Iraq

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Iraq acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 15 August 2007, becoming the 155th State Party.^[1] The treaty will enter into force for it on 1 February 2008. Iraq’s initial transparency report required under Article 7 is due no later than 30 July 2008. Iraq’s treaty-mandated deadline for destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines is 1 February 2012, and its deadline for destruction of all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control is 1 February 2018.

Since 2004 government representatives had indicated on many occasions that Iraq was favorably inclined toward the Mine Ban Treaty.^[2] In early 2006 the office of the Prime Minister provided the Iraq Campaign to Ban Landmines with an unofficial draft law regarding accession to the treaty.^[3]

On 6 December 2006 Iraq voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 61/84, calling for the universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. In 2004 and 2005 Iraq voted for similar UNGA resolutions.^[4]

The head of Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority and Geneva-based diplomats attended as observers the Mine Ban Treaty’s Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2006, but did not make any statements. Iraq did not attend the treaty’s intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in May 2006 or April 2007.

Iraq is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, Stockpiling, and Transfer

Iraq produced antipersonnel mines in the past, including in the period leading up to the 2003 invasion. All mine production facilities were apparently destroyed in the Coalition bombing campaign.^[5] Landmine Monitor is not aware of any mine transfers from Iraq since the 1990s.

The total size of Iraq’s mine stockpile is not known, and will likely be difficult for the government to determine, given the dispersal of weapons stores around the country.^[6] The stocks are believed to contain mines manufactured by Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Egypt, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore, the former Soviet Union and the United States, in addition to Iraqi-manufactured mines.^[7]

Iraqi government and Coalition forces continue to find landmines in arms caches across the country. In the first six months of 2007, 274 antipersonnel mines, 564 antivehicle mines, 142 unspecified mines and six Claymore mines were reportedly seized by multinational forces in Iraq.^[8] In May 2007 an Iraqi was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Central Criminal Court of Iraq for possession of 82 antipersonnel mines, among other weapons.^[9]

Many insurgent groups in Iraq are expert in the manufacture and deployment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In March 2007 a US Navy Lieutenant was quoted in the media as stating that 15 percent of the IEDs in Iraq are made from explosives harvested from minefields on the Iran-Iraq border. In the same report US military officers were quoted as saying that, due to economic hardship, shepherds dig up mines and sell them to the insurgency. The mines are believed to have been laid by Iraq during the Iraq-Iran War of 1980.^[10]

Use

In the ongoing armed conflict, there have been no reports of new mine-laying by Iraqi government military forces. Iraqi officials have been unable to inform Landmine Monitor about the instructions Iraqi forces receive on the use of antipersonnel mines.

There have been no confirmed reports of use of antipersonnel mines by any Coalition forces. Most members of the Coalition, though not the United States, are party to the Mine Ban Treaty which prohibits them from using antipersonnel mines in any circumstance and prohibits them from assisting in any way the use, production, stockpiling or transfer of antipersonnel mines. In October 2005 a US Department of State official affirmed that US forces did not use antipersonnel mines during the invasion of Iraq and have not used them during the ongoing conflict.^[11]

The US and many Coalition members are party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons, which regulates the types of antipersonnel mines that can be used and defines the circumstances of their use until either their clearance or abandonment. The extent to which US and Coalition forces may exercise control of or utilize existing mined areas for military benefit, and therefore incur obligations under Amended Protocol II, is not known.^[12] Among those obligations would be to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians from those mined areas.^[13]

Non-State Armed Groups

Despite many documented instances of discoveries and seizures of antipersonnel mines in this reporting period (since May 2006), there have been few instances that appear to be new use of antipersonnel mines. In one case, in August 2006, a US Marine on patrol died after stepping on a mine, while following a previous patrol in Ramadi, Anbar province.^[14]

Reports of use of antivehicle mines by insurgent forces have been more frequent. In May 2007 a member of a US Army transportation unit stated that pressure plate-activated antivehicle explosives—which do not require a person with a remote detonator—were being increasingly used.^[15] Antivehicle mines recycled from the minefields laid in the Iraq-Iran war are also allegedly used by the insurgency.^[16]

Opposition forces have laid antivehicle mines on frequently traveled roads. In 2006, four US military personnel were reportedly killed by landmines, all of which appeared to be antivehicle mines.^[17] Two US soldiers from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, were killed in Samarra in October 2006 when their vehicle struck two landmines.^[18] In November 2006, two soldiers from Slovakia and Poland were killed when their armored vehicle hit a landmine.^[19]

Opposition forces have used improvised explosive devices in great numbers. An IED that is victim-activated—that explodes from the contact of a person—is considered an antipersonnel mine and prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty. An IED that is command-detonated—where the user decides when to explode it—is not prohibited by the treaty, but use of such devices in Iraq has often been in violation of international humanitarian law, such as when civilians are directly targeted. Command-detonated bombs and IEDs have been commonly reported in the media, frequently referred to as “landmines.”

Armed non-state groups have used a wide variety of explosive devices to carry out attacks. Media reports most often cite use of command-detonated roadside bombs and IEDs, but it appears victim-activated explosive devices have also been used, including booby-traps. In June 2006 Iraqi insurgent forces reportedly placed numerous IEDs in the area surrounding the bodies of two American soldiers who had been kidnapped and killed, in order to inflict additional casualties.^[20] In October 2006 an American soldier died in Tikrit when an IED detonated near his vehicle during combat operations.^[21] In May 2007 US military personnel were on a foot patrol to locate three missing American soldiers when an IED detonated, killing one soldier and injuring two others.^[22]

In August 2007 the US military reported that the number of incidents involving “house bombs” (officially called “house-borne improvised explosive devices”) had risen dramatically across Iraq in recent months, and noted that the bombs were set off by a variety of means, including tripwires and pressure plates, as well as remote devices. In one incident, on 11 August 2007, a soldier stepped on a pressure plate and detonated an estimated 30 pounds of explosives hidden under a stairwell, killing five troops and injuring three others. The US military attributes the house bombs to the al-Qaeda in Iraq forces.^[23]

Between 1 January and 1 July 2007, 331 US military personnel died as the result of IED attacks in Iraq. In 2006, 373 US military personnel were killed by IEDs, a decrease from 2005 (445 killed).^[24] IEDs have also caused numerous civilian casualties.^[25]

Landmine and ERW Problem

Iraq is one of the countries most severely affected by landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), as a result of internal conflicts, the 1980-1988 war with Iran, the 1991 first Gulf War, and the conflict ongoing in 2007 that began in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by US-led Coalition forces.^[26] Since the 2003 invasion, almost daily attacks with car bombs or other improvised explosive devices, targeted at civilians, the military and police, and at the Coalition forces indicate that huge amounts of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) were left unsecured after the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime and subsequently plundered, assisting ongoing insurgencies.^[27]

The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey (ILIS), implemented by Veterans for America (VFA) in 13 of Iraq’s 18 governorates in 2005-2006, reported mine/ERW contamination in the southern region (854.5 square kilometers), the south-center region (87.6 square kilometers) and in the northern region (776 square kilometers). There is also substantial contamination in areas that do not affect communities and therefore are not featured in the ILIS.^[28] Border minefields alone have been estimated by one source to total some 6,370 square kilometers.^[29]

Types of contamination and impact vary significantly between the regions. The Kurdistan region, comprising the governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah, is one of the most seriously mine-contaminated areas in the world.^[30] It has 1,428 affected communities and contends with thousands of tactical minefields on the borders with Iran and Turkey.^[31] There is further mine contamination along the Green Line, the former frontline between Kurdish forces and Saddam Hussein’s army, as well as UXO across all three governorates.^[32]

