority.

Risk education

Operators and service providers

Risk education operators[62]

Note: IDP=internally displaced persons.

Beneficiary numbers

Beneficiary numbers 2019[63]

* Information provided by operators who requested anonymity.

UNICEF also reported that in 2019, over 1.6 million people received risk education across 14 governorates in Syria through its work to support the delivery of risk education through government agencies and partners.[64]

In the first half of 2020, more than 1.1 million beneficiaries received risk education provided by UNMAS, humanitarian partners and public service providers in Syria. Explosive hazard ordnance awareness sessions were delivered by UNMAS personnel to 186 humanitarian workers.[65]

Risk education capacity in Syria increased by the training of over 10,000 people to conduct risk education in their own communities.[66]

Implementation

UNICEF implemented risk education in Syria alongside immunization, water, sanitation, hygiene and polio campaigns and provided risk education to adolescent boys and girls through temporary learning centers, together with a program of life skills, psychosocial support and protection. In Deir ez-Zor governorate, children who had dropped out of school were referred to relevant health or education services and received mine risk education alongside comprehensive awareness on health, nutrition, education, hygiene, and sanitation. The initiative also included house-to-house visits, awareness sessions in schools and mosques, meetings with key influencers and community leaders, and the distribution of educational materials.[67] The White Helmets delivered mine/ERW risk education sessions while providing other forms of humanitarian assistance.[68]

UNICEF has also supported the Ministry of Education to integrate mine/ERW risk education into the school curriculum in 2018–2019.

Risk education is conducted in both rural and urban settings, and is reported to be age and gender sensitive. Risk education operators address all types of contamination in their messages, including landmines, cluster munition remnants, and improvised mines.[69] The White Helmets reported that risks from unexploded submunitions was a main focus of their sessions, due to the prevalence of submunitions in northwest Syria.[70]

The majority of risk education approaches focused on inter-personal risk education sessions and the use of small printed media, as well as billboards. UNMAS and UNICEF produced a risk education video for children, which also featured a sign language interpreter.[71]

The HALO Trust works through local partners Shafak and Hand in Hand for Aid and Development (HIHFAD) in northwest Syria. Both partners are involved in the broader livelihoods and protection sector, and integrate risk education messages into their programs. Shafak and HIHFAD provided emergency risk education to at-risk communities as part of the Enhanced Contamination Impact Survey. Shafak provided training to four trainers to deliver risk education messages to community focal points.

Due to ongoing conflict, The HALO Trust managed the risk education projects remotely through an operations room located in Amman, Jordan. The approach relied on “real time” communication channels such as Skype and WhatsApp.[72]

Target groups

All civilians in Syria are vulnerable to explosive ordnance, but some groups are recognized to be more at risk than others and are specifically targeted through risk education.[73] These include:

• Internally displaced persons (IDPs): due to ongoing conflict, Syria has a large number of IDPs, living in camps and host communities. Over 870,000 people were reportedly living in IDP camps in Syria as of the end of 2019.[74] IDPs are particularly vulnerable to the risk of explosive ordnance as they have often lost most of their possessions and means of financial support, and are often staying in or travelling through areas that are unfamiliar to them.
• Children, because they are often unaware of the risks and are naturally inquisitive, and are therefore prone to risk-taking behaviour. Boys are seen to be at higher risk than girls.
• Adult men, due to having greater freedom of movement than women, and because they are more likely to engage in livelihood activities and manual labour, such as construction work and agriculture, placing them at higher risk. Men and boys are thought to be most exposed to the risk from mines/ERW.
• Women were reported to be at risk because they may be less likely to receive the printed information being distributed by teams at community level.

Aside from these specific high-risk groups, communities across the whole of Syria more broadly were reported to be at risk due to contamination of agricultural land and community infrastructure including private housing, schools, hospitals, markets, water and sanitation systems, and roads.

Victim assistance

Victim assistance providers and activities

Victim assistance operators[75]

Needs assessment

A disability assessment among adults in the governorates of Aleppo, Idleb, and Raqqa indicated an average disability prevalence rate of 30%; double the global average. The assessment also found that 45% of surveyed people who were injured as result of the conflict in Syria are expected to suffer a permanent impairment. Disabled people are vulnerable to exclusion from humanitarian support, despite their additional needs. Over 60% of persons with disabilities surveyed stated that their disability has been exacerbated due to the ongoing conflict, with a lack of access to healthcare and difficulties in meeting their basic needs listed as the most common consequences.

Medical care and rehabilitation

Ongoing conflict and insecurity in Syria restricts access to essential medical services for victims. Emergency response and first aid is limited by the ongoing conflict, while Syria faces shortages of trained medical personnel and functioning health facilities, and has suffered damage to transport infrastructure.[77] According to a study carried out by Hand in Hand for Aid and Development (HIHFAD), some sub-districts, such as, Raju and Sheikh El-Hadid in Afrin, and Ma’batli, Aleppo,were in need of almost all basic health services.[78]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported 16 hospitals and three physical rehabilitation programs in 2019.[79] The ICRC prioritized assistance to IDPs, returnees and those affected by intensified conflict, notably increasing its healthcare services in the Al-Hol IDP camp due to its population being affected by intensified fighting.[80] The ICRC also helped refer, and covered the costs, for patients requiring advanced treatment, to appropriate facilities, such as its Weapon Traumatology and Training Centre in Lebanon.[81]

The ICRC supported physical rehabilitation centers in Damascus and Aleppo through the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC). Physical rehabilitation services were also provided to individuals being held in detention, particularly in Aleppo, through SARC.

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

A study conducted in 2018 found that “in all subdistricts, mental health and psychosocial support services are either not available or not accessible.”[82] The World Health Organization (WHO) supported mental health mobile clinics for IDPs in northern Syria, funded by Japan.[83] Many organizations deliver psychosocial and socio-economic programs, but there is no coordinated nationwide provision.

Conflict and emergencies

Attacks on medical facilities by both the Syrian and Russian armed forces continued to be reported throughout 2019, 82% of which occurred in the northwest of the country.[84] Physicians for Human Rights reported that medical personnel have also disappeared, been arrested, imprisoned, tortured, or executed.[85]

The increasing number of casualties caused by explosive ordnance in Syria is further exacerbating the demand on the country’s overwhelmed health services.[86] As of the end of 2018, at least 60% of healthcare facilities in Syria were either damaged or destroyed.[87]

In 2019, 17 donors reported contributing a total of US$42.5 million to mine action activities in the Syrian Arab Republic; $24.2 million less than in 2018 when international funding totaled $66.7 million.[1] Syria was the fifth largest recipient of international support to mine action in 2019.

The European Union provided the largest contribution with $16 million, to support mine action activities. This represented 38% of the total international mine action assistance in Syria for 2019. In addition, Australia, Germany, and Norway also provided substantial assistance to mine action activities in Syria and contributed a combined total of almost $11.4 million.

International contributions: 2019[2]

Note: N/A=not applicable; N/R=not reported.

International contributions to mine action in Syria fluctuated from $11.3 million in 2015 to more than $92 million in 2017, totaling approximately $232 million in the five-year period from 2015–2019 (more than two-fifths of which was provided in 2017).

Summary of international contributions: 2015–2019[3]