Summary: State Party Somalia ratified the convention on 30 September 2015 after participating in several meetings of the convention. It voted in favor of the first UN resolution on the convention in December 2015. Somalia has condemned new use of the cluster munitions.

Somalia is not known to have used, produced, transferred, or stockpiled cluster munitions. Cluster munitions remnants have been cleared from the country’s border areas, but it has not been possible to determine the party responsibility for this use.

Policy

The Somali Republic signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 30 September 2015, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 March 2016.

It is unclear if Somalia will undertake national implementing legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions.

As of 30 June 2017, Somalia still had not submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which was originally due 31 August 2016.

In December 2015, Somalia voted in favor of the first resolution by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[1] Unfortunately it was absent from the December 2016 vote on a follow-up resolution promoting implementation of the convention.[2] 

Somalia attended one meeting of the Oslo Process that produced the convention, Vienna in December 2007.[3]

Somalia participated in the convention’s annual Meetings of States Parties in 2011–2012 and 2014, as well as intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2013–2014. It has not attended any meetings of the convention since then, such as the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2016.

In 2014, Somalia said, “we denounce ongoing use of cluster munitions” in South Sudan and Syria, as well as reported cluster munition use in Ukraine.[4] Somalia has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2016.[5]

Somalia is a party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling 

In September 2014, Somalia informed States Parties that it “is not a user, producer, or stockpiling state” of cluster munitions.[6]

Cluster munitions remnants have been cleared from the country’s border areas. For example, in March 2016, deminers found an unexploded submunition from a BL755 cluster bomb in Bardera (Baardheere) in Gedo region and found a PTAB-2.5M submunition in Dinsoor in Bay region in September 2016.[7] 

Previous use 

Kenya, a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, has denied an allegation that it used cluster munitions in Somalia in 2016.[8] In January 2016, a Somali media outlet reported an alleged cluster munition attack in the Gedo region of Somalia and published photographs reportedly taken at the site of the attack that show dead livestock and the remnants of UK-made BL755 cluster bombs and their submunitions.[9] The article stated that the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) carried out the attack against the non-state armed group al-Shabaab after Kenyan troops were forced to retreat from their base near the Somali border town of El Adde. The governor of Gedo region, Mohamed Abdi Kalil, accused the KDF of attacking the area around Bardere City “using illegal cluster bombs.”[10]

A UN investigation reported to the Security Council on 9 May 2016 that:

“In addition to civilian casualties, air strikes by the Kenyan military from 15 to 23 January in the Gedo region reportedly resulted in the killing of livestock and the destruction of water wells and houses. In this regard, allegations of cluster munitions were reported by the media and local communities. However, the Government of Kenya has officially denied them. Unexploded sub-munitions are reported to have been used by Al-Shabaab as improvised explosive devices during attacks. On 31 January, the Federal Government announced a committee to investigate the impact of the air strikes, but the committee has yet to begin its work.[11]

The Monitor also could not conclusively determine on the basis of available evidence if Kenya used cluster munitions in January 2016. A UN Monitoring Group investigation reported that al-Shabaab repurposed unexploded submunitions from BL755 cluster munitions as components for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), according to an arms cache seized by anti-al-Shabaab forces in Bardera on 7 March 2016.[12]

Previously, in 2013, mine clearance operators working in Somalia near the border with Ethiopia cleared cluster munition remnants believed to date from the 1977–1978 Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia, but it is unclear who was responsible for the use.[13] Somalia has commented that the cluster munition contamination near its border with Ethiopia dates from the “border wars of 1978–1984,” but has not indicated who was responsible for this use.[14]

Policy

Somalia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 16 April 2012 and the treaty entered into force for the country on 1 October 2012. Somalia has not yet instituted national implementation measures, but stated that it is aware of its obligation and is “committed to doing so in the future and to reporting on these measures.”[1]

Somalia submitted its initial Article 7 report for the Mine Ban Treaty on 30 March 2013, but has not submitted an updated report since.

Somalia attended the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago in November–December 2016, as well as the Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique, in June 2014. Somalia did not attend the treaty’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2017. Somalia last made a statement at the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2015, where it asked for more international support in fulfilling its obligations.

Somalia ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 30 September 2015 and will became a State Party in March 2016. Somalia is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

Several Somali factions previously renounced use of antipersonnel mines by signing the Deed of Commitment, administered by Geneva Call.

