Colombia

Mine Ban Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 6 September 2000, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2001. National implementation legislation, Law 759, came into effect on 25 July 2002.^[1]

Colombia submitted an annual Article 7 report, dated April 2008, for the period from 1 January 2007 to 31 March 2008. Colombia has submitted seven previous Article 7 reports.^[2]

At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Jordan in November 2007, Colombia made statements during the general exchange of views, as well as during the sessions on mine clearance and victim assistance. At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008, Colombia again made statements on mine clearance and victim assistance. It also offered to host the Second Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty, which will take place in 2009.^[3]

At Mine Ban Treaty meetings in 2007 and 2008, Colombia did not make any interventions on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the treaty. In 2004, Colombia stated that any mine that is victim-activated is an antipersonnel mine, and is banned.^[4] It has not stated its views on the prohibition on “assistance,” joint military operations with states not party to the treaty, or the acceptable number of mines retained for training.

Colombia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but did not attend the Ninth Annual Conference of States Parties to the protocol in November 2007 and did not submit an annual Article 13 national measures report. Colombia is not party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

The Colombian Campaign against Mines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) expanded its network of local coordinators to 23 administrative departments of Colombia with the addition of Córdoba department in August 2007. CCCM, with the support of the Norwegian government, organized workshops for local government offices and municipalities to inform them of the responsibilities and obligations of various national institutions under the Mine Ban Treaty, and for integration of local planning and responses.^[5] CCCM continued its efforts to engage Colombian non-state armed groups (NSAGs) on the antipersonnel mine ban, working closely with the Swiss-based NGO Geneva Call.^[6]

Production and Transfer

Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998, and destroyed its production equipment on 18 November 1999.^[7] As of 2001, INDUMIL was still producing Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines.^[8] Colombia has stated that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode, as permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty.^[9] However, Colombia has not reported on steps it has taken to ensure that these mines are used only in command-detonated mode.

The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines. There have been past reports of mines transferred as part of illegal weapons shipments destined for NSAGs in Colombia, but Landmine Monitor knows of none since 2003.

NSAGs in Colombia are expert in the production of explosive devices. Colombia’s Article 7 reports contain information on mines produced by NSAGs by type, dimensions, fuzing, explosive type and content, and metallic content, and include photographs and additional information. Twelve different design types are manufactured, which include antipersonnel, antivehicle, and Claymore mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The military states that the mines are sometimes fitted with antihandling devices.^[10]

Stockpiling and Destruction

Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its 18,531 stockpiled antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004.^[11]

Although the coordinator of the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory (Observatorio de las Minas Antipersonal) told Landmine Monitor in March 2007 that Colombia had made a decision to destroy all of its antipersonnel mines previously retained for training, Colombia’s latest Article 7 report indicates 586 MAP-1 mines were still retained at end March 2008, the same number listed in its previous report.^[12]

Use

In March 2008, communities in Meta and Caquetá departments told Landmine Monitor that the Colombian Army was laying mines around their encampments and removing them when leaving the area. According to witnesses, the devices appeared to be Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines.^[13] As noted above, in the past Colombia has stated that its Claymore mines are only used only in command-detonated mode, as permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty.^[14]

In June 2007, a visiting ICBL delegation received an allegation from a community in Cauca about use of mines by the army in the area, but Landmine Monitor found no evidence of army use of antipersonnel mines.^[15]

Use by non-state armed groups

NSAGs continue to use antipersonnel mines and IEDs on a regular basis. Principal among opposition armed groups are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC) and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN).^[16]

FARC

FARC is the largest NSAG and most prolific user of mines. In a June 2007 interview, FARC Commander Raúl Reyes affirmed that FARC uses antipersonnel mines, but claimed mines are “never against the civilian population.” He said FARC soldiers “try and ensure that there are no civilian casualties.”^[17] In March 2008, Reyes was reported to have died after stepping on a mine, most likely laid by FARC, while fleeing a government attack.^[18]

FARC manufactures and uses a large number of explosive devices including locally produced antipersonnel mines.^[19] Media reports attributed the following incidents to FARC activity, but the date the mines were laid is not known.

In March 2008, while harvesting corn, one indigenous person was killed and two injured by a landmine planted by FARC in Cauca department in the village of La Plata.^[20] Also in March 2008, in Boca de Nemota, municipality of Quibdó, in the department of Chocó, soldiers discovered a minefield with 20 antipersonnel mines reportedly planted by Front 34 of FARC.^[21]

In February 2008, there were numerous incidents: four soldiers were killed and two injured in a minefield in the jungle of Puerto Asís, Putumayo department along the Ecuadorian border where FARC operates;^[22] four soldiers were killed when they entered a minefield during combat in the south of Tolima department;^[23] one worker was killed and six injured by two landmine explosions while eradicating FARC coca plantations in the Anorí municipality, Antioquia department;^[24] two people were killed and three were injured by a mine in the rural area of the village of Puerto Libertador, Córdoba department, during a FARC coca plantation eradication operation;^[25] and police and army personnel discovered 15 mines laid on a route used by army troops in the municipality of Silvia, Cauca department.^[26]

In December 2007, a five-year-old boy died and two people were wounded by a FARC landmine in a rural area of Anorí municipality, Antioquia department.^[27] In July 2007, it was reported that Colombian authorities deactivated 700 mines planted by FARC in Meta and Nariño departments.^[28]

Other news reports have reported as “landmines” what appear to be antivehicle mines, command-detonated Claymore directional fragmentation devices, and bombs.^[29]

Seizures of antipersonnel mines from FARC camps were reported in 2007 and early 2008. In March 2008, Brigade 14 soldiers seized eight antipersonnel mines from a FARC camp on the border of Chocó and Risaralda departments.^[30] In February 2008, the army claimed to seize antipersonnel mines among other weapons from a FARC camp.^[31] In September 2007, the army reported that it had seized explosives buried in the municipality of San Rafael, Antioquia department, adequate for the production of 170 mines by FARC.^[32]

ELN

The government and the ELN have been engaged in peace talks for several years.^[33] Despite the January 2008 arrest of Carlos Marín, an ELN commander opposed to the peace process, talks have proceeded slowly.^[34] Mine use has apparently not been explicitly included as part of the talks, but joint mine action has been discussed. The ELN continued to use antipersonnel mines in 2007 and 2008. A media report in June 2007 stated that the army recovered an unknown number of antipersonnel mines among other weapons from the ELN after an ambush.^[35]

