Summary: Non-signatory Ukraine has acknowledged the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Ukraine last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2014. Ukraine abstained from voting on a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the convention in December 2022.

Ukraine possesses a stockpile of cluster munitions that it inherited from the former Soviet Union and it may have acquired cluster munitions from elsewhere. Russia has used cluster munitions extensively since its invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Ukrainian forces have used cluster munitions on several occasions during the conflict, causing civilian harm.

Policy

Ukraine has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Ukraine has acknowledged the deadly long-term consequences of cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to accede to the convention.[1] Ukraine told the Monitor in 2010 and 2012 that it considered cluster munitions to be “legal weapons” and “an important component of Ukraine’s defense capabilities.”[2]

Ukraine has also expressed concern at its capacity to comply with the convention’s obligations, particularly the eight-year deadline to destroy stockpiled cluster munitions.[3]

Ukraine attended several meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and participated as an observer at the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[4]

Ukraine last participated as an observer at a meeting of the convention in 2014.[5] Ukraine was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties held in Geneva in August–September 2022.

In December 2022, Ukraine abstained from voting on a key UNGA resolution that urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[6] Ukraine has never explained why it has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Ukraine has voted in favor of UNGA and Human Rights Council resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[7]

Ukraine is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Production and transfer

In 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine has not produced cluster munitions and has not imported them.[8]

Ukraine has publicly asked to be supplied with cluster munitions for use in its war against Russia, since Russia’s February 2022 invasion of the country.[9]

On 7 July 2023, the administration of President Joe Biden announced that an unspecified quantity of United States (US) stocks of cluster munitions, with a failure rate higher than 1%, would be transferred to Ukraine.[10] According to the US Department of Defense, “155mm artillery rounds” will be transferred, including ones that deliver what it called “highly effective and reliable” dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM).[11] US Department of Defense officials have claimed that the DPICM submunitions “have a dud rate less than 2.35 percent” but said the testing data behind this number is “classified.”[12]

It appears that the US will transfer 155mm M864 cluster munition artillery projectiles that each contain 72 DPICM submunitions, as well as 155mm M483A1 artillery projectiles that each contain 88 DPICM submunitions. The projectiles deliver M42 and M46 DPICM submunitions and historic data for these submunitions shows that they have a failure rate of 6–14%. The failure rate is often higher in operations due to wind, soft soil, dense vegetation, and other delivery factors.[13]

Ukraine’s Minister of Defence, Oleksii Reznikov, welcomed the US decision to provide Ukraine with cluster munitions in July 2023, which he said “will significantly help us to de-occupy our territories while saving the lives of the Ukrainian soldiers.”[14] Reznikov further outlined five “key principles which we [Ukraine] will abide by and which we have clearly communicated to all our partners, including the US.” These principles are summarized by the Monitor as: Ukraine will use cluster munitions on its own territory and not in Russia; Ukraine will not use cluster munitions “in urban areas (cities)” and will use them “only in the fields where there is a concentration of Russian military;” Ukraine will keep a strict record of its use of cluster munitions and “the local zones where they will be used;” areas where cluster munitions are used will be prioritized for demining; and Ukraine “will report to our partners about the use of…[cluster] munitions, and about their efficiency to ensure the appropriate standard of transparent reporting and control.

As of 17 July 2023, world leaders and officials from 19 countries had expressed concern over cluster munitions after the US decision to transfer its stocks to Ukraine. These states included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Costa Rica, France, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Lao PDR, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK). The US decision has received worldwide media coverage and has been criticized by US congressional representatives, United Nations (UN) spokespersons, and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

Cluster munitions may have been included in artillery and rocket systems, or among other weapons, that Ukraine has received from other states in 2022 and 2023. US officials have alleged that unnamed countries have supplied cluster munitions to Ukraine.[15]

Türkiye and Ukraine have both denied a January 2023 report which claimed Türkiye transferred cluster munitions to Ukraine in November 2022.[16] Also in January 2023, Estonian state media reported that Estonia was considering providing Ukraine with German-made 155mm DM632 cluster munition projectiles.[17] Such a transfer would require approval from the German government. In February 2023, Germany’s defense minister Boris Pistorius said that “Germany won’t authorize the transfer of cluster bombs to Ukraine.”[18]

Israeli-made or copied M971 120mm cluster munition mortar projectiles were photographed in the possession of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in December 2022.[19] Each M971 120mm mortar projectile delivers 24 M87 DPICM submunitions. Israel originally produced this type of cluster munition, but it is not known how or from whom Ukraine acquired it.

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine inherited a large stockpile of cluster munitions after the break-up of the Soviet Union and shared information on the types stockpiled in 2011, as detailed in the following table.

