Contaminated by: landmines (heavy contamination), cluster munition remnants (medium contamination), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Article 5 Deadline: 9 July 2021
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

As of the end of 2016, the Republic of South Sudan had a total of nearly 92km² suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), of which just over 82km² were suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. Of mined areas, 17.2km² were released through cancelation, 0.07km² through reduction, and nearly 2.6km² through clearance, with the destruction of 585 antipersonnel mines. Nearly 8km² was released through battle area clearance (BAC). Overall, land release doubled compared to 2015 due to a large increase in land canceled through non-technical survey. However, about half of the amount of mined area was cleared, due to the deteriorating security situation.

At the end of 2016, it had nearly 4.6km² of areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants, a decrease on the 6.5km² suspected at the end of 2015. Nearly 3.5km² of cluster munition-contaminated land was cleared in 2016, double the 1.4km² cleared in 2015. This was despite a resurgence in violence that forced the closure of mine action operations in the second half of 2016. A decision was made to deploy the bulk of capacity on cluster munition tasks, due to the need to clear areas for humanitarian access and for UN mission-related activities. A total of 3,045 submunitions were destroyed and 0.9km² of land was confirmed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

Recommendations for action

• South Sudan should increase its financial support for operational mine action. Greater support should also be provided to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) to build its capacity to develop effective mine action plans and policies.
• Continued efforts should be made to ensure accurate reporting by operators of mine action data and recording according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
• South Sudan should develop a resource mobilization strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.
• South Sudan should ensure that every effort is made to identify and address all cluster munition remnants on its territory as soon as possible.
• Operator and national reporting formats should disaggregate submunitions from other UXO.

Mine and ERW Contamination

South Sudan is heavily contaminated by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and other explosive weapons that were employed during nearly 50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital city, Juba, on 15 December 2013, commencing a new multi-dimensional conflict across the country.

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), as of the end of 2016, South Sudan had a total of 254 areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines, covering a total area of nearly 82.3km², as set out in the table below.[1]

Mine and Explosive Remnants of War contamination (as at end 2016)[2]

Note: SHAs = suspected hazardous areas.

Nine of South Sudan’s (formerly 10) states contain suspected mined areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, followed by Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei, according to UNMAS (see table below).[3]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by former state (as at end 2016)[4]

The full extent of South Sudan’s explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination remains unknown. Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) continue to be identified, while the existing threat
is being compounded by the renewed heavy fighting since December 2013, which continues to result in new UXO contamination, particularly in Greater Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states.[5] UNMAS reported that an average of 160 previously unknown hazardous areas were discovered each month in 2016.[6] Ongoing and increasing insecurity persisted in greatly limiting access to many areas of the country, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region (Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states).[7]

Cluster Munition Contamination

At the end of 2016, South Sudan had a total of 142 areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants, with a total size estimated at nearly 4.6km².[8] This compares to the end of 2015, when 116 areas were suspected to contain cluster munition remnants covering a total of more than 6.5km².[9] Areas of cluster munition contamination from decades of pre-independence conflict continued to be identified in 2016, and the threat was compounded by the fighting that broke out in December 2013.[10] In 2016, an additional 66 cluster munition-contaminated areas were identified, of which 11 were cleared during the year.[11]

Eight of the 10 states in South Sudan have areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants (see table below), with Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria remaining the most heavily contaminated.[12] Cluster munition remnants have been found in residential areas, farmland, pastures, rivers and streams, on hillsides, in desert areas, in and around former military barracks, on roads, in minefields, and in ammunition storage areas.[13]

Cluster munition contamination by province (at end 2016)[14]

From 1995 to 2000, prior to South Sudan’s independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air dropped cluster munitions sporadically in southern Sudan. Many types of submunitions have been found, including Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, US-manufactured M42 and Mk118 (Rockeyes), Chilean-made PM-1, and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5 and AO-1SCh submunitions.[15]

UNMAS discovered evidence of new cluster munition contamination in February 2014, south of Bor in Jonglei state.[16] Evidence indicated the cluster munitions had been used in previous weeks during the conflict between opposition forces supporting South Sudan’s former Vice President Riek Machar and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) government forces, which received air support from Uganda.[17] (See South Sudan’s cluster munition ban policy profile for further details.)

