Russian Federation

Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 14 November 2023

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.  

Russia said in November 2020 that it “shares the goals of the treaty and supports a world free of mines,” but regards antipersonnel mines “as an effective way of ensuring the security of Russia’s borders.”[1] Russia has also stated that it cannot join the Mine Ban Treaty due to its “serious doubts” over the treaty’s “reliability” because, in its view, the treaty lacks “the necessary tools to ensure the compliance of those States that have violated it.”[2] Russia has only ever alleged Mine Ban Treaty violations by one State Party, Ukraine.

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines extensively in Ukraine since it invaded the country on 24 February 2022, resulting in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party. The scale of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Ukraine has yet to be fully surveyed or quantified, but the conflict appears to represent the most widespread use of landmines in many years.

Russia participated as an observer in the 1996–1997 Ottawa Process that created the Mine Ban Treaty, but did not adopt or sign the treaty. It attended the First Meeting of States Parties in 1999 and the Second Review Conference in 2009 as an observer. Russia last participated in a meeting of the treaty in 2010.

Russia has consistently abstained from voting on the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Russia most recently abstained from voting on UNGA Resolution 77/63 on 7 December 2022.[3]

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on ERW. Russia last submitted annual transparency reports for both protocols in April 2022. Russia is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia has not reported any measures that it has taken to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II in relation to its invasion of Ukraine. Such measures include “feasible precautions” or steps to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas including fencing, signs, warnings, and monitoring, as required by article 5.2 of Amended Protocol II. 

Production                  

Russia continues to research, develop, and produce both antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines.[4] Some of the new landmine types were first seen publicly during annual military exercises in 2021, including POM-3 rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines, which had been in development since at least 2015.[5] Russia also tested newly-developed antivehicle mines in 2021, such as the PTKM-1R mine.[6]

Markings on some of the landmines used by Russia in Ukraine in 2022–2023 indicate that they were manufactured as recently as 2021, including POM-3 antipersonnel mines.[7]

Another antipersonnel mine used by Russia in Ukraine is the PMN-4 blast mine, developed and produced in the early 1990s, after Ukraine achieved its independence.[8] Ukrainian forces also displayed a new directional fragmentation Claymore-type mine, called MOB, in October 2022, which they claimed to have captured from Russian forces.[9]

Historically, Russia has produced at least 13 types of antipersonnel landmines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POM-2, POM-3, POMZ-2, OZM-72, MOB, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production of blast mines halted in 1997.[10]

Transfer

On 1 December 1994, Russia put in place a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines that are either not detectable or not equipped with self-destruct devices. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, but Russia reported in 2022 that it was still being observed.[11]

Antipersonnel landmines of Soviet/Russian origin have been found emplaced in at least 30 mine-affected countries.[12] In recent years, antipersonnel mines of Russian manufacture—distinct from versions produced in the former Soviet Union—have appeared in Syria[13] and Ukraine.[14]

In Libya, six types of Russian-made antipersonnel mines, and two types of antivehicle mines that had not been seen before in Libya, were used in and around Tripoli in 2019 and 2020.[15] In March 2021, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Panel of Experts on Libya reported evidence that private military contractors from the Wagner Group had brought the antipersonnel mines to Libya to use in their operations.[16]

Stockpiling and destruction

In 2004, then Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov said that Russia stockpiled 26.5 million antipersonnel mines.[17] This marked the first time that Russia had released official information on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stocks.

The defense minister forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015. In 2010, Russia told a Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it had destroyed a total of 10 million mines, including antipersonnel mines.[18] In 2010 alone, more than 464,000 antipersonnel landmines that did not meet international requirements were destroyed.[19]

Since 2010, Russia has not shared any public information on the status of its stockpile or the results of stockpile destruction efforts.

Russian military units have maintained landmine stocks in other countries, including 18,200 mines in Tajikistan, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.[20] 

Use

New use

Landmine and ERW contamination in Ukraine dates back to World War II but has worsened amid armed conflict that began in 2014, and has expanded greatly since Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.In the current armed conflict, mines have been used in at least 11 of Ukraine’s 27 regions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.