Cluster munitions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine[20]

At that time, Ukraine reported that cluster munitions constituted 35% of its stocks of conventional weapons, which totaled two million tons of ammunition. Of the cluster munition stocks possessed by Ukraine, 34% were produced before 1980, while 36% were produced in 1981–1992 and were “planned to be stockpiled and might be used.” The remaining 30% of the reported stocks comprised of antivehicle landmines.[21]

Ukraine reported in 2011 that it destroyed approximately 10,000–20,000 tons of cluster munitions annually, and stated that it could take up to 60 years for it to destroy all stocks that were slated for destruction.[22]

Use

The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions extensively in Ukraine since Russia’s invasion of the country in February 2022, causing hundreds of civilian casualties, hitting civilian infrastructure, and contaminating agricultural land.[23]

Ukrainian forces also used cluster munitions on several occasions during 2022.

The New York Times first reported that Ukrainian forces used Uragan cluster munition rockets in an attack on Husarivka, in Kharkiv region, on either 6 or 7 March 2022, when the village was under Russian control.[24] Ukraine did not deny this use of cluster munitions, but said that “the Armed Forces of Ukraine strictly adhere to the norms of international humanitarian law.”

The Armed Forces of Ukraine reportedly used cluster munitions in attacks on Izium city, in Kharkiv region, between March and September 2022, when it was controlled by Russian forces, according to the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine.[25] The commission provided three examples illustrating this use of cluster munitions in Izium city: an attack on 9 May on a residential area that killed three and injured six people; an attack on 14 July on the central market that injured two people; and an attack on 16 July on a residential area that killed two people.

In July 2023, Human Rights Watch (HRW) also reported on Ukraine’s cluster munition rocket attacks on Izium city and surrounding areas between April and September 2022, when Russian forces had controlled the areas.[26] HRW recorded at least eight civilians killed and 11 wounded in the attacks, and warned that the figures were “most likely…a fraction of the total” of civilian casualties suffered from Ukraine’s cluster munition use. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence rejected the findings shared by HRW, responding that “cluster munitions were not used within or around the city of Izium in 2022 when it was under Russian occupation.”[27]

At least 10 types of cluster munitions and three types of individual submunitions have been used in Ukraine since 24 February 2022. These types are all launched from the ground in missiles, rockets, and mortar projectiles; aside from the RBK-series cluster bomb, which is delivered by aircraft. With the exception of an Israeli-designed cluster munition, the cluster munitions used in Ukraine were manufactured either in the Soviet Union prior to 1991 or in Russia, some as recently as 2021.

Cluster munitions used in Ukraine (2022–2023)

Ground-fired rockets and missiles

• The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35km and delivers 30 9N210 or 9N235 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 20–70km and delivers 72 9N210 or 9N235 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 552 3B30 dual-purpose 9M544 submunitions or 72 9M549 antipersonnel submunitions;
• The 9M549 Tornado-S cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 72 9N235 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile, which is equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions; and
• The Iskander-M 9M723K1 ballistic missile, which contains 54 9N730 dual-purpose submunitions.

Ground-fired artillery and mortar projectiles

• The 203mm 3-O-14 artillery projectile, each delivering 24 O-16 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 152mm 3-O-13 artillery projectile, each delivering eight O-16 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 3-O-8 240mm mortar projectile, each delivering O-10 fragmentation submunitions; and
• The M971 120mm mortar projectile, each containing 24 M87 dual-purpose submunitions.

Air-dropped bombs

• The RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bomb, containing 268 PTAB-1M high explosive/antitank submunitions;
• Individual ShOAB-0.5 fragmentation submunitions (photographed in the Donetsk region); and
• Individual PTAB-2.5 dual-purpose submunitions (photographed being modified for use in drone-dropped munitions).

The use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 40 states in national or joint statements at UN bodies such as the UNGA, the Human Rights Council, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as of 1 July 2023.[28] The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the European Union (EU), the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

In March 2022, the UK, then-president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, expressed grave concern at the use of cluster munitions after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ambassador Aidan Liddle, Permanent Representative of the UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, said he “calls upon all those that continue to use such weapons to cease immediately, and calls upon all states that have not yet done so to join the Convention without delay.”[29]

Previous use

Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed anti-government forces used cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine from July 2014 until a ceasefire in February 2015, according to independent investigations conducted by HRW and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).[30] Both parties used two types of ground-fired cluster munitions: the 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, containing 72 9N235 submunitions; and the 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, containing 30 9N235 or 9N210 submunitions.[31]

Neither party to the conflict accepted responsibility for using cluster munitions. Ukraine repeatedly denied use and attributed the attacks to pro-Russian separatist groups and members of the Russian Armed Forces.[32] Russia repeatedly drew attention to Ukraine’s use of cluster munitions but never acknowledged its role in the cluster munition attacks.[33]

The 2014–2015 cluster munition attacks in Ukraine attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from at least 32 states and the EU.[34]

Previously, in 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated that Ukraine did not intend to use cluster munitions, except to defend itself from “outside aggression.”[35]

Jump to a specific section of the profile:

Treaty Status | Management & Coordination | Impact (contamination & casualties) | Addressing the Impact (land release, risk education, victim assistance)

Country summary

Ukraine is affected by contamination by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) remaining from World Wars I and II, and as a result of the ongoing conflict in the east of the country since 2014. Ukraine also reported that unexploded submunitions contaminated the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[1] The extent of contamination is unknown.