Impact of ERW, including cluster munition remnants and landmines

At the start of 2017, almost eight million people in South Sudan were living with the constant threat of the presence of mines and ERW, including more than 2.3 million South Sudanese who have been forced to become internally displaced since the outbreak of fighting in 2013. According to UNMAS, surveys of internally displaced persons identified a fear of ERW as among the most significant reasons for their inability to return home.[18] UNMAS has claimed that the socio-economic cost of mines and ERW in South Sudan in terms of interrupted agricultural production, food insecurity, halted commerce, and the lack of freedom of movement is “incalculable.”[19] Mine and ERW contamination continued to limit access to agricultural land and increased food insecurity, at a time when nearly four million South Sudanese were facing famine. During 2016, UNMAS documented numerous examples of cluster munition and munitions preventing the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid.[20]

Program Management

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is responsible for coordination, planning, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.[21]

The UN Security Council Resolution 1996 of 2011 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing mine action across the country through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau.[22] UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organizations, drafting national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the national database, and tasking operators.[23] The NMAA takes the lead on victim assistance and risk education.[24]

While it is planned that eventually NMAA will assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 notes that the government did “not have the financial and technical capacity to support its mine action program. UN agencies, development partners, and international organizations will need to support the program in providing technical and financial assistance.”[25]

In May 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2155 in response to the conflict that broke
out in December 2013. The resolution, which marked a significant change from Resolution 1996, focuses on four areas: protecting civilians, creating the conditions for humanitarian access, reporting and investigating human rights violations, and supporting the Cessation of Hostilities agreements. Significantly, most capacity development for government institutions is no longer part of the mission’s mandate.

The NMAA reported that the transition from UN to national ownership was in limbo and progress towards achieving this goal had effectively stopped. The NMAA said it lacked the basic means to fulfil its functions.[26]

Strategic planning

Following the expiry of the 2012–2016 National Mine Action Strategy, the NMAA, in close collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and with support from UNMAS, started developing South Sudan’s new national mine action strategy in 2017. A first strategy stakeholder workshop was organized in Juba in August 2017 to agree on the mine action program’s vision, mission, goals, and objectives. The new national strategy will be finalized by 2018. There were no significant changes in 2016 to the existing strategic plan for 2012–2016, which was developed by the NMAA with assistance from the GICHD and UNMAS.[27] The main objectives of the plan were to ensure that:

• South Sudan is in a position to comply with all international instruments related to mines and ERW and can conduct and manage the national mine action program.
• The scope and location of the mine and ERW contamination are fully recorded, and all high-impact contaminated areas are identified, prioritized, cleared, and released.
• The national mine action program contributes to poverty reduction and socio-economic development by being mainstreamed into development program.[28]

Operators

Four international demining NGOs operated in South Sudan in 2016: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Four commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechem, Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML, formerly MineTech International, MTI), and The Development Initiative (TDI). No national demining organizations were involved in clearance in 2016.[29]

According to UNMAS, at its peak in 2016, mine action capacity in South Sudan included 62 technical teams, the bulk of which was in commercial companies, along with six mechanical assets, and one team supported by mine detection dogs (MDDs). However, this capacity lay idle in the second half of 2016, after conflict resurged in Juba and insecurity spread across the country. As of September 2017, survey and clearance capacity had not returned to the levels prior to the July 2016 crisis, and according to UNMAS, remained dependent on the re-establishment of secure operating conditions.[30]

