Summary: Non-signatory the United States (US) has not taken any steps to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions, as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. The US has never participated in a meeting of the convention, even as an observer. The US abstained from voting on a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the convention in December 2022.

A November 2017 policy directive issued under President Donald Trump allows US forces to use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO). The US last used cluster munitions during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in 2009. The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007 but is aggressively pursuing replacements. The US stockpiles cluster munitions, and in July 2023 the administration of President Joe Biden announced that the US will transfer potentially hundreds of thousands of its artillery-delivered cluster munitions to Ukraine for use in the war with Russia.

Policy

The United States of America has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The US has not taken any steps to join the convention because, in its view, cluster munitions provide “a vital military capability.”[1] 

National policy 

As of July 2023, the Biden administration has not indicated if it will review the November 2017 policy directive on cluster munitions issued by former president Trump. The 2017 policy replaced a July 2008 Department of Defense policy directive on cluster munitions, issued under President George W. Bush, and abandoned its requirement that the US no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than a 1% UXO rate by the end of 2018.[2]

The 2017 policy requires the Department of Defense to “program for capabilities to replace cluster munitions” that do not meet the 1% UXO standard.[3] However, to “meet immediate warfighting demand” the policy gave combatant commanders (the heads of various combatant commands with geographic and other areas of responsibility) the authority to approve employing (using) cluster munitions “that do not meet the standards prescribed by this policy for procuring new cluster munitions” as well as to accept transfers of those cluster munitions.[4]

In July 2023, the Biden administration announced that the US would transfer its stocks of artillery-delivered cluster munitions to Ukraine for use in the war with Russia. (See Transfers section).

US and the Convention on Cluster Munitions

The US did not participate, even as an observer, in the 2007–2008 Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks show how the US attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states during the process in order to affect the outcome of the negotiations, especially with respect to the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations between the US and States Parties to the convention).[6]

The US has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even as an observer. The US was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties held in Geneva in August–September 2022. 

In December 2022, the US abstained from the vote on a key UNGA resolution that urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[7] The US has abstained from voting on the annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015. The US explained in 2015 that it considers the resolution to apply “only to those States Parties to this convention.”[8] In its most recent comment on the resolution, in November 2019, the US again stated that it does not accept that the convention “represents an emerging norm.”[9]

The US expressed deep alarm at Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine in 2022.^[10]However, the US backtracked on a comment from one senior official who criticized cluster munitions as unacceptable weapons that “have no place on the battlefield.”[11]

There has been widespread criticism of the July 2023 announcement by the Biden administration that the US will transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine. On 13 July 2023, 147 congressional representatives (98 Republicans and 49 Democrats) voted to prohibit the sale and transfer of cluster munitions to Ukraine, but the measure did not pass as 276 representatives voted against it.[12] The original amendment sought to prohibit cluster munition transfers to any country and was accompanied by a letter from Sara Jacobs, Ilhan Omar, and 17 other House Democrats renouncing the US transfer of cluster munitions.[13](See Transfers section). 

The US is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty but has participated as an observer at Mine Ban Treaty meetings since 2009. In June 2022, the US announced a new policy re-aligning its position with major requirements of the treaty, and committing to “undertake diligent efforts to pursue materiel and operational solutions to assist in becoming compliant with and ultimately acceding” to the Mine Ban Treaty.[14] 

The US is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but has not proposed further CCW deliberations on cluster munitions since States Parties to the CCW failed to adopt a draft protocol on cluster munitions in 2011.[15] This effectively concluded CCW consideration on the matter, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons.

Use

The last US use of cluster munitions was during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, with the exception of a single attack in Yemen in December 2009.[16] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly denied US responsibility for the 2009 attack.[17]

In 2016, the United States Air Force (USAF) said that it had not used cluster munitions in aerial operations against the Islamic State in Iraq, Libya, and Syria.[18] The US provided logistical support to a Saudi Arabia-led coalition that used US-supplied cluster munitions in Yemen in 2015–2017.