The contamination in Ukraine is yet to be surveyed although estimates have suggested that about 8% of the lands, covering about 7,000 km², contain or are suspected to contain antipersonnel mines and other ERW. With the support from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), Ukraine was in the process of establishing a national humanitarian mine action program (not established as of April 2020).

The Law on Mine Action, adopted in January 2019, was not implemented and neither the national mine action authority nor the national mine action center had been established. An amendment to the law was submitted to parliament in February 2020.[2]

Despite efforts to inform populations living along the line of contact, children have continued to be particularly vulnerable to ERW and more widespread risk education campaigns were needed.

There is no centralized victim surveillance system. Despite a decrease in new reported mine/ERW casualties since 2017, the number of new casualties has remained high in eastern Ukraine and available data is likely an underestimation.

As a result of the ongoing conflict, the healthcare system in eastern Ukraine has been suffering from damage to health care infrastructure, a shortage of health care workers, and insufficient medical supplies and equipment. Survivors had free access to emergency medical care, however they often did not have full access to continuing medical care, rehabilitation and functional prosthetics. Psychosocial support remained largely unavailable.

Treaty status

Treaty status overview

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline

Ukraine’s initial Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 June 2016. In November 2018, Ukraine submitted late its first extension request. In granting the five-year extension, until 1 June 2021, the Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that Ukraine had not acted in accordance with the agreed process for the submission of extension requests.[3]

In its first extension request, Ukraine stated that its ability to comply with its Article 5 obligations was impeded by the lack of access to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[4]

Ukraine submitted a second extension request in June 2020, which was approved at the Eighteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2020, setting a new deadline of 1 December 2023. In its second extension request, Ukraine noted that the ongoing conflict in the country’s eastern regions resulted in further contamination of areas along the contact line. Ukraine also reported that the irregularity and non-selectivity of the use of antipersonnel mines by the armed groups hampered efforts to estimate the scale of contamination.[5]

The OSCE Project-Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU) estimated that Ukraine was unlikely to meet its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline due to the ongoing conflict.[6] In June 2020, Ukraine stated that it did not have control over territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, impeding its ability to clear contaminated areas in these territories, and that the hostilities were causing further contamination along the contact line.[7]

Management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination

Mine action management and coordination overview[8]

In 2013, the Ministry of Defence’s Department of Environmental Safety and Mine Action was tasked with coordinating demining at the national level and serving as the secretariat to the national mine action authority in Ukraine.[9] Several other institutions are also involved in the sector, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Services, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Defence, the National Police, and the State Border Service.[10]

The State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) is responsible for clearance and it established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Center” in 2015 in Kiev. The center coordinates the pyrotechnical teams—similar to rapid-response Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams—involved in technical and non-technical survey (NTS), demining, internal quality control of SESU units, information management, handover of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, and risk education.[11]

The demining center of the Ukrainian armed forces in Kamyanets-Podilsky, focuses on building the military’s capacity for EOD.[12]

Strategies and policies

There is no strategic plan for mine action. The Ministry of Defence develops annual operational plans.[13]

Announced by the Ministry of Defence in February 2016,[14] the State Program for Mine Action in Ukraine for 2017–2021 was on hold due to the pending process with the mine action law.[15]

Resolution 1071 of 13 December 2017, issued by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, approved the State Program for Restoration and Development of Peace in Eastern Regions of Ukraine for 2017–2021. One section of the program foresees the implementation of humanitarian demining of territories and water areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, comprising of survey and clearance of antipersonnel mines and ERW.[16]

Legislation and standards

Ukraine’s mine action legislation entered into force on 22January 2019, but it has not been implemented and the mine action authority and center have not been established. The law was amended and submitted to Parliament for adoption in February 2020. Until the adoption of the amended law, the Ministry of Defence coordinates demining activities, while the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster coordinates the overall mine action program.[17]

National Mine Action Standards were published in April 2019. They will become binding after the adoption of the amended Law on Mine Action and the establishment of a national mine action authority.[18]

Information management

There are two functioning Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) databases, one managed by SESU and the other by the Ministry of Defence. The databases collect and analyze contamination and land release data from national operators and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[19] Consolidation of both databases to create a central national IMSMA database is planned once Ukraine adopts its mine action legislation.[20] Data on mine/ERW accidents and casualties, and victim assistance were not being collected.[21] Data on risk education was collected by the Protection Cluster.

