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Use | Universalization | Production | Transfers | Stockpiles | Transparency

Adopted on 18 September 1997, the Mine Ban Treaty seeks to put an end to the suffering and casualties caused by antipersonnel landmines. The treaty’s 164 States Parties are currently half-way through the third decade of its implementation. While the prohibitions on antipersonnel mines enshrined in the Mine Ban Treaty remain fit for purpose, they are being tested from the inside and out.

The last accessions to the Mine Ban Treaty were more than five years ago, in 2017. There were few signs of progress toward more states joining the treaty in the reporting period, from mid-2022 through October 2023. However, universalization efforts received a high-level boost in July 2023, when United Nations (UN) Secretary-General António Guterres released “A New Agenda for Peace,” a policy brief urging UN member states to work to “achieve universality of treaties banning inhumane and indiscriminate weapons” including the Mine Ban Treaty.[1]

As the Philippines noted at the treaty’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2023, there is a need to pay attention to “universalizing the norms” established through the Mine Ban Treaty by promoting the stigma against any use of the weapon by any actor.

Russia has used antipersonnel landmines extensively in Ukraine since its all-out invasion of the country on 24 February 2022. This has resulted in an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party.

The treaty’s strict prohibition on use of antipersonnel mines has been violated by a State Party only twice: by Yemen in 2011–2012 at Bani Jarmooz, north of Sanaa, during the uprising that led to the ousting of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh; and by Ukraine, with evidence indicating that Ukrainian forces used rocket-delivered PFM antipersonnel mines in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when it was occupied by Russian forces.

As in every year since it was first published in 1999, this annual Landmine Monitor report documents continued use of antipersonnel mines by government forces in Myanmar, which is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Non-state armed groups (NSAGs) in Myanmar also used antipersonnel mines during the reporting period. Use by NSAGs was also recorded in State Party Colombia and state not party India. This new use mostly involved improvised antipersonnel mines, also known as victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

The use of antipersonnel landmines in States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty highlights the importance of ensuring that appropriate national implementation measures, especially legislation, are in place to enforce the treaty’s provisions with penal sanctions and fines.

All except two States Parties have now completed their stockpile destruction obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, destroying a combined total of 55 million antipersonnel landmines. No declared stockpiled mines were destroyed by Greece or Ukraine in the reporting period. Greece told the treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2023 that it was transferring its remaining stocks to Croatia, where they would be destroyed over the next 18 months. Ukraine meanwhile reported that storage sites where its 3.3 million PFM-series antipersonnel mines were once held had come “under air and missile attack” by Russia or are located in territories being liberated. Ukraine requested time to conduct audit and verification of the stocks.[2]

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) continues its work to ensure the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, working in close partnership with its dedicated community of states, UN agencies, and international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).

Use of Antipersonnel Mines

The Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by State Party Ukraine and by states not party Myanmar and Russia during the reporting period, as detailed below.

NSAGs in at least five countries—Colombia, India, Myanmar, Thailand, and Tunisia—also used antipersonnel landmines during the reporting period.^[3] Additionally, new landmine use has been attributed to some groups in countries in or bordering the Sahel region of Africa.[4]

Use by government forces

Ukraine

Ukraine is severely contaminated by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from the armed conflict that began in 2014 and escalated after Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country on 24 February 2022.^[5] Landmines have been documented in 11 of Ukraine’s 27 regions: Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.^[6]

Russian forces have used at least 13 types of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine since February 2022.

Use by Ukrainian forces

There is credible information that Ukrainian government forces used antipersonnel landmines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty in and around the city of Izium during 2022, when the city was under Russian control.^[7] In January 2023, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that 9M27K3 Uragan rockets carrying PFM-series antipersonnel mines were fired into Russian-occupied areas near Russian military facilities in and around Izium during 2022, causing at least 11 civilian casualties.^[8]

In a report to the Human Rights Council in March 2023, the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine said that it “has found instances where Ukrainian armed forces likely used cluster munitions and rocket-delivered antipersonnel landmines to carry out attacks in Izium city, Kharkiv region, from March to September 2022, when it was controlled by Russian armed forces.”^[9] The commission reported that “Ukrainian armed forces were at that time stationed within striking distance of such rockets” and said that it “found it likely that Ukrainian armed forces have committed indiscriminate attacks, in violation of international humanitarian law.”

Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Oleksandr Polishchuk responded in November 2022 to a request from HRW to confirm evidence that showed Ukraine’s use of PFM antipersonnel mines. He stated in a letter that Ukrainian authorities cannot comment on the types of weapons used during the armed conflict “before the end of the war and the restoration of our sovereignty and territorial integrity.”^[10] The deputy defense minister also stated that “Ukraine is a reliable member of the international community, and it fully commits to all international obligations in the sphere of mine usage. This includes the non-use of anti-personnel mines in the war.”^[11]

On 31 January 2023, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the findings by HRW “will be duly studied by the competent authorities of Ukraine.”^[12] At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2023, Ukraine promised to examine reports that its forces had used antipersonnel mines.^[13] During the meeting, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK) welcomed Ukraine’s commitment to launch an inquiry, provide regular updates, and engage with the Mine Ban Treaty president and members of its Committee on Cooperative Compliance.

In June 2023, HRW reported further evidence of Ukrainian use of PFM antipersonnel mines.^[14] In May 2023, an individual working in eastern Ukraine—where the Ukrainian government had restored control after Russian forces left—posted photographs online showing multiple remnants of artillery rockets recovered during clearance operations. After close inspection of the markings on the remnants, HRW identified two 9N128K3 warhead sections of 9M27K3 Uragan 220mm rockets, which each contain 9N223 “blocks,” or stacks, of 9N212 PFM-1S antipersonnel blast mines in cassettes.^[15] Analysis of handwriting on the side of one warhead section showed a first word in Ukrainian which translates as “from,” and a second word, written in Latin script, relating to an organization based in Kyiv.

A photograph posted on social media in August 2022 that bears the watermark of a Kyiv-based non-governmental organization (NGO)—posted by an individual thought to run the NGO, which had made a monetary donation to Ukraine’s war effort—showed the same warhead section of an Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rocket recovered from agricultural land. Markings specifying the batch, year, and factory, and the same handwriting and phrases, match those in the photographs assessed by HRW.^[16] The post also showed the warhead sections of two other Uragan 9M27K3 rockets with phrases written on them. In total, at least 15 photographs have been posted online of the Uragan 9M27K3 mine-laying rockets.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, Ukrainian officials have alleged that Russia has used PFM antipersonnel mines.^[17] Ukrainian Prosecutor General Irina Venediktova claimed that PFM-series mines were used by Russian forces in the Kharkiv region as early as 26 February 2022.^[18] Subsequently, a Polish media outlet reported that the General Staff of the Ukrainian Army had confirmed the discovery of such mines.^[19] Other allegations of Russian use of PFM-series mines, recorded by the Monitor, include claims made on Ukrainian social media that a Russian aircraft had scattered PFM mines in the Sumy region in March 2022.^[20] Similar reports surfaced in April 2022 alleging Russian use of PFM-series mines near the town of Popasnaya.^[21] The UK and the United States (US) have accused Russian forces of using PFM-series mines in the Donbas region.^[22]

Use by Russian forces

Russia has used at least 13 types of antipersonnel landmines in Ukraine since its invasion of the country in February 2022. This is an unprecedented situation in which a country that is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty is using the weapon on the territory of a State Party, with the possible assistance of a neighboring State Party, Belarus.

In September–December 2022, HRW spoke with Ukrainian deminers in the Kharkiv region, including in Izium, and in parts of the Kherson region, after the retreat from those areas of Russian forces. The deminers identified numerous types of antipersonnel mines found in areas recently retaken by Ukraine, all of which are known to be in Russian stockpiles, including OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines and PMN-series blast mines (both PMN-2 and PMN-4).^[23]

Some mine types used in Ukraine can be used in either a command-detonated or victim-activated mode, including the newly-seen MOB and older MON-series and OZM-72 mines.^[24] If activated by the victim through a mechanical pull, tension release, seismic fuze, or other means, then such munitions are considered to be antipersonnel mines, which are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.^[25]

Russian forces have also emplaced victim-activated booby-traps at positions they have taken, occupied, or fortified. Ukrainian deminers told HRW that they have cleared and destroyed multiple victim-activated booby-traps from areas that were formerly under Russian control. The booby-traps were constructed using various types of hand grenades equipped with tripwires, including F-1, RGD-5, and RGN-type grenades. Booby-traps can function as antipersonnel mines when the fuze that is used is activated unintentionally by a person.

Antipersonnel landmines used in Ukraine since 24 February 2022*

Note: USSR=Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*All of the mine types listed were manufactured in Russia or the Soviet Union.

Belarus, a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, has provided various forms of military support to Russia since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has seen Russian forces use antipersonnel landmines.^[32] The Monitor is not aware of Belarus providing assistance with Russia’s mine use, either directly or indirectly. However, Belarus should address these concerns with States Parties at a formal annual meeting or in its updated Article 7 transparency report.

