Western Sahara

Mine Action

Last updated: 25 November 2016

Contaminated by: landmines (massive contamination), cluster munition remnants (medium contamination), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). 

Western Sahara cannot accede to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Cluster Munitions due to its political status

The extent of mine contamination in the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR, or Western Sahara) is not known, but at the end of 2016 there was a total of 256km2 of suspected and confirmed antipersonnel and antivehicle mine contamination, of which 3.22km2 was confirmed to be contaminated by antivehicle mines. Previously all mined areas were categorized as confirmed, but in 2015 they were reclassified as suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in order for survey to be carried out to better define the extent of contamination. In 2015, 0.5km2 of mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination land was released (excluding cluster munition remnants) and 3.9km2 of suspected contamination was canceled by non-technical survey (NTS). No areas containing antipersonnel mines were released.

Cluster munition contamination continued to be found in 2015, with 15 additional hazardous areas confirmed through survey activities, totaling 0.54km2. As of end 2015, Western Sahara had 4.89km2 of hazardous areas confirmed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. In 2015, 1.84km2 of cluster munition-contaminated land was cleared, with the destruction of 143 submunitions.

Recommendations for action 

  • Western Sahara should formally commit to respect and implement the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, including to clear all mines and cluster munition remnants east of the Berm as soon as possible.
  • Morocco should ensure immediate access and unhindered movement of all civilian staff of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), including UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) international staff, in order to allow demining by MINURSO and UNMAS to return to full functionality.
  • Morocco is strongly encouraged to provide cluster strike data to the UN or humanitarian demining organizations to facilitate survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants.

Contamination

Western Sahara remains significantly affected by mines and ERW, including cluster munition remnants, due to the conflict between the Royal Moroccan Armed Forces (RMAF) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) forces. A 2,700km-long defensive wall (the Berm) was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco on the west and the Polisario Front on the east.[1]

These explosive hazards continue to pose a daily threat to the local, nomadic, and refugee populations, along with UN personnel and military observers, and humanitarian actors.[2] Socio-economic growth and development are negatively impacted, limiting access to fluctuating and seasonally dependent water sources vital for animal herding and small-scale agriculture on which local populations depend.[3] 

In 2015, the UN reported that many minefields are located in areas with increasing civilian activity, including where civilians were returning home from refugee camps and building infrastructure northeast of the Berm in several areas that were largely abandoned since 1976.[4]

Mine contamination

The exact extent of mine contamination across Western Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm are thought to contain some of the densest mine contamination in the world.[5] The contamination is a result of fighting in previous decades between the RMAF and the Polisario Front forces. 

As at the end of 2015, Western Sahara had a total of 42 confirmed and suspected mined areas totaling over 256km2 to the east of the Berm, as set out in the table below.[6] This is almost 4km2 less than at the end of 2014 according to UNMAS’s estimate of contamination.[7] Of the 42 areas, seven, covering a total of 61.9km2, are located within the 5km-wide buffer strip and are inaccessible for clearance.[8]

Mine contamination east of the Berm as at end 2015[9]

Type of contamination

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

AP mines

0

0

1

0.099

AV mines

9

3.22

19

73.13

AP/AV mines

0

0

13

183.27

Total

9

3.22

33

256.499

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle; CHAs = confirmed hazardous areas

Both the north and south of Western Sahara contained antipersonnel mines, as set out in the table below.[10]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province east of the Berm (EoB) as at end 2015[11]

Province

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

North Region EoB

0

0

1

0.10

South Region EoB

0

0

13

183.27

Total

0

0

14

183.37

 

UNMAS reported that in 2015, previously confirmed mined areas were reclassified as SHAs in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database in order for survey to be carried out with the aim of better defining and narrowing the size of the confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs). It also reviewed and audited the IMSMA database where SHAs had been tasked for survey in order to identify CHAs and to release areas with no contamination.[12] 