Gender and diversity

The OSCE PCU integrated gender and diversity considerations into their activities, in cooperation with the GICHD’s Gender and Mine Action Program (GMAP).[22]

Risk education management and coordination

Risk education management and coordination overview[23]

Coordination

Risk education is coordinated through the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster, chaired by UNDP.[24]

National Standards and guidelines

There is no national risk education strategy. As of April 2020, Ukraine was in the process of developing national standards for risk education. There was no accreditation process for risk education operators.[25]

Victim assistance management and coordination

Victim assistance management and coordination overview[26]

Laws and policies

Legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to healthcare, and the provision of other state services. These provisions were not effectively applied. Legislation requires that public buildings are accessible to persons with disabilities. Despite the legal requirements, most public buildings remained inaccessible to persons with disabilities. Access to employment, education, healthcare, transportation, and financial services remained difficult.[27]

By law, employers must set aside a quota of 4% of employment opportunities for persons with disabilities. It was reported that many people employed to fill the quota requirement received minimal salaries but did not work at the companies of employment. Legislation also requires employers to take into account the individual needs of employees with disabilities. However, generally these laws were not enforced.[28]

The Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced People came into effect on 19 November 2014. The law provides UAH880 (approximately US$30) per month for persons with disabilities.[29] In September 2016, the Parliament adopted legislation to harmonize the law with international standards with respect to the rights of persons with disabilities.[30] Under the 2005 Law “On Rehabilitation of Persons with Disabilities in Ukraine,” every person with a disability is entitled to receive physical rehabilitation services.[31]

Persons with disabilities in eastern Ukraine did not receive appropriate care.[32]

Impact

Contamination

Contamination overview[33]

* A further 14,000km² suspected to be contaminated in non-government-controlled territory. The exact size of contaminated areas could not be determined due to the ongoing conflict.

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war; and IED=improvised explosive device.

Landmine contamination

Ukraine was affected by residual contamination of mines and other explosive ordnance, mostly as a result of World Wars I and II. Ministry of Defence engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, but 32 former firing ranges covering 1,500km² remain contaminated with ERW.[34]

Ukraine is also contaminated by antipersonnel mines as a result of the ongoing conflict which broke out in 2014 in the Crimean Peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Mines have been used in the resultant armed conflicts.[35] Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and antipersonnel mines were reported to be planted in populated areas and near civilian infrastructure.[36] IEDs used included booby-traps and devices, especially hand grenades, with tripwires.[37]

Preliminary estimates showed that about 8% of the lands, totaling up to 7,000km², in government-controlled areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, contain or are suspected to contain antipersonnel mines and other ERW, including IEDs.[38] In addition, 14,000km² in non-government-controlled areas were also suspected to be mine-contaminated.[39] It is further indicated that 15–20% of the contamination was from mines, while the rest was from ERW.[40] The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the belligerent parties, but access to this area for survey and clearance operations has been severely limited.[41]

The explosive hazard contamination in eastern Ukraine was estimated to impact around two million people.[42] Civilians living along the contact line were unable to engage in agricultural activities and access to some villages was restricted. The contamination, or suspicion of contamination also poses a threat to people crossing the contact line. Maintenance and repair of vital civilian infrastructure facilities has been impeded by the presence of mines and ERW.[43] The collection of firewood was reported to have resulted in many fatalities and injuries.[44] Access to farmlands, hospitals, and schools was also impeded.[45] Explosive ordnance poses a humanitarian risk to internally displaced people (IDPs) and returning refugees.[46]

Cluster munitions remnant contamination

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Ukraine is not known. Cluster munitions used in the conflict have included surface-fired Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition rockets, which contain 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions.[47] (See Ukraine’s Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile for details.)

Ukraine has reported that many unexploded submunitions contaminated the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[48] The most intensive use of cluster munitions was in and around the city of Debalcevo, in Donetsk region.[49]

Casualties

Casualties overview[50]

Note: ERW=explosive remnant of war.

Casualties in 2019: details

The 324 casualties identified in 2019 was similar to the 325 casualties identified in 2018, which was a significant decrease from previous years.[51] Casualty data peaked in 2015 and 2016 with 706 and 785 new casualties respectively. The Monitor recorded 2,727 mine casualties (941 killed and 1,786 injured) from 2014 through 2019.

There is no centralized database for the collection of casualty data.[52] The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) collects only conflict-related civilian casualty data. Through its pilot project on data collection, the Ministry of Defence also collects data on civilian casualties in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including mine/ERW casualties. The database was however poorly populated. In 2019, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories was developing a mine accident and casualty database and collecting data on civilians killed or injured by mines/ERW.[53]

The Monitor has recorded at least 4,714 mine/ERW casualties (2,719 killed and 1,995 injured)in Ukraine to the end of 2019. The UN reported that more than 1,500 civilians were killed in Ukraine between 1945 and 1995 in mine/ERW incidents. Another 130 people were killed during clearance operations in the same period.[54]

The then named Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES, since December 2012 operating as the State Emergency Service of Ukraine) reported that between 1996 and 2008 there were 229 ERW casualties (100 killed and 129 injured), including 59 children, due to “handling of devices.”[55]

The OHCHR has recorded over 1,000 civilian mine/ERW casualties between April 2014 and December 2019.[56] The Danish Demining Group (DDG) recorded 1,582 mine/ERW casualties from open sources between June 2014 and October 2018,[57] and the HALO Trust recorded 2,103 casualties between 2014 and 2019, based on open sources and security reports. The HALO Trust however noted that “due to a lack of reliable information from the non-government-controlled areas, the available data is likely an underestimation of the scale of the problem.”[58]

Cluster munition casualties[59]

The Monitor has recorded 76 cluster munition casualties in Ukraine; 72 casualties during attacks and four due to the detonation of unexploded submunitions.[60]

Addressing the impact

Mine action

Operators and service providers

Clearance operators

Note: IED=improvised explosive device.