As a State Party, Belarus must ensure that its joint military operations with Russia do not violate the prohibitions of the Mine Ban Treaty on assisting, encouraging, or inducing a state not party to engage in activities prohibited by the treaty.[33]

International reaction

Ukraine is bound by the Mine Ban Treaty, which comprehensively prohibits all types of victim-activated explosive devices regardless of the technical features and predicted longevity, delivery method, or type of manufacture (either improvised or factory-made). Russia is bound by a lower standard regulating antipersonnel mines via the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).

The final report of the Twentieth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, held in Geneva in November 2022, “condemned the use of anti-personnel mines anywhere, at any time, and by any actor.” Since March 2022, Ukraine and at least 42 other countries have condemned or expressed concern at Russia’s use of antipersonnel mines in Ukraine: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, in addition to the European Union (EU).

Landmine use in Ukraine has been condemned by successive Mine Ban Treaty presidents and the treaty’s special envoy for universalization.^[34] The ICBL has called on all parties to the conflict to ensure that no antipersonnel mines are used by any actor, and to destroy any antipersonnel mines seized or otherwise acquired.^[35]

Myanmar

Use by the Myanmar Armed Forces

The Myanmar Armed Forces used antipersonnel mines extensively during the reporting period. Previously, the Monitor has documented new use by Myanmar every year since the publication of the first annual Landmine Monitor report in 1999. There appears to have been a significant increase in new mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces since it seized power in a military coup on 1 February 2021. This has included the laying of mines including around infrastructure such as mobile phone towers, extractive enterprises, and energy pipelines.

Photographs reviewed by the Monitor indicate that significant numbers of antipersonnel mines were captured by NSAGs from the Myanmar Armed Forces each month from January 2022 to September 2023, in almost every part of the country.^[36] In August 2023, antipersonnel landmines manufactured by the Myanmar Army and in the possession of Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers were captured in the northwest and southwest of the country, indicating extensive mine use by the military.^[37]

Specific reports and allegations of new antipersonnel mine use by the Myanmar Armed Forces during the reporting period were recorded in Chin, Kayah, Kayin, Rakhine, and Shan states, and in the regions of Bago and Tanintharyi. Examples of specific reports and allegations of use since mid-2022 are detailed below. In some instances, the Myanmar Armed Forces acknowledge use; while in others, mine use was attributed by villagers due to the proximity of a military outpost.

On 25 July 2023, four children were killed by a mine near In Pin Thar village in Phyu township, Bago region. Villagers claimed the mine was emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces.^[38]

After attacks from 5–10 April 2023 by the Myanmar Armed Forces on Si Maw village in Shwegu township, Kachin state, two children were injured when their oxcart ran over a mine. A local defense force subsequently found another landmine in the area.^[39]

On 1 March 2023, near Cedipyin village in Rathedaung township, Rakhine state, a man was seriously injured after stepping on a mine in a mountainous area. A Myanmar Army contingent was stationed nearby.^[40]

On 26 February 2023, three boys were wounded after stepping on a mine suspected to have been laid by the Myanmar Armed Forces between the villages of Numli Hka and Nwan Hka Zup in Waingmaw township, Kachin state.^[41]

On 16 February 2023, during a change of units at the Yae Kin military camp, in Tima village in Kyauktaw township, Rakhine state, two Myanmar Army soldiers stepped on mines that had been planted by the departing unit near the camp’s fence.^[42]

On 14 February 2023, a man stepped on a mine allegedly planted by the Myanmar Armed Forces while searching for food near the Mungdung military camp, in Dawhpum Yang village in Momauk township, Kachin State.^[43]

On 27 January 2023, a man was killed by a landmine outside a Myanmar Armed Forces base near Pharpyo village in Minbya township, Rakhine state.^[44]

On 18 January 2023, a young man was seriously injured by a landmine near Panphetan village in Mrauk-U township, Rakhine state, after walking past an area where a Myanmar Army battalion is stationed. The military had warned residents to stay away from the area.^[45]

On 13 January 2023, a woman from Than Moe Taung village tract in Taungoo township, Bago region, stepped on a landmine emplaced by the roadside. The victim died before she could be reached by villagers, who heard the explosion but could not enter the area due to restrictions imposed by the Myanmar Armed Forces. Soldiers later informed villagers that they had planted the mine following clashes in the area with a local anti-military People’s Defense Force (PDF) in November 2022.[46] The military had previously notified villagers that landmines were laid on the Than Moe Taung road, and restricted access to it.^[47]

On 16 December 2022, a villager was seriously injured by a landmine emplaced by Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers in Saw Muh Plaw village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state.^[48]

On 21 November 2022, a man was injured by an MM6 mine emplaced by the Myanmar Armed Forces in Hkaw Poo village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state.^[49] 

