Cameroon

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 19 June 2019

Summary: State Party Cameroon ratified the convention on 12 July 2012 and adopted national implementing legislation in December 2016. Cameroon has attended meetings of the convention, most recently in September 2017. Cameroon voted in favor of a key United Nations (UN) resolution on the convention in December 2018.

Cameroon provided an initial transparency report for the convention in August 2014, confirming that it has not used or produced cluster munitions. It has retained a stockpile of six cluster munitions and 906 submunitions for training purposes.

Policy

The Republic of Cameroon signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 15 December 2009, ratified on 12 July 2012, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 January 2013.

Cameroon’s National Assembly adopted legislation on 14 December 2016 providing penal and fiscal sanctions for violations of the prohibitions of the convention. [1] Cameroon has also reported its Penal Code and other decrees and existing laws under national implementation measures applicable to the convention. [2] Cameroon said in September 2017 that it intends to establish a “national committee on weapons” to oversee implementation of the new law. [3]

Cameroon provided an initial Article 7 transparency report in August 2014, and submitted updated reports in 2015, 2016, and most recently in April 2017. [4] The 2016 national legislation mandates the Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs to provide annual Article 7 transparency reports by April 1 of each year, detailing the type, quantity, and lot number of cluster munitions in Cameroon’s possession. [5]

Cameroon participated in the Oslo Process and joined in the consensus adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dublin in May 2008, but could not sign the convention in Oslo in December 2008 due to challenges in securing authorization. [6] It signed the convention at the UN in New York in December 2009 and ratified on 12 July 2012, after adopting ratification legislation in March 2011. [7]

Cameroon has participated in every meeting of the convention except the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2018. [8]

In December 2018, Cameroon voted in favor of a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution urging implementation and universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. [9] Cameroon has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Cameroon has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2018. [10]

Cameroon is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Cameroon has elaborated its views on certain important issues relating to the interpretation and implementation of the convention. In 2011, the Ministry for External Relations stated, “Cameroon has never produced, used, or stockpiled, let alone served as a platform for the transit or transfer of cluster munitions. It therefore approves a) the prohibition on the transfer of cluster munitions; b) the prohibition on the assistance in joint military operations; c) the prohibition on foreign stockpile of cluster munitions; d) the prohibition on investments in cluster munitions.” [11] Cameroon’s 2016 implementation legislation states that the president must approve any transit of cluster munitions on its territory. [12] It authorizes the transfer of cluster munitions for the sole purpose of destruction. [13]

Use, production, and transfer

Cameroon has stated on several occasions that it has not used or produced cluster munitions. [14] It imported or otherwise acquired a stockpile of cluster munitions produced in France in 1983, according to the lot numbers. [15]

Stockpiling and stockpile destruction

In August 2014, Cameroon reported a stockpile of six BLG-66 Belouga cluster bombs and 906 “grenades” or explosive submunitions. [16]

Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Cameroon must destroy all its stockpiled cluster munitions as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2021.

Cameroon never indicated that it planned to destroy the stockpile, but instead has stated via the initial transparency report and subsequent annual updates that it was retaining the stockpile for research and training purposes. [17]

Retention

Cameroon has retained six BLG-66 Belouga cluster bombs and 906 “grenades” or explosive submunitions for research and training purposes. That number has not changed since 2014, indicating that Cameroon has yet to consume or otherwise destroy the munitions in research or training exercises.

Cameroon’s 2016 implementing legislation permits the retention of a “limited” number of cluster munitions and submunitions for training related to the detection and destruction of cluster munitions. [18] The law does not elaborate what it means by “limited.”



 [1] The law contains fines for violations, ranging from $1 to $170 (1,000 to 100,000 CFA) as well as penal sanction of various terms, e.g. 15–25 years for production, storage, importation, and transportation, and 10–30 years for sales. “Loi portant régime général des armes et munitions au Cameroun” (“Law on the general regime of weapons and ammunition in Cameroon”), Republic of Cameroon, Law No.2016/015, Chapter IV, 14 December 2016.

 [2] See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Form A, August 2014 and April 2017.

 [3] Statement of Cameroon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of State Parties, Geneva, 5 September 2017. Official audio recording, UN Digital Recordings Portal.