Clearance

Land release overview (as of December 2019)[61]

Note: ERW=explosive remnants of war.

Land release: landmines

Humanitarian demining operations in the safely accessible areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are conducted according to the annual plan developed by the Ministry of Defence and interested authorities, which details clearance and survey priorities for each operator.[62] In addition to NTS and technical survey of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), the main goals of the plan remained the demining of populated areas, security during rehabilitation of infrastructure, clearance of agricultural areas and of critical infrastructures (power lines, water and gas pipe infrastructure, thermal power plants, roads and railways).[63]

The overall extent of mine contamination in Ukraine cannot be reliably estimated until surveys will be completed. In its 2019 Article 7 report, Ukraine noted that NTS conducted by NGOs have identified mined areas in Bakhmut, Lyman, Sloviansk, and Volnovakha districts in Donestsk region, and in Popasna and Stanichno-Luhansk districts in Luhansk region.[64]

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of mines and ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and separatist groups,[65] and international clearance operators have subsequently begun clearance in government-controlled areas.

The HALO Trust cited the lack of an explosives license as the main limiting factor for its program in Ukraine, it had to rely on states institutions to destroy all mine/ERW found.[66]

The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (Fondation Suisse de déminage, FSD) stopped its survey and clearance activities in Ukraine in 2019 due to a lack of funding.[67] In 2020, FSD started a new two-year clearance and survey project which will end on 30 June 2022.[68]

It was reported that national operators lacked up-to-date technical equipment for mine clearance.[69]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided training courses to demining and EOD specialists on surveying and clearing contaminated areas.[70]

In 2019, about 1.7km² was released through clearance.[71] Additional land was cleared and awaiting quality control before it could be released.[72] In addition, 70km² of battle area were reportedly reduced through technical survey. Data on land cancelled through NTS in 2019 could not be provided as there was no firm data on the size of confirmed and SHAs.[73]

Land release: cluster munition remnants

During clearance and EOD spot tasks operations in 2019, the HALO Trust removed five cluster munitions (9N210).[74]

Deminer safety

There were reports of shooting at deminers of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine who were operating near the line of contact in the east of Ukraine.[75]

Risk education

Operators and service providers

Risk education operators[76]

In addition to these risk education operators, a number of Ukrainian NGOs also conducted risk education.[77] As the entity coordinating risk education in Ukraine, the UN Mine Action Sub-Cluster organized risk education activities around the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action in April 2019.[78] In 2020, the UNDP launched a mine awareness project aiming at enhancing mine risk prevention.[79]

There was no evaluation of risk education efforts in Ukraine.[80] Risk education operators reported quarterly on their activities to the Protection Cluster.[81] The HALO Trust conducted knowledge, attitudes and practices survey before and after its risk education sessions.[82]

Beneficiary numbers

Beneficiaries of risk education in 2019[83]

The ICRC and the Ukrainian Red Cross reported a total of 30,940 beneficiaries in both government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas, 60% of whom were children.[84]

The number of risk education beneficiaries totaled 167,698 in 2019.[85] Almost 60% of beneficiaries were children.[86]

Despite current efforts by mine action actors to provide risk education, a study by DDG suggested that “there is a need for more widespread risk education campaigns.” According to this study, there is a higher proportion of incidents caused by the handling of ERW than by encounters with mines, especially among children casualties.[87]

Implementation

Target groups

Risk education target groups are school children and internally displaced persons. Individuals who cross the contact line at official crossing points are also informed about the risk posed by explosive ordnance.[88]

In 2020, FSD was planning to target specifically persons traveling from non-government-controlled areas to government-controlled areas.[89] The HALO Trust primarily targeted working age men as they constituted the majority of mine/ERW casualties, as well as women who represented a high proportion of victims of mine/ERW incidents while crossing the contact line. Other groups targeted by the HALO Trust’s risk education activities included: children, due to their natural curiosity; motorists, due to the high level of contamination with antivehicle mines in Ukraine; and elderly and persons with disabilities.[90] The ICRC reported targeting populations in areas most impacted by mine/ERW contamination, in particular adult men. Children, as the second most affected group, were also targeted by the ICRC and the Ukrainian Red Cross risk education activities.[91]

In eastern Ukraine, the 15km buffer zone from the contact line disproportionately affected elderly people. Insufficient pensions forced them to continue to cultivate plots of land, pick mushrooms, and collect firewood in areas contaminated with mines and ERW.[92]

In Ukraine, risk education targets mostly populations living within 5km of the line of contact in government-controlled areas, leaving other affected communities without such critical information.[93] In particular, risk education operators do not have access to persons leaving on the eastern side of the line of contact, many of whom have to regularly cross it to collect pensions or access other public goods.[94]

Delivery methods

Most risk education was delivered using small printed media. The HALO Trust used pamphlets, booklets, and other materials and placed posters in visible places in schools and villages. Games, puzzles and coloring materials were used during school sessions with younger children.[95] The HALO Trust also transferred risk education materials including leaflets, posters, and stickers to police departments in Donetsk and Luhansk for further dissemination.[96]

DDG had a pilot project to use web and mobile phone platforms to collect information about hazards caused by unexploded ordnance.[97]

FSD implemented a small project in specialized education institutions for children with disabilities. This included risk education using a sign language trainer.[98]

Marking

In April 2019, the government of Ukraine approved regulations that standardized the marking of hazardous areas.[99]

Victim Assistance

Providers and activities

Victim assistance operators[100]

Note: IDPs=Internally displaced people.

