Notes: EOD = explosive ordinance disposal; ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Contamination

In 2017–2018, numerous incidents involving both civilian and military casualties from landmines and a range of other locally produced explosive devices planted by Boko Haram continued to be reported in the northeast of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The majority of reports appear to describe mines of an improvised nature produced or adapted locally by Boko Haram, whether antipersonnel or antivehicle.

The extent of contamination from mines and other explosive devices is not known. Incidents involving landmines and other explosive devices have been reported in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, with Borno state the most heavily affected. According to the Nigerian military, the Sambisa forest in Borno state, Boko Haram’s stronghold, has been heavily mined, along with “extensive” mine use by Boko Haram around military positions.[1]

UNMAS carried out a scoping mission to the three northeastern states in April 2017 to assess the extent of the threat from munitions, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and “unconfirmed but credible reports of landmines.” It received reports of the use of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines of an improvised nature around defensive positions.[2]

UNMAS confirmed that use of explosive devices by Boko Haram was extensive, and included body-borne, vehicle-borne, pressure plate-activated, and to a lesser extent, command-wire and radio-controlled devices. In particular, Boko Haram had made significant use of pressure-plate-activated mines on main supply routes, primarily to attack military convoys, it said.[3]

A November 2015 assessment in Adamawa and Borno states by international demining organization Danish Demining Group (DDG) had noted local community reports of a number of local government areas in Borno state they thought needed clearance, including Bama, Dikwa, Gwoza, Kala-Balge, Kukawa, Marte, and Ngala.[4] Interviewees identified contamination including antipersonnel and antivehicle mines resembling Chinese No. 4 antipersonnel mines and Type 72 antivehicle mines; a variety of body-borne, vehicle-borne, and remotely controlled devices; as well as cluster munition remnants, mortars, rockets and rocket-propelled grenades, hand grenades, and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).[5]

In 2015, the Nigerian army warned civilians of the threat of improvised devices using adapted submunitions. Caches of French-made air-delivered BLG-66 “Beluga” cluster munitions were reportedly found in Adamawa state, alleged to have been taken from stockpiles of the Nigerian armed forces or smuggled in from Libya.[6]

Contamination from mines and other explosive devices has had a serious humanitarian impact, impeding the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and exacerbating the crisis in the region.[7] In October 2016, the governor of Adamawa state confirmed that many IDPs continued to be unable to return to their farms due to a fear of landmines.[8] Roads were closed to civilian traffic by the military due to the presence of mines or other explosive devices and there were numerous reports of civilian casualties and farmers who feared returning to work their fields, contributing to sharply worsening food shortages.[9] According to UNMAS, as of April 2017, Borno state hosted 80%—1.5 million—of Nigeria’s IDP population, and 400,000 returnees were living in areas affected by the conflict.[10] It reported that the security situation in Adamawa and Yobe states had improved gradually, but remained volatile, especially in the northeastern part of Yobe.[11]

UNMAS also declared that the likelihood of explosive accidents might significantly increase with the planned mass return of more than one million refugees and IDPs.[12] It similarly expected a significant threat to UN and humanitarian agencies with the expansion of relief efforts and increased use of main supply routes.[13]

Military casualties have also been reported among soldiers clearing mines. In 2015, two soldiers were killed and two others seriously wounded during clearance operations in Gudumbali town.[14] UNMAS reported in April 2017 that manual render-safe procedures were the primary method used by the Nigerian military EOD teams, which could be contributing to a high number of casualties among EOD personnel.[15]

There have been numerous reports of mine/ERW casualties. (For details see Nigeria’s casualty profile.)

