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United Kingdom (Falkland Islands), Landmine Monitor Report 2007

United Kingdom (Falkland Islands)

State Party since

1 March 1999

Last Article 7 report submitted on

2 April 2007

Contamination

APMs, AVMs, CBUs, booby-traps, other UXO

Estimated area of contamination

20 km2 of suspected hazardous area

Article 5 (clearance of mined areas)

Deadline: 1 March 2009

Likelihood of meeting deadline

Low

Demining progress

Spot clearance of 6 exposed APMs

Key developments since May 2006

As part of a long-awaited feasibility study, a field survey was conducted from 2 to 23 December 2006, monitored by British and Argentine experts. Cranfield University presented a draft report to the Joint Working Party in March 2007; the JWP planned to finalize the feasibility study before end-2007.

Landmine and UXO Problem

The 1982 conflict between the United Kingdom and Argentina resulted in thousands of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines being laid on the Falkland Islands, most by Argentina.[1] There is also unexploded ordnance (UXO). The UK reports the presence of booby-traps.[2] There were also more than 100 British cluster bomb (BL 755) strikes on the islands,[3] and at least two areas containing submunitions have also been fenced for later clearance.[4]

The UK and the Falkland Islands government have stated that there are between 101 and 120 minefields. The total mine-affected area is believed to cover 20 square kilometers and to contain approximately 16,000 mines.[5] According to Argentina’s Article 7 report, however, a total of 20,000 mines remain on the Falklands.[6]

The Ministry of Defence reported in 2004 that the mine contamination includes four types of antipersonnel mine and four types of antivehicle mine.[7] Regarding other explosive devices, in June 2006 the UK reported that “we have no way of knowing how many UXO remain inside.”[8] The mined areas are mainly beaches and peat areas. Three minefields are said to be within one mile of the capital, Port Stanley.[9] When depositing its initial Article 7 report in August 1999, the UK included minefield maps for the Falkland Islands.[10]

Some clearance operations were conducted immediately after the 1982 conflict, resulting in the destruction of 1,400 mines; operations were halted after several of the soldiers engaged in clearance were injured.[11] Since then, mines have been destroyed when they become exposed: in 2006, six antipersonnel mines were destroyed; in 2005, one antipersonnel mine was destroyed; and, in 2003, 16 antipersonnel mines were destroyed.[12] Between 1997 and 2002, 248 antipersonnel mines were similarly destroyed in the Falklands.[13]

Minefields are said to be surrounded by a three-strand fence and marked with danger signs at regular intervals around the perimeter, in addition to the NATO standard mine warning triangles.[14] No human casualties from mines or UXO have been reported in the Falklands since the 1982 conflict ended. Clearance of mines in the Falklands is said to be hampered by the weather and ground conditions; high winds, soft ground and sand make detection and removal difficult.[15]

Mine Action Program

By virtue of its control and asserted jurisdiction of the Falkland Islands, the United Kingdom is required to clear all antipersonnel mines from mined areas. Argentina reports that it is mine-affected by virtue of its claim of sovereignty over the Islands.[16] This claim is denied by the UK.[17]

On 11 October 2001 “an agreement by Exchange of Notes under the sovereignty formula” was signed between the UK and the Argentine Republic, “whereby they undertook to carry out a Feasibility Study on the clearance of landmines in the Falkland Islands.”[18] A Joint Working Party (JWP) was created in 2001, which by April 2007 had met 15 times.[19] In August 2006 there was a second Exchange of Notes, in which the aims and duration of the feasibility study were defined and UXO contamination added to its terms of reference.