Russia has used at least 13 types of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its 2022 invasion.[21]

In September, October, and December 2022, Human Rights Watch (HRW) spoke with Ukrainian deminers who were involved in clearance operations in the Kharkivska region, including in Izium, and in parts of the Khersonska region, after the retreat of Russian soldiers from those areas. The deminers identified numerous types of antipersonnel mines that they had found and neutralized in the recently retaken areas, all of which are known to be in Russian stockpiles, including OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines and PMN-series blast mines (both PMN-2 and PMN-4).[22]

Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps around positions they have taken, occupied, or fortified. Deminers told HRW that they have cleared and destroyed multiple victim-activated booby-traps from areas that were formerly under Russian control. The booby-traps were constructed using various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades. Booby-traps can function as antipersonnel landmines when the fuze that is used is activated unintentionally by a person.

There were numerous allegations from Russian media sources in 2022–2023 that Ukrainian forces have also used antipersonnel mines during the conflict, in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. (See Ukraine Mine Ban Policy country profile for details).

 Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine since February 2022

Name

Origin

Type

Initiation

Notes

MOB

Russia

Fragmentation

Multiple options

A modern hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mine that can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty. This mine is only used by Russia.

MON-50

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/ command

MON-series hand-emplaced directional multipurpose mines can be used either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner.[23] When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

MON-90

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/ command

MON-100

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/ command

MON-200

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/ command

OZM-72[24]

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/ command

A multipurpose bounding munition emplaced either in a command-detonated or victim-activated manner. When used in victim-activated mode with a mechanical pull, tension release, or seismic fuze, these mines are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

PFM-1/ PFM-1S

USSR

Blast

Pressure/self-destruct

Uniquely shaped and constructed, this plastic-cased mine can be scattered by mine-laying rockets and dispensers mounted on trucks or helicopters. It contains 37 grams of a liquid high explosive. Both Russia and Ukraine stockpile this type.

PMN-2[25]

USSR/Russia

Blast

Pressure

A circular, plastic-cased mine. Ukraine destroyed its stockpile of this type in 2003.

PMN-4[26]

Russia

Blast

Pressure

A modern circular, plastic-cased mine produced by Russia. First publicly displayed by Russia in 1993, it has never been stockpiled by Ukraine.

POM-2/ POM-2R[27]

USSR/Russia

Fragmentation

Tripwire/self-destruct

A metal-case bounding mine delivered by helicopter, ground-fired rockets, or other means. POM-2 and POM-2R mines are stockpiled by Russia. Ukraine destroyed its stocks of this mine in 2018.

POM-3

Russia

Fragmentation

Seismic

Used only by Russia, POM-3 mines were first publicly displayed during annual military exercises in 2021. The POM-3 is scattered by rockets or truck-mounted launchers. Ukraine does not possess the POM-3 mine or its delivery system. Markings on an expended delivery canister photographed with POM-3 mines that failed to deploy properly indicate that it was produced in 2021.[28]

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

All the mine types listed in the above table were manufactured in Russia or the Soviet Union.

Some types of landmines used by Russia in Ukraine can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, MON-series, and OZM-72 mines.[29] If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then these mines are considered to be antipersonnel mines, prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[30]

International reaction

All parties to the conflict in Ukraine are bound by treaties that prohibit or regulate landmines in addition to the general laws of war. The Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of the technical features and regardless of the mine’s predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (improvised or factory-made).

The Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, in November 2022, “condemned the use of anti-personnel mines anywhere, at any time, and by any actor.”

Since March 2022, Ukraine and at least 42 other countries have condemned or expressed concern at Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US), in addition to the European Union (EU).

Landmine use in Ukraine has also been condemned by successive Mine Ban Treaty presidents as well as the special envoy for universalization.[31]  

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has called on all parties to the conflict in Ukraine to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.[32]

Previous use

Antipersonnel mines were used in the conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russian-supported separatists that erupted in 2014—initially in Crimea, and later in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine. Ukraine stated that it did not use antipersonnel mines in the conflict and has accused Russian-supported insurgent forces of laying mines.[33]

Since 1999, Russian forces have used antipersonnel landmines in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on Russia’s border with Georgia.[34] Russia has argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop the flow of weapons, drugs, and terrorists; and maintains that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines.[35]

In Libya, significant new mine contamination was discovered in Tripoli in May 2020 after Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) fighters withdrew from the city. Credible evidence indicated that the Wagner Group, a private Russia-based military contractor with apparent links to the Russian government, was responsible for transferring and using antipersonnel mines as part of its support to the LAAF.[36]

Several types of Russian or Soviet-made antipersonnel landmines were laid in the Ain Zara, Al-Khilla, Salahuddin, Sidra, and Wadi al-Rabi districts of Tripoli in 2019–2020, according to the Government of National Accord (GNA), the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC), and mine clearance operators. This included Russian-made MON-50, MON-200, and OZM-72 mines, which had not been used in Libya previously. Various explosive charges were also used to booby-trap homes, including antivehicle mines.