On 20 October 2022, a resident of Aung May K’Lar village in Kawkareik township, Kayin state, activated a tripwire landmine while making charcoal near a military camp. The mine was thought to have been planted by troops based at the nearby Aung May K’Lar military camp.^[50]

On 13 October 2022, a Rohingya woman and her infant son were injured by a tripwire landmine placed along the exterior fence of a Myanmar Armed Forces camp in Pa Laung village in Kyauktaw township, Rakhine state, near the border with Bangladesh.^[51]

On 1 October 2022, a village guard was injured by a landmine planted by the Myanmar Army near a military camp in Htee Htaw Per village in Hpapun township, Kayin state.^[52]

In October 2022, a villager stepped on a mine in the Htee Moh Pgha special area in Tanintharyi township, Tanintharyi region. The mine was believed to have been planted by Myanmar Armed Forces troops.^[53]

Villagers in Hpapun township, in northern Kayin state, reported that the Myanmar Armed Forces planted around 100 landmines on the Lu Thaw road between September and November 2022.^[54]

On 1 September 2022, a resident of Meh T’Raw Hta village tract in Dooplaya district, Kayin state, claimed that the Myanmar Armed Forces had planted a mine near his land.^[55] On the same day,an eight-year-old boy was killed by a landmine laid by retreating Myanmar Armed Forces troops outside his temporary school in Krok Khu village in Demoso township, Kayah state.

In September 2022, livestock near Noh T’Kaw village tract in Kyainseikgyitownship, Kayin state, detonated landmines laid near a Myanmar Army camp. Villagers stated that the Myanmar Armed Forces had previously informed them of mines laid in the area. Later, in February 2023, the military repeated its warning to villagers that it had planted mines in the area.^[56]

In September 2022, a local NSAG claimed that Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers had emplaced antipersonnel mines around a church in Moybe village tract in Pekon township, Shan state.^[57]

In 2022 and 2023, civilians continued to be injured due to antipersonnel landmines planted along Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh.^[58] Previously, in October 2020, Myanmar rejected reports that it had emplaced mines on the border, after Bangladesh had expressed concern at ongoing use of antipersonnel mines by Myanmar in the area. Bangladesh stated that “unfortunately, outright denial to such a fact-based report remains the only response from Myanmar.”^[59]

Use by non-state armed groups

During the reporting period, the Monitor identified new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Colombia, India, Myanmar, Thailand and Tunisia, and by some groups in or bordering the Sahel region—in Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo.

Since 1997, at least 70 NSAGs have committed to halt use of antipersonnel mines.^[60] The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures. However, there were no new declarations by NSAGs from mid-2022 through October 2023.

Colombia

In Colombia, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), dissident groups of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP or FARC), and other NSAGs continue to produce and use antipersonnel landmines.

In 2022, there were a total of 105 incidents of landmine use attributed to the ELN, 224 incidents attributed to FARC dissidents, and 26 incidents attributed to the GAO Clan del Golfo.^[61] This represents a 30% annual increase on incidents of reported mine use in 2021.

In the first seven months of 2023, a total of 50 incidents of mine use were attributed to the ELN, while 241 were attributed to FARC dissidents and seven were attributed to the GAO Clan del Golfo.^[62]

In February 2023, the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace stated that the departments of Chocó, Bolívar, Nariño, and Putumayo and were seriously affected by antipersonnel mines, and called on all armed actors to halt use.^[63] There were reports in 2022 and in the first half of 2023 of both military and civilian landmine casualties in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Cauca, Chocó, Huila, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Valle del Cauca. These are all regions where armed conflict was ongoing between the National Army of Colombia and NSAGs. It is difficult to determine precisely when these mines were laid.^[64]

India

In India, several incidents involving use of pressure-plate antipersonnel mines by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M), or its People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), were reported in 2022 and 2023.

In May 2023, a man foraging in Luiya forest in Chaibasa district, Jharkhand state, was killed by a mine reportedly laid by Maoist rebels. Several other villagers in Chaibasa district were reportedly killed in similar incidents earlier in the year.^[65] In January 2023, Maoist rebels had disseminated leaflets to villages in Kolhan division, Jharkhand state, warning that they had laid explosive devices in the area.^[66] In December 2022, a man collecting wood in Goilkera forest in West Singhbhum district, Jharkhand state, died after stepping on a landmine.^[67]

In September and November 2022, mines attributed to Maoist rebels were cleared by the military after livestock injuries in Kathagudem district, Telangana state.^[68]

Myanmar

NSAGs have used antipersonnel landmines repeatedly in Myanmar since the Monitor began reporting in 1999. There were allegations of new use by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), and other groups in early 2022.^[69]

Local media in Myanmar has reported the use of landmines by local anti-military militia groups established after the February 2021 coup, including by PDFs. These devices appear primarily to be command-detonated roadside bombs, though some are victim-activated.^[70] Pro-military militia groups, such as Pyusawhti, also operate in several areas of Myanmar.^[71]

The Monitor has reviewed the following incidents attributed to NSAGs in Myanmar during the reporting period.