 [4] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2017. Cameroon’s transparency reporting has been inconsistent and fraught with delays. An internet archiving service shows that Cameroon’s initial report from 2014 was not uploaded to the UN database of Convention on Cluster Munitions transparency reports until August 2016. Reports covering the years 2015 and 2016 were both uploaded in April 2017.

 [5]Loi portant régime général des armes et munitions au Cameroun” (“Law on the general regime of weapons and ammunition in Cameroon”), Republic of Cameroon, Law No.2016/015, Chapter IV, Article 36, 14 December 2016.

 [6] For details on Cameroon’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2010, see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 126–127.

 [7] Law 2011/003 was adopted on 6 March 2011 and signed into law by President Paul Biya on 6 May 2011

 [8] Cameroon attended the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015, intersessional meetings in 2013–2014, and regional workshops on the convention, most recently in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in August 2016.

 [9]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 73/54, 5 December 2018.

 [10]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 73/182, 17 December 2018. Cameroon voted in favor of similar resolutions in 2013–2017.

 [11] Original text in French: “Le Cameroun, n’est producteur, ni utilisation, ni stockeur encore moins une plate-forme de transit et de transfert des armes à sous-munitions. Il approuve par conséquent a) l’interdiction de transfert des sous-munitions; b) l’interdiction d’assistance en opérations militaires conjointes; c) l’interdiction de stocker des armes à sous-munitions étrangères; d) l’interdiction d’investir dans les armes à sous-munitions.” “Cameroon and the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” statement provided to Handicap International in email from Dr. Yves Alexandre Chouala, Ministry of External Relations, 12 May 2011.

 [12]Loi portant régime général des armes et munitions au Cameroun” (“Law on the general regime of weapons and ammunition in Cameroon”), Republic of Cameroon, Law No.2016/015, Chapter II, Article 6, 14 December 2016.

 [13] Ibid., Chapter IV, Article 35.

 [14] Statement of Cameroon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 15 September 2011; statement of Cameroon, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, Closing Plenary, 30 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action; and statement of Cameroon, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

 [15] Each bomb contains 152 submunitions; Cameroon reported a total of 906 submunitions rather than 912 submunitions.

 [17] Ibid., Form C. See also, statement of Cameroon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 September 2017. Official audio recording, UN Digital Recordings Portal.

 [18]Loi portant régime général des armes et munitions au Cameroun” (“Law on the general regime of weapons and ammunition in Cameroon”), Republic of Cameroon, Law No.2016/015, Chapter IV, Article 35, 14 December 2016.


Impact

Last updated: 17 November 2022

Country Summary

The Republic of Cameroon originally declared that there were no mined areas under its jurisdiction or control, and its initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline expired in 2013. However, since 2014, victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have caused casualties, particularly in northern districts along the border with Nigeria. Cameroon has yet to clarify the extent of contamination from improvised mines, though it is believed to be small.

Since 2016, Cameroon has experienced a protracted armed conflict between opposing anglophone separatists in the Northwest and Southwest regions and the francophone government.[1] Increased use of IEDs in both regions has been reported.[2] The Boko Haram insurgency in northeast Nigeria has also spilled over into Cameroon’s Far North region due to the porous nature of the border. The United Nations (UN) has reported indications of the transfer of components and methodologies in IED use between the two countries.[3]

Cameroon does not have a functioning mine action program, but state security forces have been trained in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) by France, Russia, and the United States (US). Cameroon did not report any risk education activities in 2021.

There was no specific victim assistance program in Cameroon. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to support the only hospital providing surgical services.[4] Ongoing insecurity, and a lack of capacity and resources, meant that access to healthcare and rehabilitation was limited.

Management and Coordination

Cameroon does not have a functioning mine action program. In 2021, the in-country Protection Cluster coordinator requested the establishment of a Mine Action Area of Responsibility (AoR) in Cameroon, in response to the escalating threat to civilians and humanitarian workers posed by IEDs.[5] As of November 2022, no progress has been made in this regard. 