The Somalia Coalition to Ban Landmines has continued to engage on the Mine Ban Treaty with government officials, as well as with the Somali National Mine Action Agency.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Somalia has stated that it never had production facilities for antipersonnel mines within the country.[2] Somalia’s initial Article 7 report states that “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals.” The report also states that Somalia is “putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.” No stockpiled mines have been destroyed since the convention came into force for Somalia.[3] Most factions involved in armed conflict in Somalia are believed to possess mines.[4] Previously, demobilizing militias have turned in mines.[5] Some mines have been turned in by armed groups for destruction in the past.[6]

No transfers of antipersonnel mines were reported during 2012 or early 2013. The Monitor has reported transfers in previous years.[7] No open sale of antipersonnel mines has been reported since 2009.[8]

Use

There have been no allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Somalia. Previously, reports of use by al-Shabaab insurgents had been alleged in several news reports, but the Monitor has been unable to verify these reports.[9] Recent reports seen by the Monitor alleging landmine use by al-Shabaab appear to refer to command-detonated bombs rather than victim activated improvised explosive devices [10]

Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in large numbers and media often refer to command-detonated IEDs and bombs as “landmines.”[11] Victim-activated mines and other explosive devices are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, but command-detonated mines and devices are not. Monitor analysis of media reports indicates that most, if not all, of the recovered explosive weapons and explosive attacks attributed to mines involve command-detonated or time-detonated bombs. In October 2011, Somali authorities and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces discovered an IED-manufacturing facility in Mogadishu, after which UNMAS noted, “The presence of improvised pressure plates indicates that [al-Shabaab] intends to employ Victim Operated IEDs, against vehicles or dismounted troops.”[12]

In the past, antipersonnel mines were used by various factions in Somalia, but in recent years the Monitor has not been able to verify any reports of new use by any of the NSAGs operating in the country.

Somalia continues to suffer significant antivehicle landmine attacks.[13]

Contaminated by: landmines (extent of contamination unknown), cluster munitions (extent of contamination unknown), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) (heavy, but extent unknown).

Article 5 Deadline: 1 October 2022
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Deadline: 1 March 2026
(Too soon to assess likelihood of compliance)

(See separate mine action profile for Somaliland).

Landmines and UXO:The extent of mine contamination is unknown.As in 2015, no areas containing mines were released in Somalia, but 6km² of area was confirmed as mined by survey. Almost 0.04 km² of land was released through clearance in Somalia in 2016, but no mines were found. 5.3km² of land was confirmed as mined through survey. Approximately 32.5km² of land contaminated by other UXO was released through battle area clearance (BAC).

There are no confirmed or suspected cluster munition-contaminated areas, although evidence of cluster munition contamination has been reported, including in 2016.

Recommendations for action

• Greater priority should be accorded to survey, demining, and cluster munition clearance by the Somali Republic.
• Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) terminology.
• Somalia should develop a resource-mobilization strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.
• The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database should be transferred to full national ownership under the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA) and efforts made to ensure transparency and accessibility of all mine action data for operators and other relevant stakeholders. Information management and coordination of mine action activities could also be improved through more effective dissemination of information electronically.
• Somalia should submit its initial Article 7 transparency report.

Mines and ERW Contamination (except cluster munition remnants, see below)

As a result of the Ethiopian-Somali wars in 1964 and 1977–1978 (also known as the Ogaden War), and more than 20 years of internal conflict, Somalia is significantly contaminated with mines and ERW.

Contamination from mines and ERW exists across Somalia’s three major regions: southcentral Somalia, including the capital Mogadishu; the Federal State of Puntland, a semi-autonomous administration in the northeast; and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed, though unrecognised, state that operates autonomously in the northwest. (See separate mine action profile for Somaliland.)