In February 2008, the ELN restricted access to areas under its control in Samaniego, in Nariño department by laying antipersonnel mines at night and removing them during the day, according to local inhabitants. The ELN placed warning signs of the presence of mines during certain times. When the army entered the area, the ELN stopped removing the mines during the day. This restricted the movement of the civilian population and prohibited the arrival of food and basic supplies. In January 2008, an International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) vehicle detonated a mine in La Llanadas municipality, which caused damage to its vehicle but did not injure any staff. ^[36] The army said it had located 54 victim-activated IEDs on the roads.^[37] In March 2008, the Ministry of Defense stated that three civilians had died and 11 others had been injured by mines in the area. Five deminers were also wounded trying to clear them. The injuries during clearance were attributed to ELN’s use of mines with multiple mechanisms of activation, and booby-traps.^[38]

The President sent the nation’s High Commissioner for Peace to the area and ordered the Presidential Program for Integrated Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Programa Presidencial de Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonales, PAICMA) to implement an emergency program, including an assessment of the situation, a risk education (RE) program, and preparations for a humanitarian demining program.^[39]

Landmine/ERW Problem

The precise extent of Colombia’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) problem is unclear. Since 1990, mines, IEDs, and other explosive ordnance have been used in Colombia during the conflict with NSAGs and paramilitary forces.^[40] It is reported that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines laid by NSAGs are found along routes used by government forces and around NSAG bases, in rural areas, around schools, houses, national parks, indigenous communities’ land, and coca production sites.^[41]

As of June 2008, a total of 8,147 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) had been recorded, of which 4,742 had received military clearance of some kind, but not to humanitarian standards.^[42] In addition, the government laid mines around 34 military bases prior to becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2001,^[43] of which 10 had been cleared by June 2008. Another six were due to be cleared by end 2008, leaving 18 as of January 2009.^[44] So-called impact surveys conducted by the army at 29 of the bases by December 2007 identified a total of 4,024 antipersonnel mines over an area of 222,023m²; 26 of the mined bases were said to be marked with warning signs.^[45]

In November 2007, a British Royal Engineer who led training of 130 deminers at the Colombian Armed Forces Engineers School said, “The problem that the Colombian soldiers and civilians have to deal with on a daily basis is similar to what our troops have to deal with in Afghanistan, if not worse.” The main problem in Colombia according to the British Royal Engineers is nuisance mining and IEDs planted by NSAGs.^[46] In an interview with Landmine Monitor, Colonel Alexander Carmona, the Commander of the Engineers School, said army troops are the primary target of mines and IEDs, and incidents occur during military engagements as well as during military clearance, when mines are detonated by remote control. “The intent and effect of the mines is massive with multiple casualties for each incident.”^[47]

Although Colombia maintains a database that includes information from as far back as 1990, the database is more of a conflict monitoring system than an accurate appraisal of Colombia’s mine problem.^[48] So-called “events”—a generic term specific to mine action in Colombia that encompasses “incidents,” “accidents,” “suspected hazardous areas,” “UXO,” “deactivation” of devices, and “military demining”—have occurred in 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments, the only exception being the Caribbean archipelago department of San Andrés, Providencia, and Santa Catalina. In the 31 affected departments, 686 municipalities (62% of the total) have reported at least one event.^[49] The most affected department, based on this metric, is Antioquia, accounting for 19% of the events registered, followed by Meta (11%), Bolívar (9%), Caquetá (7%), and Santander (5%).^[50] Approximately half of all events recorded have occurred in these five departments.

In the first seven months of 2008 the number of “events” was down substantially on the same period in 2007.^[51] A possible reason for the sharp decline is military setbacks suffered by the two main NSAGs, the FARC and the ELN, since the beginning of the year.^[52]

The European Commission (EC) issued a call for tender on 24 April 2008 to conduct a Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) in Colombia over a 15-month period beginning in September 2008. The tender indicated the survey would identify communities affected by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and IEDs, the location and size of SHAs, the kind and number of socio-economic blockages, the number of casualties, and the level of support mine survivors receive. The survey would follow “the protocols and guidelines required for UN certification.”^[53] No decisions on the tender had been announced as of 12 August 2008.^[54]

Mine Action Program

Coordination and management

The National Interministerial Commission on Antipersonnel Mine Action (Comisión Nacional Intersectorial para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CINAMA), established on 8 October 2001, is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions, and coordination of international assistance.^[55]

The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory, established in 2002, operated as the technical secretariat of CINAMA until June 2007 when Presidential Decree 2150 created the Presidential Program for Integrated Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (PAICMA). The decree transferred all functions previously held by the Antipersonnel Mines Observatory to PAICMA, which operates as the technical secretariat to CINAMA. PAICMA facilitates the creation and adoption of public policies through strategic planning.^[56] It is working with the Ministry of Defense to build a national humanitarian demining capacity, with support from Canada, the United States, and the Organization of American States (OAS).^[57] The EC issued a tender on 24 April 2008 to conduct one international seminar each on RE, victim assistance (VA), and humanitarian demining between September 2008 and September 2009 to build the capacity of the Colombian mine action program.^[58]

PAICMA determines emergency demining priorities and the President and Vice-President of Colombia approve them.^[59] Criteria for determining emergency demining for any given site include: the absence of conflict for one year; the Colombian Army is in control of the area to ensure security; mines are impacting the population; there is a known landmine problem; and part of the population is displaced.^[60] PAICMA admits, however, there are sometimes political considerations to clearing a village: it shows the government is in control of the area.^[61]

To meet its responsibilities under the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia developed two National Protocols on Humanitarian Demining, one for military bases and one for mines laid by NSAGs. Both are based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The two protocols cover safety, procedures for impact and technical survey, marking, the destruction of UXO, and internal quality assurance (QA), and were updated in 2007 based on lessons learned from demining activities.^[62]

Under the responsibility of the General Inspector of the Armed Forces, a National Demining School at the Colombian Armed Forces Engineers School is responsible for training army deminers. Three platoons of 40 deminers each were trained in 2006, and a fourth in 2007. The OAS, the Inter-American Defense Board, the British Royal Engineers, and the Salamandra Foundation (Fundación Salamandra) supported the training.^[63] Colombia plans to train two more platoons (80 deminers) in 2009. ^[64]

The focus of the OAS mine action program in Colombia is to coordinate international assistance as described in the March 2003 Agreement of Cooperation and Technical Assistance between the General Secretariat of the OAS and the government of Colombia. Support includes technical assistance to develop standing operating procedures for humanitarian demining operations, and monitoring, funding, equipping, and training a military demining capacity.^[65] Five international monitors with the OAS conduct QA after completion of clearance at the military bases.^[66]

Colombia has used the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) to store its mine action data since 2002^[67] and as of 2008 used the most recent version of IMSMA.^[68] The primary source of information in the IMSMA database in Bogotá is media reports where the military, police, or local authorities are the primary informants.^[69] Ongoing armed conflict and related safety concerns have limited surveys and data collection, although it is expected that the LIS will significantly improve the dataset.