In June 2021, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) highlighted the “urgent need for awareness raising on risk education in schools, and sensitization of community members particularly school children and caregivers, on improvised explosive devices (IED) risk and mitigation measures.”[6]

Impact

Contamination

Landmine contamination

The extent of mine contamination in Cameroon is not known. There are no legacy minefields, and incidents involving explosive remnants of war (ERW) were reported infrequently.[7] Since 2014, improvised mines have caused casualties, particularly in the Northwest, Southwest, and Far North regions. Yet it is not clear whether these devices meet the definition of improvised antipersonnel mines. Cameroonian military officials reported in 2015 that “huge” numbers of landmines had been planted by Boko Haram along Cameroon’s border with Nigeria, posing a threat to civilians, livestock, and soldiers. They also reported recurrent use of landmines along the road between Kerawa and Kolofata, targeting military vehicles.[8] The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) has identified use of improvised mines in Cameroon since 2016.[9]

Reports in 2020–2021 by local media and humanitarian organizations showed that IED trigger mechanisms used in Cameroon were diverse, and included body-borne IEDs carried by women and children, and command-detonated IEDs. Use of improvised antivehicle and antipersonnel mines was reported.[10] An increase in IED use was reported during 2021 in the Northwest and Southwest regions, targeting state security forces but also placing civilians and humanitarian workers at risk, while preventing humanitarian access.[11]

IED and improvised mine contamination restricted movement and impeded access to services and livelihoods, and posed a particular threat to internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and returnees, who had fled to unfamiliar areas or returned to their areas of residency unaware of contamination.[12]

Cross-border contamination

Between August 2019 and July 2021, there were “indications of the transfer of components and methodologies for the use of improvised explosive devices across borders and regions between Cameroon and Nigeria which underscored the need for a regional and multidisciplinary response.”[13]

Casualties

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Cameroon is not known. Between 2014 and 2021, the Monitor recorded a total of 207 min/ERW casualties; including 87 killed and 120 injured. [14]

Casualties in 2021[15]

Overview

Total

14

Change from 2020

Decrease from 32

Survival outcome

Injured

8

Killed

6

                                                    Casualties by device

Improvised mines

14

Casualties by civilian status

Civilian

14

Casualties by age and gender

Women

1

Total adult

1

Girls

2

Children/Gender unknown

6

Total children

8

Age and/or gender unknown

5

 Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

The Monitor recorded 14 casualties in Cameroon in 2021, marking a decrease from 32 in 2020 and 43 in 2019.

However, the proportion of civilian casualties increased over the same period. In 2021, all reported mine/ERW casualties were civilians, compared to 78% in 2020 and 48% in 2019.

It is not clear whether all of the casualties recorded in 2021 and in previous years were the result of improvised antipersonnel mines, due to the lack of information available on trigger mechanisms. Casualties were mainly located in the Far North and Northwest regions.

Addressing the Impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

Cameroon has two national clearance operators: the Military Engineer Corps, and the military police or “gendarmerie,” which was reported by UNMAS in April 2017 to be developing an EOD capacity. A capacity for battle area clearance (BAC) and spot tasks was also reported to be required.[16]

From June 2018 to June 2019, more than 1,400 members of Cameroon’s security forces were trained in EOD by the Francophone International Police Training Network (Réseau international francophone de formation policière, FRANCOPOL).[17] This followed the earlier training of 25 Cameroonian soldiers by the French and US militaries in Level 4 EOD, from March–April 2018.[18] Since 2015, Cameroon was reported to have received demining and EOD training and equipment from Russia and the US.[19]

In June 2021, 14 military sappers, including one woman, completed training in IED disposal.[20]

Clearance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Cameroon was required to destroy all antipersonnel landmines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2013. Despite reports of improvised mine incidents in recent years, Cameroon has not reported on the nature or extent of this contamination nor requested an extension to its clearance deadline.

It is not known if, or to what extent, clearance or EOD has been undertaken in affected areas. In October 2019, Cameroon appealed for international support to boost its mine clearance and technical survey capacity.[21]

In May 2021, following an increase in IED incidents in the Northwest and Southwest regions, Cameroon’s Minister of Defense said special troops were being deployed to detect and destroy IEDs.[22]

In November 2021, IED spot task operations were carried out on the Kerawa-Nigeria road in Mayo-Sava department, Far North province.[23]

Risk education

Cameroon did not report any risk education activities in 2021.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) identified the need to develop a risk education strategy for the Far North region to benefit refugees and IDPs, as well as host communities.[24]

In 2021, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) highlighted the need for risk education in schools and communities.[25] In 2022, it reported that a lack of funding and partner capacity was preventing the implementation of activities in the Far North and North Regions.[26]