The US has used cluster munitions in past conflicts in several countries and areas: Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s–1970s); Grenada and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001–2002); Iraq (2003); and Yemen (2009).[19]

Production

The US Department of Defense could not confirm whether the US still produces cluster munitions as of December 2018, telling a US media outlet that it “is not aware of any U.S. industry production of cluster munitions.”[20]  However, several research and development programs are underway that may result in the production of new weapons that are not compliant with the Convention on Cluster Munitions. (See Replacements for cluster munitions section).

Since 2005, all submunitions produced by the US must have a failure rate of less than 1%, according to a 2001 policy issued by Secretary of Defense William Cohen.[21] The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007.[22] Since then, the US has manufactured cluster munitions only for each foreign sales order in accordance with the contractual delivery schedule.

The US government has not taken any steps to prohibit US production of cluster munitions since 2016, when the sole remaining US producer, Textron Systems Corporation, announced an end to its production.[23] In a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission on 30 August 2016, Textron Systems Corporation said it had discontinued production of the CBU-105 cluster bomb because of reduced orders, stating that “the current political environment has made it difficult” to obtain sales approvals.[24]

US defense contractor Northrop Grumman announced in January 2021 that it was ending participation in a US government contract to test the shelf-life of stocks of cluster munitions.[25] The company, which does not make cluster munitions, inherited the stockpile management contract after acquiring US company Orbital ATK.

In the past, before the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the US licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, South Korea, and Türkiye.

Replacements for cluster munitions

The US military is developing several replacements for ground-launched cluster munitions that could not meet the requirements of the cluster munition reliability policy of the Department of Defense, namely M483A1 and M864 155mm artillery projectiles, which contain M42/M46 dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) and M26 rockets containing M77 DPICM. The first of these replacements, the Alternative Warhead variant for the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), began production in 2015 and contains 160,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments, but no explosive submunitions.

The US Army has budgeted nearly $500 million during 2022–2028 for researching and developing replacements for 155mm artillery projectiles containing older DPICM (M42/M46). In 2018, two parallel research and development tracks began to develop Cannon-Delivered Area Effects Munitions (C-DAEM) as “policy-compliant munitions.”^[26]

The first of the replacements is called “C-DAEM Armor” and is designated XM1180. This is an extended-range, presumably unitary, guided projectile with advanced components including a seeker, shaped charge warhead, and military-grade GPS. C-DAEM Armor is intended to destroy moving self-propelled howitzers, infantry fighting vehicles, and tanks. Assuming the success of the research and development program, the decision to “type classify” the projectile will occur in 2026, with a decision on whether to enter full production planned for 2028.^[27] The US Army is requesting $57 million in the 2024 budget for the eventual procurement of 250 projectiles.^[28] Under earlier decisions in this replacement program, the US procured 3,676 BONUS Mk2 projectiles in 2019–2021 from BAE Systems AB, Sweden, totaling $209 million.[29]

The second project in the replacement program is called “C-DAEM DPICM Replacement.” This is intended to attack targets ranging from personnel to soft-skinned vehicles. The US Army has approved the Israeli-designed M999 advanced antipersonnel munition, designated XM1208, as the solution for this requirement. The XM1208 projectile dispenses nine M99 “advanced submunitions.”^[30] Hardware and some components for this projectile are being imported from Israel in cooperation with the Israeli Ministry of Defence. [31]

The US Army has also initiated two other longer-range research and development tracks to enhance the performance of the GMLRS missile. A total of $327 million is being requested from 2022–2028 for this program. The first project within the program covers the development of a modified enhanced alternative warhead in addition to other modifications that improve effectiveness against “light and medium armored targets,” with the objective to include these modifications in the 2026–2027 production run. A second project will attempt to integrate a “Sensor Fuzed Weapon” (type not specified) for delivery by the GMLRS missile by 2030. Another program will “determine the feasibility and effectiveness of utilizing GMLRS rockets to dispense anti-armor submunitions for engaging medium and heavy armor targets.”^[32] 