South-central Iraq and the southern governorates of Basra, Thi Qar and Missan also have minefields on the border with Iran from the 1980-1988 war. Some newer mines were laid by Saddam Hussein’s army before the 2003 Coalition invasion in al-Muthanna governorate on the border with Saudi Arabia, but many villages in these areas are abandoned. Cluster munitions and unexploded air and ground ordnance used by Coalition forces in their advance on Baghdad, together with huge quantities of ordnance abandoned by the Iraqi army, have been the major cause of casualties.^[33] The village of Jurf al-Malh, close to the Shat al-Arab waterway, was on the frontline in the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war and is one of the most heavily affected communities.^[34] Recent studies by local NGOs have reported at least 800,000 metric tons of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in and around Basra; this is mainly unused ammunition, bombs, rockets and mortars discarded by fleeing Iraqi troops.^[35]

Mine Action Program

National Mine Action Authority

Iraq’s National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in July 2003, within the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation.^[36] It had responsibility for mine action policy, planning, coordination and managing the budget for mine action and for donor relations. It was also responsible for setting national mine action standards and maintaining a national database.^[37] The NMAA’s ability to fulfill its mandate, however, has been undermined by political turbulence, changes of management and insecurity.

Although the NMAA was created as the authority for the whole of Iraq, in 2004 the Kurdish Regional Government assumed responsibility for mine action in the three northern governorates of Erbil, Dahuk and Sulaymaniyah.^[38] In 2004-2005 the NMAA had three directors general. In July 2006 Iraq’s Integrity Authority announced that former NMAA Director General Al-Alatrakche and Technical Director Hayder Al Wardi were under investigation for corruption and that the Director General was “on the run.”^[39] This had a detrimental impact on the image of mine action in Iraq within the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (MoPDC) and left NMAA staff at all levels reluctant to make decisions.^[40] Abdul Wahab Adwan took over as Director General in November 2006 but was kidnapped in May 2007; as of August there had been no news of his whereabouts.^[41]

In June 2007 the Council of Ministers issued a letter closing down the NMAA within the MoPDC, rendering it “a non-functioning entity” pending a decision on which ministry would take charge of mine action. The Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation had taken the view that mine action did not belong in his ministry. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) planned to hold a workshop in Amman in the last quarter of 2007 attended by senior officials of all ministries to facilitate a decision on which ministry would take responsibility for mine action and the NMAA’s future mandate and structure.^[42]

UNDP has provided institutional development and local capacity development support to the NMAA and regional mine action centers through one institutional and one senior technical advisor based in Amman, both of whom make frequent visits to Iraq. In March 2006 UNDP deployed a full-time national advisor to northern Iraq to support the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center (IKMAC) and the General Directorate for Mine Action (GDMA). It also contracted national advisers to support the NMAA in Baghdad and Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC) South in Basra. The US commercial clearance company RONCO provided technical support to the NMAA until the end of September 2006 and continued to support RMAC South until July 2007, when its adviser moved to Baghdad.^[43]

The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) was installed in the NMAA in 2003 but after the VFA technical advisor left in 2005 almost no data entry occurred. ILIS data is in the IMSMA database, but data gathered by the Iraq Mine UXO Clearance Organization and Danish Demining Group has been entered in the RMAC South database. Data from operations in Kurdish governorates is entered into the IKMAC and GDMA databases (including for operations below the Green Line).^[44] None of the clearance data from the Iraqi army and police or from the Coalition forces has been made available to the NMAA.^[45]

Mine Action Centers

Iraq initially set up three regional mine action centers under the NMAA in the north, center and south. Responsibilities included coordinating mine action, collecting and analyzing data, preparing plans and assigning clearance tasks, and monitoring quality assurance.^[46] As of mid-2006 it had one center, RMAC South, based in Basra covering the governorates of Basra, al-Muthanna, Thi Qar and Missan.^[47] RMAC South receives its funding from the national budget through the NMAA. However, coordination between the NMAA and RMAC South needed further development as RMAC South was seeking greater autonomy.^[48]

Two mine action centers operated in the Kurdish governorates of the north. The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center based in Erbil covers the governorates of Erbil and Dohuk, operating with its own demining personnel. The General Directorate of Mine Action, set up by Kurdish authorities in Sulaymaniyah to manage mine action in that governorate, contracts clearance work to commercial companies.^[49] IKMAC and GDMA operate under the authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), from which they receive their budget; they do not report to the NMAA. In April 2007 the KRG passed a law merging the two organizations but as of August the law had not been put into effect.^[50]

In support of IKMAC, a UN Office of Project Services (UNOPS) project involves the provision of mechanical and manual mine clearance equipment, training on explosive ordnance disposal and installation of IMSMA.^[51] Mines Advisory Group has also received funding to recruit an expert to support IMSMA in northern Iraq. However, the IKMAC and GDMA have reservations about using IMSMA and currently rely on information from the old UNOPS database.^[52] Norwegian People’s Aid provides data to the GDMA and maintains its own reporting system and database.^[53] According to the UN, the IMSMA databases used in Iraq will probably be upgraded to version 4 during 2008.^[54]

The Green Line between the northern areas under the control of the KRG and the south currently divides the regional responsibilities between the IKMAC, GDMA and NMAA.^[55]

National Mine Action Legislation and Standards

The NMAA drafted concept legislation intended to provide a legal framework for mine action and submitted it to the Planning Minister in 2005.^[56] In early 2007 the government’s legal committee rejected the draft law saying that the functions described in it belonged to the Ministry of Defense. This matter will only be solved once it is decided under which ministry the NMAA should function.^[57] The NMAA also drafted 29 national mine action standards based on international standards in 2006, which were also awaiting ministerial approval in early 2007.^[58]

Most mine action operators have submitted applications for accreditation to the NMAA, but only a few have been approved. After a long period of inaction, NMAA resumed reviewing applications in mid-2006 but subsequently referred them to UNDP; no further accreditations had been issued as of mid-2007.^[59]

Strategic Mine Action Planning

Political turbulence and insecurity have brought mine action planning to a standstill. In early 2006 the NMAA identified its priorities as persuading the government to enact legislation formalizing the NMAA’s status and role; increasing coordination with other government departments; integrating mine action into broader economic and social development planning; developing a database; building NMAA staff capacity; increasing the amount of land cleared of mines and UXO and increasing public awareness of the dangers of mines and ERW.^[60]

However, in 2006 the NMAA abandoned the Iraq mine action plan Vision 2020.^[61] No annual workplan was approved for spending the NMAA’s 2006 budget of US$15 million.^[62] The NMAA Director General and senior officials attended a strategic planning workshop in Jordan in January to discuss a workplan for 2007 but did not formulate one. Mine action in Iraq is said by the UN to be no longer implemented according to any formal plan.^[63]

During the reporting period (since May 2006) UNDP provided operational management and training on results-based programming, as well as supporting IMSMA, in the hope that the NMAA will deal effectively with Iraq’s humanitarian and developmental problems related to mine/ERW contamination, including productive use of cleared land and reduction of mine-related incidents.^[64]

Integration of Mine Action with Reconstruction and Development

The GDMA in Sulaymaniyah is said to have started to mainstream mine action into development; it made presentations to ministries and received funding from them for clearance related to development plans.^[65]