Local communities in conflict-affected areas were exposed to mine/ERW risk, while IDPs and refugees were at high risk in areas they were unfamiliar with. IDPs and refugees were hard to reach due to the unpredictability of their movements, including in areas that were inaccessible to humanitarian operators due to insecurity.[27]

Victim assistance

There is no victim assistance program in Cameroon. The ICRC continues to support the health sector. In 2021, insecurity, a government-imposed curfew, and the COVID-19 pandemic led to overcrowded facilities and limited access to health services.[28]

The Mada Hospital, in the Logone-et-Chari department, Far North region, was the only facility providing surgical services. ICRC supported the Mada Hospital and covered the cost of surgery for patients injured by weapons. It also supported primary healthcare centers in the Far North region, despite ongoing insecurity.[29]

UNICEF provided access to mental health and psychosocial support services for children and caregivers.[30] In 2022, a lack of funding and local capacity prevented UNICEF from conducting mental health and psychosocial support activities in the Far North and North regions.[31]



[1] ACAPS, “Cameroon: Overview,” updated 27 June 2022; Ilaria Allegrozzi, “Renewed Attacks on Aid Workers in Cameroon,” Human Rights Watch (HRW), 4 June 2020; and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Humanitarian Needs Overview: Cameroon,” March 2021, pp. 9–18.  

[2] UNOCHA, “Cameroon: North-West and South-West: Situation Report No. 32,” 30 June 2021, p. 1; and UNOCHA, “Cameroon: Rapport de Situation” (“Cameroon: Situation Report”), 29 December 2021, pp. 1–2.   

[3] Report of the Secretary-General to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), “Assistance in Mine Action,” A/76/283, 10 August 2021, p. 2.

[4] ICRC, “Annual Report 2021,” 27 July 2022, p. 243.

[5] Report of the Secretary-General to the UNGA, “Assistance in Mine Action,” A/76/283, 10 August 2021, p. 12.

[7] UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS explosive hazard mitigation response in Cameroon, 9 January–13 April 2017,” 30 April 2017, p. 1.

[8] Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Land Mines Hamper Cameroon, Chad In Fight Against Boko Haram,” Voice of America (VOA), 3 March 2015; and Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Boko Haram Surrounds Havens With Land Mines,” VOA, 24 May 2015.

[9] See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Cameroon: Mine Ban Policy,” updated 26 September 2019.

[11] UNOCHA, “Humanitarian Needs Overview: Cameroon,” 14 April 2022, p. 14; and UNOCHA, “Cameroon: Rapport de Situation” (“Cameroon: Situation Report”), 29 December 2021, pp. 1–2.  

[12] Report of the Secretary-General to the UNGA, “Assistance in Mine Action,” A/76/283, 10 August 2021, p. 16; and UNOCHA, “Cameroon: North-West and South-West: Situation Report No. 32,” 30 June 2021, pp. 1–2.

[13] Report of the Secretary-General to the UNGA, “Assistance in Mine Action,” A/76/283, 10 August 2021, p. 2.

[14] Monitor analysis of ACLED data for calendar years 2014 and 2017–2021.

[15] Unless otherwise indicated, casualty data is based on Monitor media monitoring from 1 January 2019 to 31 December 2021; and analysis of Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) data for 2019–2021. See, Clionadh Raleigh, Andrew Linke, Håvard Hegre, and Joakim Karlsen, “Introducing ACLED: An Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset: Special Data Feature,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, Issue 5, 28 September 2010, pp. 651–660.

[16] UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS explosive hazard mitigation response in Cameroon, 9 January–13 April 2017,” 30 April 2017, pp. 12 and 14.

[17] FRANCOPOL, “Clôture du projet de sensibilisation aux spécificités de la lutte antiterroriste et au traitement de la problématique des engins explosifs improvises” (“Closing ceremony of the awareness-raising project on the specifics of the fight against terrorism and dealing with improvised explosive devices”), 4 July 2019; and “Cameroon: 1,000 police officers and gendarmes trained to fight against explosive devices,” Daily News Cameroon, 19 June 2019.

[18] Mireille Onana Mebenga, “Cameroun: Génie Militaire - Des démineurs formés” (“Cameroon: Military Engineering - Deminers trained”), Cameroon Tribune, 23 April 2018; and “L'armée camerounaise initiée au déminage des explosifs par les Américains et Français” (“Cameroonian military initiated into the clearance of explosives by the Americans and the French”), Cameroun 24, 24 April 2018.