UNMAS assigns mine action tasks to operators. In 2016, MAG began deploying Multi-Task Teams (MTTs) with mechanical support from a PT-300D mine clearance machine, a MineWolf 330, and three Bozena machines that allowed for a sizeable increase in the scale of its operations on large-area clearance tasks, and a corresponding increase in monthly output of BAC. Its staff level rose to a total of 200, a significant increase in capacity from 2015. Two MTT and one MineWolf team under UN contracts were demobilized, however, after the cancelation of the contracts in September 2016 due to insecurity.[31] In 2017, MAG was continuing to concentrate operations in Terekeka state, Central Equatoria due to ongoing nationwide insecurity.[32]

DDG began a cluster munition-clearance task at the end of 2015 and deployed one team of eight deminers on the BAC task in January 2016. Following completion of this task, DDG changed its operational focus to responding to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) callouts.[33] Due to the spread and intensification of conflict in the Equatoria region, DDG was forced to shut down all clearance operations across Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria in April 2016, following the attack on its staff. It resumed operations in Unity and Upper Nile states two weeks later; however, work remained suspended across the Equatoria region as of June 2017.[34]

NPA changed its operations to deploy smaller, more mobile teams focusing on non-technical and technical survey, with support from its MDDs, and for emergency EOD. Teams were re-accredited and a new operations base opened in Juba, although the teams could not be deployed because of the security situation.[35] NPA reassessed the viability of its program in South Sudan, with no signs of improvement in security conditions and in the wake of an internal restructuring following an incident involving missed mines in an area of its operations in 2015, and took the decision to close the program indefinitely in November 2016.[36]

Standards

While there were no changes to the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for mine action in South Sudan during 2016, according to UNMAS, revisions to the NTSGs that were implemented from October 2015 were a factor which contributed to more efficient land release.[37] The NTSGs are jointly monitored by UNMAS and the NMAA.[38]

Quality management

UNMAS reported carrying out external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) operations throughout 2016 on all mine action operators in South Sudan.[39]

Due to constraints on the movement of UN staff due to increasing security concerns, at the end of 2016, UNMAS contracted a private company, Janus Global Operations, to conduct external QA/QC on behalf of UNMAS in South Sudan.[40]

Land Release (mines and ERW)

In 2016, nearly 20km² of mined area was released through survey and clearance, including more than 2.6km² through clearance and technical survey, and a further 17.2km² through non-technical survey.[41] Nearly 8km² was also released through BAC. In total, nearly 27.8km² was released back to local communities, with the destruction of 585 antipersonnel mines, 200 antivehicle mines, and 20,190 items of UXO. In addition, 1,272km of roads were opened through route assessment and verification.[42] This was despite a resurgence of violence that resulted in mine action operations being suspended for much of the second half of 2016 and a dramatic reduction in areas across the country where operations could safely be carried out.[43]

Overall land release in South Sudan doubled in 2016, from close to 14km² in 2015 to 28km² in 2016, due to a large increase in land canceled through non-technical survey and an increase in BAC. The amount of mined area reduced by technical survey and cleared, however, fell from 5.1km² in 2015 to 2.6km² in 2016, in large part due to a significant decrease in the amount of mechanical clearance and technical survey. This was a result of the deterioration of the security situation and greater restrictions on safe movement.[44] There was a corresponding decrease in 2016 in the number of mines and UXO destroyed, down from the 1,715 antipersonnel mines, 473 antivehicle mines, and 27,395 items of UXO destroyed in 2015, and also a reduction in the amount of road opened through route assessment and verification, from that of just over 3,000km in 2015.[45]

Survey in 2016 (mines and ERW)

As summarized in the table below, in 2016, a total of 18 mined areas covering just under 17.2km² were canceled through non-technical survey, and almost 71,400m² was reduced by technical survey. In addition, 30 areas covering nearly 1.8km² were confirmed as mined, according to UNMAS records.[46]

As noted above, this is a significant increase in land canceled through non-technical survey as compared with 2015, when 33 mined areas covering just under 4.4km² were canceled. UNMAS reported that the nearly fourfold increase in area cancellation in 2016 was due to a greater emphasis on the role of community liaison officers in obtaining accurate survey data from informants.[47] At the same time, as with the reduction in clearance output, the amount of land reduced by technical survey fell by nearly half, compared to the reduction of nearly 145,000m² by technical survey in 2015. The amount of land confirmed as mined also decreased in 2016, from 145 areas comprising nearly 3.5km² the previous year.[48]