A survey in 2006–2008 by an international NGO, then Landmine Action, later Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), initially identified 37 mined areas on the east of the Berm, nearly half of which were in Bir Lahlou, followed by Tifariti, Mehaires, and Awanit.[13] According to UNMAS, five minefields were addressed in 2012–2016, but new mined areas continued to be identified. No new antipersonnel mine contamination was identified in 2015.[14]

Neither survey nor clearance has been conducted in the 5km buffer zone to the east of the Berm.[15] The extent of contamination west of the Berm remains unknown, and as of April 2016, no survey had been carried out there.[16] The RMAF controls territory to the west of the Berm where it has been conducting large-scale demining. According to UNMAS, the RMAF cooperates with the UN Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) and submits regular monthly reports, helping to build a clearer understanding of the mine and ERW threat across Western Sahara.[17]

In 2015, 15 casualties were reported east of the Berm, eight injured, six killed, and one unknown. Thirty-two casualties were reported west of the Berm; 25 injured and seven killed. (See the Casualties and Victim Assistance profiled for further information.)

Cluster munition contamination

Western Sahara had almost 4.9km2 of area confirmed to contain cluster munition remnants east of the Berm as of the end of 2015. Of this, six cluster strike areas with a total size of 0.5km2 are located inside the buffer strip and are inaccessible for clearance.[18] Both the north and south of Western Sahara contain confirmed cluster munition-contaminated areas, as set out in the table below.[19]

Cluster munition contamination by region east of the Berm as of the end of 2015[20]

Region

Confirmed hazardous areas

Area (km2)

North

30

1.31

South

25

3.58

Total

55

4.89

 

This is an increase in confirmed cluster munition contamination from the 51 areas totaling 4.67km2 recorded at the end of 2014.[21] 

The RMAF used both artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions against Polisario forces during the conflict in Western Sahara from 1975 to 1991. According to SADR, BLU-63, M42, and MK118 submunitions were used by the RMAF at multiple locations in Bir Lahlou, Dougaj, Mehaires, Mijek, and North Wadis.[22] 

While clearance had been projected to be completed by the end of 2012,[23] discovery of previously unknown contaminated areas meant this target date was not met. New contaminated areas have continued to be identified, with an additional 15 cluster strike areas with a total size of 0.54km2 discovered in 2015. New strike areas are expected to be found in the future as mine action activities continue and additional information is received from local populations.[24]

Of the 4.89km2 of cluster munition contamination remaining at the end of 2015, six cluster munition strike areas with a total size of 520,609m2 are located inside the buffer strip and are inaccessible for clearance. This amount of reported contamination may also increase if access restrictions to the buffer strip are removed and survey and clearance can be conducted.[25]

Program Management

MINURSO manages a Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC). MINURSO MACC supports the mine action activities implemented by commercial contractor Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) and NGO Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in 2015.[26] 

In September 2013, the Polisario Front established a local mine action coordination center (the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office, SMACO), which is responsible for coordinating mine action in Western Sahara east of the Berm and for land release activities.[27] SMACO also conducted external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) activities.[28] SMACO, which was established with UN support, started its activities in January 2014. 

Strategic planning 

MINURSO MACC’s activities are conducted in accordance with the UN Mine Action Strategy for 2013–2018. UNMAS planned to develop a mine action strategy specific to Western Sahara in the second half of 2015.[29] As of April 2016, the strategy was still under development and awaiting finalization and approval by mine action stakeholders.[30] 

UNMAS reported that the MACC identifies priorities for mine clearance to the east of the Berm in conjunction with SMACO. These priorities are then confirmed with MINURSO and an annual operational workplan is developed and implemented. Priorities for mine clearance are areas that restrict MINURSO from carrying out its mandate and have a high impact on local communities.[31]

Standards 

In 2016, UNMAS intended to develop local mine action standards applicable east of the Berm in coordination with mine action partners. Once completed, the standards will be jointly managed by SMACO and MINURSO MACC.[32]

Operators 

In 2015, MINURSO MACC deployed three multi-task teams (MTTs) and one community liaison/risk education/survey team, employing a total of 37 operational staff. Of its four teams, two MTTs were tasked for mine clearance, and one was tasked to address cluster strike areas.[33]

DML, formerly called Mine Tech International (MTI), changed its name on 3 August 2015 to Dynasafe MineTech Limited.[34] It took over the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) tender for mine action in Western Sahara in September 2014 from AOAV, which closed operations due to lack of funding.[35] DML was the only implementing operator tasked with conducting cluster munition survey and clearance during 2015.