The US Department of State awarded a seven-month grant to Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP) from 1 May 2008 to deploy OASIS (Operational Activity Security Information Service), a software tool to manage data in an insecure environment,^[70] with the aim of developing a primary platform for data sharing, analysis, and mapping. iMMAP will initially research and define available datasets, alternative methods, and sources for collecting and analyzing mine/UXO data and integrate them with other data sources. The project should enable stakeholders to enhance cooperation both for mine action and for relief and development programs.^[71]

Status of strategic mine action planning

Colombia’s National Strategic Plan for 2004–2009, approved by the government on 10 August 2004, included four goals:

• capacity-building and implementing state policy against landmines;
• reducing casualties and providing assistance;
• meeting treaty obligations by demining military bases, destroying stockpiles, and “universalizing the fulfillment of the Treaty”; and
• promoting changes in perception and practice of the population towards mines.

The strategy did not set timelines for each goal.^[72]

Integration of mine action with relief, reconstruction and development

The National Development Plan 2006–2010, approved by Congress with Law 1151 of 24 July 2007, refers to certain mine action activities but does not make any mention of demining.^[73]

Mine action evaluations

The Canadian Landmine Fund, as part of a global evaluation of the mine action programs it has funded, conducted field work for the evaluation in Colombia in March 2008.^[74] The findings of the evaluation were not available as of August 2008.

In January 2008, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) conducted an evaluation of the 2005–2007 EC Mine Action Strategy in Latin America, including a case study on Colombia. The focus of the evaluation was the EC mine action strategy and programming issues at the country level.^[75] As of July 2008, the results of the evaluation were not yet publicly available.

In 2008, UNICEF was conducting an evaluation of the CCCM project “Mine Risk Education and Victims’ Assistance” in the departments of Cauca, Chocó, Nariño y Región de la Mojana; results of the evaluation were expected before the end of the year.^[76]

Demining

The Colombian Armed Forces are the sole demining operator. The army conducts military mine clearance operations to protect government troops and to facilitate the mobility of tactical units.^[77]

In addition, four 40-person platoons within the Ministry of Defense have been trained for demining to humanitarian standards. Two teams have been assigned to clear the mined areas around military bases and the remaining two teams conduct “emergency humanitarian demining” in areas where NSAGs operate.

Identifying hazardous areas

PAICMA, the OAS and the Colombian Army jointly plan and implement impact surveys, based on the standard IMSMA form that attempts to measure impact, to assist in determining clearance priorities. Survey teams each consist of up to seven military personnel. Each survey team speaks with community leaders, parents, schools, and individual households. The number and type of people interviewed differs in each community. As of April 2008, 29 surveys had been completed;^[78] complete results of the surveys were not publicly available.

Demining of 10 military bases in 2004–2007

Mine and ERW clearance in 2007 and 2008

In 2007, 17,874m² of SHA was cleared around military bases, with the destruction of 487 antipersonnel mines.^[79] As of June 2008, the demining platoons had cleared mines at 10 military bases: Alguacil, Bagre, El Barroncon, Florida, Mamonal, Neiva, Neusa, Piojo, Pita, and Tame.^[80]

In 2007, explosive ordnance disposal teams and military humanitarian demining teams from the army’s School of Engineers conducted military clearance in 176 SHAs destroying 9,081 mines and items of UXO.^[81] From May to November 2007 near San José de Guaviare, the Colombian Army demining platoons, with OAS support, cleared 15,600m² and destroyed 255 items of UXO.^[82] In 2008, to 30 April, the teams had cleared 88 SHAs, destroying a further 4,533 mines and UXO.^[83] The locations of these areas are not publicly available, although news items on the website of the Colombian Army radio station indicate that they have included Antioquia, Caquetá, Meta, Putumayo, and Santander departments.^[84]

Although some mine clearance is underway in civilian areas, all SHAs have not been systematically surveyed and all known mined areas have not been publicly identified. This lack of information limits the ability of the Colombian government to set priorities and conduct operational planning and the lack of transparency limits Landmine Monitor from reporting such activities. A Landmine Monitor mission in April 2008 included visits to two mine-affected communities where, on an exceptional basis, so-called “emergency demining” by the Colombian army took place. The local population questioned the quality of the clearance.

Bajo Grande is an abandoned village in the municipality of San Jacinto in the department of Bolívar 200 kilometers from the city of Cartegena in northern Colombia. Manual clearance began in December 2007 with one army platoon of 40 deminers. Houses, yards, roads, and agricultural land were targeted for clearance. All mines found were destroyed in situ. Through August 2008, 40,780m² had been cleared and 52,526m² had been released through survey, leaving approximately 10,000m² to clear in September 2008. Three victim-activated IEDs and three items of UXO were found and destroyed by the end of August.^[85] In April 2008, Landmine Monitor found that although the government had plans to restore water, electricity, health, education and other services to the area it was not known if former residents of the community—the internally displaced persons (IDPs)—would have clear titles to their land or how exactly the returnees would be resettled.^[86]

In San Francisco near the municipalities of San Carlos and Cocorna in the department of Antioquia six mined sites had been identified: Boquerón, Buenos Aires, El Aguacate, Jardín, Rancho Largo, and San Isidro. Clearance began in December 2007. By May 2008, clearance in San Isidro had been concluded with the clearance of 8,707m² and the destruction of 11 victim-activated IEDs and two items of UXO. Work on the second mined site, El Aguacate, began in June 2008 and by the end of August had resulted in an additional 8,439m² cleared and 12 more IEDs found and destroyed. Because there is no other safe access to the other four San Francisco sites, a complete picture of the SHAs will not be available until the El Aguacate site is finished.^[87] PAICMA planned to ensure that infrastructure in the community would be improved after clearance was completed.^[88]

Summary of Efforts to Comply with Article 5

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2011. The Antipersonnel Mines Observatory in 2005 said “the government plans to meet the Article 5 deadline in terms of clearance of the minefields under the jurisdiction of the armed forces,” but “there is no guarantee that Colombia will be able to declare itself mine-free in 2011, especially if non-State actors do not embrace the principles in the Convention. However, the Government will not ask for any extension until evaluating the possibility to completely fulfill what is established in the Treaty.”^[89]

In June 2007, the Chief of the Joint Command told Landmine Monitor that Colombia would clear “all mined areas under its control.”^[90] At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007, Colombia said it would likely request an extension of its Article 5 deadline to address the types of mines manufactured by the NSAGs. In the same statement Colombia reiterated it would clear all mines from its military bases by 1 March 2011.^[91]

Landmine/ERW Casualties^[92]

