Contaminated by: landmines (extent of contamination unknown), cluster munitions (extent of contamination unknown), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) (heavy, but extent unknown).

Article 5 Deadline: 1 October 2022
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Deadline: 1 March 2026
(Too soon to assess likelihood of compliance)

(See separate mine action profile for Somaliland).

Landmines and UXO:The extent of mine contamination is unknown.As in 2015, no areas containing mines were released in Somalia, but 6km² of area was confirmed as mined by survey. Almost 0.04 km² of land was released through clearance in Somalia in 2016, but no mines were found. 5.3km² of land was confirmed as mined through survey. Approximately 32.5km² of land contaminated by other UXO was released through battle area clearance (BAC).

There are no confirmed or suspected cluster munition-contaminated areas, although evidence of cluster munition contamination has been reported, including in 2016.

Recommendations for action

• Greater priority should be accorded to survey, demining, and cluster munition clearance by the Somali Republic.
• Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) terminology.
• Somalia should develop a resource-mobilization strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.
• The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database should be transferred to full national ownership under the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) and efforts made to ensure transparency and accessibility of all mine action data for operators and other relevant stakeholders. Information management and coordination of mine action activities could also be improved through more effective dissemination of information electronically.
• Somalia should submit its initial Article 7 transparency report.

Mines and ERW Contamination (except cluster munition remnants, see below)

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–1978 (also known as the Ogaden War), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and ERW.

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia’s three major regions: southcentral Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; the Federal State of Puntland, a semi-autonomous administration in the northeast; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the northwest. (See separate mine action profile for Somaliland.)

Southcentral Somalia: No comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination in Somalia. However, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in 10 was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.[1] Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.[2] Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mined area and found that 74 of 191 communities were impacted by mines and ERW, of which 13 reported an antipersonnel mine threat.[3]

Puntland State Administration: Mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Center (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Center (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug in 2005.[4] The LIS identified 35 communities affected by a total of 47 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). The LIS estimated that about 151,000 people—around 6% of the population of some 2.5 million—live in mine-affected communities.[5]

Insecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised mines, by non-state armed groups have a serious humanitarian impact. The extent of the threat is not well known, except in Puntland and Somaliland, where a range of surveys have been carried out over the past decade.[6]

In 2017, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that mine and ERW contamination in Somalia continued to restrict community access to basic services and economic opportunities and remained an impediment to stability, security, and ultimately, recovery and development.[7] The HALO Trust reported that threats of minefields constrained pastoral herders from moving their flocks freely and accessing important water sources, which in a harsh desert climate plagued by famine and drought, are essential for community survival.[8]

Cluster Munition Contamination

The extent of cluster munition contamination in Somalia is unknown, although cluster munition remnants have been found in southcentral Somalia and Puntland. In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several AO-1SCh submunitions were found within a 30km radius of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border, in the southern Gedo region of southern Somalia.[9] Cluster munition remnants were also identified around the town of Galdogob in the northcentral Mudug province of Puntland, further north on the border with Ethiopia.[10] More contamination was expected to be found in southern Somalia’s Lower and Upper Juba regions.[11]

According to UNMAS, eight reports were submitted in September 2015 from Rabdhure, in Bakool region of South West state showing empty RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers, which can contain both AO-1Sch and PTAB-2.5M submunitions.[12]

The Ethiopian National Defense Forces and the Somali National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–1978 Ogaden War.[13] The Soviet Union supplied both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict. PTAB-2.5 and AO-1Sch submunitions were produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale.[14]

Three additional reports of the identification of cluster munition remnants were made in 2016. All reports remained to be verified as of July 2017. In January 2016, several BL755 submunitions were reportedly found near Bu’ale, Middle Juba region. In March 2016, a modified BL755 submunition was found in Bardera (Baardheere), Gedo region, and in September 2016, one PTAB-2.5M submunition was reportedly found in Dinsoor, Bay region.[15] On 24 January 2016, Somali media reports circulated photos alleging that BL755 cluster munitions had been used by the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) during an intensive bombing campaign in Gedo region, an allegation that Kenya denied.[16] There were subsequent reports by local residents that al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded submunitions near Bu’ale around the same time. A UN Monitoring Group investigation later determined that unexploded submunitions of the same BL755 type were used in the manufacture of components of IEDs found in a cache of materials seized by anti-al-Shabaab forces in Bardera, reported on 7 March 2016.[17] (See Somalia’s cluster munition ban policy profile for further details.)

While the extent of cluster munition contamination along the Somali border with Ethiopia is not known, in 2014, Somalia said it posed an ongoing threat to the lives of nomadic people and their animals.[18]

Program Management

According to the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), as of October 2016, mine action management in Somalia was “temporarily” divided into two geographical regions: Somalia (including Puntland) and Somaliland.[19] (See the separate mine action profile on Somaliland for further details.) SEMA is responsible for mine action in southcentral Somalia and Puntland.