On 18 March 2023, two villagers were killed and two were injured by tripwire landmines set up by a PDF in Palaw township, Tanintharyi region. According to the PDF, the mines were emplaced to defend the area from the Myanmar Armed Forces.^[72]

On 13 March 2023, three people were seriously injured by a mine in Tedim township, Chin state, and were taken across the border to India for treatment. PDF rebels acknowledged responsibility for laying the mine.^[73]

On 27 February 2023, in Meh Way village tract in Hpapun township, Kayin state, a child was killed and an adult was injured by a mine laid by the KNLA. The KNLA had previously warned villagers that it had planted mines in the area.^[74]

On 16 February 2023, two residents of Pweh Pah village in Hpapun township, Kayin state, stepped on mines laid by the KNLA near a Myanmar Armed Forces camp.^[75]

On 12 February 2023, two Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers were injured after stepping on mines laid by an unknown group near the Paju crossroads in Kutkai township, Shan state.^[76]

On 2 February 2023, members of the Shanni Nationalities Army were injured after stepping on a mine laid by an unknown group near Na Kata village in Indaw township, Sagaing region.^[77] On the same day, a resident of Mone village tract in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, was injured by a landmine planted by the KNLA.^[78]

On 14–15 January 2023, two villagers in Nyaunglebin township, Bago region, stepped on mines planted by the KNLA. The mines were reportedly emplaced by the KNLA after Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers had left the area, to prevent them from returning. The KNLA had issued a verbal warning of the danger to villagers.^[79]

On 12 January 2023, a woman was injured and her daughter killed by a landmine planted by the Ja Htu Zup People’s Militia Force near the Yuzana Factory, in Shar Du Zut village in Hpakant township, Kachin state.^[80]

In December 2022, a PDF medic in Kale township, Sagaing region, laid mines around her house when she learned it would be raided by the military. Troops were later injured by the mines.^[81]

On 12 October 2022, a PDF rebel was killed while maintaining a minefield in Khin-U township, Sagaing region.^[82]

On 7 October 2022, a Rohingya civilian lost both legs to a landmine laid in his courtyard by the Arakan Army in Gudar Pyin village tract in Maungdaw township, Rakhine state.^[83]

On 22 September 2022, a resident of Kone Nee village tract in Kyaukkyi township, Bago region, was killed by a mine planted by an unknown group. Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers provided medical treatment but the man died from his wounds.^[84]

On 9 September 2022, Myanmar Armed Forces troops stepped on two landmines in Yung Ngaw village in Kutkai township, Shan state, where KIA forces were positioned.^[85]

In September 2022, villagers said that the Kamarmaung–Ka Taing Tee road in Hpapun township, Kayin state, had been mined by KNLA rebels, Border Guard Forces, and the Myanmar Army.^[86]

On 29 August 2022, Myanmar Army soldiers were injured by mines that had been laid by a PDF in Taungjah village in Sagaing township, Sagaing region.^[87]

On 13 July 2022, Myanmar Armed Forces soldiers stepped on two landmines at Nang Zaw Yang road junction in Waingmaw township, Kachin state, which were reportedly planted by the KIA.^[88]

Thailand

Pattani rebel groups in southern Thailand used improvised antipersonnel landmines sporadically in 2022 and 2023.^[89]

In June 2023, a paramilitary officer was injured after stepping on a landmine while patrolling in Joh Ai Rong district, Narathiwat province.[90]

On 15 August 2022, a woman working at a rubber plantation in Sungai Padi district, Narathiwat province, was injured after stepping on a mine. A Royal Thai Army soldier was killed and six police officers were injured by a second mine that exploded near the site of the first incident.[91]

Tunisia

In Tunisia, the Monitor has reported the use of victim-activated IEDs by Islamist groups based in the mountains of Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate for more than a decade. In April 2023, a shepherd was injured after stepping on a mine in a mountainous area of Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate, near the border with Algeria. It is unclear exactly when the mine was laid.^[92]

Improvised antipersonnel mine use in the Sahel

Islamist NSAGs have used improvised antipersonnel landmines in at least eight States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in the Sahel region of Africa since mid-2022: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, the DRC, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) was reported to be responsible for mine use in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Togo. The Islamic State-West Africa Province (ISWAP), or Boko Haram, was responsible for use in Niger and Nigeria. Mine use in Algeria was attributed to Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Islamist groups were also responsible for incidents in Egypt’s Sinai region. Specific examples include:^[93]