Southcentral Somalia: No comprehensive estimates yet exist of mine and ERW contamination in Somalia. However, surveys completed in 2008 in Bakol, Bay, and Hiraan regions revealed that, of a total of 718 communities, around one in 10 was contaminated by mines and/or ERW.[1] Other contaminated areas lie along the border with Ethiopia, in Galguduud, Gedo, and Hiraan regions.[2] Non-technical survey initiated in 2015 identified more than 6km² of mined area and found that 74 of 191 communities were impacted by mines and ERW, of which 13 reported an antipersonnel mine threat.[3]

Puntland State Administration: Mine and ERW contamination was assessed during Phase 2 of a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), implemented by the Survey Action Center (SAC) and the Puntland Mine Action Center (PMAC) in the regions of Bari, Nugaal, and the northern part of Mudug in 2005.[4] The LIS identified 35 communities affected by a total of 47 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs). The LIS estimated that about 151,000 people—around 6% of the population of some 2.5 million—live in mine-affected communities.[5]

Insecure and poorly managed stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, as well as use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including improvised mines, by non-state armed groups have a serious humanitarian impact. The extent of the threat is not well known, except in Puntland and Somaliland, where a range of surveys have been carried out over the past decade.[6]

In 2017, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that mine and ERW contamination in Somalia continued to restrict community access to basic services and economic opportunities and remained an impediment to stability, security, and ultimately, recovery and development.[7] The HALO Trust reported that threats of minefields constrained pastoral herders from moving their flocks freely and accessing important water sources, which in a harsh desert climate plagued by famine and drought, are essential for community survival.[8]

Cluster Munition Contamination

The extent of cluster munition contamination in Somalia is unknown, although cluster munition remnants have been found in southcentral Somalia and Puntland. In 2013, dozens of PTAB-2.5M submunitions and several AO-1SCh submunitions were found within a 30km radius of the town of Dolow on the Somali-Ethiopian border, in the southern Gedo region of southern Somalia.[9] Cluster munition remnants were also identified around the town of Galdogob in the northcentral Mudug province of Puntland, further north on the border with Ethiopia.[10] More contamination was expected to be found in southern Somalia’s Lower and Upper Juba regions.[11]

According to UNMAS, eight reports were submitted in September 2015 from Rabdhure, in Bakool region of South West state showing empty RBK-250-275 cluster bomb containers, which can contain both AO-1Sch and PTAB-2.5M submunitions.[12]

The Ethiopian National Defense Forces and the Somali National Armed Forces are thought to have used cluster munitions in clashes along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–1978 Ogaden War.[13] The Soviet Union supplied both Ethiopia and Somalia with weapons during the conflict. PTAB-2.5 and AO-1Sch submunitions were produced by the Soviet Union on a large scale.[14]

Three additional reports of the identification of cluster munition remnants were made in 2016. All reports remained to be verified as of July 2017. In January 2016, several BL755 submunitions were reportedly found near Bu’ale, Middle Juba region. In March 2016, a modified BL755 submunition was found in Bardera (Baardheere), Gedo region, and in September 2016, one PTAB-2.5M submunition was reportedly found in Dinsoor, Bay region.[15] On 24 January 2016, Somali media reports circulated photos alleging that BL755 cluster munitions had been used by the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) during an intensive bombing campaign in Gedo region, an allegation that Kenya denied.[16] There were subsequent reports by local residents that al-Shabaab had discovered unexploded submunitions near Bu’ale around the same time. A UN Monitoring Group investigation later determined that unexploded submunitions of the same BL755 type were used in the manufacture of components of IEDs found in a cache of materials seized by anti-al-Shabaab forces in Bardera, reported on 7 March 2016.[17] (See Somalia’s cluster munition ban policy profile for further details.)

While the extent of cluster munition contamination along the Somali border with Ethiopia is not known, in 2014, Somalia said it posed an ongoing threat to the lives of nomadic people and their animals.[18]

Program Management

According to the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), as of October 2016, mine action management in Somalia was “temporarily” divided into two geographical regions: Somalia (including Puntland) and Somaliland.[19] (See the separate mine action profile on Somaliland for further details.) SEMA is responsible for mine action in southcentral Somalia and Puntland.