In 2007, for the first time since 2002, there was a decrease in recorded casualties due to explosive devices in Colombia, but figures still remained among the highest in the world due to continued use of explosive devices and ERW contamination. Colombia forecasted in its Article 7 report submitted in April 2008 “a permanent change in the historic trend.”^[93]

In 2007, Landmine Monitor identified at least 895 casualties, including 193 people killed and 702 injured. These figures include the 887 new casualties PAICMA recorded in 492 explosive device incidents, including 193 people killed and 694 injured for 2007. The NGO Fundación REI recorded an additional eight injured civilians who do not appear to be recorded by PAICMA, but which are included in the Landmine Monitor figures.^[94]

An ever-decreasing percentage of casualties recorded by PAICMA were civilian (190 or 21%) compared to 32% in 2005–2006 and 49% in 2002. According to PAICMA, the main reason for this decrease was the army’s increased territorial control, which forced NSAGs into less densely populated areas.^[95]

However, under-reporting of civilian casualties is certain as many people do not report incidents for fear of being suspected of belonging to NSAGs or of being threatened by NSAGs.^[96] Also, most casualties occur in remote rural areas or areas where conflict is ongoing, and there is a lack of data collection capacity. Several organizations stated that the majority of mine/ERW casualties are only recorded once they seek government assistance.^[97] Handicap International (HI) noted that 80% of survivors it interviewed for its VA study (see below) were not recorded by PAICMA.^[98] ICRC estimates that civilian casualties in some areas could be 30% higher than recorded.^[99]

Of the 190 civilian casualties recorded by PAICMA for 2007, 36 were killed and 154 injured in 112 incidents. At least 28 of the casualties were indigenous people.^[100] For 86 casualties the activity at the time of the incident was not recorded or was recorded as “other.” When recorded, “passing by” was the most common cause (87). Civilian casualties were recorded in 19 departments; all but one, an ERW tampering casualty in Bogotá, occurred in rural areas. Most casualties occurred in Nariño department (50) due to continued intense conflict,^[101] followed by Antioquia (24), Guaviare (19 including 16 casualties in one ERW incident), and Arauca (18).

PAICMA recorded one male NSAG ERW casualty but these figures are incomplete. It is possible that NSAG members are recorded as civilian casualties since they often do not describe the cause of their injuries when seeking civilian treatment.^[102] There is no information on NSAG casualties who are taken prisoner and treated by the government.^[103]

The remaining 696 casualties were security forces (all adult males) injured by antipersonnel mines (157 killed and 539 injured). Military casualties occurred in 24 departments, particularly in Antioquia (114), Tolima (86), and Arauca (80). As in previous years, Nariño was the only department with more civilian than military casualties (37 military). Reportedly, four military casualties occurred during demining by the military in 2007 and eight casualties (of unknown military/civilian status) were recorded during coca eradication in 2007.^[104]

In 2007, casualties decreased significantly compared to 2006 when 1,167 casualties due to explosive devices were reported (230 killed and 937 injured) in 577 incidents. The main reason for this decrease would appear to be due to the setbacks suffered mainly by FARC.^[105] However, as in previous years the 2007 figure is likely to increase due to slow data collection.

Casualties continued to be reported in 2008, albeit at an apparently decreased rate, with 364 casualties to 10 June 2008 (94 people killed and 270 injured). Civilians accounted for 25% of casualties (92). One casualty was a female NSAG member and the remaining 271 were security forces. Five (civilian) casualties were caused by ERW. Most casualties occurred in the departments of Meta (due to increased conflict) and Antioquia (69). Nariño department recorded 31 casualties, but data collection could be hampered due to a lack of access to conflict zones. For the same period in 2007, 469 casualties were recorded in Colombia.

According to PAICMA, casualties have occurred during military demining.^[106] During a field visit to Samaniego (Nariño department), Landmine Monitor identified five military clearance casualties in this municipality alone in the first three months of 2008.^[107] Until 31 March, 18 casualties occurred in Samaniego during coca eradication.^[108]

Civilian Casualties by Age and Gender

Civilian Casualties by Device Type

Data collection

PAICMA has registered casualty data in IMSMA since 2002. Information is obtained from departmental and municipal authorities, the civil defense, national park guards, daily bulletins of the secret service, military sources, occasional meetings with survivors, civilians, and the media. NGOs including CCCM also provide data to PAICMA, but it appears that this information is not always included.^[109]

In 2007, PAICMA adapted the IMSMA form to its local context and included modules on the type of services provided to survivors. As of 2008, service information was only recorded for some 300 casualties,^[110] which hampers service provision.^[111]

According to PAICMA, information flow and verification improved in 2007 as information providers are more aware of the type of information needed and to whom they should report.^[112] In 2007, PAICMA continued to decentralize and strengthen local data collection capacity; 10 departments were equipped with IMSMA enabled computers and there were plans in place to train new staff on this equipment.^[113] However, significant gaps remain, as almost no information is received from health or rehabilitation facilities.^[114] As of April 2008, PAICMA was still trying to reach an agreement with health facilities to report casualties in the standard format. At the local government level, casualty reporting depended on capacity and interest.^[115]

Verification is hindered by conflict; military sources only provided the strict minimum of information and did not allow PAICMA verification. The military reportedly also decides whether slightly injured soldiers are reported to PAICMA.^[116] This corresponds with earlier reports provided by the army to CCCM in Santander.^[117] Colombia stated that a survivor census is needed to further improve data.^[118]

The ICRC collects casualty and other mine-related data (in EpiInfo, a database system developed by the US Centers for Disease Control) for its own operational purposes; data is classified. The ICRC signed a memorandum of understanding to exchange limited casualty information with PAICMA in April 2008.^[119]

The scope and modalities of the expected LIS survey have not been defined and there is a concern among practitioners about the likely accuracy of the survey in light of the ongoing conflict.^[120]

Issues with casualty reporting according to device types

It is impossible to report accurately on the device types causing casualties in Colombia. CCCM was not able to identify incidents due to commercially manufactured antipersonnel mines.^[121] The vast majority of casualties are caused by IEDs, which can be victim-activated, command-detonated, or have multiple detonation mechanisms.^[122] At the Eighth Meeting of States Parties, Colombia stated that NSAGs “indiscriminately use artisanal [homemade] mines… with different activation mechanisms.”^[123] The ICRC noted that, “the reality is that all mines in Colombia are home-made and thus officially classified as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).”^[124]

However, PAICMA’s data collection forms only specify two categories: “MAP” (minas antipersonal—antipersonnel mines) and “MUSE” (municiones sin explotar—UXO).^[125] The “MAP” category is said to cover all types of IEDs, as well as both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.^[126] Command-detonated landmines and IEDs are not considered within the scope of the Mine Ban Treaty, whereas victim-activated IEDs are considered to be de facto antipersonnel mines. The “MUSE” category covers abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) as well as UXO, but the distinction is not made as, reportedly, most ERW casualties are due to military AXO.^[127]

The type of device used varies from region to region, based on the NSAG manufacturing the device and on the situation in which they are used. Most actors involved in data collection state that the majority of IEDs used are victim-activated. However, it was reported that remote-detonated IEDs are increasingly used in some areas as capacity and expertise to produce these are developed.^[128] While analysis of casualty data for 2007–2008 cannot give a conclusive assessment on the devices used, there was an increase in multiple casualty military incidents, particularly in Antioquia, Arauca, and Tolima. In its latest Article 7 report, Colombia noted that despite decreased casualties, the number of fatal casualties remained the same “implying a greater lethality of MAP and MUSE.”^[129] This could possibly mean increased use of command-detonated devices.