Major Developments in 2019

Needs assessment

DRC-DDG, with the support of UNICEF, conducted a needs assessment of child mine/ERW survivors in 2019, in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Due to the limited timeframe of the project, it was not an in-depth needs assessment and it recommended the conduct of a more thorough needs analysis.[101]

Medical care and rehabilitation

As a result of the ongoing conflict, the healthcare system in eastern Ukraine is suffering from damage to health care infrastructure, a shortage of health care workers, and insufficient medical supplies and equipment.[102]

Survivors had free access to emergency medical care, however they often did not have full access to continuing medical care, rehabilitation, and functional prosthetics. Access to medical care was particularly difficult for survivors living in rural areas, where most mine/ERW incidents occurred, and they often could not afford to travel to urban centers.[103]

The ICRC provided first-aid training, ambulances repair, surgical supplies, medical equipment to hospitals on both sides of the line of contact. It also gave cash assistance to cover hospital expenses as well as repairs or upgrades of 30 health facilities along the line of contact.[104]

As public health facilities in Ukraine’s conflict-affected regions gradually resumed services, Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF) began transferring patients to the Ministry of Health for treatment. By the end of 2019, all were provided with care through the public health system.[105]

A cohesive and coordinated rehabilitation system was lacking. Physical rehabilitation facilities were located in districts and cities, and access for mine/ERW survivors living in conflict-affected rural areas was limited. No assistance was provided for transportation.[106] Child mine/ERW survivors often received cosmetic rather than functional prostheses.[107] UNICEF reported that “families often lack the means or ability to provide children with the assistive devices they need.”[108] The Donetsk and Luhansk regions suffered from a lack of qualified specialists and equipment to assist mine/ERW survivors.[109]

The ICRC provided mobility aids, physical rehabilitation equipment, and supplies, and supported the training of four orthopedic technicians.[110]

The USAID’s Leahy War Victims Fund continued to support the UCP Wheels for Humanity, which provided training for rehabilitation personnel, assistive technologies, and medical and physical rehabilitation for persons with disabilities—many of whom were injured in the ongoing conflict.[111] The UPC Wheels for Humanity project launched in 2019, Strengthening Rehabilitation Services within Health Systems (SRSHS), aimed to improve rehabilitation services and increase access to those services in Ukraine. The SRSHS project aligned with the World Health Organization Rehabilitation 2030 Agenda.[112]

The ITF supported psychosocial rehabilitation for severely traumatized children from eastern Ukraine (Donbass region) on the Slovenian coast with the support of the Youth Health and Summer Resort of the Slovenian Red Cross. ITF also continued to support physical rehabilitation for one conflict casualty.[113] The ITF provided equipment to the Ukrainian Research Institute for Prosthetics and Rehabilitation.[114]

The NATO Trust Fund provided for physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics and vocational rehabilitation for injured soldiers; support to the rehabilitation sector through the provision of equipment, training of physical rehabilitation and psychological professionals, support to the development of academic curricula for prosthetists, and provision of psychological support to former military personnel, it also continued to support physical rehabilitation for one conflict casualty at the University Rehabilitation Institute of the Republic of Slovenia in Ljubljana.[115]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

Psychosocial support remained largely unavailable.[116] Local and international NGOs provided psychological and psychosocial support on request to survivors.

Efforts have been made in Ukraine to make education more inclusive of persons with disabilities. The Concept of Inclusive Schools was adopted in 2010. Social and financial assistance to survivors was lacking.[117] ICRC supported social inclusion through sporting events.[118] The ITF supported psychosocial rehabilitation for severely traumatized children from eastern Ukraine (Donbass region) on the Slovenian coast with the support of the Youth Health and Summer Resort of the Slovenian Red Cross.[119]

Policy

Ukraine signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 February 1999 and ratified it on 27 December 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2006.

Ukraine does not have specific legislation in place to enforce its implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty with fiscal and penal sanctions. It has reported existing laws and regulations under national implementation measures, including a 2012 law which approved an agreement with an agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to destroy Ukraine’s stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[1] A 2019 law on mine action “defines the legal and organization[al] foundations for the implementation of anti-mine activities in Ukraine.”[2]

Ukraine has provided 17 annual transparency reports under Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty since 2006. Its last annual updated report was submitted on 25 April 2023 and covered activities in 2022. Ukraine has not yet submitted a report covering calendar year 2021.