On 7 August 2006 an invitation to tender for the feasibility study was issued; the tender was won by Cranfield University through its Resilience Center. The contract was signed by the JWP and Cranfield, with Argentina providing 90 percent of the funding and the UK 10 percent. The feasibility study was intended as a general assessment of 120 minefields and UXO contamination, using satellite imagery and providing detailed information on the contamination, with the overall aim “to assess a range of options for clearance, including the estimated costs and risks of each technically feasible option, including the environmental risks.”[20]

Between 2 and 23 December 2006 a survey team from Cranfield University conducted the field survey on the Falkland Islands, which was monitored by two British and two Argentine experts.[21] Cranfield University presented a draft report to the JWP in March 2007. The JWP intended to produce a final report of the feasibility study before the end of 2007.[22]

The UK announced, in March 2003, the creation of a national mine action authority to oversee future clearance work.[23] However, in June 2006 the UK reported that “in order to carry out the Feasibility Study, there is no requirement to create a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA). Once the clearance phase is started, the NMAA will be formally created.”[24]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, the UK must destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 March 2009. The Falkland Islands are the only mined areas under the UK’s “jurisdiction or control,” in the terms of the Mine Ban Treaty. In June 2006 the UK stated that it was committed to fulfilling its treaty commitment.[25]

While Article 5 of the treaty sets a deadline for destruction of antipersonnel mines in mined areas, it requires States Parties to complete clearance “as soon as possible.” In mid-2007, more than eight years after becoming a State Party, the UK had not initiated formal clearance operations, nor even developed a clear timetable and operational plan.

When asked why the process was taking so long, the UK answered that “this is a complex bilateral negotiation conducted against the background of a sovereignty dispute. This is a very complicated and intricate process.”[26] However, the UK was not obliged to follow a bilateral process; there is no technical reason why the UK, which has unfettered control of the islands, could not have begun demining in 1999.

In May 2006 the British NGO Landmine Action stated that, “…there is no way that the UK will now be able to meet its obligation to destroy all of the landmines in these identified areas. Given the long history of inaction on this it is very hard to see that the UK has worked in good faith towards this legal obligation…. Unless it takes radical action to resolve this problem, the UK should not be granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline and should be held to be in breach of the Convention when the current deadline is reached.”[27]


[1] See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 771.

[2] Article 7 Report, Form C, Table 1, 2 April 2007.

[3] Written response to Parliamentary Question by John Spellar MP, Minister of State for Defence, 28 May 2000.

[4] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “A Guide to Marking and Fencing,” draft, Geneva, July 2007.

[5] Article 7 Reports, Form I, 15 March 2005 and 12 April 2006; “Mine Action in Central and South America, Falkland Islands Profile,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 8.2, November 2004; Landmine Action, “The Falklands Islands.”

[6] Argentina Article 7 Report, Form C, 8 May 2006.

[7] Fax from Ministry of Defence, 9 February 2004.

[8] Email from Guy Pollard, Second Secretary, Permanent Mission of the UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 15 June 2006.

[9] Article 7 Reports, Form I, 15 March 2005 and 12 April 2006; Simon Conway, “The Falkland Islands - a get out clause for the unscrupulous?,” Campaign Newsletter, Issue 10, Summer 2005, p. 3.

[10] Article 7 Report, Enclosure 2, 26 August 1999.

[11] See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 953.

[12] Article 7 Reports, Form F, Table 2, 2 April 2007, 12 April 2006. No mines were reported to be destroyed in 2004.

[13] Fax from Ministry of Defence, 9 February 2004.

[14] Article 7 Report, Form I, 12 April 2006.

[15] “Mine Action in Central and South America, Falkland Islands Profile,” Journal of Mine Action, Issue 8.2, November 2004.

[16]See report on Argentina in this edition of Landmine Monitor.

[17] See for example, Argentina Article 7 Report, Forms A & C, 8 May 2006.

[18] Article 7 Report, Form C, Table 1, 2 April 2007.

[19] Presentations by UK and Argentina, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 25 April 2007.

[20] Presentations by UK and Argentina, Standing Committee on Mince Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 25 April 2007; interview with Navy Captain (retired) Carlos Nielsen, Geneva, 22 March 2007.

[21] Article 7 Report, Form C, Table 1, 2 April 2007.

[22] Presentations by UK and Argentina, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 25 April 2007.

[23] See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 855, citing a parliamentary answer by UK Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hansard, 5 March 2003, col. 1069W.

[24] Email from Guy Pollard, Permanent Mission of UK to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, 15 June 2006.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Statement by Richard Moyes, Policy and Research Manager, Landmine Action, 10 May 2006. See also, Landmine Monitor Report 2007, p. 774.