Individual operators also tied clearance more closely to development needs in 2006-2007. Both Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) have prioritized operations in support of socioeconomic rehabilitation, including infrastructure development and agriculture, in addition to responding to the humanitarian aspects of conflict recovery.  NPA had three development projects in 2006, clearing land for a primary school and making roads.^[66]

The Iraqi Mine UXO Clearance Organization’s main tasks in 2006 were in support of oilfield reconstruction, rehabilitation of water and sewage canals and destruction of “readily available ERW offering significant stocks of explosive devices” to non-state armed groups.^[67] It also works on commercial contracts and in 2007 was due to carry out clearance in support of the Ministry of Electricity.^[68]

Demining

Demining in Iraq is conducted by international forces and the national military, NGOs and commercial demining operators. ^[69]

The Iraq army has 10 divisions, each with one company that conducts mine clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), totaling 120 personnel. The police conduct improvised explosive device disposal. None of these clearance efforts are coordinated with the NMAA and there is no information available on these activities.^[70] Coalition forces also conduct EOD for force protection purposes.^[71] For example, Bosnian ordnance experts were working with US forces in 2006 to destroy UXO near Fallujah.^[72] MAG and NPA coordinate clearance and EOD activities with GMDA and IKMAC.^[73] 

The Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Center employed nearly 800 operations staff in 61 mine action teams in the Kurdish governorates of Erbil and Dahuk at the start of 2006.^[74] In Sulaymaniyah governorate the General Directorate for Mine Action coordinates and tasks mine action, issuing contracts for clearance to commercial companies. It also operated one manual demining team for small tasks, a general survey team, five technical survey teams and four mechanical teams; four quality control teams checked land before it was released to the public.^[75]

MAG has worked in Iraq since 1992; in 2006 it operated in Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates in addition to areas of Kirkuk, Mosul and Diyala governorates along and south of the former Green Line in 2006. MAG provided technical training to the 4th Division, 2nd Brigade Mine Clearance Unit of the Iraqi army (formerly part of the Iraqi National Guard) in humanitarian demining operations; by late 2006 the teams were operating semi-autonomously under MAG supervision.^[76] NPA has operated in the north of Iraq since 1995, and worked in three areas in 2006: Sharbazher and Halabja districts (Sulaymaniyah governorate) and Khanqin (Diyala governorate). NPA is also mandated by GDMA to conduct all EOD tasks in GDMA’s area of responsibility.^[77]

In central Iraq the German NGO HELP conducted EOD in Baghdad in 2006 but suspended operations in February 2007. Since the start of operations in October 2003, HELP reported it cleared 18.1 tons of explosives and more than 1.45 square kilometers of land.^[78]

The Iraq Mine UXO Clearance Organization (IMCO), set up in 2003 and supported by RONCO, is operational in the center, center-north and south. IMCO, funded by the US Department of State, conducts humanitarian demining around Baghdad, Najaf and Basra. It has also been awarded contracts for commercial work.^[79]

In the south, Danish Demining Group (DDG), supported by UNDP and DANIDA, conducts mainly battle area clearance. In 2006 it took over four EOD teams from the Italian NGO INTERSOS which terminated its contract at the end of May 2006 due to the worsening security situation.^[80] DDG also trained staff for the national NGO, Rafidain Demining Organization (RDO). UNDP expected RDO to take over implementation and assets of DDG’s program from October 2007, with DDG providing management and technical advice.^[81]

The Iraqi Mine Action Service, a local company with its head office in Baghdad and a sub-office in Amman, employs ex-Iraqi military engineers and has signed agreements with some international companies to provide expertise for clearance contracts. It executed some small commercial EOD contracts in Iraq during 2006.^[82]

The US Army, through the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program, contracted five companies to conduct clearance of abandoned munitions in depots and supply points in 2006. The companies were Parsons, Tetra Tech ECI, EOD Technology, Zapata Engineering and USA Environment. Since the program started in 2003, 19,000 tons of munitions have been turned over to the Iraqi army and 400,000 tons have been destroyed.^[83]

Identification, Marking and Fencing of Affected Areas

Although there have been several mine/ERW contamination surveys the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey, funded by the US Department of State, is the first comprehensive national survey of mine/UXO contamination. Data collection started in 2004 and ended in April 2006.^[84] By then, ILIS teams had completed the survey of every district and subdistrict of 13 governorates, except for two districts in Hilla governorate, close to Baghdad, and 346 communities, where access was not possible due to lack of security or because they were too remote. With these exceptions, the areas completed constituted three of the NMAA’s four mine action regions, plus Kirkuk governorate, which is part of the fourth, north-central region. The ILIS provided Iraq with its first census-quality data since 1997 identifying many communities not previously known to exist.^[85] By June 2006 it was apparent the ILIS would not be able to complete the survey of this region, which included Iraq’s most highly conflicted and Sunni-dominated governorates of Tikrit, Diyala, Mosul and Anbar.^[86]

The ILIS found 3,548 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affecting an estimated 1,718 square kilometers of land and 1,577 communities—one fifth of the total surveyed—with a population of over 2.7 million people. The heaviest contamination but lowest casualties were in the three Kurdish governorates. The total area of 3,024 SHAs was estimated at 776 square kilometers. Although the ILIS found mine contamination was heaviest in the north, casualties were heaviest in the southern four governorates where most of the contamination is more recent and communities are less aware of the dangers of mines and ERW.^[87]

Mines Advisory Group conducted technical surveys of 64 minefields in 2006. GDMA deployed technical survey teams for area reduction before it contracted clearance tasks. IKMAC carries out technical surveys as required in accordance with determining priorities.^[88] In 2006 IMCO conducted a technical survey in the south from al-Hatha to the Salemsha border crossing with Iran, as a prelude for a contract with the Ministry of Electricity.^[89] This was believed to be the only minefield technical survey that was conducted in central and southern Iraq in 2006.

Mines Advisory Group conducted demarcation of 88 minefields (an increase from 41 in 2005) in northern Iraq in 2006 with a total area of 7.6 square kilometers.^[90] IMCO fully re-marked a minefield around Ramlah oilfield as part of the humanitarian funding in 2006.^[91]

As of mid-2007 no progress had been made on the 12 December 2005 memorandum of understanding between the Iraqi and Iranian ministries of defense to provide documentation and maps of contaminated areas, set up a bilateral committee to oversee demining activities involving the national capacities of both countries and to open border crossings.^[92]

Mine/ERW Clearance

Political uncertainty and the hazardous security environment continued to constrain demining in Iraq, to a severe extent in many parts of the country.^[93] Despite these factors, even without the results of IKMAC operations, demining organizations reported clearance of 5.73 square kilometers of mined areas and 99.51 square kilometers of battle areas in 2006, a large increase from 2005 (25.1 square kilometers).^[94] Most of the increase was accounted for by DDG in the south.

