Summary: Non-signatory Russia says that it cannot join the Convention on Cluster Munitions as it regards cluster munitions as legitimate weapons, despite the humanitarian risks associated with their use. Russia last participated in a meeting of the convention in 2012. It was the only country to vote against a key United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in December 2022 that urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”

Russia—and the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russia has used cluster munitions extensively in Ukraine since its February 2022 invasion of the country, including newly produced models of cluster munitions.

Policy 

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. 

Russia is one of the most vocal critics of the convention and has not taken any steps to accede as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated in 2016 that Russia views cluster munitions “as a legal means of warfare.”[1]

This position was reinforced at the UNGA in November 2022, when Russia stated that “cluster munitions are a legal type of weapon,” and said that “the main cause of the humanitarian problems associated with them is not the weapons themselves, but their improper use.” Therefore, the delegate said, “Accession of the Russian Federation to the [Convention on Cluster Munitions] is currently considered inappropriate.”[2]

In its statement, Russia reiterated that it “respects the efforts of the activists of the Convention on Cluster Munitions…to reduce the negative consequences of the use of this type of weapon for the civilian population, both during armed conflicts and after them.” The representative went on to state that “Russia’s position on this ambiguous document hastily prepared outside the UN framework remains unchanged. We did not participate in the development of the [Convention on Cluster Munitions], because it was originally aimed at imposing discriminatory restrictions contrary to Russia’s defense and security interests.” Russia repeated its long-held concerns over the convention and its alleged “double standards” and “shortcomings.”[3]

Russia did not participate in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[4] When the convention opened for signature in December 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Russia’s opposition to “unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions,” which it defended as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[5]

Russia participated as an observer at meetings of the convention in 2010 and 2011. Russia was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Tenth Meeting of States Parties held in Geneva in August–September 2022.

In December 2022, Russia voted against a key UNGA resolution that urged states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[6] Russia has previously abstained or voted against this annual UNGA resolution promoting the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.[7]

Russia criticizes some but not all users of cluster munitions and deflects attention from its own use. Russia rarely acknowledges its own use of cluster munitions in Syria and Ukraine, where it has used the weapons extensively since invading the country in February 2022. (See Use section).

Following the July 2023 decision by the United States (US) to transfer stocks of cluster munitions to Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin told the media: “I want to note that in the Russian Federation there is a sufficient stockpile of different kinds of cluster bombs. We have not used them yet. But of course if they are used against us, we reserve the right to take reciprocal action.”[8]

Previously, in 2014, Russia criticized and expressed “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against [the] civilian population” in eastern Ukraine.[9] Russia has never acknowledged the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine.

Russia voted in favor of a 2015 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[10] It also voted in favor of a 2014 UNSC resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[11]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Russia had opposed CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, but changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the US to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[12] That initiative failed in November 2011, which ended CCW deliberations on cluster munitions, leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons. Since 2011, Russia has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions. 

Development and production

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[13]

According to international technical reference and corporate marketing materials, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

• Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
• Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
• Splav State Research and Production Enterprise (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).

Russia continued to produce new cluster munitions in 2022 and its forces used at least two new types of cluster munitions in combat for the first time:

• The 300mm 9M54-series guided missile, produced by Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, delivered by the 9K515 “Tornado-S” rocket launcher. The 9M544 model contains 552 3B30 dual-purpose submunitions, while the 9M549 model contains 72 antipersonnel submunitions; and
• A cluster munition variant of the Iskander-M 9M723 ballistic missile.