Since 2009, Ukraine has participated in meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, most recently attending the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2022 and intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2023.[3]

Ukraine is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW). However, its obligations on antipersonnel landmines are superseded by the stricter prohibitions contained in the Mine Ban Treaty. Ukraine last submitted an annual updated transparency report for CCW Amended Protocol II and Protocol V in April 2021.

Ukraine is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Production and transfer

Ukraine declared in 2009 that it “has not made and does not produce antipersonnel mines.”[4]

Ukraine has not produced antipersonnel mines since its independence in 1991 and is not known to have exported them.[5] A moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines was put in place in 1999 and stayed in effect until the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Ukraine in 2006.

Use

New use

Ukraine is severely contaminated with landmines and ERW from the armed conflict that began in 2014 and escalated with Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.^[6] Landmines have been documented in 11 of Ukraine’s 27 regions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.

Russian forces have used at least 13 types of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine since February 2022. (See Russia Mine Ban Policy country profile for more information).

In its most recent Article 7 transparency report for the Mine Ban Treaty, submitted in April 2023, Ukraine stated that, “Given the continuation of intensive hostilities on the part of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defenсe of Ukraine currently lacks complete information on the coordinates of areas where anti-personnel mines are installed.”[7]

Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine since February 2022

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Use of PFM antipersonnel mines by Ukraine

There is credible information that Ukrainian government forces used antipersonnel landmines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when the city was under Russian control.[15] In January 2023, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report detailing how 9M27K3 Uragan rockets carrying PFM-series antipersonnel mines were fired into Russian-occupied areas near Russian military facilities in and around Izium during 2022, causing at least 11 civilian casualties.[16]

In a March 2023 report to the Human Rights Council, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine said that the commission “has found instances where Ukrainian armed forces likely used cluster munitions and rocket-delivered antipersonnel landmines to carry out attacks in Izium city, Kharkiv region, from March to September 2022, when it was controlled by Russian armed forces.”[17] The commission found that “Ukrainian armed forces were at that time stationed within striking distance of such rockets” and stated that it “found it likely that Ukrainian armed forces have committed indiscriminate attacks, in violation of international humanitarian law.”

Ukraine’s Deputy Minister of Defense Oleksandr Polishchuk responded in November 2022 to a request from HRW to confirm evidence that showed Ukrainian forces’ use of PFM antipersonnel mines. He stated that Ukrainian authorities cannot comment on the types of weapons used during the armed conflict “before the end of the war and the restoration of our sovereignty and territorial integrity.”^[18] The deputy defense minister also stated, “Ukraine is a reliable member of the international community, and it fully commits to all international obligations in the sphere of mine usage. This includes the non-use of anti-personnel mines in the war.”^[19]

On 31 January 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that HRW’s findings “will be duly studied by the competent authorities of Ukraine.”^[20] At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in June 2023, Ukraine promised to examine reports that its forces had used antipersonnel mines.[21] During the meeting, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK) welcomed Ukraine’s commitment to launch an inquiry, provide regular updates, and engage with the treaty’s president and members of its Committee on Cooperative Compliance.

In June 2023, HRW reported further evidence of Ukrainian use of PFM antipersonnel mines.[22] In May 2023, an individual working in Kharkiv oblast—where the Ukrainian government had restored control after Russian forces left—posted photographs online showing multiple remnants of artillery rockets recovered during clearance operations. After close inspection of the markings on the remnants, HRW identified two 9N128K3 warhead sections of 9M27K3 Uragan 220mm rockets, which each contain 9N223 “blocks,” or stacks, of 9N212 PFM-1S antipersonnel blast mines in cassettes.[23] The GRAU Index numbers matched the warheads used to carry PFM-1S antipersonnel mines. Analysis of handwriting on the side of one warhead section showed that a first word, in Ukrainian, translates as “from,” while a second word, written in Latin script, relates to an organization based in Kyiv.[24]

A photograph posted on social media in August 2022 that bears the watermark of a Kyiv-based non-governmental organization (NGO)—posted by the individual thought to run the NGO, which made a monetary donation to Ukraine’s war effort—shows the same warhead section of a Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket recovered from agricultural land. Markings specifying the batch, year, and factory, and the same handwriting and phrases, match those in the photographs assessed by HRW. The post also showed the warhead sections of two other Uragan 9M27K3 rockets with phrases written on them. At least 15 photographs have been posted online of the Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rockets.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian officials have alleged that Russia has used PFM antipersonnel mines.[25] Ukraine’s Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series mines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022.^[26] Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.^[27] Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft scattered PFM mines in the Sumi region in March 2022.^[28] Similar reports surfaced in April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.^[29] The UK and the United States (US) have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.^[30]

Use of antivehicle mines

Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have used at least 14 types of antivehicle mines (also referred to as antitank mines) during the war. Agricultural production is being negatively affected due to the use of landmines in fields and on rural paths and roads. The hand- or mechanically-emplaced TM-62 series antivehicle blast mine, equipped with an MVCh-62 pressure-activated fuze, appears to be the most common type of antivehicle mine used in Ukraine since Russia’s full-scale invasion began. These mines are often buried but have also been sighted laid on top of the ground.