GDMA = General Directorate for Mine Action; MAG = Mines Advisory Group; NPA = Norwegian People’s Aid; IMCO = Iraq Mine UXO Clearance Organization; DDG = Danish Demining Group

In the south, DDG reported that it achieved a sharp increase in productivity, conducting battle area clearance on a total of 94.41 square kilometers in 2006, compared with 6.3 square kilometers in 2005. The RMAC and DDG selected an area of more than 100 square kilometers, selecting tasks on the basis of data collected by its community liaison and survey teams.^[96] Field operations are conducted entirely by national staff, working with protection provided by a 100-person security unit.^[97] Prioritization of tasks is said to be difficult and due to the current security situation it was not always possible to attend to priority tasks first. Both DDG and IMCO work on several tasks at any one time, monitoring the security situation to determine which ones are safe to work on, on a day-to-day basis.^[98]

In the north, six companies contracted by GDMA, MAG and NPA cleared more than six square kilometers of mined and battle areas. Among the commercial companies, Khabat Zangana, which was set up in 1998 and designs and produces demining machines, employed 79 people split between two manual teams and four mechanical teams. These operated a range of clearance assets, including flails, an armored bulldozer, front-end loaders, excavators and vibrating sifters.^[99]

In 2006 RONCO conducted three commercial projects, two for the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program and one for a private contractor. In 2007 RONCO was awarded a contract with the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity to conduct mine clearance in southern Iraq.^[100]

In January 2006 the US Corps of Engineers issued a three-year contract worth at least $538.5 million to the US company Tetra Tech ECI to operate roving EOD teams clearing surface and subsurface UXO.^[101] By June 2006 the Coalition Munitions Clearance Program destroyed more than 450,000 tons of stockpiled munitions and Coalition troops continued to find substantial caches of weapons and munitions.^[102]

Rafidain Demining Organization registered with the government and started operations in May 2007 as an independent, non-commercial, non-profit humanitarian organization, supported by UNDP and receiving technical advice from DDG. In the first six months of 2007 DDG and RDO cleared 19.7 square kilometers of land, disposing of 23,623 items of UXO.^[103]

The Ministry of Electricity contracted an unidentified Iranian company to clear 20 kilometers of the 36-kilometer route designated for powerlines intended to import electricity from Iran. The Iraqi army started clearance of the remaining 16 kilometers. Work started in June 2007 and as of August the Iranian company had reported clearing 16 kilometers and the army 12 kilometers. The NMAA said it had been unable to conduct quality assurance of the project and had not identified an agency to certify the land as cleared.^[104]

Mine Risk Education

The main challenges for MRE providers in Iraq, according to UNICEF, are the difficult access to at-risk populations, lack of suitable implementing partners, unclear status of the NMAA and lack of legislative support, and continued population movement in the country. Frequent changes in leadership in the counterpart institutions and high staff turnover have affected delivery and timely response to MRE needs.^[105] However, MAG reported that in the north it has worked productively with regional government authorities to develop a sustainable Iraqi MRE capacity able to deliver MRE in areas currently inaccessible to international NGOs in Kirkuk and Ninewah and Mosul governorates.^[106] 

In 2006 the NMAA remained in charge of coordinating MRE in Iraq but provided little input. UNICEF has invited NMAA to MRE planning and annual review meetings in 2006 and 2007, but it did not participate. However, the NMAA approved the 2007 MRE action plan developed by UNICEF through three stakeholder workshops in 2006, and it provided some technical support to training of trainers for youth groups in Baghdad and to some NGOs. In 2007 NMAA’s role weakened further when in May the Director General of the organization was kidnapped and the NMAA was rendered non-functional by the Council of Ministers.^[107]

UNICEF assumed de facto coordination of MRE in 2007, and continued to provide technical and financial support through institutional capacity-building on MRE, MRE in schools and communities, MRE materials review, and direct MRE for high-risk populations.^[108] It established cooperation with the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Youth and Sports for MRE in schools, and teacher’s training; focal points from these ministries received capacity building training.^[109] In November 2006 UNICEF reviewed MRE materials from 11 organizations and government agencies working in mine action in order to analyze gaps in “consistency and accuracy of messages, appropriateness of the messages as per the target groups, adequacy to address the problems and safe behavior.” Results of the review were presented at a workshop in Amman, Jordan, in January 2007; changes were suggested, and an overall package of materials was prepared.^[110]

At least two local NGOs, the Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO) and DARASTAN Group for Child and Media, and three international NGOs, Mines Advisory Group, INTERSOS and Danish Demining Group, carried out MRE in 2006 and 2007. In addition to its coordination, technical and financial support roles, UNICEF conducted direct MRE for high-risk populations.^[111]

In 2006 at least 335,380 people in Iraq received MRE directly through training sessions, community events or school-based MRE, including at least 247,923 children. Within this total, 550 children and adolescents were trained by UNICEF and DARASTAN;^[112] 29,673 children and 17,307 adults were reached by MAG training sessions;^[113] 28,700 people were trained by INTERSOS volunteers, 200,000 schoolchildren were educated by INTERSOS-trained teachers and 31,058 adults were trained in community-based MRE by INTERSOS;^[114] and 17,700 children, 5,586 women and 6,806 men were trained by DDG.^[115] In addition, INTERSOS trained 2,200 primary and secondary school teachers and 158 community volunteers to carry out MRE.^[116]

UNICEF supported INTERSOS MRE activities in 2006, including an MRE project in Basra, Thi Qar and Baghdad, and two GDMA-implemented summer schools in Sulaymaniyah, and the local NGO DARASTAN’s MRE activities in eight contaminated villages in Khanaken and Balkha. In mid-August 2007 it supported a community-based MRE needs assessment in Wassit, Kerbala and Qadissiya, because according to the ILIS very little MRE had been provided in these contaminated areas where no clearance had taken place but were occupied by displaced people. In northern Iraq, 40 social workers and teachers from Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah were trained in MRE. In June it started an MRE project with INTERSOS in four southern governorates (Basra, Thi Qar, Muthanna, and Missan). Another project with a local NGO started in August focusing on MRE in schools and home-based activities for children as Baghdad and its surrounding areas have always been difficult to access.^[117]

In January 2007 IHSCO resumed MRE activities using its vocational training and resource center in Baghdad in partnership with Handicap International. People with disabilities receive MRE training so they can provide MRE in their communities in Baghdad; IHSCO also gives them MRE leaflets for distribution. For monitoring purposes it conducts site visits to places where MRE has been conducted. There were an estimated 700 beneficiaries. IHSCO plans to provide MRE training materials to the Ministry of Education and will then start MRE training for teachers. IHSCO is still working on raising funds for teacher training. IHSCO also participated in the MRE coordination meetings conducted by UNICEF.  However, IHSCO has not received any technical support from partner organizations and lacks funding to continue its MRE activities.^[118]

In 2006 MAG conducted some 400 MRE sessions, including trainings of trainers and direct MRE. In 2006 and 2007 it prioritized direct MRE for people displaced from central to southern Iraq into areas contaminated by ERW, and provided training of trainers workshops for teachers and international and national staff of various organizations. MAG worked with the Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency and the General Directorate of Mine Action. In July 2007 MAG conducted community liaison and MRE in support of humanitarian mine action operations in northern Iraq with six teams; subsequently, it expanded capacity with three more teams to work alongside mobile small arms and light weapons destruction teams. MAG was active in the governorates of Erbil, Dohuk, Sulaymaniyah, Kirkuk, Mosul and Diyala. MAG’s two-week teacher training programs are designed to increase the capacity for MRE in schools and communities. In 2006, the training of trainers program was extended to Ninewah and Kirkuk as planned.^[119]

INTERSOS’ community-based approach to MRE has since 2003 focused on training of trainers as well as direct MRE. From November 2005 INTERSOS implemented its emergency response, community education, MRE and teachers training project, with the support of UNICEF, in three governorates in central and southern Iraq; the project was extended to January 2007. From October to December 2006 INTERSOS developed MRE materials for teachers and children, and a network was established for community liaison, follow-up and monitoring of MRE. In early 2007 INTERSOS implemented a one-week training session in northern Iraq combined with capacity building for teachers and social workers.^[120]

DDG performed MRE and community liaison in 2006 with four three-member teams in Al-Zubair district in Basra region, focusing on children; direct MRE sessions in schools and house visits were carried out, and materials distributed.^[121]