Transfer

Export moratorium language has been included in the annual US Department of Defense budget each year since 2009.[33] The provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, and the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology is prohibited unless “the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments.” In addition, any agreement “applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology” must specify that the munitions “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)—the US government agency that administers weapons transfers—issued a memorandum on 19 May 2011 regarding the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy, by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual. According to the memorandum, “the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).”[34]

On 7 July 2023, US officials announced that President Biden had signed a waiver allowing the US to transfer to Ukraine an unspecified quantity of US stocks of cluster munitions that have a higher than 1% failure rate.[35] In July 2023, The Washington Post reported that there was no waiver provision on the 1% limit that Congress had placed on cluster munition dud rates, written into Department of Defense appropriations since 2017. Biden could bypass this, according to a White House official, under the Foreign Assistance Act, which allows the president to furnish assistance, regardless of appropriations or arms export restrictions, as long as he determines and notifies Congress that it is “vital to the security of the interests of the United States.”

According to the Department of Defense, “155mm artillery rounds” will be transferred, including ones that deliver what it called “highly effective and reliable” DPICM.[36]

The US has not named the specific types of DPICM projectiles or the quantities to be provided. Department of Defense officials claim the DPICM submunitions “have a dud rate less than 2.35 percent” but say that the testing data behind this figure is “classified.”[37] From congressional briefings, it appears that the US will transfer 155mm M864 cluster munition artillery projectiles that each contain 72 DPICM submunitions, as well as 155mm M483A1 artillery projectiles that each contain 88 DPICM submunitions. The two types of projectiles deliver M42 and M46 DPICM submunitions. Historic data for these submunitions shows that they have a failure rate of 6–14%; often higher in operations due to wind, soft soil, dense vegetation, and other delivery factors.[38]

As of 9 July 2023, world leaders from 19 countries had expressed concern over cluster munitions after the US decision to transfer stocks to Ukraine, including: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, Costa Rica, France, Germany, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Lao PDR, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK). The US decision to transfer cluster munitions to Ukraine received worldwide media coverage and has been criticized by US congressional representatives, United Nations (UN) spokespersons, and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

Previous transfers

Previously, the last congressional sales notification for CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons was in July 2015. Congressional notifications show that the US had concluded agreements from 2008–2015 to sell the CBU-105 to India,[39] Oman,[40] Saudi Arabia,[41] Singapore,[42] South Korea,[43] Taiwan,[44] and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).[45]

In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official said that the end-use provision of its 2012 agreement with Saudi Arabia and “a handful of other cases” was “incomplete.”[46] The Saudi Arabia-led coalition’s use of the CBU-105 in Yemen in 2015–2016 raised serious questions about whether the transfer requirements were being met.^[47] In May 2016, the administration of President Barack Obama suspended US transfers of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas in Yemen.[48]

While the historical record is incomplete, in the past, the US transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, Thailand, Türkiye, the UAE, and the UK.[49]

In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided information showing that Chile transferred one 250kg cluster bomb and one 500kg cluster bomb to the US in 1991.[50]

Stockpiling

A 2004 Department of Defense report to the US Congress detailed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types, containing approximately 728.5 million submunitions, as listed in the following table. That total does not appear to be a full account of cluster munitions available to US forces, as it apparently does not include US cluster munition stocks located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[51]

Although it is outdated, the list from 2004 remains the most detailed public account of US cluster munition stocks.

US stockpile of cluster munitions (as of 2004)[52]

Note: ATACMS=Army Tactical Missile System; MLRS=Multiple Launch Rocket System; APICM=Antipersonnel Improved Conventional Munition; CBU=Cluster Bomb Unit; CEM=Combined Effects Munition; WCMD=Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser; SFW=Sensor Fuzed Weapon; JSOW=Joint Standoff Weapon.