In 2015, NPA deployed to Western Sahara for a two-year period with two MTTs totaling 17 demining personnel tasked to conduct mine clearance.[36]

Information management 

UNMAS stated that a complete audit of the IMSMA database was initiated in 2015, which was expected to be completed in mid-2016. According to UNMAS, the audit was designed to ensure the data in IMSMA is accurate and comprehensive, and includes information on mined areas, cluster strike areas, and UXO spot sites.[37] In May 2016, UNMAS reported that the audit had validated the accuracy of the cluster munition-related information recorded in IMSMA.[38]

Land Release (Mines)

No areas containing antipersonnel mines were released in 2015. All tasked areas were contaminated with antivehicle mines and no antipersonnel mines were located during clearance.[39] 

According to UNMAS, nearly 4.4km2 of mine and ERW contamination (excluding cluster munition remnants, see section below) was released in 2015, of which 502,901m2 was cleared and 3,881,967m2 was canceled by NTS.[40] This compares to clearance of 1.2km2 of mined area in 2014.[41] No land was reported canceled or reduced by non-technical or technical survey during that year, though 52km2 of SHA was handed over to local communities after the completion of a combination of non-technical and technical survey carried out over two years in 2012–2014, and almost 4.2km2 was confirmed as mined in 2014.[42]

NPA began operations in August 2015 and its teams deployed on one task for a three-month period, where the main threat was from antivehicle mine contamination. It reported additionally canceling 247,000m2 by NTS and reducing a further 103,000m2 through technical survey.[43] According to UNMAS, DML confirmed 289,889m2 as mined.[44]

To the west of the Berm, according to a UN Secretary-General report, the RMAF reported that it had cleared more than 220.3km2 in territory under its control between April 2015 and April 2016, with the destruction of 9,873 items, including antivehicle and antipersonnel mines, UXO, and small arms ammunition. This is a slight decrease from the nearly 223km2 it reported clearing between April 2014 and March 2015.[45] This figure has not been included by the Monitor in the total amount of land cleared.

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

Total cluster munition-contaminated area released by clearance in 2015 was just over 1.84km2, an increase on the 1.75km2 of area cleared in 2014.[46]

Survey in 2015 (cluster munition remnants) 

In 2015, DML identified 15 new cluster munition strike areas with a total size of 537,431m2 through its survey activities.[47] In 2014, AOAV, Mechem, MTI, and MINURSO confirmed a total of nearly 0.9km2 as contaminated with cluster munition remnants through non-technical and technical survey.

Clearance in 2015 (cluster munition remnants) 

In 2015, UNMAS reported that DML cleared 11 cluster munition-contaminated areas with a total size of 1,841,225m2 to the east of the Berm, destroying 143 submunitions and another 120 items of UXO.[48] This compares to clearance of seven areas totaling 1,756,566m2 in 2014 by AOAV and MTI, with the destruction of 321 submunitions and 297 items of UXO.[49]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 5 Compliance 

Western Sahara cannot become a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. However, in June 2014, the SADR submitted a voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report to the UN “as a sign of the support of the Sahrawi State for the goals of the Treaty.”[50]

Western Sahara also cannot accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, in June 2014, the SADR submitted a voluntary Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency report to the UN, stating that “By submitting its voluntary report, the SADR would like to reaffirm its commitment to a total ban on cluster munitions as well as its willingness to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and be bound by its provisions.”[51]

MINURSO MACC reported that priorities in 2016 would include the tasking of six minefields and six cluster strike areas for clearance east of the Berm, in support of MINURSO’s ceasefire monitoring efforts and logistical supply teams, and by extension, local populations. It did not expect funding levels to change in 2016.[52]