The US Department of State reported at least two incidents with command-detonated devices in the municipality of Buenaventura (Valle de Cauca department) on 21 January (six people killed and 14 injured; eight police officers were among the casualties) and in the municipality of Valle del Guamez (Putumayo department) on 14 April 2007 (three killed and four injured; all police).^[130]

Cumulative casualties

Since 2002, PAICMA has recorded 7,052 explosive device casualties (1,640 killed and 5,412 injured) in 3,688 incidents which took place between 1990 and 10 June 2008. Some 33% of these casualties were civilians (2,358), including 1,428 men, 536 boys, 208 women, and 140 girls (46 unknown). The military accounted for 4,652 casualties (all adult men) and 42 were NSAG members (including four children). For 1,331 casualties the activity at the time of the incident was not recorded or was recorded as “other.” The most common civilian activity at the time of the incident was “passing by” (749, 32% of civilians). All livelihood activities combined caused 238 civilian casualties and 105 civilian casualties were caused by tampering. Thirty-two military casualties were caused while not on duty.

More than 97% of casualties occurred in rural areas (6,850) of 31 departments. Most casualties were recorded in Antioquia (1,594), Meta (718) and Caquetá (526). There continued to be increased casualties in Nariño department with 302 casualties, compared to 164 reported in June 2007. Since 1990, casualties have been registered in 443 of 1,119 municipalities.^[131]

According to the most recent census, persons with disabilities comprise 6.4% of the population.^[132]

Landmine/ERW Risk Education

According to CCCM, RE implementers reached less than half of the affected municipalities in 2007 and activities were limited to the accessible parts of these municipalities.^[133] Those who need RE the most in rural areas were not reached.^[134] The lack of humanitarian clearance continued to impede a rapid reduction in casualties.^[135] According to PAICMA, however, risks are gradually being reduced due to increased government territorial control and better community knowledge of mine/ERW risks.^[136]

In 2007, PAICMA (with UNICEF support), some departmental governments, the ICRC, the Colombian Red Cross (CRC), six national NGOs, as well as Pastoral Social/Caritas Colombia,^[137] conducted RE activities. They reached approximately 305 communities in 76 municipalities in 16 departments.^[138] This is an increase compared to 2006, when less than half of the target of 68 municipalities in 12 departments were reached.^[139] Corporación Indígena Caucana Horizontes del Mañana (CICHM) and Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco did not carry out RE activities in 2007.^[140]

Strategic framework

PAICMA is responsible for coordinating and monitoring RE activities; it also carries out direct RE, capacity-building, and material development. PAICMA is supported by UNICEF and receives guidance from the ICRC.^[141] In 2007, PAICMA continued to work in accordance with the basic objectives set out in the National Development Plan 2006–2010 and the National Strategic Plan 2005–2009. As part of the reorganization of the mine action authority, new RE plans were being developed for 2008. While maintaining the same basic principles, RE was to be linked more systematically to other mine action and community development activities providing livelihood alternatives to vulnerable communities.^[142]

Within this framework, in 2007, PAICMA focused on defining the RE needs of vulnerable communities, universalization of RE standards and the development of alternatives to increase RE dissemination. All three components focused on capacity-building of key people in communities, but for the first time, with demographic considerations. The main target groups were local authorities, indigenous people, people in national parks, and the educational sector.^[143]

In 2006, the IMAS RE guidebooks were translated into Spanish, and function as the national standards but they are not adapted to the national context.^[144]

To standardize RE, in 2007 PAICMA completed a curriculum for “community mine action agents” (Agente Educativo Comunitario de Atención Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, AICMA) in cooperation with the National Learning Institute (Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje, SENA). Under this program, key community figures would be trained by SENA on the mine/IED/ERW issue, including RE.^[145] Training was scheduled to start in August 2008.^[146] Other RE implementers expressed concern that the SENA project might not be the most appropriate format and that the target students might not be the most appropriate RE disseminators.^[147] SENA would also be involved in the accreditation of RE providers.^[148]

For 2008, PAICMA focused on the creation of a network of RE providers, capacity-building and increasing coverage at the local level and in emergency situations.^[149] A national RE committee was created, as the sub-commission was inactive before the reorganization of PAICMA and in the remainder of 2007.^[150] PAICMA reported that the committee met regularly,^[151] but not all stakeholders appear to be involved systematically.^[152] UNICEF noted that coordination in RE “is still a new element” but PAICMA developed strategies to involve all local actors.^[153] Some departmental authorities were involved in RE coordination and many considered RE to be a priority activity.^[154]

Stakeholders’ geographic priorities change regularly due to the ongoing conflict and subsequent mine/ERW casualties.^[155] PAICMA’s latest revision of priorities (December 2007)^[156] identified 59 priority municipalities in 19 departments.^[157]

In August 2008, PAICMA and UNICEF were due to complete their revision of RE materials.^[158]

Colombia provided RE information similar to that provided in the PAICMA documents referred to above in its Article 7 report. It includes plans, partners and statistics.^[159]

The ICRC’s 2007 Knowledge, Attitudes, Practices (KAP) study in three of the affected departments of Colombia found that less than half of the interviewees could respond correctly when asked what mines were, and 45% did not know how to identify a mined area, which is low considering that some communities have lived with long-term contamination. Mine contamination was not a high priority for contaminated communities (10%), but 61% said they believed there are mines/ERW in their area and 76% said that the presence or the fear of mines limits access to resources. A high percentage of interviewees (63%) responded correctly to how to act safely, despite the low percentage of RE messages distributed. However, there is a difference between the reported and the actual behavior, and safe behavior appears to be decided on the spot.^[160]

The most common dissemination mechanisms reported for RE messages were TV (43%), radio (38%) and informal discussions with family and friends (27%). For children, school was an important source of information (21%); community leaders (6%) and churches (2%) were less important information transmitters.^[161]

Coverage and response

Most civilian casualties are men of working age injured in rural areas, mostly by victim-activated devices. PAICMA acknowledged that there was insufficient information about the activity undertaken by casualties at the time of the incident, but some factors increasing risks were identified: forced displacement, ongoing conflict, retaliation when communities report mines/IEDs/ERW, movement restrictions, and coca cultivation/transfer.^[162]

Specific at-risk groups among the civilian population are indigenous people (particularly when engaged in lawful coca production, such as for tea), people in national parks (often engaged in manual eradication of unlawful coca production),^[163] and children, as they often encounter devices in and around schools.^[164] Security forces have the highest casualty rate, although it is said that the army provides RE for its troops.