• In Algeria, on 13 January 2023, an IED presumably planted by AQIM killed four hunters in Boudkhar, in the commune of Babar, Khenchela.
• In Benin, on 23 December 2022, two young children were injured in an IED explosion in Kofounou. It is not known which group emplaced the device.
• In Burkina Faso, on 2 March 2023, a child riding a bicycle was seriously wounded after hitting an IED likely planted by JNIM militants in Koalou, Kompienga.
• In the DRC, on 2 December 2022, a man was killed by a landmine planted by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Lumanza, Nord-Kivu province, as he was going to his field. The Monitor had previously reported on mine use by the ADF in 2021 and 2005.
• In Mali, on 6 February 2023, two farmers were killed in an IED explosion between Niono and Tiemaba, in the Segou region. The device was likely planted by JNIM militants.
• In Niger, on 16 October 2022, two pastoralist women were killed, and two others injured, by a roadside IED likely planted by ISWAP near Boula Gana, in the Diffa region.
• In Nigeria, on 22 June 2022, an IED buried by Boko Haram rebels in Ngala, Borno state, exploded after it was stepped on by an internally displaced person (IDP). The victim, who was searching for firewood at the time of the blast, was killed instantly.
• In Togo, on 4 December 2022, two children were killed when their cart hit an IED likely planted by JNIM militants in the village of Kpembonle, Savanes.
• In Egypt, on 20 February 2022, an IED planted by the Islamic State in Sheikh Zuwayid, in the north Sinai, detonated, killing a young girl and injuring two other children.

Universalizing the Landmine Ban

There are a total of 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Of these, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 32 acceded.^[94]

The 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory. No states acceded to the treaty during the reporting period. The last to do so were Palestine and Sri Lanka, both in December 2017.

The administration of President Joe Biden realigned US policy with most core provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty in June 2022, and again set the goal of ultimately joining the treaty. Yet little public information is available on how this policy is being implemented.[95]

For the first time, there was open discussion in two States Parties in 2022–2023 about potentially withdrawing from the Mine Ban Treaty. Under Article 20 of the Mine Ban Treaty, a State Party engaged in armed conflict is not allowed to withdraw from the treaty before the end of the armed conflict. The treaty is also not subject to reservations.

On 22 June 2023, the UN confirmed receipt of a letter from Eritrea, informing the UN Secretary-General of the government’s decision to withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty. However, in October 2023, Eritrea reportedly submitted a letter to the UN Secretary-General rescinding its previous letter of withdrawal.[96]

In late 2022, in Estonia, the Conservative People’s Party proposed that Estonia withdraw from the Mine Ban Treaty and acquire and use antipersonnel mines, given the threat posed by Russia. The party’s parliamentary motion failed. Estonia’s Ministry of Defence argued that antipersonnel mines would not provide a military advantage in deterring a potential attack, and would make it more difficult to cooperate with military allies.[97]

Annual UNGA resolution

Over the past 25 years, a key annual United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an opportunity to demonstrate their support for its humanitarian approach and the objective of its universalization. More than a dozen countries have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.^[98]

On 7 December 2022, a total of 167 states voted in favor of UNGA Resolution 77/63, which urged full universalization and the effective implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. No state voted against the resolution, while 17 abstained.[99]

Support for the annual UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty fell slightly compared to 2021, which was the fourth consecutive year when 169 states voted in favor.

Myanmar, for the first time since 1997, voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution in 2022. States Parties Central African Republic and Serbia abstained from the vote, but did not explain their reasoning. Previously, States Parties Serbia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe abstained voting on the 2021 resolution.

Several countries explained their vote, including South Korea, which reiterated that it “sincerely supports the objectives and purposes of the Ottawa Convention,” while repeating its long-held position that “due to the unique security situation on the Korean Peninsula we are currently not a party to the Convention.”^[100]

A core of 13 states not party have consistently abstained from consecutive UNGA resolutions on the Mine Ban Treaty since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.[101]  

Production of Antipersonnel Mines

More than 50 states have produced antipersonnel landmines at some point in the past.^[102] As many as 40 states have ceased production, including three states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, and Nepal.^[103]

The Monitor has added Armenia to its list of countries producing antipersonnel mines, bringing the list to a total of 12 countries: Armenia, China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam.