Splav State Research and Production Enterprise, which is part of state-owned arms company Rostec, displayed the new generation of 300mm multi-barrel rocket launchers at its rocket assembly facility in Tula, south of Moscow, in July 2020.^[14] Photographs from the event showed 9M55K 300mm cluster munition rockets and 9N235 fragmentation submunitions, as well as 9M54-series cluster munition guided missiles made for the new Tornado-S launcher system.^[15]

In early 2018, Russia began testing the “Drel” RBK-500U guided cluster bomb, developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise.[16]

Transfer

There is limited information available on Russian arms transfers, including cluster munitions. However, at least 35 states have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin, including 21 states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[17]

At least 11 States Parties that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks and listed types and quantities, as outlined in the following table:

Stockpiled Russian/Soviet cluster munitions declared by States Parties[18]

Stockpiling

In 2009, Russia acknowledged that it possesses a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions which are “stored throughout the state.” It said disposing of such a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions would be time-consuming and “a significant financial expenditure.”[19] In 2011, Russia stated that its cluster munition stockpile was similar in size to that of the US, which then reported stockpiling 5.5 million cluster munitions.[20]

According to Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[21] The following list detailing types of cluster munitions stockpiled by Russia is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by Russia[22]

Note: FAE=Fuel Air Explosive; HE/AT=High Explosive/Antitank; SFW=Sensor Fuzed Weapon.

Use

The Russian Armed Forces have used cluster munitions extensively in Ukraine since Russia’s all-out invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. Russian forces were also reportedly involved in a cluster munition attack in Syria in November 2022.

Ukraine

Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has caused hundreds of civilian casualties, damaged civilian infrastructure, and contaminated agricultural land.[23] Ukrainian forces have also used cluster munitions on several occasions during the conflict.[24]

At least 10 types of cluster munitions and three types of individual submunitions have been used in Ukraine since 24 February 2022. These types are all launched from the ground in missiles, rockets, and mortar projectiles; aside from the RBK-series cluster bomb, which is delivered by aircraft.

With the exception of an Israeli-designed cluster munition, the cluster munitions used in Ukraine were manufactured either in the Soviet Union prior to 1991 or in Russia, some as recently as 2021.

Cluster munitions used in Ukraine (2022–2023)

Ground-fired rockets and missiles

• The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35km and delivers 30 9N210 or 9N235 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 20–70km and delivers 72 9N210 or 9N235 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 300mm 9M54-series “Tornado-S” cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 552 3B30 dual-purpose 9M544 submunitions or 72 9M549 antipersonnel submunitions;
• The 9M549 Tornado-S cluster munition guided missile, which delivers 72 9N235 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile, which is equipped with the 9N123K warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions; and
• The Iskander-M 9M723K1 ballistic missile, which contains 54 9N730 dual-purpose submunitions.

Ground-fired artillery and mortar projectiles

• The 203mm 3-O-14 artillery projectile, each delivering 24 O-16 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 152mm 3-O-13 artillery projectile, each delivering eight O-16 fragmentation submunitions;
• The 3-O-8 240mm mortar projectile, each delivering O-10 fragmentation submunitions; and
• The M971 120mm mortar projectile, each containing 24 M87 dual-purpose submunitions.

Air-dropped bombs

• The RBK-500 PTAB-1M cluster bomb, containing 268 PTAB-1M high explosive/antitank submunitions;
• Individual ShOAB-0.5 fragmentation submunitions (photographed in the Donetsk region); and
• Individual PTAB-2.5 dual purpose submunitions (photographed being modified for use in drone-dropped munitions).

Russia has not denied using cluster munitions in Ukraine, but has sought to draw attention elsewhere. It has criticized past use of cluster munitions by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states in the former Yugoslavia in 1999.[25] Russia accused Ukraine of using cluster munitions in the city of Donetsk on 14 March 2022, in an attack that has not been independently confirmed.[26] In June 2022, France issued a statement denying “allegations circulating in the Russian media and amplified by social media asserting that France is supplying Ukraine with cluster munitions,” describing the reports as “totally false.”[27]

The use of cluster munitions in Ukraine has been condemned by at least 40 states in national or joint statements at United Nations (UN) bodies such as the Human Rights Council, UNGA, and UNSC as of 1 July 2023.[28] The cluster munition attacks have also been condemned by the European Union (EU), the NATO Secretary-General, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs and Experts, and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC).