UNICEF and Pastoral Social have both stated that an expansion of RE coverage is needed;^[165] Pastoral Social has claimed that Samaniego (Nariño department) was over-served as of mid-2008.^[166] From mid-2007 through 2008, RE providers were switching to a more integrated approach, combining risk reduction and RE, integrating RE and VA messages, integrating RE messages in the task package of health staff, and linking RE to conflict emergency response plans.^[167]

Activities

In 2007 and to March 2008, PAICMA trained 960 community RE agents in 16 departments; 342 community leaders in 12 national parks; 320 teachers, leaders, health and social workers in indigenous communities; and 60 rangers; and 108 people received training on the RE standards.^[168]

UNICEF, in cooperation with PAICMA, supported the capacity development of community facilitators. UNICEF also provided financial and technical support to CCCM, Corporación Paz y Democracia and the Programa Desarollo para la Paz (PRODEPAZ).^[169]

PRODEPAZ provided first-aid and RE messages to 105 youths in seven municipalities in several departments, including Nariño.^[170] CCCM, in cooperation with Paz y Democracia continued to work in four departments (Bolívar, Cauca, Chocó, and Nariño), and Mojana (Sucre department),^[171] reaching 34 communities in 17 municipalities with house-to-house visits; 89 RE facilitators received training. Paz y Democracia also worked with PAICMA on a pilot project to include RE in schools; 790 children and 33 teachers were reached.^[172] UNICEF supported Paz y Democracia’s work in 15 municipalities in Antioquia.^[173]

CCCM in coordination with the indigenous organization Camaguari also conducted emergency RE in 24 communities in Nariño department (10 indigenous communities).^[174] The Norwegian government provided funding for a one-year project (2007–2008) for workshops on incident prevention and capacity-building in 12 departments.^[175] UNICEF also assisted CCCM in developing a workplan for integrated RE and VA in these departments.^[176]

In 2007, the ICRC expanded its RE activities as part of an integrated response, including risk reduction and RE, as well as other humanitarian assistance to reduce the socio-economic impact of mines/ERW.^[177] The ICRC provided direct RE in areas not accessible to other operators,^[178] but where possible worked through the CRC. The ICRC’s risk reduction activities include the provision of alternatives to affected communities based on their needs, such as access to water, or economic security activities, or seeking improved marking of mined areas.^[179] In 2007, the ICRC developed a capacity to undertake RE in areas where other organizations were unable to operate.^[180]

The CRC is a major RE provider, but its activities are dependent on obtaining security and access guarantees and sufficient trained staff.^[181] The ICRC provided technical, material and financial support to CRC RE activities in 10 departments, and a joint RE pilot project was developed in Sur de Bolívar focusing on rural and semi-rural areas.^[182] The CRC conducted 187 training sessions in 19 municipalities, reaching 3,261 civilians.^[183]

In Cauca, the NGO Tierra de Paz, with support from Diakonie, implemented an RE project, including RE in community emergency plans, integrating RE in the school curriculum and turning schools into “humanitarian safe zones” when conflict erupts in communities.^[184]

The departmental government of Antioquia conducted RE training for municipal leaders from 40 municipalities. The municipal leaders conducted 821 awareness-raising and 782 prevention workshops in 240 communities. Teachers also received RE training and psychosocial support skills, and brochures were distributed in schools in 17 rural municipalities.^[185]

At the end of 2007, the government of Antioquia received EC funding for a project to enhance the institutionalization and sustainability of RE through inclusion in municipal education plans in 46 prioritized municipalities. The project also contained psychosocial support to mine/ERW survivors. The EC contributed €525,000 (US$719,828) and the government of Antioquia €348,000 ($477,143); implementation started in February 2008.^[186]

Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia’s (CIREC’s) Seeds of Hope (Semillas de Esperanza) program trains RE trainers at local groups it supports. It works with six community liaison staff and provided RE to 830 people, including 220 children.^[187]

CARITAS Germany received a second EC grant to implement RE (and VA) through the national secretariat of Pastoral Social. The project started in October 2007 and focused on risk reduction through awareness-raising and training on safe behavior in five southern departments (Caquetá, Cauca, Meta, Nariño, and Putumayo).^[188]

Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco discontinued its projects in 2007 due to funding problems but restarted in April 2008 with the support of Children of the Andes from the UK. It continued to focus on RE programs for children and youth in Bolívar, Nariño, and Santander departments.^[189]

The military provided limited RE as part of surveying and clearance.

Victim Assistance

In its latest Article 7 report, Colombia acknowledged that mine/IED/ERW survivors have limited opportunities, limited access to high quality assistance, do not know their rights and have difficulties obtaining them.^[190] The government has the capacity to manage health and other services, but not in all parts of the country, and capacity varies over time and location due to conflict. NGOs or international organizations often fill the gaps in service provision.^[191] Overall, VA lacks coordination, follow-up, and a unified vision.^[192]

In rural areas, where most mine/ERW casualties occur, there are few health services, of varying quality. Most survivors do not have access to timely emergency care.^[193] The US Department of State reported that only 15% of persons with disabilities received adequate medical attention.^[194] IDPs, Afro-Colombian, and indigenous communities have even less access to quality healthcare.^[195] Military mine/ERW casualties are usually evacuated by air to the main military hospitals in Bogotá, Cartegena and Medellín.^[196]

Colombia possesses an extensive, but unequally distributed, network of hospitals with well-trained staff. Level I health posts provide basic care in rural areas and in departmental capitals Level IV and V hospitals possess comprehensive surgical and rehabilitation services. Referrals are not conducted routinely.^[197] A lack of financial means, road blockades, long distances, and ongoing conflict hamper civilian access to services in urban centers.^[198] In areas along the border with Venezuela, people prefer to seek free treatment provided by Cuban doctors in Venezuela.^[199]

Medical costs are generally covered by social security, private health insurance, or government funds for the poor and conflict victims. Service providers are strained by the decreased budget allocated by the government for those without private insurance.^[200] Reimbursement delays have created a hospital crisis and several major hospitals functioned at reduced capacity or were closed for limited periods while they waited for the government to reimburse them.^[201]