SEMA reported that it maintains a presence across Somalia through its five federal state members, the SEMA Puntland State Office, SEMA Galmudug State Office, SEMA Hirshabelle State Office, SEMA South West State Office, and SEMA Jubaland Office.[20] Under each of the five federal state members is an independent consortium of national NGOs.[21]

SEMA was established in 2013 as the mine action center for southern Somalia, replacing the Somalia National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA) created
two years earlier.[22] SEMA’s goal was to assume full responsibility for all explosive hazard coordination, regulation, and management by December 2015.[23] UNMAS reported that “significant steps” were made in late 2015 towards “the transfer of responsibilities to a national authority” with Somalia’s Council of Ministers endorsing of SEMA’s legislative framework, policy, and budget, making it responsible for managing and coordinating all contamination in Somalia.[24]

In June 2016, SEMA reported that its legislative framework was still awaiting the approval of the federal parliament.[25] However, elections held in February 2017 resulted in a period of government paralysis and the legislative framework was not adopted.[26] Due to the lack of parliamentary approval, SEMA did not receive funding from the government in 2016.[27] A seven-month grant from UNMAS, under which SEMA was expected to have established itself as a government entity in order for a sustainable mine action institution to be established, expired in December 2015.[28]

SEMA began staffing its office in 2016, but as of May 2017, did not have sufficient capacity to manage the reporting and coordination requirements of a national mine action center. Operators raised concerns that less time should be directed at political liaison between stakeholders, and that facilitating the conduct of demining operations must be a higher priority.[29] Greater clarity on SEMA’s role and cohesion between SEMA and its five federal state offices, as well as national consortiums, would also facilitate communication between stakeholders and more efficient implementation of mine action activities.[30]

In 2017, under a United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID)-funded partnership project, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was providing capacity development for SEMA on managing the IMSMA database, conducting non-technical and technical survey, and trainings for SEMA management staff.[31]

The SEMA Puntland State Office, formerly known as PMAC, was established in Garowe with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support in 1999. Since then, on behalf of the regional government, PMAC has coordinated mine action with local and international partners, including Danish Demining Group (DDG) and Mines Advisory Group (MAG).[32] It runs the only police explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) team in Puntland, which is responsible for collecting and destroying explosive ordnance.

Strategic planning

SEMA developed a national mine action policy, which as of September 2017, had received one reading in the Somali parliament but had yet to be ratified. The document existed in Somali and no translations were available, nor had it been disseminated to national or international mine action operators. Operators raised concerns that the policy was drafted with little to no input from international mine action stakeholders or the international donor community.[33] NPA reported, however, that it was intended that the policy would be translated and shared with mine action operators in 2017 as part of the DFID-funded capacity-building project.[34]

In 2017, the recently elected Somali government approved The Somalia National Development Plan 2017–2019, outlining priorities for recovery and development. Mine and ERW contamination is recognized as a hindrance to socio-economic development and a security concern for sustainable development initiatives, and clearance is identified as a crucial part of stabilization efforts in the national development process.[35]

In 2015, the Federal Government of Somalia’s Ministry of Internal Security and SEMA developed a national strategy document, the “Badbaado Plan for Multi-Year Explosive Hazard Management,” in coordination with federal state members, the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), and UNMAS. The plan’s overarching objective is to support the federal government in fulfilling its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions, with a focus on national ownership through the institutional development of SEMA federal state entities, the training of national police EOD teams, and the creation of employment opportunities for local Somalis, including from at-risk groups such as youths and former combatants, to undertake clearance operations in their own communities.[36] According to SEMA, the Badbaado Plan’s objectives for nationwide mine and ERW clearance in southcentral Somalia include areas “reported with cluster munition presence.”[37] As the Badbaado plan sets out its duration as “the next 2 or 3 years,” an updated national strategy document will need to be developed, and as of September 2017, NPA reported that discussions were underway to begin this process with SEMA.[38] A separate plan was developed for explosive hazard management by the police.[39]

Somaliland’s latest strategic mine action plan expired in 2014. In May 2017, HALO Trust reported that it intended to work with SMAC to develop a mine action strategy in 2017–2018.[40]

Standards

UNMAS developed National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for Somalia in 2012–2013.[41] The NTSGs are not, however, specific to the Somali context, and in 2017, there were calls for their review and revision to ensure they represent best practices for tackling the specific explosive threat in Somalia.[42]

Operators


In 2016, four international NGOs were operational in Somalia: DDG, HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA, as well as UNMAS, and the Ukrainian commercial operator Ukroboronservice. Ten government police EOD teams were also deployed in Somalia.[43]

In 2016, DDG continued to focus its activities on EOD and risk education and did not conduct any mine or BAC.[44]

In the first half of 2015, HALO opened a new program to conduct survey and clearance in Somalia.[45] Its capacity increased from 38 staff at the start of the year to 185 in December 2016, due to a planned enlargement of mine clearance operations. It reported significant gains in training and technical competence, and correspondingly in clearance output, during the year.[46]