Landmine/ERW/IED Casualties

In the absence of systematic data collection, conflict and numerous IED explosions in Iraq, it has not been possible to determine the exact number of casualties in 2006. The Iraq Landmine Impact Survey indicated that there are approximately 300 casualties per year in surveyed affected communities; the ILIS did not cover five governorates, some of which are severely mine/ERW contaminated.^[122]

Landmine Monitor has estimated that in 2006 there were at least 99 mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties (54 killed, 29 injured, 16 unknown), which is an apparent decrease from 2005 (358 casualties).^[123] But Landmine Monitor believes the actual number of mine/ERW casualties to be much higher, as less data collection took place and organizations providing casualty data were not able to do so for 2006. Also, media reports do not accurately distinguish between mine and IED incidents and increasingly refer to IED casualties instead of mine/ERW casualties. Media do not report on all the conflict casualties occurring daily, and focus on foreigners rather than on Iraqis. It is estimated that between 16,000 and 34,500 people were killed in the conflict in 2006.^[124]

Landmine Monitor analysis of one of the five NMAA databases (pending verification) indicates that the NMAA was not able to record any casualties in 2006; the last casualty was recorded on 25 October 2005. The database clearly shows increasing under-reporting since the 2003 conflict resulting in only 10 casualties recorded in 2005 and none in 2006.^[125] In 2005 Landmine Monitor identified 358 mine/ERW casualties through regional mine action centers and the media.^[126]

In 2006 GDMA recorded 15 new mine/ERW incidents in Sulaymaniyah, resulting in at least five killed and 10 injured. All were civilians; eight incidents were caused by antipersonnel mines and two by ERW. Four incidents occurred while tending animals, three while farming and three because of tampering. This information has not been exchanged between GDMA and the NMAA.^[127] In comparison, 34 casualties were recorded by GDMA in 2005.^[128]

During its operations in northern Iraq MAG recorded 29 new mine/ERW incidents; further details about the number of people killed and injured were not provided; the 2006 data was more than a 50 percent decrease from 2005 (68 casualties).^[129]

IKMAC in Erbil was not able to provide casualty data, as the survivor assistance officer resigned. In 2005 there were 172 new mine/ERW casualties reported to IKMAC.^[130]

In the southern and central parts of Iraq, the Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO) recorded at least 16 casualties occurring by 1 May 2006; further detail was not available.^[131] The Basra governorate health department stated in June 2007 that there are one or two ERW casualties per day in the southern governorates; approximately 70 percent were children. This would mean there are between 350 and 700 ERW casualties per year in the south of Iraq alone. Although exact statistics are not available, the Basra Union against War Mines said there had been approximately 560 mine/ERW casualties in Basra since 2003.^[132]

In 2006 Landmine Monitor identified at least 68 new mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties reported in the media, including 49 killed and 19 injured. However, injured casualties are largely unreported. Most of the casualties were Iraqi civilians, police or military, and US military. There also were foreign civilian and military casualties from India, Poland, Slovakia, the UK and Ukraine. Three people were killed by antipersonnel mines, 18 people were killed and 17 injured by unspecified mines, 25 people were killed and two injured by victim-activated IEDs, two people were killed by ERW and one person was killed by a cluster submunition; all of these incidents occurred in southern or south-central governorates. A further 504 casualties caused by devices that do not appear to be victim-activated were reported in the media, including nine people killed and 16 injured by command-detonated mines, 138 killed and 88 injured by command-detonated IEDs, and 249 people killed and four injured by unknown devices (most likely remote-detonated IEDs).^[133] In comparison, 115 new mine/ERW/IED casualties were reported in the media in 2005, including 67 killed and 48 injured.^[134]

Increased use of antivehicle mines by insurgent groups has been reported. In 2006 at least eight US military personnel were killed by antivehicle landmines.^[135] In March five US soldiers were killed and two injured when their vehicle hit a mine near Habbaniyah.^[136] In May a marine was killed when his vehicle hit a mine south of Fallujah.^[137] Two US soldiers were killed in Samarra in October 2006 while traveling in their vehicle.^[138] In November 2006 two soldiers from Slovakia and Poland were killed when their vehicle hit a landmine.^[139] In addition one US soldier was killed by ERW.^[140] IEDs have been the main cause of death and injury among US soldiers; in 2006, 372 US soldiers were killed by IEDs (11 vehicle-born IEDs).^[141]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2007, with at least 44 mine/ERW/victim-activated IED casualties by the end of May (29 killed and 15 injured). Danish Demining Group had one clearance accident killing one person and injuring another on 9 January 2007.^[142] IMCO had three accidents, two of which resulted in two deminers injured.^[143] On 28 April 2007 Rafidain Demining Organization was informed of a cluster munitions incident the previous day which killed four people in two separate incidents in southern Iraq. In the first incident, a nine-year-old and a 12 year-old girl were killed in a BLU-97 explosion while tending sheep; when their two adult brothers went to the site they were also killed by a cluster submunition.^[144] Media reported 14 people killed and 10 injured by mines, and nine people killed by ERW.^[145] In May 2007 US military personnel were on a foot patrol to locate threemissing American soldiers when an IED detonated, killing one soldier and injuring two others.^[146] In addition two people were killed by command-detonated mines.^[147] Between 1 January and 1 July 2007, 331 US military personnel died as the result of IED attacks in Iraq.^[148]

Data Collection

As of August 2007 there was no unified data collection mechanism for new mine/UXO/IED casualties in Iraq. Several regional and federal ministries (health, interior, defense and possibly human rights), the police, hospitals, IKMAC, GDMA and NGOs (NPA, MAG, IHSCO) collect casualty data, but they do not use standard systems.^[149] According to MAG, there is effective and successful regional cooperation in the north.^[150] 

The already very limited data collection activities decreased further in the second half of 2006 and in 2007 due to the deteriorating conflict. In principle, the NMAA through the regional mine action centers is the collecting and controlling body for landmine casualty data. A data-sharing system was established in the second half of 2004 with all stakeholders, and some information was handed over to the NMAA. It is contained in five defunct databases, awaiting verification from an external data expert from Veterans for America (VFA). This person was scheduled to start in 2007, but the position remained vacant. The database verification and preparation for upgrade to IMSMA version 4 was estimated to take six months and scheduled for completion by mid-2008 after which the upgrade to IMSMA version 5 is planned to commence. The consolidated database will be the basis for further data collection.^[151]

Efforts were undertaken to revitalize and strengthen data collection capacity in Iraq. UNICEF, in coordination with UNDP and the World Health Organization (WHO), has worked to establish a national casualty surveillance system and database; a standard data gathering form was created and several workshops were organized on the issue.^[152] A joint UNDP/UNICEF/WHO injury surveillance pilot project was created for three governorates (Baghdad, Erbil and Basra). In the pilot phase the project will collect data in the standard form from 26 emergency rooms and through civil defense offices. Ministry of Health (MoH) and mine action center staff will be trained to improve data collection and analysis skills. The first project meeting and training were scheduled for September 2007. A UNICEF-supported MRE project for 2007 in four central-south governorates will complement the victim surveillance pilot project.^[153]

While formulating the pilot project, it was agreed that the NMAA would remain the authority for storing and reporting casualty data. However, until it has adequate capacity to fulfil this role, the MoH will take the responsibility of data collection, storage and analysis with support from RMAC South and IKMAC. Data will be sent to the NMAA once the capacity is demonstrated.^[154]