In April 2016, UNMAS reported that all confirmed and suspected hazardous areas were currently tasked for NTS to more accurately identify the remaining mine and ERW threat. According to UNMAS, no survey operations for cluster strike areas were planned for 2016, but discovery of new cluster munition contamination during the course of mine and ERW survey and clearance operations remains a possibility.[53]

In keeping with previous estimates, UNMAS stated that with current mine action capacity, it would take about 9 years to clear all current confirmed and suspected hazardous areas, including minefields and cluster munition strike areas, provided that the number of CHAs does not increase significantly in 2016.[54] According to UNMAS, key challenges include: insufficient information regarding the location of hazardous areas, particularly to the west of the Berm; inclement weather conditions, such as heavy winds, sandstorms, and temperatures exceeding 50°C; and the impact of Western Sahara’s political status on resource mobilization.[55]

Following a visit by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to Sahrawi refugee camps in southern Algeria in March 2016 and his use of the term “occupation” to describe the political status of Western Sahara, Morocco ordered the expulsion of 84 civilian staff members of MINURSO, including the international staff of UNMAS. This resulted in the suspension of UNMAS-contracted demining activities in Western Sahara as of 20 March 2016.[56] The decision sparked international condemnation and has threatened to seriously paralyze MINURSO’s mission in Western Sahara, raising concerns over stability in the region and setting a dangerous precedent for UN peacekeeping operations.[57] 

On 29 April 2016, the UN Security Council voted to extend MINURSO’s mandate in Western Sahara for one year until 30 April 2017. In doing so, it emphasized strongly “the urgent need for the mission to return to full functionality,” noting that MINURSO has been unable to fully carry out its mandate as the majority of its civilian component have been prevented from performing their duties. The resolution requests that the UN Secretary-General report back to the Security Council within 120 days on whether MINURSO has returned to full functionality.[58]

In April 2016, SMACO reported that as a result of these events, anticipated funding had been put on hold until the issue between MINURSO and Morocco is resolved. It stated that consequently, and without the MACC, it was “nearly unable to conduct its duties as it is totally reliant on UNMAS support which has been affected by the current crises.”[59] NPA stated that SMACO was carrying out quality assurance/quality control activities but was having difficulty performing its functions and struggling with significant financial and logistical problems.[60]

In June 2016, following a visit by a UN team, a UN official reported back to Security Council members on the situation of MINURSO’s mission in Western Sahara and stated that “the mission was unable to fulfil its mandate and that it was carrying out limited observation and demining activities at substantial risk to the personnel involved because of a shortage of security and maintenance staff in the mission.”[61]

As of mid-August 2016, UNMAS reported that its staff had not yet been able to return to Western Sahara, but expected to do so within the following two to three weeks. NPA and DML’s Emergency Response Team were, however, operational.[62]

Five-year summary of cluster munition clearance

Year

Area cleared (m2)

2015

1,841,225

2014

1,756,566

2013

985,000

2012

819,122

2011

1,045,500

Total

6,447,413

  

 

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] The Berm is 12-times the length of the Berlin Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China. 

[2] Emails from Sarah Holland, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 26 April 2016; and 18 May 2015.

[3] Ibid.; and UNMAS, “2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: MINURSO,” undated.

[4] “Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” S/2015/246, 10 April 2015, p. 7.

[5] See, UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Western Sahara,” updated May 2015; and Action On Armed Violence (AOAV), “Making life safer for the people of Western Sahara,” London, August 2011.

[6] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016. The extent of contamination in Moroccan-controlled territory to the west of the Berm remains unknown.

[7] Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 18 May 2015. The extent of contamination in Moroccan-controlled territory to the west of the Berm remains unknown.

[8] The buffer strip is an area 5km wide east of the Berm. MINURSO, “Ceasefire Monitoring Overview,” undated.

[9] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Email from Graeme Abernethy, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 24 August 2016.

[13] Email from Penelope Caswell, Field Programme and Geographic Information System Manager, AOAV, 18 May 2010.

[14] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Western Sahara,” updated May 2016; and email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.