In August 2021, the BBC published a report on the contents of an electronic tablet believed to have belonged to a fighter from the Wagner Group, which included maps of mined areas in Tripoli in 2020.[37] Mine clearance operators subsequently confirmed to HRW in May 2022 that all 35 locations listed in the tablet were indeed contaminated by landmines, and that the Wagner Group was likely responsible given its presence in those areas at the time.[38]

 



[1] Russia Explanation of Vote on Resolution L.26, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 75th Session, New York, 6 November 2020.

[2] Ibid.

[4]In 2004, Russia said that it had spent or planned to spend RUB3.33 billion (US$115.62 million) on research, development, and production of new engineer munitions, including alternatives to antipersonnel mines. Statement by Sergei Ivanov, Minister of Defense, parliamentary hearings on ratification of CCW Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004. Average exchange rate for 2004: RUB1=US$0.03472. Oanda.

[5] Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” Izvestia, 6 September 2021. In 2015, the POM-3 mine’s design engineers claimed that the seismically-activated POM-3 would be able to distinguish between combatants and civilians as it is activated by a sensor that detects the footfall of an individual, characterizes it against known signatures, and fires its warhead into the air. Directors Igor Smirnov and Mikhail Zhukov of the Scientific Research Institute of Engineering’s Department of Munitions, Mining, and Demining, interviewed on Zvezda TV, 20 November 2015, cited in “Russia Develops Landmine With ‘Electronic Brain’,” Defense World, 20 November 2015. See also, “Perspective Anti-Personnel Mine POM-3 ‘Medallion’,” Military Review, 30 November 2015.

[6] Landmine delivery systems Zemledeliye and UMZ-K Klesh-G, as well as antivehicle mine PTKM-1R. See, Lee, Rob (RALee85), “UMZ-K Klesh-G and Zemledeliye minelayers at the Mulino training area.” 31 July 2021, 21:53 UTC. Tweet; and Roman Kretsul and Anna Cherepanova, “Fire and ‘Tick’: Russia tested a new system of minefields,” Izvestia, 6 September 2021.

[7] The POM-3 mine is equipped with a sensitive seismic fuze that makes it prone to detonate when approached, as well as a self-destruct feature. Collective Awareness to UXO, “POM-3 Landmine: Description,” undated; and Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Ukraine: Russia Uses Banned Antipersonnel Landmines,” 29 March 2022.

[8] Collective Awareness to UXO, “PMN-4 Landmine: Description,” undated.

[9] Ukraine Weapons Tracker (UAWeapons), “#Ukraine: A previously unseen Russian MOB AP directional mine was captured by the AFU. Apparently, this type is modular - up to 3 units can be connected to each other. They can also be fitted with additional preformed fragmentation blocks and various aiming and mounting devices.” 3 October 2022, 13:19 UTC. Tweet.

[10] See, for example, Statement of Russia, CCW Amended Protocol II Tenth Annual Conference of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2008.

[11] Russia CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form F, April 2022. See, CCW Amended Protocol II Database.

[12] Afghanistan, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Cuba, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[13] Since 2012, the Syrian Army has used landmines of Soviet/Russian origin, including PMN-2 and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines, and TMN-46 and TM-62 antivehicle mines, along its borders with Lebanon and Türkiye. See, HRW, “Syria: Army Planting Banned Landmines: Witnesses Describe Troops Placing Mines Near Turkey, Lebanon Borders,” 13 March 2012.

[14] Since 2014, antipersonnel mines produced in Russia but never stockpiled in Ukraine have been spotted in visual media reports and reported as being seized by Ukrainian authorities. For example, in a video produced by a pro-rebel media source in July 2014, combatants associated with the Russian-supported Zarya Battalion were shown emplacing a PMN-4 antipersonnel mine, in conjunction with emplacing TM-62M antivehicle mines at an unknown location in eastern Ukraine. This type of mine has never been declared to be stockpiled by Ukraine and was only first publicly displayed by Russia in 1993. See, “Life of Zarya battalion,” YouTube.com, July 2014 (no longer available online); and “Anti-personnel mine PMN-4,” Saper, undated.