The total number of mine casualties over the years in Iraq is not known. The five separate casualty databases stored at the NMAA contain overlapping and conflicting information that is pending verification. Several databases could not be operated as of August 2007, but one database put at the disposal of Landmine Monitor contained approximately 21,492 records entered since 2001, but covering mine/ERW casualties since 1929. The large percentage of casualties where device types, activities or person details are not specified and the censorship of certain fields makes analysis of the database complex. However, clear increases in casualties due to conflict and its immediate aftermath are visible; as is the sharp decrease in reporting since the start of the 2003 conflict. Under-reporting is certain, especially in southern and south-central regions; most casualties in the NMAA database were recorded in the northern governorates of Sulaymaniyah (11,835) and Erbil (6,136). Preliminary analysis shows a very sharp increase in casualties starting from 1991 (after the 1990-1991 Gulf War): 259 casualties were recorded in 1990 and 3,849 in 1991. Throughout the 1990s casualties gradually declined from over 2,000 to approximately 1,000 casualties per year. The first sharp decline was noted in 2000 with 206 casualties, after which the casualty rate remained constant at around 300 per year until casualty data collection deteriorated in 2003. To illustrate this, mine action operators recorded at least 2,191 new mine/ERW casualties in 2003, while the NMAA database only includes 375.^[155] This could indicate that, with increased contamination, the current casualty rate is at least 300 per year as corroborated by the ILIS. Further, the NMAA database indicates that 88 percent of casualties were male (18,839). At least 37 percent of casualties where the age is known were children (5,170 out of 13,895) and approximately 13,000 people were civilians. Landmines caused approximately 13,832 casualties, cluster submunitions 110 (almost all in Basra), ERW 20 and the rest are unknown (over 7,500 records).^[156]

As of August 2007 the Iraq Landmine Impact Survey provided the only reliable information on casualties in Iraq. But the ILIS does not reflect the total number of casualties, as it only records casualties living in contaminated communities and does not record nomads or displaced people. Veterans for America completed the ILIS in 2006, although several governorates remained unsurveyed for security reasons. The complete final report was not available as of August 2007. The final executive summary stated that 577 “recent” casualties had been recorded (38 percent fatal casualties): 307 in southern governorates, 159 in northern governorates, 99 in south-central governorates and 12 in Kirkuk. ^[157] This equals nearly 18 new casualties per 100,000 people per year in affected communities with a population of 1.6 million people. This would mean there are approximately 300 casualties per year in surveyed affected communities alone. The highest annual rate was 34.5 casualties per year in Kirkuk, 33.6 in south-central areas, 21.8 in the south and 10.6 in the north. These differences can be explained by longer experience with contamination in the north and larger exposure to ERW in the south. The reason the south-central rate is even higher is linked to extensive cluster submunitions contamination in Qadissiya, Babylon and Kerbala governorates. The vast majority of casualties were male (90 percent). Most casualties were between 15 and 29 years old (45 percent); children between five and 14 constituted nearly 25 percent of casualties. The most frequent activity at the time of the incident was shepherding (51 percent) followed by agriculture (19 percent). Tampering and scrap metal collection constituted seven percent of casualties, but may be under-reported due to sensitivities surrounding dealing with explosives in Iraq.^[158] A breakdown of casualties per device type was not given, but monthly updates during ILIS survey activity indicated that the vast majority of casualties in south-central areas was due to unexploded cluster submunitions (up to 83 percent), whereas landmines caused the majority of casualties in the north.^[159] In addition to recent casualties a further 7,672 “less recent” casualties have been recorded.^[160]

MAG has recorded at least 8,037 casualties in northern Iraq since 1993.^[161]

The Iraqi Health and Social Care Organization set up a war victim surveillance system in mid-2004, and a new uniform data form was adopted in February 2006. The initial focus of IHSCO casualty data collection was retroactive to fill the gap since March 2003 in six governorates (Baghdad, Karbala, al-Muthanna, Babel, Thi Qar and Diyala) to facilitate planning of mine action including victim assistance. Between March and June 2006 IHSCO gathered information on 193 casualties since March 2006; 148 were due to cluster submunitions and 26 due to antipersonnel mines. Most casualties occurred in Karbala and Babylon governorates; further analysis was not available.^[162] As of July 2006 IHSCO had not been able to collect casualty data for security reasons but limited mine/ERW survivor testimony was collected for advocacy reasons; by January 2007, 31 cluster submunition survivors and two antipersonnel mine survivors were interviewed; it is unknown if they had been included in the database previously.^[163]

The Ministry of Health has registered 43,600 war-injured people with a disability of 60 percent or more prior to 2003, and approximately 80,000 amputees of whom some 75 to 85 percent reportedly were caused by mines or UXO. There is some ongoing data collection of war casualties but this does not distinguish the device that caused the casualty and includes people injured by IEDs and bullets.^[164]

The US Department of Defense (DoD) reported that between 20 March 2003 and 11 August 2007, 1,925 soldiers were killed and 18,860 injured by explosive devices, including mines, ERW and IEDs.^[165]

According to mine action and survivor assistance operators there are between 5,000 and 6,000 mine/ERW survivors in northern Iraq and 3,000 fatal casualties.^[166]

Survivor Assistance

Due to conflict, the prevalence of disability in Iraq has increased significantly. The World Bank reported that, “Physical disabilities, combined with mental health problems, could easily present the highest burden of disease in Iraq,” adversely affecting economic activity.^[167] It was also stated that “the breakdown of community support systems and the limited access to health services and rehabilitation services have had a devastating effect on the disabled in Iraq.”^[168] Approximately 2 million people are internally displaced and have limited access to healthcare and other services; people with disabilities are an especially vulnerable group among displaced people.^[169] Some insurgent groups provide assistance to their communities to fill the vacuum left by government and aid agencies.^[170]

The UN noted that survivor assistance “is still the mine action activity sadly neglected due to the lack of capacity in most of the country and the capacity available is regularly disturbed through acts of terrorism.” The main challenges for survivor assistance were summarized as the lack of a comprehensive approach to survivor assistance, lack of a referral system, awareness and knowledge about available and existing services, the cost of services, insufficient socioeconomic rehabilitation, medical and physical rehabilitation, inadequate capacity and the lack of a systematic mechanism for casualty surveillance and analysis.^[171]

A needs assessment concluded that the care of people with disabilities is implemented through a charity approach and people with disabilities are considered to be “useless” members of their society.^[172]

Once considered as having one of the best healthcare systems in the Middle East, Iraq now has the poorest health indicators of the region and scores well below countries with a similar gross domestic product, because of economic sanctions in previous years and ongoing conflict. Healthcare provision is hampered by poor quality services, lack of supplies and staff, power and water cuts, infrastructure damage and insufficient management capacity at the government level. As of June 2007 it was estimated that 50 percent of health professionals had left the country while the others are under constant threat. Facilities were functioning with insufficient and overworked staff that do not have sufficient training for the responsibilities they have to undertake.^[173]

The deteriorating security situation in many parts of the country, but particularly in the southern and central regions, has prevented people from reaching hospitals. The neutrality of health professionals and ambulances is disrespected by all parties to the conflict. In June 2007 about 70 percent of critically ill or injured patients arriving at emergency services did not survive; however it was estimated that more of half of them could have been saved if there had been experienced staff and sufficient supplies and equipment.^[174] In addition, the ongoing conflict has decreased the ability of Iraqis to afford medical and rehabilitation services; more than 21 percent of southern Iraq is “chronically poor” meaning that even with assistance their basic needs are not met.^[175]