In March 2022, the United Kingdom (UK), then-president of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, expressed grave concern at the use of cluster munitions during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The UK said that it “calls upon all those that continue to use such weapons to cease immediately, and calls upon all states that have not yet done so to join the Convention without delay.”[29]

Previously, in 2014–2015, Russian-backed insurgents used cluster munition rockets in eastern Ukraine.[30] Ukrainian government forces were also responsible for cluster munition rocket attacks.[31] Russia expressed concern at this Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but never commented on cluster munition attacks by pro-Russian separatist forces.[32]

Syria

In Syria, there is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city. There is also strong evidence that Russia has used cluster munitions in Syria or, at a minimum, directly participated with Syrian government forces in attacks that have used cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.

Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons, and frequently carry out operations together.[33] There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia began its joint operations with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015.[34] All except two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured in Russia or the Soviet Union.[35]

The Syrian-Russian military alliance used cluster munition rockets in attacks on camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Idlib governorate on 6 November 2022, killing and wounding civilians.[36]

Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but has claimed that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[37] In December 2016, Russia issued a position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria, which concluded “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munitions] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.”[38] In December 2015, the Russian Ministry of Defence stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[39]

The civilian harm caused by use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread global media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[40]

Previous use

During the August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used cluster munitions including RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM cluster bombs and 9M27K-series Uragan ground-fired rockets containing 9N210 and 9N235 submunitions. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor, south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[41] Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[42]

Russian forces used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[43]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, cluster munitions were used by various forces in conflicts in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The extent of involvement of Russian forces in this use of cluster munitions is not known, but cannot be discounted.

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions from 1979 to 1989 in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had first used cluster munitions in 1943, against German forces during World War II.[44]

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.  

Russia said in November 2020 that it “shares the goals of the treaty and supports a world free of mines,” but regards antipersonnel mines “as an effective way of ensuring the security of Russia’s borders.”[1] Russia has also stated that it cannot join the Mine Ban Treaty due to its “serious doubts” over the treaty’s “reliability” because, in its view, the treaty lacks “the necessary tools to ensure the compliance of those States that have violated it.”[2] Russia has only ever alleged Mine Ban Treaty violations by one State Party, Ukraine.

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines extensively in Ukraine since it invaded the country on 24 February 2022, resulting in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party. The scale of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Ukraine has yet to be fully surveyed or quantified, but the conflict appears to represent the most widespread use of landmines in many years.

Russia participated as an observer in the 1996–1997 Ottawa Process that created the Mine Ban Treaty, but did not adopt or sign the treaty. It attended the First Meeting of States Parties in 1999 and the Second Review Conference in 2009 as an observer. Russia last participated in a meeting of the treaty in 2010.

Russia has consistently abstained from voting on the annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Russia most recently abstained from voting on UNGA Resolution 77/63 on 7 December 2022.[3]

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on ERW. Russia last submitted annual transparency reports for both protocols in April 2022. Russia is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia has not reported any measures that it has taken to comply with CCW Amended Protocol II in relation to its invasion of Ukraine. Such measures include “feasible precautions” or steps to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from mined areas including fencing, signs, warnings, and monitoring, as required by article 5.2 of Amended Protocol II. 

Production                  

Russia continues to research, develop, and produce both antipersonnel and antivehicle landmines.^[4] Some of the new landmine types were first seen publicly during annual military exercises in 2021, including POM-3 rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines, which had been in development since at least 2015.[5] Russia also tested newly-developed antivehicle mines in 2021, such as the PTKM-1R mine.[6]

Markings on some of the landmines used by Russia in Ukraine in 2022–2023 indicate that they were manufactured as recently as 2021, including POM-3 antipersonnel mines.[7]

Another antipersonnel mine used by Russia in Ukraine is the PMN-4 blast mine, developed and produced in the early 1990s, after Ukraine achieved its independence.^[8] Ukrainian forces also displayed a new directional fragmentation Claymore-type mine, called MOB, in October 2022, which they claimed to have captured from Russian forces.[9]