Program Management

There is no structured mine action program in Nigeria. Both Nigeria’s armed forces and its police carry out EOD activities and ERW clearance. The state police have EOD units that support the army in clearing UXO and explosive devices. The army’s ERW clearance is primarily focused on facilitating military operations and clearing roads and areas to facilitate access for troops to carry out attacks on Boko Haram and to keep military supply routes open.[16] The 2016 Buhari Plan for Rebuilding the North East from the Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI) includes a plan for demining as part of clean-up operations in reclaimed communities before resettlement of IDPs. It assigns responsibility for clearance to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), the Nigerian military and paramilitary agencies.[17] In September 2018, it was announced that the federal government was planning to spend $6.7 billion to deliver the PCNI.[18]

In March 2017, the United States (US) reported donating demining and EOD equipment to Nigeria and providing mine action training for Nigeria’s EOD teams at the Nigerian School of Military Engineering.[19] In December 2016, a media source published photos of a “newly-acquired” Slovak-made Bozena demining machine, which it said had been deployed on roads in Borno state.[20] In 2015, it was reported that Nigeria had ordered 10 demining machines from a Slovakian company, with five scheduled for delivery in 2015 and the remainder in 2016.[21] In 2015, 24 Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPs) were said to have been given to the Nigerian army by the US.[22]

In April 2017, a senior Nigerian military commander informed UNMAS that due to limited resources, the army’s priority was to provide demining support for military operations. Saying that it lacked the capacity to undertake humanitarian demining, he called for additional equipment ongoing support, and refresher training.[23]

The 2017 and 2018 Humanitarian Response Plans from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for northeast Nigeria both make reference to mine action activities, in particular emphasizing the importance of mine risk education, which features in three of the 2018 plan’s objectives.[24] In 2017, DDG was delivering mine risk education sessions for community members and humanitarian organizations in the northeast states. It will also provide recommendations to the government regarding how to ensure injury surveillance systems include data on injuries from mines and other ERW. Funded by the European Union (EU), the project is part of a wider initiative to promote stability in Nigeria’s northeast and will run from December 2016 to November 2018.[25] In 2017, DDG also delivered initial EOD training to police officers in Maiduguri, Borno state.[26]

Mine Advisory Group (MAG) has been working in Nigeria since 2016 initially in arms management and destruction. In March 2017, MAG secured funding to begin providing risk education to IDP, refugees and host communities affected by the conflict. MAG is also working to map mine contamination in northeast Nigeria and has conducted non-technical survey in accessible areas of Borno state.[27] In July 2018, UNMAS deployed a rapid response team to Maiduguri in order to develop a program aimed at coordinating and supporting humanitarian mine action.[28]

Land Release

MAG conducted non-technical survey in Konduga, Gubio, Bama, and Gwoza, in Borno state in 2017 and 2018. Due to issues with access this relatively “light touch” non-technical survey is based on collecting information from individuals during mine risk education sessions. When participants report having seen a suspicious device while they were fleeing the conflict, MAG send staff to verify, and if this is confirmed, they demarcate, take pictures and global positioning system (GPS) coordinates, and hand over the information to the security forces. During this process MAG has located 23 devices across 17 different locations within Borno state.[29]

In April 2017, Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant-General Tukur Buratai reported that the army was carrying out limited clearance of routes in forested areas to enable troop movements, but said that humanitarian demining of the Sambisa forest as such had not begun. He called for assistance from the UN and NGO demining organizations.[30]

In March 2018, Colonel Garba Nura, Acting Brigade Commander of the 21^st Armoured Brigade, reported that demining of roads and general areas was taking place around Bama in Borno state to facilitate the safe return of IDPs to the area.[31]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Nigeria was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2012. At the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in November 2011, Nigeria declared it had cleared all known antipersonnel mines from its territory.[32]

Under the convention’s agreed framework, in the event a mined area is discovered after the expiry of a State Party’s Article 5 clearance deadline, it should immediately inform all other States Parties of this discovery and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible. Nigeria has not submitted an Article 7 transparency report since 2012.

Given the extent of apparent contamination from antipersonnel mines, Nigeria should request a new extended Article 5 deadline, which should be no more than 10 years. It must also continue to fulfil its reporting obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, including by reporting on the location of all suspected or confirmed mined areas under its jurisdiction or control and on the status of programs for the destruction of all antipersonnel mines therein.[33] As of September 2018, Nigeria had not made a public declaration of any newly discovered antipersonnel mine contamination to States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty.

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.