In principle the Ministry of Health is responsible for a relatively large network of hospitals and specialized services, but its capacity to provide treatment to the victims of war is limited and reconstructive surgery and rehabilitation services are severely limited.^[176] Most facilities capable of dealing with war surgery are in Baghdad, which is difficult to reach for most people, and moving around in Baghdad is also complicated. In northern Iraq the healthcare situation is generally better than in other regions, due to a better security situation and better regional government capacity. In the southern-central area 90 percent of mine-affected communities do not have healthcare facilities.^[177]

Reconstruction efforts have been delayed as security measures consume a major part of international donor funding. However, it has been reported that the health sector was not given enough support to cope with increasing needs since the 2003 conflict, resulting in lost opportunities and organizations launching projects in an uncoordinated manner. The Ministry of Health returned $18 million unused funds to the UN Iraq Trust Fund in 2006, but requested $1 billion for medical sector support from the US government; another $1 billion “earmarked for reconstruction of the health system are still unaccounted for.”^[178]

The Ministry of Health estimated that there are approximately 80,000 amputees requiring prostheses in Iraq. Government-run or NGO rehabilitation centers and specialized hospitals dealing with physical rehabilitation are located in the major cities; community-based rehabilitation programs are not available. Most centers have been severely damaged due to the conflict and cannot function to capacity due to security constraints and a lack of trained staff and components. Some centers have been renovated with World Bank, international organizations and NGO support, for example the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). If sufficient raw materials were available, local annual production capacity would be 5,000 prostheses.^[179] There often are long waiting lists and centers are in many cases heavily reliant on international technical and material support. Services are free of charge for all people in some centers, while others treat certain groups (students, military) for free or charge according to disability or income level.^[180] Service provision in Baghdad has deteriorated for security reasons but appears to have improved in southern Iraq.^[181] In northern Iraq services are more accessible and of higher quality than elsewhere. Many people used to travel to the north to obtain rehabilitation services but in 2006-2007 this decreased due to deteriorating security.

Medical and rehabilitation training available at several centers, including the Institute of Technical Medicine in Baghdad has also been disrupted. According to Medact, a British organization of health professionals, “Institutions are struggling to keep open with at least a few hours of training a week but some have had to close completely.”^[182]

A WHO representative stated that mental trauma due to conflict is one of the most important but neglected health issues in Iraq which urgently needs to be addressed.^[183] There are very few psychiatrists available in hospitals in Baghdad and there also is a lack of social workers, psychologists and nurses to provide psychological support.^[184]

Increasing unemployment (70 percent) due to the conflict has reduced the standard of living, making socioeconomic reintegration for mine survivors and other people with disabilities more difficult.^[185] The Ministry of Social Affairs operates several basic programs for children and youths with disabilities, but there is a lack of appropriate educational materials, trained staff and funding. There also are several government and NGO vocational training centers.^[186] In early 2006 the government started the Social Safety Net program to assist the growing number of poor families; it replaced the earlier welfare system that was limited to war widows and disabled people; it will provide higher monthly allowances. The World Bank estimated that the project should benefit up to one million families, six times more than previously, and will cost $330 million per year.^[187] Despite challenges in dealing with the high number of people who apply for the benefits and bureaucratic difficulties in obtaining the allowance, approximately 1 million people are said to have benefited.^[188] Disabled war veterans also receive pensions but they usually need to supplement it with employment.^[189] In areas under the control of Kurdistan regional authorities, people with disabilities are eligible for a monthly allowance of approximately $40.^[190]

Iraq has legislation to protect the right of people with disabilities to medical, rehabilitation, education and economic opportunities. Legislation was generally enforced in the government sector but not in the private sector.^[191] As of 13 August 2007 Iraq had not signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Survivor Assistance Strategic Framework^[192]

The NMAA has not taken the lead on survivor assistance. Due to the political turmoil, frequent leadership changes, the lack of capacity and unclear mandate and status of the NMAA, very little activity has taken place at the federal level in terms of survivor assistance. In 2007 the kidnapping of the NMAA director general and planned move of the NMAA out of the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation have further weakened the NMAA’s position.

Iraq’s national mine action strategy to 2009 contained survivor assistance objectives, including: “assess existing victim support capacities and develop additional capacity if required” and “establish a nationwide victim surveillance system and map existing victims.”^[193] However, the strategy is not in use and is considered to be “completely outdated” due to the security situation; the strategy will be addressed once it is clear under which ministry the NMAA will operate. The NMAA has a director for survivor assistance but he is not an expert in the field. The position of survivor assistance technical advisor, vacant since May 2006, had not been filled by August 2007. Allocation of funds in the NMAA budget is not transparent; it is unclear whether funds were earmarked for survivor assistance. However, even if funding were available, a mechanism to utilize this funding was not in place.

There are survivor assistance officers at GDMA in Sulaymaniyah and RMAC in Basra; the IKMAC survivor assistance officer in Erbil resigned in early 2007. Nevertheless, progress was made in both regions. RMAC South played a leading role and expanded its coordination role from MRE to include survivor assistance and casualty surveillance. In northern Iraq, where the survivor assistance program is functioning well “considering the circumstances,” regular coordination meetings were convened and UNICEF efforts to stimulate this were “appreciated.”

Coordination between the NMAA and the RMACs, as well as with government authorities and survivor assistance implementers, remained weak in 2006 and the first half of 2007. By legislative decree IKMAC and GDMA merged in May 2007, with the physical merger to be completed at the end of 2007 dependent on ministerial reform in the Kurdish region.

The UN mine action team remained focused on building capacity and leadership at the NMAA and RMACs, improving communications between the various centers and establishing links between the NMAA and government authorities and stakeholders. The main federal ministries working on survivor assistance are the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and Ministry of Education. But the volatile situation in the country affected their capacity. Additionally, the NMAA has not been able to link to any assistance projects benefiting people with disabilities, such as the Social Safety Net. In 2006-2007 the Kurdistan Regional Government continued to support survivor assistance activities by funding local implementers through the GDMA, but it was not able to sustain all ongoing activities and could not maintain the same level of staff salaries as paid prior to the handover to the government. This has resulted in the scaling-back of several programs.

UNICEF provides support to the casualty surveillance mechanism, together with WHO and UNDP. UNICEF does not implement survivor assistance programs but psychosocial support activities under the child protection program include mine/ERW survivors; it conducts awareness-raising on the human rights of people with disabilities. At the end of August a two-year joint UNDP/WHO survivor assistance project funded by Japan ($2.4 million) was due to start. The project will include psychosocial support and income-generating opportunities, and be implemented by local NGOs. It was expected that this program would return survivor assistance in northern Iraq to its level before international NGOs withdrew in 2005.