[19] See, ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Cameroon: Mine Action,” updated 7 November 2018.

[20] Alfred Mvogo, “Génie militaire : 14 démineurs en fin de stage” (“Military Engineering: 14 deminers finalize their training”), Cameroon Tribune, 18 June 2021.

[22] Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Cameroon Military Says Rebels Turning to IEDs as Numbers Fall,” VOA, 11 May 2021.

[23] UNOCHA, “Cameroon: Rapport de Situation” (“Cameroon: Situation Report”), 29 December 2021, p. 5.    

[26] UNICEF, “Cameroon Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2,” 5 August 2022, p. 4.

[27] Report of the Secretary-General to UNGA, “Assistance in Mine Action,” A/76/283, 10 August 2021, p. 16; and UNOCHA, “Cameroon: North-West and South-West: Situation Report No. 32,” 30 June 2021, pp. 1–2.

[28] ICRC, “Annual Report 2021,” 27 July 2022, p. 241.

[29] Ibid., pp. 241 and 246.

[30] UNICEF, “Cameroon Humanitarian Situation Report No. 1,” December 2021, p. 5.

[31] UNICEF, “Cameroon Humanitarian Situation Report No. 2,” 5 August 2022, p. 4.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 26 September 2019

Policy

The Republic of Cameroon signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 19 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003.

Legislation to enforce the antipersonnel mine prohibition domestically has not been enacted. Cameroon submitted its initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report on 5 December 2005 and a subsequent report in August 2009 but has not provided any further annual reports.

Cameroon destroyed its stockpile of 9,187 antipersonnel mines in April 2003. Cameroon apparently retains 3,154 “inactive mines” for training purposes.[1] It has not provided further reporting on the use of retained mines, as agreed by States Parties.

Cameroon attended the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in Vienna, Austria in December 2017 but did not make any statements. It did not attend the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2018, nor the treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2018.

Cameroon is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but not CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Use

Cameroon has previously stated that it has not used, produced, or exported antipersonnel mines and will not facilitate their transit through its country.[2]

Non-state armed groups

In both 2018 and early 2019, UNMAS identified use of pressure plate-initiated improvised mines by Boko Haram in northern Cameroon.[3] However, it is unclear if these improvised mines were detonated due to the pressure exerted by weight of a person or a vehicle. Such use was previously identified in 2016 and 2017.[4]

Most recently, a soldier and two civilians were killed on 15 September 2017 by a landmine planted by Boko Haram between Abdouri and Woulba, in the country’s northern region.[5]

The use of victim-activated improvised mines has regularly been reported in the northern extreme of the country, where it shares borders with Nigeria and Chad, though several of the incidents reported as “landmines” in the press appear to be antivehicle mines or remote-controlled improvised explosive devices.[6] In May 2015, Cameroon’s Defense Minister, Edgard Alain Mebe Ngo’o, stated that the Cameroonian military’s efforts to secure the country's northern border with Nigeria are being hampered by landmines planted by Boko Haram.[7] Boko Haram has been documented to manufacture and use victim-activated improvised explosive devices across the border in Nigeria.[8] In 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported the presence of landmines in Fotokol and Mayo Moskota, both in Logone et Chari department.[9]



[1] See, ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 273.

[2] Statement of Cameroon, Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 19 September 2002.

[4] UNMAS, “Mission Report: UNMAS Explosive Hazard Mitigation Response in Cameroon 9 January–13 April 2017,” undated, p. 11.

[5] Simon Ateba, “Cameroon: Over 109 Houses Set on Fire by Boko Haram in Overnight Attacks,” Cameroon Concord, 18 September 2017.

[6] See for instance, Felix Nkambeh Tih, “Landmine explosion kills 2 soldiers in north Cameroon,” Anadolu Agency, 24 April 2014.

[7] Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Boko Haram Surrounds Havens With Land Mines,” Voice of America (VOA), 24 May 2015; Moki Edwin Kindzeka, “Cameroon Vigilantes Hunt for Boko Haram Landmines,” VOA, 4 March 2016; and “Six villagers injured in Boko haram landmine explosion,” Journal du Cameroun, 17 May 2017.

[8] See, ICBL, “Country Profile: Nigeria: Mine Ban Policy,” 21 November 2016.

[9] UNHCR/International Organisation for Migration (IOM), “Cameroon: Far North – Displaced Population Profiling,” 19 May 2015.