[15] Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014.

[16] UNMAS, “2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara),” undated; and email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.

[17] UNMAS, “2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: MINURSO,” undated.

[18] The buffer strip is an area 5km wide east of the Berm. MINURSO, “Ceasefire Monitoring Overview,” undated.

[19] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.

[20] Ibid. Bir Lahlou (also spelled Bir Lehlou), Tifariti, and Mehaires (also spelled Meharrize) are considered to make up the north, and Mijek and Agwanit the south. Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 9 June 2015.

[21] In May 2016, UNMAS reported that the actual number of cluster munition-contaminated areas as of end 2014 was 51 instead of the 49 it had reported in May 2015. It stated that the increase in contamination from 2014 to 2015 was due to new areas identified by survey during the year and the fact that “during cluster munition clearance for a particular task, fade out is applied to the individual clearance requirement and in almost all cases, this far exceeds the initial size of the cluster munition remnants recorded in IMSMA.” According to UNMAS, fade out distances may vary from site to site, but in normal circumstances would be “not more than 50m from the last submunitions located in a particular area of a task.” Emails from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 27 May 2016; and from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 23 May 2016, and 18 May 2015.

[22] SADR Voluntary Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form F, 20 June 2014; and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Cluster Munition Ban Policy: Western Sahara,” updated 12 August 2014.

[23] Email from Karl Greenwood, Chief of Operations, AOAV/Mechem Western Sahara Programme, AOAV, 18 June 2012.

[24] Emails from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 23 May 2016; and from Gordan Novak, AOAV Western Sahara, 25 July 2014.

[25] Emails from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 23 May 2016; and from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 27 May 2016. The six areas were identified in a 2008 survey.

[26] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.

[27] Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014; and email, 25 February 2014.

[28] Email from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, Programme Manager, NPA, 4 May 2016.

[29] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 5 June 2015.

[30] Ibid., 26 April 2016.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.; and 21 April 2016.

[34] Dynasafe website, “History of MineTech,” undated.

[35] Emails from Melissa Fuerth, Head of Programmes, AOAV, 7 May 2015; and from Melissa Andersson, Country Director, NPA, 11 April 2015.

[36] Email from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, NPA, 4 May 2016.

[37] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.

[38] Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 27 May 2016.

[39] Ibid., 24 August 2016.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 18 May 2015.

[42] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016; and response to questionnaire, 18 May 2015.

[43] Email from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, NPA, 4 May 2016.

[44] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016; and response to questionnaire, 18 May 2015.

[45] “Report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” S/2016/355, 19 April 2016, p. 10.

[46] Emails from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; and 18 May 2015.

[47] Ibid., 21 April 2016.

[48] Ibid.

[49] Ibid., 18 May 2015.

[50]SADR initiative welcomed by Maputo Conference on Mine Ban,” Sahara Press Service, 2 July 2014.

[51] SADR voluntary Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form F, 20 June 2014; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Western Sahara: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” 12 August 2014.

[52] Email from Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 26 April 2016.

[53] Ibid.; and 21 April 2016.

[54] Ibid.

[55] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Western Sahara,” updated May 2016.

[56] R. Gladstone, “Morocco Orders U.N. to Cut Staff in Disputed Western Sahara Territory,” The New York Times, 17 March 2016; and What’s in Blue: Insights on the work of the UN Security Council, “Western Sahara: Arria-formula Meeting, Consultations, and MINURSO Adoption,” 26 April 2016.

[57] What’s in Blue: Insights on the work of the UN Security Council, “Western Sahara: Arria-formula Meeting, Consultations, and MINURSO Adoption,” 26 April 2016; and “In recorded vote, Security Council approves one year extension of UN mission in Western Sahara,” UN News Service, 26 April 2016.

[58] UN Security Council Resolution 2285 (2016), 29 April 2016.

[59] Email from Samu Ami, Coordinator, SMACO, 27 April 2016.

[60] Email from El Hadji Mamadou Kebe, NPA, 27 May 2016.

[62] Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 24 August 2016.