SEMA reported that it maintains a presence across Somalia through its five federal state members, the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hirshabelle State Office, SEMA South West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office.[20] Under each of the five federal state members is an independent consortium of national NGOs.[21]

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action center for southern Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created
two years earlier.[22] SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.[23] UNMAS reported that “significant steps” were made in late 2015 towards “the transfer of responsibilities to a national authority” with Somalia’s Council of Ministers endorsing of SEMA’s legislative framework, policy, and budget, making it responsible for managing and coordinating all contamination in Somalia.[24]

In June 2016, SEMA reported that its legislative framework was still awaiting the approval of the federal parliament.[25] However, elections held in February 2017 resulted in a period of government paralysis and the legislative framework was not adopted.[26] Due to the lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA did not receive funding from the government in 2016.[27] A seven-month grant from UNMAS, under which SEMA was expected to have established itself as a government entity in order for a sustainable mine action institution to be established, expired in December 2015.[28]

SEMA began staffing its office in 2016, but as of May 2017, did not have sufficient capacity to manage the reporting and coordination requirements of a national mine action center. Operators raised concerns that less time should be directed at political liaison between stakeholders, and that facilitating the conduct of demining operations must be a higher priority.[29] Greater clarity on SEMA’s role and cohesion between SEMA and its five federal state offices, as well as national consortiums, would also facilitate communication between stakeholders and more efficient implementation of mine action activities.[30]

In 2017, under a United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID)-funded partnership project, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was providing capacity development for SEMA on managing the IMSMA database, conducting non-technical and technical survey, and trainings for SEMA management staff.[31]

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, PMAC has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).[32] It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.

Strategic planning

SEMA developed a national mine action policy, which as of September 2017, had received one reading in the Somali parliament but had yet to be ratified. The document existed in Somali and no translations were available, nor had it been disseminated to national or international mine action operators. Operators raised concerns that the policy was drafted with little to no input from international mine action stakeholders or the international donor community.[33] NPA reported, however, that it was intended that the policy would be translated and shared with mine action operators in 2017 as part of the DFID-funded capacity-building project.[34]

In 2017, the recently elected Somali government approved The Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019, outlining priorities for recovery and development. Mine and ERW contamination is recognized as a hindrance to socio-economic development and a security concern for sustainable development initiatives, and clearance is identified as a crucial part of stabilization efforts in the national development process.[35]

In 2015, the Federal Government of Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and SEMA developed a national strategy document, the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management,” in coordination with federal state members, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and UNMAS. The plan’s overarching objective is to support the federal government in fulfilling its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, with a focus on national ownership through the institutional development of SEMA federal state entities, the training of national police EOD teams, and the creation of employment opportunities for local Somalis, including from at-risk groups such as youths and former combatants, to undertake clearance operations in their own communities.[36] According to SEMA, the Badbaado Plan’s objectives for nationwide mine and ERW clearance in southcentral Somalia include areas “reported with cluster munition presence.”[37] As the Badbaado plan sets out its duration as “the next 2 or 3 years,” an updated national strategy document will need to be developed, and as of September 2017, NPA reported that discussions were underway to begin this process with SEMA.[38] A separate plan was developed for explosive hazard management by the police.[39]

Somaliland’s latest strategic mine action plan expired in 2014. In May 2017, HALO Trust reported that it intended to work with SMAC to develop a mine action strategy in 2017–2018.[40]

Standards

UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–2013.[41] The NTSGs are not, however, specific to the Somali context, and in 2017, there were calls for their review and revision to ensure they represent best practices for tackling the specific explosive threat in Somalia.[42]

Operators


In 2016, four international NGOs were operational in Somalia: DDG, HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA, as well as UNMAS, and the Ukrainian commercial operator Ukroboronservice. Ten government police EOD teams were also deployed in Somalia.[43]

In 2016, DDG continued to focus its activities on EOD and risk education and did not conduct any mine or BAC.[44]

In the first half of 2015, HALO opened a new program to conduct survey and clearance in Somalia.[45] Its capacity increased from 38 staff at the start of the year to 185 in December 2016, due to a planned enlargement of mine clearance operations. It reported significant gains in training and technical competence, and correspondingly in clearance output, during the year.[46]

In 2016, MAG continued its arms management and destruction program across Somalia. In 2016, MAG mobilized six teams through partners to provide risk education to both communities and returnees at way stations as they entered southern Somalia.[47]

In 2016, NPA conducted BAC around Mogadishu and the Banaadir region, and initiated assessment activities as part of a capacity-building program for SEMA.[48]

From 1 September 2015 to 31 May 2016, UNMAS contracted commercial operator Ukroboronservice to undertake mine action-related tasks in southcentral Somalia. It deployed four MTTs along with nine community liaison officers in support of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) projects to conduct survey and clearance of ERW, main supply route assessments, stockpile and ammunition management, and explosive hazard risk education.[49]

Quality management

NPA reported that SEMA conducted external quality assurance (QA) of its BAC tasks during 2016.[50] HALO said that no external QA of its tasks was conducted in 2016 and reported that, as of May 2017, only one visit by a SEMA representative had occurred since the start of the year. No field visits to conduct QA by international managers could be carried out due to security concerns.[51] In June 2017, SEMA confirmed that clearance projects had been initiated without a strong QA/quality control (QC) process in place and called for further capacity building of SEMA to carry out QA/QC before awarding future contracts.[52]