NSAGs are said to have their own health services. They do not assist civilians and NSAG members do not go to regular hospitals for complex treatment.^[202] FARC and the ELN have threatened medical staff and killed enemy combatants receiving medical care. Certain armed groups have also prevented the delivery of services.^[203]

Rehabilitation centers are usually of good quality but are only available in major cities. Very few outreach services are available. Services are provided by the government, private centers, and NGOs. Service providers face the same reimbursement challenges mentioned above.^[204] The main challenges for patients were the cost of transport and accommodation, movement restrictions, complicated administrative procedures, and a lack of awareness of available services.^[205]

Mine/ERW survivors are entitled to psychosocial assistance for one year after the incident, but services are virtually non-existent.^[206] They can access free vocational training at SENA, but such courses require a level of education which most survivors do not have. Courses are often not geared towards people from rural areas.^[207] Economic reintegration opportunities for persons with disabilities also exist, but there is an almost complete lack of effective socio-economic assistance to mine/IED/ERW survivors.^[208]

The military provides comprehensive health and rehabilitation services to its personnel, but the level of services differs between professional soldiers and conscripts. The military is not able to provide sufficient socio-economic reintegration or pensions to professional soldiers who then often need to turn to charities and civilian services.^[209] Civilian casualties are rarely allowed to make use of the military services.^[210]

Mine/IED/ERW survivors and the families of those killed by these devices can claim one-time government compensation and reimbursement of treatment costs within one year of the incident under various legislative frameworks implemented by the Presidential Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation (Agencia Presidencial para la Acción Social y la Cooperación Internacional, Acción Social) and the Solidarity and Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía, FOSYGA) of the Ministry of Social Protection.^[211] Payments are slow and inadequate. In October 2007, Decree 3990 to streamline procedures entered into force. It is feared the decree might limit compensation options for beneficiaries to one funding source,^[212] without addressing existing gaps in service provision.^[213] Practitioners described the extension of the period for prosthetic device replacement (from two to five years) as problematic.^[214]

Colombia has specific legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but its implementation is limited due to a lack of capacity, inter-sectoral coordination, and institutional leadership.^[215] On 30 March 2007, Colombia signed the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities but not its Optional Protocol. As of 31 July 2008, Colombia had not ratified the convention.

Progress in meeting VA25 victim assistance objectives

Colombia is one of 25 States Parties with significant numbers of mine survivors, and with “the greatest responsibility to act, but also the greatest needs and expectations for assistance” in providing adequate services for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors.^[216] As part of its commitment to the Nairobi Action Plan, Colombia presented its four 2005–2009 objectives at the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in 2005. They have not been updated since, nor have plans been developed. The objectives remain incomplete and not SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound).^[217]

Other than improving healthcare for survivors, Colombia’s objectives do not involve direct assistance activities. In 2008, steps were underway to improve healthcare but it remained inadequate in 2007. The other objectives related to data collection and the development of a VA strategy. Progress was made on all objectives, but the actual benefits for survivors remain to be seen.

PAICMA acknowledged that the objectives were not SMART. VA staff at PAICMA noted that assistance for survivors was already incorporated into larger programs for conflict victims or poor people.^[218] The main program is the “ruta de atención” (“route of assistance”), a legal framework specifying assistance, ranging from first-aid to socio-economic reintegration, to be given to conflict-injured people, including mine/IED/ERW survivors. Colombia presented this as the “Integral Route for Mine/UXO Victims” in April 2007, but the framework has been in place since 1997.^[219] The “ruta de atención” would be a useful framework for the development of a time-bound victim assistance plan. However, the framework is not known by many service providers and by most people who need to benefit from it.^[220] Moreover, according to the ICRC KAP survey, none of the surveyed municipalities had received information on the rights of casualties and services available to them.^[221]

In principle, assistance under the framework is free of charge for civilian mine/ERW/IED casualties once they are recognized as conflict victims.^[222] In 2007–2008, bureaucracy was difficult and slow for survivors, as assistance is not a priority for local authorities.^[223] Many survivors also do not report to the local authorities out of fear.^[224] Not all services are covered by the “ruta de atención,” existing services are insufficient, not adjusted to the needs of survivors, and service provider reimbursement is delayed.^[225] The main gap, according to two assistance providers, is the lack of transport and accommodation for survivors seeking treatment.^[226] Treatment is only covered when survivors obtain services in their department of residence, even if it is unavailable or inconvenient.^[227] This is, for example, the case in the heavily mine-affected Montes de María region (in Bolívar and Sucre departments), where most people seek treatment in Bucaramanga (Santander department) as it is much nearer than Bolívar’s departmental capital, Cartagena.^[228]

The Colombian delegation at the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2008 and at the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in November 2007 included a VA expert. Colombia included detailed information on casualties, VA achievements in 2007 and 2008 plans in its latest Article 7 report.^[229]

Victim assistance strategic framework

VA is coordinated by PAICMA, which as of June 2008 was still reorganizing the VA department.^[230] PAICMA acknowledged that VA is the weakest component of its program and that several gaps remain to be filled, especially in the areas of coordination and monitoring of activities, as well as proactive identification and follow-up of survivors, and actual service provision.^[231] Adequacy of coordination between stakeholders was said to have been of varying quality, depending on local capacity and interest in the issue.^[232]

Assistance for survivors is a part of Colombia’s National Development Plan 2006–2010, and its budget should ensure “integral and retroactive attention” to survivors.^[233] A new long-term plan for 2009–2019 was under development in 2008 and a workplan for 2008 was made. The main goals related to capacity-building for service providers and the “ruta de atención,” the review and better follow-up of VA activities and data collection, socio-economic reintegration, and channeling resources to RE implementers.^[234]

Two measurable objectives for 2008 were: 100% of civilian casualties to be reported in 2006–2007, and 50% of older casualties to receive information about their rights and about their progress in the “ruta de atención.”