[15] Antipersonnel mines: MON-50, MON-90, OZM-72, POM-2, POM-2R, and PMN-2; antivehicle mines: TM-62M and TM-83. See, Oded Berkowitz (Oded121351), “#Libya-#GNU photos of ERW (~ 9 tons) from the #Tripoli campaign that were recently removed from the south of the city. Note the North Korean PG-7 shells (F-7 HE) and extensive mint condition mines used by #Russia|n PMC, including MON-50, MON-90, PMN-2 & OZM-72 with older PRB M3.” 5 September 2021, 09:54 UTC. Tweet.

[17] Statement by Sergei Ivanov, Parliamentary Hearings on Ratification of CCW Amended Protocol II, 23 November 2004. Ivanov said that in 2000, Russia stockpiled 46 million antipersonnel landmines, but had since destroyed or disposed of around 19.5 million of them.

[18] Statement of Russia, Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2010. Notes by ICBL.

[19] Russia CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 1 March 2011.

[20] In each of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports since 2003, Tajikistan has reported that intergovernmental talks are “currently underway” to clarify and complete data collection regarding these Russian mines. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Database.

[21] Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have used at least 14 types of antivehicle mines (also called antitank mines). The hand or mechanically emplaced TM-62 series antivehicle blast mines, equipped with an MVCh-62 pressure activated fuze, appears to be the most common type of antivehicle mine used since Russia’s full-scale invasion. These mines are often buried but have also been sighted laid on top of the ground. See, HRW, “Landmine Use in Ukraine,” 13 June 2023.

[22] HRW, “Ukraine: Banned Landmines Harm Civilians,” 31 January 2023.

[23] The numbers associated with each model of the MON family indicate the range, from 50 to 200 meters. According to Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance (2008), each model contains a specific number of pre-formed fragments that are projected horizontally. The MON-50 contains 540 ball bearings or 485 pieces of 5mm chopped steel rod, and the MON-100 contains 400 pieces of 10mm chopped steel rod. Colin King, Jane’s Mines and Mine Clearance 2008-2009 (Croydon: Jane’s Information Group, 2008).

[24] Trevor Kirton (TJK_EOD), “Today the @OfficialSOLI EOD team was able to remote pull a live OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mine from a marsh located close to a farming community. This will be destroyed so it no longer presents a danger.” 21 April 2023, 14:08 UTC. Tweet.

[25] Maksim (kms_d4k), “In this footage, you can see why it is important not to touch any mines. These mines are set with a trap underneath. It is very dangerous to demine them, so the only way is to destroy them right away.” 6 February 2023, 13:32 UTC. Tweet.

[26] Mark Hiznay (MarkHiznay), “More PMN-4 antipersonnel mines being cleared. Since Ukraine never stockpiled this type, it doesn’t take much to figure out who did it. Now where? @minefreeworld.” 20 April 2023, 17:42 UTC. Tweet.

[27] Stu M (SM_EOD), “More anti-personnel mines out of a field today. We have also come across more evidence of POM-2 use which adds another level of complexity to our work. #onemineatatime #minefreeukraine #eod #demining #StandWithUkraine.” 21 April 2023, 09:58 UTC. Tweet.

[28] Armament Research Services has produced a detailed technical reference for POM-3 antipersonnel mines. See, Mick F. and N. R. Jenzen-Jones, “Russian POM-3 anti-personnel landmines documented in Ukraine (2022),” Armament Research Services, 15 April 2022.

[29] Collective Awareness to UXO, “OZM-72 Landmine: Description,” undated.

[30] HRW, “Backgrounder on Antivehicle Landmines,” 8 April 2022.

[33] Submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 18 June 2014; statement of Ukraine, Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 26 June 2015; and statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Geneva, 22 May 2019. In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by the Armed Forces of Ukraine or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions.

[34] For a summary of past use, see ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Toward a Mine-Free World (New York: HRW, October 2004), pp. 1,186–1,187. Russia has denied using antipersonnel mines during the conflict in 2008 with Georgia over South Ossetia. HRW investigations could find no evidence of mine use. See ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2009: Toward a Mine-Free World (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2009), p. 1,069.

[35] See, for example, statement by Amb. Anatoly I. Antonov, CCW Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), 6th Session, Geneva, 18 November 2003.

[36] For background on the Wagner Group, see Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State,” 21 September 2020.

[37] Nader Ibrahim and Ilya Barabanov, “The lost tablet and the secret documents: Clues pointing to a shadowy Russian army,” BBC News, 11 August 2021.