Information management

In July 2017, UNMAS reported having made several attempts to hand over the IMSMA database to SEMA, but said that lack of capacity within SEMA had left the agency unable to accept the responsibility. UNMAS was continuing to process the data as an interim measure until SEMA has sufficient capacity to administer the database on its own.[53] NPA reported in September 2017, however, that SEMA, with assistance from NPA, had developed new IMSMA reporting formats to be used by operators for the duration of 2017 and that UNMAS had submitted all recent reports to SEMA for inclusion into the database. It said that SEMA had two staff working with the database with NPA’s support.[54]

Land Release (mines)

Almost 0.04 km² of land was released through clearance in Somalia in 2016. No mines were found in Somalia, though 5.3km² was confirmed as mined through survey.[55] This compares to 2015, when approximately 1.8km² of mined area was released through survey and clearance in Somaliland. As in 2016, no areas containing mines were released in Somalia, but 6km² of area was confirmed as mined by survey.[56]

Approximately 32.5km² of land contaminated by other UXO was released through BAC.[57]

No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2016; operations consisted only of risk education and EOD spot tasks.

Survey in 2016 (mines)

No comprehensive overview of SHAs exists in Somalia, and as of 2017, no nationwide survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[58]

In 2016, HALO Trust reported confirming nearly 5.2km² of mine contamination, including just over 3.3km² in the Hiran region of Hirshabelle state, 1.1km² in the Galguduud region of Galmudug state, and 0.8km² in the Bakool region of South-West state.[59] Previously, from the deployment of its teams in May 2015–2031 December 2015, HALO reported confirming over 6km² of mined areas in southern Somalia, including more than 75 minefields through non-technical survey.[60]

As of June 2017, HALO reported that since operations began in May 2015, it had surveyed a total of more than 16km² of hazardous area in southern Somalia.[61]

HALO reported that it was conducting non-technical survey activities in southern Somalia under methodology developed on the basis of experience gained in Somaliland. Under this methodology, all areas recorded by non-technical survey are treated as confirmed hazardous areas.[62] In 2017, experienced non-technical survey team supervisors from Somaliland were overseeing and building the capacity of survey teams in southern Somalia, but acknowledged that some areas surveyed may require refinement and a “progressive approach” to land release.[63]

Clearance in 2016 (mines)

Since the initiation of clearance activities in the last quarter of 2016, HALO reported clearing three mined areas covering just over 40,000m² in southern Somalia: one in Hiran region, Hirshabelle state, with a size of 5,169m² and two in Galguduud region, Galmudug state, covering 34,860m². No mines or UXO were found.[64] No antipersonnel mine clearance was carried out in southern Somalia in 2015.

During 2016, NPA operated three BAC teams for surface ERW clearance in Mogadishu and its outskirts. NPA completed approximately 32.5km² of surface BAC using a mechanical asset in 2016.[65]

Progress in 2017

In 2017, NPA was training five survey teams to be deployed in all of southern Somalia’s states. Additionally, as of May 2017, NPA had deployed two survey teams and one clearance team and commenced operations in the northern disputed territories of Sool and Sanaag.[66]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Survey in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

No overview of areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants exists in Somalia, and, as of May 2017, no national survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[67] No survey specific to cluster munition remnants was conducted in 2016.

In 2015–2016, HALO carried out surveys in the Hiran region of Hirshabelle state, along the Ethiopian border in the Galguduud region of Galmudug state, and in the Bakool region of South-West state, surveying a total of 101 minefield and 179 UXO tasks. Of this, only one cluster munition fragment was found in Hiran. No further evidence of use of cluster munitions or cluster munition contamination was encountered.[68]

Clearance in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

No cluster munition clearance occurred in Somalia in 2016.[69] No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2016; operations consisted only of risk education and EOD spot tasks.

DDG, NPA, and MAG confirmed that they did not encounter any cluster munition remnants in their operations in Somalia in 2016.[70]

Deminer safety

In September 2016, two HALO Trust staff were killed and one permanently disabled in a shooting incident in Galmudug state. HALO reported that the incident was due to a conflict between rival sub-clans and was not directly targeted at its operations. Nevertheless, it was forced to withdraw from Galmudug as a result.[71]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Somalia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

In seeking to meet its treaty deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland, which are managed by the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC) under the authority of the vice-president of Somaliland (see separate mine action profile for Somaliland).

In May 2017, HALO Trust and NPA reported that it was unlikely that Somalia would meet its Article 5 deadline, due to key factors such as the slow pace of clearance to date and the lack of development and capacity building of SEMA to fulfil a robust coordinating role.[72]

SEMA has highlighted the need for international assistance, greater transparency on bilaterally funded projects, better coordination and information sharing between operators, SEMA, and its federal state member offices, and ensuring sufficient capacity to conduct independent QA/QC activities as key areas of concern.[73]

Security and the safety of demining staff amid political tension and violence remained significant concerns for operations in certain areas.[74]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.