Stockpile destruction 

All cluster munition stocks that exceed or do not satisfy operational planning requirements were removed by the service and combatant commands from the active inventory by June 2009.[53]

In March 2019, the Department of Defense budget stated, “Currently, there are approximately 93,766 tons of cluster munitions” in the demilitarization account known as B5A. It also stated that another 203,024 tons of cluster munitions in the US remained outside of B5A. The Department of Defense budget for 2022 no longer details the amount of cluster munitions.

In April 2022, Expal USA was awarded a contract for the demilitarization and disposal of cluster munitions.^[54] 

Since 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) rockets and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama and the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania.[55]

Recent funding for the destruction of cluster munitions (US$ million)[56]

          Note: FY=Fiscal Year. 

Foreign stockpiling and transit

The US appears to have removed its cluster munition stocks from the territories of at least two States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010,[57] while the UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[58]

The US has stockpiled, and may continue to store cluster munitions, in countries including States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, and in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and possibly Kuwait. This information is contained in the following US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks in 2010–2011:

• In Afghanistan, the “United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions,” according to a December 2008 cable.[59]
• Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany, according to a December 2008 cable.[60]
• In Israel, US cluster munitions are “considered to be under U.S. title” until they are transferred for use by Israel in wartime.[61]
• Italy, Qatar, and Spain are identified in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently, Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[62]
• Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [Government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them” in relation to possible storage of cluster munitions, according to a December 2008 cable.[63]
• The US may store clusters munitions in Kuwait, according to a May 2007 cable.[64]

Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

On 21 June 2022, the administration of President Joe Biden realigned US landmine policy with most provisions of the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, and again set the goal of ultimately joining it.[1]

The policy commits the US not to use antipersonnel landmines anywhere in the world, except on the Korean Peninsula.[2] Under the policy, the US will destroy antipersonnel mine stockpiles that are “not required for the defense of the Korean Peninsula.” The US will also not develop, produce, or acquire antipersonnel mines. The policy explicitly requires the US “not [to] assist, encourage, or induce anyone, outside the context of the Korean Peninsula, to engage in activity that would be prohibited” by the Mine Ban Treaty.

The US was the first country to call for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel landmines, in September 1994, and participated in the 1996–1997 Ottawa Process that created the treaty. It did not adopt or sign the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997, but the Clinton administration set the goal for the US to join the treaty in 2006. The Bush administration reversed that objective in 2004.[3] In 2014, the Obama administration issued a US landmine policy banning the production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, as well as halting their use by US forces anywhere except on the Korean Peninsula.[4] This brought US policy further in line with the Mine Ban Treaty. However, the Trump administration firmly rejected the notion of US accession to the treaty in January 2020, undoing years of incremental steps by the US to align its policy and practice with the Mine Ban Treaty.[5]

The US has participated as an observer at meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty since the Second Review Conference in Cartagena in 2009.[6] The Biden administration announced its new policy at the Mine Ban Treaty’s intersessional meetings held in Geneva in June 2022.[7] The US attended the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2022, where it criticized Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines and booby-traps in Ukraine.[8]

On 7 December 2022, the US abstained from voting on annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 77/63, which called for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty.[9] The US has abstained from every annual UNGA resolution promoting the treaty since 1998.

The US is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and provided a transparency report for CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines on 29 August 2022. The US is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The 2022 US landmine policy has been warmly welcomed by Colombia as president of the Mine Ban Treaty, and by States Parties including Australia, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK). The new policy came after years of pressure from Congressional representatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).[10] In January 2022, the United States Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL) sent a letter to President Biden, signed by 37 organizations, urging “immediate action to ban the use of antipersonnel landmines without geographic exceptions, and to set the U.S. on a short direct path to join the Mine Ban Treaty by 2023.”[11] In January 2023, Legacies of War became Chair of the USCBL with its director, Sera Koulabdara, representing the organization in this role.[12]