Most of the countries listed as producers are not believed to be actively producing but have yet to commit to never do so in the future.^[104] India, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Russia appear most likely to be actively producing antipersonnel mines. The Monitor removed the US from the list of producers after its June 2022 prohibition of the production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines.[105]

In September 2022, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense released a statement, along with a video, claiming to have found 100 Armenian-made PMN-E antipersonnel mines, eight PMN-2 antipersonnel mines, and 10 antivehicle landmines.^[106] Later that month, as hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan reignited, Azerbaijan claimed that Armenian forces had “mined the territories and supply roads” of Azerbaijani army units.^[107] These initial claims of Armenian production of antipersonnel mines were difficult to confirm via non-Azerbaijani sources.

In August 2022, the Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense claimed to have cleared a total of 1,318 PMN-E antipersonnel mines in the Lachin region.^[108]Armenia denied these claims and stated in a letter to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), dated 13 September 2022, that Azerbaijan was “disseminating false information…in preparation for launching armed aggression.”^[109]

However, since these allegations emerged, reputable technical sources have now listed the PMN-E antipersonnel mine and attributed its production to Armenia.^[110] While many questions remain about the origin and specific production details of the PMN-E mine, the Monitor considers that “production” could also include modifying the original manufacturer’s product for improved performance in combat and then re-loading, re-assembling, and re-packaging the items into a condition suitable for storage or use.

Russia continues to research, develop, and produce both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.^[111] Some of these new mine types were first seen publicly during annual military exercises in 2021, including POM-3 rocket-delivered antipersonnel mines, which had been in development since at least 2015.^[112] Russia also tested newly-developed antivehicle mines in 2021, such as the PTKM-1R mine.^[113] Markings on some of the mines used by Russia in Ukraine in 2022–2023 indicate that they were manufactured as recently as 2021, including the POM-3 antipersonnel mine.^[114] In October 2022, Ukrainian forces also displayed a new type of directional fragmentation Claymore-type mine, designated as MOB, which they claimed had been captured from Russian forces.^[115]

Production of antipersonnel mines has occurred in India since 2016. In December 2021, the first of 700,000 “Nipun” antipersonnel blast mines were delivered to the military as a replacement for the M-14 antipersonnel mine.[116] At least two other mine types are reportedly under development, including “Ulka,” a bounding antipersonnel fragmentation landmine, and “Parth,” a directional antipersonnel landmine.[117] A procurement announcement by the Indian government in August 2020 called for the domestic manufacture of an antipersonnel fragmentation mine. Previously, in 2019, the Ordnance Factory Board sent out a tender to local manufacturers for one million M-14 mines, to be delivered at a rate of 200,000 per year.[118]

India also produces the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, with warheads that can lay antipersonnel landmines. In September 2022, it was reported that Armenia had ordered the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher from private companies in India, though it is not known if this order included the antipersonnel mine laying variant of the system.[119]

NSAGs have produced improvised mines in Colombia, Egypt, India, Myanmar, and Thailand.^[120]

Transfers of Antipersonnel Mines

A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel landmines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma created by the Mine Ban Treaty. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing the annual Landmine Monitor report in 1999.

At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have enacted a formal moratorium on exports of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters, including Cuba and Vietnam, have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting antipersonnel mines. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting mines in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.[121]

Stockpiled Antipersonnel Mines

States not party

The Monitor estimates that as many as 30 of the 33 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty have stockpiled antipersonnel landmines.[122] In 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpiled about 160 million antipersonnel mines. Today, the collective total in the stocks of states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty may be less than 50 million.^[123]

Largest stockpiles of antipersonnel mines

It is unclear whether all 30 states not party thought to stockpile antipersonnel mines are currently doing so. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they possess only small stockpiles which are used solely for training in clearance and detection techniques.

States not party that have stockpiled antipersonnel mines

States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as part of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, the US, and Vietnam.

Stockpile destruction by States Parties

Of the 164 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, 161 do not stockpile antipersonnel mines. This includes 94 states that have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction, and 67 which confirmed that they never possessed antipersonnel mines (except for, in some cases, for training in detection and clearance techniques).

States Parties have collectively destroyed more than 55 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines under the treaty. Sri Lanka was the last State Party to complete its obligation to destroy its stocks in October 2021.[124]

Two States Parties possess a combined total of 3.7 million antipersonnel mines left to destroy: Ukraine (3,364,433) and Greece (343,413).