Mined area survey in 2016[49]

Note: TS = technical survey

Clearance in 2016 (mines and ERW)

A total of 74 mined areas covering nearly 2.6km² were released by clearance in 2016, with the destruction of 585 antipersonnel mines and 200 antivehicle mines (see table below).[51] This is nearly half of the amount cleared in 2015, which UNMAS had reported as the highest ever total land reduced through technical survey and cleared since the inception of humanitarian mine clearance in South Sudan in 2004.[52] According to UNMAS, the reduction in mine clearance in 2016 was caused by the deteriorating security situation.[53]

Mine clearance in 2016[54]

Note: AP = antipersonnel: AV = antivehicle.

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Nearly 3.5km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was released in 2016, more than double the amount in 2015, when just over 1.4km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was released.[58] This was despite the reduction in mine action activities in 2016 due to the resurgence in violence. UNMAS attributed the increase to a shift in most mine clearance teams to cluster munition tasks, an improvement in the efficiency of land release and revisions to the NTSGs.[59] The decision to deploy the bulk of capacity on cluster munition tasks was taken in response to a need to clear areas for humanitarian access and for UN mission-directed activities.[60]

Survey in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Just over 0.9km² of land was confirmed as contaminated with cluster munition remnants in 2016 (see table below).[61] This compares to 1.35km² confirmed as cluster munition contaminated and 500m² canceled by non-technical survey in 2015.[62]

Cluster munition survey in 2016[63]

Clearance in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Just under 3.5km² of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in 2016, with the destruction of more than 3,000 submunitions, as shown in the table below.[64] This is a significant increase from 2015, when almost 1.4km² was cleared with 1,200 submunitions destroyed.[65]

In addition, in 2016, seven operators (DCA, G4S, MAG, Mechem, DML, NPA, and TDI) conducted BAC of almost 8km² and closed a total of 2,210 spot tasks, destroying nearly 20,200 items of UXO in the process.[66] This is also a significant increase, compared to an output of 4.5km² of BAC in 2015.[67]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2016[68]

Deminer safety

On 12 April 2016, two members of DDG’s EOD team were killed by gunmen when their vehicle was ambushed as they travelled to the field from their base in Yei, Central Equatorial state, for a routine EOD call-out.[69] The outbreak of violence across the Equatorial states in July 2016 affected many operators, including MAG, which experienced an ambush during evacuation to Nimule, on the Ugandan border, resulting in the death of one national medic and gunshot wounds to three other staff. Two ambulances were set on fire and a large proportion of the team’s equipment was lost.[70]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, South Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan is not on track to meet this deadline.

UNMAS has highlighted the serious obstacles posed to mine action operations by ongoing fighting and insecurity, lack of access to contaminated areas, and new UXO contamination, along with continuing significant challenges from lack of infrastructure and access to vast areas of the country, and the unpredictable rainy seasons.[71] Given the current security situation, UNMAS stated in 2017 that it is not likely that South Sudan can meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline.[72]

Mine clearance in 2012–2016[73]

In total, UNMAS has reported that, from 2004 to end 2016, more than 13,580 hazards have been addressed, over 1,175km² of land has been released (canceled, reduced, and cleared), and 27,573km of roads opened, with nearly 31,253 antipersonnel mines, 5,735 antivehicle mines, and 902,360 items of UXO destroyed.[74]

While operators raised concerns over the lack of government funding for the NMAA and mine action activities in the country, according to UNMAS, the Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan paid the salaries of the staff of the NMAA in 2016.[75] In December 2016, at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, South Sudan requested support for the NMAA to enable it to undertake QA/QC and field visits, for training in areas of concern such as information management and operations, and for institutional capacity-building and office hardware and supplies as well as transportation.[76]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.