On 21 September 2022, ranking members of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives sent a letter to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressing their concerns over the new landmine policy and requesting further information.[13]

Use

Under the 2022 landmine policy announced by the Biden administration, the US has committed to not use antipersonnel landmines anywhere in the world, except on the Korean Peninsula.[14]

Upon making the 2022 policy announcement, US officials confirmed that the last US use of antipersonnel mines was in Iraq and Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War, with the exception of the use of a single antipersonnel mine in Afghanistan in 2002.[15]

The Department of Defense has long cited the need for the US to use antipersonnel mines on the Korean Peninsula in the event of an invasion of South Korea by North Korea, and has expressed concern that in the event of active hostilities, the current arrangement for a joint combined command structure would put a US general in charge of South Korean military forces.[16] Yet numerous retired US military officers, including those who commanded forces in South Korea, have said that using antipersonnel mines there is of little or no military value.[17]

Unlike the previous policy, the 2022 policy does not exempt “non-persistent” antipersonnel mines equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features from the prohibition on use outside of the Korean Peninsula. This reflects how the US has come to accept that the Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively bans all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of their predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (improvised or factory-made).[18]

The US maintains no minefields, anywhere in the world. Since October 1991, the landmines already emplaced in and near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North Korea and South Korea have been under the responsibility of South Korean forces, not US forces.[19] The US cleared and destroyed the landmines laid around its naval base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba in 1999.[20]

Transfer

Since 23 October 1992, US law has prohibited the export of antipersonnel landmines through a comprehensive moratorium, which has since been extended multiple times.[21] The 2022 policy continues this long-standing practice by stating that the US will not export or transfer antipersonnel mines “except when necessary for activities related to mine detection or removal, and for the purpose of destruction.”[22]

Upon announcing the 2022 policy, US officials clarified that the “Claymore mines that were transferred by the U.S. Government to Ukraine are command-detonated with a person in the loop who can actually detonate them,” which is permitted under the Mine Ban Treaty.[23]

Between 1969 and 1992, the US exported more than 5.6 million antipersonnel landmines to 38 countries. Deminers in at least 28 countries have reported clearing US-manufactured antipersonnel mines, including non-self-destructing and self-destructing/self-deactivating types.

Production

The US last produced antipersonnel mines in 1997.[24] The Trump administration policy allowed the US to acquire landmines, but this never happened. The 2022 policy recommits the US to not develop, produce, or acquire antipersonnel mines, as it had previously pledged in 2014.

No antipersonnel landmines, or other victim-activated munitions, are funded in the ammunition procurement budgets of the US Armed Services or Department of Defense for fiscal year 2023 or requested for fiscal year 2024.

In 1997, when the US last produced antipersonnel mines, it manufactured 450,000 ADAM and 13,200 CBU-89/B Gator self-destructing/self-deactivating antipersonnel mines. The last non-self-destructing antipersonnel mines were procured in 1990, when the US Army bought nearly 80,000 M16A1 antipersonnel mines.

Alternatives to antipersonnel mines

Over more than 20 years, the US has spent in excess of $2 billion to develop and produce weapons systems that could be considered alternatives to antipersonnel landmines.[25] The 2022 policy will continue that work by stating that the US “will undertake diligent efforts to pursue materiel and operational solutions to assist in becoming compliant with and ultimately acceding to the Ottawa Convention, while ensuring our ability to respond to contingencies and meet our alliance commitments.”

The US has undertaken programs to develop alternatives to landmines, including the XM-7 Spider Networked Munition and the IMS Scorpion. Both initially had the potential for victim-activated features, thereby making them antipersonnel mines, but the Department of Defense later indicated that they would be command-detonated and not victim-activated. The XM-7 Spider Networked Munition has been produced and used in combat, while the IMS Scorpion project was cancelled.