In 2016, MAG continued its arms management and destruction program across Somalia. In 2016, MAG mobilized six teams through partners to provide risk education to both communities and returnees at way stations as they entered southern Somalia.[47]

In 2016, NPA conducted BAC around Mogadishu and the Banaadir region, and initiated assessment activities as part of a capacity-building program for SEMA.[48]

From 1 September 2015 to 31 May 2016, UNMAS contracted commercial operator Ukroboronservice to undertake mine action-related tasks in southcentral Somalia. It deployed four MTTs along with nine community liaison officers in support of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) projects to conduct survey and clearance of ERW, main supply route assessments, stockpile and ammunition management, and explosive hazard risk education.[49]

Quality management

NPA reported that SEMA conducted external quality assurance (QA) of its BAC tasks during 2016.[50] HALO said that no external QA of its tasks was conducted in 2016 and reported that, as of May 2017, only one visit by a SEMA representative had occurred since the start of the year. No field visits to conduct QA by international managers could be carried out due to security concerns.[51] In June 2017, SEMA confirmed that clearance projects had been initiated without a strong QA/quality control (QC) process in place and called for further capacity building of SEMA to carry out QA/QC before awarding future contracts.[52]

Information management

In July 2017, UNMAS reported having made several attempts to hand over the IMSMA database to SEMA, but said that lack of capacity within SEMA had left the agency unable to accept the responsibility. UNMAS was continuing to process the data as an interim measure until SEMA has sufficient capacity to administer the database on its own.[53] NPA reported in September 2017, however, that SEMA, with assistance from NPA, had developed new IMSMA reporting formats to be used by operators for the duration of 2017 and that UNMAS had submitted all recent reports to SEMA for inclusion into the database. It said that SEMA had two staff working with the database with NPA’s support.[54]

Land Release (mines)

Almost 0.04 km² of land was released through clearance in Somalia in 2016. No mines were found in Somalia, though 5.3km² was confirmed as mined through survey.[55] This compares to 2015, when approximately 1.8km² of mined area was released through survey and clearance in Somaliland. As in 2016, no areas containing mines were released in Somalia, but 6km² of area was confirmed as mined by survey.[56]

Approximately 32.5km² of land contaminated by other UXO was released through BAC.[57]

No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2016; operations consisted only of risk education and EOD spot tasks.

Survey in 2016 (mines)

No comprehensive overview of SHAs exists in Somalia, and as of 2017, no nationwide survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[58]

In 2016, HALO Trust reported confirming nearly 5.2km² of mine contamination, including just over 3.3km² in the Hiran region of Hirshabelle state, 1.1km² in the Galguduud region of Galmudug state, and 0.8km² in the Bakool region of South-West state.[59] Previously, from the deployment of its teams in May 2015–2031 December 2015, HALO reported confirming over 6km² of mined areas in southern Somalia, including more than 75 minefields through non-technical survey.[60]

As of June 2017, HALO reported that since operations began in May 2015, it had surveyed a total of more than 16km² of hazardous area in southern Somalia.[61]

HALO reported that it was conducting non-technical survey activities in southern Somalia under methodology developed on the basis of experience gained in Somaliland. Under this methodology, all areas recorded by non-technical survey are treated as confirmed hazardous areas.[62] In 2017, experienced non-technical survey team supervisors from Somaliland were overseeing and building the capacity of survey teams in southern Somalia, but acknowledged that some areas surveyed may require refinement and a “progressive approach” to land release.[63]

Clearance in 2016 (mines)

Since the initiation of clearance activities in the last quarter of 2016, HALO reported clearing three mined areas covering just over 40,000m² in southern Somalia: one in Hiran region, Hirshabelle state, with a size of 5,169m² and two in Galguduud region, Galmudug state, covering 34,860m². No mines or UXO were found.[64] No antipersonnel mine clearance was carried out in southern Somalia in 2015.

During 2016, NPA operated three BAC teams for surface ERW clearance in Mogadishu and its outskirts. NPA completed approximately 32.5km² of surface BAC using a mechanical asset in 2016.[65]

Progress in 2017

In 2017, NPA was training five survey teams to be deployed in all of southern Somalia’s states. Additionally, as of May 2017, NPA had deployed two survey teams and one clearance team and commenced operations in the northern disputed territories of Sool and Sanaag.[66]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Survey in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

No overview of areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants exists in Somalia, and, as of May 2017, no national survey had been conducted, mainly due to the security situation.[67] No survey specific to cluster munition remnants was conducted in 2016.