Greece and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, having both failed to complete stockpile destruction by their respective four-year deadlines. Greece had an initial deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine’s deadline was 1 June 2010. Neither State Party has indicated when the obligation to destroy their remaining stockpiles will be completed.[125]

Greece did not destroy any stockpiled mines in 2020–2022. In June 2023, Greece announced that its remaining stocks of antipersonnel landmines would be transferred to Croatia, where they will be destroyed over the next 18 months.[126]

Ukraine has destroyed 3,438,948 antipersonnel landmines to date, constituting more than half of its total stocks.^[127] In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report covering 2022, Ukraine declared a stockpile 3,364,433 antipersonnel mines, comprised of 3,363,828 PFM-series mines and 605 OZM-4 mines.^[128] 

Ukraine reported in April 2023 that its stockpiled antipersonnel landmines are stored in military warehouses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, and “will be destroyed in accordance with the commitments made after the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” However, Ukraine also noted that, “if the warehouses and arsenals where anti-personnel mines are stored are located in the territories occupied by Russia, or they have been subjected to air and missile strikes by the armed forces of the Russian Federation, then information about such mines can be obtained only after the territory has been liberated, cleared and [after] carrying out relevant inspections.”^[129] In June 2023, Ukraine told States Parties at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva that it needs time to audit and conduct verification of the stockpile.

Tuvalu must provide an initial Article 7 report for the treaty, to formally confirm that it does not stockpile antipersonnel mines.^[130]

Some NSAGs possess stockpiles of improvised antipersonnel mines. In May 2022, Colombia’s armed forces discovered a stockpile containing 1,984 improvised antipersonnel mines in Puerto Concordia, Meta department. It is not known which armed group had produced the mines.[131]

Mines retained for training and research

Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows States Parties to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”

A total of 66 States Parties retain antipersonnel landmines for training and research purposes.  Twenty-five States Parties retain more than 1,000 mines each, including two (Bangladesh and Finland) that each retain more than 12,000 mines. Angola and Peru collectively used a total of 1,142 retained mines during 2022, decreasing their retained mines to under 1,000 respectively.^[132]

Forty-one States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines. Another 97 States Parties do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 44 states that stockpiled or retained landmines in the past.[133]  Nigeria, which initially declared 3,364 retained mines in 2011, reported having no retained mines in 2022.^[134]Nicaragua and Portugal, which also previously reported 435 and 383 retained mines respectively, reported no retained mines in 2022 according to their Article 7 reports.

States Parties retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines

Note: N/R=not reported.

In addition to those listed in the table, the 41 States Parties each retaining fewer than 1,000 mines collectively possess a total of 15,264 mines.[135] The total increased by 1,091 on the previous year, with Angola and Peru added to this list in 2022. Thirteen of these states consumed a combined total of 2,259 retained antipersonnel mines in 2022.[136] Twenty States Parties that retain under 1,000 mines have not yet submitted an updated Article 7 transparency report for calendar year 2022.[137]

The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that retain mines but are apparently not using them for the permitted purposes. For these states, the number of retained mines has stayed the same each year, indicating that none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research. No other details have been provided about how these mines are being used.

Five States Parties have never reported consuming landmines retained for the permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them:

• Djibouti and Oman (each retaining more than 1,000 mines); and
• Burundi, Cape Verde, and Togo (each retaining less than 1,000 mines).

The Oslo Action Plan requires each State Party that retains antipersonnel mines under Article 3 to “annually review the number of mines retained to ensure that they do not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for permitted purposes,” and to “destroy all anti-personnel mines that exceed that number.”[138]

States Parties agreed to Action 49, whereby the president of the Mine Ban Treaty is given a new role in ensuring compliance with Article 3. This has been described by some as an “early warning mechanism.” Action 49 states that “If no information on implementing the relevant obligations [of Articles 3, 4, or 5] for two consecutive years is provided, the President will assist and engage with the States Parties concerned.”[139]

While laudable in terms of transparency, several States Parties still report retaining antipersonnel mines and devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel landmine. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty. At least 13 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.[140]

Transparency Reporting

Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on developments during the preceding calendar year.

Tuvalu is the only State Party that has not provided an initial transparency report, after missing its 28 August 2012 deadline.

As of 15 October 2023, only 75 States Parties (46%) had submitted their annual Article 7 reports for calendar year 2022.[141] A total of 89 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2022, of which most have failed to provide an annual transparency report for two or more years.[142] The submission rate of reports for calendar year 2022 was less than that of 2021.

Morocco, a state not party, has submitted 12 voluntary transparency reports since 2006.[143] States not party Azerbaijan (2008–2009), Lao PDR (2011), and Mongolia (2007) have also previously submitted voluntary reports. Palestine (2012–2013) and Sri Lanka (2005) also submitted voluntary reports prior to acceding to the Mine Ban Treaty.

In 2019, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic submitted a voluntary Article 7 report, covering the period from June 2014 to November 2019, which included information on contamination, clearance, casualties, and victim assistance in Western Sahara.[144]