The Federal Ministry of Health developed a 2004-2007 Rehabilitation and Care for the Disabled Strategy that aimed to ensure health and rehabilitation services for all people with disabilities.^[194] The renovation of certain physical rehabilitation centers has been the only verifiable achievement under this strategy. In December 2006 the ICRC organized a technical coordination meeting with rehabilitation centers from all parts of Iraq and authorities to discuss the development of a common strategy for rehabilitation centers.^[195]

At least 33,892 people with disabilities benefited from services in 2006, including 5,139 mine/ERW survivors. Within this total, the Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center in Dohuk assisted 1,955 people with physical rehabilitation (1,103 mine/ERW survivors).^[196] The Italian NGO Emergency opened 11 cooperatives for mine/ERW survivors and provided house modifications for five severely disabled mine/ERW survivors.^[197] Kurdistan Organization for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (KORD) assisted 6,500 people with physical rehabilitation (2,960 mine/ERW survivors), 65 mine/ERW survivors started income-generating projects and 1,650 social services were provided at the center (1,200 for survivors). Mercy Corps provided a variety of health and educational services as well as 20 grants to projects for and by people with disabilities benefiting 4,500 people (mostly war injured).^[198] The ICRC-supported centers assisted 20,872 people with physical rehabilitation (1,011 mine/ERW survivors).^[199] GDMA recorded that 7,337 rehabilitation and socioeconomic services were provided to an unspecified number of mine/ERW survivors in 2006; however some of these services were provided by implementers mentioned above.^[200]

All the organizations reported in last year’s Landmine Monitor report continued their activities in 2006-2007. In southern Iraq the Iraqi Red Crescent Society (IRCS) has been the main survivor assistance operator with remote support from the ICRC. Other survivor assistance stakeholders were the South Peace Organization, the Basra Union against War Mines and the Basra Health Department.^[201] But it was said that the ongoing conflict has put “service provision in complete disarray.”^[202] As well as health and emergency programs, IRCS started a community-based psychosocial support program; 60 trainers were trained in Baghdad and 40 in Basra, but due to the conflict they could only carry out limited community-based support.^[203]

The ICRC continued its support by repairing and/or upgrading health facilities that had ceased functioning or deteriorated substantially. It also provided medical supplies for all parts of the country directly or through Iraqi authorities, focusing on the regions with the most violent conflict and the largest numbers of displaced people. The total number of people benefiting from physical rehabilitation decreased but more people had access to services in Najaf and Basra. Fifty-six Iraqi surgeons participated in war surgery and trauma treatment seminars, 20 Ministry of Health and IRCS staff attended a first-aid seminar, four technical seminars for prosthetic and orthotic staff were held, and one technician was sponsored to attend further education at Amman University. Despite its wide range of activities the ICRC stated that, its efforts were “far below the needs of those it sought to serve and its own emergency response capacity and overall objectives.”^[204]

In northern Iraq local NGOs provided the bulk of services and are financed mainly by the regional government.^[205] The Emergency rehabilitation center in Sulaymaniyah was placed under national management in 2006.^[206] In 2006 the Norwegian Red Cross continued to support the rehabilitation centers in Erbil and Mosul, but due to deteriorating security it was decided to integrate the program into the ICRC mine action program. The number of people assisted continued to decline in 2006: Erbil assisted on average 38 people per month (down from 55) and Mosul only assisted 15 people per month on average.^[207] The Prosthetic Limbs and Rehabilitation Center in Dohuk closed the vocational training and socioeconomic reintegration component of its program due to a lack of funding and suffered from staff and raw material shortages. However, it created a physical rehabilitation section for children and continues to serve an increasing number of people from other governorates in the northern and central regions of Iraq.^[208] Rozh Society reoriented itself towards legal issues to ensure inclusion of disability rights in the constitution and participation of people with disabilities in this process; it also started organizing sports activities.^[209] Mercy Corps organized a leadership and peer training workshop in Kuwait in which 30 disabled Iraqis participated to learn about disability services in other parts of the Arab world. It also established a disability information and service center.^[210]

At the end of 2006 Mercy Corps and Cordaid funding for KORD in Sulaymaniyah finished, resulting in significant financial challenges. However, it was able to expand socioeconomic reintegration programs in 2006, with support from GDMA and Norwegian People’s Aid. The November 2006 long-term strategy (2008-2011) recommended maintaining the 2006 level of rehabilitation services, but this was endangered by lack of funding; funding for salaries was scheduled to end on 1 September 2007.^[211]

In central Iraq IHSCO opened a vocational training and resource center for people with disabilities in the second half of 2006; at the end of 2006 the program was expanded with support from Handicap International. The center provides computer training, assistive devices, casualty data collection and MRE training and information about available services.^[212] The Iraqi Handicapped Society continued to raise awareness of disability issues.

Between March and May 2007 Handicap International conducted several disability needs assessment missions in Iraq, which concluded that: 60 percent of people admitted in emergency care were war-injured and rarely return for continuing medical care; physical rehabilitation services are adequate to meet needs but could be improved through capacity-building and physiotherapy training; and that the main gap was the lack of a referral system or knowledge about available services. As a result, Handicap International planned to conduct a project facilitating access to services for people with disabilities and raising awareness on disability issues in all parts of Iraq. The project was scheduled to start in July 2007 and a team has been on the ground since May 2007.^[213]

Funding and Assistance

In 2006 international donations totaling $35,288,325 (€28,089,091) for mine action in Iraq were reported by 14 countries, an increase of some 27 percent from 2005 ($27.8 million provided by 14 countries).^[214] Donor countries reporting funding in 2006 were:

• Australia: A$3 million ($2,260,500) consisting of A$1 million to UNICEF for mine action, and A$2 million to UNDP for capacity-building for mine clearance and victim assistance;^[215]
• Belgium: €449,927 ($565,243) to MAG for mine action;^[216]
• Denmark: DKK13 million ($2,187,900) to DDG for integrated mine action;^[217]
• Germany: €529,115 ($664,727) to HELP for mine clearance in the Baghdad region and capacity-building;^[218]
• Greece: €$1,882,758 ($2,365,309) through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI) for mine action;^[219]
• Ireland: €500,000 ($628,150) to MAG for mine clearance;^[220]
• Netherlands: €1,122,872 ($1,410,664) consisting of €122,872 to HI for victim assistance, and €1 million to MAG for mine clearance;^[221]
• Norway: NOK8,469,608 ($1,321,259) to NPA for mine clearance;^[222]
• Slovakia: SKK254,642,773 ($8,581,461) in-kind support of 110 mine clearance personnel to Operation Iraqi Freedom;^[223]
• Slovenia: SIT799,998 ($4,160) for mine action and coordination;^[224]
• Spain: €180,000 ($226,134) in-kind for training of Iraqi armed forces in Spain;^[225]
• Sweden: SEK12,331,000 ($1,673,317 ) consisting of SEK10 million to MAG for unspecified mine action, and SEK2,331,000 to Swedish Rescue Services Agency (SRSA) for unspecified mine action; ^[226]
• Switzerland: CHF250,000 ($199,500) to NPA for mine action;^[227]
• US: $13,200,000 through the Iraq Rehabilitation and Relief Fund (IRRF).^[228]

Countries reporting funding in 2006 but not in the previous year were Australia, Belgium, Greece and Ireland. Countries which reported funding to Iraq in 2005 but not 2006 were Iceland, South Korea, and Italy and Japan (but see below). Poland also reported contributing demining personnel to Operation Iraqi Freedom but did not report a value.^[229]

The 2006 end-year review of the UN’s Portfolio of Mine Action Projects reported that Iraq received 44 percent ($20,648,025) of funds requested through the appeal process in 2006. This included $5,222,322 from state donors (including Japan and Italy, neither of which reported funding to Iraq), $350,000 from the Kurdish government, $607,400 from NGOs, $3,195,000 from the IRRF and $11,273,303 from various or unspecified sources.^[230]

The 2007 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects includes 11 project-appeals for Iraq totaling $38,781,674, of which $8,491,474 had been funded by November 2006.^[231]

In January 2007 UNDP reported that South Korea and Greece would provide “additional support” through the IRFFI to assist the creation of a national mine action NGO in Iraq capable of operating according to international standards.^[232] As of July 2007 neither country had confirmed funding to Iraq.