Several countries supplying Ukraine with military assistance have transferred antivehicle mines to the country, including Estonia, France, Germany, Sweden, the UK, and the US.

Antivehicle landmines used in Ukraine since February 2022

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; RAAMS=Remote Anti-Armor Mine System; US=United States.

Many types of antivehicle mines, including some of those listed above, have devices, features, and characteristics designed to deter and attack military clearance efforts during armed combat. Some may have an antihandling device that would cause the mine to explode due to the unintentional act of a person. Others feature a fuzing mechanism that is sensitive enough to be activated and trigger the mine by the unintentional act of a person. Certain types of antivehicle mines rely on a tripwire, break-wire, or tilt rod as their sole initiating mechanism.^[43]

No matter its label or design intent, there is widespread agreement that any explosive device that is capable of being detonated by the unintentional act of a person is an antipersonnel mine and thus prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. This is the view of the majority of the treaty’s 164 States Parties and is also shared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).^[44]

International reaction

All parties to the conflict in Ukraine are bound by treaties that prohibit or regulate landmines in addition to the general laws of war. The Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of the technical features and the predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (improvised or factory-made).

The Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2022 “condemned the use of anti-personnel mines anywhere, at any time, and by any actor.” Since March 2022, Ukraine and at least 42 other countries have condemned or expressed concern at Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, in addition to the European Union (EU).

Landmine use in Ukraine has also been condemned by successive Mine Ban Treaty presidents and the special envoy for universalization.^[45] 

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has called on all parties to the conflict in Ukraine to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.^[46]

Previous use

Previously, antipersonnel mines were used in the conflict between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-supported separatists that erupted in 2014—initially in Crimea, and later in the eastern Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. Ukraine has stated that it did not use antipersonnel mines during the conflict, and has accused Russian-supported insurgent forces of laying mines.[47]

There is significant evidence, at different locations, that antipersonnel mines of Soviet-origin with production markings from the 1980s, and antipersonnel mines with production markings from the 2000s (indicating Russian origin), have been stockpiled and used by Russian-supported separatists in eastern Ukraine since 2014, including MON-series mines, PMN-1 and PMN-2 mines, OZM-72 mines, and POM-2 mines.

 Stockpiling and destruction

The types and quantities of antipersonnel landmines that Ukraine has reported in its stockpile have varied over the years. The highest reported total—6,664,342 mines of nine different types—was detailed in Landmine Monitor 2006.[48]

Ukraine has destroyed 3,438,948 antipersonnel landmines to date, constituting more than half of its total stocks. However, it missed its 1 June 2010 treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines and is therefore in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.[49]

In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2022, Ukraine declared a stockpile of 3,364,433 antipersonnel mines, comprised of 3,363,828 PFM-series mines and 605 OZM-4 mines.[50] This is the same amount reported to have been in Ukraine’s stockpile in 2020.

Ukraine claims that the stockpiles are stored in military warehouses, but notes:

Anti-personnel mines, the presence of which was declared by Ukraine as part of the implementation of Article 4 of the Ottawa Convention, are in the warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders. At the same time, if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and carrying out relevant inspections.[51]

Stockpiled antipersonnel mines destroyed by Ukraine (2011–2021)[52]

Between 1999 and 2018, Ukraine completed the destruction of all its stocks of antipersonnel mines except for the PFM-1 type.[53] The OZM-4 mines were taken from storage facilities in Crimea seized by Russian forces in 2014.[54]

The process for the destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines has been overseen by a 2013 agreement between the Ministry of Defense, NATO’s Support and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant. However, that agreement expired at the beginning of 2020 and has not since been renewed.[55]

To revitalize stockpile destruction efforts, Ukraine said in November 2021 that the NATO Support and Procurement Agency would open an international tender process to find bidders from Ukraine and NATO member states to destroy the remaining stocks.

In 2022, 17 donors contributed a total of US$162.3 million to mine action activities in Ukraine. This represents an increase of more than $141 million from the $21.2 million contributed in 2021.[1] The significant rise in funding reflects that many donors directed funds to Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022. Ukraine received the most mine action assistance of all recipient countries in 2022, accounting for 20% of total contributions.

The largest contribution to Ukraine was from the United States (US), which provided $91.3 million to support capacity-building, clearance, risk education, and victim assistance activities. The second and third largest donors—the European Union (EU) and Norway respectively—provided a combined total of $48.8 million.

Of the total contribution to Ukraine in 2022, a total of $36 million (22%) went toward clearance activities, while $28 million (17%) went to capacity-building and $1.9 million (1%) went to dedicated risk education and victim assistance activities. The largest portion, $96.4 million (60%), went to mine action activities that were not disaggregated by donors.

International contributions: 2022[2]

Note: N/A=not applicable.

Five-year support for mine action

In the five-year period from 2018–2022, international contributions to mine action in Ukraine totaled approximately $232 million. The $162.3 million provided in 2022 marked a significant increase in annual funding compared to the previous four years.

Summary of international contributions: 2018–2022[3]

           Note: N/A=not applicable.