Historically, Russia has produced at least 13 types of antipersonnel landmines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POM-2, POM-3, POMZ-2, OZM-72, MOB, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production of blast mines halted in 1997.[10]

Transfer

On 1 December 1994, Russia put in place a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines that are either not detectable or not equipped with self-destruct devices. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, but Russia reported in 2022 that it was still being observed.[11]

Antipersonnel landmines of Soviet/Russian origin have been found emplaced in at least 30 mine-affected countries.[12] In recent years, antipersonnel mines of Russian manufacture—distinct from versions produced in the former Soviet Union—have appeared in Syria[13] and Ukraine.[14]

In Libya, six types of Russian-made antipersonnel mines, and two types of antivehicle mines that had not been seen before in Libya, were used in and around Tripoli in 2019 and 2020.[15] In March 2021, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Panel of Experts on Libya reported evidence that private military contractors from the Wagner Group had brought the antipersonnel mines to Libya to use in their operations.[16]

Stockpiling and destruction

In 2004, then Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov said that Russia stockpiled 26.5 million antipersonnel mines.[17] This marked the first time that Russia had released official information on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stocks.

The defense minister forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015. In 2010, Russia told a Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it had destroyed a total of 10 million mines, including antipersonnel mines.[18] In 2010 alone, more than 464,000 antipersonnel landmines that did not meet international requirements were destroyed.[19]

Since 2010, Russia has not shared any public information on the status of its stockpile or the results of stockpile destruction efforts.

Russian military units have maintained landmine stocks in other countries, including 18,200 mines in Tajikistan, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.[20] 

Use

New use

Landmine and ERW contamination in Ukraine dates back to World War II but has worsened amid armed conflict that began in 2014, and has expanded greatly since Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country in February 2022.In the current armed conflict, mines have been used in at least 11 of Ukraine’s 27 regions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.

Russia has used at least 13 types of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its 2022 invasion.[21]

In September, October, and December 2022, Human Rights Watch (HRW) spoke with Ukrainian deminers who were involved in clearance operations in the Kharkivska region, including in Izium, and in parts of the Khersonska region, after the retreat of Russian soldiers from those areas. The deminers identified numerous types of antipersonnel mines that they had found and neutralized in the recently retaken areas, all of which are known to be in Russian stockpiles, including OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines and PMN-series blast mines (both PMN-2 and PMN-4).^[22]

Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps around positions they have taken, occupied, or fortified. Deminers told HRW that they have cleared and destroyed multiple victim-activated booby-traps from areas that were formerly under Russian control. The booby-traps were constructed using various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades. Booby-traps can function as antipersonnel landmines when the fuze that is used is activated unintentionally by a person.

There were numerous allegations from Russian media sources in 2022–2023 that Ukrainian forces have also used antipersonnel mines during the conflict, in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. (See Ukraine Mine Ban Policy country profile for details).

 Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine since February 2022

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

All the mine types listed in the above table were manufactured in Russia or the Soviet Union.

Some types of landmines used by Russia in Ukraine can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly seen MOB, MON-series, and OZM-72 mines.^[29] If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then these mines are considered to be antipersonnel mines, prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[30]

International reaction

All parties to the conflict in Ukraine are bound by treaties that prohibit or regulate landmines in addition to the general laws of war. The Mine Ban Treaty comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices, regardless of the technical features and regardless of the mine’s predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (improvised or factory-made).

The Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, in November 2022, “condemned the use of anti-personnel mines anywhere, at any time, and by any actor.”

Since March 2022, Ukraine and at least 42 other countries have condemned or expressed concern at Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US), in addition to the European Union (EU).