Stockpiling

In June 2022, US officials said that the US has approximately three million stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.[26] That total has not changed since 2014, when the Department of Defense disclosed that the US had an “active stockpile of just over 3 million anti-personnel mines.”[27]

Previously, in 2002, the US said it had a stockpile of around 10.4 million antipersonnel mines.[28]      

The US stockpile mostly consists of remotely-delivered mines that are scattered over a wide area by aircraft or tube artillery, and equipped with self-destruct features designed to blow the mine up after a pre-set period of time, as well as self-deactivating features. Various types of antipersonnel landmines are stockpiled by the US. The following table details the latest publicly available data on the types and quantities possessed, dating from 2010.

   US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in 2010[29]

*The accounting for GATOR includes CBU-89 [22], CBU-104 [22], and CBU-78 [15] air-dropped bombs.

Stockpile destruction

The existing US stockpile of antipersonnel mines is expected to expire—meaning that the mines will become unusable—by the early 2030s, in part because their shelf-life, of 36 years, decreases over time as batteries embedded inside the mines deteriorate with age.

The 2014 policy precluded the US from extending or modifying the life of the batteries in its stockpiled antipersonnel mines.[30] The 2022 policy is understood to be continuing this practice.

A Department of Defense spokesperson stated in 2014 that the existing antipersonnel mine stocks “will start to decline in their ability to be used about[sic]…starting in about 10 years. And in 10 years after that, they’ll be completely unusable.”[31]

The 2014 policy committed the US to destroy antipersonnel mines that were “not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea.”[32] In 2014, Expal USA (the US subsidiary of Spanish defense company Expal) won a contract to destroy GATOR and Volcano mines at its facility in Marshall, Texas.[33] The estimated completion date was June 2020, according to MAXAM, the multinational company that owns Expal.[34]

General Atomics built the US Army a special “munitions cryofracture demilitarization facility” at the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma, to destroy US stocks of ADAM mines through disassembly and cryofracture.[35] The destruction process started in December 2004 and was supposed to have concluded by June 2018, but it is unclear whether this deadline was met.[36]

Since 2011, at least 96 M86 Pursuit Deterrent Munitions and 40 M74 antipersonnel mines, as well as other “problematic munitions,” have been destroyed in a static detonation chamber built to destroy US stocks of chemical weapons.[37]

It is unclear how many landmines were destroyed by the US prior to the 2020 policy change under the Trump administration.

Retention

In 2020, the US said that a small quantity of “persistent mines” (non-self-destructing) had been retained for demining and counter-mine testing and training.[38]

In 2022, the United States (US) contributed some US$310.2 million in mine action support to 27 countries and one other area.[1] This represents a significant 59% increase from the $194.5 million provided in 2021.

US support to mine action was distributed among the following regions: Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia ($104.3 million, or 34%, across five recipient countries/areas); East and South Asia and the Pacific ($101.1 million, or 32%, across eight recipient countries); the Middle East and North Africa ($58.7 million, or 19%, across seven recipient countries); the Americas ($24.6 million, or 8%, to one recipient country); and Sub-Saharan Africa ($21.4 million, or 7%, across seven recipient countries).

Contributions by recipient: 2022

Mine action assistance approach

The US allocates the majority of its mine action funding via the Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, under the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, within the framework of its conventional weapons destruction efforts. Additional funding is allocated through the Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund, under the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The US is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions or the Mine Ban Treaty, but it has been the largest source of financial support to mine action efforts since the 1990s.

At the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Open Debate on Mine Action in April 2021, the US noted that its mine action assistance aimed at protecting civilians and creating a safe environment for people to live in. The US further added that it was following a “three-pronged approach” focusing on support for clearance, risk education, and rehabilitation.[2]

Five-year support to mine action

From 2018–2022, the cumulative US contribution to mine action totaled more than $1 billion. This represents a 28% increase on the $847.4 million provided in the previous five-year period from 2013–2017. Annual US support has totaled more than $100 million since 2009.

Summary of contributions: 2018–2022[3]

Note: N/A=not applicable.