In 2015–2016, HALO carried out surveys in the Hiran region of Hirshabelle state, along the Ethiopian border in the Galguduud region of Galmudug state, and in the Bakool region of South-West state, surveying a total of 101 minefield and 179 UXO tasks. Of this, only one cluster munition fragment was found in Hiran. No further evidence of use of cluster munitions or cluster munition contamination was encountered.[68]

Clearance in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

No cluster munition clearance occurred in Somalia in 2016.[69] No formal land release occurred in Puntland in 2016; operations consisted only of risk education and EOD spot tasks.

DDG, NPA, and MAG confirmed that they did not encounter any cluster munition remnants in their operations in Somalia in 2016.[70]

Deminer safety

In September 2016, two HALO Trust staff were killed and one permanently disabled in a shooting incident in Galmudug state. HALO reported that the incident was due to a conflict between rival sub-clans and was not directly targeted at its operations. Nevertheless, it was forced to withdraw from Galmudug as a result.[71]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Somalia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 October 2022. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

In seeking to meet its treaty deadline, Somalia must confront a number of challenges, not least of which is the security situation in much of the country. It does not effectively control mine action operations in Somaliland, which are managed by the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC) under the authority of the vice-president of Somaliland (see separate mine action profile for Somaliland).

In May 2017, HALO Trust and NPA reported that it was unlikely that Somalia would meet its Article 5 deadline, due to key factors such as the slow pace of clearance to date and the lack of development and capacity building of SEMA to fulfil a robust coordinating role.[72]

SEMA has highlighted the need for international assistance, greater transparency on bilaterally funded projects, better coordination and information sharing between operators, SEMA, and its federal state member offices, and ensuring sufficient capacity to conduct independent QA/QC activities as key areas of concern.[73]

Security and the safety of demining staff amid political tension and violence remained significant concerns for operations in certain areas.[74]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2016, nine donors contributed US$10.9 million for mine action activities in the Federal Republic of Somalia, this is $2.7 million more than in 2015 (a 33% increase).[1]

The largest contribution came from the United Kingdom (UK) ($3.1 million), with two additional countries—Germany and Norway—contributing more than $1 million each. Two donors, Italy and Norway, contributed a combined total of $1.3 million to support victim assistance activities in 2016.

International contributions: 2016[2]

International support to Somalia’s mine action activities has fluctuated greatly since 2012, ranging from a minimum of $7.9 million in 2014 to a maximum of $23.7 million in 2012.

Summary of contributions: 2012–2016[3]

Casualties Overview

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) recorded 22 casualties as a result of 14 incidents in the Somali Republic (excluding Somaliland) for 2016.[1] Detailed data was available for only 17 casualties, of those, one was killed and 16 were injured. More than 76% were male. More than three-quarters (76%) of all casualties were children (10 boys and three girls), while adult casualties were comprised of three men and one woman. All were civilians.[2]

Casualties were reported in the following regions: Bay, Galgaduud, Gedo, Hiran, Lower Juba, Mudug, and Nugaal.

The 22 casualties reported for 2016 represented less than 40% of the 56 casualties reported for 2015.[3] The total for 2016 also marked a 74% decrease on the 84 casualties reported in 2014. However, due to the lack of accurate and consistent casualty data across the years, differences between annual reported casualty statistics do not necessarily represent trends.

The Monitor identified 3,170 mine/ERW casualties in Somalia (excluding Somaliland) between 1999 and the end of 2016. Of these, 1,250 people were killed, 1,568 were injured, and for the remaining 352 casualties it was unknown if they survived their injuries.

Cluster munition casualties

The number of cluster munition casualties in Somalia is not known. In a 2014 statement to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Somalia recognized that there are cluster munition victims in Somalia living in severe conditions with mostly unmet needs.[4]

For most landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors and other persons with disabilities, services remain unavailable or inaccessible and the ongoing conflict and extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) simply increases the number of people who require assistance. 