Landmine use in Ukraine has also been condemned by successive Mine Ban Treaty presidents as well as the special envoy for universalization.^[31]  

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) has called on all parties to the conflict in Ukraine to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.[32]

Previous use

Antipersonnel mines were used in the conflict between Ukrainian forces and Russian-supported separatists that erupted in 2014—initially in Crimea, and later in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine. Ukraine stated that it did not use antipersonnel mines in the conflict and has accused Russian-supported insurgent forces of laying mines.[33]

Since 1999, Russian forces have used antipersonnel landmines in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on Russia’s border with Georgia.[34] Russia has argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop the flow of weapons, drugs, and terrorists; and maintains that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines.[35]

In Libya, significant new mine contamination was discovered in Tripoli in May 2020 after Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) fighters withdrew from the city. Credible evidence indicated that the Wagner Group, a private Russia-based military contractor with apparent links to the Russian government, was responsible for transferring and using antipersonnel mines as part of its support to the LAAF.[36]

Several types of Russian or Soviet-made antipersonnel landmines were laid in the Ain Zara, Al-Khilla, Salahuddin, Sidra, and Wadi al-Rabi districts of Tripoli in 2019–2020, according to the Government of National Accord (GNA), the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the Libyan Mine Action Center (LibMAC), and mine clearance operators. This included Russian-made MON-50, MON-200, and OZM-72 mines, which had not been used in Libya previously. Various explosive charges were also used to booby-trap homes, including antivehicle mines.

In August 2021, the BBC published a report on the contents of an electronic tablet believed to have belonged to a fighter from the Wagner Group, which included maps of mined areas in Tripoli in 2020.[37] Mine clearance operators subsequently confirmed to HRW in May 2022 that all 35 locations listed in the tablet were indeed contaminated by landmines, and that the Wagner Group was likely responsible given its presence in those areas at the time.[38]

Contamination

The Russian Federation is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem.[1] In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km² of land and posed a major obstacle to development.[2] In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organizations have previously estimated that 245km² of land was mined, including 165km² of farmland and 73km² of woodland.[3]

In January 2017, a commander in the Russian armed forces reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km² of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km² in neighboring Ingushetia.[4] According to the online media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.[5]

Program Management

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defense engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the MES, through its specialized demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks).[6]

Russia reported that its armed forces established an International Demining Action Center in 2014. The center serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action center as the term is generally understood in mine action.[7]

Clearance of explosive ordnance in 2017 was reportedly undertaken by 7,050 military personnel, including 846 officers, 97 demining teams, 978 vehicles, and 51 pieces of demining machinery.[8]

Land Release

In its Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V transparency reports for 2017, Russia reported that its armed forces engineering units conducted demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in the “territories of the Russian Federation,” including the western, southern, central, and eastern military districts, and the northern navy district.In total, more than 331,607 explosive devices were destroyed, including 30,292 IEDs.[9]

In 2016, the Deputy Chief Engineer of Russia’s armed forces, Colonel Ruslan Alahverdiev, had reportedly promised to complete clearance of Chechnya and Ingushetia by 2018.[10] However, in the online media report, it was unclear whether Colonel Alahverdiev was referring only to clearing all roads and forests, or if roads and forests are the only remaining mined areas in Chechnya and Ingushetia. In September 2017, online media reported that combat engineers had been working since April 2017 to clear forests in mountainous areas and foothills in Chechnya.[11]

Progress in 2018

For 2018, Russia planned to clear more than 53km² of ERW: 14.7km² in the western military district, 14.2km² in the southern military district, 13.9km² in the central military district, 6.2km² in the eastern military district, and 4.1km² in the northern navy district.[12]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

Casualties Overview

In 2016, four mine/ERW casualties were identified in the Russian Federation through Monitor media scanning. All recorded casualties in 2016 were adult male civilians. No child casualties were recorded among civilians.[1]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties throughout Russia remains unknown.

A total of 3,187 civilian mine/ERW casualties (746 killed; 2,440 injured; 1 unknown) have been recorded since 1994, including in UNICEF data for casualties in Chechnya.[2]

Cluster munitions were reported to have caused at least 638 casualties; 612 of the casualties occurred during strikes in Chechnya (294 killed; 318 injured) in the period from 1994 to the end of 1999. The other 26 casualties were caused by unexploded submunitions and were reported between 1994 and the end of 2007.[3]