In 2007, PAICMA’s coordination with NGOs and international organizations was not systematic and they were not consistently involved in strategy development.^[235] In 2008, the VA sub-committee was reportedly reactivated and two technical working groups were created.^[236] Activities were unclear and key stakeholders did not appear to be involved systematically.^[237]

Significant responsibility is delegated to departmental authorities, some of whom included mine action in their development plans or created mine action committees. However, they did not identify VA as a priority.^[238] The departmental authorities also had competing priorities, and a lack of capacity, continuity and funds.^[239] UNICEF provides support to mine action committees, as well as to a survivors’ organization in the municipality of Cocorná (Antioquia department).^[240]

The Ministry of Social Protection has a disability unit which is in charge of developing and coordinating disability strategies, paying disability pensions and funding disability activities, but most mine/ERW/IED survivors are assisted through Acción Social and FOSYGA.^[241]

Assistance activities

In 2007, PAICMA worked on increasing awareness about VA services, including through meetings with survivors (30 survivors in Arauca and 150 in Meta), and assisting VA efforts of the security forces. With assistance from UNICEF it facilitated physical rehabilitation in Antioquia and Bolívar and 11 income-generating projects were started. Through the Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia, 88 survivors received physical rehabilitation. It also cooperated with the OAS to provide vocational training for survivors at SENA (10 military and 25 civilians). PAICMA also built the capacity of 80 service providers and 500 local authority staff and organized thematic workshops (800 participants).^[242] In May 2008, PAICMA launched a major four-year capacity-building project to improve comprehensive rehabilitation services in cooperation with the departmental health secretaries in Valle Del Cauca and Antioquia.^[243]

In 2007, the ICRC decided to expand its support to the physical rehabilitation sector, assisting five rehabilitation centers after an assessment of the existing services. It started covering assistance to all persons not covered by any “government-run health-care programme.”^[244] The program is part of an integrated strategy to reduce the humanitarian impact of mines/IEDs/ERW, which also includes first-aid training, assistance to the health system, RE, and data collection in cooperation with the CRC.^[245] In 2007, the ICRC provided medical assistance and support to 307 civilian mine and ERW victims.^[246]

By April 2008, the ICRC and HI completed the development of interactive training modules to improve knowledge about the “ruta de atención.”^[247]

The CRC implemented a psychosocial support program for survivors in Cauca and Santander departments. ^[248]

In 2007, CCCM continued its activities in various departments and provided transport, accommodation and food for 200 survivors and socio-economic opportunities for 50 others.^[249] CCCM suspended its referral of survivors to the Roosevelt Center, as the center did not have the capacity to assist them due to reimbursement delays. In 2008, it opened a farm in Girón (Santander department) where survivors can live and work during their rehabilitation. It was seen as an effective contribution to the psychological rehabilitation of survivors and a more cost-efficient/sustainable way to provide accommodation. It is next to a SENA branch.^[250]

CIREC provided physical rehabilitation, socio-economic assistance to survivors, as well as capacity-building and peer support through its Seeds of Hope groups. In 2007, 15 new groups were established and trained in conflict-affected areas in the departments of Meta, Nariño, Santander, Sucre, and Tolima. In 2008, CIREC also started decentralizing its rehabilitation services, as transfer of patients to Bogotá was not considered the most effective option. In 2007, 54 survivors received medical assistance, 39 physical rehabilitation, 854 peer support, 231 socio-economic reintegration, 10 job placement, and four educational support.^[251] The OAS supported the assistance of 62 survivors at CIREC.^[252] In July 2007, a CIREC truck transporting prosthetic devices for the Seeds of Hope group in Arauca was attacked by the ELN.^[253] The prosthetics were stolen but subsequently returned to the ICRC.^[254]

In November 2007, HI expanded its VA project to five departments (Antioquia, Bolívar, Norte de Santander, Santander, and Sucre). It covers capacity-building of local organizations to inform survivors about appropriate services, referral, and direct assistance. To better orient its assistance, HI conducted the first comprehensive study on the VA situation in Colombia with recommendations for the government in 2007. In a second phase, HI developed awareness-raising and capacity-building modules regarding the “ruta de atención” for distribution in 12 departments, with the ICRC. It also provided community-based rehabilitation (CBR) for persons with disabilities and technical advice to the Fundación REI rehabilitation center.^[255] In 2007, 700 people were assisted by the CBR program.^[256] HI also covered the physical rehabilitation or medical costs of 49 survivors, provided psychosocial support to 73 and socio-economic support to 16; 30 people were referred.^[257]

In 2007, the departmental government of Antioquia organized a meeting with survivors to assess their needs and take appropriate action; 21 were referred to the OrthoPraxis rehabilitation center and 11 had medical check-ups at the university hospital. The Antioquia government also conducted awareness-raising on the “ruta de atención,” promoted economic reintegration, and monitored assistance to 150 survivors in municipalities with a municipal mine action plan. It received EC funding for psychosocial support in late 2007. ^[258]

In late 2007 and early 2008, the national secretariat of Pastoral Social started psychosocial support for survivors and their families in five southern departments in conjunction with its RE activities. It also helps survivors to get all the legal documents needed to apply for assistance, and provides them with income-generating opportunities. It receives EC and CARITAS Germany support and was scheduled to end in October 2008. ^[259]

In 2008, the Polus Center started the “Sembrando Esperanza” (Seeding Hope) project, dealing with physical rehabilitation and socio-economic reintegration of survivors in Caldas in Antioquia department. The project is coordinated by a mine survivor with CCCM support and US Department of State funding.^[260]

Support for Mine Action

Landmine Monitor is not aware of any comprehensive long-term cost estimates for meeting mine action needs (including RE and VA) in Colombia. CINAMA is responsible for implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, including development of a national plan, policy decisions and coordination of international assistance.^[261]

National support for mine action

National funds for mine action in Colombia are allocated under the project entitled “Implantación del Programa Nacional de Prevención de Accidentes por Minas Antipersonales y Atención a Víctimas” (“Implementation of the National Programme for the Prevention of Anti-Personnel Mine Accidents and for the Care of Victims”). In its Article 7 report for 1 January 2007 to 31 March 2008, Colombia reported a government commitment of COP2.665 billion (about $1,332,500) for the national mine action program for July 2007–June 2008. For July 2006–June 2007 the government allocated COP2.562 billion (about $1,127,280 at the average 2006 exchange rate). The 2008 commitment was estimated, based on the average 2007 exchange rate, to be COP2.771 billion ($1,385,500).^[262]

International cooperation and assistance

In 2007, seven countries reported providing $8,785,053 (€6,407,303) to mine action in Colombia. Reported mine action funding in 2007 was 103% more than reported in 2006. Funding from the US, which increased from $370,000 in 2006 to $3.7 million in 2007 represented a large part of the increase. The EC, which committed €2 million ($2.5 million) in 2006 as part of a multi-year agreement with the government of Colombia, made no additional commitments in 2007. Of funds committed in 2007, however, €700,000 ($959,770) was allocated in April 2008 to a tender issued for the LIS.

International funding has roughly doubled each year since 2005. Past statements by Colombia have suggested that the lack of effective control of mine-affected areas, rather than funding levels, are the main hindrances to meeting its Article 5 deadline.

While funding at 2007 levels appears adequate for supporting clearance of areas under military control, it is not adequate for meeting overall mine clearance needs. Although a significant portion of international funds were dedicated in 2007 to RE and VA, both remain insufficient overall for meeting needs in Colombia.

2007 International Mine Action Support to Colombia: In-Kind^[263]

2007 International Mine Action Funding to Colombia: Monetary^[264]