Victim assistance commitments

The Somali Republic is responsible for significant numbers of mine/ERW survivors and cluster munition victims, although the total number is unknown. Somalia has commitments to victim assistance as a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The Monitor identified at least 1,568 mine/ERW survivors from 1999 to the end of 2016.

Victim assistance since the Maputo Action Plan

In May 2014, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) held a Victim Assistance and Disability Working Group meeting in Mogadishu. It was the first such meeting ever held to discuss needs, the development of a plan, and possible support for persons with disabilities, including survivors. Participants included representatives of the Somali Federal Government, the UN, the Somalia Coalition to Ban Landmines (SOCBAL), the Institute for Education for Disabled People (IEDP), the National Disability Council, and the Somali Union for the Blind.[1] Disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) attending the meeting “demanded with strong voice” to be part of the victim assistance decision-making process and working groups.[2] The working group was intended to meet quarterly, but no meeting has taken place since the initial meeting in 2014.

Victim assistance in 2016

In 2016, survivors in Somalia continued to lack adequate emergency and ongoing healthcare, employment, and training and education opportunities.[3]

Assessing victim assistance needs

No efforts to identify victim assistance needs in Somalia in 2016 were identified.

Coordination

A quarterly meeting on mine action, hosted by the mine action authority, the Somali Explosive Management Agency (SEMA), provides an opportunity for victim assistance issues to be raised and addressed, but this is not systematic.

The Horn of Africa Disability Forum (HADF) hosted a celebration of the International Day of Mine Action and Awareness in April 2016, calling on the government and the international community to fulfill the victim assistance mandate and calling on SEMA to uphold its responsibilities as the victim assistance focal point.[4]

Disability associations are organized under the National Disability Council, an informal coalition of the private associations working with and on behalf of persons with disabilities However, the council is not formally recognized by the government, and lacks power to contribute. Although there are many DPO’s, they remain uncoordinated and are differentiated on various bases.[5]

As of 1 September 2017, Somalia had not submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for calendar years 2013, 2014, 2015, or 2016, nor has Somalia provided its initial report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which was due on 31 August 2016. It had provided detailed information on victim assistance and the existing lack of planning and services in Form J of its initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, covering the period to March 2013.[6] Somalia did not make statements on victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2016.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Emergency and continuing medical care

Ongoing armed violence and conflict continued to erode the minimal health resources available.In 2016, the ICRC supported 12 hospitals, four comprehensively, and provided support to thousands of war-wounded Somalis. The ICRC reported 191 admissions of landmine and ERW casualties, including 35 women and 26 children. The ICRC also trained and deployed 10 emergency first aid teams to serve in violence-prone areas.[7]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

The Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) Rehabilitation Centre in Mogadishu is the primary provider of prosthetic and orthopedic appliances in Somalia. There are no private providers.[8] The centre serves 350 to 400 persons per month providing physical rehabilitation services in addition to assistive devices.[9]

ICRC MoveAbility (formerly the Special Fund for Disability) had planned to develop a national plan to strengthen rehabilitation services in Somalia, but continuing instability has delayed that project.[10]

Presidential candidate, Fadumo Q. Dayib, provided some wheelchairs and crutches to persons with disabilities in Mogadishu through the Somali Disability Empowerment Network (SODEN).[11]

Social and economic inclusion

Economic inclusion programs for landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities are nearly, if not totally, nonexistent. IEDP worked on an inclusive educational program with the African Education Trust.[12] In Kismayo, SODEN hosted a week-long workshop to identify barriers to and develop an inclusive education program.[13]

Abdullahi Hassan of the IEDP spoke at an event commemorating International Human Rights Day, noting the neglect of persons with disabilities despite the fact that they may constitute 15% of the population.[14]

Psychological assistance

Psychosocial support is extremely limited in Somalia with the Mogadishu Memorial Hospital serving as the only formal provider of such services and reaching only a few dozen individuals.[15]

Laws and policies

In April 2016, the UN-appointed independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia conducted a site visit to the country. During that visit, the government acknowledged a “lack of understanding of rights of persons with disabilities,” and the expert also received several reports from civil society that neither the government nor the international community provided support to persons with disabilities.[16]

In December 2015, the minister for internal security of Somalia announced to the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties to the that the prime minister of Somalia had “ratified” the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. However as of 1 September 2017, no ratification or accession instruments had been deposited with the UN.